1 Tuesday, 12 November 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
9 This is the case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 The Chamber was informed that the Prosecution would wish to raise
12 two short preliminary matters.
13 MR. GROOME: Good morning, Your Honours.
14 Your Honours, last Friday, the Chamber entered its decision on
15 the Prosecution's 27th Rule 92 bis motion. The Chamber admitted RM054's
16 closed session testimony in Kvocka and one associated exhibit without
17 designating them to be admitted under seal. We believe this may have
18 been an oversight and would ask the Chamber to investigate and consider
19 amending its decision.
20 JUDGE ORIE: We'll seriously consider that.
21 MR. GROOME: The second matter, Your Honour, in response to the
22 Trial Chamber's request to be notified regarding translations of the
23 documents on our 11th motion to amend Rule 65 ter exhibit list dated the
24 2nd of August, 2013, the Prosecution now confirms that all English
25 translations have been received and uploaded into e-court for all
1 993 documents. These have been assigned 65 ter numbers 29171 through
3 And that's all I wanted to say, Your Honour. Thank you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for this update, Mr. Groome.
5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I apologise, there's one other very
6 brief matter. Yesterday I sent an e-mail regarding the scheduling
7 problem next week. In discussing the matter with Mr. Lukic this morning,
8 he believes that can he accomplish all he needs to in six hours, so the
9 scheduling problem is no longer relevant.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, of course, the parties should be very
11 disciplined in sticking strictly to the estimates. But that then
12 resolved the matter I wanted to put on the record; that is, whether we
13 would sit either two hours somewhere during the week or to have a short
14 session on Wednesday.
15 But we leave it, as matters stand now, to the parties.
16 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
17 Yes, and, as a matter of fact, I can quickly respond, Mr. Groome,
18 about the status of the documents admitted in the 27th Rule 92 bis
19 decision. Because, on the 8th of November, in its decision on the
20 Prosecution's 27th motion to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis, the
21 Chamber admitted into evidence in relation to RM054 excerpts of the
22 witness's testimony from Prosecutor versus Kvocka and -- et al and the
23 document bearing Rule 65 ter number 13888. These documents should have
24 been admitted under seal, and therefore the Chamber instructs the
25 Registry to change their status to under seal.
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Dannatt.
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, good morning.
4 JUDGE ORIE: May I remind you that you're still bound by the
5 solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony that
6 you will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
7 THE WITNESS: Yes.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic will now continue his cross-examination.
9 You may proceed.
10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 WITNESS: FRANCIS RICHARD DANNATT [Resumed]
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]
13 Q. Good morning, General.
14 A. Good morning, Mr. Ivetic.
15 Q. I'd like to take up where we left off yesterday, the Krstic trial
16 and your book.
17 MR. IVETIC: If I could have in e-court 1D1448, page 17. This
18 ought to correspond to pages 260 and 261 of the book. And I would like
19 to focus on the left at about three-quarters of the way down on the page.
20 And it begins:
21 "During the trial it become very apparent that his principal
22 failing had been a personal moral one. His body language in the dock
23 increasingly indicated that he knew that his principal mistake was in
24 blindly accepting the order given to him directly by Ratko Mladic on
25 12 July 1995 to instruct his troops to conduct mass killings."
1 Q. Sir, here, you again seem to reference an explicit order given
2 directly to Krstic from Ratko Mladic on 12 July 1995. Can you please
3 confirm for us that this conclusion by you is not based on any physical
4 orders that you saw from General Mladic ordering any kind of massacre?
5 A. No, that's correct. It's my assumption on the basis that, within
6 the chain of command that was operating, the one person that could give
7 an instruction to General Krstic was General Mladic. And my personal
8 observation during the course of the Krstic trial was that General Krstic
9 had done something that he was most uncomfortable to do and had done so
10 as a result of following instructions from another person.
11 Q. Is your assumption also based upon your review of
12 Richard Butler's report entitled: "The Srebrenica Narrative"?
13 A. I think I would stay with what I wrote in my book. It was my
14 observation over an extended period of time giving evidence and watching
15 the effect of that evidence in examination and cross-examination on the
16 demeanour of General Krstic who, to my observation, and it's my opinion,
17 had begun with giving me the impression of a confident, professional
18 military man, but when confronted by the material that was put to him
19 during the course of the time that I was giving evidence, seemed to look
20 increasingly uncomfortable. And I drew the deduction that there was a
21 realisation that he knew that he had done wrong. And as I have just
22 said, the only person who could have given him instructions was his
23 military superior, which we know in the chain of command was
24 General Mladic.
25 Q. So did you not have this conclusion or predisposition against
1 General Mladic before you were an expert in the Krstic case?
2 A. I don't think I felt it my duty to come to a conclusion about
3 anyone's guilt. I appeared in this court 13, 14 years ago in order to
4 give my opinions on a range of matters for the benefit of the Court. I
5 did not feel then or now it's my duty in court to express an opinion on
6 anyone's guilt or not.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dannatt, the question simply was whether you had
8 this conclusion before you were an expert. That's a factual question.
9 Whether it was your duty or not to develop any opinion is a different
11 Did you have that opinion?
12 THE WITNESS: I did not have that opinion, sir, no.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
14 MR. IVETIC:
15 Q. If we can turn to page 12 of your book in e-court which should
16 correlate to pages 224 to 225 of the book, and if we can focus on the
17 middle paragraph of the page that is on the right-hand side:
18 "But not everyone believed [sic] so" --
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: "Behaved so."
20 MR. IVETIC: "... behaved so. The following Sunday, Sky TV
21 released an interview with Radovan Karadzic in which he taunted NATO for
22 its inability to arrest him and indeed asserted that it would be stupid
23 of us to try. I looked on with interest, knowing that he would not be
24 able to run forever, but having no idea that he would elude capture for
25 so long. I had been given orders that if he did come into the Banja Luka
1 area he should be detained. Such an arrest would undoubtedly have been
2 another major bump on the path to peace, but I thought that it would
3 certainly be very worthwhile. Privately, though, I believed that
4 arresting General Ratko Mladic was quite another matter. The Bosnian
5 Serb army was very loyal to him and an arrest at that time could have had
6 a very violent backlash, one that was not worth the risk given the
7 sensitive process in which we were then immersed. Like Karadzic, this
8 monster could not run forever. One day justice would apprehend him."
9 Q. Can you confirm for us whether your views of General Mladic being
10 a monster date from the time-period when you were in Banja Luka in 1995?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Okay. Do you still hold these same views of General Mladic that
13 he is monster and that you desire him to be apprehended by justice?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. If we can now turn to your statement.
16 MR. IVETIC: Which is P2629, marked for identification.
17 Paragraph 27 of the same, which would be page 7 in the English, page 6 in
18 the B/C/S.
19 Q. Here, sir, you describe how the British Army has changed from
20 centrally controlled to this manoeuvrist approach. Does that mean that
21 it is common for an army's doctrine to change in order to address the
22 present factual circumstances facing a nation?
23 A. Over time, it is possible to do that, yes.
24 Q. Did your extensive research and experience reveal if the
25 Yugoslavian military, that is, the JNA, or the Yugoslav defence doctrine
1 change at all or were they static and unchanging from their inception
2 until the dissolution of Yugoslavia?
3 A. The model of a centralised command and control system, I believe,
4 remained in places throughout the lifetime of the JNA and of the VRS.
5 JUDGE ORIE: It's only now that the interpreters have finished
6 their interpretation.
7 Please proceed.
8 MR. IVETIC:
9 Q. General, do you consider the British approach to mission command
10 doctrine to be demonstrative of other NATO nations and their armies?
11 A. It is demonstrative of those that are predominantly volunteer
12 armies, which I would include the United States. And over the last
13 ten years a number of European armies that previously relied heavily on
14 conscripts have become increasingly made up of volunteers, and as their
15 level of training and education has increased, they are moving more
16 towards the NATO model, which is a model based on the manoeuvrist
17 approach, mission command and Auftragstaktik which lends itself to armies
18 that are professional as opposed to conscript.
19 Q. I'd like to now take a look at 1D1449. I can introduce that as
20 being an article dating from 2009 in the Canadian Military Journal by a
21 Keith Stewart.
22 And I'd like to look together at the bottom of the first column
23 of the first page. Start:
24 "Information age scholars Donald S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes
25 have proposed a spectrum of command and control approaches in which they
1 distinguish between 'order specific,' 'objective specific' and 'mission
2 specific' philosophies. These discussions have focused upon the levels
3 of control centralisation and directive specificity in orders. 'Order
4 specific' approaches tend to be adopted by command organisations that
5 maintain centralised control and issue regular, detailed orders. The
6 Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and former Soviet armies are cited
7 as examples. 'Mission specific' approaches are at the opposite end of
8 the scale and describe low levels of central control such as employed by
9 the Israeli Army and by the German Army during the Second World War. The
10 centre of the spectrum is occupied by 'objective specific' approaches."
11 Sir, do you agree, based upon your expertise, with what is
12 written here about there being a spectrum of command and control
13 approaches --
14 JUDGE ORIE: One second. Again, it is only now that the
15 interpreters were able to finish their interpretation. Could we all slow
17 Could you answer the question, Mr. Dannatt.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: If there --
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, could you read with us whether you --
22 your question was complete already?
23 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: It was.
25 Could you then answer the question.
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, a second time, I say yes.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I missed it the first time.
5 THE WITNESS: Thank you. That's all right, sir.
6 MR. IVETIC:
7 Q. If we can return to the text and the next paragraph, which will
8 bleed onto the next page:
9 "Within this category, Alberts and Hayes contrast 'problem
10 bounding' and 'problem solving' approaches. The former, they suggest, is
11 consistent with British doctrine, and it is speculated here that it is
12 broadly equivalent to the" - and if we can go to the next page. Again it
13 will be the left-hand side - "approaches adopted in the Canadian and
14 Australian armies. Alberts and Hayes observe that although British
15 headquarters provide directives based upon objectives to be accomplished,
16 they tend to present them in very general terms. They propose that
17 'problem bounding' directives are less detailed than those issued by
18 commanders in 'problem solving' environments - 'often by a factor of
19 three to one, reflecting this lack of detail.' By contrast, problem
20 solving approaches are characterised by a tendency to provide more
21 substantial guidance as to how objectives are to be met. Alberts and
22 Hayes suggest that it is this approach that has been adopted by the
23 US Army since the Second World War."
24 General, do you agree with what is presented here?
25 A. That is Alberts' and Hayes' opinion. I read it with interest.
1 Thank you.
2 Q. Can I take that as a disagreement then, sir.
3 A. No, you can't. I think it's an interesting comment. I think
4 it's a very general comment to sweep up into one sentence an operational
5 approach said to be adopted by the US Army since the Second World War.
6 In that 60- or 70-year period, the US Army has gone through several
7 transformations based on experiences in places such as Vietnam, and their
8 approach to command and control, their approach to training, equipment
9 and discipline has changed more than once over that extended period of
11 So I say again, I note Alberts' and Hayes' opinion. I don't
12 necessarily share it.
13 MR. IVETIC: If we could take a look at the next paragraph that
14 begins "differences."
15 I'd like to skip to the middle of that paragraph where it starts
16 talking: "A high-profile example ..."
17 Q. And I'd like for you to follow along as we introduce that part:
18 "A high-profile example of this difference in command philosophy
19 resulting in friction is provided by the American General Wesley Clark,
20 who believes that it was a major contributing factor to his
21 well-publicised disagreement with the British KFOR commander,
22 Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Jackson, during the Kosovo campaign.
23 Clark reflected that 'in the British system, a field commander is given
24 mission-type orders, not detailed and continuing guidance ... the
25 American military has always aspired to this model, but has seldom seemed
1 to attain it.' Likewise, in his now notorious assessment of the US
2 Army's early experience in Iraq, the British Brigadier, Aylwin-Foster,
3 states, 'that commanders and staff at all levels were reluctant to
4 deviate from precise instructions.' This raises another interesting
5 issue. Although it is one that cannot be developed further here:
6 namely, that as well as representing a 'top-down' managerial approach, a
7 culture of command by detailed orders is also 'demand-driven.' That is,
8 unless they are carefully trained otherwise, personnel will expect and
9 prefer to receive detailed direction - especially in high-risk
11 And I'd end there and ask you, sir, since you -- I -- I believe
12 you have personal knowledge of General Clark and General Jackson's
13 experiences in Kosovo.
14 A. Uh-huh.
15 Q. Do you agree with the differences between the British and the US
16 doctrine as described by General Clark, on the one hand, and by Brigadier
17 Aylwin-Foster on the other hand?
18 A. I think their opinions interesting, and not far removed from
19 reality. As the quote said, the US aspire to mission command, but in a
20 very large army, they have not always been able to deploy it, have not
21 always been able to follow it in the way that they would like to. And
22 Brigadier Aylwin-Foster's comments are interesting and they were
23 controversial at the time, and they caused a bit of trouble at the time,
25 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to turn to the JNA. If we can go to
1 your statement.
2 MR. IVETIC: P2629, marked for identification, at page 6 in the
3 English and page 5 of the B/C/S, paragraph 24 is what I would like to
4 look at.
5 Q. Here, sir, you talk about the antecedents for the VRS being in
6 the JNA and that the doctrinal roots of both are in the Soviet model. In
7 this paragraph and the next one of your statement, you cite several JNA
8 publications from the early 1990s. Do you consider that these
9 publications are fully representative of the entirety of the origins and
10 the doctrinal roots of the JNA?
11 A. I think they are a sufficient basis on which the VRS was founded
12 from the doctrinal -- received doctrinal understanding of the JNA,
13 bearing in mind that many of the officers and leaders of the VRS had
14 former service in the JNA and therefore had been educated and trained by
15 the method of command and control practiced by the JNA.
16 Q. For purposes of your research and review, did you ever come
17 across the name of Dr. James Gow from the King's College in London and
18 someone who has testified for the Prosecution as an expert in other
19 proceedings such as the Celebici case?
20 A. I'm aware of James Gow. I don't know him personally.
21 MR. IVETIC: If we can please have 1D1446 in e-court.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Is it -- Mr. Ivetic, is it Gall or is it Gow?
23 MR. IVETIC: Gow, G-o-w, I apologise.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Your answer related to Dr. James Gow?
25 THE WITNESS: It did, yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
2 MR. IVETIC:
3 Q. Sir, we see one of Dr. Gow's publications or books on the screen.
4 This is something that we received from the Prosecution in disclosure.
5 Have you had occasion to ever review this book and read it?
6 A. I've not read that book, no.
7 Q. Okay. I'd propose to take a look at some of the things that are
8 said about the origins of the Yugoslav military.
9 MR. IVETIC: If we can go to page 40 of this document in e-court,
10 page 33 of the book, and it will be starting with the last sentence on
11 this page and will then bleed then on over to the next page dealing with
12 December 1941. And I begin:
13 "The next major step came in December, when the 1st
14 Proletarian" -- I apologise.
15 And then if we go, yeah:
16 "... Shock Brigade was formed. By the end of the war, there had
17 been 295 brigades. These were elite units, service in them was the
18 highest honour for every individual fighting man - specifically under
19 Communist leadership which could operate wherever necessary. Thus, while
20 retaining a national, or territorial character (in the main), these were
21 the first formations of an army that could be directed from the centre to
22 perform tasks anywhere.
23 "Prior to this, the military effort depended on local feelings
24 but this led to low reliability. For instance, Djilas describes how
25 Montenegrin peasants, who had been quick to rise up and take action,
1 abandoned the cause once the Italians mounted an offensive: 'To escape
2 artillery fire, they had abandoned the position. The peasants sped back
3 to their homes, hoping to save their families and animals, and no force
4 on earth could have stopped them.' The territorial specificity of the
5 early partisan detachments meant not only that members might fight only
6 for their own village, but that they were in constant touch with their
7 households, frequently sleeping there. This kind of attachment had
8 awkward consequences, especially if an individual was killed. To avoid
9 these situations and create a less territorially defined, more flexible
10 military structure, brigades were introduced."
11 Q. And I'll stop right there and ask you, sir, was this something
12 that you came across in your research, the earlier territorial-based
13 units and the switch to brigades in 1941?
14 A. This is very interesting comment on the early days of what became
15 the JNA, and I note, with interest, the earlier part of the quotation
16 that you read out. That brigades, and I quote now, "were the first
17 formation of an army that could be directed from the centre to perform
18 tasks anywhere."
19 What that tells me is that the realisation that leaving it just
20 to the man on a the ground to do whatever he thought was right was not
21 going to be militarily effective, as the rest of your quote would
22 indicate, and that therefore there was a need to have better trained,
23 more centrally controlled units which could carry out their tasks as
24 required in a better fashion. I find that very interesting.
25 MR. IVETIC: If we could scroll down not to the next paragraph
1 but the one thereafter, I'd like to continue the talk of the brigades.
2 Dr. Gow's book reads as follows:
3 "The brigades' greatest attraction was mobility. The concept of
4 mobile territorial units was, to some extent, an inheritance of the
5 former Royal Army's thinking, a product of the incorporation of some of
6 that army's officers in the new movement. It was also a descendant of
7 the Serbian forces in the First Balkan War."
8 Q. Did your research into the doctrinal roots of the JNA include
9 research of the Royal Yugoslav Army and the Serbian forces in the
10 First Balkan War?
11 A. No. But thank you for drawing my attention to it.
12 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to page 47 in e-court. And this will
13 be page 40 of the underlying book.
14 Q. And I'd like to direct your attention to the first
15 paragraph under the heading: "Military legitimacy in the post-war
16 period: The functional imperative."
17 And it reads as follows:
18 "Taking military doctrine as the imperative of functional
19 legitimacy, the post-war evolution of the YPA (including the change from
20 the Yugoslav Army to the Yugoslav People's Army) falls into three phases.
21 In the first, the YPA was established as a conventional standing army.
22 In the second, the army returned to its partisan roots, becoming a
23 territorial militia army. In the final period, the army no longer
24 encompassed the territorial aspect of defence; instead, it became one
25 element in a duplex defence system, the two structures being an
1 operational army and a territorial defence force.
2 "Official versions of the post-war development of the armed
3 forces give the dates for the three stages as follows: 1945 to 1958;
4 1958 to 1968, and 1969 onwards. These are the dates when new military
5 doctrines were formally adapted on the basis of new defence laws.
6 However, if account is taken of the three factors said to define military
7 doctrine, a different picture emerges."
8 In the course of your research and work on preparing your expert
9 statement on the origins of the JNA and the VRS, did you, in fact, come
10 across information about these changes in military doctrine by the
11 Yugoslav forces?
12 A. Yes. But I would comment, and I repeat a comment as I made
13 yesterday --
14 Q. Please continue, General.
15 A. I would repeat a comment that I made yesterday, that sometimes
16 loose language is used in military discussions, and the three phases of
17 development of, let's call the JNA, actually represent the following of
18 three strategies as opposed to doctrines. I say again what I said
19 yesterday, a doctrine indicates how an army thinks. A strategy is the
20 headline of what it does. And what you have just described to me that
21 I'm sufficiently familiar with is three stages of development when the
22 strategies, the national strategies of Yugoslavia, changed. And they
23 describe that very accurately.
24 Thank you for drawing that interesting passage to my attention.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, may I briefly consult with my ...
2 JUDGE ORIE: Since the interpretation has finished now, you may
3 briefly consult with your client. But usual conditions: Short and
4 whispering rather than audible speech.
5 [Defence counsel confer]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. -- Mr. Mladic, would you please return to your
7 initial volume.
8 Mr. Ivetic, could you ask Mr. Mladic to return to his initial
10 Mr. -- Mr. Mladic, I stop you now. I will not allow any further
11 consultations if Mr. Mladic does not speak at low volume. Then he has to
12 wait until the next break, which is in 15 minutes from now, and then you
13 can take instructions during that break, Mr. Ivetic, and you can put
14 whatever questions you wish after the break.
15 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to page 44 -- page 51 of the document
16 in e-court, which should be page 44 ... I apologise. Next page. Last
17 paragraph of the page, and it will bleed over onto the next page, talking
18 about the restructuring of the Yugoslav military:
19 "Before long, there was another new military doctrine and
20 concomitant re-organisation. General People's Defence (GPD) came into
21 force in 1969. The Yugoslav armed forces were to get a radically
22 different structure. Territorial Defence was emphasised by a division of
23 responsibility. Until this point and in other instances of armed," if
24 can you go to the next page, "forces based on a territorial principle,
25 sole responsibility for defence had been with the central institution of
1 defence; usually, territorial forces have been integrated with, or
2 adjunct to the army. GPD divided responsibility between the YPA and
3 socio-political communities.
4 "According to the 1969 National Defence Law, the Yugoslav armed
5 forces would comprise two equal elements: The YPA and Territorial
6 Defence. Whereas the YPA would be the responsibility of the federal
7 authorities, Territorial Defence would be organised by socio-political
8 communities, that is, republics, autonomous provinces, communes and work
10 Q. We can end there, I think, and I'll ask you again: Do you stand
11 by your testimony that the changes in the Yugoslav military doctrine
12 relate only to strategy and do not relate to command and control, based
13 upon what we've just read here?
14 A. Yes, what we've just read there is a very clear description of a
15 shift in national strategic stance, one that I completely recognise, and
16 the way Territorial Defence is described and organised is something that
17 one recognises throughout the latter history of Yugoslavia and into the
18 way, in many ways, that the part of Bosnia that was controlled by the
19 Serbs operated. Local defence is very much part and parcel of the
20 organisation. That was a strategic shift. It's -- doesn't actually have
21 that much bearing of the doctrine of military command and control.
22 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to the next page, which should be
23 page 47 of the underlying book, the last two paragraphs on the page:
24 "As in earlier periods, however, much of the doctrine was
25 theoretically compatible with self-management and thus was a welcome but
1 secondary feature. If 1967 offered a ten-year perspective on the armed
2 forces' progress that would indicated -- that which indicated a
3 continuing need to work intensively on the optimal solution to problems
4 in that quarter was not the need to produce a more social form of
5 defence. Although, in practice, GPD met civilian demands for
6 self-managing principles to be applied to the armed forces, bringing
7 defence into line with the decentralising confederative tendencies of
8 society at that time, the changes did not owe anything to the theoretical
10 "The 1969 changes constituted a diminishing of the YPA's
11 institutional status, where previously it had sole and virtually
12 unquestioned authority in defence matters, it had been reduced to a
14 And then if we could turn to two paragraphs down from here.
15 A little more. Should begin: "War-time experiences ..."
16 Up a little bit. Just missed it. There we go:
17 "War-time experience had shown that small units operating locally
18 could not be centrally commanded. Were Yugoslavia to be attacked, it
19 would have been highly unlikely that the YPA could achieve full
20 mobilisation before certain areas were occupied by the enemy; certainly
21 it could not have provided anything more than specialist local leadership
22 in the event of territory being seized."
23 Q. Sir, does this that we've just gone through comprise your
24 understanding of the system that was introduced subsequent to 1969 in
25 Yugoslavia in relation to the Yugoslav army and the Territorial Defence
2 A. Yes, I recognise that. And it is an interesting description of
3 one part of the development of what was going on in the former
4 Yugoslavia. I have to question, however, in my own mind, the relevance
5 to -- between that and the situation of the Bosnian Serb Army between
6 1992 and 1995. Different conflicts at different points in history, and I
7 stand by the centralised nature of the VRS. But thank you for bringing
8 this to my attention. I found it very interesting.
9 Q. Could you give us your understanding of the changes that were
10 being instituted in 1988 in the Yugoslav army according to your research
11 and expertise, sir?
12 A. I won't go into that. Thank you. I can't answer that question.
13 Perhaps you'd like to tell me. You've been very instructive so far this
14 morning. Thank you.
15 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to page 66 of the book in e-court.
16 And if we could focus on the middle paragraph of the page that starts:
17 "It is not clear why that tradition was ended ..."
18 And I would start with the line right there, three lines from the
19 top on the screen:
20 "Already in 1974, the co-equality" --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, please sit down.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
23 MR. IVETIC:
24 Q. "Already by 1974, the co-equality of the two elements of the
25 armed forces in the five-year-old GPD system had become imbalanced, the
1 YPA, de facto, having become the senior element. Gradual erosion of
2 regional authority in the Territorial Defence Force (TDF) was completed
3 in 1980 with the establishment of a Council for Territorial Defence.
4 Answerable only to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, which
5 was staffed by soldiers, and of which the minister was always the most
6 senior YPA officer, the council's foundation meant a concentration of the
7 [sic] YPA control; the TDF became an integral part of the YPA itself.
8 Creeping centralisation within the YPA culminating with the changes which
9 included the LAD's abolition was signalled by the end of 1987. At that
10 time, the ZMD, which assumed the responsibilities of the LAD and its
11 equivalent in Zagreb, was formed. The year 1988 would appear to have
12 been one of transition."
13 Does this accord with your knowledge of the facts and the changes
14 being undergone by the Yugoslav military in 1988, just a few years before
15 the dissolution of that army?
16 A. Yes, in very general terms, I would recognise that. But if I'm
17 allowed to offer a comment, 1988 is still quite sometime before the very
18 different circumstances in Bosnia in 1992 to 1995.
19 Q. Do you agree that changes meant to centralise the defence forces
20 would not necessarily have been completed by 1991?
21 A. That is entirely possible, but I think I have to draw a
22 distinction between the shifts in national strategy reflecting -- which
23 were then reflected in organisational changes don't necessarily of
24 themselves, within the professional part of the military -- and your
25 quotes have drawn attention several times to the term "co-equal," that
1 the professional military did not necessarily, by the argument that
2 you're developing, mean that a decentralised form of command and control
3 was accepted, even if there was a degree of decentralisation earlier and
4 recentralisation of the way the strategy was carried out.
5 Q. But you will agree with me that the VRS when it was formed took
6 in former Territorial Defence units which then became a part of that
8 A. Yes, I will agree with you that -- with that, but I will also
9 comment, and an organisational chart which I've seen that we have not
10 looked at today shows that from an early date, the VRS was formed on an
11 organisational structure based on corps which had territorial areas of
12 responsibility. And within those territorial areas of responsibility,
13 everything that occurred was the responsibility of the military
14 commander. And he always -- corps areas, it was a general, either of
15 major-general or lieutenant-general rank, who were answerable directly to
16 the Main Staff headed by General Mladic.
17 Q. Do you consider that the absorption of TO, Territorial Defence
18 units and commanders, with the history of the duality of the All People's
19 Defence doctrine that we just went through, introduced elements of
20 decentralisation and confusion within the VRS during the early days of
21 its formation?
22 A. I think confusion is a very good word to introduce into our
23 conversation, particularly as not all the military operations that the
24 VRS were conducting were ones of defence, which Territorial Defence was
25 naturally an expression of, but many of the operations were operations of
1 offence, of moving into areas not previously controlled by Bosnian Serb
2 forces, and, therefore, not -- there is not a direct applicability of all
3 aspects of Territorial Defence being relevant to the activities of the
4 VRS who, in some areas, conducted offensive operations.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic --
6 MR. IVETIC: We're at the time for the break, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: -- time for a break. Mr. Dannatt, we'd like to see
8 you back in 20 minutes. You may follow the usher.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 JUDGE ORIE: And then before we actually take that break,
11 Mr. Groome, the Registry informs me that it has not yet received
12 notification that the documents we earlier talked about, that's documents
13 covered by the 27th -- the decision on the 27th motion, 92 bis, have been
14 uploaded into e-court. But once that has been done, the Registry will
15 assign numbers and give the status as ordered by the Chamber this
17 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break, and we resume at ten minutes
19 to 11.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
24 MR. IVETIC: If we could move along to another document, 1D1234.
25 This is dated the 24th of March, 1994. It is a UN document sent to the
1 Chairman of the Commission of Experts, Mr. Cherif Bassiouni. And if we
2 could turn to page 2, we can see that it is the report on the military
3 structure of the warring parties.
4 Now, I'd like to turn to page 6 in e-court. And I'd like to go
5 through some of the items here, starting with number 10:
6 "The TDFs and, in the case of Croatian, the ZNG, are known as
7 militias (milicija) and have a separate command structure from the
8 regular army. Nevertheless, they join in the armed conflict, frequently
9 operating with the regular army and under regular army officers' command.
10 But they also operate independently in certain geographic areas, usually
11 where most of the personnel in these units comes [sic] from."
12 Number 11:
13 "In addition, two other types of paramilitary groups and
14 formations are also engaged in military operations. They consist of: (a)
15 what is called special forces; and, (b) local police forces augmented by
16 local armed civilians. All the warring factions make use of such forces
17 among their combatants, but the lines of authority and the structure of
18 command and control are confused, even to the combatants."
19 Number 12:
20 "There are 37 reported special forces which usually operate under
21 the command of a named individual and with substantial apparent autonomy,
22 except when they are integrated in the regular army's plan of action."
23 Q. And I would stop there and ask you, sir --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, before you do so, I would like to know
25 more about the -- what this document exactly is because it was sent to
1 Mr. Bassiouni, I do understand --
2 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: -- but it comes from the administrative secretary --
4 MR. IVETIC: Correct.
5 JUDGE ORIE: -- and the document reads in its heading that it's
6 the 10th draft of a certain document. Is there a final version of this
7 document, because it seems to be very much an internal working document
8 of the commission.
9 MR. IVETIC: There is, Your Honour. And I can --
10 JUDGE ORIE: With an unknown author.
11 MR. IVETIC: Mm-hm. The final expert report is in -- in e-court
12 as 1D1447.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Why don't we then look at the final report instead
14 of a working document which, by its character, seems to be an unfinished
16 MR. IVETIC: Because some of the language is not in the final
18 JUDGE ORIE: That there may be good reasons for that, but I let
19 you go at this moment. But please be aware that this is -- that I
20 express the concern on behalf of the Chamber for the use of this
22 Mr. Groome.
23 MR. GROOME: Could I also ask for some clarification as to which
24 period or what period, is it even a period that's within the indictment
25 or is this a reference to the pre-indictment period.
1 MR. IVETIC: Well, if we look at number 5, which would have been
2 on page 3, it's talking about in May 1992, the JNA's FRY forces
3 officially withdrew from Bosnia, and it's talking about the ORBAT
4 subsequent thereto. If you could scroll down, I think that's down -- oh,
5 there it is. So we're talking about periods that would be within the
6 indictment period.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But is that the time-frame for the -- I mean,
8 I see that it's mentioned there. But is that the time-frame for the
9 document as a whole or ... or I'm just trying to find ...
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, if you could assist the Chamber in
12 finding, apart from one line which says that at a certain moment the JNA
13 withdrew, which seems not to be in dispute, but whether that defines the
14 time-frame for what is said in the report. Otherwise, it's still unclear
15 to the Chamber.
16 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honours, I'm a little confused. We have
17 a gentleman who is being presented as an expert witness --
18 JUDGE ORIE: And if you can answer my question, then I would
19 appreciate that. Otherwise, we can move on. But I think Judge Moloto
20 would have a question.
21 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: My question to you, Mr. Ivetic, is if this is a
23 draft and you say the final document doesn't have some of the language
24 that is contained in it, in this draft, isn't that indicative of the fact
25 that even the drafters of this document decided to abandon that language
1 and therefore move away from the positions expressed by that language?
2 And that now, we are not putting to the witness the final position of the
3 drafters but we're putting to them something that was work in progress
4 and which they abandoned?
5 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to 1D1447, the third page of the
6 same. And this -- this is the 1994 final version of the UN expert
7 report. If we can turn to the -- I had it as the third page. Is this
8 the third page in the document in e-court?
9 JUDGE ORIE: That is the third page.
10 MR. IVETIC: Ah. We need to go to the 31st; I apologise. I have
11 the abbreviated version in front of me. The 31st page, if we look at
12 paragraphs 119, 120, and 121, I think we'll find that the exact identical
13 language is in the final report but for the change of instead of
14 35 special -- 37 special groups, it's now 45. So I will combine my
15 questions to the expert.
16 Q. Sir, did you have knowledge of such a confused situation with
17 such a large number of groups operating with apparent autonomy in the
18 region at any point in time during the existence of the VRS?
19 A. Most certainly. And you touch on confusion, which is a point
20 we've already touched on already.
21 MR. IVETIC: Okay. If we can now turn to -- if we could turn to
22 paragraph 122 which should begin on the bottom of this page of the
23 official version. We'll stick with that. And it reads as follows:
24 "Some towns and villages formed paramilitary units, which are not
25 to be confused with the special forces mentioned above. These local
1 forces operate in the areas of their towns and villages. Occasionally,
2 they also lend support to similar groups and other combatants in the same
3 opstina (county) and neighbouring areas. Their command and control is
4 local, and the chain of command difficult to establish, through
5 characteristically, these groups, like the special forces, have an
6 identifiable leader. Frequently, the unit or group is called by the
7 leader's name. Otherwise, the unit or group uses a politically
8 significant name or the name of their town, village, or area. The
9 leadership is local, mostly consisting of political figures."
10 Q. Did you take into account the existence of such formations in
11 terms of your expertise?
12 A. Most certainly. But I would also point out to you what I have
13 already said, that in the case of the Bosnian Serb part of Bosnia, that
14 the VRS operated under a corps arrangement where the geographic area of
15 the country was divided into corps tactical areas of responsibility and
16 within those areas of responsibility, irregular and militia special
17 forces and other armed groups came under the authority of the VRS itself.
18 Whether they always followed that authority is another issue but they, by
19 regulation, were under the command of the commander of that corps
20 tactical area of responsibility. And in my experience, these groups were
21 small and by definition incapable of carrying out large-scale military
22 operations, such as the movement of 30.000 civilians from Srebrenica and
23 the undoubted execution of around 8.000 of those, their burial,
24 exhumation and reburial. That kind of activity requires a high degree of
25 command and control and resources and is not characteristic of the kind
1 of militias, special forces, and armed civilian groups to which you
3 I also note that much of what you refer to refers to Croatia and
4 its development and not to Bosnia.
5 Q. That was why I wanted the draft report that had all the 47 forces
6 named which included Croat, Bosnian, and Serb forces. Was that part of
7 your expertise, sir, that that there were these forces on all three of
8 the groups that I've mentioned, the Serb side, the Bosnian side and the
9 Croatian side?
10 A. Irregular forces characterised all three warring factions in that
11 particular war, yes.
12 Q. Now, I would like to move to a related topic. If we could take a
13 look at your statement again, P2629, marked for identification.
14 MR. IVETIC: And we'll be looking at page 10 -- pardon me,
15 page 11 in the English, page 10 in the Serbian.
16 Q. Paragraph 38 of your statement. And I want to focus on the last
17 part of this paragraph where you say:
18 "An example of one of the groups Mladic would have been
19 responsible for can be found on video," and then you list it and you
20 identify it as the Skorpions video.
21 And I want to ask you, first of all, what is the basis of your
22 research that leads to the finding that Mladic would be responsible for
23 the group that is depicted in the Skorpions video? What sources or
24 documents did you consult for this?
25 A. The basis for my comment is founded on the overall conclusions of
1 my research, and if the Court will forgive me for a degree of repetition,
2 within the Bosnian Serb republic part of Bosnia, the country was divided
3 into corps tactical areas of responsibility and all the military groups,
4 whether VRS or irregular, were under the command of the corps commander
5 of that area an answerable directly to the Main Staff in which the senior
6 person was General Mladic.
7 That is the basis of the comment that you've just drawn my
8 attention to.
9 Q. Based upon your expert review, can you tell us from what area or
10 municipality the Skorpions come from?
11 A. I can't remember now.
12 Q. Can I refresh your recollection that it's Djeletovci, Croatia?
13 A. Thank you. And I'm -- I -- just point out the significance of
14 that, would you?
15 Q. Are you aware that, in fact, this unit was affiliated with the
16 assistant minister of interior for the Republic of Serb Krajina,
17 Mr. Mrgud Milovanovic?
18 A. I'll take your word for that.
19 Q. Well, I'm asking if your expert review uncovered that, sir?
20 JUDGE ORIE: The answer of the witness clearly indicates that the
21 witness has no personal knowledge but that he has no reason to challenge
22 what you said, Mr. Ivetic.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. I agree with that.
24 MR. IVETIC:
25 Q. Do you consider yourself to be an expert with sufficient
1 knowledge of the laws and regulations in respect to the police forces of
2 the SFRY, the FRY, the Republika Srpska, and the Republic of Serbian
3 Krajina, such as to be qualified to render expert opinions as to those
5 A. The word "sufficient" is, I think, relevant. My expertise is
6 based on a wide-ranging set of subjects and issues, and bringing those
7 wide-ranging issues together I believe qualifies me to be of assistance
8 to the Court, to the extent that I can at this time.
9 Q. There has been significant and detailed testimony at this trial
10 describing of how the Skorpions unit was under the direction and control
11 of Mr. Milovanovic as well as the Serbian State Security Police or DB.
12 Did you have access to information of that nature at the time
13 that you were rendering this opinion about the Skorpions that is set
14 forth in your statement?
15 A. My opinion with regard to the Skorpions is that if they were
16 operational in the Bosnian Serb republic, then, by account of the
17 explanation that I have given today two or three times, they would have
18 been operating within one of the corps areas of responsibility that
19 you've referred to the Krajinas. This could well be under the 1st or
20 2nd Krajina Corps area of responsibility, and, therefore, by the same
21 process that I've described more than once, ultimately under the control
22 and command of General Mladic.
23 Q. Did you have occasion to study the laws on resubordination of the
24 Ministry of Interior forces to the army at the time of war, specifically
25 the Law on Internal Affairs, provisional Law on Internal Affairs relying
1 for the time-period of war, was that part of your research?
2 A. I believe I have looked at those documents. I can't recall the
3 exact document now, but I am aware in general terms of the relationship
4 between the police and the military within the context, which I've
5 referred to several times, of the corps tactical areas of responsibility.
6 Q. Were you aware that police units resubordinated to the army for
7 purposes of combat retained their police commanders during that combat?
8 A. Yes. And that during that period of combat, they were under
9 command of the military in the tactical area of responsibility of the
10 corps in which they were operating with its relationship that I've
11 referred to several times to the Main Staff and to General Mladic.
12 Q. Were you aware that after combat is completed and that the police
13 units then return to their police work they are no longer resubordinated
14 to the army?
15 A. Yes, that is entirely likely. If they're no longer taking part
16 in military operations, then their primary function is the policing of
17 the civilian community and that is what I would expect them to do.
18 Q. Okay. Would you agree that such an analysis of whether police
19 forces were subordinated or not to the army at particular instances is
20 lacking from your expert statement?
21 A. If it's an omission, I'm very grateful that you've brought it out
22 in cross-examination for illumination of the Court. I think that's why
23 I'm here.
24 Q. Now I'd like to switch to another topic. You mentioned yesterday
25 your belief that the 2nd Military District -- at least I think you were
1 talking about the 2nd Military District. You said a Military District
2 was created --
3 A. 2nd.
4 Q. So are we talking about the --
5 A. 2nd Military District.
6 Q. And your belief that that was created such as to become the VRS.
7 I'd like to ask you if your research uncovered that the headquarters of
8 that district as well as the units subordinated to the district as
9 non-Serb personnel left, they were not replaced by anybody and thus the
10 overall size of the headquarters and personnel in the units shrunk? Or
12 A. Yes, that's right. I mean, it was, back to this word
13 "confusing," a confusing period and inevitably a military headquarters,
14 any military headquarters, populated by a variety of people when there
15 is, as happened in 1992, a parting of the ways on ethnic grounds, I think
16 is the right way to say it, then a number of people are going to leave,
17 to take up alternative employment or occupation within the grouping of
18 which they have -- from their ethnic origin. This left the Bosnian Serb
19 people a reduced number to populate that headquarters until such time it
20 was reorganised and more were appointed to it.
21 Q. Now the VRS Main Staff headquarters was located near Han Pijesak.
22 Did your research reveal that this location was actually the fallback or
23 rear command post of the 2nd District and the 1st Army, rather than being
24 a primary command post?
25 A. Yes. That's where General Mladic went to exercise command when
1 he was appointed around about the 12th of May, 1992.
2 Q. The JNA 2nd military headquarters, when it had been situated in
3 Sarajevo, when it had been fully staffed according to the formational
4 rules of the JNA, would you agree with me that it had perhaps over a
5 100 members in this composition? Perhaps you even know the precise
6 amount that I don't.
7 A. No, I don't know the precise number. It depends which units that
8 you count as part of the overall headquarters, whether it's just the
9 commander and his immediate staff or whether it's the support staff,
10 whether it's the communications staff, whether it's the local protection
11 staff. You can answer that question in a variety of ways.
12 Q. Okay. Let's talk about what we do know, the VRS. Would you
13 agree that the time of its formation, the Main Staff of the VRS was
14 comprised of a total of 12 persons of whom five were generals?
15 A. Yes, that's the number that I've seen written down and the fact
16 there were five generals doesn't entirely surprise me. It was to be the
17 Main Staff and they were senior people. Some of them were already
18 generals. Some of them got promoted quite quickly to become generals,
19 heading up the Main Staff functions, which is what I would expect to see
20 on the Main Staff of an army.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you whether, when reading the number of
22 12, whether you would consider that to include support staff, et cetera?
23 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I wouldn't. My understanding of that 12
24 is that they were principally staff officers or immediate assistants in
25 order to carry out the initial staff functions of the Main Staff.
1 Undoubtedly, that number would have grown as support staff and
2 communication staff and close-protection staff were added over time.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
4 MR. IVETIC:
5 Q. Do you have an opinion of what percentage of manpower the
6 Main Staff operated under for the duration of the time-period 1992
7 through 1995?
8 A. I'm sorry, was your question to do with percentage?
9 Q. Yes. Percentage of the manning of the staffing of the
10 Main Staff. You said people were added and it grew. I would like to
11 know what your opinion is based upon your research of how much it grew
12 and what level it attained of its staffing as foreseen by the
14 A. I don't think I can offer a view on what percentage or what
15 numbers. It's quite clear that it grew for the reasons that I've already
16 given. I can't give you a figure.
17 Q. Okay. Well, my figure is based on Mr. Richard Butler, at
18 transcript page 16813 of this trial, where he said the Main Staff was
19 manned with only 37 per cent of the officers that were foreseen by the
21 Would you agree or disagree with that figure, sir, based upon
22 your research and expertise?
23 A. I do apologise, I'm not entirely clear of the question you're
24 asking me. Could you just -- this percentage figure? Percentage of
1 Q. Officers, as foreseen by the establishment documents for the VRS.
2 A. Ah-ha, okay.
3 Q. It was operating at 37 per cent of its --
4 A. Okay. I think what you're suggesting to me -- and I apologise if
5 I'm drawing out the question but I can't answer a question until I
6 understand it. I think you're suggesting that there was an establishment
7 figure of officers and men for the Main Staff of a certain size but that
8 it was only filled to 37 per cent?
9 Q. That's what Mr. Butler says, sir. And I'm asking if you agree or
11 A. I've not got no reason to disagree with Mr. Butler.
12 Q. Okay. Would you agree that a proper analysis of the command
13 structure of the VRS should take into account the officer staffing levels
14 at all ... let me start again. Would you agree that a proper analysis of
15 the command structure of the VRS should take into account the officer
16 staffing levels within all units subordinated to the -- to the
17 Main Staff?
18 A. No, I don't particularly agree with that. I think what matters
19 more is what the Main Staff actually achieved. How many people were in
20 the Main Staff, actual number against their establishment, I don't think
21 is relevant. This is an input conversation. What I'm suggesting is that
22 the output, what the Main Staff achieved, was really rather more
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
25 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I must object to this line of
1 questioning. When I look back at Mr. Butler's testimony, I see that it
2 was put to him the figure of 37 per cent and I just read the first line
3 of his answer:
4 "Well, again, yes, sir. I mean, while I don't understand -- or I
5 don't recall the specific numbers ... I think I've testified I've never
6 done analysis of the specific numbers ..."
7 So it doesn't seem that Mr. Butler has offered that figure of
8 37 per cent or any precise number that I can find.
9 JUDGE ORIE: What I see is that the page referred to is that by
10 January 1995 that the Main Staff was only staffed at 37 per cent of the
11 officers that were foreseen under the establishment. 41 per cent of the
12 necessary junior officers, and 50 per cent of the necessary soldiers or
13 it says non-officers, but perhaps it should -- we should understand it as
14 non-commissioned officers. That is what I read on page 16813.
15 MR. GROOME: That's the question, Your Honour. I think we need
16 to look at the answer to see what Mr. Butler said.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me see. Yes, it's the question, I do
19 MR. IVETIC: I apologise [overlapping speakers] --
20 JUDGE ORIE: And the witness, Mr. Butler, then said indeed that
21 he had not studied it. So it is the position of Defence that was put to
22 you rather than the evidence, the testimony, given by Mr. Butler.
23 Mr. Ivetic.
24 MR. IVETIC: Thank you. If we can call up document, P338.
25 Q. It's one that apparently you did look at. It's an analysis of
1 the combat readiness of the VRS from 1st April 1993.
2 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to page 71 in the Serbian this should
3 be page 80 in the English.
4 Q. First of all, sir, can you advise that you in fact did review
5 this document for purposes of your expertise?
6 A. I don't think it's come up on my screen yet.
7 Q. I apologise.
8 MR. IVETIC: If we can get the first page in English.
9 THE WITNESS: It looks familiar.
10 MR. IVETIC:
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. IVETIC: Now, if we go again to page 80 in English --
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: We haven't seen the first page in English.
14 MR. IVETIC: Oh. I apologise.
15 Q. Sir, this does this appear to be a document that you would
16 have --
17 A. Yes, I recognise that document.
18 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to page 80 in English that will
19 correlate to page 71 in the B/C/S.
20 Q. I would like to take a look at the last bullet point with you,
21 which reads as follows:
22 "In total, in the Army of RS, of the 14.541 officer establishment
23 posts, 7.287 or 51 per cent are filled with officers, of whom 1.579 or
24 22 per cent are active officers, and of the 12.032 non-commissioned
25 officer establishment posts, there are 12.942 or 108 per cent
1 non-commissioned officers, of whom 1.190 or 8 per cent are active
2 non-commissioned officers ..."
3 Sir, would you agree that such a low staffing level of active
4 officers and active -- and a low staffing level of active NCOs, or
5 non-commissioned officers, would negatively affect the ability of the VRS
6 command and control to function irrespective of which model is employed?
7 A. Not necessarily. It depends on who the additional people were,
8 what their educational background, what their previous experience had
9 been, and my conclusion would be that's where you have got less
10 experienced or less well-trained people, there is a greater degree to
11 exercise a tighter degree of control in order to ensure that the intent
12 of the commander is carried out in the best possible manner.
13 MR. IVETIC: If we could take a look at the next paragraph in
14 English, which is at the top of the page in the B/C/S -- of the next page
15 in B/C/S, I think we see the ethnic makeup of the officer corps of the
16 VRS and we see that one quarter of the same is non-Serb:
17 "The national structure of active officers serving in the Army of
18 RS" --
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, Mr. Ivetic, where are you reading?
20 MR. IVETIC: It's the first paragraph in English after the last
21 bullet point. It's in the middle of the page --
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
23 MR. IVETIC: -- in e-court. Should be the top of the page in the
25 "The national structure of active officers serving in the Army of
1 RS is: 37 Montenegrins, 204 Yugoslavs, 62 Croats, 26 Macedonians,
2 33 Muslims, 13 Slovenes, 2.165 Serbs, 3 Albanians, 1 Bulgarian, 2 Czechs,
3 4 Hungarians, 3 Ruthenes, 1 Turk, 1 Jew, 1 Pole, 1 Roma, 1 Ukrainian,
4 21 of undeclared nationality."
5 Q. Would you agree, sir, that based upon this information, the VRS
6 did not replace non-Serb officers as a matter of policy?
7 A. No, I don't agree with that conclusion at all. What you
8 describe -- what is described in the document here is that the Army of
9 Republika Srpska was indeed made up of many nationalities and different
10 ethnic groupings. But what you don't describe is those who had formed
11 units under headquarters of the 2nd Military District who left the
12 2nd Military District and went elsewhere. I find it totally unsurprising
13 that the VRS was made up of different nationalities. And with the
14 indulgence of the Court, I will comment that when I commanded the British
15 Army, it was comprised of individuals from 42 different nationalities.
16 Q. Did those officers that left the 2nd Military District go on to
17 join other armies and do you consider their departure to have been
19 A. Well, I don't know how you possibly expect that I could answer
20 that question, to tell you where all the officers that left the
21 2nd Military District went to. I think we can conclude from evidence
22 that the majority of them left to go to other factions and continued
23 their involvement in the war in that way. And I believe that yesterday I
24 mentioned that it was an interesting feature of the first conference that
25 we held in the early days of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement
1 to see the commanders of the three warring factions in the south and the
2 west of the country greeting each other as former comrades as they had
3 all had former service in the JNA.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I'm a bit puzzled by the last bullet
5 point and the following paragraph you have drawn our attention to.
6 Because in the last bullet point, I see that there were close to
7 1600 active officers involved. Whereas, in the following paragraph, the
8 active officers are represented by their ethnic or national background,
9 but that is about approximately 2.500 active officers, so I have -- I'm
10 puzzled by how can you give the ethnic or national background of close to
11 1600 officers by telling us how it was divided over the two and a half
13 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I invite you to read the bullet point
14 that says that there are 1.579 active officers and that there are
15 1.190 active non-commissioned officers which, indeed, I believe would be
16 the figure of the ethnic makeup which is over 2600.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I try to read it. In the bullet point you
18 referenced to the 1190, which, by the way, would make the problem even
19 bigger than it is, is about non-commissioned officers, you would say the
20 active officers would include the non-commissioned officers? Because
21 where the language "active officers" is used in the last bullet point,
22 second line, the number of 1579 appears. The same language, "active
23 officers," is used in the following paragraph, which amounts to some, all
24 together I would say close to 2500 --
25 MR. IVETIC: 2500, correct. That's what [Overlapping
1 speakers] --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because you -- you asked me to read it
3 carefully. I tried to do that. I've now explained to you what my
4 attempt of careful reading led me to -- led me to believe what was said.
5 And the puzzle now has not been resolved for me.
6 MR. IVETIC: My understanding was that it was in relation to both
7 commissioned and non-commissioned officers. I was hoping that the expert
8 would be able to enlighten us further and he is not been able to.
9 THE WITNESS: I wasn't aware that was a question that you put to
11 JUDGE ORIE: No. The question was not put to the witness.
12 Mr. Ivetic, it is unsuccessful attempt to shift the blame, if there's any
13 blame, to someone else, which is not appreciated. If you thought that it
14 would be an explanation by adding up 1579 to 1190, then the puzzle still
15 would be there because there is a considerable difference between that
16 total and the total of the numbers we find in the first paragraph
17 following the last bullet point.
18 You may proceed.
19 MR. IVETIC:
20 Q. General, for purposes of your analysis, did you take into account
21 the organ known as the Supreme Command which existed at all times in
22 Republika Srpska and exercised command over the army and the defence
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. As an expert, can you please tell us how many members of the
1 Supreme Command there are?
2 A. No, I'm not going to be tested in that way. It has a composition
3 of about six or seven members, and it was not a fixed membership. It did
4 change over the course of the war in 1992 to 1995, but it was headed by
5 the president, President Karadzic.
6 Q. As an expert, can you tell us if General Ratko Mladic was ever a
7 member of the Supreme Command?
8 A. Well, this was a moot point, and it was decided, to my mind quite
9 correctly, that he should not be a formal member. Because -- and this
10 gets into a very interesting philosophical debate as to what the
11 Supreme Command represented and what the Main Staff represented. If the
12 Court will indulge, I will try and explain that and be as brief as
14 The Supreme Command decided national, what one would call in
15 military terms grand strategy, what the nation of Republika Srpska wanted
16 to achieve and issued direction on that, set out, if you like, grand
17 strategic objectives. They were then sent in a directive of one sort or
18 another to the military command to carry out the military objectives to
19 formulate what in doctrinal terms we would call military strategy.
20 And that was the responsibility of the Main Staff to develop that
21 military strategy into campaign plans at what we would call, in military
22 terminology, the operation level of war. And that was why it was very
23 important that General Mladic was not a member of the Supreme Council but
24 took instructions from the Supreme Council in order to be able to carry
25 them out by the military, the army under his command. And that
1 separation of membership was often debated but it was felt to be more
2 appropriate that he was not a member of the Supreme Command.
3 Q. Were the military court systems and the military prosecutors also
4 separate from General Mladic's command?
5 A. It's usual for the military judiciary system to stand apart from
6 the command and control system of the military so that it retains
8 Q. Now I'd like to move on to General Mladic's presence on the
9 ground in Srebrenica and the Hotel Fontana that you testified about
10 yesterday. At transcript page 19071, you talked of Mladic keeping close
11 control and issuing directions. I wish to now take a look at part of
12 your testimony from the Krstic case.
13 MR. IVETIC: 1D1444, page 71 of the same, which should correlate
14 to transcript page 5713 of the underlying document.
15 If we could focus on lines 24 through 25 for the question and
16 then we'll have to turn the page for the answer which is on lines 1
17 through 4.
18 Q. Sir, I read:
19 "Judge Riad: But there was no sign of General Mladic giving
20 direct orders to the subordinates of General Krstic?
21 "A. No, sir. I think we've looked at that several times
22 previously, and I can see no evidence of General Mladic giving direct
23 orders to constituent parts of the Drina Corps and therefore bypassing
24 the normal corps command and control structure. I don't see any evidence
25 of that."
1 Do you stand by this testimony as being truthful such that you
2 would so repeat the same today?
3 A. Absolutely. I don't see any evidence of that. That's not to say
4 it didn't happen. But I don't see and didn't see any evidence of that.
5 Q. Now, yesterday we talked about Mladic leaving for meetings in
6 Belgrade. You discuss this at paragraph 40 of your statement.
7 MR. IVETIC: This is, again, P2629, MFI, it's page 12 of the same
8 in English, page 11 in B/C/S.
9 Q. And I'd like to draw your attention to the part where you say:
10 "I am aware that in the trial of Momcilo Perisic, Carl Bildt
11 testified that he met with Mladic and Milosevic on 14 July 1995 and
12 Sir Rupert Smith testified that he met with Mladic and Milosevic on
13 15 July 1995. Mladic was therefore personally informed and involved with
14 what was going on above him and below him. In my opinion, he was very
15 much part of the plan and its execution."
16 Sir, was it your understanding for purposes of this meeting that
17 Mr. Mladic appeared of his own accord or was he requested to be present
18 by someone?
19 A. I presume you're referring to the meeting between Mr. Mladic and
20 Mr. Milosevic the 14th of July?
21 Q. Both of these meetings.
22 A. I think it's an interesting question. I -- I can't remember
23 whether he was requested to attend or not. But having looked at the
24 substance of the conversation that took place particularly between
25 Mr. Mladic and President Milosevic as recorded in Mr. Mladic's notebook,
1 the tone of the conversation was such that he would probably have been
2 asked to attend because the tone is critical.
3 Q. Now we're mixing apples and oranges. I'm talking about 14th and
4 15th July. You're talking about the meeting with Milosevic that occurred
5 several weeks later.
6 A. Yes, that's quite possible.
7 Q. Do you recall this meeting 15th of July as being the one that you
8 talked about where you said General Smith, according to General Mladic's
9 diary --
10 A. Yeah --
11 Q. -- made some comments and that your opinion was that General
12 Mladic did not do enough as a general and seemed to not do anything and
13 you made certain comments about that. Do you recall it now?
14 A. I do. And you're right, I confused in this conversation, the
15 subsequent meeting with President Milosevic later on when he criticised,
16 as recorded by General Mladic's notebook, his activities. But to return
17 to the meeting which involved General Smith --
18 Q. Yes --
19 A. -- again, in the record of that, which I've seen, General Smith
20 raises the question of massacre, rapes, and executions with Mr. Mladic.
21 There's no record that I've seen which says what Mr. Mladic did about it.
22 But the point that I've endeavoured to make and I think is very important
23 is that when a senior general, in this case representing the
24 international community, and, of course, I mean General Smith, was to
25 draw to the attention of one of the commanders of one of the warring
1 factions an allegation of misconduct, he can therefore -- he must --
2 Mladic can no longer say that he is unaware of what might or might not
3 have been going on. And therefore when such allegations of such
4 significance are made, it would be extraordinary if he had not then
5 conducted some investigation to see what had gone on. I have no idea
6 what investigation that he did conduct. But if he did not conduct an
7 investigation, then he was negligent.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, we'll have a break in five minutes from
9 now, so therefore ...
10 MR. IVETIC:
11 Q. Well, sir, I'm a little confused by your answer. I'd like to
12 call up 65 ter 1932, which was a document that was indeed on the
13 Prosecution's list for direct examination with you and is a memo dated
14 17 July 1995 from Yasushi Akashi to Mr. Annan of the UN - and I'll wait
15 for it to come up on our screen - in reference precisely to this meeting.
16 And I think it shows that your approach is flawed. It states as
17 follows --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
19 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, in that one question Mr. Ivetic has
20 made two comments now with respect to the witness. I think that is
21 improper. I think he is entitled to put questions but not his comments
22 about what he thinks it may show.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, rather than commenting on the document,
24 you're invited to put a question to the witness.
25 MR. IVETIC: Yes. I'd like to first introduce the document to
1 the witness and the contents of the same.
2 Q. Sir, you can read along --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, there are better ways of doing that.
4 You are aware of that. Please proceed.
5 MR. IVETIC:
6 Q. "Mr. Carl Bildt, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg and myself met in
7 Belgrade with President Milosevic on Saturday, 15 July. I was
8 accompanied by General Rupert Smith. Milosevic, at the request of Bildt,
9 facilitated the presence of General Mladic at the meeting. Mladic and
10 Smith had a long bilateral discussion. Despite their disagreement on
11 several points, the meeting reestablished dialogue between the two
12 generals. Informal agreement was reached in the course of the meeting on
13 a number of points between the two generals which will, however, have to
14 be confirmed at their meeting scheduled for 19 July. In view of the
15 highly sensitive nature of the presence of Mladic at the meeting, it was
16 agreed by all participants that this fact should not be mentioned at all
17 in public."
18 Sir, given that General Smith and General Mladic had agreed on a
19 number of points to be confirmed at a 19 July meeting already scheduled
20 and given the instruction to keep Mladic's presence at this meeting
21 confidential, does this shed some new light on another reason why
22 General Mladic didn't need to rush back to Srebrenica to investigate
23 claims made by General Smith?
24 A. The short answer is -- is no. Your question and this document
25 don't tell me what the number of points were. And you missed the point
1 of how command and control works.
2 General Mladic didn't have to rush back to Srebrenica to commence
3 an investigation. He had merely to pick up a telephone, give an
4 instruction to a staff officer to initiate an investigation. I don't
5 think that your question -- well, I'm sorry, you rather lost me on the
6 point you were trying to make and I think I have probably said that I can
7 all usefully and unhelpfully say.
8 Q. If we can briefly --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic --
10 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Your question is full of assumptions, suggestions,
12 which need to be specified before we -- one of those questions would be
13 whether the meeting was and what was discussed during the meeting,
14 whether that was a reason for something still to be established, that
15 Mr. Mladic rushed back to investigate, for example, that's -- those are
16 all implicit assumptions, suggestions, which, without being made
17 explicit, would not elicit answers that would assist the Chamber.
18 Please proceed.
19 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to the next page of this document,
20 we'll see the compacts understandings agreed to and reached between
21 General Rose -- pardon me, General Smith and General Mladic and we'll see
22 whether they're reasonable.
23 Q. Do you see the second paragraph here saying:
24 "The specific agreements will be revealed after the meeting of
25 General Mladic and General Smith scheduled for Wednesday, 19 July 1995."
1 Would you agree that it would appear that the international
2 negotiators requested that everyone, including Mr. Mladic, keep this
3 under wraps?
4 A. No, I'm sorry -- I don't -- I don't follow the question. I
5 understood from the previous document that it had been decided for
6 unspecified reasons to keep the presence of Mr. Mladic at that meeting
7 secret. But forgive my stupidity, but I don't see the question that
8 you're trying to ask me now. Perhaps you would be kind enough to explain
9 it in great detail so I can give you answer.
10 Q. Sure. Can we start reading from the top:
11 "Understanding from Belgrade discussions, situation in Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina, 15 July 1995. General press line. Mr. Akashi at his
13 request and in the presence of Bildt and Mr. Stoltenberg was informed of
14 certain possible relaxations in the Bosnian Serb position. The specific
15 agreements will be revealed" --
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You should slow down.
17 MR. IVETIC: I apologise.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Nobody can follow.
19 MR. IVETIC: "The specific agreements will be revealed after the
20 meeting of General Mladic and General Smith, scheduled for Wednesday,
21 19 July 1995.
22 "Srebrenica. Full access to the area for UNHCR and ICRC."
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, we could invite the witness -- first ask
24 him whether he is familiar with those under items "Srebrenica" or ask him
25 to read it. There's no reason to read it aloud. And perhaps even we
1 could take a break, if there's a hard copy of this page, so that the
2 witness could familiarize himself with those points and you can ask any
3 further questions.
4 MR. IVETIC: I don't have a clean hard copy. I don't know if the
5 Prosecution does. It's their document. Otherwise I could have one
6 printed and brought up. I just --
7 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, apart from the sarcasm, the
8 Prosecution will -- Ms. Stewart will print the document for the witness.
9 I don't keep hard copies of every document that we've disclosed to the
11 JUDGE ORIE: I think it's appreciated that either party would
12 provide the witness during the break with a clean hard copy of this page.
13 And we already ask the witness to leave the courtroom.
14 We'd like to see you back in 20 minutes.
15 THE WITNESS: Fine, sir.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that the clean copy will find its way to
18 the witness and --
19 MR. IVETIC: I hope so. I don't know how to effectuate it.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I beg your pardon?
21 MR. IVETIC: I hope so. I don't know how to effectuate it on my
23 MR. GROOME: I have it here and I'll leave it with the Registrar,
24 Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Groome. We'll take a break and we'll
1 resume at quarter past 12.00.
2 --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.
3 --- On resuming at 12.18 p.m.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
5 Meanwhile, I briefly address the following. The -- it is the
6 about the Prosecution's submissions related to P1501, P1502, P1736,
7 P1379, P1740, and P1481, made in its submissions made in the informal
8 communication of the 31st of October.
9 [The witness takes the stand]
10 JUDGE ORIE: I'll deal with all those exhibits individually
11 after -- at a later point in time.
12 Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.
13 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. General, have you an opportunity to review the understanding from
15 the Belgrade discussions and in particular the points that were agreed as
16 to Srebrenica?
17 A. I have, yes, thank you.
18 Q. Would you agree that this sheds new light on what was actually
19 discussed at the meetings and what actions Generals Mladic and Smith
20 agreed to, to address the concerns of General Smith from the first part
21 of the meeting?
22 A. I agree it's a very interesting document.
23 At the time, General Smith only knew what General Smith knew. We
24 now know rather more. The date of the meeting and the dates of the
25 activities agreed are themselves interesting because by the 21st of July,
1 1995, when it was agreed that Generals Smith and Mladic will observe the
2 move of the Dutch battalion out of Srebrenica, the killings and the
3 burials would already have been complete. Therefore, there was no reason
4 for access to Srebrenica by General Smith to be denied.
5 Furthermore, I'm very interested by the totality of the
6 agreements reached on that occasion, and they are quite widespread.
7 Agreement seemed to have been reached on UNPROFOR resupply routes, troop
8 rotations, freedom of movement agreements, and even discussion of a
9 conference for a cessation of hostilities. These are significant events
10 that would not have come about unless something very significant had
12 My deduction, as an expert witness and with some considerable
13 knowledge of the circumstances, is that General Mladic conceded these
14 points in considerable fear that the actions that had taken place around
15 Srebrenica would play to his and the Bosnian Serb republic's
16 disadvantage, and he made a number of concessions at that time to try and
17 improve his position.
18 That is my view.
19 Q. Sir, would you concede that another reasonable view from this
20 same document is that a general who had just personally left with
21 Srebrenica and had seen with his own eyes that no one was being raped and
22 no one was being killed, would agree to the international negotiators to
23 allow them to come in, take a look, agree to all their demands and show
24 that he didn't have anything to hide.
25 Isn't that another possible reading from this document, sir? And
1 the circumstances?
2 A. No. You know as well as I know that those who were massacred in
3 the area of Srebrenica were buried a considerable distance away from
4 Srebrenica and that any civilians remaining in Srebrenica would be
5 unaware of what had happened to those who were taken away. I do not
6 agree with your analysis at all.
7 Q. As an expert, sir, did you examine the relevant VRS regulations
8 to determine what the effect was of General Mladic's leaving the zone of
9 responsibility of his army, that is to say, if his command continued or
10 reverted to some deputy?
11 A. Yes. This is an interesting and moot point and gets at the heart
12 of a relationship between a commander and his deputy commander who, under
13 VRS regulations, is also the Chief of Staff, and, as we know was
14 General Milovanovic.
15 When General Mladic left the country and went to Serbia, then, in
16 leaving the country, command devolved from him to General Milovanovic.
17 That was the regulation.
18 What we know from practice is that when General Milovanovic
19 exercising authority as the authorised deputy invariably then cleared any
20 decisions he taken with General Mladic and made sure that he was
21 completely comfortable and up to speed with events that had happened.
22 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, we would tender Prosecution
23 65 ter number 1932 as the next available Defence exhibit in this trial.
24 MR. GROOME: No objection.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1932 receives number D410, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
3 MR. IVETIC:
4 Q. If we can return to your statement, P2629, page 19 in the
5 English, page 16 in the B/C/S, in the middle of paragraph 56 you state
7 "In accordance withstanding procedures for operational security,
8 the commercial telephone system would not be the normal method of passing
9 sensitive information, military orders or routine reports."
10 Do you know if General Mladic in the vehicle that he was using to
11 travel to Belgrade had any secure communications equipment?
12 A. I have no idea. And I don't think I can understand why you think
13 I would know that. But thank you for asking the question.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dannatt, there's no need to express, again and
15 again, your appreciation for what Mr. Ivetic brings to your attention.
16 If you just answer the questions, that would --
17 THE WITNESS: I apologise. It's my natural courtesy, sir.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
19 MR. IVETIC: If we can take a look at another topic then, the
20 issue of reporting, I'd like to call up 1D1444 in e-court, page 81 of the
21 same. It's, again, the Krstic transcript.
22 And I'd like to start from line 10 and go onward through the
23 questions and answers that were given:
24 "Judge Riad: General Dannatt, I would still like to have some
25 precisions" --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Would you please kindly slow down for the
2 interpretation. Thank you.
3 MR. IVETIC: Let me start again.
4 Q. "Judge Riad: General Dannatt, I would still like to have some
5 precisions, although I have understood you very clearly. You spoke
6 about -- of the daily combat reports, and I can just quote one part of
7 your report. You say: 'I have seen evidence of daily combat reports
8 that are clearly in a laid-down format which provides a full account of
9 all activity.'
10 "Did this daily combat report give an account of the massacres?
11 "A. No, Your Honour. I have not seen direct reports of what you
12 would describe as massacres. As I said in an earlier answer, there
13 were -- and I wouldn't expect to do so either, because I think most
14 people would have realised that to commit to paper, in a formal daily
15 report matters like that, was laying themselves open to subsequent
16 investigation as indeed the business of this court is all about.
17 "But one does see in some places references to things that one
18 knows afterwards were indirect references, whether it's to prisoners, and
19 I'm thinking now of the Zvornik Brigade's report complaining, if you
20 like," if we can go to the next page, "of the large number of prisoners
21 being held in schools and other reports relating subsequently to engineer
22 equipment being moved and fuel being requested or being made available.
23 "So I see no direct reference to what you've described, sir, as
24 massacres, but I have seen several examples of indirect references that
25 we now know refer in part to that process.
1 "Judge Riad: Now, to go further, if these daily combat reports
2 were submitted to the Higher Command, so the Higher Command was not
3 informed about the executions if they are not mentioned in the combat
4 reports, just to follow the echelon, how would you know about it?
5 "A. In a direct sense, Your Honour, I agree with you, and -- I
6 would agree with that point, sir."
7 Do you stand by this testimony as being truthful and accurate as
8 to these points, such that you would so testify today?
9 A. Entirely.
10 Q. Okay.
11 A. The point being, if I can make the point, is that the reports
12 were going to the higher headquarters and the reason that they were in --
13 in an opaque fashion was for the reasons that I gave, that to be precise
14 and detailed would invite those reports becoming evidence at some point
15 in the future. So although the higher headquarters, the higher command,
16 the Main Staff, was not being informed, it offers no comment on whether
17 the commander himself was aware of what the situation was.
18 Q. Now I want to take a look at another topic.
19 MR. IVETIC: To do, so I'd look at 1D1448 in e-court. And when
20 we get that, I'd like page six of the same.
21 Q. That will be, again, your book -- excuse me. Again, if we can
22 turn to page 6. That should correlate to the underlying book pages, I
23 believe, 182 and 183. And I'd like to go through the part on the
24 left-hand side which reads as follows:
25 "The 5 October cease-fire brokered by Lieutenant-General
1 Sir Rupert Smith, Michael Rose's successor, as commander of the UNPROFOR
2 mission had brought to an end an eventful summer in which many of the
3 Bosnian Serb army (VRS) gains of the previous two years had been
4 dramatically swept aside. The predominantly Muslim Army of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina (the ARBiH, which I will refer to as the Bosniak
6 army), together with the Croats of the HV (Croatian regular army) and HVO
7 (Bosnian Croat army), who after their violent differences earlier in the
8 war had joined together in the Croat-Bosnian Federation of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina, had made substantial territorial gains in September at the
10 expense of the Serbs, who had been punished for non-compliance with UN
11 demands by targeted NATO air-strikes and powerful artillery bombardments.
12 These Federation operations had been conducted with careful precision and
13 had been so overwhelming successful that I suspected, from my experience
14 of teaching at Camberley, that professionals rather than the brave but (I
15 suspected) moderately train the Croat and Bosnian armies had been at
16 work. Were the NATO bombing and artillery strikes around Sarajevo,
17 Banja Luka, and Doboj somehow part of the same well-orchestrated plan?
18 Had the UN and even NATO been manipulated? If so, by whom? I could not
19 help feeling that the Pentagon probably had the answer. Over the six
20 months I was in Bosnia, I spent quite some time talking to the commanders
21 on all three sides, and these conversations confirmed me in my view that
22 expert campaign planning had been brought in to align the situation on
23 the ground with the outcome that international negotiators felt they
24 could deliver."
25 Do you stand by these words as being truthful and accurate as to
1 the facts that are set forth therein?
2 A. I most certainly do. But I would point out that there are a
3 number of questions in the text as well as statements.
4 Q. Yes. Could you clarify for us one of those questions, where you
5 ask: Had the UN and even NATO been manipulated? If so, by whom? What
6 answer did you believe the Pentagon could offer to that question, sir?
7 A. I'll try and keep this answer brief. By 1995, the warring
8 factions and the international community had grown tired of the war in
9 Bosnia, and efforts were increased to bring it to a conclusion. The
10 failure of earlier potential peace agreements - I'm thinking of the
11 Vance-Owen Plan, in particular - had foundered for many reasons, one of
12 which was that the land holding between the two principal sides, the
13 Bosnian Serb republic and the Federation, was unsatisfactory and not
14 equal. For there to be a negotiated conclusion to this war, the land
15 holdings had to be about 49 per cent, 51 per cent of the land mass of
17 By a process which I found puzzling and which I investigated out
18 of personal and professional curiosity, I wondered how the operations
19 conducted by the Federation forces - that is, the Bosniaks and the
20 Croats - during the spring and summer of 1995, had managed to be so
21 successful that by the cessation of hostilities on the 5th of October, lo
22 and behold, the land holdings of the two sides was about 50-50. And,
23 therefore, on the ground, the precondition circumstances for a peace
24 agreement had been arrived at.
25 In my professional view, the Bosniaks and the Croats were not
1 capable of springing together seven military operations into a
2 co-ordinated campaign supported by air-strikes and the use of artillery
3 to have achieved this on their own. To do this, they needed expert
4 military assistance, and it is my belief that they received this from a
5 contracted United States advisory company. The net result was that a
6 situation was arrived at on the ground whereby Mr. Holbrooke was able to
7 bring the parties together at Dayton and end the war.
8 Q. And who is it, sir, that you believe manipulated NATO and the UN?
9 A. I speculate, but I think you know my answer that it was in the
10 wider international community interest to end this war and the leading
11 player in the international community by that stage was the
12 United States.
13 I will also add as a tail-piece that General Smith said to me on
14 one occasion while this activity was going on, It seems rather strange
15 that wherever the Federation forces advance, circumstances were such that
16 he felt it was right to order air-strikes. And he wondered to me
17 privately who was pulling the strings, and he felt that his strings were
18 being pulled.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I didn't interrupt the witness for -- I
20 think for good reasons but, of course, speculation which was the first
21 part of his answer is not what the Chamber assists.
22 The second part of answer, of course, refers to facts. That is
23 conversations the witness had with General Smith and therefore I'm glad
24 that I didn't interrupt, although the speculations observation stands.
25 Please proceed.
1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
2 Q. Now, General, the appraisal of General Krstic by General Mladic
3 which we looked at yesterday, this occurred shortly after this
4 time-period when the Bosnian Muslim and Croat armies were attacking the
5 Serbs with the support of NATO air-strikes.
6 Do you concede that perhaps the appraisal of General Krstic is
7 more focussed on this event and defending the republic in the face of
8 such overwhelming enemy forces supported by the United States?
9 A. I have always paid considerable tribute to General Krstic's
10 abilities as a military commander and I have no doubt that his conduct
11 throughout the war from 1992 to the cessation of hostilities in
12 October 1995 was of a very high order. That is, of course, a separate
13 issue to the issue of any misdoings by him. I note that he was convicted
14 of a number of offences and is in detention as a result of a sentence
15 passed by this Tribunal.
16 Q. And do you rely upon that conviction for any of the expert
17 opinions that you have formulated for purposes of this trial, sir?
18 A. Well, I wouldn't be so presumptive as to have a view that's
19 contrary to the findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
20 former Yugoslavia.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Which is not an answer to the question whether would
22 you have different views. The question was whether you relied on those
23 findings by the Tribunal when preparing your report.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: That question is not on the record.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Consistent with an earlier answer
1 today, when I gave evidence in the trial of the Tribunal against
2 General Krstic, I left that hearing in my own mind convinced that he had
3 been guilty of at least the offences relating to Srebrenica, and that was
4 when I formed my view. That view has not changed.
5 I hope that answers your question.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Not fully, as a matter of fact. Your personal
7 convictions about the matter is not the same as whether you used it as a
8 basis for your report. You can ignore your own feelings in drafting a
9 report. You can rely on your feelings which, as you explained, are
10 related to the findings of this Tribunal.
11 THE WITNESS: I think it is fair to say that I took as fact the
12 findings of the Tribunal and therefore it was a working assumption on my
13 part that General Krstic was guilty of the offences as charged and
14 therefore he had a major role to play in the massacres at Srebrenica.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
16 MR. IVETIC:
17 Q. Yes. If we could rewind to the conversation you had with
18 General Smith that we just talked about, where you mentioned that he
19 remarked that he felt as if his stings were being pulled.
20 Could you give us some indication, if not a month or day, but
21 perhaps was that still he was commander of the UNPROFOR forces?
22 A. Yes, it was. When I deployed to Bosnia on that occasion, it was
23 in October 1995. General Smith was the commander of UNPROFOR, and I was
24 the commander of Sector South-West. So he was my immediate boss, someone
25 I had worked for on a number of occasions in the past and would count as
1 a friend, and the conversation that I just alluded to was a private
2 conversation between us in October or November, I can't remember exactly
3 when, 1995, when we were reflecting on the current situation and how we
4 had got there.
5 Q. And just to complete the picture, by that time the offensives by
6 the joint Croat-Muslim forces and the NATO air-strikes had been
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Okay. Thank you, sir, for answering my questions.
10 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, that concludes my cross-examination.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, any need to re-examine the witness?
14 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, I have a few questions.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed.
16 Re-examination by Mr. Groome:
17 Q. General Dannatt, yesterday at transcript page 19109, you agreed
18 with Mr. Ivetic that the command model employed by individual armies lies
19 along a spectrum with the manoeuvrist approach and the centralised
20 command approach at opposite sides of the spectrum.
21 My question on this topic is whether you have an opinion
22 regarding where on this spectrum the Army of Republika Srpska falls.
23 A. To be short, it falls closer to the paradigm of centralised
24 control. I think it's a point that I've made many times over the last
25 two days, and I would do so in the context that centralised control is
1 the effective way of controlling a disparate, largely conscript, not
2 highly trained army and reduces risk when it comes to the translation of
3 a commander's intent into successful operations on the battle-field.
4 Q. Now Mr. Ivetic has also made the point that difficulties in fully
5 staffing officer positions may have had an impact on the command
6 structure. In your review of General Milovanovic's evidence, did you see
7 anything to suggest that he felt the ability to command subordinates was
8 either compromised or diminished by not having all staff positions
10 A. No. And in my wider experience -- and it was a point I was going
11 to make earlier but if I may I'll make it briefly now. When we discussed
12 an hour or two ago the different nationality and ethnic makeup of the
13 Main Staff, I reflected on the time in my career when I commanded the
14 Allied -- NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and had officers from
15 17 different nations under my command, and the multinational nature of
16 that did not reduce the effectiveness of that headquarters but there were
17 a relatively small number of officers on who one could completely rely
18 and others that -- let's be kind and say made up the numbers.
19 So my point is that numbers in a headquarters don't actually
20 dictate the effectiveness of that headquarters which was the point that I
21 was trying to make earlier. What really matters is the output, the
22 effectiveness of the headquarters, not the number of staff officers
23 sitting at desks and looking at screens or talking into radios.
24 Q. Now again this topic you said at transcript page 36 today:
25 "There is a greater degree to exercise a tighter degree of
1 control in order to ensure that the intent of the commander is carried
2 out in the best possible manner."
3 In a situation of possible staff shortages, can you explain what
4 you meant in more detail including at what levels of the command
5 structure would you expect to see a tighter degree of control?
6 A. Well, without repeating part of my last answer, I would just say,
7 again, that numbers in a headquarters don't have a direct bearing on the
8 efficiency of that headquarters. The efficiency of a headquarters is
9 more determined by the quality of the key staff officers.
10 I'm just looking at the second part of your question to make sure
11 that I answer it rather than run the risk of waffling.
12 Q. If I could ask you to address this concept of tighter control in
13 such a situation and whether that -- is that one level or did you intend
14 that to mean more than one level of command?
15 A. Well, the way of exercising tighter control is in part to pass
16 more detailed orders and, in second, to require more regular and detailed
17 reports on how the conduct of operations is going. In that way, the high
18 headquarters is best informed, and if operations are not going in the way
19 that the superior headquarters or superior commander requires, then
20 further direction can be given and adjustments can be made.
21 Now, this isn't necessarily something that is just done by radio
22 or e-mail. The position and influence of the commander is important, and
23 it's a common command or leadership technique that where greater
24 supervision needs to be made, a commander will go forward to the
25 subordinate headquarters, make a judgement for himself on how things are
1 going, and, if appropriate, give further direction, encouragement or
2 whatever else he feels is necessary.
3 Q. Now if I can change topics --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, if you would allow me one question in
6 I'm a bit puzzled by the percentage discussion and the quality of
7 those remaining. I have not heard but I'm asking you whether the
8 functionality, if the functionality is affected, that that would have a
9 great effect? For example, if all persons knowledgeable on
10 communications would fall out, then the functionality, apart even if you
11 would have 92 per cent staffing level, it wouldn't function any further.
12 Now, first of all, I would like you to tell me whether you would agree
13 with this thought? And, second, if so, whether you would tell us whether
14 or not you noticed any basic functionality failures within the command
16 THE WITNESS: Quite clearly, if there were insufficient members
17 of staff in any given function and that function ceased, then there would
18 be a partial or potentially complete failure in command and control.
19 But, Your Honour, it's very interesting, in another document that I have
20 read, I think it was actually part of General Milovanovic's evidence,
21 that he says that at no stage throughout the war did command and control,
22 particularly relating to communications to enable command and control,
23 break down except for one very short period when a number of NATO strikes
24 destroyed a number of command installations. And I think, if I remember
25 correctly, he said that the length of time that communications had broken
1 down was only a matter of hours and it may have only been -- I think the
2 number 2 hours comes to mind.
3 So following General Milovanovic's evidence, it would appear that
4 the main command, control and communications function of the VRS remained
5 intact through 1992 to 1995.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I just gave that as an example but perhaps the same
7 would be true for a complete failure of transportation facilities or --
8 well --
9 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, military operations are characterised
10 by things going wrong. It always happens. We call it the fog of war.
11 If transportation collapsed, it would be a problem, it would be a
12 nuisance. But I picked up on communications because if communications
13 break down, you can no longer exercise control and you can't exercise
14 command. That is an important distinction.
15 JUDGE ORIE: You say it's a vital function of command.
16 THE WITNESS: If we cannot speak, we cannot communicate, I can't
17 decide, I can't give direction, I cannot command.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, you may proceed.
19 MR. GROOME:
20 Q. Mr. Ivetic spent a considerable amount of time today asking you
21 questions about the military history of the Yugoslav army and he put a
22 passage from Professor Gow's book to you at transcript page 18. It said:
23 "War-time experience had shown that small units operating locally
24 could not be centrally commanded."
25 And this was a description of an earlier point of history in the
1 Yugoslav army. Did you see any evidence that the VRS was comprised of
2 small units operating locally that could not be centrally commanded?
3 A. The short answer is no. My understanding from my research is
4 that the VRS was an organised army. It was poorly resourced at times in
5 terms of fuel, ammunition, and equipment, but it retained a coherent
6 structure. And in my personal experience, right through the latter days
7 of the war and into the implementation period of the Dayton Peace
8 Agreement, it remained a coherent organisation.
9 That said, we were aware of militias and irregular units on all
10 sides that played a role in the war, but that didn't characterise the
11 nature of the VRS which -- which remained an organised being right
12 through the war.
13 MR. GROOME: Could I ask that 65 ter 790 be brought to our
15 Q. Now, Mr. Ivetic pursued this line of questioning with respect to
16 paramilitary groups and Territorial Defence groups. This particular
17 document that you will now see before you was issued on the 12th of May,
18 1992, I believe.
19 Just wait until we can see this.
20 Now, here -- this is a document entitled: "Decision on forming
21 the Army of the Serbian Republic of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina on 12th of May, 1992."
23 Can you draw your attention to Article 2 which states:
24 "Former units and staffs of Territorial Defence are re-named into
25 commands and units of the army whose organisation and formation will be
1 established by the president of the republic."
2 Can I ask for your comment on this article given the line of
3 questioning Mr. Ivetic had about the -- the inability of a centralised
4 command to control Territorial Defence units.
5 A. I come back to the answer that I gave Mr. Ivetic on a number of
6 occasions. That, irrespective of the existence of irregular militia
7 special forces units, the nature of organisation of Republika Srpska and
8 the VRS was that the territory controlled by the VRS was divided into
9 corps tactical areas of responsibility. And all those militaries,
10 paramilitaries, and when taking part in military operations, police
11 forces, within that area, came under the control of that corps
12 headquarters. And, as we all know, the corps were given geographic
13 names: 1st Krajina Corps, 2nd Krajina Corps, Drina Corps, et cetera. So
14 that, I think, gives ample clarification of the situation and it's
15 enshrined by Article 2 of the decision on the 12th of May that you've
16 just redrawn my attention to.
17 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, the Prosecution would tender this
18 exhibit, 65 ter 790, into evidence.
19 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Document 00790 receives number P2799,
22 Your Honours.
23 JUDGE ORIE: P2799 is admitted.
24 MR. GROOME: Could I now ask that P501 be brought to our screens.
25 Q. General Dannatt, I want to show you another document which may
1 illustrate the same point with respect to paramilitaries. This is an
2 order signed by General Mladic on the 28th of July, 1992, and is in
3 response to some of the armed groups that Mr. Ivetic has brought to your
5 The order is signed within two months of Mladic's appointment.
6 The first part of the order describes the problem roughly in the same
7 terms as Mr. Ivetic has described it.
8 Once you can orient yourself to the name of the order and the
9 date, can I ask that we go to e-court page 2 and look at the actual text
10 of the order issued by Mladic himself.
11 And we see here, in paragraph 1 of this order:
12 "All paramilitary formations and their leaders, if their
13 intentions truly are honourable, are to place themselves in the service
14 of the just struggle for the survival of the Serbian people and are to
15 offer to incorporate themselves into the regular SRBiH army units, to be
16 deployed in accordance with their military specialities and level of
17 military training."
18 Before I seek your comment on this, I would ask that we go to the
19 next page, and if I could draw your attention to paragraph 7, which
21 "I will hold the corps commanders in their areas of
22 responsibility and the SRBiH army Main Staff chief of intelligence and
23 security affairs responsible for the implementations [sic] of this
25 Is this an illustration of the concept that you've just described
1 for us in your last answer?
2 A. I think it's more than an example. I think it's the -- it's the
3 order, the unambiguous order that these special units must come under the
4 corps commanders in their areas of responsibilities. I apologise for
5 repetition, but I think I've made that point probably half a dozen times.
6 Q. Now if I can change to a different topic.
7 Mr. Ivetic has suggested to you today, with respect to the
8 15th of July, 1995, meeting, that the desire to keep Mladic's presence at
9 that meeting confidential somehow prevented him from taking appropriate
10 steps to investigate General Smith's claims.
11 Based upon your experience as a senior commander, is this a
12 plausible reason for General Mladic to have failed to have done anything
13 in response to the report by General Smith?
14 A. I give a two-part answer --
15 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, the question misstates the evidence and
16 the questions that were raised.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please assist Mr. Groome in where you
18 think he misrepresented the evidence so that he can correct this.
19 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour. I believe I indicated that the
20 document showed that appropriate steps were taken. The -- the document
21 being the document that was introduced, the 15 July understanding reached
22 between Generals Smith and General Mladic as reported by Yasushi Akashi,
23 another participant of that meeting.
24 JUDGE ORIE: I think Mr. Ivetic is right, that at least in his
25 question it was not suggested that Mr. Mladic could not take the
1 appropriate steps to investigate. I think there was no reference to an
3 The witness has testified about that, about what he considered to
4 be a natural duty to investigate if that information reaches you, but it
5 was not the suggestion Mr. Ivetic made. So would you please rephrase
6 your question.
7 MR. GROOME:
8 Q. General, let me add one more element to my question.
9 The agreement that Mr. Ivetic put before you, General Smith, when
10 he was before this Chamber, was asked about this agreement and whether
11 UNHCR ever did gain access to Srebrenica to which he replied at
12 transcript page 7344 to 45:
13 "I don't think UNHCR ever got access in the end to Srebrenica.
14 "Q. Did Mladic ever give an explanation as to why they were not
15 given access?
16 "A. Not in my memory, no."
17 Having the benefit of General Smith's evidence on this point,
18 does that cause you to question the sincerity of the agreement that was
19 entered into with General Smith on the 15th?
20 A. Yes. It causes me to -- to doubt the sincerity of it, but there
21 was a terrible track record throughout the duration of that conflict of
22 agreements being reached at conferences that were never carried through
23 on the ground. So as disappointing as that observation is, it is not a
25 Q. Mr. Ivetic also spent some time asking questions about matters
1 related to General Mladic being in Belgrade during this period. Given
2 all of the circumstances and your study of the documents and the -- the
3 practical ways in which command function was exercised by the VRS, do you
4 have an opinion whether or not Mladic was in command of his troops while
5 in Belgrade on the 14th, 15th and 16th of July?
6 A. By the letter of the law and VRS regulations, when he was in
7 Belgrade, he was not technically in command of the army. Command having
8 devolved to General Milovanovic as deputy commander. But, in practice,
9 and I have said this before, General Milovanovic would have done nothing
10 that did he not think General Mladic would have agreed with, and any
11 decisions that he took, he would have cleared with General Mladic at the
12 first available opportunity.
13 Therefore, whether, in Belgrade or in Sarajevo, General Mladic
14 continued, in effect, to continue to exercise command over the army. And
15 you invited an opinion, and if I can express an opinion, the lack of
16 evidence that's come to light of General Mladic conducting an
17 investigation into the allegations put to him by General Smith occurs
18 because, actually, General Mladic did not need to conduct that
19 investigation because he knew exactly what had gone on.
20 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I have no further questions.
21 MR. IVETIC: One or two in recross based upon the document that's
22 now on the screen. With Your Honours' permission.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But I'd like to -- if you would not ...
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ORIE: I would like to clarify the issue about the document
1 in which the agreement was laid down.
2 I tried to analyse the line of questioning and the answers given
3 by the witness. I just try to summarise that and would like to hear from
4 the parties whether my recollection is correct or not. And I invite the
5 witness also to carefully listen to my summary.
6 It started with a -- an observation by the witness that if you
7 receive information about executions and rapes, that the witness
8 considered it to be appropriate to take as a measure, to investigate.
9 That's how it started.
10 Then, Mr. Ivetic, you put to the witness the content of the
11 document in which the agreements were described, which is the -- I think
12 it's the memo sent to Mr. Annan and sent by Mr. Akashi. Then you took
13 the witness to the relevant portion where the content of the agreements
14 are described, and you asked the witness whether the instruction to keep
15 Mladic's presence at the meeting confidential, or secret, whether that
16 shed any light on another reason why General Mladic didn't need to rush
17 back to Srebrenica, as you said, to investigate claims made by
18 General Smith. So we are still dealing with the need to investigate.
19 The witness then said no.
20 And then I think the further questions were mainly about what was
21 agreed. I got the impression, first of all, that no explanation had yet
22 been given by the witness, so, therefore, whether there's any other
23 explanation, it's unclear what the first explanation was. And I, in
24 re-reading it, I gained the impression that to investigate allegations of
25 executions and rape were then, in one way or another, linked to all kind
1 of other matters which were agreed upon; that is, ICRC to have access,
2 et cetera, et cetera.
3 So, therefore, the -- both questions and answers are puzzling me.
4 I then understood from your question, Mr. Ivetic, that -- and it
5 was an implicit assumption, I think, in your question - that the
6 obligation to keep matters secret and the silence in the document
7 containing the agreements would have a direct link with the executions
8 and rapes as they were put on the table by General Smith.
9 First of all, is my summary of questions and answer more or less
10 in line with your understanding of what was asked and what was answered?
11 MR. IVETIC: Except for the last part, Your Honour, and perhaps
12 it's because when I started reading that section you did not let me
14 The secrecy is also in relation to the agreements that were
15 reached, including the one that is for the ICRC to have immediate access
16 to prisoners of war, to assess welfare, register and review procedures at
17 Bosnian Serb reception centre in accordance with the Geneva Conventions
18 as to Srebrenica.
19 So if a general like General Smith makes -- raises issues of --
20 of misconduct having occurred, and if a general like General Mladic
21 agrees send in international agencies to assess whether everything is
22 being done properly, that was the -- the -- the crux of the question, and
23 the second paragraph of that understanding on the second page says that
24 these specific agreements will be revealed after the meeting scheduled
25 for Wednesday, 19 July 1995. So again there was an overarching cloak of
1 secrecy over this meeting and for the agreements reached not to be
2 revealed until that later date. That was the direction I intended to go.
3 I apologise if I was inartful.
4 JUDGE ORIE: That's the crux of your position.
5 Mr. Groome, do you have any comment on my summary of what was
6 asked and what was -- the answers were?
7 MR. GROOME: I don't think it's inaccurate. I had some other
8 impressions, but I'm not sure it is all that relevant for me to voice
10 JUDGE ORIE: Then I have the following question to you. Because
11 it comes down, to some extent, to the inclusion or the exclusion of an
12 investigation into executions and rape in this document as part of what
13 was agreed. If I would put you to the following, that giving access to
14 camps, et cetera, would not in any way resolve the issue of persons being
15 executed because they usually do not live in camps but they are buried,
16 as you have said, already by that time, that's how I understood your
17 testimony, therefore the content of the agreement seems not to cover the
18 issue - at least that issue - raised by General Smith, that executions
19 and rapes had happened. And I'm focussing primarily on executions
20 because rape victims may still be visited by ICRC, if need be.
21 Could you please comment on this understanding of the relation
22 between what Mr. -- General Smith put on the table and the content of the
23 agreement -- agreements reached.
24 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, yes, I agree with your assessment. I
25 see nothing in the page headed "Understandings from Belgrade discussions"
1 that tells me that there had been any conversation, any further
2 conversation, between General Mladic and General Smith, and between
3 General Mladic and anybody else, that instigated any kind of
4 investigation into the allegations that General Smith had put to
5 General Mladic previously. And the agreement, the understanding about
6 the ICRC having immediate access, is -- is very clear. It's -- it's
7 fine. But they're going have access to people who were alive, who were
8 at the Bosnian Serb reception centre. These weren't the people missing
9 because by that stage they were dead and they were buried some distance
10 away from Srebrenica itself. History records that, and that is fact.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, any further questions? I'm wondering
12 whether -- how much time you would need because we are at a time --
13 MR. IVETIC: I would say approximately five minutes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Then would you prefer - and perhaps you want to
15 consult with your client - to do that now?
16 Mr. Groome, next question being whether you would wish to start
17 with Ms. Tabeau's evidence today after a break which would leave us some
18 20 to 25 minutes.
19 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. My request would be in this
20 session that we finish General Dannatt's testimony and that in the next
21 session we begin Ms. Tabeau's testimony. She is waiting.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, if that is agreeable to Mr. Mladic.
23 Because, otherwise, we would take break.
24 [Defence counsel confer]
25 MR. IVETIC: My client is asking for the break at this time,
1 Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll take the break first.
3 Could Mr. Dannatt follow the usher. We'd like to see you back in
4 20 minutes.
5 [The witness stands down]
6 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break, and we resume at quarter to 2.00.
7 --- Recess taken at 1.23 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.
9 JUDGE ORIE: While the witness is brought in, I now address some
10 of the exhibits I referred to before the -- before.
11 P1501, the Chamber accepts the Prosecution's position that it
12 relates to, in addition to the testimony of witnesses with whom he has
13 been used in court, other documentary evidence and that the Prosecution
14 intends to rely on it in its final closing brief.
15 Accordingly, the Chamber considers that P1501 can remain in
16 evidence in its current form. I'll deal with the others -- I'll just
18 [The witness takes the stand]
19 JUDGE ORIE: With the apologies to you, Mr. Dannatt, I just deal
20 with a few administrative matters.
21 As to P1739, P1740 and P1481, the Chamber accepts the
22 Prosecution's submissions that the length of these documents cannot be
23 meaningfully reduced without significantly undermining their potential
24 probative value and notes that these can also remain in evidence in their
25 present form.
1 Turning to P1502 and P1736, the Chamber instructs the Registry to
2 replace their current versions with the redacted ones and, in particular,
3 with doc ID 0293-5619-RED and doc ID 0095-0901-RED.
4 Mr. Ivetic, you still had a few questions for the witness.
5 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: My apologies again, Mr. Dannatt, for dealing with
7 other matters.
8 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:
9 Q. General, I would direct your attention to the document which is
10 still up on the screen in e-court, which is P501 which is dated the
11 28th of July, 1992. I would like to go through some of the provisions
12 that were skipped and ask for your comment on the same. Beginning with
13 paragraph number 2:
14 "Individuals and groups which had carried out crimes, looting and
15 other types of criminal acts are not to be included into units. They are
16 to be disarmed, arrested, and criminal proceedings are to be instituted
17 [sic] against them in SRBiH army courts regardless of their citizenship."
18 In relation to that paragraph, is there anything inappropriate
19 about a general issuing such an order as to paramilitary groups when
20 determining whether they would be integrated into the VRS or not?
21 A. No, I think that's a very proper exclusion of groups that he did
22 not want to come into the military command and control structure and I
23 take it as of -- a tacit acknowledgment that things had happened in the
24 past that they didn't wish to happen in the future.
25 Q. If you look at 3:
1 "Paramilitary formations, groups and individuals which refuse to
2 be placed under unified SRBiH army command are to be disarmed and
3 arrested, in co-operation with the MUP /Ministry of Interior/ and
4 criminal proceedings are to be initiated against them for crimes
6 The same question, sir: Would this --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask for Mr. Groome.
8 Is there any dispute about 2 and we have now 3 to be not
10 MR. GROOME: No, Your Honour, and I'm sitting here wondering --
11 maybe there has been some misunderstanding but I've never suggested that
12 anything in this order was inappropriate.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I think what Mr. Groome, if I under
14 stood him well, wanted to establish was kind of inclusion or
15 subordination of groups, and he has not expressed in any way -- and
16 apparently he now says that 2 and 3 are not inappropriate at all.
17 Please proceed.
18 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I direct your attention to
19 paragraph 38 of the witness's report, which indicates:
20 "Moreover, there is documentary evidence of General Mladic
21 accepting command of all paramilitaries and territorial organisations,"
22 and so [overlapping speakers] ...
23 JUDGE ORIE: Does that arise from the re-examination? You could
24 have asked this question in cross-examination, isn't it?
25 MR. IVETIC: Yes. But it is arising from Mr. Groome's dealing
1 with this document, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. I'll not stop you any further. But let's try
3 to -- of course, all -- and that's a matter that was -- that arose a
4 couple of times, all may be almost all or that's clear and there seems to
5 be no dispute about these matters that where the general rule is
6 described in paragraph 1, that some exceptions are made.
7 Please proceed.
8 MR. IVETIC:
9 Q. If you can take the time, sir, to look through the remaining
10 items on this page, 4, 5, and 6, I believe, and I would ask you in
11 relation to those, is this a demonstration of General Mladic doing
12 precisely what you as an expert would expect of a proper general to do
13 when integrating units that had previously been labelled paramilitaries
14 into the armed forces that one commands?
15 A. With relation to all those paragraphs, I agree with you, that is
16 exactly what he should be doing. It was a noble intent expressed in
17 1992. My query would be whether that intent was followed through in the
18 totality of the war to 1995.
19 JUDGE ORIE: But that's not the question that is put to you. And
20 there seems -- Mr. Groome, may I take it that there is no disagreement
21 on -- between the parties no dispute about this to be an appropriate ...
22 MR. GROOME: No, we're in a full agreement with respect to that,
23 Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Therefore, the ...
25 MR. IVETIC:
1 Q. Would shortages in qualified officers have affected the ability
2 for these orders to have been complied with at all levels down the chain?
3 A. It might have affected their compliance in an immediate
4 time-frame, but I don't see why it should have affected their compliance
5 over an extended time-frame.
6 Q. Thank you for those answers.
7 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, that concludes the re-cross.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
9 Mr. Groome, you're on your feet.
10 MR. GROOME: One question arising.
11 JUDGE ORIE: One question arising from further cross.
13 Further Re-examination by Mr. Groome:
14 Q. General, what would be the implications of -- once this order is
15 issued, of -- the period after this up until the end of the war, of
16 paramilitary groups such as the Skorpions being incorporated into VRS
17 military operations?
18 A. Well, sir, my understanding would be that this order, as passed
19 in 1992, had an open-ended validity and that other paramilitary groups,
20 as might have been set up during the course of the war, should also have
21 come under command of the main VRS structure, as was the intention behind
22 this order issued in 1992.
23 MR. GROOME: Nothing further, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, Defence, no further questions?
25 MR. IVETIC: None for this witness, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
2 Then, Mr. Dannatt, I would like to thank you very much, because
3 you're -- we have concluded your -- to hear your evidence. I'd like to
4 thank you very much for coming to The Hague and for having answered all
5 the questions that were put to you by the parties and by the Bench, and I
6 wish you a safe return home again.
7 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, thank you. And I will remain at the
8 disposal of the Court if I can assist at any stage in the future. Thank
9 you, sir.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that offer. You may follow the usher.
11 [The witness withdrew]
12 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, all that remains now is for the
13 Prosecution to move to formally admit the expert statement of
14 General Dannatt that's been marked for identification as P2629. And I
15 would also tender at this time as a demonstrative exhibit, P2630, marked
16 for identification, that's the chart that has the updated citations.
17 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, we would supplement our previous
18 objection to the entry in evidence of the -- a statement as an expert
19 report based upon the witness's concession under oath that someone else
20 of a legal background, perhaps working for an international prosecutor's
21 office, drafted the agreement with him. Statement, pardon me, not the
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, the Chamber denies your objections,
25 including the one raised newly today, and admits into evidence P2629 and
2 Mr. Groome.
3 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, just apart from that, just to make very
4 clear for the record that the person who served as his legal research
5 assistant, although she has a background in international criminal law,
6 she has never and does not work for the Office of the Prosecutor.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, I carefully listened to what Mr. --
8 Mr. Ivetic said for an international prosecutor's office. Not this.
9 That's how I understood it. And apart from that, we have -- in this
10 understanding of the additional submission, we have ruled there is no
11 specific position that the person which may have assisted in drafting the
12 report was specifically employed by the ICTY Office of the Prosecution.
13 MR. IVETIC: Correct. And my statement was made on the witness's
14 testimony where he said he didn't know. So I did not specify --
15 JUDGE ORIE: You could have further explored the matter, but you
16 didn't, and that's the understanding of the Chamber. And we now have on
17 the record, Mr. Groome, that you say, even if the witness doesn't know,
18 you know where she was not employed.
19 MR. GROOME: That's correct, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: That's on the record.
21 Then could the next witness be escorted into the courtroom.
22 [The witness entered court]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Ms. Tabeau.
24 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Tabeau, you'll be with us only for 15 minutes
1 today and we'll continue tomorrow, but, nevertheless, I would like to
2 invite you to make the solemn declaration, which is required by the
3 Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
4 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
5 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
6 WITNESS: EWA TABEAU
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Tabeau. Please be seated. You'll
8 first be examined by Ms. Marcus. Ms. Marcus is counsel for the
9 Prosecution, which may not come as a surprise to you.
10 Please proceed, Ms. Marcus.
11 MS. MARCUS: Thank you very much, Your Honours. Good
13 Examination by Ms. Marcus:
14 Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Tabeau.
15 A. Good afternoon.
16 Q. You provided an updated CV to the Prosecution in the past few
17 days; is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 MS. MARCUS: Your Honours, that CV is uploaded and it has been
20 now assigned the MFI exhibit number P2789. I will be tendering all the
21 materials at the very conclusion of Dr. Tabeau's testimony as I mentioned
23 Your Honours, Dr. Tabeau has brought along with her hard copies
24 of her reports for ease of reference during her testimony. I have not
25 have had an opportunity to ask the Defence if they have any objection to
1 her having them in front of her, but I'd like to ask the Chamber now and
2 the Defence if that would be acceptable.
3 MR. IVETIC: As long as they're unmarked, I have no objection.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Tabeau, you heard, as long as they are unmarked,
5 the Chamber also has no problems. But they should be unmarked. Not even
6 your own notes written on it, just the clean copies.
7 THE WITNESS: Yes.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. Marcus.
9 MS. MARCUS: Thank you. Your Honours, as discussed prior to the
10 commencement of Dr. Tabeau's testimony, part of Dr. Tabeau's evidence
11 will be tendered via Rule 92 ter and 94 bis, and some solely via Rule 94
12 bis. I will now lay the foundation for those transcripts and reports to
13 be tendered via Rule 92 ter.
14 Q. Dr. Tabeau, did you testify before this Tribunal on the
15 7th of December of 2010 in the Stanisic and Simatovic case?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. And in that case, did you present a proof of death, or POD,
18 expert report dated 6th of August, 2010?
19 A. Yes, I did.
20 Q. Did you also testify before this Tribunal in the Karadzic case on
21 the 25th and 26th of April, and the 1st of May of 2012?
22 A. Yes, I did.
23 Q. In the Karadzic case, during that testimony, did you tender an
24 IDPs and refugees expert report from the Slobodan Milosevic case which
25 was dated 4 April 2003?
1 A. Yes. But actually not the whole report, just the annexes to this
3 Q. Before coming to court today, did you have an opportunity to
4 review the portions of those testimonies and the sections of those expert
5 reports which the Prosecution is tendering now in this case?
6 A. Yes, I did.
7 Q. Are there any clarifications you would like to make to that
8 evidence at this time?
9 A. No, there are no clarifications.
10 Q. Do you confirm the truthfulness and accuracy of that evidence?
11 A. Yes, I do.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly pause between question and answer.
13 Thank you.
14 MS. MARCUS: Thank you. I will try my best.
15 Your Honours, the Stanisic and Simatovic testimony is P2785, MFI.
16 The section of the Stanisic and Simatovic POD report is P2787, MFI. The
17 excerpt of the Karadzic testimony is -- is P2786, MFI. And the portion
18 of the Milosevic IDPs and refugees report is 11102, MFI. Those are
19 Dr. Tabeau's 92 ter materials.
20 I will now move on to the attestation process for
21 three additional items --
22 JUDGE ORIE: One second.
23 MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: The number 11 --
25 MS. MARCUS: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please repeat the portion of the Milosevic
2 IDPs and refugees report.
3 MS. MARCUS: Yes, my apologies. That would be P2788, MFI.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
5 MS. MARCUS: Thank you. I will now move on to the attestation
6 process for three additional items which Dr. Tabeau has prepared in the
7 past few days in preparation for her testimony today.
8 Could I ask the Court Officer to please call up 65 ter -- well,
9 I'll give the exhibit number. P2790, MFI, which is a one-page addendum
10 to the POD annex, P2797, MFI. This addendum pertains to four victims.
11 Q. Dr. Tabeau, was this addendum pertaining to four victims prepared
12 by your team under your supervision in preparation for your testimony
14 A. Yes, it was.
15 Q. Was it prepared using the identical methodology as the POD annex?
16 A. Yes, it was.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Marcus, could you repeat the 65 ter number for
18 P2790 MFI.
19 MS. MARCUS: The 65 ter number, Your Honour, is 30454 and the MFI
20 number is P2790.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
22 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. Did you review it in detail in the same way in which the way you
24 reviewed the POD annex prior to it being to submitted today?
25 A. Yes, I did.
1 Q. Do you affirm the accuracy of this addendum?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 MS. MARCUS: Could I ask the Court Officer to now please call up
4 P2791, MFI, which is 65 ter 30455. This is a table of name
5 correspondence between the POD annex and the victims list which was
6 attached to the indictment.
7 Q. Dr. Tabeau, was this document prepared by your team under your
8 supervision and reviewed comprehensively by you in preparation for your
9 testimony today?
10 A. Yes, it was.
11 Q. Can you tell us, very briefly, please, what the purpose of this
12 document is.
13 A. There are minor spelling differences in the names of victims in
14 the schedules as compared with the spelling of these names in the annex
15 to the POD report prepared for this case. This document explains the
16 spelling differences, explains the sources which basically relate to the
17 names as reported in the operation census and on the schedules.
18 Q. Do you affirm the accuracy of this document?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 MS. MARCUS: Could I now ask the Court Officer to please call up
21 P2793, MFI, which is 65 ter 30465. This is a list of corrections or
22 clarifications to the proof of death annex, which is now given the MFI
23 number P2797.
24 Q. Dr. Tabeau, did your team prepare this list of corrections and
25 clarifications to the POD annex under your supervision in preparation for
1 your testimony today?
2 A. Yes, we did.
3 Q. Did you have an opportunity to review it comprehensively prior to
4 coming to court?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. Do you affirm its accuracy and the accuracy of the POD annex in
7 conjunction with these corrections and clarifications?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 MS. MARCUS: Your Honours, the POD report, which will be P2796,
10 MFI, contains updated numerical data emerging from this table of
11 corrections. In other words, that report has been updated with these
12 corrections. The Prosecution was, however, not planning to produce an
13 updated version of the POD annex in that it is 656 pages, and this might
14 be cumbersome. We what we were planning was, with leave of the Chamber,
15 is just to have the POD annex kept as it is and with this table of
16 corrections one can compare the two. This is just as we do in our
17 practice with witness statements and we tender a clarification with it,
18 that was the way in which we planned to proceed with the POD annex.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any objection by the Defence on this way of
21 MR. IVETIC: With respect to the POD annex, no.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Then you may proceed as you suggest, Ms. Marcus.
23 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Finally, Dr. Tabeau, based upon your expertise, do you affirm the
25 truthfulness and accuracy of the results of the analysis carried out in
1 your expert reports for this case; namely, the 2013 Srebrenica update
2 report, P2794, MFI, and its annexes, P2795, MFI; the proof of death
3 report, P2796, MFI, and its annex, P2797, MFI; and the IDPs report for
4 the Mladic case, P2798, MFI?
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 MS. MARCUS: Your Honours, I would just now, in my two minutes
7 remaining, present a very brief public summary for the witness, and I
8 have explained the purpose of this to the witness.
9 JUDGE ORIE: If can you do it in two minutes, you're invited to
10 do so.
11 MS. MARCUS: Thank you.
12 Dr. Ewa Tabeau is a demographic expert and statistician whose
13 evidence relates to the demographic shifts which occurred during the wars
14 in the former Yugoslavia. She testifies about the process of updating
15 the list of Srebrenica missing and the DNA-based identification of
16 Srebrenica victims. Dr. Tabeau also provides expert evidence pertaining
17 to the circumstances of deaths of approximately 2.000 named victims from
18 the municipalities component of the Mladic case.
19 Your Honours, that concludes the public summary. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Marcus.
21 Ms. Tabeau, we'll adjourn for the day. But I'd like to instruct
22 you that you should not speak or communicate in whatever way with
23 whomever about your testimony, either given today, or still to be given
24 in the following days. We'd like to see you back on -- tomorrow, at 9.30
25 in the morning in this same courtroom, III. And you may follow the
2 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 JUDGE ORIE: We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume tomorrow,
5 Wednesday, the 13th of November, 9.30 in the morning, in this same
6 courtroom, III.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.15 p.m.,
8 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day of
9 November, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.