1 Thursday, 5 December 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
9 This is the case IT-09-92-T, The Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 The Chamber was informed that the Prosecution wanted to raise a
12 preliminary matter.
13 MR. GROOME: Good morning, Your Honours.
14 The first one relates to P431. On the 19th of November, the
15 Chamber brought to our attention that the English and B/C/S pages
16 uploaded in e-court did not match. We've corrected that error and have
17 uploaded a corrected version of the exhibit. It is 65 ter 02353B, and I
18 would ask that the Chamber authorise the replacement of that exhibit.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Groome, is the original or the English
21 MR. GROOME: Both, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Both.
23 May I take it that there's no objection against replacing both
24 the original version and the translation of P431 to be replaced by the
25 newly uploaded one?
1 MR. IVETIC: No objection, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, you may replace both versions of
3 P431 in e-court by the new ones uploaded.
4 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the second issue relates to P2602. In
5 that case, we've discovered that the English translation of that document
6 is incorrect. We have uploaded a corrected version under document ID
7 021164161, and we would ask that that authorisation be given to replace
8 the English translation of that document.
9 JUDGE ORIE: No objections apparently.
10 MR. IVETIC: None.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, you may replace the old English
12 translation of P2602 by the new one uploaded as doc ID 0211-6416-1.
13 Any other matter?
14 MR. GROOME: No, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Then could the witness be escorted in the courtroom.
16 MR. WEBER: Good morning, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Weber.
18 [The witness takes the stand]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Theunens. Please be seated.
20 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, before we continue, I would like to
22 remind you that you are still bound by the solemn declaration that you've
23 given at the beginning of your testimony.
24 And Mr. Weber will now continue his examination-in-chief.
25 Mr. Weber, please proceed.
1 MR. WEBER: Thank you.
2 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]
3 Examination by Mr. Weber: [Continued]
4 Q. Good morning, Mr. Theunens.
5 A. Good morning, Mr. Weber.
6 Q. On Tuesday we generally discussed some of the principles and
7 functions of command and control. I will return to them throughout the
8 course of your examination when we discuss some particular materials.
9 Today, I would like to return to where we left off. We were
10 talking about the notion of All People's Defence in the former
12 On page 17 of Part 1, you discuss Article 97 the 1982 ONO law
13 regarding the authority of the SFRY Presidency.
14 MR. WEBER: This can be found in e-court in B/C/S on page 53.
15 Under exhibit number P3029, marked for identification. Thank you,
16 Ms. Stewart.
17 Q. Did the SFRY Presidency take any steps to limit the authority of
18 the republics over their respective Territorial Defence units or
19 Territorial Defences prior to 1991?
20 A. Indeed, Your Honours, and this is happening in the latter half of
21 the 1980s under the so-called Jedinstvo plan which reviews, as I would
22 call it, the strategic concept for the use of the SFRY armed forces
23 transforms the General Staff of the JNA into the General Staff of the
24 SFRY armed forces. And also then in 1990, there is the order by
25 General Adzic, chief of the General Staff of the SFRY armed forces, to
1 safe-guard the weapons of the TO in JNA warehouses.
2 Q. How did this limit the authority of the republics over their
3 respective Territorial Defence?
4 A. Well, Your Honours, I will just summarise what is described in
5 the report. In the sense that the republics were responsible for the
6 training, organisation, and combat readiness of the TOs, and after the --
7 the death President Tito in 1980, there were fears amongst some in the
8 former Yugoslavia that some republics, in particular Slovenia and
9 Croatia, would try to develop their TO into republican armed forces. And
10 as is described in the report, then steps are undertaken, the ones I
11 mentioned, in order to increase the authority of the JNA over the TO, for
12 example, by renaming the chief of General Staff, as I indicated, and also
13 what I didn't mention yet, the replacement of the armies as -- as -- as a
14 geographic military structure as well as a command structure by military
15 districts whereby, for example, the military district would cover the
16 territory of eastern Croatia, the largest part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as
17 well as the largest part of Serbia.
18 Q. Did the Bosnian Serb political leadership apply or adapt any of
19 the ONO principles during the mobilisation of Bosnian Serbs into
20 Territorial Defence units prior to May 1992?
21 A. I'm not sure I understand the question, but I think it's
22 important to clarify that when the Bosnian Serbs established their own
23 political structures, starting in the latter half of 1991, and further
24 expanding into the first half of 1992, obviously they also need some kind
25 of an armed force, so steps are made to mobilise a Bosnian Serb TO. But
1 this is a self-declared or a self-established structure which should not
2 be confounded with the TO of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as it
3 existed under the concept of All People's Defence.
4 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have Exhibit D78, page 2
5 of both versions, for the witness.
6 Q. Mr. Theunens, before you is going to appear the Variant A and B
7 instructions from 19th December of 1991.
8 I'm going to start with the first paragraph at the top of the
9 page. The section indicates that these instructions elaborate the
10 unified tasks, measures, and other activities that will be undertaken
11 within the national community of the Serbian people in Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina with the aim of implementing the plebiscite decision of the
13 Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to live in a single state.
14 Could you please assist us first with what plebiscite decision is
15 this a reference to?
16 A. Your Honours, in -- I believe on 9 and 10 of November, the
17 Bosnian Serbs organised a -- yeah, plebiscite in Bosnia-Herzegovina where
18 the voters can express themselves or could express themselves about
19 whether they wanted to stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina or not. I remember -
20 and I'm not sure whether I included these documents in this report but
21 when I worked on other cases - that, for example, the JNA facilitated the
22 participation of its personnel in that plebiscite. I mean, JNA units
23 deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 Q. I'd like you to also just take a look at paragraph 2 indicating
25 "the tasks, measures, and other activities defined in these instructions
1 will be undertaken in order to increase mobility and readiness for the
2 defence of the interests of the Serbian people."
3 From these two initial paragraphs, do you have any comments on
4 what the purpose of these instructions are?
5 A. Your Honours, the purpose of these instructions is, I think the
6 text is quite clear, is to -- to organise the Bosnian Serbs in order
7 to -- to -- to be ready if needed to use military means; i.e., it means
8 to mobilise, as is further explained in the text, police forces as well
9 as TO. But, again, at that stage, there was a republican police in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina and a republican TO but no ethnically based
11 structures. I mean, there was no Bosniak or Muslim TO or no Bosnian
12 Croatian TO or no Bosnian Serb TO, and the same applies to the police
14 MR. WEBER: If we could please have page 5 of the B/C/S original
15 and page 4 of the English. And in the English, if we could please direct
16 ourselves towards the bottom half of the page.
17 Q. According to item 2 under the second stage of Variant A --
18 MR. WEBER: The Prosecution would note, for the record, that the
19 same language appears under the second stage of Variant B.
20 Q. -- these instructions envision the mobilisation of all police
21 forces from among the Serbian people and their gradual resubordination to
22 JNA command. In considering the principles of All People's Defence, when
23 would such an instruction be given?
24 A. Your Honours, unless it would concern an exercise, such a
25 decision would be taken if one of the three states would be declared;
1 i.e., the state of war, the state of imminent threat of war, or the state
2 of emergency.
3 Q. Would a mobilisation only occur during any of those particular
5 A. Yes. Unless it would be for -- it would be an exercise, i.e.,
6 for training purposes.
7 Q. Under item 3, it states that: "Through the responsible organs,
8 ensure the implementation of the order on the mobilisation of reserve JNA
9 forces and Territorial Defence units."
10 Under this, when would such a mobilisation be undertaken
11 according to the All People's Defence?
12 A. Your Honours -- I'm sorry. In my understanding under the same
13 conditions as I have indicated in my answer to the previous question;
14 i.e., one of the three states or for training purposes during an
16 Q. On page 22 of Part 2 of your report, which is P3029, e-court page
17 236 in the B/C/S, you note the conclusions from the Second Assembly of
18 the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 21 November 1991 and its
19 decision to mobilise "Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we see the document on the e-court, please.
21 MR. WEBER: Of course, Your Honour. It's in the English page
22 238, B/C/S page 236 of P3029.
23 Your Honour, I see that it might be continuing on from the
24 previous page 2, at the top.
25 Q. My question, Mr. Theunens, in relation to these earlier
1 conclusions, is whether the December 1991 variants are consistent with
2 the intention to further mobilise individuals of Bosnian Serb ethnicity.
3 A. Yes, they are, Your Honours, and I -- I try to include what I
4 consider main political decisions on the Bosnian Serb level in order to
5 provide the context for military develops [sic] we are seeing as is also
6 expressed through the documents on the two variants.
7 Q. On page 15 of Part 2 of your report, which can be found on the
8 document before us in English, page 231, and B/C/S page 229, on this
9 page, you state that:
10 "Serb dominated 2nd Military District units also actively (and
11 overtly) support the SDS in taking over of power in certain strategically
12 located municipalities in BiH."
13 How was this done?
14 A. Well, Your Honours, in -- in this conclusion, I am referring to
15 what is discussed in detail under title 3 of section 4 of the report,
16 i.e., implementation of Bosnian Serb strategic goals; and more
17 specifically, the take-overs of municipalities in northern BiH between
18 April and May 1992, which is discussed on pages 117 to 162 of Part 2 of
19 the report, whereby we see that armed formations consisting of, I mean,
20 generically, Bosnian Serb TO, Bosnian Serb police, sometimes
21 volunteers/paramilitaries originating from Serbia, including units that
22 enjoy particular relations with the minister of the interior of the
23 Republic of Serbia, together with the JNA or, in some cases, the JNA does
24 not participate, i.e., actually facilitates the take-over by just not
25 intervening. So these armed formations, they take control of a number of
1 municipalities, and when we look at these municipalities and we look at
2 the map, well, this actually corresponds with the implementation of
3 strategic goal number 2, namely, establishing a corridor between Krajina
4 and Semberija.
5 Q. Were these take-overs implemented in a manner consistent with the
6 Variant A and B instructions?
7 A. Yes, they were. Because we see that local Serb TO and police
8 units are being established. The SDS plays a role in that. These units
9 are mobilised. And as I mentioned then depending on the situation, I
10 mean, you have to look at the details of each take-over, the JNA
11 participates or does not participate but then does not prevent a
12 take-over. And when the JNA participates they -- there are examples that
13 they have command and control over the take-over. But in any event, a
14 unified and single command and control over what I would call Serb forces
15 conducting these take-overs is established.
16 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have 65 ter 2887, page
17 11 of the English and page 16 of the B/C/S.
18 The Prosecution notes that only a small excerpt of this report
19 was admitted as P97. However, this report is referenced on -- on
20 numerous occasions in Mr. Theunens's report, in different parts of it.
21 Q. Mr. Theunens, in your report, in Part 2, in a number of footnotes
22 but, in particular, in footnotes 810 and 32, you discuss this 20
23 March 1992 2nd Military District report on the elevation of the situation
24 in its zone of responsibility. What is the context of this document?
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. ...
1 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I'm just asking for a general
2 explanation of Mr. Theunens' -- why he thought this document was relevant
3 to his review, but I might be going to this particular page in a second.
4 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the context is the situation as it is
5 say during spring 1992 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is marked by a degree
6 of confusion and uncertainty about the future. Because on one hand there
7 is the JNA. On the other hand, we see that the -- the main ethnic groups
8 are establishing armed structures. And at that stage the future of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether or not it will stay in Yugoslavia, has not
10 been decided but is the subject of negotiations at the highest level even
11 if obviously the parties are ready -- are already taking or making their
13 MR. WEBER:
14 Q. And with respect to this 20 March 1992 report from the
15 2nd Military District, what information was relevant to your analysis in
16 the context of what was going on?
17 A. Your Honours, this document shows that the 2nd Military District
18 is providing support to the Bosnian Serbs, for example, by distributing
19 weapons. It also shows that there is a -- I would say a coherence
20 between the goals of the 2nd Military District as well as the SDS even
21 if -- I think in one of the paragraphs there is some criticism on what
22 the SDS, SDS is being too aggressive. But in conclusion, the document
23 show there is a consistency between the goals pursued by the Bosnian Serb
24 as established by the SDS and the 2nd Military District.
25 Q. On page 14 of Part 2 of your report, if we could stay on this
1 document on e-court, but it is on -- in terms of the reference to
2 Mr. Theunens's report, that's in e-court on English page 230 and B/C/S
3 page 228. You note that this 2nd Military District report indicates
4 there were 69.198 Serb volunteers in the zone of responsibility of the
5 2nd Military District. Does the list before you represent the breakdown
6 of volunteers in each municipality who had been mobilised into the
7 Territorial Defence of the SRBiH by that time?
8 A. I don't see the top of the page. Because, I mean, the Bosnian
9 Serb, if I know it, that's -- I mean, I don't see the top but I agree
10 with your suggestion. It is indeed a detailed breakdown. I think of
11 notice also and that -- I put that in page 14 is that when the report is
12 discussing Bosnian Serbs, these are qualified as volunteers where when it
13 consists the other parties, i.e., the -- the Croats or the Muslims, then
14 it -- the -- the term paramilitary formations is used, which also shows
15 the position the 2nd Military District of the JNA had in relation or --
16 or on these groups.
17 MR. WEBER: Your Honours, at this time the Prosecution tenders
18 the complete report, 65 ter 2887.
19 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Document 2887 receives number P3030,
22 Your Honours.
23 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
24 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have 65 ter 09189.
25 Page 2 in both versions.
1 Q. Mr. Theunens, the document coming up is in Part 2, footnote 48,
2 of your report.
3 Appearing before us is -- is going to be the report approved by
4 Blagoje Adzic, forwarded to the JNA 2nd Military District on
5 3 April 1992.
6 I'd like to focus your attention under task 1 in the middle of
7 the page.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
9 MR. IVETIC: I don't think we have the actual proper footnote.
10 It's not Part 2, footnote 48.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Footnote 48 reads: "ERN B/C/S," and then a long
12 number, "order from the SSNO Colonel -- General Adzic," dated the 3rd of
14 And this seems to be a report rather than an order, Mr. Weber.
15 Or is that?
16 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I believe if we could see the previous
17 page, this is the continuation of that document, possibly.
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, if you allow me, it is indeed the
19 document I refer to and it -- I mean, the correct description is, of
20 course, "report" instead of "order," so the text in footnote 48 may have
21 to be corrected.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, does this resolve your problem?
23 MR. IVETIC: Well, the ERN matches but the signature does not so
24 I'm still confused.
25 THE WITNESS: You know, if you look at the cover page, the
1 Major-General Simonovic, he forwards the document, which consists of
2 report of a meeting General Blagoje Adzic had, and during that meeting he
3 also gives instructions. And actually when you look at the cover page
4 and this is where, I mean, "confusion" between brackets, may come from,
5 it clearly states: "Please have in mind the tasks are exclusively for
6 your personal use."
7 I mean "tasks" in a military context means "order," but I agree
8 with you that the correct description of the document should have been
10 MR. WEBER: If we could please go to page 2 of this document.
11 Q. Thank you for those clarifications, Mr. Theunens.
12 Again, if I could direct your attention to --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel please speak into the
14 microphone for the sake of interpretation. Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
16 MR. WEBER: Understood. I was just looking over the document.
17 My apologies to the booth.
18 Q. Under task 1 in the middle of the page:
19 "The command of the 2nd Military District appears to be
20 instructed in the shortest possible term to start to form headquarters,
21 detachments, and brigades of volunteer units and to appoint them adequate
22 commanding staff from the JNA and to fill them with arms and equipment."
23 It appears that the term set for this was 15 April 1992. Could
24 you please explain to us how this task would facilitate the command and
25 control of the 2nd Military District over the existing Bosnian Serb TO
2 A. Your Honour, it is as the document states, that is, that these
3 units - I mean, headquarters, detachments and related units - have to be
4 led by a commanding officer of the JNA, which obviously facilitates a
5 single and unified command and control.
6 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, the Prosecution tenders 65 ter 9189 into
8 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Document 09189 receives number P3031,
11 Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
13 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have Exhibit P3027.
14 Q. Mr. Theunens, this document is in Part 2 section 1 of your
15 report. I see in footnotes 125 and 126, just for your assistance.
16 These are the decisions distributed on 16 April 1992 by SRBiH
17 Minister Of Defence Bogdan Subotic. In your report, you note these were
18 sent to the governments of the self-declared Serb Autonomous Regions in
19 Bosnia. What are the significance of these decisions to your analysis?
20 A. Well, Your Honours, as I explained, these -- these decisions show
21 that the Bosnian Serbs in their -- in their - how would I say it? - in
22 the way to creating their own state in -- in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
23 explicitly foresee that they may have to use military means -- or they
24 would have to use military means in order to achieve that goal. And this
25 document then demonstrates how self-declared TO units are being mobilised
1 following the decision on the day before of an imminent state of war by
2 these Bosnian Serb authorities. Or by the self-declared Bosnian Serb
3 authorities. And again, I think there is reference is made in the
4 document on the requirement for close co-operation with the -- with
5 the -- with the JNA.
6 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have the second page of
7 both versions.
8 Q. Before you is the statement of reasons on this page. If we
9 could -- we have it.
10 The first statement states:
11 "The municipal TO Staffs that have operated regularly so far
12 shall remain in the same formation and establishment. Set up TO Staffs
13 in newly formed Serbian municipalities on the same principle."
14 Could you please tell us what the -- was the reason that there
15 were newly formed Serbian municipalities that required the setting up of
16 new TO Staffs by mid-April 1992.
17 A. Well, Your Honours, in -- in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it existed at
18 the time, i.e., one of the six republics of the Socialist Federative
19 Republic of Yugoslavia, there were no Serb municipalities nor there were
20 Bosnian Croatian or Muslim municipalities. They were all municipalities
21 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We see on the political level that the Bosnian
22 Serbs are establishing their own structures, both at the, I mean, we seen
23 the SARs, so the Serb Autonomous Regions and the Serb Autonomous
24 Districts - SAR and SAOs - similar measures are taken on the municipal
25 level, and obviously as I have mentioned there is a requirement also to
1 have military structures, so they rely for that on existing TOs whereby
2 on the basis of those they create their own structures and this is, of
3 course, easier in municipalities with a Bosnian Serb majority, and they
4 do the same for the police. And while doing so, they seek co-operation
5 with the JNA as is illustrated, for example, in this document by
6 subordinating these units to the JNA. So there they try to apply to the
7 legislative framework as it existed in the SFRY and also under the
8 concept of All People's Defence.
9 Q. Since this document is on our screen, I just want to direct your
10 attention to the end of the statement of reasons where it states:
11 "In preparing the instruction as well as the engagement of TO
12 unit, achieve co-operation with JNA units, and where possible, put them
13 under a single command."
14 Is this statement consistent with the views you've already
15 expressed on this document?
16 A. It is, Your Honours. And the -- where possible I explained that
17 earlier it is at that stage the JNA is still -- I mean, the 2nd Military
18 District, there are still a substantial number of non-Serbs part of it.
19 And even among Serb officers in the 2nd Military District, they do not
20 necessarily share the objective of the SDS. So that's why the -- the
21 notion of "where possible" is included because the point of view of
22 2nd Military District is not entirely clear at that stage.
23 Q. On page 43 of Part 2 of your report, in e-court English page 259,
24 B/C/S page 257. Again, this is Exhibit P3029 marked for identification.
25 You conclude:
1 "The establishment of the VRS signifies that the SRBiH TO ceases
2 to exist and that the TO SRBiH staffs and units are integrated into the
4 Could you, at this time, just please explain to us how this
6 A. Yes, Your Honours. During the 16th Assembly Session on 12th of
7 May, 1992, the creation of the VRS is announced. We see in the 1993
8 analysis of combat readiness report that the Main Staff of the VRS is
9 established between 3rd of May and I believe 16 or 19 May 1992. And then
10 orders are issued, for example there is an order by General Mladic in
11 June, determining not only the structure of the VRS, because this has
12 also already been ordered also by Mr. Karadzic, but also explicitly
13 mentioning the integration of the TO and other armed structures into the
14 VRS. And obviously this process takes some time. And I have explained
15 in my report that, for example -- I mean, there are two examples: The
16 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and I believe the Herzegovina Corps where the
17 integration of the Bosnian Serb TO into the VRS takes more time than in
18 other areas.
19 But then there is a September 1992 document by General Mladic
20 which kind of creates an overview of the status of the VRS at that stage,
21 and that document explicitly mentions that everywhere the Bosnian Serb TO
22 has been integrated into the VRS, and this is further then also explained
23 in the 1993 analysis of the combat readiness of the VRS.
24 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have 65 ter 792.
25 Q. Mr. Theunens, this document is in Part 2, footnote 67 and 68, of
1 your report. Before you is a 2nd Military District order dated
2 11 May 1992 from Ratko Mladic. Can you please comment what
3 General Mladic orders under item 1?
4 A. Well, I mean, it's explained in the text he orders to immediately
5 mobilise and establish all war-time units in your -- and this refers to
6 the subordinate units of the 2nd Military District. And those are to
7 include what he describes as Serbian people, Territorial Defence, i.e.,
8 Bosnian Serb TO, as well as volunteer units. Again, these are Bosnian
9 Serb or volunteers from Serbia. And they have to be included in -- in --
10 in JNA establishment units. And he also instructs to ensure command and
11 control over these --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. --
13 THE ACCUSED: Stop.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic. Mr. Mladic, no loud speaking.
15 [Defence counsel confer]
16 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, the comment of my client was directed
17 to the document which does not indicate anywhere the volunteer units from
18 Serbia as the witness has mentioned.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we -- although that could have been left to
20 cross-examination, perhaps, under the present circumstances,
21 Mr. Theunens, could you point us as where volunteer units from Serbia are
23 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, it is correct that this specific
24 document does not mention volunteer units from Serbia. But I was looking
25 or I was commenting on the document in the context of the overall
1 situation as it is existing by that date, i.e., 11 of May, 1992, in
3 JUDGE ORIE: And when you were commenting, did you want to refer
4 to Serb volunteer units or volunteer units from Serbia? Which is not
5 exactly the same.
6 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, what I wanted to refer to, that -- I
7 mean, there are different types of volunteer units or units that are
8 called volunteer units present at that time in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As we
9 see during the take-overs, we see that there are groups that consist --
10 that come from Serbia, consisting of volunteers from Serbia. Among these
11 groups, when I refer then to groups that are active in Sarajevo, and
12 groups I mean by that affiliated with the Radical Party, my understanding
13 is that they consist both of volunteers, Serbian volunteers from
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Serbs from Serbia, from outside
16 JUDGE ORIE: So the -- the proper way of telling us this would
17 have been Serbian volunteer units not excluding those coming from Serbia.
18 THE WITNESS: Exactly, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
20 MR. WEBER:
21 Q. Mr. --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic is seeking a timeout again.
23 Mr. Mladic, only if you lower the volume of your voice such that
24 it is not audible for anyone else in this courtroom. Otherwise, I'll not
25 allow any further consultations.
1 [Defence counsel confer]
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, your voice is ...
3 I noticed that, at the end, you were speaking at an audible
4 volume. Any those matters could be dealt with in cross-examination and
5 could be discussed during the breaks.
6 Mr. Weber, please proceed.
7 MR. WEBER:
8 Q. Mr. Theunens, your previous answer on page 17 was interrupted.
9 You were stating with respect to the first part, under item 1 of this
11 "Again, these are Bosnian Serb volunteers from Serbia and they
12 have to be included in the JNA establish establishment units and he also
13 instructs to ensure command and control over these" --
14 If you could please just complete your answer or if you have any
15 other comments?
16 A. No, I just -- maybe there is a slip of the tongue, but I don't
17 think I said Bosnian Serb volunteers from Serbia. These are Serb
18 volunteer units. And I think, Your Honours, you gave a good summary. So
19 Serb volunteer units not excluding also Serbs from Serbia.
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.
21 MR. WEBER: At this time the Prosecution tenders 65 ter 792 into
23 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Document 792 receives number P3032, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
2 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have Exhibit P1966,
3 page 4 in both versions.
4 Q. Mr. Theunens, you cite this document multiple times in Part 2.
5 They are footnotes 37, 172, 262, 751, 752, and 1176.
6 Mr. Theunens, this is General Mladic's September 1992 report on
7 the results achieved on the front in the state of the VRS. Is this the
8 September 1992 report that you were just earlier referring to?
9 A. Indeed, Your Honours.
10 Q. Directing your attention to the second paragraph on this page and
11 the part where General Mladic states:
12 "The regular army consists of all units of the former Territorial
13 Defence inherited from the earlier system of ONO ... or which were formed
14 (self-organised) at the time the Serbian people were self-organising for
15 the defence against the advancing Nazi-Fascism in BH in 1991."
16 Does this statement confirm that the former SRBiH TO units were
17 incorporated into the existing military units of the JNA once the VRS was
19 A. Yes, Your Honours.
20 Q. There is mention of the ONO in General Mladic's statements.
21 Could you please comment on whether or not General Mladic's statements
22 indicate whether the VRS was still using the territorial system based on
23 the notion of All People's Defence?
24 A. No, Your Honours. As the document states and also the -- the
25 June order and report, I mean by report I mean the document where
1 General Mladic explains that all TO units or Bosnian Serb TO units have
2 been integrated, except that in the area of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,
3 and if I'm not wrong the Herzegovina Corps and/or the Eastern Bosnia
4 Corps. This integration goes more slowly because of local factors. But
5 he clearly states that All People's Defence is something from the past
6 and that the VRS is the only authorised armed force, I mean military
7 armed force, in the SRBiH.
8 Q. In the next sentence, General Mladic states:
9 "The decision to establish the Army of Republika Srpska ensured
10 single command over the armed struggle from tactical to operative
11 formations and the army as a whole."
12 Do you have any comments on this based on the principles of
13 command principles -- excuse me, and functions of command and control?
14 A. Your Honour, it is fully consistent with the principles as set in
15 SFRY armed forces doctrine, and these principles were also confirmed in
16 the SRBH Law on Army I mean, the three principles of command and control.
17 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I note the time.
18 Q. And, Mr. Theunens, I will return to the topic of the SFRY forces
19 and the ONO after we discuss some additional evidence.
20 MR. WEBER: Your Honours, I'm about to move into a brand new
21 topic. If this is a good time.
22 JUDGE ORIE: We will take the break after Mr. Theunens has been
23 escorted out of the courtroom.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens -- Mr. Weber, I noticed that speed of
1 speech is still problematic.
2 We take a break and we resume at ten minutes to 11.00.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: While we are waiting for the witness to come in, I'd
6 like to put on the record that the revised English translation for P3008
7 has been uploaded into e-court. It was about the word "supervise"
8 against "control."
9 I do understand that the translation which says "supervise" has
10 been corrected to "control." It is transcript pages 20119 and 120, and
11 transcript page 20214 and 215. Since the translation issue was the only
12 reason why it was MFI'd, P3008 is now admitted into evidence. If there's
13 any reason to revisit the translation, we'll hear from the Defence.
14 Further, I would like to invite the Defence to prepare for making
15 submissions on the bar table motion in relation to Witness Treanor.
16 Eighteen documents have been bar tabled. The Chamber would like to hear
17 on shortest notice from the Defence in relation to those 18 documents.
18 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, Mr. Stojanovic and I met with
19 Ms. Bibles the other day, and as I had communicated yesterday, I believe
20 the -- there had been 20 and we said we did not have an objection to 18,
21 so I'm assuming that the 18 are those that we did not have an objection
23 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that's the case. I see that Ms. Stewart
24 is nodding.
25 So you left out the two contested ones.
1 Under those circumstances, Madam Registrar is invited to prepare
2 to assign numbers to the 18 documents. Once she has done so, we'll
3 decide on admission.
4 Please proceed, Mr. Weber.
5 [The witness takes the stand]
6 MR. WEBER:
7 Q. I would like to now turn your attention to 12 May 1992. Have you
8 reviewed Ratko Mladic's speech to the 16th Assembly of the Serbian People
9 of BiH on this date?
10 A. Yes, I did, Your Honours. And that can be found on English page
11 40 of Part 2 of the report.
12 Q. In reviewing this speech, what general observations did you have
13 or do have you about General Mladic's references to his experiences in
14 Croatia as an officer in the JNA 9th Corps?
15 A. Well, General Mladic mentions his experiences in Croatia as the
16 deputy commander and Chief of Staff of the 9th Corps, and subsequently as
17 the commander of the 9 Corps headquarters located in Knin, in order to
18 illustrate his interpretation and his understanding of strategic goals
19 focusing, in particular, on the first and the sixth -- excuse me, and the
20 fifth goal. So the first one, the separation of the people, and the
21 fifth the maintaining the division of Sarajevo.
22 Q. Could the Court Officer please bring up Exhibit P431. The
23 Prosecution would like page 42, the bottom half in English, and page 35
24 of the B/C/S.
25 Mr. Theunens before -- we're going to go through portions of this
1 speech in greater detail. Before doing so, I would like to simply ask
2 you whether you found references in General Mladic's speech to events
3 which are part of your analysis in Part 1, section 3, of your report?
4 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours. And the most obvious ones are
5 General Mladic addressing Mr. Milan Martic, who is in the audience of the
6 16th Assembly Session when highlighting the need for single and unified
7 command and control over the forces and refer -- he does that by
8 referring to the situation in Kijevo where he established single command
9 and control over SAO Krajina also known as Martic police and forces of
10 the 9th corps.
11 Q. Mr. Theunens, if I can interrupt you just so we go through this
12 step by step in this speech. I believe in the English version, it's
13 towards the bottom half on the screen starting in the middle. I'd like
14 to direct your attention to the portion that states:
15 "The Knin Corps was successful because under a single command in
16 the zone of the corps were the JNA, the Territorial Defence forces, and
17 Martic's police, isn't that right, Martic? And because he and I, I call
18 him and say, give me 40 policemen here at Kijevo and you took part in the
19 fighting, isn't that right Milan? And we did what we planned. And we
20 planned. And we will have artillery here and this artillery acts."
21 In the context of the materials reviewed, could you please tell
22 us what General Mladic is talking about in this specific passage.
23 A. Your Honours, General Mladic is talking about the operations led
24 by the JNA to take control over Kijevo, and this took place if I'm not
25 mistaken in August 1991, Kijevo being located on the main supply road
1 between municipalities or locations that were already under Serbian/JNA
2 control in southern Dalmatia.
3 Q. What was the objective of the attack on Kijevo in August 1991?
4 A. Well, the objective was to remove the Croatian police station
5 which was seen as a symbol of Croatian control over this -- yeah,
6 Croatian town, in order to achieve territorial integrity between other --
7 or with other surrounding municipalities and terrain that was already
8 under, as I said, Serb/JNA control.
9 Q. Throughout this speech, General Mladic makes a total of six
10 references to Martic. Again, based on your review of materials, could
11 you describe the nature of Mladic and Martic's relationship prior to 12
12 May 1992?
13 A. Well, I would say at face value already the excerpt of the
14 speech, the quite personal way General Mladic addresses Martic shows that
15 their relations went beyond purely professional co-operation, and I would
16 say that there is even mutual sympathy or at least mutual agreement about
17 the goals they are pursuing.
18 Q. After May 1992, were there any VRS operations in Bosnia that
19 included Serb forces provided by Milan Martic?
20 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours. We have -- I mean, two examples.
21 First of all, there are the so-called corridor operations which are
22 conducted in June and November 1992. And, secondly, there is -- there
23 are the operations in the so-called Sadinska [phoen] Krajina in the
24 latter half of 1994 and running into 1995 which, I mean, are best known
25 through the separate command -- the so-called Pauk Command that was
1 established, and these operations were intended to support Fikret Abdic
2 against the ABiH 5th Corps.
3 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have page 35 of the
4 English, the bottom half, and page 29 of the B/C/S.
5 Mr. Theunens, I'm going to be directing your attention to the
6 part of General Mladic's speech where he states:
7 "There's nowhere they can go. One of the reasons is because the
8 head of the Dragan of fundamentalism lies beneath our hammer. To tell
9 the truth, what I have seen - and must tell you that I've seen very bad
10 picture - and I've ordered officers from the Knin Corps to come who will
11 very soon change this picture. One cannot take Sarajevo by spitting at
12 it from a mortar or a howitzer."
13 Were there any officers brought over from the Knin Corps and
14 incorporated as officers of the Main Staff of the VRS?
15 A. Your Honours, I know of at least of General Tolimir who became
16 the assistant commander for security and intelligence in the VRS
17 Main Staff. At this moment, I'm not sure whether
18 General Manojlo Milovanovic, who was the Chief of Staff -- or who became
19 the Chief of Staff of the VRS Main Staff also served with General Mladic
20 in the 9th Corps. I'm not sure.
21 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have page 38, the bottom
22 half, in English, and page 31 of the B/C/S.
23 Q. Coming off this past reference to Sarajevo, I'd also now like to
24 consider a couple additional portions.
25 I -- I'd like to discuss the sections independently and then I
1 will ask you to provide more general comments.
2 The first section is:
3 "The army must have unified command. And when we start fighting
4 over Sarajevo, we must not say before the international public or tell
5 Mr. Ostojic to pass it to them, we are going to shut down your water and
6 power supply, why should I explain to him what I'm going to do? He will
7 see what I am going to do. And we have to put a ring around the dragon's
8 head of Sarajevo this very moment, and only those whom we let out should
9 be allowed out," and it continues.
10 What do you make of these statements by General Mladic?
11 A. Well, in relation to -- to Sarajevo, as we know, the 5th Corps
12 does not consist of taking control of the whole of Sarajevo but consists
13 of maintaining the division of Sarajevo because of the symbolic and --
14 importance of Sarajevo, and General Mladic explains then to the assembly
15 members how this can be best achieved --
16 Q. If we could just pause there.
17 Continuing on a few lines down, General Mladic states:
18 "What is it, we do not know, damage, we should fix it, no, we
19 will fix it slowly. And the same with the electrical power. Zadar and
20 Sibenik and Split, they disconnected the army's power supply, and the
21 army had none for six months."
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. ... is there any reason why the speed of speech
23 is not the -- the volume of the speech is not such that it's inaudible
24 because I've warned now again and again, and I do not intend to continue
25 doing that. Consultation will only be allowed if it's inaudible for the
1 remainder of the courtroom.
2 Mr. Ivetic.
3 MR. IVETIC: I'm told it's again a problem with the monitor, that
4 the B/C/S is not legible on the monitor. And I don't know whether it's
5 the size of the text, or yesterday we had a problem where half of the
6 B/C/S was truncated because of the settings of the monitor, which I did
7 fix by the end of the day. But that is what I'm told is the issue that
8 was just raised by Mr. Mladic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: If the B/C/S is the only text on the monitor, and I
10 take it that is the case for Mr. Mladic --
11 MR. IVETIC: Actually, the B/C/S and the English are on the
12 monitor --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Both are on the monitor.
14 MR. IVETIC: [Overlapping speakers] ...
15 JUDGE ORIE: Then we should zoom in in such a way that it becomes
17 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I see it's in Cyrillic. I don't know if
18 Mr. Ivetic can assist us maybe with locating the passage that I was
19 referring to. And I believe it was towards the bottom of the Cyrillic,
20 but it may be onto the next page. I'm not quite sure.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, any way you could assist?
22 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I believe it may be on the next page of
23 the Cyrillic.
24 MR. IVETIC: It's the very last line of this page and will go
25 onto the next page, so the text is actually not on the screen. That's
1 the remainder of the text. The reference to Mr. Ostojic is in the middle
2 of the last line.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Are we now looking at the page where it started or
4 are we looking at the next page? The next page. Okay. Yes. It may not
5 be easy to read it, just as it is not easy in English.
6 If Mr. Mladic has found it, and if he's able to ...
7 [Defence counsel confer]
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, otherwise -- otherwise we'd have to --
9 yes, Mr. Ivetic.
10 MR. IVETIC: I -- I was -- we were trying to get a hard copy
11 organised for the general that might assist. I'm told the text is still
12 too small to read on the monitor. But as far as I know, there is no way
13 to show only the B/C/S to the general and then have everyone else follow
14 the English. So I think that technologically speaking, we are stuck with
15 what we have in the monitors with a double screen.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand that one of the solutions
17 might be that all those who have an opportunity to move to the other
18 screen and read there in English, that we would have a larger
19 presentation of the B/C/S text for the accused.
20 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I will also try to read the full passage
21 slowly in cases the accused would like to follow it on the B/C/S channel
22 as I'm reading it.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, every effort being made to -- could you
24 please start in slowly reading the passage that you would like to draw
25 the attention to.
1 MR. WEBER:
2 Q. Mr. Theunens, the passage we were discussing -- I'd like to
3 discuss with you, says:
4 "What is it, we do not know, damage, we should fix it, no, we
5 will fix it, slowly. And the same with the electrical power. Zadar and
6 Sibenik and Split, they disconnected the army's power supply, the army
7 had none for six months, but I told them, while I am here, you will not
8 get it. And they didn't, apart from when I felt like letting them have
10 The sentence continues but I'm going to just stop there. End
12 Could you please explain General Mladic's reference -- references
13 to past events in Zadar, Sibenik, and Split in the context of his
14 previous statements about Sarajevo?
15 A. Your Honours, General Mladic explains to the -- to the assembly
16 members how he had used the control of public services, like water and
17 electricity provision, in the conflict with the Croats; i.e., when the
18 Croats are to block JNA garrisons and barracks and installations in the
19 cities mentioned in the transcript, he retaliated by cutting off water
20 and electricity to these cities. And he uses this experience to
21 illustrate to the assembly members how the 5th goal -- or the 5th
22 strategic goal should be implemented, i.e., maintain the division of
23 Sarajevo. So by using Serbian control over water, gas, and electricity
24 distribution to the city as a, quote/unquote, I mean, in my language,
25 quote/unquote weapon in order to put pressure on the enemy. And I refer
1 to an order in -- during the conflict on page 257 of my report, an order
2 by General Manojlo Milovanovic, that confirms this interpretation of
3 Mr. Mladic's words during the assembly session.
4 Q. Continuing on and in the next sentence on the screen before you,
5 General Mladic states:
6 "Therefore, we have to wisely tell the world it was they who were
7 shooting, hit the transmission line, and the power went off. They were
8 shooting at the water supply facilities. There was a power cut at such
9 and such a place, we are doing our best to repair this [sic], this is
10 what diplomacy is."
11 How do these last statements by General Mladic relate to events
12 that happened in Sarajevo after May 1992?
13 A. Well --
14 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, at this point I think I'm going to
15 object because I just checked the Rule 65 ter summary for this witness
16 and he's being presented as an expert on command and control and now I
17 think he is becoming a historical expert witness which is not noticed on
18 the Rule 65 ter summary for this witness, nor in the Rule 94 bis
20 JUDGE ORIE: Could you explain exactly what you meant by
21 historical witness or is it context of the in the way in which command
22 and control is exercised?
23 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, it says here:
24 [As read] "He will testify to the composition and command
25 structure of the Bosnian Serb TO, the establishment and functioning of
1 the Army of Republika Srpska, and its co-ordination and co-operation with
2 other Serb military and police forces from other parts of the former
3 Yugoslavia; in particular, he will address the status and military
4 activities of volunteers, and volunteer units, and forces of or
5 associated otherwise by the MUP Serbia, including their relationship to
6 and subordination within the other military forces on the ground such as
7 the Army of Republika Srpska, the JNA, VJ, and local Serb TO and special
8 police units."
9 What we've had from the last --
10 JUDGE ORIE: One second.
11 Yes, Mr. Ivetic.
12 MR. IVETIC: What we've had with the last several questions has
13 been this witness attempting to give a historical context to an
14 interpretation of documents not related to any command and control
15 questions but rather trying to give the Prosecution's arguments as to
16 documents and to give a historical opinion about things. We've had
17 several witnesses who have done that, Professor Donia and I believe
18 Professor Treanor for one, but they were noticed as having been able to
19 do that. This witness was presented as a military expert, and I think
20 we're going outwith what has been presented as his purported expertise.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE ORIE: The objection is denied.
23 Please proceed, Mr. Weber.
24 MR. WEBER:
25 Q. Mr. Theunens, I see on the screen the quote that I just read has
1 been cut off at the top. But my question was: How do these last
2 statements, if you still recall them, by General Mladic relate to events
3 that subsequently happened in Sarajevo after May 1992?
4 A. Your Honours, as I illustrate in the report, when I discuss the
5 authority of General Mladic as commander of the Main Staff, I conclude
6 based on the documents I reviewed that control over humanitarian aid,
7 including public facilities like gas, water, and electricity
8 distribution, in those areas where Serbs could -- could exercise control
9 over these facilities, are important tools or weapons for the Bosnian
10 Serbs to achieve the Bosnian Serb strategic goals. And General Mladic
11 explains here to the assembly members how this should be done, and he
12 even makes a reference to how this can play a role in -- in negotiations,
13 in my view, by referring to the concept of diplomacy.
14 MR. WEBER: At this time, could the Prosecution please have
15 65 ter 732.
16 Mr. Theunens, before you will be appearing a -- or the 1991 JNA
17 9th Corps combat readiness report from General Mladic dated
18 22 January 1992.
19 Just quickly. At this time, was the JNA 9th Corps part of the
20 2nd Military District?
21 A. Yes, it was Your Honours. The 2nd Military District being
22 established early January 1992.
23 Q. On the first page of this report, General Mladic refers to the
24 elimination of the weakness in the concept of All People's Defence or ONO
25 or self-protection system or DSZ. What is he talking about?
1 A. Your Honour, General Mladic is talking about issues related to
2 weakness in command and control, i.e., that initially when the Bosnian
3 Serbs established their own armed structures in this case in Croatia,
4 local Serb TO, local Serb MUP, or Martic police, these units are not
5 necessarily subordinated to the JNA. We also see the appearance of
6 volunteers/paramilitary formations where the same problems occur, and
7 then from also earlier orders from General Mladic as well as actually the
8 commander of 9 Corps prior to him, General Vukovic, clear instructions
9 are given to subordinate all what I call Serb forces to the JNA in a
10 given zone of responsibility.
11 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have page 5 of the
12 English and page 3 of the B/C/S. I would note that the information we're
13 about to discuss continues onto page 4 of the B/C/S.
14 Q. Directing your attention to the bottom paragraph on this page,
15 under section 4 on the basic experience drawn from the use of units. In
16 the paragraph, General Mladic discusses the carrying out of the first
17 stage of operation with the engagement of tactical and combat groups --
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we go to the next page in B/C/S.
19 MR. WEBER: Thank you, Your Honour. I appreciate it.
20 Q. With the engagement of tactical and combat groups throughout the
21 9th Corps area of responsibility.
22 In reviewing this report, can you tell us, as commander of the
23 VRS, did General Mladic draw upon these earlier experiences to facilitate
24 his exercise of single authority over tactical and operational groups?
25 A. Indeed, Your Honours, and I would even widen the issue. It's not
1 just these operational groups or tactical groups, but it's just he takes
2 active steps from the very beginning that he is appointed commander of
3 the Main Staff to enforce a single and unified command and control in the
4 areas where the VRS is operating. And we see successive orders to
5 achieve that. And, I mean, if you want, I can give examples but
6 otherwise they're in my report.
7 Q. Your Honours, if we could please move to the bottom of page 6 in
8 the English and page 4 which I believe is currently on the screen in the
10 At the bottom of this page, General Mladic mentions the positive
11 effect of "the successful placing of the SAO Krajina TO under the single
12 command of the 9th Corps on the ability of the 9th Corps to conduct
13 combat operations in a wide area."
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could we have page 6 on our screens? I don't think
15 we have. There we are.
16 MR. WEBER: I'm sorry.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Could you re-start, Mr. Weber, or at least draw our
18 attention to the portion you just read. I think it's the bottom part.
19 MR. WEBER: It is, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Then... yes. We've --
21 MR. WEBER: It --
22 JUDGE ORIE: -- had an opportunity to read it.
23 Please proceed, where you stopped.
24 MR. WEBER:
25 Q. My question, Mr. Theunens, would be could you please explain how
1 the placing of the TO under a single command would facilitate an army's
2 ability to conduct operations in a wider area?
3 A. Well, Your Honours, I mean, single command I would say in any
4 circumstance is the easy situation. If you have -- it's the easiest,
5 sorry, situation. If -- in a military context you have two commanders,
6 you can have chaos because a subordinate should only have one commander.
7 Even if we're talking about two different units here - on the one hand,
8 JNA; on the other hand, Krajina Serb TO - by that time they are pursuing
9 the same goals or at least coherent goals. Most effective way to achieve
10 that, i.e., to have a unified system of command and control is, as I
11 mentioned, to have only one commander which, in practical terms, means to
12 subordinate the TO, the Bosnian -- excuse me, the SAO Krajina TO to the
13 JNA 9th Corps by attaching these SAO Krajina TO units to units of the JNA
14 9 Corps.
15 Q. After General Mladic was appointed commander of the VRS, did his
16 incorporation of the existing SRBiH TO units into the VRS structure
17 increase or not the ability of the VRS in a similar way?
18 A. Yes, it did. And I refer to the June -- the 4th of June, 1992,
19 order by General Mladic which is footnote 260. Then there is the
20 September 1992 report by General Mladic, footnote 262, and both in Part 2
21 of the report, and of course there is the 1993 analysis of combat
22 readiness report which clearly highlight the benefits of subordinating
23 all units to the single command of the VRS in order to achieve the said
25 Q. I'd like to direct your attention to the top and middle of the
1 page. In these paragraphs, there's reference to successful tasks being
2 carried out related to the lifting of the blockade on a number of places,
3 including Zadar, Sibenik, and Split. Mr. Mladic -- General Mladic also
4 indicates that these offensive combat operations forced the enemy to
5 negotiate, and he then describes how artillery would soften targets,
6 direct fire artillery groups would destroy the observed targets - God
7 bless you, Ms. Stewart - and infantry protected with tanks and armoured
8 combat vehicles would take control of features.
9 Do the tactics applied in these locations as described by
10 General Mladic bear any similarity to how General Mladic pursued
11 strategic goal number 5?
12 A. I would say to a certain extent, Your Honours, because Sarajevo
13 did not see so much the use of VRS infantry for obvious reasons because,
14 first of all, achieving goals in a buildup area where infantry is -- I
15 mean, on the one hand it is more effective than using tanks, but it
16 requires a lot of manpower and it also requires -- no, it will also
17 involve high losses. One of the deficiencies the VRS was facing
18 throughout the conflict was a lack of manpower, compared to the ABiH. So
19 for Sarajevo, for the fifth goal, I would say that the emphasis lay on
20 the use of artillery and other indirect fire weapons that were deployed
21 on the hills and mountains surrounding Sarajevo in addition to what we
22 discussed earlier, i.e., the control over public facilities; namely
23 water, gas, and electricity provision.
24 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have page 16 of the
25 English and page 9 of the B/C/S of this report.
1 In this section of the report, General Mladic discusses the
2 preparation and mobilisation of RJ of the 9th Corps in several stages.
3 He describes a partial mobilisation between 21 and 29 June 1991.
4 If you could assist us, did this occur right around the time that
5 General Mladic was transferred to the JNA 9th Corps?
6 A. Yes. I mean, I believe he was transferred -- I mean, he took
7 over as Chief of Staff and deputy commander of the 9th Corps, if I
8 remember well, on 20th of -- of June -- sorry, 30th of July of 1991. And
9 prior to that, he was the chief of the Department for Operations and
10 Training in the 9th -- in the 9th Corps. So yes, indeed, it coincides.
11 Q. On page 121 of Part 1, you list General Mladic's positions
12 including his initial assignment as the chief of the operations, which
13 you just mentioned, between June and July 1991. In this position, what
14 were the responsibilities of then-Colonel Mladic?
15 A. The chief of the Department for Operations and Training is, as
16 the name says it, is responsible for training. And again based -- this
17 is based on the instructions from the commander which training programmes
18 have to be conducted. This concerns both individual training as well as
19 collective training or at unit level. He is also responsible for drawing
20 the operational orders. You could compare it with what is in western
21 militaries called the J or the G3, so the -- the person responsible for
23 Q. Returning to the report before us, it states that then from 19 to
24 24 September 1991, all corps units were fully mobilised. And in the next
25 paragraph it states that:
1 "From 20 September to 30 November 1991, subordinated units
2 constantly grew."
3 We see here then a reference to newly established TO units being
4 incorporated into the 9th Corps and soldiers being recruited from the
5 corps area of responsibility and other republics.
6 Did these events occur after General Mladic was appointed
7 deputy commander of the JNA 9th Corps?
8 A. Yes. During and after, Your Honours.
9 Q. Between 20 September and 30 November 1991, did the JNA 9th Corps
10 take over areas of the Croatian Krajina?
11 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I would raise an objection as to the
12 relevance of 30 November 1991 which is outside the temporal scope of the
13 indictment and the Croatian Krajina which is outside the geographic scope
14 of the indictment. This is an issue we have raised ever since the
15 pre-trial brief of the Prosecution, and I think we at this point in time
16 need to have an order from the Chamber so we know what is part of this
17 case and what is not part of this case.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
19 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, first of all, the Defence statement is
20 inaccurate in terms of the temporal scope. We alleged in the indictment
21 that it began in October 1991. With respect to the relevance of this
22 material, we've stated it clearly multiple times in submissions.
23 Your Honours, the conduct of General Mladic is relevant to this
24 case, and the Defence has even tried to rely on the fact that he was off
25 in Croatia as mitigating his responsibility for events that occurred once
1 he became commander of the VRS. As Mr. Theunens has testified, there was
2 a pattern between what General Mladic's conduct was when he was commander
3 of the JNA -- well, when he was assigned to the JNA 9th Corps and when he
4 immediately became commander of the VRS. Mr. Theunens has also testified
5 to a number of facts already that show that General Mladic immediately
6 implemented things that he specifically learned as part of the JNA 9th
7 Corps immediately when he became commander of the VRS.
8 So in terms of substantive relevance, I believe that the
9 threshold has been met. I would just ask: Your Honours specifically
10 instructed the Prosecution as part of its examination to lead evidence
11 from Part 1 of its report and, of course, I am applying your guidance in
12 doing that right now, trying, of course, to go to the pertinent documents
13 from General Mladic himself, and on top of it, Your Honours, you've
14 acknowledged in multiple ways that events in Croatia to some extent, as
15 it relates to the accused, are relevant to these proceedings. And just
16 to name the two most prominent examples: The Chamber has admitted
17 General Mladic's personal notebooks from this time throughout -- updating
18 all the way back to June 1991, and also Mladic audio recordings recovered
19 from seizures of premises associated exhibited with the accused
20 containing General Mladic's statements at this time. Just --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, any response. Specifically on the
22 temporal scope of the indictment and the Defence relying on what happened
23 in -- during the time Mr. Mladic was in Croatia.
24 MR. IVETIC: Be happy to, Your Honour.
25 This witness is an expert witness supposedly on the command and
1 control of the VRS which was established in May of 1992.
2 JUDGE ORIE: If I could --
3 MR. IVETIC: Therefore the witness is not --
4 JUDGE ORIE: If I could interrupt you.
5 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: The issue was first temporal scope.
7 MR. IVETIC: Correct.
8 JUDGE ORIE: You are now addressing how this witness is
9 presented. Now, relevance of the evidence and whether something falls
10 within the scope of the expertise of a witness are two different matters.
11 Would you please specifically first address the temporal scope where
12 Mr. Weber said --
13 MR. IVETIC: I'm attempting to, Your Honour. May 1992 is within
14 the indictment when it is alleged that General Mladic became part of
15 the -- of the plan by becoming part of the alleged JCE by becoming part
16 of the VRS Main Staff; therefore, events of 1991 are outwith the temporal
17 scope of the allegations in the indictment.
18 Furthermore, this witness's testimony was said to be related to
19 the command and control of the VRS in the early days of its formation,
20 which is again May 1992. Therefore, we have multiple problems with
21 allowing this witness now to opine as to matters that go to 1991 and
22 which go to Croatia which do not, in fact, arise out of his opining about
23 the command and control of the VRS in May of 1992.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 Mr. Ivetic, I haven't heard you yet on the Defence relying at
1 various occasions on events in 1991 in Croatia. Or at least considering
2 of such -- relevance.
3 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, if the Defence objecting to evidence is
4 to be interpreted as "relying," we have objected continuously to
5 inclusion of events from 1991 by saying he was not part of the VRS. We
6 have said that since day one. We had in our pre-trial brief. It was
7 part of the pre-trial conference. That's why I'm asking Your Honours to
8 finally rule on the same.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, could you address the two issues I
10 specifically have drawn the attention of Mr. Ivetic to.
11 [Prosecution counsel confer]
12 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, the -- with respect to the Defence
13 relying on Mr. Mladic's --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps I first -- Mr. Ivetic, paragraph 5 on
15 the joint criminal enterprise says that Ratko Mladic was, as of the 12th
16 of May, 1992, a key member of an overarching joint criminal enterprise
17 which lasted from at least October 1991 until 30th of November 1995.
18 Do you say that every moment before Mr. Mladic became a key
19 member, and it's not said he became a -- no, became a key member, that
20 everything that happened in the joint criminal enterprise which is
21 described as at least from October 1991 would be irrelevant for this
22 case? Is that the position of the Defence?
23 MR. IVETIC: No, Your Honour, we're saying that the indictment
24 with the paragraph that you've just read for General Mladic relates the
25 start date to the 12th of May, 1992.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And you say if you joins a joint criminal
2 enterprise in May 1992, then that joint criminal enterprise, which is
3 described of having existed before, is irrelevant for this case.
4 MR. IVETIC: No, Your Honours. I'm saying that in terms of the
5 notice requirements of the jurisprudence and the pleading requirements of
6 an indictment, when one pleads that the participation of an accused
7 begins on a certain date, the Trial Chamber is presumably going to be
8 focused on the activities of the accused that date and thereafter.
9 Otherwise, the Defence is not in a position to know what case it must
10 respond to and what evidence it must bring to rebut the Prosecution's
11 case, as was raised in the Defence pre-trial brief.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The Chamber denies the objection. Based on
14 the temporal scope, what has been dealt with is to some extent within the
15 time scope described in the indictment, although giving history and given
16 context and the Chamber accepts the relevance of this context.
17 Then we have the ...
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Then the geographic scope ... for the geographic
20 scope, it similarly gives context, not only in terms of geography but
21 also in terms of the history of the accused which may give additional
22 context on what happened at the later stages.
23 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, then I renew my objection this witness
24 giving historical expert testimony for which has not been notified under
25 65 ter or Rule 94 bis.
1 JUDGE ORIE: That was denied already and that is still denied.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Weber.
3 MR. WEBER:
4 Q. Mr. Theunens my last question was between 20 September and
5 30 November 1991, did the JNA 9th Corps participate in take-overs of
6 areas of the Croatian Krajina?
7 A. Yes, it did, Your Honours.
8 Q. Returning to the document before us, General Mladic then
9 discusses new motorised and a new infantry brigade joining the 9th Corps,
10 and the implementation of replenishment plan in four municipalities
11 within the self-declared Serb Autonomous Region of the Croatian Krajina.
12 General Mladic then goes on to state:
13 "The Serbs made up 97 per cent of the corps units and members of
14 other ethnic groups made up 3 per cent. This ratio did not correspond to
15 the ethnic composition of the population in the area of responsibility of
16 the corps."
17 Is the ethnic composition of the JNA 9th Corps, described by
18 General Mladic at this time, consistent with the transformation of the
19 JNA that occurred throughout the former Yugoslavia which you discuss in
20 Part 1 of your report?
21 A. Indeed, Your Honours, and I mean, if you want I can explain it
22 because it's a bit of a complex issue. It's not just a matter of people
23 being removed or -- or people not just -- not wanting to join the JNA
24 anymore when they are mobilised. I mean, there is a whole evolution
25 occurring, and the end state is that, okay, the JNA in Croatia -- or what
1 remains of JNA is -- is pursuing mainly Serbian goals, and I mean by that
2 that the JNA is enforcing control or Serbian control over territories
3 that are considered Serb in close co-operation; i.e., supervising in a
4 military sense, local Serb TO, forces consisting of TO, and MUP local
5 Serb forces, sorry.
6 Q. Just so we have it on the record, I would like you to confirm
7 what -- the opinion that that's stated on page 132 of Part 1. You
8 conclude based on the instructions of the SFRY Presidency and
9 Veljko Kadijevic's orders that:
10 "The JNA ceased to be the SFRY army and instead, at least in
11 Croatia, gradually develops into a mainly Serb force, serving Serbian
12 goals. The JNA's role has been transformed from one of interposing among
13 the conflicting parties to one of creation and control of Serb-held areas
14 in those parts of Croatia that the Serbian leadership considered Serb."
15 Is that your opinion?
16 A. That is my conclusion, Your Honours, on the basis of the material
17 I have reviewed.
18 Q. Does this report that we've been looking at from General Mladic
19 support this conclusion?
20 A. It does, Your Honours. It's one of the many documents I
22 Q. On page 131 of Part 1, you refer to General Mladic's 30
23 December 1991 closing speech at the meeting of the 9th Corps combat
24 readiness, and you conclude that this speech -- that in this speech
25 Mladic demonstrated the coherence between the operations of the 9th Corps
1 with the earlier instructions of Kadijevic and Adzic on the SFRY armed
2 forces goals of the war in Croatia. Could you please confirm that this
3 is your conclusion for the record?
4 A. Yes, it is Your Honours. And if you want -- again, I can explain
5 it both on -- on the -- the goals as such but also the terminology that
6 is being used to describe the conflict in Croatia.
7 MR. WEBER: Your Honours, at this time the Prosecution tenders
8 65 ter 732 into evidence, which we've been discussing.
9 MR. IVETIC: We would object in so far as it is not relevant to
10 the time-period of the indictment on the geographic scope of the
12 JUDGE ORIE: The objection is denied. It is sufficiently related
13 to the charges in the indictment, it gives context, and may be relevant
14 for drawing parallels.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Document 00732 receives number P3051.
16 JUDGE ORIE: P3051 is admitted into evidence.
17 Time for a break, Mr. Weber.
18 Could Mr. Theunens be escorted out of the courtroom.
19 Meanwhile, I use the opportunity to be clearer in my instructions
20 as far as P3008 is concerned.
21 [The witness stands down]
22 JUDGE ORIE: I had not specifically instructed or granted leave
23 to the Registrar to replace the English translation of P3008 by the newly
24 uploaded one. That was the new translation where "supervision" was
25 changed into "control."
1 We take a break, and we'll resume at quarter past 12.00.
2 --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.
3 --- On resuming at 12.19 p.m.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I'll briefly deal with a few procedural matters.
5 The first is the -- is a decision on the admission of the Treanor
7 The Prosecution has now uploaded the redacted version of the
8 Treanor reports under 65 ter numbers 02881a and 11849a. The Chamber
9 admits these redacted the versions of the reports into evidence, and
10 Madam Registrar you are hereby instructed to replace the documents under
11 Exhibit numbers P3003 and P3004 with the newly uploaded reports.
12 Perhaps, meanwhile, the witness can be escorted into the
14 And I continue with Treanor bar table documents.
15 The Chamber has received a list of 18 bar table documents that
16 the Prosecution wishes to tender with Expert Witness Treanor. The
17 Defence indicated in court that it did not oppose the admission of those
18 18. Madam Registrar has reserved exhibit numbers P3033 through 3050 for
19 these documents. The Chamber hereby admits the documents into evidence
20 under these numbers.
21 We'll wait for the witness to enter the courtroom.
22 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, if it helps expedite things, I will now
23 be immediately calling up Exhibit P1959.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And where before the break I addressed that I
25 had not previously granted leave to replace the English translation of
1 P3008, I still didn't do it. It's hereby done.
2 [The witness takes the stand]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seats, Mr. Theunens.
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, you may proceed.
6 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have Exhibit P1959.
7 Q. I'm going to be going specifically to page 3 in the English and
8 pages 2 continuing onto page 3 of the B/C/S.
9 Mr. Theunens, coming up before you is a transcript from an audio
10 recording between General Mladic and Lieutenant-Colonel Milisav. This
11 recording was recovered as part of the 2010 Serbian MUP search of
12 premises associated to Mr. Mladic's family.
13 Did you review this transcript which relates to events in Sibenik
14 and Zadar during proofing?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, any time-frame for the conversation? Oh,
16 you wanted to ask the witness about that. Okay.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours. We reviewed the transcript
18 during the proofing.
19 MR. WEBER:
20 Q. Based on your analysis of events, can you tell the approximate
21 time-period --
22 MR. WEBER: Judge, I'm just pausing.
23 JUDGE ORIE: No. Mr. Mladic should pause, not you.
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. WEBER:
1 Q. Again, based on your analysis of events, can you tell us the
2 approximate time-period in which this conversation occurred?
3 A. Your Honours, I would say this is the August/September 1991
5 Q. At the top of the page, we see General Mladic states:
6 "In Zadar, they're blocked. They are asking for negotiations at
7 1000 hours. We'll stop firing to see if they will permit a normal
8 evacuation and that everything is all right."
9 General Mladic shortly thereafter states:
10 "If they do not agree, then we will embark on the destruction of
11 Zadar, and then they will probably see what has hit Zadar and will permit
12 you a peaceful evacuation, like Sinj."
13 Do you have any comments on the -- this part of the conversation,
14 based on the materials that you've reviewed?
15 A. Your Honours, the conversation refers to the situations in
16 Northern Dalmatia at that time; i.e., the Croats have blocked a number of
17 JNA barracks and garrisons. And in this specific conversation,
18 General Mladic is explaining how he intends to act, depending of the
19 Croatian response to a request to evacuate these JNA facilities, i.e., to
20 remove the pop -- the -- the people, the personnel, and the equipment
21 from these facilities.
22 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have page 8 of the
23 English and page 6 of the B/C/S.
24 Q. Mr. Theunens, I'd like to go part by part through these
25 statements by General Mladic.
1 First, starting with the quote of General Mladic where he states:
2 "Nothing will get out of Dalmatia except children under the age
3 of 10, if they carry on like this."
4 Do you have any comments on this initial statement?
5 A. Well, I would say it -- it reflects General Mladic's mindset
6 and -- and -- I would -- in relation to or in response to the Croatian
7 blockade of JNA barracks and garrisons in that area, and with "they" he
8 refers to Croatian forces.
9 Q. This exchange continues Lieutenant-Colonel Milisav stating:
10 "That's what I said. If we get hurt here, then they from 301 to
11 306, and these ones here, they will have to pay."
12 General Mladic then states:
13 "Listen, Milisav, not from 301 to 306. All that is older than 10
14 and younger than 75 will come to harm in Sibenik, and we will not leave a
15 single house standing, unless they finish the job like it was done in
17 Lieutenant-Colonel Milisav then states:
18 "All right."
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: If may just interject, please.
20 Mr. Theunens, do you by any chance know what 301 and 306 mean?
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I haven't been able to check a map of
22 the area, but usually these figures are used for geographic features.
23 But that is, I would say, an educated guess at this stage because I
24 didn't have an opportunity to look at the map and to see whether there
25 was a feature 301 and a feature 306 which again, extrapolating, could
1 imply that were Croatian forces on that location. But again, this is
2 just drawn from these five lines of conversation without looking at the
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: But it looks like Mr. Mladic's response relates to
5 age - I'm not quite sure - and not geography. When he says "not only 301
6 to 306 but all that is under 10 and over 75." Years.
7 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the reason I referred to a geographic
8 location is, as I mentioned, because I have seen similar figures -- I
9 mean, similar manner of describing geographic features. And then
10 obviously it's not just a feature but it's the forces located that
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
13 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, and I don't know if it would further
14 assist the Chamber or if Mr. Theunens could also further assist us, but
15 if Mr. Theunens is able maybe to identify a map via the Registry, we are
16 willing to go and look if -- for one if you'd-like that done.
17 JUDGE ORIE: To provide Mr. Theunens with an unmarked map of the
18 area, would that cause any objections? No. No objections.
19 So if you give it to the Victims and Witness Section so that they
20 can provided to Mr. Theunens.
21 Mr. Theunens, the reference to the job finished in Sinj, does
22 that ring any bell to you?
23 THE WITNESS: I understand that the -- the -- the JNA garrison in
24 Sinj was -- I mean, again, based on what is written there, allowed to --
25 to leave under peaceful conditions.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. WEBER:
4 Q. What does this part of the conversation show about
5 General Mladic's intentions concerning the uses of force -- forces under
6 his commander?
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
8 MR. IVETIC: Objection as to calling for speculation and going
9 beyond the expertise of the witness. I don't believe now he is a
10 psychological expert as well.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber is able to interpret this part of the
13 conversation without the assistance of the witness.
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. WEBER:
16 Q. Does this conversation at all show how General Mladic exercised
17 his authority, or is there an exercise of authority in this conversation?
18 A. Indeed, Your Honours, it's -- as conversation between a superior
19 and a subordinate, and the superior gives instructions to the
21 Q. On Tuesday, at transcript page 20239, you indicated that there
22 was a pattern between how General Mladic exercised his authority while he
23 was in Croatia and when he was a commander of the VRS. Are these
24 statements by him consistent with this pattern?
25 A. Yes, they are, Your Honours. My impression or my conclusion
1 of -- of the way how General Mladic commanded the VRS while he was
2 commander of the Main Staff is that he is very much focused on the goal
3 he wants to achieve and he wants his subordinates to achieve, and much
4 less concerned of any potential constraints that could inhibit [Realtime
5 transcript read in error "prohibit"] achieving that goal.
6 Q. Based on your review of materials related to the 9th Corps
7 campaign in Croatia, were there any reports that crimes were committed
8 during that campaign?
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
10 MR. IVETIC: Again, I would object as to the scope of the same
11 being outwith the indictment. We've had evidence that the campaign,
12 as it is referred to now, started in June of 1991. Surely the indictment
13 does not cover June of 1991. I think we need to have this issue resolved
14 once and for all so the Defence know what is the Prosecution's case that
15 we must address.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber considers the answer to the question or
18 at least the question relevant in view of potential context to be given
19 and parallels and to -- possibly to be drawn.
20 You may answer the question, Mr. Theunens.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours. Before doing so, I would just
22 like to make a small correction to the transcript. At the last line of
23 page 51 I mentioned "inhibit" instead of "prohibit."
24 And to answer the question, in Part 1 of the report, pages 171
25 and following, I discuss documents -- I mean, JNA documents concerning
1 alleged crimes that were committed in Skabrnja and Nadin on 18 and -- and
2 in particular, 19 of November 1991.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you one question, Mr. Theunens. In
4 relation to the conversation which was recorded, you said it shows how he
5 uses his authority. The portions read were very much like, "if," "then,"
6 which means that any authority is not exercised yet, although it may show
7 some inclination to do something. Would you agree with that?
8 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honours. I mean, he is not
9 giving a strict military order. There is a lot of "if" and "then." But
10 at the same time, if you put yourself in the position of the subordinate,
11 it gives an impression of -- of -- of how General Mladic sees what should
12 be done. In a sense, it -- I mean, the choice of wording and threats
13 that are implied I would say create quite the impression among the
14 subordinate that they have to be ready to -- to do whatever
15 General Mladic wants them to do and that this can go very far what he
16 wants them to do if certain conditions are not fulfilled. So he's not
17 going to -- apparently he's not going to reconsider the situations if
18 certain things are done or not done by the enemy, but the subordinates
19 have to be ready that if indeed the -- the enemy does certain things or
20 fails to do certain things, then General Mladic's instructions are very
21 clear. And he --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But if -- are these instructions already? You
23 say he's not going to reconsider. What makes you believe that he is not
24 going to reconsider. If I say, if this and this happens, I will do that.
25 It happened in my life that I later considered it wiser not to do what I
1 announced to do and no one would have known in advance whether I would
2 reconsider this announcement of action to be taken.
3 Would you agree with that as well, or do you have any specific
4 reason to say that he would not reconsider, even if he didn't announce
5 that he would reconsider. But is it reasonable to assume that everyone
6 who announces certain action, that, automatically, that means that that
7 person would not reconsider it?
8 THE WITNESS: You know, Your Honour, I understand your -- your
9 comment. But I think we have to be conscious of the context in which
10 these -- in which General Mladic expresses himself. He is not talking
11 on -- as a person. I would say he is talking as a military commander.
12 And communication - and again, we can find that in the doctrine
13 [indiscernible]. But the subordinate expects from the commander
14 instructions and guidelines and the subordinate will act upon what the
15 commander says. If a commander says certain things on one day and then
16 he says the other day the opposite, that has -- gives a negative
17 impression of the commander's authority because the subordinates will
18 say, you know, he is talking again. But this is not a kind of command
19 style General Mladic practiced. My understanding after reviewing all the
20 documents is that if he makes certain -- if he gives certain instructions
21 or -- like here he makes certain threats, that he is very serious about
22 it, and that it's unlikely that he will change his view unless maybe
23 because he is forced by outside circumstances.
24 So I think we should make a distinction between I would call it a
25 more personal conversation between two individuals as opposed to here a
1 conversation between a military commander and a subordinate officer.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Which doesn't change in any way that are no clear
3 instructions here given for the situation which is considered to to
4 potentially develop.
5 THE WITNESS: I agree with you, Your Honours. But I think --
6 again, we don't know how the situation ended -- I mean, we know how the
7 situation ended. I understand the Zadar garrison and the artillery
8 centre were evacuated in a "peaceful manner," that the JNA managed to
9 withdraw its personnel and its equipment there. From the top of my head,
10 I don't know of any garrisons where there was no evacuation, so it is
11 difficult to -- to -- to say whether or not General Mladic would have
12 implemented this threat if there had been no peaceful evacuation by the
13 enemy as he had expressed it from them.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll never know. To some extent, it's
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. WEBER:
18 Q. Mr. Theunens, I'd like to return to a military doctrine on this
19 point that we were just discussing. Can a commander give a conditional
21 A. I mean, a commander can do anything. But from a doctrinal point
22 of view, an order has to be clear and concise because if you have
23 confusion among the subordinates, then the commander's intent will most
24 likely not be implemented in the manner the commander wanted it to do --
25 to be.
1 Q. I'd like to just come to maybe a quicker close to this section.
2 If you could -- I just need to you confirm a couple parts of Part 1 of
3 your report.
4 If you could please go to paragraph 4 on page 169, continuing
5 through to page 170, could you please fully tell us or completely read
6 the conclusions you reached on what the 9th Corps monthly overview
7 reports showed in terms of the crimes recorded in their own corps units
8 and commands.
9 A. You want me to read or to summarise?
10 Q. Mr. Theunens, I -- you -- you -- it's -- it's pretty clearly
11 stated here, so you're welcome to read it if you would like.
12 A. "The 9th Corps prepares monthly overview reports of the crimes
13 that have been recorded in the corps' units and commands and the measures
14 that have been taken. These reports show that wilful abandonment and
15 desertion of the armed forces, failing or refusion to go carry out orders
16 are the most common crimes, and that there is a functioning system for
17 military justice to take care of these crimes.
18 "These reports which are signed by the corps commander, do not
19 include serious crimes, including violations of the laws of armed
20 conflict that, at least according to OB reports, have been allegedly
21 committed by members of the SAO Krajina TO and/or other forces while
22 participating in combat operations under the command of the
23 JNA 9th Corps. This situation is the same for the quarterly 'analysis of
24 unusual incidents' covering the first quarter of 1992,
25 Major-General Ratko Mladic submits to the 2nd Military District on the
1 1st of April, 1992."
2 Q. In this paragraph are you citing to multiple reports both from
3 General Vukovic or Vuckovic and General Mladic?
4 A. Indeed, Your Honours. And I compared those with, for example,
5 reports by security organs concerning events in Skabrnja on 18 and 19
6 November 1991.
7 Q. Did the reported crimes in the Croatian Krajina become publicly
8 known during the course of 1991 and early 1992?
9 A. I mean, they became -- the events in Skabrnja, there was -- as I
10 mentioned in my report, there was a complaint by the Croats to the
11 European Community Monitoring Mission quite soon after these alleged
12 crimes took place, and the ECMM then requested access to the area from
13 the command of the military naval district, which was the superior
14 command of the 9th Corps, and on the other hand there is also a
15 Human Rights Watch report from January 1992 that was sent to
16 General Kadijevic as well as president of Serbia, then Mr. Milosevic. I
17 mean, these are just two examples.
18 Q. On page 8 of Part 2, you discuss a 30 April 1992 entry from the
19 published notes of Borislav Jovic, where it was agreed to replace
20 General Vukovic of the 2nd Military District with Ratko Mladic. Among
21 the people present at this meeting were Slobodan Milosevic,
22 Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, and Nikola Koljevic.
23 Based on the documents you reviewed in this case, would any of
24 these individuals have been aware - I believe you already mentioned
25 President Milosevic - of the reported crimes committed by units under
1 General Mladic's command?
2 A. Well, given the fact that there is an answer by the -- there's a
3 written reply, I'm sorry, by the chef de cabinet of President Milosevic
4 to the Human Rights Watch report, I think it's reasonable to assume that
5 President Milosevic was made aware of the contents of that report which
6 doesn't only address Skabrnja but also other parts of Croatia where the
7 JNA and subordinate units were active.
8 Q. Prior to April 1992, was there any co-ordination between these
9 individuals at this 30 April 1992 meeting, so co-ordination between
10 individuals from the Bosnian Serb leadership, the SFRY, and the Republic
11 of Serbia, related to the transformation of the JNA?
12 A. Your Honours, from -- from Borisav Jovic's published memoirs, one
13 can conclude that a number of the aforementioned individuals meet and
14 indeed at different occasions discuss the future of the JNA. I also
15 remember that, for example, Mr. Martic and Mr. Babic were invited in
16 1991, early 1992, to meetings of what remained of the SFRY Presidency.
17 And also there, the future of the JNA was -- in Croatia was being
19 MR. WEBER: The Prosecution at this time tenders from the bar
20 table 65 ter 17314 and 65 ter 17315 related to the public dissemination
21 and notification of crimes committed in Croatia. These materials consist
22 of the letter from Helsinki Watch to Slobodan Milosevic and
23 Veljko Kadijevic, which the mention has mentioned, and a list of press
24 coverage related to the same letter which indicates that it was widely
25 covered internationally and within the region.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
2 MR. IVETIC: Can we have some clarification. The witness has
3 been talking about Human Rights Watch, which is not the same as
4 Helsinki Watch.
5 MR. WEBER: I'm sorry, I might have misspoke.
6 THE WITNESS: I meant the same document so I can check who it is.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. May I take it that if there remains any
8 confusion about that, that the parties will report that, and that we act
9 on the assumption that Helsinki Watch -- the report which was mentioned
10 as be a Human Rights Watch, that that's the same as the Helsinki Watch,
11 and the Chamber of course will seriously consider any further reports on
13 Apart from that, Mr. Ivetic.
14 MR. IVETIC: We would again object to the relevance of the same;
15 in particular, the other news coverage which this witness has not
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, therefore it's bar tabled. The witness was
18 asked about public knowledge about these matters and that is apparently
19 what the Prosecution wants to establish, that at least there was -- there
20 were publications about it.
21 Mr. Weber, you said you want to bar table it. That is, two
23 MR. WEBER: Correct, Your Honour. And I see it's a letter from
24 Helsinki Watch.
25 JUDGE ORIE: It's Helsinki Watch.
1 THE WITNESS: I stand corrected.
2 MR. WEBER: And it's 65 ter 17314, and then the distribution of
3 this is 65 ter 17315.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Registrar, the first document -- single
5 document, Helsinki Watch.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Document 17314 receives Exhibit P3052.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
8 THE REGISTRAR: And document 17315 receives number P3053,
9 Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Also admitted into evidence.
11 Mr. Weber you -- yes. May I take it that the first number for
12 17 -- yes, there we have it, 3052.
13 Mr. Weber, you announced what I understood to be the
14 Helsinki Watch letter and the publications.
15 Now, you also referred to a response or at least the witness
16 referred to a response by the chef de cabinet of Milosevic. Is that part
17 of it or is that --
18 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I'll be guided by you. I'm happy to
19 tender as many documents as the Chamber would like relating to these
20 matters, so I --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, as many -- I was --
22 MR. WEBER: I can tender that document too, Your Honour.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speakers kindly not overlap for the
24 sake of interpretation. Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: We will. Isn't it, Mr. Weber?
1 Yes, the Chamber would like the response to the letter of
2 Helsinki Watch to have it in evidence as well. So if you would please
3 tender it.
4 MR. WEBER: Thanks, Your Honour. I was just marking it as a to
6 Could the Prosecution please have 65 ter 14429.
7 Q. The document coming up before you, Mr. Theunens, is a 9th Corps
8 order from Ratko Mladic dated 22 April 1992.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Weber. Did you present the response?
10 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I'll have to -- I'm sorry. If I can
11 look it up during the next break, I'm happy to do it, and I will
12 immediately provide the 65 ter number after the -- the recess.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, Ms. Stewart's a little faster than I am.
15 It's 65 ter 17316.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps we have it briefly on our screens so
17 that we ...
18 Now, I notice that this apparently is not the original but it's a
19 publication in which apparently the response is reproduced.
20 Do you have a -- an original one or don't you have that,
21 Mr. Weber?
22 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I don't believe so.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then this is better categorised as what was
24 published at the time and perhaps falls into the category of public
25 dissemination of the -- the discussion on the matter. We'll be able to
1 carefully, first of all, to see whether this is a response to what you
2 presented. And I see that the English translation shows a nice B/C/S
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, it's the original -- the original is in English,
6 yes. I'm -- apologise. One second, please.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we see the bottom of the page.
8 JUDGE ORIE: And -- could we have the English --
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The entire --
10 JUDGE ORIE: The entire -- yes.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, there it is.
12 JUDGE ORIE: It is very difficult to read it. Let me ...
13 One second, please, Mr. Weber, so we have an opportunity to look
14 at it.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE ORIE: If you would give us just one minute.
17 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Any objections? But more in the category of
19 dissemination of the information.
20 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, I haven't seen the text of the
21 article that this is contained in. I would have an issue with that
22 coming in since we don't have the text of that, and I would think that
23 would not be appropriate to come in without having it be translated.
24 But as for this coming in, in the context of the witness's
25 testimony, I do not have an objection to this, the actual response from
1 the Chief of Staff of the president of Serbia.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, would you then -- you can do two things:
3 Either can you upload the publication in its entirety -- and it has been
4 uploaded, but translate the publication in its entirety which would then
5 include the text of the response; or you can now state that you will only
6 rely on this document for purposes of reading the response.
7 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, if we could please check in to see what
8 we have, and if we could just mark it for identification right now so we
9 can ask for a replacement. And I just want to note for the record that
10 it is cited in Mr. Theunens's report just so that we have it on the
11 record, this version.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --
13 MR. WEBER: Thank you.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, the number under which the document
15 will be marked for identification is?
16 THE REGISTRAR: Document 17316 receives number P3054,
17 Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ORIE: P3054 is marked for identification.
19 I noticed that that -- but perhaps we could ask the witness who
20 dealt with it. The language used as far as -- especially in the second
21 paragraph, where it reads:
22 "The president of the Republic of Serbia asked the competent
23 organs of the Republic of Serbia to investigate the abuses ..."
24 Could I ask you whether there's any chance that there is some
25 problem in using the English language for what originally is the Republic
1 of Serbia and Republika Srpska, but that could not be yet in
2 February 1992. So I'm a bit -- I'm puzzled by it's not within our
3 competence, more or less, but we -- at the same time, we asked the
4 competent organs to investigate. Yes, yes, for involvement of the
5 citizens of the Republic of Serbia, I see. So the gist is we are not
6 competent because it was not on our territory, but we'll nevertheless
7 investigate to see whether of any of our citizens is involved in those
8 crimes and whether they should be brought to justice. Is that a correct
9 understanding of?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. WEBER: Could I please have exhibit -- or, I'm sorry,
14 65 ter 14429.
15 Q. Mr. Theunens, this will be another document from your report.
16 This is a 9th Corps order from General Mladic dated 22 April 1992
17 concerning the provision of arms and equipment for the police units of
18 the RSK.
19 Was this order issued after the Vance Plan was agreed to?
20 A. Yes, Your Honours, it was.
21 Q. Could you please explain to us what General Mladic orders under
22 item 1?
23 A. Your Honours, General Mladic orders to assist the transfer of
24 manpower of the corps, so the JNA 9th Corps, to the RSK MUP. And by
25 assisting, I mean that they should be given, as the text states, personal
1 arms and one combat set of ammunition similar to what military persons
2 are issued with.
3 Q. On pages 175 to 179 of Part 1, you discuss the Vance Plan and
4 related events that occurred in the 9th Corps zone of responsibility
5 through the end of April 1992.
6 Could you please tell us whether this order and other actions by
7 General Mladic were in accordance with the Vance Plan?
8 MR. IVETIC: I'll object again. This is beyond the scope of the
9 expertise of this witness for which he has been noticed under Rule 65 ter
10 and Rule 94 bis.
11 Again, we're going into something that at best could be labelled
12 historical expert testimony, but in actuality is Prosecution closing
13 arguments making their assertions of how documents and evidence should be
14 interpreted which is not appropriate for this phase of the proceedings.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE ORIE: The objection is denied.
17 This could be considered as background information, especially
18 how the accused -- whether the accused in the past has acted in
19 accordance with -- with international political developments or not.
20 At the same time, Mr. Weber, you may have noticed that I had to
21 consult with my colleagues several times. Background and context should
22 not become the foreground, and please keep that in mind.
23 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, thank you very much. I understand that.
24 I was just trying to lead this evidence, and I thought this one document
25 kind of makes the point.
1 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers]...
2 MR. WEBER: So --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
4 MR. IVETIC: Just briefly, Your Honour.
5 For background factual evidence to come in, the Prosecution ought
6 to be held to the standard of bringing background factual witnesses. To
7 have an in-house former member of their staff be the only witness about
8 background factual issues for this Chamber to reply upon in this case I
9 believe is not in accord with the jurisprudence.
10 JUDGE ORIE: In evaluation of the evidence, of course, the
11 Chamber will not just rely on what the witness says but also the
12 documentary -- on the documents underlying what the witness expressed as
13 his expert opinion.
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I know what you're saying. If maybe
16 later today I could just have a moment in time to -- to just understand
17 what you just said.
18 Q. But, Mr. Theunens --
19 A. Mm-hm --
20 Q. -- could you -- could you -- I don't remember if you remember my
21 question before the discussion. Go ahead, then.
22 A. I do. And, again, without going in too many details, but one of
23 the provisions of the Vance Plan is to demilitarise the -- the areas
24 called United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, and this meant that all
25 armed forces had to be withdrawn, JNA, ZNG, TO, anything else, or
1 demilitarised and demobilised; I mean, those a remaining in the territory
2 of the UNPAs except for lightly armed police force, and I have explained
3 that on page 176 of Part 1 of my report.
4 What we see in this order by General Mladic is that he undertakes
5 active steps to circumvent the demilitarisation part by handing over
6 personnel and/or weapons that were military to this local Serb police
8 MR. WEBER: At this time, the Prosecution tenders 65 ter 14429
9 into evidence.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
11 MR. IVETIC: We would object for the reasons previously stated on
12 the record, that this relates to events that are outside the subject
13 matter and geographic scope of the indictment that was given to the
14 Defence as notice of the charges to defend against in this trial. To at
15 the eleventh hour receive an expansion of the substance and the
16 geographic scope of the indictment, impinges upon the ability of the
17 Defence to address the same.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE ORIE: The objection is basically on the same basis as the
20 previous ones and is denied.
21 I think we still needed the number for the document.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, document 14429 receives number
24 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
25 MR. WEBER:
1 Q. I would now like to turn to a discussion of the Bosnian Serb six
2 strategic goals. On page 36 of Part 2, you state that these strategic
3 goals are an order of priority with the first being the separation of the
4 Serbian people from the other two national communities.
5 What is the reason you -- you conclude that this first strategic
6 goal takes priority over the other five?
7 A. Yes. I think you mentioned in order of priority. My conclusion
8 is based on the fact how Mr. Karadzic presents the strategic goals at the
9 12th Assembly Session and also to a lesser extent then how this goal
10 actually continues to be covered in the military documents, not only the
11 directive for further operations but also subsequent orders and
12 subordinate orders to implement these corps.
13 Q. On page 41 of Part 2, you conclude:
14 "The six strategic goals are the basis for the plans to seize and
15 control territory, establish a Serb republic, defend defined borders, and
16 separate the ethnic groups in BiH."
17 I would like to have you further explain each part of this
19 First, could you tell us, how were the strategic goals a plan to
20 seize and control territory?
21 A. Well, I mean, by looking at the contents -- by looking at the
22 actual goals, and I will just -- I will read the second one, because I
23 think it's the most obvious, if you need -- if you want to establish a
24 corridor between Semberija and Krajina, and this is a land corridor, you
25 have to achieve control not only over the roads in that area but also the
1 surrounding areas. When you look at the map of Bosnia-Herzegovina, say,
2 prior to April 1992, so before the take-overs, you will, of course, see
3 that there are a number of municipalities with a Serbian majority. But
4 there are also municipalities with a non-Serb majority. And since
5 these -- the populations there, the non-Serb populations may well have
6 pursued other goals than the Serbian goal, you have a problem if you want
7 to establish a corridor there, unless you manage to establish Serbian
8 control over those municipalities. And we see, then -- I mean, we see
9 the take-over operations where one of the results is the
10 departure/removal of substantial parts of the non-Serb population in
11 areas where Serbs do not have a majority or only very slim majority.
12 I mean, I can do that for the other goals but I think it's pretty
13 clear -- it's quite clear for the first goal already.
14 Q. If I can just breakdown the next part of this. How did the
15 strategic goals represent a plan to establish a Serb republic?
16 A. Well, many of the documents -- actually all -- I mean, all the
17 documents that talk about the bigger context: Why are the Bosnian Serbs
18 doing what they are doing or -- or resorting to military means is that
19 they want to stay in Yugoslavia or what remains of Yugoslavia, but the
20 problem is that the other groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina have a different
21 view on that. And, again, I think the ethnic -- the map with the ethnic
22 distribution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think have you a 1991 map in the
23 Tribunal, you see how complex the situation is because there is no
24 territorial integrity. So when the Bosnian Serbs political as well as
25 military leadership talk about Serbian lands, the problem is they have a
1 clear view as to how this -- what areas these Serbian lands should cover,
2 but there are a lot of non-Serbs living on these Serbian lands. And in
3 some of the orders, for example, when we refer to Directive number 4 and
4 then subsequent orders --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. --
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm sorry, Your Honours.
7 Subsequent orders of the Drina Corps in Eastern Bosnia, it is
8 clearly stated that for what the non-Serbs are concerned, only those that
9 accept Serbian rule will be allowed to stay or are allowed to stay and
10 should even be protected. I've seen documents using the express "loyal
11 Serbs" -- "loyal non-Serbs," I'm sorry, and these people are to stay.
12 The others it is sometimes it's implied but at other times
13 explicitly mentioned that they have to leave. So the -- I think in a
14 nutshell the big problem is: How do you achieve territorial integrity
15 when there are people of different ethnic origin and therefore different
16 concept as to how the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina should look if they
17 are living there.
18 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, this is a good point for me to break. I
19 don't know if it's a good time for the Chamber.
20 JUDGE ORIE: We'll take the break.
21 Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 JUDGE ORIE: We resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.
24 --- Recess taken at 1.15 p.m.
25 --- On resuming at 1.39 p.m.
1 JUDGE ORIE: While the witness is escorted in the courtroom, I
2 would like to deal with P2505.
3 On the 17th of October of this year, the Chamber asked the
4 Prosecution whether there was an English translation available for the
5 text of one of the maps under P2505. The Prosecution has informally
6 communicated that there is no English translation available, that it does
7 not rely on this text, and that there technical difficulties with
8 redacting the text.
9 And, exceptionally, the Chamber accepts to leave the text
10 unredacted with the clear understanding that the Prosecution does not
11 rely on this text. And that is hereby put on the record.
12 Please be seated, Mr. Theunens.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber you may proceed.
15 MR. WEBER: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Q. Mr. Theunens, on page 36 of Part 2, you conclude:
17 "The six strategic goals provide the SRBiH TO and subsequently
18 the VRS with a clearly identified set of long-term objectives from which
19 they develop operational and tactical planning documents and conduct
20 military operations throughout the conflict in BiH. The six strategic
21 goals are the basis for Bosnian Serb military operations during the 1992
22 to 1995 time-period."
23 We'll go through this in more detail throughout the remainder
24 of -- of my examination. But at this time, could you just generally tell
25 us how did Ratko Mladic implement all six of the strategic objectives
1 between 1992 and 1995?
2 A. Your Honours, the most obvious way how the six strategic goals
3 were implemented by General Mladic is through the directives for further
4 operations he signed. Directives for further operations of the VRS,
5 whereby he signed seven out of nine of these directives, and they covered
6 the May 1992 to October/November -- October 1995 time-period.
7 Q. On page 117 of Part 2, you conclude that -- and this is something
8 you've mentioned already today, I just want to go further.
9 A. Mm-hm.
10 Q. "Even though the take-over operations in northern BiH, as well as
11 other strategically located municipalities in other parts of BiH, are
12 carried out prior to the public announcement of the Bosnian Serb six
13 strategic goals, the pattern in relation to their location, timing,
14 modus operandi, specific objectives, and end state indicate that they
15 represent, in fact, the first phase of the implementation of these six
16 strategic goals."
17 Just so we have a clear reference to this on the record, what
18 time-period are you referring to when you describe this first phrase?
19 A. Your Honours, this cover April to May 1992 time-period where we
20 see the take-over by Bosnian Serb forces, including components I have
21 discussed in -- in the report, I mean, also components from outside
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, of municipalities located in northern
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In my conclusion, in order to implement strategic
24 goals number 1 and 2; two being the establishment of a corridor there
25 between semberija, i.e., north-eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the
1 Krajina, i.e., the west.
2 Q. Could you tell us whether this pattern continued once the VRS was
3 formally established in May 1992?
4 A. It does, Your Honours, with the difference that whereas during
5 the take-over operations we see different components in these Serb
6 forces. I mentioned them earlier this morning but we see local Serb TO
7 volunteers, volunteers from Serbia, groups affiliated with MUP Serbia.
8 After the establishment of the VRS, the VRS takes -- I mean, the
9 Main Staff takes active steps to subordinate all groups, and then we see
10 the VRS as the main armed forces and in most cases the only armed force
11 conducting operations on the Serbian side in order to implement the
13 Q. Before going through some of the specific directives, I would
14 like to discuss with you a few documents from May and June 1992.
15 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have 65 ter 793.
16 Q. Mr. Theunens, this will a 2nd Military District order from
17 General Mladic dated 11 May 1992 standing in -- he is signing -- it's
18 standing -- or it indicates that is he standing in for the commander.
19 This order appears to relate to the carrying out preparations and
20 transfer of JNA units from BiH territory to the FRY.
21 Could you please comment on what you see summarised or what
22 appears before us under items 1 and 2 of this order.
23 MR. WEBER: If we could please scroll down. Thank you.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And could the B/C/S version move to the right.
25 MR. WEBER: Thank you again, Your Honour.
1 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the document shows that
2 General Mladic as the -- I mean, actually he is the commander of the
3 2nd Corps by then. Orders that JNA units that are to withdraw from
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina have to remain -- sorry, have to leave their equipment
5 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I mean, this is not explicitly mentioned but
6 he implies only those units that are present in areas under Bosnian Serb
7 control. And then also, I mean, the second paragraph, I mean, it's quite
8 obvious. I think he states that mobilisation should be continued.
9 Q. If we could go up to the top -- I'm sorry, Mr. Theunens, did you
10 want to add anything else? I didn't people that to cut you off.
11 A. Yeah, the last sentence of -- I mean, it's just background, but
12 the last sentence of the second paragraph is that - and this is
13 throughout the war - General Mladic insists with the authorities in --
14 in -- in Serbia and Montenegro, i.e., in FRY, that individuals residing
15 there but who have been born in Bosnia-Herzegovina and who are obviously
16 of Serbian ethnicity should be sent back in order to -- I mean, for those
17 who still have military obligations should return to join the VRS.
18 Q. If we could go -- if we can look at the top of this now. This
19 order is sent to the commands of the 5th, 10th, and 17th, JNA Corps.
20 Could you please tell us which VRS corps were created from these specific
22 A. For what -- the 5th corps is concerned initially its headquarters
23 was in Zagreb, but then obviously during 1991 it had to be moved and
24 ended up in Banja Luka. The 5th Corps forms then -- the 5th JNA Corps,
25 sorry, forms the basis for the 1st Krajina Corps of the VRS.
1 The 17th Corps is a more complex situation because it had its
2 headquarters in Tuzla, so parts of it are withdrawn, and then these parts
3 are transformed in Eastern Bosnia Corps and -- yeah, the
4 Eastern Bosnia Corps.
5 And for the 10th Corps, I need to check my report because I'm not
6 sure any more. Yeah, they used to be in Drvar and they transformed into
7 the 2nd Krajina Corps.
8 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have page 2 of the
9 English translation.
10 Q. General Mladic, under items 4 and 5 of this order, indicates that
11 corps commanders are personally accountable to him for the implementation
12 of this order and he instructs:
13 "Report to me regularly on the progress of the realisation of
14 this order."
15 Is this consistent with the way in which General Mladic exercised
16 his authority over the corps that he commanded?
17 A. Indeed, Your Honours. And it's not limited to General Mladic, I
18 would say. I mean, when I was working here before and from documents I
19 reviewed for other cases, this is common knowledge in -- common language,
20 excuse me, in JNA documents, as late as -- as well as VRS later or other
21 armed forces, and it's simply the implementation of the inspection
22 function of command and control.
23 Q. The Prosecution --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, could I ask you, is this common in all
25 military organisations?
1 THE WITNESS: I -- I mean, in -- in the organisation I belonged
2 to, it wouldn't be put as explicitly, but it's implied that you have
3 report about the level of implementation of an order that you have
5 JUDGE ORIE: And that you are accountable for -- to the higher
6 level for whatever is ordered.
7 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: So it's, I would say, either implied or explicit,
9 it's general military structure.
10 THE WITNESS: Exactly, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Weber.
14 MR. WEBER: The Prosecution tenders 65 ter 793 at this time.
15 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Document 00793 receives number P3056, Your
19 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
20 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have 65 ter 789.
21 And if we could please slide over just slightly to the left of
22 the B/C/S.
23 JUDGE ORIE: No loud speaking, Mr. Mladic, again.
24 MR. WEBER:
25 Q. This is a 2nd Military District order from Chief of Staff
1 Major-General Manojlo Milovanovic dated 13 May 1992. In the first
2 sentence of this document, we see it states:
3 "Based on the verbal order of lieutenant-general Mladic of 13
4 May 1992, corps commanders and the commanders of the 580th mabr and
5 289th, rabr will telephone him every day ..."
6 And then the date of 14 May 1992 is there between 0700 and 0800
8 First, could you please explain to us how General Mladic is using
9 an oral order in this document; and then if you could subsequently
10 comment for us what does this type of regular reporting, which appears to
11 be twice a day, in the morning and then in the evening, shows.
12 A. Your Honour, there's nothing unusual about an oral order in -- in
13 a very straightforward matter. That is, that everybody -- I mean, the
14 corps commanders and commanders of -- of units that are directly
15 subordinated to the Main Staff have to report on a regular basis to the
16 commander of the Main Staff so he -- I mean, from the document, it can be
17 concluded General Mladic issued an oral order to, for sure, his Chief of
18 Staff, maybe he did to some corps commanders; but, in any event, the
19 Chief of Staff then transforms this oral order into a written order,
20 which is then forwarded to the subordinate commanders.
21 And the fact that he orders them to report regularly about their
22 activities is not just the inspection function of command and control but
23 also -- I mean, the -- the knowledge that -- or the common principle, I'm
24 sorry, that as a commander he has to be familiar with the situation of
25 his subordinate units two levels down in order to take decisions on the
1 use of his of -- of -- of his units.
2 Q. In Part 1, you discuss the role of oral orders on page 34 and 43,
3 and you mention oral reports on page 45.
4 Is General Mladic's use of oral orders and reporting in this
5 document consistent with SFRY armed forces doctrine?
6 A. Yes, it is, Your Honours.
7 Q. Do oral orders carry the same weight as written orders?
8 A. Yes, they do, Your Honours.
9 MR. WEBER: At this time, the Prosecution tenders 65 ter 789 into
11 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar --
12 Mr. Ivetic.
13 MR. IVETIC: Can we have an idea of the provenance of the
14 document? Is it an official document or is it from some unofficial
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
17 MR. WEBER: I see -- if I could please have the evidence
18 registration number up at the top. I'm sorry, this is the one I happen
19 not to have with me.
20 Your Honour, this comes from the VRS Main Staff archives,
21 received by the Office of the Prosecutor on 18 October 2006.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
23 MR. IVETIC: Then we have no objection.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 MR. WEBER: I'm sorry. It's -- if I could be more detailed.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I don't know whether any further details
2 are -- if you want to change the information, that's different.
3 MR. WEBER: If I could add, it's the archives based in the Kozara
4 barracks in Banja Luka.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We had already the green light from the
6 Defence. In the assumption that the parties take no issue with a small
7 mistake which is that, in the English, the semi-last word says the 289th;
8 whereas, the original says the 389th as -- further down in the English.
9 MR. WEBER: Mm-hm.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Further down in English, please. There we are.
11 289th. I take it that you will not take issue with that and that we
12 don't need to upload a new version of it.
13 Madam Registrar, the number.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Document 00789 receives number P3057,
15 Your Honours.
16 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
17 Please proceed.
18 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have Exhibit P44 --
19 excuse me, P466.
20 Q. This is a document from your report. It's an order from the
21 commander of the Birac Brigade to the Zvornik TO dated 28 May 1992.
22 Item 6 of this order states:
23 "The moving out of the Muslim population must be organised and
24 co-ordinated with the municipalities through which the moving out [sic]
25 is carried out. Only women and children can move out, while men fit for
1 military service are placed into camps ..."
2 Do you have any comments on this order?
3 A. Well, Your Honours, I mean, the context of the previous
4 discussion, paragraph 6, would be consistent with the first strategic
5 goal, i.e., the separation of the population -- of the -- of the people.
6 Q. What level of -- how -- how does this order from a lower command,
7 a brigade level, relate to -- and their actions that are carried out
8 here, relate to the organisation and co-ordination, both with the
9 municipalities and, if any, its superior commands?
10 A. I'm not sure I understand the question. But I would say it is,
11 as -- as we have discussed several times already, it's the implementation
12 of the command and control process and applying -- or abiding with its
13 principles, i.e., single command, unity, and the obligation to implement
14 decisions. So the actions that are ordered by a subordinate commander
15 have to be coherent with the tasks set by the superior commander.
16 Q. Could the Prosecution now please have 65 ter 00864.
17 Mr. Theunens, this is an another document in your report, in
18 Part 2. It is a 1 June 1992 document from Major Pero Despotovic of the
19 Ilidza Brigade. What does this order show?
20 A. Well, as I have tried to -- to briefly describe in my report,
21 that is, that in spring 1992, Serbian municipalities are established
22 in -- in areas with a Serb majority. And these lower-level political
23 bodies play a role in mobilisation and so on. Mobilisation of Serbs
24 into, first, local Serb TO, and then, subsequently, also in the VRS.
25 In the time -- in the time of SFRY, we did have secretariats for
1 national defence at lower level, but those were operating in the context
2 of the SFRY armed forces, but the Bosnian Serbs rely on existing
3 structures or they establish their own structures but operating in a
4 similar manner as the other ones. And here, General Mladic issues an
5 order to the Secretariat for National Defence in order to -- to assist
6 with mobilisation of -- of -- of -- yeah, of able-bodied population for
7 the benefit of -- of -- of the VRS, i.e., a brigade.
8 MR. WEBER: The Prosecution at this time tenders this document.
9 MR. IVETIC: No objection.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, the number would be.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Document 00864 receives number P3058,
12 Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
14 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have Exhibit P353,
15 page 93 of the English, and page 93 of the B/C/S.
16 Q. Mr. Theunens, coming up before you will be an entry from
17 General Mladic's notebooks dated 6 June 1992 regarding consultations on
18 the military and political situation in SRBH.
19 We see that the location for this is indicated as being Jahorina.
20 At the beginning of the notes, it says: Present, leading representatives
21 of the state and political leadership."
22 Did you review this entry during proofing?
23 A. Yes -- yes, I did, Your Honours.
24 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
25 MR. WEBER:
1 Q. There are four items on the agenda of this meeting, which
2 continues onto the next page in both versions. The first one is the
3 debate on the borders of SRBiH; the second is the border of
4 Romanija-Birac region; the third one is providing for civilians and
5 refugees; and the fourth is political and military doctrine for upcoming
6 war objectives.
7 If we could have the next page in the B/C/S also, please.
8 On this page, we see that, according to these notes, that
9 Radovan Karadzic opens this meeting and references: "The SRBH Assembly
10 defined the strategic aims."
11 He then comments on a number of other things, including losses
12 during the war, and references to the Croat/Muslim, Croat coalition --
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could the English version be enlarged, please.
14 Thank you.
15 MR. WEBER:
16 Q. A little bit after this, the notes indicate that Karadzic
17 reiterates the strategic objectives with comments and explanations.
18 What are the strategic objectives that are being referred to at
19 this meeting?
20 A. Your Honour, the six strategic goals as they were presented by
21 Mr. Karadzic at the 16th Assembly Session on the 12th of May, 1992.
22 Q. Does this meeting relate at all to the planning function of
23 command and control?
24 A. I mean, it -- it could. I don't know whether any military
25 planning is really discussed at this stage. It seems mainly political.
1 Maybe the next page is going to military issues. But if it goes into
2 military issues, yes, then -- then the military will implement the
3 political tasks, and they are be being planned from what we can read
5 Q. If we could continue with this, and then maybe I'll come back to
6 that, to page 97 in both versions.
7 On this page, we see that Karadzic indicates: "The birth of a
8 state and the creation of borders does not occur without war."
9 He then notes the things that are important for demarcating
10 borders. Among those items are: "According to the map, we have 66
11 per cent of the territory which the world would deny us."
12 What does this comment refer to?
13 A. It can mean two things, Your Honours. It can mean that the VRS,
14 at that stage, control 66 per cent of the territory of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or - but I think that's a less likely option - that
16 66 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- that 66 per cent of
17 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina should, according to Mr. Karadzic,
18 belong to the Bosnian Serbs.
19 Q. The next item states: "1.920.000 inhabitants would fit into this
21 Do you have any comments on what Karadzic is referring to?
22 A. I haven't analysed that. I know at that stage the Bosnian Serbs
23 are approximately, say, yeah, 33 per cent of the population of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I haven't -- I mean, I haven't seen this -- this
25 notebook prior to arriving here for the proofing, so I have not been able
1 to look into what the meaning of what this figure was.
2 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have page 101 of both
4 Q. On this page, there's a note -- notation which appears to appear
5 after individual reports from municipalities. Under the one from
6 Bratunac municipality, the entry states:
7 "There are no Muslims now in Bratunac municipality. It is a
8 fully liberated town. There are even no villages which cut off the
10 "Srebrenica municipality is at half. Srebrenica is empty.
11 "90 per cent of the area is bauxite or we have agreed to divide
12 Srebrenica half and half and to have them stay in the area" --
13 If we need the next page --
14 JUDGE ORIE: You left out at small portion [Overlapping speakers]
16 MR. WEBER: [Overlapping speakers] ... I'm sorry --
17 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] ... before the bauxite --
18 MR. WEBER: [Overlapping speakers] ... if I misread it --
19 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] ... mine. It is an area which
20 is described as -- but it now disappeared in the screen.
21 MR. WEBER: My apologies, Your Honour, I was just trying to --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. Please proceed. The reference is to a
23 specific area.
24 MR. WEBER:
25 Q. "Have them stay in the area of Osmace.
1 "Zvornik will fall with the fall of Bratunac."
2 What does this show about the status of operations in
3 Eastern Bosnia as of June 1992?
4 A. In general terms, Your Honours, it shows that the Bosnian Serbs
5 have achieved control over a number of territories there, which would be
6 consistent with the implementation of strategic goal number three, i.e.,
7 eliminating the Drina as a border.
8 And the comments of Mr. Karadzic on -- on the -- on the ethnic
9 makeup would be consistent with strategic goal number 1, i.e., the
10 separation of the people.
11 MR. WEBER: Could the Prosecution please have page 108 of both
13 Q. At this same 6 June 1992 meeting, General Mladic notes comments
14 from Momcilo Krajisnik. These comments begin: "The goal was to form and
15 unite the Birac-Romanija area."
16 Could you tell us quickly what this strategic goal is.
17 A. Well, this -- this -- Your Honours, this refers to northeastern
18 Boris-Herzegovina. I mean, it is partly strategic goal number 2; the
19 corridor. And mainly, of course, eliminating the Drina as a border;
20 strategic number 3.
21 Q. According to the notes, Krajisnik continues:
22 "To draw the borders of this area into include a number of
23 locations," among them Hadzici, Ilidzja, Nova Sarajevo?
24 And then states: "Dobrinja, if we can take it."
25 And then he continues on to list a number of places and ends with
1 the quote:
2 "This should be defended. That will be ours."
3 First of all, could you confirm whether or not these locations
4 being referred to are in and around Sarajevo?
5 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours. This refers to -- to the western part
6 of Sarajevo in the wider vicinity of the airport.
7 Q. On this page and continuing onto the next, the notes indicate
8 Krajisnik states:
9 "The border has to be defended and held. As of tomorrow" --
10 I believe it's on the next page of the -- both versions.
11 "As of tomorrow, we have to conquer what is ours and be prepared
12 to defend our state."
13 The date of this meeting is 6 June 1992. On this same date, did
14 General Mladic issue operational directive number 1 concerning
15 forthcoming VRS operations?
16 A. Yes, he did, Your Honours.
17 MR. WEBER: Your Honours, this is a good break time.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber -- yes.
19 Mr. Theunens, we'd like to see you back tomorrow, because we will
20 adjourn for the day. We'd like to see you back at 9.30 in the morning.
21 But I first instruct you not to speak or communicate in whatever way,
22 with whomever, about your testimony, either given or still to be given.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber, you asked for eight hours. If you would
1 be on track, you would finish tomorrow. Is that ...
2 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, if you would allow me to just review the
3 transcript so far and look at the report overnight, I would be happy to
4 report to Your Honours first thing in the morning on that.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And then if the answer is, No, I'm not going to
6 finish, what would you then expect the Chamber to do?
7 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, if I could even have a couple of hours
8 after -- after court today to -- to let you know as soon as I possibly
9 can in looking at the transcript and what has been admitted so far and
10 what is coming up.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you have used four and a half hours by now.
12 So there are three and a half hours left of the eight hours. And I'm not
13 without reason raising this issue with you because there comes a moment
14 where hours are translated into minutes, and minutes are translated into
15 seconds. The Chamber urges you to stick to your time-limit.
16 We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume tomorrow, Friday, the
17 6th of December, 9.30 in the morning, in this same courtroom, II.
18 MR. LUKIC: Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic.
22 MR. LUKIC: I'm sorry. I was just informed by Mr. Mladic --
23 JUDGE ORIE: One -- one second, Mr. Lukic.
24 Yes. We do not adjourn yet for the day --
25 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.
1 Mr. Mladic just informed me that he would waive his right to be
2 present tomorrow.
3 JUDGE ORIE: I'm looking at Mr. Mladic, and he confirms that you
4 are waiving your right to be absent tomorrow. I see Mr. Mladic is
5 nodding in the affirmative.
6 Therefore, we now then finally adjourn for the day, and we'll
7 resume tomorrow, the 6th, at 9.30 in the morning.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.19 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Friday, the 6th day of
10 December, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.