1 Tuesday, 18 March 2014
2 [Rule 98 bis Hearing]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
8 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is the case
10 number IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
12 One second, please.
13 Yes. The Chamber was informed that the parties, or at least you,
14 Mr. Ivetic, would like to make a short submission in relation to the
15 quote of yesterday, the quote that was introduced in the following way:
16 The quote of General Mladic, to be found at page 39 of the English
17 translation, as the document is uploaded in e-court, which I had
18 understood as page 39 in e-court and not the physical page 39 of a
19 document which was uploaded in e-court but where it appears on a
20 different e-court page. If there is anything you would like to add,
21 please do so.
22 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour, just to clarify the record we are
23 talking about Exhibit P431, and indeed the hard copy page 39 is the
24 35th page in e-court. The page Your Honour had, the 39th page in
25 e-court, is the 43rd page.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. IVETIC: We are referencing the 35th page in e-court, and the
3 reference to the forehead kissing the ground, which is a euphemism in
4 Bosnia for being born. So our position is that the quote relates to
5 anyone being born in the country must live together in the country.
6 And I thank you for the opportunity to correct the record.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Just to avoid any misunderstanding, that's also the
8 position of the Prosecution, that bowing your forehead to the ground has
9 got nothing to do with the religious ritual but rather with being born on
10 a certain territory.
11 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I am not able to say that.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 MR. GROOME: I would want to consult with some of our experts
14 about that. Thanks.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we'll hear from you if it is to be
16 understood in any different way.
17 Then we have concluded yesterday the 98 bis submissions by the
18 Defence, which means that the Prosecution has now an opportunity to make
19 its submissions in relation to what is found in Rule 98 bis; that is,
20 that the Chamber should acquit if there is no evidence to support the
21 indictment. I leave it alone whether it is charges or count.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Groome.
23 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honours, and good morning.
24 Your Honours, today the Prosecution will respond to
25 General Mladic's motion requesting that this Chamber enter a judgement of
1 acquittal on all counts of the indictment on the grounds that there is no
2 evidence capable of supporting a conviction.
3 General Mladic's motion must be denied in its entirety. The
4 Prosecution has tendered and the Chamber has admitted the evidence of
5 over 360 witnesses and approximately 5.200 exhibits. This corpus of
6 evidence establishes clearly and unequivocally each of the crimes
7 enumerated in the indictment, the role General Mladic played in those
8 crimes, and his criminal liability for them.
9 Before we review our evidence, it may be useful to first briefly
10 set out our understanding of Mr. Ivetic's submissions yesterday.
11 THE INTERPRETER: You're kindly asked to slow down for the
12 interpretation. Thank you.
13 MR. GROOME: First, Mr. Ivetic has requested that the Chamber
14 depart from the well-established legal test applied to a 98 bis motion.
15 I will address that in a few moments.
16 Second, the Defence challenges the Prosecution's proof with
17 respect to the overarching joint criminal enterprise set out in the
18 indictment. I will also address the Chamber on this.
19 It is our understanding of the Defence motion that it makes a
20 very limited challenge to Counts 9 and 10 of the indictment related to
21 Sarajevo. Ms. Bibles will address the Chamber on this challenge to
22 scheduled crime G1.
23 The Defence challenges specific allegations related to the
24 municipalities component of the case and including Schedule D as well as
25 some specific allegations and individual crimes listed in Schedules A and
1 B. Mr. Traldi will address those arguments.
2 Mr. McCloskey will address several challenges to the Srebrenica
3 component of the case.
4 The Defence challenges Prosecution proof with respect to crimes
5 in which non-members of the VRS took part or played a primary part. Both
6 Mr. Traldi and Mr. McCloskey will address those aspects of the argument.
7 Ms. Bibles will address the Chamber on challenges related to
8 Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, the crime of genocide. And I will
9 conclude our submissions by addressing the Chamber on Mr. Ivetic's broad
10 challenge to our proof establishing liability pursuant to 7(1) and 7(3)
11 of the Statute.
12 The Defence has made a submission that the Prosecution will not
13 address in its response. Defence raised a number of issues related to
14 how the indictment was pled. Rule 72 applies to such applications, and
15 in this case the Chamber has already received and already decided upon
16 the Defence Rule 72 application.
17 Let me first address the jurisprudence.
18 Mr. Ivetic spent a considerable amount of time during his
19 submissions encouraging the Chamber to abandon well-established
20 jurisprudence governing the test to be applied to General Mladic's
21 Rule 98 bis application. In sum, he suggests that this Chamber should
22 depart from this jurisprudence and examine the proof related to specific
23 factual allegations and specific incidents, and where it finds proof
24 lacking dismiss that particular allegation from the indictment.
25 The analysis and test that the Trial Chamber must apply has been
1 recently restated by the Appeals Chamber in its 98 bis judgement in the
2 Karadzic case. It summered the test in paragraph 21 of its judgement,
3 which I will now read:
4 "The Appeals Chamber recalls that a judgement of acquittal shall
5 only be entered pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the Rules 'if there is no
6 evidence capable of supporting a conviction.' The test to be applied by
7 the Trial Chamber is 'whether there is evidence, if accepted, upon which
8 a reasonable trier of fact could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
9 of the guilt of the accused on the particular charge in question.'
10 Pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the Rules, a Trial Chamber is required to
11 'assume that the Prosecution's evidence is entitled to credence unless
12 incapable of belief' and to take the evidence at its highest. It cannot
13 'pick and choose among parts of that evidence' in reaching its
15 In the context of General Mladic's motion, the jurisprudence is
16 clear, that should the Chamber find there is sufficient evidence which,
17 if credited, could establish General Mladic's guilt beyond a reasonable
18 doubt for a particular count of the indictment, the motion must be denied
19 with respect to that count.
20 This standard has been applied consistently since the plenary of
21 Judges adopted the current version of Rule 98 bis in 2004. This test was
22 applied in deciding the 98 bis motions made by Mrksic, Martic,
23 Milutinovic and his co-accused, Prlic and his co-accused, Milan Lukic and
24 his co-accused, and most recently in the Hadzic case. Should this
25 Chamber departing from this for the last 98 bis application before this
1 Tribunal? The simple answer is no.
2 Mr. Ivetic has set out no reason for this Chamber to apply a
3 different test. The Prosecution has prepared its submissions today with
4 the expectation that the Chamber will apply this established standard.
5 Should the Chamber be inclined to adopt the standard proposed by
6 Mr. Ivetic, I submit that procedural fairness requires that we know that
7 and be given an opportunity to prepare our submissions accordingly.
8 Finally, I would conclude my introductory remarks by saying the
9 Defence submissions, for the most part, have focused on narrow aspects of
10 individual counts with the exception of their broad attack on evidence
11 establishing Mladic's 7(1) and 7(3) liability as well as genocide. Their
12 submissions leave much of the Prosecution's case uncontested with respect
13 to individual counts.
14 The Defence, by tailoring its arguments to a legal standard that
15 does not exist, has failed in many respects to demonstrate that there is
16 a basis for granting the relief sought under Rule 98 bis.
17 Yesterday at transcript 20768, the Defence suggested that
18 insufficient evidence had been adduced to support the charge that
19 General Mladic shared or intended to further the common purpose of the
20 overarching JCE. In fact, the evidence clearly demonstrates that between
21 12 May 1992 and 30 November 1995, General Mladic was a pivotal figure in
22 the evolution and the execution of an overarching criminal plan.
23 The aim of this plan, whose genesis was in October of 1991, was
24 the forcible and permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
25 from the Bosnian Serb claimed territory. Put simply, the aim was ethnic
2 This plan was to be achieved through the commission of the crimes
3 including deportation, inhumane acts, murder, extermination, and
4 persecutions as charged in Counts 3 to 8. The campaign of persecutions
5 would in some municipalities escalate to include the crime of genocide.
6 Yesterday the Defence argued that the Prosecution failed to
7 establish Mladic's liability for genocide under JCE III. Conflating
8 concepts of both intent and liability, Mr. Ivetic, once again, urges the
9 Chamber to ignore what he, himself, called "established case law before
10 this Tribunal" and reject JCE III convictions for specific intent crimes.
11 As recently as January of this year, the
12 Djordjevic Appeals Chamber affirmed that an accused can be found
13 criminally liable under the third category of joint criminal enterprise
14 for specific intent crimes, provided that the crimes were reasonably
15 foreseeable to the accused.
16 When Mladic joined the overarching JCE to rid Bosnian Serb
17 territories of non-Serbs, it was foreseeable to him that genocide was a
18 possible consequence of implementation of the common plan. This common
19 plan of the JCE was conceived of and implemented by the leading
20 Bosnian Serb and Serbian political, military, and police figures. It was
21 a plan that was overarching, of three additional and related JCEs.
22 The crimes committed pursuant to and in furtherance of these JCEs
23 ultimately furthered this overarching plan. The terror created through
24 the campaign of shelling and sniping in Sarajevo, Counts 9 and 10, was
25 used to exert pressure on the international community and the Bosnian
1 government in order to achieve their demographic objectives. The taking
2 of UN personnel hostage, Count 11, was aimed at gaining leverage over the
3 UN and NATO for the same purpose. The forcible transfer and murder
4 operations in Srebrenica were the starkest, most audacious examples of
5 this persecutory campaign.
6 The most prominent participants in the overarching JCE and these
7 other three related JCEs were President Karadzic, president of the
8 presidency and later the expanded presidency of the Republika Srpska and
9 the supreme commander of its armed forces; and General Mladic, the
10 commander of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.
11 Though Mr. Ivetic claimed that "the mere position General Mladic
12 held within the VRS cannot be used as primary evidence to infer his
13 criminal responsibility," the Prosecution has never relied on Mladic's
14 formal role as its strongest evidence of his culpability.
15 Mladic contributed to the common purpose of the overarching JCE
16 primarily through his authority and his ability to engage the armed
17 forces under his command in the commission of crimes.
18 Mladic also oversaw the VRS's co-operation with other
19 institutions linked to other members of the JCE and who were similarly
20 engaged in furtherance of the overarching plan. These includes the
21 RS Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies, and the Bosnian Serb police under the
22 control of President Karadzic. For example, see the evidence of RM097
23 and adjudicated facts 363 and 365, as well as 373 and 405.
24 Through JCE liability, Mladic is responsible for such crimes
25 committed by these entities regardless of whether they were committed by
1 forces directly subordinated to the VRS or other institutions linked to
2 members of the JCE.
3 This co-operation between JCE structures is shown by the patterns
4 and the systemic nature of the crimes committed and some of the
5 discussions held between JCE members, including meetings of the
6 RS presidency, the Supreme Command, and the RS Assembly. And I would
7 refer to Reynaud Theunens expert report, P3029, which discuss such
8 meetings in detail.
9 The existence of this common plan and General Mladic's
10 involvement in it is demonstrated by the patterns of the crimes committed
11 during the take-over operations that began in April 1992 and the
12 operations that followed General Mladic's appointment as commander of the
14 Other indications of this plan include the six strategic
15 objectives when considered in their context and the military directives,
16 orders, and instructions issued pursuant to and in furtherance of the
17 strategic objectives.
18 The circumstances in which the strategic objectives were
19 formulated and in which General Mladic was appointed can be understood
20 from a number of entries in his military notebook, P352. These reflect
21 discussions in the week before Mladic's appointment, discussions held
22 with key JCE members Karadzic and Krajisnik. Together, these entries
23 tell a story that places a persecutory campaign at the heart of the VRS'
24 war objectives.
25 On the 5th of May, 1992, Mladic recorded a discussion concerning
1 the objectives of the VRS and the "relationship towards non-Serbian
2 inhabitants in the territory"; that is P352 of e-court page 246.
3 At this time the relationship toward non-Serb inhabitants was
4 characterised by expressions of leading JCE members in favour of ethnic
5 separation. For example, during March 1992 both Karadzic and Krajisnik
6 made speeches at Bosnian Serb assembly sessions in which they advocated
7 ethnic division and contemplated take-overs of Serb claimed territory; in
8 particular, Zvornik. These are noted in the expert report of
9 Robert Donja, P2001.
10 A few weeks later, BBC journalist Martin Bell witnessed 20.000
11 Muslim refugees outside the town of Zvornik, following an attack by JCE
12 member Zeljko Raznatovic, aka Arkan; that's P832. In a 6th of May entry,
13 Mladic noted that "in Bratunac, two representatives of the SDS are
14 killing all Muslims by slitting their throats"; this is P352 at page 253.
15 He also records Karadzic stating: "It would be a disaster if we did not
16 separate with them"; that's P352 at page 257.
17 In the context of these violent take-overs on the 7th of May,
18 during a closed meeting of select people, the strategic objectives were
19 set out by Krajisnik and noted down by Mladic in his notebook. Karadzic
20 was also present at this meeting. The first of the strategic objectives
21 as noted by Mladic in his notebook states: "1. To separate from the
22 Croats and Muslims forever"; that's page 262.
23 Karadzic and Krajisnik were looking for an accomplished military
24 commander capable of carrying out the type of persecutory campaign that
25 had already begun.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, parts of what you're saying soon will be
2 missing on the transcript because of your speed of speech.
3 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour. I'll slow down.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Could you perhaps restart from the quote of the
5 first strategic objective, "to separate from the Croats and Muslims
6 forever," and then parts were missing already.
7 MR. GROOME: That quote which was restated helpfully by
8 Your Honours, that's found at page 262 of P352.
9 JUDGE ORIE: If you read the transcript of page 10 for me, it is
10 line 17, you see that part of the sentence --
11 MR. GROOME: Oh, I see. Yes, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: -- you spoke already is missing. If you could
13 restart from there.
14 MR. GROOME: Yes.
15 The first of these strategic objectives noted down by Mladic
16 states: "To separate from the Croats and Muslims forever." Karadzic and
17 Krajisnik were looking for an accomplished military commander capable of
18 carrying out the type of persecutory campaign that they had already
19 begun, someone with a proven track record, someone who would consolidate
20 gains made since April 1992 and continue the process of seizing Serb
21 claimed territory.
22 Mladic had demonstrated his credentials for such a task while a
23 commander in the JNA 9th Corps in Croatia during the autumn of 1991.
24 There, soldiers under his command comitted crimes against non-Serbs in
25 Serb claimed territories.
1 This pattern of seizing territory and forcibly removing civilians
2 in areas in Croatia would be repeated in Bosnia, as observed in the
3 Krajisnik testimony of Milan Babic, now an exhibit in the case, and the
4 expert report of Reynaud Theunens.
5 On the 12th of May, 1992, Mladic attended the 16th Assembly
6 Session. At the end of that session, the VRS was formally established
7 and General Mladic was formally installed as the commander of the VRS
8 Main Staff.
9 At that session, President Karadzic outlined the six strategic
10 objectives to the plenary, stating:
11 "The first such goal is separation from the other two national
12 communities, separation of states."
13 The remaining five objectives set out by the Bosnian Serb
14 leadership identified their geographic aspirations, territory which had
15 been or would be seized, dominated, and ethnically cleansed.
16 These objectives were articulated in the context of an ongoing
17 campaign of ethnic cleansing. Following their promulgation and Mladic's
18 appointment as commander of the VRS, this campaign increased in its scope
19 and its scale. It is this context and the widespread pattern and
20 systematic nature of the related criminal operations that give the
21 strategic objectives their criminal implications.
22 Within days of his appointment --
23 JUDGE ORIE: There seems to be a problem with the transcript.
24 MR. GROOME: There's an indication that the computer has crashed,
25 Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: We'll ask through Madam Registrar whether this is a
2 matter that can be fixed. We were warned already earlier this morning
3 that the system had problems and became very slow.
4 Mr. Groome, I do understand that the computer has to be restarted
5 and of course the substance of every minute of these proceedings is too
6 important to miss anything on the record. Therefore, I suggest that we
7 take a couple of minutes, because that's the expectation it would last,
8 and then resume in anything between three and five minutes from now.
9 MR. GROOME: We'll stand by, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: We will just suspend the hearing for a short while.
11 --- Break taken at 10.02 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 10.15 a.m.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, if you're ready to continue, please do
15 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 I was talking about what happened immediately after the
17 promulgation of the six strategic objectives, and it was in this context
18 that the widespread pattern and systemic nature of the related criminal
19 operations that gives the strategic objectives their criminal
21 Within days of his appointment, the VRS, under General Mladic's
22 direction, began contributing to the implementation of the overarching
23 criminal plan. The first charge crime, Schedule A6.2, took place in
24 Hambarine on the 23rd of May, 1992, and by mid-June massacres had been
25 perpetrated by his soldiers in six different municipalities.
1 One way in which Karadzic and Mladic applied the forces under
2 their command was by turning the strategic goals into operational
3 directives. As P338, at page 159 indicates, this is the 1993 VRS combat
4 readiness report. This demonstrates that the strategic goals served as a
5 "general guide-line" for the VRS.
6 This evidence is directly contrary to Mr. Ivetic's submission
7 yesterday that Mladic somehow disagreed with the strategic objectives.
8 JCE members met to discuss the progress made in implementing the
9 strategic objectives. Following such meetings, operational directives
10 would be issued implementing orders passed down the chain of command and
11 military operations carried out. Some of these operations included the
12 commission of serious crimes.
13 The meetings prior and the events following the issuance of
14 Directives 4 and 7 are notable examples of the way in which the political
15 goal of permanent ethnic separation became absorbed into regular army
16 orders which led to the commission of crimes.
17 Yesterday the Defence argued that the evidence shows
18 General Mladic did not share intent related to any common purpose that
19 has been identified by the Prosecution. This was at transcript
20 page 20772. The crimes committed in furtherance of the JCE were clearly
21 intended by Mladic and his fellow JCE members. Throughout our
22 submissions here today, we will be referring to evidence of this shared
24 The evidence establishes the General Mladic created, shaped, and
25 led the VRS to perpetrate the crimes contemplated by the overarching JCE.
1 The claims made yesterday by the Defence that there was a frail
2 connection between General Mladic and the acts for which he now stands
3 trial is simply not credible. There is a very clear connection between
4 General Mladic and the crimes committed in pursuance of the overarching
6 Through skillful and effective use of command and control
7 principles, such as single command, subordination, inspection, he
8 established a system through which his orders flowed efficiently down the
9 chain of command and the information he needed rapidly back up. That
10 gave him what expert General Dannatt described as "finger-tip control"
11 over the soldiers under his command. His full and active engagement with
12 his troops in the field ensured that he was often present at the most
13 critical events in the war, such was his commitment that on occasion his
14 forcefulness and precision would rise to the level of micromanaging
15 particular campaigns.
16 Lest there be any confusion, Mladic's finger-tip control, his
17 ability to engage his forces with precision, is as important to any
18 assessment of his criminal liability under Article 7(1) of the Statute as
19 it is under Article 7(3). His ability to effectively command VRS
20 soldiers and apply them in the commission of crimes was his primary
21 contribution to the joint criminal enterprise as set out in paragraph 13
22 of the indictment. I would ask you to keep this in mind as we review the
23 evidence of the crimes and how they were committed.
24 As my colleagues will describe, he used this control to
25 devastating effect in his efforts to conquer and cleanse Serb claimed
2 I will now ask Mr. Traldi to respond to the Defence arguments
3 related to the municipalities.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Traldi, you may proceed.
5 MR. TRALDI: Thank you, Mr. President, and good morning.
6 General Mladic and the VRS, in co-operation with forces under the
7 control of other JCE members, implemented the common criminal purpose
8 Mr. Groome described in a brutally efficient genocidal and persecutory
9 campaign throughout the Bosnian municipalities. That campaign is charged
10 in Counts 1 and 3 through 8 of the indictment.
11 In addressing the Defence arguments about these counts, I will
12 start with the objectives of that campaign, turn to Mladic's role in
13 implementing it, and finally deal with the campaign itself. It is
14 necessary to understand this was a single campaign in which each crime
15 contextualises and explains each other crime. I will thus address the
16 criminal nature of the campaign and not artificially segregate specific
18 General Mladic himself described the Bosnian Serbs' territorial
19 objectives and demonstrated that he fundamentally shared in the common
20 criminal purpose of the JCE.
21 You can see on what should be the next slide, C2, that these
22 targeted areas spanned the length and width of Bosnia. In an interview
23 in evidence as P1975, General Mladic called for taking "back the
24 territory Muslims took during World War II and as punishment, even more
25 than that," and he called for achieving "the unification of the Serbian
1 lands from Knin, through Banja Luka and Sarajevo, to Belgrade."
2 And if you look at the blue areas on the map, you can see what
3 General Mladic meant. Knin is just to the west and Croatia, and then the
4 blue areas extend through the ARK, the Posavina corridor, cover the
5 entire eastern border regions, and include the areas of Sarajevo claimed
6 by the Bosnian Serb leadership.
7 These areas parallel the territory identified by strategic
8 objectives 2 through 6. These were the territories which Bosnian Serb
9 leaders told Witness Okun they intended to make "ethnically pure Serb or
10 as overwhelmingly Bosnian Serb as they could make it." And that's in
11 P3103, page 23. I'd refer you also to P431, page 49.
12 General Mladic knew that this was a massive undertaking. Slide
13 C3 shows that he told the RS Assembly: "People and peoples are not pawns
14 nor are they keys in one's pocket that can be shifted from here to there.
15 It is something easily said but difficult to achieve."
16 The way that the JCE achieved what Mladic termed "shifting people
17 and peoples from here to there" was an organised campaign of ethnic
18 cleansing through co-ordinated military operations in municipality after
20 Other crimes, including the destruction of cultural heritage
21 sites and the large scale detention of non-Serb civilians, were committed
22 to facilitate this ethnic cleansing process.
23 Slide C4 shows that General Mladic cogently expressed the JCE
24 member's common purpose to the RS Assembly in 1994, describing their
25 historic chance to create a "all Serbian state," and "all Serbian" didn't
1 leave much room for the people who lived in Ahatovici or Brdo or Zepa.
2 And you can see on slide C5 how similarly other Bosnian Serb authorities
3 described their common purpose.
4 The first quote is particularly instructive in showing how the
5 permanent nature of the forcible removal of non-Serbs flowed directly
6 from the Bosnian Serb leadership's policies. After Radovan Karadzic
7 presented the strategic objectives, one assembly delegate,
8 Miroslav Vjestica, rose and proudly noted that there were no more Muslims
9 in Bosanska Krupa. Then he asked: "Will they have a place to return
10 to?" And he answered: "I think it is unlikely after our president told
11 us the happy news that the right bank of the Una is the border." And for
12 your reference, Your Honours, P3853, page 9, shows that in 1995 Krupa was
13 100 per cent Serb.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Traldi, we have now reference to P431. The
15 previous one, I think you said page 4 -- the previous reference to that
16 exhibit, you said page 49 which I think appears in the transcript at this
17 moment as P449 --
18 MR. TRALDI: I think I may have stammered a little, Your Honour,
19 and so it may be my fault.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but it's clear that you wanted to refer to page
22 MR. TRALDI: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed. Sorry to have interrupted you.
24 MR. TRALDI: The emphasis on permanent separation, which Mladic
25 recorded in his notebook on 5 May 1992 was an integral part of the
1 campaign he was asked to implement. And as you see here, that emphasis
2 lasted throughout the war.
3 I'd refer you generally to Exhibits P2798 and P3072 regarding how
4 Mladic and the other JCE members redrew the demographic map of Bosnia.
5 General Mladic had an integral role in redrawing that map. He
6 immediately established command and unified Bosnian Serb forces, and as
7 commander of the Main Staff his orders -- his orders drove the JCE
9 Mladic continually received information about how those orders
10 were being carried out. This information is reflected in the trial
11 record in four primary ways: First, his own notebooks in which he
12 recorded many of his day-to-day meetings; second, the daily combat
13 reports he received regularly from subordinate VRS corps; third, his
14 participation in meetings with international observers; and fourth,
15 records of other meetings he attended including meetings of the
16 Republika Srpska government and meetings with local civilian authorities
17 and lower level VRS officers. The record shows that the reports he
18 received paralleled the testimony of many survivor witnesses.
19 These reports describe different VRS brigades utilising the same
20 tactics, committing the same crimes, and achieving the same criminal end.
21 That consistency is not a coincidence. It is the inevitable result of
22 decisions made at the strategic level to separate the population through
23 the commission of crimes.
24 Slide C6 shows a selection of the reports General Mladic received
25 on the implementation of the JCE. The Defence asserted yesterday that
1 Mladic did not know or have reason to know that crimes were being
2 committed during this campaign. In fact, he was extensively informed
3 about its criminal nature.
4 His subordinate corps often reported on the removal of non-Serbs
5 from Serb claimed territories. Several of the reports shown on this
6 slide in the first section coincide with large ethnic cleansing
7 operations in late May and late July.
8 Indeed, VRS officers sometimes complained that civilian
9 authorities were not efficient enough in removing non-Serbs from their
10 municipalities, reporting, for instance, that the civilian authorities
11 were not "sufficiently organised in implementing this model for removal
12 of the enemy," or suggesting that they "work much harder at this." And
13 that's P3815 and P3714.
14 Other reports in General Mladic's notebooks described the flight
15 of non-Serbs from Bratunac, Foca, Kalinovik, Kljuc, Zvornik, and Serb
16 claimed areas around Sarajevo.
17 Reports to General Mladic described the detention of large
18 numbers of non-Serbs.
19 And reports to General Mladic described murders which were
20 repeated throughout the VRS campaign in the municipalities.
21 From municipality to municipality, witnesses told the same story
22 of the patterns of destruction wrought by Bosnian Serb forces: Serb
23 take-overs of power; attacks against defenceless people or violence that
24 continued long after the fighting had stopped; destruction of
25 Bosnian Muslims' and Croats' towns and sacred places; detention of
1 civilians as well as fighters in camps in inhumane conditions; organised
2 expulsions to a few holdout enclaves; and large massacres, from Prijedor
3 in the west to Vlasenica in the east, Foca in the south, and everywhere
4 in between.
5 These repeated patterns of crimes by forces under JCE members'
6 control are highly relevant to showing their common purpose. I will
7 focus on two for the moment.
8 First, the killings across these municipalities reached a massive
9 scale. P2796 and 2797 identify by name nearly 2.000 of the victims of
10 the massacres charged in Schedules A and B of the indictment. These
11 massacres, of course, led up to the killing of thousands more
12 Bosnian Muslim men and boys when Srebrenica fell in July of 1995.
13 Second, the Defence referred yesterday to the destruction of
14 non-Serb cultural heritage sites. The only reasonable inference from the
15 uniform destruction of these sites is that it was part of the JCE
16 members' common purpose and their persecutory and genocidal campaign.
17 Mr. Riedlmayer testified at transcript page 17933: No mosque in the
18 indictment municipalities survived the war undamaged. This removed the
19 core of non-Serb communities and the clearest visual evidence of their
21 The pattern of these destructions shows the widespread and
22 systemic nature of the attack on non-Serb communities. The Defence
23 asserted yesterday at transcript page 20743 that the Chamber cannot
24 review evidence about uncharged cultural heritage sites. This is
25 incorrect. Those sites are also relevant to prove the widespread and
1 systemic nature of this campaign. And I'd refer Your Honours to
2 paragraphs 746 and 766 of the Tolimir trial judgement regarding the
3 relevance of these destructions to the perpetrator's mens rea.
4 P4333, pages 89 and 90, reflects that the destruction of non-Serb
5 sites was part of JCE members' policy. That's the evidence of Bosnian
6 Serb official Predrag Radic. And it is clear from the evidence of one
7 VRS soldier that the uniform destruction of mosques was part of the
8 policy. When he was asked if there were 19 mosques in his municipality,
9 he said there couldn't have been because if there had been, he and the
10 other soldiers would have destroyed 19 mosques. That's at transcript
11 page 17298. And I'd refer you also to Witness Taci's evidence,
12 particularly at transcript page 2098.
13 Several Bosnian Serb witnesses gave evidence which demonstrates
14 how the destruction of mosques fit into the plan to permanently and
15 forcibly remove non-Serbs. Your Honours have received evidence from
16 Milan Tupajic, RM15, RM16, and RM513 that the Serbs believed that if the
17 mosques were destroyed, the Muslims would not return. That's P3170,
18 P2362, P1054, and transcript page 17388.
19 The permanent change in the Bosnian landscape wrought by these
20 destructions was precisely the point. As to the specific Defence
21 arguments about individual sites, there is evidence in the trial record
22 to support each charged site. Much of this is in Mr. Riedlmayer's
23 evidence, particularly P2503, 2510, 2511, and 2514.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Traldi, may I ask you to look at the new
25 transcript page, we started again after the break, page 9, lines 19 and
1 20. The name of the witness is not recorded and the page number is not
2 clear. Please, can you repeat so that we are able to find it.
3 MR. TRALDI: Ah, it's Witness Taci, Your Honour, at transcript
4 page 2098.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
6 MR. TRALDI: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 While the Defence attempts to impugn some of Mr. Riedlmayer's
8 sources, his conclusions are corroborated by pre- and post-damage
9 photographs, witnesses evidence in this trial, and they are also
10 corroborated in large part by facts adjudicated by the Chamber.
11 Looking at the municipalities the Defence singled out yesterday,
12 each site in Bijeljina is addressed in Mr. Riedlmayer's written evidence.
13 P1054, paragraphs 77 and 78, discusses the large-scale destruction of
14 mosques in Bijeljina by VRS forces and the message it sent, that
15 non-Serbs should leave the area.
16 P4163 shows the destruction of mosques in Bijeljina continued in
17 1993. And the Chamber has recognised the destruction of Bijeljina
18 mosques in adjudicated fact 517.
19 Each site in Pale is also addressed in Mr. Riedlmayer's written
20 evidence, and Witness Crncalo testified at transcript page 3238 that all
21 the mosques in Pale were destroyed while it was under SDS control.
22 And perhaps my speed was off, but it was Witness Crncalo and
23 transcript page 3238.
24 Finally, Mr. Riedlmayer was unable to reach an expert conclusion
25 that two of the four charged mosques in Kalinovik were destroyed during
1 the indictment period, as the Defence pointed out. However, the Chamber
2 has received witness evidence and found adjudicated facts on the subject.
3 Indeed, as Mr. Ivetic pointed out, the Prosecution redacted P2800 on the
4 basis of those facts.
5 This evidence satisfies the Rule 98 bis standard even if the
6 Chamber were to consider each mosque separately.
7 The Defence also offered boilerplate challenges to a large number
8 of Schedule A and B incidents in the span of a few sentences. To be fair
9 to the other components, rather than go through each incident in detail,
10 I will simply discuss the genocidal campaign and explain how those
11 incidents fit into the implementation of the JCE members' common criminal
12 purpose. We will provide --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Traldi --
14 MR. TRALDI: Mr. President.
15 JUDGE ORIE: -- could I just ask you one question. You referred
16 to a witness who testified in paragraph 77 and 78. It was -- what was
17 it? It was 45. Let me just have a look.
18 MR. TRALDI: It's P1054. And --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, P105 --
20 MR. TRALDI: -- it's evidence under seal, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you refer to paragraph 77 and 78. Now, if I
22 understood Mr. Ivetic well, it's not that he ignores the existence of
23 this evidence but the issue he raised is that it is the quality of that
24 evidence. I think he said when the witness explains how the mosques were
25 destroyed that this information was spoken about in Bijeljina or, in
1 paragraph 78, this was a clear signal to non-Serbs. And what he
2 challenged is not the existence of that evidence but is that the witness
3 apparently does not explain why he had the opinion that this was a clear
4 signal, whether that is opinion or whether that is a statement of facts,
5 and similarly for the sources of his information in paragraph 77.
6 So if you say, Well, there is the evidence, then that seems not
7 to respond to what Mr. Ivetic brought to our attention yesterday, if I
8 understood you well, Mr. Ivetic. Mr. Ivetic is nodding yes.
9 MR. TRALDI: And I'd just make two brief responses,
10 Mr. President.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do.
12 MR. TRALDI: First, that looking at the quality of that evidence
13 is precisely the type of weighing exercise that is for final judgement
14 rather than for the 98 bis stage of this proceedings. Second, you
15 singled out the quality of the witness' evidence, that this was a clear
16 signal to non-Serbs that they should leave. As I mentioned a moment ago,
17 that's evidence that the Chamber has also received from a number of other
18 Bosnian Serbs witnesses, and I'd suggest, for corroboration and
19 explanation, that those references are more than sufficient to provide
21 JUDGE ORIE: You say it's not only this quote from this witness
22 but it is the broader picture which puts this into context. Is that how
23 we have to understand your argument?
24 MR. TRALDI: I'd say you've encapsulated it better than I have,
25 Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Well, let's not make it a competition.
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. TRALDI: I appreciate that.
4 JUDGE ORIE: But I'm also looking at the clock. We are far
5 beyond the time we usually take a break. Perhaps I was a bit disturbed
6 by the interruption we had halfway, although that was certainly less than
7 the 15 minutes we are over time now.
8 Since I have interrupted you, anyhow, Mr. Traldi, would it be of
9 any problem if we would take the break now or would you finish a few
10 sentences before we take the break?
11 MR. TRALDI: I think, Mr. President, I was about to turn to a
12 different topic and so this would be a good time.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. We take a break, and in view of the fact that
14 we were a bit longer, perhaps we should take a slightly longer break and
15 we resume at quarter past 11.00.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.50 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 11.19 a.m.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. Traldi, I would like to
19 briefly address what may be not a significant issue.
20 Mr. Groome, you commenced this morning your submissions by saying
21 that the Prosecution will respond to General Mladic's motion requesting
22 that this Chamber enter a judgement of acquittal on all counts of the
23 indictment on the grounds that there is no evidence capable of supporting
24 a conviction.
25 Now, the Chamber is not aware of any motion. The Chamber is
1 aware of the Defence having announced and asked for an opportunity to
2 make submissions so as to assist the Chamber in fulfilling its duties
3 under Rule 98 bis.
4 Then later on you said that many of the counts had been left
5 uncontested. Again, but perhaps I'm also addressing you, Mr. Ivetic, the
6 Chamber understands the situation as that the Defence wanted to make
7 submissions so that the Chamber could fulfil its duties under
8 Rule 98 bis, and in that context made specific submissions on charges or
9 counts in the way you did in which, I think, you enumerated in four
10 specific items, of course, leaving the duties of the Chamber under
11 Rule 98 bis in respect of any other matter still in existence.
12 Is that how we have to understand?
13 MR. IVETIC: You are correct, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, is it clear now or -- Rule 98 bis
15 doesn't speak about the motion, and there is no motion before the
17 MR. GROOME: I understand, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Having clarified this matter, Mr. Traldi is invited
21 to continue his presentation of argument.
22 MR. TRALDI: Thank you, Mr. President. I was about to turn to
23 the JCE members's campaign.
24 General Mladic's integral role is most visible in that campaign's
25 rapid escalation after he formally assumed the post of commander of the
1 VRS Main Staff.
2 You can see on slide C7 a 1st Krajina Corps document from
3 21 May 1992 noting his appointment and the establishment of unified
4 command, and in this excerpt noting the need to "struggle for complete
5 separation from the Muslim and Croatian peoples."
6 Within days the VRS was conducting large-scale operations
7 throughout Bosnia. A senior VRS officer testified that cleansing
8 territory on ethnic grounds was a regular feature of those operations.
9 That's at T5012, 5013.
10 The criminal nature of these operations is evident from
11 Bosnian Serb documents. You can see the RS MUP's report of the killing
12 or wounding of hundreds of inhabitants of non-Serb villages in Prijedor
13 on slide C8. These attacks are charged as incidents A6.1 through 6.3.
14 The Defence suggested yesterday that the Prosecution had not specifically
15 identified the perpetrators. Instead, this is one of many instances
16 where the crimes were committed in the context of a large-scale operation
17 under VRS command by joint Serb forces subordinated to their local
18 commander, then their corps commander, and then, of course, to
19 General Mladic.
20 Regarding operations in Prijedor at this time, I refer you also
21 to P2243 and 2875.
22 Other municipalities saw similar cleansing operations. P2889 and
23 3294, for instance, describe operations in Sanski Most. And while the
24 Defence challenged the identity of the perpetrators of two other
25 scheduled incidents in Drum and Kenjari around this time, in each case
1 the Chamber received evidence that the perpetrators included soldiers in
2 uniform. I'd refer Your Honours to P2489 and 3391.
3 Slide C9 shows how these operations were carried out on the other
4 side of Bosnia. Major Andric ordered expulsions of women and children
5 from the Birac area in an organised and co-ordinated way and that all the
6 men had to be kept in camps for exchange. You can see this applied in,
7 for instance, P3737, P524, P4004, and P3170, page 46. Back in the ARK,
8 P3872 shows a similar policy to what we see here. And P3599 and P3600
9 show the thousands deported to Croatia in the campaign's implementation.
10 A summary of some of the key evidence about the campaign in late
11 May and early June is on slide C10. Bosnian Serb authorities completed
12 these operations by expelling most women and children and confining them,
13 whether or not they were armed or fighters, in detention facilities in
14 terrible conditions. Reports to Mladic around this time reflected
15 significant numbers of prisoners, including women and children held all
16 around the country: The ARK, Rajlovac, Ilidza, Susica. All of those are
17 facilities where we've shown large-scale crimes were committed.
18 The creation of detention facilities accelerated after the
19 operations in late May because the VRS had taken so many non-Serbs
20 prisoner. As you can see on slide C11, Batkovic camp, for instance, was
21 created at General Mladic's order. I would refer you also to P189 and
22 P377. Serious crimes were committed at Batkovic, several prisoners
23 killed. At T9355, one Bosnian Serb witness called the camp a disgrace.
24 Yesterday, the Defence asserted that the evidence was not
25 sufficiently specific as to perpetrators of crimes at Batkovic. Of
1 course, again, the commander remained in the VRS chain of command,
2 subordinated to the East Bosnian Corps and to Mladic, and the guards
3 subordinated to him. Indeed, all of the camps charged in the indictment
4 fell within either the military or police chains of command, directly
5 subordinated to members of the JCE.
6 One example from around this time illustrates how the military
7 and police co-operated in committing crimes in these facilities. In
8 early June, shortly after the operations in the ARK, a delegation of
9 high-ranking 1 KK officers, including General Talic, visited their new
10 camp at Manjaca. They could see blood on the prisoners' faces and on
11 their clothing.
12 The 1st Krajina Corps then co-ordinated with the Sanski Most
13 Crisis Staff to transfer from Sanski Most to Manjaca politicians,
14 extremists, and those unwelcome in the municipality. That's T3001 and
15 P2409 and 3255. And P2362 shows those unwelcome in the municipality
16 meant basically all non-Serbs.
17 In that transfer, at least six people were killed. This
18 incident, B1.1, is another for which the Defence suggested yesterday the
19 VRS bore no responsibility. Instead, it compelling illustrates the
20 co-operation between JCE forces in committing crimes related to the
21 detention camps.
22 The next slide, C12, shows a selection of witness evidence, that
23 detention of non-Serbs was done arbitrarily, on a large scale, by the VRS
24 and served as a tool in forcibly removing non-Serbs. The Bosnian Serb
25 authorities described their policy similarly.
1 Slide C13 shows Minister Stanisic reporting to President Karadzic
2 that the VRS was to arrest as many Muslim civilians as possible, many had
3 been placed in camps with poor conditions run by the MUP.
4 I'd refer Your Honours also to P3874. The Defence stated
5 yesterday that certain camps involved RS MUP perpetrators. As reflected
6 here, of course, that's true and has always been part of our case. The
7 camp system illustrates how these different JCE members and their forces
8 co-operated in implementing their common criminal purpose.
9 While Minister Stanisic refers in this document to camps run by
10 the MUP, detainees in camps run by the VRS were primarily civilians as
11 well. P221 is a Manjaca camp report from July 1992 just days after this
12 document, and it states clearly what Manjaca was, a camp for segregation
13 of Muslims and Croats, which history will not forgive us.
14 In early June 1992, Witness Wilson had challenged Mladic and
15 RS presidency member Plavsic about the massive detention of non-Serb
16 civilians. That's at T3997. But it continued throughout the war. I'd
17 refer you to, for instance, P355, page 63; P2886; P3808; and P4008.
18 This next slide shows the interrelated nature of the camp system.
19 For instance, General Mladic could task multiple camps in the same order
20 through his chain of command as he did in P201 and P2879. This map
21 labels the detention facilities charged in Schedules B and C. The solid
22 blue lines show areas where people were transferred from one municipality
23 to another, to move them to or from one of the camps where General Mladic
24 is charged with crimes.
25 You can see the large number of dotted lines representing
1 transfers between charged camps and the large number of lines pointing to
2 the centres at Manjaca in the north-west and Kula near Sarajevo.
3 Of course, dozens of other camps pockmarked the landscape of
4 Bosnia. And on the left side of the map you can see what P2225 shows,
5 that one witness was held in seven different detention facilities in the
6 Sarajevo area during the summer of 1992, including Kula prison. That's
7 only possible because the camps were a single co-ordinated system.
8 Why hold tens of thousands of civilians in camps? Because they
9 were part of implementing the permanent forcible removal of non-Serbs.
10 You can see on the next slide, C15, green lines showing releases into
11 either Croatian or Muslim held territory in Bosnia.
12 For instance, when Manjaca was closed at the Main Staff's order,
13 the VRS deported some detainees to Croatia. You can see that green line
14 on the left side of the map. Other detainees were sent to other camps in
15 the Bosnian Serb system and hidden from the international community.
16 While many non-Serbs were held in camps, operations to ethnically
17 cleanse remaining villages continued through the summer and fall. I'd
18 refer you to P520 regarding Kljuc and P2440 regarding Prijedor.
19 Yesterday, the Defence suggested that the Prosecution had not
20 specifically identified the perpetrators of crimes committed during these
21 operations. Those relate to Prijedor A6.5 through A6.9 inclusive, and
22 Kljuc, A3.3. Again, these were co-ordinated operations under clear VRS
23 command. For Prijedor, I'd refer you also to P2365, P2432, and
24 transcript pages 17805 through 17807 among others.
25 The Prijedor operations are particularly illustrative. An
1 officer from the 6th Brigade told RM095 that the Muslim areas of Brdo and
2 Biscani would be cleansed even though the population had surrendered
3 their weapons. Non-Serbs from those areas were then massacred in a
4 number of different villages. Others were brought to Keraterm and
5 Omarska where hundreds more were killed. And the group that collected
6 the bodies of the non-Serbs who had been killed in just one of these
7 areas, Biscani, had to make 19 separate stops to pick up dead bodies.
8 The campaign continued to devastate the Bosnian Muslim and Croat
9 communities with massacres throughout the summer and fall. And I'll just
10 briefly refer to one with which Your Honours are very familiar, evidence
11 regarding the massacre at the Grabovica school. I refer to it because it
12 illustrates like those operations much about the persecutory campaign.
13 General Mladic had been personally involved in negotiations regarding the
14 surrender of Vecici, the War Presidency had followed his instructions,
15 that's in P2884, and then his forces, VRS forces, captured fleeing
16 Muslims, took them to the school, and massacred at least 150 prisoners.
17 This next slide, C16, shows the massacre was reported up the
18 chain of command to the Main Staff and that the next day the 1st Krajina
19 Corps reported that the same prisoners had been killed in combat, same
20 number of persons. No VRS soldiers were ever punished and almost all of
21 the victims' bodies are still missing.
22 Having cleansing most of the areas they claimed, the JCE members
23 then turned their focus to the remaining enclaves in the Drina Valley.
24 Regarding the state of the campaign at this point, I'd ref you to
25 Exhibits P320 and P2813.
1 General Mladic issued an order creating the Drina Corps, P3659.
2 Huge parts of the area it would cover had already been ethnically
3 cleansed, and now the JCE members had a new VRS corps to finish the job.
4 It would include brigades under Rajko Kusic and Svetozar Andric.
5 Krstic's 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade became part of it soon
6 afterwards. Each had already been responsible for serious crimes.
7 On 8 November after the massacre at Grabovica, Mladic met with
8 his corps commanders and JCE members Karadzic and Krajisnik. Slide C17
9 reflects some of his notes of that meeting. Here, Mladic records that
10 Krajisnik noted: "We have achieved the corridor and separation with the
11 Muslims," and then summarised "the most important objective is the task
12 assigned to the Zivanovic," who, evidence shows, was the commander of the
13 Drina Corps, "the mopping up of the Drina. The most important task is
14 separation from the Muslims."
15 Days later, Mladic signed Directive 4, P1968. It called for
16 driving the enemy army out of the Drina Valley with the Muslim civilian
17 population. And the Drina Corps issued an implementing order which was
18 equally clear, and it read, in pertinent part: Force the Muslim local
19 population to abandon the area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde.
20 And that's P2095.
21 Many of the people in these enclaves had already been driven out
22 of their homes and during this campaign many were re-expelled to
23 Srebrenica. Witness Osmanovic summaries it eloquently on slide C20. His
24 family -- C18 now, I'm sorry, I've done a little bit of cutting during
25 the break. His family is just one of many which was driven from hamlet
1 to hamlet or camp to camp by the implementation of the JCE. The
2 Main Staff and its representatives were directly involved in cleansing
3 this area, and on 15 February 1993 the Main Staff issued an attack order,
4 P2218, which noted the enclaves had "the burden of a large number of
5 civilian refugees," and used the ethnic slur "poturice." Villages in the
6 targeted area were destroyed and burned.
7 I want to turn to one last massacre to which the Defence referred
8 to yesterday at length, the massacre at Skrljevita, charged at A7.5. The
9 Defence told you yesterday that military police arrested the
10 perpetrators, but failed to mention that VRS and SDS officials intervened
11 to have those perpetrators released. That's at P2362, 2371, and 2375.
12 And it's clear from P3294 that one was a former paramilitary who had been
13 incorporated into the VRS.
14 Contrary to some of the Defence arguments, far from wanting to
15 stop this paramilitary from committing further crimes, VRS and SDS
16 officials intervened to protect him from punishment when he was part of
17 the murder of a group of unarmed Bosnian Croats. This incident is
18 certainly relevant to the Chamber's assessment of the incorporation of
20 Indeed, as the VRS consolidated control over its targeted areas
21 and expelled their non-Serbian populations, many of the commanders whose
22 units committed the worst crimes in the municipalities were promoted
23 through the ranks. This last slide, C19, shows some examples. Several
24 of the same perpetrators committed more crimes under General Mladic's
25 command later in the war, like Krstic and Kusic.
1 Taking this campaign as a whole, the evidence of the crimes in
2 the municipalities is clear, reliable, and overwhelming. A comprehensive
3 review of each incident would require much more time. However, the
4 evidence I have discussed, even in this limited time, is amply sufficient
5 for the Chamber to dismiss the challenges to incidents addressed in
6 Counts 1 and 3 through 8.
7 Accordingly, I'll ask Mr. McCloskey to discuss the evidence
8 showing how Mladic led the genocide at Srebrenica.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Good afternoon, Your Honours, everyone.
10 JUDGE ORIE: You are moving ahead a bit too quickly. It's still
11 the morning, Mr. McCloskey.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you. I can't quite get the clock from
14 It's not my purpose today to go over an exhaustive account of
15 the -- Mladic's involvement in the Srebrenica genocide. You've heard
16 that evidence and we all saw you listen very carefully with plenty of
17 questions. I will refer you to my opening statement where I do identify
18 some of the key links in our basic theory of our case, as well as our
19 trial brief where we identify some of the key evidence.
20 What I do want to do here in the some roughly 40 minutes that I
21 have is respond to Mr. Ivetic's sometimes specific challenges. Now, as
22 you saw most of his challenges had to do with the weight of the evidence
23 or the credibility which, as we know, is not really what this kind of a
24 challenge is about, but I will want to respond to it to give you a better
25 context of how to look at some of this material.
1 I want to start off with his challenge to Directive 7. He
2 suggested in his comments that Mladic was somehow separate from
3 Directive 7, and he stated -- Mr. Ivetic stated that, and I quote:
4 "The corps commanders should not have reacted to Karadzic's
5 directive before receiving Mladic's orders as a result of the directive."
6 This is absolutely wrong. General Mladic and his Main Staff
7 don't have the time nor energy and ability, as you've learned from the
8 documents themselves and from the description of the experts, to lay out
9 the details of combat plans. This is left to his corps. And we see this
10 from the documents when we look at, for example, Krivaja 95. This is an
11 operation by the Drina Corps that's approved be the Main Staff. It's not
12 the other way around.
13 So the Drina Corps is not waiting to develop a combat plan based
14 on Directive 7. Of course we understand the reason why Mr. Ivetic wants
15 to separate Mladic from Directive 7 because of its two now famous and
16 criminal aspects. I won't go over that. You've heard it probably a
17 hundred times. The first: Create an unbearable situation of total
18 insecurity of the inhabitants of Srebrenica, one; two, the creation of
19 unobtrusive system of permits to make the population dependent on their
20 good will.
21 It's important to understand just how involved General Mladic is.
22 And I want you to actually -- I'm not going to show you many documents,
23 but I do want you to see the front. P1469. This is Directive 7 and this
24 should be -- a cover letter should come up that, you may recall, was in
25 the name sent out from the chief of staff to the Main Staff,
1 General Milovanovic. Now, here it is.
2 General Milovanovic, who you've learned is the one person who can
3 issue orders aside from Mladic, is on this document sending out
4 Directive 7 and he wants the corps to confirm receipt of the above
5 mentioned directive by returning a copy of this document.
6 Now, I think you understand at this point that when
7 General Milovanovic sends out a document from the Main Staff to his corps
8 they understand this is a very serious order. And General Mladic is just
9 a big part of this as General Milovanovic and President Karadzic who
10 actually signed the order.
11 Go back to the testimony of the chief of operations, Obradovic
12 and others, explain to us how directives are made. They are made at the
13 Main Staff by the serious -- the sectors, the expert sectors, be they
14 morale, legal, religious, security, operations, logistics, all those
15 staffs get together and they create this document and it's put together
16 by the chief of operations and training, Directive 7, in this case
17 General Miletic. You'll recall that his name is the person that drafted
19 So this is a Main Staff document, created by the Main Staff, sent
20 to President Karadzic who reviews it, signs it, as we see it gets sent
21 back to the Main Staff, the Main Staff sends it out. And you'll remember
22 the words of Directive 7: "By well organised, planned and organised
23 combat operations, create an unbearable situation ..."
24 So Mladic is every bit a part of this directive as Karadzic and
1 Now the language, we may never know who put in that famous
2 criminal language. Did Karadzic put it in or did Mladic put it? It
3 sounds very similar to the chief of the Bratunac Brigade's report in
4 July 4th 1994, P1505 that also talks about creating an unbearable
6 But, Your Honours, it's important to understand who wrote it does
7 not matter. They both own this. There is no dual chain of command
8 problem. Karadzic is the Supreme Commander as we know; Mladic is the
9 commander of the Main Staff which is the corps of the army. They both
10 own it militarily. They both are responsible for it.
11 Mr. Ivetic also -- well, and -- for Butler's words on that topic,
12 you can see transcript 16158 to 16160. Mr. Ivetic also makes the
13 argument that Mladic's Directive 7.1, which comes out March 31st, shortly
14 after Directive 7, somehow replaces the criminal language of Directive 7.
15 This is just not correct. It's clear when you look at the documents side
16 by side, Directive 7.1 cites Directive 7. And Directive 7.1 is very
17 specific and it involves combat operations not involving the enclaves,
18 and it doesn't suggest anything significant about the enclaves. The
19 wording in Directive 7 remains valid and important.
20 We know this because General Zivanovic in Exhibit P1468, sent out
21 on March 20th, before Directive 7.1, I'll tell you, but he cites to
22 Directive 7 in the same exact language to the Drina Corps, the illegal
23 language. But very importantly, on July 2nd the Drina Corps develops
24 Exhibit P1465, it's the Krivaja 95 attack plan. And it's one of the
25 first things you'll see in that attack plan is the citation to
1 Directive 7 and Directive 7.1. They are looked at together. Just as
2 valid at that point.
3 We also, if you'll recall from Krivaja 95 attack plan, Mladic
4 approved it. A copy of that went to the Main Staff and remember the --
5 there is a map that goes with it, Exhibit P1084. Mladic signed it, made
6 a comment on it. That's his approval of that plan. And in that plan
7 you'll remember the famous language: Reduce the enclave to its urban
8 areas, this small area of 1 by 2 kilometres, that 35.000 people will be
9 jammed into if it's reduced. And also the language: Create conditions
10 for the elimination of the enclaves. This is a reflection of the wording
11 of Directive 7. It's approved by Mladic, developed by the Drina Corps.
12 Mr. Ivetic also argued that the MUP forces in Srebrenica that
13 after the initial combat were acting on their own, not under the command
14 of army -- the army or Mladic. Butler evaluates the key documents on
15 this point from transcript 16206 to 16209. But that first exhibit that
16 Mr. Butler talks about is P2103. You may recall the 10 July order, by
17 then the acting minister, Tomo Kovac, that is an order from Borovcanin to
18 report from the Trnovo front where he is with several units of the
19 special police and other units, and he's to go to the Srebrenica area and
20 report to General Krstic. And Mr. Butler discussed that -- what that
21 language to go to General Krstic meant. That meant, in Butler's view,
22 that he was now under the command of the army.
23 Mr. Butler also in his testimony and in his report refers us to
24 Exhibit P2104, it's Article 14, the law, and entitled: "Use of Police
25 Units in Combat Operations, dated November 29th, 1994." And this
1 describes that when the MUP and the army are working in combat together
2 that the army is in command and that the MUP retains their unit commander
3 like Borovcanin but the army is overall in command. And Kovac's letter
4 is consistent with that law.
5 And Butler speaks to that at 16210 of the transcript.
6 Also to finish this subject, look at Exhibit P724. This is
7 Borovcanin, the commander of the special police forces. This is what we
8 refer to as his after-action report. It's a detailed description of his
9 unit's actions and movements from 11 July to about 20 July. And one of
10 the first things he notes in it is that he reports to Pribicevac, the
11 forward command post, as you recall is just south of Srebrenica, south of
12 Bratunac. And he finds Mladic there and reports to Mladic and receives
13 orders from Mladic to go attack Potocari. This, of course, is an
14 indication that Boro is now under the command, Borovcanin is now under
15 the command of General Mladic in the VRS.
16 You may recall that report and Butler's discussion of it but
17 the -- his forces have not arrived yet, and so he is unable to attack
18 Potocari that night but does attack it the next morning, the
19 12th of July, takes up position around the enclave, around Potocari, and
20 receives more orders from General Mladic on the 12th of July, personally
21 to go along the road, the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road, to set up
22 blockade for the fleeing Muslims where he is on the 13th and 14th, still
23 obviously under the command of General Mladic. Mladic is giving him
24 orders under his own report. So that is very clear. The special police
25 and the units that are working hard in Potocari separating people and
1 working hard along the road capturing people are all under the command of
2 General Mladic.
3 Mr. Ivetic also suggested that General Mladic was not involved in
4 or didn't know anything about the Skorpions and their activities in
5 Trnovo when they butchered six men on video. Now, let's not forget who
6 those men were, and boys. These were people that were last seen in the
7 Srebrenica area. These weren't Sarajevo kids or men. They were reported
8 missing by their family and friends from the enclave when it fell. We
9 put two witnesses on: 92 bis RM311, she ID'd her brother on the tape;
10 RM347, his brother-in-law fled with him in the woods and he didn't see
11 him again. Erin Gallagher told us the names of those six people on the
12 tape and how they were identified by the investigation.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, since you were interrupted anyhow, I
23 understood Mr. Ivetic to emphasise that on the side of the perpetrators
24 of those killings, the link was missing with the accused.
25 Now, when you said Mr. Ivetic also suggested that General Mladic
1 was not involved in or didn't know anything about the Skorpions and their
2 activities in Trnovo when they butchered six men on video, you said:
3 "Now, let's not forget who those men were."
4 It seems that you're focusing on the victims and that Mr. Ivetic
5 is focusing on the perpetrators of what is seen on the video.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm getting to part two of that, to respond
7 specifically to that.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because I never heard Mr. Ivetic say anything
9 that these victims did not come from Srebrenica. So let's try to focus
10 exactly, and I said this earlier to Mr. Traldi, let's try to focus
11 exactly on where the disagreement is.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: The important point there, Your Honour, is that
14 he's trying to separate General Mladic and the VRS from this killing
15 completely. And my point is that this killing is part of the organised
16 murder operation that was developed by Mladic as you've seen it from the
17 evidence. And so that's the first thing that we need to understand.
18 Mladic cannot escape organised executions of Srebrenica people during
19 this time-period. But that's point one.
20 Point two is that Mr. Ivetic suggested that the Skorpion unit was
21 only working in a co-ordinated action with the VRS. In fact, he said on
22 page 49, 8 through 10, and I quote:
23 "The Skorpion unit itself was operating in co-ordinated action as
24 described by Mr. Theunens rather than being resubordinated to the VRS.
25 This is at transcript page 18715 through 18717," of Mr. Ivetic.
1 Actually, the transcript cited by Mr. Ivetic is from the
2 testimony not of Theunens but of a protected witness, RM280, who did say
3 the Skorpions were working in co-ordination with the VRS. He's a
4 low-level person. What Theunens actually testified to was the Skorpions
5 were subordinated to the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and that's at
6 transcript page 20671.
7 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Citing --
9 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed.
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Citing an Exhibit P3096, which you may recall is
11 a Sarajevo Romanija Corps daily combat report of 23 July, where its
12 commander, Dragomir Milosevic, refers to the Skorpions twice and both
13 times under the heading or in reference to "our forces." So it's clear
14 from that report cited by Theunens, as you can read yourself, that
15 Dragomir Milosevic has subordinated the forces of the Skorpions as well
16 as some others.
17 And if we -- we can go back to July 1st, we have a report from
18 Borovcanin, before he and his units were sent to Srebrenica,
19 Exhibit P2102, Borovcanin is reporting on his work with the Skorpion
20 unit, so there in that combat area around Trnovo, Sarajevo, fighting with
21 Borovcanin. That same law that I referred to applies when they're in
22 combat together with the army, they're under the command of the army. We
23 see that direct reference in Milosevic's report. So it's clear not only
24 the Srebrenica victims being killed shortly after the fall of Srebrenica,
25 but the Skorpion units, be they created by, as I'm sure you know better
1 than I, the Serbian MUP, at the time they're in combat operations working
2 with the VRS and the special police. Mladic, as a general, takes
3 responsibility for the actions of his units and those subordinated to
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, if I may just comment. Whatever
6 knowledge you have from your earlier work, this Chamber only knows
7 anything which is presented in this case in court. You referred earlier
8 to you may -- and I'm sure you know better than I.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps I misunderstood that, but it could be
11 understood as a reference to earlier cases we may have heard which are
12 whatever we heard in those cases apart from having taking judicial note
13 of the other facts of these cases are not on our mind at this moment.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: I understand. And I'm sure in this case it's
15 clear who the creators of this unit were and I don't know precisely where
16 it is in this record, but that's what I meant to be referring to.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Oh. You mean to be referring to our knowledge from
18 this case. I just wanted to avoid any misunderstanding in this respect.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, and you're right. I'm probably thinking of
20 the other cases as well.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, which is not on any of our minds.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Understood.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Understood.
25 All right. Mr. Ivetic went into a rather detailed discussion of
1 the executions at the Jadar river, and I won't be able to do that justice
2 today in the time I have, but I will try to get you back on track to the
3 situation that we actually have there. He first suggested that our
4 pre-trial brief that we would call six witnesses for the Jadar River and
5 we only called one, but if you look at the pre-trial brief we have a very
6 large footnoted reference that is more than the Jadar River. The other
7 people mentioned are from other incidents, such as Kravica. So we do
8 cite the survivor of this incident, RM314, but you also saw another
9 witness, the nurse that treated 314, Mr. Subasic.
10 Now, Mr. Ivetic brought up a medical document that had a
11 reference that CLSS didn't make out but we could all read, as you saw,
12 some -- a Latin reference to "explosiva" or something like that. We
13 looked into that in more detail. We are continuing to look into that.
14 But we do believe, thus far, that this is a reference to explosive
15 injury, and we will -- I've informed that to Mr. Ivetic and we will work
16 with CLSS to get you the best Latin translation so that you can see this,
17 but it appears that the medical records are referring to this twice in
18 Latin as an explosive injury. And we do see in other documents that are
19 as part of this case, other medical references, explosive injury as --
20 looked at as distinguished between gun-shot injury, though we're not
21 absolutely sure yet if this term explosive injury could be referred to as
22 a gun-shot injury. We don't see that yet. We'll get back to you on that
23 as we -- as we determine that.
24 And in his cross-examination of RM314, at transcript 10897 to
25 10899, Mr. Ivetic did confront the witness with this medical record, and
1 he -- and I quote:
2 "Did they explain that their diagnosis, as written, implies an
3 explosive injury not related to a bullet?"
5 "Well, one could see that the wound was caused by a gun-shot
6 wound, not an explosion."
7 So Mr. Ivetic confronted the witness, the witness denied it, says
8 it's a gun-shot wound.
9 Could we look at Exhibit 1440. I know we saw this before and it
10 was a long time ago, but it's a picture of this wound. Please don't
11 broadcast it.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Under seal not to be shown to the public.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: You may recall the Jadar River person was --
14 testified that he was at Konjevic Polje on the morning of the 13th, taken
15 in a bus with 15 others with some soldiers who took him down to the banks
16 of the Jadar River a short distance away where they were all lined up by
17 the river and shot and fell into the river and that he was shot in his
18 hip area but was able to survive and go down to the river where he
19 eventually came out.
20 He also described that he was shot, fell down into the river, and
21 fell on his hip and -- which additionally injured it. And he describes
22 it in his statement as one big wound. He went on to describe that the
23 next day he meets a group of Muslims that are in the woods nearby and is
24 treated by a nurse who he knows by name and by -- by what he did, and he
25 gives us the name of Mujo Subasic who -- who he told his account to and
1 who treated him.
2 You've heard from Mujo Subasic, I believe he was a 92 bis
3 witness, who describes -- he doesn't know the name of the person, but he
4 does remember on the -- about the 14th treating a person who said he was
5 the victim of a mass execution. He thought it was a leg wound but then
6 he went on to say in his statement that he treated so many wounds that he
7 couldn't remember exactly. So you have that corroboration. I don't know
8 what happened to our photograph, but I'll continue on this until we get
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We are told that the system has some problems to
11 upload some documents. We have to wait.
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay.
13 JUDGE ORIE: You are referring to the photograph where a small
14 spot, and I think it's marked at -- more or less at the left back part of
15 the left part of the body?
16 Well, we can --
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Absolutely correct.
18 JUDGE ORIE: We can look at it from a distance if the --
19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
20 JUDGE ORIE: The photograph is visible, although from a distance,
21 and shows the undressed upper body of a person with a number 1 to what
22 seems to be in some kind of a wound at the left side of the body and a 2
23 appearing to refer to what looks as a wound as well but more in the
24 front, the left front of the body. That's what you're referring to and
25 that's what we looked at, although from a bit of a distance.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. And you will recall that the
2 witness testified that the entry was from his back, and I think he marked
3 that with a number, and then the exit was from the front side, and I
4 don't recall what the numbers were. And you can see that the entry is
5 very small and the exit is a bit bigger.
6 JUDGE ORIE: That's clear. You may proceed.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I would ask you that when considering the
8 medical conclusion about explosive injury, that you take into account
9 what you see in this actual picture and think about what that wound would
10 have looked like on the 16th when the doctors look at it after he'd
11 fallen on his hip and bruised it as well, and how accurate a medical
12 conclusion would be in that context.
13 In addition to further support this witness and his credibility,
14 you'll remember Jean-Rene Ruez testified all about what this witness had
15 told him he had experienced. First, Ruez testified that this witness
16 told him about -- that he was held in a little guard house outside the
17 school in Konjevic Polje, and Ruez went there and found a guard -- a
18 little guard house type thing outside a school and put it in his book.
19 It's Exhibit 1132 at page 49.
20 He also told Mr. Ruez that he saw a Muslim named Resid Sinanovic
21 at Konjevic Polje that day on the 13th, and Momir Nikolic has also
22 testified that Resid Sinanovic was there and that he even, in fact,
23 picked up Resid Sinanovic and took him to the Bratunac military police to
24 Celanovic with a few others. You may recall Celanovic testifying that he
25 interviewed Resid Sinanovic.
1 He also told Mr. Ruez that he was taken to a hangar at the
2 intersection of Konjevic Polje, and you'll see a picture of a hangar at
3 that intersection that Mr. Ruez found; Exhibit P1132, page 50. He also
4 told Mr. Ruez about going up the road and going down to the river. At
5 this point, Mr. Ruez told you that he needed to get the witness and
6 actually went with the witness who showed him this little open spot along
7 the side of the road. And that picture is Exhibit P1132, where you see a
8 slight pullover spot. It's page 88.
16 Now there is a very confused situation, which I'll try to sort
17 out the best I can, where the witness is in the -- I believe it's around
18 the 27th of July, is in an infirmary. And --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you do that after the break. That's the --
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Good idea. Thank you.
21 JUDGE ORIE: That requires some time.
22 We take a break and we will resume at 25 minutes to 1.00.
23 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 12.42 p.m.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. McCloskey, could I ask you
1 to be as focused as possible. Since you have no prepared text,
2 apparently, that tends to prolong a bit what you want to tell us. That's
4 We lost 15 minutes this morning. Let's try to find some extra
5 time at the end of this session, perhaps another ten minutes, and I think
6 due to Mr. Mladic, we had also an extended break and that -- so
7 therefore, do you think you could finish by 2.25 if we take a 15-minute
8 break in between?
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm not sure how much time that gives.
10 JUDGE ORIE: You would lose approximately five minutes on the
11 whole of --
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'll try to --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see -- I should also look at Ms. Bibles,
14 perhaps who is also expected.
15 Mr. Groome, you are the team leader.
16 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it was our expectation that our
17 submissions would be three and a half hours. And we have lost a fair bit
18 of time. We are keeping track of that. We are trying to reduce as we
19 go, but I could not commit to using less time that we thought we'd need.
20 JUDGE ORIE: The reason why I'm asking is the following: The
21 Defence, if we would give you, for example, tomorrow, another 15 minutes,
22 would miss then those -- the content of those 15 minutes, but if there is
23 no other solution, and Mr. Ivetic you could address us when it comes to
24 that. Yeah. Okay. Let's proceed and not lose any further time.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Now, we were still going over the credibility challenge to
2 Witness RM314, and in his testimony and statements he talks of being in
3 the infirmary in July, that's around the 27th, and he describes that an
4 unknown man comes up to him and tells him that there are journalists
5 here, something to that effect, and that he should tell them he was shot
6 in Karakaj. And the witness told the Court that he told this person no,
7 he would not do that. And then he did speak to a journalist and gave an
8 oral statement to a journalist. And then he gave a written statement
9 reporting this contact from this unknown people to the hospital
10 authorities, which was then sent and -- sent off to the BiH security
11 people because they were concerned about unknown people speaking to their
13 Now, Mr. Ivetic, I think, confuses this issue. He says at
14 transcript page 10880 through 10882, after questions from Judge Fluegge,
15 it transpired that in the handwritten statement he gave to the journalist
16 and signed to confirm the truthfulness of was, in fact, false testimony,
17 as conceded by RM314. The handwritten statement was not given to a
18 journalist and nothing in it undercut anything he has said. And it's
19 certain not false testimony.
20 What did happen during this trial, you may recall it, during the
21 question, Judge Fluegge did ask him questions about this, and at one
22 point he did say that he told this unknown person that he was shot at
23 Karakaj, and then he became somewhat confused and said, Now I'm confused,
24 and his testimony stopped.
25 So to look at this and understand it, one must look at the
1 exhibit that Mr. Ivetic referred to, D281, that's the handwritten
2 statement, but also look at P1441, which was the first page of that that
3 shows that the hospital people are sending this on to the security. And,
4 of course, look carefully at the transcript. But this witness, while
5 having suffered terrible trauma, does not undercut himself and his
6 statements are corroborated by all the evidence I've just discussed.
7 Now, Mr. Ivetic made a brief reference that Mladic was in
8 Belgrade on the 14th through the 16th, suggesting he wasn't involved in
9 command. I won't go at length now, especially with the time situation we
10 have, but I can refer you, as you remember Mr. Butler talked about that,
11 he basically was referring to the Mladic diaries where Mladic himself
12 describes the business that he's doing for the VRS on both the 14th and
13 the 15th. Mr. Butler also discussed some orders that Mladic issued on
14 those days. And for the references, you can see Mr. Butler speaking on
15 this at transcript 16328 to 16331, 16339, to 16340, and that's the
16 exhibit P00363, pages 2 through 6. It's the notebook. He also -- Butler
17 also discuss the orders I just referred to, and those orders are Exhibits
18 P2123, P2124, P2125.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, did you say "pages 2 to 6" or did you
20 say "pages 2 through 6"?
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: It should have been 2 through 6.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then it's accurately transcribed. Please
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. Butler also discusses the transcript of the
25 video that we see. It's Exhibit 1147, and at the transcript pages 94
1 through 95, where we see Mladic speaking about what's going on in those
2 areas, speaking of Vinko, speaking of various things including, according
3 to Mr. Butler, the bombing that he is concerned of -- that's
4 concerning -- that's happening in Zepa. And you can see a report
5 relating to that bombing at Exhibit P2128. And Mr. Butler's overall
6 conclusion is that General Mladic is in uniform, speaking about the
7 operations and activities that are going on in his unit at the time that
8 he's at the Belgrade VMI --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, you were referring to Exhibit 1147, I
10 think I heard.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's clear now.
13 Please proceed.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. Ivetic also made mention that there was no
15 genocide in Srebrenica, and he claimed that our principal witness for
16 that was Major Kingori and that Kingori's witness collapsed. I'm not
17 sure where Mr. Ivetic felt that Major Kingori was our main witness for
18 genocide. That, of course, is not correct. Major Kingori is an
19 excellent witness. He speaks to the -- as you know, he was a UN military
20 observer. He noted down the various shellings that were occurring in and
21 around Srebrenica town. He was in Potocari and describes the horrible
22 situation that the public and the Muslim people are going through there.
23 He is the one that you'll remember on the video, that's the one person
24 that stands up to Mladic and points out -- he stands up and points out
25 the men crowded in the white house, and we see him doing that. He's
1 telling that to one of the MUP officers on the -- on the video. And so
2 he's very important to help us understand the suffering and the misery
3 and the humanitarian disaster that the Serbs created -- the Bosnian Serb
4 created in this situation. And to the degree that that fits into the
5 genocide case, which it always does, yes, but as the principal witness of
6 genocide, no.
7 He also cites the 14 July mention in the Mladic diary I've just
8 mentioned before where Mladic says he gives access to the ICRC to see the
9 Srebrenica men and suggests that Mladic is -- this shows that Mladic has
10 a big plan to exchange the people of Srebrenica. Well, you'll recall
11 that on the 14th of July everyone, some 800 to 1.000 men, had been
12 summarily executed at the Kravica warehouse the day before; and the
13 executions at Orahovac are almost over by midnight, the 14th of July,
14 that's another 800 to a thousand people; the executions at Petkovci dam
15 were started at midnight on the 15th where another 800 to a thousand
16 people were summarily executed; and then on the 16th another 800 to a
17 thousand people were summarily executed at the Kozluk execution site; and
18 then on the 16th of July, some 1.000 to 1500 people were summarily
19 executed at the Branjevo military farm. There is no indication in this
20 case of any desire on General Mladic's part to exchange anyone. It's his
21 intention to kill them as he did -- as his troops did.
22 He also noted that Mladic at the Sandici meadow, and let me bring
23 up -- Ms. Stewart can bring it, it's actually P1087 [Realtime transcript
24 read in error "P0187"], page 10 in e-court.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: You said "P1087," not "P0187."
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, it should be P1087.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: And Mr. Ivetic notes that a witness at the
4 Sandici meadow tells us of Mladic offering -- telling these prisoners
5 that they were going to be exchanged. That is actually RM256. I think
6 Mr. Ivetic was mistaken when he said RM253 was at Nova Kasaba. And
7 looking at this to remind us where the Sandici meadow is, General Mladic
8 was there in the afternoon of the 13th, as you'll recall, and after he
9 left and headed towards Konjevic Polje at --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you please instruct your client that he
11 should not speak aloud.
12 MR. IVETIC: I will, Your Honour. I'm told there is no B/C/S
14 JUDGE ORIE: There is no B/C/S translation. That is -- could we
15 verify that there still is no B/C/S translation?
16 Mr. Mladic, is it now fixed or is it a choice of channel which
17 causes it? Let's see whether there is any B/C/S translation. I hear on
18 channel 6 that there is.
19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
20 MR. IVETIC: I'm told now that we have the translation,
21 Your Honours.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I had it already on channel 6. Let's proceed.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right.
24 Your Honours, after Mladic leaves Sandici meadow prisoners and
25 goes towards the prisoners assembled at Konjevic Polje, at about
1 5.00 p.m. from the evidence, we know that several hundred prisoners from
2 Sandici, the people he'd just spoken to, were taken to the Kravica
3 warehouse and -- where they were summarily executed in two waves, one at
4 one side of the warehouse and one at the other side. Now, I don't have
5 time to go through that incident, it's not appropriate in this context,
6 but that murder was part of the organised mass executions in this case.
7 And while we do believe a Muslim came out during those executions,
8 grabbed a gun, and shot and killed a Serb, and a Serb did grab that gun
9 and burned his hands, it's not reasonable to believe that that happened
10 before these executions based on the testimony of the survivors and the
11 MUP witnesses along the road, which we will direct you to in due course
12 when reviewing this.
13 As Mladic goes to Konjevic Polje, and remember the testimony of
14 Momir Nikolic, when he says that Mladic indicates what's going to happen
15 to the prisoners at Konjevic Polje with a signal of a hand across his
16 chest, then he goes over to the Nova Kasaba soccer field where there is a
17 thousand prisoners. You should remember the survivors that were there.
18 They killed a man right in front of Mladic. But very importantly
19 remember the testimony of Colonel Keserovic, the Main Staff security
20 officer for military police, who says that when he was in the area on the
21 17th, Major Molanic [phoen], the commander of the 65th Protection
22 Regiment military police force told him that he was making lists of
23 prisoners, and then Mladic came on the 13th and told him to stop making
25 You also heard from Molanic in this case who was confronted with
1 that and said he couldn't really remember. It was too many years ago.
2 But he did not deny Keserovic's memory of the situation. Clearly Mladic
3 directing no list to be taken was a sign that these men were to be
4 murdered and they were in the group of men that were later killed in the
5 executions I just spoke of.
6 Could we -- almost over. Mr. Ivetic also mentions General Mladic
7 speaking to the crowd in Potocari saying that the women and children and
8 old men will be allowed to leave.
9 Could we have one short video-clip that I think is of utmost
10 importance for this issue.
11 You may recall the -- the shot where the men are walking on one
12 side of the bus in a line with their belongings, old men with berets.
13 These are men that --
14 [Video-clip played]
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. If we can play that.
16 [Video-clip played]
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: These are the men I'm talking about. Take a good
18 look at them.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's P1518. We can stop that. We have a number
21 of these men identified in our victim ID book that were killed in the
22 mass execution. These men are separated. We don't know of any separated
23 men that survived.
24 JUDGE ORIE: No loud speaking, no interruption when the
25 Prosecution presents its argument.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: You'll recall --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: -- on the 12th of July Mladic announced at the
4 Hotel Fontana that he would be screening men between 16 to 60 to
5 determine who were war criminals among them. Critical evidence in this
6 case is there were no screening. They took men 16 to 60, many older,
7 some younger, some as young as 8 years old. There were no significant --
8 there was no list taken --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. -- is there a -- I -- could we -- let me check
10 whether there is any B/C/S translation.
11 Mr. Ivetic, I have a translation on channel 6. So I want to -- I
12 want someone to find out what's actually going on, otherwise Mr. Mladic
13 will have to put on his headphones as we all have.
14 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, you'll be provided with headphones. And
16 if you want to use your earphones, that's okay, but before you complain
17 that there is no translation, you should first try your headphones
18 because I was informed - and I verified its myself - that there was no
19 interruption in the B/C/S translation. So first use the other phones if
20 you have difficulties in hearing the B/C/S translation. I do not accept
21 any further interruptions.
22 Mr. McCloskey, you may proceed.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: So General Mladic at the Hotel Fontana meeting of
24 12th July said that they would be screening people 16 to 60. Now, you'll
25 recall that was not on the tape that we had of that meeting but
1 Major Boering remember that. He testified about that. But very
2 importantly, when those separations started that afternoon there was no
3 screening, there was no list taken, the property was taken, the IDs were
4 destroyed as we saw in a picture on the 14th of July. They weren't given
5 any medical. They weren't given any food. They were given just enough
6 water to keep them alive. They lived like that, at the schools around
7 Bratunac, some for two nights. Clearly by the afternoon of July 12th the
8 murder operation that Mladic commanded was underway.
9 And I want to end with one bit of testimony. I want to end with
10 one bit of testimony. If I could get ...
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 MR. McCLOSKEY: The last bit of testimony I think I would like to
13 go into private session for because it's of a protected witness.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Private session, please.
15 [Private session]
17 [Open session]
18 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
20 Where the transcript reads "operation" it should be "area," I
21 think. It's the second time that the word "operation" is used, "Cerska
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: I ask Your Honours to look carefully at the
24 material I've mentioned and cited, and I have no doubt that we will have
25 met our burden under 98 bis. Thank you very much.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.
2 Ms. Bibles, could you give us an indication as to how much time
3 you would approximately need.
4 And also, Mr. Groome, to tell us whether he -- it's he who will
5 conclude the presentation or whether it will be Ms. Bibles.
6 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, it is I that will conclude the
7 presentation. And it looks at this stage that we will need an hour and
8 15 minutes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: One hour and 15 minutes. Then there is a -- they
10 most likely will not be able to finish. But let's try to see where we
11 end up.
12 Now the question is whether we rather take the break now,
13 Ms. Bibles, so that we don't have to further interrupt you or -- my
14 colleagues advise me that we'd rather proceed.
15 Please go.
16 MS. BIBLES: Thank you, Your Honour. And good afternoon,
17 Your Honours, counsel.
18 I'll be addressing Counts 1 and 2, genocide; and Counts 9 and 10,
19 terror and unlawful acts on civilians. First, I'll address the arguments
20 made yesterday which were limited to the neighbourhood of Sirokaca. This
21 was part of the 28 May 1992 city-wide shelling described in
22 Scheduled incident G1. You've heard that the entire city of Sarajevo was
23 shelled on this date and that the G1 scheduled incident was not limited
24 to one particular neighbourhood.
25 This attack occurred within the context of the campaign against
1 Sarajevo as set forth in Counts 9 and 10.
2 Between May 1992 and November 1995, General Mladic and his fellow
3 JCE members implemented a campaign of sniping and shelling on Sarajevo.
4 The primary purpose was to spread terror among the civilian population in
5 Sarajevo. The campaign of terror in Sarajevo was a means for members of
6 the Bosnian Serb military and political leadership to achieve their
7 territorial aims. The impact of this campaign was devastating for the
8 people of Sarajevo, where the civilian population lived in a constant
9 state of fear. "Terror" is a term numerous witnesses use to describe the
10 psychological impact this prolonged VRS campaign had on the city.
11 General Mladic played a key role in the implementation of this
12 campaign by commanding the SRK and its tactics of shelling and sniping
13 activities at Sarajevo.
14 This is evident as it pertains to G1 in an intercept, P327, dated
15 25 May, 1992. We heard General Mladic warn a subordinate to make sure
16 that the soldiers become aware that "Sarajevo is going to shake.
17 Sarajevo will shake, more shells will fall on per second than in the
18 entire war so far."
19 Three days later, on the evening of 28 May 1992, General Mladic
20 issued orders to indiscriminately bombard Sarajevo. Your Honours have
21 heard the recording admitted as Exhibit P105. In this recording,
22 General Mladic instructs a subordinate to fire on the neighbourhoods of
23 the old town and of Pofalici because there weren't many Serbian
24 inhabitants there. During the same conversation, General Mladic said he
25 intended to shell the city so "we drive them out of their minds." In
1 fact, the entire city of Sarajevo was shelled on 28 May 1992, under
2 General Mladic's orders.
3 Several eye-witnesses testified about this incident, including
4 RM115, RM147, John Wilson. RM115 heard General Mladic on the radio
5 ordering the shelling of Sarajevo on the night of 28 May 1995. Hours
6 later, she was hit by a shell that fell on the state hospital in the
7 centre of Sarajevo. I refer Your Honours to P549, pages 71 and 72, which
8 is the Stari Grad log-book which confirms there were victims of shelling,
9 injured and killed, in other parts of Sarajevo.
10 Against this overwhelming evidence, the Defence refers only to
11 the origin of one shell in one neighbourhood. In relation to the
12 evidence of Fadila Tarcin, the Prosecution submits that the information
13 regarding the origin of fire is solely based on hearsay evidence of the
14 witness's neighbours. I would refer you to the transcript of her
15 testimony at 3424, lines 11 through 15.
16 Reviewing the evidence more completely, UNPROFOR's chief military
17 observer, General John Wilson, testified:
18 "It appeared the whole city was being engaged, not just
19 particular areas, but there was an emphasis of fire down in the old
21 General Wilson also explained that it was a really horrendous
22 experience for the inhabitants of Sarajevo on that particular night.
23 General Wilson described exactly what General Mladic ordered. Shellings
24 like this set the tone for years to come, and the evidence shows that
25 over three years the actions of General Mladic and the SRK were
1 intentionally designed the terrorise the city's residents. The
2 Prosecution has proven Counts 9 and 10.
3 Your Honours, I'll now address Counts 1 and 2, genocide.
4 In 1992, Bosnian Muslim and Croat communities in the
5 municipalities of Kljuc, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Kotor Varos, Vlasenica,
6 and Foca were targeted for destruction. Thousands in these communities
7 were killed, subjected to serious bodily and mental harm, and detained in
8 conditions of life which were calculated to destroy them. Those that
9 survived and others were forcibly displaced.
10 In 1995 in Srebrenica, over 7,000 Muslim men and boys were
11 executed while thousands more were forced from the enclave. In the
12 municipalities and in Srebrenica, the combination of physically
13 destructive acts and other acts targeting the foundation of the group
14 such as displacements, the destruction of property, cultural and
15 religious sites, led to the physical demise of the Bosnian Muslim and
16 Bosnian Croat communities and their inability to reconstitute themselves.
17 Despite these well-established facts, the Defence argues that
18 genocide was not committed and that his client lacked genocidal intent.
19 This approach ignores the facts and the accurate state of law, most
20 recently set forth in the Appeals Chamber 98 bis judgement in the
21 Karadzic case.
22 Let's first turn to a number of the arguments which can be dealt
23 with quickly. First, the ICJ judgement. As Your Honour, Mr. President,
24 noted on the record, at T1615:
25 "I think clear to everyone that the
1 International Court of Justice does not express itself on the individual
2 criminal responsibility of persons but of states."
3 The ICJ reached this determination based on different evidence in
4 applying a different legal standard. It is simply not relevant to your
5 determination here at the 98 bis proceeding. Likewise, the point
6 regarding previous ICTY cases ignores that the genocide count, for the
7 municipalities, have been upheld at the 98 bis stage in all prior cases,
8 whether by the Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber following an appeal.
9 Jelesic was acquitted at the trial level, but the Defence
10 yesterday failed to recognise that the Appeals Chamber held that the
11 Trial Chamber erred in doing so and found that the evidence presented
12 supported a finding of genocidal intent. In terms of the Defence urging
13 a review of societal context, this is a misconception of the legal
14 requirements. This is the notion that to prove genocide we must be able
15 to look objectively at a particular scenario on the ground and affix the
16 label "genocide" in isolation from an accused. This is contrary to the
17 legal requirements of the crime of genocide.
18 As to the intent of physical perpetrators, it is not necessary
19 for JCE liability to show that physical perpetrators were acting with
20 genocidal intent. Rather, that their acts are attributable to Mladic
21 through the JCE and that Mladic and other JCE members were acting with
22 genocidal intent. I refer you to the Brdjanin appeals judgement,
23 paragraph 410, and also the Krajisnik appeals judgement, paragraph 226.
24 Finally, the Defence argument for a numerical threshold ignores
25 the legal requirements. It is not necessary to prove that the underlying
1 acts of genocide, in fact, have an impact on the existence of a group,
2 and there is no numerical threshold of victims necessary to establish
3 genocide. It also ignores the fact that for the municipality evidence
4 there are two other major categories of acts of genocide besides
5 killings. For Srebrenica there is one other act of genocide aside from
7 These aren't really arguments. Rather, these are attempts to
8 distract from the voices and images of genocide which have been proven in
9 your presence. The Appeals Chamber judgement on the Karadzic 98 bis
10 genocide charge confirms that at the 98 bis stage the analysis is quite
11 simple: First, that there is evidence that acts of genocide were
12 committed and attributable to Mladic; second, there is evidence that
13 Mladic had genocidal intent with respect to these acts.
14 To further explain, I will first briefly set out the acts of
15 genocide that characterise both genocides in the municipalities and in
16 Srebrenica, and then discuss the mens rea of the JCE members,
17 particularly Mladic and Karadzic.
18 Turning to the 1992 genocide. Consider the detailed evidence
19 presented earlier by Mr. Traldi as the backdrop for the discussion of
20 acts of genocide. Looking specifically at acts of genocide:
21 First, thousands of targeted people were murdered in the six
22 municipalities. Community leaders were often singled out for
23 particularly sadistic violence and were often beaten to death or killed
24 outright. As Adil Medic testified, the Serbs removed those people who
25 represented security for these communities. And that's at transcript
1 page 2050, starting at line 21, and it goes to page 2051, at line 14.
2 Second, serious bodily and mental harm lingers today and
3 indelibly imprints those who survived the brutality. Look at Ivo
4 Atlija's evidence. He survived the murders at Brisevo and spoke bravely
5 here about the murder of his own father and of his neighbours, many of
6 whom he had to bury himself. But he would not name the women in his
7 village who had been sexually assaulted. Because they were so
8 traumatised it was difficult to stop them from killing themselves. And
9 that's at transcript page 2315.
10 In this vein, consider the testimony of RM70, at transcript
11 17652, lines 12 to 15:
12 "My opinion was that they wanted to destroy, kill, destroy our
13 spirit as much as they could because a raped woman -- there is no cure
14 for a woman who was raped. I will not recover."
15 And third, members of the VRS and other Bosnian Serb forces
16 created conditions of life calculated to destroy thousands more targeted
17 people in the detention camps. You've heard repeatedly that the camps,
18 designed mostly for civilians, were not fit for human habitation. You
19 can look to RM008, who described over 500 detainees crammed into room 3
20 at Keraterm, and RM088 who pointed out the hangar in P526 in which 600
21 detainees were jammed. Witness after witness at camp after camp
22 described beatings, torture, sexual violence, and the lack of basic
23 sanitation, depravation of food, water, and medical care. Consistent
24 with Adil Medic's evidence, Your Honours heard that specific prisoners
25 were particularly targeted for abuse and violence. For instance, an
1 Omarska guard told Kerim Mesanovic that he had been put on a "cooling
2 list" to be killed because in the first category of prisoners. Mesanovic
3 explained that this was meant for leaders, intellectuals, and wealthier
4 people. That was at P3414, paragraphs 40 to 42.
5 By the end of 1992, targeted civilians had effectively been
6 driven out of the Serb lands or were forced in enclaves. As a result,
7 the enclaves were bursting with Muslim detainees. By 1995, over 30.000
8 Muslims were inside the Srebrenica enclave. The existence of the
9 enclaves within Bosnian Serb territories was a point of frustration to
11 After initial plans in March of 1995, the attack on Srebrenica
12 began on 6 July 1995, and by the time it was over more than 7.000 Bosnian
13 Muslim men and boys were dead and over 30.000 women and children had been
14 forced out of the enclave.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, could I seek one clarification.
16 MS. BIBLES: Yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: You talked about bursting with Muslim detainees.
18 Did you intend to say that being in the enclave would create a situation
19 of imprisonment or?
20 MS. BIBLES: Your Honour, I misspoke. What I meant to say was
21 that the enclaves were bursting with Bosnian Muslims.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
23 MS. BIBLES: The discriminatory systemic violence levied across
24 Bosnia in 1992 was applied in Srebrenica in 1995. This violence assured
25 that the objective of the overarching JCE - the destruction of Muslim and
1 Croat communities in Serb claimed Bosnia - was achieved in Srebrenica as
2 it had been in the targeted areas through Bosnia.
3 The Defence claims the Prosecution has not presented sufficient
4 evidence of their client's genocidal intent to pass the 98 bis stage.
5 This is a revisionist view of the trial record. Both direct and indirect
6 evidence provide a sufficient basis for a reasonable chamber to conclude
7 that the accused and other JCE members intended to physically destroy the
9 The direct evidence of the accused's statements alone, taken at
10 its highest, is sufficient to show that the accused had genocidal intent.
11 Mladic's intent was set forth clearly in a number of documents,
12 interviews, and intercepts. Ratko Mladic stated his intent with respect
13 to Bosnian Muslims in 1994 at the 37th Assembly session. He spoke of an
14 objective that the Karadzic Appeals Chamber has considered an indication
15 of genocidal intent. He said:
16 "My concern is not that they will create a state. My concern is
17 to have them vanish completely."
18 P3076, at page 49. Mladic repeatedly made similar comments about
19 Bosnian Muslim and Croat communities in the holdout enclaves.
20 At the most basic and pervasive level, Mladic brought and
21 endorsed a lexicon of derogatory terms and eliminationist rhetoric when
22 referring to the targeted peoples in Bosnia. This sanctioned verbal
23 abuse was widespread, extending into official VRS directives. You can
24 look at P1963. His use of the terms "Ustasha" and "Turks" was directed
25 at enemy forces but also civilians. See at P1969. It is
1 well-established that the use of verbal abuse relating to targeted ethnic
2 groups is a relevant factor in finding genocidal intent.
3 Ratko Mladic's use of these terms reverberated throughout the
4 carnage which his forces imposed on Bosnian Muslim and Croat communities.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, I'm about at the point where I would
6 like to take a short break. If you say better after a few sentences,
7 then I'll wait. Otherwise, we'll take the break now.
8 MS. BIBLES: I have -- let's go ahead and take a break.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then we take the break. We take the break a
10 little bit shorter than usual. We resume at quarter to 2.00, the last
11 break being five minutes longer than usual.
12 --- Recess taken at 1.30 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 1.46 p.m.
14 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber is inclined to continue until 2.30,
15 that's a little bit longer than usual. That's due to the circumstance
16 and also to avoid that the Defence misses a major part of the submissions
17 when expected to make further submissions tomorrow. To the extent the
18 Prosecution could finish by then, that would be appreciated. If not,
19 limited time will be available tomorrow morning.
20 And I do understand from Madam Registrar that this would be
21 possible in view of all those assisting us. If that is -- or if I'm
22 mistaken, I would like to be informed.
23 You may proceed, Ms. Bibles.
24 MS. BIBLES: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 While these direct manifestations of intent alone would be
1 sufficient to find the requisite intent, considerably more evidence is
2 found in Ratko Mladic's conduct. My colleagues have set out in
3 compelling detail for you exactly how forces under Mladic and Karadzic's
4 control turn their genocidal intent into reality and made those targeted
5 populations vanish.
6 The record also reflects the shared genocidal intent of other
7 members of the JCE, in particular the man who selected Mladic to command
8 the military forces, Radovan Karadzic. Karadzic expressed his genocidal
9 intent towards Bosnian Muslims as early as October 1991 when he warned
10 Bosnian Muslims that Bosnian independence would entail "the same highway
11 of hell and suffering" that Slovenia and Croatia went through. He also
12 indicated that this would result "in a possible extinction" of the Muslim
13 people. You'll find this at P2004 at the bottom of page 3 in English, or
14 the transcript reference 15521, lines 16 to 21.
15 As the attacks were well underway in the municipalities,
16 Radovan Karadzic gave the 17th Assembly session, which started on the
17 24th of July, 1992, an accurate status of the Bosnian Muslim populations:
18 "They think they are being nationally established, but in fact they are
19 vanishing." From P4581, page 86 in the English translation.
20 Karadzic also acknowledged to his followers and subordinates that
21 the groups were being physically destroyed and agreed with the assertion
22 that the conflict had been "roused in order to eliminate the Muslims."
23 That's Exhibit 4581, again at page 86.
24 Beyond the direct evidence of intent, additional evidence
25 considered in totality supports the conclusion that Ratko Mladic and
1 other JCE members had genocidal intent. Genocidal intent can be readily
2 inferred from the scale and repetitiveness of the genocide and other
3 culpable acts in the municipalities, the level of brutality, methods
4 employed, and animus exhibited during the commission of those acts, and
5 the fact that they were all directed against all members of the groups.
6 Genocidal and other culpable acts were directed against and impacted
7 virtually all members of the groups in the municipalities.
8 Your Honours, the first witness in this trial spoke to you as a
9 man, but he portrayed vividly the 13-year-old boy who experienced
10 persecution at its worst. In boyish terms, he described an idyllic rural
11 childhood in a multi-ethnic area in which children played without regard
12 to religion or ethnicity. He and his family were forced from their home.
13 Elvedin described a boy's excitement several days later about returning
14 home and then the heartbreak of finding his home damaged, the mosque
15 destroyed, the elderly left behind murdered, and his dog, whom he was
16 anxious to reunite with, shot dead. Elvedin Pasic and his family fled
17 from village to village and finally into an enclave, from which he and
18 mostly men tried to flee in a column.
19 Surrendering for this group that he was with was not enough.
20 Elvedin lay in the mud and heard his father and other men beaten and
22 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Bibles, you're developing a speed of speech
23 which causes problems for the transcript. Slow down, not too much but
25 MS. BIBLES: Elvedin's very core seemed shaken when he described
1 hearing a man he held in great regards, the hodza, being beaten to death.
2 Although Elvedin escaped this fate, over 150 men who surrendered were
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I interrupt you and ask: Is this a protected
6 MS. BIBLES: No.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
8 MS. BIBLES: Elvedin's painful words described the pattern that
9 had been repeated before and would be repeated over and over again. From
10 the hand waving in the window in 1992 that haunts Elvedin Pasic, to the
11 ghost that haunted Mirsada malagic from 1995 until her murdered family
12 members were finally found more than a decade later in Srebrenica, these
13 genocides are connected by the stated intent of Ratko Mladic and the
14 other members of the JCE who were determined to destroy not just a way of
15 life for Bosnian Muslim and Croat communities but the communities
17 Your Honours, the Prosecution has proven Counts 1 and 2 of
18 genocide. Thank you.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Bibles.
20 Mr. Groome, you may proceed.
21 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 General Mladic exercised highly effective command and control
23 over the VRS to return to the concept that General Dannatt spoke to you
24 about, he exercised "finger-tip" control. That is, the control a
25 commander achieves when he has developed an instinctive sense of how
1 things are, how things should be, and how he wants things to develop,
2 enabling him to direct the actions of his subordinates with great
4 The term "finger-tip control" is a term used precisely for the
5 image that it brings to mind, possibly the operator of a complex machine
6 controlling it from his or her keyboard. The ability to control a large
7 organisation as if it were simply an extension of one's own hands. This
8 level of control meant that the VRS troops were engaged in operations.
9 If they were engaged in operations, it was because Mladic intended those
10 operations. This is what enabled him to deploy the VRS and subordinated
11 units in the commission of crimes. This was his greatest contribution to
12 the JCEs that have been described here today.
13 Relevant to an assessment of General Mladic's submissions in this
14 hearing is the recent appeals judgement in the Djordjevic case. At
15 paragraph 169 at segue, the Appeals Chamber discusses the role a
16 hierarchal structure can play in a joint criminal enterprise. The
17 evidence shows that the VRS, under General Mladic's tenure, was an
18 especially effective hierarchal structure. Mladic had experience in
19 bringing together poorly organised and fragmented formations and forging
20 them into a cohesive unit moving in the same direction. At the
21 16th Assembly session, he described his incorporation of Milan Martic's
22 men into a single fighting force during the ethnic cleansing campaign in
24 General Mladic knew before -- even before being formally
25 appointed that key to his success was melding the disparate fighting
1 formations in Bosnia into a single effective fighting force under a
2 single line of authority. As he said to the 16th Assembly, "I do know
3 how to command an army. We cannot have 100 masters in one home. The
4 army must have a unified command." Once appointed he quickly realised
5 this important principle. Thus, fully prepared for the situation in
6 Bosnia, General Mladic hit the ground running.
7 From the day he was appointed commander, he was able to exercise
8 command and control over the VRS. He was able to do this because he
9 inherited the functioning infrastructure of the JNA. As you heard
10 General Milovanovic explain to you, the VRS inherited the corps commands,
11 the logistics bases, a common doctrine, all that existed prior. So by
12 linking to the existing communication networks and other infrastructure,
13 the VRS came to life within 24 hours. And from one moment to the next,
14 combat reports came in regularly.
15 Part of this infrastructure was, of course, General Mladic
16 himself. He had been appointed the commander of the
17 2nd Military District on the 9th of May and in that capacity had already
18 begun the issuance of orders. For example, P3032 or P2866. Part of this
19 infrastructure, was, of course, the other members of the Main Staff, a
20 newly constituted group of old comrades who had worked together in the
21 same military their entire careers.
22 This familiarity of personnel and infrastructure was instrumental
23 in Mladic's ability to quickly assert his own will over this organisation
24 in furtherance of Karadzic's instructions to him. So from the beginning
25 of the indictment period, the VRS was capable of reliably and predictably
1 carrying out General Mladic's orders. P3057 is an example of this.
2 I want to spend a few minutes setting out how Mladic used
3 specific command principles to create and maintain his finger-tip
4 control. I will deal with, one, the principle of a single command; two,
5 the principle of subordination; and three, the principle of inspection.
6 The first is the principle of singleness of command. There is
7 only one line of command authority, a line that begins with Karadzic,
8 flows directly through Mladic, to his immediate subordinates, to their
9 immediate subordinates, and so on, so that the orders given to every
10 single soldier travels along a carefully constructed network. He
11 integrated and brought the Territorial Defence units within this
12 structure. Recall the evidence that Rajko Kusic, whom Mr. Traldi
13 referred to, he was the commander of the Rogatica Territorial Defence on
14 the 12th of May, but by the 25th of May he was leading the cleansing of
15 the Rogatica town as the commander of the Rogatica Brigade of the VRS.
16 The second command principle I will address is the principle of
17 subordination. In short, superiors issue orders to subordinates who
18 carry out those orders. This principle ensures that the will of the
19 Supreme Commander Karadzic was communicated to Mladic, his direct
20 subordinate, who in turn then initiated the orders necessary to his
21 subordinates. The essence of the order always remaining constant, only
22 the details being tailored to the specific area of responsibility of the
23 particular subordinate unit. A cascade of commander's intent flowing
24 downward to subordinates whose only obligation was to obey.
25 Discussing an order, a senior VRS officer who testified here at
1 transcript 5027 said that a subordinate in the VRS had no discretion
2 whether or not to obey an order. No discretion. This directly reflected
3 General Dannatt's assessment that the VRS was a centrally controlled army
4 in which subordinate commanders had little latitude when interpreting
5 orders. They simply strictly adhered to the dictates of the order.
6 Also constituent to the principle of subordination is the
7 requirement for subordinates to report to superiors the results of their
8 implementation of an order. Reporting on the implementation of an order
9 together with other relevant information was an inherent component of
10 subordination. Reports flowed back up the chain of command from the
11 foot soldier up to the commander of the Main Staff who, himself, was
12 responsible for reporting to Karadzic.
13 General Milovanovic testified, subordinate commanders had no
14 discretion not to submit a report, even when there was nothing new to
15 report. The procedure for the daily combat reports ran like an expensive
16 watch. As General Obradovic explained, the process began every day with
17 battalions reporting to their brigade commanders, who reported to their
18 corps commanders, who in turn reported to the Main Staff. These timely
19 informative reports enabled Mladic to make informed and timely decisions
20 and issue new or follow-up orders down the chain of command. This
21 cyclical loop of orders flowing continuously ensuring that subordinates
22 were never without the direction of the commander and he was never
23 without the information necessary to direct them.
24 As General Dannatt and General Milovanovic both made clear, this
25 cycle was at the heart of how General Mladic maintained finger-tip
1 control. Mladic was able to issue directives and orders, confident that
2 they would be implemented as he intended, and assured that he would
3 receive reports confirming this.
4 General Mladic's commanders and staff knew also that they could
5 not exceed his orders. This principle was illustrated early in the war
6 on 24 May 1992, during the barracks crisis in Sarajevo when then
7 Colonel Tolimir caught the brunt of Mladic's fury after informing Mladic
8 that he had agreed that the VRS would leave behind some ammunition;
9 that's an intercept, that's P2752.
10 The very next day on the 25th, in another transcript, P2755,
11 Momcilo Mandic tells Tolimir that no one can pass through the barracks
12 without General Mladic's authorisation. This time Tolimir simply says:
13 "Well, that's clear." General Obradovic gave evidence that assistant
14 commanders on the Main Staff "can only issue orders in the spirit of the
15 basic decision adopted by the commanders." In the absence of
16 General Mladic, he explained, an assistant commander's order can only go
17 as far as the framework laid down by the commander while he was there.
18 General Obradovic put it in very simple terms: He had never
19 heard of any Main Staff assistant commander ignoring or failing to follow
20 any of General Mladic's orders.
21 The last command principle which ensured General Mladic's
22 finger-tip control was the principle of inspection. This principle was
23 in addition to the reports that Mladic received. This principle ensured
24 the verification of the information Mladic was receiving through the VRS
25 reporting mechanisms. This principle required superiors to proactively
1 monitor their subordinates to ensure that the commander of the
2 Main Staff's will was being faithfully fulfilled on the ground.
3 Mladic not only expected his subordinate commanders to monitor
4 and inspect their subordinates, but he himself was constantly out in the
5 field for this purpose. There was evidence of this throughout the war,
6 from the start of the war in Sarajevo to the operation in Srebrenica. He
7 was at forward command posts checking that his orders were being
8 followed. He was at brigade headquarters. He was at specific artillery
9 emplacements. When he deemed necessary, he micromanaged commanders,
10 ordered the movements of individual soldiers and pieces of equipment.
11 Dannatt pointed to Mladic's engagement at the "main point of effort,"
12 engaging in the most critical areas at the right time.
13 Even when he couldn't get to the field, General Mladic used every
14 means at his disposal to ensure that subordinates were carrying out his
15 orders and that he had the information necessary to take next steps. As
16 General Dannatt made clear, physical location was unimportant in the
17 exercise of command as long as there was effective communication.
18 Your Honours, you will recall General Milovanovic's evidence that
19 the VRS communication networks functioned throughout the war with only a
20 single lapse of two hours. General Mladic made frequent phone calls to
21 his subordinate units. The commander of the East Bosnian Corps expected
22 the daily call from General Mladic or the Main Staff to discuss their
23 regular report that day. Your Honours will recall the Srebrenica trial
24 video, P1147, showing General Mladic calling from Belgrade, among other
25 things, to inquire about events up at Vinko's, which, as you saw, was a
1 reference to the Zvornik Brigade.
2 Apart from these three command principles, General Mladic delved
3 fully in every aspect of command to enhance the operational capacity of
4 his troops. He dove into the details of staffing, logistics,
5 communications, and other aspects of command not immediately visible on
6 the field but essential to understanding the combat readiness of his
7 troops and to further the objectives of the JCE.
8 Mr. Traldi has already addressed the Chamber on Mladic's hand
9 selection of his subordinate officers. He made sure, in short, that he
10 had the people he could rely on to implement his orders.
11 You've seen the evidence of the crimes General Mladic's army had
12 been engaged in throughout the indictment period across Bosnia. Forcible
13 transfers of non-Serbs, murders of non-Serbs, the mass detention of
14 non-Serbs, the vast logistics of expelling citizens of disposing of
15 bodies, the VRS was engaged in all these operations. The principles of
16 command and control, the simple written text on paper is but theory, but
17 you have heard the evidence of a number of VRS officers at different
18 levels of the army that Mladic and his use of the principles of command
19 and control were a powerful force compelling VRS personnel in everything
20 that they did.
21 You've seen the extensive evidence Mladic's ability to direct
22 this large, complex organisation with precision. You have seen evidence
23 of his finger-tip control. General Dannatt said: "Command and
24 responsibility cannot be separated." General Mladic exercised command
25 and is responsible for the conduct of those he gave orders to.
1 Your Honours, for the last several hours we have addressed the
2 arguments presented by General Mladic's Defence in their 98 bis
3 submission. We have marshalled just a small portion of the evidence
4 which supports each and every count of the indictment. During the
5 Prosecution case, we have adduced sufficient proof of each crime set out
6 in the 11 counts of the indictment, proof that is both credible and
7 reliable, proof that establishes both the actus reus and mens rea of the
9 One important category of evidence which merits special mention
10 before I conclude our submissions today is that group of exhibits which
11 originate from General Mladic himself. The Chamber now has before it a
12 nearly complete collection of his military notebooks from the period of
13 the indictment as well as video and audio recordings which memorialise
14 conversations he had with others about events in the conflict. This body
15 of evidence was recovered by police officers from Serbia on two occasions
16 in 2008 and 2010.
17 Slide I1 enumerates all of the admitted exhibits which came from
18 the Mladic home. This is important evidence from General Mladic's own
19 hand and possessions. It is important in its own right but also because
20 it corroborates much of the other evidence the Chamber now has before it.
21 Considering the Prosecution's evidence in light of what was recovered
22 from General Mladic's home will also help the Chamber understand the full
23 import of this evidence. For example, P1959 is an audio cassette tape
24 recovered from the Mladic home. The label on the tape bears the caption:
25 "7 October 1991, operations around Skradin, Sibe, and Zadar." An excerpt
1 of what Mladic says is now on the screen on slide I2. This tape records
2 his contemporaneous comments at a time when he was involved in the events
3 in Croatia before any of the charged crimes in the indictment. It's an
4 excerpt of a conversation he had with a subordinate,
5 Lieutenant-Colonel Milosav, during operations in the Zadar area. He
6 makes known in no uncertain terms his disposition toward civilians:
7 "All that is older than 10 and younger than 75 will come to harm
8 in Sibenik if they carry on like this."
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, sorry to interrupt you, I1, I don't know
10 whether there is anything missing or whether it's just a double that
11 P4518 was I think twice on the 0 -- 4518, do I see that it's there twice?
12 MR. GROOME: That's possible, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, documents, first line, last two items is a
15 MR. GROOME: I see that, yes.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Now, if it's just a double, then we are not missing
17 anything. If, however, I4518 stands for another number, then we might
18 miss something. Could you please verify that.
19 MR. GROOME: I will check that, Your Honour.
20 We could go to slide -- the next slide, I3. Slide I3 shows an
21 excerpt from another tape recovered from the Mladic home. This
22 particular one is a Dictaphone tape.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please, no loud speaking, no conversations
24 otherwise --
25 Mr. Stojanovic, you know the rules. Please take care that your
1 client is abiding to them as well.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Groome.
3 MR. GROOME: Here in P1969, Mladic has recorded a conversation he
4 had with the person by the name of Marinko in 1993.
5 JUDGE ORIE: No speaking aloud. I say it now for the second time
6 and otherwise, Mr. Mladic, you'll be aware of the consequences.
7 Please proceed, Mr. Groome.
8 MR. GROOME: So he's speaking to a person by the name of Marinko
9 in 1993, where in reference to Muslims and Croats, he says:
10 "May they disappear, both them and the other ones."
11 Evidence such as this will assist the Chamber in assessing
12 Mladic's state of mind during the crimes charged in the indictment. The
13 words of Mladic were not only recorded by himself but also by confidants
14 such as Milan Vlasic, a supporter and benefactor of the VRS living in
15 Canada. P1974 is an excerpt from a videotape made by Lesic during one of
16 his meetings with Mladic. The video was made with Mladic's knowledge.
17 An excerpt is here on slide I4.
18 Here, referring to the Muslim population of Srebrenica, he says
19 that but for the international community, the Muslim population of
20 Srebrenica would have disappeared long ago. The evidence the Chamber now
21 has before it is as compelling as it is comprehensive. It is evidence
22 that demonstrates that the Army of Republika Srpska had an effective
23 system of command and control throughout the time that the crimes were
24 being committed. It is evidence that proves that Ratko Mladic, as
25 commander of this army, used his ability to command and control those
1 under his authority to commit the crimes enumerated in Counts 1 to 11.
2 I want to return to two documents recovered from the Mladic home
3 for the last two documents I will discuss. They both contain the words
4 of General Mladic after the Dayton Peace Accords had been signed, after
5 the indictment period. The first is a speech he made on the
6 14th of January, 1996, to a gathering to celebrate the Serbian new year.
7 It has been admitted as P1981 and was recovered from the Mladic home in
9 In his comments he makes clear that the most significant military
10 decisions were taken within a close circle of members of the Main Staff,
11 while the most difficult ones were "quite often taken by no one else but
13 The last document I will ask you to consider today is the last
14 document General Mladic signed as the commander of the Main Staff. On
15 the day the authority he had previously enjoyed was no longer vested in
16 him, it was transferred to General Milovanovic. The last day any of us
17 spends in a position or job is most often a time of retrospection and
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Groome, we don't have the English version.
20 MR. GROOME: I'll show that in a second, Your Honour. I want to
21 point out a few things about this before. That will be the next slide.
22 It is with this that I would ask you to look at P5028. On the
23 slide before you is an image of the document. As you can see, it bears
24 General Mladic's signature and stamp of the Main Staff. The last
25 document General Mladic signed. Apart from transferring his
1 responsibility as commander of the Main Staff to Milovanovic, he makes a
2 number of requests to the president of Republika Srpska. At this time,
3 it was Biljana Plavsic, Karadzic having resigned the previous July.
4 These requests concerned the welfare of his soldiers and their
5 families. He says with the transfer of authority "as a simple man with a
6 heavy task and in unusual times, I am worried about the fate of the army
7 and the people who created the army."
8 I want to now draw your attention to paragraph 3, where he makes
9 a request that is particularly prescient:
10 "That the president of the RS will give written guarantees that
11 not one member of the army of the RS will bear any disciplinary,
12 criminal, or other responsibility or consequences for the execution of
13 orders in line with the decisions and orders of General Mladic up to the
14 passing of this decision."
15 Mr. Ivetic began his submissions to you asserting "General Mladic
16 never intended nor ordered any crimes." A general who has never given an
17 illegal order does not seek immunity for those who followed his orders.
18 General Mladic requested this extraordinary grant of immunity for his
19 subordinates because he knew he had taken decisions and had given orders
20 to his subordinates to commit crimes, The crimes that are enumerated in
21 the indictment and now fully established with the evidence you have
22 before you.
23 The next time I address the Chamber on the merits of this
24 evidence, I will be submitting that it establishes the guilt of Mladic
25 beyond a reasonable doubt. Today, I simply submit that this evidence
1 meets the applicable standard articulated by the Appeals Chamber. There
2 is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could be
3 satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of Ratko Mladic for
4 each of the crimes set out in each of the counts in the indictment.
5 Thank you, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Groome.
7 This would then conclude the submissions for today.
8 Tomorrow, Mr. Ivetic, we have reserved one hour for you. We also
9 have reserved one hour for the Prosecution to respond.
10 Therefore, we adjourn for the day and we'll resume tomorrow,
11 Wednesday, the 19th of March, at 9.30 in the morning at this same
12 courtroom, I.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.24 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 19th day
15 of March, 2014, at 9.30 a.m.