1 Monday, 23 November 2015
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And good morning, Your Honours. This
9 is case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Before we start with the examination of the next witness, the
12 Chamber would like to hear the Defence's position on the report of
13 Mr. Dunjic, which we discussed last week.
14 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, the Defence will be utilizing
15 Dr. Stankovic to defend the report with his supplements or additions to
16 the same, primarily matters that he can confirm and have the same opinion
17 as in the report, or where his opinion may be more extensive or differ
18 would be the subject of a short supplement to that report or notations in
19 relation to paragraphs of that report.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, another matter is how much time
21 Mr. Stankovic would need to prepare his position.
22 MR. IVETIC: The materials have been given to him and the
23 preliminary estimate is that he believes by some time in the first part
24 of January he should be able to have it all done with the -- any
25 supplement thereto. But that's a very preliminary estimate since, again,
1 he has just received the materials recently and I don't know how
2 extensive of a review is required, but we will update if any new
3 information comes to our attention.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And is it your intention that then a new
5 supplementary report will be produced or just that Mr. Stankovic will
6 prepare for, if I could say so, defending? That means being
7 cross-examined on the expert report of Mr. Dunjic.
8 MR. IVETIC: Well, I think any work product of Mr. Stankovic,
9 whatever form it takes, would qualify as an expert report if it is any
10 material that is not contained in the Dunjic or different from the Dunjic
11 or expanding on the Dunjic. And I don't know if we could deal with that
12 as a proofing matter or as a completely new report since it's relating to
13 the existing report that has already gone through the 94 bis process. So
14 I'm kind of not -- not quite in a position yet to know without seeing how
15 substantive any additional supplement would be to qualify it as a new
16 report or simply a matter of proofing on the existing report.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, one of the options also considered by
19 you, if I understand you well, was just to accept the report, not
20 necessarily the content of it, and refrain from asking the expert to be
21 called to be cross-examined. Have you considered that? Because that
22 would change the situation a bit for the Defence. I think that was one
23 of the options considered when we dealt with the matter last time.
24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I also recall that was one of the options that
25 was raised in court and that Mr. McCloskey indicated he would consider.
1 I think we were waiting for the Defence response before coming to a final
2 view. And I will double-check with Mr. McCloskey, but I think for
3 various reasons we began looking skeptically at that option and
4 considered that the most prudent course would be the allowance for a
5 certain level of examination, depending on what was submitted.
6 So probably -- and those discussions were taking place with some
7 intensity between Mr. McCloskey and other members of the team directly
8 concerned with the Dunjic report. I can check quickly to see if what I
9 have related is fully accurate and get back to the Court at the next
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would you please do that. Because it sounds
12 as if that option, report is there, no need to call anyone for -- to be
13 cross-examined or on -- on that report. Of course, it could not be
14 Mr. Dunjic but also not Mr. Stankovic, whether that option is now --
15 MR. TIEGER: I can certainly appreciate that the Court would like
16 to know where it stands and I'll get back immediately.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you very much.
18 Mr. Ivetic, perhaps it's best to wait for the final position of
19 the Defence. Then before we start with the -- yes, Prosecution.
20 Then before we start with the next witness, I'd like to briefly
21 deal with the associated exhibits related to this witness.
22 Pursuant to its Rule 92 ter motion for Witness Akashi, dated the
23 27th of October, 2015, and most recent exhibit list received on the
24 20th of November, the Defence has tendered 37 associated exhibits. The
25 Chamber notes that three of these have already been admitted into
1 evidence, leaving 34. The Chamber reiterates to the Defence its guidance
2 that the Chamber should not be flooded with associated exhibits, and the
3 Chamber also recalls the preference for documents to be tendered during
4 the witness's examination in court which allow the witness to explain and
5 comment on them.
6 The Chamber therefore invites the Defence to reduce the number of
7 associated exhibits it is tendering through this witness. Alternatively,
8 could the Defence explain why these documents need to be tendered as
9 associated exhibits, as opposed to being tendered during the
10 examination-in-chief of this witness?
11 Mr. Ivetic, there's a clear invitation here. Of course, we do
12 not know, also in view of the time you have asked for
13 examination-in-chief, how much of these associated exhibits you'd like to
14 touch upon during your examination, but if there's any observation you'd
15 like to make you have an opportunity to do so.
16 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honours. I note some of the associated
17 exhibits are rather lengthy. I will be dealing with the lengthy ones in
18 court so we'll only be dealing with parts of those exhibits which will be
19 presented to the witness and which then we will not need to have
20 introduced since they'll be read into the record. So I will try to limit
21 the number of lengthy exhibits that come in. It's still likely to be a
22 large number because there are a lot of small, one- or two-page documents
23 that were used with the witness in parts of his testimony from the
24 Karadzic case. I can perhaps reassess at the conclusion of the evidence
25 which of those I might be able to exclude. Of course, some of them
1 relate to the Prosecution's cross-examination during the Karadzic case so
2 I feel if I try to exclude any of those, then I could be accused of not
3 giving a full picture of the testimony. So I'm hesitant to do that. But
4 will I try to see if I can shorten things as far as exhibits are
5 concerned after the conclusion of all aspects of the testimony.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course, this Chamber doesn't know anything
7 about the cross-examination of this witness in Karadzic. We haven't --
8 it has not been tendered, it has not been presented to us. And usually
9 the --
10 MR. IVETIC: It is a part of the Rule 92 ter statement, I
12 JUDGE ORIE: Let me see. Then I thought I read some 90 or
13 95 pages of transcript. I saw here and there Ms. Edgerton dealing with
14 some matters.
15 MR. IVETIC: Then I could be mistaken. In any event, I think I
16 will deal with the associated exhibits at the very end after we finish
17 the witness so we'll have time to --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: Just a couple of matters. I don't believe that
20 cross-examination was included.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Could I then express my surprise, Mr. Ivetic, that
22 where I having read the 90 pages over the weekend and having no
23 recollection as to what was tendered, that you apparently think that
24 cross-examination is part of that. I saw that Ms. Edgerton has
25 intervened a couple of times.
1 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, Mr. -- I didn't mean to interrupt,
2 Mr. President.
3 JUDGE ORIE: No, no, please.
4 MR. TIEGER: I was only going to respond to the other matters
5 raised by Mr. Ivetic and indicate that I appreciate and I am confident he
6 will do his best to follow the Court's guidance. In support of that
7 effort I'd simply note that it was my impression from working with these
8 materials that they were -- these were matters all raised in the
9 examination, discussed at some point during the examination, and it
10 seemed to me that it might indeed be the most efficient way of
11 proceeding. Otherwise we'll have two discussions of those -- of many of
12 those documents in court - the one in the transcript from the Karadzic
13 case that's been submitted and the one that Mr. Ivetic might be
14 attempting to elicit in response to the Court's guidance.
15 So, in that sense, I would, I suppose, support the exceptional
16 request to -- that identifies as -- this many documents as associated.
17 In any event, we'll both have to consider I think at some point which of
18 the documents that seem, if any, that seem to have been associated or
19 considered to have been associated by the parties up to this moment or
20 not and possibly adjust our examinations accordingly.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. I still do not see any
22 cross-examination in the materials. I think it finished on one day and
23 then there was a little bit remaining for the next day. And then on that
24 next day, I think the accused then concluded his examination-in-chief
25 and -- I have not seen any cross-examination.
1 MR. IVETIC: You are correct, Your Honours. I apologise. I
2 stand corrected. I, of course, did read the whole thing in preparation
3 for the witness and [Overlapping speakers] ...
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I understand that. You may not have been
5 aware. At the same time, I think it's important to know what exactly was
6 presented to this Chamber and what was not.
7 Then, I think it's time to ask the usher to escort the witness
8 into the courtroom.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Akashi.
12 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Akashi before you give evidence, the Rules of
14 Procedure and Evidence require that you make a solemn declaration, the
15 text of which is now handed out to you. May I invite you to make that
16 solemn declaration.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
18 I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth,
19 and nothing but the truth.
20 WITNESS: YASUSHI AKASHI
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please be seated, Mr. Akashi.
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Akashi, I have addressed you as Mr. Akashi. I
24 have read that in other -- before other Chambers often you were addressed
25 as Your Excellency. It's not any way as a depreciation of your titles
1 and your -- the honours that have been given to you, but it's just this
2 Chamber has developed a habit in just addressing everyone as Mr. or Mrs.
3 Please don't misunderstand that.
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much. You're most gracious and I
5 fully understand. I think titles have only the effect of inflating some
7 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I don't know whether I would support that.
8 But, Mr. Akashi, you'll first be examined by Mr. Ivetic. You'll find
9 Mr. Ivetic to your left. Mr. Ivetic is a member of the Defence team of
10 Mr. Mladic.
11 Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.
12 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Examination by Mr. Ivetic:
14 Q. Good morning, sir.
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. I would like to first ask to you please state your full name for
17 the purposes of the record.
18 A. Yes, my full name is Yasushi Akashi.
19 MR. IVETIC: And I would ask for 1D5815 to be displayed in
20 e-court. I do have a hard copy for the ambassador of this document.
21 Q. And, Ambassador, while we wait for the same I can ask you a
22 question. Did you have occasion to testify in the case at this Tribunal
23 in relation to Radovan Karadzic?
24 A. Yes, indeed, I did.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Akashi, then you'll certainly have read again
1 that you were asked at that time whether you had any papers before you.
2 If you want to consult anything other than the hard copy of the testimony
3 in the Karadzic case, would you please tell us that you are doing it and
4 what you are consulting.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, I will follow your instruction.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
7 MR. IVETIC:
8 Q. Ambassador, this document before us in e-court is the transcript
9 from the Karadzic proceeding dated 24 April 2013. Does that accord with
10 your recollection of the first day you started to testify in direct
11 examination in the Karadzic case?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. And if now we could turn briefly to page 79 of the document, and
14 it will be tabbed in the hard copy at the top for your convenience, here
15 on the screen we now see the transcript from the same case, dated
16 25 April 2013. Sir, does that accord with your recollection of the
17 second day that you testified in direct examination in the Karadzic case?
18 A. Yes, this seem to be the -- in accordance with what I said on
19 that day.
20 Q. Okay. And, sir, did you have occasion to review this transcript
21 from the Karadzic case in these last few days before today?
22 A. I cannot say I went through every word of it, but this seems to
23 be in general accord with what I said.
24 Q. Okay. And after the -- after your review, do you think the
25 transcript is accurate and complete as to the testimony that you gave in
1 the direct examination in the Karadzic case?
2 A. In general, yes.
3 Q. Okay. And if I were to ask you today questions exactly the same
4 as those in the Karadzic transcript, would your answers today be in
5 substance the same as in this transcript?
6 A. I hope so. But you said in substance, yeah.
7 Q. And, sir, you have taken a solemn declaration to tell the truth
8 today. Can you tell us if your answers in the Karadzic case were
9 truthful in nature as recorded?
10 A. As I saw the events in those days, yes.
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, we would thus tender 1D5815 as a
13 public exhibit. And as we indicated, we would deal with the associated
14 exhibits after the conclusion of the testimony.
15 JUDGE ORIE: I hear of no objections.
16 Mr. Registrar.
17 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D1361, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ORIE: D1361 is admitted.
19 Please proceed.
20 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours. At this time I have a
21 short public summary of the transcript for the public to know some of the
22 matters that were testified about, a copy of which has been given to the
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Have you informed Mr. Akashi about the purpose
25 of this summary?
1 MR. IVETIC: Yes, and I can repeat again --
2 Q. Ambassador, this is a short summary just for purposes of the
3 public. It is does not form part of your evidence. Your transcript is
4 your evidence.
5 A. I understand.
6 MR. IVETIC: Ambassador Akashi joined the UN in February of 1957.
7 He served from then on in a variety of offices and functions in his
8 career, ranging from ambassador to under-secretary-general, until he
9 retired from the UN in 1997. In 1992, Ambassador Akashi was appointed
10 the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN for the
11 former Yugoslavia and served in that capacity during the war in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. After retiring from the UN he went back to Japan.
13 In his transcript from the Karadzic case, Ambassador Akashi
14 testifies as to a number of matters including, but not limited to, the
15 following. He says the basic trouble --
16 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Mr. Ivetic. I think there's an error
17 here. In 1992 I was appointed the Special Representative of the
18 Secretary-General of the UN for Cambodia. And it was in January 1994
19 that I was appointed on the same -- the same, similar job with regard to
20 former Yugoslavia.
21 MR. IVETIC:
22 Q. I agree with that and I misspoke. And I apologise.
23 MR. IVETIC: Ambassador Akashi says the basic trouble with
24 UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia was a lack of unity of opinion within the
25 Security Council where at least three differing viewpoints prevailed.
1 This made the work of UNPROFOR difficult.
2 There was no peace to keep in the former Yugoslavia, and the UN
3 Secretary-General and others had serious doubts about the UN going there,
4 but European countries exerted pressure on the UN to step in.
5 Governments were in many ways compelled to do something to respond to the
6 voices of public opinion and media cries.
7 Some UNPROFOR officers, such as General Briquemont, felt the
8 mandate given to the peacekeepers was extremely ambiguous and almost
9 impossible to implement.
10 Demilitarization of the safe areas, including Srebrenica, was a
11 constant issue raised, and it was repeatedly pointed out that the lack of
12 demilitarization affected an indispensable element of the safe area
13 concept itself. Many reports to the Security Council reported problems
14 as to all the safe areas.
15 As to six safe areas, the problems included several defects or
16 shortcomings in both the concept and implementation of the safe areas,
17 which led the Secretary-General and others to have serious reservations
18 and express their concerns.
19 First, only less than a quarter of requested UN troops to
20 implement the agreements were provided. Second --
21 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry to interrupt, but this typewritten
22 version seems not in perfect accord with the original text. There were
23 some slips.
24 MR. IVETIC:
25 Q. Yes. I think that the final transcript usually gets combed and
1 those typos get fixed.
2 A. Okay, fine. Thank you.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Akashi, what is written now will be reviewed
4 before it becomes the final transcript. And there is an audio available
5 to check whether everything is okay. And that's usually done the same
6 day or the same night.
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much for your reassurance.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
9 MR. IVETIC: Second, the Bosnian side used the safe areas to rest
10 and re-equip their troops and other purposes. Third, the disarmament
11 provisions were not implemented. Fourth, there was not always
12 demarcation of the safe areas.
13 Ambassador Akashi agreed with observations of others that
14 premature recognition of Croatia and Bosnia worsened the situation.
15 European governments should have heeded the advice of Badinter Commission
16 of the EU to make sure first the constitutions of Bosnia and Croatia
17 provided for the vital interests of both majority and minority groups.
18 At one point in time, the main -- an issue was that neither the
19 Bosnian government nor the United States government wanted a long-term
20 cease-fire because of concerns of making territorial holdings of the Serb
21 forces permanent.
22 As a result of active military assistance from the United States,
23 Germany, and the Islamic states to Croatian and Bosnian forces, the
24 overall power balance drastically shifted against the Serb side as the
25 war progressed. It was the UN's consistent position that if there were
1 infractions by any side, that the use of air power was to be applied
2 equally to the parties. But this position was not shared by NATO or some
4 As to the Markale 1 shelling, the Ambassador appointed a
5 commission of experts that determined the attack could have come from
6 either side.
7 And that completes the summary.
8 Q. Ambassador, I would now propose to return to parts of your
9 transcript from the Karadzic proceedings to ask you some questions to
10 clarify and seek further information.
11 MR. IVETIC: If we could thus have D1361 on our screens, and
12 page 5 of the same, which should correlate to transcript page 37667 of
13 the underlying transcript.
14 And, sir, here at lines 10 through 12, you say and I quote:
15 "The basic trouble with UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia was
16 lack of unity of opinions or viewpoints in the Security Council."
17 You then in the remainder of this answer through line 19 say that
18 at least three different viewpoints prevailed among the permanent members
19 of the Security Council.
20 What were these three different viewpoints?
21 A. One was the viewpoint of the United States that the Bosnian
22 government was basically the victim of the aggression by Bosnian Serb
23 forces supported by Serbia. And second viewpoint was that of the Russian
24 Federation which considered the -- the Bosnian Serbs as a minority group
25 which was defending its rights against the majority group, which was the
1 Bosnian government. The third viewpoint was held by countries like the
2 United Kingdom and France which felt that the most important thing to do
3 is to stabilize the situation, not the designation of who was the main
4 culprit of the difficulties, and that some kind of peace and the
5 cessation of hostilities was the main objective of the international
7 Of course, German position was somewhat different, somewhere
8 between, you might say, the position of the United States and that of the
9 French and the British. And many Islamic countries who were
10 non-permanent members of the Security Council were anxious that the
11 injustice, as they saw it, suffered by the Bosnian government should be
12 corrected. So these were three or you might say four different
14 Q. Thank you, sir. Next I'd like to turn to page 8 which should
15 correlate to transcript page 37607 of the underlying Karadzic transcript,
16 and here first I'd like to focus at lines 15 through 25 on this page.
17 And here, you again discuss the Security Council compromises that led to
18 ambiguity in resolutions which were difficult to understand and difficult
19 to implement on the ground.
20 Did anyone from the ground ever tell the Security Council of
21 these problems that were being experienced by those trying to implement
22 their resolutions?
23 A. I think many of us did that, within the limit of basic politeness
24 which we always adhered to, vis-à-vis members of the Security Council,
25 and including the Secretary-General himself. His reports pointed out the
1 difficulty of implementing Security Council resolutions which did their
2 best to hide the differences among Security Council members and tried to
3 paper over these differences with the use of ambiguous and seemingly
4 elegant phraseology.
5 Q. And now, sir, looking at the earlier part of this same page, more
6 specifically your answer at lines -- beginning at lines 4 through 14,
7 here you talk of the media and how governments were compelled to do
8 something to respond to public opinion and calls from the media.
9 Was the media presenting a full and accurate picture of what was
10 happening on the ground?
11 A. I think to generalise the media would not be doing justice to the
12 media. There was a big variation about the accuracy of the -- or balance
13 of the media coverage. For instance, if you take up only television
14 media, I think, on the whole, BBC was more accurate and more balanced
15 than CNN, for instance. Some are more emotional than others, and --
16 so -- but I think there was a proclivity on the part of commercial media
17 to sensationalise issues and to simplify the picture.
18 Q. And next I would turn to page 34 of the transcript, which is the
19 underlying page 37696, and here if we could focus on lines 11 through 16,
20 your answer here talks about the topic that you just raised, the media
21 that sometimes "tended to exaggerate the nature of incidents so they can
22 sort of sensationalise their nature."
23 Do you recall any specific examples of this that related to the
24 former Yugoslavia?
25 A. I cannot offhand recall specific instances.
1 Q. Thank you. Then if we can turn to page 11 in e-court and that
2 will be transcript page 37673 of the underlying transcript, and here the
3 question posed from you is at lines 4 through 9 and it deals with the
4 part of your -- where your book where you say that neither the Bosnian
5 government nor United States government wanted a long-term cease-fire
6 based on the view of not wanting Serb territorial holdings to be
8 Then at lines 15 through 17, you are asked, in essence, if this
9 selection from your book refreshes your recollection on different
10 interests of foreign elements and domestic elements prolonging the war.
11 And then on the next page at line 3 we finally get your answer to these
12 questions, which is recorded as:
13 "Yes, that was my interpretation of events at that time."
14 Do you recall any specific matters or events that brought you to
15 that interpretation?
16 A. I negotiated in Geneva, I think it was in June 1994, so could --
17 we had heard proximity talks between three parties in the Bosnian
18 conflict, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian government, and the Croat -- Bosnian
19 Croats. And since they did not want to meet face to face with two
20 others, the -- I had to go through different rooms where three parties
21 were ensconced. And the -- I was able to extract a commitment on the
22 part of Bosnian Serbs to agree to at least a four-month cease-fire
23 proposed by the UN and they did agree to it. But Bosnian government did
24 not want to accept cease-fire as being too long, and this coincided with
25 the American viewpoint presented by Ambassador Redman that cease-fire
1 period should be for one month. And Croats were somewhere in a position
2 vacillating between these different periods.
3 Q. Thank you. And further down on the page from line 11 through 23
4 you talk about a visit of President Carter to Bosnia, and in lines 16
5 through 17 you say:
6 "But Bosnian government did not particularly appreciate Carter's
8 Could you please explain for us what this relates to?
9 A. Yeah, I was negotiating at the time towards the end of 1994 as
10 general cessation of hostilities agreement between the three parties, and
11 I found the Bosnian government reluctant to accept the four-month period.
12 I think Serbs were somewhat more willing to do it, and the Croats, as
13 usual, vacillated between two other positions. And -- but in the end I
14 was able to extract agreement among the three parties for a general
15 cessation of hostilities agreement for a four-month period. And
16 President Carter helped me with regard to getting agreement of Bosnian
17 Serbs which were, I think, any way forthcoming. So I -- like what media
18 said, I'm not sure how much President Carter's help was actually needed.
19 It was obvious that Bosnian government was not happy with that visit by
20 President Carter, and yet I think the coincidence of interests by the
21 three parties enabled us to get four month's cessation of hostilities.
22 But at the end of that, hostilities again were rekindled.
23 Q. Thank you. Next I'd like to turn together with you to page 24 in
24 e-court which should correlate to transcript page 37686 of the underlying
25 transcript. And at lines 5 through 8 as your answer, you say:
1 "Yes. Demilitarization of safe areas, including Srebrenica, was
2 one of our preoccupations, and we never stopped pointing out that the
3 lack of demilitarization of safe areas is an indispensable component of
4 the safe area concept itself."
5 First of all, do you mean to say that the lack of
6 demilitarization of safe areas is an indispensable component of the safe
7 areas concept or do you mean to say demilitarization is an indispensable
8 component of the safe areas concept?
9 A. Demilitarization of the safe areas was very important and as you
10 quoted in -- even indispensable part of safety and security of safe
11 areas. But as I said elsewhere, other elements like delimitation or
12 delineation of the scope of respective safe areas was also important, and
13 the freedom of movement by UNPROFOR and others was also important. In
14 addition, the very presence of the UN to supervise the safe areas was
15 also important. Here, if our presence was just symbolic, then that would
16 not be sufficient to ensure safety and security of these areas. So these
17 three or four different elements were interlocking assurances for the
18 effectiveness of safe areas.
19 But I must add that in the case of Srebrenica and Zepa, the
20 delineation and demilitarization at one period or the other, I think in
21 initial period was partly achieved and then somehow they deteriorated.
22 Q. And in this part of the transcript you say "we never stopped
23 pointing out."
24 To whom was this that you never stopped pointing out this
1 A. Primarily to the Security Council.
2 Q. And, sir, what did the Security Council do, if anything, in
4 A. I regret to say that, as I said earlier, the lack of unity of its
5 members, including the permanent members, was characteristic of the
6 Security Council in the whole Yugoslav episode. This is in sharp
7 contrast to the effectiveness of the Security Council and its unity
8 during the Cambodian conflict in which there was a remarkable degree of
9 unity of approach as well as attitude. And so you might say this is a
10 fundamental underlying necessity for the effectiveness of the UN, that
11 its members, particularly permanent members, be united in the basic
13 Q. And in relation to demilitarization, was that also raised with
14 the Bosnian government?
15 A. Yes, all these matters were raised with the Bosnian government,
16 as well as with the Bosnian Serb party.
17 Q. And as to demilitarization what was their response?
18 A. Bosnian government insisted that their military forces had to
19 remain, particularly with regard to Sarajevo they emphasised. You know,
20 it was a seat of the government and therefore they needed military
21 presence sufficient to enable the tranquility and safety.
22 Q. And now if we can turn to page 49 in e-court of the transcript
23 and that should correlate to 37711 of the underlying Karadzic transcript.
24 At lines 7 through 15 of the same, you were asked a question by
25 Mr. Karadzic and it goes as follows:
1 "Do you remember -- do you remember our meeting on 22nd of April,
2 1994, in Belgrade, where I claim that the BH army launching attacks from
3 the safe areas and that I seeked and requested the UN to proceed
4 immediately to Gorazde to be able to accurately report who was
6 "A. I think in our meeting on the 22nd of April, 1994, we
7 discussed many things. That meeting started at 12.00 noon and went on
8 until 11.30 that night. So it was a marathon negotiation. We discussed
9 many, many things centring, of course, around Gorazde crisis."
10 Ambassador, was one of the things discussed during that marathon
11 negotiation these matters that were raised by Mr. Karadzic in his
13 A. Could you repeat what Karadzic raised at that meeting?
14 Q. He raised -- he claimed that the BH army was launching attacks
15 from safe areas and that he requested the UN to proceed to Gorazde to be
16 able to accurately report who was attacking. That's his question, and
17 I'm asking if you recall if that specific item was one of the items that
18 would have been discussed at that marathon negotiation.
19 A. I -- I do not specifically remember reference to this matter, but
20 I hasten to add that we had a small UN presence in the form of the UNMOs,
21 military observers. I think they numbered eight. And what Karadzic was
22 asking is not a UN presence but a more numerous UN presence.
23 Q. I understand. And now if we can turn to the next page in e-court
24 which will correspond to page 37712 of the underlying Karadzic
25 transcript, and at lines 17 through 22 you are giving an answer and you
1 say that -- you talk of many reports of the Secretary-General to the
2 Security Council as to these problems. And this is in reference to
3 Karadzic's question about paragraph 3 of the document you were looking
4 at. So I'd like to look at that document.
5 MR. IVETIC: And that is number -- 65 ter number 16806. And I
6 also have a hard copy of the same to provide to the witness.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, may I draw to your attention that the
8 last answer, that the whole last line has not been translated and
9 transcribed because you immediately started your next question not
10 waiting for the finalization of the translation.
11 Please proceed.
12 MR. IVETIC: I apologise. Then. Perhaps to be on the safe side
13 I should ask the ambassador --
14 Q. Sir --
15 JUDGE ORIE: It will be worked over -- I mean, overnight. That's
16 not the problem, but then we have to wait until tomorrow, I think. The
17 witness said that it was not about the presence but about increasing the
18 number of those present.
19 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: But I leave it our transcribers to finalize it.
21 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
22 Q. And now that we have this document in front of us, we see it is
23 dated the 23rd of April, 1994, and references a meeting with Bosnian Serb
24 civilian and military leaders. If we could turn to page 2 of the same
25 and look at the paragraph 3 that Mr. Karadzic was basing his question on,
1 and it says:
2 "In view of the importance and urgency to reach a concrete
3 agreement on the Gorazde crisis, Mr. Akashi suggested that this item be
4 addressed first. Dr. Karadzic, in addressing the issue, said that the
5 fundamental problem of the safe areas was that they did not meet the
6 criteria of safe areas as defined in international conventions. Of the
7 six designated safe areas only two - Srebrenica and Zepa - had been
8 delineated but still remained undemilitarized. The others served as
9 strongholds for the BiH armija. Consequently there was a need to solve
10 not only the issue of Gorazde but the status of other safe areas as
12 Now, in the transcript you say -- strike that.
13 Did the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council
14 about these problem -- include anything about these problems?
15 A. Mr. Ivetic, could you repeat your question.
16 Q. Yes. When we were looking at the transcript we talked about
17 reports to the Security Council on the topic of safe areas. Did those
18 reports also encompass these that have been raised in this document as
19 expressed by the Serb side, by Dr. Karadzic in particular?
20 A. There were several reports of the UN Secretary-General referring
21 to the questions of difficulties encountered by the UN in order to
22 implement the safe area concept. And so maybe there are slight
23 differences in the way the matter was described or analysed, but in the
24 basic line Secretary-General's approach was the same and consistent.
25 Q. Okay.
1 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I see we're at the time for a break.
2 I would at this time tender this document as the next exhibit. Then we
3 can take that break.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 16806 will be Exhibit D1362,
6 Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: D1362 is admitted into evidence.
8 Mr. Akashi, we'll take a break. We'd like to see you back in
9 20 minutes. You may follow the usher.
10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 JUDGE ORIE: We will resume at five minutes to 11.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, the Chamber was informed that you wanted
16 to raise a matter.
17 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. I indicated to the Court I
18 wanted to get back to you as quickly as possible and -- in response to
19 your inquiry earlier today. And that's why I've asked for this brief
20 time. I wanted to advise you that Mr. McCloskey's initial response to
21 the possibility of the simple tendering of the report with nothing else
22 was apparently predicated on his understanding that it had either been
23 proposed by the Defence or that the Defence did not object. Our current
24 understanding, however, is that the Defence does object, and in light of
25 that we do not consider that the preferable option but instead consider
1 that a targeted, short, proofing note-style contribution by Dr. Stankovic
2 would be the more suitable option.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 Mr. Ivetic, you can confirm that that option was not accepted by
5 the Defence.
6 MR. IVETIC: While most of the discussions were between
7 Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Lukic, the part I was there for talked about
8 potentially submitting the transcripts of the cross-examination in the
9 prior proceeding which we felt then would unfairly prejudice us if we did
10 not have a chance to, in essence, re-direct an expert on those topics.
11 But again, most of the discussions were between Mr. Lukic and
12 Mr. McCloskey directly without my involvement. I was only there for a
13 part of the discussions last week, I believe it was Thursday.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So then as matters stand now, unless there's
15 any change in the positions is that we'll -- that the Dunjic report will
16 be added to by Mr. Stankovic and that Mr. Stankovic will be called to be
17 briefly examined and be cross-examined.
18 That's -- unless we hear otherwise from the parties, that's what
19 the Chamber now understands the case to be.
20 Then could the witness be escorted in the courtroom again.
21 Meanwhile I used the time for P7681.
22 On the 19th of November of this year, during the testimony of
23 Mitar Kovac, Exhibit P7681, a military report, was admitted into
24 evidence. To be found on transcript page 41640. The Chamber notes that
25 the original has a stamp in the upper left-hand corner with the date the
1 11th of April, 1993. However, in the English translation, the date is
2 11 April 1992. The Chamber hereby requests the Prosecution to verify and
3 correct the translation.
4 Mr. Weber.
5 MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honour. And thank you.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And the transcript, line 8, on page 25 should
7 read "11 April" instead of "1 April."
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, you may proceed.
10 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
11 If we can call up again the transcript of the Karadzic case,
12 which is D1361, and if we could turn to page 74 in e-court which should
13 correlate to page 37736 of the underlying transcript.
14 Q. Sir, here, you are talking about the Secretary-General's
15 reservations about the concept of safe areas. And in lines 2 through 21
16 on the page, you outline some of the problems raised by the
17 Secretary-General in more detail. At lines 13 through 14, you say the
18 "UN Security Council in its wisdom did not heed very much to these
19 opinions of the Secretary-General," as to the safe areas.
20 To your knowledge, was there a particular member or members of
21 the Security Council that had views in relation to addressing these
22 problems that were listed here in your answer?
23 A. I do not quite understand your question, Mr. Ivetic.
24 Q. In relation to the problems that are raised here in your
25 testimony that the Secretary-General addressed to the Security Council,
1 do you recall if there was any discussion within the Security Council as
2 to those problems?
3 A. Yes, indeed. There was a prolonged and repeated discussions in
4 the Security Council with the participation of all its members.
5 Q. Okay. And in the end, was there a particular position that
6 prevailed within the Security Council in relation to these problems?
7 A. I'm afraid not.
8 Q. Okay. And you said a little bit before the break that in
9 relation to disarmament, after some initial success the situation
10 deteriorated. Were there any indications that more weapons were being
11 brought into the safe areas after they'd been declared?
12 A. It's difficult to generalise because there was six safe areas and
13 situation differed from one area to another. And in the question which
14 we were discussing just before the recess, it was the -- the most urgent
15 issue was connected with the Gorazde safe area. So it varied from time
16 to time.
17 Q. Okay.
18 MR. IVETIC: And now if we can turn to 1D4661 in e-court, and I
19 have a hard copy of that document as well for the witness.
20 Q. And this is a document that was discussed with you within the
21 Karadzic transcript at pages 37727 through 37729. And you can perhaps
22 see from the copy on the screen and soon in the hard copy that will be
23 given to you that this is dated -- first of all, it's from
24 General de Lapresle to Mr. Annan dated 14 February 1995 with the subject:
25 "Unidentified fixed-wing aircraft flights in Tuzla."
1 MR. IVETIC: And if we could turn to the next page in both the
2 hard copy and in e-court, I propose to discuss ...
3 I see counsel on his feet. I don't know if there's --
4 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Ivetic, just in respect of the hard copy, it may
5 be that you only wish to present this portion of the document. There's
6 just a -- and it's only a tiny portion of the document that appears to me
7 to be missing and it's point 9 and then in the back of that is a map.
8 MR. IVETIC: That's correct. I inadvertently left those off. I
9 just saw that but I'll --
10 JUDGE ORIE: So that you'll provide them now --
11 MR. IVETIC: I can provide them. I will not be asking questions
12 about that section, but if you want the -- in fairness the whole idea of
13 having a hard copy is to give the complete document to the gentleman, so
14 I should provide them.
15 JUDGE ORIE: And could I meanwhile, before Mr. Akashi focuses on
16 the next question, ask one thing.
17 Mr. Akashi, you answered one of the previous questions by saying
18 it's difficult to generalise because there were six safe areas and the
19 situation differed from one area to another. And then you said:
20 "And in the question we were discussing just before the recess,
21 it was the -- the most urgent issue was connected with the Gorazde safe
23 And you said it varied from time to time.
24 I remember that Mr. Ivetic in his question referred to a
25 situation deteriorating as far as demilitarization is concerned. Now
1 what I read from your testimony from before the break, and I'll read that
2 part of your answer. You said:
3 "But I must add that in the case of Srebrenica and Zepa, the
4 delineation and demilitarization at one period or the other, I think an
5 initial period was partly achieved and then somehow they deteriorated."
6 So I wondered whether Mr. Ivetic's question was about that
7 portion of your evidence. It was. And I'm slightly confused that in
8 your answer now you are referring to Gorazde, whereas in that portion of
9 your answer before the break you referred to Srebrenica and Zepa where it
10 deteriorated over time.
11 Could you help me out.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, I think we were paying attention to different
13 periods. I think when I talked about temporary improvements of the
14 situation with regard to Srebrenica and Zepa, Srebrenica safe area was
15 the first of the six to be established, and in the initial period,
16 delineation and disarmament part went rather well in Srebrenica, in
17 particular. This was a local agreement, not of general application to
18 all safe areas. Anyway, the other areas came into existence at a
19 somewhat later period. But in the initial period, there were ups and
20 downs, and there were short periods of some optimism on the local
21 situation, particularly in Srebrenica.
22 But then there was a focus of worldwide attention after the
23 Markale market situation in Sarajevo in February 1994, and the attention
24 shifted to Gorazde in April 1994. And in those areas there were
25 certainly no demarcation of boundaries, nor any substantive disarmament
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for this clarification.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I just -- one follow-up question.
4 You said and the attention shifted to Gorazde and in those areas
5 there were certainly demarcation of boundaries or no demarcation of
6 boundaries? What did you say?
7 THE WITNESS: Here again, difficult to generalise, but there were
8 general difficulties of demarcation, and I think the cases of Sarajevo
9 and Zepa were rather specific and temporary.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: My question was only about what -- the last
11 sentence you said. Because in my view there was a "no" missing in the
12 transcript. I read in the transcript:
13 "... there were certainly demarcation of boundaries, nor" and
14 then it went on. Were there demarcation or no demarcation of boundaries?
15 THE WITNESS: In the majority of the cases, no demarcation.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
18 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
19 Q. Ambassador, if I could draw your attention to item number 7 on
20 the document that we have before us which reads:
21 "We are not yet in a position to comment in detail on these
22 events, but it appears that two clandestine resupplies have taken place.
23 The equipment being delivered is assessed to be of a high value/high
24 technology such as new generation antitank guided missiles or perhaps
25 surface to air missiles. Regardless it is unreasonable to expect that
1 just two aircraft deliveries could provide enough supplies required for
2 the BiH forces, and that more resupply flights are likely. The origin of
3 the cargo aircraft or the jet [sic] is not known."
4 And in relation to this document, if we could look at the
5 transcript for the Karadzic case, D1361, page 65 of the same in e-court
6 and that will be page 37727, lines 10 through 12. You say in relation to
8 "1995. I do not specifically recall an incident in February 1995
9 with regard to Tuzla airport. The incidents at or around Tuzla were very
11 And I wanted to, first of all, ask you: Does your answer about
12 incidents being very frequent relate to incidents of the type that we
13 just looked at or in general?
14 A. Could you repeat your question.
15 Q. Yes. In relation to here where you say, "The incidents at or
16 around Tuzla were very frequent," when talking about incidents are you
17 only talking about the type that we just looked at and which was then
18 shown to you in this same transcript, dated from February 1995? What is
19 it that you're talking about when you say "incidents"? That's basically
20 the question.
21 A. Throughout the two years, 1994 to 1995, particularly in 1994, the
22 question of the opening of the Tuzla airport for the freedom of movement,
23 particularly to facilitate movement of humanitarian goods, was very much
24 on my agenda. But I -- I think this report you mentioned stemmed from
25 one incident which occurred in February 1995, and I do not have specific
1 recollection of that incident. I think it was dealt with at the military
2 level rather than at the political, diplomatic level.
3 Q. Okay.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
5 Mr. Mladic, apart from speaking aloud a minute ago, would you
6 please draw your attention to what happens here in the court rather than
7 to communicate in a way, as you know, you're not allowed with the public
8 gallery. So if you turn a little bit, then it will be better visible for
9 us that you're focusing on what happens here rather than to deal with
10 other matters. I invited you to slightly turn, Mr. Mladic, away from the
11 public gallery.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. IVETIC:
14 Q. Ambassador, in February of 1995, were there any --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, the first thing you now do is again turn
16 to the public gallery which I just told you not to do. This is the last
18 Please proceed.
19 MR. IVETIC:
20 Q. In February 1995, were there restrictions in place on the use of
21 the air-space over Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is, the operation of aircraft
22 by the warring parties? Do you recall?
23 Ambassador, do you recall if there any restrictions on the use of
24 aircraft in the air-space above Bosnia in February of 1995?
25 A. I -- I remember there was general restriction.
1 Q. And do you recall if during this period there were any
2 restrictions in place in regard to providing weapons to any of the
3 warring parties?
4 A. Yes.
5 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, we would tender 1D4661 as a Defence
6 exhibit at this time.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D1363, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: D1363 is admitted.
10 MR. IVETIC: Thank you. Next I'd like to look at page 25 of the
11 transcript in e-court, which will be 37687 of the underlying transcript.
12 Q. And at lines 17 through 25, and it goes onto the next page, you
13 talk about the expert committee that was established to investigate the
14 first Markale market shelling. And here you say, at line 21 and onward,
15 that two members each were picked from countries friendly to each of the
17 Do you recall the way this alignment worked, who was considered
18 to be members of the commission that would be from countries that were
19 friendly towards either of the sides?
20 A. I think this committee consisted of five members, and two of them
21 came from countries with some favourable attitude towards Bosnian Serb
22 party and two others from Islamic countries. And the fifth member who
23 served as the chairman was from Canada, which in my opinion was
24 considered neutral and impartial.
25 Q. Okay. And if we could turn to page 26 in e-court, which is the
1 very next page of the transcript, in the continuation of your testimony
2 about this committee, you talk of the conclusion reached by the experts,
3 which you accepted fully, was the attack could have come from either
5 Did you have faith in these experts and the conclusion that they
7 A. So far as, yeah, they were able to reach their conclusions, I
8 think this is expert view. And -- but that was a rather general
9 conclusion in character under the circumstances because there was only
10 one mortar bomb, and the crater created by the result of the bombing was
11 not very precise due to the fact that the bomb fell not directly on the
12 ground but it encountered some object in the market on the way to finding
13 its place on the ground. So it was not extremely precise or conclusive.
14 And the general conclusion reached by the expert committee was that in
15 view of the general angle and the estimated distance between the Markale
16 market and the place where the mortar was issued, there were in the
17 general areas partly occupied by the Bosnian Serb party and partly
18 occupied by the Bosnian government side, so their conclusion was that the
19 mortar could have come from either one of the two parties.
20 This is quite contrary to the press reports which had appeared in
21 the "New York Times" and others that it came from one party or another.
22 But you know, under the circumstances, we have to rely on the expert
23 opinion however inconclusive it might be.
24 Q. Okay. And if we could next turn to page 31 --
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may just ask a question.
1 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: These experts who constituted this five-member
3 committee, were they experts in mortar investigations or ...
4 THE WITNESS: Sir, they were experts in ballistics.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Ballistics. Thank you so much.
6 THE WITNESS: Welcome.
7 MR. IVETIC: If we could now turn page 31 of this same
8 transcript, which should correlate to page 37693 of the underlying
9 Karadzic transcript.
10 Q. Here, on lines 16 and onward, you were asked about the weapons
11 exclusion zone in Sarajevo and weapon collection points. And here, from
12 line 21 onwards to 25, you say that UNPROFOR would have an intermediary
13 presence between the opposing forces.
14 Did the intermediary presence of UNPROFOR, was that allowed in
15 every instance; that is to say, did it work as planned? Did the parties
16 permit the intermediary presence of UNPROFOR in every instance?
17 A. So far as I recollect, yes.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, no speaking aloud.
19 MR. IVETIC: I'm told that the Serbian translation stopped.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If that's the case that will be repaired.
21 Let's wait for a second. By the way, whispering to Mr. Stojanovic's ears
22 would do the same instead of speaking aloud. But could you confirm,
23 Mr. Stojanovic, that the B/C/S translation is now accurate again.
24 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I confirm
25 that we hear now this B/C/S translation, but we did not hear either the
1 previous question or the previous answer. That's what the General was
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then -- what's your suggestion, we could
4 re-read it, which may be the best. Mr. Stojanovic, if you could assist
5 in telling us from where -- is it from: "Here, on lines 16 and onward"?
6 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it's from the
7 question asked by Mr. Ivetic and I believe it is from line 17 on page 34.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Well, in 17 Mr. Ivetic says that he has been told
9 that the Serbian translation stopped so ...
10 MR. IVETIC: I think it must be --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Is it line 8? Mr. Ivetic.
12 MR. IVETIC: It must be. I don't have any means of verifying, of
13 course, since I was listening to the English.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Let's -- I'll read, then, from line 8.
15 The question was:
16 "Here, on lines 16 and onwards, you were asked about the
17 weapons," I take it, "exclusion zone in Sarajevo and weapon collection
18 points. And here, from line 21 onwards to 25, you say that UNPROFOR
19 would have an intermediary presence between the opposing forces.
20 Did the intermediary presence of UNPROFOR, was that allowed in
21 every instance; that is to say, did it work as planned?" And then I take
22 it, "did the parties permit the intermediary presence of UNPROFOR in
23 every instance?"
24 And the answer given then by the witness was:
25 "So far as I recollect, yes."
1 Does that complete, Mr. Stojanovic, the lacking translation? If
2 so, we'll proceed.
3 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it does, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
5 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
6 MR. IVETIC: Then if we could turn the page to the next page of
7 the Karadzic transcript, which will then be 37694 of the underlying
8 Karadzic transcript, and in this section at line 19 and onwards at the
9 bottom of the page, you were discussing a document identified as a
10 protocol that talked about the right to self-defence and the -- in the
11 event of withdrawal of the interposition of UNPROFOR from the
12 interposition area or if UNPROFOR is not able to prevent or stop attacks.
13 I wish to look at that document with you and that is D112 in the Mladic
14 case, and I do have a hard copy of that as well. Hopefully.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, could you ...
16 MR. IVETIC:
17 Q. While we wait for that hard copy, you can see on the screen that
18 this is dated 16 August 1994. And it's from yourself to Mr. Annan and
19 others in New York and it's entitled: "Weapon collection points."
20 And in relation to the same, if we look at item number 2, it
22 "The recent fighting around Visoko-Olovo-Kladanj could pose a
23 complex and dangerous situation whereby a BiH offensive seriously
24 threatens the BSA forces in that area, which is in very close proximity
25 to the northern edge of the Sarajevo EZ. BiH action may be in the form
1 of a provocation or a real desire for tactical gain. Should the BiH move
2 heavy weapons into the zone, this would put them in clear violation of
3 the EZ. In recent days, the BiH have also fired weapons already within
4 the zone. BiH activity has already prompted the BSA to seek to withdraw
5 their heavy weapons from the WCPs."
6 And if we could turn the page and look at, first, items 3 and 5,
7 3 talks of "the protocol to the Sarajevo WCP agreement of
8 14 February 1994 (attached) recognises the BSA's legitimate right of
9 self-defence. If the BSA comes under more pressure from the BiH, their
10 demand to have access to their weapons could become a more pressing
11 reality under the protocol referred to above. There are several
12 scenarios that could prevail, and the staff at BH command and UNPROFOR HQ
13 are examining these."
14 And in item 5:
15 "This problem is now being examined in detail. It raises many
16 questions including the numbers and types of weapons that the BSA might
17 justifiably be allowed to use under various scenarios; and the reactions
18 of NATO, the media, and the international community should commander BH C
19 authorise release of an appropriate number of weapons. In the interim,
20 however, we would very much appreciate your early initial views on this
21 very difficult and potentially pressing problem."
22 The first question I want to ask is: Here you reference a
23 protocol to the weapons collection agreement that is attached to this
24 document. Do you recall if you were present at the time the weapons
25 collection agreement was negotiated and this protocol was discussed?
1 A. I was present in Sarajevo at the initiation period of negotiation
2 between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serb party. After I saw
3 that there was a distinct possibility of meeting of minds eventually on
4 this issue, I departed from Sarajevo to meet with president of the
5 Yugoslav republic in Belgrade and saw the -- all the details of the
6 agreement between the two parties about Sarajevo had been put into
7 detailed points only after my departure and the actual negotiation on the
8 part of UNPROFOR was General David Rose, commander of our Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina sector, but under the supervision of General de Lapresle from
10 our headquarters in Zagreb.
11 Q. Okay. And at the time that this cable that we have in front of
12 us was drafted and sent, was the release of weapons to the Serbs from
13 weapon collection points seriously being considered to allow the Serbs to
14 defend against these BiH attacks?
15 A. I think from the Bosnian Serb viewpoint, all -- they had to
16 prepare for all possible situations. I'm not sure whether, you know, it
17 is possible to consider and put all the details in agreement of this
18 kind, but I can understand why two parties may want to prepare themselves
19 for all eventualities. But our concern was how to breach the differences
20 between the two parties. Of course, from the Bosnian Serb viewpoint, the
21 more weapons collection points there are, the better. And from Bosnian
22 government side, the fewer these weapon collection points, the better.
23 Because it will be easier to defend those points if there are only very
24 few in number and it would facilitate monitoring and control of weapons
25 collection points if they were fewer. But we had to eventually agree on
1 the midway points to meet the two parties' concerns halfway.
2 Q. And if we turn briefly to page -- I believe it's 4 of this
3 document, we can look at the actual -- yes, it is. And we see before us
4 a typed document which has at the top the fax header line that another
5 witness identified as BH command forward command which was the UNPROFOR
6 forward command in Sarajevo. And this is entitled: "Protocol of
7 understanding between the civilian/military representatives of the
8 Republika Srpska and UNPROFOR."
9 Do you happen to know who drafted this document? Do you have any
10 information as to that?
11 A. I think General Michael Rose had a major hand on the UNPROFOR
13 Q. Okay. And at the time that you wrote this cable and forwarded
14 this protocol, did you believe that this protocol reflected what had been
15 agreed to with the Serb side in relation to weapon collection points?
16 A. I certainly hope so.
17 Q. And now if we can look at P631, and again I have a hard copy for
18 your convenience.
19 MR. IVETIC: And it would assist, the usher's assistance, and --
20 JUDGE ORIE: For the -- if I just can interrupt you for a second.
21 In the previous document we were talking about the NAC decision. NAC was
22 an acronym for what? The parties have no disagreement on that? It came
23 up a few times in court, both in the initial appearance -- Mr. Tieger,
24 NAC, any idea? What your understanding is of NAC acronym.
25 If the witness could tell us what NAC stands for. It's in the
1 previous document. We don't have to stop now, but if the parties could
2 just consider whether there's any agreement on what NA --
3 MR. IVETIC: I can propose the Defence's view and see if that
4 assists. I think it would mean the North Atlantic Council, a reference
5 to a body that oversaw NATO. But I, unfortunately, don't have a copy of
6 that document in front of me to be able to see the context of where it
7 was used. I do know it is in a document but I can't remember precisely
8 the formulation of how that was ...
9 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Mr. President, I just remember an earlier
10 discussion during which the meaning of an acronym was resolved on the
11 basis of an explicit reference in the document. I don't recall if this
12 was the same -- okay. So presumably -- we'll take a look at whether
13 surrounding documentation sheds direct light on the meaning or whether
14 we're otherwise in a position to come to agreement on precisely what the
15 acronym means.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 Mr. Akashi, if you could help us out to tell us what NAC stands
18 for as an acronym in the previous document we looked at?
19 THE WITNESS: I'm afraid, Excellency, I'm unable to help in this
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you so much for at least --
22 THE WITNESS: I think our military colleagues like to indulge in
23 a lot of acronyms.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes, it seems to be very popular in ...
25 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
2 Q. Now, Ambassador, we have this document before us which is dated,
3 I believe, 12th September 1994, again from you, going to several
4 individuals in New York, again on weapon collection points. And the
5 first page of this document appears to say that the protocol we just
6 looked at was determined to be unsigned and invalid and it attaches the
7 opinion of a legal advisor who I think -- from the next page his name
8 might be Stefan Katz [phoen], but I don't know -- do you know if there
9 was any legal advisor present for the negotiations with the Bosnian Serb
10 side as to weapon collection points on the part of the UN?
11 A. We had our legal advisor at UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb,
12 certainly. But negotiation in this particular case was conducted in
13 Sarajevo and in the case of Bosnian Serbs probably at Pale, and I don't
14 think we had legal advisor as such, but there was a head of civil affairs
15 which was Mr. Sergio De Mello.
16 Q. Okay. I just waiting for the transcript to catch up with us.
17 And during this time-period, that is, September 1994, when this
18 second cable was written, were there any discussions relating to the
19 potential use of air power against the Serb side, if you recall?
20 A. I do not offhand recall.
21 Q. Okay.
22 MR. IVETIC: Let's me see if we can look at D116 in e-court,
23 and -- oh, I do have a hard copy of that as well which I can provide to
24 the usher.
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 MR. IVETIC:
2 Q. And while we wait for the hard copy to reach you, from the
3 version on the screen we can see that this is from General de Lapresle to
4 Mr. Annan and Mr. Stoltenberg, dated 19 September 1994, with the subject
5 of: "Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone violation - 18 September."
6 And if I can summarise portions of the same to ask a question.
7 Here in part 1, we see the second sentence that says:
8 "The BiH and BSA exchanged approximately 300 mortar rounds and
9 6.000 small-arm rounds. The attack was initiated by the BiH armija and
10 was supported by mortars firing from residential areas within the city
12 And then it gives precise information as to parts from where they
13 fired and where they fired upon. And then the bottom two lines -- two
14 sentences, I should say, read:
15 "These initial attacks were followed by a restrained BSA response
16 using heavy weapons. Between 1807 and 1838 hours, the BSA retaliated
17 from Poljine WCP (BP 910645) with 12 120-millimetre mortar rounds. The
18 BSA mined access to the base plate to prevent FreBat 5 from" - and if we
19 can go to the next page - "interfering. The BSA responded, targeting the
20 Zetra stadium, the Presidency, the north area of the cathedral, and
21 Sedrenik. The commander BHC called on both sides to immediately cease
22 all military actions or he would be obliged to take all appropriate
23 measures to protect the civilian population of Sarajevo including
24 air-strikes. He also warned the BSA not to withdraw weapons from the
25 weapon collection points. Copies of the commander's letters are
2 And the first question I have for you is: Do you recall if
3 air-strikes were ever sought or requested against the Bosnian government
4 side for their violation of the weapons exclusion zone?
5 A. I do not recall the instances of the kind you mentioned,
6 Mr. Ivetic. But despite my clear instructions to differentiate
7 air-strikes as distinct from close-air support, I'm afraid that some --
8 some of our military leaders rather used these two terms without
10 But at my level, at least, I always kept the differences in mind.
11 Close-air support was an act of -- clearly an act of self-defence with
12 very clear restraint. The NATO was asked to attack only the object which
13 was in the process of hostile action with a view to killing UNPROFOR
14 personnel or the weapons which they were using as self-defence means.
15 While air-strike was a more political act in which we tried to send a
16 message of restraint to either of the two parties, not to worsen the
17 general situation which may hinder our objectives for humanitarian
18 assistance or for general stabilisation of the situation.
19 So that may not be my precise answer, but that's, I understood,
20 as to what was an air-strike and what was CAS, close-air support action.
21 But as I said, this distinction was not always kept in mind by the
22 military people. But it was very important thing for us in order not to
23 confuse or give unnecessary apprehensions particularly to the Bosnian
24 Serb party but also to -- as a message to the Bosnian government side as
1 Q. And if we look at item 2 on this document, we see that the
2 author, General de Lapresle says:
3 "The key facts are that the military action taken by both sides
4 contravened UN S.C.R. 836, breached the 9 February 1994 airport
5 agreement, and violated the 20-kilometre TEZ. The BiH initiated the
6 attack and the BSA response was both defensive and restrained. The BSA
7 did not withdraw weapons from the WCPs."
8 Now, this is dated approximately -- the incident is six days
9 after the memo we just looked at, the cable we just looked at which said
10 that the protocol had not been signed and therefore has no legal
11 standing. Did anyone inform the Serb side prior to this incident that
12 the protocol we previously looked at was no longer considered valid by
13 the UN?
14 A. Is that a question addressed to me?
15 Q. Yes, yes.
16 A. I do not have a specific answer to your point.
17 Q. That's fair enough. And --
18 MR. IVETIC: Oh, Your Honours, I see we're about one minute away
19 from the break point.
20 JUDGE ORIE: We are. If you want to touch upon a new --
21 MR. IVETIC: Well, I do. But I'm going to another document, so
22 we might actually eclipse the one minute rather quickly.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then take that -- use that one minute.
24 MR. IVETIC: Okay. If we could look at 1D4654.
25 Q. This is a rather lengthy document but one that you're well
1 familiar with, sir. It is a book entitled: "In the Valley Between War
2 and Peace," and it lists you -- I apologise the copy in e-court has a
3 poor reproduction of the cover page so we can't see it. It's all black.
4 But the first question I have for you: Is this book entirely authored by
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Okay.
8 MR. IVETIC: And then if we can turn to page 27 in e-court, it
9 should correspond to pages 46 through 47 in the actual document, or the
10 underlying book, I should say. It looks like we need the prior page in
12 Q. And beginning on the bottom of the -- of page 46, you are talking
13 about a situation where you say:
14 "During the joint press conference after our discussion,
15 Admiral Boorda and myself clearly stated that if NATO forces use air
16 power in the Sarajevo region upon UN request, it will be used impartially
17 against all the violators of cease-fire. This attitude, to maintain
18 impartiality with regard to all three parties to the conflict (Serbs,
19 Croats and Muslims), was in clear contrast to the subsequent NATO council
20 decisions which targeted only Bosnian Serb forces as an enemy. The
21 hard-headed and pragmatic approach of Admiral Boorda to air attack by
22 NATO forces appeared to be in sharp contradiction to the approach
23 advocated by the high leadership of the US administration, including
24 President Bill Clinton."
25 First of all, could you tell us who Admiral Boorda was? What was
1 his function?
2 A. He was the Force Commander of NATO southern command headquartered
3 in Naples, Italy.
4 Q. Okay.
5 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, I see we've eclipsed the break time by
6 approximately one minute.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we did.
8 Mr. Akashi, we take a break again. We would like to see you back
9 in 20 minutes. I again invite you to follow the usher.
10 It's a little bit more than one minute, Mr. Ivetic. Therefore,
11 we'll resume at 20 minutes past midday.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 JUDGE ORIE: I announced already the time at which we will
15 --- Recess taken at 11.59 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.21 p.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Can the witness be escorted in the courtroom -- or
18 is there one preliminary matter, Mr. Tieger?
19 MR. TIEGER: There is, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE ORIE: How much time would it take?
21 MR. TIEGER: I have two -- actually two. The first takes
22 15 seconds and the second takes a couple of minutes perhaps.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we wait for the witness to be escorted
24 in the courtroom.
25 Please proceed.
1 MR. TIEGER: The first one is quite simple and concerns the
2 Court's inquiry about the acronym NAC. We agree with Mr. Ivetic that it
3 refers to the North Atlantic Council.
4 The second, Mr. President, is that the Court asked us to respond
5 by today's date with respect to excerpts concerning the "Islamic
6 Declaration," and I -- although sometimes we wait until end of the day to
7 deal with those matters, I thought it was probably best to deal with it
8 now so it didn't escape our attention.
9 First of all, I wanted to clear up one quick -- or quickly clear
10 up one apparent misconception about the tendering of the document,
11 whether in its entirety or excerpts, and that is that somehow the
12 impression, I think, was left that it was the Prosecution which was the
13 moving force behind tendering the entirety of the document. That's not
14 the case. We have never considered it to play a particularly significant
15 role in this case. However, when it was proposed to us by the Defence
16 that they tender the entirety of the document, we had no objection to
17 that. Particularly in light of the various assertions reflecting the
18 nature of the document, we considered that it would be fine if the Court
19 could see the entirety and make its own assessment of what it was about.
20 However, in light of the Court's preference and request, we have
21 identified certain excerpts that go to both directly contextual issues
22 that -- it is our submission that certain sentences or small portions
23 have been misleadingly lifted from a larger paragraph or passage and also
24 some selections that perhaps more broadly illustrate the tenor or nature
25 of the document in the way that might be the case if the Court had the
2 That said, we're also asking if it's not perhaps a -- at this
3 point a bit more prudent and efficient to defer tendering of any further
4 excerpts for the following reasons: Number one, there's at least one
5 additional witness who we know raises the issue of the "Islamic
6 Declaration." Number two, we've identified at least some discrepancies
7 between the identified portions by the Defence and those that were
8 referred to in court. And number 3, there still seems to be a
9 translation in English issue that would benefit from some discussion.
10 So if the Court agree with that, we'd asked that you defer it.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we usually prefer to have already in evidence
12 and then later perhaps replace new excerpts by the old ones. But perhaps
13 here where there are a few other matters as well, especially that we are
14 not yet at a point where we have, I would say, a clean English version,
15 that means just a translation of what the B/C/S presents, under those
16 circumstances -- and I see Mr. Stojanovic is not opposed to it, to -- to
17 wait for a while, but not forget about it. That excerpts still are
18 sought to be admitted and that we know later which excerpts.
19 MR. TIEGER: Understood, Mr. President. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Then could the witness be escorted into the
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I think you're a little bit over one
24 hour and a half by now, so may I take it that you will conclude in the
25 next session of one hour.
1 MR. IVETIC: Yes, sooner than the end of the last -- this
3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
4 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
5 Q. Your Excellency, we just looked at a part of your book where you
6 contrasted Admiral Boorda's approach with that advocated by the high
7 leadership of the US, including President Bill Clinton. What was your
8 understanding of the approach advocated by the American leadership and
9 Mr. -- President Clinton?
10 A. I'd rather prefer not to comment on the highest political
11 leadership of any -- any country.
12 Q. Can you help us at least to identify in relation to -- in
13 relation to Admiral Boorda's position, was it complementary or contrary
14 to the position of the UN?
15 A. Here again I do not want to indulge in any speculation. But from
16 my acquaintance with Admiral Boorda, I had highest the regard and very
17 deep respect with regard to Admiral Boorda as a person, as an admiral,
18 and he had a very astute understanding of human nature and nature of
19 conflicts. So he was not just a soldier, but I thought he was a good
21 Q. Okay. If we could turn to the next page in e-court, which should
22 contain pages 48 and 49 of your book, I would propose to discuss with --
23 the last paragraph on page 48 which continues onto page 49, and it starts
24 off: "On the same day ..." And I believe in reference to the prior
25 paragraph it looks like we're talking about February 18. And you say
2 "On the same day, I met with Karadzic in Pale where the
3 headquarters of Bosnian Serb forces was situated, and also held
4 discussions in Sarajevo with President Izetbegovic. In the meeting with
5 Karadzic, we had to answer his questions on the definition and kinds of
6 heavy weapons to be removed from the 20-kilometre exclusion zone. We
7 also had to respond to the question: If Bosnian Serb forces were
8 attacked by Bosnian government forces, would they be able to retrieve the
9 weapons of the Serb side which had been placed under the control of the
10 United Nations? On the number of collection sites, there was clear
11 discrepancy between Karadzic, who wanted a maximum number for easy
12 access, and the UN side, which desired a minimum number because of its
13 troop limitation. However, we somehow managed to come to a mutually
14 acceptable compromise."
15 The first question I would ask is if this section accurately
16 reflects the negotiations that were undertaken and the result.
17 A. I hope so.
18 Q. And where you say here that Karadzic wanted a maximum number of
19 sites for easy access, was this in relation to retrieving weapons if
20 attacked or something else?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And if we can turn to page 30 in e-court, which should correspond
23 to pages 52 and 53 of your book -- I see again I'm one page off. If we
24 could go to page 29 in e-court, that should now correlate to those pages.
25 And again here at the bottom of the first page, the
1 second-to-last paragraph reads as follows and it will bleed onto the top
2 the next page, page 53:
3 "On July 22nd, I talked with US Secretary of Defence William
4 Perry who came to visit Zagreb. From his calm attitude and his readiness
5 to listen to me, I had the impression that he was a sincere man. In our
6 joint press conference after the meeting, he said that there was a
7 meeting of minds between us on the use of force between NATO and UN
8 sides, and it was agreed with the UN side that use of force should be
9 robust but should be carried out prudently.
10 "But I was startled to find out that in the statement of Defence
11 Secretary Perry on his return to the United States, the phrase
12 'prudently' had been omitted and stress was put on taking robust measures
13 against the Bosnian Serb forces. It was clear from the statement of
14 President Bill Clinton himself that his posture was that there should be
15 a clear distinction between good and evil, and that the good side, that
16 is the Bosnian government, should be supported, and that the Bosnian Serb
17 forces should be labelled as evil."
18 The first question I want to ask you is: Apart from this
19 instance, do you recall if there were any other instances when the
20 agreed-to text was deviated - when I say "agreed to," between NATO and
21 another party - was deviated from in subsequent announcements or ...
22 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, just -- yeah, so there's no -- so the answer
23 is clear and the question doesn't inadvertently expand it and I don't
24 want to -- I would just suggest that the passage upon which this relies
25 insofar as I read it doesn't necessarily -- doesn't refer to a specific
1 text. It refers to some kind of consensus between the two people
2 involved. So to -- so we've got an apples and oranges situation where
3 this is now, I think, being incorrectly characterised as agreement on a
4 specific text and now the witness is being asked to answer as if that
5 were the case.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, does this cause you to rephrase your
8 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then I'll wait for that. Please proceed.
10 MR. IVETIC:
11 Q. Do you recall if there were other situations where language
12 agreed to between the UN and another party was then presented differently
13 or deviated from in subsequent pronouncements?
14 A. From my limited experience of negotiations, these things have
15 happened and do happen with -- yeah, with some frequency. So I think we
16 should not generalise from specific instances.
17 Q. And in a general sense, do you stand behind what you have written
18 in your book in this particular section?
19 A. Yes. But my -- those passages should not be quoted out of
20 context. I hope.
21 MR. IVETIC: I will be glad to ... I guess, Your Honour, I would
22 then perhaps take those chapters and extract them from the book and
23 tender that as a reduced document, just the chapters in their entirety
24 that these selections were taken from, to address --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's a bit difficult for the Chamber at this
1 moment to say: Do it this way or that way. I mean, context should be
2 there. Whether that always requires the whole of a chapter, I do not
3 know because I haven't read the book or the booklet as you called it, I
4 think, in the Karadzic case.
5 So therefore, I would invite, first of all, the parties to seek
6 an agreement on what is such context that it would not mislead the
7 Chamber in any way. And if do you not agree, well, then finally our
8 problem is that we'd have to look at the whole book to see whether the
9 excerpt is adequate. But could the parties first focus on it and try to
10 resolve the matter.
11 MR. IVETIC: Yes, we can. At least --
12 JUDGE ORIE: And we'll -- the parties were the first, Mr. Akashi
13 to take care that you're not quoted out of context. At the same time, as
14 you may understand, this Chamber is not seeking to have large documents,
15 even where contextualisation seems not to be necessary, to have that in
17 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I appreciate your judgement, which is
18 very, very prudent, yeah.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
20 MR. IVETIC:
21 Q. Your Excellency, I have no further questions for you at this
22 time. I thank you for your indulgence.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Akashi, you will now be cross-examined by
24 Mr. Tieger. Mr. Tieger is counsel for the Prosecution. You will find
25 him not yet standing but now standing to your right.
1 Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
4 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Ambassador.
5 A. Mr. Tieger, good afternoon.
6 Q. Mr. Ambassador, you were asked during your examination-in-chief
7 in the Karadzic case about whose interests it was to prolong the war
8 longer than was inevitable or necessary. And I think there was some
9 references to that today as well, and you were even directed to a portion
10 of your book in respect of that question.
11 A. A booklet, I prefer.
12 Q. That's -- that's modest of you, and I will comply with your
14 In that connection, may I direct your attention to a meeting you
15 had with Mr. Izetbegovic on the 2nd of February, 1994.
16 MR. TIEGER: And that's 65 ter 09621. If the Registrar could
17 call that up, please. Sorry, that seems to be the wrong document.
18 Sorry, Mr. Registrar, that would be correct.
19 Q. Now, if we look at this meeting held on the 2nd of February,
20 Mr. Ambassador, looking at pages 1 and then going on to page 2 of the
21 e-court, and on page 2 of the B/C/S, we can see a reflection of
22 Mr. Izetbegovic's expression of distrust in the Geneva process. And he's
23 recorded as stating:
24 "The BiH government had to accept unwillingly the partition of
25 the country based on ethnic division due to the pressure from the
1 international community which had imposed the arms embargo without any
2 recourse to the principles recognised by international law."
3 And he went on to say that the Serb ethnic cleansing was not
4 punished but rewarded, and continued that:
5 "If the international community wants to create a Serb republic
6 in Bosnia, they can do so only with the Serb municipalities, but the
7 Serbs took 15 of our municipalities by force."
8 I wanted to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, whether it was correct that
9 the Bosnian government's attitude toward a permanent cease-fire reflected
10 its concerns that that would cement or make permanent the results of
11 ethnic cleansing?
12 A. I think certainly, as you said, the concern and the preoccupation
13 of the Bosnian government is that the acceptance of certain geographical
14 delineation might lead to more permanent division of the country of
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina. I remember Dr. Karadzic quoting from
16 Robert Frost that somehow fences make or contribute to making good
17 neighbours, so that was a general reflection of his philosophy that we
18 have to recognise ethnic divisions. But in the circumstances in which
19 there was much mingling of different ethnic or cultural groups, as in the
20 case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think it was some kind of physical,
21 artificial attempt to create more divisions than necessary in a
22 multi-ethnic country and society.
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
24 MR. TIEGER: I'd tender that document, 09621.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P7691, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. And, Mr. Ambassador, if I could ask you about one more related
5 document or document related to the same issue.
6 MR. TIEGER: If I could call up 65 ter 11148, please.
7 Q. Mr. Ambassador, this is a document stemming from an earlier
8 period. It's a transcript of a portion of a tape of the 124th Bosnian
9 Presidency Session held on the 20th of June, 1992. And on page 1 of the
10 English, we -- and I think it's page 24 hard copy of the B/C/S, we can
11 see General Halilovic discussing recent events in Bihac, noting that some
12 kind of agreement reached on exchange and resettlement and urging the
13 Presidency to take a stand, stating "because we're playing directly into
14 the hands of those whose intention it is to create some ethnic
15 territories, to move the population, and to create clean national units."
16 And he continues on to describe a situation where people were
17 given two to three hours to pack their personal belongings and leave.
18 And then if we turn the page, going to page 3 in English --
19 MR. IVETIC: Can we have the B/C/S corresponding because it does
20 not match what's on the screen.
21 MR. TIEGER: I don't know how that anomaly occurred because ...
22 [Prosecution counsel confer]
23 MR. TIEGER: Okay. That would be -- I have this, according to
24 Ms. Stewart, as page 26 in the B/C/S. I think the apparent discrepancy
25 arises from the fact that the English pages are more limited than the
1 B/C/S for some reason.
2 Q. So now I'm on page 3 where Mr. Izetbegovic, I think under the
3 heading "president," turns to the question that Halil asks --
4 MR. TIEGER: Ms. Stewart tells me it's 28 in B/C/S I'm sorry.
5 Q. He notes that:
6 The situation in Banja Luka is similar. They are threatened with
7 destruction and told you can either move out and then we'll do an
9 He continued:
10 We can choose between either accepting this or not accepting
11 this. If we don't accept it, then these people really can get hurt. If
12 we accept it, we're legalising ethnic division, that is the alteration of
13 the demographic picture of Bosnia, the creation of ethnically clean
14 territories, like some precondition for the creation of some kind of
15 Serbian state in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 And on the next page, and I think on it's -- next page in
17 English, please, and the same page in B/C/S, page 28, Mr. Izetbegovic
19 "Can we have peace at that price? No, we can't. Even if that
20 were to happen, regarding all these agreements, I think they later simply
21 point their cannons and kill all those people. Wherever they surrendered
22 their weapons, et cetera, they ended up getting hurt."
23 Mr. Ambassador, would this passage from a meeting in June of 1992
24 reflect another expression of the same concerns by the Bosnian leadership
25 about the demographic impact and purpose of ethnic cleansing?
1 A. I should think so. And I can well appreciate the overriding
2 concern about the so-called clear delineation along ethnic line of --
3 over a larger political entity, yeah.
4 Q. Thank, you, sir.
5 MR. TIEGER: I'd tender 65 ter 11148.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
7 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, should the B/C/S be the full version
8 that's longer than the English or should it correspond to what's in
9 English --
10 MR. TIEGER: I certainly agree they should correspond. If
11 there's a -- I'm not quite sure how that happened, but I think
12 Mr. Ivetic's point is correct.
13 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please.
14 Mr. Ivetic, you want to have the same excerpts in B/C/S as in
15 English, only portions are translated --
16 MR. IVETIC: Yes, my -- well, my understanding is that the B/C/S
17 is some 26 pages and the English is some five pages, so we have a lot
18 that is not translated. If it is being entered into evidence, I
19 thought --
20 JUDGE ORIE: I would suggest the following, that Mr. Tieger makes
21 an excerpt from the B/C/S version which corresponds with the English one.
22 And if you want to add any portion, that you address Mr. Tieger so that
23 he can include that in the new -- to be uploaded version, the same in
24 both languages.
25 MR. IVETIC: That would be perfectly acceptable.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Registrar, let's reserve a number at this
2 moment, because it's certainly not this document in its entirety. Or
3 perhaps we could already do the English which is apparently the
5 Mr. Registrar, number would be?
6 THE REGISTRAR: P7692, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: P7692 is admitted into evidence, but the B/C/S
8 version should again be uploaded and now in full accordance with the
9 English translation.
10 Please proceed.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. In connection with the questions raised during your
13 examination-in-chief in the Karadzic case about the Muslims' alleged lack
14 of interest in peace, you were also asked by Dr. Karadzic whether you
15 remembered that "we," that is, the Bosnian Serb side, "have been ready to
16 give up territory for peace, that we did not claim to keep all the
17 territory that we controlled." And that's found at page 56 of D1361, the
19 In that connection, that is, the -- this issue of peace and
20 giving up territory, may I first show you another document and then I
21 will ask you further about that.
22 MR. TIEGER: Can we call up, please, 65 ter 02393, e-court
23 page 41 and B/C/S page 38. That's the 40th Session of the Bosnian Serb
25 There we see Dr. Karadzic speaking to the members of the assembly
1 and noting toward the bottom quarter of the page:
2 "I guarantee that everything that extends the war is an attempt
3 by the West to enable Muslims to bring territories back in order not to
4 beg Serbs. But now the entire international community has to beg Serbs
5 to give some territories back. So, we have to prepare ourselves to lose
6 as little -- as less as possible in a firm, responsible, and statesman
7 manner. But that we get the main part," and then he goes on.
8 We also see above that, just above, Dr. Karadzic referring to
9 some of the discussions and saying:
10 "We did not say then how much of a percentage nor did we outline
11 the borders but said we wanted to separate and strategic goals would
12 be" --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. --
14 MR. TIEGER: Too fast.
15 "... and strategic goals would be territorial connection with the
16 Drina river, Neretva river, sea, Sarajevo, Sava river, Una river,
17 et cetera."
18 And then we turn the page in English to page 42, still on the
19 same page in B/C/S. Dr. Karadzic points out in respect of giving
20 territory up, we -- for example, at the -- about the seventh or sixth
21 line down:
22 "We also cannot give that much at Nevesinje, we cannot give
23 Srbobran, we cannot give town of Kupres. We are not willing to give
24 right bank in Jajce ..."
25 And then he continues just toward the bottom of that paragraph:
1 "We have to keep strategic directions and quality of the
2 country," and then just two lines down, another example of what can't be
3 given up, "we have to keep Sarajevo."
4 Q. Now, did Dr. Karadzic make -- tell you, as he explained in this
5 passage of his speech to the Bosnian Serb Assembly, that it was his
6 intention to give back as little as possible and only certain parts that
7 did not conflict with the Bosnian Serb strategic objectives or other
9 A. Dr. Karadzic, with whom I had a lot of discussions on different
10 occasions, conveyed to me the -- his principal concern is like what you
11 quoted from him, from the Serb National Assembly. As you know, at one
12 stage in the conflict, the Bosnian Serbs had at the maximum occasion
13 about 70 per cent of the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but
14 in the end, the Bosnian Serb party at Dayton accepted the division of the
15 country, about 49 per cent for themselves and 51 per cent to the Bosnian
16 government side.
17 So depending on at which stage of the conflict you consider the
18 division as rational and acceptable would very much depend on the
19 perspectives of two parties, or three parties, as -- as you may choose
20 from, and I think the efforts -- a great deal of efforts were paid by
21 UN and UN-associated mediators to take into account the principal
22 concerns of the parties with as little as possible by way of exchange of
23 territories. But I think this was a very difficult exercise and as I
24 discussed the matter with people like Lord Owen, Stoltenberg and others,
25 I think mediators made honest efforts to meet as many principal concerns
1 as possible of the parties in the conflict, but this -- perhaps a perfect
2 solution is the enemy of a good, reasonable solution, and I think that
3 was the principal conclusions of the Dayton agreement.
4 MR. TIEGER: I tender those pages from the 40th. I presume -- I
5 don't know -- I don't recall offhand if there is an ongoing selection
6 from the 40th to add those to or if this will be the beginning of that,
7 but either way I know that's the practice of the Chamber.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps Mr. Registrar could help us whether we
9 had started already with the excerpting or whether this is -- then a
10 number should be there already. If not, would you please assign a
11 number, Mr. Registrar.
12 MR. TIEGER: I believe it needs a number, in fact.
13 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
14 JUDGE ORIE: While verifying whether a number was already ever
15 assigned, we provisionally now assign a new number.
16 Mr. Registrar will verify whether portions had already been
17 selected and admitted.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, the number will be P7693.
19 JUDGE ORIE: And is reserved for the excerpt of this session.
20 Please proceed.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. Mr. Ambassador, you've made reference during the course of your
23 testimony, both previously and today, to your effort to point out some of
24 the either complexities or oversimplifications of the war in your booklet
25 as seen by yourself and others with whom you shared an understanding.
1 So, for example, we turn to page 38 of -- page 22 in e-court of your
2 booklet, which is page 38 of the hard copy. That's 1D46 -- 1D04654.
3 You point out that crimes were committed by all parties to the
4 conflict, Muslim, Serb and Croat. I take it that's not a -- something
5 you need to refer to your booklet to know that you mentioned.
6 But it's correct, is it not, Mr. Ambassador, that that does not
7 mean that there was no difference between the parties in terms of the
8 quantum of crimes. And by way of example, as you note explicitly in your
9 book, referring to comments by Lord Owen in that case, there was -- and
10 I'm pointing -- I'm now at page 25 -- page 15 in the e-court, page 25 of
11 the hard copy. There was "a quantum difference between the horrors
12 perpetrated by them."
13 And that's a correct reflection both of the -- of what you
14 pointed out in your book and of the realities of the situation; is that
16 A. That's a very important point.
17 Q. And I believe at page 22 of your book, you also note - and that's
18 under a chapter subheading entitled: "The madness of exclusive
19 nationalism" - that in the situation of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnian
20 Serb forces committed the most atrocious acts. Although you note that
21 all sides were responsible for crimes and atrocities. And that's correct
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. Now, you also point out in your book that this quantum difference
25 reflected another difference and that one that General Rose cited and
1 that you also cited in chapter one of your booklet. And that's found at
2 page 16 of the e-court, page 26 of the hard copy:
3 "Although all three sides were to some extent guilty of war
4 crimes, genocide did not form part of official Bosnian government policy
5 in the way that it clearly did with the Serbs."
6 And that's also a point you made in your book and that reflected
7 the reality as you understood it; correct?
8 A. Correct, sir.
9 MR. TIEGER: And I'll be tendering those portions of the booklet
10 but I'll wait until the end to amass them and work with the Defence as
11 the Court noted earlier.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll wait for the outcome of that
13 conversation. Please proceed.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Now earlier today, Mr. Ambassador, you were asked some questions
16 about the total exclusion zone and weapons retrieval. And specifically
17 you were asked to compare the document you wrote in -- or the dispatch
18 you sent in August of 1994, which is D112, that contained the protocol to
19 the -- to P631 which is the document you sent on September 12th
20 describing -- further describing your understanding of the -- of what had
21 happened in connection with the protocol.
22 MR. TIEGER: And I want to just call up P631 again very quickly.
23 Q. I'm going to just remind you about the contents of about this
24 because you were asked about it in the Karadzic case as well, and before
25 I turn your attention to that passage I just wanted to bring this
1 document to your attention again. Here, you note in your dispatch to
2 Mr. Annan that:
3 "The attached protocol is a Bosnian Serb proposal that was never
4 accepted by us. The protocol was sent to us in error, and was forwarded
5 to you without a full examination due to the urgency of the question at
6 the time."
7 He goes on to explain that the Bosnian Serbs had expressed
8 concern during discussions in February and rather than entering into any
9 written agreement, UNPROFOR noted their concerns and gave assurances that
10 UNPROFOR units would be interpositioned between the two sides along the
11 confrontation lines. The Bosnian Serb side nevertheless reserved its
12 right to take adequate measures in case of an attack.
13 "We did not endorse their position."
14 It attaches also the legal advisor's comments contained on the
15 following page, in particular point 4 of the following page, where it is
16 pointed out:
17 "From the available information, I have found that the protocol
18 of understanding was a draft that had been prepared and submitted by the
19 Bosnian Serb negotiators but was found unacceptable by the UNPROFOR
20 negotiators and was never signed. Accordingly, it cannot be regarded as
21 having any legal standing."
22 And I point that out because you were asked about that in the
23 Karadzic case but in your cross-examination and that can be found out --
24 MR. TIEGER: If we can call up 65 ter number 33522, first to page
25 13, it's where the discussion begins. And you can see toward the bottom
1 of the page beginning to describe -- discuss the document. If we can
2 continue onto the next page. And next page, please. Go to the -- okay.
3 Q. Let me see at the very bottom of the page at 15, at 37755:
4 "I'll ask you the question in a different way then. Dr. Karadzic
5 in his comments yesterday asserted to that you this additional protocol,
6 which he said provided or allowed the Serbs a right to remove heavy
7 weapons from the weapons collection point in case of attack, was
8 concluded, and that would" --
9 MR. IVETIC: If we go to the next page. I think it's on the next
11 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry, I didn't realise. Thank you.
12 Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
13 Q. "... was concluded, and that was agreement between UNPROFOR and
14 the Bosnian Serbs. These two documents taken together, Mr. Ambassador,"
15 that means referring to the document you sent in August and the one we
16 just looked at in September, "would tend to show that contrary to what
17 Dr. Karadzic observed, this protocol was, in fact, never concluded; isn't
18 that correct?"
19 And you responded:
20 "Yeah. I think copies of these messages I sent to New York
21 headquarters seemed to endorse what you have concluded from it."
22 I take it, Mr. Ambassador, that you stand by that position?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now in -- you were also asked by Dr. Karadzic during the course
25 of the direct examination now in evidence about the assurances and
1 representations of the Bosnian Serbs. By way of example, at page 22 of
2 the e-court, Dr. Karadzic asked you to confirm that you always achieved
3 something in Pale and never left with empty hands. Although you didn't
4 confirm that. Or by way of another example, Dr. Karadzic pointed out
5 alleged Bosnian Serb intentions to fully implement terms of agreement.
6 And that can be found at page --
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Do you want to show it to the witness?
8 MR. TIEGER: I don't think that will be necessary. This is a
9 predicate to other matters and it's in evidence, so it's -- certainly if
10 the witness would want some clarification, I'm happy to do so. But I --
11 I think for purposes of moving on to the next point that should be
12 sufficient for him.
13 MR. IVETIC: And just to clear up, I think the transcript that we
14 have on the screen where they have been going to the pages you cited is
15 the cross-examination, so the numbers you're referencing are in relation
16 to D13 -- 1561.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: 1361.
18 MR. IVETIC: 1361. Thank you, Your Honours.
19 MR. TIEGER: And apologies to the Registrar for not making clear
20 that we moved from the document reflecting the cross-examination back to
21 the 65 ter statement in evidence which is the direct examination.
22 Q. In any event, Mr. Ambassador, I wanted to ask you this. In
23 contrast to the suggestion that you could rely upon the representations
24 made by Dr. Karadzic, it is correct, isn't it, as you stated in your
25 booklet, at e-court page 43 - and that's, again, 1D4654, page 43 - that:
1 "Karadzic as a negotiator had the tendency to twist the truth
2 rather nonchalantly - a trait I observed not a few times."
3 That's a correct reflection of what's in your booklet, sir, and
4 of what you found to be the reality on the ground?
5 A. Unfortunately, yes.
6 Q. And I think you confirmed that in your testimony in the Karadzic
7 case, and that's 65 ter 33522, page 19:
8 "As I came to know these tendencies, I was, of course, made more
9 cautious, and I became, as time went on, much more cautious."
10 And that's at transcript 37759.
11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Lines 3 and 4.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. And that was in response to the question what kind of weight did
14 you give to any undertakings, representations, or agreements entered into
15 by Dr. Karadzic. And I take it you stand by that testimony, sir?
16 A. Yes, indeed, I do. I was particularly struck by this trait or
17 characteristic of Dr. Karadzic not only during the negotiations in
18 April 1994, but his response to my frequent requests for a visit to
19 Banja Luka, he gave a promise to me and then later he sidetracked by
20 raising one reason or another. And as a total consequence of that all, I
21 never managed to visit Banja Luka during my tenure of duty in the former
23 Q. Let me turn then to some of the discussions surrounding Gorazde,
24 the representations that were made and the reflections of the reality on
25 the ground, and also the efforts you made to visit Banja Luka and also
1 contemporaneous indications of why you were trying to visit Banja Luka.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, that seems to be quite an area which
3 might take quite some time. I'm looking at the clock to see whether we
4 are --
5 MR. TIEGER: I think that's a good suggestion, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But before we take that break, I've got --
7 first of all, I'd like to put on the record that Mr. Registrar informed
8 me that the number P7693 which was reserved for the 40th Session of the
9 Bosnian Serb Assembly, that there's no excerpt yet there. So, therefore,
10 that 65 ter 02393 will for the time being be attached to P7693 and is
12 I further have a very short question for you, Mr. Akashi. You
13 were earlier asked about the - let me take it literally - the quantum
14 difference and you were asked, because you pointed at that in your book,
15 whether that reflected the real situation. I think you confirmed that.
16 I noted that in that page of your book, you're mainly quoting Lord Owen
17 and General Rose. Do I understand your answer to be that you agree with
18 Lord Owen and General Rose in respect of what is written in that
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, in that respect. But with regard to General
21 Rose, I think he was not always accurate, although he was accurate most
22 of the time, and I think General -- the Lord Owen was probably closer to
23 my own evaluation of the situation than any of the military people did.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But the portions read to you which are quotes
25 from others, you agree in that respect --
1 THE WITNESS: Yes.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Having clarified this, we'll take a break and
3 we'd like to see you back in 20 minutes again. You may follow the usher.
4 [The witness stands down]
5 JUDGE ORIE: We will resume at 20 minutes to 2.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 1.21 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 1.40 p.m.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, there are two matters which I'd
9 briefly like to raise.
10 Mr. Ivetic, witnesses later this week, I do understand that after
11 this witness has concluded his evidence that we would continue with
12 Mr. Kovac. But after that, that might not take up the whole week, up to
13 and including Thursday.
14 Any ...
15 MR. IVETIC: The witness that was originally scheduled to testify
16 after the completion of General Kovac was unable to travel on that day
17 and has thus been rescheduled. So we don't as of right now have any
18 witnesses that can we could move up to that date given that most of the
19 remaining witnesses are fixed either in relation to video-link or to
20 their own schedules. And so that we right now after General Kovac
21 finishing, which I think, given the remaining estimates, will probably
22 take place on Wednesday, we'll probably be missing that last day,
23 unfortunately, of the week, Thursday.
24 JUDGE ORIE: And this witness unable to travel, when was that
1 MR. IVETIC: Last week.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Last week. Okay. Try to do your utmost best. Then
3 there's one other matter which is -- deals with the Rule 92 ter motion
4 Djoko Razdoljac. And it will not take much time so I think slowly we
5 could try already to get the witness in.
6 On the 1st of September of last year, 2014, the Defence filed a
7 92 ter motion for Djoko Razdoljac. He is not on the Defence list,
8 19th of May, 2014, the Rule 65 ter witness list, as a result of the
9 Chamber having instructed the Defence to remove him from an earlier
10 version of its witness list. This was because Razdoljac's evidence had
11 been admitted during Prosecution's case already. The Chamber addressed
12 this issue during the Pre-Defence Conference at transcript page 20977 and
13 advised the Defence how to proceed procedurally should it wish to have
14 further evidence from this witness admitted. And under these
15 circumstances, where this procedure has not been followed, the Chamber
16 denies the Rule 92 ter motion.
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 JUDGE ORIE: And the procedure implied seeking permission to do
19 what you apparently did without asking permission.
20 Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I had indicated to you just before we adjourned
23 that I wanted to follow up on your testimony that you were particularly
24 struck by the trait or characteristic of Dr. Karadzic to twist the truth,
25 not only during the negotiations in April 1994 but also in respect of
1 your frequent requests for a visit to Banja Luka.
2 So I'd like to first turn to the -- to April 1994.
3 MR. TIEGER: And if we could call up 65 ter 10949, please.
4 Q. While this is coming up, Mr. Ambassador, I can tell you that this
5 is an outgoing code cable from you to Mr. Annan, dated 7 April 1994,
6 concerning meetings with Dr. Karadzic and President Izetbegovic. And if
7 we turn to paragraph 3, we see that on the question of Gorazde you
8 expressed the Security Council and your own deep concern over the current
9 situation, and then it states:
10 Although Dr. Karadzic has given me his assurances that the BSA,
11 the Bosnian Serb army, will not attack Gorazde town and that General Rose
12 may visit the enclave in the next few days, I stressed the importance of
13 having accurate UNPROFOR information on what was happening in order to
14 allay the fears of the international community and prevent the situation
15 from reinforcing the negative image of the Bosnian Serb army.
16 So I take it then that this is an accurate reflection of that
17 portion of the meeting that took place on April 6th, 1994, in respect of
18 the assurances that Dr. Karadzic gave you about Gorazde town?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now you also -- perhaps it's useful then to turn also to
21 paragraph 12 on page 4 in which we see a reference to the other issue you
22 mentioned just before the break, where your cable reflects the following:
23 Turning then to the issue of ethnic cleansing and the violation
24 of human rights in Banja Luka and the need to halt this practice, I
25 suggested that I visit the area towards the end of next week. I further
1 requested that UNPROFOR be permitted to increase its UNMO and civil
2 affairs presence in the area and to install CIVPOL elements to reassure
3 the population.
4 Is it correct, Mr. Ambassador, that this is a reflection of the
5 frequent requests by you to visit Banja Luka in response to the
6 information you were receiving about ethnic cleansing?
7 A. Indeed, it is one such instance.
8 Q. And just -- no. It's fine.
9 MR. TIEGER: I tender that document, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
11 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P7694, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted.
13 MR. TIEGER: Can we turn next, then, to 65 ter 03459.
14 Q. This is a document dated the 16th of April, 1994, again from you
15 to Mr. Annan. And it contains a chronology of events mainly involving
16 Gorazde for 15 April and 16 April 1994 as we see in the cover.
17 If we turn to page 3, for example, which appears to reflect, as
18 we see from the preceding page, events of the 15th of April, 1994. We
19 see at 1920 Gorazde reported to be shelled again.
20 Dr. Karadzic's response that it could be the Bosnians shelling
22 If we then turn to page 4. At 2000 hours we see the reference to
23 casualties arriving at Gorazde hospital for medical evaluation.
24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Evacuation.
25 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, I misspoke. Medical evacuation.
1 And another example at page 5. At 1045, General Rose outlines
2 the need to act if Serbs enter the town.
3 Q. Now, you're more than welcome to read the entirety of the
4 document if it is necessary, Mr. Ambassador, and I just highlighted a few
5 examples, but is it correct to say that this document reflects the fact
6 that operations by the Bosnian Serb army were under way in the Gorazde
7 area, prompting deep concerns by yourself and the international
9 It's not necessary to characterise the entirety of the document
10 or every --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could we have the witness's answer verbally,
12 please, for the record.
13 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
14 Q. I think Judge Moloto noted what I noted which was you were
15 nodding your head affirmatively. If you could answer verbally so it can
16 be picked up by the transcript.
17 A. Yes, I have read and these paragraphs reflect the sequence of
19 Q. Thank you, sir.
20 MR. TIEGER: I tender that, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE ORIE: And also the paragraphs which were read to you and
22 which are not on our screen at this moment?
23 THE WITNESS: These are evolution of events in and around Gorazde
24 in those days.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Registrar.
1 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 03459 will be Exhibit P7695,
2 Your Honours.
3 JUDGE ORIE: P7695 is admitted.
4 MR. TIEGER: Can we next turn to 65 ter 03460.
5 Q. Mr. Ambassador, as you can now see, this is another code cable
6 from April from you to Mr. Annan, dated 17 April 1994, concerning the
7 Gorazde crisis and, in particular, meetings with Dr. Karadzic and with
8 President Izetbegovic. And it indicates immediately below that subject
9 heading information concerning your meeting with Dr. Karadzic and with
10 others present who are listed.
11 And it reflects the following:
12 "Despite the promises made by the Serbs last night on my
13 preconditions for our meeting today, it turned out during the course of
14 the day that most of the promises were not fulfilled: 1, none of the UN
15 personnel had been released before the meeting, and only the Canadian
16 soldiers and three UNMOs were released after my repeated request during
17 the meeting; 2, even during the meeting, there was no cease-fire by the
18 Bosnian Serb army which kept advancing to the edge of the town, and
19 several rounds impacted in the town itself resulting in further civilian
20 casualties; and 3, no concrete agreement was reached, thus no UNPROFOR
21 troops were deployed in Gorazde today."
22 Is that a reflection, Mr. Ambassador, of what you were describing
23 in your testimony before the break; that is, the -- some of the reasons
24 why you were struck during the Gorazde crisis by Dr. Karadzic's tendency
25 or characteristic of twisting the truth?
1 A. Yes. I found repeatedly that his words and the situation on the
2 ground in Gorazde did not correspond to each other. And I remember --
3 I'm not sure whether it was on this day or on a day before or right after
4 this meeting with Dr. Karadzic, but Mr. Churkin, a special envoy of the
5 Russian Federation who accompanied me in one of the negotiations, decided
6 to leave the meeting in total disgust and he decided to go back to
7 Sarajevo and he did not return.
8 But contrary to the advice of some of my associates who remained
9 with me at Pale, I was very patient. I wanted to follow up on the
10 progress of the return of UNPROFOR captives, and either no progress or
11 extremely limited progress was registered. And Churkin did not want to
12 stay with Karadzic for the press conference. He had left. But in order
13 to save Karadzic's face, I decided to stay for the joint press
14 conference, but at -- upon -- after the press conference, Karadzic
15 invited me to stay for dinner. I said I do not want to stay for dinner,
16 and he should understand my reasons. My reason was my total disgust with
17 the lack of progress and the discrepancy between his words and progress
18 on the ground.
19 And I also remember I was negotiating with Karadzic in Geneva on
20 Gorazde, and -- but there, again, the progress was extremely slow or
21 almost nil, so I decided to leave Geneva to go back to my headquarters in
22 Gorazde. I did it in a somewhat dramatic way so that Karadzic should
23 know that -- my disillusionment with negotiations. And finally when I
24 was checking out from the Hotel Intercontinental, Karadzic sent for me
25 and asked for urgent meeting in which I decided to go back to the hotel,
1 and -- but here again, I checked everything he promised. I checked it
2 with our troops and UNMOs on the ground again, and still there were
3 frequently discrepancies.
4 So the -- the progress was finally registered when we met with
5 President Milosevic in Belgrade, and there I accepted to negotiate with
6 Karadzic, and General Mladic was there, and we negotiated with each other
7 for more than 11 hours.
8 Finally, I -- upon my proposal to have a smaller restricted
9 meeting, including Milosevic, Karadzic, and General Mladic on their side,
10 and General de Lapresle and myself on the UN side, I -- I referred to
11 imminence of NATO air-strike - air-strike as distinct from close-air
12 support - and I appealed to them to heed these indications which were
13 real. And I appealed to their sense of history of the Serb people, proud
14 people with a glorious history. And I told them that, you know, they are
15 faced with a crucial choice and their judgement in -- you know, vis-à-vis
16 their history was at stake. And Milosevic immediately understood the
17 vital importance of the occasion and the imminence of a decision, but
18 Karadzic and Mladic had still difficulties. But, in the end, they had to
19 come around.
20 And we reached a final agreement towards midnight, and the next
21 morning we came back to examine the text of the agreement. And Karadzic
22 still made some points, technical points. General Mladic, once he got
23 satisfaction on the main points from his viewpoint, he was not -- he did
24 not, you know, need any more examination of the text. And we signed the
25 crucial document.
1 And when I left the Presidency in Belgrade, I looked at my watch.
2 I know it was 20 minutes to midday, and my deadline was midday. So I was
3 very moved that, here again, after Sarajevo crisis in February 1994, here
4 again in Gorazde in April 1994 we were able to avoid the catastrophe of a
5 massive air-strike by NATO through means of diplomacy. Yeah. So these
6 describe these events.
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
8 MR. TIEGER: I tender this document, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P7696, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE ORIE: P7696 is admitted.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, I note that in paragraph 2 of your cable for
14 the April 17th meeting it refers to the fact that the Serbs insisted that
15 the right bank of Drina river is their territory and that was their basis
16 for certain of the positions they took.
17 In that connection, if I could also turn you to 65 ter 13405.
18 This is a document also dated the 17th of April from Mr. Andreev to
19 Mr. De Mello. Also concerning so -- it begins by saying:
20 "The fate of Gorazde appears now to be the hands of the Bosnian
21 Serb forces. Serb forces have taken all high ground to the north of the
22 town and have reached the river to the south. They are within a
23 kilometre or two of the town centre in all directions.
24 "When we left Pale today, we had only the most limited of oral
1 It lists some of those, including immediate cease-fire,
2 withdrawal of forces, maximum restraint, limited medical evacuation, and
3 release of all remaining UN hostages.
4 And if we turn to the next page --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. ...
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. Paragraph 3, it states:
8 "In retrospect, it is clear that the Serbs have used their
9 negotiations with the United Nations as a cover for the prosecution of
10 their offensive."
11 And it explains that in more detail. It concludes by saying:
12 "Attacks continued during our presence in Pale."
13 Paragraph 4 notes that:
14 "No real progress was made today," and notes in the middle of
15 that paragraph, Dr. Karadzic insisted that "the right bank of the Drina
16 will be ours."
17 Mr. Akashi, does that conform with your recollection of the
18 circumstances at the time and is that another reflection --
19 A. Yes, indeed.
20 JUDGE ORIE: One second. Yes. It's only now that the French
21 translation has finished.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. I think we are caught up now, Mr. Akashi. And I had asked you
24 whether that conformed with your recollection of events at the time and
25 was it another reflection of the discrepancies between what you were told
1 and what was happening on the ground?
2 A. Yes, I would say certainly it was so.
3 MR. TIEGER: I would tender that document, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P7697, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: P7697 is admitted.
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Let me change directions slightly and show you a document that --
9 not emanating from you, Mr. Ambassador, but from the Bosnian Serb army;
10 that's P5039.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, while waiting for the document, would
12 you please keep in mind that we want to finish at 15 minutes past 2.00
13 sharp today.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. This is a document dated the 17th of April titled: "Very
16 urgent," comes from the Chief of Staff of the VRS Main Staff,
17 General Milovanovic. And it reflects that it -- on the 17th of April at
18 2055 hours the president of Republika Srpska ordered, and if we look
19 at -- so number 1, we see an order to now stop the fire by artillery and
20 mortars into the city of Gorazde.
21 And number 2, within the 3-kilometre radius on the right bank of
22 the Drina river capture all features and in particular the urban parts of
23 the city, and then withdraw the heavy weaponry outside the zone of the
24 3-kilometre radius. Dig it in and camouflage it.
25 And with respect to the left bank as reflected in item 3, to take
1 up favourable positions so that the whole zone is encircled by the Army
2 of Republika Srpska.
3 Is that consistent with the information you were receiving at the
4 time from the -- from your sources on the ground and inconsistent with
5 the representations you were receiving from Dr. Karadzic? That is,
6 number one, that in fact artillery and mortars had apparently been fired
7 into Gorazde town; number 2, contrary to his representation on April 7th,
8 that the Army of Republika Srpska was engaged in the attack on Gorazde
10 A. Yes, it corresponds to my memory of the situation as we saw from
11 UN side.
12 Q. Thank you, sir.
13 MR. TIEGER: And finally, I think I can conclude if we call up
14 65 ter 16806. That may be a document that is now in evidence as D1362.
15 Q. That's an outgoing cable from you to Mr. Annan on the 23rd of
16 April, 1994, reflecting information from your meetings with Dr. Karadzic
17 and General Mladic.
18 You were asked in your examination-in-chief this morning about a
19 certain portion of this document but I want to direct your attention to
20 another portion and that is paragraph 4 on page 3. There, you're
21 addressing the critical need to resolve the crisis. You state in the
22 middle of the page -- you also refer to NATO could take decisions which
23 could have tragic repercussions all around. You state that there should
24 be no illusions on any side of the seriousness of the present situation
25 and of the international community's revulsion towards it. And you note
1 that it was a tragedy, a human and humanitarian tragedy out of proportion
2 to any provocation that the Bosnian Serb army may have initially had from
3 the BiH. And then you referred to the unacceptably high civilian
4 casualties of just the previous day, almost 100.
5 A. Yes, I did my very best, I recollect, to make the Bosnian Serb
6 side, its leadership to be fully aware of the consequences of their
7 action around Gorazde. It was very clear from this that they were using
8 Gorazde in order to improve their general situation throughout Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina. But they went so far with regard to Gorazde issue that they
10 were going out of their way, out of achieving immediate objective in
11 Gorazde, and I gave the most frank warnings in that regard. And this
12 corresponds to what I said earlier today with -- at the meeting with
13 President Milosevic.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
15 MR. TIEGER: It's now 2.15. We have to conclude for the day.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Akashi, we'll conclude for the day and
17 we'll adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.30. We all expect that tomorrow
18 morning that we'll be able to conclude hearing your evidence. Meanwhile,
19 I instruct you that you should not speak or communicate in whatever way
20 with whomever about your testimony, whether that's testimony given today
21 or testimony still to be given tomorrow. If that is clear to you, you
22 may follow the usher.
23 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you very much, Excellency.
24 [The witness stands down]
25 JUDGE ORIE: We adjourn for the day, and we resume tomorrow,
1 Tuesday, the 24th of November, 9.30 in the morning, in this same
2 courtroom, I.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.17 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 24th day of
5 November, 2015, at 9.30 a.m.