1 Wednesday, 9 December 2015
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Before we -- first of all, good morning to everyone
6 in and around this courtroom.
7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-09-92-T, The Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 I did understand have the videolink, which is already set up,
12 that there was some question about how we would proceed. We have a few
13 matters to deal with - that will take most likely not more than five
14 minutes - before we start hearing the evidence of the witness, which is
15 called today by the Defence. So I'll deal with those first.
16 The first one is -- deals with the evidence of the present
17 witness. With regard to the number of associated exhibits tendered
18 through Jose Cutileiro, the Chamber reiterates that the Defence -- to the
19 Defence that it should not be flooded with associated exhibits and
20 recalls its preference for documents to be tendered during the witness's
21 examination in court or through a videolink. The Chamber therefore
22 invites the Defence to reduce the number of associated exhibits it is
23 tendering through the witness.
24 That is one matter.
25 Then there is another matter which we have to deal with in
1 private session; therefore, the audio link should be discontinued at this
2 moment. It will not last for very long, if I understand well.
3 We move into private session.
4 [Private session]
11 Pages 42378-42380 redacted. Private session.
11 [Open session]
12 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
14 I'd first like to establish whether the videolink is functioning
15 well. Could the representative of the Registry at the videolink location
16 tell us whether he can see us and whether he can hear me.
17 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] Yes, good morning, Your Honours.
18 We can see and hear you quite clearly. Thank you.
19 JUDGE ORIE: We see you and we hear you as well.
20 Before I'll invite the witness to make a solemn declaration, I'd
21 first like to know who are present at the videolink location.
22 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] Yes, Your Honours, to my extreme
23 left is Ms. Cristina Moniz, who is a representative of the Government of
24 Portugal, she is here pursuant to the oral order of the Chamber; and then
25 to my left is the witness; and it's myself. And we have technical
1 assistance in the adjacent room in the event that we need to call them --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that.
3 First of all, Ms. Moniz, welcome in this courtroom, as you are a
4 representative of the Portuguese government. The Chamber expects you not
5 to intervene in the examination of the witness, but you are there as an
6 observer, I take it, unless you would have any other perception of what
7 your role would be and then we would like to know.
8 MS. MONIZ: No, Your Honour, I fully agree with you.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you so much.
10 Then, Mr. Cutileiro, we'll now proceed and hear your testimony.
11 Before you give testimony, Rules require that you make a solemn
12 declaration. The text is handed out to you and may I invite you to make
13 that solemn declaration. If it would be difficult for you to stand,
14 please remain seated; otherwise, please stand and make the solemn
16 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
17 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
18 WITNESS: JOSE CUTILEIRO
19 [Witness testified via videolink]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Cutileiro.
21 Mr. Cutileiro, you'll first be examined by Mr. Ivetic. You'll
22 soon see him on your screen, if you don't see him already. Mr. Ivetic is
23 a member of the Defence team of Mr. Mladic.
24 Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.
25 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
1 Examination by Mr. Ivetic:
2 Q. Good morning, Ambassador.
3 A. Morning.
4 Q. Sir, I'm going to ask you to first state your full name, first
5 and last, so it can be entered into the record.
6 A. Jose Cutileiro.
7 Q. And also for the record, is it correct that you are here today
8 pursuant to a subpoena issued by the Trial Chamber?
9 A. Yes, indeed, I am because if I had not been subpoenaed, I don't
10 think I would have come --
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. -- for reason of a general nature. I think that people who have
13 act as mediators, so to speak, in what we usually call peace negotiations
14 should not be called as witnesses if after that for some reason some of
15 court cases arise, I don't think it's satisfactory that we be called as
16 witnesses, but we -- once I have been subpoenaed, here I am.
17 Q. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.
18 Now today I will have some questions for you and I want to make
19 sure that if you do not understand a question or do not hear a question,
20 you please let us know so I can repeat or rephrase that question. Is
21 that understood?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And since we will both be using the English language, it is
24 important that we pause between question and answer and vice versa so
25 that the court reporter and interpreters can do their job. Is that also
2 A. Absolutely.
3 Q. Then we will begin and I will first ask you: Have you ever
4 testified previously before the ICTY Tribunal in any other trials?
5 A. I did. In 2012 I was again subpoenaed and I testified in the
6 case of Dr. Radovan Karadzic.
7 Q. And on that occasion, sir, did you have an opportunity to give a
8 written witness statement in the -- to the Court in the Karadzic trial?
9 A. I did.
10 Q. At this time I would call up in e-court 1D04306. And, sir, I
11 hope the Court Officer over there can give you a copy in paper.
12 A. It's done.
13 Q. Okay. And, sir, this is titled as a witness statement of
14 yourself. Can you tell us if you remember giving this statement?
15 A. I do.
16 Q. And now if we can turn together to the very last page of the
17 same, both in e-court and in the paper hard copy, in the bottom right
18 corner there is a signature. Can you tell us if you recognise whose
19 signature that is?
20 A. It's mine.
21 Q. And if we look to the left of the signature, there appears to be
22 a date in 2012, which I believe to be 11 Roman numeral IV, 2012?
23 A. That's it.
24 Q. Does that date -- go ahead.
25 A. Yes, that's it.
1 Q. Does that date reflect the date you remember signing this
2 statement for the Karadzic trial?
3 A. Yes, and I always write the month in Roman characters so there's
4 no doubt that I did date that.
5 Q. Thank, you, sir.
6 Now, Ambassador, have you received a copy of this statement in
7 its entirety to review the same prior to today to see if everything is
8 accurate and correct in the statement?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And have you had a chance to perform that review, to see if any
11 corrections are necessary?
12 A. As far as I remember, there's no -- nothing is necessary.
13 Q. Okay. If we could just look at one paragraph together first.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Paragraph 30 and that is to be found on page 4 in both versions.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And if may direct examination to the last document listed in that
18 paragraph, that is --
19 A. Oh, yes, I'm sorry. That, I think, is not quite right because
20 the -- the last letter was not from Dr. Karadzic to me, but from me to
21 Dr. Karadzic if I remember rightly.
22 Q. I think are you correct, sir, and that is in our case 1D4314,
23 that letter dated 23 July 1992, which as you say was sent to Karadzic by
25 Now, apart from this one correction that we have now gone through
1 as to paragraph 30 of the witness statement, do you stand by the
2 remainder of the witness statement as being accurate?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And, Ambassador, if I were to ask you the same questions today
5 about topics in the statement would your answers be essentially the same
6 in substance as we find in the written statement?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And, sir, you've just been asked to give a solemn declaration to
9 tell the truth. Can you tell us are the statements in your written
10 statement truthful in nature?
11 A. Yes, except for the point we have just went on about, the
12 Karadzic's letter and not my letter -- or, rather, my letter not
13 Karadzic's letter to me. I re-read the statement and I think that's it,
15 Q. Okay. Thank, you, sir.
16 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I would tender 1D04306 as a public
17 Defence exhibit.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Receives Exhibit Number D1371, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
21 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, at this time, I would read a short
22 public summary of the witness statement for purposes of letting the
23 public know what is contained therein.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Is Mr. Cutileiro informed about the purpose of this?
25 MR. IVETIC: Yes, I spoke about with him and indeed it's the same
1 procedure that was in the prior proceeding.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll then listen to the summary, which is not
3 the evidence but which is just to inform the public about the content of
4 the statement of Mr. Cutileiro.
5 Please proceed.
6 MR. IVETIC: The witness joined the foreign service the Portugal
7 in 1974. Ambassador Cutileiro has served in a number of positions since
8 that time, including as Permanent Representative of Portugal to the
9 Council of Europe; as ambassador to, first, Mozambique, and, later,
10 South Africa; as head of the Portuguese delegation to the
11 Stockholm Conference; as political director to the foreign ministry; and
12 in 1992 as special advisor to the foreign minister; in 1994 he became
13 Secretary-General of the Western European Union; and in 2001 to 2004, he
14 was Special Representative of the United Nations Commission on
15 Human Rights for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro.
16 In February 1992, Lord Carrington, Chairman of the European
17 Commission's Conference on the former Yugoslavia, asked
18 Ambassador Cutileiro to chair talks on the future constitutional
19 arrangements for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ambassador participated in
20 several rounds of talks and served in this capacity until 14 August 1992.
21 As a result of the talks, on 18 March 1992, the parties agreed to
22 a Statement of Principles which provided, inter alia, for a state
23 composed of three constituent units within the existing borders of
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina. A working group was to be established to define
25 the territory of the constituent units, while a map was annexed to the
1 statement which showed the relative majority in each municipality and
2 would be basis of the work of the working group. The Statement of
3 Principles was reached after long and intense negotiations. The
4 Bosnian Serbs agreed in the statement and committed to having religious
5 and ethnic minorities in their constituent unit and respecting the rights
6 of the same, as it was agreed to by all parties and was supposed to be a
7 basis for further negotiations which were, indeed, held.
8 During the period after the Statement of Principles was agreed
9 to, the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs wanted further negotiation on
10 unresolved issues while the Bosnian government leaders dragged their
11 feet. Shortly after the parties agreed to the Statement of Principles,
12 the witness began to hear President Izetbegovic was disavowing his
13 agreement in public statements. In June 1992, the Bosnian government
14 formally rejected the Statement of Principles.
15 The Ambassador's statements also goes through some notes of
16 meetings with Ambassador Okun and others, which he states accurately
17 reflect what he said and believed. Examples are that Izetbegovic is a
18 liar and very untrustworthy. He always goes back on what he agreed to.
19 All sides lied but the Serbs lied the least.
20 On 28 May 1992, the ambassador received a letter from
21 Momcilo Krajisnik of the Serbs, noting that a Muslim broadcasting team
22 was on the spot right after the killing on Vase Miskina Street and
24 "If there is a good will to investigate, it is possible to reach
25 the truth through ballistics and medical expertise."
1 Shortly after the shelling of persons at a bread queue in
2 Vase Miskina Street, the Ambassador spoke with a Portuguese army
3 artillery officer who had participated in the investigation of this
4 shelling and was convinced that the shell had come from the position
5 where the Bosnian government had their positions.
6 Ambassador Cutileiro states that it is a tragedy that peace was
7 not achieved throughout the Statement of Principles negotiated in
8 March 1992. A comparison of the map annexed to the Statement of
9 Principles, and that which is part of the Dayton Agreement, shows that
10 after three and a half years of war, the result was about the same.
11 Countless lives could have been saved.
12 President Izetbegovic and his aides were encouraged to scupper
13 the deal prevented by the Statement of Principles and to fight for a
14 unitary Bosnian state by well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew
16 And that concludes the summary.
17 Q. Ambassador, I do have some additional follow-up questions you.
18 If we can first turn to the first page of the statement in both the paper
19 copy and the e-court and if we can look at paragraph number 6, and here
20 you state:
21 "On 2 March 1992, I received a letter from the Bosnian Serb
22 leaders requesting that the conference carry on as soon as possible, 'in
23 view of the unfortunate events in Sarajevo and throughout B and H.' The
24 letter said that the 'unhappy events' were triggered by
25 President Izetbegovic's statement that transformation into three
1 constituent units was out of the question, and the attack of the Serb
2 father of the groom at a wedding party."
3 At the time of this letter from Karadzic, that is, 2 March 1992,
4 had Izetbegovic conveyed to either you or any of the other negotiators
5 his position that transformation to the three constituent units was out
6 of the question?
7 A. Not to me. I don't know about others. Not to my knowledge.
8 Q. And, sir, generally how would you describe Izetbegovic's stance
9 in these negotiations that led to the Statement of Principles?
10 A. Well, like all -- the three parties tried to get as much as each
11 of them could to their own side, but -- and we discussed -- we started
12 discussing in early February. We made some progress in Lisbon at -- a
13 bit later. The meetings were held alternatively in Sarajevo and in -- in
14 Lisbon. At the time Portugal had the Presidency of the
15 European Community. By the way, it's a conference of the
16 European Community, not the European Commission, that Lord Carrington
17 chaired. But we -- so like in other negotiations of this kind, it was
18 just talking. There were things that were easier to some -- than to
19 others, but at the table Izetbegovic went along and we had a joint
20 meeting on the evening of the 17th which finished only on the early
21 morning of the 18th of March with everybody present. I mean, the --
22 Izetbegovic and his foreign minister; and Karadzic and Koljevic was there
23 since; and on the Croat side Mr. Bubanj was also there. So up to that
24 moment, in the talks, I don't think you could say that they were very
25 different from any other talks of this kind.
1 Q. Okay. And now if we could turn to page 2 of the statement in
2 both the hard copy and in e-court.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And if I can direct your attention to paragraph 11 in the middle
5 of the page, and here we are talking about the Statement of Principles --
6 A. Mm-hmm.
7 Q. -- that was agreed to. And you mention a working group that was
8 to be established to define the territory of the constituent units. Who
9 was supposed to make up that working group and be its members?
10 A. Representatives of the three sides in the Bosnian talks which, if
11 I may remind the Court, at the time the three sides were also part of
12 a -- were in a coalition government of Bosnia. It was not talks between
13 the government of Bosnia and others. It was the three of them where were
14 in the coalition of the government of Bosnia at the time. But besides
15 them, we had a hope that the European Commission would be able to provide
16 some experts -- that would be some specialists in community problems, in
17 geography; but unfortunately, the European Community did not provide such
18 experts, and that particular committee was never set.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, may I take it, it was a slip of the
20 tongue when you referred to paragraph 11, where paragraph 13 seems to be
21 more in line with what you said.
22 MR. IVETIC: I apologise. I meant to say, starting at 11 and
23 going to 13. You're correct. You're correct.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
25 MR. IVETIC:
1 Q. And you say the European Community did not provide such experts.
2 Do you know any reason why not or -- or how did that occur?
3 A. It was not a deliberate intention of the European Community not
4 to provide them. It was just this one was one particular matter that was
5 being discussed in which the European Community were involved. These
6 things are not easy to find -- these people are not easy to find. It is
7 not easy to organise that. There was at the time - and I don't think if
8 there is nowadays - an international organisation or a -- or even some
9 kind of ad hoc arrangement that would provide on request this kind of
10 expertise. So we didn't manage to do it in couple of weeks that or -- if
11 you want a month or so. And by then, then things had deteriorated enough
12 to go on proceeding, trying to get it.
13 I regret it. I think it would have been good if we managed that
14 because that might have kept the parties more committed to what they had
15 agreed, but that was how it was.
16 Q. And, sir, the Statement of Principles that was -- that was agreed
17 to in 18 March 1992, was it called by any other names perhaps in the
19 A. Other names? The Carrington-Cutileiro Agreement or -- what
20 sometimes may have been said is the agreement was an agreement on
21 principles, and I suppose perhaps that sometimes in the media that did
22 not come as clearly as that. But I don't know what -- what do you have
23 in mind? Do you have any other labelling for the thing that ...
24 Q. You've explained exactly what I was asking about, so that's
25 perfect, sir.
1 Now, if we could turn to the third page of your statement in both
2 of hard copy and e-court, and I propose to look at paragraph number 19 on
3 the top of the page. And here it is said that Izetbegovic began
4 disavowing the Statement of Principles in the Bosnian media and that the
5 Bosnian government formally rejected the Statement of Principles in
6 June 1992.
7 A. Mm-hmm.
8 Q. What was the reaction, first, of the negotiators upon getting
9 this information that Izetbegovic was disavowing the Statement of
10 Principles; and then later that the government side rejected the
11 Statement of Principles?
12 A. The first I heard of it was shortly after the agreement, and
13 following up on things that Izetbegovic had said before, notably that he
14 didn't believe that an arrangement of that kind, that the -- he
15 considered some kind of confederation of sorts would be feasible. He
16 didn't believe -- that was his feeling at the beginning of the talks but
17 then he agreed on the statement. Then I began hearing, in part, from the
18 Serbs, the Serbs that came to the talks but also from people that were in
19 Sarajevo at the time, that to the local media Izetbegovic said that a
20 thing like that could never work, or words to that effect. I have not --
21 I was not shown precise quotations.
22 I remember going back to him and asking him if he still accepted
23 the principles, and he always told me that he did. He never told me that
24 he himself - in the framework of these conversations - would renounce or
25 reject them; and then in June they did reject formally, if you wish. But
1 until then, on one side, I heard that he could speak publicly against
2 them to Bosnian media, but to me and to other people directly involved in
3 the conflict, he never did.
4 Q. And what was the reaction of the Serbs and Croats that were
5 participating in the negotiations upon the first hearing that Izetbegovic
6 was disavowing the statement and then later when it was rejected by that
8 A. On the first, when they first heard some -- I think they did --
9 they were among the people who told me that that these were statements
10 made to the press. But, you see, trust was not really a commodity in --
11 available in great quantity in those talks. The three sides suspected
12 each other very strongly; and the fact that we have managed to get
13 agreement, we thought, was a good sign that they were improving in their
14 attitude towards each other. The fact that they were in coalition in
15 government indicated that they could do together something things even if
16 they didn't trust each other very much. But for them, for Serbs and
17 Croats, this was another illustration of Izetbegovic's duplicitous nature
18 as they saw it from -- and these were the talks I had, I mean, on that
19 matter. As I say, Izetbegovic always told me that he may have said this
20 or that, but -- but he was keen on the conversation. He even came to
21 Lisbon once, I remember, and he participated directly on the drawing of
22 some limits in one map on the basis of the Statement of Principles. So
23 he -- he did -- to me, to the conference, he went on working as if it
24 were possible.
25 Q. At the time, did you and the other negotiators have any
1 explanation or reasoning that you could come to understand why
2 Izetbegovic and the Bosnian government side had disavowed and rejected
3 the Statement of Principles?
4 A. Well, I think that it's not unusual in politics that you tell
5 your backers one thing and you tell other people another thing. And we
6 were -- we will to deal with what we had. And what we had was agreement
7 on the 18th of March, and from Izetbegovic who was the leader of the
8 Bosnian side - and was also the president of the country at the time -
9 the firm commitment that it would go on. He might have to satisfy or to
10 appease some of his followers, I don't know. But that was all it was.
11 Q. And if we could look on the same page at paragraph 20, and I'd
12 like to focus on the first part of paragraph 20 that says:
13 "During the period after the Statement of Principles was agreed
14 to, the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs wanted further negotiations on the
15 unresolved issues while the Bosnian government leaders dragged their
17 And I'd like to ask you if you could please explain or perhaps
18 give an example of what you mean here when you say that the Bosnian
19 government leaders dragged their feet.
20 A. Look, if you have the public statements being made and then I had
21 to go and ask Izetbegovic and he would tell me to -- basically to not pay
22 attention to that and pay, rather, attention to what he told me, that --
23 there were some doubts obviously in the commitment of the -- of the
24 Bosnian side - Bosnian in the sense of the Muslim side at the time as we
25 said - to the -- to the pursuance of the work so that we can -- could
1 move from principles to a final agreement, and this was evidently felt.
2 Q. And if we can now turn again to the last page in both the hard
3 copy and in e-court, and I'd like to spend some time discussing
4 paragraph number 35, the last paragraph. And here you are again talking
5 about the Statement of Principles, and you say:
6 "In a letter to "The Economist" in December 1995, I wrote that:
7 "'After several rounds of talks our 'principles for further
8 constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-Herzegovina were agreed by all
9 three parties (Muslim, Serb, and Croat) in Sarajevo on March 18th, 1992,
10 as the basis for future negotiations. These continued, maps and all,
11 until the summer when the Muslims reneged on the agreement. Had they not
12 done so, the Bosnian question might have been settled earlier, with less
13 loss of (mainly Muslim) life and land. To be fair, President Izetbegovic
14 and his aides were encouraged to scupper that deal and to fight for a
15 unitary Bosnian state by well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew
17 "I believed this to be true then and believe it to be true now."
18 Can you explain to us why it is that you consider that
19 President Izetbegovic and his aides were encouraged to scupper the deal?
20 A. For instance, high diplomat from the State Department early in
21 April that year, came to Sarajevo. And in talk -- he was received by
22 Izetbegovic and he advised Izetbegovic to not accept the three-partite
23 plan that we had. He suggested that if they wanted to have some
24 constituent units, then to have more than three. And the -- but he
25 strongly advised him not to accept the -- the three -- or the three were
1 not there by chance or by some arithmetic reason. It was because they
2 constitute the three constituent peoples as they had in their
3 constitution of the country.
4 So the fact that a high American official advised Izetbegovic not
5 to accept that plan seems to me sufficient to make me write to
6 "The Economist" at the time what I did. They were encouraged to scupper
7 that deal and fight for a unitary Bosnia. I believe -- as I put in my
8 statement in -- three years ago, I believed this to be true then and
9 believe it to be true now and I still believe it to be true. And if you
10 read a recent publication, for instance, European Council on
11 Foreign Relations - it's a short booklet, very, very little - by
12 Carl Bildt and he starts by saying exactly the same. He starts by saying
13 that the -- what he calls the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan, if it had been
14 accepted and if it had been put into action, many thousands of lives
15 would have been saved.
16 Q. And, sir, what is the basis of your knowledge of this involvement
17 of an American officer from the State Department in advising Izetbegovic
18 to reject the three -- tripartite agreement of the Statement of
19 Principles? How do you know that?
20 A. At the time -- at the time the American ambassador in Lisbon when
21 I was negotiating the Bosnian question, I saw -- he came to see me
22 several times - he was very helpful - and he sent me documents from time
23 to time that he thought might interest me. And I didn't -- did read -- I
24 didn't send them back to him, did read the telegram in which that was
25 clearly stated, an American telegram.
1 Q. And did you see any difference between the manner in which the
2 Europeans viewed the Bosnian war and how it was viewed by the Americans?
3 A. That is a vast question, Mr. Ivetic. How the Americans, all
4 Americans, all -- how the Europeans, all the Europeans -- it's difficult
5 to say. You see, among the Americans there was sometimes a tendency at
6 that -- from politicians and from people who were not directly
7 involved -- or who had not been directly involved with Yugoslavia to, as
8 soon as they could, try to frame it in some kind of fight between good
9 and evil. And the evil tended to fall on the Serbs in their view.
10 People who have more -- Americans with more experience of Yugoslavia and
11 I can think, for instance, of two that I knew very well. One fortunately
12 still alive, it's Brent Scowcroft; the other was Larry Eagleburger. They
13 both have been posted in different capacities in former Yugoslavia, and
14 they knew that things were much more nuanced and that if you want -- also
15 Americans, perhaps because of their history, tend to have sometimes - and
16 again there are many expectations, I have just mentioned two that I came
17 across - they tend to simplify little these problems. The Europeans have
18 a long -- a long -- more than millennial history of internal fights of
19 borders, of questions of dynasties. So we tend to have an in-built
20 notion that things are not -- neither as easy nor as difficult as they
21 look and that there are many shades of grey - if I may use the
22 expression - when you look at the -- at an international problem of that
23 kind. But this is just a kind of -- I mean, there is no -- I don't think
24 there is "scientific" manner of distinguished between American views and
25 European views. I mean, as I said, there are good views and bad views on
1 both sides.
2 Q. Okay. If we can look at paragraph 33 on the same page. It will
3 be at the top of the page so we have to scroll up. And here you compare
4 the Dayton Agreement with the Statement of Principles and lament the loss
5 of countless lives which resulted after peace was not achieved in
6 March 1992. Now you have touched on this already in answering some other
7 questions. Do you have anything else you would like do add or comment
8 further about this part of the statement?
9 A. No, not really. I mean, the fact -- the big difference between
10 what was arrived at at Dayton and then signed in Paris and what had been
11 agreed in Sarajevo is that the Bosnian-Croat Federation or
12 Muslim-Croat Federation was set. I don't see that necessarily as an
13 improvement. But whatever it is, I mean, the -- the facts are that you
14 still have a partition sought in the country but arrived at after a long
15 and [indiscernible] and brutal war that didn't really help to create an a
16 spirit of compromise. I think if the agreement had been reached, if the
17 agreement reached before -- if -- was kept, if the parties had stuck with
18 it, I don't know, could have evolved. The principles are principles and
19 then there were lots of people that think that were to be discussed and
20 you have just seen through the case of the working group on the -- on the
21 establishment of the units, that it was not an easy job, neither for them
22 nor for outsiders trying to help, in this case, the European Community.
23 But if the outside pressure was kept from governments, we might have
24 reached something very similar to Dayton earlier on and, as I said, with
25 much less bad will created over the three and so years that passed.
1 Q. If we could turn to page 4, the prior page, of your statement in
2 both copies.
3 A. Thank you very much. Yes?
4 Q. And I'd like to look at paragraph 26 with you. And here you talk
5 about the killing on Vase Miskina Street. And in the very next
6 paragraph, paragraph 27, you talk of the shelling of persons in a bread
7 queue at Vase Miskina Street. How are these paragraphs related? Are
8 these both relating to the same incident or are they two different
10 A. It's the same incident.
11 Q. Okay. And now in paragraph 27, you say a Portuguese army
12 artillery officer involved in the investigation told you he was convinced
13 the shell had come from the Bosnian government side.
14 Can you provide us any more information as to the rank, position,
15 or identity of this Portuguese army artillery officer who told you these
17 A. Firstly, he was not involved in the investigation. He was there
18 as part of the European monitors. He was a artillery officer -- he is
19 dead now. And he was there -- seen what other people saw, and he thought
20 about it, and he knew what the positions were of the -- of the different
21 parties. And he told me that he was convinced that it had been fired
22 from the Muslim side and that -- and I had no reason to doubt his --
23 his -- his judgement.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Cutileiro, could I just try to make clear that
25 earlier you corrected a mistake in -- about the letters. Here, do I
1 understand you, that you stepping back from where, in paragraph 27, your
2 statement reads:
3 "He told me that he had participated in the investigation," that
4 that is not an accurate portion of your --
5 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. No, no, no. He had participated as a
6 monitor as a European -- I don't think he was an investigator from the
7 side of the Bosnian authorities. That was what I meant to say.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then this has been clarified.
9 And then could you explain a little bit further what, then, his
10 role as a monitor was when investigations were ongoing?
11 THE WITNESS: He was a monitor. There were -- the
12 European Communities had monitors there, in -- for -- helping to keep the
13 peace and so forth. And he -- he said that he had investigated the
14 matter, but I don't think he was part of an official investigating team
15 of the Bosnian government at the time.
16 JUDGE ORIE: And he was not technically equipped to deal with the
17 scene where the shell had landed and to deal with all technicalities of
18 what is usually investigated there?
19 THE WITNESS: I think he went there, and he -- he had his own
20 expertise, but I -- I don't know more about that.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
23 MR. IVETIC: I think we are at the break.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, it's time for the break.
25 Mr. Cutileiro, we will take a break of 20 minutes. We'd like to
1 see you back after the break.
2 And I'll at this moment inquire with the parties. Mr. Ivetic,
3 are we on track as far as time is concerned?
4 MR. IVETIC: We are.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because -- and I'm now addressing both parties.
6 We have a bit of a tight schedule whether we will be able to conclude
7 hearing the testimony today. I think, as a matter of fact, we should try
8 to do that and avoid that we need to come back tomorrow for ten or 15
9 minutes or for half an hour. If the parties could try to achieve that.
10 MR. IVETIC: I can update. When I say I am on task, I actually
11 mean to finish earlier than the hour and a half, so I should shave about
12 15 minutes off that time which might assist.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we'll take a break.
14 We'll resume at five minutes to 11.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Just like to verify whether the videolink is still
19 functioning well. Could the representative of the Registry at the
20 videolink location tell us whether he can see us and whether he can hear
21 us -- hear us?
22 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] Yes, Your Honour, we can see and
23 hear you clearly.
24 JUDGE ORIE: And the same is true in opposite direction.
25 Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.
1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
2 Q. I'd like to ask a few more questions about this Portuguese army
3 artillery officer that you told you about the Vase Miskina incident.
4 When and where did you have occasion to speak with him on this topic, if
5 you recall?
6 A. I think it was in Sarajevo itself because I went to Sarajevo
7 still a couple of times and I have known -- I have met him before, and
8 that was it, yes. I -- I can't tell you precisely the date.
9 Q. That's fine. That's fine. Do you recall what his rank was at
10 that time?
11 A. I think he was either a colonel or a lieutenant-colonel I think,
12 but again ...
13 Q. And can you give us an idea of how you rated the reliability of
14 this officer?
15 A. I -- I rate it very high. I -- he had impressed me as a very
16 honest man. He was a Portuguese army officer with impeccable
17 credentials. I mean, there is nothing -- he was not a pompous or
18 [indiscernible] kind of person. He was a discreet, quiet man, and I have
19 no reason to doubt what he told me.
20 Q. Now, apart from this once incident at Vase Miskina, were there
21 any other activities that you believed or that the -- that others in the
22 UN communicated that were said to be the responsibility of the Bosnian
23 government rather than the Serbs?
24 A. The case of the bread queue is the one that we have been talking
25 was a very obvious case in which this officer that we have mentioned and
1 other people were convinced that the thing had been presented as a Serb
2 attack when it had not been so, the fact that there had been a television
3 crew there and so forth. Other instances of similar magnitude I don't
4 remember, and honestly, no, I don't.
5 Q. Okay. And then what can you tell us about any observations - of
6 yourself or others - in relation to the Bosnian government position as to
7 the supplying of electricity and water to Sarajevo or the repair of
9 A. I don't recall at the moment anything specific. I think there
10 were discussions about that, but I -- I didn't deal with that directly
11 and I don't remember.
12 Q. Okay. And do you have any knowledge as to the implementation of
13 safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, efforts to demilitarise
15 A. Safe areas came into being after I had stopped dealing with
16 Bosnia, so I didn't hear anything directly then about it. I think this
17 is right, because what I heard then -- because I still attended couple of
18 meetings of the Vance-Owen Conference immediately in the beginning of
19 1993, but I -- I -- I don't -- as I said, I mean, safe areas were not
20 part of our problem at the time. So what I heard, but again I have
21 difficulty pinning down exactly who told me, is that often in safe areas
22 people could come out at night and make war, if you wish, or attack
23 peasants of -- in the case some of them Serbian peasants that lived
24 nearby could be attacked or at least they thought they were attacked by
25 people who were in the safe areas during the day and came back to that
1 afterwards. But this, again, I couldn't pin it down to any specific
2 conversation with anybody at this time.
3 Q. Ambassador, I thank you for your patience in answering my
5 MR. IVETIC: And, Your Honours, I have completed my direct
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
8 Mr. Cutileiro, you'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Tieger.
9 You'll soon see him on your screen. Mr. Tieger is counsel for the
11 Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
14 Q. Good morning, Ambassador.
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. Mr. Ambassador, we would like to conclude your testimony today,
17 so I would ask in that respect if you could keep your answers to
18 questions I ask as focussed and responsive as possible with a yes or no,
19 if it's possible, rather than expounding more generally on the subject
20 matter raised. Okay?
21 A. I'll do my best.
22 Q. Thank you. You refer in your statement in paragraph 28 to
23 Dr. Karadzic's letter of 5 June 1992 which states in part that:
24 "If you cannot keep your promises publicly announced by the EC,
25 we have to protect Serbian people on their ethnic territories."
1 Now your statement does not refer to your response to
2 Dr. Karadzic, so I'd like to do that now.
3 MR. TIEGER: Can the Registrar call up 65 ter 08886, and that
4 would be behind tab 43 of the binder that Mr. Doraiswamy has. All right.
5 Q. As we see here, you wrote back, among other things -- first you
6 note in the last paragraph of your letter:
7 "Let me add one thing referring to the last paragraph of your
8 letter. The EC has not made any promises to you."
9 And then you go on to explain that what happened instead was an
10 agreement on a set of principles which can only be upheld on the basis of
11 negotiated consensus and not force.
12 So in that letter, you made a point of clarifying that what
13 Dr. Karadzic had wrote you was not true and that, in fact, no promises
14 had been made by the European Community; correct?
15 A. It's written in the letter.
16 Q. Okay.
17 MR. TIEGER: I would tender that, Mr. President.
18 Q. Thank you, sir.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
20 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated]
21 JUDGE ORIE: Microphone, please.
22 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 08886 receives
23 Exhibit Number P7767, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted.
25 MR. TIEGER:
1 Q. Now, you discussed with Mr. Ivetic during your
2 examination-in-chief paragraph 35 of your statement, referring in part to
3 well-meaning outsiders and their view of the negotiations. Can we turn
4 to tab 47 of the binder, and that's 65 ter 1D06136. You're probably
5 seeing this ahead of the Judges, Ambassador, and so I'll say it's an
6 article from the "New York Times" --
7 A. Mm-hmm --
8 Q. -- titled: "US Policy Makers on Bosnia Admit Errors in Opposing
9 Partition," and contains, among other things, the following excerpts.
10 In the fourth paragraph down, Warren Zimmermann, then -- who was
11 at -- who was contemporaneously, that is the time of the negotiations,
12 American ambassador to Yugoslavia noting the following:
13 "Our view was that we might be able to head off a Serbian power
14 grab by internationalising the problem ... our hope was the Serbs would
15 hold off if it was clear Bosnia had the recognition of western countries.
16 It turned out we were wrong."
17 And then if we look to the bottom of that first page, we see the
18 point being made:
19 "Other government specialists on Bosnia are skeptical that
20 partition would have worked then" - and we turn the page - "or will work
21 now without renewed fighting. If there was a flaw in United States
22 policy, they say, it was more the failure to back up international
23 recognition of an independent Bosnia with any meaningful support when
24 Serbian and Croatian forces began shelling Muslim town centres and
25 seizing territory through the terror tactics of ethnic cleansing."
1 Ambassador, were aware of these alternate views about how to deal
2 with the situation in Bosnia at that time?
3 A. There were always alternative views of dealing. What I can tell
4 you to cut time is that the model, if you wish, the principles that the
5 team I led proposed and that were accepted were as it were at the time
6 what -- what the market bore. I wouldn't have been able --
7 Q. Ambassador, excuse me, sir --
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. This is perhaps a good opportunity to outline what I was
10 mentioning before about responding. I'm not asking you to defend the
11 negotiations that were taking place. Simply asking you if at the time
12 you were aware of these alternative views of how to approach the problem?
13 A. I suppose I must have heard people saying that there were, but no
14 proposal came to me in any way in that sense. And it's not, if I may,
15 it's not only -- it's not defending my position. It is to tell you that
16 the solution that was eventually found in Dayton is very, very close to
17 what was being discussed three years before.
18 Q. And, Ambassador, with respect you've offered that information in
19 your statement, you repeated it again this morning. I'm trying to move
20 quickly without inviting a repetition of the information already before
21 the Court.
22 MR. TIEGER: I would tender this article, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
24 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 1D06136 receives
25 Exhibit Number P7768, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. Ambassador, in your statement at paragraph 29, you make a point
4 of noting that you received a letter from Dr. Karadzic that he was
5 "firmly committed to stick to the principles of the agreement reached on
6 the 18th of March, 1992."
7 A. Mm-hmm.
8 Q. Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Ambassador, that Karadzic was only
9 pretending to agree to the principles because he considered doing so
10 tactically advantageous?
11 A. Anybody in the position in which I was would have to - from any
12 of the parties - try to evaluate how seriously I could take it, but all
13 parties sent their letters in the manner that they intended. We have
14 been around Izetbegovic before this morning, but I -- I had no particular
15 reason to believe that Dr. Karadzic wouldn't -- would be intent on not
16 sticking to the principles of the agreement.
17 Q. Let me look at some of those principles and some of the things
18 that Dr. Karadzic said to others, not necessarily to you, about those
19 principles. One of the key, if not the key, aspect of the Statement of
20 Principles was that Bosnia would be a state; correct?
21 A. Mm-hmm.
22 Q. I heard you say "mm-hmm," in the affirmative. Or put another
23 way, the --
24 A. It is affirmative in case you have a doubt.
25 Q. Thank you. Put another way the destruction of Bosnia was not
1 considered to be part of the Statement of Principles; right?
2 A. Certainly.
3 MR. TIEGER: Can we call up -- if we turn to tab 20 in the binder
4 and call up P7023, e-court page 2, and in the Serbian page 2.
5 Q. This is a portion of a transcript of a session, the 49th Session,
6 of the Republika Srpska Assembly held on the 13th of February, 1995. And
7 at this portion of the session, Dr. Karadzic is speaking, and his remarks
8 are reflected and he states the following:
9 "The first position in all Cutileiro's principles, if you
10 remember, was that Bosnia was a state consisting of this and that, but it
11 always said that Bosnia was a state and we never accepted that, and we
12 demanded the maximum that we could accept, Bosnia is a confederation of
13 states, if we have to stay in some kind of a confederation. But our
14 minimum is that our state is a state than it cannot can be drowned in
15 anyone else's statehood and sovereignty except for the statehood and
16 sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia, if we so wish, not even Yugoslavia
17 because if it's Yugoslavia then we want to preserve our federal unit, our
18 state, as a federative unit of this Federation, even though our priority
19 was to become a part of Serbia."
20 Can I take it, Ambassador, that Dr. Karadzic did not express this
21 view to you during the course of negotiations --
22 A. Certainly not. Certainly not. It was, as you may -- again, I --
23 I can leave a bit yes or no question. The first position of the Serbs
24 when I started was they didn't want an independent Bosnia. They didn't
25 want Bosnia partitioned. They wanted to be part of Serbia. This he told
1 me at the very beginning of the talks. But then, as we went on, they
2 accepted the principles, which he as he himself says consisted in
3 language of this and that, but it was a state and that -- that was it.
4 This was held in February 1995 and our talks were in 1992. And Dayton,
5 by the way, was in the summer of 1995.
6 Q. Ambassador, I think we're all aware of that those dates and we'll
7 definitely keep then in mind.
8 Now, the agreement in principle, for essentially the same reason,
9 also did not envision or encompass the Bosnian Serb entity joining or
10 uniting with Serbia; correct?
11 A. Absolutely.
12 MR. TIEGER: So can we turn, please, to tab 11 of your binder and
13 65 ter 02345, e-court page 64 and Serbian page 81.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you repeat the 65 ter number and read it a
15 little bit more slowly.
16 MR. TIEGER: 02345.
17 Q. Ambassador, this is a stenographic record of the 8th Session of
18 the Assembly of the Serbian People held in February 1992. And if you
19 turn to, in that tab, about the fourth page you will see Mr. Krajisnik
20 speaking. That's towards the bottom of the page in English --
21 JUDGE ORIE: We're still not there in English on our screens.
22 MR. TIEGER: It's page 64 of the -- of e-court in English.
23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik states, speaking to the members of the assembly:
24 "We have the opportunity to preserve the Serbian people in a
25 single state, to preserve the entire Serbian people in Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina, and have it become part of the Serbian empire."
2 And I take it, Ambassador, that this was not the position that
3 Mr. Krajisnik or Dr. Karadzic asserted to you during the course of
5 A. Certainly not. Can I ask one thing? Mr. Krajisnik had some
6 views that I sometimes thought particularly -- for instance, at a certain
7 stage he thought that if they were going to have an agreement on the
8 basis of the principles, then Bosnia should have three votes at the
9 United Nations and three different flags; but Dr. Karadzic in that
10 particular session told him to shut up.
11 MR. TIEGER: I would tender this excerpt, Mr. President. Parts
12 of this exhibit are already in evidence as P7005.
13 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I'm not clear as to what excerpts
14 we're tendering. Are we just tendering the part that was read or the
15 whole of the comments by Mr. Krajisnik in this part?
16 MR. TIEGER: We can do either one, either that page or the whole
17 of the comments if Mr. Ivetic wishes. I fully accept that I just
18 referred to that page so I'm satisfied with that.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
20 MR. IVETIC: We can deal with that then outside. We don't need
21 to do that now.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Just the page or would you like later --
23 MR. IVETIC: Let's do it later.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Let's do the following. After a discussion by the
25 parties, they'll inform the Chamber what 65 ter number should -- can be
1 added to what is now in evidence as P7005. So we wait for the parties to
2 agree on an excerpt.
3 And, Madam Registrar, once we've received that, you'll be
4 instructed to add that to P7005.
5 Please proceed.
6 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
7 Q. And, similarly, if we could turn to tab 8 of the binder before
8 you, Ambassador, and to 65 ter -- same 65 ter 02345, this time to e-court
9 page 17.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Is that in English or ...?
11 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, in ... yeah, and Serbian page 20, excuse
13 Q. And here we see at the same session Dr. Karadzic speaking and
15 "The aspirations of the Serbian people are" -- this is the bottom
16 paragraph, please.
17 "The aspirations of the Serbian people are very strong and the
18 Serbian people will not rest until they have attained what they had
19 during the time of the Nemanjic's their own state."
20 And again, Ambassador, the same question: This was not the view
21 expressed to you during the course of negotiations; correct?
22 A. Certainly not. If it had been, we wouldn't have had agreement.
23 This is done -- this session, if I -- is held on the 25th of February.
24 The agreement is of the -- the -- my agreement is on 18th of March, so
25 this was before. And, of course, on this basis I would not -- we would
1 not have had agreement.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. TIEGER: And I'd tender that excerpt under the same P number.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This excerpt to be added to what later then
5 will be added to P7005. We'll wait for further agreement on the parties
6 on this excerpt.
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Now, Ambassador, the agreement -- the -- the agreement in
9 principles, the Statement of Principles was also not intended to be a
10 trigger or signal to any of the parties to take control of or seize
11 territory that they considered to be theirs or wanted to be theirs;
13 A. Absolutely.
14 Q. Can we turn then to tab 24 of the binder in front of you and to
15 P4580, page 13, moving on to 14 in the English, and page 18 in the
17 Mr. Ambassador, this is a stenograph of the 11th Session of the
18 Assembly of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina that took place on
19 the 18th of March, 1992, on the same date as the Statement of Principles.
20 And involves, during the course of the discussion at that session,
21 extensive focus on the negotiations and the Statement of Principles.
22 Here, we see Mr. Krajisnik speaking and he states the following:
23 "I think the problem is that they want Bosnia and Herzegovina to
24 be internationally recognised at any cost. They want it to be a state.
25 "In this respect it would be good if we could do one thing for
1 strategic reasons, if we could start implementing what we have agreed
2 upon, the ethnic division on the ground. That we start determining the
3 territory, and once the territory is determined, it remains to be
4 established in additional negotiations whose authorities are to
5 function" - turn the page in English - "and in what way. I cannot say
6 whether this will be fair in political terms, there is not much fairness
7 in politics after all, and yes, if it does not turn out to be fair, the
8 Serbian people will be blamed. But we cannot accept a state designed in
9 the mind of the SDA people."
10 And I -- am I correct, Mr. Ambassador, that Mr. Krajisnik or
11 Mr. Karadzic did not tell you on the same day that the Statement of
12 Principles was reached that they intended to begin implementing ethnic
13 division on the ground?
14 A. No, they didn't.
15 Q. I'd also like to look at -- all right.
16 Mr. Ambassador, I asked you several questions about what
17 Dr. Karadzic or Mr. Krajisnik were telling you during the negotiations
18 and positions they were taking in other contexts.
19 A. Mm-hmm.
20 Q. Were you aware that Dr. Karadzic spoke to you about being
21 actually committed to the Statement of Principles because he considered
22 that it had destroyed Bosnia and what remained was how much of Bosnia the
23 certain entity would get? Did he tell you that during the course of the
25 A. The agreement had destroyed Bosnia; is that what you're asking
1 me, if he asked me?
2 Q. Did he consider that that was the case and that was why he
3 expressed his commitment to it?
4 A. No, he didn't tell me that this agreement would finish Bosnia. I
5 don't remember that.
6 Q. Let's turn next to tab 5 in your binder, and that would be
8 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
9 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. Tab -- excuse me, tab 5 is 65 ter 02391,
10 e-court pages -- page 86 in the English.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's 65 ter not a P number?
12 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. Thank you, Your Honour. 65 ter 02391, yes.
13 02391, e-court page 86 in English and 70 in Serbian.
14 Q. This is a tape-recording of the 39th Session of the
15 Republika Srpska Assembly held on the 24th and 25th of March, 1994, and
16 again this is Dr. Karadzic speaking. And we see this in the middle of
17 the page:
18 "There was a Lisbon map too and the Muslims rejected it. We were
19 happy when they rejected it. We accepted it in order to pull it into the
20 Lisbon process. It was the wisdom and skill of Mr. Krajisnik, who pulled
21 them into stating three things, into accepting three things - that there
22 would be a division in three, that it would be based on ethnicity, and
23 that there would be a referendum. We pulled them into it at that time
24 when they said - we accept the division in three, and that it would be
25 based on ethnicity. At that moment Bosnia was finished for the MZ -
1 international community - that was a great achievement. The maps can be
2 like this or like that. The maps can be widened even after ... signing."
3 And again, Mr. Ambassador, did Mr. Karadzic tell you during the
4 course of the negotiations that he considered that the Statement of
5 Principles finished Bosnia for the international community?
6 A. I -- he never told me that.
7 MR. TIEGER: I would tendered this excerpt, Mr. President,
8 and ...
9 JUDGE ORIE: Is it to be added to any -- not --
10 MR. TIEGER: No.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Then have you uploaded an excerpt? Not yet, I
13 Madam Registrar, would you reserve a number for a newly to be
14 uploaded excerpt of this session.
15 THE REGISTRAR: It will receive Exhibit Number P7769,
16 Your Honours.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll hear once it's uploaded then under what
18 65 ter number. Thank you.
19 Please proceed.
20 MR. TIEGER: And if we turn to tab 6, which is 65 ter 02397,
21 e-court page 7 and Serbian page 5.
22 That's actually in evidence, Mr. President, as P4582. And
23 although the witness doesn't have this in front of him and it's not in
24 e-court --
25 [Prosecution counsel confer]
1 MR. TIEGER: -- we have uploaded a revised translation, having
2 noted that the document -- the translation currently in evidence omitted
3 three words. So it's not a revision of particular words. It's just to
4 remedy the omission of a translation of three words.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Is that relevant for the portion you want to rely
7 MR. TIEGER: It is.
8 JUDGE ORIE: It is.
9 MR. TIEGER: And can I show those particular words to Mr. Ivetic
10 and he with review them. It would be words in --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Happily enough, it is you who finds out that
12 Mr. Ivetic can read both languages so that may save some time.
13 Mr. Ivetic, Mr. Tieger will draw your attention to what has
15 MR. TIEGER: And for Mr. Ivetic's benefit, and I'll try to do
16 that when we get there as well. The words are "je Bosna gotova" [B/C/S
17 spoken], and I'll note that when we get to the portion of the English so
18 Mr. Ivetic can follow it as accurately as possible. This is --
19 JUDGE ORIE: B/C/S version is not yet available in the e-court.
20 MR. TIEGER: And that's page 5, beginning in the middle of the
22 JUDGE ORIE: Oh. Then I'm ... we are looking at -- let me --
23 just one second, please.
24 MR. TIEGER: And ...
25 JUDGE ORIE: I may have the wrong one, but let's ...
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 MR. TIEGER: Ms. Stewart informs me it's the correct page in
4 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. I --
5 MR. TIEGER: Not the correct page in English yet. So if we turn
6 to page 6 in English, e-court page 6. Okay. The confusion may be -- now
7 I think I know what the problem is. We should move to P -- if we are in
8 the -- in the 65 ter we've got the entirety of the document rather than
9 the portion of the document which is reflected in P4582, and maybe that's
10 the problem.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just check. I had something totally
12 different, but I may have ... oh, yes, I made a mistake. Apologies for
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. TIEGER: Okay. So page 6, please, of the English and page 5
16 of the Serbian. Okay.
17 Q. And looking at the bottom of the page in English, this is
18 Dr. Karadzic speaking, he says:
19 "Then" --
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Where is it on the B/C/S page?
21 MR. TIEGER: Also toward the bottom of the page. Let's go to
22 page 74. That will begin toward the bottom of 74 in the Serbian.
23 Okay. Just the previous page -- that's right. Okay.
24 Q. Dr. Karadzic says:
25 "Then Alija said yes to three Bosnias for the first time, and
1 that it would be an ethnic basis, and that was fatal for him. They
2 showed us completely unacceptable maps, but Cutileiro said you can accept
3 this as a basis for further discussion, then we seized it with both hand,
4 yes, as a basis for further discussion yes" -- -
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot find this text
6 in Serbian.
7 MR. IVETIC: It's not there.
8 MR. TIEGER: All right. Let's turn to the next page at the --
9 page 5 in B/C/S and --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, if it would assist you, the 40 and
11 50 per cent which appears on the fourth line of page 7 in e-court, they
12 appear approximately in the middle of page 75 the first word I think some
13 14 lines from the top.
14 MR. TIEGER: Right.
15 JUDGE ORIE: That's where we are. So it should start some seven
16 or eight lines before that. And perhaps you could restart quoting so
17 that the interpreters have a --
18 MR. TIEGER: Okay. And I think can you see about nine, ten lines
19 down, Mr. Ivetic, the reference to Alija in the middle of that sentence.
20 Happy to read it again.
21 "Then Alija said yes to three Bosnias for the first time. And
22 that it would be an ethnic basis and that was fatal for him. They showed
23 us completely unacceptable maps, but Cutileiro said you can accept this
24 as a basis for further discussion, then we seized it with both hands,
25 yes, as a basis for further discussion yes. It was important to us that
1 it was in three, that it was on a territorial basis, and that there was
2 some kind of map in existence by which we could establish our right to
3 territory as between 45 and 50 per cent, you know what Cutileiro's map
4 looked like. Then Bosnia exploded, then we were accepted as a side in
5 the conflict. The international community made a serious mistake because
6 they sent Cutileiro and Carrington to us before the war, because they
7 accepted us as a side in the conflict. If they had ignored us and kept
8 quiet, recognised Bosnia, and said afterwards that there were some kind
9 of insurrectionists there who were wrecking their own state, we would be
10 in serious difficulties, nobody would be talking to us; by our pliability
11 and willingness to negotiate we -- it seemed to them at every moment,
12 there it is, except the Serbs have not agreed and that from the beginning
13 right up until now, except that the Serbs -- I have not agreed -- not
14 agreed and we led them on so that it seemed to them that they would be
15 successful, that they would enter the process, that they would
16 internationalise the Bosnian Question, because that very moment when
17 Bosnia was internationalised ... Bosnia was finished and when they were
18 recognised as a side in the conflict, although they say the government in
19 Sarajevo and the government in Pale ..."
20 And then he goes on to talk about -- what -- the status of the
21 government in -- in Sarajevo and what they might tell diplomats in
22 confidence or not.
23 Q. Ambassador --
24 JUDGE ORIE: You did read was finished, that's --
25 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry --
1 JUDGE ORIE: -- I have difficulties in --
2 MR. TIEGER: -- yeah --
3 JUDGE ORIE: -- is that the portion --
4 MR. TIEGER: -- "Bosnia is finished" is the portion that was
5 omitted in translation previously.
6 MR. IVETIC: I don't know --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Could you then briefly --
8 MR. TIEGER: -- yeah, and the lines.
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- read that again and although we're usually not
10 relying on interpreters for translation, but if indeed a few words are
11 missing we would like to -- if words are not missing, we'd like to --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Those words are indeed
13 missing as well as a few other words of minor importance, but definitely
14 missing. The whole portion as read into the record should be revised.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, the words indeed are missing but there
16 seems to be more missing, and the whole portion --
17 MR. TIEGER: -- of course you want it as accurate as possible. I
18 was able to discern that those words are missing. I didn't have the
19 linguistic capability to be aware of any others, which I think our
20 interpreter indicated are of minor importance but, of course, it should
21 be taken care of in any event.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it will be taken care of in any event. Another
23 way of dealing with the matter would be that the relevant portion is read
24 but now in B/C/S, by someone who speaks that language, so that we would
25 have at least as accurate as possible reflected what the document says
1 prior to a final revision of the translation anyhow.
2 Mr. Ivetic, I'm looking at you, whether you would be able to
3 offer your services in this respect.
4 MR. IVETIC: With my reading of Cyrillic, it's rather slow and I
5 think it would be better addressed by CLSS in the manner that the
6 interpreters have suggested.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then this portion should be revised. What
8 you've read until now you can put your questions on the basis of that --
9 MR. TIEGER: Yes, I can, Mr. President. Thank you.
10 JUDGE ORIE: And at the same time we know that, especially in the
11 very end of your reading, that more work is there still to be done.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. IVETIC: One question, though, Your Honours. The -- counsel
14 has stopped in the middle of a sentence in both the --
15 MR. TIEGER: -- I'm happy to finish that. I thought that would
16 be more expeditious, but I'm happy to finish that, Mr. Ivetic, no
18 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. You continue reading and then put your
19 question, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: Will do. And I can tie it in the discussion we just
21 had. Okay. I'll start a little bit above.
22 "Accept the Serb have not agreed and we led them on so that it
23 seemed to them that they would be successful, that they would enter the
24 process, that they would internationalise the Bosnian Question because
25 that very moment when Bosnia was ... internationalised ... Bosnia was
1 finished and when we were recognised as a side in the conflict although
2 they say the 'government in Sarajevo' and the 'government in Pale,' but
3 that government in Sarajevo is Muslim and not universally Bosnian. It
4 mean what is Mr. Micic says, that we must brace ourselves and tell those
5 diplomates in confidence what we might perhaps put up with and what we
6 would not."
7 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, with apologies for the linguistic
8 difficulties and the clarifications, can I take it that Dr. Karadzic did
9 not express this view to you during the negotiations of what --
10 A. He did -- he did not, he didn't.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. TIEGER: And I think we've handled the tendering portions,
13 Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and this was already in evidence, but those
15 portions were also already in evidence so there's nothing to be done any
16 further, apart from revising the translation especially of this hard copy
17 page 5.
18 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
19 Q. Now, Ambassador, moving from the expression of this view by
20 Dr. Karadzic, let me ask you this question: Were you aware of
21 Dr. Karadzic's view that after Bosnia was "done" or "finished," the
22 question was how much of it the Bosnian Serbs would get?
23 A. I don't quite understand your question. I suppose once we had an
24 agreement of principles, maps were going to be designed by the three
25 parties with technical help, and eventually some bits will be found --
1 some borders would be found. So I don't understand your question.
2 Q. Well, perhaps I can put it more coherently in the context of a
3 particular comment or two by Dr. Karadzic. So if I could turn your
4 attention to tab 21 of the binder, and that's P4580, e-court pages 43
5 through 44 in English and 63 through 64 in Serbian and that would be, in
6 Serbian, beginning around the second sentence of the fourth full
8 Now, once again, this is Dr. Karadzic speaking at the assembly
9 session which was held on the 18th of March, 1992, the same day as the
10 Statement of Principles, and at page 43 of the English, toward -- in the
11 last paragraph, Dr. Karadzic states the following:
12 "We have preserved the Serbian people as a corpus, in its
13 entirety, in the BH and detached it as an entity, and now it is a matter
14 of quantity only. We have achieved the quality. This is what Europe
15 recognises: Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina exists. The only remaining
16 question is the one of quantity, there is a tug of war about who will
17 have more. We won, we have drawn the rope to a certain point and we are
18 not going to yield it back. There is no return to a unitary BH, we can
19 go forward and obtain more power for the constituent units. So, we have
20 led them into the waters, into which we wanted to lead them. The fact
21 that it is not up to here (showing at his neck) but only to the waist,
22 that has to do with quantity."
23 And if we turn the page in English, he continues -- and Serbian
24 as well, please. It continues:
25 "And it will happen according to our political will, our right to
1 self-determination and organisation, it will happen according to the
2 actual conditions which are up to you to create."
3 Now, Ambassador, you already alluded to the difficult questions
4 of defining the territories of the constituent units indicated in the
5 Statement of Principles. Did Dr. Karadzic emphasise to you during the
6 course of the negotiations his view that Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 exists, now the only remaining question was how -- was one of quantity,
8 how big it was going to be, and that he was emphasising to his followers
9 that it would be up to the actual conditions which were to them to
11 A. Are you asking me?
12 Q. Yes, sir. Is that -- is that the information Dr. Karadzic was
13 emphasising to you at the time?
14 A. We had come to an agreement and then each party had then to
15 convince their own people. He didn't go into details like that to me.
16 He went back to his people and that was it.
17 Q. All right. One more excerpt before we take a recess, and that's
18 at tab 27 of your binder, sir, and 65 ter 02345, e-court page 20 in
19 English and page 24 in Serbian.
20 MR. TIEGER: And I'll be directing the witness's attention to the
21 fourth full -- to paragraph in Serbian but his attention in English
22 translation, of course.
23 Q. This is Dr. Karadzic speaking at one of the sessions I referred
24 your attention to earlier, Ambassador, the 8th Session held on the 25th
25 of February, 1992, and these are the words he spoke at the assembly:
1 "We accept, and I say BH must remain within these borders.
2 Great. Now let us turn to internal borders. And once that is done, once
3 they are wider than the external borders, then we can say, who cares
4 about external borders. What matters is that the ones within BH become
5 as wide as possible. As the popular saying goes, if kicked out the door,
6 go back through the window. You will still be in the same place."
7 During the course of the negotiations, was Dr. Karadzic
8 emphasising to you his intention to ensure that the borders were as wide
9 as possible?
10 A. Certainly not.
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. TIEGER: I'd tender that excerpt, Mr. President. It should
13 be added to P7005.
14 JUDGE ORIE: And this is the excerpt as it is uploaded now? Not
15 yet. So therefore, once this excerpt has been uploaded, it will be added
16 to P7005.
17 MR. TIEGER: And, Mr. President, I see we're at the time for a
18 break. It's an appropriate moment.
19 JUDGE ORIE: At the time of a break.
20 Mr. Cutileiro, we'd like to see you back in 20 minutes. We'll
21 take a short break.
22 And, Mr. Tieger, can we be confident that we'll be able to
23 conclude to hear the testimony of Mr. Cutileiro today?
24 MR. TIEGER: On the basis of the pace so far, yes; but, of
25 course, I don't want to jinx our progress by being over-optimistic.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 Mr. Cutileiro, everyone in this courtroom is still confident that
3 we would be able to conclude your testimony today, but unforeseen
4 circumstances could change that.
5 We take a break and we resume at quarter past 12.00.
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 --- Recess taken at 11.55 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 12.16 p.m.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I again would like to establish whether the
10 videolink is functioning well at this moment. Could the representative
11 of the Registry at the videolink location confirm that he can see us and
12 that he can hear us.
13 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] Yes, Your Honour, we can see and
14 hear you clearly. Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We can see and hear you as well.
16 Mr. Tieger will now continue his cross-examination.
17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Before I commence, may I
18 just note the following and may I overcome my own suspicious nature
19 sufficiently to note that there's at least a realistic prospect of
20 concluding this session. I spoke to Mr. Ivetic briefly about that. I --
21 at the moment, I don't think he has too much in -- very well in
22 re-direct, I think. So I only wanted to alert the Court, so if that
23 happens you're not caught by surprise and unable to take any actions you
24 might otherwise have taken.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, so that we can start thinking about what to do
1 in our leisure time, isn't it, Mr. Tieger?
2 MR. TIEGER: Well, I was going to suggest that, but I was leaving
3 that to the Court.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you. Please proceed.
5 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
6 Q. Mr. Ambassador, just before we recessed we had been looking at
7 the question of quantity and wide borders. In that connection, I wanted
8 to ask you if Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Krajisnik during the course of
9 negotiations emphasised certain factors that I'm going to bring to your
10 attention that -- that implicated the extent of the borders.
11 So this Court has received evidence, for example - that's P3006
12 for benefit of the Court and parties - the declaration of the
13 proclamation of the state, that the territories of the Bosnian Serb
14 republic were considered to include areas in which the Serbian people is
15 now a minority due to the genocide carried out against it in
16 World War II. And we also see that in P3007, Article 2, of the
17 Constitution of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, that
18 the territory was considered to include regions where genocide was
19 committed against the Serb people in the Second World War.
20 Did Mr. Karadzic emphasise to you or indicate to you during the
21 course of negotiations that he considered that the Bosnian Serb entity
22 should include territories on which the Bosnian Serb people were a
24 A. Not that I remember. But I don't exclude it. You know, we
25 discussed the principles, and then we were going and we did go for a
1 while on the maps, and the basic -- the basis for working on the maps was
2 the current - at the time - the demographic reality. And there was no
3 absolutely recent census, if I remember rightly, but it was on the last
4 available census. And the kind of - if I may comment - mythical,
5 historical notion of territories that had once been people populated by
6 one of the -- one of the groups, and that for one reason or another in
7 the war perhaps, would have stopped being -- that group would have
8 stopped being a majority. I don't think we would accept that. I know we
9 didn't accept that as an argument. So at the time when we came to
10 discuss maps, that was not an issue anymore.
11 Q. Well, in connection with the mention of the mythical nature of
12 that view of territorial entitlement, let me just turn briefly to tab 46
13 of your binder, 65 ter 02366, e-court page 32 and Serbian page 23.
14 This is a tape-recording of the 24th Session of the People's
15 Assembly of Republika Srpska held on the 8th of January, 1993. And this
16 is a delegate from Prijedor in north-west Bosnia speaking, Mr. Srdic.
17 And he says:
18 "Also from this place I want to say that I was shocked with the
19 map presented to us by our respected President, Mr. Karadzic. What do
20 those renegades think, that we have spilled our blood and conquered what
21 belongs to us all for nothing? We have conquered -- actually restored
22 only the Serb territory that they took from us back in 1941 when they
23 conducted a massacre over the Serb people. Gentlemen, and I can tell you
24 only this, and I believe that I share the opinion of the neighbouring
25 municipalities of Bosanska Novi, Bosanska Krupa, and Sanski Most not a
1 single inch of the land shall be given to those vile traitors and brats
2 who want to share the municipality of Prijedor as well as other
3 municipalities the way it suits them. It is the greeting from under
4 Kozara. We will fight until the very last man" --
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please slow down.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. "That is the greeting from under Kozara. We will fight until the
8 very last man and not a single inch of land shall we give."
9 Now, Ambassador, we'll look reasonably soon at, for example, the
10 maps that you referred to, the Dayton map, and what happened during the
11 course of the conflict, but I simply wanted to draw your attention to
12 this and ask if you were aware of the time -- I'd already asked you, of
13 course, about the provisions in the declaration, the proclamation of the
14 state, and in the constitution, if you were aware of the fact that those
15 historical or mythical views of entitlement to territory were reflected
16 in not only the legal documents but in exchanges of views at the
17 Parliament in positions taken by the representatives of Republika Srpska?
18 A. Again, I -- I have difficulty with your question. Obviously
19 these are difficult questions and they are difficult questions
20 particularly in a place where history is of extreme importance - it is
21 much more important than law in many cases - for what people feel. But,
22 as you know, I was not a member of the People's Assembly of the
23 Republika Srpska, and in January 1993 I didn't deal with Bosnia anymore.
24 So I'm sure this is what happened, and I'm sure many other people had
25 these kind of views. But when they were negotiating map, the bits that
1 we did on that, obviously this was not an argument that we could accept,
2 so probably that's why Karadzic was -- if I understand well the
3 quotation, what you have just showed, the Serbs negotiators had
4 difficulties with their own assembly. But that's part of a deal like
6 MR. TIEGER: I tender that excerpt, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE ORIE: And the excerpt as such is uploaded?
8 MR. TIEGER: And it should be added to P6921 -- no, it is not,
9 Mr. President.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. So the excerpt will be under uploaded and
11 will then be added and Madam Registrar will be instructed to add it to
13 Please proceed.
14 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
15 Q. I wanted to look at another basis or motive that implicated the
16 extent of the borders and claim territory, and in that respect wanted to
17 turn your attention to tab 26 in your binder, which is P4584, e-court
18 pages 5 through 6 and Serbian pages 6 through 7.
19 This is Dr. Karadzic speaking at a session of the 53rd Assembly,
20 Republika Srpska National Assembly, in 1995, talking about what has
21 happened and why. And he says at the bottom of the page in English and
22 toward the bottom quarter of the page on page 7 in the Serbian:
23 "To tell the truth, there are towns that we've grabbed for
24 ourselves" - and now next page in English - "and there were only
25 30 per cent of us" --
1 JUDGE ORIE: It's not yet on our screens. Could you wait for a
2 second. It's there.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: There it is now.
4 JUDGE ORIE: And is it there also in -- apparently not in B/C/S.
5 MR. TIEGER: It's the bottom of the page, please, in English.
6 JUDGE ORIE: The very bottom, I think. Yes. And now in B/C/S?
7 MR. TIEGER: Next page in B/C/S, please. And enlarge the bottom
8 quarter of the page.
9 Q. Again, Dr. Karadzic states:
10 "To tell the truth, there are towns that we've grabbed for
11 ourselves and there were only 30 per cent of us. I can name as many of
12 those as you want."
13 MR. TIEGER: Next page in English, please.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Turn the page, please.
15 MR. TIEGER: In English, not in B/C/S, please.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Could we then go back in B/C/S. Yes.
17 Please proceed.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. "I can name as many of those as you want, but we cannot give up
20 the towns where we made up 70 per cent. Don't let this get around, but
21 remember how many of us there were in Bratunac, how many in Srebrenica,
22 how many in Visegrad, how many in Rogatica, how many in Vlasenica, in
23 Zvornik, et cetera. Due to strategic importance they had to become ours,
24 and no one is practically questioning it anymore."
25 Now --
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tieger when was this session held?
2 MR. TIEGER: In 1993 and specifically 28th of August -- 1995,
3 excuse me, and specifically 28th of August, 1995.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Now, I'll ask you to remember those or keep those specific areas
7 named in mind, because I'll be directing your attention to them in
8 connection with a later document as well. But I simply wanted to ask you
9 whether during the time of negotiations, as you were considering the
10 prospect of negotiating on territory, whether Dr. Karadzic emphasised
11 that there were strategic reasons which dictated that the Bosnian Serbs
12 should obtain multiple areas where the Bosnian Muslims were, in fact, a
14 A. Not that I remember.
15 Q. Thank you, sir.
16 Now, Ambassador, even setting aside for a moment these factors
17 which implicated the extent of the territory that the Bosnian Serb
18 leadership considered should be Serbian, the international negotiators
19 understood that the maps did not speak favourably about ethnic division;
21 A. I can't understand your question.
22 Q. Well, perhaps it would be clearer if I turn your attention to a
23 specific portion of notes taken during the course of those discussions,
24 and in that connection if I could turn your attention to tab 10 of your
25 document, and this is 65 ter 0958.
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. Ambassador, I hope these look familiar to you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that one digit is missing which
5 would enable to find that document.
6 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry, 07958 and I obviously must have
7 omitted one of those digits.
8 Q. Ambassador, I was just saying that I hope these look familiar to
9 you. You had an opportunity to review them when Mr. Hayden and I met
10 with you in, I believe, 2009 --
11 A. Mm-hmm.
12 Q. -- and you indicated at that time that they appeared to
13 accurately reflect what had taken place during the course of the
14 negotiations, although obviously you were unable to conduct an extensive
15 exhaustive review. I think you said the following. You were able to
16 verify the document to the extent that the dates recorded reflect the
17 actual dates of the talks and that it does appear to be a genuine attempt
18 to recreate what happened.
19 "The topics discussed are consistent with my recollection of the
20 matters raised by Mr. Karadzic and the other Bosnian Serbs in these
21 separate talks."
22 Is that still consistent with your understanding of that
24 A. I point out to that you that that document is of the 6th of
25 February, 1992, which was my first visit to Sarajevo - I accompanied
1 Lord Carrington. And it was at that meeting that Lord Carrington told
2 the Bosnians in general - Izetbegovic, Karadzic, and the representatives
3 of the Croats as well - that we were going to have a set of negotiations
4 to try to get a political solution for Bosnia. And these were the
5 negotiations I chaired. So this is previous to that. We started our
6 talks couple of weeks later, I think --
7 Q. Right --
8 A. -- and so this is not exactly -- well, it is a -- I was there.
9 It is a conversation between Lord Carrington and Dr. Karadzic, and, yes,
10 they said what is said is there. But this is at -- we have not yet even
11 started --
12 Q. No, I understand that, Ambassador --
13 A. -- negotiating the Bosnian question.
14 Q. Right --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, before we continue, I see at this moment
16 in the original a cover -- cover of what seems to be a kind of a booklet.
17 But in the English translation, there is some comment on the top three
18 lines of comment what it may be and to whom it belongs, et cetera, which
19 I do not see in the original.
20 MR. TIEGER: No, I think that's why -- it should be in brackets,
21 I imagine. That's how --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Even I expect a translation to just translate what
23 is in the original document and not any -- with or without brackets any
24 further comments to what it claims to present. Therefore, if you later
25 want to tender part of this, I think that the comment should be removed
1 from what is now presented as an English translation.
2 MR. TIEGER: I'm happy to do so, Mr. President. I would indicate
3 that it's significant for provenance purposes that this document was
4 tendered by Dr. Karadzic as the notes taken by his chef de cabinet
5 relating to the negotiations Ambassador Cutileiro --
6 JUDGE ORIE: We might be very much interested to know what it
7 says, but it should not be part of the translation where in the original
8 it doesn't say anything about that. That's my only comment at this
10 MR. TIEGER: Okay. No, we'll take care of that then.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I wanted to bring your attention to two --
14 JUDGE ORIE: But Mr. Ivetic --
15 MR. IVETIC: I note that the B/C/S translation isn't coming
16 through. Perhaps the microphones are not turned on.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Did you -- do you now receive B/C/S translation?
18 MR. IVETIC: I'm told yes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Any need to repeat what was just said, which was
20 just a technical issue of -- in the translation appearing some text what
21 does not --
22 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] -- not needed, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll move on.
24 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. I just want to draw your attention, Mr. Ambassador, to two
2 portions of that. The first one is contained at page 3 of the document
3 and it's during the course of that meeting involving -- that's headed
4 "Lord Carrington visiting Dr. Karadzic." And there Lord Carrington is
5 recorded as stating:
6 "The map of BiH" - and this is in the middle of the page - "is
7 not speaking in favour of division of Bosnia."
8 This was a reflection, was it not, Mr. Ambassador, of the fact
9 that the question of the division of Bosnia was already on the table and
10 Lord Carrington's position that the map of Bosnia - meaning the
11 demographics of Bosnia - did not speak favourably about the prospect of
12 that division?
13 A. Well, this is what is written here, so he certainly said that.
14 And there are probably parts of the world where maps would reflect
15 more -- would speak differently in favour or disfavour of a division, but
16 this was one possibility; there were others. And in the end what we
17 managed to get agreement on from Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, was the
18 division on the three constituent units. I don't want to take time -
19 because I only want to finish early, if possible - but the Muslims didn't
20 want any division at all. The Serbs didn't want Bosnia do exist. They
21 wanted to -- things being carved in a way that the Serbs would remain in
22 Serbia and this is a particular extreme case of elasticity of borders, if
23 you wish. The Croats were more discreet in what they wanted, but
24 basically they would have profited if Bosnia disappeared and Serbs would
25 remain in Serbia and the Croats -- particularly the Croats of Herzegovina
1 would have gone to Croatia. What eventually we arrived at where they all
2 were still talking to each other, the coalition government was in place,
3 which was the tripartite thing which - if I may remember - with the
4 addition of the Muslim-Croat Federation is what you find in Dayton.
5 I'm saying this because obviously on the onset looking -- without
6 looking or discussing with -- with the people concerned, you might have
7 imagined different ways of trying to sort out the Bosnian question, but
8 that was the way that in the end we managed to get agreed upon by the
9 parties themselves. So the comment of Lord Carrington is absolutely
10 normal and it's there. That's what it said. But this is -- again, this
11 is before we had tried to probe the question with the three
12 constituent -- the three parties, the Muslims, the Croats, and the Serbs.
13 Q. Thank you, Ambassador. For the moment I'm focussing on the issue
14 of division and the extent of the territory claimed. Let me move to a
15 portion of this record of the negotiations deeper into the negotiations,
16 in particular, on the 27th of February - that's page 8 - where the same
17 issue appears to be raised. And we can look at the bottom of the page.
18 We see Dr. Karadzic saying:
19 "Essentially they are taking us out of Yugoslav forever and are
20 closing us into BiH."
21 Mr. Koljevic speaks:
22 "Are Muslims going to accept ethnic principles?"
23 And then it says:
24 "Darvin" - I presume that's a reference to Henry Darwin; is that
1 A. It says -- it says --
2 Q. "-- states:
3 "'I cannot accept that they become ethnically clean entities
4 because it is not feasible in the field."
5 That's another reflection, is it not, Mr. Ambassador, of the view
6 that the demographic distribution in Bosnia did not speak favourably of
7 the possibility of ethnic division?
8 A. It depends on how you did it, you see, because you -- the -- what
9 we call loosely the international community - and that means in this case
10 basically Europe and the United States - wanted an independent Bosnia.
11 And the three people that were the main people there found no better way
12 to sort that out and to get an independent Bosnia than by having three
13 constituent units with appropriate protection for minorities and so
14 forth. This was the case in 1992 and this was the case in -- since then,
15 until 1995. It was with us all the time. There were attempts by Owen
16 and Vance and then by Owen and Stoltenberg that they wished to negotiate
17 different arrangements. That didn't work. And eventually when
18 Dick Holbrooke took over, we went back basically to the original
19 arrangement. Neither of this is satisfactory, but it was what was
20 possible. It was what was the market bore as I said. We were aware from
21 the beginning of these difficulties.
22 MR. TIEGER: I would tender those excerpts, Mr. President, and I
23 don't believe there is an existing number yet.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Apparently no objection. Could the Chamber be
25 informed about the -- I do understand, Mr. Tieger, that it was tendered
1 in the Karadzic case by Mr. Karadzic and it is presented as being a
2 notebook of Mr. Karadzic's secretary.
3 MR. TIEGER: His chef de cabinet, yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Chef de cabinet, yes. If there's no dispute about
5 that on the origin of this.
6 Madam Registrar, the number would be ...?
7 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 07958 receives
8 Exhibit Number P7770.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
10 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
11 JUDGE ORIE: Admission is complete, but we expect the English
12 version to be -- that the comment will be taken out of the English
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Ambassador, we've looked at a number of concepts or positions
16 that implicated the extent of the territory claimed and the potential
17 position on the map appended to the Statement of Principles which, as I
18 believe you've indicated, was a map that reflected the existing
19 demographic distribution in Bosnia by municipalities.
20 I'd like to look next in that regard at Exhibit P7294. The
21 transcript is at pages 1 to 2 of the English and the Serbian, but I'd
22 like to look -- this is a video recording of Dr. Karadzic speaking about
23 the map, and I'd like to play that for your benefit and for the benefit
24 of the Court and parties, sir.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Has the audio been reviewed against the excerpt --
1 MR. TIEGER: -- this is -- yes, it's already in evidence and it's
2 already been reviewed --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I apologise.
4 Please proceed.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 [Video-clip played]
7 JUDGE ORIE: We do not receive English translation. Have the
8 transcript been distributed to the booth? They have.
9 Could we re-start and are the interpreters -- do they know -- I
10 see there is a bit of gesturing between the various booths.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, we are trying to locate the
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you inform us one you've found it.
14 [Prosecution counsel confer]
15 MR. TIEGER: We just provided one this morning and there's a note
16 on it that identifies it as beings this document in connection with this
18 THE INTERPRETER: We have a copy. Thank you.
19 JUDGE ORIE: A copy is there. I see everyone is smiling so we
20 could continue.
21 Could we re-start, as a matter of fact.
22 [Video-clip played]
23 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Mr. President, ever since the
24 Lisbon Conference took place, we entered a real epic of maps. World
25 politics didn't operate with maps so much until then. Please explain to
1 our public, the Serbian public, certain issues that remained unexplained
2 all this time. Shall we start? What was happening after the
3 Cutileiro Plan?
4 "Radovan Karadzic: You're right. The fact that the main problem
5 has always been the map tells us that this map -- this war was about
6 territory. Here before us is the Cutileiro preliminary map which had
7 recognised around 50 per cent of our territory before the war had even
8 started and before any kind of so-called aggression had occurred which
9 was not entirety satisfactory to us but we accepted the logic of the map
10 and that's why we accepted it because for the first time it was about the
11 separation of Bosnia into three pieces. You see, for instance, remember
12 this, it will be very important to us later as regards the western part,
13 they accepted the border to be at the Una River. They acknowledged that
14 there were Muslims at the foothills of Mount Grmec and Mount Kozara, but
15 they expected that we would trade it for something like they expected us
16 to trade something in the area of Mount Kupres, part of Mount Kupres for
17 Posavina. However, this map here shows something that all the future
18 maps would show, which is the necessity of cutting off the Serbian
19 territory at Brcko. The western interests are making sure that the
20 Serbian state is not established, that --
21 "Journalist: Therefore, it is a rope around the neck from the
22 beginning of the Serbs in the long run?
23 "Radovan Karadzic: Yes, absolutely. We didn't want to accept
24 the map but we decide it was a major step forward because the Muslims
25 thought we wouldn't accept it. We ensured that it would be written
1 'preliminary' on it and then we accepted it and it was the first time
2 that the Muslims and Croats accepted to divide Bosnia into three pieces.
3 We weren't satisfied with an Eastern Bosnia, with Sarajevo too, although
4 we can see that Sarajevo is divided between the Serbs and Muslims. We
5 weren't satisfied with the Neretva River valley, especially not here. We
6 were satisfied here with the Una River and we could accept that. Look at
7 this map here which is in fact the Vance-Owen Plan which shows the black
8 fields represent what we would have to give back if we had accepted the
9 Vance-Owen Plan. You see, once again, you can notice that we're cut off
10 here at Brcko.
11 "Journalist: For the exit too?
12 "Radovan Karadzic: Yes, but not only at Brcko. In this scenario
13 we would have lost Mount Ozren, Doboj, and entire Posavina, and then a
14 large area in the Eastern Bosnia and here, of course, is Western Bosnia.
15 You see, we saw on Vance's table special maps of mineral resources and
16 other resources which were issued by the Central Investigations Agency,
17 the CIA, and there we saw that a lot of attention given to the Ljubija
18 mining facility, the Kamengrad coal-mine, and all the central mines here
19 and the power plants on the Drina River and the Neretva River.
20 Therefore, the west has always been making sure that it be given to
21 Croats, and I must say that all the Croats have a true friend which is
22 Germany. Neither are the Americans friends of the Muslims nor have the
23 Russians done anything for us, whereas the Croats would always only
24 accept that was offered as Germany already made sure that they'd got the
25 right thing.
1 "Journalist: You've mentioned Ljubija. It's interesting that
2 Goerring had exploited that same area during the Second World War. I
3 believe that the CIA had taken most of these resource maps from the
4 Germans. That's the essence of it in my opinion.
5 "Radovan Karadzic: In that regard you can understand why a
6 green -- a green stain has appeared here. Another German -- actually an
7 Austrian Valdheim had carried out genocide here. Here, for instance, in
8 Sanski Most over 5.300 Serbs were killed, murdered, and slaughtered in
9 one day. In this area here in Bosanska Krupa even and Bihac, the Bihac
10 county, we were absolutely the majority of the population in this area,
11 more than two-thirds. Somewhere between 70 per cent and 77 per cent of
12 the population were Serbs. And now when you tell someone from the
13 foothills of Mount Grmec and Mount Kozara that a part of Mount Kozara, a
14 part of Mount Grmec, the Sana River valley, et cetera, which have always
15 been exclusively Serbian, for the most part Serbian, that it will become
16 someone else's, you can expect a negative response, not just from the
17 people here but from all the people here as well who will not allow that
18 to happen to the Serbs here. A complete national solidarity and
19 self-awareness is present here and everybody equally worries about how
20 the state will be."
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. Ambassador, you've just had an opportunity to see along with the
23 rest of us Dr. Karadzic speaking about the map and indicating his
24 dissatisfaction with the map in respect of Eastern Bosnia, Sarajevo, the
25 Neretva, the "green stain" in north-west Bosnia. Did Dr. Karadzic
1 express to you his dissatisfaction with these significant portions of the
2 Cutileiro map during the course of your negotiations?
3 A. I suppose you call the Cutileiro map the original map, which was
4 a basis for discussion.
5 Q. My apologies, I made the same -- I did the same thing to
6 Mr. Ivetic was referring to earlier. The map appended to the Statement
7 of Principles.
8 A. Oh, yes. Well, the map was a basis to start discussions, and
9 discussions were started. And all parties had their arguments in one way
10 or another, but nothing of the kind that I have just heard was told to me
11 in that way. This is certainly not a thing that appeared. We knew it
12 was difficult - you yourself said why it was difficult - and we were
13 doing as we could. But you -- the maps that was -- that were finally
14 agreed were the maps that were agreed in Dayton, so you probably should
15 ask the people who were in Dayton whether this kind of arguments or
16 reservations lasted there. I don't remember that being so important
17 because at my time we didn't come to a detailed overall map of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina with the three constituent units. We were in the
19 preliminary phase.
20 Q. And in fact, Mr. Ambassador, as you yourself have written, once
21 recognition -- once Bosnia was recognised as independent or recognition
22 was imminent and the negotiations from the Bosnian Serb point of view
23 unsuccessful, the Bosnian Serbs felt confirmed in their paranoid view of
24 history and went brutally on the offensive; correct?
25 A. I wrote that in an article, but I don't -- at the stage in which
1 I was talking to you, which is the stage of the preliminary map with the
2 principles, I don't think you can take that map as an example because
3 further maps were negotiated later, particularly in the Dayton process.
4 Q. I'm going look at what those maps were based in part on. But
5 first if we could quickly turn to tab 42 of the binder in front of you,
6 page 40 of the documents listed there, and it's 65 ter 1D04315 --
7 [Microphone not activated] if we could enlarge the last paragraph on the
8 left column, please. That's the article to which you were referring,
9 Mr. Ambassador - is that correct? - where you wrote:
10 "Recognition triggered the war. The Serbs felt confirmed in
11 their paranoid view of history and went brutally on the offensive"?
12 A. Mm-hmm, yes.
13 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] Mr. Tieger, we don't have
14 the right document. Could you --
15 MR. TIEGER: It's page 40 of the documents in tab 42, and they're
16 paginated on the bottom of the page in pencil, I believe. It should be
17 the second-to-last document in that -- under that tab.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Is it a manuscript document?
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. No, Mr. Ambassador, it's a --
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, then it's something.
22 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] I'm afraid we have the wrong --
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. Do you see tab 42? It should have about 40 pages of documents
25 under it, and the second-to-last page is a copy of this newspaper
2 A. Oh, yes.
3 MR. IVETIC: Okay --
4 THE WITNESS: I have it in front of me, yes. Yes? Right?
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Okay. Thank you, sir.
7 MR. TIEGER: And I tender that. If -- just the one page.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
9 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 1D04315 receives
10 Exhibit Number P7771, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Now, Mr. Ambassador, were you aware before these offensive
14 operations began that the Bosnian Serb leadership had contemplated doing
15 so even as the negotiations were in progress or before the agreement in
16 principle was reached?
17 A. We hoped that it would not happen. I didn't know of any Serbian
18 plans. Recognition was necessary to put Bosnia in the map of
19 international relations and we had expected that the three parties would
20 go on negotiating.
21 Q. Let me direct your attention to a few documents, if I may. First
22 document behind tab 8 of your binder, 65 ter 02345, e-court page 21,
23 page 25 in the Serbian, the bottom one-third of the page. And in your
24 binder, Mr. Ambassador, it should be about the --
25 A. Yeah --
1 Q. -- fifth page in there marked page 21 of that --
2 A. Okay.
3 Q. But hard copy -- no, it's the fifth page but paginated as 21 on
4 the --
5 A. 21, okay.
6 Q. Okay. And there it's Mr. Krajisnik speaking?
7 A. Mm-hmm.
8 Q. And he says the following:
9 "As I was a participant in the Lisbon talks I would like to add a
10 few remarks" -- and I should draw your attention to the fact that this is
11 the 8th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People held on the 25th of
12 February, 1992.
13 "As I was a participant in the Lisbon talks, I would like to add
14 a few remarks," Mr. Krajisnik says. "Today we must discuss the first
15 item which is crucial for the Serbian people. Gentlemen, we have two
16 options: One to fight by political means to make the most out of the
17 present time, as a first phase; or to break off the talks and go for what
18 we have done over the centuries: Win our own territories by force."
19 And then later, if we turn to the very next page, and page 64 in
20 the e-court in English and page 81 in the Serbian.
21 A. Um, in the same document?
22 Q. Same document. Just turn the page and I'm directing your
23 attention to the middle of the page.
24 A. I'm on page 21.
25 Q. Yes, and if you turn the page you will see -- these are excerpts.
1 You turn that page, it should be paginated page 64.
2 A. I haven't got it --
3 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] That's the last page in the tab,
4 Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Well, I'm going to read it out because it's just one sentence --
7 A. Okay, yes.
8 Q. -- with the indulgence of my colleagues. Again, it's page 64 in
9 the English and page 81 in the Serbian. Mr. Krajisnik says -- it's
10 actually two -- two or three sentences:
11 "Gentlemen, we want to remain in a single state together with
12 Serbia, Montenegro, the Independent Autonomous Region of Krajina, now the
13 Krajina state, and the rest, we just need to agree on the method to
14 achieve this.
15 "If we don't want to do this by certainly methods, let us put a
16 stop to it. You know what our profession has always been - to wage war."
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Was Mr. Krajisnik or Mr. Karadzic during the course of
19 negotiations emphasising to you that if -- that they were contemplating
20 if the results of the negotiations were not sufficiently satisfactory to
21 simply win their territories by force?
22 A. No, to me they didn't say that. They were trying to keep
23 negotiating. They liked, in fact, to show that they -- or they said that
24 they were keen to negotiate and that -- and I'm quoting them as I
25 remember, it was the Muslims who didn't want to go on negotiating. They
1 did want to go on negotiating.
2 Q. Thank you, sir.
3 MR. TIEGER: I tender those excerpts.
4 THE WITNESS: As far as I remember. But again, I mean, I was not
5 in the Serbian Republic Assembly and --
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. Understood, sir.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
9 MR. TIEGER: And it should be added to P7005.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This portion still to be uploaded and the
11 65 ter number to be -- to be given then will be added to P7005.
12 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
13 Q. And I direct your attention, Ambassador, to remarks by
14 Mr. Krajisnik. Let me also direct your attention to remarks by
15 Dr. Karadzic behind tab 5 of your binder, and that's 65 ter 2391?
16 JUDGE ORIE: While we are waiting for that, Mr. Tieger, may I
17 just draw to your attention to part of the previous exhibit, which was
18 the notebook of the chef de cabinet of Mr. Karadzic. I think you dealt
19 with one page and in e-court it was 64 pages. Could you --
20 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, and I think -- first of all, I think I dealt
21 with two pages --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay --
23 MR. TIEGER: Not to quibble about that, but of course you're
24 right about the discrepancy between the extent of the exhibit and the
25 excerpts I referred to.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yeah.
2 MR. TIEGER: I think I indicated I intended to -- that I tendered
3 the excerpts --
4 JUDGE ORIE: You -- yes, but it's not uploaded, those excerpts --
5 MR. TIEGER: No, that is the case.
6 JUDGE ORIE: So therefore, we are still waiting for that and that
7 should then replace what is now the totality of that admitted exhibit.
8 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
9 JUDGE ORIE: Could you again give the details of the document you
10 are calling.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: 0239 --
12 MR. TIEGER: 65 ter 02391.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which is now P7769.
14 MR. TIEGER: Well, not the entirety, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Overlapping speakers] --
16 MR. TIEGER: And this would be page 88 of the English and page 72
17 of the Serbian beginning about the tenth line down from the top of the
19 Q. This is a tape-recording of the 39th Session of the RS National
20 Assembly - we referred to that before - and again Dr. Karadzic is
21 speaking. And he says the following --
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Where exactly?
23 MR. TIEGER: In the middle -- almost smack in the middle of the
24 page, Your Honour. If you look at -- I'm trying to think of something --
25 there is the designation [sic] after the end of one sentence in the
1 middle of the page, and --
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I see that.
3 MR. TIEGER: And then this is where -- and the passage --
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes --
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: There are two "sics."
6 MR. TIEGER: Well, this is the one in the middle of the page I
7 think and it begins -- the portion I'm going to read is "before the war."
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Where can we find it in B/C/S?
10 MR. TIEGER: About ten lines down from the top of the page -- or
11 from the bottom of the page, excuse me. No, no, no. That's -- I was
12 correct the first time. So about ten lines down from the top of the
13 page, and it starts toward the right-hand part of that --
14 JUDGE ORIE: I think I see the name Milojevic there.
15 MR. TIEGER: Yeah.
16 JUDGE ORIE: That's on the -- Milojevic is at approximately eight
17 lines down from the top.
18 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
19 Q. This is Dr. Karadzic speaking:
20 "Before the war, Professor Milojevic while anticipating whatever
21 would happen with that BiH, we were making plans and it turned out to be
22 almost similar to what will be in Sarajevo. We were thinking then to
23 capture Zvijezda Mountain and that it would be the border. The canyon of
24 the Krivaja River would serve then for connecting Sarajevo and
25 Banja Luka, so that the distance between Sarajevo and Banja Luka could be
1 covered, on a good road, in 1.5. That is a state. That is a
2 well-integrated nation. That was our plan way back before the war."
3 And again, Mr. Ambassador, did Dr. Karadzic relate to you during
4 the course of negotiations that his plans even before the negotiations
5 were taking place and he -- included capturing certain parts of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina territory?
7 A. No. No, he didn't.
8 Q. Thank you, sir.
9 MR. TIEGER: I'd tender that and ask that it be added to --
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: P7769.
11 MR. TIEGER: P7769.
12 JUDGE ORIE: The excerpt still to be uploaded under a 65 ter
13 number still to be announced will then be added to P7769.
14 Mr. Tieger --
15 MR. TIEGER: Okay. Moving to a slightly different topic and
16 which will involve looking at a number of maps, so probably best to break
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then apparently your optimism has not
19 become a reality in one session, but how much would we still need after
21 MR. TIEGER: I will certainly conclude in the next session,
22 Mr. President, unless something completely unforeseen happens --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Well, the next session. Then Mr. Ivetic would still
24 need time for -- I think you announced that you're still optimistic to
25 finish in this session.
1 MR. TIEGER: Well, that's another case of no good deed going -- I
2 would be seen as having made appropriate progress if I hadn't been
3 over-optimistic. We moved at a slower pace than the first session. I'm
4 still moving as quickly as possible and it's --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Could you try to --
6 MR. TIEGER: -- will try to complete as quickly as I can.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Could you try to see whether you could find,
8 together with Mr. Ivetic, perhaps I have no idea how much time he would
9 need in re-examination, how -- how we could achieve to finish still today
10 even if there would be a small extended session perhaps.
11 And I ask Madam Registrar whether there's any option to -- well,
12 to go on for, let's say, 15 minutes -- or 15 to 20 minutes, if that would
13 be agreeable to the Defence, because if Mr. Mladic would insist on
14 finishing on quarter past 2.00, we would do so.
15 Could all parties try to see whether we can achieve that.
16 We'd like to take a break, Mr. Cutileiro. We'd like to see you
17 back in 20 minutes.
18 We'll resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
20 --- Recess taken at 1.15 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 1.36 p.m.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Have the parties reached an understanding on how to
23 finish today or --
24 MR. TIEGER: Well, not quite in that sense, but I've reduced my
25 areas to three. I hope I can move through quickly. I projected a
1 completion time for Mr. Ivetic that should allow him sufficient time
2 according to him so --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because there's one decision that the Chamber
4 would like to deliver today, but that takes another four to five minutes.
5 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
7 Q. Mr. Ambassador, I'll try to move quickly. At paragraph 32 of
8 your statement tendered to the Court, you indicated that Dr. Karadzic
9 expressed his willingness to return territory to the Muslims.
10 Now, this Trial Chamber has received in evidence, among other
11 things, a -- notes from a meeting between Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic
12 in August of 1992 - that's P354, page 22 in English and 29 in Serbian -
13 during which Dr. Karadzic said to General Mladic:
14 "The European community will accept the factual situation which
15 is why we must not make any concessions militarily."
16 And I also wanted to bring to your attention and ask you a
17 question about that. That's -- this is something found at tab 33 of your
18 binder. It's P7357, page 5 of the English, pages 4 and 5 in Serbian,
19 beginning on the fourth line from the bottom on page 4 in Serbian. And
20 the portion in English starts on the third line above the number 29 in
21 the middle of the page:
22 "Our goal is to create a state. How big it will be, we do not
23 know, but it has to be in one piece. And in order for the state to
24 exist, it has to be in one piece. We have to maintain this reality as
25 long as the world accepts this idea.
1 "We have created new realities. Speaking in narrow terms,
2 Zvornik used to be 60:40 to the advantage of Muslims, but the Serbs from
3 Zenica came, they occupied Kozluk, the Muslims left for Europe and I do
4 not know where else. And those gentlemen told us - who gives you the
5 right to ask for Zvornik? We said that the whole Bosnia was the Serbian
6 land. That is the history, but it is not what we are interested in. Who
7 gives you a right to request Zvornik now? We request Zvornik based on
8 the right which comes out of a new reality. This war had created the new
9 reality. It has never happened in history that the war did not create a
10 new history. This war has created the new reality: There are now the
11 Serbs from Zenica here. If you want to give Zvornik to the Muslims then
12 you have to wage a new war in order to expel these Serbs back to Zenica.
13 We request Zvornik according to this right."
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, could you just give the date of this
15 session for the witness because I think you didn't do that yet.
16 MR. TIEGER: I didn't do that. It's 1994, the 9th -- I think
17 it's contained in his binder, the 9th through 11th November and 23rd
18 November 1994.
19 Q. So when Dr. Karadzic indicated to you, as you indicated in your
20 statement, that his willingness to return territory, did he also indicate
21 his view of creating new realities and the effect of a fait accompli on
22 which territories he would be willing to return?
23 A. No, he didn't.
24 Q. Thank you, sir.
25 Next I'd like to draw a couple of excerpts to your attention.
1 That's -- first one is found at tab 39 of your binder. It's 65 ter 02388
2 at pages 126 through 127; and Serbian page 94, the third full paragraph.
3 This is a session of the 37th Assembly Session held on 10th of
4 January, 1994. The first speaker we see is Mr. Maksimovic, president of
5 the Deputies Club, and at the bottom paragraph on page 126, he states:
6 "What I would really like to see here, is a firm attitude" --
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This is quite difficult to follow. We -- I don't
8 see --
9 MR. TIEGER: Can we blow up, the last paragraph, please.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: -- Mr. Maksimovic.
11 MR. TIEGER: "What I would really like to see here is a firm
12 attitude that the Muslims and the Croats will not be allowed to return to
13 the areas under our rule. Accordingly, we should not return to the areas
14 that will be under the Croatian rule. I think that we should be decisive
15 about this. Otherwise, I am afraid that those people from Sandzak will
16 occupy Srbinje and surrounding areas because there are too many of them
17 in that area."
18 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I think we missed the link.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, the videolink apparently is -- should be
21 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] Your Honours, I think we're okay
22 from our end.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but we still cannot see you. We can hear you.
24 THE WITNESS: Oh. I have the paper in front of me that I was
25 following what Mr. Tieger was reading.
1 JUDGE ORIE: We still do not have the video. We hear what is
2 said at the videolink location but cannot see you yet.
3 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
4 JUDGE ORIE: We'll wait for a message whether it can be resolved
5 soon or not.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tieger, are we on the right page in B/C/S?
7 THE WITNESS: Well, I think that finished our chances to finish
9 JUDGE ORIE: Well, we still give it a try, Mr. -- I think that we
10 see you now again. If Mr. Registrar would say a few words, we can
11 confirm that we hear him and perhaps the confirmation would be that he
12 sees us and hears us as well.
13 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] Yes, Your Honour, confirmed on
14 both accounts.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Then we can continue.
16 MR. TIEGER: And that would be page 94 of the Serbian, please,
17 and it's the document that -- with ERN 02152154. That's it.
18 Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. We had ended, referring to Mr. Maksimovic's remarks, he continues
20 at the bottom of the page in English:
21 "So we should take a firm position and ban any ... returns to the
22 territories we have gained through these international combinations" --
23 MR. TIEGER: Turn the page. Now we're on page 126 the B/C/S --
24 of the English in e-court. Okay. That's it. And he continues on. I
25 think we can see that and the witness has had a chance to see it:
1 "I do not care if the Muslims will live at all, where they will
2 live, whether they will have a country or not. I am not interested in
3 that. The only thing I'm interested in is my people and the territory
4 where my people live. Therefore, any thought about having 500 or more
5 Muslims within our future country is out of the question."
6 And then at page 132 of the English and 98 in the Serbian
7 Dr. Karadzic responds:
8 "As to the return of the refugees, I owe an answer to Vojo's
9 question" - that's Vojislav Maksimovic - "according to the international
10 law, we have no right to ban the return of the refugees. In principle,
11 all refugees can return, but I would just add one sentence: This also
12 has to be a two-way process.
13 "The Muslims and the Croats accepted the two-way process. Later
14 on Owen asked me: Why did you insist on the two-way process? But when
15 the Serbs from Zvornik returned to Zenica, then the Muslims from Prijedor
16 will return to Prijedor. Therefore, it must be a two-way process. In
17 accordance with the international law, we cannot declare a ban of the
18 return of refugees."
19 Q. And in a same vein, Mr. Ambassador, if you could turn to tab 40,
20 the very next tab, the same issue is raised at 65 ter 02418.
21 MR. TIEGER: And of course I'll be tendering these excerpts,
22 Mr. President, but in the interests of time I think we can handle that --
23 this previous one will be added to P3076.
24 Now in 65 ter 02418, if we could turn to page 29 of the English
25 and the bottom page 36 in Serbian; 65 ter 02418, page 29 in English.
1 Okay. We see at item 5, and that's what we're looking for, the
2 portion marked number 5, this is Dr. Karadzic speaking --
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We don't have it in B/C/S, I think.
4 MR. TIEGER: It's page 36 in B/C/S at the bottom, moving on to
5 page 37.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Next page.
7 MR. TIEGER: There, it's at the bottom there.
8 Q. "Full catalogue of human rights and inserted: Freedoms as listed
9 in international instruments, et cetera, including the right of refugees
10 and displaced persons to be able to return, we have now added which must
11 be an overall process. They don't know what that is, so they kept
12 shifting the first part of the sentence. That's our intention, to say,
13 all right, everyone has the right to return to his home after the war, if
14 that is an overall process. What does that mean, an overall process?
15 That means that the Muslims from Kozluk can return to Kozluk, if the
16 Serbs from Kozluk return to Zenica. If they don't want to return, then
17 we need, and if they cannot return, then we need a new war to exchange
18 that, and that's why I think we should always insist on this. So an
19 overall process, either overall or none at all.
20 "We can act the Serbian Cyrillic way and tell it all to their
21 face, or we can be a bit cunning, we do have to be a bit cunning."
22 Mr. Ambassador, did Dr. Karadzic tell you that you was attempting
23 to implement cunning approaches to ensure that the de facto situation
24 that had been created in, for example, Kozluk, would remain as it was?
25 A. Certainly not. But as you have noticed, this document is from
1 1995, it's from after Dayton. In the -- or about that time. No, to me,
2 he didn't tell anything of that kind.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. TIEGER: And I tender those excerpts, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you --
6 MR. TIEGER: Added to P4584.
7 JUDGE ORIE: And you have not yet uploaded the excerpt; that will
8 be done, we'll be informed about the 65 ter number, and we'll then
9 instruct Madam Registrar to add it.
10 Please proceed.
11 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
12 Q. And finally, Ambassador, you referred during the course of your
13 testimony today and in paragraph 33 of your statement to the
14 Dayton Accords and indicated that a comparison of the map, the Dayton
15 map, to the map annexed to the Statement of Principles, indicated that
16 the result was about the same. And I wanted to look very quickly at the
17 two maps which we can find at tab 29 of the binder and at 65 ter 17597.
18 Ambassador, that's about this coloured representation of the
19 Dayton map was confirmed by you in the Karadzic case and reflects with a
20 visual depiction rather than the hash marks --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, it says the Cutileiro Plan March 1992
22 what we see on our screens now.
23 MR. TIEGER: Right.
24 Q. Do you see that, Mr. Ambassador, the green-red-and-blue map
25 marked Cutileiro Plan, March 1992, and behind is it the Dayton map.
1 Now --
2 JUDGE ORIE: I see that the witness is nodding yes. Apparently
3 he sees it.
4 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
5 Q. Now --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any way that we could have the two --
7 MR. TIEGER: Side by side?
8 JUDGE ORIE: -- side by side on our screens?
9 MR. TIEGER: The ERN -- the 65 ter for the Dayton map is 17982.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Still the same map here.
11 JUDGE ORIE: That's not very helpful -- well, perhaps we get --
12 MR. TIEGER: There we go.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, there we are.
14 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
15 Q. Now, looking at it quickly, the areas in green reflect Muslim
16 areas in the case of the Cutileiro Plan map, Muslim-majority areas at the
17 time; and in the Dayton map, we see that the Muslim-Croat Federation
18 areas are depicted in pink and the Serb areas in orange.
19 So looking quickly at Eastern Bosnia, we see that the swaths of
20 green reflected by the Muslim-majority areas there have given way to an
21 almost -- total area of orange which are the Serb areas; correct?
22 A. I'm looking at the maps, yes.
23 Q. So areas that were once Muslim-majority areas were now -- now
24 became part of the Serb entity; correct?
25 A. In which map?
1 Q. Areas that were Muslim-majority areas as depicted in the
2 Cutileiro Plan map of March 1992 --
3 A. Yes --
4 Q. -- are now part of the Serb area under the Dayton Accords; right?
5 A. Right.
6 Q. And looking more closely at those areas in the Cutileiro map and
7 referring back to Dr. Karadzic's remarks at the 53rd Session regarding
8 the areas of strategic importance that had to be Serb, he referred to
9 Bratunac, Srebrenica, Visegrad, Rogatica, Vlasenica, and Zvornik. And
10 those are all municipalities which were Muslim-majority areas in 1992 and
11 which became part of the Serb entity under the Dayton Accords; right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And that was -- that was because the Muslim -- or that reflected
14 at least the fact that the majority Muslim population in those areas were
15 no longer there; right? That they had been displaced.
16 A. Possibly. Yes?
17 Q. And that, Ambassador, reflected --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Could I just -- yes, I think there was a bit of a
19 problem with overlapping speakers but I heard you say "possibly."
20 That's... what you said, isn't it?
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, I agree.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Fine. Thanks.
23 Please proceed.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. And, Ambassador, that was a difference between the two maps which
1 reflected the destruction of hundreds of communities, the displacement of
2 tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people and the deaths
3 of many thousands, wasn't it?
4 A. It's very difficult to compare what you call the Cutileiro Plan
5 map, which was a preliminary plan, that was attached to the principles
6 and on which the negotiations were going to take place. The other is
7 done more than three years after, after a violent war among the
8 communities, and you have to go almost area by area to -- to see how
9 things evolved. So I -- I don't think they are exactly comparable.
10 The -- that's all.
11 Q. I didn't think there were comparable either, sir, but I was just
12 responding to the portion of the statement that indicated the results
13 were the essentially the same.
14 MR. TIEGER: In the interests of time, that concludes my
16 MR. IVETIC: Are you tendering the two maps?
17 MR. TIEGER: I am tendering those maps, yes.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Two maps. Madam Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 17597 receives Exhibit number P7772.
20 65 ter number 17892 receives Exhibit number P7773, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Both are admitted into evidence.
22 Before we continue ...
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Tieger, you had indicated that 65 ter 02388
25 you will ask that it be added to P3076. Are you abandoning that or are
1 you still going to do that?
2 MR. TIEGER: I'm certainly not abandoning tendering it,
3 Your Honour, but that if I --
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: You asked that it -- you said you will ask that it
5 be added to P3076.
6 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry, you're right. I moved ahead. So
7 that still remains my request. We still need to upload it in that
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Ivetic, I noticed that in relation to
12 paragraph 28, 65 ter number 1D02721, which is on your list of associated
13 exhibits, was dealt with in comparison with the letter which was sent in
14 return which is now P7767. Having heard the witness about it and
15 portions of letter to have been read to him, would you consider to tender
16 that document not as an associated exhibit but in relation to the -- if
17 do you it now, then --
18 MR. IVETIC: Yes, I will do it now.
19 JUDGE ORIE: That's where a reference is made to the promises
20 where the witness has answered to that.
21 Madam Registrar, for 65 ter number 1D02721, what number would be
22 assigned to it? A D number.
23 THE REGISTRAR: D1372, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: D1372 is admitted into evidence.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
1 MR. IVETIC: Okay. Your Honours, while we're still on exhibits,
2 I can update. I'm withdrawing two of the associated exhibits, 1D04316
3 and 1D04309. When we take all that into account with those that have
4 become exhibits by other means, we're now down to ten associated
5 exhibits, and I would thus tender those ten under Your Honours' previous
6 guidance of associated exhibits for statements.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll consider that request. We have to make a
8 list and provisionally --
9 MR. IVETIC: I know, I know.
10 JUDGE ORIE: And numbers should be assigned while we're still
11 considering admission.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
14 Re-examination by Mr. Ivetic:
15 Q. Ambassador, I will be very short and we should finish today.
16 I'd like to call up --
17 A. Thank you.
18 Q. -- I'd like to call up P4580 this was a document that should be
19 in the Prosecution's binder as it was used today, and we'll need page 14
20 in the English, page 18 in the Serbian, and to refresh your recollection
21 this should be the 18 March 1992 Serbian Assembly --
22 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Ivetic, in the interests of time, the entirety
23 of the assembly sessions were not transported for the videolink but the
24 intended excerpt, so it may or may not be that the particular portion you
25 have in mind is in the binder, and I wanted to let you now.
1 MR. IVETIC: I appreciate that. It's the next few lines from
2 where you read so I'm hoping it's there. If not, I can read it. No?
3 JUDGE ORIE: If it's not there, you can read it.
4 MR. IVETIC:
5 Q. Then I will read it for you, sir.
6 A. Yes, please.
7 Q. Right after the part that Mr. Tieger read, Mr. Karadzic went on
8 to say as follows:
9 "I also realised that the SDA became aware that they would know
10 they have been defeated if they accept the idea of three national states
11 and they tried to wiggle out of it but without much success in the army
12 issue or any other matter.
13 "Many issues remain unsolved such as the economy and other
14 things. We started all, but finished nothing. If we work hard, and
15 remain strong and stable, I hope that we can have many functions existing
16 in the national entities and not accepting anything as final until we
17 reach our goal. That is why your suggestions are very welcome.
18 "If I may say this, I was much more pleased after these talks
19 than I was after Brussels because I sensed that they understood this
20 Assembly was the one making final decisions, not the European community."
21 And he says: "These are my impressions."
22 Do any of those contradict what was planned in regard to the
23 Statement of Principles, that is to say, that there still remained work
24 to do be done regarding the economy, and other things, the army issue,
25 et cetera?
1 A. It is perfectly acceptable, I think. It implies exactly that we
2 have to work more and a lot in different things but that the basis is
4 Q. You were asked multiple times today about excerpts that various
5 Serb politicians said at various political gatherings. I'd like to look
6 at another document from the Prosecution's binder. It should be the last
7 one in the binder. It's 65 ter number 33529, and it is the transcript of
8 your testimony from the Karadzic case. And I would first ask for --
9 MR. TIEGER: It should be the first tab in that binder.
10 MR. IVETIC: I apologise. So the first tab in the binder. And I
11 would ask for page 18 which should correlate to transcript page 33958 of
12 the Karadzic transcript which will be visible, I believe on the upper
13 right-hand corner, if I -- it's either on the right or the top left.
14 There we go.
15 Q. Are you on that page, sir?
16 A. Yes, I am.
17 Q. I would then direct your attention to the answer -- or excuse me,
18 the question and answer at lines 2 through 7. The question was:
19 "And it's destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state was
20 not consistent with the agreement in principles, was it?
21 "A. You cannot take bits of political discourse during some kind
22 of meeting of an Assembly from one side or the other and present them.
23 When I see that, I'm not surprised by that. I think the three sides had
24 a discourse that was complicated with their own basis, if you want to --"
25 And then you were interrupted.
1 The first question: Do you stand by this part of what you said
2 in the Karadzic case?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And now -- and now, Ambassador, if could you, please, I give you
5 the opportunity to finish the answer that was cut off in the Karadzic
6 case, if you feel that you need to.
7 A. Well, the three sides had to negotiate on one side with us, the
8 negotiators, Lord Carrington, others, myself, and to their own basis, to
9 their own followers. And sometimes in -- that negotiation must have been
10 difficult to all of them. We have gone today through things that, for
11 instance, President Izetbegovic said to his people and that, at the same
12 time, he told me that I shouldn't take that into account, that it was
13 what he told to me that was important. And, mutatis mutandis, a bit
14 happened like that, with the Serbs. And I suspect that the Croat
15 negotiator [indiscernible], difficulties with his basis, particularly in
16 western Herzegovina.
17 So I find it perfectly normal that the kind of discussions that
18 we read today or heard read today from the Serbian Assembly would happen,
19 and I -- I'm sure they did happen in the equivalent bodies that discussed
20 what the positions of the negotiators would come.
21 I must tell you that the first time that Dr. Karadzic told me
22 that he might agree in principle but he had to see that with his people,
23 I thought he was trying to gain time. But then, as we went on, I
24 realised that he did go, indeed, to his people. And sometimes what his
25 people told him were not the things that he needed or that he wanted to
1 negotiate capably with both the other two parts and with the
2 internationals, in our case, the European community, later on in --
3 possibly in the conference with -- the Vance and Owen conference with the
4 United Nations and the European communities.
5 So this is all I have to say. I am not -- I'm not startled by
6 some of the contradictions that we find in these kind of parliamentary
8 Q. Thank you. And the last question I have relates to page 23 of
9 this same document, the transcript, and it should be page 33963 of the
10 Karadzic transcript, and I'd like to look at lines 18 -- should be 8
11 through 14, I apologise. And your answer here is recorded as -- and this
12 is the reference to the book of the aide-de-camp or chef de cabinet of
13 Dr. Karadzic. And your answer is:
14 "Certainly. Neither Henry Darwin or myself would have accepted
15 ethnical cleansing to -- either by Serbs or, for that matter, by Croats
16 or by whoever. The idea was that this will not be done, and to us in the
17 conference, I think it was Dr. Karadzic himself who agreed that if we
18 came to a final solution of that, there would be -- people would be --
19 that would have been thrown out from their places would come back to
20 those places."
21 Do you stand by this part of the Karadzic testimony, sir?
22 A. Well, that's what I said at the time, referring to what I knew
23 and what had happened in 1992, and I stand, indeed, to -- for what I
25 Q. Ambassador, I thank you wholeheartedly for your time and your
1 consideration and for answering our questions.
2 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I am complete.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Before we invite Mr. Tieger or ask Mr. Tieger
5 whether he has any further questions, I would have one question for you,
6 Mr. Cutileiro.
7 I think, if I understood you well, it is your opinion that if all
8 parties would have stood by the agreement on principles that quite many
9 lives would have been saved. Is that well understood?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes. But --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Can --
12 THE WITNESS: -- one has to understand how things work there. We
13 have agreed on principles. They would have had to negotiate according --
14 following those principles, and then, then many thousands of lives would
15 have been saved.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That would be my next question. Your
17 expectation of how lives would have been saved did depend on your
18 expectation that the parties would, in a loyal sense, implement what they
19 had agreed upon in principle and perhaps later in more detail.
20 THE WITNESS: Certainly. Otherwise there was no point in
21 negotiating with anybody, if you don't expect them to do as they said.
22 It's a bit frustrating.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, I understand your testimony to be that if
24 the war could have been stopped that it would have saved lives at that
25 point in time, and you had a positive expectation that war more likely
1 would have stopped or even not started if the general principle agreement
2 would have -- was standing.
3 Have you -- in the loss of lives, have you considered only or
4 primarily the -- the victims of warfare, or have you also included in
5 your expectations the possible victims of criminal or war crimes or crime
6 against humanity?
7 THE WITNESS: I think that in some parts of the war that went on
8 there, as you know, Your Honour, sitting where you sit, that war was --
9 was full of violations of human rights and laws of war, and I don't think
10 I -- in my mind I saw it separately. I didn't see, on one hand, people
11 legally killed and people unlegally [sic] killed, as it were. What I do
12 think is that if they have -- if they had continued negotiating,
13 representing the principles, there would be -- there would have been less
14 war and therefore less malpractices during the war itself.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for those answers.
16 Mr. Tieger, any questions for Mr. Cutileiro?
17 MR. TIEGER: No. Nothing further, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Cutileiro, this then concludes your testimony
19 unless the Defence would have any follow-up questions on the questions of
20 the Bench, but --
21 MR. IVETIC: Nothing, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Nothing.
23 This then concludes your testimony. I'd like to thank you very
24 much for coming to the videolink location and for having answered during
25 quite a number of hours all the questions that were put to you, put to
1 you by the parties, some put to you by the Bench. I wish you a safe
2 return home again.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. And I would like to thank you
4 specifically because I think that with -- without your steering, we might
5 not have finished today, and I'm very grateful for that.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Well, it's the first time, Mr. Cutileiro, that a
7 witness praises me for these kinds of things; I start blushing a bit
8 perhaps. But I think everyone in this courtroom is happy that we could
9 conclude this day. And I have to aid immediately that all that steering
10 doesn't help if the parties are not fully co-operative. So I share the
11 praise with the parties, if you would not mind.
12 THE WITNESS: I don't mind at all. Thank you.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you so much.
14 MR. IVETIC: We should thank our hosts on the other end, the
15 Portuguese authorities who provided the videolink.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's -- we are --
17 We'd like to thank you as well for your presence being
18 representative of the -- Ms. Moniz, of the Portuguese government, and I
19 do understand that the Portuguese government has provided its support and
20 provided the facilities for the establishment of the videolink, which is
21 highly appreciated by this Chamber and by this Tribunal. Thank you very
22 much for that.
23 And we can conclude the videolink.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
25 THE REGISTRAR: [Via videolink] Thank you.
1 [The witness's testimony via videolink concluded]
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for assisting me, Mr. Ivetic. I must
3 admit that I was not fully aware of how the videolink was organised. So
4 thank you very much for reminding me of that aspect.
5 There's one decision I would very much like to read before we
6 adjourn, and since I received information that an examination that would
7 not go beyond 20 minutes of the usual time would still be acceptable, I
8 abuse that now for reading a decision, which is a decision on the
9 expertise of Dusan Pavlovic.
10 On the 5th of October of this year, the Defence filed a notice of
11 disclosure of Dusan Pavlovic's expert report pursuant to Rule 94 bis of
12 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
13 On the 2nd of November, the Prosecution filed its notice pursuant
14 to Rule 94 bis (B) of the Rules in which it challenged the status of
15 Pavlovic as an expert in tracing, exhumation and identification of
16 victims of war.
17 The Prosecution argues that the witness's CV does not support his
18 qualification as an expert and that his report does not demonstrate his
19 expertise in the claimed field. The Prosecution further argues that if
20 the Chamber qualifies the witness as an expert, it would not accept the
21 conclusions of his report and would therefore wish to cross-examine him.
22 On the 13th of November, the Defence filed a submission providing
23 further details on the witness's work experience in his claimed field of
24 expertise, while not objecting to the Prosecution's request to
25 cross-examine the witness.
1 With respect to the applicable law concerning expert evidence,
2 the Chamber recalls and refers to its 19th of October, 2012 decision
3 concerning Richard Butler.
4 In relation to the Prosecution's argument that the witness does
5 not qualify as an expert in the field of tracing, exhumation and
6 identification of victims of war, based on the Chamber's reasoning in the
7 decision on the expertise of witness Milan Tutoric on 22 May 2015, the
8 Chamber considers the current situation to be distinct from the situation
9 of Milan Tutoric's claimed expertise.
10 Pavlovic's curriculum vitae and the submissions by the Defence
11 show that he has work experience in the field of tracing, exhumation and
12 identification of victims of war. In particular, Pavlovic worked for
13 five and a half years as the head of tracing and exhumation and
14 identification sector of the central records of missing persons in the
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina Missing Persons Institute and is currently
16 employed as a senior associate for exhumation, forensic processing,
17 identification, records, and field-work related to the search of missing
18 persons for the Republika Srpska Government Centre for Research of War,
19 War Crimes, and Tracing Missing Persons.
20 His responsibilities include documents and analysing the list of
21 missing persons around Srebrenica in July 1995; proposing exhumation
22 plans; participating in visits to graves, exhumations, and forensic
23 analysis of remains; and drafting reports on exhumed and identified
25 While Pavlovic's expertise is not demonstrated very clearly in
1 the Defence's submissions, there is a sufficient basis for the Chamber to
2 accept that he has specialised knowledge and expertise in tracing,
3 exhumation, and identification of victims of war and that such knowledge
4 and expertise may be of assistance to the Chamber in assessing the
5 evidence presented by the parties -- by both parties.
6 Based on the foregoing, the Chamber decides, pursuant to
7 Rule 94 bis, that Pavlovic may be called to testify as an expert witness
8 in the fields of tracing, exhumation and identification of victims of war
9 and that he shall be made available for cross-examination.
10 Concerning the arguments related to the methodology of Pavlovic's
11 report, the Chamber considers that these are matters that can and should
12 be addressed during the examination of this witness. Therefore, the
13 Chamber defers its decision on the admission of his report until the time
14 of his testimony.
15 The Chamber now directs the Defence's attention to one further
16 observation concerning Pavlovic's report.
17 In his report, Pavlovic includes to a large extent expert opinion
18 which appears to fall outside the scope of his area of expertise. Many
19 pages of the report focus on the political and military situation in
20 Srebrenica between 1993 and 1995. Further, the witness offers
21 conclusions related to the ethnic cleansing of Serbs and genocide, which,
22 again, seem to be outside the scope of his expertise. In addition, the
23 witness evaluates evidentiary materials, including statements and
24 testimonies of witnesses. The report does not fully reveal what
25 evidentiary material Pavlovic has reviewed or whether such material is in
1 evidence. On that basis, the witness then draws conclusions not covered
2 by his field of expertise.
3 The Chamber emphasises that it allows Pavlovic to be called in
4 his capacity as an expert in tracing, exhumation and identification of
5 victims of war but not as an expert in history, law, military matters, or
6 any other field for which he is not qualified. The Chamber therefore
7 expects the parties to focus their examination of the witness on those
8 aspects of the report that relate to the witness's area of expertise.
9 And this concludes the Chamber's decision.
10 Before we adjourn, I'd like to thank very much all those
11 assisting us that they enabled us -- I should have extended the praise to
12 you as well and not only to the parties but that enabled us to conclude
13 hearing the testimony of Mr. Cutileiro today. It is, as always, highly
14 appreciated by the Chamber.
15 We adjourn for the day, and we resume tomorrow, Thursday, the
16 10th of December, 9.30 in the morning, in this same courtroom, I.
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.28 p.m.,
18 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 10th day of
19 December, 2015, at 9.30 a.m.