1 Tuesday, 31 October 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The accused Sljivancanin takes the stand]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning.

7 Mr. Moore.

8 MR. MOORE: Good morning.

9 JUDGE PARKER: Before Mr. Moore starts, may I remind you,

10 Mr. Sljivancanin, of the affirmation which you made which still applies.

11 WITNESS: VESELIN SLJIVANCANIN [Resumed]

12 [Witness answered through interpreter]

13 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much. Your Honour, before we commence

14 this morning, as I say, we have four files to put before the witness and

15 the Court. I'd like to deal, if I may, with the first file of documents

16 and have those handed out now, if I may, please. The title will

17 be "Military documents and miscellaneous."

18 The interpreters have got their documents already.

19 May I just explain how the document operates. I hope and trust

20 that there is an index at the front which should be two pages indicating

21 that there are 32 tabs referring to exhibits.

22 If we take, by way of example, tab 1 is in the English, tab 2 is

23 the B/C/S version. That system follows the whole way through with two

24 exceptions. That was the problem we had yesterday.

25 Tab 17 and tab 18, they will have the B/C/S immediately behind.

1 So when one goes to 17, you'll find an excerpt from a paper and there is

2 the B/C/S version itself. The other files are fairly similar in

3 structure.

4 Can I assist Your Honour in any way?

5 JUDGE PARKER: It's beyond your capacity from there, Mr. Moore,

6 but I will plod along trying to find the transcript on the screen soon.

7 Carry on, Mr. Moore.

8 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much, that's very kind.

9 Cross-examined by Mr. Moore: [Continued]

10 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, when I refer to documents, I will try to refer

11 to the tab numbers on the right-hand side. Do you follow?

12 A. Yes - good morning, Mr. Moore - I do.

13 Q. Good morning, Mr. Sljivancanin.

14 Can we deal, please, can tab 3 and tab 4. Tab 3 is the English

15 version; tab 4 is the B/C/S version. It is known as Exhibit 396. Do you

16 have your regulations, Mr. Sljivancanin?

17 A. Yes, regulations on the application of international laws of war.

18 Q. Thank you very much. I want to deal, if I may, as we can see,

19 there is a large series of contents but I would like to deal with the

20 various rules, and just dealing with it in fairly brief order, if we look

21 at rule 20, we can see that it refers specifically to "Personal

22 responsibility for violations of the laws of war." I just read it so it

23 goes into the record: "Every individual, a member of the military or a

24 civilian, shall be personally accountable for violations of the laws of

25 war if he or she commits a violation himself, herself, or orders one to be

1 committed. Ignorance of the provisions of the laws of war does not

2 exonerate the transgressors from responsibility."

3 Would it be fair to say that you were aware in what I will call

4 general terms, perhaps even specific terms, of this provision, what is

5 called a basic provision?

6 A. During my time at the military academy, I studied regulations and

7 the laws. We also studied international laws of war and, yes, I was

8 familiar with this.

9 Q. Thank you. There are basically four paragraphs in this article.

10 The third clearly relates to liability before an international court. And

11 then thirdly -- I should say fourthly: "A person organising, inciting, or

12 assisting in the commission in a violation of the laws of war, or an

13 accomplice in the same, shall also be held responsible as a perpetrator."

14 Can I take it that in relation to your last answer, you were also

15 aware of this fact?

16 A. Yes, that's what it says.

17 Q. Thank you. Let us move to Article 21 which, to some extent, is

18 inaccurately titled. Let us proceed with that. It says: "Responsibility

19 for the actions of subordinates." That's in highlights, but the content

20 is different, I would suggest.

21 "An officer shall be personally liable for violations of the laws

22 of war if he knew or could have known that units subordinate to him," note

23 the next word, "or other units or individuals were planning the commission

24 of such violations and at a time when it was still possible to prevent

25 their commission failed to take measures to prevent such violations. That

1 officer shall also be held personally liable who, aware that violations of

2 the laws of war have been committed, fails to institute disciplinary or

3 criminal proceedings against the offender, or if the instituting of

4 proceedings does not fall within his jurisdiction, fails to report the

5 violation to his superior officer."

6 The title says "Responsibility for the action of subordinates,"

7 but I would suggest to you that this particular section is much wider. It

8 relates to subordinate units or other units or individuals. Now, you

9 attended various courses and colleges, you reached a high rank within the

10 JNA. Would it be right to say that you were aware of the responsibility

11 that this particular article created?

12 A. As an officer, I was always fully aware of the fact that the

13 responsibility was mine; also for training my subordinates and that I was

14 to answer for any of their actions in my area.

15 I didn't go that thoroughly through each and every item of these

16 regulations, but I'm familiar with the international provisions. And

17 based on what you've just read out, my subordinates were security officers

18 in my own unit. I did not have any units that were subordinated to me. I

19 didn't know or indeed notice at the time that any crimes were committed.

20 As for this unit that I was responsible for as chief of security,

21 and you must be aware of that based on my reports, all those individuals

22 who committed minor disciplinary infractions were sent away from the unit

23 and steps were taken against them.

24 Q. Can we please come back to the question, and that is, it says

25 clearly in relation to the action of subordinates but there were two other

1 categories, one is other units, clearly referring to units that were not

2 subordinated to him, or individuals, who actually relate to civilians, and

3 is a logical follow-up of Article 20. So it's not just units

4 subordinated; it is units general and civilian. You were aware of that,

5 were you not?

6 A. I'm certain that you are a much better lawyer than I am, and I am

7 also certain that your interpretation of these laws and provisions must be

8 convenient for you as a lawyer.

9 As I said, I am familiar with these regulations and laws. I did

10 study these at the military academy. Everything that I did, I did in the

11 spirit of the laws and regulations that applied. I also know that all of

12 my subordinates were working in keeping with all the laws and regulations

13 that applied at the time.

14 Q. Look, let's set aside all the lawyer/officer elements. What this

15 actual says is just common sense. It says as an officer, if a unit is

16 subordinated to you, you should try and stop it or deal with it. As an

17 officer, if you know other units are going to be involved, you become --

18 you either stop it or deal with it. And if it's a civilian that is going

19 on, you deal with it the same way. It is just a question of common sense.

20 It's not fancy lawyer's construction, is it? It's just common sense;

21 isn't that right?

22 A. Of course both as an officer, and as a human being, it is my duty

23 to fight any crime or any criminal action. However, within my area of

24 responsibility alone, and within my area of influence, if you like.

25 Q. Let's look at the core section or the core of Article 21. It

1 says, in relation to planning the commission of such violations: "... and

2 at a time when it was still possible to prevent their commission."

3 What that means, I'd suggest, is if a criminal act has commenced,

4 and there is the responsibility of stopping that criminal act continuing,

5 Article 21 puts a duty upon such an officer to intervene. That's correct,

6 isn't it?

7 A. An officer is duty-bound to intervene right away, as soon as he

8 gets wind of any sort of suspicion at all. However, where I was at the

9 time, I had not heard of any crimes being committed or indeed planned. As

10 I said, even when we had completely minor disciplinary infractions by

11 certain soldiers or territorials and volunteers, if you like, we foiled

12 those and nipped them in the bud. We would send these people to the

13 military remand prison in Belgrade - there's a letter about that, about

14 the forensics from the military police patrol - and such soldiers would

15 immediately be sent away from our area.

16 Q. What is the significance of the final passage in that article,

17 namely: "... fails to report the violation to his superior officer"?

18 A. The significance is important. It means that every officer must

19 report even minor disciplinary infractions and not only crimes. He must

20 request measures to be taken in cases where he is unable to take any steps

21 himself.

22 At the time, I never, at any point in time, had anything at all to

23 indicate that anyone had committed any crimes of the magnitude under

24 consideration here.

25 Q. Does this article apply to Mr. Mrksic?

1 A. I tried to explain yesterday, Mr. Moore. I took the stand as a

2 human being, as an officer, as a witness. I told you what my reasons

3 were. My intention was to tell you everything I know. It is not as a

4 judge or as a lawyer that I am now sitting here. I can't interpret these

5 for you and tell you who this might or might not be in relation to. This

6 applies to all JNA officers equally since the rules apply to the JNA as a

7 whole. It's difficult to name names and to individualise. I think this

8 applies to all officers equally.

9 Q. Well, if that is your answer, that will suffice. Let us -- I will

10 come back to this section in all probability in due course, but let us

11 know, please, move to tab 1 for the English and tab 2 for the B/C/S.

12 For the record, this relates to Exhibit 107. It's called "The

13 rules of service of the security organs in the armed forces of the

14 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." And I want to deal, if I may,

15 please, with something that Mr. Lukic had dealt with but rather briefly.

16 It relates to, in English, page 7, starting "the tasks of security

17 organs," and it is number 6.

18 Would you have that?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Thank you very much. I said to you yesterday: Did you accept

21 whether the security organ was -- I will amend it slightly, an additional

22 set of eyes and ears for the commander and the command? Let us look,

23 then, at what the task of the security organ actually are as specified.

24 "6: Security organs are responsible for the detection, tracking,

25 and prevention of intelligence activities and other activities of foreign

1 military intelligence," it seems to be non-military intelligence, "... and

2 the activities of hostile Yugoslav immigration carried out in the country

3 or from abroad or aimed against the armed forces and the preparation of

4 the armed forces for the country's defence while JNA security organs also

5 deal with activities aimed against organisations for NVO."

6 So whether it applies in the Vukovar scenario, here there is

7 reflection to -- or reference to detection, tracking, and prevention. You

8 obviously accept that. Is that right?

9 A. Sir, again, I must say that I do not accept that at all. I, as a

10 security organ, was there in a technical capacity and had technical tasks.

11 What it says right here, "detection, tracking and prevention" and that's

12 quite specific, "of foreign military intelligence services." Now that

13 makes more than just a blight bit of difference, doesn't it.

14 Q. What I'm trying to indicate, Mr. Sljivancanin, is what the

15 function is of the security organ. I am accepting that this may not apply

16 to Vukovar, but I'm referring to the function of the security organ, and

17 it is detection, tracking, and prevention.

18 Look at B, if you may, please. "The detection and prevention of

19 hostile activities by individuals, groups or organisations, against the

20 armed forces and members of the armed forces while JNA security organs

21 also deal with activities against organisations for NVO and persons

22 employed in these organisations," and goes on.

23 But again, "detection, prevention, of hostile activities by

24 individuals, groups, and organisations." Doesn't that suggest a proactive

25 role, Mr. Sljivancanin?

1 A. While answering Mr. Lukic's questions and while answering yours, I

2 said what you're reading from are tasks of which security organs are the

3 focal points, and it is quite true that under B, it says what you just

4 quoted, "hostile activities by individuals, groups or organisations

5 against the armed forces and members of the armed forces."

6 If you, Mr. Moore, or the Court have enough time, I can give you

7 an example of some work that I did precisely along these lines and that

8 will illustrate my understanding of this particular issue. If there is no

9 time available, then I would say that what you have just read out is

10 accurate.

11 Q. No, Mr. Sljivancanin. You have three counsel, and they are able

12 to deal with any points who have been dealing with this matter at some

13 length, I think, for almost four days.

14 So I'm asking you a simple question: B refers to the Vukovar

15 scenario, doesn't it? It refers to social order established by the

16 constitution of the SFRY, threatening the country's security, threatening

17 the armed forces or breaching the secrecy of the plans and preparation of

18 the armed forces for the country's defence.

19 You went into Vukovar as the JNA, still believing in Yugoslavia;

20 isn't that right?

21 A. I went there as a JNA member. We had received an assignment from

22 our Superior Command. I believed in that country. I believed that it

23 would survive. I tried to deal with all my tasks in a regular and proper

24 manner.

25 Q. When the phrase "detection and prevention of hostile activities by

1 individuals, groups, and organisations," basically against the

2 constitution of the SFRY, it would be right to say that the persons who

3 were in Croatia, in Vukovar, what I will call, for convenience, the

4 Croatian defenders of Vukovar, fall within that category, don't they?

5 They were fighting against Yugoslavia. They were trying to achieve the

6 dissolution of the constitution of Yugoslavia; isn't that right?

7 A. Now that you're asking me, I don't agree with the term "Vukovar's

8 defenders." We were all defenders. It really very much depends on your

9 point of view, doesn't it? What I call them, what I choose to call them,

10 is Croat paramilitary units. As far as that's concerned, I personally at

11 the time believed that the Croatian people were not against Yugoslavia and

12 that for me as a security organ, the paramount thing was to track down and

13 bring in the leaders of this armed insurrection, those who were behind the

14 whole thing, or even possibly as we relate at all by those we captured had

15 mobilised certain people by force and given them weapons to man the

16 barricades.

17 For me, it was the instigators of that whole thing that were to

18 blame. If those 10 or 15 men could have been brought to justice at the

19 time, maybe the whole situation would have been resolved.

20 Q. But 6(B) specifically deals with the situation in Vukovar, doesn't

21 it? As you perceived it.

22 A. This rule does not specifically refer to Vukovar but to general

23 tasks, and I have explained how I perceive a general task. These are

24 tasks specified against anyone subverting the constitutional order and

25 eroding the system which functioned in Yugoslavia at the time. All those

1 who armed themselves irregularly, illegally, and opened fire at members of

2 the Yugoslav People's Army, which at that time was a regular army, were

3 perpetrators of criminally fences. And I as the security organ then

4 thought - and I repeat - I never believe the Croatian people to be against

5 Yugoslavia but individuals who incited and indeed forced people to bear

6 arms were against Yugoslavia, and that those people, those individuals

7 were to be brought to justice and that everything should have been done in

8 order to prevent them from pursuing their activities.

9 Q. Just taking that answer, do you accept that persons who wilfully

10 opened fire at members of the Yugoslav People's Army, which, as you say,

11 was a regular army at the time, that they were "... subverting the

12 constitutional order and eroding the system which functioned as Yugoslavia

13 at that time"?

14 A. Not all of them were eroding the system. They were committing

15 criminal offences which can be punished according to specific articles of

16 the law, or some persons may have been mislead. But I consider then and I

17 consider today that the system was eroded by individuals who organised

18 themselves for reasons known to them, and they also incited other people

19 to transgress in that way.

20 Q. And that would be eroding or subverting the constitutional order,

21 isn't that right, as you perceived it at that time. Isn't that right?

22 A. That is correct. Any armed insurgency is tantamount to an erosion

23 of the constitutional order.

24 Q. Let's move on to C. I'll deal with these matters, I hope, a bit

25 quicker. C relates to the implementation of measures and operations of

1 counter-intelligence and relates to territories, zones in respect of the

2 country's defence. So implementation is a very active involvement for the

3 security organ, isn't it?

4 A. Item C presupposes the implementation of measures and operations

5 of counter-intelligence tasks which are extremely important in the work of

6 security organs. And these counter-intelligence tasks primarily involve

7 the protection of plans, of facilities, of documents, of persons of

8 significance to the armed forces, and generally what was of relevance and

9 of importance to the armed forces for the defence of the country. And

10 that is counter-intelligence work. Counter-intelligence work is one of

11 the difficult and labourious tasks pursued and carried out by organs of

12 security.

13 Q. D, the gathering and verification of information for the

14 operational needs of security organs and the running of security checks on

15 persons for recruitment into the armed forces. So that is the security

16 organ checking that whoever comes into the army is a person who can be

17 trusted. It doesn't perhaps apply so much in Vukovar, but that is one of

18 the tasks, isn't it? It's very proactive.

19 A. Mr. Moore, sir, one of my very important tasks as the security

20 organ was that we had to check out all people assuming duty in the Guards

21 Brigade, including soldiers. I have talked about the structure, the

22 composition of the soldiers sent to us in 1991 from doing their military

23 service because they were deliberately planted on us, some territorial

24 organs from all other Yugoslavia who were better aware of the ideas about

25 the disintegration of Yugoslavia than I was. That is why this

1 verification of staff was important for us because you had to give a

2 rifle, ammunition, weapons to this young person and to assign him to a

3 certain -- to secure a certain person, and if that young person was a

4 psychopath and unstable and wields a rifle, he could create lots of

5 problems. Because the Guards Brigade troops were, in contrast to others,

6 always -- always carried live ammunition for the discharge of their tasks.

7 Q. Let us deal with F, please. I'd like you to read this

8 specifically with Vukovar in mind. "The organisation and maintenance of

9 the security organ's information system for the purpose of analysing data

10 and intelligence, reporting, informing, controlling, and guiding within

11 the competence of the security organ and in accordance with these rules or

12 regulations and general enactments."

13 Now, how can you possibly say that the security organ is not the

14 eyes and ears of a command with 6(F) being actively pursued?

15 A. Well, I see this item differently. We, as the security organs in

16 our department, were to undertake an analysis of our work and to undertake

17 annual analysis of the tasks, including the collection of data and other

18 things in order to gain some experience, and to do that, we had to develop

19 information systems. At some later point that involved the introduction

20 of computers. We had -- this item actually more deals with the annual

21 analysis of the work of the security organs. This is the way I see

22 item F, and this is the way we see item F.

23 Q. Well, analysing data and intelligence can also relate for

24 information coming in from the SSNO, can't it? Reports coming in about

25 who's actively involved? Doesn't it also apply to your secret network

1 that you referred to?

2 A. An analysis is undertaken of all data, of all information coming

3 in. We had some short-term analyses, monthly ones, but the most important

4 analyses and the information processing was on an annual basis, when he

5 summed up the experiences and proposed new measures to improve the methods

6 of work and to check whether we had been properly using the methods of

7 security organs. Of course I was only there for two years. I'm not a

8 great expert on security, so that that is as much as I can tell you.

9 Q. With the utmost respect to you, Mr. Sljivancanin, two years is an

10 extremely long time and that does not exonerate you in any way from the

11 responsibilities that you had in Vukovar, so let's make it absolutely

12 clear.

13 "Intelligence," what does that mean?

14 A. "Intelligence" means gathering data on such persons and all those

15 who have been infiltrated to work against the unit in which I am the

16 security organ, or to pursue any intelligence work on their part in order

17 to gain insight into the situation, the combat readiness of it, or to

18 influence the men of the unit to erode through them the combat readiness

19 of that unit.

20 Q. Can I, in simplistic terms put "intelligence" in the following

21 way: Intelligence would imply intelligence from within the army, within

22 the units at that time, and intelligence externally coming in from other

23 units or organisations like the SSNO. That's one limb of the intelligence

24 operation you would operate on, isn't it?

25 A. Mr. Moore, in the Yugoslav People's Army, there is a security

1 organ, and then there is an intelligence organ.

2 Well, to put it in the simplest of terms and briefest of terms,

3 the security organ namely -- fought against the intelligence organs

4 against others who targeted the JNA in their activities. And the

5 intelligence organ of the JNA collected the data that you are referring to

6 from others. Meaning I pursued a counter-intelligence activity and these

7 others pursued an intelligence activity. That would be it in briefest

8 terms.

9 Q. I would suggest to you that is not correct. I would suggest to

10 you that you were gaining intelligence from individual soldiers, as you

11 suggested to us, when you were talking to them in the front line, finding

12 out about their combat readiness, finding about their morale, finding out

13 exactly if there were any problems. Do you accept that or not as a

14 general concept?

15 A. I said yesterday that in Vukovar, I was on the front line. I

16 consider that to have been an armed rebellion, and I was collecting

17 intelligence, collecting data in my own country, on my own territory, who

18 were the spear-heads of the armed rebellion, what weapons they had, and

19 whether I could reach them and bring them to justice.

20 Q. I will ask the question again: Do you accept, as a general

21 principle, that you were gathering intelligence from your soldiers, JNA

22 soldiers, about their morale, about their combat readiness, about their

23 fatigue, about any other problems that were existing at that time? Do you

24 accept that or not?

25 A. I wouldn't call it intelligence. I would say that these were

1 regular bits of information that I was interested in in terms of what the

2 situation in the unit in which I was chief of security was like.

3 Q. I will use the word "information." So you accept that as the

4 first head. Secondly, do you accept that you were receiving information

5 from other organisations, for example, the SSNO, giving you information

6 about what may be happening in Vukovar or other areas? Do you accept that

7 as a second head?

8 A. I've said here, I've shown that from the chief of security of the

9 cabinet of the federal secretary I received information which he received

10 from the security administration, referring to the organisers of the armed

11 rebellion in Vukovar at that time.

12 Q. So I will suggest to you that the answer to that is "yes."

13 Thirdly, do you accept that you were attempting to obtain

14 information about who was actually fighting against you, the actual

15 persons and numbers. You knew about Jastreb but other names. You were

16 looking for other names as well; isn't that right?

17 A. No, it's no secret we were looking for persons who were the

18 organisers and -- of the armed rebellion and the ringleaders of everything

19 that had happened in Vukovar. Inter alia, I looked the most for Jastreb.

20 I knew, having received information from the competent organs, that he was

21 a former colonel of the Yugoslav People's Army, and I believe that he was

22 from the aerial observation and alert service and reporting service. And

23 I wanted to meet with him so that we could talk as human beings. And I

24 drew attention to the fact that it was ugly that our common soldiers

25 would -- should be killing each other. And I wanted to talk about these

1 things with him as a human being and to let the people decide rather than

2 fight, because we had coexisted happily together until recently. Why we

3 should be fighting? That was the idea that I had.

4 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, if you could just try and focus on the

5 questions. I am saying you were trying to find out who you were fighting

6 against, names, and also numbers, units. That is correct, isn't it? I'd

7 suggest it's perfectly obvious.

8 A. Mr. Moore, I'm telling you what I was thinking about at the time.

9 I cannot give you answers which you will find suitable.

10 My initial desire was to meet with Mr. Jastreb, and I believe that

11 if we met, that as two officers of the Yugoslav People's Army, we would be

12 able to find a solution in order not to fight each other and kill each

13 other. I was convinced of that.

14 Now, what kind of an answer you would like me to give you, I don't

15 know. I'm giving you my own feelings, what my wishes were. Believe me,

16 as a man, please don't try to extract the answer from me which you would

17 like me to give you. I'm really telling you what was in my heart and in

18 my mind.

19 Q. And the fourth category, and I'm not saying that they are

20 absolute, but for convenience in cross-examination, you were trying to

21 ascertain whom you saw was responsible for this rebellion, the 10 or 14

22 people; isn't that right?

23 A. Well, as the fighting progressed, and as more and more people got

24 killed, and when Mr. Vance told me that the Croatian people regarded the

25 Yugoslav People's Army as an aggressor, well, frankly, it occurred to me

1 why use force? Why do this? Let us save what we can and do everything

2 that we can in order to save the captured men and officers of the Yugoslav

3 People's Army and let the politicians deal with this matter.

4 So later I said that as many members of the paramilitary units

5 should be taken in, brought in, in order to be exchanged for our own

6 soldiers and officers.

7 Q. But you use the word "kravatski" here in court 15 years on, but

8 you didn't use the word "kravatski" in your reports, did you? You used

9 the word "Ustasha"; isn't that correct? Or are you saying you've never

10 used the word "Ustasha" in any formal document?

11 A. I used the word "Ustashas" because the very people with whom I was

12 communicating via the radio station called themselves Ustashas and they

13 were proud of it.

14 Actually, I found that word alien, and from studying the history

15 of the peoples of Yugoslavia - because I knew that in the Second World War

16 the Ustashas had aligned themselves with the fascists - if that history

17 was interpreted to me accurately, that is what we learned. And I thought,

18 I never considered the entire Croatian people Ustasha but those who opened

19 fire at the innocent members of the Yugoslav People's Army and the

20 innocent civilians and called themselves Ustashas to boot, I considered

21 them Ustashas as well.

22 Q. But the word "Ustasha" to a Serb had a very specific meaning,

23 didn't it? Ustasha had originally allied themselves with the Nazis and

24 had fought against the partisans. That is correct, isn't it? And it is a

25 pejorative word for a Serb to use against a Croat; isn't that right?

1 A. Well, you see, let me tell you, I told you what I had studied and

2 learned from books in school as a young person. The Ustashas in the

3 territory of Yugoslavia, just like the Chetniks for that matter, were

4 considered to be traitors in the Second World War, aligned with the

5 fascists.

6 Q. Let's look on, please, at the security organs participate in

7 [sic], because I'm suggesting, as I said to you yesterday, you were eyes

8 and ears.

9 Number 7: "Security organs participate in the detection and

10 prevention of serious crimes that involve the theft of or damage to arms,

11 ammunition, combat, equipment, mines and explosive devices and other types

12 of serious property crime in the armed forces," and then relates to other

13 matters.

14 Can we work on the basis that attacking, beating, and abusing

15 individuals who are in the trust of the JNA would fall within this

16 category? Can we work on that basis?

17 A. The tasks which we enumerated before are the basic tasks for which

18 the security organs are responsible principally, but in these that you

19 enumerated now are tasks that they participate in but they are not the

20 principal protagonists of. And this is one of the tasks that they should

21 be participating in.

22 Q. And what this actually says, again, common sense, is that you

23 participate in the detection and prevention of serious crimes, and serious

24 crimes clearly would include beating of prisoner of war or individuals who

25 had been taken prisoner by the JNA forces. That's right, isn't it? It

1 falls quite clearly within your ambit?

2 A. It is not written -- the word "beating of prisoners of war" is not

3 referred to in this item. It just refers to damage to arms, serious

4 property crime in the armed forces, threatening defence capability, combat

5 readiness. This is what the item refers to. I don't see beating referred

6 to anywhere in this item.

7 Q. It's my fault. What I am trying to suggest is that here you are

8 involved in the prevention and detection of serious crimes. They refer

9 to theft and damage to arms, but it refers clearly to the prevention of

10 serious crimes, or are you trying to say, or is Mr. Lukic trying to say

11 that's not the case?

12 A. I cannot try to tell you anything. We just read this item. It

13 says quite clearly they participate in the detection and prevention of

14 serious crimes, referring to theft or damage to arms, ammunition, combat

15 equipment, mines and explosives and other types of serious property crime

16 in the armed forces.

17 Q. But you're not trying to suggest, for example, that if you were

18 aware that there was severe beating of individuals that that wouldn't

19 involve your prevention, trying to prevent it, are you?

20 JUDGE PARKER: If you are suggesting that 7(A) would extend to

21 that, Mr. Moore, there would appear to be some difficulties with the

22 language.

23 MR. MOORE: Well, I will deal with it in generic terms if that's

24 the easiest way.

25 JUDGE PARKER: The language suggests a limitation to certain

1 specific types of serious crime.

2 MR. MOORE: I accept that, and I'm curious actually about "just

3 involve or include" but I can have things checked. I will deal with it in

4 the generic way, if I may; probably the easiest.

5 Q. Let's set aside 7 for a moment. It is the duty of an officer of

6 the security organ to prevent and detect serious crime along with other

7 crimes. Do you accept that?

8 A. It is the duty of every officer to prevent and report any criminal

9 offences if he has any information about any criminal offences, and that

10 includes, of course, the security organs.

11 Q. Thank you. Thank you. That will do for my purpose.

12 And then B: "The recommendation, regulation, organisation of

13 security and self-protection measures, and also in other security matters

14 organised and implemented by commands." What does that mean?

15 A. This means that all commands, all commanders at their respective

16 levels, and all commanding officers, "komandiri," in their units shall

17 deal with the question of the security and self-protection of their own

18 unit and draft plans, of course according to their respective levels as

19 well, for the men to be secure whilst discharging their tasks in the unit.

20 The security organs participate and give guidelines for the drafting and

21 proposing of such measures so -- in all the -- so that security would

22 be -- would be at its best level in all units, installations, and

23 institutions.

24 Q. Can we just turn the page to Article 46, please. I require your

25 assistance on this. "Authorised officers of security organs have the

1 right to use physical force for the purposes of overcoming resistance by a

2 person who is to be taken into custody or for the purpose of repelling an

3 attack against themselves or a person for whom they are providing

4 security."

5 Now, what I would like to know is who is an authorised officer?

6 A. Mr. Moore, sir, this item 46 is most applicable in peacetime;

7 namely, the powers of security organs in peacetime. Generally speaking,

8 this entire regulations, these rules apply in peacetime. And in wartime

9 and in a state of the imminent threat of war, they are restricted; these

10 tasks are restricted.

11 It is stated accurately here that all security organs may use

12 firearms but the conditions are also specified, and it is specified under

13 what conditions they can use them in contrast to other officers of the

14 Yugoslav People's Army. And these officers were empowered to use such

15 weaponry during peacetime, and it is regulated very precisely how it shall

16 be used. But any organ of security would be severely punished if they

17 used firearms contrary to all these very detailed regulations which are

18 spelled out here.

19 Q. Thank you very much. So all security organs have the right to use

20 firearms, as you have indicated. Let's just look below when they can use

21 those firearms, shall we?

22 "In carrying out tasks within their competence, authorised

23 officers of security organs may use firearms only if they have no other

24 way: A, protecting people's lives."

25 Now, does that mean that, in actual fact, that if -- let's move on

1 in time - if you were aware that people's lives were at risk, in a zone of

2 responsibility, your zone of responsibility or indeed other zones of

3 responsibility, and you were specifically told by your commander to go

4 and sort the matter out, you would be entitled to use, I'm sure

5 regrettably, firearms if you thought it was necessary to protect people's

6 lives?

7 A. So, Mr. Moore, let me try to repeat this. Once a security organ

8 has used up all of their other powers - they're not stated here, IDing

9 people, applying physical force, bringing people in - and they still can't

10 deal -- or, rather, prevent what is described here from happening, then,

11 well, it's quite clear, isn't it? Then firearms are resorted to. But it

12 is certainly not the case that a security organ can resort to firearms

13 right away before they've used up all their other powers under the rules,

14 if you understand what I mean.

15 Q. Yes. So if your charm doesn't work, if your persuasion doesn't

16 work, and there's nothing left, you can use firearms. That's right, isn't

17 it?

18 A. I'm not talking about charm. I could warn them. If they still

19 refuse, I could apply physical force. If I can overwhelm them by using

20 physical force, then there's no need to use firearms. I'll just tie their

21 hands behind their backs, right.

22 Q. I want to move away from those regulations. I took a bit longer

23 perhaps than I had hoped. Could we try and keep the answers a little

24 shorter and I'll try and keep the questions a little shorter also.

25 Can we look at tab 11, please, of this same document. So tab 11

1 is IDET, it's 06003051. And it is tab 12 for yourself. I want to deal

2 with what I will call "notice."

3 Now, have you got tab 12?

4 A. Yes, the security organ of the command of the 1st Military

5 District, yes.

6 Q. And you've already told us that you were kept in the loop in

7 relation to various matters. Here is a document dated the 18th of October

8 to the 1st Military District command security organ. What name do we put

9 to that? Who is the person who is receiving this, 1st Military District

10 command security organ?

11 A. Well, the title itself tells you that this is a report sent to the

12 security organ of the command of the 1st Military District. It was a

13 rather large security organ in terms of pure numbers. I wasn't in touch

14 with them at the time, but I think they were led by Major General Babic at

15 the time; he was the chief.

16 I do have to express some reservations as to the accuracy of this

17 particular piece of information. I may have got the name wrong, but I

18 think he was chief of security in the 1st Military District at the time.

19 Q. All right. The name, perhaps, is not so crucial but let's look at

20 the content. A number of sources of the security organ of the JNA point

21 to the fact that: "In the crisis area of the Republic of Croatia,

22 particularly along the Sid-Negoslavci-Vukovar axis. There are a number of

23 armed formations besides the JNA, primarily volunteer units which carry

24 out combat activities and whose self-proclaimed commanders refuse to

25 coordinate actions with the JNA units and are carrying out party

1 propaganda activities through the residents, and particularly through

2 local and foreign journalists, accusing the JNA, the leaders of the

3 paramilitary compositions, are trying to mould themselves into heroes of

4 the Serb people's resistance presenting their units as the nucleus of what

5 appears to be ideological Serbian army, carrying out the activities under

6 the parole of for the keen and the fatherland. Basically those are

7 relatively small units of 20 or 30 men who, apart from mentioned, carry

8 out other illegal activities. They are treating the prisoners of war

9 brutally and increasingly often kill them on the spot and thus satisfy the

10 justice. The abandoned houses are looted, and besides the money,

11 jewellery and other precious items, in an organised manner they confiscate

12 automobiles, tractors, and other mechanical devices, even cattle."

13 It then goes on about smuggling. I won't go into any great detail

14 of that.

15 Now, on the English page, it's the second page, I'd like you to

16 move on to the short paragraph that carries on: "Apart from this, an

17 increasing number of instances of war looting." Have you got that? If

18 you don't, I'll read it all and make it easy for you.

19 A. Yes, that's the second passage, right?

20 Q. "Apart from this, an increasing number of instances of war looting

21 are registered also by the volunteers and the TO headquarters."

22 Then it goes on about a man called Bibic Milan tolerating

23 even -- "tolerates and even organises the looting himself."

24 It goes on about the selling off items. Then I want to start,

25 please, with the paragraph commencing "lack of respect." Have you got

1 that? "Lack of respect for the regulations."

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thank you very much. "Lack of respect for the regulations,

4 self-will, abusive positions and other are taking on troubling dimensions

5 which doesn't bypass the members of the JNA." And then, for example,

6 chief of security for the 453rd, gives a name. "While in the village of

7 Negoslavci, illegally issued special authorisations to the civilians with

8 which he helped them carry out a misuse. The authorised persons were then

9 abusive to the citizens, even carrying out liquidations on occasions, on

10 their own decisions. In order to overcome the registered weaknesses, and

11 particularly to stop the genocide and the revenge-seeking, the anti-army

12 activities and other crimes, it is necessary to place a bigger importance

13 on these problems, and whenever possible, to document such activities in

14 order to show it to the MUP and other organs of the Republic of Serbia.

15 Pass on your information on the activities of the heads of the

16 paramilitary formations and the anti-army and other criminal activities to

17 the SSNO Federal Secretariat by the 25th."

18 Now, here is a document that clearly refers to prisoners of war

19 brutally and increasingly being treated, killing them on the spot,

20 looting, even phrases like "genocide." This is a document, where did it

21 go to? The 1st Military District? That's right, isn't it?

22 A. Yes, that's right, Mr. Moore. It went to the 1st Military

23 District. And what I can tell you is this: If you --

24 Q. Just before you start telling us, 1st Military District is

25 OG South. That's right, isn't it?

1 A. No. The 1st Military District is the 1st Military District; it

2 had jurisdiction over its own territory. If we see OG South as a

3 temporary formation for the purpose of completing a very specific mission,

4 which is liberating the Vukovar barracks and disarming the paramilitary

5 units in and around Vukovar, in that case, you had units from the

6 1st Military District in that operations group, but the Guards Motorised

7 Brigade was not a unit belonging to the 1st Military District. And --

8 could I perhaps explain this document, tell you what it's about?

9 Q. I'm sure you will be able to. But is Negoslavci not then the

10 Guards Motorised Brigade zone of responsibility?

11 A. Yes, until the mission is completed.

12 Q. And when we refer to the Sid-Negoslavci-Vukovar axis, does that

13 not certain the Guards Motorised Brigade as well?

14 A. No, it does not. The Sid-Oriolik village -- Berak village axis

15 was under the control of the Infantry Guards Division from the

16 1st Military District which had three Guards Brigades.

17 One thing I wish to point out, and there seems to be some degree

18 of confusion about that here, the Guards Brigade is called the Guards

19 Motorised Brigade, whereas there seems to be a confusion of terms

20 occurring quite frequently here. There is the 1st Guards Brigade, the

21 2nd Guards Brigade, the 3rd Guards Brigade. These are units of the Guards

22 Division belonging to the 1st Military District.

23 Therefore, if we talk about the Guards Motorised Brigade, there is

24 no 1st or 2nd Brigade. Its name is the Guards Motorised Brigade and that

25 name alone.

1 Q. Thank you. But in any event, this document requests for material

2 to be sent to the SSNO. That is correct, isn't it?

3 A. Mr. Moore, please, allow me to explain. This document was

4 produced by the security administration based on my observations, based on

5 the observations of security officers belonging to the Guards Motorised

6 Brigade. If you've been listening carefully to my evidence, if you look

7 carefully through my documents, you will have realised that I had reported

8 on problems with Bibic Milan, Boro Bogunovic, this gentleman called Besic

9 Muharem. All three of them were from the territorial jurisdiction of the

10 1st Military District. I was in no position to report to them. Instead,

11 I was reporting to my own direct superior in terms of the technical line

12 of command, my superior from the security organ, and he forwarded that to

13 the security administration.

14 The security administration is a technical body which now forwards

15 this information to the security organ of the 1st Military District for

16 measures to be taken and for checks to be run as to the veracity of what

17 the organs of the Guards Motorised Brigade had been writing about. So

18 there is that document for you.

19 It's a very good thing you raised this point. Again, we worked in

20 a systematic fashion, and we were struggling to preserve this country that

21 was called Yugoslavia. And we didn't mind the fact that this man was a

22 JNA security chief; we didn't look at that at all. We wanted steps to be

23 taken against him also, if he indeed had been guilty of committing such

24 errors.

25 Q. When you say this document was produced by the security -- "by the

1 security administration based on my observations," does that mean that

2 references to the brutal treatment and killing of prisoner of war was

3 known to you at that time?

4 A. Mr. Moore, I explained that at the time, I, or rather my security

5 organs -- I'm sorry, saying I, I, all the time; I'm speaking on their

6 behalf.

7 You have the sources stated specifically in any reports that I

8 sent to the chief of the security administration. Such and such 6 captain

9 misused his position of authority and took action on the ground that

10 wasn't allowed. We wanted that to be checked, interviews to be conducted,

11 and measures to be taken. He was not under our territorial jurisdiction.

12 He was not within our competence at all, and there was absolutely nothing

13 we could do about him or about what he did. Our duty, however, was to

14 report on anything that we found out, which we duly did, and it was the

15 competent -- the relevant bodies that were supposed to take any further

16 measures. After that, I was not told again what exactly was done about

17 this person, if anything.

18 Q. That's not what I'm asking. I'm asking quite simply, there's a

19 reference to treating of prisoners of war brutally and killing of them.

20 And I am simply asking you: Did you have knowledge at that time that such

21 actions were occurring? Simple question. Simple answer.

22 A. So a simple question requires a simple answer. And that would

23 be: I remember reading that report, and we heard at the time about the

24 sources used by those people who had provided our information. They said

25 that a messenger had been killed. I don't have the report now to be able

1 to check, but those people who were in possession of those certificates

2 that this man had been issuing were treating the entire population in a

3 disrespectful manner and we asked for that to be stopped. We did not

4 track down any such individuals, but we wanted checks to be run in another

5 area which was at the time under his control because the territory -- the

6 area under his control was much larger than the one we were covering, the

7 area under the control of those units.

8 Q. I will ask the question one more time. Does that mean that you

9 knew there was ill treatment and killing of prisoners of war? As you've

10 said, you read this report.

11 A. I didn't know. I heard sources telling us about that. I

12 forwarded a request for that to be verified or checked.

13 Q. And the phrase "genocide," refers to what, as far as you believed,

14 as opposed to knew?

15 A. I didn't produce this document. Whoever used that

16 term "genocide," I really have no idea what they were referring to at the

17 time. I can't be expected to interpret every single word that this person

18 used. What I told you is what I knew. I told you about everything that

19 I dispatched at the time and everything that I wrote about and everything

20 that I'd shown you previously to this document being shown.

21 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, I wouldn't dream of trying to define genocide

22 even as a lawyer. But genocide means specifically, does it not, the

23 targeting of a certain group. In layman's language, that's what it means,

24 doesn't it?

25 MR. LUKIC: Objection.

1 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Lukic.

2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I think the witness has answered the

3 question already. But the crux of my objection is Mr. Moore is now asking

4 Mr. Sljivancanin to interpret the word "genocide," for him. And this word

5 was suggested by whoever produced the document, and this person is a

6 totally different person. Mr. Sljivancanin wrote about these facts but he

7 never used the term. Mr. Moore can ask him what in very general terms he

8 believes the word to mean, but he cannot possibly be asking him to

9 interpret the term as used in this document or to suggest what the author

10 of this document may or indeed may not have meant.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Lukic. I think Mr. Moore has moved

12 to agreeing with you the way he framed it at the end.

13 Carry on, Mr. Moore.

14 MR. MOORE:

15 Q. I'm suggesting to you that "genocide" in everyday language means

16 the targeting of a group. Would you agree with that?

17 A. Mr. Moore, genocide is a dreadful thing. I wouldn't agree that it

18 normally targets just one group, nor did I feel at the time that any acts

19 of genocide had been committed in the area. I never used the term myself

20 in any of my reports.

21 Q. Well, if you're able to tell us that genocide is a dreadful thing,

22 you obviously know, then, what it means by your definition. What does it

23 mean, as you understand it, being a dreadful thing?

24 A. Well, based on what I found out, based on what I learned, it means

25 the extermination of a population in an area so that this population

1 ceases to exist altogether. The cleansing of a population, the cleansing

2 of an area from the entire population that used to inhabit it.

3 Q. Did you ever hear it suggested that the JNA and the TOs who

4 supported them were endeavouring to cleanse the area around Vukovar? Did

5 you ever hear that dreadful thing being said?

6 A. I never heard anything like that being said. Wherever I was at

7 the time, and which ever member of the JNA that I talked to or spent time

8 with, whenever I was present, they were trying to treat every human being

9 alike, and we wanted everybody to stay in that area as long as the right

10 conditions were there.

11 You say that the Territorial Defence men were supporting the JNA.

12 That is, in fact, not true. They were not supporting us. They had their

13 own tasks under the law that applied at the time for all the Territorial

14 Defence forces to remain in the area. And I know that among the TO

15 troops, there were people of all sorts of different ethnicities. They

16 were not mono-ethnic. Some ethnicities were represented to a greater

17 extent and some to a lesser, but they were certainly not a mono-ethnic

18 force.

19 Q. Can I take it, then, having seen this document and the reference

20 to revenge-seeking that you were aware or had notice that revenge-seeking

21 was actually occurring?

22 A. I never witnessed anything like that. I never witnessed any

23 revenge-seeking or acts of revenge. When we arrived in the area, I tried,

24 as I have explained already, to find out what had been going on before our

25 arrival and to report all of that so that we might take measures to make

1 sure that any such acts of revenge were foiled and to make sure that

2 people understood the necessity to not do that sort of thing.

3 Q. And I take it, then, that you were aware, if not personal

4 knowledge, but you were aware of the suggestion being made that there was

5 revenge-seeking occurring?

6 MR. LUKIC: Just a second, please.

7 [Interpretation] Can we just please have a more specific question,

8 because the B/C/S interpretation that we're receiving, and I think that

9 very much follows the English original, if then you were not aware

10 personally, was a suggestion made to you. I'm not sure about the word

11 where -- I think the phrasing of the question is not particularly clear.

12 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.

13 Carry on, Mr. Moore.

14 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

15 Q. You have said that you are not personally aware, but you'd been

16 told about it, hadn't you?

17 A. I'll try to be as accurate as possible. Again, I was not aware of

18 any incident involving any acts of revenge.

19 When we arrived in the area, there were all sorts of rumours

20 circulating as to what had been going on before our arrival. Quite

21 simply, clashes had erupted between the people living in the area. The

22 term "revenge" was used. We wrote about everything that we had heard, and

23 we tried to deal with this for as long as we were there. We took various

24 measures to prevent this from happening.

25 There was never a meeting at our command post without the

1 commander pointing out that all the measures should be complied with and

2 that the civilian population was to be treated in the most respectful way.

3 Q. But the word "revenge" had been used and inquiries had been made

4 by you and that's what had been suggested, that people were taking the law

5 into their own hands. That's right, isn't it? That's what you heard.

6 A. Mr. Moore, whoever wrote this document used the words the way he

7 used them. Again, we heard all sorts of rumours and stories about that

8 when we arrived. Everybody was hoping that we would help them, and

9 indeed, we did our best to oblige.

10 From day one, after our arrival in the area, we did all we could

11 to foil all rumours and to see whether there was any truth to the rumours

12 and to restore order to the area to the extent that we were able to, as

13 well as to disarm any disobedient individuals who could not comply with

14 our requests, and for measures to be taken against them.

15 I provided specific figures as to how many volunteers left our

16 area on any given day, those undisciplined ones. Sometimes we would even

17 send officers away. You have an example in my report. There was that

18 officer who committed a disciplinary infraction. You have it quite

19 clearly there what the commander had done about it and what we did about

20 it. I can't give you any names right now, but one thing is certain we did

21 take steps to stop such things from happening.

22 Q. But it would be right to say that the ever-present fear of revenge

23 was there when you were in Vukovar; isn't that right?

24 A. Well, listen, there's fighting. People are selling and buying

25 weapons. People are arming themselves. Any psychopath can buy a weapon,

1 someone you don't know. Well, of course there is fear.

2 Secondly, people were moving about, moving out, returning. They

3 would go of their own accord. The next day they want to go back. You

4 have no idea what they are coming for. There is always fear.

5 We weren't monsters not to feel any fear. Of course we felt fear.

6 Q. But it's much more than that, Mr. Sljivancanin, isn't it? You

7 were on the front line. What was happening was that people were being

8 killed. They were being killed either by a Croat or a Serb, as they

9 perceived it, and there was always the danger that revenge would reoccur

10 or occur; isn't that right? It's equivalent to a civil war.

11 A. Well, I said it, I've written it, and we've heard a great deal of

12 evidence by a number of witnesses in this Court, starting with the

13 peacetime period. There were acts of sabotage and people were killed.

14 Later on, clashes erupted, regrettably. When the Guards Brigade arrived

15 in the area, there was heavy fighting going on, armed clashes, fierce

16 ones. In those days, I only knew of those who had been killed in combat,

17 our own officers and soldiers as well as the soldiers belonging to the

18 enemy forces.

19 There were things like that happening. For example, my driver was

20 killed. But I can't say that anyone killed him for any specific reasons,

21 for revenge or anything like that. Someone killed him who was in a

22 sheltered position, they just fired and they happened to kill my driver.

23 That was all.

24 Q. But the situation as of the 18th of November changed because, for

25 the first time, Croat defenders did not have their weapons. Many of them

1 had disarmed themselves and they were extremely vulnerable to revenge

2 attacks. That's right, isn't it?

3 A. In those days, I didn't feel that there was any sort of

4 revenge-seeking in the air. I was concerned that some people might start

5 flooding back who had long moved out of the area. And once they got wind

6 of the fact that Vukovar had now been liberated, I was afraid that all

7 these paramilitary formations would start flooding in to see what was

8 going on. And then there is turmoil, and the situation gets out of hand.

9 But I must say this too: I was pleasantly surprised to see those

10 young soldiers and members of the TO in my presence, in the area where I

11 was moving. And you saw that footage of the wounded being stretchered out

12 of the hospital. It was the young soldiers doing that. And all the

13 hospital staff was trying to get to the buses as soon as possible. So you

14 can see for yourself they did everything within their power to help.

15 Those people who had been through so much suffering, the people of that

16 town, to try to show some sympathy, to help them through their pain, and

17 to help them in any way they could and whatever they could. I really

18 admired my soldiers. Those young people not infected by all the hatred,

19 by all the revenge-seeking, not infected by anything that makes a man

20 inhuman. I taught them what to do and how to behave.

21 Q. Well, who were they going to get the infection from?

22 A. Again, the soldiers, most of the soldiers, the vast majority of

23 soldiers and officers in the Guards Brigade did not feel any hate. We

24 spoke earlier of how soldiers were selected. One spends sometimes growing

25 up for 20 years, somebody that raises this person brings them, and now at

1 the age of 20 they come to the JNA. We're not all alike. There may have

2 been certain unstable individuals in a certain group infected by some sort

3 of hatred, but I didn't notice that there were any such persons in my

4 presence, but I'm not saying that there could not possibly have been also

5 such individuals hiding or mimicry in a mass of people.

6 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, I notice the time.

7 JUDGE PARKER: We will adjourn now and resume at 11.00.

8 --- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m.

9 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

10 JUDGE PARKER: I'm back with us, Mr. Moore. Please carry on.

11 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much. May I make application for this

12 document to be made an exhibit.

13 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

14 MR. MOORE: Thank you.

15 May I move on, please, to tab 9.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Sorry. Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit 847.

17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

18 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

19 Could we move on, please, to tab 9 in the English version and

20 tab 10 on the B/C/S version. The previous document was dated, I believe,

21 the 18th of October. This is a document dated the 23rd of October; at

22 least I hope it is.

23 Q. Have you got that document, Mr. Sljivancanin, it's tab 10?

24 A. I've got it, Mr. Moore.

25 Q. Thank you very much. Can we just look at this document in fairly

1 brief order, I hope. We can see the date is the 23rd of October. And

2 it's, again, to the command of the 1st Military District sent by telegram

3 under the heading "urgent." I just want to deal with various parts. I'm

4 not going to read it. We would submit that the document is relevant for

5 many issues, but trying to delineate them.

6 Can we go to paragraph number 3 for a moment, please. It should

7 read, it's on page 2: "Activities and occurrences which have a positive

8 impact on the state of the morale in the division units." Have you got

9 that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And there are various headings, such as improving conditions of

12 accommodation, food, expressing concern for the troops. And third from

13 bottom, I just draw your attention to it, "Proper conduct towards

14 prisoners." Do you see that?

15 A. I see that.

16 Q. Thank you very much. Can we then move on to paragraph numbered 4

17 or titled four, really, "Activities or occurrences which have a negative

18 impact on the state of the morale in the division units." There is

19 reference to the statement of General Simovic. There is reference to

20 spread of misinformation, about desertion and panic, invincible snipers,

21 et cetera, about the enormous number of the enemy troops in the

22 surrounding locations, particularly in Vukovar and Nustar. Thirdly,

23 there's reference to a combat activities zone which needn't concern us.

24 But just dealing then with the next topic, and we've already heard

25 evidence about this. It starts: "In the village of Lovac." Do you see

1 that? Have you got that paragraph?

2 A. Yes, yes, I'm following you. I have got it.

3 Q. Thank you very much. Let us just read it then, please. "In the

4 village of Lovac, on one occasion, 80 villagers of Croatian nationality

5 were captured by the TO Lovac and Dusan Silni detachment. They were then

6 physically abused and four of the Lovac villagers were killed.

7 "After the arrival of the Valjevo detachment in the village of

8 Lovac, the captured villagers were used for clearing minefields and 17

9 villagers were killed. The wounded villagers were refused medical help by

10 the staff at the Sid medical centre."

11 Now, we have heard evidence, as I say, from the ECMM evidence

12 about the village of Lovac. While clearly it is not within your zone of

13 responsibility, it is right to say that you were aware of this incident at

14 Lovac and the behaviour of the TO?

15 A. What I can tell you, Mr. Moore, in relation to this document is

16 this: It is true that it was sent to the command of the 1st Military

17 District, the moral guidance department. That means that all the

18 structures of the commands and units were dealing with prisoners of war on

19 the ground and at the level of the brigade and of the division in this

20 department, there were jurists, i.e., judges, who were to deal with many

21 criminal complaints, reports, and such. I was familiarised with this

22 document only when it was first read here in this courtroom, and I don't

23 know anything about the content of this document, so anything that I was

24 to tell you about it would be just interpreting what was meant by its

25 author. I can just tell you that I was not familiar with it and I don't

1 know anything about it.

2 What I can see from this document is what I said before, that this

3 refers to the units of the 1st Guards Motorised Division where there were

4 the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Guards Infantry Brigades. I don't know what else I

5 could tell you about it.

6 Q. But where was this sent to?

7 A. As far as I can see, this document was sent to the command of the

8 1st Military District to the moral guidance department, and it was sent by

9 the commander for moral guidance in the 1st Infantry but then it is

10 missing here but probably the division. The assistant commander for moral

11 guidance of that division forwarded this document to the commander or

12 perhaps Milan Jeremija was the deputy commander for instructions in

13 matters of moral in some of the brigades within that division, but since I

14 don't know the man, I can't tell you that with precision.

15 Q. What I'm suggesting to you is that there was a dreadful phrase,

16 I'm sorry, but there was a track record, there was a history of abuses

17 towards prisoners of war occurring at that time towards Croatian fighters

18 and individuals who were not sympathetic to the JNA, and that was widely

19 known. Do you agree?

20 A. I fully disagree with you. That may have existed in some

21 instances, in some milieus, if people have reported about it. So it was

22 in their own milieus. In the zone of the Guards Brigade, we did not have

23 any such phenomena.

24 There is also another document which I saw attached referring to

25 the certificates which were issued by the security organs which we took

1 from the residents and then we returned it to the security administration

2 with proof about what that chief of security was doing, which was prior to

3 our arrival. We sought to establish complete law and order in accordance

4 with the law, and I don't know that any such cases happened in our zone.

5 I'm not excluding that there may have been others elsewhere, but I wasn't

6 aware of them.

7 Q. Yes, what you were saying is: Oh my goodness, the murder of

8 200-odd people at Ovcara came as a terrible surprise to you all. That's

9 pretty much what you are saying, isn't it?

10 A. It is a grievous crime to kill 200 people who were considered

11 suspects for having committed criminal offences, and I was surprised, as a

12 human being, that that should have happened. But it was not, I repeat, in

13 the zone of our brigade.

14 Q. Well, we'll look at what you did about it in due course. But

15 let's look, please, at subdivider 8 and 9. This is document is well

16 known, but nevertheless you should have the opportunity of looking at it.

17 This is what's called the Zivota Panic warning document. It's

18 Exhibit 415.

19 Now, have you got the B/C/S version at subdivider or tab 8? Do

20 you have that in front of you?

21 A. I have it, sir.

22 Q. And where does this document come from?

23 A. It comes from the command of the 1st Military District, the

24 forward command post, and it is dated the 18th of November, 1991.

25 Q. And it's right to say OG South are one of the nominated

1 recipients. That's right, isn't it?

2 A. That's right.

3 Q. I want to just deal with various aspects of it. I'll read

4 it: "The Croatian armed forces are defeated in the area of combat

5 operations carried out by the 1st Military District units. However, the

6 war did not end with the fall of Vukovar and an even more fierce and

7 brutal war against Ustasha forces is now ahead of it."

8 It's my fault for not asking: Did you see and were you informed,

9 or were you informed about this document by Panic by Colonel Mrksic? I

10 should have asked that at the very start.

11 A. To the best of my recollection, seeing as that this document was

12 drafted on the 18th of November, 1991, I would have to consult my war

13 diary to see when it got in the command of the operations group and when

14 it was filed there, but I have stated and I repeat: On the 18th, I

15 attended a meeting with the commander in the morning. On the 18th, in the

16 afternoon, on the 19th, on the 20th, and the 21st, I attended no meetings

17 with the commander, if he conducted any, nor was I aware of any such

18 meetings being held. And I saw this document for the first time when I

19 arrived here at the court and when I was given this document. Never

20 before did I have this document of the command of the 1st Military

21 District, and it says here that it is addressed to the commander I chief

22 [as interpreted].

23 Q. Really, just a very easy question. You've seen this document many

24 times. You know what the contents are. I am asking you a perfectly

25 simple question: Did Mrksic tell you about this warning from Zivota

1 Panic, yes or no?

2 A. I don't remember that we discussed this document.

3 Q. So can we take it, then, that concerns expressed by Zivota Panic,

4 and we're not talking actually concerns expressed, it was clear and

5 unequivocal about the fears of what had happened and might happen. You're

6 saying your commander never told you, because that clearly is something

7 you would remember, isn't it?

8 A. This is what I have to say in responding to that: The

9 1st Military District has a wide zone. As far as I remember, at that

10 time, it encompassed the zone of even somewhere there around the border

11 towards Nis, then Vojvodina, Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and of course this area

12 where Vukovar is, including the town of Osijek. So the commander, on the

13 basis of all the data collected in his zone, writes such warnings.

14 Now, if we link this to the document that we saw previously where

15 this assistant commander for moral guidance wants the commander of the

16 1st Military District, that in the zone of the Guards Brigade there were

17 some problems occurring, the commander sums up all the experiences coming

18 from all the units in this document and then dispatches it to all units

19 subordinated to him. But the shortcoming of this document in my

20 view is its lack of precise information; what instances of negative

21 behaviour are concerned, such as indicated in the document of the

22 commander for morale saw that the commander, in this case Mr. Mrksic,

23 would be informed -- yes, sir.

24 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, I asked you very simply were you informed about

25 the contents of this document by Mrksic? He had received a document from

1 Zivota Panic saying that incidents had occurred and to be on your guard.

2 Now, can we please forget about all the other areas where it's

3 been, who it's going to. I am asking you a very simple question. Can we

4 please, once again, have a very simple answer: Were you aware of that

5 information being imparted to you, yes or no?

6 A. I just wanted to say I don't remember having seen this document

7 ever before, that is to say, until I arrived here at The Hague. But let

8 me add: The commander may have received this document if it is filed in

9 the war diary, and he assessed that in the zone -- that he was commander

10 of, there were no such practices, such occurrences, and that also there

11 was no need for him to inform everybody. That is perhaps why I don't know

12 anything about it, in brief.

13 Q. So you're saying you don't know anything about it. Is that what

14 you're actually saying? We've gone around in this enormous speech, but

15 what you say is this is perhaps why I don't know anything about it. I'm

16 not talking about the document; I'm talking about the contents. Are you

17 saying you don't know about the Zivota Panic warning?

18 A. At that time, I knew nothing about this document.

19 Q. Would it surprise you that there is an entry in the Guards war

20 diary of the 19th of November of its receipt at 6.00 in the morning, or

21 the entry is at 6.00 in the morning?

22 A. Well, if there is an entry, it was certainly received at that

23 time.

24 Q. Did you never check the war diary to see what was happening as a

25 security organ?

1 A. I never checked the war diary. The Chief of Staff had the right

2 to check the war diary and to control what was being entered in it.

3 Q. So whether, in actual fact, things had happened in the zone of

4 responsibility of OG South or whoever it is, you say you weren't informed

5 of the content of this? That's the bottom line, isn't it?

6 A. Well, that is an equivocal question. If that refers to this

7 document, I assert that I have never seen this document prior to coming to

8 The Hague.

9 Now, what happened in the zone of the Guards Brigade is something

10 that I always sought to be informed about. And to give you a very brief

11 answer, in that period, of course that is a subject for some analysis, I

12 was not interested in the zone of Jakubovci, Ovcara, et cetera, because

13 that was not the zone of combat operation. That was an area where units

14 rested. There may have been infiltrations but -- by terrorist groups, and

15 there were such instances, or a mortar fire could have been opened on

16 units, but there were no combat operations proper there. And I moved in

17 the area where there were combat actions and where barracks were to be

18 deblocked and the paramilitary units disarmed.

19 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, it's not an equivocal question, it is decision

20 time. Either Mr. Mrksic told you or he didn't. Now what is the answer?

21 A. I don't understand. Told me what?

22 Q. "That every unit must fully control the situation on the territory

23 of its area of responsibility, commanders at all levels will be

24 responsible for this. Wartime laws have not entered into force, and

25 therefore, as always, nobody has the right to retribution and other kinds

1 of revenge which some local TO, Territorial Defence units carried out. In

2 future, arrest those who commit any such acts and undertake appropriate

3 legal measures."

4 It cannot be clearer. It cannot be more specific. It drives

5 specifically at your function and the protection of individuals, doesn't

6 it?

7 A. I'm telling you again, Mrksic issued such tasks almost on a daily

8 basis. In looking through these documents in preparing myself for the

9 testimony, I remember the number of document issued by Mrksic as strictly

10 confidential 250-1. That was an order that he issued in October. And

11 concretely speaking, as far as this document is concerned, I was only

12 informed of it when I arrived here.

13 Q. I have asked you: Did you -- or were you told by Mrksic about

14 this Zivota Panic warning? This is after the fall of Vukovar. That's the

15 importance of it. Now did he or did he not tell you the contents of this

16 document?

17 A. I have already replied to that question. I was familiarised with

18 this here document only when I arrived at The Hague. And I did not attend

19 any meetings, probably held by Mrksic. So on the 19th in the evening, if

20 this document came on the 19th, I was not at that meeting and I had not

21 seen -- I did not see this document.

22 Q. And you were not told of this document. Is that what you're also

23 trying to say?

24 A. I said that I was not familiarised with this document. I did not

25 specifically discuss the document, any document with Mrksic, including

1 this one.

2 Q. Let's move on to other parts of this document. I'm sorry it was

3 my fault for not asking it in correct sequence.

4 "The Croatian armed forces are defeated in the area of combat

5 operations carried out by 1st Military District units. However, the war

6 did not end with the fall of Vukovar and even more fierce and brutal war

7 against Ustasha forces is now against us."

8 It goes on about Ustasha forces and especially their more extreme

9 members will continue to fight subversively. And then goes on by saying:

10 "By carrying out sabotage and terrorist actions just behind our lines as

11 well as deeper in our territory and liberated parts."

12 Would you consider that that is an accurate analysis of what

13 commanders were considering at that time after the fall of Vukovar? It is

14 really the first step on a number of battles yet to come?

15 A. Mr. Moore, I can hardly be expected to interpret what the author

16 of this document meant. Here is what he wrote. Again, I wasn't familiar

17 with this document. I don't know what he was planning or what battles

18 would ensue. I really don't know and I can hardly be expected to

19 interpret his thoughts.

20 Q. Paragraph 3 refers to Geneva Conventions and prisoners of war.

21 Paragraph 5, I'd like to deal with, please. "During preparations on the

22 19th of November." Do you see that? Have you got that section?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. "During preparations on the 19th of November, 1991, most

25 resolutely prevent any disobedience, unsoldierly appearance, and

1 behaviour. Commanders of all levels will ensure realistic and favourable

2 conditions for this task to be accomplished."

3 As far as you're aware, would that apply to military units within

4 OG South, as a general term, or a general category?

5 A. Well, now that I'm looking at this, now that I'm listening to you

6 read this, this is a general assignment and this is something that was

7 copied from the military rules. This just adds more emphasis to the task

8 that we, as members of the Guards Brigade, were always familiar with.

9 This was an ongoing task for all units to remain disciplined. The fact

10 that the commander here seems to be emphasising the need for discipline

11 probably means that it was an issue of particular importance for him.

12 Q. You as an officer, not just security organ, you as an officer,

13 would it be right to say, have a duty to ensure that disobedience, not

14 perhaps overly concerned about unsoldierly appearance, and behaviour, is

15 an important directive?

16 A. That applies to every army, including the JNA. Discipline was the

17 foundation, the cornerstone of any task. But believe me, even in

18 peacetime conditions, when soldiers are peacefully in their barracks, you

19 can't do everything fully.

20 In a situation like this where you had inter-ethnic clashes, it

21 was very difficult to keep it all spick and span, so to speak, down to the

22 last detail. We, the officers, did our best to make sure that discipline

23 was sufficient and did everything within our power to ensure that.

24 Q. Kindly tell the Court, then, what it was that you did to ensure

25 that the attacks upon the buses was either prevented or punished? And

1 when I say that, I'm -- in relation to the JNA barracks.

2 A. I never even assumed that the buses would come under attack.

3 Everything I did, that was within my power, I did to help my assistant who

4 was taking those buses into barracks. I told him that he should have a

5 sufficient number of men with him to make sure those people wouldn't be

6 hurt or jeopardised. He told me that back at the barracks there were the

7 most responsible officers who were responsible for discipline there, and

8 he told me that there was a military police company present there.

9 Therefore, I believed that all the appropriate steps would be

10 taken. If the chief of security alone could take care of everything,

11 well, there would be no need for any other officers, would there. The

12 barracks at the time for me was a safe facility where people could go

13 about their tasks as usual.

14 Q. But yesterday I asked you specifically about the personal

15 responsibility of an officer to go and see what was happening, and indeed

16 you gave us an enormous explanation about how desirable it was for

17 personal involvement of a commander.

18 Now, I'm asking you: What did you actually do? You've told us

19 that you were told by Vukasinovic that everything was there. What did you

20 do? Did you check? Did you radio? Did you go personally? I'd like to

21 know what you did.

22 A. As chief of security, I had no power to issue any orders or,

23 indeed, to control the work of my superiors. When Vukasinovic informed me

24 that there had been attempts, such as verbal taunts or attempts at

25 mistreating those 24 persons that, pursuant to my order, he was to return

1 to the hospital -- or pursuant to my request, if you like, I then asked

2 him which officers are there at the barracks?

3 When I heard about this happening. He said there was

4 Lieutenant-Colonel Panic, Lieutenant-Colonel Lukic, Captain Predojevic,

5 and he mentioned a couple of other military police officers. That was my

6 personal belief at the time, knowing those officers and knowing what the

7 overall situation was that those officers would take all the necessary

8 measures to prevent that.

9 It wasn't my function or my role to supervise their work. Had

10 they not been there, I would have gone myself to see what was going on.

11 Since I had been informed that they were there, I felt there was no need

12 for me to go

13 As for what you asked me yesterday, you asked me specifically what

14 I would have done if I had been the brigade commander and if I had issued

15 a task to an officer, how would I have checked whether the task had been

16 carried out successfully, and that was the answer -- that was the question

17 that I answered yesterday.

18 Q. Do you remember yesterday in your evidence you told us that you

19 wandered about, walked about, I should say, with a radio - do you remember

20 that - "at all times"? Did you ever use your radio to try and find out

21 what was happening at the barracks, yes or no?

22 A. No. I had no radio link to the barracks. I had a radio link to

23 my command post back at Negoslavci and the command at Negoslavci.

24 Q. Did you, at any time, attempt, by radio, to find out what was

25 going on at the barracks?

1 A. No, I did not. Why? Because I had been informed by my assistant.

2 He told me which of the officers were at the barracks at the time, and I

3 believed that order and discipline reigned supreme.

4 Q. But you told us yesterday that it was prudent and wise to ensure

5 that one kept an eye, a constant eye on what was happening. Why did you

6 not use the radio? Why did you not try and find out if things had

7 changed?

8 A. You asked me a specific question yesterday, what would I have done

9 as commander in relation to a specific mission? And this question now,

10 I'm telling you this: The officers who were at the barracks, they were

11 from the command structure of the Guards Brigade. I was not their

12 superior. I put my trust in them. Those were officers I knew. I

13 believed that they would do their job in a soldierly way. I believed

14 since they were there, there was no need for me to go and supervise them,

15 nor, indeed, was that my duty.

16 Q. So the answer is you didn't do anything; is that right?

17 A. No, the answer is not I didn't do anything. The answer is what I

18 just told you. If you like the answer you're providing yourself better,

19 well, you can keep it. My answer is what I've just said.

20 Q. Let's move to tab 25, please. It's a 65 ter document, 1D0038, and

21 it should be dated the 16th of October. English version, 25.

22 Well, this is certainly a document you have seen because you wrote

23 it, or compiled it, perhaps, is a better phrase.

24 A. I have two documents here, the 6th of October, that is tab 27 in

25 my folder. I'm not sure if I'm looking at the right one. The brigade

1 command.

2 Q. It's all right, don't worry about it. Would you go to tab 26, and

3 we are on tab 25. Let me make sure that that's -- I'm certainly right for

4 that. 26.

5 A. That's right. I have that.

6 Q. Thank you very much. Now that is a document created by yourself,

7 Guards Motorised Brigade, 16th of October, 1991, Negoslavci, urgent to

8 SSNO. You've got that.

9 Let us just deal with it in part. If we move down to the

10 principal paragraph, it reads as follows --

11 MR. MOORE: Would Your Honour forgive me for a moment.

12 [Prosecution counsel confer]

13 MR. MOORE: I'm just finding out what certain initials meant.

14 Q. "The work of the security organ and the military police mostly

15 focuses on the following: The security organ units mostly detect

16 indications and prevent instances of individual or group defeatism in the

17 units in the area of combat operations. Look for ZNG, National Guard

18 Corps, and MUP sources in the general area of the brigade's command post

19 and the rear command post. Detect, arrest, and close channels used by the

20 MUP and ZNG, members to infiltrate the Vukovar area who may be infiltrated

21 in the area of the command post Negoslavci village and further afield for

22 various reasons. After an evaluation is made of the whole territory where

23 combat operations are carried out, observe persons for whom there is a

24 previous information of indicative behaviour. Organise and introduce

25 special war security regimes in the general area of combat operations, and

1 offer professional and other assistance to members of the Negoslavci

2 Secretariat of the Interior and the TO Defence staff."

3 Do you remember this phrase I've used about "eyes and ears." But

4 this is quite simply you saying what your function and tasks are, isn't

5 it?

6 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Moore please slow down slightly when

7 reading. Thank you.

8 MR. MOORE: I will.

9 Q. That's right, isn't it, Mr. Sljivancanin? You are stating here

10 what your function and tasks are.

11 A. Mr. Moore, the interpretation I got may be different from what

12 you've read out. It places me squarely in a dilemma, because the

13 interpretation is not what this reads.

14 So I showed you yesterday that document from the chief of security

15 of the cabinet and the security administration requesting the command of

16 the Guards Brigade, or, rather, its chief of security to urgently submit

17 to them a working map showing the involvement of security organs and

18 military police units of the Guards Motorised Brigade.

19 They were the tactical, focal point for providing equipment to

20 these units with any special equipment, so that in cooperation with other

21 focal points, they could supply this equipment, bring the manpower levels

22 up, and do whatever was necessary for those units. It was based on that

23 request that I tried, in this document, to tell them where these

24 respective units were involved and what they were doing.

25 It says "security organs of the unit," and reference here is to

1 the Guards Brigade. It says in the title "the Guards Brigade command,"

2 and that's where the interpretation was different; that's why I'm saying

3 this. Principally they were involved in these tasks stated here.

4 Further down are the exact locations for the military police units

5 and described their activities.

6 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, that's an enormously long answer. But the

7 reality is you're looking for ZNG and MUP forces. That's right, isn't

8 it? You say it?

9 A. Yes. We were looking for members and particularly leaders of the

10 ZNG units and the MUP.

11 Q. Does that mean, then, that you were looking for names?

12 A. I was looking for people who were the organisers of that armed

13 insurgency. I didn't know some of the names. I learned some of the names

14 in the area or by listening to their radio frequencies, and I was given

15 some names by my superior security organs. I don't know how they'd got

16 hold of the names to begin with.

17 Q. So you were looking for names. You were looking for the names of

18 the people who were organising the resistance against you. That is right,

19 isn't it? It's not a particularly difficult point, is it?

20 A. It's not -- I was looking for names, I was looking for specific

21 people, specific person who were the organisers of this armed insurgency.

22 For example, I was looking for Mile Dedakovic in order to meet him. I'm

23 not sure what you mean when you say I was looking for names. I was

24 looking for specific persons.

25 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, it's not a case of army, and it's not a case of

1 law, it's a question of common sense. You are security organ. You have

2 got various sources, and it is like a jigsaw. You put together the

3 pieces, and you find out who are the people who are in charge, who are the

4 people who are politically active, who are the people militarily active.

5 You don't know that until you are either told it or given it by someone.

6 That's right, isn't it? And names will crop up from various sources.

7 It's not rocket science, is it?

8 A. Fair enough. All right. I understand now. I did not know the

9 names of all the leaders of this armed insurgency because they used

10 code-names or aliases. I was looking for those persons. But I did not

11 wish to be played because someone might have planted the wrong person on

12 me with no documents whatsoever, and this turned out to be the wrong

13 person, not the person I was after. I personally in the security organs

14 were looking primarily for the leaders of the paramilitary units, the ZNG

15 and the MUP, those who had organised the armed insurgency in Vukovar, in

16 the briefest possible terms.

17 Q. It's not just political opposition, it's also military leadership

18 as well; isn't that right?

19 A. That's right. That's right. But we were looking at military

20 leaders too.

21 Q. And again, just a question of common sense, lists were being kept

22 of the people who were the leaders. That's right, isn't it?

23 A. I got some of the names of those people who were the leaders of

24 this all from the technical bodies in the security organ, and I got some

25 of the names from the civilians, those leaving their cellars. I got some

1 of the names during interviews with these civilians. I got some of the

2 names from individuals who had been captured during the fighting.

3 Q. But I'm saying: Lists were compiled of the people. You just have

4 to keep a record of who you're being told. It's not all going down in

5 memory, is it?

6 A. That's true. We kept lists and we tried to take down as many

7 names as we could.

8 Q. Let's just move on to this document. Reading on: "In addition,

9 the security organ are engaged in the operative team that works with

10 prisoner of war, determines who took part in the commission of crimes, and

11 identifies the ZNG and MUP leaders in Vukovar."

12 So you were basically trying to ascertain who was doing what on

13 the other side; isn't that right?

14 A. That's right.

15 Q. Well, can you just assist me with one little phrase in this

16 document? Because when one looks at the next line, it says as

17 follows: "Furthermore, the chief of the security organ is engaged in the

18 command of the Operations Group South on planning combat operations and

19 providing assistance to the units on the front line."

20 Now, who is the chief of the security organ?

21 A. I've said it before, haven't I? I am the chief of the security

22 organ. I wrote this when the commander took the decision. As far as I

23 remember, every time a decision was taken, in some way I was involved or I

24 was there, or at least I was at the command post to hear what the decision

25 was in relation to any units, especially those belonging to the Guards

1 Motorised Brigade. If you go through the documents very carefully, the

2 decisions and orders issued by the commander --

3 Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Sljivancanin, I'm just dealing with this document.

4 You say that you are the chief of the security organ. But look at the

5 following passage: "... in the command of the Operations Group South."

6 It's not referenced just to Guards Motorised Brigade, is it? It's

7 OG South.

8 A. Well, you interrupted me, but that's just what I was about to

9 explain. Commander Mrksic, as commander of the Guards Brigade, took the

10 decision to have the Guards Motorised Brigade units involved in lifting

11 the siege of the barracks and in disarming the paramilitary units.

12 In addition to this, he gave other units certain tasks briefly

13 that were outside the Vukovar area and were not involved in the tasks

14 being carried out in Vukovar itself, if that's what we mean when we

15 say "operations group."

16 I don't see any other unit with the exception of the Guards

17 Brigade that was involved, and he gave these tasks to battalions, the 1st

18 and the 2nd Motorised Battalion, the 1st and the 2nd Military Police

19 Battalions, and that's what I accepted it to be. And that's what my

20 understanding was when I was actually there, and I was physically present

21 when these decisions were taken.

22 Q. What you are trying to say to this Court is that you are the chief

23 of the security organ only for the Guards Motorised Brigade but not

24 OG South. That's what you're saying, isn't it, in simple terms?

25 A. That was my understanding. That's how it was. That's what I did.

1 Q. Well, see if you can help me on this topic. You have OG South,

2 what I will call an umbrella command. You are the security organ for one

3 of the brigades, the Guards Motorised Brigade. Am I correct so far?

4 A. I'm following.

5 Q. And underneath, as it seems to be the case, there were other

6 brigades subsumed under the OG South command; do you agree with that?

7 80th is one of those examples.

8 A. The 80th Motorised Brigade had the level of a Guards Brigade, and

9 quite a strong one. You could perhaps have assumed that Colonel Mrksic

10 was our superior in relation to a superior task in as far as the brigade

11 was involved in that particular area, but there was no such thing as a

12 separate OG South command. Once Colonel Bojat and Ljubicic had left the

13 area, all that remained was the command of the Guards Brigade.

14 Q. Well, in the British army, you normally have three brigades

15 sitting within a division.

16 Could you just switch off -- move the microphone as it's rather

17 like a North Sea gale at the moment. Thank you very much.

18 You have various brigades, each brigade will be represented by a

19 security organ, the chief of the security organ for that brigade; that's

20 right. You were for the Guards Motorised Brigade. Who was for the 80th?

21 Who was your equivalent?

22 A. For the 80th -- the man actually gave evidence here. I just met

23 him once, no more than once in Vukovar, Dragi Vukosavljevic, that's him.

24 Q. Can I just ask you, then, who was actually the definitive

25 commander of the security organ to assist Mrksic? Who were you reporting

1 up to?

2 A. There is no commander in a security organ. There is the chief and

3 there are security clerks, desk officers. I was subordinated to the

4 commander of the Guards Motorised Brigade, as chief of security, to

5 Colonel Mrksic.

6 Q. But I want to know who the chief of the security organ was for

7 OG South; otherwise, the way you're explaining it, Mrksic is going to have

8 to speak to the security organ for each and every brigade. And I'm

9 suggesting what Mrksic did perfectly reasonably was he made you chief of

10 the security organ for OG South. He had one person to link with. What do

11 you say to that?

12 A. Given the fact that OG South, if that's what we assume it to have

13 been like. This is a temporary unit for a particular mission. This group

14 does not have any permanent command. It does not have an establishment

15 command. You can set one up. If that is established, there should be a

16 written order for establishing that command that specifies all its

17 members. If there is no such order, then there's no command; at least

18 that's how I see it.

19 I never received such an order like that. I know that I was chief

20 of security of the Guards Brigade. Mrksic, in his capacity as commander,

21 was never supposed to talk to any chief of security of any of the other

22 brigades, the 80th, for example. He would always talk to the commander of

23 that brigade. The chief of security has the duty to inform the brigade

24 commander about everything that he knows. He works for the brigade, not

25 for anybody else's purposes or needs or for a different chain of command.

1 He only works for that particular unit.

2 In the JNA, there was no dual command. Please try to understand

3 that. There was singleness of command and there was unity of command.

4 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, I do understand it. All I'm simply suggesting

5 to you is that in actual fact, even though it may well have been a

6 temporary unit, nevertheless it had to have an inherent structure where

7 there was a single point person for the security organ, i.e., the chief of

8 the security organ, and that was you, whether you like it or whether you

9 don't.

10 A. These are the arbitrary positions on your part. I was issued no

11 such orders and if there is such an order, I should like to see it and

12 then I shall apologise for everything that I'm saying because I would be

13 remiss for not having familiarised myself with that. On the other hand, I

14 believe that there's a mistake on the part of the 1st Military District

15 for not having issued such an order.

16 Had I been the chief of security of OG South, and had a command

17 like that existed, I would have been invited for a meeting with the

18 commander, with the chief of the 1st Military District to be informed of

19 that, and I would not be receiving information from the chief of security

20 of the cabinet of the federal secretary, but I would have been given

21 information from the chief of security of the 1st Military District.

22 So if any such document exists, please present it -- exists,

23 present it to me and I shall apologise for everything that I have said. I

24 cannot speak about things that I know nothing about. I'm trying to be

25 very sincere in providing my answers, and you can see whether they are

1 acceptable to you or not.

2 Q. Well, then, let's look at it another way. When was OG South set

3 up with Mrksic in charge?

4 A. There is a record of that, an entry in the war diary, namely that

5 Commander Mrksic assumed the post of commander of the OG sometime in

6 October. Whether it was on the 8th, or 9th, or 10th of October, I'm not

7 sure. I've said that I attended no such meeting nor any change-over in

8 that respect. Now what was said to him and whether he has a written order

9 and what specific tasks he was given, I don't really know; namely, I never

10 discussed that with him.

11 Q. So the answer is 8th, 9th, 10th of October; is that right?

12 MR. MOORE: I see Mr. Lukic has a concern.

13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] A correction of the transcript,

14 page 60, line 11, there should be a separation between the answer and the

15 question in line 11 from the words of "there is a record of that," which

16 is actually the beginning of Mr. Sljivancanin's answer.

17 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

18 MR. MOORE:

19 Q. Before you go any further, Mr. Sljivancanin, I've got 19 lines of

20 answer to deal with. Can I just try and deal with that and then perhaps

21 we can move on.

22 But we've got the 8th, 9th, 10th of October. When the OG command

23 was being set up, it ceased on the 24th, there or thereabouts, of

24 November, so it's clearly a temporary command for the duration of the

25 battle of Vukovar. Would that be, in very general terms, correct?

1 A. Well, I could not fully accept what you've just said. I believe,

2 and from what I learned from military regulations and rules, if a

3 temporary command is set up for a specific mission, and if no order has

4 been issued spelling out precisely the period from which -- to which the

5 command shall function, in my view, that command shall cease to exist once

6 the mission has been accomplished, and that mission was accomplished,

7 completed on the 18th of November.

8 Q. You knew Mrksic before coming to Vukovar. You knew him pretty

9 well, actually; isn't that right?

10 A. No, that is not right either. I met Mr. Mrksic for the first

11 time, I believe, some three years before the Vukovar event. But don't

12 take my word for it. He was, however, never my immediate superior. He

13 was my superior officer when he became the commander of the brigade, and

14 in August 1992 I met Mrksic as my first immediate commander.

15 Q. I think it's 1991. But the point I want to make --

16 A. Yes, 1991. That's right. I apologise.

17 Q. Not at all. It's not a problem. But the question I want to ask

18 is this: Didn't it occur to you on the 8th, 9th, 10th of October, seeing

19 that there were going to be security organs for each brigade, that it was

20 desirable for there to be a security organ, a chief of security of

21 security organ for OG South to coordinate such material?

22 A. Personally, it was my idea, my position, and it still is that that

23 was not necessary because it was an entering command, the mission was a

24 temporary one, and the security organs, once they immediately applied

25 themselves to that kind of a mission, they should concentrate on that

1 particular task without having the possibility of dealing with other

2 elements, the development of a network of contacts, the training of

3 personnel, the collection of data, the manning of units, but they should

4 focus primarily on the discharge of the concretely issued task. That is

5 my view.

6 Q. So you never said to Mrksic at any time that it might be desirable

7 or something that should be thought about? The answer, I presume, is no?

8 A. No, I never discussed the subject with Mrksic at all.

9 Q. Can you explain a piece of evidence that was given by

10 Vukosavljevic who said that when he went to report, he, being in charge of

11 the 80th, the security organ of the 80th, that he reported to Karan and

12 Vukasinovic who were your subordinates? Can you explain that to the Court

13 how that was occurring, if you weren't in charge of OG South?

14 A. First of all, Mr. Moore, I don't exactly remember that that is

15 what Mr. Vukosavljevic precisely said, but I can give you an explanation

16 if you are interested. Because of security considerations, namely when

17 the 453rd Brigade was there, I tried to get in touch with the security

18 organ, and he told me I have my own commander so he had no document which

19 actually instructed him and joined upon him to provide me with any

20 information.

21 When the 20th Partisan Brigade was there, I saw the commander of

22 that brigade several times, I've said for which reasons, and he told me

23 that he knew everything in his own brigade and he was managing things and

24 informing Mrksic, reporting to Mrksic about the situation in his brigade

25 and he was not, of course, participating in any combat operations in the

1 area of Grabovo.

2 When the 80th Motorised Brigade came to the area - that may have

3 been on the 18th, I'm not quite sure of the date - my assistant for

4 counter-intelligence work told me that a new security organ that had

5 appeared on that territory had reported and he told me what his name was,

6 and he told me that this was a good man who had expressed the desire to

7 cooperate with us and to exchange information if any of it was relevant

8 and significant to us.

9 Then I said all right, I should see this man if he wants to

10 cooperate with us. So one evening he came to us, and I asked him to whom

11 was he submitting reports and to whom was he reporting, and he told me

12 that he was submitting his reports to the command, to the chief of

13 security of his own corps, that he knew what his tasks were, and that he

14 was prepared to cooperate with us if there should be any need in order for

15 us to exchange important information, information important to us.

16 In that period, the plan was for that brigade to remain in the

17 combat operations zone and our further -- any traces of our further

18 cooperation and action in concert was lost. I never saw him again. He

19 worked according to instructions from his commander. We were exhausted,

20 we were on the first line of battle, and we waited -- could hardly wait

21 for someone to come and replace us. And perhaps this rotation of units is

22 the reason why concentration should falter and people, perhaps, don't

23 remember everything in detail. But neither Vukasinovic or Karan ever told

24 me that he had submitted any written reports to them, nor any report for

25 that matter. Those people will be giving evidence here themselves, so you

1 can also ask them that question. But as far as I know, they told me that

2 that was the case.

3 Q. So the answer is you weren't aware of that? It's taken you 32

4 lines.

5 A. Well, Mr. Moore, I had to explain accurately. I want to tell the

6 truth. If you want me to just say yes or no all the time, it will be some

7 sort of a quiz show.

8 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Lukic.

9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I have a general remark that Mr. Moore

10 is extracting this conclusion, which he just gave us, from his sentence

11 that he was not familiar with it; whereas Mr. Sljivancanin has clearly

12 explained his position in regard to the thesis advanced by Mr. Moore,

13 namely to what Mr. Moore said, Vukosavljevic had stated. So that I

14 believe it would be very expedient if we were indicated the mark on the

15 page where Vukosavljevic stated what Mr. Moore says he had stated because

16 I believe it was somewhat different.

17 But if Mr. Moore asserts that Mr. Vukosavljevic stated that he had

18 reported to Karan and this other person, that has to be shown by a precise

19 indication of the page in the question.

20 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Moore.

21 MR. MOORE: I will endeavour to do so. I'm just having checks

22 made on a transcript reference.

23 In any event, I want to move on to another document, if I may,

24 please, and I will come back to that if it assists. Or Your Honour can

25 allow me two or three minutes to locate the passage.

1 JUDGE PARKER: Carry on, Mr. Moore. It will be checked by others.

2 MR. MOORE: Yes.

3 Your Honour, I'm told -- well, would Your Honour give me a

4 moment. It's perhaps just best to deal with it at this time.

5 [Prosecution counsel confer]

6 MR. MOORE: Could we go back to -- it's the page reference 8697,

7 line 21.

8 Q. I read as follows, it's a question by Mr. Domazet: "This is what

9 I'm talking about, the security line, the professional line, not the chain

10 of command which is completely clear to all of us, I'm talking about the

11 line of the security organ that is very special in its work, and if we're

12 talking about that line, I would like to know when you arrived in

13 Negoslavci and when you were involved in Operation Vukovar. Who was it

14 who gave you instructions, orders, along that line? Who did you cooperate

15 with directly?

16 "A. To the Prosecutor's question, I've already spoken about that

17 and I informed the Trial Chamber about that. Around the 10th, the brigade

18 command told me that the brigade command was subordinated to the Guards

19 Motorised Brigade. In other words, that the Guards Motorised Brigade is

20 also the command of the OG South, and according to the rules of service a

21 subordinated security organ has to report to his superior security organ

22 in the command. I went to the command post of the Guards Motorised

23 Brigade and in -- and I found Captain First Class Karan with whom I had

24 the initial conversation that concerned our profession."

25 That deals with Karan.

1 May I deal, then, with, I believe it's 8702, line 16.

2 "Mr. Domazet: There seems to have been --

3 "Judge Parker: It reads as follows on line 9, 8702: It

4 indicates that the chief of security of the 80th brigade was Colonel

5 Sljivancanin. Is that the answer that was given? Is that correct?"

6 Well, clearly it's not correct.

7 "Mr. Domazet: No, no, this is a mistake.

8 "The Witness: If you're asking me, no, no, of course not. I was

9 the chief security of the 80th Brigade, and the colonel was the chief of

10 security of the Guards Motorised Brigade and also the chief of security of

11 OG South."

12 I will try and find the other reference to Vukasinovic.

13 There is a clear reference to Karan, and there is a clear

14 reference to the fact that he said that his unit, the 80th, was

15 subordinated to the Guards Motorised Brigade security organ; isn't that

16 right? That he contacted Karan on that basis?

17 A. I listened to you reading this and my comment is this:

18 Mr. Vukasinovic is not sufficiently professionally acquainted with

19 military rules. Never can a brigade be subordinated to another brigade.

20 Where he said that the 80th Brigade was subordinated to the Guards

21 Brigade, I have never heard of anything of the kind.

22 And I believe, and there is no such order that the command of the

23 Guards Brigade was the command of the OG South, as he said it, and I

24 adhere to my position. I can only say that this was an interpretation of

25 his -- the way he saw things, but this has to be proved by documents, to

1 see whether that is indeed true or not.

2 MR. MOORE: Thank you. Let's move on to another document.

3 Document 20, tab 29.

4 Would Your Honour forgive me.

5 Your Honour, I'm informed that I have not tendered this document

6 as an exhibit. Could I ask for it to be an exhibit.

7 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.

8 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much. Thank you.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this becomes Exhibit number 848.

10 MR. MOORE:

11 Q. Can I ask you --

12 JUDGE PARKER: Am I correct in assuming you deliberately did not

13 tender one earlier document, that was number 9? I think the witness said

14 he knew nothing of it.

15 MR. MOORE: Will Your Honour just allow me a moment.

16 No, I did not deliberately not tender it. It is my error for not

17 doing so. I am told, a whisper from the side, that it is actually an

18 exhibit anyway. It's Exhibit 636 as shown on the index that we have

19 supplied at tab 9 and 10.

20 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

21 MR. MOORE:

22 Q. Can I ask you now just a general question before we move on to

23 other documents. You say you're here to tell the truth and to try and

24 assist everyone. Would you consider, and did you consider, at that time,

25 that Mrksic was a commander who was weak in certain aspects of his

1 character?

2 A. First of all, I was not Mrksic's superior to be able to keep

3 detailed tabs on how he was discharging his tasks. I may have disagreed

4 with some positions of his or perhaps I might have had a different opinion

5 as to how something was to have been gone about. Every person, every man

6 has his own method of work. I may have thought that Mrksic, in certain

7 instances, should have been stricter with some of his subordinate officers

8 and then again I may not have been right, and maybe I was wrong when I

9 thought that he should have been stricter in discharging some task with

10 his units, and perhaps he was right and wanted to do it his way whilst

11 abiding by the rules and regulations. But I never thought that Mrksic was

12 a weak commander.

13 Q. The reason why I ask you is because on tab 29 and tab 30. I want

14 to deal with a document of the 10th of December which is your

15 re-evaluation. I seem to remember, even though it's dated the 10th of

16 December, you say you compiled it, I think, on the 21st of November. Is

17 that right?

18 A. This document, which I see before me, was compiled by me in

19 December, and as indicated on the date it bears, the 10th of December, it

20 was sent to the security administration. And on the 21st of November, I

21 had sent a report from Vukovar, just like I had sent earlier reports on

22 the events that were unfolding in the zone of the Guards Brigade. But

23 that is a different report, not this one.

24 Q. So this is your document compiled by yourself, compiled on

25 the 21st, sent on the 10th of December.

1 I see Mr. Lukic nodding, no, vigorously. Can you repeat it, then.

2 A. This is what I'm saying, Mr. Moore. On the 21st of November,

3 having accomplished our tasks, and after everything that I told you about

4 had transpired, I, as the chief of security, compiled the report which, as

5 a report that I regularly sent from the zone of combat operations and I

6 sent it to the chief of security in the cabinet of the federal secretary

7 and to the security administration.

8 This document which is now before us, I compiled after my talk

9 with the General Aca Vasiljevic in the security administration on the 10th

10 of December, and I dispatched it on the 10th of December to the security

11 administration.

12 Q. All right. Thank you very much for that. Let us then deal

13 with -- we can see it's your signature, we can see the date, and we can

14 see who it's going to, and the progress -- the progress combat operations

15 conducted to liberate Vukovar.

16 I want to deal with the first part. "The Guards Motorised Brigade

17 commenced executing its combat task in very specific and difficult

18 conditions. The Guards Motorised Brigade commander, Mr. Mrksic,

19 continually emphasised the unit's ability to execute the most difficult of

20 tasks, but when he was assigned an actual combat task he started

21 vacillating."

22 Now, what do you mean by that?

23 A. Well, it's not what I meant, it is clearly written. If you go on

24 to read this, there were some doubts, some officers were saying that there

25 was treason in the military leadership.

1 Actually, I would rather say that there was vacillation on the

2 part of some officers because of their fear from action, and that is what

3 I put down here.

4 Q. Well, I'd suggest that's not what it seems to suggest. Reading

5 on, and I will not mention one of the names because it's a protected

6 witness: "He decided," that's Mrksic, "He decided that, first, the

7 traitors at the top of the military, as he said, should be replaced,

8 thinking primarily of army General Kadijevic, and that he would start on

9 the execution of the task after that had been settled."

10 Now, that's, I'd suggest, is fairly clear. Are you saying, then,

11 that Mrksic was suggesting that the traitors at the top, Kadijevic, was,

12 in his terms, the problem, a traitor at the top, let's remove Kadijevic?

13 A. I actually put that down in this report. That is the kind of

14 information that I heard at the time; namely, that there was suspicions to

15 the effect that General Kadijevic was a traitor, and among him were a part

16 of the military top leadership.

17 It was suggested to me that I was supporting General Kadijevic.

18 Then I said to Mrksic that this was misinformation that he was dealing

19 with, that I knew General Kadijevic personally, and that I was firmly of

20 the view that he was a Yugoslav-oriented and committed person and that I

21 was convinced that these stories were untrue, and that as long as my men

22 were providing security for General Kadijevic, not a hair from his head

23 would fall.

24 After that, Mrksic went for a talk with General Kadijevic together

25 with Aca Vasiljevic, Blagoje Adzic, and I am not sure whether any other

1 general was there, Colonel Vuk Obradovic was. I don't know what the

2 subject of their conversation was, but I do know that this was not a putch

3 [as interpreted], as many of the media portrayed it, and as was said by

4 General Aca Vasiljevic in an interview granted the Nin magazine in 1992,

5 because he had been at that meeting with General Kadijevic.

6 I wrote that this was similar because it was prior -- immediately

7 prior to the brigades going to discharge this mission. This was not in

8 July, this was on that day, immediately prior to that.

9 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, I considered that this document was not

10 on the screen. I looked at various screens around me and I didn't see it.

11 There is a name mentioned on it which is a protected witness. If -- if it

12 is being shown outside, then regrettably, it will have to be redacted. I

13 thought that it was not on the screen. I must say, I thought people were

14 using hard copies.

15 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. We will learn the answer to that. It

16 has not been shown.

17 MR. MOORE: That's what I thought. Thank you for that.

18 JUDGE PARKER: Now when it comes to a convenient moment, we will

19 adjourn.

20 MR. MOORE: I'm almost there.

21 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, you can see that there are various names

22 mentioned there. I don't want to repeat them because one of them, as I

23 say, is a protected witness. But what you say is you mention those

24 individuals and said, Mr. Mrksic: "He found people of similar views to

25 his."

1 So the view that you took was that Mrksic, himself, was unhappy

2 about Kadijevic, that he talked hard and vacillated when it came to

3 combat, and he had people who basically supported his position. That's

4 what that means, doesn't it?

5 A. I don't think that's what it means. As chief of security, was

6 supposed to know what the situation was in the brigade. Mrksic listened

7 to all the various positions held by these different officers and I tried

8 to dissuade him, I tried to make himself see that this was a lie.

9 It is from this witness stand that I now wish to address the

10 public and everyone to say that I knew General Veljko Kadijevic's family

11 very well. I knew his brothers too. They were pro-Yugoslav, particularly

12 General Kadijevic. That was certainly my impression, and this is what I

13 told Colonel Mrksic at the time. Had Mrksic been hatching any plans, I

14 don't think General Kadijevic would have agreed to see him to begin with.

15 Now, what exactly did they talk about, Vuk Obradovic, Blagoje

16 Adzic, and Aca Vasiljevic, Mrksic, and Veljko Kadijevic, well, only they

17 can say because I wasn't there. I didn't attend the meeting. But I heard

18 these positions that were taken from Mrksic, and I informed both Vuk

19 Obradovic and the chef du cabinet of the federal secretary to whom I was

20 subordinate. I also assigned extra security just to cover all the

21 eventualities and for the measures to be what they were supposed to be.

22 These people that I told you about, they had talks immediately that

23 evening, and I have no idea what the substance of that talk was.

24 Q. I want to deal with this matter very quickly if I can, please.

25 It's taking a long time this morning.

1 But the situation was Mrksic went to see Kadijevic, Kadijevic

2 remained in power, and isn't it right that there has often been said that

3 the Guards Motorised Brigade was sent to Vukovar as a punishment because

4 of its insubordinate approach with Mrksic at the helm? Hasn't that been

5 said?

6 A. Mr. Moore, this is misinformation, pure and simple. And this, in

7 relation to these people - I'm going mention some of them - Kavalic,

8 there, he was one of these people spreading misinformation out of fear.

9 The day before this happened, the brigade had already received orders for

10 resubordination to the 1st Military District and it was off on a mission.

11 This is a decision that had been taken previously. There was no need for

12 anyone to take a new decision now.

13 As I said, it was supposed to have been of a day earlier, had not

14 all of this happened. That's why I believe this to be misinformation.

15 People who arbitrarily tried to spread word through the public media as

16 well about things that were simply untrue.

17 Q. I'm suggesting that Mrksic went to Vukovar with a question mark

18 over his career from the powers that be, and that he is an extremely and

19 was an extremely ambitious officer at that time. Now it's really two

20 questions. Do you accept that he went, along with others, with question

21 marks over their career and their commitment to the cause?

22 A. I totally disagree. If you want to look at it that way, Mrksic

23 was promoted to the rank of general by General Kadijevic, of all people.

24 He was on an upward grade, so to speak, and he was promoted several times

25 over the following years. He had a brilliant military career. He became

1 the number two person in the General Staff, if I can put it that way, the

2 head of the land force. It is not true that Mrksic's career was

3 hamstrung. Quite the opposite in fact, he made progress all the time.

4 Q. I would suggest to you that Mrksic's career was built on the

5 rubble of Vukovar. That's why he was promoted the way he was.

6 A. I don't agree with that either. Mrksic got the rank of general

7 after Vukovar; that much is true. A decision was taken by his superiors,

8 he had the requisite training, and everything else. And probably he

9 proved his mettle in a number of other positions later on, because new

10 people came to some of the leading positions in the armed forces. And I

11 don't think he would have been promoted on the strength of Vukovar alone.

12 He probably had other qualities too. I was never his superior, I never

13 worked directly with him. I don't know about he went about performing his

14 job, and it is simply impossible for me to assess that sort of thing.

15 JUDGE PARKER: Over the break, Mr. Moore, could you just confirm

16 whether document at tab 29 is, in fact, Exhibit 843?

17 MR. MOORE: I've got it down as 843. Did I not call it that?

18 JUDGE PARKER: It's not so described in your index sheet.

19 MR. MOORE: I think it's because the index was done before it was

20 made an exhibit. My apologies.

21 JUDGE PARKER: We will adjourn now and resume just a little

22 after 1.00.

23 --- Recess taken at 12.40 p.m.

24 --- On resuming at 1.05 p.m.

25 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Moore.

1 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

2 Q. I'd like to go through the documents at a greater rate than we're

3 going, Mr. Sljivancanin, and if you could keep your answers is little

4 shorter, I would be very grateful.

5 Can I ask you, please, to go to the fifth main paragraph of

6 tab 29. It should read: "A few days after the conduct of combat

7 operations began ..."

8 Have you got that?

9 A. I see that.

10 Q. Thank you. I just want to deal with one or two matters on this

11 paragraph and two or three other paragraphs.

12 "A decision was issued for the Guards Motorised Brigade commander

13 to take over the OG South command." So we have, quite clearly, in this

14 document, that reference, you now have accepted it.

15 We move on down that paragraph, and you refer to: "The greatest

16 difficulty was with the Podunavlje Brigade where I personally had to send

17 two battalions who wished to leave their positions back to those

18 positions."

19 I'm curious about the phrase "where I personally had to send,"

20 bearing in mind you are a gentleman who says that he has got no ability to

21 order. Was this a polite suggestion, perhaps? What do you mean by "I

22 personally had to send two battalions who wished to leave their position

23 back to their positions"?

24 A. I remember that incident well. This brigade was deployed just

25 outside the village of Negoslavci facing Vukovar. Whenever I was on my

1 way to Vukovar, I would pass that brigade. The commander, as far as I

2 remember, was a colonel, by rank, as far as I remember, but the name

3 escapes me.

4 As a human being and an officer, I did not like the way the

5 commander was treating that unit. He never taught his unit. He was in a

6 cellar somewhere deep in the village of Negoslavci, safely tucked away.

7 Whenever I passed the soldiers, they would always tell me something to

8 that effect. I informed the previous commander of the operations group,

9 since the brigade was subordinated to him, and I informed Colonel Mrksic

10 as well.

11 One day, it so happened, that those people were off, armed, and

12 entered the village of Negoslavci near our command post. They asked to

13 see someone, to speak to someone about that. I think I was the person who

14 happened to be at the command post at the time, and I told the commander

15 that I would be the one to have a word with them.

16 I took off my belt, my rank, my pistol, not sure if I carried a

17 rifle at the time, and I said, "Here I am, bare-handed. Let's see what it

18 is you want to talk about."

19 They talked about some misinformation. They said that three of

20 their own had been killed but not in combat operations. An example, this

21 sabotage group from the paramilitary units was infiltrated into that area,

22 and two snipers climbed up an electricity pylon. The lines were down and

23 this was a flat area, so it was from the top of that pylon at a distance

24 of about 400 to 500 metres that these snipers were shooting at people and

25 they got two of their soldiers. This caused a great deal of panic among

1 these people.

2 I tried to explain why that had happened, that we would be looking

3 into the matter, and later I was reproachful of their commander. And I

4 myself had come under heavy criticism by Colonel Mrksic because I had

5 previously criticised the commander. But I had a word with those people,

6 and those people then went back to their positions. That's what happened,

7 and that's why I wrote this.

8 Q. But this was a unit that was subordinated to OG South; is that

9 correct?

10 A. I know that the next day the unit left our area and abandoned

11 those positions, and there is no paper trail of them at any point later on

12 as a unit. This was on the early days of our stay in the area, and I

13 don't remember that ...

14 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, this was a unit that was subordinated to

15 OG South at that time; isn't it correct?

16 A. I don't remember that it was subordinated in that sense. It was

17 in the area, but there are no references in any of our documents to that

18 unit being a part of OG South, or at least I don't remember. As I say,

19 they immediately left the area.

20 Q. Forgive me for being cynical, it comes with age, I suppose, but

21 what on earth are you, Major Sljivancanin, doing having a chat with these

22 fellows? Why you? What's it got to do with you?

23 A. Well, I've told you, haven't I? I happened to be in the building

24 at the time these people came by. They were demonstratively leaving their

25 own area, and they didn't know where to go. They had no one to turn to.

1 I approached the commander to go and have a word with those people. These

2 were our own soldiers after all, they weren't the enemy. We wanted to

3 know where they were going or what they were doing in the area of our

4 command post because that was our command post, after all.

5 All sorts of thoughts were crossing my mind. They might be there

6 to stir some sort of trouble. What did I know?

7 Q. Which commander? Are you talking about Mr. Mrksic, or are you

8 talking about someone else?

9 A. I seem to remember that the commander was Colonel Bojat, the

10 commander of the operations group when this incident occurred. I am not

11 exactly certain, and don't hold it against me. That was immediately after

12 our arrival in the area. The commander called that colonel, he criticised

13 him, and I know that the unit was then sent back to its position. But I

14 think Bajo Bojat who was the commander at the time, but there might be a

15 certain possibility that I'm wrong.

16 Q. So the reality is it is Bojat who was the commander of OG South

17 that you had dealings with; is that right?

18 A. No. I was at the command post of the Guards Brigade command.

19 What I said is Bojat was in a different house, the OG South command, and

20 Colonel Mrksic was there too.

21 Later on, and I seem to remember that this incident took place

22 when Bojat was still commander, these soldiers came over to the area of

23 our command post. They came over to the house -- to the houses where we

24 were billeted at the time.

25 Q. But Bojat was OG South, he handed over to Mrksic, or Mrksic took

1 over from Bojat. That's right, isn't it?

2 A. Well, Mr. Moore, I think this incident recorded here occurred

3 while Bojat was still there, but Mrksic said that these people had got as

4 far as the houses where we were staying, and then Bojat called the

5 commander in order to take some measures and the case was resolved. And

6 that's what I remember, and that's why I wrote it.

7 Q. But I question I asked you is perfectly simple: Bojat -- Mrksic

8 took over from Bojat as the commander of OG South. So what are you

9 dealing -- why are you dealing with something with OG South if you are

10 merely Guards Motorised Brigade? It's got nothing to do with you, has it?

11 A. I tried to explain about this incident. I think Bajo Bojat was

12 still commander of the operations group at the time this happened. These

13 military men, they were armed, they came to the area where our command

14 post was, and we were surprised to see them there and we didn't know what

15 they were there for. We took some measures because we didn't know what to

16 do. Those people were just wandering about aimlessly. They didn't know

17 where to go. There has to be some degree of discipline in the area of

18 your command post.

19 Bojat then conducted the interview. They called the commander.

20 They criticised me because I'd raised my voice at this commander, saying

21 wasn't he ashamed that his soldiers were walking around all dissolute like

22 that. I realised that I had been wrong because he held a rank that was

23 higher than mine. But this brought the discussion to an end.

24 What I wish to say by writing this is that certain commanders did

25 not really hold their own units in high esteem. That's what I was trying

1 to say.

2 Q. Mr. Sljivancanin, look at this paragraph. Just look at it. It's

3 created by you in a way to demonstrate, after conduct of combat operations

4 began, there was a decision issued for the Guards Motorised Brigade

5 commander to take over OG South. That is the core of the paragraph. And

6 then you go on: "Following these decisions, the situation in OG South

7 active zone was much improved. Everything began to function without

8 problems. The greatest difficulty was with the brigade where I personally

9 had to send two battalions who wished to leave their positions back to

10 those positions."

11 What I'm suggesting to you is this paragraph is specifically --

12 and relates specifically to the transference over to OG South from the

13 Guards Motorised Brigade, how things were improving, and you then

14 describing what the greatest difficulties were. You were dealing with an

15 OG South difficulty.

16 And what I'm asking you is: What are you, Mr. Sljivancanin, doing

17 involving yourself in OG South business if, in actual fact, you were only

18 involved with the Guards Motorised Brigade?

19 A. Mr. Moore, again, I must say this, it's true what it says here,

20 that it improved. I believe when the commander became the brigade

21 commander, because the brigade was the only one carrying out that task.

22 The other units were not involved in carrying out the mission in Vukovar.

23 But as far as I remember, truly, I believe that this incident

24 involving the Podunavlje Brigade occurred during Bajo Bojat's time as

25 commander of the operations group. It was perhaps of my own impatience I

1 wanted to do something immediately. I was sorry that anything like that

2 was happening in the JNA to begin with, but I thought that the area of our

3 command post, of our Guards Brigade had come under threat, and I thought

4 these persons had no right to dwell in the area. So I talked to the

5 commander, I asked him to go and see what these people were after. So he

6 did.

7 My duty as chief of security was also to supervise or to monitor

8 the area of our brigade, and especially the area of the command post, and

9 I stopped these men well within the area of our command post. That's my

10 answer.

11 Q. And I also am suggesting and will be suggesting to this Court that

12 the functions that you have undertaken in Vukovar have far exceeded your

13 role of a security organ. The phrase "I personally had to send two

14 battalions," there's no discussion, there's no advice. It's quite

15 specific. "I personally had to send," what does that mean, if you didn't

16 have some form of command and control or try and adopt command and control

17 powers?

18 A. I wrote in my reports about the situation, about the units that

19 were in the area resting or awaiting a new mission in the area of the

20 Guards Brigade, and I wrote about all the problems. Again, I'm telling

21 you I remember the brigade being just outside the village of Negoslavci

22 facing Vukovar. If you want, I can indicate their position to you on the

23 map.

24 I passed through that area often on my way to Vukovar, and what I

25 wrote here I know that I personally talked to those people when they

1 arrived in the area of the command post of the Guards Brigade, and I tried

2 to turn them around and to impose some discipline. As chief of security,

3 was I perhaps to allow these people to just wander around their own

4 command post area committing breaches of discipline. What was I supposed

5 to do? I accept what you are suggesting. Perhaps my authority was not

6 that great, but what was I to do in this very case? Allowing breaches of

7 discipline in the area of the command post. I said I just go out and see

8 what these people are after and it wasn't my task, but they didn't have

9 their own commander. Who on earth knows where their commanders were.

10 Probably sitting in a house somewhere well away from the front having a

11 drink or something like that.

12 Q. Tell me, does the security organ have within its defined task the

13 role of placing soldiers or TOs in various units or under command of

14 various units?

15 A. The security organ has no such role. As for the security aspect,

16 they can advise the commander, they can provide their own assessment as to

17 how some people are to be deployed in case the commander can use that sort

18 of information for his intelligence work or anything. But any such advice

19 need not be accepted by the commander.

20 Q. Can we drop two paragraphs down, please. The paragraph

21 commencing: "In addition to the Guards Motorised Brigade, the Vukovar and

22 Leva Supoderica and a large number of volunteers also participated in the

23 fighting."

24 Have you got that paragraph?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. "The volunteers came in groups individually with no organisation.

2 Our unit had major difficulties in receiving checking and including them

3 and employing them in combat and a large number of volunteers arrived with

4 party insignia which might have had some considerable effects on the order

5 and discipline of the units conducting combat tasks. Through daily and

6 relevant activity, we succeeded in placing all the volunteers under JNA

7 command, i.e., that of OG South."

8 Now, why are you saying "we"? What's it got to do with you if

9 you're a security organ?

10 A. What this is about is the Guards Brigade command. You see that.

11 I, as a security organ, was part of that command what is included here is

12 the replenishment in manpower levels organ, the logistics organ and the

13 staff as well because the replenishment in manpower level organ was in

14 charge of replenishment and bringing manpower levels up. The equipment

15 organ was in charge of weapons and equipment, and the morale organ was in

16 charge of morale.

17 I'm talking about the command. I was part of command, and I

18 consider myself as security organ to have part of command.

19 Q. The next paragraph deals with the government, and I'll try to

20 remember and come back to that in due course.

21 Can we go to the next page, as it is in English, but can you look,

22 please, for the highlight "Guards Motorised Brigade, its combat

23 operations." Have you got that? "OG South command" --

24 A. Yes, I've got that.

25 Q. Can I take it that you, as a security organ, played no part in

1 combat operations, the planning, coordination, et cetera, of those combat

2 operations? Would that be right? Can you just answer the question rather

3 than read the paper for a moment, please.

4 A. I was not involved in planning at all, but I did provide advice

5 and proposals before any decision was taken as to what my views were on

6 how to go about certain missions, especially as concerned my experience on

7 the ground in terms of better ways of dealing with certain missions and

8 avoiding losses or cutting losses. Sometimes my proposals were accepted

9 and sometimes not, depending.

10 Q. Well, let's just look at your participation that you refer to

11 here. "OG South command regularly planned combat operations presumably,

12 not all of which, however, proceeded according to plan. There were

13 certain problems and a drop in combat morale. The first time this

14 happened was on the 6th of October of this year, when I, myself, visited

15 the front combat line to personally encourage the officers and men and

16 give them advice on future activity and the course of the operation."

17 And then you tell us about the death of your driver.

18 Now, what do you mean by "giving them advice on future activity

19 and the course of the operation," if that's outside the ambit of the

20 security organ?

21 A. The paragraph you've just read out, that moment, that day, the

22 6th of October, I'll always remember that day. It was on that day that I

23 lost an honourable and honest man who wasn't even carrying a rifle, just a

24 pistol, no more than a pistol. He was my driver. Didn't fire a single

25 bullet. Or run anybody over, by the way.

1 It was while he was moving near the command post of the

2 1st Motorised Battalion under Major Tesic. He then informed me, Tesic

3 informed me, that he was suffering major losses and that there was heavy

4 fighting underway. He said he had a lot of wounded and that a lot of his

5 men had been killed in the 2nd Company sector along Svetozara Markovica

6 Street. Company commander had requested support, especially in order to

7 evacuate some of the wounded.

8 I was listening to all of that at the time; this was at the outset

9 of fighting. I decided to abandon my vehicle, but my driver did not want

10 to let me go alone. He said: I'll go with you, Major.

11 We got into an APC and this APC was supposed to go and evacuate

12 the wounded. There was a man from Sombor who came with us; he was a

13 reserve sergeant. He said he knew where this place was where these people

14 needed to be evacuated. We got near the house. I don't think I can

15 possibly describe what this was like. There was shooting on all sides.

16 It was difficult to find your way around in that town, and we wanted to

17 take a left turn in order to drive into a yard. We couldn't get through

18 because there was heavy firing meeting us.

19 At one of the gates, there was a heavy military vehicle. We

20 couldn't get through. It had been struck by an anti-tank missile, the

21 front right end of the vehicle. We then got out of the APC. There wasn't

22 much damage. Maybe it was a hand-held rocket that damaged the tank or

23 something like that. But one thing I do know is that Popovic, my driver,

24 got hit by a sniper just after that.

25 I know that the situation in that unit was difficult. I came

1 across the company commander later on, and he told me that the soldiers

2 had been in a state of panic, that they were facing very tough opposition

3 and that I told him the resistance would certainly be on its way very

4 soon, that we shouldn't start running because then there would be more

5 losses, and that we would avoid further casualties by just staying in our

6 positions. So that was the role I had in that particular incident.

7 Q. I am suggesting to you there are repeated examples of you

8 exercising control, de facto control over and above that which you

9 exercised within the security organ, and this is another example of it.

10 Let us just move down, please, to -- it's three paragraphs below

11 that started, starting "the artillery units played an important part ..."

12 A. Excuse me, Mr. Moore, that is your conclusion, but find me a

13 document which says that I exercised any control of that kind. To assist

14 a wounded soldier and to help soldiers not to be taken by panic is the

15 task of any officer, whether he be a security officer or holds whatever

16 post, and that was the task that I was discharging at that particular

17 moment.

18 Q. Let's just deal with this very quickly. I seem to remember it

19 relates to an incident on the 20th, 21st of October where there was

20 defective artillery fire.

21 Do you see the sentence starting: "The artillery units played an

22 important part in the liberation of Vukovar, but there were incidents of

23 friendly fire. Following what I saw at the front line, I informed the

24 commander, held a meeting. After that, there were no targeting errors at

25 all."

1 Is this the incident of the 20th, 21st of October that we have

2 heard evidence about, and I believe there is a reference to it in the

3 Guards war diary? Is that what we're talking about?

4 A. This refers to that event. I have said everything that I know

5 about that event. I thought that this was such a meeting. The colonel

6 then had brought the division commanders to the observation post, but they

7 came there primarily with a fact of dissuading me, to convince me that I

8 was not right, that I was wrong, but they actually came to -- found out

9 that I was right, and that is why I wrote that this meeting was held.

10 Q. And isn't it also right to say that on one occasion, in relation

11 to artillery fire, you had, I believe, computer control of the guns, of

12 the howitzers, that an individual refused to give coordinates to the

13 gunners because of the concern that he had for inaccurate fire; isn't that

14 right? He actually refused to give the coordinates because the firing was

15 so bad.

16 A. I didn't quite understand your question, but let me tell you this:

17 I am really not an artillery officer, and I know what target

18 redistribution and correction of fire is but I cannot operate artillery

19 pieces and never have. But I have observed many an exercise and I went to

20 different tactical meetings where artillery units were also presented to

21 us, and I know what they are supposed to do, but I never controlled any

22 computer fire of howitzers, nor am I professionally capable or trained for

23 that.

24 Q. So you have never heard of an officer refusing to give the

25 coordinates to facilitate artillery fire because the results had been so

1 bad? You never heard of that, the firing had been so inaccurate?

2 A. There was a case of inaccurate fire and I have said that before.

3 When I was in the area of the 1st Platoon for anti-terrorist activity and

4 I collected information from other people who informed me as I was

5 touring the different areas, namely they told me that there was imprecise

6 shooting by the artillery units in the 1st Military District, which is why

7 I did what I did, let me not repeat that. But this what you are now

8 saying, that is something that I can not recall.

9 Q. Let us finish with this document by going to the conclusion. Can

10 we look at conclusion number 5, conclusion number 6. These are your

11 conclusions.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "The placing of all groups, individuals and units under OG South

14 command had a very positive effect." Yes?

15 A. Yes, I've found that task. I believe that it was positive for one

16 command to be in that zone.

17 Q. And then number 6: "The work of the Guards Motorised Brigade

18 security organ, officers in processing prisoners and undertaking all the

19 security measures ordered and in providing security in the zone of active

20 combat was particularly well-organised and professional."

21 Is that you? Is that you saying that in actual fact it was your

22 unit -- was particularly well-organised and professional?

23 A. Yes, I always thought and I still do that the security organs of

24 the Guards Motorised Brigade performed their work in a professional way

25 and controlled their zone professionally and discharged their tasks

1 properly and there were no -- I didn't notice that anything was being done

2 in an unorganised or irregular fashion.

3 Q. And processing prisoners? This is the 10th of December.

4 A. Processing prisoners, I primarily meant the processing of

5 prisoners during the very operation of the deblocking of the barracks and

6 the disarming of paramilitaries. Because from the 18th, there were no

7 more processings of prisoners because the orders were that they were all

8 to be sent to Sremska Mitrovica. We no longer, from that date, dealt with

9 them because they would be -- they were all sent to Mitrovica then.

10 Before that, we were supposed to send prisoners to Sid, as soon as

11 possible, but before sending them we had to conduct an interview with them

12 in order to ascertain what units, what forces were ahead of our own units,

13 if those people were able to impart that information to us.

14 Q. Sir, what are you saying, that processing prisoners, the

15 term "processing prisoners," really only relates up to the 18th of

16 November? What you describe then -- or what title do you ascribe then to

17 the prisoners taken after the 18th of November?

18 A. We had specific orders then not to detain and not to conduct any

19 interviews with the people, but to send them to the collection centre in

20 Sremska Mitrovica where the proper authorities would deal with them.

21 And the combat operations stopped so that we no longer needed to

22 collect information on the disposition of paramilitary units ahead of our

23 own units, and those were the orders.

24 Q. Can I finish today with the following question: When was it that

25 you say you actually heard firstly rumours that there had been atrocities

1 committed in Ovcara?

2 A. I learned of that, for the first time, seriously, in 1995. And as

3 I have said, I do not deny that there have been rumours in some sections

4 of the media which I called "tabloids" and there was a lot of

5 misinformation planted in such media. They tried to also mount a smear

6 campaign against me personally, whereas others commended me. So I didn't

7 want to devote any time to that and I mostly did not read any of that.

8 But it was in 1995 that I learned most of the pertinent

9 information.

10 Q. So are you saying, then, that no former officer or officer or any

11 member of any administration ever contacted you, Mr. Sljivancanin, the

12 chief of the security organ of the Guards Motorised Brigade, about the

13 atrocities at Ovcara? Is that what you're actually saying?

14 A. The first time it was I, myself, that asked, in 1995. Having

15 heard about it, I asked to see the chief of the General Staff for the

16 truth to be ascertained for the sake of the truth and dignity and to see

17 what measures needed to be taken.

18 The chief of the General Staff received me. I asked to be also

19 received by the chief of the security administration who said that he

20 would summon me when needed via his secretary, and he called me for a talk

21 for the first time in February 1998, if I'm not wrong. And then again I

22 also went to see the military prosecutor in the military court, General

23 Obrencevic, if I remembered his name correctly.

24 Both the chief of the General Staff and the military prosecutor

25 promised saying that they knew that this certainly did not refer to me,

1 but they promised that they will take all the necessary measures for

2 action to be taken in that regard and that we would know what course to

3 follow.

4 Q. General Kadijevic was a man you knew, whom you respected, and you

5 knew his brothers and family, I think; isn't that right?

6 A. General Kadijevic was a man -- is a man whom I still hold in the

7 highest of esteems, and I knew his wife Ozrenka very well. I knew his

8 brothers, the wives of his brothers, and I think that this is a decent,

9 decent family.

10 Q. Well, would you be kind enough to turn up tab 18 and tab 19 --

11 sorry, 17 and 18. In actual fact, it is just tab 18 because of the

12 translation difficulties which I mentioned. Just tab 18.

13 I'd like you to look at the date on the right-hand corner. Have

14 you got it?

15 A. What I have here is an act called the secretariat --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, sorry, sorry. The interpreter is lost.

17 Can the witness please repeat this more slowly.

18 MR. MOORE:

19 Q. Can you turn, please, to tab 18, and you will find, I hope -- so

20 tab 18, you'll find an English version and you will find beneath it the

21 B/C/S translation.

22 A. Yes, yes, I have it. I thought you had said 17. Well, it says

23 "General Veljko Kadijevic" in the --

24 Q. May I ask the question, please. Here is a letter dated the 9th of

25 December, 1991, going to the head of the armed forces at that time,

1 General Kadijevic. That's the same gentleman you speak so highly about.

2 Is that right?

3 A. Yes, it is addressed to General Veljko Kadijevic.

4 Q. Thank you. The first paragraph deals with --

5 MR. MOORE: Mr. Lukic has another objection.

6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] No, I don't have an objection. I just

7 can see that Mr. Sljivancanin has the English version in front of him, and

8 knowing that his English is not that good, I just wanted to ask him to

9 turn the page.

10 MR. MOORE: Thank you very much.

11 Q. Have you got the B/C/S version? It seems to me you have.

12 A. Yes, I have it.

13 Q. Thank you. Let's go back. So we've got -- going to General

14 Kadijevic. It's the British Medical Association out of Tavistock Square.

15 I'd like to go to the second paragraph. "I am writing to you to appeal

16 for information about the fate of some 500 patients and medical staff who

17 were said to have been evacuated by the JNA from the Vukovar Hospital last

18 month. When the army entered Vukovar, it was estimated that an

19 approximate total of 440 patients were being treated in the hospital by

20 320 staff. Only 120 patients and 72 health professionals have since been

21 returned to the Croatian authorities. We understand that the acting head

22 of the hospital, Dr. Vesna Bosanac, and her assistant, Dr. Njavro, have

23 been taken to the prison in Sremska Mitrovica together with a wounded

24 journalist, Mr. Glavasevic, and his Serbian colleague, Mr. Polovina.

25 The remaining patients and staff apparently appear to be missing.

1 Evidence put forward by Amnesty International indicates that all sides of

2 the conflict have committed atrocities, including the extrajudicial

3 execution or arbitrary or deliberate killing of unarmed civilians and

4 wounded or surrendering combatants. We are seeking the help of the

5 authorities in Belgrade to trace the whereabouts of those who worked or

6 were treated in the Vukovar Hospital and would urgently request your

7 assistance."

8 Now, this is a letter from the BMA, it's going to Kadijevic, it's

9 asking specifically about the evacuation that you had responsibility for.

10 Are you saying that Kadijevic never ever spoke to you about the general

11 problems that may have arisen at the Vukovar evacuation?

12 A. Well, Mr. Moore, you said that I was responsible for an

13 evacuation. I was not in charge of any evacuation, including that of the

14 Vukovar Hospital. I only was in charge of security tasks and that is what

15 I did. So General Kadijevic never invited me in connection with these

16 issues, nor did I ever have any talk with him on that subject.

17 As regards this letter which you have just read, I received that

18 letter in the batch of documents that were given to me at the Detention

19 Unit in The Hague, and now I see that, you just having read out for me, I

20 didn't know about it before nor did I ever discuss this subject with

21 General Kadijevic.

22 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, would that be an appropriate moment.

23 JUDGE PARKER: Time, Mr. Moore, time has slipped by.

24 MR. MOORE: Too slowly.

25 JUDGE PARKER: Too slowly, Mr. Moore.

1 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, the answers are very long. I don't wish

2 to be discourteous to Mr. Sljivancanin.

3 JUDGE PARKER: The answers undoubtedly at times are long, as are

4 some questions, as are the scope of what you're trying to deal with it.

5 We resume tomorrow at 2.15 in, I believe, Courtroom I.

6 I see everyone wants a star performance.

7 Mr. Lukic.

8 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I have already talked with Mr. Moore.

9 This is just a technical question. Will he be finishing possibly tomorrow

10 because of the next witness. He has announced that he will be questioning

11 this witness all day tomorrow. I presume he has not changed his plan and

12 pace. So shall we plan to bring our witness for the next

13 day, I mean for tomorrow or not? This is just what I wanted to ask.

14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Moore, can you help?

15 MR. MOORE: Yes, I can. I did indicate to my learned friend that

16 I felt that I would finish on the Wednesday. It may well be that Your

17 Honour takes a view the scope is too broad, but the reality is, I have

18 other topics to go through. I wanted to get through these documents and

19 then move on to, shall I say the more factual evidence, and I will move as

20 quickly as I possibly can.

21 The only way I can move on quickly --

22 JUDGE PARKER: Does that mean Thursday, Mr. Moore?

23 MR. MOORE: I hope to finish my cross-examination tomorrow, but I

24 am worried now that it may slip into Thursday, and I don't want that to

25 happen.

1 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

2 Mr. Lukic, your witness Thursday, not tomorrow, even if we lose a

3 bit of time if Mr. Moore overcomes his problems.

4 Now, Mr. Borovic.

5 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was waiting for the

6 moment for a segment to be finished so as to state my view on the

7 submission of documents. The introduction of documents, the admission of

8 documents, so I have a position to make clear. When would it be

9 convenient for Your Honours? Would it be the time now or perhaps in the

10 morning, tomorrow? I just wanted to announce this in time.

11 THE INTERPRETER: And the interpreter apologises. She had already

12 taken her headphones off.

13 MR. BOROVIC: This would only take a very short while.

14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Borovic, we are already 10 minutes over time

15 and delaying the next trial's commencement by 10 minutes as a result.

16 We do not propose to interrupt the evidence of Mr. Sljivancanin to

17 deal with the question of the admission of documents. But as soon as his

18 evidence is finished, we would allow no more than 10 minutes for all

19 submissions about the issue.

20 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you, Your Honours.

21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.53 p.m.,

22 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 1st day of

23 November, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

24

25