2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Will you kindly invite the witness,
4 MR OSTBERG: Your Honour, Mrs McHenry has one issue
5 pertaining to yesterday's hearing to take up just for a
6 few seconds.
7 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Let us get the appearances of counsel.
8 MR OSTBERG: You will have them, your Honour.
9 MR OSTBERG: I am Eric Ostberg. I appear today with my
10 learned friend Mrs Teresa McHenry and Miss Elles van
11 Dusschoten and support assistant Mr Rod Dixon.
12 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: The appearances for the defence,
14 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Good morning, your
15 Honours. I am Edina Residovic, defence counsel of
16 Zejnil Delalic being together with Mr Eugene O'Sullivan,
17 Professor of criminal law.
18 MR GREAVES: I am Michael Greaves, counsel on behalf of
19 Mr Mucic.
20 MR KARABDIC (in interpretation): I am Salih Karabdic,
21 counsel of the accused Mr Hazim Delic, and with me in
22 the team is Mr Thomas Moran, lawyer from Houston, Texas.
23 MR BRACKOVIC (in interpretation): Good morning, your
24 Honours. I am Mustafa Brackovic, defence counsel of the
25 fourth accused, Esad Landzo, and with me in the defence
1 team is Mrs Cynthia McMurrey, who probably was not
2 informed of the earlier start of this morning's
3 sessions. She is late.
4 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Thank you very much. We appreciate
5 the fact that she is unable to be here now because of
6 the change in the time. We mentioned 10.30 but for
7 other reasons we had to start a little earlier. So I am
8 sorry about that.
9 Can we now have the witness?
10 MS McMURREY: Your Honour, with your permission, I would
11 just like to bring up one matter from yesterday, and I
12 apologise for not handling it yesterday but I must
13 confess I was a little confused by the whole manner in
14 which the impeachment process was being handled. We
15 would like to offer into evidence at this time the prior
16 statement of Mrs Cecez, which were referred to by the
17 defence and shown to the witness yesterday.
18 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: How do you introduce it now? How do
19 you put it in.
20 MS McHENRY: Well, your Honour, I believe they were shown
21 and identified to the witness yesterday and I do not
22 believe there will be any dispute with counsel that the
23 witness statements they were referring to, although they
24 did not themselves mark them, are the witness statements
25 of Mrs Cecez, but ...
1 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I do not quite understand this. Which
2 of the defence counsel was trying to put it in then?
3 MS McHENRY: Your Honour, they were not trying to put it
4 in, but we referred to it several times and showed it to
5 the witness, and certainly we should have objected more
6 vigorously at the time and made sure they were marked
7 and introduced into evidence, but given that I do not
8 believe that there is any dispute that these are her
9 prior statements that the defence counsel referred to,
10 and indeed showed the witness, we believe that they may
11 be introduced into evidence.
12 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Did it not occur to you during
13 re-examination to put it to her?
14 MS McHENRY: Your Honour, I apologise for my defects in not
15 raising this issue earlier, and I realise it is a
17 JUDGE JAN: In fact, I had pointed out yesterday that these
18 documents should be brought into the evidence and it was
19 not done at that stage. I thought you were quite happy
20 they should not be brought into the record.
21 MS McHENRY: No, your Honour. I thought after you brought
22 it up the defence would do it, and then, because I must
23 admit I was confused by the whole manner in which the
24 defence was doing it, I neglected to do it, which is why
25 on the theory better late than never I am attempting to
1 offer them into evidence now.
2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: It is a little awkward. Can I hear
3 the defence on this?
4 MR MORAN: Your Honour, Tom Moran for Hasim Delic. A
5 couple of thoughts, your Honour. First, there are some
6 questions based on the witness's testimony as to the
7 authenticity of one of the documents. There was a
8 document -- there was a record of a court proceeding in
9 the former Yugoslavia, and there was some corrections
10 made to that record in handwriting, and the witness said
11 she did not recall anything at all about those
12 corrections, but, more importantly, your Honour, if the
13 court wishes to have those introduced into evidence, we
14 wish they be admitted solely for the limited purpose of
15 impeachment rather than for all purposes.
16 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Actually, that is the only basis on
17 which it could be admitted in the first instance, but if
18 it was not so done then ... since Mr Moran is not
19 objecting to that you can tender is at least for
20 impeachment purposes if it has any such effect.
21 MR MORAN: Except the document with the corrections on it
22 because there is some question based on the witness's
23 testimony as to the authenticity of the corrections. It
24 is the court record from a proceeding before an
25 administrative -- an investigating magistrate in the
1 former Yugoslavia. There are two versions of it. One
2 of them is the original version and the other is the
3 version with corrections, and, as the court will recall,
4 I asked the witness will the corrections and she said
5 she did not recall anything about them.
6 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: What I remember is, as she said, she
7 came to The Hague only once, only once, and that she did
8 not remember any of the corrections made in the second
10 MR MORAN: That is correct, your Honour.
11 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: That is what she said.
12 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honour.
13 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Yes?
14 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Mr President, I do not
15 know in what way the witness could now authenticate one
16 of the documents of which she said that she had not even
17 given it. Therefore, there are several statements we
18 are talking about, incorrect statements, statements
19 given elsewhere in a different place and statements that
20 the witness claims never to have made. Therefore, the
21 only basis for accepting this in evidence could be to
22 impeach the witness and to impeach the procedure by
23 which the witness testified.
24 JUDGE JAN: We are talking about the document which
25 admittedly bore her signatures and admittedly contained
1 corrections in her own handwriting.
2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Actually there is no doubt about what
3 is being discussed. Mr Moran, who started it, put that
4 document to her. She denied knowing about how the
5 mistakes were corrected. This is what the prosecution
6 now wants tendered, at least for impeachment purposes
7 and for no other thing. I think that is sufficient for
8 that purpose.
9 MR BRACKOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honours, as defence
10 counsel of Esad Landzo, I should like to support what
11 has been said by counsel Edina Residovic. I also
12 support all the reasons she has given, so I do not feel
13 it necessary to elaborate on them. The authenticity of
14 the statement may be called in question, and especially
15 of the corrections made subsequently, and the witness in
16 her statement gave a wrong location, and she also could
17 not remember having made that statement, and therefore
18 we are absolutely against the acceptance of this
19 statement as evidence.
20 MR GREAVES: Your Honour, as far as Mr Mucic is concerned,
21 the position is this, that I am content to adopt the
22 arguments advanced by each of my friends who appear for
23 the defence.
24 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I think after listening to all that
25 has been said I am content to admitting for the purposes
1 of impeaching whatever has been said on the opposing
2 statements, because there are two statements which
3 Mr Moran did consider, and I think that is the only
4 purpose for which that document is being tendered. I
5 think it is admissible for that purpose.
6 MR MORAN: Excuse me, your Honour. I believe there were a
7 total of three separate statements, plus the one with
8 corrections. Are all four being admitted for
9 impeachment purposes.
10 JUDGE JAN: The one relating to the -- we are talking about
11 the document which she admitted bore her signatures.
12 MR MORAN: That is the one. We would ask if one be
13 admitted, they all be admitted for the purposes of
15 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: That was not what was in issue
17 JUDGE JAN: There is an objection to it because you have to
18 confront the witness with the omissions or
19 contradictions. You referred the witness only to that
20 particular document which bore her signatures.
21 MR MORAN: I understand, your Honour.
22 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: So that is the only one that is in
23 issue, not all the others.
24 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Mr President, I asked
25 the witness to recognise the statement, which she did
1 not recognise as having made. Therefore, we would ask
2 that all the statements be tendered together.
3 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: You are raising quite fresh issues
4 different from what the prosecution has related to us,
5 and I think I am only considering the issue the
6 prosecution raised as compared with the evidence which
7 Mr Moran was concerned with. All that is new and I do
8 not think anybody is thinking about that now. We do not
9 use this opportunity to raise new things other than what
10 the prosecution has said.
11 MS McMURREY: Your Honours, if I may apologise to the court
12 for being tardy this morning. I would also like to add
13 that, because we had discussed our strategy and because
14 we had assumed that this document would not have been
15 introduced into evidence, Esad Landzo waived questioning
16 of that witness completely. Now, if this document is
17 admitted into evidence, then we would like to ask the
18 court's indulgence to reopen cross-examination just for
19 the limited purpose of that document only, nothing
21 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I do not remember the document being
22 in issue at any time. All it was used at that time was
23 for the purposes of cross-examining the witness. That
24 was what was done. So its admission was never an issue.
25 JUDGE JAN: The defence itself introduced that document by
1 referring to it in the cross-examination of the
2 witness. It was not the prosecution which has done it.
3 MS McMURREY: I understand that is correct but our defence
4 agreement was basically the document would not be
5 admitted into evidence, but I can see our hands are tied
6 at this point. I wanted to express to the court that if
7 it is allowed into evidence, defence or prosecution,
8 Esad Landzo has a few questions to clear up on that one
9 statement, and we would like to have just a tiny bit of
10 cross limited to five questions.
11 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: It might be impossible to allow you
12 that indulgence, because it is merely being tendered for
13 the purposes of impeaching that document. So it has
14 nothing to do with your opportunity of cross-examining.
16 MS McHENRY: Your Honour, I will now tender them into
18 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Only one. I do not remember more than
20 MS McHENRY: Okay. Your Honour, I believe it is the
21 document that was -- she said had taken place in Borci.
22 I will tender both the document and the translation of
23 it. It is the document that was given to defence
24 counsel yesterday morning. If I understand correctly.
25 Thank you. I have anything else if anyone wants it.
1 Thank you.
2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Will you kindly invite the witness?
3 (Witness enters court)
4 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Kindly take your seat. Please remind
5 her she is still on her oath.
6 THE REGISTRAR: I wish to remind you that you are still
7 under oath.
8 MR OSTBERG: Thank you, your Honour.
9 Dr Marie-Janine Calic (continued)
10 Examined by Mr Ostberg
11 MR OSTBERG: Good morning, Dr Calic.
12 A. Good morning.
13 Q. Yesterday we went so far as to document number 7 in your
14 file of documents. I hope today that all the counsel
15 have their files with them. The court has them before
16 them, I can see. So we do not have to take up time
17 putting documents on the ELMO except for maybe maps or
18 things like that. May I ask you, Dr Calic, to take up
19 the thread where you left it yesterday afternoon?
20 A. Let me briefly summarise what I was trying to explain
21 yesterday. Basically there were two subjects of debate
22 among the leaderships of the people in Bosnia. One was
23 the question of independence of Bosnia and the second
24 was the future constitutional set-up of Bosnia. Both
25 questions were, of course, interlinked and this is what
1 made it difficult for the leaderships to agree on a
2 common view.
3 As far as the question of independence, there was
4 an alliance between the Croat leadership and the Muslim
5 leadership. Both did not want to stay in a Yugoslav
6 state which would have probably been dominated by the
7 Serbs. That is why they were in favour of independence,
8 but as for the second question there was a different
9 coalition. There was a coalition between the Croat and
10 the Serb leadership. As for the question of the future
11 constitution, both were in favour of having a
12 constitution on the basis of ethnic principles,
13 cantonisation. Instead the Muslim leadership was in
14 favour of having a unitarian state. This is what I was
15 trying to explain yesterday.
16 The Bosnian Serbs continued to contest the
17 legitimacy of the Sarajevo Assembly, having decided to
18 become -- Bosnia to become an independent and sovereign
19 state, and from September onwards they made a number of
20 decisions. They were trying to establish their own
22 I have included in this file a number of documents
23 showing how the Serbs were then trying to establish
24 their own state, the government, the constitution.
25 These are the documents number 7 -- from number 7 to 15,
1 and if you allow me, your Honours, I would prefer not to
2 show each document but just two of them.
3 These documents seem for me important for two
4 reasons. One is document number 10. It indicates the
5 territories which the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted to
6 include in the Serb state of Bosnia. It's just a bit
7 difficult here.
8 We can see from this document, which numbers all
9 the municipalities who were supposed to become part of
10 the Bosnian Serb republic. Can we switch on the ELMO?
11 Q. Yes. Can I have some help from any technician with the
12 ELMO? . Now we see the model on the screen and not the
13 document. There we are. Are you directing our interest
14 to paragraph --
15 A. Paragraph 1.
16 Q. In this Decision?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you?
19 A. In this document you find all the municipalities which
20 were supposed to become part of the Serbian Republic,
21 Serb Republic of Bosnia, and we can see from this
22 document that Konjic was not supposed to be part of this
24 So the Serbs proclaimed in January the republic of
25 the Serbian people. They declared a constitution in
1 February and they declared independence from Bosnia in
2 April 1992.
3 Let me emphasise that in many of these documents
4 the Serbs expressed their wish to stay in Yugoslavia, so
5 they considered themselves as being part of what
6 remained of Yugoslavia. The constitutional court of
7 Bosnia instead made two decisions declaring these
8 unconstitutional, and I have also included the decisions
9 of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia in this file.
10 Q. Will you tell us under what number?
11 A. It's number 16 and 17. The Bosnian Serbs were not the
12 only group challenging the territorial integrity of
13 Bosnia. Also the Bosnian Croats were moving towards
14 independence. In November 1991 the Croatian Community
15 of the Bosnian Sava Valley was established and in
16 November Croat leaders decided to form the so-called
17 Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna. This community of
18 Herceg-Bosnia was defined as a political, cultural,
19 economic and regional entity, and on 3rd July 1992 it
20 was officially proclaimed.
21 Q. Is that what we find under number 18?
22 A. This is what you find under number 18 and in this
23 document, which I also will show you a bit in detail we
24 can recognise under Article -- I cannot see it on my
25 screen -- under Article 2 we can read:
1 "The Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna shall
2 consist of the following municipalities..."
3 We can see here that Konjic was supposed to become
4 part of this republic -- not republic. It was called
5 "community", but in fact it was perceived as a separate
6 state and this is also exactly how the constitutional
7 court in Sarajevo perceived this declaration of the
8 Croat -- proclamation of the Croat Community of
9 Herceg-Bosna. They also made a Decision against this
10 declaring Herceg-Bosna unconstitutional. This is
11 document number 19 in my folder.
12 Let us go back to what happened in autumn 1991.
13 In October I was explaining yesterday there was a
14 proclamation, declaration of sovereignty by the Bosnian
15 Assembly. There was Serb opposition against this
16 declaration. There was a break-up of all state
17 institutions in Bosnia and there was a letter by the
18 Bosnian government to the European Community in December
19 1991. Bosnia should be recognised as an independent
21 In view of these facts tensions in Bosnia
22 increased constantly throughout the winter of 1991/1992
23 reaching a peak after the referendum on 29th February
24 and 1st March 1992 on the republic's independence. The
25 European Community had made independence -- had made
1 recognition of Bosnia conditional on holding a
2 referendum to determine whether the population of Bosnia
3 was really in favour of independence.
4 This brings me back to the Badinter Commission,
5 which I mentioned yesterday. This time it is Opinion
6 Number 4, document number 20 in our file. Can we have
7 it on the screen? So the European Community Arbitration
8 Commission under Badinter was aware of the fact that a
9 part of the Bosnian population was opposing
10 independence. You can see this in the last page which
11 is on the screen, paragraph 4:
12 "It was therefore of the opinion that the will of
13 the people of Bosnia to constitute an independent
14 republic, an independent state, cannot be held to have
15 been fully established."
16 This is what they were assessing.
17 In the referendum, it was the condition of the
18 European Community to recognise independence. 66 per
19 cent of the Bosnian citizens participated. The Serbs
20 boycotted this referendum and the overwhelming majority
21 of those who took part -- this is nearly 66 per cent of
22 the Bosnian population -- expressed their will that
23 Bosnia should become indeed an independent state.
24 The European Community then took the decision to
25 recognise Bosnia and from 7th April 1992 Bosnia was a
1 sovereign independent republic recognised by the
2 European Community, by the United States, and other
3 states followed.
4 Even before the official recognition of Bosnia
5 around the referendum the first violent incidents
6 occurred in Bosnia, and the European Community was very
7 concerned about this fact. The first barricades were
8 set up in Sarajevo. There were violent incidents, and
9 you can see these events from a declaration, document
10 number 22, a statement of the European Union. I will
11 not put it on the screen. It is just to support what I
12 am saying. So the referendum maybe was the turning
13 point towards a more violent state in this republic.
14 Bigger, more violent conflicts erupted after
15 Bosnia became independent, and the Presidency of Bosnia
16 had to declare the state of imminent war danger on 8th
17 April 1992, which meant that all power was now
18 concentrated in the Presidency. The Parliament did not
19 work any more. First efforts to mobilise soldiers were
20 undertaken. The state of war was proclaimed by the
21 state Presidency as late as June 1992, nearly three
22 months after the break-out of armed hostility. There
23 was a certain period in which -- during which the
24 Bosnian Presidency was acting under immediate danger of
25 war but not under a state of war.
1 Q. Any explanation to why it took more than two months to
2 come up with the decision of a state of war?
3 A. There are many speculations. I am personally not sure
4 about the real reasons for this. It is, on the other
5 hand, a fact that the difference between having
6 immediate -- a state of immediate war danger and having
7 a state of war danger are not too big in terms of
8 mobilising all forces against the perceived enemy. So
9 the real reason I cannot know this or I cannot support
10 with any document this -- I mean it is just speculation,
11 but it was a matter of criticism. It has been
12 criticised from various sides that it took so long to
13 organise all forces against this perceived enemy.
14 Q. What happened during this period in shaping a Bosnian
15 army? You are coming to this?
16 A. I am coming now and I am moving to the main military
17 forces in the Republic of Bosnia. I am also explaining
18 how the Bosnian army was formed.
19 Q. Yes, please.
20 A. The main military forces which were active in Bosnia in
21 1992 need to be described in the context of the Yugoslav
22 defence doctrine of all people's defence, also known as
23 total national defence. It is just a question how to
24 translate this Yugoslav term. So all people's defence.
25 Q. Is that what is called TO?
1 A. No. The doctrine is all -- I will explain what is TO,
2 but all people's defence meant the Yugoslav defence
3 doctrine, which was introduced in 1968, and it was meant
4 and aimed to mobilise all possible means and resources
5 from the bottom up of the society upwards to the purpose
6 of defence in the event of war. It meant also that
7 practically all citizens were expected to participate in
8 armed struggle wherever they could.
9 This doctrine was implemented in the defence law
10 of 1969 and later on in the defence law of 1974, and we
11 can also find it in the constitutions of Bosnia and of
12 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
13 In its Article 254 the constitution of Bosnia
14 referred explicitly to the principle of all people's
15 defence. I quote:
16 "It is the right of the working people and
17 citizens to actively participate in the formulation of
18 defence policy and preparations for the defence of the
19 country, and to ensure themselves within the framework
20 of the system and plans for national defence, the
21 conditions necessary for training to protect and defend
22 the country, and to participate in its defence."
23 The Yugoslav system of all people's defence had
24 basically three main components. One component was
25 civil protection, the Civil Protection Organisation, as
1 it was called. This was an organisation aimed to
2 provide relief in the case of war for civilians, but
3 also in the case of natural disasters. I am not going
4 too far and not explaining too much on this. More
5 interesting for us are the other two elements, the armed
6 forces of Yugoslavia.
7 The Yugoslav people's army was one part of the
8 armed forces and the so-called territorial defence
9 organisation, TO, was the second element of this defence
10 of the armed forces of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav
11 people's army known under the name of JNA was the
12 regular standing army of Yugoslavia. It was the federal
13 army. It was also financed by the federal budget and it
14 existed since 1945. The Territorial Defence
15 Organisation, on the other hand, was under the
16 authority, control and jurisdiction of the republic as a
17 second pillar of the Yugoslav defence system.
18 So since 1968 the armed forces of Yugoslavia were
19 composed of JNA as a federal army and of the territorial
20 defence organisations as the armies of the republics.
21 Each republic had its own headquarters of the
22 territorial defence, TO, which was responsible to the
23 respective republican presidency in a military sense,
24 but in a political sense there was also a certain
25 responsibility towards Belgrade, towards the federal
1 army, because this system of defence was conceived as a
2 unified system, and this is how it should have worked in
3 the case of war.
4 I would like to show you my document 28 just to
5 make visible how the armed forces of Yugoslavia were
6 structured. This comes from Zivkovic on the Territorial
7 Defence of Yugoslavia printed in Belgrade in 1985. You
8 can here see forces of Yugoslavia. First pillar: the
9 Yugoslav people's army, JNA; second pillar: Territorial
10 Defence Organisation under the jurisdiction of the
12 The Federal Army of Yugoslavia, JNA was the
13 largest and best equipped armed force in the armed
14 conflicts that began in Yugoslavia in 1991. The JNA was
15 a real pan-Yugoslavian institution deriving from Second
16 World War partition and struggle against German and
17 Italian occupation. So it was the one army which was
18 aiming at, let us say, at least in this early part of
19 the war -- aiming at keeping Yugoslavia together as a
21 However, as the first armed conflicts erupted, the
22 JNA turned more and more -- it became more and more a
23 Serb-dominated force. Many of non-Serb officers left
24 the army. They were joining the local territorial
25 defence units and you have to see that the JNA as early
1 as the autumn of 1991 started mobilising also in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially Bosnian Serbs, and they
3 started also distributing weapons to Bosnian Serb
4 volunteers. So as early as the autumn of 1991 we can
5 conclude that the JNA was becoming more and more a
6 Serb-dominated army.
7 All parties to the conflict were arming their
8 respective populations, and this was again a matter of
9 concern. On the international level the United Nations
10 Security Council passed a resolution in September 1991
11 imposing an arms embargo on the whole territory of
13 I included the Security Council resolution, but it
14 is a well-known fact. I think there is no need that I
15 put it here on the ELMO.
16 Q. We can find it in your binder.
17 A. Yes, we can find it in the binder.
18 Q. Under number 29.
19 A. The JNA was openly present and it was also involved in
20 the armed struggles in Bosnia-Herzegovina at least until
21 May 1992. On 4th May the Federal Republic of
22 Yugoslavia, which consisted at that time of Serbia and
23 Montenegro decided to withdraw JNA troops from Bosnia,
24 withdraw the troops from Bosnia by 19th May 1992.
25 During this formal withdrawal, however, the JNA
1 left behind many of their troops and also equipment and
2 arms. These former JNA forces, armed with heavy
3 weaponry, were integrated in the newly-established
4 Bosnian Serb Army, which was later to become the army of
5 the Republika Srpska. This is a process which General
6 Veljko Kadijevic of JNA described in his book "Moje
7 Vidjenje Raspada", "My View on the Collapse", as
8 follows. You have this document 31 in the binder.
9 Let me put it on the ELMO. It is such an
10 interesting quote can we see it on the screen, please?
11 It is this paragraph basically, in which he openly
12 admits that:
13 "The units and headquarters of the JNA formed the
14 backbone of the army of the Serb Republic with complete
15 weaponry and equipment".
16 Q. May I put a question to you in this context?
17 A. Of course.
18 Q. What you just said about JNA, what they left in the
19 territory of Bosnia, would that mean that after the
20 international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 hostile forces belonging to another republic was
22 fighting on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
23 A. This is indeed true, and there is much evidence that the
24 JNA remained involved in the struggles in Bosnia even
25 after May 1992. We have quite a lot of evidence for
1 this. I included one document, which is a report of the
2 UN Secretary General of 3rd December 1992, document 32,
3 again expressing concern about the fact that, despite
4 the decision to withdraw the JNA, JNA troops were still
5 present and at least actively supporting the Bosnian
6 Serb army in this armed conflict.
7 Q. On the territory of --
8 A. On the territory of Bosnia. The idea to recognise
9 Bosnia as an independent state and to recognise also
10 Croatia was originally to transform the conflict into an
11 international conflict. This was aimed to deter the
12 Yugoslav army to be involved in the two republics, but
13 it did not work, as we can see from these documents and
14 from any other documents. See also report of UN
15 Secretary General of 3rd December 1992, document 32 in
16 this binder.
17 Q. Thank you very much.
18 A. So how many were the Bosnian Serb troops? Difficult to
19 say. There are very different assessments. Most
20 scholars estimated at that time there were about 60,000,
21 but it could easily be more or less. During the
22 conflict they were mobilising more troops, reaching then
23 during 1993 maybe up to 100,000 troops, reserve troops
24 included, but there is no reliable -- not really one
25 document showing how many they really were. So far to
1 the Bosnian Serb army.
2 What we are doing now, the Bosnian Muslims,
3 respectively the Bosnian government.
4 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I think we might rise now, have a
5 break and reassemble at 11.30.
6 MR OSTBERG: Thank you.
7 (11.07 am)
8 (Short break)
9 (11.30 am)
10 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Please remind the witness she is still
11 under oath.
12 THE REGISTRAR: You are still under oath.
13 MR OSTBERG: Thank you, your Honour. Well, Dr Calic, I
14 just ask you to continue before you stopped before the
16 A. I started to describe how the unified system of all
17 people's defence started to disintegrate when the first
18 armed conflict erupted in the Republic of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. I also identified two
20 main military actors on the republican level. One was
21 the JNA on its way out of Bosnia and the second one was
22 the Bosnian Serb Army, which was formed in May 1992,
23 and, as I was explaining, they included part of the JNA
24 troops, personnel, arms, equipment and so on. So the
25 third important actor in this war is the Bosnian Army
2 The Bosnian Army was created in April 1992. The
3 basic organisation was the Territorial Defence
4 Organisation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
5 the so-called second pillar of the former unified former
6 system of Yugoslavia. The Bosnian presidency announced
7 mobilisation of the Territorial Defence Organisation in
8 April 1992. Territorial defence units were mobilised in
9 many municipalities throughout BH including Konjic
11 The Presidency of Bosnia set up a Supreme Command
12 in Sarajevo, and they were also trying to set up
13 regional headquarters. These headquarters were
14 situated, among others, in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica,
15 Doboj and in Bihac. The formal date of establishment of
16 the Bosnian Army is 15th April 1992. There was also a
17 decree on the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia
18 passed in May. It is also included in this binder. The
19 Bosnian Army was conceived as the common armed forces of
20 all three constitutive peoples of the Republic of Bosnia
21 and it was under the command and control of the Bosnian
22 Presidency. However, as I was trying to describe
23 earlier on, many members of other -- of non-Muslim
24 nationalities did not follow this order. They did not
25 become part of this Bosnian Army, but they were trying
1 to establish their own order forces.
2 Q. I would like to put the question to you in this
3 context. What you have just said about the forming of
4 the Bosnian Army, would that mean that when the attacks
5 against the villages surrounding Konjic took place in
6 May 1992 there was also a Bosnian Army formed?
7 A. On paper, yes. There was a Bosnian Army formed, but I
8 will explain later on that many of the regulations which
9 were passed in April and in May 1992 by the Bosnian
10 Presidency and by the Bosnian government were not
11 implemented in practice. So there were many parts of
12 Bosnia -- in many parts of Bosnia the local units were
13 acting practically independently from their supposed
14 superior command, but I will explain this later on in
15 more detail, when I come to what happened in Konjic
16 during this early period of the war.
17 Q. Thank you very much.
18 A. So how many were now the troops of the Bosnian Army?
19 Again we have the problem in this early period. There
20 were different sources. Different sources say different
21 things. Between 50,000 and 80,000 and then during the
22 war up to 100,000 personnel. Anyway, we have to
23 acknowledge that even maybe if the Bosnian Army were
24 more in personnel in numbers, they were for sure not
25 sufficiently armed and they were unequipped. This was
1 maybe one of the main problems of the newly-established
2 Bosnian Army.
3 Another problem was, as I was already pointing out
4 before, that not all troops were actually following the
5 orders given by the Bosnian Presidency to build up the
6 new Bosnian Army, but they were creating their own armed
7 forces. The Bosnian Serb Army was one, but also the
8 Croats established their own armed forces. This brings
9 me to the next important actor, the Croatian Defence
10 Council, HVO.
11 The Croatian armed forces were established in
12 April 1992 together with separate headquarters, and they
13 were conceived to be the armed forces of the Bosnian
14 Croats. From the very beginning the armed forces of the
15 Bosnian Croats, the HVO, had quite good relations with
16 the Bosnian army. The HVO comprised of some 30,000
17 troops, most of them trained and armed by the government
18 of Croatia, and this brings me to a second external
19 actor in the Bosnian war.
20 We have also many reports from the international
21 organisations, showing how the Croatian army from
22 Croatia was involved actively and took part in the
23 Bosnian war. This is, for instance, my document number
24 37, the report of the UN Secretary-General of 24th
25 November 1992.
1 Q. Did you mention from which time the Croat influence was
2 to be observed on the Bosnian territory?
3 A. It was practically to be observed from when the HVO was
4 established. We can say there were some signs already
5 in late 1991 but there were many more signs in 1992,
6 when the conflict actually erupted, the armed conflict.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 A. So let us summarise the main actors on the republican
9 level, the JNA, the Bosnian Serb Army, the HVO, the
10 Croatian armed forces, and of course the Bosnian Army
11 established in April 1992.
12 Let me now come to the micro level and look in
13 more detail at what happened then in the municipalities,
14 as Konjic was one of the Yugoslav -- the Bosnian
16 I prepared a map showing 109 municipalities of
17 Bosnia. Can we have it on the screen, please?
18 Q. Do we have this in the bundle also?
19 A. We have it in the binder, number 38. Can it be
20 reduced? ? So 109 municipalities. Konjic is located
21 here. We can see the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo. Here
22 is the coast. Here lies Croatia and here the Federal
23 Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia in socialist times
24 granted the municipalities quite a high level of
25 autonomy, and this was to prevent the emergence of
1 political and ethnic tensions. The aim was to provide
2 self-government, of course always in the framework of
3 the federal and of the republican supervision.
4 Article 116 of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974
6 "A commune" of the municipality "is a
7 self-managing community and the basic socio-political
8 community based on the power of and self-management by
9 the working class and all working people."
10 According to the Yugoslav constitution, the
11 municipalities had, among others, the rights and the
12 duties to take care of economic, cultural, social and
13 other common needs of the Yugoslav citizens. They were
14 also allowed to set up organs of self-management and
15 organs of power for the conduct of such affairs, and
16 they were also enabled to regulate and to organise
17 national defence and, of course, self-protection, and
18 this brings me to the very essence of our case here.
19 Before I come to what happened in Konjic, let me
20 just show another diagram. This is the diagram number
21 40. I will not explain it in too much detail. It is
22 the former Yugoslavian organisation of the
23 municipalities. Just briefly to mention which bodies on
24 the political side were set up in the Bosnian
25 municipalities to organise self-administration, and who
1 "the authorities" were at that time. So we can find an
2 Assembly, Municipal Assembly, which was elected. In the
3 municipality there was an Executive Council, which
4 functioned more or less as a kind of local government,
5 so it was the council, but there was also a President of
6 the Municipal Assembly, and this President performed
7 maybe the highest function in a municipality. He was in
8 charge of organisational questions related to the work
9 of the Assembly and related to the work of the council,
10 and he held at the same time the position of
11 co-ordinator and supervisor of the different
12 institutions of the municipality.
13 So this was basically how municipality was
14 functioning before the war. Assembly with different
15 chambers, self-management, quasi-government and not seen
16 here on this graph but this high position of President
17 of the Municipal Assembly.
18 Q. This organogram, Dr Calic, is taken from a book?
19 A. It is taken from a book by Aleksandar Ivic and a
20 co-author. It is named "Political and Constitutional
21 System of the SFRY" published in Belgrade in 1988. It
22 is a book on administration and constitution.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 A. What interests us here is that the municipalities played
25 an important role in implementing the doctrine of all
1 people's defence, all people's defence, which meant to
2 mobilise all possible persons, means and resources from
3 the local level upwards in case of a war.
4 The municipality was conceived as an autonomous
5 community of defence; in other words, a kind of nucleus
6 of national resistance against foreign invasion. This
7 is how it was meant, but then during the war in Bosnia
8 it changed this meaning, and it became a completely
9 different thing.
10 In terms of the 1974 Bosnian constitution, the
11 municipalities were able to make certain decisions in
12 the event of a war or an imminence of war. Article 273
13 of the Bosnian constitution stated and I quote:
14 "In time of war or in case of an immediate threat
15 of war the Presidency of the Municipal Assembly shall be
16 formed, will decide questions within the competence of
17 the Assembly if it is impossible for the Assembly to
19 We have the exact articles of the Bosnian
20 constitution in document 25, which explains the
21 functions of the War Presidency in times of war. It was
22 Article 273. I will come back later to this in more
23 detail, when I explain exactly what happened in Konjic,
24 but at this stage it is enough to bear in mind that
25 municipalities played indeed a very important role in
1 self-defence, and that they were allowed under the
2 constitution of Yugoslavia and under the constitution of
3 Bosnia to perform certain war-related tasks.
4 So how was this now implemented in Konjic? Let me
5 show first some basic data on the municipality of
6 Konjic. First, a diagram of the ethnic composition of
7 Konjic municipalities in 1991, document number 42. I
8 will put it on the screen on the ELMO. I cannot see it
9 on the screen. Maybe you can. Do we have it on the
10 screen? Okay. Can you reduce it a bit? Thank you.
11 In 1991 the population of Konjic municipality was
12 composed of 54 per cent Muslims, 26 per cent Croats, 15
13 per cent were Serbs and 3 per cent were Yugoslavs, and
14 then there were also 1 per cent of population of other
15 nationalities. The population was 43,000 altogether
16 approximately. So this is how it was in 1991. I will
17 at the end of my statement show another diagram. This
18 diagram will then show the ethnic composition of today.
19 So we have about 15 per cent Serbs in this
20 municipalities, 6,620 people.
21 Let us look how these people were distributed.
22 Another map, document 41.
23 Q. 41.
24 A. Based on the population census of 1991. We can see that
25 also the municipality of Konjic was mixed and you can
1 see majority villages of the Muslims nearly all over
2 this municipalities. The red ones are the Serbs. So
3 there is no clear division within this municipality.
4 There are no clear Muslim or no clear only Serb areas in
5 this municipality.
6 Let us look, however, where the Serbs, Serb
7 villages, the Serb majority villages were located. Let
8 me put document number 43, a map of the Serb towns of
9 the municipality of Konjic. So these are the
10 settlements with Serbs as an absolute majority. We can
11 see --
12 Q. Exactly how do I read this? The blue dots?
13 A. The blue points, dots, they are the settlements with
14 Serbs as absolute majority. Interestingly these
15 villages were located along the main road running from
16 Sarajevo down to the coast and along the railway,
17 running also along mainly the same way.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 A. In document 44, which I will also put on the screen, we
20 can see a bit better where Konjic was located, mainly in
21 the northern part of Herzegovina. Here in the northern
22 part is Sarajevo. Here is the coast. Much of its area
23 is heavily wooded. It is rocky, it is mountainous and
24 this makes it difficult to carry out any land
25 operation. Konjic is located on the Neretva river in
1 the valley of the Neretva but it has high mountains
2 around. The whole area is important as a transit region
3 for several reasons. There are important communication
4 lines. I also mentioned the road and the railway from
5 Sarajevo down to the coast, but there were also other
6 important communication lines very close to the
7 municipality of Konjic: the road here from Jablanica
8 going up to Gorni Vakuf, Central Bosnia, and other roads
9 leading from this main road through Herzegovina to the
10 eastern part of Bosnia.
11 Q. Central Bosnia, which starts -- Konjic is also something
12 like the border between the two historical areas of
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina. It's the most important
14 municipality of Herzegovina and it is so very close to
15 an area which we call Central Bosnia, and which then
16 starts from here up.
17 During the Second World War Bosnia, especially
18 Central and eastern Bosnia, witnessed very bitter ethnic
19 struggles. During the Second World War Bosnia formed
20 part of the Croat fascist state. Under the so-called
21 Ustasha the fascist state was established by the German
23 It had the name of an independent state but it was
24 not an independent state. It was occupied territory.
25 So Bosnia was part of this state and so was Konjic. The
1 Croat fascists during this time conducted an extremely
2 brutal war against the Serbs. Hundreds of thousands of
3 Serbs were killed in this time and, of course, this
4 history is still in the minds of the people in this
5 area. There were also Serb nationalists conducting
6 aggressions against non-Serbs, and this Cetnik, the
7 national movement of Cetniks, of course, massacred
8 thousands of Muslims and Croats in this area.
9 There is a whole debate over how many people were
10 really killed during this struggle. It is a matter of
11 debate among historians in the countries of the former
12 Yugoslavia. It is a highly politicised debate. All
13 sides claim to have more victims on their side. Being a
14 historian looking from the outside, having seen many
15 sources, I would conclude that there were altogether 1
16 million Yugoslavs who died, Yugoslavs all over
17 Yugoslavia who died during the Second World War and
18 Bosnia lost about 10 per cent of its population. So
19 this is just to give a --
20 Q. When you say "Bosnian population", do you mean all three
22 A. All three nationalities.
23 Q. 10 per cent of the total population?
24 A. Population, yes. Historically Konjic and also the
25 Neretva River marks the border-line between two historic
1 spheres of influence. For historical reasons the
2 Bosnian Croats and also the Croatian Croats have laid
3 claim to Herzegovina, which they consider as the real
4 heartland of Croatian. Herzegovina goes up to here, the
5 Mt Ivan saddle, which marks the border between
6 Herzegovina and Bosnia. They have laid claim to this
7 territory for historical reasons, even though there are
8 many, many municipalities and areas where Croats are not
9 in the majority but where the Muslims are in a majority.
10 The Serb leadership, on the other hand, apparently
11 had territorial aspirations on the eastern side of the
12 Neretva Valley. It was reported in the press that since
13 the beginning of the war, the Serb leadership considered
14 territory east of this Neretva Valley as being Serb
15 territory. There is no document evidence. This is just
16 press reports. There were also many, many speculations
17 that the Serb and the Croat Presidents and the local
18 leaders of the Croats and the Serbs had made an
19 agreement to divide Bosnia between themselves, and we
20 find the municipality of Konjic in the middle of this.
21 So on the one side the Serb aspiration and the Croats,
22 and nothing left for the Bosnian Muslims.
23 So for all these reasons, as well as for others,
24 which I will discuss now, the Konjic municipality has
25 been of high strategic importance for all the warring
2 I mentioned the strategically very important road
3 running from Sarajevo down to the coast. It was a major
4 line of supply for the Bosnian troops. I have also to
5 mention that Sarajevo was besieged from the very
6 beginning of the conflict, and this was the way through
7 which -- this was the way from Central Bosnia and from
8 Herzegovina to reach Sarajevo from the western side. So
9 it was very important to have this road and railway
10 under control.
11 This area forms at the same time the link to the
12 coast, and it was a major weapons supply line. I
13 mentioned earlier on that there was an arms embargo on
14 the countries of the former Yugoslavia and -- but, of
15 course, the arms embargo was broken. Many parts and
16 weapons usually came from Croatian and then they were
17 transported on this line. So this was another reason to
18 get weapons from Croatian through this line, why this
19 road was very important, especially when it came to the
20 first military attempts to lift the siege of Sarajevo
21 and get access to the Bosnian capital.
22 Konjic itself was also an important military
23 centre. About 55 per cent of the Bosnian military
24 industry, defence industry, was located in the Republic
25 of Bosnia, and most of this in its central part. The
1 largest military industrial enterprise was the so-called
2 united specific purpose industry in Sarajevo. This huge
3 defence industry had about 60 large and small plants
4 located throughout the former Yugoslavia, and one of
5 them was the Igman factory of arms and ammunition in
6 Konjic town.
7 There were other military industrial centres in
8 other parts of Bosnia but Igman was one of the largest
9 armaments plants in Bosnia, and it produced ammunition
10 up to 20 mm. It produced mines and other things. It
11 was built underground, and it covers about 20,000 square
12 metres. Control over this factory was, of course, a
13 pre-condition to control over the local defence
14 production, and it was of paramount importance for the
15 Bosnian Army that was under-equipped.
16 I took this information from an article which I
17 have also included in this binder, an article by Milan
18 Vego. He is a specialist in military developments in
19 the former Yugoslavia. This is from the Jane's
20 Intelligence Review. It is published and it is document
21 number 45. There are some more details. I have not
22 time to explain on this here.
23 There were also other objects of military interest
24 in this area. This is my document 44, which I am
25 showing here. So I mentioned Konjic as a town where
1 important defence industry was located. Other objects
2 of high interest to the warring factions were the
3 weapons storage. According to TO's strategy of all
4 people's defence, weapons were stored at the local level
5 in the country and they were supposed to be used by the
6 territorial defence organisation of the republics in the
7 case of a war.
8 So the weapons of the territorial defence of
9 Konjic and of the municipalities of Prozor and Jablanica
10 were stored in the Ljuta Barracks. The Ljuta Barracks
11 are here. It had a similar underground structure as the
12 Igman factory, and this can also be seen in the document
13 by Milan Vego. We find other military facilities in
14 this area like the JNA barracks of Celebici.
15 Konjic municipality is located in the mountainous
16 part of Herzegovina and it is sparsely populated and let
17 us say maybe even economically a weak area with the
18 exception of Konjic town. There are reserves, even rich
19 reserves, of iron ore and several other important goods
20 located in this area.
21 I just would like to mention that Yugoslavia --
22 in Yugoslavia was a very, very serious economic crisis,
23 that aggravated throughout 1991 and 1992. Bosnia's
24 national product was down 45 per cent from its 1990
25 level in 1991, so it had reduced by nearly one half.
1 The inflation rate in 1991 was above 1000 per cent, and
2 30 per cent of people were registered as being
3 unemployed. So the economic crisis was, in fact,
4 deepening. There were many people that did not earn
5 enough money to -- enough money for subsistence. There
6 was a rapid drop in the standards of living in the
7 income. There was growing unemployment and so on.
8 In Konjic there were about 10,000 people employed,
9 most in factories, but these factories had not enough
10 contracts any more, so the economic crisis was also very
11 present in this municipality. About half of the
12 employed in Konjic municipality were employed in
13 factories, and these factories, as I was indicating, did
14 not function any more as they were supposed to do. I
15 believe that the fact that more and more Bosnians found
16 themselves living below the poverty level contributed
17 very negatively to the tension and also to the
18 hostilities that had emerged at this time in the
19 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
20 Now what happened on the political side in this
21 municipality? Diagram document number 46 shows us
22 composition of the Municipal Assembly in 1990 after the
23 elections. It is in a way similar to the results of
24 elections on the republican level. People tended to
25 vote according to their ethnic affiliation. So we can
1 see that out of 60 seats in the Assembly, the Muslim SDA
2 -- can we see this? -- 60 seats: 28 for the SDA; 14
3 for the HDZ; and 9 for the Serbs. There were, of
4 course, nine other seats for the three parties
5 altogether: the former Communist, the Alliance of the
6 Reformed Forces, and one to the Union of Socialist
8 All over Bosnia and also in Konjic municipalities the
9 administrative structures started to disintegrate in
10 1991. This was a process that happened also in the
11 administrative bodies of this municipality. It happened
12 also within the territorial defence organisation. The
13 territorial defence organisation, together with other
14 forces, became, as I was pointing out, the Bosnian Army,
15 but many local TO commanders of Serb origin did not join
16 this territorial defence and later the Bosnian Army, but
17 they refused to do so, and many Bosnian Croats also
18 refused to do so and the Bosnian Croats joined then the
20 From March 1992 throughout BH local authorities
21 formed so-called crisis staffs or war staffs. They were
22 already expecting that conflicts might erupt. So I
23 would say after the referendum marked such a critical
24 moment in the history, political history, of this
25 country. These bodies -- let me say what local
1 authorities were at that time.
2 Local authorities meant members of the local
3 administration for higher level. It meant
4 representatives of the political parties, but it meant
5 also chiefs of factories, of the water supply system, of
6 the police and it meant sometimes also military
8 These crisis staffs, bodies, if you want, were
9 established to control all levels of municipal life,
10 including the police, finance, communications and so on,
11 and they were preparing to take control as soon as
12 hostilities erupted.
13 We can see this in many municipalities throughout
14 Bosnia. There were marked differences as to how these
15 crisis staffs were functioning, as to how they were
16 composed, but this was, in fact, the case in many
17 municipalities, that these kind of underground
18 structures were emerging.
19 Q. May I understand it in the way that all the three
20 groups, the three parties had their own crisis staff?
21 A. They had more or less their own.
22 Q. So the one who then took control had a crisis staff
23 ready and the others on the losing side could not use
24 their crisis staff any more, at least in that
1 A. Yes. It depended, of course, which group was in
2 majority. It was easier in regions where one or two
3 groups had a clear majority, and they were -- as maybe
4 in Konjic already, they hold already the majority of
5 positions and of seats in the Assembly. Then it was
6 clear that they were the most important members to
7 participate then in these crisis staffs, and of course
8 there were other examples, especially in communities
9 which were taken by military action, how these staffs
10 came into being.
11 Q. So the member of a crisis staff in Konjic, for instance,
12 could also be sitting working on the existing
13 municipality levels?
14 A. Exactly. I now elaborate a bit more on this.
15 Especially on the civilian side of these war
16 preparations which started in March and then were
17 intensified, of course, in April when the state of
18 imminent war danger was declared, proclaimed by the
19 Bosnian Presidency.
20 By March 1992 administrative bodies of Konjic had
21 ceased to function. The Serb representatives had
22 withdrawn from the Executive Council, and also from the
23 Municipal Assembly. In April 1992 this mentioned crisis
24 staff was formalised into a local government. It was
25 called "War Presidency". This institution of a War
1 Presidency, which was then at the time the most
2 important civilian authority at the time, was an
3 institution which was already invented in the system of
4 all people's defence, so it was in a way a heritage
5 coming from the old Yugoslav times.
6 Let me show the law on all people's defence of
7 Bosnia of 1983, my document number 47, and I will put it
8 on the ELMO.
9 JUDGE JAN: Just a minute. After Bosnia-Herzegovina
10 declared independence, did it immediately have a
11 constitution of its own?
12 A. Sorry? No, it did not have a constitution. It had the
13 old Bosnian constitution of 1974 but the constitution
14 was constantly amended through this time.
15 JUDGE JAN: I thought the most relevant would be the
16 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina itself but did it
17 have the constitution of 1974?
18 A. Yes. Then the Bosnian government was constantly adding
19 new Articles to this constitution and there was a period
20 of time in 1992 where, in fact, there was a kind of
21 chaotic situation from the legal point of view and also
22 from the point of view how these laws and how the
23 Articles of the constitution were, in fact, implemented,
24 because it was just so much confusion about which law
25 was still there and which law should not be applicable
1 any more. This also creates now a lot of confusion for
2 persons who have to analyse what was really going on
3 from the legal point of view during this time.
4 So we have to consider, I think, as well the old
5 Yugoslav legislation and the old constitution but we
6 have also to consider what was then new from the legal
7 point of view are and I will show you both.
8 Let me start now with how the old legislation
9 perceived the War Presidency in times of -- immediate
10 threat of war in times of war. I refer here to the law
11 on all people's defence for the Republic of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina published in the Official Gazette of the
13 Republic of Bosnia in 1983, document number 47.
14 We see here in Article 66:
15 "The Presidency of the Municipal Assembly", which
16 is the War Presidency, "shall be established in time of
17 war or in the event of an immediate threat of war."
18 This War Presidency, as we can see from the same
20 "... shall lead all people's resistance in the
21 territory of the municipality.
22 It shall make decisions about issues which fall
23 within the sphere of competence of the Municipal
24 Assembly, should the Assembly not be able to convene."
25 This was in many municipalities of Bosnia the
1 case, especially in the ethnically mixed area. So it
2 could not meet any more. War Presidencies were
3 established and also in Konjic this kind of War
4 Presidency was established. So who was now supposed to
5 be a member of this? Article 67, which is -- 67 starts
6 on this page -- tells us that the Presidency is composed
7 of the Presidency of the Municipal Assembly and a
8 certain number of members. A certain number of members
9 says the Article.
10 Q. It sounds a bit unprecise to me?
11 A. It sounds a bit unprecise. I will explain later on a
12 bit more that it was, in fact, not too unprecise. It
13 was flexible but not unprecise. Let us see here. There
14 are more members named in the same Article. For
15 instance, the President of the Municipal Assembly; the
16 President of the Council; the President of the Committee
17 of the League of Communists. At this time that was the
18 only party, the main party. Then we have
19 representatives of labour unions. We have war veterans
20 and again we have other members of the Presidency, and
21 interestingly under this Article we have also the
22 Commander of the local territorial defence.
23 So under this old Yugoslavian law the War
24 Presidency, which was, in fact, meant to be a civilian
25 body, was composed of all relevant persons in a certain
1 local environment, starting from administration,
2 including also people coming from the factories or water
3 supply or whatever, and also representatives from the
5 Q. The last sentence in this matter is:
6 "Other members of the Presidency shall appointed
7 by ..."
8 A. Exactly. So there was a possibility to appoint members
9 according to local conditions.
10 Q. Yes. Was this Municipal Assembly functioning at this
12 A. It was not -- you mean in Konjic?
13 Q. In Konjic in the Spring of 1992?
14 A. It was not functioning.
15 Q. The Assembly was not functioning?
16 A. It was not functioning. So this was the old law. The
17 Bosnian government in May 1992 passed a new Defence Law,
18 and this Defence Law had also an Article on War
19 Presidencies and it was a bit different from the old
20 Yugoslavia, the old Bosnian socialist law. This was, of
21 course, normal, because the conditions had changed
22 completely, and the needs and also the composition of
23 this War Presidency had to be changed.
24 I, therefore, present the new Defence Law of May,
25 especially the Article 40.
1 Q. We are now under number?
2 A. We are number 48, Article 40, telling us the composition
3 according to the new law. It was again the Chairman of
4 the Municipal Assembly, the Executive Council,
5 representative of the Ministry of Defence, the Chief of
6 Police and the Commander of the Civil Defence, and also
7 the Chairman of the political party factions. To make
8 it a bit more clear, I produced a diagram, which is
9 document number 49. So this is the composition of the
10 War Presidency according to the Defence Law of Bosnia in
11 May 1992. Just a little bit more to be reduced, please,
12 otherwise you cannot see it. Okay.
13 So, interesting under this new law, the
14 representative of the territorial defence, which means
15 the representative of the armed forces, was not any
16 longer supposed to be a member of this War Presidency.
17 So it formally on paper became a pure civilian body,
18 with the President, so the highest authority of the
19 municipality, representative of the civil defence staff,
20 the President of the government, named Executive
21 Council, the Head of Police, Head of Public Security
22 Service, representative of the Defence Ministry coming
23 from Sarajevo, and the representatives of the political
24 parties in specific municipalities.
25 Let me just --
1 Q. May I just ask you, before we leave this, the law is of
2 20th May 1992?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Did it enter into force immediately?
5 A. It did enter into force immediately. However, it was
6 not implemented in most of the municipalities, and it
7 was not implemented in Konjic until September 1992. So
8 I cannot really conclude who exactly the members of this
9 civilian, highest civilian body, were, and I assume it
10 was a very flexible system of composition. I cannot
11 confirm that the composition was according to the old
12 law, and I can neither confirm that it was according to
13 this law. What I know is this law was implemented in
14 September 1992. There was a period of like a vacuum and
15 maybe changing persons participating in the work of the
16 War Presidency.
17 What was the War Presidency supposed to do?
18 Organise the local defence logistically according to the
19 doctrine of all people's defence. They were, of course,
20 involved in many, many security-related matters, for
21 instance, arms supply; for instance, recruitment of
22 soldiers; and other war or defence-related tasks.
23 So this was the civilian organisation under the
24 law of the Bosnian constitution and under the law of the
25 -- Defence Law of 20th May 1992. So what happened now
1 on the military side?
2 I just wanted to mention one thing. I was saying
3 under the new law the Territorial Defence was not
4 supposed to be represented in this War Presidency.
5 However, we have here the Head of the Security Service,
6 the Head of police, and under the same Defence Law the
7 police in times of war was supposed to become a part of
8 the armed forces. So this person, Head of Security,
9 Head of Police, was in a way the link, the institutional
10 link between the civilian and the military side, and
11 again I cannot -- I do not know who exactly the members
12 at this time were.
13 So on the military side let us remember that the
14 Bosnian government was trying to build up the new army,
15 the Bosnian Army, and they were trying to streamline the
16 organisation all over the territory of Bosnia, and of
17 course in some areas this was easier and in some areas
18 it was completely impossible. The armed forces
19 consisted -- included also the police and other security
20 forces. This is what I was just explaining before.
21 So what was the situation in April and May 1992?
22 The situation was difficult, of course, for the Bosnian
23 government. Sarajevo was besieged by Serb troops. The
24 communications were interrupted with much of the rest of
25 the territory and the local armed forces, the former TO,
1 which was to become the Bosnian Army often operated
2 under the command of local officers.
3 I show you another diagram, the diagram 51, the
4 organisational structure of the army of the Republic of
5 Bosnia in Spring 1992. This is how it should have
6 looked like, but it does not work, of course in that
7 way. According to the already mentioned law on all
8 people's defence, and according also to the new Defence
9 Law there were three levels within the organisation of
10 the Bosnian army.
11 There was, of course, the republican level, so the
12 headquarters in Sarajevo; there was then a district
13 level; and there was a municipal level. So we have
14 three levels. So at this time the HQ in Sarajevo, of
15 course, was effectively working. However, they did not
16 manage to establish headquarters in all the cities where
17 they wanted. The headquarters in Mostar would not be
18 established at that early time for different reasons.
19 There were internal problems going on in this
20 municipality. Croats and Muslims are not in agreement.
21 The armed forces were not in agreement on establishing
22 such a headquarters. So in a way we should just bear in
23 mind that this did not function as it should. It was in
24 the mind of the commanders but not in reality. The HQ
25 in Konjic, which was established at this time, was more
1 or less acting independently, and there remains a
2 question mark as to whether they had a direct line, of
3 course, to the headquarters in Sarajevo, which may have
4 been the case, but I also can imagine there were many
5 decisions taken autonomously in this area.
6 So what I was trying to say is in this early
7 period, the first months after the outbreak of
8 hostilities in Bosnia, the normal chain of command,
9 supreme command -- supreme command, district
10 headquarters, municipal headquarters, and then the units
11 which came under them was interrupted and they were
12 interrupted here on the district level, and I guess they
13 were often interrupted even here on this level, as I was
14 saying. The capital was besieged and it was not easy
15 often to get communications through from here to the
16 different levels.
17 From April 1992 onwards the Konjic Territorial
18 Defence Organisation, which was later to become the
19 Bosnian Army, formed a joint command with the HVO. The
20 Croats had established their own headquarters in the
21 municipality of Konjic. Croats and the TO forces formed
22 at that time a joint staff. The TO Commander was the
23 Commander of the joint staff and the HVO Commander was
24 the Deputy Commander of the staff. This structure,
25 however, did not result always in an integrated command
1 structure. In reality it often happened that decisions
2 were taken jointly by the commanders of each military
3 formation, and also the police forces participated
4 somehow in this military structure.
5 Let me come to a very important document from the
6 Yugoslav army from before the war. It is a document on
7 the strategy of all people's defence.
8 Q. Under number 52?
9 A. Under number 52. It explains how leadership should
10 function in times of war. It shows us in reality how
11 flexible this system was.
12 "Leadership is organised so that the transition to
13 operations during emergencies and in a war requires
14 minor structural and organisational changes. All
15 leadership structures must make their decisions within
16 their jurisdiction and in their field and area according
17 to general aims and specific circumstances, with the
18 purpose of finding appropriate solutions, even when no
19 orders have been received from higher authorities."
20 This document on all people's defence is a secret
21 document where the statutory of all people's defence was
22 established in 1987, and it explains to us de facto
23 local commanders should have a relatively high level of
24 competence and of independence and in this situation
25 they just could not get the orders from their
1 superiors. So it continues in the same sense:
2 "Leadership of all people's defence in peacetime,
3 emergencies and in wartime is arranged organisationally
4 and functionally so that it enables the leadership to
5 take the initiative in organising and performing various
6 forms and means of defence activity. Acting according to
7 the directions of higher authorities ... is the basic
8 principle of the functioning and the leadership system
9 ... But", and now I think it is gets very important,
10 "since the activities of all people's defence are
11 distributed throughout society, the leadership of those
12 activities establishes not only relations of
13 subordination, but also those of cooperation and
14 coordination. Within that framework all sub-systems,
15 elements and parts of systems which are positioned lower
16 in the hierarchy of leadership have to seek
17 opportunities to demonstrate their own initiative and
18 their own contribution to the efficiency of the system
19 as a whole."
20 So really this document really places a high
21 degree of responsibility to the local commanders, and it
22 was perceived in a way that many of the local commanders
23 and persons should contribute to make this system
24 function, all people's defence, in fact.
25 Q. It looks to me as if it is a very open mandate?
1 A. It is like a very open mandate, especially then as
2 summarised in the last paragraph of this document:
3 "Leadership is decentralised to the extent which
4 allows the required degree of unity. The decentralised
5 system of leadership creates a division of
7 So a division of responsibility:
8 "But neither the responsibility of the parts for
9 their own activity nor their responsibility for the
10 activity of the whole system is thus diminished or
12 So very interesting document from old Yugoslavia.
13 It was this strategy of all people's defence and self
14 protection of the SFRY and I think it explains then what
15 happened throughout Bosnia.
16 It was very flexible, it was very open, and this
17 also included in many instances that personal
18 relationships, informal contacts based on friendship,
19 kinship and so on -- and similar were often maybe more
20 important than holding an official appointment, having
21 rank or following a formal chain of command.
22 It was also, in fact -- it was also the fact that
23 in many parts of Bosnia and also in many other parts of
24 Yugoslavia new personalities, new elites emerged in this
25 situation of total social, political and also economic
1 change. Persons with influence, with credibility,
2 skills and of course economic power could assume
3 responsibility in the civilian structure, but also often
4 in the military hierarchy persons were often appointed
5 positions on an ad hoc basis according to local needs
6 and conditions. For example it was also common and
7 regulated by a decree with force of law for civilians to
8 be appointed to specific positions within the military
9 structure. This statement is supported by document
10 number 53: "Decree on Service in the Army of the
11 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1992". There we
12 can have this regulated, that also. If need be,
13 non-military persons could perform functions in this
15 Q. The thing you now stated on people with influence or
16 money or strong personality or whatever it might be --
17 have you made these observations not only at Konjic but
18 also in other municipalities?
19 A. Yes. In many municipalities in many parts not only of
20 Bosnia but also Croatia and Serbia. I mean, there were
21 persons like leaders of paramilitary formations. Arkan
22 is a prominent example. It might also refer to even
23 prominent persons like Fikret Abdic, who was a member
24 even of the State Presidency, but he was also
25 economically in a very strong position in the area of
1 Bihac. He was often described as a person who had much
2 influence and power, at least in this area, due to
3 economic achievements, to good relations, to his
4 personal capabilities. So there are really many
5 examples, and also on all sides.
6 Q. What you now say pertains to all the three parties?
7 A. It pertains to all the three parties.
8 Q. Serbians, Muslims --
9 A. It pertains to all the three parties. This also means
10 in reality the composition and also the competence of
11 many institutions. The civilian but also the military
12 institutions were highly unclear, and they are
13 especially -- from looking from outside they were often
14 unclear, and there were big differences from one
15 municipality to the next.
16 It is, to summarise, not always entirely clear
17 from the existing legislation which functions were being
18 performed by different organs or by individuals at the
19 local level, especially during the early period of
20 1991/1992, and we have always to bear in mind that the
21 conditions for which the defence system had been
22 invented were now no longer in place, that they were
23 changing dramatically, especially during the first
24 months. All institutions had split along ethnic lines
25 and the idea to have a unified defence system was
1 completely out of reality during that time.
2 So what happened in the early months of 1992? I
3 am, of course, not a fact witness, so I cannot testify
4 on the military events happening, but apparently there
5 were during April and May 1992 armed conflicts between
6 the Territorial Defence Organisation, later the Bosnian
7 Army, on the one hand, conducted together with the Croat
8 HVO, together with paramilitary forces coming from
9 Croatia, coming also from the Muslim side, and JNA
10 forces on the other side. The JNA had, prior to those
11 conflicts, mobilised volunteers in this area. They had
12 also distributed weapons among them. I have got a
13 document number 54 elaborating on this, explaining
14 this. This is a document by the JNA of Bosnia to the
15 General Staff of the Army of Bosnia in Belgrade in March
16 1992. This is the evidence for what I was saying. JNA
17 mobilised Serbs, distributed weapons.
18 However, we have to have in mind that the JNA had
19 no specific interest in this area of Konjic. They had
20 specific interest in many other parts of Bosnia in the
21 North and in the eastern part, but not so much in this
22 Central part, and we can also read this from the very
23 same documents. We can understand from these documents
24 that in Konjic JNA was preparing to withdraw and they
25 were even trying to take on the arms they had stored
1 there to parts of Bosnia where the Serbs were in
2 majority, and which were under Serb control, but they
3 apparently did not manage.
4 I could conclude that during April 1992 and May
5 1992 the Croat and the Muslim forces managed to take
6 over most of the significant points and installations in
7 the municipality, parts of them by military action, and
8 we know about this by two reports by the United Nations'
9 commissions of experts established pursuant to Security
10 Council Resolution 780, a very basic document on what
11 was going on in the former Yugoslavia. So the two
12 annexes, annex 3A and annex 8, here included as document
13 number 33 and document number 55, explain some of the
14 military events going on in the early -- in this early
15 time, so that we have at least an independent body
16 testifying on these events.
17 If I had to characterise the first months, April,
18 May 1992 and maybe part of June, the first months -- if
19 I had to characterise them, I would say there was a
20 power vacuum on the republican level, a power vacuum
21 that allowed the local authorities in the municipality,
22 the civilian authorities as well as the military
23 authorities, to act nearly independently from the rest.
24 There was also a certain continuity of power structures
25 from before the war. For instance, this institution of
1 War Presidency was introduced earlier on, but it still
2 existed as an institution. However, this whole system
3 was highly flexible. It adapted to the changing
4 circumstances, and it allowed to integrate new elements
5 and persons wherever needed, and this fitted completely
6 perfectly in the idea in the doctrine of the Yugoslav
7 all people's defence.
8 From the summer onwards, from the early summer
9 onwards, the focus of military interest of the Bosnian
10 Army shifted away from the Konjic municipality. The
11 Bosnian Presidency planned to lift the Serb siege of
12 Sarajevo, which required major support from other areas,
13 and it required also support from Konjic. Konjic, as I
14 was saying, at this time was nearly completely under
15 control of the Muslim and of the Croat authorities in a
16 civilian and military sense. So there was certain room
17 for manoeuvre to supply or to contribute to the effort,
18 to the military effort in other areas.
19 The army of Bosnia at this time established a
20 tactical group to lift the siege of Sarajevo. I am
21 again not a fact witness on tactical groups or who was a
22 member or a commander, or how it was composed. I can
23 just explain in general what a tactical group was.
24 I have got two documents and I will use here only
25 one. They are saying basically the same things. I use
1 document number 36. This is the Military Lexicon
2 published in Belgrade in 1991. It has a short paragraph
3 on tactical groups.
4 Q. Number?
5 A. 36.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 A. Tactical groups, in our file number 36.
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. "Tactical group: Temporary combined unit intended for
10 combat activities in a separate tactical direction when
11 a certain combat task cannot be carried out in the zone
12 or direction of the activities with a formation unit".
13 So it is first formed just to fulfil a very
14 specific, a clearly defined task. It can be a military
15 task; it can also be support, supply. It can be maybe a
16 tactical group. So they had a specific purpose,
17 specific task:
18 "It is formed within combined tactical units and
19 it acts independently as a part of the combat structure
20 of the unit. It is assigned separate command or it is
21 commanded by the command that set it up. The strength
22 and composition of the tactical group depends on the
23 strength and the composition of the unit that is setting
24 it up, the task, as well as on the characteristics of
25 the terrain, the site of the zone and strength and
1 composition of the enemy".
2 So this tactical group at this time, Tactical
3 Group Number 1, was established to take military action
4 to lift the siege of Sarajevo. It was not successful at
5 this time, but again I am not a fact witness.
6 Q. Have you studied in any way how tactical groups function
7 in other parts of Bosnia?
8 A. Well, I am not an expert in military things. I know
9 that there were other tactical groups. I know
10 especially about one in eastern Bosnia in this early
11 period, eastern parts of Bosnia, but I cannot testify or
12 I cannot give any expertise on how they were composed,
13 which tasks they were exactly performing, what their aim
15 Q. How they functioned in general, etc. Thank you.
16 A. So this period between April and maybe June, let us say,
17 marked a new phase in the country.
18 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I think it is a convenient time to
19 break for lunch.
20 A. Okay.
21 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: The Trial Chamber will rise and
22 reassemble at 2.30.
23 (Luncheon Adjournment)
1 (2.30 pm)
2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: The witness is continuing on oath.
3 MR OSTBERG: Thank you, your Honour. Please, Dr Calic,
4 will you pick up your statement again and conclude your
5 statement for us?
6 A. Thank you. To continue, I would like briefly to
7 summarise what I was saying before the break about the
8 political and military structures in Konjic in April,
9 May 1992. I prepared a diagram. This is document
10 number 50. Just to make it a bit clearer, can we have
11 it on the screen, please? It should be reduced a bit.
12 It has to be reduced. We cannot see it.
13 MR OSTBERG: Will you please reduce it a bit, if possible.
14 There we are?
15 A. Okay. This diagram was made by myself. It shows
16 defence planning or military planning, security planning
17 in Konjic municipality as of May 1992. I mentioned the
18 War Presidency as the highest administrative, highest
19 political body in this municipality and I mentioned on
20 the military side the two main military actors. HVO,
21 the Croat military, and the Bosnian Army speaks for
22 itself. The two were related. They had a joint
23 command. They were acting together.
24 We are not completely sure whether or not the
25 members of the two structures participated in the War
1 Presidency. If they were official members under the old
2 Bosnian law there was a representative from the HVO
3 participating in the War Presidency; under the new law
4 he was not, but maybe we can assume close contacts,
5 frequent meetings and maybe even joint decisions
6 because, of course, the work of the War Presidency and
7 the work of the military was interrelated and defence
8 could not function otherwise. In the middle we have the
9 very wide position of the co-ordinator, trying to
10 coordinate the civilian military sides. Again I do not
11 know exactly what his functions were but there was
12 certainly a necessity to coordinate the different
13 activities at this stage.
14 The relationship between the Bosnian Army and the
15 Croat army, the HVO actually, were a bit disturbed by
16 some disputes. I mentioned earlier this morning the
17 fact that the Croats were trying to establish their own
18 community the Herceg-Bosna community as a political
19 community but also having their own army, the HVO.
20 There were disputes arising around this, coming to
21 a head in July 1992. This led, in fact, to a split of
22 this joint command. Completely separate structures were
23 then established by July 1992. There was then de facto
24 a period where parallel power structures existed, Croat
25 and Muslim power structures in the same municipalities,
1 and again they were formally allied and they were
2 continuing to act together, as they were doing in other
3 areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4 In the summer of 1992 also the Bosnian government
5 was more successful in establishing state structures and
6 also in streamlining the military, and this led to the
7 establishment of a new administrative structure on the
8 republican level, and it led to a reorganisation of the
9 Bosnian Army.
10 Q. Before, Dr Calic, we leave this organogram you made with
11 the co-ordinator, in the middle, we know in this case
12 there was indeed a co-ordinator in Konjic. Can you say
13 something if this was usual in other municipalities that
14 also have a similar structure that they also have a
16 A. I can say on the diagram I showed before lunchtime that
17 coordination was necessary and also coordination was
18 needed in many instances, and also the statutory of all
19 people's defence had in mind to have these coordinating
20 functions. If there was a position of only one
21 co-ordinator or if there were several, this was, of
22 course, then up to the authorities or to the actors on
23 the ground. It depended also on the real needs, on the
24 concrete circumstances.
25 Q. You have seen it also in other municipalities or
2 A. I have not seen it in exactly the same way.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 A. In August 1997, seven regional administrators of
5 districts within Bosnia and Herzegovina were formed by
6 the BH government. Konjic was designated to form part
7 of the regional district of Mostar. Just to remind you
8 of where Mostar is located, so we have the municipality
9 of Konjic, Mostar is kind of the capital of the region
10 of Herzegovina. So Konjic was supposed to be a part of
11 the district of the -- of the Mostar district. I have
12 got a document about this. This is document number 56,
13 the decree on the establishment and the functioning of
14 districts. These districts were authorised to organise
15 and to prepare citizens for defence, for armed struggle
16 on the territory of the distinct.
17 This included also that many duties that were
18 formally fulfilled by the War Presidencies in the
19 municipalities moved to these regional centres. The new
20 district structures were, therefore, in a position to
21 potentially reduce the local powers of the
22 municipalities and again we do not know whether or not
23 or when this law was implemented. It was published in
24 August, but if they managed to efficiently implement
25 this law is not known to me.
1 As for the military reorganisation of the army, I
2 have another diagram, document 57. It shows the
3 composition of the Bosnian Army at the end of 1992, when
4 this was produced by UN sources. Five corps were
5 established. You can see them on this diagram. The
6 military of Konjic was subordinated to the fourth corps
7 with an HQ in Mostar.
8 I was showing earlier this day how the Bosnian
9 government was trying to establish this HQ in Mostar but
10 it did not work at this time but later in 1992 they were
11 then successful in establishing this HQ and the fourth
12 corps was established with its headquarters in Mostar.
13 This fourth corps commanded all army units of Mostar of
14 Jablinica and other areas, Prozor, including also parts
15 of the formerly-mentioned tactical group 1, which had
16 dissolved by this stage.
17 What happened after the end of 1992? The
18 relations between the Croats and the Muslims or between
19 the HVO and the Bosnian Army got worse and worse. There
20 arose conflicts between the BH armed forces and the
21 HVO. Already in the autumn of 1992 in some parts of
22 Central Bosnia including Konjic, and they intensified
23 during 1993, and they were ended as late as early 1994.
24 They thus created a kind of second war. The people call
25 it second war between Muslim and Croat armed forces,
1 between the BH army and the HVO.
2 To conclude, I wish to show you how Konjic -- the
3 ethnic composition of Konjic looks like today exactly in
4 September -- how it looked like in September 1996. This
5 is based on data from the UNHCR in this area. The
6 respective report of UNHCR is also included in this
7 binder. It is document 58.
8 Konjic municipality today belongs to the
9 federation of Bosnia, under the Dayton Agreement has two
10 parts. The Serb republic on the one hand and the
11 federation on the other hand, so Konjic municipality
12 today forms part of the federation. The composition as
13 of September 1996 is the following. We have 88 per cent
14 Muslims; we have 4 per cent Croats; 2 per cent Serbs;
15 and 6 per cent others. More than 18,000 people left the
16 municipality during the war, but there were coming new
17 people, refugees and displaced persons, so this also, of
18 course, changed the ethnic structure of this
19 municipality, and very few persons have managed to
20 return. There are only 270 Muslims returned and only 14
21 Serbs have managed to return to their homes.
22 Q. Only how many?
23 A. 14.
24 Q. 14 persons?
25 A. 14 Serbs have returned by September 1996. I would like
1 to conclude with this diagram showing how much the
2 ethnic structure changed.
3 Q. Thank you very much, Dr Calic, for this comprehensive
4 and also very detailed and fact-filled presentation of
5 yours. I have no questions to ask and I have concluded
6 my examination of Dr Calic. Thank you.
7 JUDGE JAN: Excuse me. I want to ask a question. I do not
8 know whether it is really relevant or not. You are
9 talking about ethnic compositions?
10 A. Uh-huh.
11 JUDGE JAN: You have Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs. Do
12 they come from different stocks or is it just a
13 difference in religion that is important?
14 A. They are basically of the same ethnic stock. They are
15 all south Slavs. They had historically -- historically
16 they belonged to different religions. The Serbs are
17 Orthodox religion, Muslims, Islam and both Croats were
18 Catholic. During the 1970s these religious communities
19 were transformed into nations. People got national
20 consciousness and they perceived themselves as being
21 nations. So we have the fact that the religious
22 communities were effectively transformed into people,
23 into nations. People perceived themselves as belonging
24 to a nation more than belonging to a religious
25 community. Many persons are not religious at all. So
1 we have to recognise that these people are now nations
2 and not religious communities any more.
3 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: I am sorry. In the same line I would
4 like to know if the same happened with the Jews, because
5 in the list of the ethnic composition you gave to us,
6 the same that the Muslims, you also -- not you -- the
7 document listed Jews among the Turks, Italians,
8 Slovenians and so it is the same. They are a
9 nationality; they are not a religious group.
10 A. This is again a matter of debate, whether the Jews form
11 a nation or whether they belong to a religious
12 community. In Yugoslavia the law was that they formed
13 an ethnic group, a minority. They were not recognised
14 as a constituent people of Yugoslavia. As constituent
15 nations of Yugoslavia were recognised only six nations.
16 The Slovenians, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Serbs,
17 Montenegrans and Macedonians. All other peoples were
18 considered as minorities. They had certain rights but
19 they were not considered as constituent nations of
21 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: It is a little complex?
22 A. It is very complex.
23 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Actually your interpretation gives me
24 some anxiety. You start with a general concentration of
25 Bosnia as the nation?
1 A. Yes.
2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: But within it you come up with Muslims
3 and Serbs. From your explanation you say they all come
4 from the same stock?
5 A. Historically.
6 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Yes.
7 A. In 6th century --
8 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: How do you now get other nations which
9 are within that general umbrella of Bosnia?
10 A. Sorry. I did not get the question.
11 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: How do you get other nations within
12 the general umbrella of Bosnia, which is the main stock?
13 A. They are historically belonging to the same South Slavic
14 stock, tribes coming to the Balkans in about the 6th
15 century. They were then dividing, because they got
16 different religions. By getting different religions,
17 they were also getting different nationalities. They
18 speak basically the same language. They can understand
19 each other easily. There are, of course, different
20 variants and different dialects, but they perceived
21 themselves as belonging to different nations. Again it
22 is very complex and a difficult thing to explain, but I
23 think we should accept that these persons perceived
24 themselves as belonging to a nation. Even if they all
25 live together in the same country, in Bosnia, but they
1 are different nations.
2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I do not know. I think I do not
3 rationalise, because it does not appear those who have
4 considered religion as a binding tie have considered
5 themselves a different nation?
6 A. It is a specific historical development in South-eastern
7 Europe. It is very specific to this area. One reason
8 for this is that this area was for quite a long time,
9 for many centuries, under foreign rule, and these people
10 had practically no rights to participate in the rule of
11 the foreigners, but shed certain cultural rights, and
12 these cultural rights were concentrated in the religious
13 communities and the churches. So the churches became
14 maybe the most important agent of forming national
15 consciousness, and this is how they developed. In the
16 19th century they were aware that they were different
17 and this is how was created then this perception of
18 being a nation, forming a nation.
19 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Any questions from the defence? Any
21 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honours, the defence
22 would like to inform you that the cross-examination of
23 this witness will be conducted in the following way.
24 First, the defence counsel for Zejnil Delalic will
25 question, followed by Hazim Delic's defence counsel.
1 Following that the defence counsel for Esad Landzo and
2 as a fourth the witness will be questioned by the
3 defence counsel for Zdravko Mucic.
4 Mr President, since I am starting
5 cross-examination and I have some documents here, would
6 you allow me to move over to that lectern?
7 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: You can do so, please.
8 Cross-examination by MS RESIDOVIC
9 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Ms Calic, first I would
10 like to ask you which pronunciation is correct: Calic
11 not Calick, since I have heard both variants of your
13 A. You can call me Calic, because this is my father's name
14 because this is my father's name but I was born in
15 Germany and the Germans for some mysterious reasons
16 eliminated the diacritics. Maybe it is difficult for
17 them to pronounce. You can of course call me Calic.
18 Q. Thank you. I would not want to mispronounce your name,
19 so I will call you Ms Calic. Before we received your
20 report with the voluminous binder, the defence counsel
21 also received information from the prosecution regarding
22 experts that they will use for expert witnesses in these
23 proceedings. In this information it was indicated that
24 you were to present a historical, political and military
25 context and circumstances surrounding the violations of
1 the international humanitarian law as stipulated in the
2 indictment and the national, municipal and historical
3 circumstances in the Konjic region.
4 Given that in your presentation there is no
5 chapter addressing the historical context, I would like
6 to request that you answer several questions, that is to
7 confirm possibly some facts on which the introductory
8 parts of the indictment are based. So these are my
9 questions: is it true, Ms Calic, that Bosnia-Herzegovina
10 as a state has roots in history of over 1,000 years?
11 A. Bosnia as a state existed in the Middle Ages, but then
12 in 1463 it was conquered by the Turks, and I would not
13 say that there is a continuity of state from the Middle
14 Ages until today, because there are many centuries in
15 between. Bosnia has, of course, a long history, but it
16 has also a history of foreign rule.
17 Q. Could you agree that other states that existed in the
18 Middle Ages in the Balkans shared the same fate, that
19 for a significant historical period of time they were
20 also occupied by other foreign rules? Turning to
21 Bosnia, could you testify before this Trial Chamber
22 that, except for the period during the kingdom of
23 Yugoslavia, when there were certain districts called
24 banjabina and during the fascist state of Croatia during
25 World War II, the territorial form of Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 existed, regardless of the foreign rule in that region?
2 A. It's difficult to say "yes" in this case, because the
3 administrative borders were changing, and you mentioned
4 the Croat state of the Second World War and you
5 mentioned the first Yugoslavia. I mean, these are also
6 historical periods to be taken into consideration, and I
7 just would not like, being a historian myself, to draw
8 this line of continuity from the Middle Ages until
9 today, because then we have to do the same with other
10 nations, with the Serbs and the Croats, and the borders
11 were overlapping, and we really getting into big
12 troubles. I think we should accept that Bosnia was
13 recognised as an independent state in the borders of the
14 Republic of Bosnia, one of the republics of the former
15 Yugoslavia. It was a recognised state and I think this
16 is also enough to know for this case.
17 Q. But, Ms Calic, I think you will agree if I say that the
18 specific historical events after 1990 cannot be properly
19 understood without knowledge of a preceding period? Can
20 I bring you back to more recent history. The Zavnobih
21 conference in 1942, Bosnia was defined as one
22 constituent part of the new Yugoslavia?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did you -- have you answered that, just for the record,
25 please? These decisions were also confirmed by Abnoj,
1 which was the top legislative body during World War II.
2 Can you confirm that these borders are the borders of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina just prior to the outbreak of the
4 war? Taking into account certain historical facts, I
5 would like to ask whether you know that in
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina different populations have lived
7 there with a large amount of tolerance for centuries?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Can you also confirm to me, Ms Calic, that in the
10 document of 1463, which is an edict on religious
11 freedoms and one of the oldest documents on religious
12 freedom in Europe issued by Mehmed Fatih and entitled
13 "Ahdnama" which was directed to the Franciscan monks in
14 Bosnia and is still kept in Fojnica in a Franciscan
15 monastery, it has been unequivocally determined that
16 Jewish, Orthodox, Catholic members within
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina can work freely and --
18 A. I would like to look at this document before I confirm.
19 Q. In other words, you are not familiar with this document?
20 A. I would like to see the document right now.
21 Q. I am not in a position -- I just wanted to know whether
22 I knew of this document?
23 A. I would like to verify it before I confirm.
24 Q. I am not in a position to show it to you today but I
25 will be in a position to show it to the tribunal, but
1 the point is that you were not able to see it today and
2 so you cannot speak to it. However, your knowledge of
3 Bosnia should point to the significant religious
4 tolerance within Bosnia-Herzegovina?
5 A. Yes, that is true.
6 Q. Ms Calic, in your presentation you said that a large
7 part of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is mixed in
8 ethnic terms. Is it true if I said that there is no
9 municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina and there are 109 of
10 them in which there are no -- there are -- in which all
11 constituent populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not
12 represented including Jewish and other minorities?
13 A. I don't know. I have to verify it. We have all the
14 statistical documentation in this book, and I think if
15 this is necessary for the case, you just mention the
16 municipalities, and we verify.
17 Q. I can show you an official document indicating that
18 there is no such municipality. However, I would like
19 you to turn to your document number 3 --
20 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Will counsel kindly take into
21 consideration the interpreters and go a little slowly so
22 that they can interpret perfectly.
23 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Can we please show
24 document number 3, representing the ethnic map of the
25 former SFRY and which -- it comes from a source from the
1 -- Republic of Croatia according to you. If I can show
2 the green colour in your map is the territory where --
3 populated by the Serbs; is that correct? Ms Calic, do
4 you believe that this could be a correct ethnic map of
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
6 A. It cannot be a complete correct map of Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina because nobody would understand it any
8 more. The ethnic make-up of this republic is so complex
9 and the nations are settled so intermixed you would
10 simply not understand any more where the majority areas
11 are. So in this sense you are right. This is not a
12 correct map of the ethnic composition of Bosnia before
13 the war. It is a reduction of facts. It is just to
14 make visible that there were certain areas where certain
15 people were in a majority.
16 Q. Ms Calic, does that mean that this map represents -- is
17 a misrepresentation of the ethnic distribution of the
18 population of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
19 A. No, it's not a false description. It is just a
20 reduction of facts, of very complex facts, and I agree
21 on that, that each reduction -- wherever you try to
22 reduce very complex facts, you try to make them visible,
23 they, of course, may contain some incorrectness. It is
24 just to make it visible to help us to understand.
25 Q. Ms Calic, this reduction of the ethnic map of Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina to a person who is not familiar with
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina would entitle a people that its
3 ethnic division was actually possible. Would you please
4 show me on this map where Banja Luka is situated?
5 A. I have a map of Banja Luka.
6 Q. On this map?
7 A. It will be wrong. I prefer to use the map where we can
8 all see where Banja Luka is situated. It is document
9 38. We have Banja Luka here and Konjic is here.
10 Q. Yes, I am interested in Banja Luka, because in your map
11 it is in the green area, where it would show that it is
12 Serb populated?
13 A. All these colours, of course, indicate kind of majority
14 areas. There were, of course, settling other people.
15 This is just a way of presenting. Of course, there are
16 other ways of presenting. We have also then other
17 mistakes, as you would call it. I would agree that you
18 show another map which is more correct or which is able
19 to show us all how the ethnic composition of Bosnia was
20 at that time. I would very much agree on this.
21 Q. Ms Calic, you offered this map as proof of the ethnic
22 composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Please if the Banja
23 Luka municipality has 195,000 population and over 51 per
24 cent of them are non-Serbs, is it not then incorrect to
25 show the area --
1 MR OSTBERG: Dr Calic, may I ask you not to answer the
2 question until the translation of Madam Residovic's
3 question is over to here.
4 A. I am sorry. I use the translation maybe.
5 MR OSTBERG: So we are able to understand you. We know you
6 understand Serbo-Croat. We others do not.
7 MS RESIDOVIC (in translation): I apologise, your Honour. I
8 will only bring up two more examples to prove that this
9 document, however accurately it depicts the reduced
10 picture it is an absolutely inaccurate picture of the
11 ethnic population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12 Ms Calic, could you show us on this map where the Bijeljina
13 municipality is located? It is also in the green area
14 and the official data say in this area there is no Serb
15 majority living. Is that correct?
16 A. I would like to stress again that this is a very
17 simplified way of showing the very complex ethnic mix-up
18 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I would encourage you to
19 present a map which would be able to show us in a more
20 correct way how people were living together. I was
21 unfortunately unable on an A4 paper to provide a better
22 map. I agree if we could have a big map and then we
23 could also go in more details.
24 Q. Ms Calic, I would only like to ask whether this map can
25 represent the ethnic map of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it
1 is a correct map?
2 A. It is a simplified map made to help us understand how
3 the situation was.
4 Q. It is incorrect. Ms Calic, this map does not give an
5 opportunity to see the complexity of the situation; is
6 that correct?
7 A. There were many villages in Bosnia, ethnically mixed.
8 If we would try to show each of these villages in its
9 concrete mixture by colours, I think it would be very
10 difficult. I think it is impossible to show this. It
11 is a simplified way of showing a very complex situation.
12 Q. But that would be the only true representation, would it
14 A. Which one?
15 Q. If you would have indicated the accurate precise data in
16 each municipality and in each village, that would be the
17 accurate representation of the ethnic composition?
18 A. I provided statistical data for every village in the
19 Konjic municipality. They are included in this file. I
20 did not provide them for all the municipalities of
21 Bosnia. I did not consider that it would be relevant to
22 this case, but, of course, we can provide the
23 statistics, the population census of 1991, and then we
24 will also have the exact numbers, figures of people, of
25 nations in any village, but as for Konjic, all villages
1 are included here. We have exact figures of 1991.
2 Q. I apologise, Ms Calic, but could you answer me on the
3 situation in Bjeljina?
4 A. I would like to verify the data before.
5 Q. Does that mean, Ms Calic, that for Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina to which you are testifying, you do not have
7 accurate data at this time and you cannot speak to that?
8 A. I have accurate data upstairs, and I, of course, can
9 provide them, if you give me the time, but there were 20
10 nations and nationalities, and if you ask me how many of
11 each of these nationalities were living in a certain
12 municipality, I have to verify it before, I am afraid,
13 and yes -- yes, this is what I want to say.
14 Q. Ms Calic, is it 20 nationalities who lived in every
15 municipality and every part?
16 A. No, they did not.
17 Q. Do you know a single municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina
18 in which -- where at least one member of one of the
19 nationalities was not also part of the inhabitants?
20 A. I did not understand the question. I was listening to
21 the English translation. I did not understand. Can you
22 repeat, please.
23 Q. Please could you indicate a single municipality in the
24 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina where members of any of
25 the nationalities did not live or the reverse, where
1 only a single population lived?
2 A. Municipalities? No, I could not.
3 Q. Municipality?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. I have a document here which is an official document,
6 not verified. It is a statistical document. May I show
7 this to Ms Calic, please?
8 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: You can show it to her.
9 JUDGE JAN: You will have to exhibit it then.
10 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Yes. That is the purpose.
11 JUDGE JAN: Mr Ostberg, you will have to exhibit this
13 MR OSTBERG: After the cross-examination, your Honour, I
14 will introduce all of it.
15 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Show it to the witness.
16 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): I would like to show the
17 document just for the cross-examination purposes, and as
18 we are going to call our own expert witnesses, they will
19 offer their own documents in the proceedings later.
20 Ms Calic, have you had a chance to look at this
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Have you seen a similar statistical report before?
24 A. No, I have not, and I do not know from where it comes.
25 It is a fax, the numbers, figures. I don't know on
1 which basis it has been made.
2 Q. On the basis of a population census of 1991 by the
3 official institution, that is the Statistical Institute
4 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but if you have not seen it, I
5 cannot expect you to comment on it. Therefore, you
6 cannot answer my question and that is: is there a
7 single municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina inhabited by
8 members of a single nation?
9 A. I rely on the population census of 1991. I have never
10 seen it in this form. I have never seen it in a faxed
11 form. I have seen it in a form of a book. This is why
12 I have just to compare the figures. This comes from a
13 different institution. This comes from the Obernistic
14 Institute of Sarajevo. I got the figures from the
15 statistic office in Sarajevo. Please give me the
16 opportunity just to compare these figures.
17 Q. Very well. Thank you. I should like to go back now, Ms
18 Calic, to the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I
19 would like to ask you kindly to confirm once again that
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in accordance with the decisions of
21 Zabnobih and Avnoj was constituted as an equal republic
22 of first the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and later
23 SFRY; is that correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Can you confirm that the constitution of 1974, Article 3
1 of the constitution of 1974, stipulates the republics as
3 A. I cannot recall the exact term, if it was "state".
4 Q. May I read the text for you as it is in your
6 "Article 3. The socialist -- a socialist republic
7 is a state based on the sovereignty of the nations and
8 the authority and self-management of the working class
9 and all working people."
10 A. But the word "state" is not mentioned in this? The word
11 state is not mentioned in this Article.
12 Q. The socialist republic is a state?
13 A. Okay. I did not get those words.
14 Q. Can you also confirm that this constitution in Article 5
15 stipulates that the territory of the republic cannot be
16 changed without the agreement of the republic?
17 A. Yes. Yes, I can confirm.
18 Q. Is it your view that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a state
19 like all the other republics within the SFRY?
20 A. Yes. It had an equal status and it was recognised as an
21 independent republic in April 1992 in the existing
23 Q. Ms Calic, in your testimony you said, and I quote:
24 "The Muslim leadership aspired towards preserving
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unified, multi-ethnic unit Aryan
2 Did you make this assessment on the basis of a
3 document of some kind?
4 A. I did make this statement on the basis of many Articles,
5 of many speeches which were made by Bosnian leaders, by
6 party leaders, by the President Izetbegovic himself, and
7 if you wish, I can also provide these documents.
8 Q. Ms Calic, is Mr Izetbegovic the President of the state
9 of Bosnia-Herzegovina or is he the leader of the Muslim
10 majority, as you put it?
11 A. He was elected President of the 7-member Presidency of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina and he was perceived by many
13 people as a leader before he was elected President of
14 this republic.
15 Q. Ms Calic, you are testifying here as a scholar, and
16 therefore I think it would be advisable if we should not
17 rely on views of people who saw Izetbegovic as a leader
18 or something else but on the legal documents of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Would you agree with me?
20 A. I agree with you on this, but, of course, Alija
21 Izetbegovic existed before he was elected President.
22 How can we then deal with him? How can we take into
23 consideration his writings, his thinking, if we have to
24 call him always President.
25 Q. Ms Calic, I wish to discuss with you the position of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state regardless of who is its
2 President. Therefore, in connection with your last
3 statement I would like to ask you whether the
4 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 1974
5 constitution, with the amendments that you have
6 provided, those of 1989 included, which you have not
7 submitted, nor have you reviewed them -- did it
8 stipulate Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did that state, both before and after the elections,
11 have its legally-elected bodies?
12 A. It had, yes.
13 Q. Did the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina exist as the
14 highest organ of authority in the republic?
15 A. It existed as a body but it cannot be compared to what
16 it became after 1990 when the first free and multi-party
17 elections were held. You cannot compare these two
19 Q. I did not hear the translation. Can you please repeat
20 your answer?
21 A. My answer was that in 1990, when the first free and
22 multi-party elections were held, the institutions of
23 Bosnia were transformed. You cannot compare the
24 institutions after 1990 with the bodies existing
25 before. It's a different thing.
1 Q. Ms Calic, that is why I wish to remind you of
2 constitutional amendments of 1989. Were those new
3 bodies constituted in accordance with the constitution
4 of Bosnia Herzegovina and the 1989 amendments?
5 A. I am not sure if I understand your question. Can you
6 please repeat it?
7 Q. In 1989 the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted
8 amendments to the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina
9 enabling multi party elections and a multi party
10 system. My question is: since we are talking about the
11 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina whether the bodies
12 elected in 1990 were constitutionally elected state
14 A. The elections in 1990 were multi-party elections, as you
15 were saying, and those were the first free elections
16 held in Bosnia.
17 Q. Carried out in accordance with the constitution and the
18 elections law?
19 A. It was in accordance with the elections law.
20 Q. There was no legal discontinuity in the functioning of
21 the institutions of the state?
22 A. This is maybe a legal question, a very specific legal
23 question, and I am not a lawyer. I am a historian.
24 Maybe we can pass this question to a lawyer.
25 Q. But, Ms Calic, today you claimed that after that certain
1 changes occurred in the constitution, certain
2 amendments, which created a confusing situation. Can
3 you explain to us whether you can allege that those
4 legal changes of the constitution in the way envisaged
5 by the constitution could create confusion in a normal
7 A. I was referring in my statement to the situation after
8 April 1992. This was after the outbreak of armed
9 conflicts. This was a state of imminent war danger.
10 The Parliament of Bosnia did not function any more. It
11 could not pass any laws any more. These functions were
12 assumed by the state presidency. So the laws were
13 passed by the presidency. It was a different situation,
14 and going through the official gazettes of Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina in 1992 I got indeed the impression that
16 many of these regulations were made or were decided on
17 an ad hoc basis. They were reactions to what was
18 happening on the ground.
19 Q. In view of the fact that you are familiar with the
20 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina you can probably confirm
21 that the constitution and the laws envisage the
22 procedure for passing laws in conditions of an imminent
23 threat of war and conditions of war?
24 A. These were decrees made by the state Presidency with the
25 effect of laws.
1 Q. Such decrees were authorised by the constitution in the
2 event of war?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Therefore we cannot claim that these decisions could
5 create confusion, because they had legal continuity and
6 a legal basis, do you not think?
7 A. I am sorry if you understood that they created
8 confusion. I did not intend to say these laws or
9 decrees were creating confusion, but they were made in
10 the middle of a very confusing situation, where many
11 state organs, in fact, did not function any more, and as
12 I was saying before, going through these decrees which
13 were not laws but decrees, going through many of them I
14 got the impression that they were reactions to what was
15 happening on the ground.
16 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Actually if counsel will spare us a
17 little bit, you might avoid conclusions of law in
18 cross-examinations. These are conclusions of law.
19 JUDGE JAN: Actually you have been talking about two
20 different things. You have been talking about the
21 sanction behind the decrees. A sanction is of course a
22 constitution. She is talking about the effect of these
23 laws in the situation, which was very confused at that
24 time. We are talking really about two different matters
1 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): The situation in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina I agree is extremely complicated, but
3 I think that Ms Calic can understand me. We are not
4 talking about different things after all.
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina consists in continuity to the
6 present. That is my conclusion. I do not wish to talk
7 about it. I just wish to clarify the conclusions made
8 by Ms Calic in this court. I am not going into
9 constitutional questions any more.
10 Ms Calic, in your paper you claim that the Serb
11 and Croat leaderships wishing to unite their ethnic
12 groups with their motherlands supported the plan for the
13 cantonisation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is
14 that correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. But the Muslim leadership did not support it?
17 A. Yes. Only for the very short time to be precise.
18 JUDGE JAN: I thought the impression you gave to us was
19 this: the Muslim Bosnians wanted to keep the state as a
21 A. Yes.
22 JUDGE JAN: While the Serbians wanted to split it up and
23 join the rest of Serbia?
24 A. Yes.
25 JUDGE JAN: But you said for a short while?
1 A. I am saying this because in September 1991 the European
2 Union, the European Community, was trying to reconcile
3 these views. They set up this Arbitration Commission
4 and they set up a peace conference, and the situation
5 was very difficult at that time. There were two parties
6 in favour of having ethnic cantons, a federalised state
7 of Bosnia and one party, and the Bosnian government
8 saying: "No, we want to keep it as a unitarian state".
9 So this was a very difficult situation and for a very
10 short moment there appeared to have been agreement
11 between the three parties that -- this was in March 1992
12 -- that Bosnia could be restructured on the basis of
13 ethnic criteria. This were the so-called "cotilles" or
14 principles, the Foreign Ministry of Portugal mediating
15 between the parties on behalf of the European Community,
16 but immediately afterwards -- this was on 18th March
17 1992 -- immediately afterwards the Muslim leadership and
18 the Croat leadership seemed to have rejected this plan
19 again, and, in fact, the proposal to create ethnic
20 entries within Bosnia came up again and again in the
21 peace conferences, and, as you can see, today the Dayton
22 Agreement and the constitution of Bosnia of today is
23 also based on ethnic principles. So this was a proposal
24 that was going around since the end of 1991, and some
25 certain moments there was more pressure also from the
1 side of the international community to have these ethnic
2 criteria implemented just to get the situation calm and
3 to come to an agreement.
4 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Ms Calic, in your
5 testimony and the written report you frequently mention
6 the ethnic sides and ethnic leaderships. That is why I
7 am asking you once again: can you confirm that
8 throughout that period there were legally-elected
9 bodies: the Assembly, the Presidency and the
10 Government; regardless of who were members of those
11 bodies and what their percentage share was in those
13 A. I can confirm that there were such bodies, but I have
14 also to stress that these bodies did not function as
15 they should have functioned, as they were meant to
16 function, because in October 1991 the Serbs left most of
17 these bodies. So they were just something like rump
18 bodies. All the debate was exactly over this.
19 Q. Ms Calic, can you confirm that all Serbs or members of
20 SDS and SPO walked out of the Assembly?
21 A. If all members walked out of the Assembly, the SDS
22 members walked out of the Assembly.
23 Q. Did all Serbs or only members, deputies of SDS and SPO?
24 A. No. I was actually talking about political parties, not
25 of nationals, and I also would not intend to consider
1 all Serbs being members of these parties or supporting
2 these parties. Of course not there were many Serbs who
3 did not support these parties and who did not elect
4 them. The same is true for the other parties to the
6 Q. Can you confirm that the President of the Assembly of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina until Dayton was a Serb, Miro
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. The two members of the Presidency throughout the war
11 were Serbs?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. That the national composition of the Presidency did not
14 change, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Why then are you talking of the Muslim leadership all
17 the time then and not referring to the legal authorities
18 of the statement of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
19 A. This may be again a legal question, and I may be again
20 not be the right person to answer. This legal question
21 was -- I was trying to explain that there was, in fact,
22 legally elected bodies existing in Bosnia-Herzegovina at
23 this time, but on the other hand these bodies were not
24 functioning any more as they were meant to function, and
25 it is maybe just -- you know, there is a difference
1 between what was on paper and what was on the legal
2 side, and then what was in reality, and the reality was
3 that the members of the SDS party which got the majority
4 of Serb votes then left the Assembly and they have left
5 the Presidency, and they did not want to participate any
6 more in the work of this, and unfortunately because of
7 the war there was no possibility to have new elections.
8 We had them as late as September last year.
9 Q. Ms Calic, you were introduced as an expert for political
10 matters. These are not legal; these are political
11 matters. There are legal regulations stipulating how
12 deputies are substituted, those who leave the assembly,
13 those who resign or give up. With the withdrawal of a
14 certain number of deputies from the legal bodies of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina at least according to the view of the
16 United Nations they did not lose the status of
17 legitimate bodies of authority?
18 A. I did not intend to say this.
19 Q. Yes, but in the course of your testimony and in your
20 written report you constantly repeatedly used the term
21 "Muslim leadership" but, in fact, you were referring to
22 the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of which the
23 President throughout the war was a Serb, and many
24 deputies were both Serb and Croat in the Assembly?
25 A. If I remember correctly, I did not use Muslim leadership
1 when I was talking about the Presidency, but I used the
2 term "President", "Presidency" many times. However, I
3 used also the term "Muslim leadership" because there
4 were more Muslim leaders than were represented in the
5 presidency. There were local Muslim leaders. I have
6 maybe a problem with language, but I would not like to
7 contest the legitimacy of the Bosnian Presidency. It
8 was a recognised state. I was showing this many times,
9 and I -- yes, it was a recognised state and the
10 President of Bosnia was a recognised President. It was
11 not my intention and I apologise if you got this
13 Q. I am not talking about an impression. I quoted from
14 your report, and you can confirm what I am saying, and
15 that is the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina had 7
16 members, of which 3 were Muslim, 2 Serb and 2 Croat; is
17 that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. In view of the legality of the highest bodies of
20 authority, can you confirm that they did have the
21 opportunity to lawfully pass decisions?
22 A. Well, they passed decisions under the circumstances of
23 an immediate threat of war, at least after April 1992,
24 and then from June 1992 onwards under the state of war.
25 These were very specific conditions of this -- yes, very
1 specific conditions.
2 Q. Yes, but the state of immediate threat of war is also
3 envisaged by the constitution and other regulations?
4 A. Yes, of course.
5 Q. Since you said today that one period was a period that
6 could be called a short break or a vacuum in the legal
7 system, are you aware that already in April a decree was
8 passed to take over the regulations of the former SFRY
9 to be implemented in the territory of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Does that mean that legal
11 continuity was ensured without interruption?
12 A. In a certain way, because there were all these
13 amendments coming after this. The Bosnian government
14 had to change, for instance, names. They had to adapt
15 many laws and Articles of the constitution to the
16 changing situation. So there was a basic stock of
17 constitutional Articles, which were continuing to exist
18 but there were also some new, and I was trying to show
19 some of these new decrees, and I was also trying to show
20 some of the old elements or how old elements of the
21 former Yugoslav systems were still existing and how new
22 were introduced. I did not intend to give the
23 impression that this was illegally done. I was just
24 trying to show how the government was trying to adapt to
25 the new conditions and to react to the changing
2 Q. Certainly we are not talking about the substance of
3 those acts. We are just saying that this was a legal
4 state that was in existence in continuity as a sovereign
5 and independent state, and as such it passed certain
6 documents in accordance with its own laws and
7 regulations; is that correct?
8 A. Bosnia was indeed recognised on 6th April 1992 by the
9 European Community and afterwards by many other
10 countries and states.
11 Q. Yes, at the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, and the
12 following day it was recognised by the United States and
13 Croatia, and on the 8th the first diplomatic relations
14 were established. That is without doubt and you did not
15 dispute that fact, but, Ms Calic, you spoke here about
16 the intentions of the Serb and Croat leaderships from
17 Bosnia and their wish to link up with their
18 motherlands. Are you aware, Ms Calic, that in the
19 former SFRY and in the Socialist Republic of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina there was a law on citizenship?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Do you know that in accordance with that law all
23 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who were born there or
24 who belonged to it by origin are citizens of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you consider all citizens of
1 Konjic who, in accordance with this law, were born there
2 or come there by descent are also citizens of
4 A. You see, it is not up to me to decide these legal
5 questions. I was just trying to explain that part of
6 the Bosnian population, namely a bigger part of the
7 Bosnian Serb population did, in fact, not intend to be
8 considered only as citizens of Bosnia, but they wanted
9 to be considered citizens of Yugoslavia, and whether or
10 not this is a illegal, I cannot say. I am not a legal
11 expert, and also the members of the European Community
12 were a bit confused about this fact, and they had to
13 establish a commission. So I am afraid I cannot answer
14 this question.
15 Q. In other words, you agree that there is a citizenship
16 based on laws of the former SRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina
17 and that they regulate this issue?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Ms Calic, I will move on to another set of questions.
20 In your presentation and today's testimony you did not
21 speak about other political aspects relating to the
22 aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you know that over
23 a longer historical -- period of time in history that
24 there are tendencies working towards the destruction of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina and coming from outside
2 A. I have no such document available showing a plan to
3 destroy Bosnia as a state. I have indicated that forces
4 from outside Bosnia were involved in the struggle over
5 Bosnia, and this is what I was trying to show in my
7 Q. Do you, as a historian, know about Garasanin and his
8 work "Natje Tanja?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Are you familiar with the concept of the independent
11 state of Croatian of World War II?
12 A. Yes, I am.
13 Q. Do both of these concepts negate Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
14 state and Bosnia as a nation?
15 A. As far the first concept, the Serb,"Natje Tanja" was
16 made at this time and Bosnia did not exist as an
17 independent state. As for the second one, Bosnia did
18 not exist yet as an independent state before the Second
19 World War.
20 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Now I think the Trial Chamber will
21 rise for 20 minutes. We will assemble at 4.15.
22 (3.55 pm)
23 (Short break)
25 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: The witness is still on oath. I think
1 you can carry on with your cross-examination.
2 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Thank you, your Honour.
3 Thank you, Ms Calic. I have a number of questions that
4 I need to ask of you.
5 You were talking about the historical continuity.
6 Please can you answer the following questions. Is the
7 geo-political context of Bosnia-Herzegovina also very
8 important for understanding the recent past?
9 A. You mean the actual or before the war historically?
10 Q. The historical context before the war relating to the
11 causes of the war. I asked you earlier and I would like
12 a response: do you know the political treatise of
13 Garasanin, a Serbian politician, called "Natje Tanja"?
14 A. Yes, I know this document.
15 Q. Are you familiar with the political project and
16 territorial framework of the Croatian fascist creation
17 during World War II?
18 A. Yes, I am.
19 Q. Are you also familiar with Memorandum of the Serbian
20 Academy of Sciences?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Do you know that there was a military plan by the former
23 JNA called Ram and its political underpinnings?
24 A. This was reported in the press. I never seen any
25 document plan Ram.
1 Q. Are you familiar with the names of Greater Serbia and
2 Greater Croatia?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Among the documents that I quoted earlier can you
5 identify those that are the political foundation for the
6 Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia?
7 A. I have not seen this plan Ram, so I cannot really
8 speak. I saw a press report on it, but I have never
9 seen this plan, so I cannot comment on this.
10 As for the Memorandum of the Serb Academy of
11 Science it is quite unprecise on the territorial side,
12 so I am unable to compare the territorial aspirations of
13 the Natje Tanja document with any assumed territorial
14 aspirations elaborated in this SANU Memorandum. They
15 are not so explicitly formulated.
16 Q. The motto "All Serbs in a single state", is that motto
17 directly or indirectly relating to the security of
19 A. Not necessarily, because in Yugoslavia the Serbs were
20 living in one state and it was a state where Serbs
21 believed to live together and Bosnia still existed as a
22 republic, had institutions, had its territorial
23 borders. So it is just a matter of interpretation and
24 it is a matter of politics in which concrete shape you
25 then realise the aim: "All Serbs have to live in one
2 Q. Since you quoted a document speaking about dissolution
3 of Yugoslavia, such a motto can also mean something else
4 with respect to the security of the Republic of
6 A. What can it mean? You mean after the dissolution of
7 Yugoslavia? I cannot understand your question.
8 Q. If there is still insistence on all Serbs living in a
9 single state, does that affect directly
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, which is populated by 30 per
11 cent of Serbs, given its ethnic distribution?
12 A. It affects, of course, Bosnia, but the Serbs, on the
13 other hand, were insisting on the fact that they wanted
14 to remain in Yugoslavia, and the way Yugoslavia
15 dissolved was not correct according to their views. So
16 this is what the Serb position was on this fact, but it
17 affected, of course, the territorial integrity of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state once it was recognised.
19 Q. Is it your opinion that part of the strategy to create a
20 Greater Serbia is also the quick pull-out of the JNA
21 from Slovenia and Croatia?
22 A. I cannot -- I do not wish to argue in terms of a plan of
23 Greater Serbia. In Slovenia there were nearly no Serbs
24 living and I would assume also there were no territorial
25 aspirations on the side of the JNA and on the side of
2 Q. In other words, keeping the armed forces was only
3 limited to the areas where there were territorial
4 aspirations; is that not what you are stating?
5 A. I am stating that I do not like to argue in terms of
6 plan to create Greater Serbia.
7 Q. I can appreciate your desire not to speak of that. We
8 accepted you as an impartial expert with knowledge of
9 political and historical issues, but I am not going to
10 insist on this question.
11 However, I have following questions for you, since
12 you are an expert in this field. Based on your
13 expertise rather than your desires to answer these
14 questions or not, you chose not to answer them. You
15 said that Bosnia was recognised on 6th April 1992?
16 A. The decision was taken on 6th April 1992. It came into
17 effect one day later.
18 Q. Tell me: as of that moment was the former JNA a foreign
19 military force in the territory of that state?
20 A. The JNA was after this time still present on the
21 territory of Bosnia. It was then partially withdrawn.
22 Some troops remained, and there remained also support
23 from Belgrade, and I was trying to explain this morning
24 that the bigger part of this JNA was, in fact,
25 transformed into the Bosnian Serb Army, leaving behind
1 troops, leaving behind weaponry and equipment.
2 JUDGE JAN: She said that already.
3 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: She was just asking a simple
4 question: was JNA on foreign territory? That is all
5 she asked.
6 A. JNA was on Bosnian territory and it was under the
7 command of Belgrade, superior command of Belgrade.
8 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Does that mean that as
9 of that moment there was an aggression on
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina and it was an international armed
11 conflict from there on?
12 A. On 27th April the new Yugoslavia was created, and I
13 think that from this moment onwards we can consider for
14 sure the JNA as a foreign force being present on the
15 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16 Q. Do you know that in early May the Security Council
17 brought a Resolution ordering all forces of the JNA to
18 leave Bosnia-Herzegovina?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Do you know that this was not done within the deadline
21 of 19th May?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you know that, following that, on 30th May the
24 Security Council introduced sanctions against Federal
25 Republic of Yugoslavia?
1 A. Of course.
2 Q. Do you know that JNA, the Army of the Federal Republic
3 of Yugoslavia, through its officer corps, logistics and
4 other ways was continually present in
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Can you tell me if you have the data on the JNA
8 preparing for this aggression over a longer period of
9 time? Do you know that in May of 1991 under the
10 pretence of military exercises all major centres of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina were blocked with heavy weaponry?
12 A. I know that many important strategic points were blocked
13 or controlled by the JNA at this time.
14 Q. Sarajevo, Bihac, Konjic?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Thank you. Do you also know that from 1990 on the
17 weapons legally belonging to the Territorial Defence was
18 kept, guarded by the JNA?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Do you know that these weapons were distributed to the
21 Serbian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the SDS
22 and JNA?
23 A. I know of this. I know that this happened in certain
24 parts, in certain areas in Bosnia, and I also submitted
25 a document to support this view.
1 Q. In other words, the JNA behaved as an aggressor in large
2 portions of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that
4 A. It is probably not correct for the time before Bosnia
5 was recognised as an independent state, and the JNA
6 started distributing weapons a month ago, so I think we
7 have to distinguish between the period before the
8 international recognition of Bosnia and the period
10 Q. Yes. I am thinking of the period after. Is the fact
11 that Yugoslavia played this role in Bosnia-Herzegovina
12 one of the reasons why it was not recognised by the
13 United Nations?
14 A. Yes. This is correct.
15 Q. Miss Chalic, I would like to go into the questions
16 relating to the Konjic area. Before that, just one more
17 question relating to the general political issues. In
18 your written report you stated that there were whispers
19 about speculations that the President of Serbia,
20 Milosevic, and President of Croatia, Tudjman, as well as
21 the leader of Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, and
22 Bosnian Croats, Mate Boban, had agreed on the partition
23 of Bosnia. Please answer whether there was a meeting
24 between Tudjman and Milosevic in Karageorgevic or not?
25 A. I heard about this meeting. However, I have never seen
1 any document coming out of this meeting. I included
2 this actually in this paragraph on the speculations on
3 what might have been agreed. So I am aware of this
4 fact, that there was a meeting in Karageorgevic, but I
5 am not aware of the exact outcome.
6 Q. Do you know that in 1990, in June, Mate Boban and
7 Radovan Karadzic met in Graz?
8 A. It was the same. It was reported in the press they met,
9 but we have never seen any documents, any result coming
10 out of these meetings.
11 Q. We are expecting precise data from you as an expert. I
12 think that such an answer based on speculation cannot be
13 part of an expert opinion.
14 A. I presented what I believed and was reported in the
15 press and I want to make clear I have no exact
16 information of the outcome of these meetings, and these
17 meetings were also behind closed doors.
18 Q. Ms Calic, you offered documents that are results of such
19 agreements. The decisions on creation of the Assembly
20 of Republika Srpska, of the Croatian community
21 Herceg-Bosna, division of the territory, do they not
22 speak about the realisation and results of these
23 agreements, if we disregard all the victims that have
24 come as a result of these agreements?
25 A. In none of the documents that I have submitted we can
1 find any agreement between Croat -- Croatian and Serbian
2 or Croat and Serb leaders or Presidents or authorities.
3 These documents show how the Serb leaders, on the one
4 hand, and the Croat leaders, on the other hand, were
5 trying to establish autonomous areas, how they were
6 trying to establish quasi-structures, but they cannot
7 show us how the two communities were trying to divide
8 Bosnia between themselves.
9 Q. In your opinion could these states that you have
10 mentioned have been states based on the laws in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina or were they just para-states?
12 A. They were para-states, and the Constitutional Court made
13 several decisions that are all included in my file. The
14 Constitutional Court considered the creation of these
15 para-states as unconstitutional in several Decisions.
16 Q. Ms Calic, before I move on to the Konjic region, I will
17 only say a couple of things. I recognise that you did
18 your doctorate on the social issues in Serbia, that you
19 have been employed in the Institute in Munich, and that
20 you have worked for the German Government, and this is
21 the basis of your knowledge, and the number of documents
22 that you have also submitted. Please if you could tell
23 me what is the basis of your knowledge of the
24 historical, geo-political and military circumstances of
25 the Konjic region?
1 A. Excuse me. Can you repeat, because I am parallelly
2 listening to the original and the translation and in the
3 middle I lost the connection. Maybe just the translator
4 to repeat the question, if you can.
5 Q. Please what documents did you use for -- as a basis for
6 forming your opinion on the Konjic region, and who made
7 these documents available to you?
8 A. I used many documents. I started with the Encyclopedia
9 Yugoslavia. They have a separate volume on Bosnia and
10 there are several pages, several parts also referring to
11 Konjic, especially the parts on the geography, on
12 economy and others. I used then statistical data from
13 the official statistical yearbooks of Yugoslavia, the
14 last one from 1991. I used to a lesser extent press
15 reports. I also used some documents made available to
16 me by the Office of the Prosecutor, and what did I use?
17 I also used some books. I also used books actually,
18 yes. I used the books by Cekic and I used -- yes, this
19 is what I used basically.
20 Q. So you had no specific personal research, nor did you
21 have insight into documents that would refer
22 specifically to that region except for these indirect
23 documents, indirect sources?
24 A. Well, there were the quoted sources which I was using.
25 There were many references to Konjic directly.
1 Q. Allow me to say that in your written report you say
3 "During the Second World War the region of Konjic
4 witnessed the fiercest ethnic conflicts in Bosnia."
5 A. Yes. I already know the question.
6 Q. Do you know that in this region the forces of the
7 National Liberation Army, led by Marshall Tito,
8 conducted their Fourth Offensive against the Germans and
9 Italians, together with domestic traitors, the Ustashas
10 and the Cetniks. This was known as "The Battle on the
11 Neretva". A film of that name was nominated for the
12 Oscar award.
13 A. I know it.
14 Q. Were you thinking of those events and battles,
15 especially against the Cetniks at Prenj, after crossing
16 the Neretva River when you made this statement?
17 A. I was also thinking of these battles, but not only, but
18 also of these partisan struggles, of course.
19 Q. Can you say then that this part of your report is not
20 quite correct when talking about the events during the
21 Second World War in the territory of the municipality of
23 A. In the area, in the broader area. I was referring to
24 the area. I cannot understand why it is not correct to
25 explain how history developed in this area, and Konjic
1 was part of the Neretva area. I don't know.
2 Q. Yes, Ms Calic. You said that these were the fiercest
3 ethnic conflicts, but, in fact, it was a liberation,
4 anti-Fascist movement, against occupation by Fascism.
5 As far as I know, these are quite different legal,
6 historical and political categories.
7 A. Unfortunately on the side of the German occupation,
8 troops were also fighting troops consisting of Croats
9 and Muslims. These were mainly special forces created
10 by the German SS. The SS was a special force kind of
11 elite troop of the Germans. They were well-known for
12 committing many crimes unfortunately, especially in the
13 second half of this cruel war. Also Croats and Muslims
14 participated in this struggle, some of them voluntarily
15 and some of them were forced, and it remained
16 unfortunately in the memory of many people, and many
17 people perceive it today also as an ethnic struggle,
18 even if the partisan movement as such was a
19 multi-ethnic, pan-Yugoslav movement.
20 Q. What you have just said, Ms Calic, is something that you
21 have not written in your report. I accept the
22 explanation, but a host of documentation can be found in
23 the museum in Jablanica. Obviously you have not had
24 occasion to consult that documentation.
25 A. I went to this area when I was a student, so this is ten
1 years ago, but I know the monument. I know also much of
2 the history of the partisan struggles. I was a bit
3 brief, but there are many parts in my statement, which
4 was only 13 pages long, in which I could not elaborate
5 all interesting, all relevant information. I confess it
6 is very brief.
7 Q. I apologise for insisting, but you made no mention of
8 the anti-Fascist struggle in this part of your report,
9 but I think we have cleared things up now and I will not
10 insist on further answers to my questions.
11 Can you tell me whether the overall situation in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina was reflected upon the situation in
14 A. Yes, yes, I would agree on that, yes.
15 Q. Can you confirm that an event in October 1991 decisively
16 affected and influenced the further course of events in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Let me remind you, and to remind
18 you I would like to show you a brief tape of that
19 event. It maybe takes fifteen seconds. If I may, I
20 would like to call on the Technical Department.
21 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Yes, you are permitted. You can show
22 your tape.
23 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Will you please give the
24 text of the translation?
25 (Videotape played)
1 Q. Can we please have the text? I cannot hear my sound.
2 There is no sound. Could you repeat the insert, please?
3 A. And I have no pictures. I have nothing.
4 Q. Perhaps this text could be given to the interpreters, so
5 that they can read it. This would avoid having two
6 pictures on the monitor. There is no sound. Will you
7 please read the text if there is an error on the
8 videotape? Will the technicians please try to reproduce
9 the tone? Will you please read the text of this speech
10 in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
11 JUDGE JAN: How is it relevant?
12 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): It is important that an
13 expert witness who is dealing with historical events in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina should identify this man and this
15 Assembly and the words which significantly determined
16 developments, including in the territory of the
17 municipality of Konjic; in the whole state and, of
18 course, also in Konjic.
19 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Let us hear the interpretation, so
20 that you will get what he said.
21 JUDGE JAN: How do we know that this statement was made by
22 this gentleman on the screen?
23 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Please let us hear the
25 THE INTERPRETER: The text reads:
1 "You want to take Bosnia-Herzegovina down the same
2 highway to hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia
3 are suffering? You do not think that you will lead
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina into hell and do not think that you
5 will not perhaps make the Muslim people disappear
6 because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is
7 a war. How will you prevent everyone from being killed
8 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?"
9 Underneath it says:
10 "Radovan Karadzic, Leader of the Bosnian Serbs
11 before the Bosnian-Herzegovina Assembly, October 14,
13 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I gather you can now hear the
14 videotape. Let us hear it from the words of the speaker
16 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Mr President, I would
17 ask the witness to look at the text and to say whether
18 she can recognise the man and is she aware of the words
19 written on this piece of paper as being the words
20 uttered by this man.
21 A. I actually had no -- I had only the picture. I had no
22 words, but I am familiar with this document. It is
23 published in the same Cekic book which I was also
24 using. So it is familiar to me.
25 Q. Can you testify before this court who we are talking
1 about and what he said on that occasion?
2 A. I could not hear the tone. I know the document from the
3 book, but I had no words. I could not -- maybe you can
4 repeat. If I had to translate ... I still have nothing.
5 Q. You can use the text you have before you as a
7 A. What should I -- what did you ask me?
8 Q. I am asking: can you recognise the picture of the man
9 and whether this is what he said at that Assembly
10 meeting, who he is and what he said?
11 A. I recognised Karadzic on the screen, but I did not get
12 his words because they simply were not in my earphones,
13 I am afraid, but I know this document from the Cekic
15 Q. And on the BBC programme too?
16 A. Maybe. I have it in my mind that I have read it in this
17 Cekic book. This is where I ...
18 Q. I apologise. Did the court hear the words spoken by the
20 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I did not hear it. I heard the
22 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): I would like to ask the
23 witness to testify, having said that she knows that it
24 was Radovan Karadzic in the Assembly of Herzegovina and
25 that she is aware of the words he spoke on that
1 occasion, can she testify that those words had a
2 decisive effect on the further course of events in
4 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I do not think she can testify to
5 that. She was not a member of the Assembly. She had
6 nothing other than what any other person observed. So
7 how do you expect her to testify to that? If you have
8 other questions, more valid questions, please try and
9 put them to her.
10 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honour, she is not
11 a factual witness. She is Ms Calic, an expert, and we
12 are asking to testify to a document from the Assembly of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina which was shown before this court on
14 several occasions, and if she can confirm that document,
15 I would like to ask her to do so. If not, I would be
16 grateful if she looked at it.
17 A. I cannot confirm this, because I have not seen this tape
18 before, not here in the court. I know this document
19 from publication, from the Cekic book, as I was saying,
20 but I am not a fact witness. I did not attend this
21 meeting, and I could unfortunately not understand from
22 my earphones what Karadzic was saying here on this tape.
23 Q. Can you testify what the document in Cekic's book says
24 that you are familiar with?
25 A. I have a big problem with translating and I had it
1 already when I read it for the first time in this book.
2 It concerns the word "disappear". I cannot exactly
3 remember the Bosnian word, so I am afraid I have not the
4 original text and I am not a fact witness, but if this
5 is important, we can provide the book. We can find the
6 book or we can make the screen work.
7 Q. Did this word "disappear" apply to the Muslim people?
8 A. I cannot testify on this, I am afraid.
9 Q. When was the book written, please, so that defence could
10 perhaps submit it as evidence?
11 A. In 1993. We have it here. I think I brought a copy,
12 but I am not sure.
13 Q. Ms Calic, can you tell us please whether you know that
14 the town of Konjic after these events was blocked as an
15 important strategic point along the line from Sarajevo
16 to the sea?
17 A. I'm again not a fact witness. I read in some of the
18 witnesses' reports that the road was blocked, but I
19 personally am not capable of confirming or not
20 confirming this fact. I'm not a fact witness.
21 Q. Can you confirm that already on 29th April an air raid
22 was announced and actually carried out at the point of
23 Glavicine, Konjic?
24 A. Again I am not a fact witness, and I personally did not
25 witness any of these attacks, so it would be maybe
1 better to ask these questions to the fact witnesses and
2 not to me.
3 Q. Ms Calic, I am still asking you a question as an
4 expert. You said that you could testify on events in
5 the region of Konjic. In answer to each of my questions
6 you say that you are not a fact witness. I am not
7 expecting you to say that you lived in Konjic, but as an
8 expert you could have had the opportunity to study
9 documents relating to these events.
10 A. Yes, I had the opportunity to study documents on these
11 events, but I am not sure to which extent I can rely on
12 each of these documents, and I really would prefer that
13 you asked these questions to the fact witnesses and not
14 to me, because I was asked to give a general background
15 to help the court to place into context what was going
16 on, but I was not asked to testify on these facts, and I
17 am afraid that I am incapable of doing this, because I
18 was not present in the area at that time.
19 Q. The war, the bombing raids and all the other events that
20 I am mentioning are historical events, and you are an
21 expert on history. Can you confirm that from May 4th
22 Konjic was daily exposed to terrible raids?
23 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Please can I advise counsel: you
24 started very well by outlining what the witness came to
25 say, historical, geographic context in which the whole
1 event occurred, but specific events or daily happenings
2 might be something of history, but it is not a history
3 preceding what has happened. I do not think the witness
4 is in a position to be answering specific questions of
5 bombing raids. That is not the reason why the expert
6 was asked to come and testify. It has nothing to do
7 with this case. In fact, that is not even a question of
8 expertise. There is no expertise in knowing there was a
9 bomb raid, whether a place was bombed.
10 JUDGE JAN: Perhaps you can ask her was the area generally
11 bombarded. Maybe about that she might be knowing, but
12 not specific raids, or blockades. She said earlier many
13 places were blockaded. Maybe Konjic was also one.
14 A. Yes. In this general way I can confirm. I also
15 submitted a report by the UNHCR, which gives evidence of
16 this. Many, many houses and other buildings were
17 destroyed during the war. I, of course, cannot say
18 which specific raid or which specific bombing or
19 shooting was then the real event, because there was, of
20 course, also afterwards fighting in this area, fighting
21 between also Croat and Muslim forces. So in the general
22 way I can confirm there were many attacks on Konjic.
23 JUDGE JAN: Bombing raids?
24 A. Also bombing raids.
25 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honours, I
1 apologise, but in the announcement to the defence it was
2 indicated to us that Ms Calic would be speaking about
3 concrete historic, political, economic and military
4 questions of importance for the region of Konjic, and I
5 am really confused if I cannot ask Ms Calic questions
6 about the subjects that I was told she would be
7 testifying to. I did not ask about any particular
8 building. The month of May was an important historical
9 period, when within half an hour there were 44 air
10 raids. I am not asking her that, but whether Konjic was
11 exposed to heavy shelling. In our view and from the
12 standpoint of that region it is a political and military
13 and historical fact. So, if possible, I would like her
14 to answer this question. If she is aware of it, then
15 let her tell me so, and if she does not know, she does
16 not know.
17 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I am sorry if you are getting a little
18 worried, and I do not want to be tedious about such
19 things. Now when an expert comes to give evidence about
20 historical incidents or things leading towards anything,
21 the expert is not a participant observer and is not
22 expected to give evidence of what happened during the
23 conflict. So I do not see how you can go as far as
24 that. I suppose if the Prosecution does not object, I
25 think you can go ahead asking whatever questions you
1 like, but I think that is not the way to conduct a
2 cross-examination of an expert. I am not talking about
3 somebody who was a participant. When you are asking an
4 expert questions, you know your limits.
5 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Thank you, your
6 Honours. The expert has just told us that she had many
7 sources of the United Nations and other agencies about
8 the heavy shelling of Konjic, so she could have said
9 that at the beginning.
10 I wish to ask the following question: do you know
11 that from April 1991 there was a significant movement of
12 the population from Eastern Bosnia and Eastern
13 Herzegovina after a terrible crime of ethnic cleansing
14 was committed against the Borciac people?
15 A. Sorry. Did you say 1991 or 1990?
16 Q. 1992.
17 A. 1992. There are many reports again by international
18 experts, like the final report of the UN Commission of
19 Experts, that give evidence on population movements, and
20 I think there can be now no doubt about this fact.
21 Q. Do you know that tens of thousands of people from those
22 regions were moving over the Bosnian mountains towards
24 A. Yes, I know that.
25 Q. As an expert, is it your opinion that this situation
1 affected significantly the political and other situation
2 in the Konjic municipality?
3 A. Yes, indeed, and we could see this also afterwards in
4 the following years, when masses of refugees and
5 displaced persons were moving to Central Bosnia, which
6 was a matter of concern, of course, with the local
7 authorities, and it created conflicts between Muslims
8 and Croats over the division of resources and everything
9 else. I agree this was a real matter of concern. I
10 mentioned it actually at the end of my report, that
11 there were about 8,000 people coming to Konjic, new
12 people coming to Konjic, displaced persons from other
13 areas, mainly from Eastern Bosnia.
14 Q. Can you confirm that this number of 8,000 could also be
15 much higher, or do you allow that possibility?
16 A. I really don't know. I rely here on a report by UNHCR,
17 which is in my opinion a reliable source, and I
18 personally cannot speculate whether there was a higher
19 number or not.
20 Q. As a social scientist, can you confirm that such events
21 and such movements of people were creating enormous
22 difficulties to the authorities in that region?
23 A. Of course I can confirm that.
24 Q. Moving to the last group of questions that I would like
25 to ask you, and I thank you for your patience in
1 answering what you are able to answer, as far as the
2 structures of authorities in the Konjic area are
3 concerned, I would like to know whether you had access
4 to the documents relating to the local government in
5 Konjic, the document relating to the Assembly of Konjic
6 and then the decisions that were taken later, and if you
7 can give me the sources of your information in that
9 A. I had unfortunately only some of these documents
10 available. I was -- I requested them and, as I
11 understand, the Office of the Prosecutor was also trying
12 to get them, but unfortunately the Bosnian institutions
13 -- I do not know which institution it was -- were not
14 able to provide them in time, but we are trying -- keep
15 on trying to get these documents. I don't know for
16 which reason it was not possible to get them from
18 Q. You submitted a document on the all people's defence
19 strategy issued by the Federal Ministry for Defence of
20 SFRY. Do you know that on 10th April the Presidency of
21 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina issued a Directive
22 regarding organising and operating of the staffs of
23 Territorial Defence?
24 A. Can you please repeat the date?
25 Q. 10th April.
1 JUDGE JAN: Also the year. 10th April 1992? Please repeat
2 the year also.
3 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): 1992.
4 A. Sorry. Can you please repeat?
5 Q. Do you know that on 10th April a Provisional Directive
6 was issued, in which a reorganisation of the local
7 headquarters were put in a new hierarchical order
8 towards the General Command?
9 A. If this is the one published in the Official Gazette,
10 yes. If it's a secret one, no.
11 Q. That is not the Directive that you submitted in your
12 documents. Were you in a position to see another
14 A. I submitted two documents relating to the Bosnian Army
15 and the Territorial Defence Organisation. Both were
16 passed in May 1992. One is the Defence Law of Bosnia.
17 The other one is the law on the armed forces, and both
18 laws are included in this binder.
19 Q. In other words, you did not see other documents?
20 A. I saw the whole Official Gazette. If you are referring
21 to documents published in this Gazette related to
22 defence, I have seen them. If you are speaking about
23 whatever secret decisions internally made, I have not
24 seen them.
25 Q. You saw the Decree in the Official Gazette taking over
1 the laws from the former SFRY?
2 A. Yes. I think so, yes.
3 Q. You saw that a number of documents were taken over, but
4 not documents relating to the defence matters?
5 A. No, the Bosnian Government was passing new documents,
6 but they were, in my view, very similar to the former
7 ones in essence.
8 Q. The Bosnian government did not adopt this strategy of
9 all people's defence and self-protection of the people,
10 did it?
11 A. This strategy was in effect on the Republics of the
12 former Yugoslavia, and I actually did get it from the
13 Republic of the former Yugoslavia, whose name is not
14 Serbia or Montenegro, and I was advised by former
15 Attorney-General that it was still valid at this time
16 and that many military persons were still behaving
17 according to this defence doctrine, and my general
18 impression from what was going on on the ground is
19 indeed that many people still behaved in accordance with
20 this document.
21 Q. You did not personally verify the actions or behaviour
22 of the people in the Konjic municipality, did you?
23 A. No, I did not. I was saying it before, that I am not a
24 fact witness. I cannot confirm or not confirm any
25 concrete behaviour of any person at this time in the
1 area of Konjic.
2 Q. However, you have confirmed certain things in your
3 written report. You stated that there was a rule or
4 frequent cases that people of some standing, people who
5 had money, people who were businessmen, were coming to
6 help their people, and you stated examples in Croatia
7 and Bosnia. Do you think you can cite five such
9 A. I would not like to cite five such persons. I cited two
10 prominent persons and I think, if you give me a bit more
11 time, I will find other adequate examples. I quoted a
12 bit earlier the case of Arkan and I quoted the case of
13 Fikret Abdic. I think I can also maybe find some more,
14 but I would need a bit more time.
15 Q. I apologise. Arkan is not a citizen of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am not sure that I know in what
17 context you used him here, and Fikret Abdic did not come
18 from abroad. Based on these two individuals I don't
19 know how you arrived at the conclusion that you arrived
20 at in your written report.
21 A. Well, both persons were acting on the territory of
22 Bosnia and both persons were also relying on financial
23 resourcing coming from outside of Bosnia. I, of course,
24 have no documents here, and I am, of course, again not a
25 witness, a fact witness for this, but this is what was
1 generally assumed at the time, and I think many still
2 believe in this, and they were powerful persons just
3 because they had a lot of economic power in certain
4 areas, one in Western Bosnia and the other one in
5 Eastern Slovenia. They had the bases and they had good
6 contacts outside of the Republic of Bosnia and outside
7 of also Croatia and they had connections to foreign
9 Q. However, those are not individuals who are the members
10 of the legal armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
11 A. No, they are not.
12 Q. In other words, what you testified to in your written
13 report does not refer to the members of the legal armed
14 forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, does it?
15 A. I did not mention the armed forces of Bosnia in this
16 context, if I remember well. If you understand this,
17 then I apologise. It was not my intention to put it in
18 such a way. I wanted just to say that in a situation
19 where really everything was changing, it was a normal
20 thing that new elites were emerging, persons of
21 influence were coming in. Immigrants were coming back
22 from foreign countries. This was not only the case in
23 Bosnia, but also in Serbia and Croatia and maybe also in
24 the other republics. It was maybe part of this --
25 excuse me again -- confused situation, which is, I was
1 trying to explain, this confused situation which
2 characterised the first months after the outbreak of the
4 Q. Ms Calic, a little while ago you correctly pointed to
5 the fact that you were not a fact witness. I would like
6 to ask you: is this your assumption or is it a
7 historical fact that you got based on the information
8 available to you?
9 A. Which fact are you referring to, please?
10 Q. The fact about influential persons who were coming?
11 A. I believe it has become already a historical fact, and
12 there are scholars who have written about this. I have
13 a chapter of a book by a French scholar. His name is
14 Xavier Bugarel. The article is not included in this
15 file, because I thought it would not be relevant for
16 this case, but I can provide you with this book and with
17 this article. So there are already scholars writing
18 about this fact, and I think we should also take notice
19 of this.
20 Q. Yes, Ms Calic, but you are testifying about the Konjic
21 area, and you testified that these people were business
22 people, cafe owners, who were supporting certain
23 political parties, who provided financial resources to
24 them, and who also had influence on political and
25 military structures, especially in the area of
1 1992/1992. This is what is in the indictment, that
2 period, and in the beginning of this paragraph we are
3 talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the Konjic
4 area, and I am asking you whether you have facts that
5 are -- information that is based on facts or are you
6 just referring to general books and other general
7 documents when stating this?
8 A. If I recall correctly, then I did not mention in this
9 report Konjic specifically. I was mentioning Bosnia as
10 a part of the former Yugoslavia, and I would like to
11 stress here again that this is also true for many other
12 parts of the former Yugoslavia. It was a general fact.
13 It happened in many parts. It happened on all sides, I
14 would assume, and there are already scholars writing on
15 these facts, and this is what I wanted to make clear
16 here. I was not, of course, as I am not a fact witness,
17 referring to a concrete person or concrete -- yes, a
18 concrete person in Konjic.
19 Q. So it was an assumption on your part that it also was
20 referring to the Konjic area; can we put it that way?
21 MR OSTBERG: Your Honour, I object to this question. You
22 are putting something else in the mouth of the witness.
23 The witness just said that it was not in the Konjic
24 area. It was a general observation. The question is
25 answered already.
1 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Well, the witness actually said that
2 she had no such experience with the facts surrounding
3 the Konjic area. Is that what you are saying?
4 A. Yes. I have no facts or evidence personally.
5 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honour, but the
6 paragraph that I just quoted starts with the words:
7 "In all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina including
8 Konjic ...".
9 So I could not understand it in any other way but
10 the way it is written.
11 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: If she has now made that exception of
12 the place which you have in mind, you ought to accept
14 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Thank you. The next
15 group of short questions is in reference to your
16 knowledge of the structures in the Konjic municipality.
17 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I am sorry. You might not have enough
18 time for these short questions, because we have to rise
19 at 5.30. So you might continue tomorrow morning at
20 10.00 am.
21 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Thank you very much.
22 Thank you, Ms Calic.
23 (Court adjourned until 10.30 tomorrow morning)