1 Monday, 16th February 1998
2 (10.00 am)
3 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Morning ladies and
4 gentlemen. We are back in full force this morning.
5 Can we have the appearances, please?
6 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, please, my name is
7 Niemann and I appear with my colleagues, Mr. Dixon,
8 Ms. McHenry and Mr. Khan for the Prosecution.
9 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: May we have the
10 appearances for the Defence?
11 MS. RESIDOVIC: Good morning, your Honours,
12 I am Edina Residovic, counsel for Mr. Zejnil Delalic,
13 together with my colleague, Eugene O'Sullivan,
14 a professor from Canada. Thank you.
15 MR. OLUJIC: Good morning, your Honour; I am
16 Olujic, Defence counsel of Mr. Zdravko Mucic, together
17 with my colleague, Mr. Michael Greaves. Thank you very
19 MR. KARABDIC: Good morning your Honour, I am
20 Mr. Karabdic, counsel for Mr. Delic. Mr. Delic is also
21 represented by my colleague, Mr. Thomas Moran from
22 Huston, Texas. Thank you.
23 MR. ACKERMAN: Good morning, your Honour,
24 I am John Ackerman and I appear here with Cynthia
25 McMurrey on behalf of Esad Landzo. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much.
2 Mr. Moran, you are still cross-examining.
3 MR. MORAN: Yes, your Honour, if you give me
4 a second while he is coming in, to organise myself.
5 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: May we have the
7 (The witness entered court)
8 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Please remind the
9 witness that he is still on his oath.
10 THE REGISTRAR: I remind you, sir, that you
11 are still under oath.
12 A. I am so reminded.
13 DR. GOW (continued)
14 Cross-examined by MR. MORAN (continued).
15 Q. Good morning, Dr. Gow. Did you have a good
17 A. I had a pleasant weekend, thank you.
18 Q. Did you go home or were you here?
19 A. I went home.
20 MR. MORAN: I wish I could, I am jealous.
21 I have got a couple more documents I would
22 like to let you have with a little help from the usher,
23 three more documents and we will talk about them in
24 just a -- let us get them passed out. (Handed).
25 Professor, if you are looking at the first
1 one, the document number is S/23900, I am going to
2 refer you to paragraphs 1 and paragraphs 24 in
3 a second, so...
4 Okay, if I could have the exhibit numbers on
6 THE REGISTRAR: The first one is document
7 D20/3, the second one D21/3, and the third one, D22/3.
8 MR. MORAN: Okay. Fine. Thank you very
10 Professor, the first one in D20/3 which is
11 the document dated 12 May, I refer you to paragraph 1,
12 right after the footnote 1. There is a statement by the
14 "Mr. Goulding was in Yugoslavia (a term which
15 for the purposes of the present report is used to
16 signify the Republics of the former Socialist Federal
17 Republic of Yugoslavia)."
18 Would you not agree with me that that is an
19 indication that the Secretary-General agrees with your
20 feeling, that the Socialist Federal Republic of
21 Yugoslavia had ceased to exist by 12 May?
22 A. I am not sure that it is my feeling that it
23 ceased to exist, but certainly my judgement that it
24 ceased to exist.
25 Q. Your judgement?
1 A. Yes. I think that there is little doubt that
2 for most people that is the case.
3 Q. And if you look at paragraph 24 you will see
4 the phrase, "the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".
5 Again, would you agree with me that that is an
6 indication that the Secretary-General agrees with you
7 that the SFRY had ceased to exist by that date?
8 A. I think that can be taken as an
9 acknowledgement that the SFRY had ceased to exist by
10 that date, although, as we were discussing on Friday,
11 we had a number of similar cases. That does not
12 necessarily mean that all the issues are tidied up. It
13 is the difference between a dead body and the estate
14 being sorted out for many years afterwards.
15 Q. I understand that. The next document is
17 A. Which is which date?
18 Q. 27 July.
19 A. Thank you.
20 Q. I call your attention to paragraph 19 first.
21 Again, we are talking about the Federal
22 Republic of Yugoslavia and here we are talking about
23 international borders between Serbia and the Republic
24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 A. I think... I think I follow your drift, and
1 in general I think you are right, but I think that you
2 have actually phrased it incorrectly because this
3 question about the international borders is the
4 international borders within the protected area of
5 Croatia in the previous sentence, rather than a direct
6 reference to Serbia because, of course, in Belgrade's
7 and the outside world's terms generally the
8 international border would not be with Yugoslavia but
9 with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
10 Q. Right. That would indicate again that there
11 is a new nation floating around out there, the FRY that
12 has international borders?
13 A. I take that as recognition of the fact that
14 the declaration we referred to in the previous document
15 of 27 April has taken place and that as a matter of
16 fact the existence of Serbia Montenegro as a common
17 entity has been accepted.
18 Q. And now let me --
19 A. But without prejudice to the legal issues.
20 Q. Sure. Let me direct your attention to
21 D/22/3. Now, just so you know what this is and where
22 this came from, there is a volume that is published by
23 the United Nations every year called, "Resolutions and
24 Decisions of the Security Council", and what I did was
25 copy the front page so you knew where it came from and
1 then copied various pages in between. It is not,
2 believe me, a full copy.
3 A. No, I have no problems with that.
4 Q. Okay. Let me --
5 A. Just as a matter of interest, what is it that
6 is deleted?
7 Q. It says, "official record", and it is not
8 deleted, it was highlighted on the original.
9 A. Such is technology.
10 Q. Well, just so you know, there is one
11 depositories library for the United Nations where
12 I come from and this came from their library.
13 Let me direct your attention to page 22 in
14 here. On page 22, down at the bottom, or excuse me, in
15 the right-hand column, there is a paragraph about
16 halfway down which says:
17 "At the same meeting, following consultations
18 held earlier with members of the Security Council, the
19 President made the following statement."
20 Have you found that? I direct your attention
21 to the following portions of the statement, where the
22 President of the Security Council, after conversing
23 with the members of the Council, talked about centres
24 within the territory of the Former Yugoslavia and
25 especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina; again, would that not
1 lend support to your position that by the date of this,
2 which would be 4 August 1992, that the Security Council
3 had found that the Socialist Federal Republic of
4 Yugoslavia had ceased to exist?
5 A. I think the earlier documents, I mean, the
6 4th August series of documents that we have seen before
7 that confirm that by that date the judgement was that
8 the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia had
9 ceased to exist as a matter of fact.
10 Q. And again on page 25, Resolution 771, there
11 is expressing "grave alarm", that paragraph, again, the
12 Former Yugoslavia?
13 A. Again, the form, "Former Yugoslavia",
14 appears, yes.
15 Q. So, there is no doubt in your mind as an
16 expert in the politics of the former Socialist Federal
17 Republic of Yugoslavia and the areas that grew out --
18 the states that grew out of it, that the Socialist
19 Federal Republic ceased to exist as a nation, as
20 a state, on April 27th 1992, at the latest.
21 A. That would be my view. As I said, many
22 times, at the latest. There was a process beginning in
23 my judgement from 15th May when the Federation ceased to
24 function. Now, that could -- depending on the analogy
25 I used earlier could be that that was when it was kind
1 of -- when the body died, 27th April is when it was
2 pronounced clinically dead, and after that there was
3 a post mortem and then, continuing to this day,
4 testations about the estate, including who gets what in
5 the assets and what to do with the people. I mean,
6 some of the issues, if I may be presumptuous, I assume
7 from this that this relates to the questions of
9 Q. You are exactly right. We will get to that
10 in a second.
11 A. As I said, which was one of the issues left
12 to be decided, in the declaration you showed me on
14 Q. What, the declaration of April 27th?
15 A. Yes, which said kind of until these are
16 finally decided, the SFRY -- the Federal Republic of
17 Yugoslavia, kind of something like continues to
19 Q. Comparable.
20 A. Yes, this kind of thing, until it is finally
22 Q. Sure, but in fact when it comes to
23 nationality, you have testified in the Tadic trial that
24 the Republic of -- or the FRY and Republic of Serbia,
25 never in any sense claimed that it had -- that the
1 Serbs were living outside the borders of the FRY
2 were nationals of the FRY, as I recall. Did you not
3 testify something along those lines?
4 A. I do not recall precisely what I testified
5 any more. Maybe if you have some specific reference
6 I could be clear about what it is that I might have
8 Q. Okay. You said, one of the areas where
9 I have a note is, there was a question asked by Judge
10 McDonald, and she said:
11 "I am very concerned about how Serb people
12 consider themselves, what state they consider
13 themselves belonging to, and various other Republics."
14 And you responded:
15 "None of the constitutional provisions, nor
16 indeed any of the constitutional documents to which we
17 have made reference so far give any indication of
18 a responsibility of the Republic of Serbia or the JNA
19 for Serb people specifically outside the Republic of
21 A. That was an accurate statement. It could be
22 amended by the discussion that we just had, reference
23 to the document on FRY I am not sure how substantially
24 it would amend the judgement. It is a distinction,
25 again, between the formal technical position as set
1 down in some of those documents and of course
2 recognising in the character of the way the Communist
3 political -- the Communist politics worked, that a lot
4 of the time you had to have this kind of mode of
5 deception to disguise what your actual position was,
6 but that was the formal position, as per that.
7 Q. In fact, that is consistent with article 17
8 of the constitution of the FRY, which we read Friday.
9 A. I could not recall if it was article 17, but
10 yes, it is consistent with material contained in that
12 Q. And in fact, if I were to tell you that the
13 FRY did not pass any kind of citizenship law until
14 1996, and that that gave FRY nationality to all persons
15 who were nationals of the SFRY and citizens of Serbia
16 or Montenegro on 27 April 1992, you would not disagree
17 with that, would you?
18 A. I would find it hard to disagree with it in
19 the absence of alternative material, and I do not
20 profess to be an expert in these matters, but I would
21 point out that it was my understanding that there were
22 steps taken in 1993, and at a later date which might
23 well have been in 1996, both of which regulated the
24 issues of passports linked to citizenship and that
25 perhaps the 1996 law is the one which makes it no
1 longer possible for people who were not citizens of
2 Serbia or Montenegro at that time to become so, but in
3 the interim certainly there were people who were
4 citizens of other Republics who did, or who were
5 treated as.
6 I mean, for example, I think one of the
7 former cases here, General Dukic, which case was set
8 aside. General Dukic, as I understand it, was from
9 Bosnia, as a Serb, but was an FRY citizen in Belgrade,
10 so there are degrees of ambiguity. Again, part of this
11 process of sorting out the elements in the period
13 Q. Okay, by the way, just so that you know the
14 source of that statement I made, it is the third report
15 on nationality in relation to the succession of states
16 from the International Law Commission and it is dated
17 28 February of last year.
18 Coming back to the same subject, there is
19 absolutely no question in your mind, is there, that the
20 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
21 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro
22 are different legal entities?
23 A. I would be cautious both as a non- -- I would
24 be cautious in passing a judgement on that question,
25 first because I am a non-lawyer, and secondly because
1 it is an outstanding issue as part of the succession
2 talks, so I would have thought as a matter of fact,
3 both legal and political, that is not yet confirmed,
4 but I would say as a political fact that the SFRY and
5 the FRY are not the same political entity, and that,
6 because that is the case, is why Belgrade is laying
7 claim to be the sole legal inheritor of the SFRY.
8 Q. Okay. Going to another -- by the way, that
9 has never been accepted by anybody, has it? It has
10 never been accepted, for instance, by the United
11 Nations, that the FRY is the sole successor state to
12 the SFRY?
13 A. I would hesitate to say it has not been
14 accepted by anybody. I am not aware of its having been
15 accepted by anybody. It is certainly not accepted by
16 the parties to the succession talks, and it is not
17 accepted in -- it is not accepted to the extent of the
18 FRY's being admitted to full membership of the United
19 Nations. One of the documents you had the other day
20 referred to this, the question that, I think, one of
21 the documents you showed me the other day? I think it
22 was on something I have seen and maybe if not maybe it
23 is something you are going to show to me. I mean it
24 was one of the documents that I saw on Friday, either
25 from you or the Prosecutor's Office, making precisely
1 the point that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could
2 not automatically be seen as sole legal successor and
3 inherit the seat of the SFRY, that it would have to
4 apply for membership.
5 Q. Actually, that would be Resolution 777 which
6 is on page 34 of that document in front of you.
7 A. Fine.
8 Q. Now, let us switch to a different topic.
9 You testified when Mr. Ackerman was talking to
10 you, and my notes say it is something along the lines
11 that your knowledge of the Konjic area, the specifics
12 of what went on in the Konjic area were relatively
13 limited. Is that because, and I am not trying to
14 denigrate anything that happened there, but that in any
15 war there are going to be some areas that are
16 essentially a backwater, where important events as they
17 effect history and the war itself are not occurring.
18 Is that what Konjic was?
19 A. Whether it was a backwater or not, I had not
20 really considered before. It is conceivable that it
21 could be interpreted in that way. I am not sure that
22 I would or would not, without giving it greater
23 reflection. I think what I would stress is that in
24 making that comment to Mr. Ackerman I was recognising
25 that I have a degree of expertise which operates
1 principally at the strategic operational level, and
2 what you are talking about in Konjic is, as in any
3 other specific location, a tactical situation and
4 therefore I would see my role as matching that which
5 I know about the overall strategic operational
6 situation to material which I may be able to use
7 regarding an area like Konjic.
8 Q. And in fact one of the things you said to
9 Mr. Ackerman was, the real basis of your knowledge is,
10 I think, the exact quote is, "material I looked at
12 I presume that is material shown to you by
13 the Office of the Prosecutor?
14 A. Yes, indeed.
15 Q. What kinds of things did they show you?
16 A. The kinds of documents that we have been
17 discussing in the course of giving testimony, documents
18 which I think, as I recall from before Christmas,
19 Mr. Ackerman at some length raised the question of what
20 were these documents and I think the Prosecutor pointed
21 out that these were documents which had already been in
22 evidence and had been used in various ways.
23 Q. Sure.
24 A. And I think I seem also to recall that I made
25 the point that whilst I had been given several bundles
1 of the documents which had been used I had done my best
2 to skim through and to try to identify things which,
3 for the purposes of what I was being asked to testify
4 to, might be of use. And I can quite readily admit
5 that I have not exhaustively looked at all those
6 bundles of documents.
7 Q. I do not think any expert witness in the
8 world ever has, and I am proud of you for being honest
9 enough, for being one of the few experts who will admit
11 Did they show you some transcripts and
12 testimony from some generals of the Bosnian army,
13 Generals Divjak and Pasalic?
14 A. They did and I think we discussed this with
15 Mr. Ackerman before Christmas.
16 Q. Okay. When you were talking to him Friday,
17 you were talking about chains of command and that it
18 was not what you would expect in the -- in a regular
19 armed force. I take it that is because at least the
20 Bosnian army in the period we are talking about, May
21 through August, September, October, of 1992, was in the
22 process of forming and chains of command were pretty
23 murky at best.
24 A. I think that would be consistent with what
25 I said before Christmas. It was a degree of -- it was
1 a degree in which the process of forming an overall
2 regular armed force was taking place on the part of the
3 authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that in that
4 process there was always a degree of improvisation in
5 some areas, but I think that still does not take away
6 the point that within areas there would be degrees of
7 command responsibility. There were structures that
8 they were relying on, the elements of the Patriotic
9 League, the nascent elements of the army linked between
10 Patriotic League and Territorial Defence forces, the
11 provisions of the old defence system, so there were
12 elements, but the point I would make is that it was not
13 a fully coherent regular command chain that you would
14 see, for example, in the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
16 Q. But it surely is not what you would see in
17 the Dutch army. There are not the same kinds of little
18 boxes for tables of organisation and things like that.
19 A. Well, I would make a distinction between the
20 tables of organisation, because I suspect that people
21 did have tables of organisation, but for some time,
22 say, in the period towards the autumn of 1992, the
23 boxes and the tables of organisation did not correspond
24 with much of the reality.
25 Q. They did not.
1 And in fact, two Bosnian generals who were on
2 the scene at the appropriate -- at the times we are
3 talking about, the May through December 1992 period,
4 were to have looked at documents and looked at various
5 things and based on their own experience said that they
6 would be unable to say who commanded what, or -- the
7 exact extent of the commander's authority, based on
8 what they had within given and what they saw while they
9 were there, they probably would be pretty right about
10 that, would they not, that they could not tell?
11 A. I would find that -- I would find it hard to
12 make a firm judgement, without knowing, looking
13 precisely at the example. I think it is reasonable
14 that they would have some sense of the degree to which
15 command authority would run in a particular area. It
16 is not inconceivable that they might -- kind of the
17 question raised on Friday -- have self-interest in
18 presenting things in a certain way as well.
19 I am quite happy with my own judgement, which
20 is that there were degrees of authority being exercised
21 and that there was a formal command authority which was
22 emerging, and in reference to this particular case,
23 that from a certain date it can be said that there was
24 a formal command authority position, but that is...
1 Q. Okay, no, that is fine.
2 Another thing you talked about, and this was
3 back before Christmas, was the term, "coordinator", and
4 if we can remember back that far...
5 A. It is difficult.
6 Q. I cannot remember what I had for lunch
7 yesterday, so I understand where you are at, but you
8 used an example with the term, "coordinator", comparing
9 it to a position in the British army in the special
10 operations executive during the war. Do you recall
12 A. I do. I recall there was quite some
13 discussion about the matter.
14 (10.30 am)
15 Q. And no army I am familiar with has a title,
16 "coordinator". You may have various different things
17 but you tend not to have coordinators. That seems to
18 me to be kind of an ad hoc position.
19 A. I think that is the point I was making
20 precisely before Christmas, that it was not a normal,
21 regular function, it was something which would only
22 emerge in specific circumstances, and would be a role
23 designed to meet those specific circumstances, so yes,
24 ad hoc -- precisely.
25 Q. And without knowing the exact circumstances
1 and the exact duties given to that coordinator, be it
2 to your colonel in the special operations executive, or
3 someone in -- pick an army. You would not know exactly
4 what his duties, powers or authorities would be, would
5 you? All you know would be the title.
6 A. I think you would know the title and as I am
7 sure I must have said in testimony before Christmas,
8 the important thing is that if the coordinator is to
9 have a meaningful role, then it has to be somebody who
10 is able to have full knowledge and authority in
11 circumstances where otherwise the specifics of the
12 situation mean that the regular command chain is not
13 going to operate, or there is not a regular command
14 chain, it is an unusual, ad hoc situation. It is
15 somebody who has the ability to be sure that all
16 sides -- I mean the Hackett case, I mentioned the
17 private armies, they would all talk to him, he would
18 know everything that was going on and therefore would
19 be able to use his personal authority to say, "you do
20 this, you do not do that", and I think that is the
21 essence of what I was trying to get across.
22 The Hackett idea was an image. It is an
23 analogy, rather like I was saying before about the dead
24 body and the estate being sorted out afterwards. It is
25 not to say that there is a precise correlation, but
1 that within it, if the term means anything, then it
2 means somebody who has the abilities to deal with all
3 parties concerned within that same broad site and would
4 do so on the basis of having full knowledge and
5 authority with those parties.
6 MR. MORAN: But you have absolutely no idea --
7 well, let me back off. If two generals in the Bosnian
8 army said they had no idea what the powers and
9 authorities of a coordinator were --
10 MR. NIEMANN: Well, your Honour, I do not
11 think we are assisted by these generalisations.
12 I think if counsel wants to draw Dr. Gow's attention to
13 what the General said, it would assist everybody if he
14 could go to precisely the part of the evidence that he
15 is referring to, and to put that to the witness.
16 I mean, these generalisation lead us
17 nowhere. I think it just leads to done confusion and
18 in my submission, your Honours, it would be much
19 better, if counsel wants to compare what the Generals
20 said and wants to put that to Dr. Gow, then I would ask
21 him to go to the specific part of the transcript and to
22 read that transcript to the witness.
23 MR. MORAN: Well, your Honour, I am not
24 attempting to impeach either General Pasalic, General
25 Divjak or Dr. Gow with the statements that the other one
1 had. What I am trying to get at is who was more likely
2 to know specific powers and specific duties of people.
3 Two general officers on the scene, or a very learned
4 professor from the United Kingdom who, basically all he
5 knows is what he has read. Is that a fair assessment?
6 MR. NIEMANN: That is not the point, your
7 Honour. The point is that there is --
8 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Excuse me. Actually,
9 have you established that none of these witnesses has
10 been able to tell who a coordinator is within the
11 structure and the witness himself has not been able to
12 tell you. I do not know what you are looking for
14 MR. MORAN: Your Honour, you have reached the
15 point that I was getting to. I do not need to ask any
16 more questions along that line and if I can --
17 A. I am quite happy to answer the question.
18 MR. MORAN: I think that the question has
19 been answered to the court's satisfaction.
20 Let me go through my note and see if there is
21 anything else I would like to ask you.
22 A. I mean, if I may...
23 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Well, unless you still
24 have any confusion in your mind, let us hear what you
25 think, what your answer is?
1 A. I think I have clarity in my mind as far as,
2 as far as is possible in these circumstances and maybe
3 if I can assist in sorting out the confusion, I think
4 you need to be clear first that the term,
5 "coordinator", had no precedent as far as I am aware
6 in the Yugoslav military context, but therefore you
7 could not expect anybody, necessarily, in the Yugoslav
8 context, a Bosnian context, to have any knowledge of
9 what, "coordinator", would mean. It would therefore
10 not surprise me in the slightest to find Generals
11 Divjak or Pasalic or any others saying, "Well, I have
12 never come across this term before and I could not tell
13 you exactly what it contained", I think it is possible
14 to say that the term does have relevance and as far as
15 I understand it, the term was adopted at the local
16 level and being adopted at the local level it presents
17 some questions, what can it mean, and what I am putting
18 to you is that what it can mean is something of this
19 kind, because it is that -- that is the way in which it
20 would make sense, and I would say no more than that.
21 Q. It can mean something different, then?
22 A. I would say that it has to -- if it means
23 anything, if it has real content in meaning, then it
24 would have to be based on full knowledge and authority
25 and my impression is that that is, as I described,
1 I think, before Christmas, from reading the things that
2 I have seen, that, for example, Mr. Delalic did have
3 a degree of personal authority you could get on. He
4 could talk to the Croats and he could talk to his own
5 people. It was useful in that way. He had money, he
6 could do things, and I think in a sense that is where
7 this derives from.
8 Q. But you do not know what the job description
10 A. Well, the job description was, as far as
11 I recall from seeing things, was to procure arms, to
12 coordinate between the HVO and the various Territorial
13 Defence paramilitary Muslim groups, within that
14 context, to make sure that people were all -- that
15 lines between them were clear, that supplies as far as
16 possible were available, and I think all if that is
17 what you see confirmed when he becomes appointed as the
18 tactical group commander in the first instance for the
19 specifically assigned units and then in the quite
20 unusual measure for all units in the Konjic area.
21 Q. Again, if two general officers from the
22 Bosnian army said they looked at the same orders you
23 looked at and did not know what he commanded, you would
24 not disagree with them, would you?
25 A. I cannot disagree with what they say. If
1 they say they do not know something then presumably
2 they do not know something, and I am not sure what they
3 would mean if they were to have said that they did not
4 know. It does seem to me that if you see a document
5 saying that all units within a specified territorial --
6 a specific delineated territory are under one person's
7 command, and it is an order from the central command in
8 Sarajevo, then that seems reasonable to suppose that
9 all units in that sector are under that person's
10 command. But of course, against that, as I pointed
11 out, the realities of command authority also were that
12 sometimes there was an apparent degree of
13 insubordination within that structure, as I pointed
14 out. These apparent arguments with Ramic.
15 Q. Sure. It was -- the lines of authority were
16 murky or muddled to say the least.
17 A. I think the lines of authority were fairly
18 clear. I think in this case one of the individuals was
19 bucking the system a little bit, but that certainly is
20 an impression, I cannot be certain about that because
21 I do not have enough information, just an impression
22 from the things that I have seen.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. But it is clear from within that that the
25 authority rested with the commanding officer, and that
1 the problem was not that he did not have the authority,
2 but sometimes getting things done.
3 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: We are getting a little
4 confused now.
5 Now, there are two situations. The situation
6 when the gentleman was a coordinator, and the situation
7 when he became a commander. Now, what all the generals
8 have consistently said was that a coordinator had no
9 command, as far as they were aware. This is what they
10 have all said.
11 A. Yes.
12 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Well, I do not know
13 whether that is also what you believe, from your
14 analysis of the situation.
15 A. I think -- let me try to be clear about this,
16 that what I have been saying is that coordinator is
17 not -- it is not a normal position and it is not
18 a command function in a normal sense, but to be
19 a coordinator would require some of the qualities that
20 would be present in an officer commanding, that is to
21 say full knowledge of what is going on, and to have the
22 authority to get things done, but not in the terms of
23 a formal regularised command structure which has, for
24 example, the back-up of military law behind it to
25 penalise those who disobey. I think it is a degree of
1 personal authority.
2 My impression is that when Mr. Delalic is made
3 commander in the area, it is precisely because, de
4 facto, he has already been providing that role whilst
5 designated coordinator but the term, "coordinator", is
6 in part because of the ad hoc nature of the situation,
7 that it has been improvised and in part because of the
8 relationship with the HVO, it simply would not have
9 been acceptable to appoint him and name him as
10 commander because of the relationship between the
11 Croats and the Muslims in the area as they were trying
12 to coordinate joint defence operations. That is the
13 impression that I have.
14 MR. MORAN: Doctor, when you say, "personal
15 authority", but it is not part of the command, the
16 formal chain of command, would it be fair to say, to
17 substitute the word, "influence", or something along
18 that line where someone, rather than having the ability
19 to court martial people and do whatever military
20 commanders do, he just does it on his personal
22 A. I think --
23 Q. The kinds of things that --
24 A. Yes, I think that would be part of what I am
25 saying, that he does not have -- precisely. He does
1 not have the ability to court martial people for not
2 doing things, but he does have the positive ability
3 through what might be influence, might be money, well
4 money as a form of influence in that case, but
5 whatever, to arrange things so that people are doing
6 those -- carrying out activities which are more or less
7 consistent, going in the same broad direction, rather
8 than crossing lines, doing things which would be
10 Q. Convince, cajole, negotiate?
11 A. I would have thought all of those are part of
12 the everyday life of an officer commanding and would be
13 part of this role as well. I mean, a lot of it is
14 based on character and personal authority. That is why
15 people get to be officers commanding within the formal
16 structures of an armed force as well because they show
17 that they can -- they have qualities of leadership,
18 organisation, even intuition, whatever. Those are the
19 qualities which are relevant.
20 Q. But your normal officer commanding, the
21 commanding officer of the whatever infantry battalion
22 has formal structures, where you are saying this
23 coordinator probably did not. It was more of a ...
24 A. I think I have acknowledged that -- several
25 times -- that it was not a formal position in the sense
1 of a regular armed force and part of the command
2 hierarchy. I mean, it was a formal position in that it
3 was designated by the presidents -- by the chairman of
4 the local war presidency, so politically it was
5 a formal position but it is not one within that command
6 hierarchy of an armed force.
7 MR. MORAN: Okay. I pass the witness, your
8 Honour. Thank you very much.
9 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much.
10 Cross-examined by MS. RESIDOVIC
11 Q. May it please the court, thank you.
12 Good morning, Dr. Gow. My name is Edina
13 Residovic, and I am Defence counsel for Mr. Zejnil
14 Delalic. As I happen to be the last among the counsel
15 to do the cross-examination, there are not many
16 questions left for me to put to you that you have not
17 already discussed. You will forgive me if, in the
18 interests of clarification, I may go back to certain
19 issues that have already been looked into, but which
20 may not be quite clear to me as regards your
21 understanding of them.
22 A. I will forgive you anything.
23 Q. Dr. Gow, in the course of the
24 examination-in-chief, you said that you took
25 a doctorate on a thesis about Yugoslavia.
1 A. I am sure I did, if I was asked, but it is
2 the case anyway.
3 Q. And on a number of occasions in response to
4 questions put by the Prosecution, and my colleagues,
5 you also said that in the last few years and on Friday
6 you said for at least fifteen years, you have been
7 focusing your studies on the military and political
8 conditions in Yugoslavia.
9 A. Broadly that is true, yes.
10 Q. And today, again, you stated that it was your
11 position that the Socialist Federal Republic of
12 Yugoslavia was the last to cease to exist, that is on
13 the 27th April 1992, on the day when the Federal
14 Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed.
15 Is it true, Dr. Gow, that on that date when
16 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed, the
17 assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia passed
18 a constitution in which it indicated its official name,
19 that is the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Was that
20 not so?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You are also aware, and in the course of the
23 cross-examination you were shown a number of documents
24 to that effect, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
25 as of that day, called itself by that new name, that is
1 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
2 A. Yes, that is the case, although we also saw
3 some documents which showed that, as was much of the
4 discussion earlier on, some issues continued. I was
5 shown documents from Blanko Kostic where he was still
6 using the language and speaking as though the old
7 structures still existed but yes, formally that was the
9 Q. Thank you. You have also stated your opinion
10 on a number of Security Council resolutions, one of
11 which was the Resolution of May 15th 1992. It is
12 Resolution number 752. In that connection I should
13 like to ask you, since I am certain that you are very
14 familiar with its contents, could you confirm that by
15 this Resolution of 15th May it was clearly asserted
16 that the forces of the Yugoslav People's Army and
17 elements of the Croatian army should withdraw from the
18 territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Was
19 that not so?
20 A. That was so.
21 Q. Yes. That was prescribed by point 3 of that
22 Resolution, whereas point 4 provided also that the
23 forces that would not withdraw had to be placed under
24 the control, under the authority, of the government of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?
1 A. I think to be correct, both elements are
2 contained within paragraph 4 which reads:
3 "Demands also that those units of the
4 Yugoslav People's Army and elements of the Croatian
5 army now in Bosnia Herzegovina must either be withdrawn
6 or be subject to the authority of the government of
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina."
8 But, I mean, taken together, the essential
9 point is that units should be withdrawn or subject to
10 the authority of the Bosnian government.
11 Q. Yes. Thank you. And paragraph 5 says that
12 all irregular forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina have to be
13 disarmed and disbanded.
14 A. That is the case.
15 Q. This document has already been admitted into
16 evidence, so there is no need for me to tender it.
17 However, in connection with questions
18 relating to this case, I should like to ask you whether
19 you are aware that all the forces of the Yugoslav
20 People's Army withdrew from the facilities in the town
21 of Konjic by May 12th 1992.
22 A. I cannot confirm that I know that, because
23 I no longer recall. I do recall, without the specific
24 date, I recall that JNA units withdrew at a relatively
25 early stage in the armed conflict in Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina from the Konjic area and that this was
2 treated as one of the initial big successes of the
3 local defence courses, because precisely because the
4 JNA had been, had withdrawn from barracks under
5 control, and in one of the rare cases had withdrawn and
6 left behind various forms of equipment and munitions.
7 Q. In view of the fact that you testified to
8 having seen many documents given to you by the
9 Prosecution, then you could have found this statement
10 in those documents, that is that after May 12th there
11 were no remaining JNA forces in Konjic, so could you
12 please confirm that, that this was certainly done
13 before the deadline given by the main headquarters of
14 the army of -- main headquarters of the JNA, that is
15 before the deadline set by them.
16 A. If the date was 12th May 1991, then that --
17 then it would not have been the case that it was before
18 the order which was on 4th May, but it would have been
19 the case that that was completed before the completion,
20 that the prescribed completion date on the 19th of May,
21 so it was after the order, if it was the date. I have
22 to say that I have looked at some of these documents in
23 the autumn, and I am perhaps too far away from them to
24 remember precise dates any more, but as long as nobody
25 else contests the date, I am happy that that was the
2 Q. For the benefit of the transcript, Dr. Gow,
3 I have been told that you said that by 12th or rather
4 the 19th May 1991; perhaps this was a slip, either on
5 your part or on the part of the interpreters, but the
6 correct date is 1992, was it not?
7 A. I am sorry, yes. It was my mistake. I did
8 say 1991 just now. I now hear it, now you point out.
9 Excuse me, I meant 1992. You are quite right.
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: I apologise to you, Dr. Gow,
11 since several documents were commented on, D21, D22/3,
12 so I would like to verify whether these documents have
13 been admitted into evidence as they were tendered by my
14 learned friend.
15 These were documents that Professor Gow
16 discussed with my colleague Thomas Moran.
17 MR. NIEMANN: As far as I know, your Honour,
18 they have not been admitted -- your Honours, I was
19 going to comment on that. I do not think that they were
20 tendered. I do not have any objection, but I query
21 whether Mr. Moran seeks to tender the whole contents of
22 the documents. There are, in some cases, many pages in
23 excess of anything that he referred to, and I think,
24 your Honour, that it is appropriate that only those
25 parts of the documents to which he took Dr. Gow should
1 be tendered in evidence, unless Mr. Moran would argue
2 that the rest of it should be tendered. It seems to me
3 that the parts that Dr. Gow were taken to should be
4 admitted. I have no objection to that, but I do, at
5 this stage, provisionally object to the rest of the
7 JUDGE JAN: Mr. Niemann, they are Resolutions
8 of the Security Council, and they are public
9 documents. We can take judicial notice of them in any
11 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours can do that; except
12 that I do not know to what other part of the documents
13 they would seek to be used and it seems to me that,
14 unless Mr. Moran would care to lay a foundation for the
15 balance of them, then it is appropriate that only those
16 parts of it which are referred to by Dr. Gow and
17 referred to him by Mr. Moran should be admitted.
18 MR. MORAN: Well your Honour, first, I did
19 forget to tender them and I apologise to the Tribunal
20 for that, and I will tender them, move them into
21 evidence, and I would also ask the Trial Chamber to
22 take judicial notice of them, as public documents of
23 either the Secretary-General or of the Security Council
24 which, of course, is the body that created the
25 Tribunal, and is the superior body to the Tribunal.
1 MR. NIEMANN: Well, I do not really want to
2 make a big issue out of this, but it seems to me that
3 if your Honours are going to take judicial notice then
4 there is no need to tender them at all.
5 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Actually what
6 constitutes international law are these things. This,
7 I think, constitutes international law. It is
8 material, in considering what is international law in
9 this situation, I do not think we really care whether
10 you tender them or not. Even if we found them ourselves
11 we could have used them.
12 MR. MORAN: Your Honour, I am not offering
13 them for the truth of the matter asserted there, I am
14 just offering them that they are documents of the
15 United Nations.
16 JUDGE JAN: They are public documents.
17 MR. MORAN: That is correct, your Honour, and
18 that is all that they are being offered for. That is
19 what the public documents say, not that the statements
20 of fact made therein are true and correct.
21 MR. NIEMANN: Well, on that basis I withdraw
22 any objection I had.
23 MS. RESIDOVIC: In that case, documents D20,
24 and the others have been admitted, thank you.
25 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: We will formally admit
1 them. I think they should -- through you, they can
2 still come.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: Very well. Thank you.
4 Dr. Gow, I apologise once again for this short
5 break. However, I should like to discuss with you some
6 other issues. Since you specialise in political and
7 military issues, beyond the territory of the Former
8 Yugoslavia as well, I would like to ask you whether you
9 are aware that in most European countries there is
10 a prohibition on political organisation and activities
11 of the political parties of other countries. For
12 example, in England, the Communist Party of the Soviet
13 Union, or the Serb Socialist Party, et cetera. Are
14 you aware of that?
15 A. I have to say that I think in the United
16 Kingdom, whilst there would be -- would have previously
17 been a proscription on membership, not only on
18 membership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
19 but possibly within the Communist Party of Great
20 Britain within the armed forces, in general there is no
21 proscription on membership of political parties and
22 I think there would be no political question. I think
23 the question just has not arisen as to whether it
24 should be a political party from one country or many
25 others, in other countries that proscript membership of
1 a political party in Germany is quite normal and
2 accepted as part of the civilianisation of the system.
3 In some other countries it is wholly unacceptable.
4 I think there is not one single message which you can
5 give on that question.
6 Q. Dr. Gow, maybe my question was not clear
7 enough. According to the constitution and the law of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, even before the war and after the
9 war there is a proscription on the operation on its
10 territory of parties of third countries, regardless of
11 the parties that are free to operate as parties of
12 their country, so my question is, are you aware that
13 what I know is true of my country, applies to the
14 majority of other countries, that a political party of
15 a third country is not allowed to engage in political
16 activity or to be organised in a foreign country. That
17 is something I am asking you to confirm.
18 A. I hesitate to get bogged down in this, but
19 I think it would depend on what you mean by, "political
20 activity". Two things, I think, are the case. One is
21 that in my own country and most other of the, say, for
22 example, the EU member states of which I am aware,
23 political activist members of parties from one country
24 can go to another country and may make speeches/hold
25 rallies. It is also the case that they might then
1 separately also constitute a political party, for
2 example, within the United Kingdom, which is somehow
3 connected, a branch of that party, but which is
4 a different party. Maybe I am struggling to understand
5 what it is that you want from me.
6 JUDGE JAN: Perhaps England is a wrong
7 example. She is probably talking about the continent.
8 A. As far as I am aware that is also the case
9 in --
10 JUDGE JAN: England has a different
11 tradition altogether.
12 A. Perhaps my country -- I think I probably
13 acknowledge that the UK generally is an exception to
14 many rules but in this case, I think that the same
15 applies when it comes to all the member states of the
16 European Union. I would not state that categorically
17 without looking into it closely, but I think it is in
18 the nature of the European Union that something like
19 that is the case.
20 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: But are you aware of
21 such a constitutional provision in the constitution of
23 A. I think that is a separate question. I was
24 not asked was I aware of that --
25 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I think they are tied
2 A. I think the question as I --
3 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: If you are aware of
4 that, then that question follows.
5 A. Okay. Then yes, but I thought the question
6 was, is the rest of Europe the same as Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina, to which I was answering, "no", basically,
8 but that is... sorry.
9 MS. RESIDOVIC: Obviously, the way that the
10 question was put may have caused some confusion. May
11 I try once again to establish understanding with what
12 I am asking and what you are answering, namely, all
13 that you have said, that someone with certain political
14 convictions from England or another country may act in
15 England or another country, I find that clear.
16 I belong to a party in my state, and I come here in
17 Holland and I am free to express my political
18 convictions. But probably, according to the
19 constitution and law of The Netherlands, I would not be
20 allowed to form a branch of my party from
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina here, to engage in political
22 activity. So these are two different things. One
23 thing is my human right and freedom to express and
24 voice my political convictions wherever I wish, but
25 I am asking, are you aware that this other thing is
1 prohibited, that is for me to come here and form
2 a party of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to act and be active
3 here, and struggle for the aims of that party of
5 (11.00 am)
6 A. I am not aware that that is the case. I am
7 not an expert in Netherlands electoral or party
8 registration law. I would be surprise if it were not
9 possible to organise a party for those purposes in The
10 Netherlands, perhaps not for you as a non-citizen to do
11 it but I am not sure what to say, but...
12 MS. RESIDOVIC: Though my question is, foreign
13 citizens in a country would not be allowed to organise
14 political parties of a foreign country. Can you
15 confirm that?
16 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, Dr. Gow, I think,
17 has assisted as much as he possibly can. I think he
18 has expressed his reservations and the extent of his
19 knowledge on this, and I do not think -- I think it is
20 flogging a dead horse to go any further on this issue.
21 MS. RESIDOVIC: I thank my learned colleague
22 Mr. Niemann, but I think that Dr. Gow can answer, whether
23 he is able to answer or not, any question put to him,
24 so I would like to ask Mr. Gow to answer my question.
25 A. I think I have been making clear that I do
1 not feel particularly qualified to answer these
2 questions, but as far as I have understanding of them,
3 I think it is not impossible. What I said before was
4 that it would not certainly be the case that somebody,
5 for example, yourself, you could come here and organise
6 a political party. I do not know whether that would be
7 the case or not. I would not exclude the possibility.
8 I know of people in the United Kingdom, where that kind
9 of thing has happened, so again, it is difficult. My
10 familiarity is more with the electoral system in the UK
11 than in The Netherlands, but...
12 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I just want to know
13 what counsel is about. Are you suggesting that because
14 of the constitutional provision in Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 no political party of a separate country can be
16 established in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Is that your
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: Yes. A political party,
19 shall we say, the De Gaullists of France cannot form
20 a party in Bosnia-Herzegovina by French people, by
21 foreign citizens. The citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina
22 may form such a party.
23 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I suppose, I do not see
24 the difficulty in answering that question, whether,
25 according to their constitution...
1 A. I do not see any difficulty in answering that
2 question either, as I think I already have done, your
3 Honour, which is to say that I would agree with that
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: I am satisfied. Thank you.
6 However, let me ask you something else, which is
7 probably much closer to your expertise.
8 You know that in the majority of European
9 countries there are many foreign citizens and would you
10 agree that in most of those European countries cultural
11 organisations of those foreigners is permitted. They
12 may form clubs, cultural associations, and societies.
13 You are familiar with that fact, I think, and can
14 confirm it.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. May we now go back to your work on questions
17 related to the Former Yugoslavia and
19 During the examination-in-chief and later you
20 said that the testimony you gave before this Tribunal
21 was based in the first place on your personal research,
22 regarding the Former Yugoslavia, on your global
23 understanding of world conditions in the world in
24 Europe and in that area. Was that not so?
25 A. I suppose it must have been. Again, I do not
1 recall precisely, but I have no problem with that.
2 Q. Your views and knowledge was also based on
3 the study of numerous documents, regulations,
4 scientific scholarly publications, but third parties.
5 A. That is the case.
6 Q. However, when you were stating your views
7 about conditions in Konjic you also said, as you did
8 a moment ago when asked by my colleague, that your
9 knowledge of the circumstances in Konjic was not the
10 result of your prior personal investigations.
11 A. That is absolutely true. As I have said
12 several times now in the course of testimony, I am not
13 a specialist in Konjic, my degree of speciality is to
14 do with military-political affairs across the
15 territories of what was the SFRY. Konjic, like any
16 other locality is only a question as far as I look into
17 it with relevant material to see how it fits into that
18 overall context. I am not here, as I understand it,
19 I am not here as an investigator in the Konjic case.
20 Q. However, as far as I was able to understand,
21 so if that is correct, please confirm it, that most of
22 your information about Konjic came from the material
23 shown to you by the Prosecution, among which was the
24 statement of Mr. Delalic. Would it be correct to say
1 A. I think that would be correct, yes.
2 I think -- yes. Certainly most of my knowledge of
3 Konjic is based on those documents, yes.
4 Q. As far as I can remember in answer to
5 a question by my learned colleague Mr. Ackerman, you
6 mentioned one figure, one source regarding the quantity
7 of armaments, that is a book by a Spanish author, of
8 whom you did not have the precise data.
9 However, conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina
10 were something that you studied at a much broader level
11 so you had the opportunity to examine the regulations
12 that preceded the war or that were passed after the
13 outbreak of the war.
14 A. I have seen matters pertaining to official
15 declarations, legislation, if that is what you are
16 asking, yes. And for the record, the book was by
17 Shabye Agere. Spelling, no doubt can be provided for
18 the transcribers at another date.
19 Q. In view of the fact that in the Tadic case
20 and probably also preparing yourself for this
21 testimony, you studied most of the legislation of
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina. My question is, are you aware
23 that already in April 1992 the state of Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina passed a decree with the value of law,
25 taking over the majority of the legislation of the
1 former SFRY, establishing that they should be applied
2 in Bosnia and Herzegovina until special regulations are
3 adopted for particular areas, and this decree was
4 published in the Official Gazette of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina, issue number 2. Are you aware of that
7 A. I was not aware, I mean, I could not have
8 told you that it was issue number 2, but I was aware
9 that it took place.
10 Q. Then, Dr. Gow, you surely know that on April
11 8th 1992 a decree with validity of law was adopted,
12 whereby the former Territorial Defence was reorganised,
13 and made independent of the former Yugoslav People's
14 Army, whereby it became the armed force of the new
15 state. Are you familiar with that?
16 A. I am familiar with that. I think that was
17 pursued as the mobilisation of the Territorial Defence
18 on 4th April. The dates -- I think the date is
19 probably right, but I am sure you would not be wrong.
20 Q. Do you know that by that decree, certain
21 authorisations in terms of the control and command of
22 the Territorial Defence were conferred on the Ministry
23 of Internal Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina which,
24 for a certain period of time, was, in fact, the supreme
1 A. I am aware of the role of the Interior
2 Ministry in the defence structures, yes.
3 Q. I apologise. The translation that I received
4 was the Interior Ministry, whereas my question was, are
5 you aware that by this decree, passed on April 8th and
6 published in Official Gazette number 1, authorising the
7 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so it is either a wrong translation
9 or we misunderstood one another.
10 A. I think I was confused in the original
11 question, both -- I mean, both statements, yes, the
12 Ministry of Defence was authorised to organise
13 a command, but there was a role within the structures
14 for the Interior Ministry, but sorry, if
15 I misunderstood the first question, then excuse me.
16 Q. Thank you. We are here, so it is easy for us
17 to correct any errors that may occur.
18 Are you aware, Dr. Gow, that on the basis of
19 this decree, which is actually law of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina, the Ministry of Defence, in accordance
21 with its authorisations, conferred on it by this
22 decree, passed or adopted instructions, temporary
23 instructions on the subordination of district and
24 municipal TO headquarters to the new headquarters of
25 Territorial Defence of the Republic of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Are you aware of that fact?
2 A. I am aware of that, although going back to
3 much of the earlier discussion, it is worth pointing
4 out that this was a formal measure, and as I think
5 I said in the original evidence it was many months
6 before any of this began to have complete and real
7 effect, and in the meantime there was this period of
8 elements of improvisation, of trying to sort things out
9 at different levels and using and relying on the old
10 Territorial Defence practices and structures, so if
11 there was -- in the absence of direct overall command
12 from Sarajevo there would be local command and
13 authority, for example, in this area, with the Konjic
14 war presidency.
15 So, broadly yes to the formal proposition,
16 but bear in mind that the formal legislative position
17 did not necessarily correspond with what was there in
18 reality for some months. And of course, was subsequent
19 to the decision to rename, as the army of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina in, as I recall it was later in April or
21 maybe in May.
22 Q. Dr. Gow, could we now turn to the legal
23 foundations for the establishment and structure of the
24 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then later we may
25 go back to the actual situation in Konjic.
1 In connection with these two documents that
2 were officially published in the Official Gazette
3 number 1, and these instructions, you are familiar with
4 these documents, legal documents of the Republic of
6 Do you know, Dr. Gow, that these provisional
7 instructions, compiled by Dr. Divjak and issued by the
8 Minister of Defence, Jerko Doko and which has been
9 admitted into evidence, D122/1, stipulates that all
10 municipal and district headquarters need to be
11 subordinated to the republican headquarters of
12 Territorial Defence and where no such district
13 headquarters exist, that the municipal staffs should be
14 directly subordinated to the republican headquarters of
15 Territorial Defence. Are you aware of that?
16 A. I am sorry, I am not clear about the question
17 by the end of it, if you could, would you mind
18 repeating it?
19 Q. Dr. Gow, you have already confirmed that you
20 are familiar with the fact that these documents were
21 adopted. This document was drawn up by Colonel Divjak
22 and issued by Defence Minister, Jerko Doko.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. My question is, if you have looked at that
25 document, do you know that that document requires the
1 placing under the control of the republican staff all
2 the municipal and republican staffs of Territorial
3 Defence and that this document says that in cases when
4 there are no district staffs, that the municipal staffs
5 should be directly accountable to the republican
6 staff. Are you familiar with that fact?
7 A. Yes I am, now I have understood clearly that,
8 where a level of command structure is missing, then the
9 local level should be directly responsible to the
10 chief, to the general staff, yes. But again, in line
11 with the provisions of the defence doctrine, if that is
12 not available then the local authority will make
13 decisions at its own initiative. That is how I would
14 interpret the defence system.
15 Q. So therefore your answer is that you are
16 familiar with that.
17 Dr. Gow, will you tell me, please, whether you
18 know that this same piece of legislation established
19 also that all patriotic and armed groups and forces
20 need to be placed under the command of Territorial
21 Defence staffs by April 15th 1992, and that precisely
22 for this reason, this date is considered to be the date
23 marking the establishment of the army?
24 A. I take that to be the date marking the
25 formation of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
1 as distinct from the formation, formal formation of the
2 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina which came slightly
3 later but, if I understand these things correctly --
4 but the basic answer, with that minor qualification, is
6 Q. So I agree that you do not agree only with
7 regard to the name, the armed forces of Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina, with a name that was given subsequently.
9 Thank you.
10 Dr. Gow, you are also aware that in the
11 development of the armed forces of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina a prominent place was played by decrees on
13 defence and the armed forces adopted on May 15th 1992,
14 and published in the Official Gazette, number 4.
15 A. Yes. As I recall that would be the point at
16 which I would say that was the point at which the army
17 of Bosnia and Herzegovina formally took shape.
18 Q. So, Dr. Gow, you would agree with me, that the
19 development of the armed forces which later became the
20 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was defined by
21 legislation passed by the state of Bosnia and
23 A. As a matter of political fact, I understand
24 it to have been established by legal measures, within
25 the -- by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
2 Q. Let me ask you now, Dr. Gow, are you aware
3 that in mid-April, or, to be more precise, on
4 17th April 1992, a Municipal Assembly meeting was held
5 in Konjic at which the former TO staff was reorganised
6 as a new TO staff, to bring it in line with the
7 provisions of these decrees that I referred to early
9 A. I am aware that some action was taken at that
10 stage, yes.
11 Q. So, in actual fact, if that was indeed on the
12 17th April 1992, the military structure of the
13 Territorial Defence and the defence forces of Konjic
14 was brought in line with the instructions issued by the
15 Minister of National Defence. Is that not so?
16 A. I would not want to speak too strongly on the
17 matter in either direction. I think it was the case
18 that some action was taken. Whether or not it was
19 brought completely in line and what the implications of
20 that would be, I think would be something about which
21 we should exercise care. That is, formally some action
22 was taken, but it does not mean that the full content
23 of things being brought into line was achieved.
24 Q. However, Dr. Gow, you are not aware of the
25 opposite being true. You do not know that everything
1 was done, but you also do not know that what I have
2 suggested was not done.
3 A. I am not sure what it was now that you
4 suggested was done, in particular. I mean, I think it
5 was just that I was being careful about the expression
6 that you gave, which was, "brought into line with". And
7 I would just say that that should not be interpreted as
8 being a full establishment, i.e., not everything could
9 be brought into line but action was taken regarding the
10 steps to be taken, so something was done, but not
11 necessarily all of it.
12 Q. So, you could normally answer this question
13 with greater precision, if you had the minutes from
14 that meeting of the Municipal Assembly in Konjic. Is
15 that not right?
16 A. I would imagine that the minutes from the
17 meeting in Konjic would give evidence of discussion and
18 decisions taken, but still would not give you
19 information actually on implementation, and I think
20 some of the other evidence that we have discussed over
21 the course of my giving testimony here indicates that
22 there were areas of -- shall we say blurred areas,
23 areas in which certain things were not yet clear, in
24 which practical measures and authority was being worked
1 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Both of you are
2 actually speaking out of context, because we do not
3 know what those minutes of the meeting are.
4 A. I think I am -- simply to say that
5 hypothetically, even if we had the minutes right here
6 in front of us, all they would tell us would be what
7 went on at the meeting rather than what was implemented
8 pursuant to the meeting, which I think is the point
9 that I was making.
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honour, you are probably
11 not familiar with many of these documents that Dr. Gow
12 is referring to, as I am not, but he is expressing many
13 of his hypothetical views on the basis of things that
14 he personally did not study, so I am going to try and
15 be more precise.
16 Would you think this would be an appropriate
17 time for a break?
18 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, by the time you
19 return you might have organised your thoughts clearly
20 as to where we are going to. So we will break now and
21 return at 12 noon.
22 (11.30 pm)
23 (A short break)
25 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: You may continue
1 Ms. Residovic.
2 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you, your Honours.
3 Dr. Gow, before we continue, when you only wish to say,
4 "yes", would you please state it so clearly, because
5 I have noticed that in part of the transcript there
6 were some nods that were not taken down, so if you
7 would just please, when you confirm something, you also
8 say so, by answering, "yes".
9 A. Gladly. I think that I probably did, but
10 maybe it was not registered. If there are any such
11 points you want to take me back to, I am happy to
12 revisit them.
13 Q. I will review it and we will see if there are
14 any unclear points, so we will get back to that if
16 A. On the record I said, "okay", there as well.
17 I realise that had it did not sound here, so...
18 Q. Very well. Dr. Gow, we left off when we
19 talked about the last assembly meeting in Konjic in
20 April of 1992.
21 Do you know that in this assembly meeting it
22 was concluded that all patriotic forces, that is the
23 organised armed groups, that had to be put in service
24 of the defence forces of the HVO and the MUP, which was
25 in accordance with the decisions made by the republican
2 A. I am sorry, I think I will have to ask you to
3 repeat the question, because I think the translation
4 may have been a bit muffled, I am getting two versions,
5 so if you could, please...
6 Q. Do you know that the Konjic parliament, the
7 assembly, in this meeting of April 1992, concluded that
8 all armed forces, all patriotic forces had to be, as of
9 that moment, be placed under the command of the staff
10 of the Territorial Defence, that is the -- under the
11 command of the territorial forces of Konjic?
12 A. That is clearer and better, although this
13 time there was no mention of MUP and other forces as
14 well, which was making me unclear.
15 Specifically, I cannot say here and now I am
16 aware of that decision on that date, but it seems to me
17 perfectly reasonable to say that that would have been
18 taken and consistent with things that I know.
19 Q. Certainly Dr. Gow, you are familiar with the
20 fact that only the SDS armed forces were the ones which
21 did not place themselves under the control of the legal
22 defence forces.
23 A. I am aware that the -- for present purposes
24 we will call, "pro-SDS", elements did not put
25 themselves under the command of the official
1 authorities, and the official armed forces of Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina. It is also fair to point out that the
3 HVO, the Croatian forces, only did so at a very formal
4 level, in an initial attempt, but there was always
5 a considerable degree of autonomy, and I suspect
6 a degree of friction in this -- generally and in this
7 specific area.
8 Q. As you call this a reasonable decision of the
9 assembly, and with respect to that, could you confirm,
10 Dr. Gow, that after that date there are no independent
11 or private or other uncontrolled groups in the armed
13 A. No. I would not confirm that there were no
14 independent or private or any of these other labels
15 after that date. From that date, it was clearly the
16 formal position that there should not be any, but as
17 I was indicating earlier on, it is one thing to look at
18 the decision taken, or the minutes of a meeting about
19 a decision taken, and then to consider the time period
20 in which the decision itself is implemented, so for
21 some time to come, as I recall from a case in the
22 autumn which came out in, I think it was "Dane", one of
23 the Sarajevo newspapers about cases in which still,
24 certainly in late 1992, possibly in early 1993, private
25 armies, Muslim paramilitary groups were being held
1 responsible for killing Serbs in the kind of north-west
2 Sarajevo suburbs there, in the edge, I forget the
3 precise detail, and this was coming out and was being
4 condemned by the Bosnian government as the detail was
5 emerging. So I think, I would make a distinction
6 between the decision taken, and the period it takes
7 fully to have everything integrated, and under control,
8 as that, I think, would show.
9 Q. Dr. Gow, what you know from the paper, "Dane",
10 is what I know from my personal experience in Sarajevo
11 at that time, and my own involvement in prosecuting
12 this. So, I am not excluding your knowledge or
13 questioning your knowledge about certain incidents in
14 other areas, but do you know from any precise data that
15 there were some such groups in Konjic who had not put
16 themselves under the command of the armed forces of
18 A. I conclude from that which I have seen that
19 there was not a precisely defined and clear situation
20 in Konjic, that it was one which was evolving and one
21 which, particularly because of the relationship with
22 the HVO but also regarding elements within what people
23 would call the Muslim or the Bosnian elements loyal
24 clearly to the Bosnian government, there were still
25 elements being sorted out. I do not see why there
1 would be any problem in accepting that a decision made
2 one day takes some time to have effect before
3 everything is coherently arranged.
4 I gave the example of Sarajevo simply to
5 indicate one clear case which has emerged to show how,
6 I think, throughout the country there would be such
7 examples to be found.
8 Q. Dr. Gow, I believe that you can agree with me
9 that in this period, that is early on in the war, April
10 1992, and let us say, through the summer or fall of
11 1992, the defence forces of Konjic, that is the forces
12 who were fighting for the liberation of the town,
13 included the Territorial Defence, the HVO, and the
15 A. Yes, I can agree that all of those were
16 present, yes.
17 Q. Dr. Gow, you do not have any reliable document
18 on the basis of which it would -- which would show that
19 apart from these defence forces there were some other
20 private armed groups in the town of Konjic. Is that
22 A. It is my recollection that I saw materials
23 indicating that there were such groups in the area.
24 I do not have the specific recollection to mind.
25 I would be happy to review documents and to indicate
1 where that was the case, but...
2 Q. In any event, you have not verified
3 authenticity of any such document, provided you had
4 some such document available to you.
5 A. I have not personally verified any of the
6 documents, and as I think we have discussed previously,
7 it was my understanding that these are documents which
8 are either accepted in other cases or have been entered
9 into evidence in this case, and at a minimum already
10 given to the Defence.
11 Q. Thank you. I would now like to ask you some
12 questions in a narrow area relating to the events
13 before the events in Konjic that we are concerned
15 In the Tadic case you testified on the basis
16 of studying a number of decisions taken by the SDS in
17 the 1991, and then later the SDS party in 1991, and in
18 1992. Is that correct?
19 A. It is correct that I used a variety of
20 documents including some SDS documents which related to
21 the project to create the territory from Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina, i.e., to form Republika Srpska to be
23 separated from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
24 MS. RESIDOVIC: I would like to request
25 assistance to show Dr. Gow a document that has not been
1 used previously in the proceedings.
2 Could you please tell me how it is going to
3 be marked?
4 THE REGISTRAR: Document D133/1.
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: Dr. Gow, I presume you are
6 familiar with this document?
7 A. I am afraid to admit that I am not certain
8 that I am. I do not recognise it, I might have seen it
9 before, I am certainly aware of this decision on this
10 date to implement it, and I have made reference to that
11 in previous testimony. I cannot say for sure that
12 I have not seen it, but it does not -- it is not
13 immediately familiar to me. But I am very glad to see
15 Q. Dr. Gow, you can testify before this Trial
16 Chamber that in the fall of 1992, after 1991, after the
17 famous address of Radovan Karadzic, the parliament, the
18 Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina was
19 organised contrary to the constitution of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina at that time. Are you familiar with that
22 A. I am not sure which fact I am being asked
23 about, but if I may, I will state a number and hope
24 that one of them is the one.
25 I am familiar that in the autumn of 1991
1 Radovan Karadzic made some statements to the effect
2 that you suggested. I am aware that in the autumn of
3 1991 the Serb autonomous regions mentioned here, and
4 consistent with that statement were declared, so in
5 either case I think I would agree, but I am not sure
6 which one it is that you wanted from me. I might also
7 point out that that decision built on the earlier
8 measures taken in April 1991, to form associations of
9 Serb, so-called associations of Serb
10 municipalities, and this was a further step in that
12 It was certainly judged by the third element
13 of whether, do I agree with the fact, I am not sure if
14 I could give a legal interpretation, but I can
15 certainly say that it was a judgement of the
16 constitutional court in Sarajevo that these were
17 anti-constitutional or illegal measures, so I hope one
18 of those three facts is the one you wanted.
19 Q. You actually answered my next question, but
20 I would still like you to look at the document and
21 confirm that this was a document which, in fact,
22 legally confirmed this decision to establish Serb
23 autonomous regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
24 A. I would take a reservation on making the
25 legal judgement regarding the document, but I would say,
1 I would confirm that it is a document which confirms
2 the political decision to create the autonomous regions
3 in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the five regions
4 indicated with some of their composition, or the
5 composition at that stage.
6 I would also confirm that if you go to
7 paragraph 2 it makes clear that the intention is for
8 these autonomous regions to be associated with
10 Q. In connection, with respect to this document,
11 Dr. Gow, could you say that it is an incontrovertible
12 that the town of Konjic is located in the part of
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina which is called Herzegovina?
14 A. Again, I think there may a little bit of
15 a problem in the way the question comes through. Is
16 Konjic -- if the question is, "is Konjic part of an
17 area, Herzegovina", then as far as I understand the
18 answer is, "yes". I am not sure with the reference in
19 connection to this document, Konjic is not a place
20 mentioned in this document.
21 Q. My question is, whether in point 1 of
22 paragraph 3, which regulates the Serb autonomous
23 region of Herzegovina, the town of Konjic is included.
24 A. No, in that case -- if the town of Konjic is
25 not mentioned in that paragraph, although as I think
1 I indicated in evidence-in-chief there were other
2 documents where, on the basis of the number of
3 representatives in the local municipality it was
4 designated to be part of the Republika Srpska, or at
5 least part of it would have been. There are arguments
6 as to how realistic it was to assume it could be
7 incorporated, given its demographic composition. Is
8 that satisfactory?
9 Q. Yes, it is very satisfactory. I would just
10 like to ask you further to maybe specify what you had
11 explained more generally.
12 In essence, does this decision of the
13 assembly of the Serb people express a certain
14 political position by which the town of Konjic was not
15 supposed to be included in these territories of the
16 autonomous province, Serb provinces and later
17 Republika Srpska?
18 A. I think that what you can say is that this
19 document does not list Konjic as being one of the
20 municipalities already part of the declared Serb
21 autonomous regions. I do not think you can read into
22 it necessarily anything about intent, and as I said,
23 there is other material which indicates that it was
24 considered that it might become part of the Republika
25 Srpska, again, however unrealistic it might have been
1 because of the demographic composition. But it was
2 considered, although I do not think it makes any
3 particular difference if you are considering the issue
4 of armed conflict, because the armed conflict
5 encompasses the whole of the territory of Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina, whether it is intended to be part of one
7 part or the other.
8 MS. RESIDOVIC: I would like to tender this
9 document now as defence exhibit. Is it accepted?
10 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Let us hear the
12 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honour, there is no
13 objection to it, except that it may have already been
14 tendered in the Prosecution case. We are just
15 checking, your Honours. Yes. There is no objection,
16 your Honours.
17 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Admitted. Yes.
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you.
19 Dr. Gow, you are probably familiar with the
20 fact that in March of 1992 the assembly of Serb
21 people of Konjic municipality adopted a decision on the
22 Serb territories.
23 A. I believe so.
24 Q. Could you then agree with me that the SDS of
25 Konjic was practically adopting decisions apart from
1 the SDS assembly at the republican level based on this
2 document that we have just reviewed.
3 A. If judgement were to be made purely on the
4 basis of that document, then you might well draw that
6 However, as I have indicated, there were
7 other documents, including the SDS party instructions
8 on how to organise, on the basis either of a majority
9 Serb population within a municipality, or on the
10 basis of the number of representatives in the Municipal
11 Assembly, and that on the basis of that second
12 category, Konjic was included within SDS, within the
13 SDS framework for mobilisation for action.
14 Therefore, the simple proposition, if you
15 make the connection with this document, is you cannot
16 draw that from this document, but if you are aware of
17 other things, then you would see that there was an
18 overall SDS -- that the overall SDS programme included
19 Konjic within the frame of reference for action.
20 I think I said already when I was giving
21 evidence-in-chief that whilst I know that there was
22 a decision to be made on the number of representatives
23 in the Municipal Assembly I have no idea what number
24 qualified, I have no idea what the number in Konjic was
25 or what number would qualify for action.
1 Q. As far as I can recall your answers during
2 the examination-in-chief, Dr. Gow, you pointed to some
3 changes of the political position after the meeting of
4 Borodan Karadzic after the meeting in June of 1992.
5 A. I may well have done. I do not recall doing
6 so, but if the question is asked in specific reference
7 to the issue we were discussing immediately previously,
8 then I think the answer is possibly no, because as
9 I recall, the documents, I am talking about were from
10 the period prior -- April or earlier.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 Dr. Gow, I am one person in this courtroom to
13 become familiar with the name of John Hackett, and I am
14 very glad that I did so, because through that testimony
15 I found out additional facts about this person from
17 You used John Hackett to present to the Trial
18 Chamber your own view what a coordinator, what
19 a function of the coordinator might be. Have I summed
20 up correctly, what you -- what your intention was?
21 A. Yes. My intention was to assist in
22 clarifying what that role might be, what that term
23 might mean and I used the example of Hackett during the
24 Second World War. I have to say it is not purely and
25 simply my own conclusion. I based on discussions with
1 others, including senior military figures, about --
2 with whom I discussed the question of, you know, "how
3 would you understand this, would this be a fair
5 If I might, this might be a point, if your
6 Honours permit --
7 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: If you can explain --
8 A. Just to point out that in the break, because
9 questions had been asked about the evidence of Generals
10 Divjak and Pasalic, I did ask to be given the testimony
11 just quickly to peruse. I am afraid I did not get to
12 look at the Divjak but I already noted in the Pasalic
13 that contrary to some of the views that were expressed,
14 and I can confirm my own feeling, which is that they
15 did not say that they accepted the coordinator meant
16 nothing or that it was not a recognised, or that it was
17 not something which they would understand, but simply
18 that, as I had said before, consistent with what I had
19 said, that it was not a formal recognised position, but
20 that they could imagine the usefulness or rather
21 Pasalic said that he could imagine the usefulness of
22 such a role in a case where lines were unclear where
23 something was involving, where there was a degree of
24 improvisation, so I think just to be clear on that
25 point, while we are talking about the issue of
2 Q. Thank you Dr. Gow, for having reminded
3 yourself of what the general said, but as we were here
4 present I think that the court and the rest of us are
5 familiar with those facts.
6 To go back to John Hackett, I wanted to ask
7 you a few things that may be of use to all of us.
8 Could you tell me, please, John Hackett was
9 a respected citizen of England, even before the Second
10 World War, was he not?
11 A. I think he was a scholar. It is hard to
12 judge the degree to which he was respected, but yes.
13 I mean, he was originally from Australia but he was
14 a recognised scholar, a person of some respect,
15 I suppose, yes, although I am not particularly
16 qualified to judge the degree to which he was respected
17 at that stage.
18 Q. And he lived in England before the Second
19 World War, did he not?
20 A. Yes. He was a scholar at, I think, Oxford.
21 Q. And through many years of life there he
22 surely was very familiar with the conditions in
23 England, and this probably served as a basis for him to
24 be proposed to hold such a post.
25 A. I am not sure that his familiarity with
1 conditions in England or the UK as a whole are
2 necessarily of particular relevance to his being given
3 specific functions whilst serving in the armed forces.
4 I mean, he was inducted. He was serving in the armed
5 forces before he was given such a role, it just
6 happened to be that at a certain point ad hoc, as
7 Mr. Moran put it this morning, a situation emerged and
8 in that ad hoc situation he was a person who could
9 carry out that role.
10 Q. Yes, but as a participant of the armed forces
11 of England and someone familiar with those forces, he
12 had sufficient knowledge of the conditions in the armed
13 forces of England, because, after all, that is the
14 basis for, as you said, the possibility of somebody
15 being appointed to such a function.
16 A. I think the key things are first that he was
17 a member of the armed forces, secondly, that whatever
18 the existing character and structure of the British
19 armed forces, there was a peculiar development taking
20 place in the course of the Second World War regarding
21 what I alluded to in evidence-in-chief as "private
22 armies", that is the formation of what was later to
23 become the special forces, and that in that evolving
24 context where there were degrees of uncertainties where
25 some individuals had decided that they would like to
1 form their own small special units where others had
2 been instructed to form small, special units, his role
3 as coordinator was to bring all of that together, so
4 I think the idea of the experience of the British armed
5 forces is of limited value, because it was the British
6 armed forces in new circumstances.
7 Q. Yes. I gathered that, but regardless of his
8 personal abilities, if he had just come from Australia
9 and if he had never lived in England, and if he was not
10 familiar with the armed forces, he would not have had
11 a chance of being appointed to such an important
12 position. Is that not so?
13 A. I am not quite sure, to be honest. In the
14 situation of the Second World War and where new
15 developments are taking place and there is a degree of
16 improvisation, and given what I have said previously
17 several times about the qualities required of
18 a coordinator, there is a basic fact that he was
19 present, but beyond that I think it can be said to be
20 his qualities of being able fully to know, because of
21 having the trust, respect, of those involved in the
22 so-called "private armies", and the ability therefore
23 to influence them to make suggestions and give
24 directions on how best to proceed. There is nothing
25 which necessarily says that he has to have had that
1 experience previously.
2 If I may give another example from the Second
3 World War, one relevant to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
4 a British conservative MP, Sir Fitzroy Maclean, a close
5 friend of the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, was
6 chosen Churchill to go to be a special operations
7 executive liaison officer with Tito and the partisans
8 simply because he was judged by Churchill to be the
9 best qualified person to do so, so I do not think the
10 situation of being in that position and knowledge
11 beforehand in the circumstances of some of the things
12 happening in the Second World War necessarily means
13 some of the things that you said had to be there, that
14 some of the things you mentioned had to be there for
15 that situation.
16 Q. Perhaps, Dr. Gow, we are going outside our
17 subject matter, certainly that Mr. Churchill, like any
18 other statesman or civilian body may appoint somebody
19 to carry out a certain task for him. Of course,
20 General Maclean did not take over any of the
21 obligations or responsibilities of Churchill. He just
22 carried out the tasks assigned to him by Prime Minister
24 A. In the same way that Hackett carried out
25 those responsibilities which were due to him, not the
1 responsibilities of Churchill either.
2 Q. Dr. Gow, speaking about John Hackett, you said
3 that he was to have coordinated among the various
4 armies which emerged in the structure of the English
5 army, as you have just mentioned.
6 A. As I understand the question, yes, his role
7 was to coordinate various small units which were
8 evolving within the broader context of the British
10 Q. So his duty was not to coordinate the work of
11 civilian authorities or certain armies, for instance,
12 the municipality of London, and certain military
13 structures or units. That was not his duty.
14 A. As I understand it that was not one of the
15 tasks which he carried out, although I imagine had it
16 been relevant to his situation, then it would have
17 been, in the nature of something which is per ad hoc
18 situations that you do those things which are relevant.
19 Q. The Prosecutor has probably shown you,
20 Dr. Gow, the appointment, the document appointing Zejnil
21 Delalic, and authorising him to coordinate between the
22 war presidency as the civilian body and the defence
23 forces. Are you familiar with that document of
25 A. I am familiar with the document of
2 Q. So, the task assigned to this coordinator in
3 Konjic differed from the one assigned to John Hackett.
4 A. I think it differed in its specific content,
5 but I think that was clear some time ago when I was
6 giving evidence-in-chief, and their Honours asked me
7 some questions about the role of John Hackett. I think
8 the essential thing always to bear in mind is the
9 qualities inherent in a coordinator, full knowledge and
10 authority, and the degree to which those qualities are
11 put into effect, whatever the tasks in question might
12 be, and recognising that those are similar qualities to
13 be found to those found in an officer commanding, but
14 are pertinent to a non- -- to a specific, or a peculiar
15 situation in which normal structures do not apply, and
16 I think the key point is that the comparative reference
17 to Hackett is to show that in a situation where normal
18 structures were not relevant, the role of coordinator
19 was relevant, and I was making the allusion to try to
20 understand the term "coordinator" in the Konjic
21 context, to say that it was something which could be
22 useful in that specific context and it would still
23 have, when distilled, those same key elements and
24 I take it from my refreshed reading of the evidence of
25 General Pasalic that that was probably his judgement as
2 Q. Dr. Gow, you have no reliable source, nor are
3 you aware whether there were any groups in Konjic that
4 called themselves, "the Patriotic League", "the Green
5 Berets", so you conveyed your thoughts on the basis of
6 information that such groups did exist in Bosnia and
8 A. No, as I said earlier, it was on the basis of
9 references to, as I recall, at least two paramilitary
10 groups operating in the Konjic area, and as I said
11 earlier, if I am given a chance to revisit the
12 documents that I have seen, I would be happy to
13 identify where that was and to confirm it and if I am
14 mistaken, to withdraw the opinion.
15 Q. So, you do not recall at this point in time
16 on the basis of which document you asserted that there
17 were private armies or paramilitary groups in Konjic,
18 after the 17th April?
19 A. That is the case. I cannot point to this
20 document and say, "that is the one". But, as I say,
21 I am quite happy to look into this and to produce what
22 it is that I have seen.
23 Q. Are you aware that Mr. Zejnil Delalic lived
24 for twenty years abroad before the war?
25 A. I am still aware that he spent some time
1 living outside the SFRY, Bosnia and Herzegovina, prior
2 to the dissolution and conflict.
3 Q. You are also aware that he came by chance to
4 attend the funeral of his brother, just before the war,
5 and that he stayed on.
6 A. I am aware that he came to Bosnia at that
7 stage for a funeral of his brother. That he -- I have
8 no sense of whether -- of what degree of chance
9 operated. Perhaps there was. Yes.
10 Q. You are also aware, Dr. Gow, that Zejnil
11 Delalic was not a member of political parties.
12 A. Depending on precisely what you mean by
13 that. It may well be that he was not a member of, by
14 some technical definition that you might not offer, of
15 a political party, but it is clear that he was a member
16 of the SDA, at least from things that I have seen and
17 I cannot tell you exactly what they are either, but
18 I am happy to identify them, again, if it is desirable
19 that I should do so, that he was a member of an
20 association formed in Vienna of the SDA party from
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I would take that, other
22 than in a technical sense as being membership of
23 a political party, and I would also point out that
24 prior to his coming to Bosnia and Herzegovina he was
25 also a member of the organisation called Green Berets.
1 Q. In the course of the examination-in-chief you
2 referred to what Zejnil Delalic spoke about that in his
4 A. Quite possibly, yes.
5 Q. Are you aware that in that statement made in
6 Scheveningen, Zejnil Delalic clearly stated that he was
7 not a member of the SDA, and that he received
8 a membership card of the Green Berets in the course of
9 a celebration in 1994. Is that what you read in his
11 A. I am aware that that is what he said in his
12 statement, but also that the actual documents indicate
13 membership of the Green Berets from an earlier date,
14 and that the membership of the SDA is a moot point as
15 to the technical definition of whether you regard being
16 a member of the SDA Association in Vienna as being
17 a member of the party. Obviously, he was not a member
18 of the party in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I think to
19 be a member of the SDA Association would reasonably be
20 seen to be a member of the SDA, albeit, or a supporter
21 of the SDA living abroad, if not a member of the party
22 then a clear member of the supporter's club.
23 Q. So, your hypotheses are virtually just your
24 interpretation of some of the documents shown to you by
25 the Prosecutor.
1 A. I am not sure precisely which hypotheses you
2 make reference to, but I think I would confirm, as
3 I have done in many cases, that I draw my conclusions
4 on the basis of the evidence available to me and my
5 reading of it, which, in this particular case, includes
6 materials provided by the Office of the Prosecutor.
7 Q. Even though Zejnil Delalic said in the
8 statement that you rely on that the Green Berets did
9 not even exist in Konjic in 1992, and that the
10 booklets, the cards were only issued in 1994, as is
11 evident from that interview, so your conclusions can
12 hardly be said to be based on reliable foundations.
13 A. Personally I would regard it as being
14 a reliable inference based on the existence of
15 a membership card of the Green Berets from, as
16 I recall, January 1991 or January 1990, certainly
17 a date prior to his return to Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 for the funeral of his brother, or the onset of armed
20 Now, I am sure this is more pertinently
21 a matter for an investigator to have looked at, but as
22 far as I have looked at this and I have integrated it
23 in my overall understanding then I would say that that
24 does seem to be the case, and whether or not the Green
25 Berets were specifically formed in Konjic at that stage
1 I am afraid I cannot say. My comment was on
2 Mr. Delalic's membership of the Green Berets
4 Q. You assessed Mr. Delalic's influence also from
5 the fact that he had assisted the defence with his own
6 personal resources. Is that true?
7 A. I had drawn the inference from looking at
8 some of the things he appeared to be doing and from
9 reading some of the documents, in particular the
10 documents saying that he would be doing things at his
11 own expense, that one of the factors in his being able
12 to play a role was that he had personal finance, and
13 that he was prepared to put this at the disposal of
14 the defence of Konjic specifically and I suppose Bosnia
15 and Herzegovina more broadly.
16 Q. Are you aware, Dr. Gow, that in Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina at the beginning of the war, thousands of
18 citizens contributed funds to assist the Defence.
19 Women were giving their jewellery, men, whatever they
20 had, in order to provide the minimum conditions for
21 defence in view of the sudden circumstances that
23 A. I am aware that people in Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina were making those contributions which they
25 were able. I think the point I was making is that
1 Mr. Delalic, as a seemingly wealthy businessman coming
2 from outside, was in the immediate position of having
3 reasonably substantial resources available to use,
4 rather than small amounts to put in to an overall kitty
5 and that is what gave him -- again, and I say this is
6 only interpretation of the things that I see, I do not
7 know this to be the case, but as an expert looking at
8 the bits that I have seen, my interpretation would be
9 that he did have specific personal wealth at that stage
10 and in that particular situation he was prepared to put
11 it to use for the defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
12 did so.
13 But that is not to say that there were not
14 other people in other areas who would do the same or
15 that the people as a whole were not making contribution
16 and committed to their own defence.
17 Q. Do you know, Dr. Gow, that more than 10
18 individuals in Konjic contributed much more and much
19 more significant resources over a longer period of time
20 than Mr. Zejnil Delalic did, and that this was nothing
21 strange compared to people who contributed their
22 factories, bakeries, petrol stations and so on. It was
23 not unusual at all.
24 A. I absolutely recognise that there were many
25 people who were making contribution. I think I did
1 that in the previous answer.
2 I would make the distinction between what you
3 just put to me in terms of over a longer period, and
4 the specific relevance of the resources which
5 Mr. Delalic maybe had available in that specific period
6 where there was an immediate need, but I would not want
7 the whole understanding to turn on the question of the
8 degree to which he used his own finance to play
9 a role. As I have said, it was clearly the case that
10 he was able, through his own personality, on the whole,
11 to be able to influence people, and to play the kind of
12 role which we discussed.
13 Q. Dr. Gow, in the course of the
14 examination-in-chief, you spoke about the development
15 of the armed forces, and as far as I understood you,
16 you mentioned that there was the stage of coordinator,
17 then tactical groups, then the specific role of
18 tactical groups and finally the formation of cause.
19 Did I understand well a short review of the things you
21 A. With reference to developments in the Konjic
22 area, yes. It may well have been that there were
23 coordinators in the other areas, but use of the term
24 "coordinator" has been discussed specifically with
25 reference to Konjic and its surrounding region, but
1 broadly, the understanding is correct, as I discussed
2 the process of formation of the army of Bosnia and
4 Q. You spoke about the formation of the tactical
5 group in May. I think you can agree with me, if I say
6 that it was formed on 14th May, and that its first
7 commander was Mustafa Polutak.
8 A. I think I would agree on that, yes. I always
9 have difficulty remembering the dates unless I have
10 been looking at them, but yes.
11 Q. You know that the headquarters of the
12 tactical group 1 was in Pasarici, about 60 kilometres
13 north of Konjic.
14 A. I believe so, yes.
15 Q. You know that Zejnil Delalic, as
16 a coordinator, was nominated on 18th May 1992, do you
18 A. I think that is the case, yes. That is my
20 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I think we can stop
21 now, and reassemble at 2.30 for you to continue with
22 your cross-examination. The Trial Chamber will now
24 (1.00 pm)
25 (Luncheon adjournment)
1 (2.30 pm)
2 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Ms. Residovic, you may
4 MS. RESIDOVIC: Just to come back to what we
5 talked about before we left off, before the break you
6 confirmed that during the examination-in-chief you
7 pointed out that a stage of development of the BH Army
8 in the area of Konjic would be followed in such a way
9 that there would be a coordinator, a tactical group and
10 later an army corps. Then I asked you something which
11 you confirmed, that the Tactical Group I was
12 established on May 14. Is that correct? And that its
13 commander was Mustafa Polutak.
14 A. I believe that is what we were saying, yes.
15 Q. And you know that Zejnil Delalic's
16 coordinator was appointed on 18th May 1992.
17 A. Yes, I think that confirms what we were
18 saying this morning.
19 Q. And I believe that you can agree very easily
20 on the date, on the fact that the 18th May is later
21 than 14th May.
22 A. I think that -- I do not see any problem in
23 agree being that, yes.
24 Q. So that the sequence of phases in the
25 situation in Konjic would start with the tactical group
1 and then something was interrupted and then we come to
2 the next phase.
3 However, I am not trying to elicit your
4 comment. I think this is something that can be simply
5 inferred rather than to which you need to testify
7 A. Well, if I may I would just point out that
8 I did not say that it was a phased sequence. I said
9 that these were aspects of the evolving situation, and
10 there would be a difference between a completely phased
11 situation from one step to another and a state of flux
12 in which a number of things were happening.
13 Q. Thank you. I must say that I am not an
14 expert for military matters but listening to the
15 generals and officers as well as the experts in this
16 field such as you, I am learning, so I would just like
17 you to confirm that my understanding of what you said
18 is correct, that is that you confirmed before this
19 Trial Chamber that the tactical groups in all
20 continental armies are known as temporary formations
21 with certain tactical tasks, and that they are formed
22 for a particular time frame until such a task is
23 executed. Did I understand that correctly?
24 A. I think that is more or less a correct
25 understanding. Tactical groups both in the old JNA and
1 in other places are understood to be ad hoc temporary
2 formations, usually a small number of units assigned
3 for one of two types of purpose. One, a very specific
4 purpose in designated operation and the other in an
5 area of uncertainty and weakness where the mission is
6 to do whatever you can.
7 Q. And if my understanding of what I have heard
8 about tactical groups is correct, please confirm for
9 me, is it true that in all armies, tactical groups are
10 formed as temporary, either operational or manoeuvre
11 units, whereas in the -- and that can also be done in
12 the armies that are already established.
13 A. Tactical groups can certainly be established
14 where there are already existing armed forces
15 established and again in that context it is to meet
16 a specific need where the regular structures are not
17 compatible with the tasks to be set.
18 It is for a temporary period, but the period
19 might not necessarily be defined. It might be defined
20 by the task and when the task is accomplished then that
21 period would be at an end, so temporary in the sense
22 that it is not foreseen that it will be a permanent
23 element in the structure.
24 Q. This morning we talked about regulations of
25 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by which it
1 regulated its armed forces and the army of Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina. Since you are familiar with these
3 regulations you can certainly agree with me that in
4 none of these regulations that we have mentioned
5 neither the coordinator nor tactical group were
6 foreseen as parts of the development of the armed
7 forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8 A. I can agree that we discussed the documents
9 this morning, and that because neither of the functions
10 you make reference to, either that of coordinator or
11 that to be performed by a tactical group are part of
12 the regular structure of the armed forces, the position
13 of tactical groups, as far as I am aware, is not
14 something which would usually be subject to
15 legislation. It is something which would be a decision
16 probably at an operational level, possibly at
17 a tactical level, depending on a particular situation
18 in the course of military operations.
19 Sorry, if I may just make clear the last
20 point, what I mean is that I would not expect to see it
21 in legislation because it is not part of the structure,
22 the normal arrangement for things.
23 Q. I believe you would agree with me if I said
24 that the law on the armed forces of Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina did foresee its own development and the
1 need of establishing first brigades and then the corps
2 of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3 This was set out as a sequence of phases in
4 the establishment and development of the armed forces
5 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is that correct?
6 A. I would agree that that was the structure
7 foreseen and the one upon which work was done to
8 develop it, yes. But that work took time and in the
9 meantime, there was this continuing state of evolution
10 in which other things were relevant.
11 Q. We talked -- in fact you talked about it, you
12 and I have not touched upon it yet, you said that
13 Sarajevo was a major problem for the armed forces of
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is the blockade of the
15 capital was a major problem for the armed forces of
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina from the very beginning. Is
17 that correct?
18 A. As far as I recall what I was saying was that
19 the -- that in this phase which primarily we have under
20 discussion between spring and autumn 1992, there was
21 a specific objective for the armed forces of Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina to attempt to relieve the encirclement of
23 Sarajevo and that some of operations, including those
24 designated for the tactical groups, were geared towards
25 that objective.
1 Q. You know that the basic goal and the mission
2 during this encirclement of Sarajevo in certain parts
3 of Sarajevo area, part tactical groups were formed and
4 the formation of a tactical force, of Tactical Group I
5 was precisely to try to break the siege of the city of
6 Sarajevo. Is that correct?
7 A. I refer you to my last answer in which
8 I think that is what I confirmed.
9 Q. Dr. Gow, during your testimony in
10 examination-in-chief, while clarifying this period, you
11 said that in Konjic there were about 2,000 members of
12 the Territorial Defence during that period. Do you
13 recall that?
14 A. What I recall saying, and I am not sure if
15 this is exactly the same thing, but what I recall
16 saying was that there should have been 2,000 members on
17 the list for the Territorial Defence in the Konjic
18 area, but a large number of them did not respond to the
20 Q. I would like to remind you of this answer at
21 page number 9,274 when you said that there were more --
22 where you stated the number of the members of the
23 territorial unit, but my question to you is whether
24 your view, that is your conclusion was based on
25 documents offered to you by the Prosecution in addition
1 to the documents found in possession of Mr. Delalic
2 referring to the establishment of the tactical groups.
3 A. I am afraid I am unable to answer that
4 question because it is not clear to me which of the
5 documents I have seen are those deriving from
6 Mr. Delalic. I would have to appraise things on the
7 basis of saying, "these are documents from Delalic and
8 these are not", before I could be sure to answer that
10 MS. RESIDOVIC: I would like to request for
11 assistance to show Dr. Gow the documents, the chart,
12 which came from the Prosecution, and whether he based
13 his views also on this particular chart.
14 Could the document please be marked before we
16 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit D134/1.
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: Have you reviewed this
18 document when you reviewed the documents given to you
19 by the Prosecution?
20 A. Quite possibly. It is not one with which
21 I am particularly familiar, but I saw a series of
22 documents which included things like this at different
23 times. But as I say, not one I am particularly
24 familiar with. Although I might point out, on looking
25 at it now, that this document refers to mobilisation
1 for Tactical Group I which was at a later date than the
2 information about which I was just making reference,
3 which is the number -- which was the people in the old
4 Territorial Defence forces in Konjic prior to the onset
5 of armed hostilities. So, to be clear, here you are
6 talking about a phase once you have got to the
7 formation of tactical groups and mobilisation for them
8 and what I was saying before and what you asked me
9 about was pertinent to the Territorial Defence within
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the onset of armed
11 hostilities, let us say, to the independence of Bosnia
12 and Herzegovina.
13 So, within that framework, you need to be
14 clear about what exactly it is we are talking about.
15 Q. I would in fact like to talk about this given
16 your comments. You said in this chart where it says,
17 "Konjic", it is the very number that you referred to
18 that is being mentioned, so Dr. Gow, my question to you
19 is, in regard to this mobilisation chart, is this the
20 chart -- was this chart part of your preparation for
21 this -- for your testimony and is this one of the
22 documents on the basis of which you talked about the
23 tactical groups in the area in question?
24 A. This is not a document on which I based my
25 comments reference the fact that there were supposed to
1 be 2,000 people in the Territorial Defence in Konjic,
2 thereabouts. It is not a document upon which I have
3 relied in any particular sense in any course of giving
4 evidence, but it is part of a bundle of documents which
5 have been shown to me.
6 Q. You certainly must have taken into account
7 this document in addition to other documents when you
8 gave, when you offered your conclusions about what
9 a tactical group may be. Is that correct?
10 A. Not when I offered my conclusions about what
11 a tactical group might be. In forming comments
12 regarding the formation of tactical groups in this
13 area, yes, but not regarding what a tactical group
14 might be.
15 MS. RESIDOVIC: Since you are familiar with
16 Mr. Delalic's statement which also stated things that
17 are reflected in this chart, I would now like to offer
18 this document as a defence exhibit on the basis of
19 Dr. Gow's general statements regarding this particular
20 area of questioning.
21 Is the exhibit admitted?
22 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Well, what actually is
23 it supposed to portray? What do you want it to say?
24 Because it is not an admission that his opinion was
25 based on this.
1 MS. RESIDOVIC: We accept a series of
2 documents from the UN resolutions to some other
3 documents which have all assisted the witness to form
4 his opinions. Dr. Gow has seen these documents among
5 other documents. He also read Mr. Delalic's statement
6 in which he explained this chart and this all formed
7 the basis for his understanding of the tactical group
8 and its role in the region, and so in that context
9 I would like to offer it as a defence exhibit, since
10 from here we can glean certain relevant aspects of what
11 the tactical group was.
12 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, we object to this
13 document being tendered, certainly under the present
14 basis, because it is an enormous leap to go from this
15 document to an UN Resolution and say that because an UN
16 Resolution has been admitted into evidence, this
17 document should be admitted into evidence.
18 We have no idea of its authorship, and Dr. Gow
19 in his testimony has said that he has not relied on it
20 in order to form the opinions that he has expressed.
21 Now, it seems to us, your Honours, that if
22 you give a document to a witness and he says, "Well,
23 I have not relied on that", and then say, "Well, I wish
24 to tender it", well, that is an inappropriate basis on
25 which to tender it, so at the moment we object to it.
1 JUDGE JAN: But this is a document supplied
2 by you to the Defence.
3 MR. NIEMANN: It is not a Prosecution
5 JUDGE JAN: That is what Ms. Residovic said.
6 It was one of the documents supplied to the Defence.
7 MR. NIEMANN: I do not know where she bases
8 it. I have no idea where she gets that from. It may be
9 a document which the Defence has given to the
10 Prosecution and Dr. Gow may have seen it but it is not
11 a Prosecution document.
12 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Actually, I am relying
13 essentially on what the witness said. He did not rely
14 on this document in forming his opinion. It is not
15 admitted. I accept the interpretation did not bring
16 that out clearly, but that was what I heard him say.
17 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, may I please --
18 is this a definitive decision or can we argue it a bit
20 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I do not know what else
21 you would argue. If you are relying on the fact that
22 it was what he relied upon for his opinion, and he said
23 no, he did not rely on this for his opinion, I do not
24 know what your argument then is.
25 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, my
1 understanding of the witness was, and I would like your
2 assistance, the witness did not rely on this document
3 when clarifying the general term of tactical groups,
4 but if I understood you correctly, and Dr. Gow, please
5 correct me if I am wrong, you also took it into
6 account, this document, when you offered your general
7 opinions about the area and in the given period of
8 time, and since Mr. Delalic offered us the same -- the
9 very same comments when -- that you referred to, so my
10 understanding was that this document must have been
11 part of the documents that you based your opinions on.
12 Is that correct?
13 A. I believe that what I said in the first
14 instance was that I was not immediately familiar, or
15 especially familiar with this document. It was not one
16 which immediately I recognised. I later said -- was
17 the first part of what I said registered?
18 Q. But later you recognised it.
19 A. I want to be clear that if the first part --
20 the microphone was not on when I spoke first. It came
21 on when I was speaking. I want to check that the first
22 part of what I said was registered, or should I begin
24 Okay. Thank you.
25 That the document was not one particularly
1 familiar to me, that I had seen documents of which this
2 might have been one which have some of the same broad
3 type of information, that I did not rely on the
4 document, either in forming my opinions about what
5 a tactical group might be, or, I think I was trying to
6 make clear, particularly in forming my views on the
7 tactical group in this area. In response to your
8 question I said that there is no way that I could,
9 I think what I was trying to convey was that there was
10 no way in which I could use it to form an opinion on
11 what a tactical group might be, but that if, and I have
12 to say "if", because I could not confirm for sure that
13 it was one of these documents, I just assume that if
14 these are the documents which are going around which
15 I am being shown it was part of that set of documents,
16 then in a small sense presumably I would have reviewed
17 it, but going back to the original answer it was not
18 something which I primarily relied on in forming my
19 views, so I do not know where that leaves things.
20 Q. Dr. Gow, can you please, looking at this
21 document, tell me whether this is a document which in
22 contents relates to questions of mobilisation for
23 Tactical Group 1, that is my first question, and that
24 the document refers to the mobilisation for Tactical
25 Group I. Is that not so?
1 A. I can, and that is so. I think I already
2 said that, yes.
3 Q. Is it correct to say, Dr. Gow, that from this
4 table which is indicative of the mobilisation for
5 Tactical Group I that we can clearly see that from the
6 Konjic area, 300 soldiers are being mobilised for
7 Tactical Group I.
8 A. The way this scheme appears that would seem
9 to be the case.
10 Q. This scheme also shows how many soldiers are
11 being mobilised for the tactical group from other
12 municipalities for the area of operations of Tactical
13 Group I.
14 A. It would appear to show that as well,
15 although I am not clear when you talk about
16 mobilisation for the tactical group what you infer the
17 document to show. It could be that these are people
18 specifically being mobilised into units which exist
19 already, because within the idea of tactical --
20 a tactical group you would be using existing units
21 which would be assigned to a tactical group commander
22 for a particular task. Now, there may be an element of
23 strengthening those units by adding. It is not clear
24 to me what this document represents, is what I am
1 Q. Will you please look at the Konjic area for
2 Tactical Group I? It is indicated that 300 soldiers
3 should come under Tactical Group 1, and that 300 out of
4 the 2,000 remain under the authority of the municipal
5 staff of Konjic. You find this in the remark of the IV
6 Corps which says that the body of the forces remains in
7 the municipal staffs and are fully responsible to the
8 main staff of the army, and partly to the war
9 presidencies of those municipalities.
10 A. That may be, yes.
11 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, in view of the
12 fact that the document is relevant in content for the
13 questions we are discussing, and also due to the fact
14 that Dr. Gow has among others reviewed this document,
15 and from the standpoint of the relevance of this
16 document that we should know which are the troops
17 subordinated to Tactical Group 1, I would ask that this
18 exhibit be admitted into evidence, as a defence
20 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I suppose you can, but
21 not on the ground that Dr. Gow has reviewed it, because
22 he has done nothing of the sort. May I be following
23 you in interpreting it as you went along? It does not
24 originate from him.
25 JUDGE JAN: ... and you have to cross it also
1 before you can get in the evidence. Who prepared this
2 document and when was it prepared? It bears some sort
3 of a seal on the original, but whose document is it?
4 You already asked him to comment on it. Is it proven?
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: It is a document --
6 JUDGE JAN: You have to show provenance.
7 You have to show us, from where does the document come,
8 who prepared it and when was it prepared?
9 MS. RESIDOVIC: It is an official document of
10 the IV Corps of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As
11 far as I am able to recognise the signature, it is
12 signed by Brigadier Mustafa Polutak --
13 MR. NIEMANN: I object if --
14 JUDGE JAN: The IV Corps was formed some
15 time in November, so this document must have been
16 prepared in November 1992. You are talking about the
17 composition of the November 1992. What corps? If
18 I remember correctly was formed some time in November
19 1992. This document comes from that corps, it must
20 have been prepared after November 1992. It shows the
21 composition then, not on the day it appeared, when we
22 are talking about.
23 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Actually you do not
24 give evidence of --
25 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, may I answer?
1 On the basis of the Defence investigation, on the basis
2 of the official request of the Defence in 1996,
3 addressed to the IV Corps, which has inherited all the
4 units from the area in which the tactical group
5 operated. The Defence received this document
6 officially, as a structure of the IV Corps and in 1996
7 this document, together with official explanations, was
8 given to the Prosecution, and during the interview with
9 Mr. Delalic on 23rd August in Scheveningen was used by
10 the Prosecutor during that interview. Therefore, the
11 document was drafted in 1996, according to the
12 documentation of the IV Corps, but it relates to the
13 situation in 1992.
14 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honour, might I...
15 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Actually the problem is
16 how does this witness tender it. You could not tender
17 it through him, from all you have even said.
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: On the basis of the fact that
19 this witness has analysed all the documents, including
20 the interview in Scheveningen in which Delalic
21 commented on this document in the presence of the
22 Prosecutor, and that this was one of a series of
23 documents that he reviewed in forming an opinion, and
24 I am tendering it because of its relevance for the
25 question we are discussing.
1 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: -- opinion. He said
2 that he did not do so.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: If you will not admit it, the
4 only thing I can do is to continue with my
5 cross-examination of Dr. Gow.
6 JUDGE JAN: You can prove it is part of your
7 defence document later on telling us from which source
8 it comes and you can prove it, not that we are going to
9 throw it out like this. You can prove it. It will be
10 open to you when your defence case starts to prove this
11 document from the records of the IV Corps. -- to speak
12 about the authenticity of this document.
13 MS. RESIDOVIC: I am very glad that we have
14 come back to the question of authenticity because it
15 seems to me that there was a period of time when much
16 of the evidence was admitted on the basis of relevance,
17 but I abide by your decision, and if the Defence is in
18 that situation, it will prove this document, but
19 I certainly hope that my client will not need that.
20 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Actually it is not lost
21 to you. You can always tender it through your own
22 witness. It would be easy.
23 MS. RESIDOVIC: I understand that, your
24 Honours. I am hoping that we will not need any
25 witnesses of our own.
1 Dr. Gow, I should now like to ask you to try
2 and bring to a close this conversation, and to ask you,
3 would you agree with me that the municipal staffs of
4 Territorial Defence and the corps later on, also formed
5 tactical groups for the execution of certain occasional
6 tactical combat tasks?
7 A. I am not sure what you have in mind in posing
8 that particular question. I can provide two answers
9 relevant to how I understand something, but I am not
10 sure what it is to understand.
11 The first is, as we have discussed several
12 times, tactical groups were formed and at one stage the
13 unusual step was taken of transforming a tactical group
14 from the conventional understanding of
15 specifically-assigned units for specific tasks to being
16 all units for a particular area, and the way I read
17 this in terms of the formation of the army of Bosnia
18 and Herzegovina is that --
19 Q. I apologise, but I think that you did not
20 understand my question well. I know what you said in
21 that connection during the examination-in-chief. I do
22 apologise, but my question is, are you aware that the
23 municipal staffs, later on brigades and corps, also
24 according to your knowledge, did form tactical groups
25 for certain specific combat assignments. Are you aware
1 of that or not?
2 A. Well, coming to the second part of what I was
3 going to say, I said there were two interpretations
4 I could put. The second would be --
5 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Excuse me, please, why
6 do you not take the questions as they are asked? Are
7 you aware of the fact that local forces formed tactical
9 A. Your Honour, I was merely indicating that
10 that is what I was proceeding to do, which is to say
11 that it would be perfectly normal, again, for tactical
12 units specifically to be formed for specific tactical
13 purposes, and that I am aware that at later stages,
14 both tactical groups and operational groups were
16 JUDGE JAN: Tactical groups and operational
17 groups are the same, are they not? Most generally.
18 Whenever a task is given to a particular group, it
19 operates to achieve that objective.
20 A. If I may, your Honour --
21 JUDGE JAN: Generally.
22 A. If I may, your Honour, within general
23 military thinking, it is possible to conceive of
24 action, an activity at a strategic level, or even at
25 a grand strategic level, or at a strategic level, at
1 the operational level and at the tactical level. The
2 three levels connote the degree to which you are
3 working to a specific localised objective. When we are
4 talking about tactical groups, we are talking about
5 small groups, perhaps in this case comprising up to
6 five components, possibly up to brigade size, and if
7 you are talking at an operational level then you are
8 talking about a much larger-scale operation over
9 a wider spread of territory and involving a much larger
10 number of units, so I think, I mean, what I am making
11 the distinction of saying is that yes, both are
12 designed to meet specific needs, but the level at which
13 you are discussing things is different. So the
14 tactical level would be specifically more or less
15 local, an operational group would have a much broader
16 range of operations. I hope that is clear. I am not
17 sure... thanks.
18 MS. RESIDOVIC: I should like to ask you,
19 Dr. Gow, if you could answer very clearly, my question.
20 Are you aware that in that period, that is between
21 April and November 1992, on the basis of your
22 knowledge, that the municipal staffs and the brigades
23 and later corps when they were formed, also formed
24 tactical groups for the execution of specific combat
25 tasks. Are you aware of that?
1 A. Concretely I am aware of the formation of the
2 tactical groups 1 and 2 which we have discussed
3 previously. I am not aware of any specific formations
4 of tactical groups which municipal -- at a municipal
5 level. I would be surprised other than in a very
6 narrow sense that that would happen, but I would not
7 exclude the possibility.
8 Q. You just mentioned Tactical Group II.
9 Tactical Group II was also formed by the main staff of
10 the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the
11 same assignment as for Tactical Group I. Is that
13 A. That is my understanding.
14 Q. You know that that tactical group was also
15 active in the area of Igman, Hadzici, Pazaric and
16 Trnovo. Are you aware of that?
17 A. I am.
18 Q. You also know that the area of Hadzici and
19 Trnovo was an area which, before the war, and in the
20 initial stages of the war, belonged to the district
21 staff of Sarajevo.
22 A. I cannot say I know, I would have to check,
23 but I am prepared to accept it.
24 Q. Later, when the I Corps was formed, this was
25 an area that came under the responsibility of the
1 I Corps of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did it
3 A. In principle, yes. I would have to check all
4 the places again, but yes. It is that area.
5 MS. RESIDOVIC: In view of the previous
6 question that I put to you I should like the witness to
7 be shown an Exhibit D125/A/1.
8 In view of the fact that it is an exhibit
9 that has already been admitted into evidence, and that
10 it is an exhibit of the Prosecution, I assume that in
11 the selection of documents given to you by the OTP you
12 also were able to review this document.
13 A. My first rule is always, "assume nothing",
14 but anyway...
15 Q. Have you seen this document before, Dr. Gow?
16 A. I cannot say for sure. I mean, I presume,
17 again, in the mountain of documents, I may well have
18 looked at it as I have been going through, but again it
19 is not one to which I have paid a great deal of
20 attention or upon which I have sought to rely for
22 Q. In view of the fact that this is an exhibit
23 tendered into evidence, you can see that it is
24 a document issued on the 25th June 1992 by the army
25 staff of Konjic, and that it is signed by the commander
1 of the municipal staff, Esad Ramic. Is that not so?
2 A. That appears to be the case, yes.
3 Q. And when you look at the contents you are
4 able to infer from it that the municipal staff formed
5 as many as five tactical groups for the conduct of
6 battle in the direction of the Boras Lake and on the
7 basis of an order by the republican commander of the
8 army of the 18th June 1992.
9 A. I see that the circulation list includes
10 coordinators, an interesting use of word, of five
11 tactical groups within this area. I am not entirely
12 clear to what the document refers, because it is quite
13 clearly outside the framework of the tactical groups
14 organised to which we have made reference earlier,
15 Tactical Group I and Tactical Group II for the specific
16 operations, although it seems to relate to the same
17 kinds of operations.
18 Q. I think that you were clear. This is quite
19 different because it relates to a previous period, and
20 in an area east of Konjic towards the mountain of Pren
21 and the Boracko Lake. This operation is obviously
22 being conducted by the municipal staff.
23 My question was simply for you to confirm
24 that the municipal staff in the conduct of these
25 operations did form tactical groups itself for specific
1 tasks, and that is, I think, what we can adduce from
2 this document.
3 A. I would be prepared to agree that the
4 document designates five tactical groups, presumably
5 under the command of the Konjic army headquarters, in
6 which the circulation goes to coordinator and the
7 coordinators of the tactical groups which, in the
8 context of this and in fact of our earlier discussions
9 must be taken to mean people who are regarded as having
10 command responsibility in those situations, but I would
11 note that the date, 25th June 1992 is also in the
12 period that Tactical Group I has already been formed
13 and I think by then Tactical Group II on the larger
14 scale we have been talking about so it is not an
15 earlier period. It is within the same period, so
16 I think we can be clear, yes, the designation is used,
17 the term, "coordinator", is used for those people
18 charged with responsibility for them; again, a flexible
19 situation but it is in the same period.
20 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you. This document can
21 be returned to the Registry.
22 Finally, Dr. Gow, before I thank you, I should
23 like you to confirm my conclusions from this very
24 fatiguing testimony for you, I am sure.
25 You have actually based your opinion on
1 Konjic on general knowledge of the circumstances, and
2 the documents given to you by the Office of the
3 Prosecutor in preparation for this testimony. Is that
5 A. I think I have said many times, I have based
6 it -- I bring my general understanding and expertise to
7 bear and in reviewing documents, I select those which
8 it seems to me add to the understanding regarding
9 Konjic, and where that marries with the general
10 expertise, but I think I said a long time ago at the
11 beginning of the evidence I skimmed many, many
12 documents but I could not possibly -- I could not say
13 I have examined all of them in detail, I just looked
14 through to try and find things which were useful.
15 Q. And as my final point, you personally did not
16 do any kind of research in Konjic, nor did you verify
17 the authenticity of the documents that you saw.
18 A. I think I have confirmed that I do not think
19 I have ever been to Konjic. If I did pass through
20 sometime, I did not realise that I was doing so, and
21 that I think I said also that I did not personally
22 verify documents. I did not see it as my
23 responsibility to verify documents. I used documents
24 on the basis either that they have already been
25 accepted or, as I have said on other occasions, that
1 they have been evaluated by well-qualified experts on
2 behalf of member governments for the United Nations.
3 MS. RESIDOVIC: In any event, I wish to thank
4 you, Dr. Gow, and if you know any of my friends, please
5 convey my greetings when you get to London. Thank
7 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much
8 Ms. Residovic. Any other questions from... any
10 Re-examined by MR. NIEMANN
11 Q. I only have one question, your Honour.
12 Dr. Gow, Mr. Ackerman, when he was
13 cross-examining you, asked you a number of questions
14 and showed you documents in relation to the withdrawal
15 of the JNA which later became the VJ from Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina in May of 1992. Notwithstanding those
17 documents and what you said about this withdrawal, was
18 there still the continued involvement of the JNA or the
19 VJ in Bosnia and Herzegovina after May of 1992?
20 A. There was. I believe that I have already
21 indicated in testimony that the -- that at that initial
22 stage JNA continued to be identified as being present
23 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is personnel from
24 Serbia and Montenegro who had not yet been withdrawn
25 for some time afterwards that the whole operation of
1 the army of the Republika Srpska was, in fact,
2 a JNA/Belgrade military operation, but by that stage,
3 as proxies, because of this -- what is described as
4 Communist approach of deception, so as not to be
5 identified, the attempt to avoid being identified as
6 Belgrade being responsible for the operations in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, we made reference to the evidence
8 from the diary of Bosislav Jovic that that decision was
9 taken at the end of 1991 specifically with a view to
10 a situation in which they knew they would be regarded
11 as an external power, and trying to avoid that
12 designation, and in addition to that, I think in
13 evidence at other times in Tadic and in other cases
14 I have made reference to a number of occasions where
15 even after the formal division and in spite of this
16 attempt to maintain the idea that there were two
17 separate armies, a number of cases in which the VJ
18 itself did participate, or is known to have
19 participated, and I think this is on record, for
20 example, the air operations in 1994 which involved
21 personnel from Podgorica and Montenegro, the
22 introduction of special forces from Nis and Ordica in
23 the course of a number of actions including those at
24 Gorazde in 1994, the insertion of reinforcement troops,
25 perhaps as many as 4,000 through the Posafina Corridor
1 at various stages, so there are a number of instances,
2 openly-known instances in which the VJ itself was
3 obliged, covertly but sometimes being disclosed to
4 contribute, and of course I would go back to the
5 position I made reference to on Friday, the report of
6 Ambassador Pardue, the US special representative for
7 arms control in Bosnia in the Former Yugoslavia
8 territories, that one of the problems with the army of
9 the Republika Srpska is that it still has these ties
10 to Belgrade so they are not dealing all the time with
11 an army there but with something which is tied to
13 MR. NIEMANN: No further questions, your
15 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I suppose that is the
16 end of the case of the Prosecution, is it?
17 MR. NIEMANN: I was going to close the case,
18 your Honour.
19 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: That is the end of your
21 MR. NIEMANN: I was going to close it, yes.
22 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Well, thank you very
23 much Dr. Gow. You have been very helpful, and I am sure
24 the Defence also have been fairly satisfied with your
1 A. I certainly hope so. It took a long time to
2 get there.
3 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Well, I said, "fairly".
4 I did not say "fully".
5 So, we thank you very much for your
7 (The witness withdrew)
8 MR. NIEMANN: And, your Honour, that is the
9 Prosecution case.
10 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Now, I think on the
11 12th we had an undertaking from the Defence that you
12 intend to make a submission, and that within three days
13 of the close of the Prosecution case -- do you still
14 abide by that promise?
15 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, we would like to
16 be able to file by 1 o'clock on Friday, if that would
17 be okay with the Trial Chamber and in line with that
18 that adds maybe a half a day to what we had in mind,
19 but it appears now that we need it.
20 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I think the Prosecution
21 will not grudge you even if you file it on that day.
22 MR. ACKERMAN: But we will file at 1 o'clock
23 on Friday, then, that is what we will plan to do.
24 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, Mr. Olujic?
25 MR. OLUJIC: Your Honours, before this
1 decision is taken, the Defence of the second accused,
2 Zdravko Mucic would like to appeal to the Trial
3 Chamber, given the statement by Dr. Gow on Friday and
4 today. We would like an extension of this deadline,
5 that is until the end of the month, that is the 28th of
7 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I see Ms. Residovic
8 wants to say something.
9 MS. RESIDOVIC: Yes. Your Honours, but
10 a completely different issue from the one that we
11 just -- from the issue that we were just discussing, so
12 maybe we should wait for your decision on this issue
13 first and then I will indulge you to hear me out on the
14 issue that I have to bring up.
15 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I was relying on your
16 undertaking to be able to file it within the week, and
17 that is Friday the 20th. I thought that was
18 sufficient. I did not know, even, that Dr. Gow added
19 anything to what he would have said, even if he did not
20 come again it would not have made much of a difference
21 to your case. Well, I thought that you should be able
22 to abide by that undertaking.
23 I hear Mr. Olujic saying something different,
24 the end of the month. That is a week after. Well,
25 I do not know. That is a little different from what we
1 both understood.
2 MS. RESIDOVIC: The Delalic Defence accepts
3 the deadline of Friday, 1 pm, but I would like to ask
4 a question on another issue. This could be my mistake,
5 maybe not, but in preparation for the cross-examination
6 of Dr. Gow I have looked through the exhibits proffered
7 by the Prosecutor, including the Delalic statement from
8 Scheveningen, the Exhibits 997 and 998 was admitted.
9 It includes a report on the conditions in Celebici.
10 This was introduced through Witness D, and this was
11 admitted to the -- into evidence, but I would like to
12 state that it is inconceivable that this exhibit should
13 be attached, or admitted with the Delalic statement, so
14 I want to ask that it be separated out from this
15 exhibit. Zejnil Delalic said that he never heard or
16 saw this person, and given the -- and this report is
17 part of his statement given in Scheveningen, the
18 detention unit, and this is how these documents were
19 presented to us by the Prosecution, and we would like
20 this particular document to be taken out of this
21 bundle. He has never seen it. He does not know about
22 it and this document does not belong with the Exhibits
23 99/7 and 99/8.
24 The other thing that I want to bring up is
25 just a clarification on whether I understood you
1 correctly, something from the transcript, and that is
2 that the statements of the co-accused cannot be used
3 against the other co-accused. If this is correct
4 I would like you to confirm it. Thank you.
5 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Well, I suppose there
6 might be some confusion here, and perhaps you are not
7 familiar with the procedure of a no-case submission.
8 That is one other thing.
9 It appears when you are making a no-case
10 submission, you are arguing that no prima facie case
11 has been made against your client for the Trial Chamber
12 to call him to come and give his own side of the
14 Now, all the arguments on that basis are
15 arguments of law.
16 If you have arguments based on evidence
17 simply, simplicita, perhaps you are using a different
18 argument, although nobody stops you arguing that you
19 are closing your case with that of the Prosecution, if
20 you want to do so. If you want to take the chance, and
21 to make a submission both on law and the evidence, you
22 can do so, and take the chance of either succeeding or
23 failing on that and no longer going forward to give
24 evidence, so there are two sides of it. If you are
25 making a no-case submission, the submission is based
1 entirely on legal grounds. I think this is our
2 understanding of a no-case submission.
3 Now, when you start questioning the weight of
4 evidence and other matters which are not strictly based
5 on law, you are going beyond the ambit of a no-case
6 submission and might not be acceptable.
7 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, I believe that
8 we had a complete misunderstanding. Obviously I was
9 not very clear on what I intended to say.
10 When I say that the Defence may not find it
11 necessary for me to give evidence, that is based on the
12 fact that the Delalic Defence is claiming that their
13 client is innocent, but if this request is not
14 accepted, we will obviously call witnesses and offer
16 What I am doing here is -- I am doing as
17 a professional and I am following the -- what my client
18 is telling me. However, there is -- what I have
19 addressed here is something else. We say that there
20 was an error made in the exhibit that were submitted
21 here in 99/7 and 8. In other words, my client says
22 that he has never stated things that were -- that
23 appeared in Exhibit 99/7 and 99/8. This was later
24 introduced through another witness, and this is an
25 error that could be a technical error, it is something
1 that can be corrected, and this is what I was referring
2 to when I touched on this subject, and the other thing
3 is, whether I have understood your position correctly,
4 because we had not received a written decision, so
5 I need to be perfectly clear about whether you intend
6 to use the statements of the accused against the other
7 co-accused provided they do not appear here as
9 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Well, as far as this
10 Trial Chamber is concerned, I do not know what happens
11 elsewhere, we do not give hypothetical decisions,
12 decisions which are likely to come when, in fact, they
13 might not even come.
14 Now, according to our law here, what you have
15 been doing, we have always said that the evidence of an
16 accused person, the statement of an accused person is
17 only evidence against himself, not against another
18 accused person, so that even if it was tendered it has
19 nothing to do with another accused person, except it
20 was admitted by that accused person, and then it forms
21 part of the statement as a whole, in which case it will
22 apply to the other accused person.
23 As long as you have the position which no
24 such statement has been tendered for the purposes for
25 which it is being -- evidence is being led, you do not
1 have any fear.
2 So you do not expect us to give a decision
3 against somebody who might, in future, object to it.
4 Now, if there is any attempt to use it
5 against another accused person, obviously you will
6 object to it, and even if you do not, as common-law
7 judges we will do it ourselves, because we know that it
8 should not be evidence against the other accused
10 MR. MORAN: Your Honour, I have one
11 scheduling problem I ought to bring to the court's
12 attention, something probably more for the Registry,
13 but as I understand the schedule that we are all agreed
14 on, we are going to file something by 1 o'clock on
15 Friday. The Prosecutor would then have two weeks,
16 which would be Friday, March 6th, and we agreed that we
17 would have a week to respond to that which would make
18 it like, I think, March 11th -- no, Friday of the next
19 week, in any case.
20 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: 13th.
21 MR. MORAN: And the Trial Chamber is
22 scheduled to meet during that week.
23 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: On the 11th and 12th we
24 should be meeting.
25 MR. MORAN: Yes, your Honour, and the
1 question I have is that if we have not completed our
2 response to their -- our reply to their response to our
3 submission, I do not know what we can do. It might be
4 to everyone's advantage if we could trade off some days
5 with another Trial Chamber.
6 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: We will see what we can
7 do, whether we can find a way of you shortening your
8 time, and coming within the period of -- we will find
9 out something.
10 MR. MORAN: Well, the problem I see with
11 that, Judge, is that if they file it on March 6th,
12 Friday, March 6th, I am not likely to have it until
13 Monday, March 8th, have it in my hands, or March 9th,
15 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, that is true.
16 MR. MORAN: And that is --
17 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: It leaves only one
19 MR. MORAN: That creates a problem, so I just
20 wanted to point that out to the court and see if we can
21 in some amicable way solve this problem.
22 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: We will find a way of
23 trying to deal with it.
24 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, of course, your Honour,
25 if Mr. Niemann files a week early that solves the whole
2 MR. NIEMANN: I am very grateful for that
4 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: So, hopefully, we
5 accept these dates, except, I do not know, Mr. Olujic,
6 are you falling in line or are you still staying the
7 odd man out?
8 MR. OLUJIC: Your Honours, we requested of
9 you, if you could meet our needs, given the
10 consultations that I also had with my client with
11 regard to the -- Dr. Gow's testimony, so we will abide
12 by your decisions anyway, because your decision is law
13 for us.
14 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: We are trying to find
15 that everybody falls in line and facilitates the
16 argument. It makes life easier for both the
17 Prosecution and the Defence.
18 I am trying to turn to the Prosecution for
19 assistance to see if they can file two days earlier.
20 Can you? (Pause).
21 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honour, we have no idea
22 what we are going to get. We have tried to anticipate
23 what we are going to get, but for us to sort of say now
24 yes, we can do it two days earlier is really very
25 difficult, and all we can say is we could try, but
1 I think that we would have to find some other means of
2 perhaps seeing whether Registry can send it over by
3 courier or something of that nature. We might be able
4 to accommodate and assist in that way, but at this
5 stage, we just cannot say.
6 JUDGE JAN: You have got a very able team!
7 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I think, let us remain
8 in constant consultation.
9 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour.
10 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: So that whatever
11 happens, we know how to adjust it. So let us keep the
12 date as it is, and remain in constant consultation to
13 be able to arrange it. So thank you very much.
14 I think we are on our first lap. The Trial Chamber
15 will now adjourn.
16 (3.50 pm)
17 (Hearing adjourned)