1 Monday, 28 October, 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.
5 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Madam Registrar.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number
7 IT-98-34-T, the Prosecutor versus Naletilic and Martinovic.
8 JUDGE LIU: Thank you very much. Good afternoon, ladies and
9 gentlemen. This afternoon, we will hear the final argument from the
10 Prosecution. Mr. Scott, you informed us that you have some procedural
11 matters to address to the bench.
12 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. Mr. President, Your Honours, good
13 afternoon. Only one question, just as a procedural matter. The Chamber
14 had indicated earlier that rebuttal might be allowed on Thursday in the
15 Court's discretion. And I just wanted to be sure before we start our
16 arguments, presumably for the benefit of all parties, that whether or not
17 there will be rebuttal or the amount of rebuttal will not be a function of
18 either party then reserving time. Do I understand that correctly?
19 You are not asking -- in other words, Mr. President, you are not
20 asking or suggesting, if I understand correctly - I'm asking to be
21 corrected if I'm wrong - that in order for the Prosecution to have any
22 rebuttal time, we would have to reserve some of our time today and take
23 less time today. So I'd appreciate the Chamber giving us some guidance on
25 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe that you have to finish your final
1 argument today, and after hearing the rejoinder argument of the Defence
2 side, you may be given an opportunity on Thursday morning for one hour for
3 your rebuttal argument.
4 MR. SCOTT: All right.
5 JUDGE LIU: It is true to the Defence counsel. The Defence
6 counsel, each party, will have one hour for the rejoinder argument. That's
7 what we understand the rules.
8 MR. SCOTT: Very well, Mr. President. Thank you very much.
9 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek?
10 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, Your Honours, the Defence has an
11 objection. We were under the understanding that each party would give
12 final statements Monday morning, Tuesday morning, Wednesday morning and
13 Thursday morning. The Defence of Naletilic is disadvantaged because the
14 Prosecution, we find, is allowed to commence their final argument Monday
15 afternoon, will go to 7.00. And then we're made -- the defence of
16 Naletilic is made to come in tomorrow morning at 9.00. We have just been
17 handed two binders of documents.
18 Our further understanding is that on Wednesday and Thursday, the
19 sittings will be in the afternoon. We absolutely cannot understand why we
20 are put at this disadvantage. We believe that it violates the equality of
21 arms theory that permeates this Court, and we feel that we should be
22 allowed to give our final arguments commencing at 2.15 tomorrow
23 afternoon. Why should we be put in this position and be disadvantaged?
24 And we are disadvantaged if we are made to argue tomorrow morning at 9.00
25 after stopping at 7.00 tonight. It's just not fair.
1 JUDGE LIU: Well, I think the Court scheduling has been arranged
2 by the Registrar a long time ago, and if you have some objections, you
3 should have raised that objection almost a month ago when the scheduling
4 was issued and this Trial Chamber does not believe that any Defence
5 counsel was put in that disadvantaged position because this trial has been
6 going on for 14 months already and we have already received your final
7 argument in written form. Well --
8 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, for the record, we didn't know -- we had
9 no idea that this schedule placed us arguing at 9.00 a.m. on Tuesday, when
10 all other arguments start at 2.15 in the afternoon until last Friday.
11 Absolutely did not know it until that time. Came as a surprise to us.
12 JUDGE LIU: Well, anyway, the scheduling arrangement made by the
13 Registrar has been issued a long time before. I think that's just on your
14 part for the ignorance of that scheduling order.
15 Yes, Mr. Scott. You may start your final argument.
16 MR. SCOTT: May it please the Court, counsel, ladies and
17 gentlemen, on 17th of April, 1993, Mladen Naletilic, Tuta, was on the
18 cutting edge of ethnic cleansing. Those are the words that I told you on
19 the 10th of September, 2001, when we started this trial. And the evidence
20 that the Prosecution has submitted in these past 14 months has confirmed
21 and proven that statement and each charge in the indictment.
22 For Mladen Naletilic, Tuta, the days previous to the 17th of
23 April, 1993, must have been both heady and yet anxious. It was heady
24 because here he was the tip of the HVO sword, months and even years of
25 talk, of dreams of an independent Croatia, of a Herceg-Bosna either free
1 of Muslims or certainly with the Muslims in their place, what perhaps just
2 now become a reality. And here he was on the cutting edge.
3 Tuta's friend and a man he admired, Mate Boban, together with the
4 HDZ, HVO leadership, had made their plans. They had issued an ultimatum
5 to the Muslims, submit to the HVO by the 15th of April or face the
6 consequences. And here was Tuta first in Siroki Brijeg and then in
7 Risovac, chosen to implement that HVO plan and to enforce the ultimatum in
8 Herzegovina just as Kordic and Blaskic and others were about to enforce it
9 in central Bosnia. It must have been heady and exciting. But Tuta must
10 also have been anxious.
11 There is evidence, indeed even from a Prosecution witness, that
12 Tuta took care of his soldiers. Some might have described him at least in
13 this respect as a soldier's soldier, or a soldier's commander. He tried
14 to plan his actions and carry them out in a way to minimise danger to his
15 own troops. He must have thought even then, What will happen in these
16 next few days? Could he have expected that only one, two, or three days
17 later, one of his most trusted deputies, Mario Hrkac, Cikota, would be
18 killed and several others of his soldiers as well? There is no doubt that
19 Tuta was a charismatic man and a leader of men. His soldiers admired him;
20 they considered him a hero. He was an example to them. He was a role
22 It is unfortunate that when -- what he so often modeled to them
23 was brutal treatment of Muslim soldiers and Muslim civilians. Beating
24 prisoners, repeatedly, in front of his men, in effect, showing them the
25 way, giving his approval, expelling women and children, burning their
1 houses, destroying their mosques. Could such conduct be wrong when their
2 very own Tuta did it himself?
3 After the attack on Sovici and Doljani was completed, many of the
4 Muslim prisoners were taken to the Doljani fish farm which the Chamber has
5 heard much evidence about. There, they were repeatedly beaten and abused
6 by Tuta personally and again by his senior officers and soldiers. Tuta
7 threatened prisoners with a pistol. They were told to lie down and kiss
8 Croatian ground. Tuta's soldiers followed his example. Only a few weeks
9 later on the 9th and 10th of May, 1993, Tuta found himself once again
10 leading the HVO charge in Mostar. Perhaps even by then, the HDZ and HVO
11 leaders knew that Tuta was given to extreme, even criminal, conduct. But
12 there was a plan and it had to be executed. And for such a plan, you need
13 men like Tuta, for when you lose the dogs of ethnic cleansing you want
14 your dogs to be the meanest ones around.
15 On the 10th of May, at the tobacco institute in Mostar, Tuta stood
16 victorious with other senior HVO leaders and received the captured and
17 arrested Muslim men. Tuta swore at the Muslim prisoners, insulted their
18 balija mothers. He personally beat one prisoner in the face with a
19 Motorola radio, and once again, as before and as so many times thereafter,
20 once again, his own soldiers followed suit. There was also another man
21 who would play a key role in the HVO's continuing attacks and expulsions
22 in Mostar and the surrounding areas, one of Mladen Naletilic's commanders,
23 Vinko Martinovic, Stela.
24 A Muslim prisoner told you that he was twice taken to the front
25 line in Mostar to work for Vinko Martinovic's unit. On the first
1 occasion, the prisoner was beaten by Martinovic who told him, "You will
2 find out who Stela is."
3 In the midst of brutal treatments of Muslim prisoners who were
4 taken for forced labour at Stela's front line area on the confrontation
5 line in Mostar, you heard that Vinko Martinovic, Stela, said to them,
6 "Stand up, balijas. Do you know who you have come to work for?" In
7 1993 -- Mr. President, Your Honours, in 1993, both of these men must have
8 been relatively pleased with their positions. Certainly, things could
9 have been better but overall, they were both powerful men.
10 Overall, in their respective areas, with Tuta's area being a bit
11 broader, they were powerful men. They had the power indeed of life and
12 death, of freedom or captivity, of keeping your property or having it
13 taken. Even then, both Tuta and Stela certainly wanted all of the power
14 but none of the responsibility. And that is what they still want today,
15 none of the responsibility.
16 The Prosecution submits, Your Honours, that based on the law and
17 the evidence, and the evidence that you have received, Tuta and Stela must
18 be held responsible.
19 Mr. President, Your Honours, before continuing on and discussing
20 the evidence, I will tell you a bit about the trial. Some information
21 about the evidence in the case in terms of how the Chamber might consider
22 it, and about the Prosecution's plan for this closing submission.
23 As you know, the trial began on Monday, the 10th of September,
24 2001. The Prosecution case in chief was concluded on the 24th of January,
25 2002. The Prosecution called 56 witnesses live in court. In addition to
1 that, and we would respectfully ask the Chamber not to forget other
2 important evidence because the Chamber also admitted the testimony of ten
3 what we have called transcript witnesses, ten witnesses, important
4 witnesses, from other Tribunal cases, those transcripts are in evidence,
5 just as if they had given their testimony in this case. Important
6 witnesses like Robert Donia and Remi Landry and Charles McLeod and others.
7 In addition to that, the Chamber will recall that there were 16
8 deposition witnesses, all of whom testified in proceedings that began here
9 at the Tribunal on the 23rd of July, 2001, and continued until the 3rd of
10 August, 2001. So the Chamber will see that in addition to the 56
11 witnesses that were called live by the Prosecution, there are 26 other
12 witnesses whose evidence is a matter of record, and indeed that evidence
13 has been included in the final brief that the Prosecution has submitted.
14 A very brief word about the exhibits, as voluminous as they are.
15 The Chamber may have wondered from time to time about the Prosecution's
16 numbering and organisational system. It's actually relatively
17 straightforward although I'm sure not executed perfectly. The documents
18 have been organised and numbered in such a way, with a few errors that we
19 have certainly found in the past months, so that the documents are
20 arranged chronologically. It was that practice that led us sometimes to
21 have to enter, delineate, if you will, numbers from 31 to 32, being 31.5
22 or 31.6. The point is this: That in the work that the Chamber and your
23 staff has in front of you, if one of you, Your Honours, or your staff
24 wants to review documents, for example, related to the -- related to April
25 1993, you can go to the binders and you should be able to find in
1 chronological order from the 1st of April to the end of April, all the
2 exhibits covering that critical period of time. There are two exceptions
3 to that. Some, but not all, of the international armed conflict exhibits
4 are IAC exhibits, were and are organised separately in two binders.
5 Likewise, the presidential transcripts or the PT exhibits are also
6 organised separately.
7 In terms of this closing argument, Mr. President, the Prosecution
8 proposes to conduct it in this way. Obviously I have started the closing
9 and I will address most of my comments and arguments to the accused Tuta.
10 Mr. Stringer will then pick up the closing argument and address most of
11 his comments to the accused Stela, and he will also touch on the question
12 of the participation of the Croatian army, or the HV, in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the international armed conflict. Then,
14 Mr. President, I will again rise to my feet and address finally a bit more
15 on widespread and systematic, what might be considered the broader
16 international armed conflict in terms of the political aspects, and will
17 then end, bring to an end, the Prosecution closing argument.
18 Mr. President, you said a few days ago, on the topic of the
19 closing arguments, you said we, that is, you the judges, will have our
20 briefs, and there is no need to repeat everything that is in the brief.
21 Of course that is true. And I can tell you, Mr. President and Your
22 Honours, that the Prosecution has fully accepted your guidance. We will
23 not in our closing argument follow the Prosecution brief to any great
24 extent, although certainly of course, given that -- given the case and the
25 evidence in the case, our positions and the comments that we make will
1 certainly be similar to those stated in our brief.
2 As the Chamber will know and I will say primarily for the benefit
3 of the public gallery, and for those who may be watching elsewhere, it is
4 impossible, of course, to tell the whole story and to cover 14 months of
5 evidence in any detail in the approximately four hours, now less, that the
6 Prosecution has been given for closing argument. So we will certainly
7 make no attempt to do that, and I'm confident, Mr. President, Your
8 Honours, that when Mr. Stringer and I sit down at the end of the day,
9 there will be vast parts of the case which will not have been addressed.
10 But of course, that is what the briefs are for.
11 Instead, what the Prosecution will do or at least what I will do,
12 Mr. President, in my part of the closing argument is to recall in large
13 measure - this won't be my entire argument - but I will recall in
14 substantial measure six important witnesses, only six, that will give the
15 Chamber an overall, we believe and respectfully submit, feel of the case
16 and a reminder of much of the evidence that you have heard. These six
17 witnesses have a particular focus in some respects, and that is they tell
18 us about the man Tuta, who he was, and what his role was, in the HVO's war
19 on the Muslim people.
20 We will call six witnesses.
21 Mr. President, the Prosecution calls the Spanish battalion officer
22 Witness LL. You will recall that Witness LL, a senior officer in the
23 Spanish army, testified about having dinner at Andabak's house in Siroki
24 Brijeg on the 5th or 6th of April, 1993, approximately, he said day or two
25 before he finished his report which itself was dated the 7th of April,
1 1993. Witness LL told us,
2 "A. Yes, I met the whole family of Ivan Andabak. I also met his
3 friend and a friend who was very important to him, and that was Tuta.
4 "Q. Who introduced to you Tuta at that dinner?
5 "A. The formal introductions were made by Mr. Ivan Andabak.
6 "Q. Can you tell the Chamber, please, how was it if you remember,
7 what words did Mr. Andabak use in introducing Tuta to you and saying who
8 he was?
9 "A. Well, after all these years I cannot really repeat the words,
10 but what he said, that this was a very influential person, both in the
11 world of politics and in the world of economy, of business, and in
12 military life. And that it was his commander, that he worked with him,
13 and that he was first and foremost his friend.
14 "Q. Just now you said that he was his commander. Please explain
15 between these two individuals, Andabak and Tuta, who was whose commander?
16 "A. During the conversation at that time, I understood that Tuta
17 issued orders to Ivan Andabak, that he was the commander, that
18 Ivan Andabak was the chief of his Special Forces but above him there was
19 Tuta, who planned operations or perhaps made a recommendation regarding
20 the instructions, regarding the operations.
21 "Q. Did you come to know the business of operations, so to speak,
22 for Tuta and Andabak in 1993?
23 "A. Yes, I came to know both the building which housed
24 Ivan Andabak's office, his headquarters, and another building.
25 In the interests of time I will skip a few places in the
2 "Q. Let me go back to what you observed about the relationship
3 between Andabak and Tuta during that evening or any other time. When you
4 saw the two of them interact with one another, can you tell the Chamber:
5 Was one of them more deferential to the other?
6 "A. Well, at the time regarding this kind of relationship, you
7 know, you're at a dinner which is very agreeable and you don't notice much
8 of the hierarchy. What I could see was the friendship which existed
9 between Andabak and Tuta. As for the deference, I could see that he was
10 very happy, that he was very happy, very glad to be with Tuta, to be his
11 friend. I could see that. Tuta was very smart, very dignified, highly
12 ranking socially, and quite evidently above Ivan Andabak's level."
13 Witness LL went on to tell us how he learned much about Andabak
14 and Tuta during that dinner conversation. And we asked him:
15 "Q. Did Tuta himself tell you some of his personal history? Did
16 he tell you in his own words about himself?
17 "A. Yes. He in a way supplied me with a summary of the story of
18 his life, why he was in that particular situation at that time. He
19 created the impression of a man who had left all the commitments he had
20 outside his country to come and help his country. He wanted to invest all
21 his effort, all that he had to defend the cause of his country and the
23 "Q. What did Andabak and Tuta say about their intentions?
24 "A. Well, the future was clear at the time to them. They were
25 fighting for a country where Bosnian Croats would predominate and their
1 intention was to set up a Republic of Herceg-Bosna, expelling the Muslim
2 people from the area.
3 "Q. Sir, is that what Tuta and Andabak said, it was their
4 intention, their purpose, to expel all the Muslims?
5 "A. Yes.
6 "Q. Was anything said about the role of Mostar in Herceg-Bosna?
7 "A. Yes. To them, Mostar could serve as the capital of the
8 republic, a very important one. It was for them the key city, and they
9 disliked in a way, they disliked the presence of Muslims in the area and
10 because of that, they wanted to try to take precedent and to get rid of
11 the Muslim population in the area, to apply pressure to get rid of the
12 Muslims in the area."
13 Now, going back to Mr. Andabak, do you recall how Mr. Andabak
14 referred to Tuta? Did he describe him in any military term or refer to
15 him in any way as a superior? Well, tell us what he said.
16 "A. Well according to a document that that was done after the
17 dinner party a report I put forward, Mr. Tuta was a sort of chief
18 instructor of Ivan Andabak and the forces under him. He was over him.
19 This is what I understood from Mr. Tuta."
20 During Witness LL's testimony and I think arising out of
21 cross-examination, the Chamber may recall that it was put to Witness LL
22 how Andabak viewed Tuta, again in a military capacity. And this answer
23 was given.
24 "A. Andabak told me that sometimes Tuta was addressed as force
25 commander. He told me that when I asked him, Who was your boss? And
1 Andabak told me it was Tuta. He told me this on many occasions."
2 If I can have Mr. Bos's assistance, I'm going to put certain
3 documents in the course of my comments on the ELMO.
4 Mr. Bos, if I could ask to you please put Exhibit 327 on the ELMO,
5 first page of it. Mr. President, Your Honours, some of these documents
6 you will have in a binder that has been provided to you. Some of them
7 have been reserved, if you will, only to be placed on the ELMO. So you
8 will not have every document that I refer to but a number of them you will
9 have and also on the ELMO.
10 Mr. President, I can tell already that the time is going to move
11 very quickly, and I think on this document, the Chamber will recall, this
12 is the report that was prepared by Witness LL, giving a detailed account
13 concerning the person Tuta, about his views, his past, and his
14 intentions. And I submit -- the Prosecution submits that that report is
15 consistent with what Witness LL himself told you and other evidence in the
16 Prosecution case. And the Chamber will have that document of course at
17 its full disposal.
18 Witness LL went on to talk about the accuracy of the information;
19 he was questioned about that. The Chamber may recall that he talked about
20 corroborating the information, that indeed much of it came from either
21 Ivan Andabak or from Tuta himself. He also talked about later seeing
22 Mr. Naletilic at a military meeting at Medjugorje and that further
23 confirmed his understanding of Tuta's military role.
24 It was ultimately put to Witness LL, who stayed in Bosnia then
25 from that April and before, until July. He continued to collect
1 information during -- throughout that time and he testified ultimately
2 that "At the end, he did not change his assessment one bit." Which in his
3 words meant, "It was all accurate." Now, before I leave Witness LL and go
4 on to another witness, let me highlight a part of Witness LL's testimony
5 in response to questions from Judge Diarra. Judge Diarra asked, "Witness,
6 you were told, we do not like the presence of Muslims. Now, first, under
7 what circumstances were you told that and who was that who told you that,
8 and did this mean the presence of Muslims in the city of Mostar or
9 throughout Herceg-Bosna?"
10 Witness LL said, "Yes, specifically that night of the dinner
11 party, both Mr. Tuta and Mr. Ivan Andabak said that they were against
12 Muslims in that city. And subsequently, later on, when talking to other
13 brigade commanders with whom I had contact, he mentions hearing from other
14 HVO commanders that there should be no Muslims in that area."
15 Judge Diarra then followed up and said, "The city of Mostar or all
16 of the parts of Herceg-Bosna?"
17 And Witness LL said, "Not only the city of Mostar, because it is
18 very difficult to find a Muslim family in Ljubuski or the interior.
19 Perhaps there were people like that, perhaps there were still some
21 The Chamber will also recall, gets into the evidence concerning
22 Sovici and Doljani but another report by the Spanish Battalion, Exhibit
23 325 which I will ask Mr. Bos to put on the ELMO and I will read -- refer
24 to just part, on page 5. This was a Spanish battalion report and of
25 course, the Spanish Battalion was part of the United Nations protection
1 force on the ground. And in their report, on the 21st of April, on page
2 5, in reporting on the attack on Sovici and Doljani, they said this:
3 "The offensive is directed by a person of substantial political,
4 economic, and military influence; someone who is tired of signatures and
5 political treaties. Hence he has no wish to uphold the cease-fire
6 agreement struck between the Armija and the HVO. This person is known as
7 Tuta. He has chosen two collaborators he had with him in Operation Bura
8 namely, Ivan Andabak and Brigadier Lasic."
9 There are other aspects of Witness LL's testimony. He remembers
10 running into Andabak on the 7th of May, 1993, unexpectedly in Mostar and
11 the Chamber may remember Andabak was fully kidded out, some might say in
12 the vernacular armed to the teeth. And when LL asked him what was this
13 all about, Mr. Andabak said, "Heads will roll." Of course the attack on
14 Mostar was a short time thereafter.
15 Finally, one further comment from Witness LL. In fact, he saw
16 Tuta and Andabak later, after this dinner party, and he was asked:
17 "Q. During these continuing conversations, did Mr. Andabak say
18 anything more to you, not only about his personal objectives but what the
19 objectives of the HVO were during this time?
20 "A. Yes. He told me that his objective was to try and get all
21 the Muslims out and that this was being very difficult to do because he
22 had not expected such resistance and he thought it would have been easier
23 to do this.
24 "Q. Did you see the man Tuta again?
25 "A. Yes, I did. It's nothing that we had scheduled at all. It
1 was a casual encounter in Siroki Brijeg on the street. I saw that he had
2 a military uniform on. We had a brief conversation. I realised he seemed
3 to be quite satisfied that the war had begun and that he expected the war
4 to come to a successful end; namely, getting the Muslims displaced from
5 the city of Mostar."
6 The Chamber will recall the testimony of Witness O. Witness O, a
7 political leader on the Muslim side, who told the Chamber about a
8 conversation he had in late 1992 in a meeting involving Boban, Naletilic,
9 and others and how Tuta at the very beginning of the meeting essentially
10 seized control of the meeting by racial commentary, suggesting there were
11 no such things as a Muslim people, there were only Serbs and Croats. So
12 polarising the meeting at its very beginning that the meeting essentially
13 came to an immediate end.
14 Witness O was asked to look around the courtroom and say -- and
16 "Q. Do you see that man? Do you see that man that made those
17 comments to you in that day in Mate Boban's office in Grude in 1992? Do
18 you see that man?
19 "A. Yes, the accused Naletilic."
20 The Chamber will recall the testimony of the Dutch ECMM officer,
21 Major Van der Grinten who talked again about his experiences and his
22 encounters with Andabak and Tuta. He told you how that even in the
23 official ECMM briefings and the information, they were told early on who
24 this man Tuta was. He was in charge of two special units with one
25 commanded by Andabak and the other by Juka. The Chamber will recall it
1 was Van der Grinten that took the Chamber at some length through an
2 organisational chart, Exhibit 532.1, prepared by the Spanish Battalion,
3 indicating the place of Mr. Naletilic on that chart. Again showing him to
4 be in a position on the chart immediately superior to Juka Prazina on the
5 one hand and Ivan Andabak on the other.
6 Turning to Exhibit 484, a report that was shown to Mr. Van der
7 Grinten and perhaps Mr. Bos can assist us with that, page 4, the last page
8 of that report, under item 6, Assessment, Major Van der Grinten told us
9 about a meeting he had with another senior HVO officer named Slavko
10 Puljic, and as the basis of that conversation he made his report which is
11 Exhibit 484, saying this:
12 "Mr. Puljic seemed to be more friendly than his HVO colleagues,
13 also more honest than them. We think he has told us the truth when
14 talking about the paramilitary organisations inside or next to the HVO.
15 These organisations are extremist and nationalist, usually full of
16 criminals from all over the world. Their power is their money and their
17 behaviour, worse than any other people. We had met some of these capos of
18 these Mafias, Mr. Tuta, Mr. Andabak, Mr. Juka, et cetera, et cetera, and
19 we had confirmed their high level in the Croatian Community of
20 Herceg-Bosna and the HVO."
21 The Chamber will recall - and again, Mr. President, I'm finding I
22 must move very quickly - will remember Mr. Van der Grinten's chance
23 encounter once again with Andabak at the end of June 1993, when Andabak
24 was with a group of men at that time. And by Mr. Van der Grinten's
25 account, Andabak was not only surprised but frankly angry to encounter Van
1 der Grinten in that situation. Didn't want to be seen there. Didn't want
2 international observers there. And of course, the Chamber will know that
3 it was at the end of June and the 1st of July when the second major waive
4 of expulsions in West Mostar started. Mr. Van der Grinten testified to
5 seeing the Defence Minister, Bruno Stojic in Siroki Brijeg and seeing Tuta
6 at the same time.
7 The Prosecution submits, Your Honours, that that is one of the
8 relationships that the evidence shows of a man, this man Tuta, in close
9 association with the Minister of Defence, the HVO Minister of Defence,
10 Stojic, part of the power structure, if you will, that Mr. Naletilic drew
12 The Chamber will recall the testimony of the mufti of Mostar, Seid
13 Smajkic. I would respectfully submit to Your Honours a brave man who came
14 and testified publicly with no protective measures despite his high public
15 profile, unlike so many others who came, on all sides in fairness to the
16 Prosecution, from the Prosecution and the Defence, and asked to be
17 protected, not Mr. Smajkic. Mr. Smajkic came in here without protection
18 and told his story.
19 And told a compelling story and one of the parts of his story that
20 the Chamber will recall was that the man, one of his colleagues, one of
21 his subordinates in the Islamic church structure, the imam, Kasim Mezit.
22 He told you clearly how Kasim Mezit was taken to Siroki Brijeg, personally
23 interrogated and abused by Tuta, with Tuta becoming so angry with Kasim
24 Mezit, the imam, that he stabbed the man in the face with a pencil,
25 piercing his cheek when Kasim Mezit would not write on a piece of paper
1 what Tuta wanted.
2 Finally, the Chamber will recall Sir Martin Garrod a senior ECMM
3 diplomat who had an extensive exchange and meeting with Tuta. You will
4 remember his testimony about that, his lunch on the 15th of August, 1993,
5 in Siroki Brijeg. In which Tuta again perhaps ultimately ill advisedly
6 but was quite candid in his views about describing his history, his
7 thinking, and his intentions to Martin Garrod. Martin Garrod made a
8 report on that - and I will just briefly put it on the ELMO, Exhibit
9 565.2 - memorialising his lunch with Mr. Naletilic.
10 Mr. Naletilic characterised the Muslims as Islamic
11 fundamentalists, they had to be stopped. Sir Martin said, "This Tuta was
12 definitely charismatic but I would not trust him," and he didn't. And the
13 further comments are there for the Chamber to see, but I'm afraid we
14 simply don't have time to cover them in detail.
15 You will recall that Sir Martin also told the Chamber a fair
16 amount about Tuta's connections with Zagreb, about people like Susak, the
17 Croatian Minister of Defence; about Mate Boban; about their close
18 association, their close contacts and dealings with one another. And
19 indeed it was Sir Martin who said, "Siroki Brijeg seemed to be sort of an
20 HVO or HDZ power centre. So many of the important things happened there."
21 Sir Martin told the Chamber -- I asked him, "How did many of the
22 Bosnian Croats consider Tuta?" And he said, "I would say about 50 per
23 cent of the Croats to them Naletilic was mythical -- well, not mythical
24 but a hero of the war. And they regarded him with respect and awe." And
25 as I said in my earlier comments, Mr. President, it's a shame -- the
1 Prosecution submits, it's a shame that a man respected by so many, sets
2 such a poor example for so many to follow.
3 Now, there has been considering discussion in this trial about who
4 Tuta was, and I would like to turn, Mr. President -- let's not ask the
5 Muslims who Tuta was, because we all know what the Defence position will
6 be on that. Let's consider, who did the HVO, who did the HVO say that
7 Tuta was? And I would ask the Chamber to direct its attention with the
8 assistance of Mr. Bos, if he could put a schedule that has been prepared
9 on the ELMO. And again Mr. President, I'm not going to have time to
10 simply read off all these entries but look at person after person after
11 senior HVO official and what they knew -- who they considered Tuta to be.
12 Actually, the very first one is not an HVO official. It was the
13 Croatian Minister of Defence, Susak, himself. Tuta was regarded as the
14 HDZ's leadership "person" for military activities in the area of
15 Herceg-Bosna. He referred to Tuta's men. He described Andabak --
16 Mr. Susak described Andabak as Tuta's deputy. Bruno Stojic, the HVO
17 Minister of Defence who I already mentioned; Marijan Biskic, the assistant
18 Minister of Defence for the HVO for security, who was responsible for both
19 the military police and the intelligence service SIS; Ante Roso, chief of
20 the HVO main staff; Slobodan Praljak, chief of the HVO main staff; Milivoj
21 Petkovic, chief of the HVO main staff; Zarko Tole, senior member of the
22 chief of the HVO main staff; Miljenko Lasic, opera stiff zone commander,
23 Zeljko Siljeg, operative zone commander; Ivica Lucic, head of the HVO
24 intelligence service; Mile Curic, chief of the HVO operations and
1 Ivan Andabak himself, what did he tell Witness LL? Tuta was my
2 commander. Stanko Bozic, the HVO warden; Josip Praljak, the HVO deputy
3 warden. Vinko Martinovic, Stela himself in his testimony in the Zagreb
4 proceedings said: "Tuta was the commander of the Convicts Battalion, Tuta
5 was his superior." Ivan Baga, HVO commander of the Posuska battalion.
6 Stipe Pole, the commander of the Mijat Tomic third Brigade. 17 of the
7 most senior commanders, including none other than the Minister of Defence
8 of the Croatian republic, and they all considered Tuta to be the commander
9 of the Convicts Battalion, all considered Tuta to be a key military player
10 in the HDZ, HVO structure.
11 Prosecution submits, Mr. President, they were not wrong.
12 The evidence concerning, turning now to Sovici and Doljani, the
13 events that occurred there from approximately the middle of April 1993
14 until early May. I'm going to ask Mr. Bos to put on the ELMO a chart that
15 has been prepared simply as an aid, comparing in particular as a vehicle,
16 if you will -- and this will be in the judges' notebooks, I hope, should
17 be -- the Rados diary, Exhibit 926C and other documentary evidence in the
18 case. And what the Chamber will see is a compellingly consistent story
19 told by source after source, document after document, witness after
20 witness, that interlocks into a single, cogent, compelling description of
21 the events in Sovici-Doljani. And if time allowed, I would spend much
22 more time going through these exhibits.
23 The Chamber can move from the Rados diary column repeatedly to the
24 other evidence column and see the interlocking evidence, to see how what
25 is said in the Rados diary is reported elsewhere. It is all of a piece,
1 Mr. President, Your Honours, it all tells a story of the man Tuta, who was
2 responsible for the ethnic cleansing of approximately 500 women, children,
3 and elderly from Sovici-Doljani, the imprisonment, interrogation, and
4 mistreatment of approximately 100 Muslim men, the burning, not during --
5 not battle damage, Mr. President, but after the armed conflict, after the
6 battle was over, the intentional torching of the Muslim houses, the
7 intentional destruction of the mosque when they were dynamited and blown
8 down. I only will have time if I can ask Mr. Bos to help me with Exhibit
10 Now, Mr. President, I submit that the documents concerning
11 Sovici-Doljani are particularly powerful but again -- the Chamber will be
12 able to - as I am already sure has - review those in more detail. For
13 now, I only -- I select one document, Exhibit P333, the report from
14 Mr. Rozic on this 23rd of April, 1993, and really, Mr. Rozic sums it all
15 up. After the armed conflicts in the settlements of Doljani and Sovici,
16 the interrogation and arrest of all members of the army was carried out
17 and civilians were collected in several places. In total, we have 422
18 women and children and 25 military conscripts. About 94 military
19 conscripts were transported to Ljubuski. Seven military conscripts who
20 had been killed and were members of the BH Army from Sovici have been
21 buried so far.
22 The Chamber will recall, and the Prosecution submits, that at
23 least four of the prisoners were executed behind the Sovici school.
24 Returning to Rozic's report:
25 "After the conflicts in these areas ended, all Muslim houses were
1 burned and two mosques destroyed at the order of high-ranking commanders."
2 Who were those high ranking commanders, Mr. President? Judge
3 Clark? Judge Diarra? The high ranking commanders, the highest of those
4 commanders in that operation was Naletilic, Tuta.
5 Moving on, touch very briefly in some of the time remaining before
6 the first recess, moving to the attack on the Vranica building on the 9th
7 and 10th of May, 1993, as I said earlier only a few weeks later. And I
8 submit to the Chamber that given the volume of evidence that the Chamber
9 has received, it is sometimes easy, or has been for me, to forget the
10 connection of some of these events or their proximity in time. The attack
11 on the Vranica building on the 9th and 10th of May is only days after
12 Sovici-Doljani, only days. In fact, one might say the bodies in
13 Sovici-Doljani weren't even cold yet. And here was Tuta again at the
14 forefront of the HVO charge, attacking the Vranica building in Mostar.
15 Now, I don't think we should minimise the importance of the
16 Vranica building from a symbolic perspective. The evidence showed that at
17 the end of the day there was only a small group of soldiers there,
18 probably no than 20, maybe 30. Did it really constitute much armed
19 resistance to the more HVO? No. But it symbolised the organised, armed
20 Muslim resistance, or at least potential resistance in West Mostar. And
21 the pattern that the Chamber will see over and over again in the evidence
22 is in the ethnic cleansing that occurred whether it was in Sovici or the
23 Vranica building or in Rastani or elsewhere is that the first thing you do
24 is take care of the military-age men and the armed resistance. And once
25 they are under control, you deal with the rest of the population at your
1 leisure. Because then the Muslim women and children, the elderly can be
2 taken care of without much trouble really.
3 And it was Naletilic that did it.
4 On the 9th of May and again the evidence could be discussed at
5 much greater length and is in our brief, but there has been much
6 discussion about what happened and who started the attack on the 9th of
7 May. Let me make two submissions to the Chamber.
8 First of all, it is the Prosecution's view respectfully based on
9 the weight of the evidence, on the overwhelming weight of the evidence,
10 that the HVO attacked Mostar, specifically West Mostar, at approximately
11 5.00 in the morning on the 9th of May, 1993. Having said that, let me
12 just indicate to the Chamber, whether that's true or not really has no
13 bearing on the charges. Whoever started it, whoever pulled the trigger
14 first, has nothing to do, does not absolve for a moment the mass arrest of
15 Muslim civilians that were taken out of their flats, that were taken to
16 Velez stadium, that were put on buses that day and taken to the
17 Heliodrom. It does not absolve for a moment the Muslim men who were taken
18 out of the Vranica building, taken to the tobacco institute, presented to
19 Tuta, and personally mistreated by Tuta himself and his subordinates. Who
20 fired the first shot really doesn't matter at all.
21 Now, having said that, again Sir Martin Garrod told us that this
22 was clearly a preplanned, deliberate attack. You remember that Sir Martin
23 was the former commanding officer -- not one commanding officer, the
24 commanding officer of the British Royal Marines, a professional soldier
25 all his life. And he told the Chamber what it would take to organise a
1 military operation on this scale. You don't do it on five minute's
2 notice. You don't do it in a reaction to some Muslim insult on a street
3 in West Mostar. This was planned, logistics had to be put in place, the
4 buses had to be arranged, the collection centres had to be designated at
5 the Velez stadium and elsewhere. This was a preplanned, concerted
6 orchestrated attack that took days to organise. That's what the military
7 professional soldier, Sir Martin, told you, and others.
8 Tuta was there. Two indications of that in addition to other
9 evidence are the fact that Juka Prazina was there and played a key role
10 repeatedly identified by witnesses and one of Tuta's other deputies,
11 Zeljko Bosnjak played a key role and was there. In fact, on Exhibit 17.2,
12 it's a videotape, the Chamber will recall a videotape of the men coming
13 out of the Vranica building and then some other clips as well. In the
14 middle of that clip, Zeljko Bosnjak is interviewed, interviewed that day,
15 and who is he but one of the lead deputy commanders, along with Prazina of
16 the Convicts Battalion.
17 And Exhibit 17.3, I don't know if you have that, Mr. Bos, but is a
18 still simply a still photo made from the videotape and there is Bosnjak.
19 There he is at the Vranica building on the 9th and 10th of May, 1993. In
20 fact, before I leave the Vranica building, one of the Defence's own
21 witness, another relatively experienced military man, Witness NP, not a
22 Prosecution witness, Mr. President, a Defence witness, Witness NP saw Juka
23 taking prisoners to the Ministry of Defence building. He saw Juka arguing
24 with a prisoner. He saw Tuta at the Ministry of Defence on the 10th of
25 May. He saw the yard at the tobacco institute awash with people,
1 civilians, and soldiers. He saw -- or, in fact, Tuta spoke with the
2 Defence Witness NP and some of the soldiers from his unit. All put Tuta
3 there, in addition to the extensive Prosecution witness testimony that put
4 him there.
5 Couple of brief points. It is the Prosecution's view and the
6 Prosecution case, Mr. President, Your Honours, that the man Naletilic Tuta
7 has what we call the 7(3) command responsibility not only concerning the
8 Vinko Skrobo ATG, but for the conduct of the other ATGs that were part of
9 the Convicts Battalion and over which he was superior. The Chamber heard
10 about the Benko Penavic ATG, the Baja Kraljevic ATG, other ATGs. The
11 Prosecution case was confirmed unexpectedly, was not an exhibit at the
12 beginning of the case, but was confirmed to the letter -- to the letter,
13 in the Karlo Rotim book a part of which is Exhibit P927/2 describing in
14 detail the structure of the Convicts Battalion, of Tuta being its
15 commander, and of the ATGs that were part of it, including the Vinko
16 Skrobo, commanded by Vinko Martinovic, the Baja Kraljevic commanded by
17 Predrag Mandic, the Benko Penavic commanded by Mario Milicevic, et cetera,
18 et cetera, et cetera.
19 Very quickly, if Mr. Bos has Exhibits P51 and P52 if he could put
20 those on the ELMO. Small pieces, Your Honour, but part of the hundreds of
21 exhibits that the Prosecution has given to you. If these units were not
22 part of the Convicts Battalion, if they were not Tuta's units, then why do
23 their patch say, Kaznjenicka Bojna, on the patch? And the exhibit, the
24 first one for the Vinko Skrobo and the second one for the Baja Kraljevic
25 ATG. There is extensive evidence in our brief, those are just samples.
1 Secondly, Your Honour, the second point that we would make is that
2 in terms as a commander, Naletilic was responsible for the care of
3 prisoners taken by his troops. It was not sufficient -- it was not
4 allowable for Tuta time after time, whether in Sovici-Doljani or at the
5 Vranica building or elsewhere to take prisoners and then simply forget
6 about them. He as a commander has responsibility to see the prisoners are
7 treated according to the laws of international humanitarian law, according
8 to the Geneva Conventions. He simply cannot wash his hands and go on
9 about his business.
10 Mr. President, that is a brief overview of the Prosecution case.
11 As I said at the beginning, could not cover it in any detail. There
12 was -- there is also the attack on Rastani. It's in our brief. There are
13 other aspects of the Prosecution case which are covered in our brief. Of
14 course, Mr. Stringer now will turn his attention after the break to the
15 case concerning Mr. Martinovic. And then I look forward to addressing the
16 Chamber again at the end of the day. Thank you very much.
17 JUDGE LIU: Yes, shall we have the break now? We will resume at
19 --- Recess taken at 3.29 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 4.02 p.m.
21 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Stringer, you may proceed.
22 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President. May it please the Court,
23 Mr. President, Your Honours, counsel for the Defence, like Mr. Scott, I
24 will not engage in any sort of wholesale restatement of the evidence,
25 certainly it's all found -- everything that we have to say about the
1 evidence is found in the brief. I intend to use the time allotted to me
2 to discuss the crimes and criminal responsibility of Vinko Martinovic in
3 this case and will use this occasion to respond to a variety of the
4 assertions he and his defence have made in their final submissions, their
5 brief. I will then also briefly address the proof of Croatia's direct
6 military participation in this conflict, which is one of the bases on
7 which the Prosecution submits that it has proven the existence of an
8 international armed conflict in this case.
9 Mr. President, my first comments would be of a general nature,
10 some general observations about the application of article 7 in this case
11 in respect of Vinko Martinovic. The Trial Chamber will find, if it hasn't
12 already, that the Defence devotes a significant amount of discussion in
13 its brief to article 7(3) under the Statute, asserting that Mr. Martinovic
14 cannot be held responsible under article 7(3) for a variety of reasons,
15 claiming that he was not a military commander, that he acted in the
16 capacity of a civilian commander, for example, that he didn't know of
17 crimes committed by subordinates, et cetera. The Prosecution rejects
18 these assertions because it's our submission, Mr. President, they are not
19 supported by the evidence or by the law.
20 Mr. Martinovic's military authority as a commander, a military
21 commander in this case, is in our view beyond doubt. He was not a
22 civilian. He did not wield authority as a civilian. He was at all times
23 a military commander in a position to exercise responsible command over
24 subordinates in his unit. The evidence I think amply demonstrates in fact
25 the manner in which Mr. Martinovic in fact exercised his authority and his
1 control over his subordinates.
2 Throughout the trial, the Defence has in fact never asserted that
3 Martinovic could not or did not have the ability to exercise command and
4 effective control over his subordinates. The fact that this unit held and
5 successfully defended a strategic section of the confrontation line at the
6 Bulevar in Mostar is itself proof that Martinovic exercised command and
7 control over his subordinates.
8 Mr. President, the main point that I wish to emphasise on -- in
9 respect of article 7 is that the Defence submissions in respect of article
10 7(3) must not distract the Trial Chamber from the primary basis of
11 Martinovic's criminal responsibility, which is found under Article 7(1).
12 Martinovic ordered crimes. He planned crimes. He personally committed
13 crimes. And in doing so, he instigated crimes, the many crimes, committed
14 by his subordinates.
15 Martinovic regularly called upon his subordinates to commit and
16 participate in crimes directed against Muslim prisoners in the
17 confrontation line, at his headquarters, near the confrontation line, and
18 against those many civilian residents of West Mostar whom he and his
19 subordinates forcibly evicted and transferred across into East Mostar.
20 For Vinko Martinovic, this is first and foremost a case of criminal
21 responsibility under Article 7(1).
22 In their brief, the Defence ignore Article 7(1) entirely. Their
23 response to the overwhelming proof of Martinovic's personal involvement
24 and guilt for the crimes charged is simply to assert that the witnesses
25 called were not credible and to make their oft-repeated and never-proved
1 claims about the AID.
2 I am not going to devote any time during this argument debating or
3 assessing for the Trial Chamber, if you will, the credibility of the
4 witnesses who came, the many witnesses who came and testified about the
5 events in which they participated, the things that happened to them. The
6 Trial Chamber certainly is in the best position to judge the credibility
7 of all the witnesses that it's heard in this case.
8 But because of the strength of the Prosecution case proving
9 Martinovic's guilt and direct responsibility for all the crimes with which
10 he's charged in the indictment under Article 7(1), we point out that the
11 Trial Chamber may in fact never even need to consider the Defence
12 submissions on article 7(3). Having said that, Mr. President, there is
13 there is one vital aspect of the law of command responsibility which has
14 been totally ignored by the Defence in their submissions which the Trial
15 Chamber may find useful in its consideration of Martinovic's conduct and
16 omissions in respect of prisoners who found themselves in his custody.
17 Mr. Scott touched upon this briefly in his remarks, and that is
18 the fact that under international humanitarian law, every commander has an
19 obligation, an affirmative obligation, to ensure that prisoners in their
20 custody, prisoners in their charge, are treated humanely in accordance
21 with international law. It's incumbent upon military commanders such as
22 Vinko Martinovic to ensure that procedures, practices, are in place to
23 ensure that the rights of prisoners of war, civilians as well, are
24 honoured at all times when those prisoners are in his custody or in the
25 custody of his subordinates. That obligation was reaffirmed, I believe,
1 most recently in the Blaskic Trial Chamber decision after having
2 considered a number of the post World War II cases.
3 This was Martinovic's obligation in respect of all prisoners for
4 whom he took responsibility. He cannot, as he suggests in his brief,
5 attempt to lay off responsibility for prisoners to those people who were
6 out at the Heliodrom, the administrators or the military police who had
7 custody of prisoners when they were at the Heliodrom. The prisoners'
8 entitlement to proper and humane treatment followed them from the
9 Heliodrom to Vinko Martinovic's headquarters on the Kalemova Street in
10 West Mostar. He's responsible for everything that happened to those
11 prisoners when they were brought to work for him and his unit.
12 I'm speaking of all of the prisoners who were brought to the ATG
13 Vinko Skrobo, who were forced to work in the confrontation line, on the
14 Bulevar making sandbags, moving sandbags, digging fortifications and
15 trenches. I'm talking about the prisoners who died on the 17th of
16 September, 1993, during the military operations that occurred on that day,
17 and I'm also speaking of Nenad Haramandic, a prisoner who as the parties
18 now appear to agree was in fact at the headquarters of Vinko Skrobo and
19 was brought to Vinko Martinovic on the day in question. I'll talk about
20 that all in a few moments.
21 In respect of counts 2 through 8, Mr. President, which are the
22 group of counts that relate to forced labour of prisoners, detainees, on
23 the confrontation line, the evidence establishes that Martinovic and the
24 ATG Vinko Skrobo participated virtually every day in an organised, highly
25 regulated, highly documented, system within the HVO for using Muslim
1 prisoners to perform unlawful labour in dangerous confrontation line
3 In respect of the ATG Vinko Skrobo, the Trial Chamber has heard
4 the testimony of numerous witnesses who were themselves brought from the
5 Heliodrom and forced to perform any number of acts placing themselves at
6 risk routinely and regularly in what can only be described as an
7 incredibly brutal confrontation line that existed across the Bulevar in
8 West Mostar.
9 The Trial Chamber heard not only from victim witnesses, the Trial
10 Chamber heard testimony about this practice from members of
11 Mr. Martinovic's own unit. I refer to Allan Knudsen and Witness Q, and I
12 also refer to the testimony of Witness S who was a member of the HVO 4th
13 battalion who was ordered and given responsibility to guard prisoners who
14 were in the custody of Vinko Martinovic and were forced to work in his
15 area of responsibility.
16 I'm going to ask Mr. Bos to quickly place Exhibit 562.2 on the
17 ELMO. This is one of the many reports which the Trial Chamber has
18 documenting the removal and the return of prisoners to and from the
19 Heliodrom for work with the many, many HVO units in Mostar, and HV units,
20 I might add - and I'll get to that later - which used prisoners for
21 unlawful labour.
22 We know, and the Trial Chamber recalls, I'm sure, the great deal
23 of testimony regarding Dinko Kenezovic, who was often charged with going
24 to the Heliodrom and bringing the prisoners back from the Heliodrom to
25 work for Vinko Martinovic and his unit. This particular report
1 memorialises the wounding of one of the prisoners that had been released
2 to Mr. Martinovic's unit in August of 1993. The bottom of the report
3 appears the signature of Stanko Bozic who wrote many reports about the
4 conditions at the Heliodrom and the mistreatment of prisoners who were
5 taken for forced labour.
6 The Trial Chamber will also recall the extensive HVO logbooks
7 which are in evidence which provide a great deal of documentation
8 concerning the dates, the numbers, and the identities of witnesses who
9 were taken out of the Heliodrom to perform forced labour.
10 The fact is, Mr. President, that this accused, Vinko Martinovic,
11 and his unit routinely and regularly used prisoners unlawfully to perform
12 extremely, highly dangerous tasks in an active confrontation line, tasks
13 which he deemed too dangerous for himself or his own subordinates to
15 One last question the Trial Chamber may wish to ask itself when it
16 considers this group of counts in the indictment - and I may ask this
17 question again in my remarks concerning the other facts of the case, and
18 other counts - we know the extent to which this practice occurred among
19 the HVO, all units, during the entire time of this conflict, certainly
20 after the events of 30 June, 1993. Knowing what the Trial Chamber knows
21 about Vinko Martinovic, knowing what the Trial Chamber knows about the
22 conduct of his subordinates, is it the least bit reasonable to question
23 whether he would have in fact used prisoners to perform these tasks rather
24 than using his own subordinates? Is it reasonable to conclude that he
25 would not have permitted prisoners to be used for these purposes? Is
1 there any evidence to suggest that he attempted to prevent these sorts of
2 activities, this unlawful conduct, from taking place within his own, as
3 the Defence would assert, very small area of responsibility?
4 Mr. President, it's our submission that in fact the evidence does
5 not permit any conclusion that he would have taken any measures to prevent
6 this conduct, and that he knew this conduct was taking place, actively
7 promoted it and now in our view, Mr. President, finds himself having been
8 proven to be guilty of the crimes associated with the unlawful use of
9 forced labour.
10 The events of 17 September, I will briefly address. The Trial
11 Chamber knows a great deal about that day. We know that there was a major
12 HVO operation that took place in Mostar on that day, an attack was
13 launched along the entire length of the confrontation line, along the
14 Bulevar, in Mr. Martinovic's area of responsibility, all the way down
15 north to the area of Santiceva Street. The Trial Chamber only recently
16 heard the testimony of Witness AF, whose brother was killed on Santiceva
17 Street on that day. Witness AF was then involved in the burial of a
18 hundred or so bodies of Muslim prisoners who were killed in the operation
19 on the 17th of September.
20 We know that on that day, a special group of prisoners, a
21 different group of prisoners, was brought from the Heliodrom to Vinko
22 Martinovic. Much of the planning that went into the operation of 17
23 September, 1993, is contained in Exhibit P608. Mr. Bos has that, if we
24 could take a quick look. I should first point out, Mr. President, that in
25 their brief, it appears to me that the Defence concede the correctness or
1 the reliability of this document, 608. The Defence for Mr. Martinovic
2 assert that the document in fact establishes that the events of 17
3 September, 1993, fell under the command of Mario Milicevic and that
4 therefore, Mr. Martinovic could bear no criminal or command responsibility
5 for the acts of 17 September, 1993.
6 We disagree with that submission, Mr. President. We submit that
7 the evidence establishes conclusively that Mr. Martinovic was actively
8 involved in the planning and directing of certainly the actions of the ATG
9 Vinko Skrobo on the 17th of September, 1993.
10 Referring to Exhibit 608, particularly on the second page, we find
11 and we will find this time and time again when we examine the documents
12 regarding the activities of Mr. Martinovic, that in fact his activities
13 and the activities of 17 September are linked to his superior, Mr. Mladen
14 Naletilic. The second paragraph of page 2, in fact, refers to a meeting
15 called by Mr. Naletilic in which he summoned his commanders of his ATG
16 groups, or at least three of them, to Siroki Brijeg for meetings with
17 others to engage in the planning of the operation on 17 September, 1993.
18 We know that Tuta's men were involved in this operation. We know that
19 Vinko Martinovic was involved in this operation.
20 The third and final page of this document provides additional
21 corroboration concerning a lot of the witness -- victim-witness testimony
22 regarding the events of the 17th of September in which it states that the
23 attack began at exactly 1200 hours, 12 noon, on the 17th. The Trial
24 Chamber heard testimony from several witnesses, and has before it the
25 testimony of several witnesses, on that point.
1 We know that on the 17th of September, 1993, a group of prisoners
2 was signed out of the Heliodrom by Dinko Kenezovic and taken to the
3 headquarters of the ATG Vinko Skrobo, that is shown in a couple of pages
4 that are found in one of the log books, Exhibit P601.1. Mr. President,
5 this is a part of the logbook for the 17th of September, 1993. It shows
6 the names of those prisoners who were taken to Vinko Martinovic on this
7 day. It includes the name of prisoners who died on the confrontation line
8 on this day.
9 We know that the wooden rifles incident in particular was planned
10 ahead of time. We know because first of all it was necessary to make the
11 wooden rifles. We also know it was planned because as Witness I
12 testified, that's a day when the usual group of prisoners was not taken to
13 Mr. Martinovic. We've heard a lot in the Defence submissions about the
14 favoured group of prisoners, the prisoners that perhaps knew him or the
15 prisoners who perhaps possessed certain skills which Mr. Martinovic
16 needed, particularly in repairing the many cars at his disposal. But on
17 this day, the usual group of prisoners got up to go with Mr. Kenezovic and
18 were told that they weren't needed. A different group of prisoners was
19 taken and that's the group whose name appears on the logbook that is in
20 Exhibit P601.1. We know that the prisoners were given wooden rifles. We
21 know that Vinko Martinovic was directly involved in selecting and
22 equipping the prisoners with camouflage uniforms and the wooden rifles.
23 That he was directly involved instructing them on their mission.
24 We know that the mission took place at 12 noon when other
25 prisoners were instructed to remove sandbags from the area of Liska Street
1 so that the tank could pass through, passing closer toward the ABiH
2 positions on the other side. We have not only the testimony of victim
3 witnesses who participated in these events. We also have the testimony of
4 two of the members of Mr. Martinovic's unit, Allan Knudsen and Witness Q
5 who testified about their own participation in these events and the
6 participation of the prisoners in the carrying of the wooden rifles in
7 front of the tank.
8 The Defence in their brief rely on Exhibit P612.1, which is a
9 document purporting to indicate that all of the prisoners signed out on
10 this day, the 17th, in fact returned to the Heliodrom. Mr. President, we
11 know that that document is wrong; it is false. In fact, not all of the
12 prisoners signed out to Mr. Martinovic on that day did return to the
13 Heliodrom. We know that at least two of them, and probably three of them,
14 were killed in the area of the Bulevar confrontation line on the 17th of
15 September, and I'm going to briefly turn to two of those prisoners, Aziz
16 Colakovic and Enes Pajo. The Trial Chamber will find their names
17 appearing among those who were signed out to Vinko Martinovic on the 17th
18 of September.
19 We know that these two prisoners were performing forced labour in
20 the active, dangerous area of the confrontation line during the HVO
21 operation on the 17th of September. Witness I was with Aziz Colakvic on
22 that day. They were both at the sandbag barrier on Liska Street. They
23 had been given a number of tasks to perform by Ernest Takac, the very
24 well-known and notorious subordinate and colleague of Mr. Martinovic.
25 Witness I and Aziz Colakvic were subsequently separated by events. Later,
1 Witness I was with Hamdija Colakvic inside the health centre when they
2 were instructed to remove sandbags from the windows.
3 Later, Takac instructed Witness I to move north to an area above
4 the health centre, to remove the body of a wounded HVO soldier who was out
5 in an open area on the confrontation line. In moving to this area, in
6 order to get to this soldier, Witness I found and saw the dead body of
7 Aziz Colakvic in a clearing, and in fact at that point, Witness I was
8 himself hit by a bullet in the leg and found himself hiding behind the
9 body of his friend, Aziz Colakvic in the middle of this battle on the
11 The same day, Witness NN recognised the body of Enes Pajo lying in
12 a pool of blood after Witness NN had been told, ordered, to get out of the
13 trench and to remove wounded and dead bodies from this area. We know from
14 Witness J that Enes Pajo was in fact one of the prisoners who had
15 initially been selected to carry one of the wooden rifles by Vinko
16 Martinovic earlier that morning.
17 Mr. President, the documents and the testimony establish that
18 these two prisoners were among those taken to Mr. Vinko Martinovic on the
19 17th of September. The evidence establishes beyond any doubt that these
20 prisoners were among all of the others who were deliberately forced to
21 work in an area in which there was an extremely high likelihood of death
22 or serious injury. It's true, we don't know whether these two died as a
23 result of being used as human shields, but it's our submission,
24 Mr. President, that we do know that Vinko Martinovic bears individual
25 criminal responsibility for the deaths of those two prisoners on the
1 Bulevar confrontation line on that day.
2 Counts 13 through 17 relate to the beating and death of Nenad
3 Harmandic. I'm not going to go into great detail over the extensive
4 evidence, the detailed evidence that has been submitted in respect of this
5 issue. I will use this occasion to respond and to address some of the
6 points and assertions made by the Defence in their case and in their final
7 trial brief.
8 Mr. President, it seems that after -- at the end of this long
9 trial, we do have agreement on at least a couple of very critical facts
10 relating to Nenad Harmandic. Agreement, that is, with the Defence of
11 Mr. Martinovic. We know and the Defence of Mr. Martinovic appears to
12 concede, that in fact Nenad Harmandic was brought to Vinko Martinovic and
13 the headquarters of the ATG Vinko Skrobo. I'm referring to paragraph 351
14 of the Defence brief.
15 The Defence also agree or concede that when he was at the
16 headquarters of the Vinko Skrobo, Mr. Harmandic was in a state of having
17 been severely beaten. Both of these points corroborate and are consistent
18 with the testimony of Prosecution witnesses, Halil Ajanic and Witness AD,
19 who testified that she saw Mr. Harmandic at Martinovic's headquarters.
20 We know based on the testimony of Halil Ajanic, the severe beating
21 that was inflicted on Mr. Harmandic at Mr. Martinovic's headquarters by
22 Mr. Martinovic's subordinates, Ernest Takac in particular. We know that
23 Vinko Martinovic invited Halil Ajanic, himself a prisoner, to participate
24 in this severe beating that was taking place. The Trial Chamber has
25 already heard Mr. Ajanic's testimony about other forms of outrage,
1 outrageous conduct and acts that were directed against Mr. Harmandic
2 before he was finally put in a car by Mr. Martinovic's subordinates and
3 taken away. And it's conceded, Mr. President, that that's the last we
4 know about what happened to Mr. Harmandic.
5 The Defence offer two explanations or defences in respect of
6 Nenad Harmandic which are perhaps related. First is their assertion that
7 Mr. Harmandic had been severely beaten at the Heliodrom and that he was
8 then brought in that condition to Mr. Martinovic, who saw him and simply
9 sent him back to the Heliodrom. The Defence also point to a couple of
10 documents in evidence. One is Exhibit P774, which indicates that in fact
11 Mr. Harmandic was signed out in mid-July, 1993, not by the ATG Vinko
12 Skrobo but instead by the 1st HVO military police light assault
13 Battalion. The Defence assert that Mr. Harmandic was in their custody and
14 control and that whatever happened to him was not the responsibility of
15 Mr. Martinovic. And that in fact this particular document indicates that
16 Mr. Harmandic had managed to escape.
17 Mr. President, it's our submission that there is no evidence or
18 logic that supports the assertion that Harmandic would have been brought
19 to the ATG Vinko Skrobo headquarters from the Heliodrom if he had already
20 been severely beaten there by others. Nor does that rule out the
21 likelihood that any such beatings would have continued upon
22 Mr. Harmandic's arrival at the ATG Vinko Skrobo. In any event, it's our
23 submission that it makes no sense to bring a prisoner to the front line
24 who can't work, because we know that the prisoners brought to
25 Mr. Martinovic's headquarters were brought there to work.
1 It's equally implausible, Mr. President, that Vinko Martinovic
2 would have sent Harmandic back to the Heliodrom after the severe beating
3 that was inflicted on Harmandic at that headquarters. The orders with
4 which prisoners were released to all of the units, including the Vinko
5 Skrobo unit, required and reminded the commanders that the prisoners were
6 to be treated in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. We know that Mr.
7 Stanko Bozic, the warden at the Heliodrom prison, was regularly writing
8 reports about the mistreatment that prisoners were suffering when they
9 were in the custody of individual HVO units.
10 To return Harmandic to the Heliodrom would have been to reveal to
11 everyone, both the prisoners and the HVO military personnel at the
12 Heliodrom, the treatment that Harmandic received while he was in
13 Martinovic's custody. Martinovic had no choice but to ensure that
14 Harmandic's condition was kept secret. The fact is, Mr. President, it was
15 easier and safer for Martinovic to have Harmandic killed or to kill him,
16 himself, rather than to allow him to be returned to the Heliodrom in the
17 condition of near death.
18 He therefore told the prisoners - and the Trial Chamber heard
19 testimony about this - that Harmandic would not be returning with them to
20 the Heliodrom on that day, and that he had tried to escape. That lie is
21 in fact reflected in the documentation in respect of this incident. On
22 the ELMO, Exhibit P774, in which Martinovic's lie about what really
23 happened to Harmandic is reflected in the paperwork in order to cover up
24 what really happened.
25 Mr. President, this exhibit, 774, is useful for another reason
1 which, in our submission, strongly corroborates the testimony of Halil
2 Ajanic. When it reviews the testimony of Mr. Ajanic, the Trial Chamber
3 will find that Mr. Ajanic in fact recalled that the persons who removed
4 Harmandic from the Heliodrom on that day were the so-called Strump
5 brothers. He said the sons of Ivan Culo. We find on Exhibit P774, that
6 in fact Harmandic appears to have been signed out or the responsible
7 person for his release was in fact someone named mill Yenko Culo.
8 It's our submission, Mr. President, that Ajanic accurately
9 recalled for the Trial Chamber not only the identity of the persons who
10 removed Harmandic from the Heliodrom and took him to Vinko Martinovic, but
11 that this small detail, this important detail, should tell the Trial
12 Chamber much more about the credibility and reliability of Mr. Ajanic's
13 testimony about this entire incident. We know from the testimony of
14 Witness AF that it was routine, that it was certainly not unusual, for
15 prisoners to be signed out of the Heliodrom by representative of the
16 military police and taken to Vinko Martinovic. The fact that Harmandic
17 was or may have been signed out of the Heliodrom by Miljenko Culo does not
18 mean that he could not have gone to the headquarters of Vinko Martinovic.
19 What it does mean, Mr. President, we submit, is that Mr. Ajanic, to this
20 day, has a clear recollection of all the events that he testified about in
21 relation to Mr. Harmandic.
22 Mr. President, count 18 charges Mr. Martinovic with forcible
23 transfer of civilians from West Mostar during the months following the HVO
24 attack of 9 May, 1993. While the forced labour counts in the indictment
25 provide the Trial Chamber with insight into the harsh treatment that
1 Martinovic inflicted on Muslim male detainees who were held at the
2 Heliodrom, the evidence proving count 18 reveals the brutality with which
3 Martinovic and his subordinates set upon those defenceless Muslim women,
4 children, and elderly, who remained behind in their homes and their flats
5 in West Mostar, living in fear of the night when the armed HVO soldiers
6 who arrive at their door and drive them across the Neretva river into the
7 hell that awaited them on the east side.
8 The evidence indicates that this form of ethnic cleansing took
9 place regularly in the months following the outbreak of the conflict, with
10 expelled civilians sometimes crossing into East Mostar in small groups,
11 and at other times in huge waves. We know that during that time, the
12 population living in East Mostar, under the burden of siege, daily
13 indiscriminate shelling, and sniping swelled from some 25.000 to
14 approximately 55.000. The Prosecution submits that before the Trial
15 Chamber in this case is one of the leading perpetrators of this form of
16 ethnic cleansing, Vinko Martinovic.
17 Mr. President, I'm going to at this point refer the Trial Chamber
18 to our brief in which we have - it's our submission - very carefully and
19 comprehensively addressed two of the waves of ethnic cleansing that
20 occurred in West Mostar, based both on the witness testimony and the
21 documents in evidence. One of these is the expulsions that occurred on
22 the 13th and 14th of June, 1993. These expulsions are documented in a
23 number of exhibits, including Exhibit P452.1, which is the note received
24 by ECMM monitor Van der Grinten in which he was informed of the names of
25 the HVO personnel who were responsible for this round of ethnic
1 cleansing. Mr. President, that exhibit is on the ELMO; that's the
2 original. You can see, I believe, the very faded typewritten names which
3 appear there, which are in fact the names Vinko Martinovic, Ernest Takac,
4 and Nino Pehar. This information is corroborated by information contained
5 in other documents in evidence, and I'm going to skip one document and I'm
6 going to go directly to P456.2.
7 Mr. President, the HVO's own documents confirmed memorialised this
8 round of ethnic cleansing from the Dum neighbourhood of Mostar on the 13th
9 and 14th of June. Exhibit 456.2 is a military police report of the HVO
10 1st Battalion. I bring this particular report to the Trial Chamber's
11 attention in response to testimony and assertions made by the Defence
12 about the alleged practice in which other soldiers, other bad people,
13 doing bad things would falsely invoke the name of Vinko Martinovic while
14 they were carrying out these crimes. The fact is, Mr. President, as these
15 documents demonstrate, Vinko Martinovic was himself identified as being on
16 the scene leading this operation. This wasn't other soldiers claiming to
17 be him. He was there. He was personally identified as taking part in
18 this ethnic cleansing operation. It's worth also noting, Mr. President,
19 as indicated in this report, that when asked by the military police what
20 these soldiers were doing, they said that they had been ordered by Tuta to
21 take the Muslims and to drive them out of this section and send them to
22 the other side.
23 Mr. President, it's no coincidence that yet again we see the HVO's
24 own documentation linking Martinovic and his crimes to those of his
25 commander, Mladen Naletilic.
1 Mr. President, it's our submission that the Trial Chamber has
2 every reason, every justification, to fully rely on all of the evidence
3 that's been submitted in respect of this round of ethnic cleansings from
4 mid-June 1993 in which Mr. Martinovic directly participated on behalf of
5 his commander, Mr. Naletilic.
6 The second round, wave, of expulsions that occurred occurred on
7 the 29th of September, 1993, in the Centar II neighbourhood of West
8 Mostar. And on this point, Mr. President, I'd ask if we could briefly go
9 into private session.
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We will go to the private session, please.
11 [Private session]
24 [Open session]
25 MR. STRINGER: Exhibit 620.1 is an HVO, SIS report of 1 October,
1 1993. It memorialises the events and the wave of ethnic cleansing that
2 occurred on the night of the 29th. Once again, this document links Vinko
3 Martinovic to this wave of ethnic cleansing that occurred, not only as a
4 participant but as an organiser, a planner, and a commander. We know that
5 this document confirms in several important respects the testimony that I
6 just referred to in private session. The reference to the persons -
7 referring now to the first paragraph on the second page - who were
8 separated into different categories and sent to the left bank near the
9 health centre, and also in the next paragraph, the testimony about the
10 cries that could be heard coming from the buildings across from the dairy
11 store. That's another location the Trial Chamber heard about in that
13 And once again, Mr. President, in the final paragraph of this
14 document, we find a reference linking this particular ethnic cleansing
15 operation to Mr. Martinovic's co-accused, Mr. Naletilic, based on the fact
16 that Colonel Ivan Andabak was one of the individuals whom this incident
17 was reported to.
18 Mr. President, I need to -- if I could go back into private
19 session again just for one very brief moment?
20 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We will go to the private session, please.
21 [Private session]
8 [Open session]
9 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President the Trial Chamber may recall that in
10 fact the events of 29 and 30 September, 1993, were captured on film by a
11 BBC journalist named Jeremy Bowen who happened to be in East Mostar at the
12 time making a documentary.
13 With your permission, Mr. President, I'd like to play just a few
14 short minutes from that videotape.
15 [Videotape played]
16 VOICE OF JEREMY BOWEN: "A few yards away, the operation on Medina
17 was still going on. They had time to do the best they could for her, no
18 other casualties had come in. It gets no better at night. 500 Muslims
19 had just been robbed and thrown out of their homes in West Mostar by the
20 Croats. They had to cross the River Neretva to get to comparative safety
21 on a bridge made of ropes and planks. Bosnian soldiers told them which
22 way to go. The Croats were shooting at the people they just made
24 Only a few hours before, until the Croat gangs had come for them
25 and forced them over the front line, they thought that they were safe.
1 They had been settling down for the night. The Croat machine-guns didn't
2 let up and the refugees kept on coming. They were trying to kill old men
3 and women, mothers and their children. She was so frightened she could
4 barely walk, but she tried to calm her sons. Each new family has to be
5 fed and housed. This is a war crime with a cold purpose: To increase the
6 pressure on the military authorities in East Mostar, the brutality of the
7 expulsions drives home the message that compromise with Croat extremists
8 is neither possible nor desirable.
9 The refugees spent their first night in East Mostar in a
10 bombed-out theatre. In one evening, all of them had lot their homes and
11 possessions. They talked of persecution, rape, and murder."
12 MR. STRINGER: Now, Mr. President, the evidence establishes the
13 documents that relate to this expulsion. The testimony in closed session
14 which I referred to a few moments ago relate to this round of expulsions.
15 Jeremy Bowen testified that this footage was in fact taken on the night of
16 the 29th of September, 1993. Mr. President, the Trial Chamber, we submit,
17 has evidence before it that proves conclusively that this accused,
18 Vinko Martinovic, was in fact the person on the other side of the river
19 that night. He was the person, he was the reason why all of these Muslims
20 were forced to cross that river, those women, those old people, those
21 children, were forced to cross that foot bridge in the middle of the night
22 and spend their first night as refugees in a bombed-out old movie theatre
23 East Mostar.
24 In his brief at paragraph 246, Mr. Martinovic makes this claim:
25 "It cannot be said that in those situations there were expulsions and
1 forcible transfers of the population, but those were voluntary transfers
2 caused by war circumstances. The greatest part of the population moved in
3 that way, and it is impermissible to ignore that and charge Vinko
4 Martinovic and his unit."
5 Mr. President, if the Trial Chamber concludes that what it just
6 saw, and if it concludes that the testimony of the many witnesses who
7 testified about their experience during these forced evictions was in fact
8 a voluntary transfer, then we should let Mr. Martinovic return to Mostar.
9 The fact is the evidence compels a contrary finding by this Trial
10 Chamber. Mr. President, it's our submission that in fact Mr. Martinovic
11 bears a high degree of responsibility for the many hundreds of forced
12 evictions, brutal acts, brutal violence committed against the Muslim
13 population of West Mostar during the course of the conflict against the
15 One last few remarks about discriminatory intent and this relates
16 to the persecution charged in count 1. In paragraph 152 of their brief,
17 Mr. Martinovic claims that he did not possess the requisite mens rea for
18 persecution. He didn't possess intent to discriminate against Muslims.
19 In support of that, he cites the testimony of a group of Muslim persons
20 that he called to testify on his behalf who were apparently protected by
21 him in one way or another during the conflict. We don't know the reasons
22 why Mr. Martinovic may have decided to assist a small number of Muslims,
23 to shield them from the brutality that he and his comrades were visiting
24 on large numbers of less fortunate Muslims throughout West Mostar. One
25 Defence witness in fact said that every Croat in West Mostar had his
1 Muslim, one or more of them, that they protected. Likewise, on the east
2 side, Muslims had one or more Croats that they protected. There were
3 indications that Mr. Martinovic protected those who were friends of his
4 family or those with whom he had fought in his HOS unit against the Serbs
5 in 1992.
6 Whatever the reasons why Mr. Martinovic may have decided to assist
7 a small number of these Muslims whom he favoured, we certainly know that
8 there were hundreds of other Muslims who did not find themselves in his
9 favour. Those few Muslims whom he produced in the courtroom were not his
10 victims. His victims, either those compelled to work in the confrontation
11 line and in his area of responsibility, or those defenseless civilians
12 whom he expelled into East Mostar, those were his victims, and those were
13 exclusively Muslim.
14 We know that Vinko Martinovic and his subordinates often used the
15 derogatory term "balija" when they were shouting at the Muslims during the
16 course of expulsions or shouting out orders for forced labour. It's our
17 submission, Mr. President, that Mr. Martinovic did in fact act and possess
18 a high degree of discriminatory intent as part of his contribution to the
19 overall HVO campaign to cleanse the Muslims from Mostar.
20 Our position on this point or this defence, if you will, was very
21 eloquently set forth in one of the international military Tribunal cases
22 from post World War II in Nuremberg, the U.S. versus von Weizsaecker, the
23 so-called ministry's case. With your permission, Mr. President, I'd like
24 to just read a very short passage from this trial which very, as I said,
25 eloquently sets forth our position on this.
1 "We reject the claim that good intentions render innocent that
2 which is otherwise criminal, and which asserts that one may with impunity
3 commit serious crimes because he hopes thereby to prevent others or that
4 general benevolence towards individuals is a cloak or justification for
5 participation in crimes against the unknown many."
6 Mr. President, in this trial, in respect of Vinko Martinovic, we
7 concern ourselves with the crimes committed in Mostar against the unknown
8 many, not the favoured few who escaped persecution and worse, because of
9 the whim or the fancy of Vinko Martinovic. It's our submission,
10 Mr. President, that the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt Vinko
11 Martinovic acted with discriminatory intent, in fact hatred, intentionally
12 targeting his victims because they were Muslims as part of his part in the
13 overall campaign against the Muslims of Mostar.
14 Mr. President, I'm going to move on now to a separate subject, a
15 different subject. Perhaps I can even finish before the break, and that
16 is the subject of Croatia's participation in this conflict.
17 The Croatian -- the participation of the Republic of Croatia in
18 respect of the conflict involved in this case, that is the HVO-ABiH
19 conflict that began at the very latest in 1993, probably in 1992, the
20 participation extended to a number of levels. Our overall submission on
21 this, Mr. President, and Mr. Scott I'm sure is going to say this again
22 when he comes back after the break with his remarks, Croatia's direct
23 participation in this conflict, the deployment of HV generals, high
24 ranking officers, HV units, into Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of this
25 conflict is merely an extension or a consequence, a natural consequence,
1 of the overall policy of Croatia and its president at that time,
2 Franjo Tudjman, in respect of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly those parts
3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina that fell within the territory of the so-called
4 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna. This policy and this conduct extends
5 in fact earlier quite a bit earlier, than many of the events that the
6 Trial Chamber has heard about in this case. I would like to very quickly
7 run through a series of exhibits which the Trial Chamber may not yet be
8 familiar with, which in our submission very graphically demonstrates the
9 effect and the participation of Croatian military personnel, high ranking
10 military personnel, in the conflict and the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina
11 going back to April of 1992. And I'm going to start with Exhibit 122.1,
12 just to set the facts for the Trial Chamber.
13 Mr. President, this goes back to the very beginning of the
14 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was on the 8th of April, 1992, when
15 Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, issued this order, this regulation.
16 What he did was to cancel the previous Territorial Defence, TO, of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina and to establish a new one. This was essentially an
18 establishment of an armed forces for the newly established, newly
19 proclaimed, Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The next exhibit is 122. On
20 the very same day, Mate Boban, on behalf of the HZ HB, in fact signed a
21 decision on the creation of a parallel, separate militia, also in the
22 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that of the HVO. The HVO was established
23 on the same day as the TO.
24 Two days later -- the next document is 123, two days later, we
25 start to see the extent to which Mate Boban and the Croatian community of
1 Herceg-Bosna intend to cooperate with the TO in the joint defence against
2 the Serbs that we've heard so much about from the Defence. This is the
3 10th of April, 1992. Two days -- sorry, two months before the liberation
4 of Mostar, very early time in the conflict. Drawing the Trial Chamber's
5 attention to the bottom third of the document, the Croatian Defence
6 Council will have exclusive Supreme Command of these forces. This body is
7 the only legal one. And its name is the only official one. Moving down,
8 "As of today, 10 April, the main headquarters of the HVO will communicate
9 solely with municipal headquarters of the HVO. All other military
10 formations on the territory of Herceg-Bosna are either illegal or enemy
11 formations. All other titles are no longer in official use." That's on
12 the 10th of April, 1992.
13 Mr. President, what I'm going to quickly do now is move down the
14 chain of command so the Trial Chamber can see precisely how this order was
15 implemented on the ground by HVO units acting under the orders and
16 commands of an active major general of the Croatian Army. Exhibit P127 is
17 an order issued on the 8th of May, 1992, by Colonel General Ante Roso.
18 Roso is clearly taking the order, the previous order, from Boban and then
19 moving it down the chain of command, declaring that the only legal
20 military units in the territory of the HZ HB are units of the HVO. Item
21 5: This order supersedes all orders of the Territorial Defence command
22 which shall be considered illegal in this territory. This territory being
24 Now, the next exhibit is 654.3. We are moving ahead about a year
25 and a half now to October 1993. Ante Roso, the person who issued this
1 order in May of 1992, outlawing the TO on behalf of the HVO main staff was
2 himself a general in the Croatian Army in May of 1992 and at all times
3 thereafter, until he resigned from the Croatian Army in October of 1993,
4 as shown in 654.3. Roso only resigned from the Croatian Army shortly
5 before he was appointed to take command of the HVO main staff, replacing
6 Slobodan Praljak in November of 1993.
7 Next exhibit is 130. Roso's order, the order of a Colonel General
8 of the Croatian Army issued in May of 1992 moved down the HVO chain of
9 command. Three days later, on the 11th of May, 1992, Tihomir Blaskic, who
10 was then the commander of the HVO operative zone based in Kiseljak, turned
11 Roso's order around and in fact issued his own order implementing the Roso
12 order, declaring that all orders of the TO are rendered invalid and the TO
13 is in this area considered illegal.
14 The next document is 128, 10th of May, 1992, Dario Kordic did the
15 same thing in his area of responsibility, Busovaca. Item number 3, all
16 paramilitary formations, the so-called TO, individuals and others, are
17 given the ultimatum to hand over all weapons or to place themselves under
18 HVO command, which includes the wearing of HVO insignia.
19 Mr. President, the Trial Chamber heard evidence during the trial
20 from a couple of witnesses, one of whom was a Defence expert witness,
21 Mr. Marijan. Mr. Marijan testified about a series of armed conflicts
22 between the HVO and the TO or the Armija that occurred during the spring
23 of 1992. Mr. President, it's our submission that those armed conflicts
24 between the TO and the HVO, going all the way back approximately a year
25 before the first outright conflict charged as a crime in this case, April
1 of 1993, those conflicts went all the way back to 1992, resulting from HVO
2 attempts to implement Croatian Army General Roso's order to outlaw and
3 disarm the TO in the territory of Herceg-Bosna.
4 Now, the participation and the role of Croatia and its generals in
5 the conflict against the Armija and the TO only intensified, but it finds
6 its roots going back a year prior to the events of the highest relevance
7 in this case, and in fact the Trial Chamber may wish to find, based on
8 this evidence alone, that we had an international armed conflict between
9 the HVO and the Armija going as far back as the spring of 1992, when you
10 had an active HV general on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina outlawing
11 orders -- issuing orders outlawing the Armija, the TO of
13 We can take the break now, Mr. President, if you wish.
14 JUDGE LIU: Are you finished or not?
15 MR. STRINGER: No.
16 JUDGE LIU: How long are you going to take?
17 MR. STRINGER: Ten minutes.
18 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We will break here and we will resume at quarter
19 to 6.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 5.15 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 5.46 p.m.
22 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Stringer. Please continue.
23 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Just to round off the subject of Ante Roso, the next exhibit is
25 664.2. As I mentioned just before the break, Mr. President, Mr. Roso only
1 resigned from the Croatian Army in October of 1993, just prior to his
2 appointment as chief of the HVO main staff, that is the HVO main staff.
3 664 is the document relating to that appointment. The Trial Chamber will
4 note, going to the bottom first, that this is a document that appears over
5 the name and title of Janko Bobetko, who was chief of the Croatian Army
6 main staff, and also the name and title of Mr. Gojko Susak, who was at
7 that time the Minister of Defence for the Republic of Croatia. This
8 document is one in which Roso and a number of other HV personnel are
9 appointed to positions within the main staff of the HVO down in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition to Roso, the Trial Chamber will note in
11 item number 4, the name of Colonel Marijan Biskic, whose name and a number
12 of documents which he authored figure prominently among the exhibits in
13 evidence that relate to the abduction and disappearance of Robert Nosic
14 from the HVO military police headquarters in Mostar following an operation
15 against the military police that was led by Mr. Naletilic later during the
16 month of November 1993.
17 The predecessor of Ante Roso as chief of the HVO main staff was
18 Slobodan Praljak who served in that capacity from July of 1993, until
19 early November of 1993. The Trial Chamber may recall the testimony of
20 Mr. Praljak when he testified in this case in which he agreed or conceded
21 that he had commanded HVO units during operations in Prozor,
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, during October of 1992, and in Gornji Vakuf in January
23 1993. His testimony on that was that because of his position, because of
24 the respect and the authority that he commanded, he was able in a de facto
25 way to take command of HVO units.
1 The point is for purposes of international armed conflict,
2 Mr. President, that at the time he participated in those HVO operations in
3 Prozor and Gornji Vakuf, he was in fact a general with the Croatian Army
4 and in fact at the time he also held the position as assistant Minister
5 of -- assistant to the Croatian Minister of Defence, Mr. Gojko Susak.
6 This document, Exhibit 458.2, is one in which Praljak departs from the HV,
7 resigns, if you will, from the HV, and then goes down to
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina to take formal command over the HVO. We will see in a
9 few moments that he then applied for reinstatement to the Croatian Army in
10 the latter part of 1993 at the time of his departure from the HVO main
11 staff. That is Exhibit 654.2.
12 This is in fact a day or two before or after Ante Roso left the HV
13 to take over the HVO. In this document, Mr. Praljak is applying to
14 re-enter the HVO in advance of his departure from the HVO and then
15 subsequent rejoining of the HV or Croatian Army after he was removed or
16 resigned from his position as commander of the HVO main staff.
17 Mr. President, the evidence establishes that these high level
18 Croatian military personnel in fact moved seamlessly back and forth from
19 the HV, Croatian Army, to the HVO. When they were in the HVO, when they
20 were in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the evidence establishes that these high level
21 Croatian military personnel did in fact exercise command and control over
22 HVO units under their command.
23 Another document related to another officer from the HV, is
24 Exhibit 559.1. Mr. President, in this document, we see that Major General
25 Praljak, acting in his capacity as Chief of the Main Staff or as an HVO
1 commander has sent this request to the Croatian Army, particularly to
2 Mr. Susak as Minister of Defence, requesting the posting of HV officers to
3 the HVO main staff. This particular document requests that Zarko Tole and
4 Ivan Kapular be placed or posted in the HVO main staff. The Trial Chamber
5 will find among the documents in evidence in this case a series of orders
6 issued very shortly after the 4th of August, 1993, by Zarko Tole, who was
7 then acting in his capacity as a member of the HVO main staff down in
9 We know that there were a number of other HV Croatian Army
10 military personnel among the ranks of the HVO generally. That's indicated
11 in two of the IAC documents that I briefly bring to the Trial Chamber's
12 attention. One is IAC 35, an order dated 12th of April, 1993, signed by
13 Zeljko Siljeg who was commander of the HVO northwest Herzegovina operative
14 zone, in which he's requiring that all his personnel submit a list of all
15 HV officers present in their units. A similar order is issued in IAC 36
16 on the same day by the commander of the HVO central Bosnia operative zone,
17 Tihomir Blaskic, ordering submission of a list of all officers of the
18 Croatian Army in his subordinate units.
19 We know and the Trial Chamber has heard extensive testimony and
20 has a number of documents in evidence which relate to the actual
21 participation and presence of Croatian Army units in the Mostar region.
22 Indeed, even at the Heliodrom, during the period of the conflict that the
23 Trial Chamber has heard about in this case. Exhibit P638.2 is one of the
24 many orders issued by Zlatan Mijo Jelic as commander of the Mostar Defence
25 sector, permitting the release of prisoners to units of the HVO. In fact,
1 this is one of Mr. Jelic's orders permitting the release of prisoners from
2 the Heliodrom to an HV, Croatian Army unit on the 11th of October, 1993.
3 This document, Mr. President, corresponds to a number of entries
4 contained in the logbooks, which I referred to earlier in my remarks, the
5 log books noting the names and numbers of prisoners taken out of the
6 Heliodrom by various units. We have reviewed those logbooks and we find
7 entries in several of them memorialising the fact that HV Croatian Army
8 units routinely often used prisoners from the Heliodrom for forced labour.
9 Those entries are found in Exhibit 566.2, 567.1, and in particular, a
10 number of entries are found in Exhibit 645.1, which includes explicit
11 references to the Tigrovi and the Gromovi, the tigers and the thunders,
12 units of the HV which the Trial Chamber has heard from several witnesses
13 were based at the Heliodrom.
14 Finally, on this point, Mr. President, we ask the Trial Chamber to
15 recall the testimony of Defence expert witness, Mr. Davor Marijan, who
16 indicated that during the second half of 1993, there were members of the
17 HV 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 7th Guards Brigades present in the territory of the
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, those being the Tigrovi, Gromovi, and the 7th guards
19 Brigade being the Pumas.
20 It's our submission, Mr. President, that the evidence establishes
21 beyond a reasonable doubt that Croatian Army units participated directly
22 in the conflict which the Trial Chamber is concerned with, in this case.
23 They were present in terms of numbers, men, materiel, support. Their
24 presence was noted by witnesses, victims who were present in the
25 Heliodrom, witnesses who were taken by members of the HV out to perform
1 forced labour in positions all across western Herzegovina, by the
2 sightings and findings of the international community, representatives who
3 were present in the region, and all of those documents are found among the
4 IAC materials which have been submitted into evidence.
5 Mr. President, it's our submission that this evidence proves the
6 direct participation of Croatia in this conflict beyond a reasonable
7 doubt, and that that presence and that participation in this conflict
8 means that the conflict in which all of these crimes occurred, all of the
9 crimes committed by Vinko Martinovic and by Mladen Naletilic, are crimes
10 that occurred in the context of an international armed conflict. It's our
11 submission therefore that all of the grave breaches charged under article
12 2 of the statute apply, the requirements have been met.
13 I've finished my comments, Mr. President, it's been my honour to
14 appear before the Trial Chamber in this case and to make these closing
15 submissions. At this time, I'd like to give the floor back to Mr. Scott
16 so that he can continue to address the additional submissions. Thank you.
17 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Scott.
18 MR. SCOTT: May it please the Court, I'm going to continue on some
19 of the other aspects of what might be called the political international
20 armed conflict and the existence of a broader plan, if you will, the
21 widespread and systematic character of the conduct that was carried out by
22 the HDZ and the HVO throughout the time in question.
23 We have covered these matters at great detail in our brief in a
24 history that begins in at least 1991, if not sooner, and talks about the
25 evolution of these political forces and showing in our submission quite
1 clearly that at the end of the day, Mr. President, Your Honours, the HVO
2 and the HDZ political party in Bosnia-Herzegovina was nothing less or more
3 than the alter ego of the Tudjman government and of the HDZ political
4 party in Zagreb.
5 In short, Your Honours, it's the Prosecution position, and we
6 submit to you that the evidence establishes it, there was indeed
7 commencing in at least 1991, and thereafter, a plan for what might be
8 called a greater Croatia, just as Slobodan Milosevic had his vision, he
9 and others around him had his vision for a greater Serbia, the evidence
10 shows that Franjo Tudjman and those around him, both in Croatia itself and
11 in Herceg-Bosna, had their vision of a Greater Croatia.
12 The Chamber heard evidence throughout the trial of the Croatian
13 banovina that existed at least as of 1939 and how indeed the banovina
14 provided the model for Herceg-Bosna and very briefly, Mr. President, we
15 would suggest that in addition to all the other testimonial and
16 documentary evidence, that the banovina provided the model for
17 Herceg-Bosna and in fact was mentioned a number of times by Franjo Tudjman
18 himself, that at the end of the day, all one really needs to do is take a
19 map of Herceg-Bosna and a map of the banovina - all those maps are in
20 evidence and the exact numbers are in our brief - and simply lay one on
21 top of the other and you will see that Herceg-Bosna, for all practical
22 purposes, was the banovina.
23 I'm going to in the time remaining highlight only two parts,
24 really one part on two separate occasions, of the widespread and
25 systematic plan for establishing Herceg-Bosna and for either removing the
1 Muslim population from Herceg-Bosna or relegating it to such a secondary
2 role that, for all practical purposes, Herceg-Bosna had become a Croat
3 state. The parts that I'm going to focus on out of the many aspects
4 covered in our brief is the two ultimatums.
5 The Prosecution would submit Your Honours, does submit, that there
6 can be little stronger proof than the existence of two ultimatums both
7 given and both acted upon when the Muslims did not do what the HVO wanted
8 them to do. If we might compare this to a more, hate to say typical
9 murder case but to a domestic murder case, it is as if you have the
10 accused who tells the victim on such and such a day, unless you do what I
11 want you to do, I am going to kill you. And when in fact the victim
12 doesn't do what the accused wanted him or her to do, he carries out that
13 intention. It is powerful evidence of intent and at the existence of a
15 Both of these ultimatums relate back to what the Chamber has heard
16 considerable evidence about, and that is the so-called Vance-Owen Peace
17 Plan. I'm going to treat this matter much more -- in a much more
18 abbreviated way than in our brief, but the highlights are these: The
19 Vance-Owen Plan was conceived in late 1992 and it was continued to be in
20 discussions until at least the spring of 1993. In a nutshell, it proposed
21 a democratically elected arrangement of multi-ethnic provinces, while
22 indeed a bona fide ethnic majority might expect to have some democratic
23 advantages just as one would find in a one-person one-vote system. The
24 Vance-Owen proposal properly understood, Your Honours, never meant in the
25 Prosecution's submission, and I suggest in the international community,
1 never meant anything like exclusive government power by one ethnic group.
2 However, that is how the Croats and the HVO and the HDZ attempted to
3 enforce it. For whatever reason, and for these purposes the reasons are
4 not important, maybe it was sheer good luck, but for whatever reason, the
5 Croats had received generally favourable treatment under the Vance-Owen
7 The Croats representing approximately 17 and a half per cent of
8 the overall population of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be allocated --
9 again in their view of things, were to be allocated approximately 28 per
10 cent of the territory. It was because of this, in fact, favourable
11 treatment, that the saying began to be circulated around this time in
12 Zagreb and in Bosnia, that what HVO really stood for was hvala Vance-Owen,
13 meaning thank you, Vance-Owen.
14 Given the favourable numbers and their interpretation of
15 Vance-Owen, Tudjman and the Herceg-Bosna leadership immediately endorsed
16 it and saw it as a tool to indeed accomplish the banovina which I
17 mentioned to the Chamber a moment ago. And again, when you look at
18 Vance-Owen provinces 8 and 10 and compare those to the historic borders of
19 the banovina, you will see the great similarity of the two.
20 By mid-January, 1993, the HDZ, HVO leadership was so eager in fact
21 to implement their vision of Vance-Owen, that they refused to wait longer
22 and issued an ultimatum to the Muslims to accept their view of what the
23 plan involved. On the 15th of January, 1993, HVO president Jadranko
24 Prelec announced that all units of the BH Army currently in regions 3, 8
25 and 10 which were proclaimed Croatian in the Geneva arrangements are
1 subordinate to the command of the main headquarters of the HVO armed
2 forces. This was immediately turned into an ultimatum with a deadline of
3 the 20th of January, 1993, when Prelec says the decision shall be
4 implemented within five days starting from today, 15 January, 1993.
5 Well, the Chamber knows from the evidence that it has received
6 that as the 20th of January approached and then passed, the first major
7 armed confrontations between the Muslims and the Croat armed forces since
8 Prozor in October 1992, these major clashes broke out in various parts of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, including at Gornji Vakuf and in Busovaca.
10 Mr. President, the international observers on the ground at the
11 time were unanimous in their conclusion that these conflicts were brought
12 about for one reason and one reason only, reported in part in Exhibit
13 P230, an UN -- an UNPROFOR report of the 24th of January, 1993, where it
14 simply characterised the HVO conduct as a premature -- and I'm quoting,"a
15 premature and imperfect grab for control."
16 That was -- led to the January and early February conflicts.
17 Things managed to calm down a bit. There continued to be localised
18 clashes but nothing on a large scale until the events in mid-April, 1993
19 that the Chamber has heard so much about. The Vance-Owen negotiations
20 continued and on the 25th of March, 1993, President Izetbegovic of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina signed the Vance-Owen Plan, including the map which is
22 shown in Exhibit 239.1 at page 280.
23 Now, it's been a bone of contention in this trial for some time,
24 virtually I suppose since the first day, that something was said, that
25 some commitment was made by the Bosnian side, by Izetbegovic, that somehow
1 justified what the HVO did thereafter. And Mr. President, the
2 Prosecution's position on this has been consistent throughout, and we
3 detailed the evidence in our brief. There was nothing in the Vance-Owen
4 Plan signed by Izetbegovic that committed the Bosnian government to any
5 sort of plan or arrangement as that interpreted by the HVO. In fact, it's
6 very clear and there is one sentence at page 280 of the treaty or of the
7 plan signed by Izetbegovic under the heading, "Withdrawal of forces," and
8 it says simply this: "Both Bosnian army and HVO forces shall be deployed,
9 both, in provinces 5, 8, 9 and 10, most importantly for our purposes, 8
10 and 10, under arrangements agreed between them." End of Vance-Owen.
11 Now, again, as they did in January, the HVO and the HDZ was so
12 anxious to enforce their view of what all this meant that Mate Boban or
13 someone for him, surely, prepared a proposed joint statement dated the 2nd
14 of April which Boban quickly signed and proposed for Izetbegovic to sign
15 which allegedly would have put into effect the subordination of the Army
16 of Bosnia-Herzegovina units to the HVO in provinces 8 and 10. It's the
17 Prosecution submission, Your Honour, and we submit there is no evidence to
18 the contrary, that President Izetbegovic never signed Boban's proposed
19 joint statement, and there was never such an agreement. In fact, when one
20 looks at Exhibit P272, which is a record -- excuse me, 273.1, my apology,
21 is a record of an HVO cabinet meeting on the 3rd of April, the day after
22 Boban's proposed statement and the very content of the minutes of the
23 meeting make it clear as of that time, there was no joint statement, and
24 they talk about that and they talk about well if Izetbegovic doesn't sign,
25 we are going to enforce Vance-Owen anyway. It's very clear that the
1 minutes can be read one way and one way only, and that is that as of 3rd
2 of April, there was no such agreement, and in fact, there never was.
3 As further evidence of that, the Chamber can look to the
4 presidential transcript PT 8.1, a high level meeting in Zagreb on the 24th
5 of April, including Tudjman, Izetbegovic, Boban, Lord Owen and others, and
6 it's very clear we submit, Your Honours, to anyone reading that
7 transcript, that there was no agreement or commitment by Izetbegovic and
8 in fact it becomes very clear, there was never a meeting of the minds at
9 all. And in our papers we essentially submit that what really becomes
10 clear in that transcript, although Vance-Owen lingered on for some weeks
11 thereafter is that for all practical purposes Vance-Owen was dead.
12 Finally the Defence expert, Mladen Ancic himself a Defence expert
13 confirmed that Izetbegovic never signed the joint statement. The
14 ultimatum's, Mr. President, Judge Clark, Judge Diarra, are powerful
15 evidence of the HVO plan and the HVO intention.
16 I want to turn the bulk of the -- my remaining comments to the
17 political aspects, if you will, of the international armed conflict.
18 Mr. Stringer has talked about, if you will, the involvement of the
19 Croatian armed forces, the Croatian Army, on the ground, and that is
20 indeed under the Tribunal jurisprudence one of the ways to establish the
21 existence of an international armed conflict. As we've made clear in our
22 brief, Mr. President, there is also an alternative way, and that is to
23 establish the overall control of one state on an organisation or quasi --
24 one might say, in this instance, quasi-state elsewhere, leading to the
25 that the foreign state is in fact completely in charge or effectively
1 controlling the other entity.
2 Even if for whatever reason, and we submit that the evidence would
3 not support another conclusion, but for whatever reason, if the evidence
4 on direct HV participation on the ground were not to persuade the Chamber,
5 Your Honour, the evidence is overwhelming that the HVO, the HDZ, and the
6 leadership thereof was nothing other than the alter ego of the Tudjman
7 government and the HDZ party in Zagreb. There was overall control. And
8 in the documents that I'll show you, take the Chamber through in the last
9 few minutes, we submit is compelling evidence of exactly that.
10 I told the Chamber in my earlier remarks that I would present my
11 part of the argument by calling upon six witnesses, and I took the Chamber
12 through five. And I now call the sixth witness, and I call as our sixth
13 witness, Franjo Tudjman. With Mr. Bos's assistance, I would like to
14 direct the Chamber's attention, the courtroom's attention, to a
15 compilation of presidential transcripts which should be at the back,
16 virtually at the back of the bundle, our binder, that the Chamber has, and
17 Mr. Bos again has a complete set that he will try and follow me on the
18 ELMO with.
19 It's in the back of -- I'm told it's in the back of what's called
20 label part 1.
21 Mr. President, just so you know, for ease of reference and to have
22 a unique page number instead of referring constantly to the so-called R
23 numbers, we now have just a regular page -- continuous page document, 75
24 pages, excerpts of four presidential transcripts, PT 12, I think 13, 14
25 and PT 28 have been -- excerpts of those transcripts have been merged into
1 one document. Of course, the Chamber has the full and complete
2 transcripts in evidence, and this is simply as an aid to assist argument
3 on these matters.
4 What the Prosecution submits, Your Honours, is that going through
5 these documents and that is all the transcripts -- all the presidential
6 transcripts, but in particular these four, it becomes abundantly clear
7 that Croatia exercised overall control on Herceg-Bosna, on the HDZ party
8 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the HVO. What becomes clear is that
9 throughout both the transcripts and the other evidence that the
10 Prosecution has submitted, Mate Boban was essentially hand-picked by
11 Franjo Tudjman and he was removed by Franjo Tudjman in late 1993 when the
12 pressure of the international community became so great that, if you will,
13 Mate Boban was jettisoned because he'd become too much of a lightning rod
14 in bringing too much pressure to bear on the Republic of Croatia. And
15 Tudjman said to his good friend Mate, Sorry, Mate, it's time for you to
16 go. Beyond that, the Croatian government specifically Franjo Tudjman and
17 his immediate circle, hand-picked or approved the government of
18 Herceg-Bosna, shown in these transcripts. Further, Franjo Tudjman and
19 those around him, hand-picked and approved the -- virtually the entire HVO
20 general staff. Referenced -- or shown in part by the document that
21 Mr. Stringer showed you a few moments ago, Exhibit 664.2, which I will
22 come back to.
23 What I'd like to do, Mr. President, is spend some moments and it
24 will take sometime, but this will be the bulk of my remaining comments
25 other than a few closing remarks. But in looking at these presidential
1 transcripts, we can see those things which I've indicated to the Chamber
2 in the last few minutes. Starting in the very -- page 1, we have a
3 meeting on the 9th of November, 1993, between Franjo Tudjman, the
4 President of the Republic of Croatia, and representatives of Herceg-Bosna,
5 this particular meeting taking place in Split. And Mate Boban goes on to
6 say, From all their political in central Bosnia they proposed and set
7 Ante Valenta as a candidate of other Croats, Mr. Zubak, but to put him
8 strictly in charge of justice and administration. Kresimir Zubak managed
9 to say, To put him in charge only for the portfolio of justice and
11 Admittedly, that particular entry is somewhat garbled, but if you
12 put it in the context of all that followed it's quite clear. Then on the
13 next page Mr. Boban goes on and talks about well, How about the 4th
14 vice-president? How about Vlado Sucic? There are other proposals and in
15 fact about the middle of page 2, Boban says, Well, let's give this man
16 Alic, he's a Muslim, as his deputy. We will give him a Muslim for a
17 deputy, that Muslim is not all that important. And so on. And then, By
18 the way, Bruno Stojic stays on as Minister of Defence.
19 Going to page three, How about education, schooling, and the
20 rest? Jozo Maric nominated for that position.
21 You see at the bottom of that page, again, talking about President
22 Tudjman to tell you, here is 15 people from Croatia and you assigned them.
23 Mate Boban on page 4:
24 "We have ten people, making a government of ten people, which is
25 basically a government drawing on the process, model, manner, decrees,
1 laws of the Croatian state and there's no need to invent anything
2 regarding the organisation of authority."
3 Skipping to page 7, coming quickly to the end of the excerpts of
4 that particular transcript which is PT 12, talks about proposing Dario
5 Kordic to a senior position. Further on that page, the Croatian consulate
6 general, at least if not at that time, later, Ciro Grubisic being proposed
7 and Milan Kovac. The Chamber may recall that Milan Kovac was a Defence
8 witness here being proposed by the inner circle for a senior position in
9 the Herceg-Bosna government.
10 Exhibit PT 13. An amazing display, Mr. President, Your Honours,
11 of Franjo Tudjman's direct, hands-on involvement at the most detailed
12 level of the affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Specific actions what's
13 happening there, what should happen there. A meeting on the 6th of
14 November in the presidential palace in Zagreb, Tudjman says,
15 "[It's] clear that the Muslims will go - they said Travnik, and
16 they took Travnik, that then, and accordingly we'll be reduced to just
17 Western Herzegovina.
18 Right until now, in June I called the Minister and the Chief of
19 Headquarters, and at the beginning of July I asked, I told them, in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina war is now being waged for the area of the border of
21 the Croatian state.
22 Accordingly, one has to do everything to help this -- one has to,
23 excuse me -- one has to do everything to help this area hold out. It is
24 not the same to us whether the...Croatian state, that is, will Jajce...or
25 with Travnik -- with Travnik, only would no be Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca.
1 In diplomatic talks we have not given up on Kiseljak and Kresovo."
2 Franjo Tudjman talking in detail about the borders of the Croatian
3 state including municipalities in Herzegovina in central Bosnia.
4 Page 10, first paragraph start being on that page, President
5 Tudjman talking,
6 "We had to do all this, of course under the cover of sending
7 volunteers. But gentlemen from the Ministry and the Minister and the
8 Chief of the Main Headquarters, people say correctly that when we brought,
9 they did not get this help from Croatia in time, and so because of it
10 being late they lost. Let's say they now say that the Muslims hold here
11 these regions that..."
12 I might submit, Your Honour, the Prosecution would submit --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Please read slowly.
14 MR. SCOTT: -- if one reads enough of these transcripts, you can
15 virtually see Tudjman and the others pouring over a map, talking about
16 borders, talking about this place and that place, detailed events on the
17 ground in a foreign state.
18 This is not a military -- in fact right here he says this is not a
19 military map. What we are working with here, gentlemen, this is not a
20 military map, but they can mainly serve -- the Muslims can mainly hold a
21 high land and mountain region.
22 Talks about negotiation with the Serbs in the next paragraph.
23 "The Serbs hold Kupres, the Serbs agreed that in the demarcation
24 this comes into our region, with the proviso that here we gave up on all
25 those areas that were Croatian..."
1 A trade. A trade with Serbs for territory of a foreign state, a
2 state recognised by the international community, a member state of the
3 United Nations called Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4 Talks about on top of page 11, in detail, We couldn't hold on to
5 some parts of central Bosnia, it's too attenuated, Vares is too far out
6 there. We would like to hold on to it, but militarily it's not
7 practical. We couldn't hold on.
8 At the bottom of page 11, he talks about the compactness of the
9 territory. Compactness of territory, that is what we have to ensure, Novi
10 Travnik, Busovaca, what we have achieved by the demarcation
11 agreement, but now I would have a go -- Tudjman apparently is feeling
12 bullish this day. He says, Well, let's have a go at Kresovo as well.
13 We'll see what will happen.
14 Bottom of page 12, Accordingly all you in the ministry in the
15 headquarters, are you quite clear about that? This is the question of the
16 borders of the Croatian state, the future of the Croatian state.
17 Accordingly, make things possible for General Roso. Now this is dated the
18 6th of November and Roso had either just gone or was about to go to take
19 over as chief of the HVO general staff. So Tudjman is saying make things
20 possible for General Roso, give him all the help and manpower. For now,
21 it has to be on the basis of volunteers. I'm not sure that tomorrow if we
22 went on that we won't have to confront them directly, but for the moment
23 under the cover of volunteers.
24 Page 15, Janko Bobetko, the chief of the general -- of the
25 Croatian Army, mentioned by Mr. Stringer, goes on and has a discussion
1 with President Tudjman and others of detailed tactical matters. These
2 aren't broad political statements, these are on the ground, this is what's
3 happening, this is what we have to do in Bosnia. Bobetko defends his
5 "We have analysed things five times, and not once have they been
6 obeyed [down there], they have done things their own way. Well,
7 that's water under the bridge. I personally think the key matter is to
8 take Gornji Vakuf.
9 President Tudjman: I said that just now, don't let's repeat that.
10 Of course is a key matter."
11 And then they get on through another series of steps, the
12 blockading of Bugojno, the formation -- the further reorganisation of the
13 armed forces. Bottom of page 15,
14 "Fourthly, we have to find solutions to group our forces, that
15 idea of volunteers, let that stay, please, it is the most legal, the most
16 efficient, but a command has to be created that will give enough authority
17 and knowledge for us to execute it...In the next eight days we have to
18 take Gornji Vakuf."
19 Chamber can skim some of these pages for itself. Janko Bobetko
20 says to Tudjman on 16,
21 "You appointed General Roso."
22 You Franjo Tudjman, appointed the chief of the HVO main staff.
23 You appointed General Roso. If Roso taking on -- is Roso taking on that
24 responsibility? A guarantee to execute this? Because we do not have any
25 time. What will happen if things go the other way around? And then there
1 again they continue on the liquidation of Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf.
2 Page 30 -- or excuse me page 20. Mr. Stringer told you a few
3 moments ago about the appointment of Tole, Zarko Tole, a senior HV officer
4 to the HVO main staff in approximately August. Here we are now in
5 November, early November, a couple of months, several months later, and
6 what is President Tudjman saying?
7 Yesterday, Tole, I think said -- we must impress upon the Chamber
8 the detail of what's -- President Tudjman is involved in daily
9 communications informed of daily communications of what is happening in
10 the military situation on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 Yesterday, Tole, I said they can undertake some local action
12 where, by Dreznica, yes, and by Jablanica, yes, on the plateau.
13 Then they talk about Mostar.
14 Page 23, the middle of the page again talking we got to take
15 Gornji Vakuf and we have the assessments of Tole and Praljak. By this
16 time, Slobodan Praljak is either still in Bosnia or has maybe just come
17 back to Zagreb early November, 1993.
18 They talk about helicopter flights and in the documents in
19 evidence, the Chamber may, if it has time, and we know we have given you a
20 large volume of material, but you will see UNPROFOR reports and ECMM
21 reports for months during 1992, 1993, where they would see helicopter
22 flights. In UNPROFOR and the ECMM were trying for the life of them trying
23 to figure out where were these helicopters coming from? Well,
24 Mr. President, the problem -- the mystery is solved. On page 23, they
25 talk about the helicopter flights. Toward the bottom of the page, They
1 carried out 20 flights in the recent period in impossible conditions to
2 Vitez in central Bosnia. It even talks about the extreme situations, as
3 at that time Vitez was an enclave, the helicopters had to take off from
4 Grude. And he goes on. I won't take the time to go through detail.
5 Where were the helicopters coming from? Whose helicopters were
6 they? The Croatian Army's.
7 Page 25, Janko Bobetko says:
8 "The first battalion that went had 780 men with all the
9 artillery. That was the most elite unit that we sent.
10 Mr. Davor Marijan comes in and tells the Chamber, there were no
11 units, there were no HV units in Bosnia, maybe some individuals, maybe
12 some volunteer soldiers, no units. Mr. President, that's not what Janko
13 Bobetko says.
14 Top of page 26, Janko Bobetko:
15 "A political and strategic change will come that moment we take
16 Gornji Vakuf."
17 Janko Bobetko further down the page:
18 "That is the spot that has to be taken. It settles everything."
19 Mr. President, I'm going to go very quickly now, because page --
20 the point is this, Mr. President: Those kind of discussions go on page
21 after page after page of the presidential transcripts. You also see
22 Tudjman, I suppose not unlike other political leaders incredibly concerned
23 about PR. And bad press for the Republic of Croatian.
24 On top of page 33, he talks about having read the latest issue of
25 Newsweek. He talks about the events in Stupni Do. What happened down
1 there? This looks terrible for us. Who is this man Ivica Rajic? And
2 they, Boban knows and tells them, it's Ivica Rajic, it's one of our guys.
3 And Tudjman is having a fit for the impact that these matters have on the
4 state of Croatia.
5 Now going on skipping down to page 36 we come back again -- my
6 apologies to translation.
7 Page 36 and thereafter, simply say this: They then pick up in
8 this particular series of meetings, the appointment of the government for
9 Herceg-Bosna. Some of the names the Chamber may well recognise. How
10 about Zulfo Robovic, the bottom of page 36, the Muslim democratic party.
11 That's theirs, that's a suggestion both Poharin and Mostar.
12 President Tudjman: "When we're discussing a Muslim from Mostar,
13 what, why are you giving him precedence over Hadziosmanovic?"
14 That Zulfo from the very first day -- Mate Boban, on page 37, that
15 Zulfo from the very first day when the SDA did not want to participate in
16 our government, he was in electric power industry and he stayed, and so
18 And then Tudjman goes off on a tangent. They are talking about
19 appoints the the government of Herzegovina Herceg-Bosna and he says:
20 "By the way, that bridge in Mostar, who destroyed it?"
21 Well, Mate Boban says it was fired on before and it was raining a
22 lot, so it collapsed on its own.
23 President Tudjman: "Are we going to be accused again?
24 It goes on for some time talking about the bridge. Then they
25 return to appointing the government. On page 41, you will see the name
1 Bagaric. Head of the HVO medical corps. Someone the Chamber heard from.
2 Being discussed and hand-picked by Franjo Tudjman.
3 Page 42, the involvement of Ivic Pasalic one of President
4 Tudjman's strongest, closest advisers, also a Defence witness in this
5 case. Of course Mr. Pasalic didn't like the presidential transcripts, of
6 course he doesn't like them because he doesn't like what they show. I'm
7 going to skip down to page 47. The Chamber has seen this one before.
8 Again my apology. It's both a function of the time and a function of
9 reading, I'm an afraid but I will try to slow down.
10 The Chamber has seen this transcript. The most important part of
11 it is the discussion of this Exhibit 664.2. Mr. President, Judge Clark,
12 Judge Diarra, the events in this transcript literally come alive off the
13 page. You almost -- almost -- feel sorry for Bobetko for the grilling
14 he's getting from Franjo Tudjman.
15 Who could have created a document like that that proves we have
16 appointed the entire HVO general staff? Tell me, General Bobetko, please
17 explain to me how could a document like that have been created? It goes
18 on for pages. This proves exactly what we've been denying all along. We
19 said they were volunteers, whoever has this document knows we've been
21 Finally I'll go to Exhibit -- excuse me page 62, Exhibit PT 28,
22 this transcript serves two purposes. One is it continues what I've said a
23 few moments ago the detailed involvement of President Franjo Tudjman in
24 the day-to-day events on the ground in Bosnia, and this transcript has the
25 additional aspect of directly touching upon the two accused in this case.
1 I'm going to, because of time, again skip to -- on page 64 and 65
2 they are talking about some trouble they are having with Kvesic, the
3 Minister of Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And Tudjman essentially says,
4 Well, we got rid of Boban and if we have to we'll get rid of Kvesic as
6 Going to page 66, obvious concerns about what's happening in
8 The President: "Tell me, please, those names which, as we have
9 seen, are also circulating in diplomatic circles, do you still have
10 them,...what is the third name? (Baja)."
11 To an unknown speaker at that particular moment:
12 "There are two, but it shouldn't be connected with the wrong one,
13 we have a Baja, an extraordinary Commander of the 2nd Company, and we have
14 a Baja there, but it's a different, as you know," (Milicevic, Baja
15 Milicevic, there is also Martinovic).
16 President: "All right, what about them, where are they?
17 These two are in Mostar, as far as I know, this Stela and this
18 Baja, that Milicevic, they are in Mostar."
19 And it goes on.
20 Again go back to talking about Kvesic, For two years he's been
21 carrying out his duty. He served the master.
22 Bottom of page 69, we are quickly coming to the end. Susak says:
23 "Mr. President, let us agree on the Tuta case. I both do link him
24 with others and I don't. Everything in Siroki Brijeg, everything that was
25 shot at, those were Tuta's men who were shot at, Tuta's best fighters.
1 Culjo Andaba -- the Prosecution submits Andaba is Andabak -- Andaba is
2 Tuta's deputy."
3 This is what the Defence Minister of Croatia -- he doesn't seem to
4 have any doubt about it. Andaba is Tuto's deputy. In all the shooting in
5 Siroki Brijeg, those are Tuta's men.
6 The President: "This now?"
7 Page 72:
8 "I would like to conclude, Mr. President, an assessment should be
9 made now. The things Tuta did and did not carry out, all witnesses are
10 here. With the exception of Tuta, we do not have a person for military
11 activities in the area of Herceg-Bosna. I think that it was recognised
12 unilaterally by everybody, that Tuta is a little...and that is the factor.
13 Do we have to come up with a judgement that is opportunistic to
14 put him in jail. I think it is not, you people who are in the field, I
15 think it is good."
16 And Susak goes on to say:
17 I will hide him here for some time, if he going down -- is he
18 going to return down there, but I do not think order can be established
19 putting Tuta.
20 "Tuta should not be in prison now, he should be hidden..."
21 President Tudjman: "Then, Tuta should be kept in Zagreb, but not
22 in Herzegovina either.
23 Susak: "He must not enter Herzegovina, Mr. President, he must
25 President Tudjman: But if he is in Makarska, it is only an hour
1 drive to Herzegovina, that's not good."
2 Top of page 74 they turn their attention to Andabak. He's a good
3 soldier, Mr. President, he was carrying out -- he's carrying out orders.
4 Mr. President, that speaks volumes about the overall control of
5 Franjo Tudjman, his government, his circle, of the events in Bosnia.
6 The Prosecution submits that it's abundantly clear that there was
7 an international armed conflict in which Croatia was directly and
8 extensively involved.
9 Turning to my concluding remarks, Mr. President, and I will, I'm
10 confident, conclude before 7.00. And I'd like to give my apology again to
11 translation for the speed. I apologise for that.
12 Mr. President, Your Honours, I'd like to close with this. The
13 Prosecution's submission. The world knows that horrific crimes and
14 tremendous human suffering occurred in the wars concerning the former
15 Yugoslavia, including the Croat-Muslim war in 1993, 1994. Sadly, it was
16 during that conflict that a new term was coined, a new term came into
17 usage, an ugly term called "ethnic cleansing." There were victims on all
18 sides of the war and as the Prosecutor told you on the first day and will
19 tell you again on the last day, we defend no criminals in that war, we
20 support all victims, be they Muslim, Croat, or Serb. There were certainly
21 victims on all sides; there were crimes on all sides.
22 Much has been said and written about these events and about the
23 political and social force that is led to them. Much has been said and
24 written about people like Milosevic and Tudjman and Boban and others.
25 Mr. President, Judge Clark, Judge Diarra, it must never be forgotten,
1 however, that without people like Naletilic, Tuta, senior commanders and
2 operatives, without people like Martinovic, Stela, willing and able to
3 carry out events on the ground, without those people, people like
4 Milosevic and Tudjman can't commit these crimes. It's the people like
5 Tuta and Stela who order, participate in, and condone the expulsion of
6 families and the plunder of their property, the beating, torture,
7 mistreatment of human beings taken prisoner, or arrested, merely because
8 they were the wrong ethnic group.
9 The crimes and the victims of Naletilic and Martinovic cry out for
10 justice to be done. I'm sure if this Chamber was sitting in Mostar, this
11 gallery would be packed with victims who would have very physical and
12 direct way be appealing to this Chamber for justice.
13 The Prosecution submits that based on the law, based on the
14 evidence that it submitted to this Chamber, we have proven our case. We
15 pray, based on the law and the evidence, that the accused be convicted on
16 all the charges against them. The Chamber saw this poster during the
17 trial. It's Exhibit 639 -- I'm sorry, 939. Photograph of Tuta and in
18 Serbo-Croatian language saying, "Our victory."
19 This is the man that Martin Garrod, Sir Martin, said he was
20 considered a war hero by so many. A man his soldiers looked up to. And
21 unfortunately so many of them followed into misconduct of the most
22 egregious kind. I'm going to ask Mr. Bos to put on the ELMO Exhibit 43. I
23 want the Chamber to consider the poster of Mr. Naletilic and at the same
24 time the photograph that is on the ELMO. This is a photograph Exhibit 43
25 it's admitted in evidence, it's a photo of the Emir Obradovic family, Emir
1 Obradovic was killed on the 17th of September in Mostar, a Muslim. But
2 that's not why the photograph is used for this purpose.
3 I submit to you, Mr. President, Judge Clark, Judge Diarra, this is
4 instead photograph of any family. It doesn't matter if they were Croat or
5 Muslim or Serb. These are the people who this war tore apart. And as we
6 said a moment ago, there were victims on all sides. Look at this man who
7 was killed, whose two children, a wife, how many -- how many wives and
8 children, their father is missing, killed, never came home. How many
9 mothers were expelled, that were kicked out of their house, they got a
10 boot in the back as one of the witness testified she got from Stela, how
11 many women thrown out of their flats in Mostar? How many lost their
12 husbands and their sons and their daughters? The children, how many were
13 killed? How many were starved during the siege of Mostar? How many died
14 in Mostar because they couldn't get basic medical care because the HVO
15 blocked access to the town? How many of their mothers their fathers and
16 brothers never came home? Maybe their father survived the war, but even
17 now that isn't quite right. The child looks at the mother and asks her
18 father, Why does mom cry so often? What Naletilic and Martinovic
19 wanted was all the power and none of the responsibility.
20 Based on the law and the evidence, Your Honours, don't let them
21 have his victory, don't let them have their victory. The law and the
22 evidence shows that these two men are guilty. Justice must be done. We
23 ask they be convicted on all counts. We ask that Naletilic be sentenced
24 to a term of at least 35 years imprisonment and that Stela be imprisoned
25 to a term of lot less than 25 years.
1 Thank you very much.
2 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Tomorrow morning, we will hear the closing
3 argument from Defence counsel. So we will resume at 9.00 tomorrow morning
4 in the same courtroom.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
6 6.55 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday,
7 the 29th day of October, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.