Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 1737

1 Monday, 22 November 2004

2 [Open session]

3 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.

4 [The accused entered court]

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Registrar, good morning to you. Could you

6 at all the case, please.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Case number

8 IT-03-68-T, the Prosecutor versus Naser Oric.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. Mr. Oric, good morning to you. Can

10 you follow the proceedings in a language that you can understand?

11 THE APPELLANT: Good morning, Your Honours, ladies and gentlemen.

12 Yes, indeed, I can follow the proceedings in my own language. Thank you.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. You may sit down.

14 Appearances for the Prosecution.

15 MR. WUBBEN: Good morning, Your Honours. My name is Jan Wubben,

16 senior trial attorney, together with co-counsels Ms. Patricia Sellers and

17 Mr. Gramsci Di Fazio, and our case manager Ms. Donnica Henry-Frijlink.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Wubben, and good morning to you and

19 your team.

20 Appearances for the Defence.

21 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. I am

22 Vasvija Vidovic, together with Mr. John Jones appearing on behalf of

23 Mr. Naser Oric. Joining us today here are our legal assistant,

24 Ms. Jasmina Cosic, and our case manager, Mr. Geoff Roberts.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Madam Vidovic. Good morning to you and

Page 1738

1 your team.

2 So do you have any preliminaries that you need to discuss? I

3 suppose there are quite a few. I'm giving you the floor first. I still

4 take it that we are starting with Dr. Gow's testimony today, no?

5 MR. WUBBEN: Yes, Your Honour. With a view to our prior scheme,

6 the latest scheme, there had been a change for this week due to the fact,

7 first, that we had, the Prosecution, will not call the male witness we, in

8 an earlier stage, requested to be on the witness list and had been

9 accepted to be. The female one for the videolink, Ms. Svetlana

10 Trifunovic, I can speak out her name, she doesn't seek for protective

11 measures. That name remains on our list, meaning that we anticipate to

12 have a videolink witness, if everything is in order, for this coming

13 Thursday. The lack -- the space we have, then, on the Friday, we'll try

14 to place in Ms. Racine Manas as a witness. We still have to complete that

15 in that respect.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. So I take it, recapitulating, that you are

17 dropping one of the two witnesses that we are supposed to hear by

18 videolink, and that you're retaining only one. You're bringing the

19 testimony of that person, Svetlana Trifunovic from Friday, 26th to

20 Thursday, 25th --

21 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honours, on Thursday.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah. To Thursday, the 25th. And that you are

23 filling, then, Friday, 26th, with the testimony of Racine Manas.

24 Is that agreeable to the Defence?

25 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

Page 1739

1 JUDGE AGIUS: You know that on Monday, the 29th, we will not be

2 sitting. I had told you that already.

3 I am pleased to inform everyone that, during these two weeks'

4 break that we have had, a lot, a lot of work has been done by my staff.

5 Not only by my staff, also I notice that you've had an opportunity, both

6 the Prosecution and the Defence, to reorganise yourself, and it shows that

7 sometimes a short break is conducive to a better handling and a more

8 efficient way of handling the case. Now, I'm pretty sure that the case

9 will actually even be shortened as we go along.

10 In any case, we have got now all the system of exhibits,

11 documents, well catalogued and preserved, and we have also started working

12 on the various other issues, particularly legal matters involved in this

13 case, so that when we come to the final stage of this case, we will have

14 practically everything ready and we could then be in a position to proceed

15 at quite a pace.

16 I am also informed that there were some new filings, and I

17 appreciate your enthusiasm in making sure that the three Judges are fully

18 occupied with such matters. There are two filings in particular that I

19 think, having gone through them -- I must admit that I have not yet had

20 the chance to sit down with Judge Brydensholt and Judge Eser to even

21 discuss the subject matter of these motions, but I'm sure that when we do

22 later on today, we are going to agree that they require some kind of

23 debate, both of them. Not just one or the other, I think both of them

24 require some kind of debate. So I would like you to discuss amongst

25 yourselves and identify a day when you could debate these two outstanding

Page 1740

1 new motions. We will be discussing them in-camera as well. But I would

2 like you to inform us when you need -- yes, Mr. Di Fazio, I see.

3 MR. DI FAZIO: Your Honours, if you please. I'm grateful for you

4 clarifying those issues. Do I take it then that you want, the Chamber

5 wants, oral submissions on either of those two motions --

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think it's the case. Both motions are such.

7 One of it is a sort of, not exactly a follow-up, but it does follow up

8 from matters that we discussed in the pre-trial stage and also at the

9 beginning of the trial. That seems to call for some kind of either a

10 revision of the situation. But in any case, I think some oral submissions

11 will be in place.

12 MR. DI FAZIO: Respectfully, we agree, and in fact prefer to take

13 that course. I'd like to address Your Honours --

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. But what I'd like you to do, I usually work it

15 out this way, is to see if you can agree on a day in which -- and time

16 frame in which you could make these submissions, and then you just let us

17 know, we will have the oral pleadings or the debate, say, on Wednesday,

18 and we require one hour. And we'll make the necessary adjustments then

19 accordingly, all right? Good.

20 Yes, Mr. Di Fazio.

21 MR. DI FAZIO: It is Wednesday, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: It's up to you. I just ask you to discuss it

23 with -- I just ask you to discuss it with -- I just mentioned Wednesday,

24 just like that.

25 MR. DI FAZIO: I see.

Page 1741

1 JUDGE AGIUS: As an example.

2 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you very much.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Thanks.

4 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour?

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Wubben.

6 MR. WUBBEN: Yes. In addition, I would like to draw your

7 attention to the fact that we sent a letter to the Defence in which we

8 sent them a medical opinion of the specialist in Sarajevo, as requested in

9 the 92 bis procedure. And attached to that letter, you also find a draft

10 English translation of the conclusion. We don't -- we were not able yet

11 in this stage to file a complete translation, and we are working on it.

12 But we already send a draft translation, and as soon as we have the

13 translation of it, we will file the supplement information to you.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Wubben, I thank you. The only thing I can say

15 is that the only information that I have for the time being is that there

16 has been some development. I haven't seen the letter. And I suppose,

17 will I see it, then I should be in a position -- oh, we have it here.

18 Okay. Let me just have a look at it.

19 In the meantime, I notice that Madam Vidovic asked for the floor.

20 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we did receive the

21 Sarajevo expert opinion, and we now agree to apply Rule 92 bis to this

22 testimony.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So I think the matter, at this point in time,

24 can be decided by us. I don't think it requires any further discussion?

25 MR. WUBBEN: Well, for the record, it needs anyhow to confirm the

Page 1742

1 final conclusion of the specialist.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: But the final conclusion is -- I have only got one

3 paragraph here which supposedly translates point 5 of the certification by

4 Dr. Lubovic, and says answering specifically questions from the memo: "I

5 am of the opinion that X is not fit to give testimony in a trial and

6 answer questions pertaining to events which occurred more than 10 years

7 ago, nor can it be expected that his overall health would improve and that

8 preconditions will be met at a certain time to make him fit to testify in

9 the said trial."

10 So at that point in time, I think there's only one thing remaining

11 to be done, taking into consideration of what has just been mentioned by

12 Ms. Vidovic, and that is to decide your motion to have his prior

13 statement, or whatever, admitted under Rule 92, whatever, (C), 92 bis (C).

14 And we will do that -- we will do that this week. There are other things

15 that we are working upon, but this shouldn't take us much time.

16 (Redacted)

17 (Redacted)

18 (Redacted)

19 (Redacted) No, the rest is points for our

20 consideration.

21 Having said that, if you have no further initial, preliminary

22 matters to raise, we will admit Dr. Gow into the courtroom and we will

23 start with his testimony.

24 [The witness entered court]

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Dr. Gow.

Page 1743

1 THE WITNESS: Good morning.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: And welcome to this Tribunal. I am the presiding

3 judge. My name is Judge Agius. I'm flagged on my right by Judge

4 Brydensholt from Denmark, on my left, Judge Eser from Germany. We welcome

5 you. You're about to give expert evidence, or as an expert witness for

6 the Prosecution in this case against Naser Oric. Our Rules require that

7 before you do so you enter a solemn declaration, which is equivalent to an

8 oath, that during the course of your testimony, you'll be speaking the

9 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Please read that text

10 out loud and that will be your solemn declaration with us.

11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.


15 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Sellers, you can lead the witness in the first

16 part.

17 MS. SELLERS: Thank you very much, Your Honour. That's what I was

18 going to ask permission.

19 Examined by Ms. Sellers:

20 Q. Would the witness please state his full name and title for the

21 Trial Chamber.

22 A. My name is Andrew James William Gow, and I am professor of

23 international peace and security at King's College London.

24 Q. And would you also describe for the Trial Chamber what is your

25 field of study.

Page 1744

1 A. I teach, research and write on war, that is, on problems of

2 international politics, of strategy, military/political affairs. And I've

3 spent quite a lot of time over the past 15 or more years dealing with the

4 former Yugoslavia, among other things.

5 Q. Okay. During this past 15 years, have you published articles,

6 manuscripts or books in your field of study, being peace and security as

7 applied to the former Yugoslavia?

8 A. I have. I've published a number of books, three single-authored

9 books, as well as a number of co-authored books, and I've published a

10 number of articles that I don't even remember, but into the tens of

11 articles on the area.

12 MS. SELLERS: Your Honours, I would ask that in the future I will

13 submit Dr. Gow's expert report which contains also his writings, and so

14 therefore I will not belabour that issue.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't think we need to do that, unless the matter

16 is being contested by the Defence. Okay.

17 You may proceed, Ms. Sellers, thank you.


19 Q. Also, Dr. Gow, have you lectured on peace and security as it

20 applied to the former Yugoslavia, and if so, name maybe a couple of those

21 places.

22 A. I've lectured, given talks, participated in discussions and events

23 in a large number of places in Europe, in North America, universities of

24 Oxford, Cambridge. I've held visiting positions at the universities of

25 Princeton and Columbia in the United States. I've given lectures all

Page 1745

1 around universities in the United Kingdom and at several places in the

2 United States again as well, in Boston, St. Louis, Indianapolis. I can

3 keep going.

4 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. I would take it that in addition to

5 travelling through Europe and North America, that you have made several

6 visits to the former Yugoslavia, is that correct, sir, for the purposes of

7 your study?

8 A. For most of the past 20 years, I was going to the former

9 Yugoslavia a few times a year. In the last three or four years, that's

10 generally come down a bit. But I've been going still a couple times a

11 year, primarily to Serbia. But I've been around all the region over the

12 whole of that period, and I've also given lectures and talks and so forth

13 within that region, too.

14 Q. In addition to research about issues in the former Yugoslavia,

15 your travels to the region, have you spoken and exchanged ideals and

16 information with other professionals in your field about the former

17 Yugoslavia?

18 A. Oh, yes. As part of researching and writing, I talk to people

19 from the region, from outside the region, academics, officials, legible

20 people. One carries out interviews, has conversations with people over

21 the years. Yeah, that's --

22 Q. And have they all informed you in terms of your research and your

23 study?

24 A. I find that almost anything I do informs me in terms of research

25 and study. It's hard not to. But yes, they have.

Page 1746

1 Q. I would ask you, what is the title of your latest book that deals

2 with the former Yugoslavia?

3 A. "The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War

4 Crimes."

5 Q. And when was that book published?

6 A. Last year, 2003.

7 Q. Now, how would you characterise that book, "The Serbian Project"

8 in terms of this field of study in which you've been engaged in in the

9 past 15 years?

10 A. It's an attempt to capture the essence of the strategic aspects of

11 the war. It's looking at the link between strategy and war crimes, and,

12 in doing so, is attempting to capture the way in which the Serbian

13 strategy, which I say is, without trying to produce anything else in the

14 book, predicated on acts that could be described as war crimes, was the

15 core to a war of dissolution about statehood, but the adversaries

16 recognising that adversaries had competing strategies with the local

17 adversaries or international, and that sometimes local adversaries also

18 adopted the same strategy as well, or elements of.

19 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. We'll return to your book throughout the

20 giving of your evidence. But I would like to ask you, have you testified

21 at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia before?

22 A. I have.

23 Q. And have you testified in cases where Muslims were the victims of

24 alleged Serb crimes?

25 A. I have.

Page 1747

1 Q. And what case was that?

2 A. That's a trial in the case of Dusko Tadic, which was the first

3 trial to come to court.

4 Q. And have you also testified in cases where Serbs were the victims

5 of alleged Muslim crimes?

6 A. I have.

7 Q. And what case was that?

8 A. That was in the case of Delalic, et al, Celebici, the Celebici

9 case.

10 Q. Thank you. Now I would like you to tell the Trial Chamber about

11 the political composition of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

12 in the years that just preceded 1991.

13 A. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comprised six states

14 within a state. The federal state had independent international

15 personality, for purposes of international law, but within that there were

16 six states, each defined constitutionally as sovereign. So in theory,

17 they were exercising -- the exercise of sovereign rights was transferred

18 to the whole.

19 The six states were, working from north to south, Slovenia,

20 Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which comprised two historic regions,

21 Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Within Serbia, there were also two

22 autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, which had de jure powers but

23 were seen as sort of sovereignty within that arrangement. Each of those

24 operated as a whole but operated as separate political entities.

25 Q. Dr. Gow, if you'd notice, there's a map to your right. I would

Page 1748

1 ask that you use the pointer, and what you've just described to Your

2 Honours, would you please point to those six republics, and I would like

3 to ask the AV unit if you would focus your cameras on the map so we might

4 have a display of that image on our monitors, please.

5 A. Am I allowed to stand?

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly. Certainly.

7 MS. SELLERS: Carefully.

8 Q. Could I ask the AV unit to focus on the map so we might see it?

9 A. In the north, the north-west, Slovenia; Croatia is kind of broken

10 goose-shape along the coast and through the mainland; Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina, the heart-shaped country in the middle; Serbia, running from

12 the north down the eastern side here; Montenegro in the southwest --

13 southwest of Serbia, south of Bosnia; and Macedonia in the very south,

14 bordering beyond it into Greece and to west Albania and the east Bulgaria.

15 The two provinces I mentioned, Vojvodina, is in the north, primarily the

16 green bit on the north of this bit of the map of Serbia, and Kosovo is in

17 down in the south, approximately somewhere there.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Will counsel and the witness please pause

19 between questions and answers. Thank you.

20 MS. SELLERS: Certainly, thank you.

21 Q. For the purposes of this case, could you please also show Your

22 Honours on the map the location of Sarajevo.

23 A. Sarajevo is the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there.

24 Q. Right. And could you please also show Your Honours, for purposes

25 of this case, the borderline between Serbia and Bosnia where the Drina

Page 1749

1 river is?

2 A. As you say, the Drina river forms the border, and it runs here

3 [indicates]. Serbia lies to the east, Bosnia and Herzegovina to the west.

4 Q. And lastly, could you show Your Honours, for the purposes of this

5 case, where the region of Srebrenica is in what you've just described.

6 A. It's Eastern Bosnia, somewhere in the region of here. There it

7 is. Srebrenica is on this map. It's just there, so this area, in the

8 middle pocket to the west of the river, just there.

9 Q. Thank you very much. You may be seated, Dr. Gow.

10 Your Honours, I would just like to note that we have presented the

11 map just for purposes of display. We do not intend to tender it into

12 evidence.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: I took it for granted, Ms. Sellers.


15 Q. Dr. Gow, would you now please tell the Trial Chamber what was the

16 ethnic composition of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia prior

17 to 1991.

18 A. It was mixed. The two single largest ethnic groups were Serbs who

19 comprised somewhere in the mid-30s, 36 per cent in the 1981 census, 34

20 per cent in the 1991 census, which is not necessarily accepted by all

21 parties. The second largest group were Croats, just under 20 per cent.

22 And then there were Slav Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegrins,

23 Macedonians, and Albanians, each of which comprised somewhere 6 to 10

24 per cent of the population.

25 In addition to that, there were a number of very small groups,

Page 1750

1 Czechs, Slovaks; Ukrainians, a larger number, who made up parts of the

2 population, and about 5 per cent who defined themselves as Yugoslavs.

3 Q. Was there any one ethnic group wholly contained or that resided in

4 just one of the republics that you've described on the map?

5 A. No. No ethnic group was contained within any one of the political

6 units. The most homogeneous was Slovenia, which had a little over 90

7 per cent in the population, but there were Slovenes outside. The province

8 of Kosovo was also said to be in the region of 90 per cent ethnically

9 homogeneous. Apart from that, the figure for Croatia was about

10 three-quarters ethnic Croats, but Croats outside in Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina. Serbs comprised about two-thirds of the population of

12 Serbia, although if you take out Serbia without the provinces, that went

13 up to about 85 per cent. The Macedonians, Montenegrins, each about

14 two-thirds of the population. And Bosnia and Herzegovina was more divided

15 with about 44 per cent Slav Muslims, 31 or so per cent ethnic Serbs, and

16 about 17 per cent ethnic Croats.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Will you please pause between questions and

18 answers. Thank you again.

19 MS. SELLERS: Yes.

20 A. If I may add, I don't know if it's assistance to Your Honours.

21 But given that there was a camera closing up in the map before, if they

22 are interested, this map that's been displayed also has a pattern of

23 ethnic distribution in the bottom left-hand corner.

24 Q. Thank you. I would like you to tell the Trial Chamber what were

25 the principal languages spoken in the former Yugoslavia.

Page 1751

1 A. The principal languages, constitutional languages, were Serbian,

2 Serbo-Croat, which was spoken by about 80 per cent of the population,

3 Serbs, Croats, and the Slav Muslim populations and the Montenegrins. And

4 also Slovene spoken by Slovenes and Macedonian spoken by Macedonians.

5 Those were distinct but related, philologically related languages. And in

6 addition, you have the ethnic Albanians which speak -- spoke Albanian.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Incidentally, while we are at this and the witness

8 referred to the map in a more specific way, could we have an indication as

9 to which period that map refers to?

10 MS. SELLERS: Yes, Your Honour. That is --

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Is it the pre-war period or is it the post-war?

12 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, that is the pre-war period, the

13 composition.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I imagined so, but I wanted it to be so

15 stated. Thank you.

16 MS. SELLERS: Yes.

17 Q. Now I would like to ask you, what were the principal religions of

18 the former Yugoslavia.

19 A. The Orthodox Christianity practiced predominantly by Serbs in

20 Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by Montenegrins, and by Macedonians.

21 Roman Catholicism practiced predominantly by Slovenes, ethnic Croats in

22 Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by some Albanians in

23 Montenegro. And Islam practiced by Slav Muslims, so ethnically the same

24 you would say as Croats and Serbs, but practising Islamic faith, and by

25 the ethnically distinct group of Albanians in Kosovo.

Page 1752

1 Q. Now, we've talked about the Socialist Federal Republic of

2 Yugoslavia. Did that republic disintegrate politically in the beginning

3 of the 1990s?

4 A. May I have now the map. I don't know if you're interested in

5 looking at the map at this moment.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't know why we have the map on the monitor.

7 Yes.

8 MS. SELLERS: We do not need the map on the monitor.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: No, no. I don't think we need the map any further.

10 Please proceed, Dr. Gow. Thank you.

11 THE WITNESS: At the beginning of the 1990s, this Yugoslav

12 federation dissolved; it broke up. That was the result of a set of

13 political, social, economic pressures, international change, through the

14 1980s. It broke up in a way where, because of the structures of this

15 unit, with the six states within a state seeking -- being obliged to

16 operate together, in theory, for their own benefit, they couldn't agree on

17 the way forward. And as the disputes deepened, the federation, in a

18 sense, ceased to function, so that there came a point in the middle of

19 1991, as a result of a series of events through 1990 and 1991, where, at

20 the political level, the interstate, inter-republican level, there was no

21 agreement, and two of those states, Slovenia and Croatia, decided to

22 declare independence at the same time at which other states were trying to

23 evaluate their positions and had been working out what they also would do.

24 And, of course, in this context, there was also quite a lot of pressure in

25 the ethnic social fabric running through the states and across the borders

Page 1753

1 of those states.


3 Q. Dr. Gow, I'd like to ask you to explain a bit about -- you

4 testified that there was ethnic tension and a series of events. Could you

5 just illuminate that for the Trial Chamber.

6 A. In terms of tension in the ethnic fabric, it was quite clear that,

7 as the end of communism affected Europe and the move towards

8 democratisation in some -- eventually in some ways all of those Yugoslav

9 states. The move to democracy opened discussion on national issues in a

10 different way and in a new way. For example, in Croatia, that created

11 tensions within the ethnic Serb communities there. In Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina, in this context, predominantly ethnically defined political

13 parties emerged and ethnic groups tended to lend their support to their

14 ethnic party. This didn't necessarily imply that there had to be mutually

15 exclusive positions which would lead to conflict. At times in Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina, it appeared at times as all parties were cooperating

17 together. In retrospect, we don't know quite how to evaluate that. But

18 those pressures were taking place.

19 In terms of the interstate relations, Slovenia, supported by

20 Croatia, proposed a realignment of the joint arrangement, confirming the

21 sovereignty of the states, taking -- giving greater authority within that

22 arrangement to the states in exercising their own affairs internationally.

23 They had substantial control internally. Serbian authorities in Belgrade

24 countered with a proposal not to loosen relations, to make them more

25 comfortable, but to tighten them. These were mutually exclusive

Page 1754

1 positions. And so through a series of events, it became clear that there

2 was probably no way in which they were going to be able to go forward

3 together on that basis.

4 In that context, in the spring of -- I mean in late 1990, Slovenia

5 held a referendum; in the spring of 1991, Croatia held a referendum on the

6 issue of independence, if a way forward was not found. These events

7 contributed to the dynamic between the parties about what was going on and

8 how it was going to turn out. And by the time it came to change the --

9 what was called technically the president of the presidency, that is, the

10 head of the state council -- if you think of an image - I don't know if it

11 helps to think of the European Union, where you have the European Council

12 where all the heads of state come together - the equivalent of that body

13 in this Yugoslav construct was due to change its presidency, the person,

14 the titular head of it. But that was blocked by Serbia. And at that

15 moment, the logjam was set, and it was only about -- a little over a month

16 after that that the declarations of independence came.

17 Q. Dr. Gow, I'd like to ask you, some of the events surrounding the

18 declarations of independence that you've testified about, did they include

19 the intervention of any armed forces on the part of republics of the

20 former Yugoslavia?

21 A. Throughout the period in which these -- the kinds of tensions I

22 was describing, both at the interstate, political level and within the

23 communal fabric, from the middle of 1990 onwards, there were rebellious

24 regions controlled by ethnic Serbs within Croatia which were using arms to

25 create effective no-go areas for the Croatian authorities. They were, in

Page 1755

1 some ways, supported by elements of the then Yugoslav People's Army. This

2 was all part of the evolving situation. And within that context, also,

3 Slovenia began preparing to have a -- to use armed forces that it already

4 had, but to enhance them for the purposes of being able to promote its

5 position, to defend its position, if it came to that. And of course, when

6 the -- at the moment the declarations of independence were made, war

7 began.

8 Q. Right. And therefore, did the Yugoslav People's Army at a time

9 physically intervene on the territory of these republics, and then later

10 on at another point in time, withdraw of these republics, Slovenia and

11 Croatia?

12 A. To be accurate, because the Yugoslav People's Army Yugoslav

13 People's Army was the army of the federation, it was always present in all

14 of the territories. At times in 1990 it was deployed out of barracks at

15 places within Croatia as part of this tense, potential conflict, or actual

16 conflict, but low-level conflict situation.

17 After the point of the declarations of independence, it was

18 deployed technically to assist the civilian authorities by moving to

19 suppress the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence. At a

20 later stage, after 10 days of armed hostilities and a three-month

21 moratorium, it withdrew completely from Slovenia. It was only to

22 withdraw -- well, no, sorry, difficult issues. The forces that it became

23 were to withdraw eventually from Croatia in 19 -- after 1995, but the JNA

24 ceased to exist as such in 1992. But that's an issue you probably don't

25 want to get into just now.

Page 1756

1 Q. We'll talk about that a bit later.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. I would like to ask the usher to assist us. I'm turning to

4 number 1 in our binder. The Prosecution has provided binders of the

5 different exhibits that we're using, and if she would kindly pass out

6 what's under page Exhibit 1. Everyone has it now?

7 Dr. Gow, it's your number 0039405 in the original Slovenian, and

8 it is 15 in the English version. I believe it's up on our monitor of

9 court evidence.

10 Dr. Gow, would you please look at the English version of this.

11 What does this document represent?

12 A. This is the declaration of independence by the Slovenian

13 parliament, which was made on the 20th of June, 1991. It makes reference

14 to the right to self-determination, and it makes -- and it indicates that

15 Slovenia, in the situation where the federation is no longer functioning,

16 is going to seek its own future as an independent political entity.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 MS. SELLERS: I would ask that the document be given a P number,

19 and I would like to tender it into evidence.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that's Exhibit P408.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: So that document -- I see no objection on the part

22 of the Defence. That document is being admitted in evidence and marked as

23 Prosecution Exhibit P408. Thank you.

24 MS. SELLERS: Yes.

25 Q. Now I would like you to turn to number 2 in the binder the

Page 1757

1 Prosecution's provided, and I would ask the usher, would you please show

2 the witness -- oh, he has -- you've given him the binder. Thank you.

3 A. I have the binder.

4 Q. That makes it much easier.

5 A. I've also worked out how to operate this thing, so I can see the

6 screen as well.

7 Q. If you go to ERN number 00328704, the original. Then I would like

8 to ask Dr. Gow to look at the English version of the document. And that's

9 ERN number 00328704 through 8707.

10 Dr. Gow, could you please tell me what this document represents.

11 A. The document, as a whole, is taken from the Official Gazette of

12 the Republic of Croatia, and if you move to the document numbered 875

13 within - I think it's 875 within this - you have the declaration of

14 independence by the Republic of Croatia.

15 Q. If I might assist you, that's -- excuse me, on page 6 of 14.

16 A. It's page 6 of 14 of the -- of that document. This document was

17 also promulgated on the 25th of June, 1991, although I should -- I point

18 out that when this was shown to me yesterday, I noted that, for some

19 reason, the translation on this particular version says 25th of May, which

20 is incorrect.

21 MS. SELLERS: I would ask Your Honours and the Defence to look at

22 page 10 of 14 in the English translation.

23 Q. Dr. Gow has testified that -- you note that it says May as opposed

24 to saying June. Dr. Gow, your testimony is that the declaration of

25 independence occurred at June of 1991?

Page 1758

1 A. Yes.

2 MS. SELLERS: Your Honours, if I may, the Prosecution has sought

3 the assistance of an English-Croatian dictionary so that one might look at

4 the original word in Croatian to verify that the word as translated in

5 English appears to be incorrect. What is May should be June. Could I

6 please hand out these copies.

7 In the document of the original Croatian, and I would ask you to

8 turn to the page which has ERN number 00328707, if you would notice in the

9 first column, about four lines down it says "Zagreb 25," and I would ask

10 you to excuse my mispronunciation pronunciation, "Lipnja" as the month,

11 and then I would direct Your Honours to that same word in the dictionary.

12 It is on page 627, in the first column, approximately seven words from the

13 bottom. And it says that that word would be translated to June. What the

14 Prosecution would like to propose is that we give the document to Language

15 Services and have them correct it for us officially. But I would want to

16 draw your attention to that.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Is there any disagreement on that on the part of the

18 Defence? Because then we can agree that the proper date and the proper

19 translation should have been June, and that we do not need to proper the

20 Translation Unit with making any further adjustments.

21 Yes, Madam Vidovic.

22 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the correct

23 translation of the word "Lipnja" is June, and I agree with what has been

24 said.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Could I ask what is the correct translation of the

Page 1759

1 month of May into Croat?

2 THE INTERPRETER: "Svibanj," Your Honour.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: There is no real reasonable explanation for the

4 mistake. It's just a mistake and that's it. I don't think we need to

5 pursue it any further, Ms. Sellers.

6 MS. SELLERS: Thank you very much. I'm grateful to Your Honours

7 and I'm grateful to our learned friends. I would ask that we tender the

8 exhibit into evidence, if I could have a P number for it, please. And

9 that would be documents relating to the Croatian independence. And if

10 Your Honours feel necessary, then I will not have to tender the dictionary

11 pages.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't think you need to tender this into evidence.

13 The other one should be 409.

14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that's exact. That would be P409.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: So the document relating to the Croatian declaration

16 of independence is being admitted in evidence and marked as Prosecution

17 Exhibit P409. And we can proceed.

18 MS. SELLERS: Thank you.

19 Q. Dr. Gow, I would now ask you to turn your attention to the

20 following: How did the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991

21 affect the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other republic of

22 Serbia and those that made up part of the federation?

23 A. Would you mind if I added something to the matter of the

24 declarations of independence first?

25 Q. No, certainly, please.

Page 1760

1 A. It was just to make clear that the context of those, and both the

2 declarations made reference to the constitutional position within the

3 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which, in the preamble, gave the

4 right to secession, self-summation up to and including secession, and to

5 elements of the constitution Article 3 which defined them as sovereign.

6 And although Article 5 was a co-mitigating factor saying there had to be

7 agreement on change of territory or borders, that didn't necessarily say

8 anything about status. And so the assumption was that sovereign rights

9 within this constitutional framework were held by the states to act in

10 that way, to clarify.

11 Q. Thank you. Yes. I would now ask if you could respond to the

12 following question, and that was: How did the independence of Slovenia

13 and Croatia in 1991 affect the other republics, particularly Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina and Serbia?

15 A. While the events between -- predominantly between Slovenia and

16 Croatia on the one hand and Serbia on the other were developing

17 politically, especially when you come to the points of declarations of

18 independence, this creates pressures on Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the

19 most ethnically divided, fragile of these states, and with significant

20 ethnic Serb and Croat populations. The arguments between Croatia and

21 Serbia, in some ways, impact and translate into arguments between ethnic

22 Serbs and ethnic Croats, wherever they happen to be. This puts pressures

23 on political change at the time of democratisation. In Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina, it meant that the word developments, such as parliamentary

25 declaration in October 1991 affirming the sovereignty and territorial

Page 1761

1 integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina it meant that there were movements by

2 ethnic Serbs and by ethnic Croats looking for union with Serbia or to

3 reject the declarations of sovereignty, and those pressures meant that the

4 authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the predominantly Slav Muslim

5 authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as time went on, took the decision

6 that the best interests of protecting Bosnia and Herzegovina - and I

7 suspect particularly the Slav Muslims within that - would be also to move

8 for a declaration of independence. I think they were reluctant to do that

9 because of the fragile situation.

10 But when the European Council, the governing body as it was of the

11 European Union, in December 1991, invited those Yugoslav and Soviet states

12 seeking recognition of independent international personality to submit

13 requests, applications to do so, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted an

14 application.

15 Am I free to continue on that or would you rather I didn't?

16 Q. Well, when you make a pause, I was going to then ask you: It's

17 your evidence, your expert opinion, that the ethnic and the religious

18 composition of the republics did affect the dissolution or disintegration

19 of the former Yugoslavia.

20 A. The dissolution was operating at a political level between the

21 governments, but there was tension in the ethnic fabric which both

22 contributed to that process and, in some way, was a product of it.

23 Tension was growing all around. And in a place like Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina, there were pressures.

25 Q. Now, did Bosnia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, eventually declare its

Page 1762

1 independence from the former Yugoslavia?

2 A. Yes. As I was saying, after the European Council invited those

3 Yugoslav and Soviet states seeking -- the Yugoslav states at that stage in

4 particular, seeking recognition of independent international personality

5 to do so, Bosnia made an application. The European Council, as part of

6 its process of trying to manage the Yugoslav crisis and breakup, had

7 appointed an advisory commission under the French constitutional lawyer,

8 Robert Badinter, and they put each of these cases, including Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina's, to the Badinter Commission, and the Badinter Advisory

10 Commission judged that the will of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina

11 was not clear and recommended, that a referendum should be held. That

12 referendum was held on the 29th of February, 1st of March, 1991. The

13 outcome of the referendum was that of those who participated, 90 -- almost

14 90 per cent voted in favour, and that constituted, I think it was about 63

15 and a half per cent of the population overall. In a later opinion, I

16 think it was opinion number 8, the Badinter Advisory Commission advised

17 the council that Bosnia-Herzegovina, the will of the people had been

18 expressed and that Bosnia and Herzegovina satisfied the terms set in the

19 guidelines and recommended recognition. And the European Council

20 proceeded in that direction.

21 Q. Now, the plebiscite that you mentioned, did the voting in regard

22 to that plebiscite break down, or was it demarcated along ethnic/religious

23 lines, to your understanding?

24 A. The voting was predominantly Slav Muslims and Croats voting for

25 independence. Those who voted against -- I'm not sure we can be sure.

Page 1763

1 But there was a boycott organised by the largest Serbian political party,

2 the Serbian Democratic Party, the SDS, which also, with the assistance of

3 some JNA units, made it difficult even for some people to vote in the

4 referendum.

5 It should also be pointed out, as the Badinter Advisory Commission

6 noted that the previous autumn, in November, the Bosnian Serbs had

7 organised a plebiscite of their own among the ethnic Serbs which expressed

8 their -- as far as you can take it as signifying anything, expressed the

9 view that the ethnic Serbs in Bosnia wanted to remain part of the Federal

10 Yugoslavia.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: And, Ms. Sellers, I just suggest that for practical

12 purposes, we -- because I've noticed that you have used the

13 word "plebiscite" with reference to what the witness had previously

14 referred to, mentioned as -- described as referendum. More or less, I

15 would suggest that you restrict the use of plebiscite only to the Serbian

16 plebiscite --

17 MS. SELLERS: Yes.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: -- while we continue to refer to the referendum on

19 whether Bosnia should become independent or not as the referendum.

20 MS. SELLERS: Yes.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. We'll keep the two separate, even though

22 basically there isn't much difference. But we'll keep the two terms

23 separate, referring to two different events or two different expressions

24 of the --

25 MS. SELLERS: I thank Your Honour for the fine and important

Page 1764

1 distinction, yes.

2 Q. Dr. Gow, now, was there a Serbian reaction to Bosnia's declaration

3 of independence that came from, at this point, the Socialist Federal

4 Republic of Yugoslavia?

5 A. In the context of these developments, the Serbian authorities in

6 Belgrade, who by this stage had already embarked on something that I call

7 in the book this new state project, i.e., to create the borders of a new

8 set of territories, or set of territories essentially for ethnic Serbs

9 from the territories of the states breaking up in Yugoslavia, and that

10 campaign was already underway militarily in Croatia. Preparations for it

11 appear to have been underway through the autumn of 1991 in Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina as well, in the early part. And as part of that preparation,

13 Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Serbia, in conjunction with Borisav

14 Jovic, the Serbian representative to the federal state council, decided

15 that it would be better if the JNA personnel were redistributed so that

16 all ethnic Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina were based in Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina and non-Bosnian Serbs were based outside. And this was in

18 anticipation of the expected recognition of independent international

19 personality for Bosnia and Herzegovina and their correct understanding, I

20 think, that the continuing presence of the JNA after such recognition

21 would be seen as external interference and, quite possibly, probably an

22 act of aggression.

23 Jovic, therefore, gave instructions to the defence minister, the

24 head of the army, General Veljko Kadijevic, to organise that

25 reorganisation, and Kadijevic by 25th of December reported that it was 90

Page 1765

1 per cent complete.

2 So this is all part of preparations to deal with this situation.

3 You have the breakup of the socialist federative republic, and you have a

4 set of -- you have a breakup which becomes accompanied by war because

5 there isn't agreement on the successor disposition. There's a clash of

6 statehood projects. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the others

7 all seeking to preserve territorial integrity of the state and add with

8 sovereignty through this arrangement; Serbia seeking to create a new set

9 of boundaries. And that's the essence of the war.

10 MS. SELLERS: I would ask Your Honours to turn to section 3 in

11 your binder, and it is ERN number 00359513.

12 Q. Dr. Gow, would you please look at this document and tell the Trial

13 Chamber that you've testified to someone referred to as Kadijevic. What

14 is the importance of the documents, if any, that we have placed in this

15 section 3?

16 A. The document is a translation -- a translated extract from

17 Kadijevic's memoirs. Kadijevic was the defence minister, the head of the

18 army. General Kadijevic, a little time after these events, wrote a

19 memoir, and this particular extract, the bit marked here in italics,

20 indicates the way in which the JNA provided the backbone of the army for

21 the Serbian -- for the so-called Bosnian Serb armed forces. So the JNA,

22 in this process, the old Yugoslav People's Army, made arrangements so that

23 the ethnic -- that as part of this project to change the territorial

24 boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to create a Serbian entity linked

25 to other Serbian entities, that it would then -- that it -- sorry, the aim

Page 1766

1 was to create a Serbian entity linked to other Serbian entities. That

2 would require the use of armed force. The elements of the JNA through

3 this arrangement were used to be the core of that armed force for that

4 purpose.

5 And here, Kadijevic is saying it was the backbone of the

6 Republika Srpska's army, replete with weaponry and equipment. You can

7 read.

8 Q. Dr. Gow, therefore, would it be your testimony, your expert

9 opinion, that the ethnic composition, in particular the Serbian ethnic

10 group, affected, if not drove, many of the decisions that were taken by

11 the JNA at this point in time, 1991/1992?

12 A. There are two things, I think, to be -- to say about the JNA in

13 this situation. The first is that it was traditionally a multiethnic

14 armed force, comprising members of each of the -- of the different

15 communities, but that its officer corps was almost predominantly ethnic

16 Serbian. And in that context, although someone like Kadijevic may in some

17 ways have not been -- certainly wouldn't be regarded by many as really

18 close to Milosevic, it was also a position where the situation of some

19 kind of sense of attachment and loyalty for many people, and also simply

20 the question of the army's having a home and a future, we'll go with that.

21 The other thing -- and so there was a kind of tendency, both for

22 the sake of the army having political support -- every army -- elsewhere

23 in the book Kadijevic says every army needs a home, it needs a state to go

24 with, and in this breakup situation, that was the home that the army --

25 the army took.

Page 1767

1 The other thing is that it appears that Serbian president Slobodan

2 Milosevic, through his security service, was also having a kind of

3 separate line of chains of command running through, helping to prepare the

4 way to identify people within the JNA who would be -- who would be loyal

5 to this kind of enterprise. So this -- these two trends here, there's not

6 one thing happening in the JNA, but the two trends come together to

7 situate it predominantly -- the rump of the JNA taking its place with the

8 Belgrade political authorities.

9 Q. Could you describe or inform the Trial Chamber exactly how did the

10 JNA fit into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia society prior to

11 this time in terms of a military apparatus?

12 A. Well, the JNA -- well, first of all, it arose from the success of

13 the communist-led resistance and revolution in the Second World War, so it

14 always had a particular place and standing within communist Yugoslavia,

15 including, at various times, a political status, quite unusually for an

16 armed force.

17 Its function was to be the first of a two-tier defence system. It

18 was meant to be the first echelon of defence. The regular armed forces

19 that if Yugoslavia, the federation, were to be involved, would resist, the

20 idea was for a minimum of 48 hours, while the second tier was mobilised.

21 That second tier was Territorial Defence structures organised at

22 republican and local levels. And the theory of the defence doctrine was

23 the JNA would hold off to provide time for mobilisation. It was assumed

24 that in face of something like a Soviet or NATO attack, the JNA wouldn't

25 be stand up to it indefinitely. But by falling back on a strategy of what

Page 1768

1 we described technically as guerilla tactics, it would be able to offer

2 resistance, and the structures were such that that would go down even to

3 the local levels. So the system was structured so that you would have war

4 presidencies, crisis headquarters, and local armed forces, territorial

5 units, that if they were not able to join up and operate with larger

6 formations, would always operate at the very lowest, even neighbourhood

7 level. So the structures were there, and there would always be some kind

8 of civil military relationship, political authority over whatever armed

9 forces were able to operate.

10 Q. So with the Territorial Defence, this unit, this second tier of

11 the two-tier Federal Republic military institution, would it use, as a

12 well-accepted strategy guerilla tactics? Is that your expert testimony?

13 A. The defence doctrine was predicated on a guerilla strategy, and

14 that is the idea that you will not be equivalent in strength in terms of

15 conventional forces. Therefore, you adopt an asymmetric strategy. You're

16 in a weaker position, you use a guerilla approach to seek, to harass, to

17 undermine, to show resistance; in the end to make it, say, unbearable for

18 the invading occupying force to remain. I think you see elements of that

19 in Iraq at the moment, with the same attempts being made. Not that we

20 should talk about that. The idea is that you continue this low-level

21 activity at this scale on your terms rather than trying to meet an enemy

22 on their own terms because you would lose on that basis.

23 Q. Dr. Gow, would members of the Territorial Defence, as part of at

24 least their theoretical if not their actual training, be advised in the

25 use of this guerilla tactics that you've described as a strategy?

Page 1769

1 A. Certainly those that would hold positions of authority would do

2 that, anybody with particular training. Everybody -- every male, that's

3 every able-bodied male, would be a conscript within the JNA, they would

4 then be expected to do reserve duty, including serving as part of

5 Territorial Defence units. There was an assumption that the whole of the

6 population in some way would be mobilised either as part of the

7 Territorial Defence or as what was called civil defence. The civil

8 defence also had training in using small firearms. There would be popular

9 resistance that anybody at any level would be capable of operating that.

10 Everybody would be familiar, I should say, with their particular place in

11 the system, at least to some degree, and that they would have a place.

12 And they would be familiar with what was to be done overall. Those in

13 more leading positions would have greater training in understanding -- in

14 doctrine and how to operate.

15 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. Returning a bit more to the JNA in 1991/'92,

16 I'd like to ask you, was it involved in an armed conflict in Bosnia?

17 A. The JNA was involved in an armed conflict in Bosnia, following

18 from the things I was saying earlier. It was the core of the Serbian

19 attempt to break up Bosnia and Herzegovina, to take one -- to take parts

20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina that would be linked to both the Republic of

21 Serbian Krajina - that's the territory controlled also with JNA assistance

22 by Serbs in Croatia to the west - and to the east Serbia itself. So the

23 JNA, after this transformation, I think I said that Kadijevic, Jovic and

24 Milosevic between them were involved in creating the situation, the JNA,

25 once the armed hostilities began in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was the

Page 1770

1 difference between war and some kind of low-level political violence.

2 That was the armed force which shaped the campaign.

3 The JNA itself ceased to exist formally on the 19th of May, 1992,

4 again, as a result of these changes as foreseen by Milosevic, according to

5 Mr. Jovic, and was divided. It's generally said that it withdrew. What

6 happened was that it was divided. Part of it became the Vojska

7 Yugoslavia, the army of Serbia and Montenegro, and part of it became the

8 Vojska Republika Srpksa, the army of the Bosnian Serbs. But it was a

9 division rather than a withdrawal, and all or most parts of the JNA in

10 Bosnia and Herzegovina became the VRS. There were some elements, some of

11 the more sophisticated aircraft were withdrawn, but other aircraft were

12 left.

13 Q. Dr. Gow, we'll return to that in a moment. I would like to ask

14 everyone to turn to section 4 of their binder. There is a map that

15 previously has been given a P number, P366.

16 Dr. Gow, I would like to ask you, did you assist the Office of the

17 Prosecutor back in 1995 in preparing this map?

18 A. All I can say is that I might have done. Certainly in

19 summer/autumn of 1994, I asked the Prosecutor's Office to prepare a map of

20 this kind, and I gave them the indications for the information that should

21 be on it. If this version of it came from 1995, that's only a

22 continuation of something that was begun in 1994.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Not that I wish to be picky. I just kind of -- yeah, that's a ...

25 Q. Could you please describe for Your Honours exactly the reason for

Page 1771

1 this map, and then illustrate a bit what do some of the designations and

2 highlights on this map mean in terms of your testimony regarding the JNA

3 involvement in the armed conflict in Bosnia.

4 A. The map indicates key points of Serbian operations in the first

5 month of armed hostilities; in fact, going slightly back before what's

6 generally recognised as the formal beginning of armed hostilities, in the

7 spring of 1992. It doesn't represent all the places where there were

8 operations or armed hostilities. But what it does show is that there was

9 a pattern within that of ensuring that all key communication points were

10 under Serbian control. So each of these stars represents one of the key

11 pieces -- key points of strategic communications within Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina. You see places like Visegrad. Foca, Visegrad, Vlasenica,

13 Zvornik, Bijeljina. These are all places which are significant in terms

14 of access for Serbian forces, if necessary, from Serbia into Bosnia and

15 Herzegovina. The initial -- the first of these operations was at

16 Bosanski Brod, that's in the north, the very top one, on the 27th of

17 March. The war is generally said to have begun in April, but these

18 operations were taking place.

19 That "other operations" across that northern tier are significant

20 in preventing access from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina. So with

21 some operations you're ensuring Serbian access, if necessary, for support,

22 and in others, you're cutting off the entry points for any potential

23 reinforcements from outside.

24 The two -- actually, two other things. The Derventa, and this is

25 something I pointed out in Trial Chambers in the past but I guess it gets

Page 1772

1 forgotten once we go away. It's not actually on the point of

2 communication on the map, but I think you get the idea. And the other is

3 to say that Kupres is the key strategic ground in the whole region.

4 Whoever controls the Kupres heights dominates all the way into central

5 Bosnia and all the way down to the Adriatic coast on the other side. So

6 it's significant that that area was taken earlier on.

7 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. I would like you to explain where Your

8 Honours might find the Posavina Corridor, if it is located on the map, and

9 what its importance might be.

10 A. The town of Brcko in the north-east on the map, where it says

11 Brcko, 30th of April, that's the key town running through the Posavina

12 Corridor. That corridor was the vital link between Serbian-controlled

13 territories in Eastern Bosnia that border Serbia itself, and

14 Serbian-controlled territories in Western Bosnia and through into the

15 Serbian-controlled territories in Croatia. That was the vital link. If

16 this project was to be successful, the territories had to be linked. And

17 that was, if you like, the life-line corridor that kept this project

18 going. At various times there were attempts to widen it, there were

19 attempts to create a broader corridor, initially a second corridor that

20 would lead to a broader corridor, but they failed.

21 Q. And, Dr. Gow, might I ask you were these locations that you've

22 shown on the map, were they places where the JNA army "was successful" in

23 that it dominated the military operation that is shown on the map?

24 A. The JNA provided a significant element in those operations. There

25 were two aspects to the takeover of these places. One was the JNA's

Page 1773

1 operating using its artillery and armour capabilities to surround places.

2 This is part of a general pattern. Other forces, generally we label them

3 as paramilitaries, were then used to go into these places to secure

4 control in conjunction with local forces, local Bosnian Serb Territorial

5 Defence forces, which had been mobilised in the course of the previous

6 autumn and through political action by the Serbian Democratic Party, which

7 from December 1991 had been laying preparations for identifying potential

8 resistance so that people would immediately be identified and perhaps

9 either killed or detained for the new government of the new municipalities

10 under the so-called Serbian label. And within that cooperation within the

11 security centers, i.e., the interior ministry services, and with units of

12 the JNA, and as part of all of that, they were mobilising ethnic Serbs in

13 those areas into Territorial Defence forces also to be part of this. In

14 some cases, it was significant; in other cases, it was perhaps less

15 significant. The key element were the shock troops, which were the

16 paramilitaries, which were provided by -- which, in one way or another,

17 were organised by the Serbian security service from Belgrade.

18 Q. So, Dr. Gow, is it your testimony that from the Republic of

19 Serbia, we have not only the JNA army intervening on the territory of

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also paramilitaries that have come from the

21 Serbian republic intervening and participating in the armed conflict on

22 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at this time?

23 A. That is my testimony, yes.

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. And that paramilitary forces, such as those known as the Serbian

Page 1774

1 Volunteer Guard, otherwise known as Arkan's Tigers, involved in the action

2 at Bijeljina for certain were -- they had coordinated with the JNA

3 special -- the JNA units at the Batajnica air base 252 and had been

4 organised by the Serbian security service.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Sellers.


7 Q. Dr. Gow, was the position more or less identical before the war

8 broke out in Bosnia? In other words, was there a similar identical

9 situation in Croatia, while the war was going on in Croatia? In other

10 words, the presence of the JNA in Croatia for sure, but were there also

11 paramilitaries, the same paramilitaries operating in Croatia, before they

12 then concentrated on Bosnia?

13 A. I think I indicated, something I already said, the fight -- the

14 campaign in Croatia had begun in June 1991. The same strategy was being

15 used, the same approach, the same mixture of JNA. At that stage, the JNA

16 was remaining as the JNA, both there and in Bosnia. At times it said it

17 was carrying out a peacekeeping operation, but it was essentially

18 assisting this Serbian campaign. Local Territorial Defence units were

19 used and paramilitary forces from Serbia were used as part of that

20 campaign, and the same pattern of surrounding places with armour or heavy

21 artillery and then using the shock troops, or paramilitaries, to go in as

22 part of the strategy to take over and to clear out potential operations.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's take it step by step. Was there a cease-fire

24 in Croatia at any given moment?

25 THE WITNESS: There was a cease-fire agreement in Croatia at the

Page 1775

1 beginning of January 1992. That said, the low-level hostilities continued

2 all the way to 1995, and at certain points during 1993, 1994, 1995, there

3 were also significant operations initiated by Croatian forces. But I

4 don't think there was ever a point where there was a genuine, full

5 cease-fire. But there was a cease-fire agreement in January 1992 which

6 led to the deployment of the United Nations force in Croatia.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Was there any substantial withdrawal of the JNA

8 forces from Croatia into Bosnia at any given moment after this supposed

9 cease-fire agreement?

10 THE WITNESS: There was a withdrawal even before the supposed

11 cease-fire agreement, and certainly after it. Again, forces were left in

12 place as the Serbian Territorial Defence of the RSK, which became the army

13 of Serbian Krajina, Vojska Srpksa Krajina. Some of those forces were

14 withdrawn into Bosnia and Herzegovina, as indeed had been earlier forces

15 from Slovenia. When the withdrawal of Slovenia took place, some of those

16 forces went into Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: So you agree that as a result of this withdrawal of

18 JNA forces from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina, the presence of the

19 JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina was strengthened.

20 THE WITNESS: It might well have been. I think that the plans

21 were already underway for shaping the position in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

22 but I think it's quite likely that would have strengthened the position.

23 It certainly would have left -- some materiel was left in Croatia, some of

24 the materiel was withdrawn and would have then been at the disposal of the

25 forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Page 1776

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Was the JNA otherwise strengthened, apart from the

2 returning forces from Croatia? Was it strengthened in any other way in

3 preparation of the conflict that eventually occurred?

4 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure that I might -- that I fully understand

5 where you might be going with this. Let me say that the JNA had a

6 position in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that as part of the mobilisation,

7 armed forces were being moved out -- this is through the autumn of 1991,

8 armed forces were being moved out of barracks onto permanent exercises.

9 That was part of the way of mobilising Territorial Defence forces to work

10 with them as well. That was doing two things. It was to make sure that

11 the -- that what had happened in Slovenia and in some places in Croatia

12 that JNA forces could not be trapped in barracks, that they would be out

13 in the field and in a position to be used. And it was also ensuring that

14 they were in a position and carrying out exercises in places that might be

15 of key importance so that when the time came - this is my assumption, I

16 can go no further than that - that they were deployed and out and in

17 strength and in their position to take whatever action would be required.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: My question is actually based on two things that you

19 mentioned earlier. One was the anticipation on the part of Belgrade that

20 the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was only a matter of time, and

21 secondly, the plans that were put in place by Belgrade for a Serbian

22 state, which would necessarily transborder into parts of Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina and which would require definitely the presence of the JNA

24 over there, whichever, so this is -- so would you agree that this would

25 required, first and foremost, the strengthening of the JNA -- of the

Page 1777

1 presence of the JNA in the areas where the Serbs had a particular

2 interest?

3 THE WITNESS: I think the JNA was already very strong in Bosnia

4 and Herzegovina. The second military district of the JNA became

5 effectively the general staff of the Serbian republic -- the Republika

6 Srpska. It had such a preponderance of weaponry, both in terms of heavy

7 artillery and armour, so outweighing anything else that a strong position

8 was already established. The one thing it lacked was manpower. The

9 manpower, as far as possible, was also to come from the Territorial

10 Defence forces, and later on in the war, at times there would be

11 supplements from Serbia. But because of the situation in Serbia, trying

12 as far as possible to disguise its involvement and not to be too open, the

13 opportunities for doing that were quite limited.

14 So part of this preparation was ensuring that the JNA in Bosnia

15 and Herzegovina was strong and was in a position to carry out those

16 actions. But the forces used were predominantly those already within

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina, although they were controlled and commanded from

18 Belgrade.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: I see. Okay. I think we can take a break now?

20 MS. SELLERS: Yes, Your Honours. I would just ask, I don't know

21 if I could move things into evidence, or as soon as I come back.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly, Ms. Sellers. We'll have a 25-minute

23 break from now. Thank you.

24 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

25 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

Page 1778

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Sellers.

2 I recognise Mr. Wubben. Have you taken over, Mr. Wubben?

3 MR. WUBBEN: At least to address one issue, Your Honour.


5 MR. WUBBEN: You asked for the parties to sit down to agree upon a

6 date for oral pleadings, and we did so, and we advise that it will be

7 subsequent to the hearing of Ms. Manas on Friday.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: On Friday. That's perfect. I thank you.

9 Ms. Sellers, before you proceed with tendering some fresh

10 documents in evidence, Judge Eser would like to put two questions to the

11 witness.

12 MS. SELLERS: Certainly.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Judge Eser, please.

14 JUDGE ESER: Dr. Gow, I would like to come back to the problem of

15 the ethnic composition.

16 Now, what are the criteria? How can you distinguish between

17 different ethnic compositions? Is it race? Is it religion? Is it the

18 place where people are born or brought up? What are the main criteria?

19 THE WITNESS: We could begin perhaps an extensive

20 philosophical/social inquiry about that. If you'll permit me to try a

21 shortcut in the first place. When I talk about these issues, it's based

22 on self-definition in the censuses in the Socialist Federal Republic of

23 Yugoslavia in 1981 and 1991, where people put themselves into categories.

24 Perhaps even there you can see that sometimes ethnicity in those forms of

25 identity have a degree of potential fluidity because the number of

Page 1779

1 Yugoslavs from one point to another, for example -- I forget the exact

2 figure, but it was kind of significantly higher in 1981 than it was in

3 1991. I don't think that's because a certain group of people disappeared

4 completely, but perhaps it's more likely, can be no more than speculation

5 because we haven't got this specific research, that these people that once

6 said, "I'm a Yugoslav," but in the changing situation and with the

7 pressures upon identity was be defining themselves in some other way,

8 would be a hunch.

9 But for the purposes of the evidence that's given, those are based

10 on the self-definition of the identity as declared those taking part in

11 the census.

12 JUDGE ESER: So when you gave some figures, some percentage of the

13 ethnic composition, all these figures are based on self-declaration of the

14 people.

15 THE WITNESS: Built on self-declaration expressed through the

16 census.

17 JUDGE ESER: But what would these people consider as relevant for

18 being a member of the one group or the other ethnic group? What are the

19 criteria for themselves to belong to one group or the other?

20 THE WITNESS: I think, quite frankly, without to a point of doing

21 research and interviewing each individual one of -- you could never give a

22 true authoritative answer to that kind of question. I think the elements

23 which are usually taken to form part of this are things to do with

24 culture, to do with the religion underpinning a particular community,

25 perhaps to do with language. Or in the case of language, or languages, as

Page 1780

1 some people say in this part of the world, the particular script that's

2 used, the particular dialect. In the eastern part the Ekavian dialect is

3 used. In the western parts of the region and Ikavian dialect is used. So

4 there are differences of vocabulary.

5 Family loyalty, i.e -- there are many factors which can come

6 into this. I think the only thing that I can say we can take reliably is

7 that this is these how people defined themselves, whatever criteria they

8 used to reach that definition.

9 JUDGE ESER: You mentioned at one point -- before the various

10 referenda, you told us that there had been tension in the ethnic

11 particular fabric. What are the reasons, as you -- as far as you can

12 estimate, reasons for these tensions? Are these shorter tensions, or are

13 they going back to other --

14 THE WITNESS: I think there were probably three elements. The

15 first is memory, so some kind of memory of an imagination of history.

16 Quite clearly, in some parts of the borderlands, either side of the

17 Croatian and Bosnian border, there were people who still remembered a

18 Second World War, or, rather, there was a second generation who had a

19 memory, what you call a memory of it, people who grew up being told,

20 "Those people over there killed your grandfather. You don't talk to

21 them." I think it's undoubted that there were elements of that.

22 The second element is quite clearly that in the situation of

23 growing political tension in this moment where people were being forced --

24 in some sense when there's an argument, it's very difficult to stand

25 completely back, especially when you're all involved. So issues between

Page 1781

1 Belgrade and Zagreb could become issues between ethnic Serbs and ethnic

2 Croats in some of these places, and ethnic Slovenes versus ethnic Serbs,

3 perhaps, if it came to that. You know, people -- these events help people

4 think about things.

5 And the third element I should have thought you need to take into

6 account is the atmosphere in the way that the political debate is

7 expressed, not something about -- to which I've spent -- to which I've

8 devoted time particularly. But there are studies, for example, the one by

9 Mark Thompson, "Forging War," on the way in which the press used some of

10 these issues and shaped issues, fostering some of this tension. So I

11 think there is a tension in the fabric which is partly there anyway.

12 Another factor which, you know, not wanting to go too far into

13 the anthropology of it, is social change. In the late 1970s, quite a lot

14 of people moved around in Yugoslavia. There was -- development took

15 place, and one of the things that people have told me, who have lived in

16 places like Tuzla or Sarajevo is that there was a difference when you get

17 the influx in the late '70s of people who have been living elsewhere in

18 the countryside who are not part of the traditional community as well.

19 So, yeah, I can -- I think, you know, certainly those three

20 factors and possibly that fourth one that I would identify as being

21 elements which are playing a part in those tensions.

22 JUDGE ESER: Thank you. The second issue I want to address was

23 your description of the defence system. You described the JNA as a first

24 tier and the Territorial Defence as the second.


Page 1782

1 JUDGE ESER: Now, the Territorial Defence units, did they have

2 uniforms, uniforms different from the JNA, or was it the same?

3 THE WITNESS: Well, the JNA was the regular army. It was the

4 standing army. It had an officer corps, and it had a conscript cadre.

5 The conscripts were recruited in proportion to ethnic distribution within

6 the whole of the population of the Socialist Federative Republic of the --

7 of 18 to 25 year-olds. They would all be wearing the JNA uniform and

8 would be in the army all the time, or all the time during their service.

9 The Territorial Defence, as a second-tier force, was not organised

10 not at the federal level by the federal Ministry of Defence and the army,

11 although obviously it was part of an overall federal defence approach. It

12 was organised, first of all, at the republican level, at the state level,

13 and below that at municipality/community levels. The people who were part

14 of the Territorial Defence would have day jobs. They might well have been

15 judges or academics like yourself and myself, but at some point in the

16 year they would go and take part in Territorial Defence exercises if they

17 were active members of the Territorial Defence force, and they would be

18 expected, in a time of mobilisation, to become part of the Territorial

19 Defence force, and they would -- those who were actively involved would

20 have uniforms. They would have marks of identification. But I think the

21 reality was that some people in these structures of Territorial Defence

22 and civil defence at times didn't have the most up-to-date equipment or --

23 the system was there in theory, and it was meant to fall back so that

24 everybody would become part of a defence effort, if necessary. But I

25 suspect, from talking to people, that it wasn't always as fully -- as

Page 1783

1 fully kitted out as theory might have expected it to be.

2 JUDGE ESER: Mr. Gow, does the village guards, if you would have

3 to put them in a certain position -- in some of the villages which have

4 been the goal of attacks, there have been village guards. Do they fit

5 into this two-tier system, or are they outside of this two-tier system

6 which you described?

7 THE WITNESS: Well, first I must say I don't have any particular

8 expertise about the villages or village guards, to which I think you're

9 making reference. I'm not sure about to what you're making reference, but

10 I would expect that anybody described as a village guard in the time of

11 the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and in this transition,

12 would be somebody who's a part of the Territorial Defence force structure.

13 If you're talking at a later stage, it's quite possible that they

14 could be volunteers within one of developing local or paramilitary

15 movements. Again, without knowing the detail of what you're talking

16 about, I can limit it to saying that I think in times they would be part

17 of it, but it might well depend on the precise situation and what you're

18 talking about.

19 JUDGE ESER: Thank you.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Judge Eser.

21 Ms. Sellers, please.

22 MS. SELLERS: If I might just follow up a question basically

23 brought up by Judge Eser.

24 Q. Dr. Gow, could you possibly clarify for us if there is a

25 difference between a reservist and a member of the Territorial Defence

Page 1784

1 organisation, or are those two things, reservist and Territorial Defence

2 member, always one and the same thing and we're using interchangeable

3 terms?

4 A. It's my understanding that for an initial period after service

5 somebody would be designated a reservist, and they could also be expected

6 to be part of the Territorial Defence force. But it would be expected

7 that they would be first mobilised into the JNA in a time of action.

8 That's my understanding.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: The other thing that I know the answer to, but I --

10 THE WITNESS: Do you care to tell me first?

11 JUDGE AGIUS: -- pose the question. Did the TOs have their own

12 weapons, weaponry and ammunition and depots, and where would those usually

13 be located?

14 THE WITNESS: Yes. The Territorial Defence forces within each of

15 the states had its own arsenal, and they would be located in Territorial

16 Defence depots distributed around the territory within the republic as a

17 whole, within particular communities, often hidden under mountains,

18 sometimes in particular warehouses. They would have their own designated

19 weaponry, and of course lots of people would also have small weapons, you

20 know, light weapons, at home as well. The idea was that everybody and

21 everything should be mobilised if the need came to defend.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: And did the JNA itself have any authority on the

23 TOs, direct authority, in particular with regard to these weapons, the

24 availability of --

25 THE WITNESS: In times of war or in times of military occupation,

Page 1785

1 the Territorial Defence forces were supposed to form part of a whole armed

2 force with the JNA, if that was possible. But the assumption built into

3 the defence doctrine was that the initial resistance would not be

4 sustained and so there would be a fall-back position. So as far as

5 possible, each small unit would work with larger units, ensuring also the

6 political military relationship and being subordinate, wherever possible,

7 to whatever the high -- the highest available level of JNA command was.

8 The JNA didn't have technical, formal, legal responsibility over

9 the weaponry of the Territorial Defence forces, which were the property of

10 the republics. But as the overall -- as overall responsible for defence

11 within the federation, at times there were issues and tensions, and one of

12 those points was in the last stages of the Socialist Federative Republic

13 of Yugoslavia where the JNA went and, in several occasions -- into

14 place -- as the emerging potential for independence came, they went and

15 took weaponry from significant stocks in Slovenia. though the Slovenes

16 managed to hold onto some of it, just most of the stocks in Croatia and

17 within Bosnia-Herzegovina took some things and allowed Bosnian Serbs to

18 take others and redistributed weaponry that they had taken control of.

19 At the time they told republican Territorial Defence authorities

20 that this was part of a programme of renewal. But of course weaponry was

21 taken away and nothing was replaced, because the intention was to try to

22 underpin the coming strategic context by removing arms from some of the

23 potential actors.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Was there, at any given moment before the breaking

25 out of the conflict, any directive from the Ministry of Defence to the

Page 1786

1 TOs, to the various TOs, in Bosnia in particular, to hand over all the

2 weaponry to the JNA for safekeeping by the JNA?

3 THE WITNESS: And the same thing, as part of this process, has

4 happened in Croatia and Slovenia. A directive -- there was actually an

5 agreement between representatives of the Bosnian presidency, in particular

6 from the Interior Minister Mr. Delimustafaic, and to the JNA to take

7 weaponry from Territorial Defence forces into JNA protection supposedly

8 for safekeeping as part of an effort, they thought -- this is what they

9 were saying at the time -- to make sure weapons were not available, to

10 limit the possibility for the use of weapons.


12 Yes, Ms. Sellers, sorry to have interrupted you for so long.

13 MS. SELLERS: No, thank you, Your Honour. Thank you for your

14 interest.

15 Q. I would like to go back to something a bit mundane right now, and

16 that would be to ask the registrar for a number for the Prosecution

17 exhibit regarding my view of the breakup, ERN number 00339513. Could I

18 please have a number.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be P410.

20 MS. SELLERS: Thank you. Your Honours, I would move to tender

21 this into evidence. And also --

22 JUDGE AGIUS: And it is so being admitted, Ms. Sellers, and marked

23 as Prosecution Exhibit P410.

24 MS. SELLERS: And also there is the map that Dr. Gow used. It was

25 already premarked 366. I would like to now move that --

Page 1787

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Which map?

2 MS. SELLERS: It is the map that related to the various places

3 where the outbreak of the war was. It's under section 4 of our binders.


5 MS. SELLERS: I would also like to tender that into evidence.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it gets number P366.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: It has already got an exhibit number, or is it being

8 given one now? Oh, I see, I see. So it's being given P366 because it had

9 been premarked already, no? Okay.

10 Ms. Sellers, that document is being admitted in evidence and

11 marked as Prosecution Exhibit P366. Thank you.

12 MS. SELLERS: Thank you.

13 Q. Dr. Gow, you've testified --

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I'll raise that. My attention is being drawn

15 to the fact that, as far as P410 is concerned, Exhibit P410 is concerned,

16 we've only got the English text. We do not have the original B/C/S text.

17 So I suppose you will take care of that later on, and it will be

18 incorporated in the same P410.

19 MS. SELLERS: Certainly. We apologise. We put in for --

20 JUDGE AGIUS: You don't need to apologise, Ms. Sellers. Just

21 rectify it, that's all.

22 MS. SELLERS: Will do. You'll also find in the next exhibit that

23 we're about to present that we'll run into the same issue, and I'll say

24 ditto beforehand.

25 Q. Dr. Gow, you testified not only about General Kadijevic but also

Page 1788

1 about Mr. Jovic. I would ask everyone to turn to section 5 in their

2 binder.

3 Dr. Gow, could you look at this document, ERN number 03022817, and

4 would you please tell the Trial Chamber what this document is.

5 A. It's a translation of an extract from the published diary extracts

6 of Borisav Jovic, whom I mentioned before was the Serbian representative

7 to the collective state body within the Socialist Federative Republic of

8 Yugoslavia.

9 Q. And if you would turn to the page that has the 5th of December,

10 1991 midway through. Dr. Gow, could you explain the importance, if any,

11 of that statement contained in the diary of Mr. Jovic.

12 A. This is the diary entry that confirms the things I was saying

13 earlier about the discussions between Jovic and Milosevic and then between

14 Jovic and Kadijevic about preparing to avoid, as far as possible, the

15 accusations against Belgrade of involvement in Bosnia of aggression by

16 reorganising -- by redistributing personnel within the JNA in advance of

17 this. And the date, 5th of December, 1991, shows that that's clearly in

18 advance of the actual recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which came in

19 April. And this was preparation as part of the planning ahead of time to

20 ensure that the Serbian project could both run but also be, as far as

21 possible, non-attributable to Belgrade.

22 And if you turn the page, I think you can also see the

23 December 25th entry is the one that says, "Conversation with Veljko" -

24 "Veljko" refers to Veljko Kadijevic, General Kadijevic - "and Slobodan,"

25 Slobodan Milosevic. "Veljko reports that 90 per cent of the military has

Page 1789

1 been dislocated," I think the translation says, it probably means

2 relocated, "in accordance with the 5th of December discussions." So that

3 that action has been taken and that the JNA is predominantly in a position

4 now to be able to separate and to have the armed force to operate in

5 Bosnia while saying that it's a Bosnian Serb force and Belgrade, as far as

6 possible, trying to distance itself and say that it's not involved.

7 Q. And I would ask that we --

8 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Are you aware of any United Nations

9 Resolutions, either GA or Security Council, regarding the presence of the

10 JNA in Bosnia before and during the early days of the conflict in Bosnia?

11 THE WITNESS: Well, the --

12 JUDGE AGIUS: That would have precisely justified the --

13 THE WITNESS: Well, there was already United Nations attention to

14 this issue in September - Security Council 713 had imposed an arms embargo

15 on the SFRY and all its territories - which had begun a process of

16 international engagement. Well, it continued a process of international

17 engagement already begun by the European Community, as it then was.

18 In January, just after this, this was the UN Security Council

19 resolution to authorise the deployment of the UN peace force to Croatia.

20 Now, clearly at the time this was taking place, it was understood that

21 that was underway that there would the cease-fire agreement under the

22 Vance Plan in Croatia, that force would be deployed, and by this stage I

23 think it was as already clear that the headquarters for that force was

24 going to be based in Sarajevo. The decision to base it in Sarajevo was,

25 in part, I think, a gesture. It doesn't make practical operational sense.

Page 1790

1 It was a gesture to make sure that attention was being paid to

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina in this emerging situation. And already, I think, in

3 November there had been requests from the Bosnian presidency to the UN to

4 become involved and to deploy a preventive force there, for various

5 reasons, the politics of it that didn't develop.

6 And as we move on, when you come to the point after the beginning

7 of armed hostilities, the UN Security Council identifies the presence of

8 other forces there in resolution, I think it's 770, off the top of my

9 head. But I'm sure we can check that for the record. But it identifies

10 the presence of these forces. It declares that their presence is a threat

11 to international peace and security and demands the withdrawal of those

12 forces.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: So this was properly identified and anticipated when

14 the decision of redistributing the composition of the JNA --

15 THE WITNESS: Yes. I think it was quite clear that the Belgrade

16 leaders had understood what the situation was likely to be and were taking

17 action to adjust to it.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.


20 Q. Dr. Gow, you mentioned the Serbian project, which is the name of

21 your most recent book. I would like to ask you, the name "Serbian

22 Project," is it similar, is it another way of phrasing what some people

23 refer to as the drive for a Greater Serbia? Could you explain if there is

24 any distinction to the Trial Chamber.

25 A. Well, first, I use that term to make some distinctions. I mean,

Page 1791

1 it's a vain hope, at times. But in saying "Serbian project," there's the

2 hope that it's a way of trying to be able to distinguish these events,

3 this political military activity from the Serbian people, the Serbs as a

4 whole. It's a difficult thing to do because people tend to ally things.

5 But one of the things I wanted to do was to say, was to try to identify it

6 with this state project.

7 The term "project" is used in my -- my usage of project is rather

8 than something like plan, because it was something which had aims and

9 objectives but was not a fully worked out plan because it was flexible and

10 adaptable to situations. So within that context, I'm looking at something

11 which is a move to create a set of territories for the Serbs, Serbian

12 states, or one Serbian state, across the region.

13 The idea of Great Serbia is one with historic roots, going back to

14 the nineteenth century. The term that's used, for example, by General

15 Kadijevic is a new Yugoslavia. Other terms were circulating at this time

16 in the 1980s as a federation of Serbian states, an association of Serbian

17 states. Again, part of the element of the flexibility is that it was

18 clear that the aim was to establish an arrangement which involved

19 territories of ethnically -- self-ethnically-defining Serbs and really

20 largely removed of other populations. The idea of Great Serbia is

21 consistent with that, but a Great Serbia is not the only option and the

22 only thing we're talking about.

23 So when people talk about Great Serbia, they are talking about

24 something that is consistent with this, but I prefer to be careful and

25 avoid the use of that term as such most of the time because there were

Page 1792

1 ambiguities and there were different options available. But the aim was

2 to still to create a set of linked territories for -- in the name of the

3 Serbian people.

4 Q. Dr. Gow, then am I correct in my understanding that the Serbian

5 project, as you described it, necessarily implies that there might be

6 flexibility in different political stance as well as different military

7 tactics in order to achieve the goal of territorial -- re-designing of

8 territory for Serb people?

9 A. Yes. I think that's -- that's quite clearly the case. It's not

10 too difficult to understand that if the leadership in Belgrade, or indeed

11 some other part of it, said we want to create a Great Serbia, we want to

12 challenge the basic principle of international life, i.e., the inviability

13 of territorial integrity under the principle of sovereignty, they would

14 have been identified as breeching international law in the most clear-cut

15 way and would have been met with responses in the most clear-cut way. At

16 every stage politically and militarily, the efforts were taken to create

17 ambiguity and to disguise so as to try to minimise the clear

18 identification and placing of responsibility on the leadership in Belgrade

19 for the programme that it had generated. Pardon me, which it had

20 generated, but of course had support among ethnic Serbian populations.

21 Yeah. We should always bear in mind that there was support for it. It

22 was not ...

23 Q. I would like to turn a little bit and ask you, what was the

24 Bosnian response to the military attacks that you've described initiated,

25 or certainly with the participation of the JNA?

Page 1793

1 A. The Bosnian government in this position began to organise its

2 resistance, to some extent, the political leadership of the predominant --

3 what's called the Muslim party, it was called the Party of Democratic

4 Action, had already become laying the foundations with something like the

5 Patriotic League in the middle of 1991. But once armed hostilities came

6 following the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an

7 independent personality, it mobilised the portions of the Territorial

8 Defence force under its control, gave instructions that portions of the --

9 in theory, all elements of the Territorial Defence force should be under

10 its control, began to shape and form an armed force which was to become

11 the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was initially declared, I think,

12 on the 15th of April. It was later declared again at different stages.

13 These are all parts of an evolving effort to create armed forces

14 on the part of the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also

15 reflecting predominantly the Muslim community in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

16 to combat the efforts from the Serbian side, to divide Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina, and to create a territorially separate state. And in that

18 context, the Bosnian presidency sought the support of international

19 actors, asked for further international involvement from the UN Security

20 Council, and eventually there was a UN peace force also deployed to

21 Bosnia. And it also made declarations of war, all part of its efforts to

22 say -- to stand for the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina

23 against the Serbian attempt to break it up.

24 We should also note, for the record, that on and off at times

25 there was a Croatian attempt from the other side also to breach the

Page 1794

1 territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2 MS. SELLERS: Your Honours, first of all, I would like to ask for

3 a number for the diary of Mr. Jovic, if the registrar would please give

4 it. That would be ERN number 03022817, that document.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the exhibit number will be P4111.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. So, Ms. Sellers, the diary is being so

7 admitted as Prosecution Exhibit P411.

8 MS. SELLERS: Thank you very much.

9 Q. I would like everyone to turn to section 6 in their binder.

10 Dr. Gow, if you could please turn to a document that has been premarked

11 P278. The original, I believe, is in B/C/S, ERN number 00520756. I would

12 like you to turn to the English version of the document that has already

13 been marked P277E. Is it 8? I'm sorry.

14 Dr. Gow, could you inform the Trial Chamber of what this document

15 concerns.

16 A. The document is an extract from the Official Gazette of Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina dated Saturday, the 20th of June, 1992. The particular

18 extract here, clearly highlighted in the middle, notes the declaration by

19 the government of -- the presidency, the government of Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina of a state of war. You might also note that the Security

21 Council resolution number I mentioned earlier was not 770. That was the

22 one which actually identified and led to sanctions and the deployment of

23 the forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was 752. And above that you

24 will also notice the identification of the alleged aggression against

25 Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of

Page 1795

1 Montenegro, the Yugoslav Army, and the so-called terrorists of the Serbian

2 Democratic Party.

3 And in making this declaration, you can also see further down the

4 page, which has also come up highlighted, that Bosnia and Herzegovina is

5 undertaking, in doing this, to comply with the provisions of international

6 law and other international -- relevant international documents about the

7 conduct of war, while acting both -- claiming to act under Article 51 of

8 the United Nations charter, i.e., exercising the right to self-defence.

9 Q. Dr. Gow, could you also turn the page and tell the Trial Chamber,

10 what is the date of this declaration?

11 A. The date of the declaration is also the date that I gave for the

12 Official Gazette, which is the 20th of June, 1992.

13 Q. Thank you. This document has already been premarked. I would

14 also ask that it be tendered into evidence, if there's no objection.


16 Mr. Registrar, so it will be 278, no?

17 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it will be 278.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So this document, which has already been

19 premarked, is being admitted as Prosecution Exhibit P278. Thank you.


21 Q. Dr. Gow, in addition to the declaration of independence, did the

22 newly formed Republic of Bosnia have to concern itself with self-defence?

23 A. It did, as I think I just pointed out. The declaration made

24 reference to the Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, about

25 exercising the right to self-defence. In seeking to exercise that right

Page 1796

1 to self-defence, as I said, they set about forming armed forces, using

2 existing Territorial Defence structures. If you follow on -- actually, on

3 the page you had before, the subsequent thing is about an order for

4 general mobilisation to take people into the Territorial Defence forces,

5 saying that all able and active people should be mobilised at that moment

6 generally into the Territorial Defence force.

7 Q. So therefore the newly formed Republic of Bosnia tended to keep

8 the structure, or possibly that it had inherited from the Socialist

9 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of Territorial Defence forces.

10 A. They were turning to the Territorial Defence force structures, as

11 far as they were available to it, that had been part of the defence system

12 within the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. I think we have

13 to recognise that parts of the Territorial Defence system were taken over

14 and acquired by the Serbian side and parts were taken over by the Bosnian

15 side, although the Bosnian authorities sought formally to exercise control

16 over all of them. In principle, they argue they should control all of

17 them. De facto, that was not the case.

18 Q. Thank you. I would like you now to turn to the following

19 document. It has been marked -- premarked already 277. The ERN number

20 is 00480501.

21 Dr. Gow, I would like to ask you to look at the English version of

22 that document, and that has been premarked 277E. The ERN number

23 is 00607094.

24 Dr. Gow, could you please inform the Trial Chamber the importance,

25 if any, of this document.

Page 1797

1 A. The document, again, is from the Official Gazette of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina, this time from a month earlier, the 20th of May, and it's

3 publishing, as you can clearly read, lawful regulation act of the armed

4 force of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the law on the

5 armed forces. This is the law which regulates the use of the armed

6 forces, and it's a law which is then used as the basis for creating and

7 structuring an army at a later stage.

8 Q. Could I please draw your attention to Article 16 of this document,

9 Dr. Gow. Could you, in your expert opinion, inform the Trial Chamber of

10 whether the different units that would constitute the army of the Republic

11 of Bosnia would include TO units, reserve units, or other units of that

12 sort?

13 A. If we understand that the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as such,

14 didn't really exist at this stage, it was in a phase of transition, that

15 the Territorial Defence force was being used as the basis for action but

16 also as a way of working towards forming an army, then I think you can say

17 that the Territorial Defence force, in some ways, was becoming the army,

18 but the army would be different from it. And the assumption was that

19 there would still be elements of Territorial Defence, here identified as

20 reservists, all of which would still, in time of war or overriding

21 military exercise, become part of one overall defence framework.

22 Q. Until any such army formed for the Republic of Bosnia, then would

23 it be true to say that the Territorial Defence and, as mentioned here, the

24 reserve units would be considered the fighting forces for the political

25 entity of Bosnia that had recently declared its independence?

Page 1798

1 A. Yes, I think that it would. My assumption has always been that,

2 although formally the Bosnian authorities in Sarajevo were declaring an

3 armed force, it was clear that the armed force, as such, was not developed

4 and organised at this stage. Indeed, you could even argue that by the end

5 of armed hostilities in 1995, it was still not fully formed and organised.

6 But at this stage, clearly it was not, and de facto if not formally

7 de jure, but I think also you'd say in terms of the law de jure, defence

8 action was taking place wherever it was possible throughout

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Bosnian authorities' terms, and at a local

10 level, using the pattern, the structure, the doctrine of the defence

11 system, of the old defence system, the All People's Defence doctrine. So

12 at local levels, where possible. But it was a fluid and emerging

13 situation, while they were trying to put a structure together.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Sellers, because exactly, I'm just appealing to

15 you now to bring everything into proper perspective.

16 The fighting started immediately after the declaration of

17 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that takes us back to April.

18 THE WITNESS: The fighting actually started on the 27th of March,

19 in advance of that. But it's usually said to be April, yeah.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Until then, was the JNA present in Bosnia.

21 THE WITNESS: Until then and after then.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Until the 19th of May.

23 THE WITNESS: Until the formal dissolution of the JNA at that

24 point, yes.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: And the creation of the VRS, which supposedly was

Page 1799

1 operative on the 19th of May.

2 THE WITNESS: Which was effectively the ghost of the JNA.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: And now, this decision here is date the 20th of May,

4 exactly the day after?

5 THE WITNESS: Correct.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: The day after the coming into existence officially

7 of the VRS.

8 THE WITNESS: That's right.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: But there was already a state of war, in effect; a

10 state of war, without any declaration.

11 THE WITNESS: I should say that that's true. I mean, the

12 declaration of war itself -- of a state of war by Bosnia and Herzegovina

13 also came a month later than that, but there were armed hostilities

14 underway from the 27th of March at the latest, and those armed hostilities

15 involved, on the one side, forces fighting for the Serbian project and on

16 the other side, those resisting it on the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: But as you said, Bosnia -- the government of Bosnia

18 and Herzegovina declared a state of war a month later, in June.


20 JUDGE AGIUS: And we're here a month earlier, where there was, for

21 all intents and purposes, a state of war.

22 THE WITNESS: Armed hostilities were under way. I exercise

23 caution there. I assume that the Bosnian government also declared a state

24 of war for formal, political and legal purposes. I wouldn't want to go

25 into that. I think it's clear that there can be a technical distinction

Page 1800

1 between formal war and armed hostilities, and I would -- if we're taking

2 war in the sense of generically describing armed hostilities, that's fine.

3 I tend to prefer to say armed hostilities because it leaves open other

4 questions that are not ones -- that I think are relevant to my evidence of

5 settling.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you see any particular reason why this -- such --

7 a decision was not taken before, or why it had to wait until the creation

8 of the VRS? Well, I think it's all -- I think -- I mean, we have to

9 understand that things evolve. I think it was -- I already said, I think,

10 that it was the 15th of April that the Bosnian presidency declared the

11 formation of an army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I think any time you kind

12 of -- which things you need to do, in terms of political procedure, to

13 create things and to give things a legal basis. I would assume that part

14 of it is just the time in which people are working out the things they

15 need to do that would be good for them to do.

16 Bear in mind also the context of the discussions of the United

17 Nations Security Council, which also at this point I think on the 18th of

18 May, was the 752 resolution, which defined the threat to international

19 peace and security and these issues, so also these actions probably have

20 to be read-- all of this interacting evolve in context.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

22 Ms. Sellers.

23 MS. SELLERS: Thank you for your question, Your Honour.

24 Q. Dr. Gow, then, would it then be your expert opinion that the

25 hostilities of the armed conflict that occurred on the territory of Bosnia

Page 1801

1 since March were the same hostilities and armed conflict that continued

2 after the signing not only of the declaration of independence, but the

3 formation of the Yugoslav army? Are we talking about a continuous type of

4 armed hostility?

5 A. In my judgment, there is one armed conflict running from June 1991

6 that embraces Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, because I see both of

7 them as parts of one theatre. They're part of the same overall aims and

8 objectives. To create this set of territories, the same approach is used.

9 So in that sense, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the 27th of

10 March, certainly; but it's part of an armed conflict that I see running

11 from the middle of 1991.

12 Q. Could I just clarify, you've mentioned the date from the 27th of

13 March, 19 --

14 A. '92.

15 Q. -- '92.

16 A. Which is the date of the first action in Bosanski Brod in Bosnia

17 and Herzegovina, which is around a week -- it's actually 10 days before

18 the formal international recognition of Bosnia as independent

19 international personality.

20 Q. So armed hostilities from that date on, certainly through till

21 June 20 of 1992, are a continuous form of the armed hostility?

22 A. Personally, the 20th of June, 1992 makes no difference to what I

23 would describe empirically as the fact of armed hostilities. It may make

24 a difference in other ways.

25 Q. Thank you. I would ask --

Page 1802

1 A. Sorry, the 20th of June declaration might make a difference in

2 other ways, but it doesn't make a difference to the fact of armed

3 hostilities.

4 MS. SELLERS: I would ask the registrar, recognising that we do

5 have P278 and 278E for the English translation, that we keep that and,

6 Your Honour, if I could tender this document into evidence as well.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the document will have Exhibit

9 number P277.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: So, as pointed out by the registrar, that document

11 is being admitted as Prosecution Exhibit P277. Thank you.


13 Q. Dr. Gow, if you could, would you describe some of the key elements

14 or the key features of this armed conflict that we have been discussing.

15 A. I think the key -- the key, core elements of it are the clash of

16 statehood projects, as I said before, either seeking to preserve states

17 within their previously defined territorial boundaries, or creating new

18 borders; using the strategy of what is described as ethnic cleansing to

19 prosecute the campaign to create new territories, that is, the forcible

20 removal -- in some cases through killing; in others through demonstrative

21 violence in others; through forcible expulsion; in others through

22 intimidation to incite flight, so that there would be no potentially

23 hostile populations on the territory to come under control of those

24 seeking to create this set of states.

25 So ethnic cleansing, the strategy of ethnic cleansing with the

Page 1803

1 character of atrocities and the large outflows of populations, demographic

2 displacement that takes place, is perhaps the key defining element of the

3 war.

4 Q. And your use of the term "ethnic cleansing," does "ethnic" relate

5 to the different ethnic groups that you testified about when we were

6 actually describing the composition of the former Yugoslavia?

7 A. It does. And it was an approach initially used by Serbian forces

8 as part of this campaign, but I think we also recognise that it was used

9 at times by other parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina -- you

10 know, mimicking fashion. I don't know how you would describe it. It was

11 something used and copied by others afterwards. If wasn't exclusively

12 Serbian. But it was the Serbian thrust in the first place which defined

13 the conflict and gave it this character.

14 Q. Would you describe ethnic cleansing as both a military and

15 political tactic or --

16 A. It's -- ethnic cleansing is the strategy. Strategy is the point

17 at which politics meets the use of armed force. So strategy is about the

18 creation and application of armed force, of destructive armed force, of

19 violence for political purpose. The aim was to create a set of

20 territories that would be linked and would be Serbian. The political aim

21 within that, which also becomes part of the strategy, is to ensure that

22 there are no potentially hostile populations that area.

23 It's quite clear from the things we've said earlier about the

24 political tensions, the inter-ethnic, inter-communal tensions, that if

25 Serbia takes over territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina with mixed

Page 1804

1 populations, if it takes over areas with mixed populations in Croatia,

2 there will be dissent. At a minimum, there will be political resistance.

3 It's quite likely that there could be political violence, whether it's

4 very low-scale terrorist what we call action or whether it's a larger

5 guerilla action. You remove the potential in terms of -- in security

6 operation terms for that resistance if you remove the population. So you

7 remove an ethno-national group as such and you remove an ethno-national

8 group as a potential challenge to the security situation, as a potential

9 instrument -- source of violent resistance.

10 If I could indulge a little further, I don't want to take time.

11 But in terms of guerrilla doctrine, one of the most famous says is that of

12 Mao Tse-Tung who described the guerrilla as a fish in water. This kind of

13 resistance depends on having a community from which you operate. If in

14 terms of strategy from the Serbian or others using it perspective, you're

15 seeking to remove potential opposition, what you do essentially is remove

16 the water. You remove the population, you remove the support and basis

17 for any violent resistance. So that is the essence. It's political and

18 it's military, and it's combined in the strategy.

19 Q. Thank you. Was there reaction by international humanitarian

20 institutions, and more specifically the International Committee of the Red

21 Cross, to the atrocities or the ethnic cleansing that you have just

22 testified about during this armed conflict?

23 A. There was widespread international attention to what was taking

24 place. The reports of atrocities, the vast outflows of population groups,

25 either within -- from one area of Bosnia and Herzegovina to another, but

Page 1805

1 also refugees moving outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina drew attention to

2 this, the UNHCR drew attention. We have also mentioned the attention of

3 the UN Security Council. The ICRC as an agency, particularly involved in

4 these situations, also gave it attention, and working with other

5 international actors, sought to gain agreement with the parties of the

6 conflict to uphold international standards and to desist from these

7 actions, which they didn't.

8 MS. SELLERS: I would ask Your Honours and the witness and Defence

9 counsel please to turn to section 8 of your binders. The ERN number is

10 00317897 of that document.

11 Q. Would you please look at the document, Dr. Gow. Would you explain

12 to the Trial Chamber what is the origin and the nature of this document

13 that you're looking at.

14 A. The document is an agreement organised by the ICRC to which the

15 parties -- the parties signing are representatives of the different

16 political parties within Bosnia and Herzegovina. It's from the 22nd of

17 May, 1992. That's, again, in the context we've been discussing of the

18 Security Council resolution on the 18th of May, 1992, the general

19 international attention being given to Bosnia and Herzegovina because of

20 the large-scale problems of atrocity there.

21 And as part of an international effort, I think, to see this,

22 there was an attempt to get the political representatives of the parties

23 to sign an agreement undertaking to uphold the elements of international

24 humanitarian law relating to armed conflict, in particular the third

25 convention of the Geneva Conventions, which is common to all four Geneva

Page 1806

1 Conventions, but also additionally getting them to recognising aspects of

2 the Geneva Convention ... The Geneva Conventions that wouldn't necessarily

3 be agreed upon by all parties.

4 Q. Could I ask you to draw your attention to the names that have been

5 signed at the top part of the document, and to explain that they've been

6 signed on behalf, as representatives of other persons. Could you please

7 tell us who these other political or otherwise persons are, whom they're

8 representing?

9 A. I can tell you. We can read in front of us that Mr. Trnka is

10 representing the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic.

11 The president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is also a member of the Party of the

12 Democratic Action, the Muslim party within Bosnia. Mr. Kalinic is

13 representing Radovan Karadzic, who is the representative of the Serbian

14 Democratic Party, as is also Mr. Djogo. Mr. Kurjak signs as

15 representative of Mr. Izetbegovic, not as president of the Republic of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but as the president of Party of Democratic Action.

17 So both Karadzic and Izetbegovic have two representatives. One is in

18 there, what they take as their formal office, and one is there as leaders

19 of political parties. And finally, Mr. Sito Coric is a representative of

20 Mr. Brkic on behalf of the Croatian Democratic Community, which is the

21 predominantly ethnic Croat party.

22 Q. Now, are all of the signatories representing the division of

23 ethnic groups within Bosnia?

24 A. They represent the main ethnically defined parties within Bosnia

25 and Herzegovina. We could just for the record be clear. We didn't say

Page 1807

1 earlier that within Bosnia and Herzegovina we had these groups. There

2 were also people who were not -- didn't define themselves either as

3 Muslims or Serbs or Croats. Somewhere in the region of 11 per cent of the

4 population in the last census didn't define themselves as one of those

5 three things. Some were Jews, some were others, some were Yugoslavs. But

6 just to be clear. But these were the three main ethnic groups, and these

7 were the representatives of the three main political parties representing

8 those groups, who were also the ones engaged politically within the

9 context of armed conflict.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Sellers, Judge Eser would like to put a

11 question.

12 JUDGE ESER: In connection with your description that certain

13 people declared themselves as Serb or Bosnian Muslim or something else,

14 how was it in the connection with the ethnic cleansing? Would it have

15 been possible that the person would say, "From now on, I would define

16 myself differently"? Or was it the case, if you declared yourself at one

17 time to be a Serb, you remained it all your life or --

18 THE WITNESS: That's a very interesting question, because I think

19 certainly it's theoretically possible that somebody could redesignate

20 themselves, and I'm not sure whether some people redesignated themselves

21 as such. But there have been points in cases in other Trial Chambers here

22 where someone has been described both as a member of one ethnic community

23 but also as part of another or acting for another. One that springs to

24 mind, if I recall it correctly, is that of Drazen Erdemovic. Yeah, so in

25 some ways not quite understanding the process and the motivations, that

Page 1808

1 can happen.

2 Perhaps more significantly, I think, we should say that part of

3 the procedure of ethnic cleansing was that documentation was prepared and

4 available, and from the outset, as part of a scheme. This included

5 documents where either people, in some cases, could sign over property

6 rights and buy a one-way exit visa and so forth. But in other cases, they

7 could also sign something to accept the new regime and to define

8 themselves, whether ethnically or not, as loyal to this situation, and if

9 not defining themselves ethnically with the dominant group in whichever

10 area it was, could at least stay where they were as second-class citizens.

11 And despite the ethnic cleansing in many -- there were places where even,

12 by the end of the whole period, it was -- there were still some areas

13 where it wasn't completely purely sorted out in ethnic terms.

14 So I think that ...

15 JUDGE ESER: So could you draw the conclusion that objects or

16 victims of ethnic cleansing have been those people who stayed with their

17 former self-declaration as X or Y, but if somebody would say, "Now, from

18 now on, I would take a different position, I would not become victim of

19 ethnic cleansing"?

20 THE WITNESS: I think there's the possibility there. I think we

21 have to be cautious in saying anything as a complete generalisation in the

22 nature of that kind of problem where it's about self-definition and other

23 definition. I don't know of a case, but I think it's hypothetically

24 possible that there could be a person -- hypothetically take the example

25 of Serbian forces taking over a place and expelling Muslims, that it's

Page 1809

1 hypothetically possible that somebody could define themselves perhaps as a

2 Serb, self-definition for whatever reason, but are identified by others as

3 a Muslim, might say, "No, really, I'm a Serb," but then still be subject

4 to ethnic cleansing because of the other perception. The censorship

5 information can come through self-definition. In the context of

6 operations of ethnic cleansing and politics, I think we have to take into

7 account also the role of other definition and the interaction and exercise

8 a bit of caution and probably not draw any absolute conclusion, but maybe

9 identify general tendencies or likelihoods.

10 JUDGE ESER: Could we concluded that it was two elements in it

11 conclusions, self-declaration by the person concerned and description of a

12 certain type, social description to be a member of this group or that

13 group?

14 THE WITNESS: If you're talking about the context in which we're

15 looking at operations pursuant to the strategy, yes. If we're talking

16 about the information in the census, then that's about self-description

17 and not about the ascription by others. So just to be clear. If we're

18 talking about the information from the census, then that's about

19 self-description. But in the context -- in other context, particularly

20 that of operations, pursuant to the strategy, then there's the element of

21 other ascription as well as self-definition.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. And perhaps one could add at this point,

23 Judge Eser, because your question was a very relevant and a very important

24 one, one could add also that -- and correct me if I'm wrong, Dr. Gow, that

25 the social background to it all is that in these small villages, in

Page 1810

1 particular, the villages themselves were classified as almost entirely

2 Muslim, entirely Serbian, and everyone -- this is a society where, leaving

3 apart the big cities, otherwise everyone knew everyone else. The names

4 themselves, most of the time, not the surname, not the family name, but

5 the names themselves would identify you as rather of Muslim extraction

6 or -- I mean, the Croats had special -- typical Croatian names, the

7 Muslims typical Muslim names, and sometimes even family names. But this

8 is a society which is very typical of the region. Everyone knows everyone

9 else, so there is no way one could be mistaken for a Serbian when it was

10 actually a Muslim, for example, or vice versa.

11 THE WITNESS: I think that's largely true when you're talking

12 about local actors. But in some cases where you're looking at

13 paramilitary forces coming in from Serbia, they wouldn't necessarily know

14 the first thing about the area. But they also would have relied already

15 on local organisation within this SDS and security-service organised

16 crisis headquarters to identify those members of the local community who

17 should be in the first range of targets to be removed.

18 I think I should also say, if I may pursue that a little further,

19 that some villages probably would be predominantly with one community or

20 another. Some might be almost entirely one community. Most probably

21 would be mixed. But the research of anthropologists shows there were

22 parallel communities, so they would live side by side. They would know

23 each other without necessarily that degree of mixing.

24 And on the names, what you said would be true to a large extent,

25 but there are also names which could occur in any one with those

Page 1811

1 categories, and you wouldn't necessarily know by the name.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: And as far as appearance and physiognomy is

3 concerned, you couldn't actually distinguish between one ethnic group and

4 another.

5 THE WITNESS: I think broadly that would be the case, yes.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I think we've cleared that terrain at least,

7 so we don't need to return to it later on.

8 Yes, Ms. Sellers. Again my apologies to you for interrupting you

9 so often, which is not my style. But at the same time, I think I'm

10 anticipating some pleasures yet to come, and I'm preparing for it.

11 MS. SELLERS: I think we're advancing as a whole, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Exactly. So My apologies to you, and please go

13 ahead.


15 Q. Dr. Gow, I would ask you to draw your attention to section 2.3 of

16 the ICRC document, the subsection entitled "Civilian Population." In that

17 section there's a reference to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. What

18 is your understanding that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 govern?

19 A. They govern international armed conflict.

20 Q. And you testified earlier --

21 A. Sorry, with the exception of Article 3, which I already -- I think

22 you already said earlier is common to all four conventions and applies to

23 non-international armed conflict as well.

24 Q. So would this document seem to want to encourage the different

25 signatories to abide by the law of war that governs both international war

Page 1812

1 and non-international war?

2 A. The document clearly gets the parties within Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina to accept the application of Common Article 3, and in addition

4 that, in the area you have here is to note that civilian populations have

5 protected status and to apply elements of international armed conflict

6 beyond Common Article 3 to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7 Q. Thank you. I would ask you now to turn to section 2.5 of the

8 document, and it is the sub-entitled "Conduct of hostilities." There

9 there's a reference to Additional Protocol I. In your understanding, what

10 does Additional Protocol I regulate in terms of international law?

11 A. While recognising that although I have a significant interest in

12 these matters of international law, I am not, as such, an international

13 lawyer, my understanding is that Additional Protocol I was agreed by those

14 who took part to enhance the provisions of international armed -- of

15 international humanitarian law relating to armed conflict.

16 MS. SELLERS: Thank you. I would ask the registrar, could we

17 please have a number for this document.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, It will be P412.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So this document is being admitted as

20 Prosecution Exhibit P412. Thank you.

21 MS. SELLERS: Thank you very much, Your Honours.

22 Q. Dr. Gow, did the JNA withdrawal from the territory of Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina occur in a manner which they completely withdrew forces,

24 equipment, logistics, or any other military equipment or apparatus?

25 A. I think to reiterate some things that we've said before, I think

Page 1813

1 "withdrawal" is not completely the right word. Although that is the one

2 that was used to described what happened, it wasn't about withdrawal. It

3 was about division of the JNA into the VRS and the VJ, that is the Bosnian

4 Serb military and the military of Serbia Montenegro.

5 So in that process, the assets and the personnel of the JNA

6 deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time, small exception, I think

7 there were a few non-Bosnian Serb people who withdrew at that point, was

8 that -- sorry. The JNA was divided, and part of the JNA that was left in

9 Bosnia and Herzegovina as the VRS. So the withdrawal -- "withdrawal" is

10 the wrong term. The bulk of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina was left

11 behind and redesignated as the VRS. And not only was it left there, but

12 it continued to have links to Serbia and Montenegro, to Belgrade. It

13 was -- the commander, General Ratko Mladic, was given significant

14 operational authority and command, but was reported as being in regular

15 contact with the staff in Belgrade. The Belgrade military continued to

16 give all kinds of support, being part of one integrated structure,

17 throughout the period of armed hostilities and indeed beyond armed

18 hostilities. Even to this day, there are still some issues about trying

19 to get the separation of the integration of the armed forces as part of a

20 process of security sector forming Serbia Montenegro and in the Serbian

21 part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22 Q. What would you give as the date of, on the one hand, possibly the

23 misnomer of the withdrawal of the JNA and, on the other hand, the

24 formation of the VRS army?

25 A. The 19th of May, 1992, was the date given by Belgrade to say --

Page 1814

1 that was the date by which it said it would withdraw the JNA. But, as I

2 say, it didn't withdraw the JNA. It simply transformed the JNA into two

3 parts. So the 19th of May is the date on which the JNA ceases to exist

4 and, by relation, on which I think we can say the VRS and the VJ come into

5 being.

6 Q. Now, how does this withdrawal compare to the JNA withdrawal from

7 Croatia and Slovenia?

8 A. The JNA withdrawal from Slovenia, first of all, was a withdrawal.

9 It was a withdrawal which raised the territory that it went. Anything

10 that couldn't be withdrawn was destroyed, was ruined, so that it couldn't

11 be left as an acquisition to Slovenia and be used. That came after a

12 three-month moratorium, and those forces, as we've said earlier, went into

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina initially.

14 The withdrawal from Croatia has two dimensions. On the one hand,

15 the withdrawal from non-Serbian-controlled parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina

16 shares characteristics with those from Slovenia. All assets were

17 withdrawn, and anything that couldn't be moved, physical assets, things

18 that were immobile, would be ruined to put them beyond use. In contrast,

19 the withdrawal from Croatia -- from Serbian-controlled areas in Croatia,

20 again, bequeathed equipment and capability to the VSK, the

21 Republika Srpska Krajina so-called armed forces.

22 If you contrast that again, in fact, also with the withdrawal from

23 Macedonia, where there was an agreement between Belgrade, military and

24 political, to withdraw from Macedonia in the south, there was a complete

25 withdrawal. But again, everything that couldn't be taken was ruined and

Page 1815

1 left behind.

2 So we see a clear difference in the pattern. Bequeathing

3 personnel and equipment, materiel, capability to the Serbian forces in the

4 Serbian-controlled areas, and withdrawing everything and destroying that

5 which cannot be withdrawn in the other areas.

6 Q. I would like to ask you to speak a bit about the weaponry that the

7 JNA left in Bosnia, the weaponry that, if I understand correctly, you're

8 saying was bequeathed to the VRS. Could you inform the Trial Chamber a

9 bit about the nature of that weaponry.

10 A. When we say that there was this division of the armed forces and

11 the VRS came into being, it came into being with almost all the weaponry

12 that was at the disposition of the second military district command of the

13 old JNA. Some elements of the air force, the most advanced and

14 sophisticated elements, were taken to Serbia. But other elements, the

15 older planes, the guards were left to operate with the forces of the VRS

16 normally. The inheritance included something like 1.000 pieces of

17 artillery. Similarly large numbers of pieces of armour, tanks, armoured

18 vehicles.

19 So there was a preponderance, what in some places I've called a

20 superabundance of weaponry on the Serbian side, which pitched against the

21 things we said earlier about removal of weaponries from Territorial

22 Defence forces for the Bosnian authorities, and generally the situation in

23 which the Bosnian government found itself -- remember, there was a kind of

24 clear imbalance in terms of weapons categories, because most of the big

25 weapons were on one side and far fewer of them were on the other, which

Page 1816

1 meant that, in the broad, strategic picture, the Serbian forces were able

2 to dominate the environment where they were able to operate using these

3 capabilities.

4 They were limited, I should point out, by a relative lack of

5 manpower. So they had all the weaponry, but they couldn't make as much

6 use of it as they could have done because of having this more than 1.000

7 kilometre front line. But it enabled them to dominate and hold the

8 situation strategically.

9 Q. Well, for a point of clarification, when you refer in that

10 instance to the use of the military weapons by the Serbians, are you

11 referring to the Bosnian Serbs or, more specifically, the VRS army in

12 Bosnia?

13 A. I'm talking about the VRS. I would also generally assume that

14 within that, there would be moments where the VJ was also part of the

15 picture and contributing at times. But we're talking about the Bosnian

16 Serb military, the VRS, the inheritance that it had in terms of weaponry

17 and the way in which that weaponry was used to prosecute the project, the

18 campaign.

19 Q. And your reference to the VJ, would you please inform Your Honours

20 what you mean by the VJ?

21 A. The army of Yugoslavia; that is, the army of Serbia and

22 Montenegro, Vojska Yugoslavia

23 Q. Was that basically the renaming of what we had been calling the

24 JNA, as it went back into the territory of the remaining republic?

25 A. That's the name of the armed force for which Belgrade is the

Page 1817

1 political and military command and control, the state -- the Federal

2 Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. When the JNA is divided,

3 part of it becomes the VRS, the other part becomes the VJ. The VRS in

4 Bosnia, with the Bosnian Serbs; the VJ with Serbia and Montenegro on the

5 other side of the Drina.

6 Q. Thank you. I would like you now to turn to section 9 in your

7 binder, and you will note that there is a map. Dr. Gow, did you --

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Before you do this, perhaps we can close on the part

9 that you've been dealing with. Now, we have, for all intents and

10 purposes, the JNA disappearing as such. It's being divided into two,

11 according to you. One is the VRS and the other is the VJ.

12 As far as the command structure, starting from the 19th of May -

13 I'm only interested in the 19th of May and afterwards - the command

14 structure, where did it start and where did it end, as far as the VRS is

15 concerned, as far as the VJ is concerned? Because obviously then it

16 becomes very important for us to know with regard to the operations that

17 followed, where they were being planned, where they were being conducted,

18 managed, whether it was in one state or whether it was in another part of

19 that state. That's the first part I would like you to elucidate.

20 The second is, do you mean to tell us that at any given moment

21 after the declaration of independence of Bosnia, or even a few days

22 before, that the -- if the Bosnian government wanted to create its own

23 army, it had to start from scratch, or did it have at its disposal either

24 manpower or resources and also weaponry which was, strictly speaking, part

25 of the JNA? I suppose you can answer. I'm asking you this because I

Page 1818

1 suppose you know, as much as I do and many others, that there was also an

2 arms embargo put in place by the United Nations.

3 So perhaps if you can touch on these two points, separate issues,

4 I think we could close that chapter.

5 MS. SELLERS: Certainly, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

7 A. In terms of -- I'll start with the Bosnian side of that first and

8 with the arms embargo. I already mentioned earlier in testimony that

9 Security Council Resolution 713 in September 1991 imposed an arms embargo

10 on the SFRY and its territories. The consequence of that, of course, was

11 partly that, in a situation such as that, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with

12 extensive materiel on the Serbian side, with the Territorial Defence

13 structures having been largely, probably not completely, stripped of

14 assets on the Bosnian side, there was this big imbalance. The arms

15 embargo was one of the big political issues at the time said to affect the

16 strategical situation. It did so to the extent that the VRS had all of

17 this heavy weaponry, and the Bosnian army, as it developed, did not. It

18 did have some, most of that which it got it captured in northern Bosnia.

19 But it had something like 40 tanks and armoured vehicles, not to compare

20 with the kind of hundreds, going up to towards 1.000 on the Serbian side.

21 So it couldn't compete on the same terms. But part of the strategy

22 perhaps was to try and gain weaponry as far as possible.

23 The arms embargo was set to cement this situation because, of

24 course, the Bosnian government would want to acquire weapons of other

25 kinds and didn't do so, at least not extensively and formally. It did

Page 1819

1 acquire quite a considerable amount over time of man-portable weaponry, so

2 things that one person could carry, including rocket launchers and so

3 forth, but not -- but not heavy artillery and armour.

4 It was also capable of producing some things. Some areas, I would

5 say in Central Bosnia, there were still arms factories from the old

6 defence system which were under Bosnian control and where they could still

7 manufacture some capabilities such as elements of artillery and multiple

8 launch systems.

9 So in that picture, there was a big imbalance. There were ways in

10 which the Bosnian side, in trying to develop this army and using initially

11 the structures of the Territorial Defence force, sought to do this.

12 Is that adequate for your purposes?

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. In other words, what I wanted to clarify by my

14 question, that part of the question, at least, was - and you have more or

15 less answered it, as expected - that one wouldn't be able to say that the

16 outbreak of these hostilities, the Bosnian government, or the government

17 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had or could have at its disposal any substantial

18 weaponry which belonged to the JNA at the time. So you're ruling that

19 out. The bulk of the weaponry was in the hands of the VRS, what

20 eventually became the VRS.

21 A. The only weaponry at that time was weaponry that it captured.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's move to the --

23 A. In terms of the command structure. Let me be clear, as far as I

24 can be. The VRS/VJ division is a political division and is a formal one.

25 It does have operational and organisational consequences. One of those,

Page 1820

1 the key one, is that General Mladic, who is already the commander of the

2 second military district, becomes commander of the VRS, has -- is given

3 broad operational authority. He's in charge of the operations in Bosnia.

4 He has -- he still has links to Belgrade, and I think it's also worth

5 bearing in mind, we should never forget, we don't have a map to show it,

6 but Han Pijesak, in Eastern Bosnia, was the old deep underground command

7 and control centre for the JNA, remained in Eastern Bosnia notionally

8 under the command of the JNA, but was the core of this integrated JNA

9 defence system. That continued to be part of the links with Belgrade.

10 So Belgrade was giving -- was setting the political agenda

11 strategically, was creating the framework through the JNA into the

12 divided -- formally divided VJ and VRS. The Chief of Staff in Belgrade,

13 General Perisic, was liaising in part of the chain of command with General

14 Mladic. But because of the issues we discussed before about trying to

15 avoid any sense of -- as far as possible, any sense of identification of

16 Belgrade, trying to project the idea that this was Bosnian Serb rather

17 than Belgrade-generated Serbian activity, Mladic was given authority to

18 run operations and not to be seeking new orders all the time. He would go

19 to Belgrade for meetings -- he was reported as going to Belgrade for

20 meetings. There was one point in 1993 where people expected that he would

21 become the new Chief of Staff of the then VJ as part of all of this. That

22 didn't happen for whatever reason.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: And the Commander-in-Chief, absolute

24 Commander-in-Chief of the two --

25 A. The theoretical commander-in-chief of the VJ is the Supreme

Page 1821

1 Defence Council of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That comprises the

2 president of Montenegro, the president of Serbia, and the president of the

3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

4 The theoretical Supreme Commander of the VRS is the president of

5 the Republika Srpksa, who was Mr. Radovan Karadzic. I tend to think that

6 the theoretical political command of the president of the Republika Srpska

7 is, at best, a grey and complex area because the real chain of command

8 through the armed forces, in terms of the strategy, leads to Belgrade.

9 And I think there were times when Karadzic had little idea, probably, of

10 what was going on in terms of the military and Mladic and the operations,

11 and there were a few moments where -- interactions with some

12 militarisations where Karadzic tried to assert his authority and was not

13 very effective in doing so.

14 So I think that's an indication that the real line of authority

15 was within the military and the chain of command going back to Belgrade,

16 and the fact that requests would be sent to Belgrade for extra units to

17 support for equipment, for ammunition, are all elements of the way in

18 which that was one integrated structure working. And as I think I

19 indicated, even after the end of -- formal end of armed hostilities in

20 1995, that continued to be an issue. The people overseeing the arms

21 control elements of the separation of forces continued to report the

22 difficulties, because there was the integration between Belgrade and the

23 VRS meant that some of the issues that this Republika Srpska was supposed

24 to deal with couldn't be dealt with unless they were dealt with in

25 Belgrade.

Page 1822

1 It meant that, as I say, even today, as people looking to try and

2 bring Serbia into the European fold, take it towards the European Union if

3 it wants to do that at some stage, towards NATO, the issues of security

4 sector reform in Bosnia and sorting this out in Bosnia and in Belgrade are

5 still problematic because of the continuing links, the integration of the

6 two.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

8 Ms. Sellers, will you be asking at any point, the witness, with

9 regard to possible withdrawals of paramilitaries from Bosnia? Because if

10 you're not, I will pose the question now myself.

11 MS. SELLERS: Be my guest, Your Honour.


13 We take it that, or at least you hinted at it, that apart from the

14 regular armed forces, there were also paramilitary groups active in the

15 area, going back even to the Croatian -- conflict in Croatia. Apart from

16 the purported withdrawal of JNA -- of the JNA from Bosnia, and apart from

17 the separation, the practical separation of the JNA into two parts, were

18 there any steps taken with regard to paramilitaries that were present in

19 the territory of Bosnia throughout -- during this period? Did they remain

20 there? Were they withdrawn? Did they withdraw themselves? Can you

21 enlighten us on this.

22 A. The paramilitary forces --

23 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm referring to paramilitaries originating from

24 outside of Bosnia.

25 A. Yes, I'm --

Page 1823

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's keep it to that.

2 A. We're on the same page.


4 A. The paramilitary forces organised by Belgrade were not used or

5 kept in any one place for a particularly long time anyway. They were an

6 element of attacks. So in the process of a takeover, the JNA elements of

7 the Bosnian Serb, say, Territorial Defence force might be used to surround

8 a town, a village, a community, to cut it off, operate, perhaps, stand off

9 bombardment. Then it would be -- but they wouldn't have the kind of

10 personnel to go into these places to do these things. So the

11 paramilitaries would provide a kind of shock troop in that situation.

12 There were a variety of paramilitary groups, some organised

13 semi-privately, all of them coordinated by the security service and by the

14 air force intelligence service at Batajnica, who would then go into

15 particular places. But they wouldn't be in any one place for a

16 particularly long time anyway.

17 In some of them, the semi-private operations, one of the

18 motivations for people to join was pillage, so you would be recruited, and

19 sometimes people were given a choice to come out of prison, it's said --

20 you know, you can stay in prison or you can go and take your chances as

21 part of this unit, but then you can take home whatever booty, whatever

22 goods you can find. There used to be cartoons of vans coming back from

23 Bosnia with lorries loaded up with fridges and so forth, because they

24 were -- these people were semi-criminal. They were part -- they were

25 involved in the ethnic cleansing activity but were then taking things

Page 1824

1 away. So they didn't stay, in some cases, very long anyway, because the

2 part -- for some of them, part of the motive was to do something, get

3 something, and go back and not be in prison anymore, or to continue

4 whatever their life was.

5 So I think to understand, the issue of withdrawal is that these

6 forces were never in any one place very long. So the issue of withdrawal,

7 in a sense, is maybe not completely a non-issue but is not really there as

8 an issue, because they would come and go on raiding missions but wouldn't

9 necessarily be permanently based in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: But did they continue to come and go even after the

11 partition of the JNA -- after the 19th of May, in other words?

12 THE WITNESS: Oh, yes, they would continue to be used through

13 1992. They ceased to be -- they appear to have ceased to have been used

14 in significant ways openly after late 1992, maybe sometime in -- early in

15 1993. Off the top -- you want it, I could go and kind of gauge exactly

16 when this was. But that was the point at which the position was more or

17 less static. There was a sense that it wasn't changing very much, and

18 would only change slowly. There was no longer, if you like, a need for

19 these shock troops to be involved in taking over places. And at the same

20 time as far as extra resources were needed, they would be supplied from

21 Belgrade by the interior ministry security service, and it would more

22 likely be units of the JSO, the special operations unit of the security

23 service within the interior ministry, the people who organised the

24 paramilitaries in the first place, and sometimes -- and often the JSO

25 members were parts of the some of the groups. So I think it's going back

Page 1825

1 to that structure, to Belgrade, to the command under -- under

2 Mr. Simatovic, who was responsible in Belgrade for organising these

3 things.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: So the conclusion to draw, according to you, is that

5 post-19th May, Belgrade was still very much present both as far as the

6 regular army of Republika Srpska is concerned and also the presence,

7 intermittent presence of paramilitary groups operating in the territory.

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, that's correct.


10 Yes, Ms. Sellers, please go ahead.

11 MS. SELLERS: If I could ask you to turn to Section 9 in your

12 binders.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: We need to take a break now? Let's have a break.

14 We'll have a break of 25 minutes, please. Thank you.

15 --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 1.06 p.m.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Sellers, you may proceed, please.

18 MS. SELLERS: Yes. I would ask that the witness, Dr. Gow,

19 counsel, and Your Honours turn to the next document in your binder. It's

20 a document of a map that's been premarked P367.

21 Q. Dr. Gow, would you please look at the map and tell the Trial

22 Chamber: Did you instruct the Prosecutor, I believe it's in 1994,

23 possibly 1995, to develop the map that we're looking at now?

24 A. I did ask for a map of this kind to be drawn up. I don't know

25 whether it was 1994 or 1995 in this case.

Page 1826

1 Q. Okay. Could you explain to the Trial Chamber the significance of

2 this map?

3 A. The map shows the overall control of territory in Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina as it would have been through most of the period from spring

5 1992 through to 1993. The actual information on which it was based was

6 taken from December 1993, but the position was static for most of that

7 period.

8 The one thing that did change within it was that, what you see on

9 -- what I have here is a black and white map. I'm not sure if we have

10 a --

11 Q. There is one on the screen.

12 A. I see the colour. The blue on the screen, for one part of 1993

13 kind of went towards where those two little blue areas are, more in the

14 center of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the green. That was when Bosnian and

15 Croatian forces were pushed into central Bosnia, fighting against the

16 Muslims, the Bosnian army forces. But then they were pushed back by the

17 end of that year. So for all but a few months, that represented the

18 picture.

19 I should also point out another of the problems of map production

20 in the Prosecutor's Office in the early days of the Tribunal, I suspect,

21 is that again, the area marked in green that includes Srebrenica, Zepa and

22 Gorazde on this map should not be one unified area. There should be three

23 separate green areas around them. Gorazde was the largest, Zepa the

24 smallest, and Srebrenica a little larger than Zepa, so they shouldn't be

25 joined up in that way on the map. If you can read red into -- red gaps

Page 1827

1 into them. And on the map showing overall control of territory, blue

2 represents Croat control, green represents Bosnian government control, and

3 red represents Serbian control. So in terms of what we were saying before

4 the recess about the dominant Serbian position that was secured, you'll

5 see that probably something in the region of two-thirds of the territory

6 of Bosnia and Herzegovina is under Serbian control through that period.

7 Q. Dr. Gow, could you please --

8 A. Sorry, I'd just add for clarity and for the record. I was asked

9 earlier about the Posavina Corridor and pointed to Brcko. You will see in

10 the north-east corner, towards the top of the map, Brcko marked, and the

11 red line of that corridor, just for sake of fullness.

12 Q. Dr. Gow, looking at the map, would you agree that the political

13 and the military division shown on this map followed along ethnic lines in

14 Bosnia during that time period?

15 A. I would. The intention was to create -- on the Serbian side and

16 also, I think, on the Croatian side at least, ethnically homogeneous

17 territories. So the idea was to create this part of the Serbian state

18 construct of the project and, as far as possible, to remove other groups

19 from that territory. That was the means of consolidating control of the

20 territory, of implementing the strategy.

21 Q. Were the different designations in terms of the armies and the

22 ethnic breakdown then the result of ethnic cleansing?

23 A. I'm not sure I follow the question. I mean, I don't think that

24 the designations of the armed forces were a result of ethnic cleansing. I

25 think that ethnic cleansing was the strategy, and this disposition of

Page 1828

1 territory was certainly the outcome of that process of ethnic cleansing,

2 using artillery and heavy armour to create the framework for it, but then

3 also using -- implementing the strategy at the local level, at the low

4 level, using means that included paperwork but also small arm and

5 violence, because that's the point at which you execute it. You don't use

6 the artillery -- the artillery creates the framework, makes the overall

7 control possible. The ethnic cleansing comes from those units on the

8 ground which go to places and either kill or forcibly remove people or

9 process them out.

10 Q. Therefore, it would be your testimony that in terms of weaponry,

11 you've already testified about heavy artillery, but now that probably

12 smaller artillery also played a role within the ethnic cleansing strategy

13 that you discussed earlier?

14 A. Without a doubt. The actual ethnic cleansing is carried out

15 either at the point of a rifle or a sub-machine-gun or a bayonet. The

16 reports in some places like Bijeljina, where people were put into the

17 community hall and knives were used to cut things from people. Those

18 kinds of stories -- whether that particular case is accurate or not, these

19 were the kinds of things happening. It wasn't -- the point of so-called

20 ethnic cleansing is the point of human contact, largely. I mean, some

21 people will flee because they know what's coming, and that's part of the

22 campaign, is to make people without actually forcibly removing them if you

23 can. But for the forcible removal, whether it's killing or expulsion, you

24 do it, yeah, as we would be in this room with somebody pointing something

25 at one of the others and saying, This is what you have to do.

Page 1829

1 Q. So therefore, the absence of heavy artillery didn't necessarily

2 mean that it would be impossible to implement some form of ethnic

3 cleansing.

4 A. No, it doesn't mean it's impossible to implement a form of ethnic

5 cleansing because it takes place at that level, where that -- where it's

6 possible to carry out that kind of action.

7 Q. And the small weaponry that could possibly assist, if not provoke

8 ethnic cleansing, would that be weapons like pistols, rifles, or rocket

9 launchers?

10 A. It can be any kind of -- any piece of weaponry. It some cases in

11 northwestern Bosnia, armoured vehicles and tanks were blowing away houses.

12 In other cases, it could be something like a pitchfork, I guess; a knife,

13 any sort of small arms that was man-portable, that you could point at

14 somebody and say, If you don't do this, this weapon will be used against

15 you.

16 MS. SELLERS: This map is already marked 367. I would ask that it

17 be tendered into evidence.

18 MR. JONES: Your Honours, we have reservations about this map for

19 the reason which has been discussed, because it shows the enclaves as a

20 contiguous territory. Notwithstanding the clarification that has been

21 offered by Dr. Gow, it appears to us that there may be confusion down the

22 line because Srebrenica was cut off, as this witness has said, and the map

23 should reflect that. Perhaps if the Prosecution could produce a new

24 version which shows that.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. In the meantime, it's going to be admitted as

Page 1830

1 it is, with the understanding that it's not a faithful reproduction of the

2 reality of the situation on the ground. I suppose, Ms. Sellers, you take

3 the hint of --

4 MS. SELLERS: Certainly. And we appreciate learned counsel, and

5 that's why we certainly did want to inform the Trial Chamber that there

6 had been a slight misrepresentation.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. In the meantime this is being admitted as

8 Prosecution Exhibit P367. Thank you.

9 MS. SELLERS: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. Dr. Gow, was there any action or reaction on behalf of Bosnian

11 Serbs that accompanied the military -- Serbian military preparation that

12 you earlier testified about?

13 A. There was a political dimension to the state project that involved

14 preparations through the SDS, the Serbian Democratic Party, to prepare the

15 way for takeover. In December, instructions were issued to begin

16 preparations, preparations which would involve the creation at a

17 designated point of crisis headquarters, with two operational plans,

18 depending on the particular circumstances, whether or not there was

19 already an ethnic Serbian majority in the area or whether the Serbs were

20 not in a majority.

21 Those plans would involve identification of non-Serbs who were

22 potentially politically significant to be immediately detained. It

23 included plans for creating a new Serbian government in the particular

24 municipality. It included instructions for coordinating with the security

25 centres within the Serbian-controlled territories, that is, interior

Page 1831

1 ministry, police, security service forces, and also for coordinating with

2 the JNA wherever possible, and for coordinating with the plans.

3 So it would be, in a sense, a political part of the strategy of

4 takeover in which the SDS-organised ethnic Serb party would take control

5 and would be relating politically and militarily to all elements within

6 the situation.

7 In line with that, already from April 1991, i.e., a year before

8 the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a year before the onset of

9 major armed hostilities, a process had begun of creating associations of

10 Serbian municipalities. By September 1991, this had become the

11 declaration of so-called Serbian Autonomous Regions designated sometimes,

12 when you read them, as SAOs. Those areas, and two had already been

13 created in Croatia as part of the phase of the war there, and in September

14 1991, between the 12th and the 19th, four of them were created in Bosnia

15 and Herzegovina; a fifth one was later to be created in November. These

16 were part of creating the political infrastructure to go with the

17 preparations for use of armed force to secure the takeover and control of

18 these territories as part of the project to create this Serbian state,

19 statelet, unit within, whatever it was going to be.

20 Q. Thank you. I would like you to look at the next document. It

21 also has been premarked 281, and the English version bears the ERN number

22 03014245.

23 Dr. Gow, could you look at that document and tell the Trial

24 Chamber its relationship to these autonomous regions that you have just

25 testified about.

Page 1832

1 A. This is a newspaper report from the newspaper "Javnost," which

2 reports described the creation of the first of those Serbian Autonomous

3 Regions, the Serbian Autonomous Region of Herzegovina, which was declared

4 on the 12th of September. Subsequently, the Bosnian Krajina, I think it

5 was on the 14th, Semberija, or North-Eastern Bosnia, on the 17th, and

6 Sarajevo Romanija on the 19th. I might have got the order of those -- I'm

7 not entirely sure of the order off the top of my head. And then one for

8 Northern Bosnia was declared later.

9 Q. Dr. Gow, were these autonomous regions still part of Bosnia, the

10 Republic of Bosnia?

11 A. They are part of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a

12 sovereign state that was, at that stage, still operating formally within

13 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -- and this is the point in

14 1991 -- and of the sovereign state of Bosnia-Herzegovina which acted

15 outside of that Socialist Federative Republic context once the dissolution

16 process had been completed.

17 The association of municipalities is something, as I understand

18 it, that was permitted, also in terms of the law. The declaration of

19 autonomous regions and so forth was kind of extralegal activity in the

20 political domain, moving towards what would ultimately be the declaration

21 of a state, the state of the Serbian people, the Republic of the Serbian

22 People in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23 MS. SELLERS: I would ask the registrar, could we please use the

24 number that's been designated and mark this as a Prosecution exhibit.

25 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit P281.

Page 1833

1 JUDGE AGIUS: It is being so admitted and marked as Prosecution

2 Exhibit P281. Thank you.


4 Q. Dr. Gow, did there come a time period when the Bosnian Serbs

5 within the territory of Bosnia took other political steps in order to

6 increase their political autonomy within that territory?

7 A. Yes, they did. Again, we made some reference to some of this

8 earlier. After this period of declaration of autonomous regions in

9 September, there was a plebiscite in the so-called Serbian-controlled

10 areas in October or November, which, again, I should know this clearly but

11 I don't remember exactly off the top of my head, which was to decide to

12 assert the will of the Serbian people of these areas to remain part of

13 Federal Yugoslavia, the context also the Bosnian part, movement asserting

14 the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15 By the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, steps were taken to

16 declare the Serbian -- the Republic of the Serbian People of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so a further step along that way, including that a

18 Serbian assembly had been created within that context, all parts of steps

19 moving towards the projected statehood element of the project and to

20 separating territories from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21 Q. Might I now turn your attention to the next document in the

22 binder. It has already received the number P288. That's in the B/C/S

23 version, and the English number is 288E.

24 Dr. Gow, would you please look at the English version. I would

25 like to draw your attention to the title, but also to what appears to be

Page 1834

1 Article 1 of this document. Would you explain to the Trial Chamber the

2 importance of Article 1 within framing the growing political independence

3 of Bosnian Serbs on the territory.

4 A. Yes. But if I may, first of all, for the record, also point out

5 what might be another deficiency, I would say, about the translation.

6 This should actually read, on the proclamation of the Republic of the

7 Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is what it says in the

8 original, not the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that's a

9 distinction at least of a small kind for an academic, if not anybody else,

10 which matters, because later on there will be a change of name.

11 Article 1 makes reference to the Serbian autonomous areas, I think

12 showing the heritage as part of this -- of the stages in this plan to

13 build this Serbian statelet. And it alludes to regions in which the

14 Serbian people remained in a minority because of the genocide conducted

15 against it in the Second World War. So this is laying claim to

16 territories -- the plebiscite 9th and 10th of December, sorry, not

17 November. I wasn't sure of the date, but we have it.

18 So this is laying claim to territories where all ethnic Serbs are

19 at that moment the majority and dominant population, but also to some

20 territories where it is said, as a result of the Second World War, they

21 are no longer a majority but it's presumed would have been had things --

22 had events of the Second World War not taken place. So this is laying

23 claim to territory, and a further element in building the political

24 structure within this part of the project.

25 Q. Now would you draw your attention to Article 2 and to see how that

Page 1835

1 explains the relationship between this declaration, the Bosnian Serb

2 people, to the former Yugoslav Republic, or what would now be moving

3 toward dissolution. Could you please explain to the Trial Chamber that

4 relationship.

5 A. Article 2 designates that this putative republic of the Serbian

6 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognising Bosnia-Herzegovina in the

7 title, is asserting that it's part of federal -- of the federal Yugoslav

8 state. It's notable that it already is cautious in use of the term

9 "Federal Yugoslav state" because it's coming at a moment where the SFRY

10 is still in a process of dissolution. So it's kind of phrased to go

11 whichever way other events might turn. But the clear thing is that it's

12 identifying the association with the federal Yugoslav state, which

13 implicitly means with Serbia in this context.

14 Q. Dr. Gow, I would ask you to turn the page so that the Trial

15 Chamber can be informed of the date of this document.

16 A. The declaration was the 9th of January, 1992, which again, for

17 clarity on the record, in this process, was between the invitation on the

18 16th, 17th of December from the European Council to invite applications

19 for recognition of independent international personality but before the

20 advisory commission had reported back and before the European Council had

21 made decisions on the way forward.

22 Q. And the person who signed the document?

23 A. Momcilo Krajisnik has signed it as the president of the Assembly

24 of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 MS. SELLERS: I would ask the registry, could we maintain the P

Page 1836

1 number, and I would ask the Trial Chamber, could we submit this document

2 into evidence.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. The number will be P288.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document is being admitted as Prosecution

5 Exhibit P288. Thank you.


7 Q. Dr. Gow, in furtherance to the reaction of Bosnian Serbs to the

8 dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, did there

9 come a time when the Assembly of Serbian People proclaimed their

10 independence?

11 A. This declaration, and also later a proclamation of a constitution,

12 were put in place and were subject to a declaration of independence on or

13 around the 7th of April, 1992, at which point there was broad

14 international recognition of the independent international personality of

15 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and so this was taken as part of the plan. Now

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina's change of status had been confirmed, this part of the

17 Serbian initiative went into action, and so to declare it separate from

18 the otherwise independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, breaching, of

19 course, the territorial integrity and the sovereign rights of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as would otherwise be understood.

21 Q. I would ask you now to turn to the next document in your binder.

22 It has ERN number 01367471 in the English version. The B/C/S version

23 follows.

24 Dr. Gow, I would really like to ask you what you have just

25 testified about concerning the independence of Bosnia, the proclamation of

Page 1837

1 independence of the Bosnian Serb people. Is that reflected in the

2 document that you're looking at now?

3 A. It is. This is a report from the 7th of April, 1992, noting that

4 the Serbian assembly -- the Assembly of the Serbian People in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina had met that morning and had declared independence. It

6 also notes at the same time that the two members, Serbian members, to the

7 collective leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mrs. Plavsic and

8 Dr. Koljevic, had resigned, thereby indicating withdrawal from collective

9 political processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 Q. All right. Now, did the Bosnian Serb people therefore start to

11 take on a separate political identity within the territory of Bosnia at

12 this point?

13 A. I think if we were to approach that accurately, what we would say

14 is that they already had clearly been laying claim to a separate political

15 identity. That's what this story of steps from the association of

16 municipalities through to the declaration of a republic of Serbian people

17 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so on, and through to this point. What this is

18 doing is actually say, in a way, no longer that it's part of

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was maintained as part of the political

20 ambiguity while Bosnia-Herzegovina was not yet recognised as having an

21 independent international personality, but now they're saying it is no

22 longer part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At this point they're withdrawing from

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina as the state, and they are saying this is going to be a

24 separate -- this is declared as a separate entity.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 1838

1 MS. SELLERS: Might I ask for a P number from the registrar for

2 this document.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. It will be P413.

4 THE WITNESS: We should also point out, just again to add to these

5 things, that the statement also notes that it would -- that this can or

6 will be joined in union with Serbia or with other entities in this

7 Yugoslav federation. That goes back to something I said earlier about the

8 terminology. Whether you call Great Serbia or Kadijevic's new Yugoslavia

9 or some other association of Serbian states, this here is being phrased in

10 that context, and I think "other entities" would also imply the Republic

11 of Serbian Krajina as well.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: In the meantime, this document is being admitted in

13 evidence and marked Prosecution Exhibit 413.

14 MS. SELLERS: Thank you very much.

15 Q. Dr. Gow, in continuance with our examination of the growing

16 political separation between ethnic groups within Bosnia, did there come a

17 time period when the Bosnian Serb people decided to have their own

18 constitution?

19 A. Okay. The Serbian entity -- the Republic of the Serbian People in

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina promulgated a constitution on the 28th of February,

21 1992, putting in place the preparations, again, for the separation and the

22 declaration of a separate unit from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23 Q. Thank you. Could I ask you to turn to the next document in your

24 binder. In the original B/C/S, it's ERN number 00359816. Dr. Gow, I'd

25 ask you to turn to the English version of that document. The ERN number

Page 1839

1 is 00359826.

2 Dr. Gow, I'd like to draw your attention to the title of the

3 document.

4 A. Which is proclaiming the constitution of the republic -- for the

5 Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the translation.

6 Q. Yes. And then I would like you to also look at Articles 1, 2, 3,

7 and 4, and if you would be so kind as to describe them and give the Trial

8 Chamber your expert opinion on what they mean in terms of the political

9 nature now of the Serbian people. I believe it's on the screen also.

10 A. It is. Article 1 indicates that we now have this Serbian Republic

11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the

12 sense that it's a state of the Serbian people and of all citizens living

13 therein. I know where this is going, so I would draw your attention to

14 the "all citizens living therein," because later on that element will be

15 removed.

16 Article 2, again, makes reference to the Serbian Autonomous

17 Regions, to the territorial composition of this construct, and again,

18 reference to the territories on which genocide was committed against Serb

19 people in the Second World War.

20 And Article 3, again, reiterates that it's linked to the federal

21 state of Yugoslavia. So, again, making clear that whatever the reference

22 to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is clearly part of this federal Yugoslav

23 project, state, entity, whichever one it's going to be.

24 Q. Right. And is that also the reason that Article 6 states that the

25 citizens of the republic have citizenship in the republic and of

Page 1840

1 Yugoslavia?

2 A. Yes, that would be the case.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 MS. SELLERS: Your Honours, I would also ask that this be given a

5 number by the registrar, and I would like to submit this constitution into

6 evidence for the Prosecution.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be P414.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document, Ms. Sellers, is being admitted in

9 evidence and marked as Prosecution Exhibit P414. Thank you.

10 MS. SELLERS: Thank you.

11 Q. Dr. Gow, moving along, I'd like to turn your attention to the next

12 document in the binder, an Official Gazette. In B/C/S the number is

13 00897223. In English, the ERN is 0048063.

14 Dr. Gow, might I draw your attention, in the English version, to

15 the date of this document, and please explain to the Trial Chamber what

16 the document is.

17 A. We saw before the 28th of February constitution of the Republic of

18 the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is the constitution --

19 revised constitution of this entity from the 17th of December, 1992. You

20 will note the name has been changed from the Republic of the Serbian

21 People of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the constitution of the Republika Srpska,

22 first of all.

23 If you move down to Article 1, you'll note that the

24 Republika Srpska is the state of the Serb people. In the February

25 constitution, I pointed out the reference to "and all citizens therein."

Page 1841

1 That has been removed.

2 If you move further, you look at the continuing consistency of a

3 kind within Article 2 the territory consists of the regions of the Serb

4 ethnic entities, still noting the regions of genocide, and giving the

5 authority to change borders and status only to the Serb people through a

6 plebiscite.

7 And in Article 3, you get the continuing reference to being part

8 of the federal state of Yugoslavia. So by now there's been a complete

9 declaration of independence, there's a new constitution which clearly and

10 unambiguously identifies the ethnic Serb character of this policy, that

11 continues to assert a link to a federal Yugoslavia, which is in clear

12 contrast to the declaration of independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 MS. SELLERS: I would ask the registrar also, could we have a

15 number for the document for the Prosecution, and then I would ask the

16 Trial Chamber to tender it.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be P415.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document, Ms. Sellers, is being admitted

19 into evidence and marked as Prosecution Exhibit P415.

20 MS. SELLERS: Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Q. Dr. Gow, throughout this time period, meaning from the spring of

22 1992, throughout 1992 until the end, was the hostility, the armed conflict

23 or the fighting relating to the declaration of war in Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina continuing?

25 A. Yes. The armed conflict continued from the starting point in

Page 1842

1 March/April 1992 through until November 199 -- possibly in some kind of

2 small ways beyond, but to the end of November 1995.

3 Q. And did the Bosnian government continue to structure, consolidate,

4 and form armed forces that it was using to defend its territorial

5 integrity during 1992?

6 A. It did. We discussed earlier the initial turning to the

7 Territorial Defence system, the declaration of forming an army, the later

8 new declaration of forming an army. It was an evolving situation in which

9 the Bosnian authorities were trying to create an armed force to -- that

10 would serve their purposes and interests as they sought to combat the

11 Serbian and, at times, Croatian campaigns to compromise Bosnia's

12 territorial integrity. That was an evolution which was affected by the

13 relative absence of certain categories of weapons a lot of the time; it

14 was affected by political factors at times; and it's one which I think

15 that, even by that point, at the end of 1995, was probably not complete.

16 Q. Could I please ask you to look at the next document in the binder,

17 and it's already been premarked P279. The English version has been

18 marked P279E.

19 Dr. Gow, could you please tell the Trial Chamber, is this document

20 related to your testimony that you've just given concerning the continuing

21 formation of the Bosnian army?

22 A. It is. It relates to a decision in August 1992 formally, having

23 declared an army previously, formally to declare the organisational

24 structure for that army, indicating that there would be five corps

25 operating in the five different regions with Bosnia-Herzegovina, with

Page 1843

1 their command in the places indicated on the map here -- indicated in the

2 list here.

3 Q. Right. And the list that you're referring to, is that the list of

4 places that one finds on the subsequent page of the document as shown on

5 the sanctions, or are you referring to the list of the different corps?

6 A. I'm looking at the list of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Corps,

7 which is identified underneath the decision on that forming of corps of

8 the army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the zones of

9 responsibility and subordination. This is about attempting to give formal

10 structure to the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and consolidating some

11 of the arrangements which have been emerging in this period.

12 Q. If you'd please turn to the next page of that document, and midway

13 through the first half of the document, it refers to now the different

14 geographical locations of the corps of the army. Would you please

15 indicate for the Trial Chamber whether Srebrenica is located in the

16 2nd Corps, not according to the document?

17 A. The document indicates that within the 2nd Corps area of

18 responsibility Srebrenica is one of the municipalities.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 MS. SELLERS: I would ask that we use the P number assigned. I

21 would ask that this also be able to be tendered into evidence.


23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, I can confirm it will be P279.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, that's correct. So this document is being

25 admitted and marked as Prosecution Exhibit P279. Thank you.

Page 1844

1 Whenever it's convenient for you, Ms. Sellers, we have got another

2 two minutes. It's up to you.

3 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, I would like to say that I could

4 complete in two minutes, but to be very honest, I think I do need another

5 15 minutes, and so I think it might be more beneficial to continue

6 tomorrow.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Since I'm not feeling well at all, we'll send

8 me home a little bit earlier.

9 THE WITNESS: You can send me home a little earlier too.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: I am deteriorating from minute to minute, actually.

11 I'm really feeling unwell.

12 The sitting is adjourned until tomorrow morning at 9.00. Are we

13 sitting in the same courtroom or in another courtroom tomorrow? Same

14 courtroom. Okay.

15 Thank you, Dr. Gow. May I just remind you that you're not to

16 communicate with anyone. You know what the rule is. I thank you.

17 We'll reconvene at tomorrow morning at 9.00. Thank you.


19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,

20 to be reconvened on Tuesday, 23 November 2004,

21 at 9.00 a.m.