1 Monday, 21 February 2005
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 2.18 p.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam Registrar, could you call the case,
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Case Number
8 IT-03-68-T, the Prosecutor versus Naser Oric.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Madam. Good afternoon to you.
10 Mr. Oric, can you follow the proceedings in a language that you can
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours,
13 ladies and gentlemen. Yes, I can.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. You may sit down.
15 Appearances for the Prosecution.
16 MR. WUBBEN: Good morning -- good afternoon, Your Honours. My
17 name is Jan Wubben, lead counsel for the Prosecution, together with
18 co-counsel, Mr. Gramsci Di Fazio; Ms. Joanne Richardson; and our case
19 manager Ms. Donnica Henry-Frijlink. And also good afternoon to the
20 Defence team.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Wubben and good afternoon to you and
22 your team.
23 Appearances for Naser Oric.
24 MR. JONES: Good afternoon, Your Honours, and good afternoon to
25 the Prosecution bar. You see a somewhat depleted Defence bench. I
1 should explain that for our CaseMap manager, he is in New York sitting
2 his bar exams which we wish him the best of luck with. As for my lead
3 counsel, Ms. Vidovic, she does have some health issues which hopefully
4 will be of short duration. But it's a matter which perhaps we can
5 discuss on Wednesday in any event, and see the situation. Perhaps I
6 failed to introduce myself. I'm John Jones, co-counsel, and I'm joined
7 by Ms. Jasmina Cosic, our legal assistant.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Jones, and good afternoon to you
9 and your team -- your depleted team.
10 Are there any preliminaries?
11 MR. WUBBEN: No, Your Honour.
12 MR. JONES: No, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: So, Madam Usher, perhaps you could fetch the
14 witness, please.
15 The reason we are waiting is I was informed beforehand that the
16 witness has been put in a room which is a little more distant than usual.
17 So Madam Usher has to take her time to bring him over.
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Good afternoon, Dr. Mujkanovic.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good
21 afternoon, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: I am assuming that you are receiving interpretation
23 like before. At any time there are problems with the interpretation,
24 please draw our attention straight away. Second thing is: May I please
25 remind you that you are testifying under oath. Last week you made a
1 solemn declaration to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
2 the truth, and that solemn declaration still stands. There's no need for
3 you to repeat it every time you are taking that seat over there.
4 Mr. Jones is -- will be proceeding with his cross-examination and
5 then we'll see whether there is re-examination and there will be some
6 questions from the Bench as well.
7 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Take your time. There's no hurry, Mr. Jones.
9 MR. JONES: Thank you.
10 WITNESS: NEDRET MUJKANOVIC [Resumed]
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 Cross-examined by Mr. Jones: [Continued]
13 Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Mujkanovic, and welcome back.
14 A. Thank you.
15 Q. You provided us a vast amount of information last week on a
16 number of themes so I'm just going to tie up a few matters today. So we
17 shouldn't be very long. Now, we speak at length last week about torbari
18 and the social phenomenon about the torbari. We also came across the
19 hapsi. Now, what do you understand about that term, hapsi?
20 A. I'm not familiar with that term. The phrase I'm familiar with is
21 "catch him alive," because that's what the torbari used to say. It was
22 some sort of a battle cry on their way into a village, probably meant to
23 intimidate those still around in the village. That's what they would say
24 on their way in: "Get him alive," "Catch him alive." The term refers to
25 more or less the same thing, get him or catch him alive. It boils down
1 to the same thing.
2 Q. Right.
3 MR. JONES: I wonder if the Witness could be shown a copy of D199
4 which is a copy of "War Hospital." And I'm going to refer to two
5 sections from that book, page 101.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Incidentally, Mr. Jones, "hapsi" is an Arabic word
7 which has various connotations, one of which is a thief, the other of
8 which is a person who has been in jail, has been imprisoned; in fact one
9 other word which derives from "haps," which means prison.
10 MR. JONES: That's fascinating, Your Honour. It may be also that
11 I mispronounced the word. "Hapsi", I think, is the correct
13 Q. Now, it's page 101 and it's the seventh paragraph. It starts a
14 little below the middle of the page. I'd read the section:
15 "Sometimes Nedret travels to the field to meet people in the
16 outlying areas. As a proud and curious member of the Srebrenica war
17 council, eager to give confidence to the soldiers, he tours every yard of
18 the front lines and visits distant medical stations.
19 "He even witnesses some war actions, viewing the fighting from a
20 distance and watching as thousands upon thousands of civilians pour in,
21 like a lava flow, to pillage Serb villages. By their sheer numbers and
22 the thunder of their voices, the howling, bag-carrying hordes help scare
23 Serb inhabitants away. The rushing plunders have earned a fake military
24 designation, the 'HPO division.' The H stands for 'Hapsi,' a Bosnian
25 word for petty thieves. If 1,000 soldiers take part in an action, the
1 HPO division adds at least 3,000."
2 Just pausing there and I'll wait for the interpretation to catch
4 Firstly, was it in Bjelovac that you saw this or was it
6 A. This is in reference to the action against Voljevica, Bjelovac,
7 and Loznicka Rijeka. As I said in the course of my testimony, I was with
8 Ramiz Becirevic in the afternoon hours of the first day of fighting. I
9 went to an elevation. It was quite far, though, 2 or 3 kilometres, and
10 it was from an elevation from a hilltop that we watched this flood of
11 people pouring into the villages. And that is what this chapter refers
12 to, that particular action.
13 Q. Thank you. And seeing that expression there "hapsi," is it right
14 that that refers to just ordinary people, civilian men, women, children,
15 old people, civilians in short?
16 A. Yes. I said it right at the outset. Those people, the torbari,
17 are groups of people whose main objective was to snatch food, or rather
18 items that they would later trade for food. They had these battle cries.
19 Hapsi is not one of the ones that I heard at the time. They would yell
20 things like "Catch them alive." It was a psychological aspect to the
21 whole situation. It was meant to drive the remaining people out of the
22 villages, leaving their houses and material goods behind so that they
23 would be free to pillage and take whatever they could away.
24 Q. Thank you. And I think you also said that they banged pots and
25 pans also to make a great noise to make the people go away. Is that
2 A. They used all sorts of things to intimidate their opponents.
3 There were battle cries and people were yelling "Allahu Akbar," Allah is
4 great. They used all sorts of methods to intimidate the other side, to
5 cause panic to arise and to make it as simple as possible for themselves
6 to obtain their objective, which was to get food, food which was
7 necessary for their survival.
8 Q. And then carrying on on that page -- you don't need to refer to
9 it, I can read it.
10 "It is the rumbling of their empty stomachs that sets these
11 'hapsi' on the heels of the soldiers. They come out of hunger and need
12 and anger, many of them displaced from their own homes. Nedret sees them
13 raging out of control, disobeying directives not to destroy things."
14 So I want to ask you about that, "disobeying directives not to
15 destroy things." Is it right then that in Bjelovac you were aware or saw
16 or heard directives being issued not to destroy things but those
17 directives being ignored by the civilians?
18 A. I'm not sure if I can be a reliable witness for the Bjelovac
19 action; I can only speak about what I saw at the time. And what I saw
20 was a flood of civilians advancing on those villages. The author of this
21 book probably got things mixed up a little, too.
22 I would like to go back to what happened in Podravanje, as I was
23 touring the area. And I saw a large group of people next to an excavator
24 that was parked there. I started talking to those people. I had seen a
25 haystack the haystack set alight previously and I told them, Don't burn
1 this; just take whatever you need. And they replied: It's not us who
2 are burning things, it's those other people. Nevertheless in this same
3 spot where I met the group of people, a while later I saw the excavator
4 catch fire.
5 Q. Thank you. That's all I'll be asking about the torbari. Now
6 just another question or two to wrap things up on the public health
7 situation --
8 A. Just a minute, please, if I may be allowed to clarify for the
9 Trial Chamber. It may be a mistranslation or it may be a concept that is
10 difficult to understand. Hapci is not the same as "hapsi." "Hapci"
11 refers to thieves, people who steal things. It's a slang term, a
12 colloquialism in the Bosnian language. So hapci would mean roughly
13 speaking petty thieves, people stealing small and unimportant things,
14 other people's chickens, bags of flour, that sort of thing. Petty theft.
15 When you say hapci this is certainly not a reference to organised crime
16 or bank robbers. Hapci may as well be a reference to a pickpocket. It's
17 a slang term, really, a colloquialism. I don't think you're likely to
18 find this term in any of the dictionaries that are available.
19 Q. When we see them referred to as the HPO division, the Hapsi
20 division, that was a joke, was it? They certainly weren't a division of
21 the armed forces.
22 A. Well, yes.
23 Q. Okay. Now, turning as I say to the situation in Srebrenica. In
24 addition to all the problems you've described, there was no electricity
25 supply in Srebrenica the whole time you were there, was there?
1 A. No, no electricity.
2 Q. So what did you do in the hospital, in the operating theatre, to
3 have light to operate by? Can you explain that for us.
4 A. This was one of the tallest odds we were facing, because the
5 wounded were pouring in during both night and day. We always had to be
6 prepared to receive them and to help them.
7 There is a factory manufacturing industrial generators nearby.
8 Those were used as sources of light, naturally. So for the first two and
9 a half or three months, we used those generators. And once one of those
10 was used up, we would trade the one that had been used up for a new one.
11 There was another power generator that used oil, but we could
12 only keep it working for a very short time because we were short of oil,
13 too; there was no oil.
14 We built a small water plant, in a manner of speaking, behind the
15 post office about a hundred metres from the hospital at the small streak
16 or creek that crosses Srebrenica. And this water plant produced as many
17 as 2 and a half or 3 kilowatts of electric power which we used to have a
18 light-bulb in the operating theatre. And we used the power also to
19 operate the steriliser. This was how we extemporised. Sometimes this
20 broke down, too, and we would use candles torch lights to provide lights
21 to work under. It was all a large improvisation and nothing was as it
22 should by rights have been.
23 Q. Isn't it true that throughout Srebrenica there were people using
24 improvised energy sources, for example using a bicycle to try and
25 generate a radio? That sort of thing?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, we touched briefly on the issue of gangrene last week. Now,
3 based on your conversations with Srebrenica fighters, can you say that it
4 affected their morale to know that if they stepped on a mine or if they
5 were injured they would have to be rushed to a hospital or operated on
6 pretty quickly to stop gangrene?
7 A. I must say that the fighters saw the hospital as a light at the
8 end of the tunnel in the whole situation. The hospital provided extra
9 security for them, a sense of security in combat. Most of them would
10 say, If I'm ever wounded, if only I can make it to the hospital, I'm sure
11 I will survive. Unfortunately it wasn't always like that. Sometimes
12 vital organs would be destroyed or injured and they died on the way to
13 hospital or on their arrival there. But our hospital certainly was a
14 source of confidence and additional strength. They certainly did see it
15 as a place of salvation.
16 Q. Are you aware, then, from these conversations that soldiers had
17 to pull out of areas where there had been action pretty quickly because
18 they had to get their wounded back to the hospital?
19 A. Yes. The evacuation was a very difficult job. Usually a lorry
20 with no top or cover was used to access these parts that could be
21 accessed. And there was another van that we used. It had been used
22 before the war by a bakery for bread supplies. Those were the two
23 vehicles used to bring in the wounded. In order to get to this area that
24 could still be accessed, even carts were used, carts drawn by oxen. It
25 was very difficult to get the wounded over to the posts where they could
1 be helped or back to Srebrenica for that matter. The distance to be
2 crossed would sometimes be as much as 20 or 30 kilometres in order to get
3 to the hospital and these evacuations took as long as two or three hours.
4 This was an insurmountable problem and many of the soldiers were lost en
5 route, during their transport to the hospital.
6 But if you look at the lie of the land around and in Srebrenica,
7 that's what makes it even more difficult to evacuate the wounded. It's
8 mountainous terrain with steep rock-face and hills. Sometimes it would
9 take as many as seven or eight soldiers to get a single soldier who was
10 wounded evacuated and brought over to the nearest medical post.
11 Q. Because they're carrying him on their backs?
12 A. They did whatever they could. Sometimes they had makeshift
13 stretchers. Sometimes they carried people on their backs. They did
14 whatever they could.
15 We didn't really have a proper stretcher, the kind that should be
16 used by any medical corps in the world. Sometimes the wounded are tricky
17 to handle and you have to be careful about how you carry them. But those
18 who evacuated the wounded did whatever they thought was best at the time
19 with little if any expertise, needless to say.
20 Q. Right. Thank you. Moving to a different area, and apologies if
21 I seem to be skipping about. But I'd like you to look at a photograph
22 and caption from the book. And it's -- if you go to page 208 firstly and
23 then basically three pages in. It's the page with the photograph of
24 yourself at the top. It's actually the bottom photograph which I would
25 like you to look at. And the caption there reads:
1 "Because of a severe paper shortage, doctors wrote prescriptions
2 on old medical records and other scraps of paper that could be found
3 around the hospital."
4 So my question firstly: Isn't that right that there was a paper
5 shortage in the hospital and in Srebrenica generally, if you know?
6 A. This is correct. We couldn't even have proper medical files
7 because there was no paper. If you wanted paper, it was something that
8 you had to organise a search in order to get. People used it to roll
9 cigarettes and most of the paper was used up that way, people smoking.
10 Q. When you told us about seeing Naser Oric's signature or what
11 looked like it on paper, was it on scraps of paper like these, like those
12 that are shown in the photograph?
13 A. Yes. As I said, those were small shreds, slips of paper like the
14 one you see here. A quarter, roughly speaking, of an A4-sized sheet of
16 Q. Now, last week you were shown a lot of documents which were typed
17 on a A4 piece of paper. In the time you were in Srebrenica, did you see
18 any typed documents of that nature?
19 A. Mr. Jones, while I was in Srebrenica, I didn't see a single piece
20 of paper like this. I was not even aware of any documents or orders that
21 existed. Therefore, documents or papers are not something I can testify
22 about. It was as late as a year ago that I first laid eyes on these when
23 they were first shown me. I didn't even realise that someone was
24 actually exchanging letters and documents at the time.
25 Q. Right. It may be an obvious question, but is it right that for
1 you personally and the other doctors that you know that you weren't
2 typing up notes about your patients with a typewriter?
3 A. This is all written by hand. When patients came in, there was a
4 book, a register, that we used where their first and last names, dates of
5 birth would written down; this applies to everyone who was received at
6 the hospital. And then the patients would be transferred to their
7 respective wards, to their beds. There was a temperature list, a
8 diagram, where their daily temperatures would be marked from the day they
9 came in to the day they were discharged. Once the patients were
10 discharged there would be some sort of a discharge letter written,
11 stating what the treatment consisted of and what the condition of the
12 patient was at his discharge, whether it was necessary to carry out any
13 further regular checks at home, whether the patient should return to the
14 hospital, or was entirely cured.
15 Q. And those discharge letters were written by hand, if I understand
17 A. The discharge letters were most often written by hand. While I
18 was in the hotel, I slept there at the hotel and there was a typewriter
19 at that hotel. So some discharge letters were typewritten, but a small
20 number, 100 or 200 at the most. So whenever I had free time I wanted to
21 organise this medical documentation and I used this typewriter. This
22 typewriter was usually brought to my hotel room and I would type up
23 discharge letters on the typewriter and I type it with my physician's
24 stamp and sign them. However, the vast majority, 90 per cent of
25 discharge letters were written by hand.
1 Q. And that's the Hotel Domavija I take it that you're referring to?
2 A. Yes, yes, Hotel Domavija.
3 Q. And were you the only one of the doctors from the hospital who
4 stayed in the Hotel Domavija? If you could answer verbally.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Pilav wasn't staying there?
7 A. No. He lived in Srebrenica with his mother and brother and
8 somebody else. He was a refugee; he was not originally from Srebrenica.
9 He had come there from the south-east area which had been occupied.
10 Q. And Dr. Advo Hasanovic didn't live in the Hotel Domavija?
11 A. No, he lived in his apartment, which was some 2 to 300 metres
12 from the war hospital in the direction of Bratunac.
13 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, during your time in Srebrenica I think
14 it's right to say that you treated between 35 and 40 patients of Serb
15 ethnicity. Is that correct, firstly?
16 A. Approximately, yes. I couldn't give you the exact figure, but
17 approximately that's right, about 40 people at the most. At the most, 40
18 Serb patients.
19 Q. And is it right that you didn't see any signs of mistreatment on
20 any of them?
21 A. Mr. Jones, I stated that already last week, namely that all of
22 them were brought to the hospital as casualties, as people who were
23 wounded. So they did not have any other injuries except for injuries
24 inflicted by various weapons or various types of ammunition, be it shells
25 or grenades or something like that.
1 Q. Thank you. And didn't you also treat Naser Oric for a leg injury
2 shortly before internationals arrived in Srebrenica?
3 A. Naser Oric is somebody whom I treated twice. The first time I
4 treated him was shortly after my arrival in Srebrenica sometime in
5 August. He had a wound in the area of the upper right leg; there was a
6 shrapnel wound. And it had been inflicted some two or three months prior
7 to my arrival, so it was a wound on his thigh. We performed surgery to
8 take the shrapnel out.
9 The second time I treated him was in April of 1993 when he was
10 wounded on the lower left or right leg. I couldn't tell you now. But he
11 had a wound -- it was again a shrapnel wound, a heavy -- serious wound.
12 Q. And after that wound was he on crutches? Was he limping? Can
13 you give us some idea of the extent of the injury.
14 A. That was some 10 to 15 days before I left Srebrenica. On the day
15 I left Srebrenica, which was the 22nd of April, Naser was in bed. I came
16 to see him. We said goodbye. At the time he was still unable to walk,
17 to move about. He was bedridden. After that I didn't see him so I
18 couldn't really tell you whether he was able to walk independently or had
19 some crutches or was limping. When I saw him, he was still in bed.
20 Q. Do you know when he sustained that injury, roughly?
21 A. I will try to give you some rough idea. It could have been
22 between the 10th or perhaps between the 5th and the 10th of April of
23 1993, around that time if my memory serves me right. Around the 10th of
25 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, again moving to a different subject. I
1 have a couple of clarifying questions about the concept of the subregion
2 which you spoke about being considered in late 1992 and early 1993. And
3 with the usher's assistance I would like to pass up a new exhibit. The
4 ERN is 03721404. Now, it's dated 21st of January, 1993, and it purports
5 to be signed by Hamid Salihovic as president of the subregional War
6 Presidency. Now, I won't go into the content of this document, but
7 firstly, I think you told us the subregion never properly came into
8 operation; would that be right?
9 A. That's right. But I have a different kind of document in front
10 of me -- no, no, it seems that it is right. Yes, the signature is on the
11 left side.
12 Q. So is it right there wasn't ever any unified command for the
13 enclaves of Kamenica, Cerska, Konjevic Polje, and Srebrenica?
14 A. As far as I know, no. There never was one.
15 Q. Are you aware that Hamid Salihovic was working on the concept in
16 January 1993, indeed in late January 1993?
17 A. I already stated that this idea of a subregion, the concept of
18 subregion and uniting the enclaves in the Drina region appeared in late
19 1992/early 1993. The purpose of that concept was to pull together all
20 human resources and material and technical resources in that area. I am
21 not aware that Hamid Salihovic was the president of this subregion. I
22 don't know what this man did. I only occasional saw him in the street,
23 and I don't know whether he actually did something about it. Maybe he
24 even did, but it didn't last long because very soon thereafter Konjevic
25 Polje fell as did Cerska. So the whole concept lost practical
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 significance. And I couldn't really tell you whether Hamid Salihovic
2 managed to put this into reality or not.
3 MR. JONES: I would ask that that document be given an exhibit
4 number, Defence exhibit number. I think it's probably D 201.
5 THE REGISTRAR: It's D202.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document is being tendered and admitted in
7 evidence and marked as Defence Exhibit D202.
8 MR. JONES: Right.
9 If the witness could now be shown P255, which is 01839515 to 0183
10 to 9516. And this is going to be the resignation document signed by
11 Hamid Salihovic, Ramiz Becirevic and others which you saw last week.
12 It's just on its way.
13 Your Honour, if I may, as a preliminary we have a corrected
14 version of the translation and it concerns the expression in the
15 paragraph 3, third sentence, which I'll read first of all in Bosnian as
16 well as I can which is "Mi nemamo ovlastenja ni mogucnosti da to
17 razrjesimo nacelnik i komandant nepokazuje interes za to." That's been
18 translated in English as "We have no powers or opportunity to dismiss the
19 chief and the commander shows no interest in doing so."
20 We submit that's not the correct translation. In our version it
21 reads: "We have no powers or opportunities to do this and the chief and
22 the commander shows no interest in doing so."
23 We would like to submit our translation as a defence exhibit. We
24 could also consider asking the interpreters which version they would
1 JUDGE AGIUS: What do you mean which -- the interpreters -- I
2 don't follow you. What do you mean by asking the interpreters which
3 version they would prefer?
4 MR. JONES: Well, Your Honour, we're going to tender our
5 translation as a Defence exhibit, but if it would assist the Chamber we
6 could ask the booth to look at that sentence and provide an
7 interpretation ad hoc or we can see with the translation section.
8 Whatever course Your Honour would like.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Wubben.
10 MR. WUBBEN: To assist the Trial Chamber and my learned friend,
11 we can also ask CLSS by do an official translation in that respect with a
12 view to the comments of my learned friend.
13 MR. JONES: Yes. That's fine. It needn't detain us, in any
15 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't think so. If the Chamber has -- will
16 encounter difficulties in this regard, if this is at all important, we'll
17 find a solution ourselves. In the meantime this is going to be tendered
18 as a Defence exhibit, I take it?
19 MR. JONES: Yes.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Which is D203. Which is the paragraph?
21 MR. JONES: Paragraph 3, the third sentence. In English: "We
22 have no powers or opportunity to resolve this." That's the difference,
23 that one sentence.
24 Q. Mr. Mujkanovic, just looking at that third paragraph, that
25 concerns the problem of vehicles, doesn't it, which I think you explained
1 was raised by these people? I'm sorry, you have to give a verbal answer.
2 A. Yes, yes. This involves a vehicle, yes.
3 Q. Now, you were shown a Prosecution Exhibit P200 last week, which
4 was dated 16th of April, 1993, which suggested that despite the letter of
5 resignation in December, Hamid Salihovic continued in his functions until
6 16 April 1993. So I have a couple of questions about that now. Now,
7 first, isn't it right that you didn't attend any meetings of the
8 operation staff after 22 December 1992?
9 A. I attended the meetings of the operations staff very rarely. I
10 attended very few of them, two or three perhaps, for a very simple
11 reason: because at the time while the operations staff was in session, I
12 always had wounded patients in the surgery room and I believed that that
13 had priority over attending meetings. So most of these things that I saw
14 I saw for the first time in these documents; therefore, I cannot really
15 tell you more about how these documents were drafted or what else was
16 discussed at the meetings.
17 Q. Right. So it correct then that you don't know whether Hamid
18 Salihovic attended meetings of the operations staff after 22 December
20 A. That's correct. I cannot claim either way, that he was present
21 or not present. I don't know anything about that.
22 Q. So when you said that Hamid Salihovic continued working in his
23 functions although -- despite the resignation letter, is that something
24 which you recollect? Is that something which you can affirm, or do you
25 not know?
1 A. It is more likely that I don't know. I would see this man in the
2 street carrying a small bag and looking like a person who is involved in
3 something, going places, and so on. But I can't tell you whether he
4 attended meetings or not. I don't know that. I don't know.
5 Q. Thank you. And would you say that his role in the operations
6 staff as head of the department for security and intelligence is
7 something completely different from being president of the subregional
8 War Presidency? In other words, it was a different post all together;
9 there was no continuity between the two.
10 A. It was not linked, no, not at all.
11 Q. Thank you. Now, as far as the reasons which are set out in this
12 letter for the persons resigning are concerned, is it right the persons
13 here are complaining about the War Presidency primarily and that they're
14 not receiving proper instructions about their competencies?
15 A. Mr. Jones, I can tell you -- only something about my contacts
16 with them, but these were not formal contacts. There were no meetings
17 there. I remember that there was always a problem with a vehicle, that
18 it was always mentioned and discussed. We needed a vehicle at the
19 hospital as well, but there was simply no vehicle whatsoever. Or if
20 there was a vehicle, then there was no fuel. So in the end it all came
21 to the same: Either you had a vehicle but no fuel or vice versa. But
22 this doesn't deal with only vehicle but also with fuel, with the gas that
23 was needed. So that was a problem that we had. It was a very urgent
24 problem and I think that they appealed to the War Presidency to do
25 something and to ensure that this vehicle was placed at the disposal of
1 the operational staff and other people who signed this document.
2 Q. Right. I'm going to put a couple of propositions to you
3 regarding this document and these resignations and tell me whether you
4 agree that they're correct or consistent.
5 In the opening speech made by the Prosecution in this trial on
6 the 6th of October, 2004, Mr. Wubben made the following declaration about
7 these resignations, and it's page 226 of the transcript:
8 "Muslim military staff loyal and proud to have been led by Naser
9 Oric felt forced to resign from the military staff post because of the
10 increasing lawlessness in Srebrenica and because Naser Oric did not
11 diligently exercise responsible command in time of war."
12 Now, firstly, do you understand or did you understand that the
13 reasons or one of the reasons for these resignations was because Naser
14 Oric did not diligently exercise responsible command in time of war?
15 A. I will tell you one thing. First of all, I didn't know that
16 there was any staff, a staff that existed before the operational staff.
17 As I told you, I knew that there were local commanders in charge of units
18 who would occasionally meet and discuss certain problems. I am convinced
19 to this day that even if something existed on paper, a staff or something
20 like that, that I'm sure that it didn't function in practice, otherwise
21 there would have been no need for the operational staff.
22 Another thing is that the commanders, local commanders, saw Naser
23 Oric as their commander, as commander of that area in Srebrenica. All of
24 them did except for one man, Hakim Eric. Therefore, I don't think that I
25 could tell you whether people who signed this accepted Naser as the
1 Srebrenica commander or not. All I know is that they did these things
2 and Ramiz Becirevic in February was appointed chief of staff instead of
3 Osmanovic, which means he saw him as his commander as well. So I
4 couldn't really answer our question to the full extent, but I hope this
5 answer I gave you is of some significance as well.
6 Q. First perhaps just one correction for the record: I think you
7 said Hakija Meholjic again, didn't you, rather than Hakim Eric which is
8 what we have.
9 A. Hakija Meholjic.
10 Q. And secondly, when you talk about the area of Srebrenica, well
11 obviously that excludes Bratunac. But equally, are you talking about the
12 town of Srebrenica or a broader area?
13 A. When I say "Srebrenica" I mean the territory of Srebrenica
14 municipality which roughly corresponded to the area of sometime
15 municipality of Srebrenica, including the people from Bratunac,
16 Vlasenica, Han Pijesak, Zvornik, who lived in Srebrenica. I exclude
17 Konjevic Polje from this concept of Srebrenica municipality in 1991 just
18 before the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina started. Konjevic
19 Polje represented Bratunac municipality, in fact, because it used to
20 belong to that local commune. So I'm excluding from this concept
21 Konjevic Polje which in my mind represents Bratunac municipality. I hope
22 I was clear enough.
23 Q. That's clear. But when you talk about local commanders in
24 Srebrenica, leaving aside the names and places which we've seen in
25 documents, are you also including commanders let's say from Mocevici or
1 Poznanovici or these other places that do not appear in the documents
2 you've been shown?
3 A. I don't understand whether commanders from Poznanovici and
4 Mocevici. I'm not sure which commanders you're referring to. Could you
5 please explain.
6 Q. Yes. Do you exclude the possibility that there were commanders,
7 let's say, in Mocevici or Poznanovici who didn't regard Naser Oric as
8 their commander?
9 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, I think this is leading to
11 JUDGE AGIUS: No speculation at all. He either knows the answer
12 or he doesn't. Of course he has been told in the course of the last week
13 that we don't need speculation and we don't want speculation from him.
14 So please answer the question if you are aware of what you're
15 being asked by Mr. Jones. If you know the answer, give it. If you're
16 not sure, if you need to speculate, then don't give it.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I'm not sure -- or rather, I
18 don't know.
19 MR. JONES: Thank you.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Jones.
21 MR. JONES:
22 Q. Now, finally on this resignation letter if we look at paragraph
23 2, and this is P255 still: "The OS staff has no official documents or
24 instructions or from the BH OS Main Staff or War Presidency in wartime
25 conditions. Work on such responsible duties assumes a great risk and
1 vast opportunities to make large mistakes."
2 My question is: If you're aware, is it not true that in December
3 1992 no instructions, laws or regulations had been received in Srebrenica
4 from either Tuzla or Sarajevo?
5 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour again.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: By whom, first, and from whom?
7 MR. JONES: By the staff from the authorities in Sarajevo and
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Which staff? The operations staff?
10 MR. JONES: Yes. The OS staff.
11 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, if I may. And who is Defence counsel
12 referring to? That who receive received it in Srebrenica? All of
13 Srebrenica or --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: No --
15 MR. WUBBEN: Because the question --
16 JUDGE AGIUS: The operations staff. And the witness -- if they
17 did receive, the witness needs to tell us from who.
18 MR. WUBBEN: Operations staff. Thank you.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can tell you something that I
20 know personally. I as chief of medical corps as a war surgeon received
21 no instructions from Tuzla, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, or anywhere else as to
22 what I needed to do. We were simply sent there and any good that we did
23 was viewed positively and if we failed did something it was ignored. I
24 received no official instructions or no formal regulation, qualifying
25 whether what I had done was properly or not. Now, what I'm saying
1 applies to myself personally, to somebody who was in charge of the
2 medical corps. So whatever we thought ought to be done we did it. We
3 didn't have any instructions, any formal protocols as to how things ought
4 to be done. Nobody ever sent to us or gave to me personally any Official
5 Gazette or any official instruction or regulation. Now, what I just said
6 applies only to me personally. I can't tell you about others. But if we
7 apply the same analogy, then it would be similar in case of the others.
8 Nobody mentioned any laws to us.
9 MR. JONES:
10 Q. Right. And did you hear that when you personally attended
11 meetings of the operations staff, complaints expressed by people that, We
12 haven't received official decrees or laws or regulations?
13 A. I heard that from the War Presidency, from people who were
14 involved in the operations staff. They would say that they lacked any
15 legal regulations that would regulate their activities, and that's how it
16 was. Nobody ever said to us that things ought to be organised in this
17 way or in that way. What we tried to do was ensure that children were
18 able to attend a school, that there were teachers. And it was very hard
19 to do that. There were no regulations available to us. How can one
20 organise school under those circumstances?
21 MR. JONES: If the witness could be shown P158 and the ERN is
22 01239545, and I'm going to be showing it just for illustrative purposes.
23 I can provide my copy if it's --
24 Q. Now, I just want you to look at this document because as you'll
25 see the heading refers to Article 18, paragraph 1, item 1 of the decree
1 law on the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as published in the
2 Official Gazette. And I'm just wondering whether you found that strange
3 in certain of these documents that they're prefaced with references to
4 the Official Gazette, which as you told us as far as you were aware
5 hadn't been received?
6 A. This is dated April 1992. That was probably before the enclave
7 was besieged or blocked in May. This is probably an Official Gazette
8 where a state of war was declared. I really wouldn't like to speculate.
9 I'm not sure what this is in reference to, but I can tell you for certain
10 that I received no documents or instructions on how I was to organise the
11 hospital. So this must be a copy of the Official Gazette of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina April 1992. It says 4/92. So probably this is something
13 that was the case before the blockade.
14 Q. Thank you. Now, I just have seven or so more documents to look
15 at which were shown to you by the Prosecutor. P74, which is 02075809,
16 and that's a purported decision dated 20 May 1992.
17 Now, you were shown this document on Monday and you weren't able
18 to confirm the signature which purports to be of Naser Oric. In fact
19 there are two signatures, aren't there? There's also one on the left.
20 A. Yes, Hamdija Fejzic.
21 Q. Do you see the passage towards the bottom, which states:
22 "This decision is provisional and will be valid until the
23 municipal, political and legislative bodies, Presidency and Assembly, are
24 established. Bogilovic shall be temporarily accountable of his work to
25 the Srebrenica TO staff, to the above bodies once they have been set up,
1 and to the authorised institutions in Tuzla and Sarajevo when they too
2 have been set up."
3 My question is: Do you agree this is a provisional decision at
4 best until the civil authorities are established?
5 A. It's difficult for me to say anything about this. I know that
6 this person was indeed a chief of the public security station. So this
7 must have been some sort of a provisional decision. I'm not familiar
8 with the method of his appointment, so I can't comment on this. I can't
9 tell you for sure wether it was provisional. But it must have been
10 provisional because after the demilitarisation of the area was set up,
11 Hakija Meholjic [Realtime transcript read in error: "Mehmedovic"]
12 replaced him as chief of the public security station, which means that he
13 had remained in this position until mid-1993 I assume.
14 Q. Are you aware that Becir Bogilovic was subsequently appointed to
15 his position of chief of the public security station by the War
17 A. I don't know that.
18 Q. Becir Bogilovic was a member of the War Presidency, though,
19 wasn't he, if you know?
20 A. I don't know that either.
21 Q. Right. Now, the next --
22 A. And the reason I don't know is that some people would come to
23 meetings of the War Presidency on the strength of their position. On the
24 one hand you had the members; on the other hand you had Becir Bogilovic
25 as chief of the public security station attending meetings to answer
1 questions concerning public order, that sort of thing. As to whether he
2 was a member of the War Presidency or not, I really don't know. I know
3 that he was always around somewhere. He dropped by the hospital every
4 now and then.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Wubben.
6 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, just a matter of clarification. Line
7 25 under 5 there is a naming of Mehmedovic, Hakija Mehmedovic. Is that
9 JUDGE AGIUS: No, I don't think that is correct.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Meholjic.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: And I heard him say "Meholjic." For the record,
12 that stands corrected: Where on page 25, line 5, we have Mehmedovic it
13 should read Meholjic.
14 MR. JONES: Thank you for that correction.
15 Q. Now, the next document I want you to look at is the so-called war
16 diary. I think that comes in one whole exhibit. The pages which I'm
17 going to refer to now is 02115054 in the Bosnian. And in English that's
18 03090714. But firstly I just want to ask some general questions about
19 this document.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: What's the P number, Mr. Jones?
21 MR. JONES: The P --
22 MR. WUBBEN: 84, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: P84.
24 MR. JONES: Yes, thank you.
25 Q. And firstly, just general questions about this document. This
1 document appears to be minutes of very meetings. In the meetings you
2 attended, were these minutes ever adopted by the members as an accurate
3 record of what had been discussed at the prior meeting?
4 A. No.
5 Q. So these are just someone's notes of what went on?
6 A. To be quite honest with you, I didn't realise that anyone was
7 taking notes in the first place. There must have been someone taking
8 minutes of what people said, but at the time I was not aware of anyone
9 doing that. No minutes were adopted at the time; that's for certain.
10 Q. Okay. Now, if you could please look at 02115054 and it's the
11 minutes of the meeting of the Srebrenica armed forces operation staff
12 held on 14 October 1992 at 1600 hours.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: It's page 10 in the English version.
14 MR. JONES:
15 Q. I'd just like you to look at the line which says: "Ramiz's
16 proposal was put to the vote and was adopted unanimously."
17 I don't know if you see that. It's the second paragraph on 5054
18 and you see Ramiz's name there. Do you see that?
19 A. Yes, I can see that.
20 Q. Now, isn't that right that the way that the staff took decisions
21 was actually by voting, voting on people's proposals?
22 A. Yes. As far as I remember, by voting.
23 Q. And if you're aware, wasn't that also the system for reaching
24 decisions in the War Presidency, namely a democratic one where people
25 voted on proposals?
1 A. Yes. Voting, yes, by voting. Majority votes.
2 Q. Right. So each person had one vote?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And you've explained the situation in the field as you understood
5 it of how local commanders were chosen from the bottom up, if you like,
6 rather than being appointed from the top down. Do you agree that that
7 was also a democratic procedure in the sense that it was up to the people
8 to choose who their commanders were?
9 A. Precisely what I said. People who were commanders of those units
10 were chosen or voted by the inhabitants of their respective villages.
11 Usually the person selected would be the bravest man enjoying the
12 greatest authority or reputation as a fighter in that particular village.
13 It was not a matter of general authority; it was more a matter of
14 choosing someone who displayed particular bravery in the first months of
16 Q. Turning back to the war diary, that's pages 5042 to 5043. That's
17 02115042. In this case it's a meeting at which you were present in
18 mid-September 1992.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, if we look at what's written on the second line it says,
21 number 1: "The meeting was called to order by Chief O. Osmanovic who
22 briefed those persons present on the tasks and departments. Nedret,
23 Hamed A, Hamed S., Adil, Ramiz and Mustafa took part in the discussion.
24 Our main task is to secure the unity of the armed forces."
25 So firstly, do you see that?
1 A. Yes, I see that.
2 Q. And so that's Osman Osmanovic, the chief of staff of the
3 Srebrenica operations staff opening the meeting. Would that be right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And do you recall him calling for military unity? In other words
6 -- well, firstly, if you could answer that.
7 A. I can't specifically recall whether he did at this meeting, but I
8 know that military unity was a conditio sine qua non: With no military
9 unity, we would not have been in a position to achieve anything. It
10 wasn't just a matter of one or two units, the overall structure has to
11 display a degree military unity. My task was to talk to Hakija Fejzic to
12 convince him to accept this concept of bringing military unity of the
13 overall army structure.
14 Q. We seem to have a bit of a curse when it comes to Hakijas. The
15 last name, were you trying to convince Hakija Meholjic or Hamdija Fejzic?
16 A. Meholjic.
17 Q. So would you agree that at that time, September 1992, there was
18 not military unity in the armed forces?
19 A. As I said at the beginning of my testimony.
20 Q. I want to turn to a passage again in "War Hospital" in page 102
21 in which you're mentioned. It's the second paragraph in that page.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, at least as I read it in the transcript
23 it seems to be an incomplete answer that we have. Your question was:
24 "So would you agree at that time [Realtime transcript read in error:
25 "point"], September 1992, there was not or there was no military unity in
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the armed forces?"
2 And the answer that we have is: "As I said at the beginning of
3 my testimony." And it stops there.
4 MR. JONES: Yes.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: I think he needs to conclude it. He may have
6 concluded it in his own language and this may have been interpreted the
7 way I read it.
8 MR. JONES: I understood him to be saying "That's what I said at
9 the beginning of my testimony."
10 JUDGE AGIUS: That's not what we have in the transcript.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes what?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was disunity throughout the
14 military units and soldiers.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
16 MR. JONES: Thank you.
17 Q. It's page 102 of "War Hospital" and second paragraph: "Part of
18 the reasons the Serbs guard" --
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. [Microphone not activated]
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Line 24 of page 28 you put a question there which
22 does not show up in the transcript, Mr. Jones. I do remember question
23 was, that's when you commented that again this Hakija thing that we have.
24 But could you recall your question?
25 MR. JONES: My question was was it Hakija Memdzic [sic] or
1 Hamdija Fejzic.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: And he answered --
3 MR. JONES:
4 Q. So the quote is: "Part of the reasons the Serbs guard
5 humanitarian access to Srebrenica so jealously is that it's one of the
6 free areas of Bosnia" -- is that correct? Let me just check. Sorry:
7 "One of the few areas of Bosnia where Muslims have fought back
8 successfully, with such punishing and brutal effect. Nedret credits
9 himself with some of this success, priding himself for having helped
10 broker cooperation between some of Srebrenica's rival commanders, men who
11 might have preferred to kill one another instead of killing Serb
13 Is that true that you helped broker cooperation between
15 A. I can certainly say that I did my best to link people up so that
16 misunderstandings between local commanders may be clarified. I made
17 several efforts and tried to get people together to talk and clear up any
18 confusion. I'm not sure how successful I was, but at least I got people
19 to talk. The intention was certainly good. The idea was that since the
20 area was under attack at least we should avoid confusion in interpersonal
21 relationships. I needed to do this as a human being, not in my
22 professional capacity. I wanted to put my authority, my personal
23 authority, to good use. People were inclined to trust me. I was a
24 doctor in the area, after all. I wanted to take advantage of this role
25 that I had or whatever authority I enjoyed to get people to talk to one
1 another and try to clear things up.
2 Q. Right. Thank you. Is it right that there were serious rivalries
3 among commanders at the time you were in Srebrenica?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. Now, going back to the war diary, as opposed to "War Hospital"
6 for a moment, and it's on the same page we were looking at earlier
7 02015042 and it's on the thing we discussed earlier. You can see Osman
8 saying "A request should be sent to Sarajevo to send us all the orders,
9 decrees, instructions, et cetera, that have been issued at the outbreak
10 of the war."
11 I don't know if you see that.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. That's just on the same point again and I think you've answered
14 it, but you were aware, were you not, that there were problems in getting
15 those orders, decrees, and instructions from Sarajevo?
16 A. Most certainly there were problems. I'm not aware of any decrees
17 or orders actually arriving. I can't say we received any laws or
18 instructions, at least not to my knowledge. But there may have been
19 something that I was not aware of.
20 Q. And then just finally on this. We see Ramiz there, next to his
21 name: "Formed units to avoid disorganisation." And then on 02115043 we
22 see: "Priority tasks, formation of units. This should be done depending
23 on the number of men and not on the number of weapons. Weapons must be
25 Seeing that, does that confirm what you were saying last week
1 that Srebrenica's fighters certainly at this date were not organised into
2 proper units?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. So would it be right also generally to say that no matter what
5 was set down on paper in terms of aspirations, that didn't always reflect
6 the reality on the ground?
7 A. For the most part.
8 Q. We also see communications discussed on 5042 just above the bit
9 we saw with Osman. Hamed: "A request for the provision of VHF lines
10 should be sent to the Tuzla district staff. We hope that the telephone
11 lines will soon be established."
12 Now, firstly would that be Hamed Alic speaking, the person in
13 charge of communications?
14 A. Yes, Hamed Alic.
15 Q. And can you confirm that the operations staff didn't have
16 telephone or VHF lines at that time?
17 A. They had nothing. That's why I'm laughing. They say "before
18 normal lines of communication are set up with Tuzla," which never
19 happened. But people were optimistic and they chose to believe that soon
20 there would be normal phone lines between Srebrenica and Tuzla and ways
21 to get in touch. That's what people chose to believe. This approach was
22 far too idealistic and it proved to be an illusion.
23 Q. Now, if the witness would be shown P270 and also seems to be the
24 same as 01801586. Just for the record, it also seems to be P109 and also
25 seems to be the same as 01801587. I'll just say that for the record.
1 Just a brief question on this document. It's dated 2 July 1992
2 and it refers to a meeting of the Crisis Staff of Srebrenica TO. You see
3 that in the first line. Now, have you ever heard of a Crisis Staff
4 existing at any time in Srebrenica?
5 A. I did hear at the outset that there was some sort of a Crisis
6 Staff when Srebrenica was first attacked in April 1992, something to the
7 effect that there was a Crisis Staff. I really know -- I really don't
8 know who the members were. But I know that people referred to something,
9 an institution or a body, called Crisis Staff.
10 Q. Right. You were asked a number of questions about this document
11 on Tuesday. The fact is, isn't it, that you don't know whether or by --
12 whether this decision was taken and if it was taken by whom it was taken,
13 do you?
14 A. That's correct. I'm not aware of this decision ever being taken,
15 and this was before I arrived. So I hadn't seen this document until last
16 year and I can't offer any comments as to whether a decision like this
17 was ever adopted or indeed in this form.
18 Last time I said that I can make observations about certain
19 people here. Halilovic, for example; I later realised that he was chief
20 of the military police. Hamed Alic worked in the post office across the
21 way. He operated the radio device. Becir Halilovic was chief of the
22 public security station and Jusuf Halilovic was the chief of the civilian
23 protection staff or this other person called Avdic and Mirsad -- and
24 Senahid Tabakovic I knew in a different capacity, as local commander in
25 Skenderovici. And so on and so forth.
1 Q. [Previous translation continues] confirm that this document was
2 received by anyone or indeed that it was --
3 A. I can't confirm that.
4 Q. One more document before the break, and that is P99. This is the
5 ERN 00926395. And in fact I would also ask that the witness be shown
6 P100 which is the same document, 02066400. Starting with P100, in fact.
7 P100 on the ELMO, please. Now, I wonder if I need to clear up that
8 document. If you can look at that Dr. Mujkanovic. If we can go to the
9 top of the document where there's a signature.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. We see a signature at the top there dated 23rd of May, 2001. I
12 need to clarify with you, Dr. Mujkanovic, were you ever shown by the
13 Prosecution when you were shown Naser Oric's signature documents that had
14 a signature like that at the top and a date or a date, if you recall?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Dealing with this document, do you agree -- well, it's a
17 handwritten scrap of paper from some notebook, firstly. Could you accept
18 that description?
19 A. I really can't tell you anything about this or what it is. I
20 have no idea. You mean the entire page that I can see here? Or are you
21 only referring to the dates, 23rd of May, 2001, 1115 hours?
22 Q. Just the page. I'm sorry. You've only seen this page. You
23 haven't it as part of any notebook or anything like that?
24 A. You mean this page with the text?
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. What we have on the ELMO right now, this seems to be something
2 that was actually torn out from a notebook.
3 Q. Now, you were asked about the meaning of the phrase "everyone for
4 everyone" which appears here. Isn't it a fact that as far as you know
5 from your time in Srebrenica that the Serbs never returned any captured
6 Muslims alive?
7 A. As far as I know, yes.
8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't get the last part of
9 the answer.
10 MR. JONES:
11 Q. Sorry. Can you repeat your answer. Are you aware of Serbs ever
12 returning live Muslims?
13 A. Well, I was there from the 5th of August, 1992, to the 23rd of
14 April, 1993, I never met any such person nor did I hear that a single
15 live Muslim was ever returned or exchanged and sent back to Srebrenica.
16 Q. One passage in "War Hospital" to look at and then I'll be moving
17 to another document.
18 MR. JONES: I'm in Your Honour's hands whether to deal with that
19 or after the break.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: How long would it take you?
21 MR. JONES: Three minutes.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we can deal with that now and then we'll
23 have a break.
24 MR. JONES:
25 Q. If you can look at page 162 of "War Hospital" please, Dr.
1 Mujkanovic. First of all, do you remember an American, Major Dudley, who
2 was a forward controller for the US air drops?
3 A. Page number you said, 162, yes. Yes, I do remember Major Rex
4 Dudley, if I remember his first and last name correctly.
5 Q. And he left in April of 1993. Would that be right?
6 A. I don't know exactly when it was that he left. But he was there
7 when air drops were carried out. My impression was that his role was to
8 coordinate the fly-overs and air drops. But I don't remember seeing him
9 around in April, which would mean that he left before I did.
10 Q. Okay. Well, the passage I want to read is page 162: "US Army
11 Major Rex Dudley departs the same day," and that's reporting to the same
12 day as the convey of evacuees, "and reports back to high ranking
13 individuals. His conclusions about Srebrenica were clear. The Serbs
14 want to achieve free reign over the whole of eastern Bosnia. The
15 besieged Muslim enclave, straddling a key line of communication, stands
16 right in their way. The Serbs desperately want to take it out and they
17 have a proven modus operandi: Take no prisoners. If the Serbs are
18 allowed to capture Srebrenica, Major Dudley warns, the result will be
20 My question is: As far as you're aware from your time there, was
21 it the Serb policy to take no prisoners?
22 A. I'm not sure I understand the question, whether it was the Serb
23 policy to do what? Can you please repeat the question. I'm not sure I
24 got it right.
25 Q. The policy was not to take any prisoners?
1 A. That's difficult for me to say whether there was a policy in
2 place like that. I didn't quite understand the question. What I did
3 understand I find very difficult to answer. Do you mean whether Serbs
4 wanted to take prisoners or refused to take prisoners? Maybe if you
5 could rephrase the question.
6 Q. Let me just put it this way: You never received a live Muslim
7 exchange in the hospital, did you?
8 A. No, but I said so.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. JONES: We can take a break there.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. [Microphone not activated]
12 --- Recess taken at 3.49 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 4.20 p.m.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Jones.
15 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Q. Dr. Mujkanovic, just three more documents to look at.
17 MR. JONES: If the witness could be shown P3, please, and that's
19 Q. Now, you were shown this document by the Prosecution and it's a
20 purported document dated 18th October 1992. And again, it refers to a
21 decree law at the top. And it refers to a decree law of the Presidency
22 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, it's right, isn't it, that there was
23 no state called Bosnia and Herzegovina until after the Dayton Peace
24 Agreement. Is that right?
25 A. Bosnia and Herzegovina did exist. It was defined by the Dayton
1 Accords as the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but I think that it
2 existed prior to that as well.
3 Q. At this time it was known as the Republic of Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina, wasn't it?
5 A. Yes, yes, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's what it
6 was called.
7 Q. And can you help us with this: Can you see who is being ordered
8 according to this purported order, or who it's being sent to?
9 A. I really couldn't say who this was sent to.
10 Q. Because it's not apparent on the face of the document, is it?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Now, would you agree from the wording that the reference to
13 "constant communication by couriers" is aspirational? In other words,
14 it's not saying that it's happened but it's hoping to establish such
15 communication by 25 October 1992?
16 A. By the 25th of October, yes, something that should happen.
17 Q. Right.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Wubben.
19 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, upon quoting this document there is a
20 rephrasing by the Defence counsel stating that there is a hope, there is
21 an aspiration.
22 Well, this document is clear in the language: There is an order.
23 So the question should be rephrased.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, point taken. Mr. Jones --
25 MR. JONES: I don't know I need --
1 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't think it's going to change anything.
2 MR. JONES: I don't think I need to rephrase it.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: I think the witness himself said that it seems to
4 be an order.
5 MR. JONES: Right.
6 Q. Now, communication by couriers, would you agree in a sense that's
7 the most primitive sense of communication? It's simply people running
8 back and forth with messages.
9 A. It certainly is the most primitive means of communication among
10 people. Yes, I agree, especially nowadays when technology is so
11 advanced. It is right, it is the most primitive means of communication,
12 to send somebody with a letter.
13 Q. Would you agree that it appears from this that even in
14 mid-October 1992 lower and higher units were not even in constant
15 communication with each other, even by courier?
16 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, I hate to interrupt, but according to
17 paragraph 2 of the document there is a redaction like "I ordered to
18 establish in full." That means that is suggested that --
19 JUDGE AGIUS: No, no, no I'll stop you here. No. I'll stop you.
20 Not -- that's not the kind of interruption that I can allow when the
21 witness has not yet started giving his answer.
22 Yes, Witness, please, I'll repeat to you the question that was
23 put to you by Mr. Jones and then please answer it.
24 "Would you agree that it appears from the text from this that
25 even in mid-October 1992 lower and higher units were not even in constant
1 communication with each other, even by courier?"
2 Would you agree with that statement?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I couldn't provide an answer to
4 that, Mr. President. I couldn't say whether the units were in constant
5 communication via couriers or not. What I can say is that that was the
6 only means of communication at the time in Srebrenica, communication via
7 couriers carrying messages, mail, and so on. Sometimes there wasn't even
8 a written order; they would simply be given verbal instructions to the
9 effect: Go and tell such-and-such person and this and that.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. JONES: I've finished with that document. If the witness
12 could be shown P164 which is ERN 03705211. For the record, this is a
13 version it appears of P263 which is 03557343, but this has writing on it
14 in Dutch.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: If that is so, I will let Mr. Wubben interrupt.
16 MR. JONES: If it's permitted, then I would like to read into the
17 record what it says in Dutch, and it's not my interpretation. In the
18 English translation the Dutch reads: "The leader of the enclave
19 announces a mobilisation to prepare an attack on the Serbian
20 settlements." This is at the bottom. And this document also has Ferid i
21 Jemso in handwriting.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Can we see it on the ELMO? What number?
23 MR. JONES: P164.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: P164, I have it here. Now, I have -- the P164 I
25 have, Mr. Jones and Mr. Wubben, is the B/C/S version.
1 MR. JONES: Yes. There is an English translation as well.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. And what you're referring to as words
3 in Dutch I suppose is the sort of postscript at the bottom of that page.
4 MR. JONES: Yes. And also at the top it says: "Order by Naser
5 Oric, 12th December, 1992."
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
7 MR. JONES:
8 Q. Now, in this document there's a reference to Glogova. Do you
9 agree that Glogova was a Muslim village?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And the document also refers to a mobilisation in Cerska,
12 Kamenica, and Konjevic Polje, again all Muslim areas. Would you agree?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Then the document says: "Be prepared to take on the enemy
16 Now, would you understand that as being a reference to repelling
17 attacks by the enemy, by the Serbs?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. So would you agree that this document speaks of repelling attacks
20 and says nothing about the Serb settlements, as the Dutch caption
22 A. Based on item 3, I would conclude that. "Be prepared to take on
23 the enemy attack," meaning be prepared for the Serb attack on this area,
24 Mackovac, Sandici, Kamenica, Previla. I'm not sure what is the name of
25 this place.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Do we have at hand the English translation of this
3 document, 164 in English, please?
4 MR. JONES: I have mine. I can pass up my copy.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Is that the official one you have been given by --
6 MR. JONES: Yes.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Because we don't seem to have it.
8 Do we have it, Registrar?
9 JUDGE AGIUS: So we don't even have an English translation.
10 THE REGISTRAR: [Previous translation continues] translation, Your
12 MR. JONES: It does say unrevised. It says OTP/DVU at the bottom
13 and then ET and an ERN number.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: We don't seem to have it even in the records.
15 MR. JONES: I'm happy to make copies available of mine.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Wubben, what's your position on this? Because
17 I've asked for -- first of all, my colleagues pointed out to me that we
18 haven't got the English translation and I am -- which is not a surprise
19 because that happens sometimes, our secretaries sometimes do happen to
20 leave out one version or the other.
21 But what I am being told by the registrar is that we don't even
22 have it in the records. For P164, we have one in the B/C/S language and
23 we don't have the English translation, which seems to me strange as the
24 translation that Mr. Jones had in his hand seems to be an official
25 Prosecution document.
1 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, I would like to have some minutes to
2 sort this out.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly, yes. Of course.
4 MR. WUBBEN: Thank you.
5 MR. JONES: Yes, my understanding is that we have that
6 translation from the Prosecutor but that it wasn't necessarily exhibited
7 with the document; in other words, I think we matched them up.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: What I see there is that it is unrevised. So even
9 if it is still unrevised we would rather prefer to have an unrevised
10 translation of this document rather than nothing.
11 MR. WUBBEN: One moment, Your Honour.
12 [Prosecution counsel confer]
13 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, we can provide a copy of that
14 translation provided by Defence counsel within let's say a quarter of an
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, there's no hurry.
17 MR. WUBBEN: Okay.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: And if it has been revised in the meantime, please
19 provide -- forward the revised version. If it's not, we're happy with
20 the unrevised version for the time being at least, probably even for the
22 MR. WUBBEN: We'll see to it, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm sure you will, Mr. Wubben.
24 Mr. Jones.
25 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Can you read the third paragraph from the document
2 you have for the benefit -- for our own benefit and also for the benefit
3 of the public, please.
4 MR. JONES: Yes. It says: "Take all security measures and be on
5 the," and then there's a question mark, Randici [sic], Mackovac,
6 Kamenica, Previla line. Be prepared to take on the enemy attack."
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
8 MR. JONES: In fact it looks like Sandici, the first place name.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I think so, yes.
10 MR. JONES:
11 Q. Now, finally P79 [Realtime transcript read in error: "P69"] which
12 is ERN 0207514, a document dated September 1992 and signed by Osman
13 Osmanovic. Now, regarding this document, and bearing in mind that it
14 concerns the operation staff of which you remember, is it right that
15 Osman Osmanovic in that document is appointing the name -- those named
16 people to their positions in the operations staff, the operations staff
17 of the armed forces of Srebrenica?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And he's submitting the appointment to the War Presidency for
22 verification, it says there, and then for approval by the republican
23 authorities. Is that right?
24 A. That's how it was supposed to be.
25 Q. So would the sequence hierarchically be chief of staff proposing
1 to the War Presidency; War Presidency communicating to the republican
2 authorities at the top for approval for the appointments?
3 A. For appointing members of the operations staff.
4 MR. JONES: I see Mr. Wubben on his feet.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Wubben.
6 MR. WUBBEN: Yes, Your Honour, I really couldn't follow this P69
7 as referred to by my learned friend --
8 JUDGE AGIUS: It's not 69, 79.
9 MR. JONES: Yes, P79.
10 MR. WUBBEN: So from the beginning -- in the transcript line 44,
11 5, there's referring to 69.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: I am looking -- I -- it's not my fault of course
13 but I do apologise to everyone because I am checking the monitor now on
14 computer monitor mode and what we have there is exhibit P179. The
15 document that was being referred to by Mr. Jones, if I understood him
16 well, is P79.
17 MR. JONES: P79. Apologies for that.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Which is completely different. So I would suggest
19 to Madam Usher to bring -- it's not your fault either, to bring that
20 document back and -- because it's not the one we are supposed to show to
21 the witness and we give him P79 which is a document that we have seen
22 already during the examination-in-chief.
23 MR. JONES: Right. Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. I'm sorry, I
24 thought I said P79.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: No, you certainly did. In fact, I went for P79 in
1 my, but I wasn't following on the monitor because I was looking for my
3 MR. JONES: Yes. One can only look at one place at one time.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Wubben, for pointing out the
6 THE REGISTRAR: I apologise, Your Honours.
7 MR. JONES:
8 Q. Right. So you've answered the request which I asked about the
9 hierarchical sequence?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. I believe you did. If Your Honours bear with me for a moment, I
12 want to see if that was answered.
13 MR. WUBBEN: But --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Jones, if it was, I suggest you go through it
15 again. It's a question of -- before we had the wrong document, now we
16 have the right document and I think it's only fair and would be wiser to
17 repeat the question.
18 MR. JONES: Yes, absolutely, Your Honour. No problem.
19 Q. So looking at this document, Dr. Mujkanovic, do you agree that
20 it's Osman Osmanovic appointing people to their positions --
21 MR. WUBBEN: Your --
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. And we had -- I think there was the same
23 objection coming from you when Mr. Wubben put the question. Because he
24 asked the question if I remember well the same you are asking it. And
25 you had -- you stood up at the time and said he's not appointing, he is
1 recommending or suggesting --
2 MR. JONES: My apologies if that's the objection. He's
3 submitting --
4 JUDGE AGIUS: I think so. Is that the objection you had in mind
5 of saying?
6 MR. WUBBEN: Yes, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
8 MR. JONES:
9 Q. That he's submitting appointments, proposed appointments, to the
10 War Presidency for confirmation and then for approval by the republican
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And it's right, isn't it, that Naser Oric or the name Naser Oric
14 or his title does not feature anywhere in that decision, either as a
15 member of the operations staff or as someone whose approval is being
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Nor even as someone who is being consulted about these proposed
20 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, witness already stated in court for
21 your Judges that Osman Osmanovic had to report to Naser Oric.
22 MR. JONES: That sounds to me very much a comment on the
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, it is a comment on the evidence. Yes --
25 MR. JONES: I think --
1 JUDGE AGIUS: You have got your answer, so I would ignore it and
2 pass on to the next question, Mr. Jones.
3 MR. JONES: Thank you. Although I do feel obliged to clarify the
5 Q. As far as this document is concerned, there is no mention
6 anywhere of consultation or approval by Naser Oric anywhere, is there?
7 A. As far as this document is concerned, that's right.
8 Q. Right. Now, just a few final questions and we're finished with
9 the documents. In the Telering programme which we saw on the very first
10 day of your cross-examination, you said the following: "I was with Naser
11 the whole time while I stayed in Srebrenica; it means that I factually
12 fought in war under his command. I think all the best about him as a
13 person and as a commander."
14 I just want to ask you about that: "I think all the best about
15 him as a person and as a commander."
16 When you said that, was that a true expression of your opinion of
17 Naser Oric?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. You've told us how Naser Oric used to visit the hospital to see
20 how people, wounded Serbs and Muslims alike, were doing and whether he
21 expressed concern about their injuries and whether they would be
22 handicapped or whether they would recover, and you said he did that out
23 of humanity. Correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. If it's possible for you to give an answer to this: What do you
1 feel Naser Oric's attitude was towards you? Or how did he react towards
3 A. Well, it's hard for me to say how he felt about me. He would
4 probably be the best person to ask that. He -- what I can say is that my
5 cooperation with Naser Oric during the time I was in Srebrenica was very
6 proper and that he had a lot of understanding for the difficulties that
7 the hospital faced. What was most important for me was to ensure that
8 the hospital ran as smoothly as possible under the circumstances. And he
9 devoted a lot of time and energy to ensuring that the hospital had all
10 the supplies, that the food and medicine reached the hospital. So in
11 that respect, my contacts with Naser Oric were extremely positive and I
12 have always since that time seen him as a very respectable person.
13 I've already said over -- in the course of the past few days
14 about the operations in which he participated or did not participate. I
15 think I am the wrong person to ask that. I can't tell you whether he
16 participated in certain operations or not because I myself did not
17 participate in them. I was involved in treating patients and working at
18 the hospital.
19 But what I can tell you is that people in Srebrenica and the
20 fighters there saw Naser as a true born commander. Many stories were
21 circulated about him as a fighter. I'm not an eyewitness, so I can't
22 tell you anything about his participation and involvement in certain
23 operations because I wasn't involved. But based on the stories that
24 circulated, he enjoyed a very high level of respect amongst the people,
25 both as a commander and as a person who can reassure people and instil
1 hope in them that the area would survive and that in the end eventually
2 they would be able to go back to their homes.
3 I can also tell you that in my presence whenever we met Naser
4 never talked about himself, never said, I fought here or fought there.
5 He tended to talk about other people and extol their qualities as
6 fighters and so on. He would frequently mention Smajo Mandzic;
7 Sabahudin, I can't remember his last name, called Mrki; Safet Omerovic,
8 Muji Sabahudin, called Mrki; Safet Omerovic [as interpreted], called Mis;
9 Nurija Memisevic, called Nurica [as interpreted].
10 So he tended to talk about his fighters, his people, people whom
11 he trusted. I never heard him talk about himself, therefore I can't tell
12 you whether he participated in certain operations or not. He was a very
13 charismatic person in the area of Srebrenica. This is my opinion. I
14 think that he was quite young and he was a very young person who carried
15 tremendous burden. He was only 25 years old and had no prior military
16 experience because he used to be a policeman before that. People used to
17 sing songs about him, so he was immortalised in several songs that were
18 played and performed. He was known as a very brave, very able fighter.
19 This is what people said in Srebrenica. This is how people in Srebrenica
20 saw him.
21 Q. Thank you for that very full answer.
22 MR. JONES: The interpreters might be on the wrong channel.
23 THE INTERPRETER: I apologise.
24 MR. JONES:
25 Q. When the Prosecution opened the case against Naser Oric last
1 October, Mr. Wubben said that Naser Oric was a: "Warlord who was drunk
2 with power."
3 Is that how Naser Oric struck you?
4 A. No, certainly not. Drunk with power? There was no power to
5 speak of in Srebrenica. What sort of power? To be anything in
6 Srebrenica where you could hardly survive. It was a punishment rather
7 than power. I was punished, too, but I had to be there.
8 Q. Now, if you know, wasn't Naser Oric's popularity you referred to
9 also quite regional in the sense that he was popular in Potocari, where
10 he was from, and in Srebrenica other commanders were just as popular like
11 Hakija, or Akif, and Zulfo?
12 A. Naser is a native of Potocari, and of course that was his base.
13 That's where his family was, his relatives. Potocari is part of
14 Srebrenica, after all; it's not external to Srebrenica. What I can say
15 is that the entire population, including the refugees who were in
16 Srebrenica at the time, trusted Naser Oric a great deal and later, too.
17 But there are people who disputed that. Nothing is ever absolute.
18 Certainly that there were both individuals and groups of people who
19 believed that this was an exaggeration or not quite what it was made out
20 to be. But this is only too human, if you see my point; it's normal.
21 Q. Would you agree that there was a Srebrenica elite, if you like,
22 of more elder educated Srebrenicians like Hakija who never fully accepted
23 Naser, accepted him as a commander?
24 A. This is the usual problem you have in the Balkans and especially
25 in Bosnia. There is a division between those who come from a more rural
1 background than a more urban background. Even if the town is very small
2 people perceive themselves as better, as a godsend to others. They
3 probably found it difficult to accept that someone from a rural
4 background participated in all sorts of roles and positions. Even if we
5 speak about civil authorities, there was a lot of bad blood, people who
6 were from the urban settlements and people who were from one of the
7 villages, they would refer to people who had a more rural background in a
8 derogatory way as farmers. But the problem, Mr. Jones, is that your
9 personal value, your worth, is assessed based on where you come from. If
10 you come from a town or a city, you are automatically made out to be more
11 valuable or as belonging to a different intellectual class as opposed to
12 those who come from rural backgrounds.
13 Q. We looked at the extract from "War Hospital" where Major Dudley
14 warned that if Srebrenica fell there would be genocide. My question is:
15 You've told us that while you were in Srebrenica over 2.000 civilians
16 were killed by shelling, air raids, et cetera. Do you agree that the
17 1995 genocide was just a continuation of what occurred when you were
18 there but on a larger scale?
19 A. I agree.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. JONES: No further questions.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Jones.
23 Mr. Wubben, is there re-examination?
24 MR. WUBBEN: Yes, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
1 MR. WUBBEN: And prior to that I would like to tender
2 translations of P164.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Okay. Thank you.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P64E -- 164E.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: 164E.
6 Yes, Mr. Wubben.
7 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honours, I would like to address several
8 issues, four issues in total I think up to three-quarters of an hour or
9 an hour.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Take your time. This is an important witness,
11 perhaps one of the most important we've had so far. I've told you
12 beforehand that I'm not going to limit either the Prosecution or the
13 Defence and we will need our own time to put questions to him in any
15 Re-examined by Mr. Wubben:
16 Q. Dr. Mujkanovic, I will refer to the transcript of last Wednesday
17 and Thursday and I will quote the parts referred to by me. First it is
18 Wednesday, 16th of February, 2005, page 5.298, Your Honour.
19 And I quote -- there is a question about destruction of Serb
20 property. The question is: "Would the same apply for the destruction of
21 Serb property?"
22 And your answer was: "Your Honours, I've already explained that
23 the things that happened with regard to the Serbian property, houses,
24 furniture, food, this was mostly caused by the civilians who wanted to
25 get hold of food and things and that that thought could be used in
1 barter, that would eventually again end up with them getting food. And
2 that was the biggest problem of the Srebrenica enclave. There was no
3 mechanism, there was no instrument that could have prevented that from
5 I would like to quote also from the transcript your answers first
6 page 5.268. A question by Judge Agius: "What was torbari mean?" And
7 your answer is in part: "They would enter villages prior to or after an
8 operation, looting food and taking food and foodstuffs away. That's what
9 they did. And these are the civilians that I was talking about yesterday
10 who would wait for the army to seize control of the village before
11 storming the villages themselves."
12 And then again page 5.269 as I quoted that on top in part. So
13 those two parts I refer to in my quotation and my question will focus on
14 those issues, those issues of various military actions, attacks or combat
15 actions, during your time in Srebrenica. And I would like to ask you:
16 Will you please answer my questions in that respect with a simple yes or
17 no or that you don't know.
18 First question: The military offensive action on Jezestica, 8th
19 of August, 1992. Were you present during that attack? Yes or no?
20 A. I was present in Srebrenica, but I don't know about the attack,
22 Q. Next question: And the military offensive action on Fakovici,
23 5th of October, 1992, were you present during that attack, yes or no?
24 A. At the war hospital in Srebrenica, yes.
25 Q. So you were not present at that attack, during that attack?
1 A. No.
2 Q. The military offensive action on Bjelovac 14 up to 19 November
3 1992, were you present during that attack on Bjelovac, yes or no?
4 A. No. I said that I was at an elevation with Ramiz Becirevic, but
5 that is quite a distance from the attack, 3, 4, possibly 5 kilometres.
6 Q. Last question: The military offensive action in the Kravica area
7 including Jezestica, 7th and 8th of January, 1993. Were you present
8 during that attack?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Let me move to another issue, that's the issue about Kemo and let
11 me refer to the transcript of last Thursday. I will quote it, Thursday,
12 the 17th of February, page 5.250. There is a question line 16, and I
14 "Q. Now you were asked on Monday about Kemal Mehmedovic,
15 nicknamed Kemal from Pale. Was he also nicknamed Kemo?"
16 "A. Yes.
17 "Q. You said he was a difficulty personality with a very bad
18 temper. Is that correct?
19 "A. Yes, that's correct."
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And I quote again --
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Dr. Mujkanovic, there is still no question put forth to you. I
24 just start quoting. Please pay attention to that. Page 5.251, line 2,
25 an answer, and I quote:
1 "A. At the time I didn't know the man. It was shortly after my
2 arrival in Srebrenica. I didn't know who he was or who many of the other
3 people were in fact. I only got to know them later on."
4 And then I will quote in part, Your Honours, page 5.253 --
5 MR. JONES: Just for the record, at the time referred to, 8th of
6 August, 1992?
7 JUDGE AGIUS: I would take it so.
8 MR. WUBBEN:
9 Q. I start quoting the question, line 2, the question is:" Right.
10 Now, concerning Kemo, isn't it right that you became aware from the
11 moment of your arrival in Srebrenica or soon after that there were a
12 number of individuals like Kemo who were out of control?
13 "A. That's correct."
14 Further on, line 14:
15 "Q. If Naser Oric tried to control Kemo, Kemo probably would
16 have killed him?
17 "A. Yes."
18 In my following questions I will refer to Kemal Mehmedovic as
19 Kemo. And my question is - and will you please answer my question in
20 that respect with a simply yes or no or you don't know - so you only came
21 to know Kemo after your arrival at Srebrenica?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And when you came to know Kemo, did you ever associate with him?
24 A. Yes --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: No.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: He said no, definitely, but the interpretation came
2 yes. It should be no, and in fact we have the interpreter's correction.
3 MR. WUBBEN:
4 Q. And is it your testimony that you never saw Kemo communicate with
5 Naser Oric therefore?
6 A. I didn't.
7 Q. I will move to the other issue, and again I will quote from the
8 transcript on Wednesday and Thursday, starting with Wednesday, Your
9 Honour, the 16th of February. Page 5.230, I quote -- it's line 2 on that
11 You stated, Witness: "When I arrived in Srebrenica, Naser Oric
12 was the commander of the defence of Srebrenica; that's how he introduced
13 himself to me. That's how the people" -- excuse me. I will start again.
14 "A. When I arrived in Srebrenica, Naser Oric was the commander
15 of the defence of Srebrenica; that's how he introduced himself to me.
16 That's how people referred to him."
17 And of Thursday's transcript, Your Honours, page 5.292, and I
18 quote from line 9. That's starting the answer in part, second sentence:
19 "There were a lot of people who looked a little bit -- who looked
20 a little like Naser, bearded people, that sort of styling.
21 "Q. Referring to that were -- that that were Naser imitators,
22 people who adopted his look?"
23 Your answer:
24 "A. Yes, that's true, very much so."
25 I have questions for you. Will you please answer my question
1 with a simple yes or no. Naser Oric introduced himself to you as a
2 commander of the Srebrenica defence. That's correct, isn't it?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And did anyone other than Naser Oric introduce himself to you as
5 Naser Oric?
6 A. No.
7 Q. And did anyone else introduce himself to you as commander of the
8 Srebrenica defence?
9 A. No.
10 Q. I will move to another issue. And let me refer to the transcript
11 of last Friday -- sorry, last Wednesday, and I will quote again. Last
12 Wednesday, page 5.197 from line 7 your answer, and I quote in part:
13 "I said that the entire area of Srebrenica was an unorganised
14 area. Nobody could look after these people in the way it could be
15 expected. There were no conditions in place for any kind of normal
17 And further line 22, I quote:
18 "In my view in that short period of chaos which involved a large
19 number of refugees and large number of people who had been transferred
20 two or three times from their original places -- original place of
21 residence, in that short period of time nobody could organise any way of
22 normalcy that is linked with a normal geopolitical situation." That last
23 part of the sentence was page 5.298, Your Honour.
24 And in the following questions I will refer to the war hospital
25 in Srebrenica during the time of your stay in that town, and again will
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 you answer my question in that respect with a simple yes or no or that
2 you don't know.
3 During your stay at Srebrenica did the war hospital function as a
4 centre for medical aid?
5 MR. JONES: Your Honour, I don't know if that question lends
6 itself to a yes or no answer, given the complexity of answers that this
7 witness has given on this subject.
8 MR. WUBBEN: I could -- I think --
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I think it's -- the question is being put in a very
10 particular context, and that is the context of hostilities, armed
11 conflict at the time. So --
12 MR. JONES: I just think in fairness to this witness if he feels
13 that a yes or no won't capture it, then he should not be --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I agree with you. The question refers specifically
15 to a war hospital and the question is also whether that -- the war
16 hospital he was running functioned as a centre for medical aid. I think
17 in a way he has already given an explanation, but if you feel that you
18 cannot answer it by just a yes or no and you would like to give us some
19 information on that, you're free to do so, Dr. Mujkanovic.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The war hospital in Srebrenica in
21 terms of how it was organised was the top-level medical institution in
22 the whole Podravanje area between Zepa and Kamenica. If you consider the
23 conditions under which we worked, the number of doctors and paramedics
24 working there, the equipment we had, there was no way it could have been
25 a relevant medical institution. This only speaks about our situation at
1 the time. But other side the war hospital there was no other institution
2 that could look after patients. We had no communication to any other
3 medical centre to begin with. A patient would come; if we could help him
4 we helped him, if we couldn't help the patient, the patient would die.
5 That was all the help that was available at the time between Zepa and
6 Kamenica; that's what I'm saying.
7 MR. WUBBEN:
8 Q. Thank you, Dr. Mujkanovic. And I was --
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Does that satisfy your question?
10 MR. WUBBEN: Yes, I was functioning on the central function for
11 medical aid.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I thought so.
13 MR. WUBBEN:
14 Q. And Dr. Mujkanovic, you told the court last Monday that from 17
15 April 1992 to 17th April 1993 the war hospital in Srebrenica provided for
16 over 3.600 wounded and injured persons, didn't you?
17 A. No. I said it provided for over 2.600 wounded. I'm only talking
18 about the wounded. 2.600 is the correct figure. 1.600 of them were
19 soldiers and about 1.000 civilians. That would be the breakdown roughly.
20 When I say "civilians," I mean women, children, elderly.
21 Q. And also that the surgical outposts of the hospital functioned in
22 the periphery of the war hospital?
23 A. Those were reception surgical outposts; that was what we called
24 them, with paramedics manning them, male and female nurses. That would
25 be the level.
1 Q. And were you as a war surgeon at that time able to treat your
2 patients on a daily basis?
3 A. That was my primary task; to deal with patients on a daily basis.
4 Q. And did --
5 A. No one stood in the way. It was my basic task, my reason for
6 being there.
7 Q. And did you provide medical treatment together with a total staff
8 of around 50?
9 A. Roughly speaking, yes.
10 Q. And did you provide that medical treatment in conjunction with
11 medical doctors?
12 A. Yes, whenever that was possible. If not, technicians and nurses
13 would assist me during operations. The best thing was if there were two
14 of those doctors together performing an operation, but that was rarely
15 the case. Everything had to be improvised and that applied to
16 operations, too.
17 Q. And was that tasking of medical treatments provided between you
18 and the other doctors?
19 A. There were five other doctors at the war hospital except me. Dr.
20 Alija Zanic worked in Vrnecka Rijeka, that's next to the Domavija Hotel.
21 He was into conservative medicine which means he treated weak people, old
22 men and women who required no surgery. Those were cases of diabetes,
23 high blood pressure, heart problems, heart-related problems, diseases of
24 that kind. It was an outpost of the war hospital that served the needs
25 of patients like these.
1 Q. And did Dr. Avdo Hasanovic carry out the function of manager of
2 the hospital?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And you told the Court that the hospital is told ahead of time in
5 order to prepare you and the staff to receive the wounded, the
6 casualties, didn't you?
7 A. I said that the hospital received information practically one day
8 before certain attacks. Sometimes we would receive that information on
9 the day of an operation, in order to prepare and so on. However, as we
10 were busy every day, we worked every day, sometimes that information
11 wasn't really of great importance to us because casualties would come in
12 regardless of the attacks or independent of the attacks. Sometimes
13 civilians were hurt on minefields or there were shelling attacks, and so
15 Q. And did you also have regular contacts with Naser Oric to update
16 him regarding the health of the wounded patients?
17 A. I said that Naser Oric came to the hospital, inquired about the
18 condition of the wounded. I did not inform anyone about the condition of
19 the patients. I did not inform the War Presidency or anybody else.
20 Whoever was interested would come in and inquire about certain patients.
21 And we at the hospital did not write formal reports and send it to any
22 body, any organ.
23 Q. And did hospital staff manage to evacuate 60 wounded per
24 helicopters and some 6.000 by trucks somewhere around 19 or 20 April
1 A. I think you have the wrong figures.
2 Q. Please tell what you know about an evacuation in April 1993.
3 A. When having discussions with General Morillon about the
4 demilitarisation of Srebrenica, one of the conditions was to evacuate the
5 wounded from the war hospital in Srebrenica. There were two attempts to
6 evacuate patients prior to the actual evacuation. On two occasions we
7 tried to evacuate the patients via the UNPROFOR helicopters; however, we
8 were prevented from doing that by the Serb forces who shelled the soccer
9 field or the sport field before we were able to complete it. So the
10 actual evacuation took place between the 18th and the 20th of April,
12 The UNPROFOR helicopter on that occasion evacuated 651 male
13 patients. I know this figure for a fact because we used to put marks on
14 patients. So 651 wounded men fit for military service were evacuated by
15 UN helicopters to the university hospital in Tuzla, and over 600 civilian
16 patients, including women, children, and the elderly, were evacuated via
17 the UN trucks through Srebrenica to Zvornik. So a total of 1300 patients
18 were evacuated during those six days of that evacuation operation.
19 Q. Thank you. So that was quite an operation?
20 A. Well, in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was the largest evacuation
21 operation of the wounded. There was nothing larger than that prior or
22 after that operation.
23 MR. WUBBEN: And for the record, Your Honour, I put the number of
24 6.000, that should be 600. So I was mistaken at that time. I apologise
25 for that, but Dr. Mujkanovic clarified that.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Wubben. You may proceed.
2 MR. WUBBEN:
3 Q. Dr. Mujkanovic, you gave extensive evidence regarding a situation
4 of certain chaos at that time. Isn't it the case that there were at the
5 hospital hardships in respect of shortages of bandage; medicine;
6 electricity, as we learned today; and food?
7 A. I wouldn't wish it upon anyone to be treated in that hospital,
8 even if that was their last chance for survival, because that hospital
9 lacked everything. Everything you mentioned lacked there.
10 Q. And that the work at the hospital, this was under hard
12 A. Yes, the hospital was shelled several times. There was several
13 direct hits. Occasionally it would happen that we would finish surgery,
14 take the patient to the bed, and he would be hit there by a shell in bed.
15 Q. And is it so that you did under these circumstances the best you
17 A. We did everything we were able to do, both I and my colleagues.
18 It is certain that we didn't provide to those people everything they
19 needed, but it is also a fact that we didn't just let them die. We did
20 everything we could under the circumstances to the best of our abilities.
21 Q. And that the staff including you at least managed to achieve a
22 functioning of the hospital, as testified by you in your response to my
24 A. I told you that the hospital functioned as it did, meaning that
25 we as doctors did our best to provide the best treatment from the moment
1 patients entered hospital until they left it.
2 Q. Thank you. I will move to my last issue as far as I see now.
3 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, that's a -- I will start with referring
4 to the transcript of last Wednesday, and I will quote. Wednesday, page
5 5.299. That's the only quotation that we expect is the transcript.
6 Q. There is a question, Dr. Mujkanovic, at line 7 and I will start
7 with referring to that question focused on contacts with Naser Oric and
8 that he never encouraged these practices, never encouraged burning or
9 looting. Your answer was, and I quote:
10 "A. I've already confirmed that in my testimony. I said that
11 not only did he not encourage, he saw it as a problem that was a constant
12 subject of discussion at the War Presidency. Naser Oric's position was
13 that there shouldn't be any fires set to the property, but no one,
14 nobody, could prevent that."
15 I have some questions for you. Will you please answer my
16 questions with a simple yes or no or you don't know. So it is your
17 testimony that Naser Oric was aware of this problem of burning and
19 A. Yes, everybody was aware, everybody knew.
20 Q. And that this problem occurred during every attack?
21 A. Roughly, yes.
22 MR. JONES: I wasn't sure if that was the problem of burning
23 occurred during every attack or Naser Oric knew that the problem occurred
24 for every attack.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't think it really calls for an explanation.
1 But, Mr. Wubben, I would suggest that you be more specific.
2 MR. WUBBEN: So I will rephrase the question.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
4 MR. WUBBEN:
5 Q. And that this problem of burning and looting occurred during
6 every attack?
7 A. Almost every attack.
8 Q. And do you recall your opinion as to why Naser Oric chose not to
9 prevent or stop that from happening?
10 MR. JONES: I'm sorry. He never expressed that opinion. If Mr.
11 Wubben has a reference for when in his evidence this witness has
12 expressed that opinion, I would be grateful if he could direct me to it.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, at the moment things being what they are, we
15 will be visiting this matter ourselves later on, too. But Mr. Jones is
16 correct. The witness has never really said -- your question was: "And
17 do you recall your opinion as to why Naser Oric chose not to prevent that
18 from happening?"
19 I think that is premised on his affirmation that Naser Oric chose
20 not to prevent this looting and burning from happening. He's never made
21 that statement.
22 MR. JONES: Yes.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: So what I suggest you should do - if you want to,
24 Mr. Wubben, because I will never interfere with your questions - is to
25 ask the witness whether to his knowledge Naser Oric ever did anything on
1 -- in regard to this looting or burning, and then you may proceed with
2 other questions. But I don't think we can allow the question that you
3 put earlier on. So you need to rephrase it or start from a different...
4 MR. WUBBEN: Thank you, Your Honour, I will rephrase it.
5 Q. Dr. Mujkanovic, are you aware that Naser Oric did -- do anything
6 about this problem of burning or looting? Did he take any steps?
7 A. I'm not aware of any specific case where such steps were taken.
8 But I also know that it was impossible to take any steps because one
9 didn't know the identity of a person who set a house on fire or stole
10 food or something like that. You have to put it in the context of the
11 events in Srebrenica. It's hard to give a yes or no answer.
12 In an area where people were in constant search for food, it was
13 impossible. There was no mechanism, no way of preventing this or
14 sanctioning it. If you disallow the people to go and search for food,
15 then you have to provide the food to them yourself. I think that people
16 did what they could in order to ensure their survival. Now, if you want
17 me to tell you that I know of a case where somebody was punished and
18 sentenced to a prison term because of what they did, I don't know of such
20 Q. Thank you.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment because he's given a very reasoned
22 answer to part of the question.
23 That explains very much what you've stated in regard to the
24 constant looting or search for food. You did not, however, cover in your
25 answer the burning and the destruction of property. I can understand
1 that searching for food and looting everything that could have become
2 useful either one way or another could be explained by the situation in
3 Srebrenica at the time, where there was a shortage of everything. But
4 destruction and burning?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President Your Honour, in those
6 days we ourselves wondered why would somebody set a house on fire if they
7 were able to loot the house and take out everything they wanted?
8 However, people tended to believe that due to the fact that Srebrenica
9 was overcrowded, overpopulated, that there were so many refugees - and I
10 mentioned this in an answer given to Mr. Jones - that there was also a
11 tension between rural and urban residents. People tended to believe that
12 they would be relocated to Fakovici, Podravanje, and so on. And out of
13 fear that they would be relocated to a place which was 20 to 30
14 kilometres from the city, where they would be exposed to Serb attacks,
15 they set those houses on fire. Most likely that was the reason. They
16 wanted to ensure that they would not be relocated elsewhere.
17 This is at least an explanation that I find plausible and an
18 explanation that seemed to dominate in discussions with people there. I
19 cannot understand why would somebody set a house on fire. My own house
20 was set on fire in Brcko; it was done by Serbs. But I myself never
21 understood, why would somebody want to destroy in five minutes something
22 that was built over the course of ten years that represented a life's
23 work of somebody else. So that's what people did, they would go and set
24 a house on fire, set somebody else's property on fire. This is a
25 sociological phenomenon and I cannot explain it. All I can do is give
1 you my own personal view of the problem.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Were the Serbs doing the same thing, burning and
3 destroying entire villages and houses?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Why do you think they were doing this? Why do you
6 think they were destroying villages and entire villages?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I don't know I can
8 answer that question. They probably also believed that by burning
9 villages or houses they would deter the people from returning. In the
10 Balkans, people are very attached to their houses, unlike the situation
11 in the US or in western Europe where people do not pay too much attention
12 to a house because that's something that can be easily changed. People
13 in the Balkans can very attached to their house. They come to a place,
14 build a house, regardless of whether they will have a job in that town,
15 in that place. They build a house and become so attached to it that it
16 becomes a part of their mentality. And this applies to people living
17 from Greece up north. People get attached to an area, regardless of
18 whether they have a job there or not. Here in Holland people do not
19 build emotional ties to a certain geographic area; they will go and live
20 wherever they can find a job.
21 I don't think I'm a witness who can fully answer this because you
22 really need a sociologist, a person who can explain this phenomenon of
23 burning and setting houses on fire and looting them.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: I put it to you that that could also be a reason
25 why Muslim civilians and soldiers, I don't know, burnt down and destroyed
1 Serb houses and Serb villages so that the Serbs would not return to those
2 villages. Would you accept that as one of the plausible reasons?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I could accept that. This is
4 one nation, Your Honour Mr. President, however people in that nation have
5 three different religions; however, their feelings and philosophy are the
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Did you hear -- did you ever hear anyone explain
8 the destruction of and burning of houses in this manner, that is to --
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I heard such explanations
10 also in Srebrenica. People would say, Well, they burnt my house, too.
11 If I don't set their house on fire, they will come back to the area. So
12 that was one of the explanations given, yes. There were such cases.
13 They wanted to ensure that people would not come back and live in the
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Wubben, but I wouldn't like to comment on
16 whether the Dutch love their houses as much as the people in the Balkans
17 or not.
18 MR. WUBBEN: I will remain silent, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
20 MR. WUBBEN:
21 Q. Dr. Mujkanovic, now returning to the steps taken or not. To
22 summarise, is it your testimony that you're not aware of any such steps
23 taken to prevent this burning and looting?
24 A. I can say that there were no cases where anyone was prosecuted
25 for having set a house on fire or having looted a house. I can't say
1 that no steps were taken to prevent that; however, there was no mechanism
2 available to prevent people from doing that, from going to a village and
3 burning houses there.
4 Q. And does that include that you're not aware of any steps taken by
5 Naser Oric to prevent that burning and looting?
6 MR. JONES: He said there's no mechanism available, so I'm not
7 sure what steps he should have taken.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, objection sustained.
9 Perhaps you can rephrase your question, Mr. Wubben.
10 MR. WUBBEN:
11 Q. Apart from the mechanism you described, are you aware of any
12 steps taken by Naser Oric to prevent that burning and looting?
13 MR. JONES: The mechanism he was saying -- no steps could be
14 taken. So if you want to ask the witness what could be done to stop it
15 and then were those the steps taken, that's one thing. But he's saying
16 it was impossible. So what is Naser Oric supposed to have done?
17 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, if I may.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Wubben, you can ask the witness whether to
19 his knowledge Naser Oric ever tried anything to curtail on this practice
20 or tried to do anything, of course failed because there was no mechanism.
21 MR. WUBBEN:
22 Q. Dr. Mujkanovic --
23 MR. JONES: Was there anything to be done --
24 JUDGE AGIUS: He's your witness, Mr. Wubben. I'm not going to
25 put the question for you.
1 MR. WUBBEN:
2 Q. The question is, Dr. Mujkanovic, whether to your knowledge Naser
3 Oric ever tried anything to curtail on this practice or tried to do
4 anything in respect to prevent this burning and looting.
5 A. Your Honours, I've already stated that the villages were burned
6 by civilians, people searching for food, in quest of food, and they would
7 loot and take the food and then after several days, they would go and set
8 houses on fire. It was not within the competencies of Naser Oric to
9 monitor over what civilians were doing. If anybody should have done
10 something, it should have been civilian protection or civilian
11 authorities or the War Presidency; they should have done something.
12 These villages are up to 30 kilometres from Srebrenica.
13 Perhaps you don't have a realistic picture of that terrain.
14 These are places very distant from each other. One is on a hill, the
15 other one is elsewhere. So these villages are scattered over the area;
16 they're not linked. There is no streets linking them. And they're
17 called villages, but they're tiny. Some of them have five houses and the
18 houses can be 1 kilometre away from each other. So these are not
19 significant settlements. It was impossible to ensure safety there.
20 Q. And, Dr. Mujkanovic, are you aware of any reason why Naser Oric
21 chose not to take any steps as far as you are aware?
22 MR. JONES: He didn't say that Naser Oric chose not to take
23 steps. He's putting words in the witness's mouth and ignoring all
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, objection sustained. And this time I'm not
1 telling you how to rephrase the question, Mr. Wubben.
2 MR. WUBBEN:
3 Q. Dr. Mujkanovic, are you aware of the reason why Naser Oric did
4 not make any steps to prevent or stop this burning or looting?
5 MR. JONES: That's exactly the same question. It's already
6 assuming that Naser Oric --
7 MR. WUBBEN: That's not the question, Your Honour.
8 MR. JONES: It's not exactly the same, but it assumes that there
9 were steps that he could take and that he didn't take them. The witness
10 hasn't said that there were steps which could have been taken.
11 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, the witness was not aware of it and he
12 explained a reasoning and to his opinion Naser Oric had no competencies
13 in that respect.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: So he has answered your question.
15 MR. WUBBEN: If that is the reason. So shall I put it in that
16 way, Your Honour?
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
18 Dr. Mujkanovic, you have already explained that according to you
19 Naser Oric did not have it within his competence and within his authority
20 to try and curtail. Is that the only reason why he wouldn't have
21 intervened in trying to curtail these burnings and destruction?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I said this was one
23 of the reasons: He was in no position to discuss this with civilians.
24 But the most important reason, the paramount reason, was that there was
25 simply no way to secure the areas. Those are enormous areas. I think
1 you should go there and see for yourselves; maybe you would have a
2 different idea then. It's a mountainous area with scattered villages.
3 You would have needed 5.000 people to secure all those settlements from
4 all those civilians that came hoarding [as interpreted] in.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I was just conferring with my two colleagues.
8 How much more do you have, Mr. Wubben?
9 MR. WUBBEN: I think it will take a quarter of an hour.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: We were going to suggest the following. I am not
11 feeling that well. I think I'm running a temperature and I would rather
12 go home the earliest possible. But what I was going to suggest is rather
13 than have a break now and resume -- have you finish and then we start
14 with our questions, that you finish with your questions as -- I mean, I'm
15 not rushing you, but try to finish. We continue for the next 15 minutes
16 and we finish for the day and we continue the next time, if that is
17 acceptable to the interpreters and staff. All right. I see hands up.
18 Is that acceptable to you, Mr. Jones?
19 MR. JONES: Yes, absolutely.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: And to you, Mr. Wubben?
21 MR. WUBBEN: Can we confer together were --
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes, please.
23 MR. WUBBEN: For one moment, please.
24 [Prosecution counsel confer]
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Alternatively, Mr. Wubben, we could finish now and
3 adjourn until Wednesday. You could finish on Wednesday. It's up to you.
4 MR. WUBBEN: Yes. We would like to finish on -- yes, Your
5 Honour, I appreciate that we would like to finish on Wednesday.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, because I would like to go home as quickly as
7 I can because I'm not feeling -- I'm concentrating all right but it's
8 getting worse as we go long. I don't want to end up in bed for the next
9 three days or four days.
10 We stand adjourned until Wednesday in the afternoon.
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.51 p.m.,
12 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 23rd day of
13 February, 2005, at 2.15 p.m.