1 Monday, 14 March 2005.
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam Registrar, could you call the case,
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is the case
8 IT-03-68-T, the Prosecutor versus Naser Oric.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you, Madam. Mr. Oric, can you
10 follow the proceedings in your own language?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours, ladies
12 and gentlemen, yes, I can.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, you may sit down. Appearances for the
15 MR. WUBBEN: Good afternoon, Your Honours, and good afternoon
16 Defence team. My name is Jan Wubben lead counsel for the Prosecution,
17 together with co-counsel, Mr. Gramsci Di Fazio and our case manager, Ms.
18 Donnica Henry-Frijlink.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Wubben, and good afternoon to you
20 and your team. Appearances for Naser Oric.
21 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. I am
22 Vasvija Vidovic, together with Mr. John Jones appearing on behalf of Mr.
23 Naser Oric. We have with us our legal assistant Ms. Jasmina Cosic and Ms.
24 Adisa Mehic, attending today for the first time.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Madam Vidovic, and welcome back. I
1 hope you're feeling better.
2 So good afternoon to you and your team, of course. Any
3 preliminaries before we bring in this witness? Yes, Mr. Wubben.
4 MR. WUBBEN: Yes, Your Honour. Last Friday we filed a -- we filed
5 and sent to the parties a new schedule for witnesses --
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
7 MR. WUBBEN: -- including and referring to videolink witness in
8 that respect we filed also an addendum to a prior filed motion. And I
9 contacted Defence counsel in that respect and requested them for any
10 cooperation, if possible, to respond on short term and they told me to do
11 so. So I'm much obliged in that respect.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
13 MR. WUBBEN: I have another issue. That's related, Your Honour,
14 to that issue we already addressed last week about sending of proofing
15 notes and in exhibit list prior to the witness itself. Yesterday my case
16 manager received from legal assistant an e-mail, legal assistant of the
17 Defence team and, in that e-mail, there is a reference to the witness
18 projected now for today and that's okay, of course, when on the level of
19 case manager versus case manager of the other team there is an exchange on
21 Well, in this e-mail of yesterday, there is also reference to
22 general issues of policy of disclosure and a kind of representing the
23 team, the Defence team referring to "we are sending you this message" and
24 there is a request to the OTP not to delay any disclosure for any witness
25 and also reference to a language like "we will vigorously seek
1 adjournments" and the practice of late disclosure.
2 Well, in my opinion, that's not true at all, but at the same time,
3 I noticed that a message is sent to our case manager and not to me as lead
4 counsel. So in that respect, there should be a better practice for
5 exchanging such information and not by legal assistant and also copying to
6 other parties. Then excluding me as the lead counsel for the Prosecution.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I thank you, Mr. Wubben. Let's take them one
8 by one. I want to make sure that I have understood you well. This
9 addendum to the Prosecution motion for the testimony of a witness via
10 video-conference link, do I take it that you are informing the Trial
11 Chamber that the Defence has agreed that there would be a video-conference
12 testimony on the 4th and 5th of April?
13 MR. WUBBEN: No, Your Honour. It was that I -- I was seeking
14 cooperation that I would file an early response to it, rather than to wait
15 for 14 days and it had been confirmed that they will do their best and
16 today or tomorrow they will try to --
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. All right. So I was understanding well. Yes,
18 Mr. Jones, what's the position.
19 MR. JONES: Yes, that's correct firstly that we indicated we would
20 respond promptly and, in fact, the position is that we won't oppose the
21 Prosecution motion. We won't actually file anything but we won't oppose
23 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Jones. So here and now we can
24 grant the motion and in other words there will be video-link conference
25 for the purposes of this addendum and the original motion video conference
1 link would be as requested, that is on the 4th and on the 5th of April of
3 MR. WUBBEN: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: So that's sorted out. Do you require -- I don't
5 think you do require a written one for the purpose of just the videolink?
6 I don't think so. Anyway, if you need a written one, we will provide you
7 with a written one but I think an oral decision would suffice.
8 I don't know. I mean I have signed others before, of course, but
9 I honestly don't remember whether it's requisite or whether we can do with
11 MR. WUBBEN: I don't remember requisite, Your Honour, but I know
12 that it's not only the mission for OTP involved but also for registry and
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. This is why I'm saying whether you require a
15 written decision, written order. I don't think so. If you require one,
16 we'll have one put in place in five minutes. Trial Chamber two is very
18 Yes, the second matter. Please, I invite you both not to take
19 much of the Chamber's time on this matter. You know what I have stated
20 earlier. This is more of a matter of courtesy to start with, a matter of
21 keeping each one another informed. Yes, Mr. Jones.
22 MR. JONES: Yes. I could probably respond in about ten seconds.
23 As far as e-mails are concerned, there's always a certain informality. I
24 don't know how helpful it is to ventilate it before the Trial Chamber.
25 But for the sake of clarity, I, in fact, drafted the text of that e-mail
1 and sent it.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: I could see that.
3 MR. JONES: Yes. And the reasons -- the reasons for why that was
4 a convenient way of dealing with matters. It was really the message
5 seemed to be more important than the message be better -- be gotten across
6 that we didn't want any delays rather than how the message was sent.
7 Having said that, the point is taken. Obviously when the lead counsel was
8 away, there might have been certain irregular communications if I can put
9 it that way and we're happy to keep -- lead counsel to lead counsel
10 communications in the spirit that Mr. Wubben asks for.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Jones. But again, I enjoin you
12 these matters can be sorted out between you or amongst you in the most
13 amicable manner. Plus the use of certain words is normal legal parlance
14 in the tradition, for example, that I am used to, like we will vigorously
15 seek adjournments. This is something that -- this is how we talk or how
16 we speak. So don't take it as if it's meant to send out loud and clear
17 war-like messages. I mean, this is how we talk. So don't worry about it
18 Mr. Wubben. I mean, I would suggest that you try to do -- you know, find
19 a common ground amongst you without involving the Tribunal -- the Trial
20 Chamber as much as you can, in these matters. Because I'm sure that there
21 is always a solution. Anything else?
22 MR. WUBBEN: No, Your Honour, but I hope that I don't have to
23 address your Trial Chamber when this happen again. I will seek to try to
24 prevent this and contact Defence counsel.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: I think that is the best way to go about it and then
1 we will see if there are problems obviously. Anything else before we
2 bring in the witness? No. You have had now the proofing notes and all
3 the documents that you needed?
4 MR. JONES: Yes, we pretty much have everything. There are one or
5 two matters still to be --
6 JUDGE AGIUS: The next thing because forewarned is forearmed.
7 This gentleman, who will be joining us soon to give testimony has given
8 lengthy statements to the office of the -- obviously, with practically all
9 the cases involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in mind. I mean
10 this statement covers not just this case, but covers a lot of other cases.
11 So please try to restrict your examination-in-chief and your
12 cross-examination to what is relevant to this case.
13 MR. DI FAZIO: It's --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Otherwise we would be opening a far wider horizon
15 than we actually need.
16 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes. There is no question that I -- I will be as
17 selective as I can. But just from what Your Honours say, I wonder that I
18 -- I hope that you have all the material. I know that you got the
19 statements beforehand. You have a statement, I think, dated
20 September/July 2001 and another one dated -- and March 2002, it's a big
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
23 MR. DI FAZIO: Going to 36 pages you have that.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
25 MR. DI FAZIO: Is that all you have?
1 JUDGE AGIUS: No. Then we have another one which is dated -- 21st
2 of September 2002 and first and second of November 2002. So that's -- and
3 we have them in both language.
4 MR. DI FAZIO: The statements aren't going to be gone through
5 chapter and verse.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: I hope not. This is why I'm making myself clear.
7 MR. DI FAZIO: I understand what Your Honours want and that will
8 not happen.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: These are topics -- subject matter that is very
10 tempting both Prosecution and Defence, to --
11 MR. DI FAZIO: There will be a little bit of background but only
12 to help you understand subsequent actions in the all important month of
13 March in Srebrenica. That's the context in which that would be given.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: The information on how UNPROFOR came about, it's --
15 there is a lot of information that we don't need for this case.
16 MR. DI FAZIO: I'm not going to go into that chapter and verse.
17 There is just one or two points I need to make about that.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Let's start. Where is the witness?
19 Yes, please.
20 [The witness entered court]
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Good afternoon, to you, Mr. Tucker.
22 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, sir.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Welcome to this Tribunal. Pretty soon you're going
24 to start giving evidence in this case, which has been instituted by the
25 Prosecution against Naser Oric. I take it that you are familiar with the
1 court proceedings. Our rules require that before you start giving
2 evidence, you address a solemn declaration equivalent to an oath that in
3 the course of your testimony you will be speaking the truth, the whole
4 truth, and nothing but the truth. The text is going to be handed to you
5 by Madam Usher. Please go ahead and read it and that will be your solemn
6 undertaking with us.
7 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
8 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Please take a seat.
10 WITNESS: PYERS TUCKER
11 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't think I need to explain to you the
12 procedure. Mr. Di Fazio will go first for the Prosecution. How long do
13 you expect your examination-in-chief to be, Mr. Di Fazio?
14 MR. DI FAZIO: Two days.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Two days, all right. And Mr. Jones, another two
17 MR. JONES: Well, I think a day and a half anyway, five hours,
18 five to six hours, yes.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm telling you this because however much I tried to
20 find some time while we are not sitting, I have another initial appearance
21 this week, another new comer, which again has also been assigned to my
22 chamber and I will need to have the initial appearance on Thursday.
23 Now, my senior legal officer is doing his level best to arrange it
24 so that as soon as we start a break here on Thursday afternoon, I move to
25 another courtroom and start with the initial appearance and try to get it
1 over and done as quick -- as quickly as possible. But there are, I think,
2 20 counts, so that will take time. I mean this morning I had 37 counts
3 and it took me an hour and a half. So that will take an hour at least, an
4 hour, hour and a quarter or less because there is only one accused. It
5 will take me 45 minutes to an hour.
6 Which basically means that we might have to lose about 30 minutes
7 from our case on Thursday. All right. So as we go along, please try to
8 make your assessment as to where we stand and decide whether we need to
9 have another witness here --
10 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: -- on Friday or not. All right. It's your
12 assessment. I will stay by it, in other words, I will cooperate with you,
13 of course, and this is an important witness. Information he is going to
14 give us is very important, fundamental to the case, and I will allow you
15 all the time that you need, both of you, to examine and cross-examine this
16 witness as you wish, as you desire, as you need. All right. Which
17 basically means, Mr. Tucker, that you may get stuck here in The Hague for
18 the next few days or until the end of the week. I know I can count on
19 your full cooperation. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Di Fazio, please go ahead.
20 Examined by Mr. Di Fazio:
21 MR. DI FAZIO:
22 Q. Thank you. Witness, I think you still have a commission in the
23 British army; is that correct?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. So I'll refer to you as Colonel Tucker. I just want to go through
1 some background material. You were educated in the United Kingdom,
2 attended University in the United Kingdom?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. You graduated summa cum laude in mechanical engineering?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. When did you graduate, can you recall?
7 A. In 1984.
8 Q. Prior to that, had you attended the Royal Military Academy in
9 Sandhurst between 1976 and 1977?
10 A. Yes, that is correct.
11 Q. You are a commissioned officer in the royal artillery?
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. You have qualified as an artillery forward observer?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. A troop commander?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And a battery commander?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. You have therefore had experience in leading and commanding men,
20 as a troop commander and battery commander?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. Both tasks place differing numbers of men under your command, I
23 believe, about fifty as a troop commander?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And about 200 men as a battery commander?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. You attended the junior division of the staff college in 1976?
3 A. 1986.
4 Q. I'm sorry. Just briefly explain what the junior division of the
5 staff college is, very briefly.
6 A. It's a course for captains in the British army to prepare them for
7 company command and company second in command and it covers administrative
8 duties and staff duties.
9 Q. Right. And you graduated top out of 130 students there?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You also attended the German general staff college between 1989
12 and 1991?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And you there came 3rd out of 60 students undergoing that course?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You've seen service in Northern Ireland on three occasions where
17 you worked as an intelligence officer, a troop commander, battery
18 commander and where you also received infantry training; is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Between May and October of 1992, you were the military assistant
21 to the chief of staff of NATO's headquarters, northern army group.
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. In October of 1992, you were posted as the military assistant to
24 the commander of the United Nations Protection Force or UNPROFOR at their
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina headquarters?
1 A. No. I was posted as the military advisor to the commander of
2 UNPROFOR's Bosnia-Herzegovina commands.
3 Q. Oh, I see.
4 A. Not of UNPROFOR.
5 Q. Right, I see. Thank you very much for clarifying that. I'm going
6 to return to that period of your work in due course.
7 Following that, you performed a two-year service in Germany
8 working as a battery commander with the British army?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. December 1995 to February 1996, you performed duties as a
11 commander of a self-propelled-artillery battery in the Banja Luka area?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Between June 1996 and December 1997 you led the Bosnia crisis
14 management team in the UK, United Kingdom national crisis management
15 headquarters which amongst other things was providing logistic support for
16 the United Kingdom contingent of SFOR; is that correct?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. You left the British army in early 1998 and you basically have
19 been working in the private sector since that time?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. I want to turn -- ask you to turn your attention to UNPROFOR. I
22 think that was established in March of 1992.
23 A. I understand so.
24 Q. Yes. Was its mandate initially to monitor the cease-fire that was
25 in place in Croatia at that time?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Where was it based?
3 A. The forces of the -- of UNPROFOR were based obviously in Croatia
4 in the UNPAs, whereas the headquarters for UNPROFOR was based in Sarajevo
5 which at that time was thought to be a convenient logistic location that
6 was not involved with any of the fighting.
7 Q. Who was the commander at that time?
8 A. General Nambiar.
9 Q. Who was the deputy force commander?
10 A. General Morillon.
11 Q. Did you meet General Morillon and form a working relationship with
12 him through 1992 and into 1993?
13 A. I did, indeed.
14 Q. There was a -- it's agreed there was an outbreak of hostilities in
15 April of 1992 in Bosnia and did that cause UNPROFOR to pull out of
17 A. Yes, that made the management of -- and administration of
18 UNPROFOR's headquarters in Sarajevo untenable and their ability to command
19 and control the operations in Croatia and in the UNPAs impractical.
20 Q. Thank you. In June of 1992, was the sector Sarajevo set up?
21 A. Yes. Sector Sarajevo was set up. It was initially a Canadian
22 battle group and then subsequently a Ukrainian and an Egyptian battalion
23 were added.
24 Q. About how many men did that number?
25 A. Combat soldiers.
1 Q. Approximately.
2 A. About 2000, 2500.
3 Q. And where did it have its headquarters?
4 A. Its headquarters was in the PTT building in Sarajevo, halfway
5 between the centre of Sarajevo and the airport.
6 Q. Thank you. In September of 1992, was a decision taken to
7 establish a new Bosnia-Herzegovina command?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Yes. A command of what precisely, just explain the structure that
10 was created.
11 A. As we've just discussed, sector Sarajevo was the only UN forces in
12 Bosnia. There had been a conference in London -- the London conference in
13 August at which a number of nations had agreed that they would contribute
14 troops in Bosnia in order to try and provide humanitarian aid and to
15 facilitate cease-fires.
16 The countries which had already provided troops, in other words,
17 sector Sarajevo, remained and additional troops from the UK, from France,
18 from Spain, Denmark, et cetera, about ten countries in total were put --
19 were established and a new headquarters was formed, headquarters
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina command.
21 Q. Thank you. You've mentioned two aspects of its mandate, the
22 delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and the negotiation of cease-fires.
23 Did that remain, the mandate of this new structure that was created
24 throughout 1992 and 1993?
25 A. Yes. For the time that I was there, that was the basis of the
1 security council resolutions of which quite a number were passed during
2 the period.
3 Q. Is it correct to describe that as the two principal objectives of
4 the command, delivery of humanitarian aid throughout Bosnia and the
5 negotiation of cease-fires?
6 A. I would describe it as facilitation of cease-fires.
7 Q. Facilitation of cease-fires.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speakers kindly pause between question
9 and answer, please.
10 MR. DI FAZIO:
11 Q. We're both speaking English so we don't have the usual hesitation
12 so perhaps if we slow it down a bit. Was the Bosnia-Herzegovina command
13 subordinate to UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb?
14 A. Yes, it was. General Nambiar, the commander in Zagreb was General
15 Morillon's superior commander.
16 Q. Did the Bosnia-Herzegovina command develop a deployment capability
17 in or around September October of 1992?
18 A. Yes. The additional forces to sector Sarajevo were deployed into
19 Bosnia during October and November of 1992.
20 Q. When did you arrive to take up your duties there?
21 A. I arrived in October 1992.
22 Q. And was Morillon already there in Bosnia or did you join him? Or
23 did he go with you to Sarajevo?
24 A. No. General Morillon was in Belgrade at that time. The route
25 through which the forces not yet deployed in Bosnia, deployed into Bosnia
1 was large -- was mostly through Belgrade. And so I met General Morillon
2 in Belgrade and we then flew into Sarajevo towards the end of October,
4 Q. Did you set up a command as a headquarter structure?
5 A. The headquarter structure that was set up was a small -- what I
6 would describe as diplomatic elements inside Sarajevo in the residency
7 building in Sarajevo, which had been Tito's summer residence and was about
8 a kilometre north of the Presidency building in central Sarajevo. The
9 remainder of the headquarters which was the bulk of the headquarters which
10 was about 350 to 400 men was set up. It was established in a village
11 called Kiseljak, which was about half an hour's drive outside of Sarajevo,
12 away from Sarajevo in the direction -- in the direction of Jajce.
13 Q. Thanks. Where did you and General Morillon work out of?
14 A. General Morillon established himself in the small diplomatic
15 headquarters inside Sarajevo, whereas the military operations were
16 directed from Kiseljak by General Morillon's chief of staff, Brigadier
18 Q. You also worked out of the residency together with Morillon?
19 A. I worked with Morillon out of the residency.
20 Q. Why was the -- why was the -- why were the headquarters split in
21 this way, with the bulk being at Kiseljak, the bulk of the working men
22 being at Kiseljak and this smaller physical location within the residency
23 in Sarajevo?
24 A. The -- General Morillon believed it was very important to show
25 international solidarity and recognition with the legally established
1 government in Bosnia and -- however, that was inside a siege and
2 encirclement and it would have been very difficult to carry out military
3 operations, logistic operations from inside the siege. Therefore he
4 decided that it would not be good military practice to constrain his
5 operations by having them inside the siege.
6 Q. Kiseljak was effectively behind Muslim lines in Muslim hill
8 A. It was actually in the Croat -- the Bosnian Croat --
9 Q. Sorry. Thank you.
10 A. -- part of Bosnia.
11 Q. Thank you. Thanks for clarifying that. What precisely were
12 General Morillon's duties in Sarajevo?
13 A. General Morillon carried out discussions, negotiations with the
14 political and military leaders of all three factions who were engaged in
15 hostilities inside Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 Q. Did that require or necessitate him travelling out of Sarajevo
17 from time to time?
18 A. Almost every day.
19 Q. Did you accompany him?
20 A. I accompanied General Morillon wherever he went.
21 Q. Thank you. You said that his duties involved carrying out
22 discussions and negotiations with the political and military leaders of
23 all three factions. And you've earlier referred to the mandate that the
24 Bosnian headquarters had namely the facilitation of cease-fires and the
25 facilitation, organisation of aid convoys. Were those two topics also his
1 objectives? Was he trying to achieve that wherever possible?
2 A. That was the reason why he had meetings every day. Sometimes two,
3 three meetings a day with various military and political leaders. And to
4 explain the context, the prime task was the provision of humanitarian aid
5 to those in need.
6 Now, in order to achieve that, they could not be fighting or
7 wherever there was fighting it prevented humanitarian aid to be delivered.
8 So therefore getting cease-fires or arranging the facilitating of
9 cease-fires was a necessary prerequisite to being able to deliver
10 humanitarian aid.
11 Q. Thank you. In carrying out his duties, did Morillon have to speak
12 to local military commanders in order to facilitate -- help bring about a
13 sort of cease-fires you have spoken of?
14 A. Yes. All the time.
15 Q. Was it important to him to ensure that he was in fact speaking to
16 the - for want of a better word - real military commander in any
17 particular area?
18 A. Yes, it was essential and he became very angry when he was being
19 delayed from speaking with the real commanders.
20 Q. Okay. As -- in addition to speaking to military commanders, in
21 order to facilitate cease-fires, did he have to speak to local politicians
22 and also more powerful politicians in the warring factions?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did you assist him to set up these meetings, organise these
1 A. My task was, firstly, to arrange the next day's meetings, the next
2 week's meetings and that's to agree time, place, route, travel, agenda
3 where relevant, and then secondly, to accompany the general, take notes
4 during those meetings, then after the meeting, to draft General Morillon's
5 reports about the meetings he had had during that day for approval by
6 General Morillon for subsequent transmission to Zagreb to HQ UNPROFOR and
7 specifically General Nambiar.
8 Q. The draft reports that you prepared on behalf of General Morillon,
9 were they created using the notes that you have referred to? The notes
10 that you took?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber how long after an event, a meeting,
13 a discussion, an occurrence, would you make these notes normally?
14 A. Most of my notes during meetings were made during the meeting
15 itself. Taking notes as the conversation ebbed and flowed.
16 Q. And if you were unable to do that, in other words, to take notes
17 actually during a meeting or during an occurrence, how long after would
18 you make notes?
19 A. Usually, at the latest, that evening.
20 Q. And when you made those notes at that time, were the events still
21 fresh in your mind?
22 A. Unpleasantly so.
23 Q. Thank you. You have in front of you a book. What is that book?
24 A. This book is a diary. It's the diary that I wrote from the 10th
25 of March, 1993 through to the 28th or 29th of March, 1993.
1 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you. If Your Honours please, I would like to
2 show you that diary and the Defence that diary. I have a copy of it of
3 course and it has the ERN number which has the advantage of having numbers
4 on it and for the rest of this witness's evidence I would like, of course,
5 to use the photocopied version which has the ERN, but I would like you to
6 have an opportunity to just look at the notebook itself, the original, and
7 perhaps if the usher could show it to the Defence.
8 Also, to seek permission that the witness keep that original --
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Show it to the Defence first, yes.
10 MR. DI FAZIO: I would like also to seek permission that the
11 witness keep that original. On occasions there has been marker pen used
12 in it so the photocopy often sometimes doesn't pick up a date which the
13 original, you will be able to see on the original. So if there is any
14 problems, we can always have the -- refer to the original to see it
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Is the original -- let me see it anyway.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Before we proceed on this, Mr. Di Fazio,
19 just a couple of questions. One to you and one to the witness. Of
20 course, there will be absolutely no problem on our part that the witness
21 will have this in front of him all the time while he is giving testimony.
22 How do you intend to overcome the problem of making the witness refer to
23 particular pages when this is not -- pages are not numbered in sequence,
24 but the photocopy that you have has got sequential --
25 MR. DI FAZIO: By using the photocopy, but to have the original
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 there in case there is some part of the photocopy that's not entirely
3 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
4 MR. DI FAZIO: Because I think you will see blue marking pen.
5 Blue doesn't come up well on photocopying. It obscures. Some
6 photocopiers don't have that problem, but blue does. So that's all -- the
7 witness will in fact refer to the photocopy so that we can all instantly
8 go to a part of the diary.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
10 MR. DI FAZIO: It's just as back up.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Di Fazio and I am sure we will find
12 a way. Also, just for the record, this now seems to have tags everywhere
13 -- that are at least some of the blue are marked with a reference to the
14 date, reference to dates.
15 I don't see any of the red tags showing any markings on them. The
16 question that I have to the witness -- for the witness is that, I came
17 across two pages that seemed to have been torn off from this diary. Are
18 you aware of this, to start with?
19 THE WITNESS: Yes.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you have an explanation -- I mean, we just want
21 to make sure that there is nothing fishy about it, that's what. It's your
22 diary obviously and you can explain.
23 THE WITNESS: That diary was the only paper that I had in
24 Srebrenica and I think we used them to light fires or something like that.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Usher, you could hand this back to the
1 witness, please. Yes, Mr. Di Fazio, please.
2 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you. If Your Honours please, in light of the
3 evidence of the -- evidence of Colonel Tucker, I seek to tender into
4 evidence photocopies of this diary.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: You have, I take it, Mr. Jones, received a copy of
6 this in good time?
7 MR. JONES: Yes. Yes, we have got it.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Mr. Tucker, before we proceed or Colonel
9 Tucker, this diary has never left your custody? You've always retained
10 custody of it?
11 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you.
13 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you. Has it been given --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: You haven't asked.
15 MR. DI FAZIO: I seek to tender it into evidence if Your Honours
17 JUDGE AGIUS: So, yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Exhibit P510.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document being a diary kept by witness --
20 [Microphone not activated]
21 JUDGE AGIUS: This diary being a photocopy of -- this document
22 being a photocopy of a diary kept by witness Colonel Tucker and starting
23 with ERN number 04193416 and ending with ERN number 04193608 is being
24 tendered and received in evidence and marked Prosecution Exhibit P510.
25 Thank you.
1 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you.
2 Q. Colonel Tucker, the general taskings of General Morillon and
3 Bosnian headquarters was, I think, onerous and required you to focus on
4 various aspects of the country at different times. Is that correct or
6 A. Yes, that is correct.
7 Q. How did you prioritize your attention from week-to-week,
8 month-to-month, in the period of time from October to March of 1993? How
9 did you decide where to direct your energies, your efforts, your manpower?
10 A. The priority that General Morillon took was, firstly, any orders
11 that he may have received from General Nambiar, of which he did not during
12 that time. Secondly, it was to listen to what the Presidency, and by that
13 I mean President Izetbegovic and his major interlocutor, Dr. Ganic, what
14 they said and where they wished General Morillon to focus his attention.
15 Secondly, on what the Bosnian Serb leadership, that's Dr. Karadzic and
16 General Mladic, where they wished concern to be focussed and, thirdly,
17 what the Croat authorities and the main person with whom General Morillon
18 spoke in that context was with Brigadier General Petkovic.
19 Q. And in the period of time between October and Christmas of 1992,
20 where was the main -- what was the main focus of your attention?
21 A. The main focus before Christmas 1992 was the situation around
22 Sarajevo and the siege and the utilities -- that's electricity, water,
23 gas, and the plight of the population inside Sarajevo.
24 Q. And during that period of time, did General Morillon have meetings
25 with the Serb leadership, including General Mladic and Dr. Karadzic?
1 A. Yes. A whole series.
2 Q. You've just said that the primary focus of attention for Bosnia
3 command was Sarajevo. In that period of time, October to Christmas, 1992,
4 did you have occasion to focus your attention and your energies on
6 A. Yes, we did and it wasn't just Srebrenica. It was also Gorazde.
7 And what happened was that the prime focus was Sarajevo, but in the
8 background there was an ongoing and continuous attempt by the United
9 Nations to get humanitarian aid convoys into the Gorazde pocket and into
10 the Srebrenica pocket.
11 Q. Did, in fact, -- did you in fact succeed in organizing an aid
12 convoy into Srebrenica in late 1992?
13 A. Yes, we managed to get a convoy of humanitarian aid into
14 Srebrenica at the end of November, 1992, which is about, I think it's 27th
15 of -- 28th November, it actually arrived at Srebrenica.
16 Q. Did Brigadier Cordy-Simpson play a role in the organisation of aid
18 A. General Cordy-Simpson who was General Morillon's chief of staff,
19 who was leading operations from Kiseljak was the main implementer of all
20 of the organisation, the logistics, the administration, of humanitarian
21 aid convoys throughout Bosnia, and particularly the ones to Srebrenica.
22 Q. Do you know how large that particular convoy was?
23 A. I believe it was ten -- ten -- 10-ton trucks, out -- which came
24 from the Belgian Dutch transport battalion.
25 Q. And about how many tons of supplies would that have been able to
1 transport into Srebrenica?
2 A. About 100 tons, about ten tons per truck.
3 Q. You've said that one of the ways in which you prioritized your
4 taskings was according to the -- what the leadership of the warring
5 factions mentioned to you, what they were concerned about. Did you
6 receive any communications of more serious concerns about what was
7 happening in Srebrenica in that latter part of 1992?
8 A. The concern that -- during 1992 was that there were people --
9 there were many refugees in those areas, that they'd been cut off since
10 about May 1992, April/May 1992 and there were a lot of starving people
11 there and that it was winter.
12 Q. And what was your source of information to establish that, namely
13 the fact that there was large numbers of refugees, starvation and the --
14 winter obviously you knew, but what was your source of information about
15 those conditions?
16 A. From the Presidency themselves, in other words Dr. Ganic,
17 President Izetbegovic, Zlatko Lagumdzija who was the Bosniak minister for
18 refugee affairs, and we had information from our own convoy which had got
19 into -- had reached Srebrenica in November. They had reported about the
20 conditions and circumstances that they found there.
21 Q. Can you recall what the -- the thrust of the report was that you
22 received from the persons who travelled in with a convoy?
23 A. The description of the circumstances in Srebrenica was that the
24 conditions were quite bad. There were a lot of refugees. There were a
25 number who were starving or close to starving. It was very cold but that
1 there were -- there were -- there was livestock still in some -- in some
2 fields that there were some supplies, that conditions were bad, but there
3 were other parts of Bosnia at that time where conditions were worse.
4 Q. Thank you. Did the Bosnian Presidency ever express any concerns
5 to you in that latter part of 1992 about fighting that was going on in the
6 area or that might have been going on in the area of Srebrenica?
7 A. No. Their concern was continually: People are hungry, people are
9 Q. You've testified that during this period you also had
10 communications with the Serb leadership. Did the Serb leadership express
11 any concerns to you about any aspect of affairs in eastern Bosnia, in
12 particular the Srebrenica enclave?
13 A. The Serb leadership, the conversations we had with the Serb
14 leadership were always at our request. The Serb leadership were not
15 seeking conversation with us about that area. They had no issues with us
16 about that area. We had issues with them, because they were stopping our
17 convoys getting through.
18 Q. Thank you. And did you have occasion, in the latter part of
19 1992 -- when I say you I mean yourself and General Morillon and other
20 officers working with you in Bosnia -- Bosnian headquarters -- did you
21 have occasion to speak to the Serbs about those impediments to the
23 A. Yes. On quite a few occasions.
24 Q. Were you able to resolve those matters, or not? Or is it the case
25 that you only succeeded in facilitating and organizing that one convoy in
2 A. We had planned something like four or five convoys to Srebrenica
3 and to Gorazde because they were planned together. It was one convoy to
4 Gorazde. One convoy to Srebrenica. We planned four or five. We only
5 managed to get one through, the one that I've just told you about earlier.
6 Q. And was that because of obstruction from the Serb leadership?
7 A. It was from -- it was due to obstruction on the ground. In other
8 words, roadblocks, not letting convoys pass or sending them the wrong
9 direction, claiming that there was fighting going on and therefore the
10 convoy could not get through claiming that local population were angry and
11 didn't want to let the convoys pass. There were a hundred excuses.
12 Q. Thank you. During the course of these conversations that you had
13 with the Serb leadership, did they ever express any concerns about the
14 action of Muslim military forces acting from out -- inside the Srebrenica
16 A. No. The Serb leadership never talked -- during that period did
17 not talk about the hostile activities of fighting or combat.
18 Q. Thank you. Turn your attention now to early -- early 1993. Was
19 there any change in the nature of complaints from either the Serb
20 leadership or the Muslim leadership regarding activities in Srebrenica?
21 MR. JONES: Sorry, it's a very small thing about Muslim
22 leadership. So far this witness has been talking about the Bosnian
23 Presidency, by which I understood the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia
24 and Herzegovina. So perhaps we should speak to the words he used.
25 MR. DI FAZIO: That's precisely what I meant.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Jones is certainly right, Mr. Di Fazio.
2 MR. DI FAZIO: You understand what we're talking about. Thank
4 Q. My question is, is any -- any change in the nature of complaints
5 coming from the Bosnian Presidency and the Serb leadership?
6 A. Requests from the Presidency for humanitarian aid for the
7 enclaves, in other words Gorazde and Srebrenica, continued. There was
8 no -- this is in January I'm talking about.
9 However, in early February, 1993, we started getting complaints
10 from the Bosnian Serb leadership about attacks out of the Srebrenica
11 enclave, specifically from the Srebrenica enclave, not from the Gorazde
12 enclave, and these were -- there were two types of complaints. There was
13 a complaint, which is a bitter complaint which was about attacks on
14 villages and Serb civilians and the numbers that they were quoting were
15 between a thousand and 1360 -- is a number that sticks in my memory. Serb
16 civilians which they alleged had been killed by the Bosniak forces inside
18 The second reason for complaint was that the -- they claimed that
19 the Bosniak forces were attacking their lines of communication from
20 Zvornik, down to Pale and down to around Sarajevo. In other words, these
21 were military operations which were making it difficult for the Serbs to
22 carry out their -- their own military operations.
23 Q. By this stage, had you and General Morillon had some experience in
24 trying to facilitate and assist in the negotiations of cease-fires in
1 A. Yes, we had been trying to negotiate cease-fires since we had
2 arrived in -- in Bosnia. There was a recurring theme to cease fires,
3 which was that the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted a cease-fire or
4 cease-fires to cover all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in other words they wanted
5 to consolidate their gain and consolidate what they had taken, whereas the
6 Bosniak leadership declared that they wanted cease-fires. The reality of
7 the way they behaved was that whenever they were under pressure militarily
8 from the Serbs, they wanted local cease-fires, but then contrived to try
9 and break those cease-fires and provoke the Serbs.
10 Q. Thank you. The complaints of attacks from the Serbs to you only
11 started in early 1993, I understand.
12 A. In February.
13 Q. In February?
14 A. 1993.
15 Q. And were those attacks that the Serbs were alleging, were in
16 breach of cease-fires?
17 A. The Serbs maintained -- or complained that the Bosniaks always
18 sought aid from the United Nations for cease-fires when things were going
19 badly for them, but then broke those cease-fires when it suited them.
20 Q. Thank you. In early -- or in the -- in the first two months of
21 1993, did the Serbs, the Serb leadership mention any events in relation to
22 a place called Kravica?
23 A. In the middle of February, specific complaints were made and
24 Kravica was mentioned and, what I mean is that they had made complaints in
25 general, saying that attacks had happened, villages had been burnt,
1 civilians had been massacred, but without naming any names or places.
2 Then in the middle of February, and I believe it was General Gvero
3 who made specific reference to one particular incidence which he claimed
4 took place on the Orthodox, the Greek-Orthodox Christmas and a village
5 called Kravica had been sacked and burnt and the population killed. And
6 for some reason, he was particularly incensed and particularly angry about
7 that particular incidence over and above a number of others that he made
8 reference to.
9 Q. In addition to this sudden increase in Serb complaints regarding
10 Muslim attacks, did you get any information via the press in relation to
11 Muslim military activity emanating out from the Srebrenica enclave?
12 A. Yes. What happened was that in early January, we read and were
13 notified by HQ UNPROFOR in Zagreb that there were reports in the
14 international media of an offensive from -- launched in eastern Bosnia and
15 which there were a couple of reports which even talked of Bosniak soldiers
16 having seized some territory across the Drina into Serbia proper.
17 Q. Just explain to the Trial Chamber why it was that you relied on or
18 actually considered press reports rather than any other sources of
19 intelligence or information regarding events in that area.
20 A. At that time the United Nations and HQ Bosnia-Herzegovina command
21 had no forces, had no personnel of its own in eastern Bosnia who were in a
22 position to see for themselves what was actually happening there. At that
23 time, we had to rely totally on what we were being told by the -- by the
24 Presidency and Bosniak politicians and military by what we were being told
25 by Serb politicians and military and what we were being told by UNHCR
2 Q. Thank you. You've mentioned the complaints from the Serb
3 leadership that you started to hear in the early part of 1993. Did
4 complaints emanate from the Bosnian Presidency, the Muslim Bosnian
5 Presidency concerning military events in the area?
6 A. The Presidency had, up until mid January, towards the end of
7 January, been -- their requests were the same as they had been since
8 October when we arrived in Bosnia, which were humanitarian aid. We want
9 humanitarian aid there.
10 From the end of January onwards that started changing, and they
11 started complaining about attacks being made by the Bosnian Serbs against
12 the Srebrenica enclave, and they -- so their requests changed from being
13 for humanitarian aid only to being for humanitarian aid and everything
14 from military action against the Serbs, cease-fires, et cetera.
15 Q. And can you -- can you give us any idea approximately when this
16 added component to their complaints came about, when this was.
17 A. This additional dimension to the -- to the requests, complaints
18 from the Presidency started at the very end of January and then steadily
19 intensified throughout February until it reached a crescendo in the
20 beginning of March when President Izetbegovic personally asked General
21 Morillon to go there in person.
22 Q. Thank you. I want to ask you about that in particular. Firstly,
23 were you present when this request was made by President Izetbegovic?
24 A. Yes, I was.
25 Q. Where was the request made?
1 A. It was made in President Izetbegovic's office in the Presidency in
3 Q. And I assume General Morillon was present?
4 A. Yes, General Morillon was present. President Izetbegovic was
5 present. President Izetbegovic's interpreter was present. I was present
6 and Mihailov, General Morillon's bodyguard was present.
7 Q. Just while we're there, just a bit more about Mihailov, who
8 exactly was he?
9 A. Mihailov was a French foreign region sergeant major who was
10 Macedonian by origin and spoke a fluent Serbo-Croat and he accompanied
11 General Morillon as his bodyguard everywhere. He also sat in the back of
12 all the meetings that took place and listened to what was being said,
13 because he clearly could understand Serbo-Croat and until later on, by
14 later on I mean about January/February and people started realizing that
15 he actually could understand and hear of what was being said, it was very
16 useful to have confirmation that the interpreters were interpreting
17 correctly and that other things were not going on in the background.
18 Q. Thank you. Did he later accompany you and General Morillon into
19 the Srebrenica enclave?
20 A. Yes, he did. He was with us the entire time.
21 Q. What did President Izetbegovic say to you at that meeting in early
22 March of 1993?
23 A. President Izetbegovic said that a humanitarian disaster was in the
24 making, that the Serbs were remorselessly attacking, that many people were
25 being killed, that many atrocities were being reported and that the
1 situation was very, very bad and could General Morillon personally go
2 there to see for himself what the circumstances were, what was actually
3 happening and, if the circumstances were as Izetbegovic had described them
4 to be, to then make the necessary arrangements for humanitarian aid to be
5 delivered, cease-fires to be arranged.
6 Q. He -- I just want to be absolutely clear about that. Did
7 Izetbegovic have a specific clear request that a cease-fire be negotiated
8 if possible, or facilitated I think is your word, if possible?
9 A. President Izetbegovic's prime concern was for the well-being of
10 the people and the refugees, and in order to ensure their welfare, a
11 cease-fire was required.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you know of a place called Cerska?
13 A. Yes, I do.
14 Q. Was Cerska mentioned at this meeting in early March of 1993?
15 A. Yes. Cerska was the main area where President Izetbegovic was
16 concerned about. Srebrenica was hardly mentioned. President Izetbegovic
17 said that the situation in Cerska and Kamenica were dire and that he had
18 had -- he, President Izetbegovic had had reports of atrocities being
19 carried out against the Bosniak population by the Bosnian Serbs.
20 Q. Did he give you any idea as to what these reports were and from
21 where they had emanated?
22 A. No. He was not specific about any specific event or incident or
23 time or place. He just said "atrocities" and what was the second part of
24 your question?
25 Q. Where they emanated from? Did he give you any idea of who
1 provided the reports?
2 A. No. He did not give -- President Izetbegovic never talked about
3 that sort of thing.
4 Q. Okay, thank you. What was the reaction of General Morillon to the
5 request of President Izetbegovic?
6 A. General Morillon's response was to promise to President
7 Izetbegovic that he would immediately try to go to Cerska and establish
8 what -- what was going on there.
9 What I need to -- need to explain is that up until that time,
10 during February that is, the Lasva Valley had gone up in flames in the
11 conflict between the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats and that General
12 Morillon's focus of attention and the focus of attention of the Presidency
13 had been on what was happening in the Lasva Valley.
14 Now, in the background to this, there had been these, also these
15 reports about Srebrenica, Kamenica, and so on. But they had been in the
16 background. And President Izetbegovic's intervention swung the focus of
17 balance for General Morillon and he had a clear request from the
18 president, leave Lasva Valley, focus, please, on this. And so General
19 Morillon promised, yes, that's what he would do.
20 Q. What precisely did he promise that he would do? What did he say
21 that he would do?
22 A. He said that he would go as soon as he could to Cerska to see for
23 himself what was happening and he did not say that -- he did not promise
24 he would go there on any particular day, because it was difficult to move
25 because of the constraints that the Bosnian Serbs put on -- on movement.
1 Q. In order to get from Sarajevo to -- to the -- to Cerska, you had
2 to cross enemy lines; correct? Sorry, warring lines, I should say. Lines
3 of confrontation.
4 A. Yes. We would have to cross a number of confrontation lines to
5 get to Cerska. Initially, we tried -- we planned, we tried to go by road
6 from Pale up to Zvornik but the Bosnian Serbs refused and said that it was
7 far too dangerous. We could not go that way.
8 By good fortune, we had -- our headquarters had been working on
9 helicopter corridors and we had just received, a couple of days
10 previously, in Kiseljak, in the middle Bosnia, UN helicopters which for
11 the first time had flown from Split down on the coast up into the middle
12 of Bosnia. And General Morillon then said, we will try -- because it had
13 not been done yet, it had not been proved possible, to fly by helicopter
14 from Kiseljak to Tuzla and then cross the confrontation line between Tuzla
15 and Zvornik and try to approach Cerska from the north.
16 Q. Thank you. If I could just interrupt you and halt you there,
17 we'll get into the actual trip itself shortly.
18 Did you actually leave for Srebrenica shortly after the meeting
19 with Izetbegovic, in other words, a matter of days?
20 A. We left the next day.
21 Q. And you've agreed that lines of confrontation had to be crossed.
22 And did you anticipate entering the Srebrenica enclave, the area held by
23 Muslim forces?
24 A. Yes. We discussed that -- we had the meeting with President
25 Izetbegovic, where he put the request. We then continued the meeting, but
1 with Ganic, Dr. Ganic and General Sefer Halilovic, the Bosniak commander
2 of the Bosniak armed forces and they discussed with us how we would get
3 there and they said that they would notify their forces in the enclave,
4 that General Morillon would be trying to approach them and that they would
5 make sure that that information was passed.
6 Q. Can you remember who said that to you, whether it was Ganic or
7 Sefer Halilovic or both of them?
8 A. I can't remember which of the two it was, but -- but it was one of
9 them. I can't remember which.
10 Q. Thank you. Were they present at the meeting when Izetbegovic made
11 his request?
12 A. No, they were not.
13 Q. Did you -- obviously you spoke to them later. Who put you on to
14 them? Who suggested that you speak to them or was it your own idea?
15 A. No. It was President Izetbegovic who said, "Please now go and
16 speak with Ganic and Halilovic, who will arrange -- help you arrange the
18 Q. So President Izetbegovic made it clear that the details of getting
19 into the Srebrenica enclave was something that they could facilitate?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. So you go and speak to them and they tell you that they will
22 notify their forces. Did they mention any names?
23 A. They mentioned Colonel Oric who was their commander, military
24 commander in the pocket.
25 Q. Did they mention a Colonel or --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Did they give you the full name of this Colonel Oric or did they
3 just say Colonel Oric? Or you can't recall? If you can't recall, say
5 A. I can't recall.
6 Q. What did they say about him at this point? What did they say that
7 he was?
8 A. They didn't say anything special. There was no reason to --
9 Q. But they mentioned the name -- they mentioned a Colonel Oric, who
10 was a commander, and the military commander in the Srebrenica enclave?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. Had you heard of him up until that point?
13 A. Yes. Naser Oric was first mentioned to us by the Bosnian Serb
14 leadership in about the middle of February.
15 Q. Right, okay. Well I will get back to that, what the Bosnian Serbs
16 said about that later.
17 A. He ...
18 Q. Sorry?
19 A. He had also been mentioned to us by our own intelligence people.
20 Q. I will get into that later too. The Dr. Halilovic or Ganic ever
21 explain to you how it was that they were going to notify Colonel Oric of
22 your possible visit?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Did you set about making arrangements for your journey?
25 A. Yes, I was responsible for booking the helicopters, the
1 clearances, for the team.
2 Q. You were organizing it?
3 A. Indeed.
4 Q. And how many people -- how big was your party when you eventually
5 set off?
6 A. The party was, as we set off from Kiseljak, was General Morillon,
7 Mihailov, myself, Larry Hollingsworth, from UNHCR. I think there was
8 someone from ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross.
9 Q. Thanks. Do you know a fellow called Alan Abraham, Major Alan
11 A. Yes. He was a British major. He was the commander of the unit
12 who we met in Tuzla, who provided us with the escorts and the military
13 vehicles to -- when we went from Tuzla into the enclave.
14 Q. And was there a ICRC representative who was with your party, a
15 chap named Andreas Schiess?
16 A. Andreas Schiess.
17 Q. Schiess, I'm sorry, my apologies. And a doctor, Simon Mardell?
18 A. Yes. He was a World Health Organisation doctor, who joined us in,
19 I forget, it was either Kiseljak or Tuzla.
20 Q. Thank you. Now, I would like to turn, before we get into the
21 trip, just one -- the two topics that you've already just briefly
22 mentioned. You said that the Serbs had mentioned Naser Oric to you prior
23 to this occasion when Sefer Halilovic, or Ganic spoke to you in March.
24 When had the Serbs spoken to you about Mr. Oric?
25 A. They spoke to General Morillon --
1 Q. Sorry, Morillon.
2 A. -- about Colonel Oric in Pale at a number of meetings we had
4 Q. And who was it precisely who you are referring to when you say the
5 Serbs spoke to General Morillon?
6 A. We had one meeting with Lukic, another with General Gvero, and
7 another with Karadzic.
8 Q. Who was Lukic?
9 A. Lukic was -- I think he called himself the prime minister of
10 Republika Srpska.
11 Q. So you spoke to both political and military Serb leaders?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. And what did they say about Mr. Oric?
14 A. They said that he was the Bosniak commander. They didn't use
15 those words, they used the work Turk, "Turky" in Srebrenica, and they
16 described him as the person who had led the attack on Kravica and who was
17 leading terrorist attacks against Serb communities and who was, in their
18 eyes, a war criminal.
19 Q. All right. So they took that view of him. But did they ever
20 explain to you why it was that they took that view of him, what sort of
21 information they had that led them to that conclusion?
22 A. They said that the civilian population of Kravica had been
23 massacred and that they -- the Bosnian Serbs -- had discovered a mass
24 grave south of Zvornik in which they had - they, the Bosnian Serbs - had
25 discovered about 50 killed Serbs.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you know if the Serb military commanders in their
2 area had any equipment for intercepting radio messages?
3 A. I -- my staff tell me they did.
4 Q. Did the Bosnian Serb military or political leadership, during the
5 course of these discussions that you've just been talking about, ever
6 discuss intercepts with you?
7 A. Yes, quite frequently.
8 Q. Did they ever discuss them in the context of Naser Oric?
9 Intercepts, I mean.
10 A. Not at the meetings that we had in Pale, but when we were in
11 Zvornik on the -- on the 5th -- on the 5th of March, on our way into
12 Konjevic Polje, a Serb Colonel, Colonel Andric, he made a statement -- he
13 said that they had just intercepted a communication between Halilovic and
14 Oric in which Halilovic had told Oric that he was sending reinforcements
15 to the enclave from a couple of locations north of Sarajevo, and that Oric
16 had told Halilovic that he was going to continue with offensive
17 operations, despite the arrival in the area of General Morillon or of an
18 attempt by Morillon to go into the enclave.
19 Q. Thank you. It's an appropriate time for the afternoon break, if
20 Your Honours please.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Di Fazio. We'll have a 25-minute
22 break starting from now. Thank you.
23 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 4.15 p.m.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Di Fazio.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.
2 Q. As -- or rather, in order to carry out your duties and assist
3 General Morillon and for him to carry out his duties, did you require
4 access to intelligence about the situation on the ground in Bosnia?
5 A. Yes, it was standard procedure for us to get an intelligence
6 briefing, particularly about a new area that we had not been to
8 Q. And what were the sources of those intelligence briefings? Who
9 contributed the intelligence?
10 A. These briefings were provided to us by our G2 intelligence staff,
11 who were officers from -- intelligence officers from the UK, from France,
12 from the Netherlands, from Denmark and the other countries contributing to
13 the forces. The intelligence -- the information that they had came from a
14 number of sources. It came firstly from reports which were submitted by
15 the various battalions on the command of PH command. It came from reports
16 provided by UNHCR. It came from reports provided sometimes by ICRC. It
17 came from intelligence provided by the national governments of the
18 contributing nations.
19 Q. And did you have briefings, intelligence briefings from time to
20 time or only when you were going into a new area?
21 A. No. We had routine intelligence briefings once a week and then in
22 any additional special circumstances.
23 Q. Did you receive any intelligence briefings about the Srebrenica
24 enclave prior to going into the - into the area in March?
25 A. Yes, we received an intelligence briefing in which we were told
1 that the situation was understood to be bad; that we were told that there
2 was fairly consistent fighting going on; that we were told that the
3 Bosnian Serbs were under pressure because their line of communications
4 between Zvornik and Pale were under continuous ambush. We were told that
5 the Serbs were carrying on an offensive against the Srebrenica enclave.
6 We didn't know precisely how far that offensive had gone.
7 We were told that the military commander of the Bosniak forces in
8 the Srebrenica enclave was Colonel Oric. We were told that there were
9 reports that Colonel Oric had previously been a -- a JNA special forces
10 soldier and that he had been a bodyguard of President Milosevic's. We
11 were told a number of other rumours, but we had no way of judging their
13 Q. The -- this information which you've just told us about, I assume
14 that you and General Morillon had access to it?
15 A. Yes. That is -- we had a longer briefing than I just gave you in
16 30 seconds now, but, yes, we were both given this -- this briefing.
17 Q. And thinking back now, can you recall when you received the
18 briefing? Was it after the conversation with President Izetbegovic when
19 he asked that you go to Srebrenica, but before you left? Or at some other
21 A. Yes. It was after we had our meeting with President Izetbegovic,
22 because we went from Sarajevo, which is where we met with Izetbegovic, to
23 Kiseljak and it was in Kiseljak that we received this briefing. We then,
24 the next morning, flew from Kiseljak up north to Tuzla.
25 Q. Thank you. Before we move on into the area of the -- the topic of
1 the actual -- your entry into the area of Srebrenica, I would like to just
2 go back in time a bit.
3 Did you meet a gentleman named Murat Efendic in 1992 or 1993?
4 A. We met -- we being General Morillon and I -- met Murat Efendic a
5 number of times in 1993 and it was mainly in February that we met. He was
6 introduced to us by Zlatko Lagumdzija, who was the minister for refugee
7 affairs, as being the representative in Sarajevo of the Srebrenica war
9 Q. Thank you. Did you actually speak to Mr. Efendic, Mr. Murat
11 A. Yes, we spoke with him on at least two occasions.
12 Q. Did he ever say anything to you that indicated he was not a member
13 of the Srebrenica -- or representative of the Srebrenica War Presidency?
14 Or did he confirm that?
15 A. To be honest, I -- I cannot recall whether he explicitly said "I
16 am a member of the Srebrenica War Presidency." That is the way he was
17 introduced to us. Zlatko Lagumdzija requested that General Morillon meet
18 with him and he was described by us as a member of the Srebrenica war
20 Q. And did General Morillon, in fact, meet with him?
21 A. Yes, he did.
22 Q. Were you present?
23 A. Yes, I was.
24 Q. And what were the topics of conversation?
25 A. It was a plea from Murat Efendic on behalf of the people in
1 Srebrenica to come to their assistance and a description by him of what
2 the circumstances were that the people were having to live in in
4 Q. And did he paint a pretty horrific picture of what was going on in
6 A. Yes, he did.
7 Q. Can you tell us if you spoke to him -- we know you told us you
8 spoke to him in 1993, but did you speak to him prior to the meeting with
9 Izetbegovic when he asked you to essentially to go to Srebrenica?
10 A. Yes. We met and I can't remember, it was either the end of
11 January or beginning of February and then we met with him later on in
12 February, but this was before -- before we met -- before President
13 Izetbegovic's request which was at the beginning of March.
14 Q. Thank you. You've told us of your sources of intelligence. Did
15 they give you an idea or a perception -- sorry, an idea of the general
16 outline of the lines of confrontation in existence in early 1993? In that
17 area, I'm talking about eastern Bosnia.
18 A. We had a belief of roughly what the confrontation lines were,
19 which came, I believe, principally from intercept, radio intercept, but we
20 did not have our own troops on the ground to confirm precisely where it
22 Q. Would you please look at this map that I produced to you. If Your
23 Honours please, I would ask that the usher show the Defence the map first.
24 You see on your screens, I think, a copy of the map that I hope to tender
25 into evidence, but it is obviously -- will not include certain markings on
1 it that I expect that this witness has put on the map. The reason for
2 that is that was only created yesterday and there hasn't been time -- you
3 can see the map is a large document.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: What Mr. Jones and Madam Vidovic are seeing now is
5 what we have on the screen, you're telling us.
6 MR. DI FAZIO: With markings on it.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Obviously. I understood that.
8 MR. DI FAZIO: All I'm saying is I'm sorry I don't have 12 of them
9 with the markings.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: It's all right. I mean that seems to be happening
11 when -- there's difficulties. You can't avoid it, Mr. Di Fazio.
12 MR. DI FAZIO: Can I ask that the Trial Chamber --
13 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm sure you will find a solution to it.
14 MR. DI FAZIO: I would ask that you now look at it.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: So now let's see this map. Is this what you were
16 going to tender?
17 MR. DI FAZIO: That's right.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 MR. DI FAZIO: I think if we used the ELMO, it's probably the --
21 and move the map around, it's probably the best way of doing it at the
23 JUDGE AGIUS: We will see what -- how best to go about this. More
24 or less we have an indication of where the markings are, and look like on
25 that map. As we go along, I think the witness is already familiar with
1 those markings.
2 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, I'm going to ask him and I expect certain
4 JUDGE AGIUS: If he is familiar with those markings, we can put
5 the map on the ELMO, bit by bit as we go along.
6 MR. DI FAZIO: That's what I meant sort of, move it around.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Yes, Mr. Jones.
8 MR. JONES: I understand -- I understand the practical
9 difficulties of making multiple copies.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm sure you do.
11 MR. JONES: At the same time, in order to take proper instructions
12 from our client, we'll need at the court end of the court day, to have
13 something which has those markings on it so we can follow to a certain
14 extent what's being done on the ELMO, but we would ask either if we can
15 borrow that copy of the map at the end of the court day or have a copy
16 because, realistically, we can't actually seek instructions from our
17 client when we met with him as to the confrontation lines et cetera.
18 MR. DI FAZIO: I understand that and I --
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Jones.
20 MR. DI FAZIO: I sympathise with their position. And I -- the
21 Prosecution has no objection to the Defence taking -- using that
22 particular exhibit, if the court's happy with that. On the undertaking,
23 of course, that no markings be added to it. The usual.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: It goes without saying.
25 MR. DI FAZIO: Other than that, we're more than happy for the map
1 to be provided so that they can get instructions.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Di Fazio and I am sure you will
3 find a way between the two of you.
4 MR. DI FAZIO: Thanks.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's proceed, please.
6 MR. DI FAZIO:
7 Q. First of all, there is, I think, on the map, Colonel Tucker,
8 you've got a little key explaining the various notations on the map. Just
9 spread it out so we can see what is written there.
10 Firstly, who made those markings on the map?
11 A. I drew the markings on the map.
12 Q. One's in black, it says "border". I think we can -- I can lead
13 you on this, that that essentially follows the border between Bosnia and
14 Serbia and in the eastern part along the -- much of the Drina River; is
15 that correct?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Thank you. And what does CFL represent?
18 A. The line in red with CFL is confrontation line and it represents,
19 my understanding, and memory of roughly where the confrontation line was
20 in early February --
21 Q. Thank you?
22 A. -- of 1993.
23 Q. Thank you, you referred to a -- a dotted line which is the symbol
24 for line of communication and logistic resupply. Whose line of
25 communication and logistic resupply are you referring to?
1 A. That is the Bosnian Serb army line of communication and logistic
3 Q. Thank you. And the remainder of the markings I think are
4 self-evident. You circled significant towns and villages?
5 A. That is correct, significant locations.
6 Q. Thank you. Can you just pull the map up a little further. Thank
7 you. You see that you have indicated a line of communication and
8 logistics with the dotted line. Where does that go from and to?
9 A. The dotted line goes from Zvornik here --
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. -- to Pale and around Sarajevo here.
12 Q. And what's the significance of that particular line of
13 communication, why was it important -- the logistics -- why was it
14 important for the Serbs?
15 A. That road here is the only road which links this part of the
16 Bosnian Serb held territory with this part of Bosnian Serb held territory.
17 This road here, as you can see from the map, is very windy, but it is a
18 passable road. However, from here, up to Zvornik, it's a mountain path.
19 It's very twisty and it's a very difficult and dangerous road,
20 particularly in winter, to pass. A much better road is from here through
21 this route here, up to Zvornik in the south. That is a much safer road, a
22 much faster road than this very difficult route here.
23 From the Bosnian Serb perspective, they were very vulnerable here
24 because you can effectively see that you've got the confrontation line and
25 the pocket of around Srebrenica Cerska and Zepa here and you've got the
1 Bosniak territory held here. This is a corridor, a gauntlet through which
2 the Bosnian Serb army had to -- had to pass and their logistics had to go.
3 I would also point out Han Pijesak, which is here, which was the
4 headquarters of the Bosnian Serb army which was very close to the
5 Srebrenica enclave.
6 Q. Just -- can you just point out where Cerska is, please.
7 A. Cerska is here. Kamenica is there. I would point out that there
8 are about five places called Kamenica in eastern Bosnia. When I refer to
9 Kamenica, this is the Kamenica at the time, referring to, which is south
10 of Zvornik.
11 Q. Did those two places assume military significance for the Bosnian
12 Serb forces given your explanation about the line of supply and logistics?
13 A. Yes. Because Cerska and Kamenica were on -- were bracketing this
14 road here, which would have given them much better logistic
15 communications through to Pale and their forces stationed around
17 Q. Facilitated those lines of communication between Zvornik and Pale,
18 is that what you mean?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And you've -- we have both referred to something called the
21 Srebrenica enclave. Just for the sake of completeness, can you please
22 show the Srebrenica enclave to the Trial Chamber.
23 A. Srebrenica is there. Zepa is there, Cerska is there. And this is
24 what I refer to as the Srebrenica enclave. I would hasten to point out
25 that this is not a formal front line in the way of traditional warfare.
1 This is a very permeous line and it was very difficult to -- it would be
2 wrong to think of it as a front line with -- with guards along all of it.
3 Q. Thank you. Further south appears to be another area or enclave.
4 What is that?
5 A. This area here is the Gorazde enclave. That is the town of
6 Gorazde itself. I have marked dotted lines here --
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. -- and here.
9 Q. What's the significance?
10 A. To signify that there was movement, or we understood, from the
11 Presidency and from people who we met and from Murat Efendic, that there
12 was movement between these two pockets and that there was also movement
13 from Zepa up to Srebrenica and up to Cerska.
14 Q. Now I anticipate that you're going to give evidence that you went
15 into Cerska in March, around the -- around early March. When you
16 eventually did, did you find that Cerska had been taken by Serb forces?
17 A. Yes. When we arrived in Konjevic Polje on the 5th of March, we
18 were met by Colonel Oric, who told us that we were too late and that
19 Cerska had fallen a couple of days previously.
20 Q. Thank you. Would that -- just pull the map a bit further down.
21 That's it, thank you. So what area of territory had they lost, had the
22 Bosniaks lost from the enclave at about the time that you arrived there?
23 A. This had lost Kamenica a couple of weeks previously. They had
24 lost Cerska two days previously. And the front line was on the high
25 ground, to the north-west of this road here.
1 Q. Thanks. My eyes are -- can you actually see Konjevic Polje on
2 that map?
3 A. Yes. Konjevic Polje is --
4 Q. Is it marked? I can't see.
5 A. It is marked as Konjevici.
6 Q. Is that actually Konjevic Polje, though?
7 A. There are two Konjevic Poljes on the maps that I used at the time.
8 There was a Konjevic Polje which was shown on the map as being just up in
9 the hills, up here. I never went anywhere near that, that location. The
10 Konjevic Polje which I referred to is the one which is at the junction
11 between the road from Zvornik to Vlasnica and the road from Konjevic Polje
12 through to Bratunac and Srebrenica, over here.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 A. The road on that junction.
15 Q. Thank you. Now, I understand that this is not a precision
16 military map, but does it represent broadly your understanding of the
17 enclave areas and the lines of confrontation in February 1993, other than
18 the qualification that you've just given about the chunk that was taken
19 out following the fall of Kamenica and Cerska?
20 A. Yes. It's my understanding of what it was like roughly at the
21 beginning of February 1993.
22 Q. Was there any large difference that you understood in March --
23 A. When we --
24 Q. -- of 1993?
25 A. When General Morillon and I went to Konjevic Polje, which is there
1 (indicating), we were told that the front line was somewhere here.
2 Q. Oh.
3 A. Between Cerska and Konjevic Polje. That was the 5th and 6th of
4 March. When we arrived in Srebrenica on the evening of the 11th of March,
5 we were told by the members of the Srebrenica war committee that Konjevic
6 Polje was under attack by the Bosnian Serb army, that the British convoy
7 which had gone there in order to evacuate the injured who we had
8 discovered at Konjevic Polje, had been attacked by the Bosnian Serb army
9 as well, and the next day we were told that Konjevic Polje had been
10 captured by the Serbs.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 A. In other words that the front -- this area had been taken and that
13 this road here had been captured by the Serbs and the Serbs were able to
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, I seek to tender that map
17 into evidence.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. That's 511.
19 THE REGISTRAR: P511.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, so the map that Colonel Tucker has been using
21 is being tendered --
22 MR. DI FAZIO: I'm sorry?
23 JUDGE AGIUS: You're tendering this map.
24 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, I am Your Honours.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Exactly. The map is being tendered and
1 admitted into evidence and marked as Prosecution Exhibit P511. Thank you.
2 MR. DI FAZIO:
3 Q. You've already mentioned that you did in fact go into the enclave,
4 the Srebrenica enclave. And that you went to Srebrenica itself. I want
5 you now to focus on your initial contact with the enclave, which I think
6 you've already said in evidence was around the 5th or 6th of March.
7 How would you describe your basic purpose, that is General
8 Morillon's and yours, purpose to -- in going there?
9 A. General Morillon had promised to President Izetbegovic that he
10 would go to Cerska to establish what the situation was and to do what he
11 could, depending on what the situation was that he found, and that he
12 would report -- he would return back to President Izetbegovic and tell him
13 what he had found and done.
14 Q. Thank you. Had President Izetbegovic complained of atrocities
15 committed by Serb forces in the area of Cerska prior to your going there?
16 A. President Izetbegovic had said that atrocities had been reported
17 in that -- in that area and it was one of reasons why he was so anxious
18 and why he wanted General Morillon to go and establish what actually had
19 happened, was happening.
20 Q. During the course of your travel on this occasion, did you go
21 through Serb-held areas and speak to Serb commanders and Serb politicians?
22 A. Yes. We flew by helicopter to Tuzla and then joined a British
23 escort who took us across the confrontation line at Kalesija and we then
24 were taken to meet with Serb commanders and politicians in Zvornik, at the
25 mayor's office in Zvornik.
1 Q. And did they, in turn, complain to you of atrocities committed by
2 Muslim forces?
3 A. Yes. The mayor of Zvornik complained about a mass grave which his
4 forces -- of which the Serb forces had uncovered and were uncovering at
5 that time. He showed us about a hundred photographs of partially
6 decomposed bodies, which he claimed had been taken of those bodies, and
7 that this was a war crime and that there were criminals in the enclave, in
8 the Srebrenica pocket, and that whilst they were willing for women and
9 children to be evacuated from the pockets, that no men were -- they would
10 not allow any men to be evacuated because they had to check whether any of
11 the war criminals who had committed these crimes were amongst them.
12 Q. Thank you. How were you actually travelling into the Srebrenica
13 enclave? How were you physically travelling towards the -- towards the
14 end of your journey, towards the end of your trip when you finally crossed
15 confrontation lines and entered the area?
16 A. We had two small British armoured vehicles, a Spartan and
17 Sultan. They're 8-ton, small armoured vehicles.
18 Q. And where did you cross over into the enclave?
19 A. We went south from Zvornik on the southern side of the Drina, to a
20 little village which I think was call Drinjaca, something like that, and
21 that was what the Serbs declared as being their front line. They then
22 said there was a mine field between them and the Bosniaks and that it was
23 our responsibility, if we chose to go into that mine field. We cleared
24 our way by hand through the mine field and, in fact, drove over a mine
25 which had been, I believe, deliberately placed there by the Serbs, but it
1 didn't go off, fortunately. And we approached Konjevic Polje from the
2 north, along this road.
3 Q. I'm going to show you a map and I would like you to have a look at
4 it and see if you can just -- if you can -- trace your route to Konjevic
6 If the witness could be given a clear marking pen so that -- so
7 that he may indicate on the map the approach into Konjevic Polje.
8 A. The location that the Serbs left us was about here on this map and
9 we proceeded along the riverside, along this road here, which came around
10 the corner here, until we met the outlying Bosniak forces who stopped us.
11 Q. Thank you. And I'm not going to ask you at this stage about all
12 the details of the -- your encounter with the Bosniak forces. It's
13 agreed, I think in this case, that you went on to Konjevic Polje. Can you
14 just show the Trial Chamber the route that you took to continue eventually
15 your journey into Konjevic Polje.
16 A. We carried on down this road here and this is Konjevic Polje here
17 and that's the junction of the road carrying on to the south and that's
18 the road going down towards Bratunac and Srebrenica.
19 Q. The area that you've marked, there's a place there called
20 Konjevicvi. Further up you see Konjevic Polje. Now, where do you think
21 you went?
22 A. Polje is Serbo-Croat for plain or flat area and this flat area
23 here is what the map refers to as Konjevic Polje, which is the area. Now,
24 the actual buildings that we went, where we met with Colonel Oric were
25 near this junction here.
1 Q. Thank you. If Your Honours please, I tender the map into
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Certainly, Mr. Di Fazio. This map -- does it
4 have an ERN number?
5 MR. DI FAZIO: No, not that I can see. Would Your Honours like me
6 to ask the witness to initial it?
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I am going to ask him myself. This map which
8 has just been made use of is being tendered and received in evidence and
9 this will be marked as Prosecution Exhibit number P512. Yes, Colonel,
10 could you please initial -- put your initials at the beginning and at the
11 end of the route that you have marked on the map, please. And sign the
12 map either at the bottom of it or anywhere where it's ...
13 Yes, that's fine. I thank you so much. Yes, Mr. Di Fazio.
14 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you.
15 Q. All right, thanks. Thank you. Now, let's get back to the journey
16 itself. You have told us of the route you took. You eventually
17 encountered some Bosniak soldiers you mentioned. Can you describe that
18 event, please, and any difficulties that you may have encountered.
19 A. We had been moving slowly for about three kilometres, four
20 kilometres, uncertain of where we would encounter the Bosniak front line
21 and Mihailov, General Morillon's bodyguard, was carrying a United Nations
22 flag and was shouting every hundred yards or so, we are the United
23 Nations, hold your fire. At one point where I showed on the map that we
24 met the Bosniak front line, somebody shouted down to us, down to Mihailov
25 "stop". And after some shouting back and forth, a Bosniak soldier came
1 down from the hill and we said that we had come to visit Cerska at the
2 request of President Izetbegovic and could he please tell Colonel Oric
3 that we had arrived and we would like to meet him and could he, the
4 Bosniak soldier there, allow us to push out of the way the obstacle which
5 was blocking our path.
6 And this obstacle was a tree which was about two metres in
7 diameter and about six, seven metres long, which was lying across the
8 road. And our armoured vehicles could not get past, but the Bosniak
9 soldier refused to let us -- he did not allow us to try and move the
10 obstacle. There were also some mines around it and said that he could not
11 let us move it until he had received permission from his officers.
12 About an hour later, some officers came up who spoke with the
13 Bosniak soldiers and gave us permission to move the tree. We then brought
14 up the armoured vehicles with chains, they pushed and pulled and shoved
15 and moved the tree out of the way, having moved the mines, the armoured
16 vehicles moved past and they then pushed the tree back into place.
17 We waited a further hour or so and then we heard the noise of cars
18 without exhausts, very loud and two cars turned up with some of Colonel
19 Oric's men. We were told to get into the cars. And General Morillon,
20 myself, Mihailov and Larry Hollingsworth got into the cars and were taken
21 in these cars from where the obstacle was to the school in Konjevic Polje.
22 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you to stop there. You said that two
23 cars turned up and some of Colonel Oric's men. Did they announce
24 themselves as Colonel Oric's men or was that your perception, your
1 A. It was my assumption, because they took us to the school and it
2 looked as if a couple of them were bodyguards and a couple of them were
3 officers and -- because the officers joined in the meeting with Colonel
4 Oric and Morillon in the school building, so therefore I assumed that they
5 were Colonel Oric's officers.
6 Q. All right. Thank you. So let's turn our attention to the school.
7 The whole -- the party including armoured vehicles and all the men
8 accompanying you also went to the school?
9 A. They followed about half an hour later, guided by Bosniak
10 soldiers. So we went ahead.
11 Q. We, being you, General Morillon and the bodyguard Mihailov?
12 A. And Larry Hollingsworth.
13 Q. I'm sorry. And Larry Hollingsworth, okay. And what happened at
14 the school?
15 A. At the school, we were shown into a room by the people I described
16 as Colonel Oric's officers and a short while later Colonel Oric arrived.
17 By this time it was dark.
18 Q. You hadn't met him up until that point?
19 A. I hadn't met him before.
20 Q. How was he dressed?
21 A. He was dressed in combat uniform, dark -- dark green combat
22 uniform, what I call winter uniform. But not white uniform. Not snow
24 Q. Who was interpreting for you?
25 A. Mihailov was interpreting for us.
1 Q. What did Colonel Oric -- sorry, let me withdraw that question.
2 Did he introduce himself, Colonel Oric?
3 A. I cannot recall.
4 Q. Did he say who he was?
5 A. Yes, he did.
6 Q. What did he say he was?
7 A. He said he was the commander of the Bosniak forces in eastern
9 Q. And what did you speak to him about or did he speak to you about?
10 A. We introduced ourselves and explained why we were there, which is
11 at President Izetbegovic's request that we wished to establish what had
12 happened in or what was going on in Cerska and that if it was necessary,
13 that we wanted to establish a cease-fire, that we wanted to facilitate the
14 evacuation of injured and casualties and that we wanted to negotiate the
15 deployment of UN military observers in order to oversee the cease-fire and
16 that we wanted to arrange for humanitarian aid to be delivered.
17 Q. Did he comment on these proposals or these notions, these ideas?
18 A. Yes. He said that we were too late, that Cerska -- that Cerska
19 had fallen two days previously and that we were welcome to try to go to
20 Cerska but that the Serbs would never let us, because the Serbs had locked
21 civilians inside houses and had burnt the houses and burnt the civilians
22 inside the houses and that the Serbs would never let us near there because
23 of these crimes that they had committed.
24 He also said that there were about 700 injured in Konjevic Polje.
25 By "in" what I mean is scattered in the various houses of the village
1 because there was no large house or single location, who were unable, who
2 were too badly injured to be moved on to Srebrenica. He said that the
3 majority of the refugees had already, from Cerska and Kamenica had already
4 passed through Konjevic Polje on their way to Srebrenica and that now
5 there was only a trickle of refugees left.
6 Q. Thank you. Did he comment on the cease-fire proposal or the
7 cease-fire idea? I mean I know it wasn't a proposal but did he comment on
8 the notion of looking at cease-fires?
9 A. No. He didn't.
10 Q. I thought --
11 A. Not that I recall.
12 Q. Thank you. What was the time of this meeting, the approximate
14 A. It was in the evening, it was after dark. It was 8, 9 -- 8, 9
15 o'clock in the evening.
16 Q. Sure. And the date, the date of this?
17 A. It was the 5th of March, 1993.
18 Q. How long did your encounter with Mr. -- with Colonel Oric last?
19 A. Two hours.
20 Q. And did he leave after the meeting?
21 A. Yes, he did. He went somewhere else.
22 Q. Did you see him again the next day?
23 A. Yes, we saw him again the next morning.
24 Q. I'll go into that in just a moment. Had you entered the enclave
25 at the point at which you had expected to?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. No. We had entered the enclave at the point that the Serbs had
2 allowed us to.
3 Q. Was it in the vicinity of any area that you had expected to enter
4 the enclave?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Had you provided any information to the Bosnian -- sorry, to the
7 Bosnian Presidency or Mr. Halilovic or Mr. Ganic as to the approximate
8 area that you intended to enter the enclave?
9 A. Yes. We radioed back to the British guard -- escort headquarters
10 and asked them to inform Kiseljak to inform the Presidency to inform the
11 Bosniak forces in the enclave of the route by which we were going to come
12 into the -- approach the enclave and approach the front line, because we
13 were concerned about not being shot as we approached their front line.
14 Q. Your expectation being what?
15 A. This was the continuation of the conversation that we had had with
16 Ganic and Halilovic on the 4th of March when they had said that they would
17 ensure that their own forces were informed of the route that we were
18 approaching, but they needed to know when it was and where it was. So I
19 had to get the information back to them saying "We're coming in on the 5th
20 and we're coming in from the north and we're coming in from Zvornik and
21 we're coming in from Drinjaca" or whatever the name of that little village
23 Q. And about what period of time elapsed between your coming across
24 the tree trunk and the Bosniak soldiers and the appearance of Colonel
1 A. It was about two hours, three hours.
2 Q. All right. The next day, can you tell us how events unfolded.
3 A. The next day, we met in the morning, soon after daylight, and
4 General Morillon said he was going to go to Cerska. Dr. Mardell was going
5 to go around the village with a guide who was provided by Colonel Oric, to
6 go and assess the casualties, the injured for evacuation, and Larry
7 Hollingsworth went off to assess the situation with the refugees and we
8 arranged to meet back at the school - I forget, at 12.00 or 1.00.
9 Q. What was the result of Dr. Mardell's enquiries?
10 A. Dr. Mardell went round with a guide provided by Colonel Oric and
11 he reported back to say that he had not found 700 casualties and injured,
12 but 73.
13 Q. Thank you. And what did you and Morillon do in the meantime?
14 A. General Morillon had climbed into one of the British -- two
15 British armoured vehicles and had driven off towards Cerska.
16 I had been climbing into the back of this armoured vehicle when it
17 suddenly drove off, and I fell out of the back.
18 Q. All right.
19 A. So the vehicle roared off, and because it had a high back the
20 commander couldn't see I had fallen out of the back, so General Morillon
21 went off into Cerska with me running behind the vehicle.
22 Q. Right. And did he eventually make it into Cerska?
23 A. Yes. When I saw General Morillon when he came back from Cerska,
24 he said that he had indeed gone up to Cerska, he had passed through the
25 Bosniak front line. I had caught up to there on foot about half an hour
1 later and waited there for two hours until General Morillon came back
2 down. And General Morillon said that he had been to Cerska. He had come
3 across a Serb sentry, a Bosnian Serb sentry, he had been very surprised to
4 see him, who had introduced him to his Serb commander. There were about
5 30 Serb soldiers in Cerska who were what I would describe as professional
6 combat soldiers, in other words not militia or home guard. And they had
7 been courteous, polite and had just let General Morillon do what he
8 wanted. General Morillon told me that he and his party got out of the
9 armoured vehicle and walked around Cerska and looked at the damage and
10 what had happened there. Other than a badly damaged village that had
11 suffered, it had clearly suffered heavy fighting, he found no casualties
12 or injured. Just these 30 or so Serb soldiers. He got back into the
13 armoured vehicle and drove back down to the Bosniak front line, which is
14 where I did climb into the vehicle.
15 Q. Did he report any bodies in houses that had been burned?
16 A. General Morillon said that he had, unfortunately - that he was
17 unfortunately familiar with the smell of burnt human flesh and that he had
18 walked around the village and that he had not smelt that smell and that he
19 had not seen anything which indicated that anyone had been burnt or there
20 had been people burnt inside houses.
21 He said that he had not gone up into the woods and the hills
22 around Cerska, so he had no idea of what was up there, but in the village
23 itself, it did not seem, as far as he could see, that there had been
24 anything other than heavy fighting.
25 Q. Thank you. Did you eventually make your way back to Konjevic
1 Polje and the school?
2 A. Yes. I got into the back of the armoured vehicle and we then
3 drove the kilometre and a half, two kilometres back to the school in
4 Konjevic Polje.
5 Q. And was Colonel Oric there at that time?
6 A. And we met with Colonel Oric there and General Morillon told him
7 that he had not been able to see any evidence, that he had been able to
8 see, of people having been burnt in houses. Colonel Oric shrugged and
9 said, "Well that's what my men told me." General Morillon also told
10 Colonel Oric that Dr. Mardell had only found 73 injured and, again,
11 Colonel Oric was not at all defensive or concerned. He just said "I never
12 counted them myself. That's what I was told and I had no reason not to
13 believe what my men were telling me".
14 Q. What was your impression of Colonel Oric when you first met him?
15 Can you comment on his bearing, his demeanour, his look, his age.
16 A. He was young. He was very intense. He looked very professional.
17 He spoke clearly. He spoke in a measured manner. He was not emotional or
18 histrionic. He gave every impression of being a professional soldier, in
19 a very difficult situation, who was in strong command of his men and --
20 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that you had a brief to discuss a number
21 of topics and in fact did discuss a number of topics, including matters
22 such as aid, cease-fires, and the atrocities committed in that area. Did
23 he ever shrink from discussing those topics?
24 A. No. He was very open. He was comfortable -- I had no impression
25 that there was something he didn't want to discuss. The one impression I
1 did have is that the thing which mattered most to him was that the Serbs
2 were going to continue to attack, regardless of what General Morillon
3 achieved or did not achieve, and that he was going to continue to defend
4 in the best way he possibly could.
5 Q. Would there have been any point at all in discussing a cease-fire
6 with Colonel Oric had he not been commander --
7 MR. JONES: I object to that question. That's -- would there have
8 been any point at all in discussing a cease -- I don't know what sort of
9 question that is, but it seems to be speculative and imprecise and has a
10 lot of objectionable features, let me put it that way.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, objection sustained. I think you need to
12 rephrase your question radically, Mr. Di Fazio.
13 MR. DI FAZIO: I will leave the topic.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: It's very easy to put the same question in a
15 different manner.
16 MR. DI FAZIO:
17 Q. Did you have any intention of discussing cease-fires with persons
18 who were not in the command, in the military command?
19 A. No. We wished to discuss cease-fires with people who were able to
20 make them happen.
21 Q. Did you -- of the men accompanying Colonel Oric, did any of them
22 introduce themselves to you?
23 A. No. None of them introduced themselves. It was very clear, from
24 their behavior and body language and the way they talked amongst
25 themselves, that they were subordinates and that Colonel Oric was the man
1 in charge.
2 Q. Thank you. Did you leave that day and go back to Sarajevo?
3 A. Yes. We left and went back to Zvornik -- to Tuzla. Helicopters,
4 back to Kiseljak and then by road into Sarajevo and reported back what we
5 had seen and what we had experienced.
6 Q. Reported to whom?
7 A. Reported to Izetbegovic and Ganic and Halilovic.
8 Q. And persons within your own command structure?
9 A. Yes, along the way, yes.
10 Q. When you reported to Izetbegovic, Ganic and Halilovic, did you
11 inform them that you had spoken to the commander?
12 A. Yes, we did. We informed them that we had spoken with Colonel
13 Oric and we recounted to them what I've recounted to you here just now.
14 Q. Was there any -- did you detect any surprise when you spoke to
15 them about Colonel Oric?
16 A. The only surprise that we encountered was in Tuzla when we met
17 briefly with the Bosniak commander of Tuzla airfields and he was very,
18 very angry and vitriolic about the fact that General Morillon had refused
19 to confirm that there had been atrocities in Cerska.
20 When we reported the same to Izetbegovic, Ganic and Halilovic,
21 they also expressed surprise that we had not discovered any clear evidence
22 of -- of any atrocities, but were not nearly as emotional and histrionic
23 as the Bosniak officers in Tuzla had been.
24 Q. Thank you. You've already told us that, in fact, you returned to
25 the enclave. When did you next enter the enclave?
1 A. We when we left the enclave, we told Colonel Oric that because we
2 had now learnt that the situation in Konjevic Polje, other than for the 73
3 injured, there was not that much there but that the really serious
4 situation was in Srebrenica and we told Colonel Oric -- or General
5 Morillon told Colonel Oric that he was going to go back to Sarajevo to
6 report to President Izetbegovic and he would then try to come back and go
7 to Srebrenica, but he would come back with UN military observers and he
8 would try to arrange for a cease-fire and he would try to arrange for
9 humanitarian aid to be deployed and that he would arrange for the injured
10 to be evacuated both from Srebrenica and for another convoy to go to
11 Konjevic Polje to evacuate 73 injured who were in Konjevic Polje.
12 Q. Thank you. You say that you told Colonel Oric that you had now
13 learnt that there was a really serious situation in Srebrenica. Who told
14 you about that, who informed you of the seriousness of the developing
15 situation in Srebrenica?
16 A. Colonel Oric did. He said the serious situation is in Srebrenica
17 now. It is no longer here. It has moved on. All the refugees, all those
18 able to walk have all gone to Srebrenica. This is effectively a front
19 line now. There's only going to be fighting here.
20 Q. Thank you. Was he able to provide you with detail? Detail of the
21 seriousness of the situation and how it was developing?
22 A. He gave us some numbers and I think he said something about 40,000
23 refugees in Srebrenica.
24 Q. He painted a grim picture?
25 A. Yes, he did.
1 Q. And you say that you told him that you were going to do all sorts
2 of things, go back to Sarajevo, report to President Izetbegovic, come back
3 with military observers, around a cease -- try and arrange a cease-fire,
4 try and get humanitarian aid underway, evacuation of the injured. Did he
5 react in any way to your proposals, Colonel Oric, I mean?
6 A. He was -- he seemed grateful that -- "thank you."
7 Q. So eventually you make your way back to Sarajevo, you said and you
8 spoke to the President Izetbegovic, Halilovic and Ganic, I believe.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Right. And eventually you made your way back into Srebrenica.
11 Did you request any forewarning -- a forewarning be conveyed to those
12 within the Srebrenica enclave of your second arrival?
13 A. Yes. This was normal routine. We asked Halilovic and Ganic to
14 warn the -- warn their forces in the Srebrenica enclave that we were going
15 to try and approach the enclave from the direction of Bratunac. And they
16 said "Yes, we will get the message to our people".
17 Q. Well, you say warned their forces. Who did you -- who do you mean
18 by that? What precisely do you mean by "their forces"?
19 A. The Bosniak forces in the Srebrenica enclave.
20 Q. And did they -- did they agree to do that?
21 A. They -- it was standard procedure.
22 Q. Thank you. When did you arrive in Srebrenica again?
23 A. We arrived in Srebrenica -- not "again" because this was the first
24 time in Srebrenica.
25 Q. I'm sorry, in the town of Srebrenica.
1 A. In the town of Srebrenica on the evening -- it was again after
2 dark -- of the 11th of March.
3 Q. Thank you. It was a very difficult trip, I think, to get into
5 A. Yes. The Serbs did everything they possibly could to obstruct us.
6 Q. I asked you about the main objectives of your previous trip to the
7 enclave. What were the main objectives of this particular trip?
8 A. Now that we knew a lot more about the situation, we had specific
9 proposals and intentions and General Morillon was accompanied by four UN
10 military observers who he wished to deploy into the enclave in order to
11 establish a cease-fire and he had issued instructions for further UN
12 military observers to be redeployed from elsewhere in order to come and
13 help man a cease-fire line.
14 Q. Thank you. You've also mentioned cease-fires. Was that one of
15 the objectives of your trip to Srebrenica?
16 A. Yes. General Morillon specifically wanted to bring the fighting
17 to a halt.
18 Q. You've mentioned concerns about the injured in Srebrenica. Was
19 that also an objective of your trip?
20 A. Yes. Both injured in -- who we knew about, in Konjevic Polje, as
21 well as, we had been told -- another thing Colonel Oric told us in
22 Konjevic Polje was that there was one hospital in Srebrenica and Dr.
23 Mardell had, in fact, left us and he went on foot from Konjevic Polje to
24 Srebrenica while we wept back out. And so when we wept back into -- when
25 we went into Srebrenica, we had a Medecins Sans Frontieres team of
1 Medecins Sans Frontieres doctors with us in order to help with the injured
2 in Srebrenica.
3 Q. Okay. And you've also mentioned humanitarian aid in your
4 evidence. Was that also a concern or objective --
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. -- of this particular trip?
7 A. Yes. There was a convoy of humanitarian aid stuck at Zvornik
8 blocked by the Serbs and we wanted to get that convoy into Srebrenica.
9 Because of a mistake by the -- by the Serbs, we managed to take one truck
10 out of that convoy and turn it around and we were passing in the opposite
11 direction, because we had been told we could only approach Bratunac on the
12 Serb side of the river. So we had to go into Serbia proper.
13 Now, the convoy was stuck trying to get the other direction into
14 Bosnia. And as we passed the stuck convoy, we turned the truck around.
15 It had medicine and sugar in it which we considered was the highest
16 priority. And a Canadian armoured personnel carrier which is also stuck
17 -- which is part of the Canadian battalion which had been trying to get
18 into Bosnia for three months and was stuck there for three months, and
19 they accompanied us to Bratunac.
20 Q. Thank you. So the -- you've now given evidence of some of the
21 objectives of the -- of your trip. Were they the principal objectives,
22 namely, facilitation of the aid convoy, facilitation of cease-fires,
23 deployment of UNMOs or military observers and evacuation of the injured.
24 Is that a --
25 A. Those are the four objectives, though I would put them in a
1 different order. I would put them in the order of deploy, UNMOs first,
2 because you needed them to have a cease-fire and you needed the cease-fire
3 in order to get the humanitarian aid through in order to evacuate the
5 Q. In order to achieve these objectives was it necessary for you and
6 General Morillon to speak to a military commander in the Srebrenica
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Can you just explain why, to the Trial Chamber, why that's
11 A. In our experience, you only ever achieved anything if the military
12 commander said "yes". If the local civilian commanders or mayors or
13 whatever said anything, it didn't really matter. It was what the military
14 commander said. And this was the same with the Bosniaks, the Bosnian
15 Croats, the Bosnian Serbs, it was -- it was the way it works in the
17 Q. Thank you. Where did you stay when you arrived at Srebrenica, in
19 A. We stayed in the new PTT building, which is immediately opposite
20 the Srebrenica maternity hospital, which is the hospital I was mentioning
21 a little bit earlier.
22 Q. You stayed, I think, in Srebrenica for up until the end of March,
23 around the 28th of March, I believe.
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. Was that the only hospital that you saw functioning in Srebrenica?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Just look at this photograph that I produce to you. This one.
3 It's a partial photograph of a building. Partial photograph of a
4 building. What building is that?
5 A. That building is the new PTT building in Srebrenica, where we were
6 accommodated on the top floor.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Just one moment before you say anything, Mr. Di
9 Fazio. How shall we -- do we have a number?
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone please, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Does this photo have a number already?
12 MR. DI FAZIO: I think it's on the side there.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: That's a ERN number. What I'm --
14 MR. DI FAZIO: Sorry.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm asking you whether it has been tendered in
16 evidence already, whether this is a new document that you are making use
18 MR. DI FAZIO: It's a new photograph, if Your Honours please.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I take it you want to tender this?
20 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, yes.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So this document is being tendered by
22 the Prosecution as being marked 513?
23 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. P513. Thank you.
25 MR. DI FAZIO: I think copies are coming, if Your Honours please.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Di Fazio.
2 MR. DI FAZIO: In essence, that's a post office?
3 THE WITNESS: That is correct, postal and telephone.
4 MR. DI FAZIO: Right.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Was it being used as PTT at the time?
6 THE WITNESS: No. There were no telephone communications working
7 by that stage. They had all been cut.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: So what was it being used for, or as?
9 THE WITNESS: It was being used as the headquarters of the
10 Srebrenica war committee, because it had a powerful radio in it with which
11 they maintained contact with Sarajevo.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. Mr. Di Fazio, we have more --
13 MR. DI FAZIO: I will be tendering those other photos.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. But would you require them to have different
15 numbers or not?
16 MR. DI FAZIO: Well --
17 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm asking you because ...
18 MR. DI FAZIO: I will tender them at different times, if Your
19 Honour please. So it's probably best if they have different numbers or
20 would you prefer me to put them in as a bundle.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: It's up to you. I don't have a preference myself.
22 But the thing is this, that this is definitely, I would imagine, a follow
23 up to this and it says PTT building Srebrenica. It does have a ERN, which
24 is one more than the previous document, but I don't know what you want to
25 do with these photos.
1 MR. DI FAZIO: We well I just wanted to tender the one photograph
2 of the PTT building without any ERN numbers or second pages.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: That's it. Do you need this?
4 MR. DI FAZIO: No, Your Honour, I do not need that.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Then there are other photos.
6 MR. DI FAZIO: I need just the photos, if Your Honours please, and
7 nothing more.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. For the time being, Madam Registrar,
9 we're talking only of this document, which has become 513 and nothing
10 else. So we'll keep these here and we will decide what to do with them
11 later. Yes, Mr. Di Fazio. We will be stopping for a break in 11 minutes
13 MR. DI FAZIO: I think I can just deal with another topic in that
15 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm just advising you where we are time wise.
16 MR. DI FAZIO: Thanks. Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. All right. So you have arrived and taken up residence, so to
18 speak, in the PTT building. Did you meet any local officials, so to
19 speak, on that night?
20 A. Yes. As you can imagine, there was great excitement and within
21 about an hour, hour and a half, we met with the -- a group of people who
22 described themselves as being the Srebrenica war committee.
23 Q. Had you ever met any of them before?
24 A. No. Though one of them described himself as Murat Efendic's
25 brother. Muret Efendic was the representative of the Srebrenica war
1 committee who we had met in Sarajevo in February.
2 Q. How many members of this war committee turned up to speak to you
3 or meet you?
4 A. It's about eight or nine.
5 Q. They explained who they were?
6 A. Yes. A couple of them explained who they were. One was called
7 Hajrudin Avdic who described himself as the president of the Srebrenica
8 war committee. There was another one called Nedjad Bektic, I'm sorry, my
9 pronunciation is not good. There was another called --
10 Q. I will take you to names at a later point, but don't bother trying
11 to recite them all. Did you meet them again in the ensuing days during
12 your stay?
13 A. Yes, we met them on a large number of occasions over the following
14 two, three weeks.
15 Q. And where would you meet them when you met them over the ensuing
17 A. We met with them in a room on the first floor of the -- of the PTT
18 building. It was the only room which had a, at that time, had a wood
19 burning heater and it had a light bulb because there was a -- behind the
20 PTT building there was a mountain stream and the Bosniaks had built a
21 little water wheel which is linked to a generator producing a little bit
22 of electricity and this electricity powered this light bulb. It powered
23 the radios in the radio room and it was connected across the road to a
24 couple of rooms in the hospital.
25 Q. Thank you. When you met with these members of the war committee,
1 did you always meet them with the same group, all being present or did you
2 meet different combinations of the group from time to time in meeting to
3 meeting? In other words, sometimes all of them, sometimes some of them,
4 sometimes singly?
5 A. We met with various groupings of them. However, Hajrudin Avdic
6 was always there an he was the -- if Hajrudin Avdic was not there, we
7 didn't have a meeting. He was the one who mattered.
8 Q. And did you, during the course of these meetings, ever see Mr.
9 Oric, Colonel Oric present?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Thank you. Can the witness be shown Exhibit P510 and I think the
12 witness has Exhibit P510 in front of him. Colonel Tucker, can I ask you
13 to look at 3438, that's the ERN number. You can ignore the first four
14 numbers and just go to -- it's like a page, page 3438 so to speak and also
15 across the page into 39.
16 Now, that's your handwriting, I take it?
17 A. That is -- no, most of it is my handwriting. Not all of it.
18 Q. All right. First of all, there's an entry on page 3438, that says
19 "Mesa" and what appears to be "brother of Murat Efendic". Can you
20 explain that entry?
21 A. Yes, I believe that Mesa was the name of the brother of
22 the -- the first name of the brother of Murat Efendic who was on the war
23 committee, a member of the Srebrenica war committee and another member of
24 the war committee wrote the two lines which are above Mesa.
25 Q. Well, I wonder if we can invite the assistance of the
1 interpreters' booth, if Your Honours please. If that could be just placed
2 on the ELMO briefly and we can see if it can be -- first of all, if it is
3 legible and if it can be understood and we can get a translation.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly. You mean of the two lines above the word
6 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, the two scrawling lines that you can see and
7 hopefully the ...
8 JUDGE AGIUS: So in case the interpreters --
9 MR. DI FAZIO: If they can read it, of course.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. We're talking of those two lines in that box,
11 the two lines above the line where you read the word "Mesa".
12 MR. DI FAZIO: I think they're just conversing with each other.
13 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter believes what it says is, "Your
14 Goniba loves you very much." Goniba probably being a proper name.
15 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, there we go.
16 THE WITNESS: I remember now, Muret Efendic's brother wrote that
17 in there for me to take back to him when I went back to Sarajevo.
18 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you very much. I'm grateful to the
19 interpreter's booth. Thank you, Ms. Usher. I am finished.
20 Q. Now, just turn over to page 3439. There are some entries there.
21 They speak for themselves, their names, obviously, Hajrudin Avdic, Senad
22 Alic, et cetera. Is that your writing?
23 A. No. That -- what I did was I passed my -- this book here around
24 the meeting and asked them to write themselves what the name was, because
25 I was not good at understanding phonetically what they said and they wrote
1 their names down.
2 There was one person present at the meeting who described himself
3 as a doctor. His name was Mujkanovic and he was at the far side and I
4 wrote down his name, but he -- I didn't understand his first name and I
5 then passed the book to him and he wrote Nadret as you can see on the
6 document there.
7 Q. Just turn back the page, back to 348 and there appears to be a
8 date at the top of that page, 12 March, 1993, 15.15. I assume that means
9 quarter past three in the afternoon?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. 12th of March, correct?
12 A. That is right. We had arrived in Srebrenica the previous evening.
13 Q. And already met with this war committee?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. So this is, in effect, is notes taken at a second meeting with the
17 A. At a third meeting.
18 Q. Third meeting?
19 A. We had a meeting with them on the night that we arrived. We had a
20 meeting with them in the morning. We then went around Srebrenica. We
21 then had a meeting with them again back in the PTT building.
22 Q. Okay. So all of these people were people who you understood to be
23 members of the War Presidency?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Or sorry, let me be absolutely precise, what you call the war
2 A. Yes. I called it.
3 Q. And finally, at the -- before the break, at the top, Hajrudin
4 Avdic, there's some words there that aren't entirely clear, obviously
5 president is one of them. Can you read out the remainder?
6 A. That is my writing, "President of War COM" as in war committee.
7 Q. If Your Honours please, that is probably an appropriate moment.
8 Would that be a suitable time for the break?
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think so. We need to in any case. So let's
10 have a 25-minute break starting from now, please.
11 MR. JONES: I wonder as well as have having a quick look at the
12 map, I wonder if it would be possible for us to just briefly inspect the
13 diary during the break. I see my learned friend nodding, if that is
15 MR. DI FAZIO: I have no problem with it and I'm sure that
16 Colonel Tucker ...
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
18 [Microphone not activated]
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. 25 minutes. Thank you.
20 --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 6.15 p.m.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Di Fazio.
23 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.
24 Q. You earlier testified that the hospital in Srebrenica was straight
25 across the road from the PTT building. Did you have an opportunity to see
1 people going in and out of the hospital, the weeks that you were there?
2 A. Yes. We were straight opposite it and we saw the bodies being
3 carried out in the morning and injured being taken in. We saw visitors
4 going in. We saw people going out.
5 Q. Thank you. Did you have occasion to visit the hospital?
6 A. Yes. I visited the hospital, in fact, on the first night that we
7 were in Srebrenica and I visited again later on, during our time in
9 Q. Thank you. It's not in dispute in this case that conditions were
10 pretty horrific in the hospital. Can you describe the conditions that you
11 saw there and, in particular, can you comment on the state of exhaustion
12 amongst the staff, the nurses and the doctors?
13 A. The conditions in that hospital were dreadful. The -- it was
14 massively overcrowded. There was no lighting other than a couple of light
15 bulbs that were powered from the little water-wheel generator. About 20
16 people a night were dying in the hospital, being buried the next morning.
17 There was a pile of off cuts, pieces of human body, legs, arms, hands,
18 fingers at the road side, opposite the PTT building which we only realized
19 what it was later on when the snow started melting a little bit. There
20 was one doctor in the hospital and a number of nurses and staff and their
21 faces were the faces of people who had seen the inside of hell. They were
22 shrunk. They were very, very tired. There was blood on their clothes.
23 They were people at the very extreme of exhaustion.
24 Q. Thank you. And this spectacle that you were able to see
25 inside the hospital, was it the same when you went again on the second
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 visit? In other words, that state of exhaustion that you saw and the
2 shrunken faces of the doctors and the staff.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you. I would like to show you a videoclip, please, from
5 Exhibit P318.
6 [Videotape played]
7 Q. Stop there, please. Do you recognise that fellow?
8 A. That is the person I knew as Dr. Mujkanovic.
9 Q. Okay, let's play on a bit. Just have a look.
10 [Videotape played]
11 A. The same person again.
12 Q. Thank you. What was his appearance when you saw him in the PTT
13 building along with the other other members of the War Presidency?
14 A. He was wearing combat clothing, beret, sunglasses, but did not
15 look anything like the doctors or the staff who I had seen in the
17 Q. Did you ever see him go into the hospital?
18 A. I never saw him go into or leave the hospital.
19 Q. Did you meet him on occasions throughout the three or four week
20 period that were you in Srebrenica?
21 A. I met him on many occasions, almost always in the PTT building,
22 which he hung around, and a couple of occasions in Srebrenica, walking in
23 the streets.
24 Q. Thank you. Did he have sunglasses when you saw him?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And did he speak a little English?
2 A. Yes. I tried to engage him in conversation, and found that he
3 spoke some English. Because I didn't understand why, if he was a doctor,
4 he wasn't in the hospital.
5 Q. Thank you for your comments on that member of the War Presidency.
6 And the other members of the War Presidency, you mentioned that you
7 understood Hajrudin Avdic to be the main man within that war committee, as
8 you call it. Did that perception ever change?
9 A. No. He struck me as being the equivalent of the mayor of
11 Q. In the meetings that you had with the War Presidency, did you
12 speak to them about the feasibility of a cease-fire?
13 A. We spoke with -- with him and the war -- the Srebrenica war
14 committee on many occasions about a whole range of subjects, amongst them
15 cease-fires and demilitarisation.
16 Q. Can you tell us -- tell the Trial Chamber if that topic of
17 conversation, demilitarisation and a possible cease-fire, arose fairly
18 early in your conversations with the war committee?
19 A. Yes, it arose about the third day, fourth day after we had
20 established what was going on and other issues.
21 Q. Yes. It's not in dispute that there was a hostage situation, I'm
22 going to develop that later. But at the moment I'm only concentrating on
23 your encounters with the War Presidency and it's the topic of the
24 cease-fire and demilitarisation I'm interested in?
25 MR. JONES: One matter to correct. There would be a dispute as to
1 any hostage situation described that way. Just to alert my learned
3 MR. DI FAZIO: Certainly I'm not suggesting that -- the evidence
4 that I expect I will be leading, that's what I was referring to.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
6 MR. DI FAZIO: I'm not taking it as -- if I went too far.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: No, no. I think Mr. Jones is correct, but I have
9 [Microphone not activated]
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Sorry. I think Mr. Jones is certainly right, but
11 more or less I know where you stand, Mr. Di Fazio, on this. Thank you.
12 MR. DI FAZIO: All right. Now, this topic of the cease-fire and
13 demilitarisation, it arose and it arose about three or four days into your
14 stay in Srebrenica.
15 Q. Was the War Presidency able to offer you anything constructive, in
16 terms of -- starting about setting up a cease-fire? Or starting the
17 process of bringing about a demilitarisation?
18 A. The war committee, whilst happy to talk about it, said that as far
19 as demilitarisation was concerned, that they had opinions, but it was
20 Colonel Oric that we needed to speak with.
21 Q. And what about cease-fires. Demilitarisation is one thing, a
22 cease-fire is another. Did they offer any constructive comments with
23 respect to that other matter of cease-fire?
24 A. Similarly, they stated we really needed to speak -- they did not
25 call him Colonel Oric. They just said Naser Oric.
1 Q. Thanks. I would just like you to be absolutely clear. You
2 started a sentence but I don't think you finished it. Similarly, they
3 stated we really needed to speak ... and you didn't finish. Who to?
4 A. With Naser Oric.
5 Q. Thanks. So your evidence is, you raised the topic. They were
6 amenable to the idea, but said you have to speak to Mr. Oric about both
7 topics, cease-fire and demilitarisation?
8 A. That's correct.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Di Fazio, one moment. Are these meetings
10 with the members of the War Presidency of Srebrenica recorded in this
11 diary or minuted in one way or another?
12 THE WITNESS: Yes. Most of them are. If I described the
13 situation, we were, for a while, constrained inside the PTT building,
14 could not leave the building and members of the war committee -- or
15 various members came and went, so it was not clear. We now have a
16 meeting, we now don't have a meeting. You're there. And you talk with
17 people at various times. There were a couple of occasions specifically it
18 when it was -- and in those cases it is minuted -- it is noted in the
20 JUDGE AGIUS: I am asking this question because you may have
21 noticed me a little bit pensive just before the break. I've gone through
22 this before in my career as a judge, as you can imagine. You have
23 tendered a whole diary in evidence. And I am pretty sure, Mr. Di Fazio,
24 that you will -- neither you nor Mr. Jones will be covering the entire
1 MR. DI FAZIO: You're right.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: -- in your examination-in-chief and
4 MR. DI FAZIO: Your Honour is correct, yes.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: And I would be very surprised if any -- either of
6 you would try to convince me that by the time you are going through your
7 examination-in-chief or your cross-examination, you have examined in
8 detail each and every entry that there is. I wouldn't be surprised at all
9 if in all truth there are parts that you can't even read because they are
10 illegible, no offence meant to you, but your handwriting sometimes is
12 I am concerned, because basically what you have done is you have
13 tendered this whole document in evidence. And once it is in evidence, it
14 is in evidence. I wouldn't like the situation to remain as it is. I
15 think if, in other words, you mean to have each and every entry that there
16 is in this diary to constitute evidence in this case, you need to declare
17 -- make such a declaration, because it's important. There may be things
18 that may be relevant, things that may not be relevant, things that
19 questions will be put on or about and things that will be overlooked.
20 It's not the ideal situation.
21 MR. DI FAZIO: Your Honours, we then -- if we didn't do that we
22 would be in a position where we're picking and extracting bits of the
23 diary which may also not be ideal. On the other hand, we can't get this
24 witness to go through and explain each an every entry because we'll be
25 here forever --
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, exactly.
2 MR. DI FAZIO: -- forever if we do that.
3 MR. JONES: If it assists, Your Honour, but as far as the diary is
4 concerned, certainly my understanding is that it's been tendered as
5 evidence, that it's the diary which was maintained by this witness.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
7 MR. JONES: But until he gives evidence about any of it, it's not
8 in itself evidence that such happened. My plan was to take him to the
9 passages which I would want his comments on and my understanding would be
10 it would only be at that point we would have evidence, you know, properly
11 understood. That's, as I said, that's my understanding and of course
12 there may be other understandings possible, so it's a good thing Your
13 Honour has raised it.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: That's correct, Mr. Jones. But in reality, it will
15 be still constitute evidence as to its content at least. And what you
16 have here remains here. This document will be examined by us.
17 MR. JONES: Yes. It would be evidence that those entries were
18 made but not that they reflect the truth of what they purport to record.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: No, no. I'm not saying they reflect the truth of
20 what they purport to show here, but there may be some damning evidence in
22 MR. JONES: Is --
23 MR. DI FAZIO: Does Your Honour wish the Prosecution to adopt a
24 position as to whether or not you would later be entitled to look at any
25 other entry that this witness does not comment on? Is that what's
1 troubling the Trial Chamber?
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's put it like this. Our responsibility, as the
3 trial judges in this case, is that if you have tendered this into
4 evidence, it would be unsafe on our part to rely only on your questions
5 and on the maybe couple of entries or a few entries that the witness is
6 asked questions about and ignore the rest. We can't ignore the rest
7 because the rest is here.
8 MR. DI FAZIO: There is evidence of course, if Your Honours
9 please, on the manner in which it was created and I can extract more
10 evidence about that. Now, that will go some way to explaining the entries
11 and the witness would -- I could ask the witness if he adopts the
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Di Fazio, I put the question to the witness, the
14 last question that I put to the witness on purpose, as you may have
15 gathered. I asked him precisely whether he kept records of these
16 meetings, when I say meetings, I'm using the word meetings in a loose form
17 as indicated. And he said "yes". Now do you expect us not to try and
18 find out what these entries are in this diary about these meetings even if
19 you don't ask the witness any particular question on these -- on those
20 entries? Of course we will. This is what we are trying to open your eyes
21 at, Mr. Jones, in particular, and you also, Mr. Di Fazio, because I have
22 been taught many years ago when I became a judge not to surprise the
23 parties with anything.
24 MR. DI FAZIO: Well ...
25 JUDGE AGIUS: So I think, I can't say more than I have stated, but
1 you have got ample time to digest these words and you know, give us a lead
2 as to what your intentions are when it comes to making use of this
3 document as a piece of evidence in this case.
4 MR. DI FAZIO: How you can treat it, in other words, and the
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Because it is entire -- what you have submitted is
7 an entire diary. I don't even need to say I agree with Mr. Jones when he
8 says that its contents are not proof of the events, but in reality they
9 are there.
10 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, yes, I understand that. I mean it would be
11 different when the witness comments in court of course about a particular
12 entry. That's another matter altogether.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, that's different. But the problem is more
14 convoluted than that, I think. But anyway, let's move and then you have
15 the whole evening and until tomorrow or even later to think about this and
16 come back to us with some kind of.
17 MR. DI FAZIO: Position?
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Yes, Mr. Di Fazio.
19 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honours.
20 Q. We were talking about -- I was asking you some questions about
21 meetings and you told us that you met with or encountered members in
22 varying combinations of the war committee and that you discussed and spoke
23 about cease-fires and demilitarisation over time with these members of the
24 war committee.
25 And I asked you -- I was starting to ask you if the War Presidency
1 had provided you with any feedback as to the -- as to their attitude
2 towards cease-fires and demilitarisation and I think your evidence was
3 that they suggested that you speak to Naser Oric.
4 My question is: Did you make an effort to contact Mr. Oric to do
5 precisely as they suggested?
6 A. We kept asking the president of the war committee, please can you
7 get in contact with Colonel Oric so that we can meet with him so that we
8 can discuss these matters and they said, he is elsewhere and -- we are
9 passing messages but we don't know when he's going to appear, we don't
10 know when he's going to be here. And in the absence of Colonel Oric, we
11 spoke with the people that were there.
12 Q. Thank you. Now, I want to ask you to turn your mind to another
13 topic. If Your Honours please, we've got six minutes to go and this is a
14 fairly big --
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Why six minutes to go? I think we have 20 minutes.
16 MR. DI FAZIO: I'm sorry, I was thinking of the earlier times. I
17 apologise, if Your Honours please. So I think we do in fact have time to
18 start the topic.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I wouldn't mind finishing.
20 MR. DI FAZIO: I got confused momentarily, Your Honour.
21 Q. Now, when you entered Srebrenica and took up your residence, so to
22 speak, at the PTT building, could you see large numbers of refugees in and
23 around that area, the hospital and the PTT building?
24 A. Yes, the place was thick with them. There were thousands of
25 people there.
1 Q. And they were there the following day on the 12th, as well?
2 A. Yes. They had nowhere else to go.
3 Q. Did you ever go up to the roof of the PTT building?
4 A. More often than I care to remember.
5 Q. What about on that day, the 12th, did you go up there?
6 A. Yes, I did.
7 Q. And did you observe the crowd?
8 A. Yes, I went up and I went up for two reasons. I went up, firstly,
9 in order to try and establish communications. We had an American tactical
10 satellite radio. However, the satellite was 18 degrees above the horizon
11 at right angles to the direction of the valley and only if we put a step
12 ladder right on the edge of the top of the PTT building could we sometimes
13 hit the satellite. It was just on the edge. The second reason for going
14 up on to the roof of the PTT building was during the afternoon of the
15 12th, which is when -- shortly before we were prevented from leaving
16 Srebrenica, I was already very concerned about our ability to leave
17 Srebrenica and I was going up on to the roof because it was the best
18 vantage point from which to see what was happening and the preparations
19 which were being made to prevent us from leaving Srebrenica.
20 Q. Thank you. Now, what was causing your concern? What was worrying
22 A. When we had arrived the previous night, we had been welcomed.
23 When we, the next morning, met with the Srebrenica War Presidency, the
24 atmosphere had changed. Hajrudin Avdic was very uncomfortable and he
25 wouldn't look us in the eyes and there was something wrong. And whenever
1 we talked about right, we now -- we've seen what we need to see, we know
2 what the situation is, we will leave the UN military observers here and
3 the doctors here, we will go back to go and negotiate further UN military
4 observers to come in. We were delayed and the war committee then
5 persuaded us to go on a walk around the town in order to see -- but it was
6 a delaying tactic. And the whole war committee walked around the town
7 with us. It took about two hours, whatever.
8 We then met again, the second meeting with the war committee, in
9 the top of the PTT building on the first floor and it was a conversation
10 that was going nowhere. It was clear they did not want us to go. And
11 Morillon was arguing with Hajrudin Avdic. I went out of the meeting room
12 to go and prepare our vehicles and whilst we were loading up the vehicles,
13 Mihailov told me that, "Do you know what they're saying in the crowd?"
14 And I said, "No." And he said, "They're discussing whether to kill you
15 now or whether you served some use being kept alive."
16 And I went back up on to the roof of the building, as I described
17 earlier, and I saw some military preparations being made.
18 Q. Thanks. Can I just interrupt you there. We'll get on to that in
19 just a moment, the military preparations that you speak of. But what did
20 -- can you recall anything specific that the members of the military
21 committee said or did that made it clear to you that they didn't want you
22 to go? Can you recall anything?
23 A. They said that the refugees were getting very anxious and that the
24 refugees were very frightened and that if -- that when you, General
25 Morillon, had left Konjevic Polje, as soon as you had left, the Serbs had
1 started shelling Konjevic Polje and had attacked and they're afraid that
2 if -- that if you leave now, that the same thing will happen.
3 MR. JONES: By the way, my learned friend referred to the military
4 committee. I take it he meant to refer to the war committee, just for the
6 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, that's right. I'm sorry. Mr. Jones has
7 corrected me properly. Thank you.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
9 MR. DI FAZIO:
10 Q. All right. Did you actually make an attempt to leave Srebrenica?
11 A. Yes, we did. We mounted in our vehicles and tried to drive off
12 and got ten metres before the crowd of refugees surged around us and laid
13 down in front of the tracks of the armoured vehicle and blockaded us.
14 Q. So there is no way out except by running over these refugees?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. And I take it you didn't do that.
17 A. That was not what we were there for.
18 Q. No. So did you abandon the vehicles and go back in?
19 A. No. We stayed with the vehicles and General Morillon climbed on
20 top of the armoured vehicle together with Mihailov and tried to calm the
21 refugees and tried to persuade them to let us pass, but to no avail. And
22 eventually we had to reverse the vehicles, back up against the wall of the
23 PTT building just by the entrance and we were manhandled upstairs to the
24 first floor of the PTT building.
25 Q. Who manhandled you upstairs?
1 A. Bosniak soldiers.
2 Q. Now, you earlier mentioned that you observed some military --
3 sorry, I don't want to misquote you, but you observed some preparations
4 being made. What preparations were you referring to?
5 A. There were two types of preparation being made. Firstly, a couple
6 of heavy machine-guns, 12.7 millimetre machine-guns on tripods were being
7 set up on a couple of positions which were overlooking the road down which
8 we would have to go. Secondly, a barrier was set up through which -- or
9 which we'd have to pass through in order to depart. Thirdly, some
10 soldiers with anti-tank rocket launchers on their shoulders were by the
11 sides of those barriers and, fourthly, there were soldiers who were moving
12 and marshalling the refugees and organising the refugees.
13 Q. Where did you see this from?
14 A. I saw this from the first floor windows of the PTT building and
15 from the roof of the PTT building.
16 Q. And you saw these prior to your going down and getting into the
18 A. That is correct. And I went into the meeting which was still
19 going on between General Morillon and the Srebrenica war committee and
20 told him, "General, they're not going to let us go." And he said, "Don't
21 worry, Pyers, of course they'll let us go" and they didn't.
22 Q. And how many rocket launchers did you see, was it just the one?
23 A. It was just the one.
24 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber how common rocket launchers were
25 amongst the Bosniak military forces in the enclave, if you know, if you
2 A. I do. They're like gold dust. When I was at the Konjevic Polje
3 -- when I was waving for General Morillon to come back from Cerska which
4 is the road from Cerska, the Bosniak soldiers there had one of these
5 rocket launchers and I was waiting there for two hours and talking with
6 them and asked them how many of those do you have, and they said, Very,
7 very few and we have to keep them for where we think the tanks will come.
8 And I asked them where you get them from. They said we get them from the
10 Q. Thank you. Did you discuss or mention or put to the members of
11 the war committee these preparations that you'd seen, what you had seen,
12 did you remonstrate with them or raise the topic with them?
13 A. No, I didn't.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I take it it's General Morillon's task to do that,
16 MR. DI FAZIO: Indeed, I will develop that.
17 Q. Did General Morillon raise these issues with them?
18 A. No, he didn't, because the war committee were portraying things
19 as, this is a spontaneous protest by the -- by the women and by the
20 refugees and later on they told us that the refugees had organised
21 themselves into a women's committee and that it was the women's committee
22 who were organising the refugees and they were powerless against these --
23 with this women's committee.
24 Q. Thank you. And how did the -- how did matters finish that day?
25 A. Matters finished with us locked into the -- one of the big rooms
1 on the first floor of the PTT building.
2 Q. Who was locked in there?
3 A. All of our party, which was General Morillon, myself, Mihailov,
4 Larry Hollingsworth, not the Medecins Sans Frontieres doctors, they were
5 over in the hospital. There were two Belgian -- Belgian officer, driver,
6 there were four United Nations, UN military observers. I have the list of
7 the names in my diary.
8 Q. We don't have to have everyone.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Locked from the inside or from the outside?
10 THE WITNESS: From the outside.
11 MR. DI FAZIO:
12 Q. What about guards or sentries.
13 A. Yes. With guards outside.
14 Q. Armed?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And did you have any idea or impression as to who these guards
17 were or -- were they soldiers?
18 A. They were wearing military uniform and they had weapons but in
19 Bosnia that doesn't necessarily mean they're soldiers.
20 Q. Did you spend the night under guard?
21 A. Yes, we did.
22 Q. The next day was the 13th, I think.
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. Was there any attempt, by General Morillon, to get himself out or
25 extricate himself from that situation?
1 A. Yes. General Morillon tried to leave the pocket and he arranged
2 with Mihailov and me that he would try to escape from the room and at
3 about 10.00 in the evening he put on a big duffle coat and pulled the hood
4 over his head, took his beret off, and when a number of Bosniak soldiers
5 walked into the room, he walked out with them and they didn't notice that
6 he'd gone. He went down the road which we'd come in to Srebrenica and
7 went and stood in a house, a ruined house at the side, and I was supposed
8 to try and leave the room early in the morning and take one of the Jeeps
9 that we had and drive down past that building, pick him up and then head
10 on down the road towards Bratunac, towards the Serb front lines where he
11 hoped to cross the front line.
12 Q. And were you successful in slipping away in a Jeep, or not?
13 A. No. What happened is that I was escorted down to one of the Jeeps
14 by some Muslim soldiers in order to use the radio, which was in the UNHCR
15 Jeep, in order to radio back to our own headquarters what was happening
16 and I asked him if I could move the Jeep to the side of the building
17 because it was better communication reception there. He allowed me to do
18 that. I then went back up into the room. At about 2.00 in the morning,
19 by which time most of the sentries were asleep, most of the guards were
20 asleep, I again asked can I use the radio and he let me go down and I got
21 into the Jeep. I started the engine and as soon as I started the engine a
22 lot of the -- the refugees were just scattered everywhere around,
23 temperature was about minus 15, minus 20 degrees and the refugees were
24 clustered around little fires. They were burning the plastic beer
25 crates. The plastic beer crates, when you light them, they burn for about
1 four or five hours and they give off quite a lot of heat. Actually
2 they're little fires everywhere. The refugees woke up hearing the engine
3 and then crowded around the vehicle and were quite angry and it was very
4 clear to me that there is no way they were going to let me drive that
5 vehicle anywhere. So I closed down the engine and went back into the --
6 went back into the building.
7 Q. All right. And did -- I take it that the escape attempt failed?
8 A. Yes, obviously the escape attempt failed.
9 Q. And what did General Morillon do?
10 A. About 6 o'clock in the morning, 7 o'clock in the morning, General
11 Morillon came back into the building with his coat on and none of the --
12 none of the guards recognised him and he came back into the room. He was
13 absolutely exhausted and he said that he had spent the night standing in
14 this house, watching the refugees - it was snowing heavily - watching
15 these refugees. It was these refugees who came from Cerska and Kamenica,
16 and they had finally reached Srebrenica having gone on foot from up there
17 and he had watched hundreds of these refugees slowly walking through the
18 snow in the cold and he said, this is something I've never -- I've not
19 experienced ever before. And that is when he made his mind up that he was
20 not going to -- try to leave Srebrenica anymore and he was going to make a
21 virtue out of the need and he was going to say "I am going to stay in
23 I put him in a sleeping bag and put him around the back of the
24 room, another small side room, which -- it wasn't obvious there was a room
25 there. The Bosniak soldiers came in for some reason looking for him and
1 when they saw his sleeping bag empty they panicked and then they -- there
2 was a lot of shouting and screaming and search parties were sent running
3 off in all directions, but actually General Morillon was asleep in the
4 back of the PTT building. And then at about 10 o'clock in the morning he
5 woke up and then the war committee were in a panic by that stage and
6 General Morillon shaved and just came out looking fresh as if nothing had
7 happened and the war committee were absolutely so relieved. Then General
8 Morillon said to them: "I'm going to stay". And things went on.
9 Q. And we'll just about wrap it up for today, but just one or two
10 matters I wanted to establish. Did he eventually give a speech to the
11 assembled refugees and people?
12 A. Yes, he gave a speech from the first floor of the PTT building
13 that afternoon.
14 Q. That afternoon, right. And did you work with him on preparing the
15 text of that speech?
16 A. Yes. We spent the morning working out what he would say and the
17 speech is in this and the speech was read out of this notebook.
18 Q. Thank you. If Your Honours please, I'm not finished with the
19 topic but this is a natural break for -- in the midst of the topic.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Colonel. We'll meet again tomorrow in
21 the afternoon, same courtroom, courtroom 2 at 2.15. Thank you.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.55 p.m., to
23 be reconvened on Tuesday, the 15th day of March,
24 2005 at 2.15 p.m.