1 Wednesday, 16 March 2005
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam registrar, could you call the case,
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Case number
8 IT-03-68-T, the Prosecutor versus Naser Oric.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you Madam. And good morning to you.
10 Mr. Oric, can you follow the proceedings in your own language?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours, ladies
12 and gentlemen. I'm able to follow the proceedings in my own language.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I thank you and good morning to you.
14 Appearances for the Prosecution.
15 MR. WUBBEN: Good morning, Your Honour. My name is Jan Wubben.
16 I'm the lead counsel for the Prosecution together with co-counsel, Mr.
17 Gramsci Di Fazio, and our case manager, Ms. Donnica Henry-Frijlink. And
18 also good morning to you Defence.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Wubben. And good morning to you
20 and your team.
21 Appearances for Naser Oric.
22 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours, my
23 colleagues from the Prosecution. I am Vasvija Vidovic together with Mr.
24 John Jones. I'm the Defence counsel for Mr. Naser Oric. Together with us
25 are our legal assistant, Ms. Jasmina Cosic and Ms. Adisa Mehic and our
1 case manager, Mr. Geoff Roberts.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Madam Vidovic and good morning to you
3 and your team. Any preliminaries before we proceed?
4 MR. WUBBEN: No, Your Honour.
5 MR. JONES: None.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Jones. My apologies to you I didn't
7 realise --
8 MR. JONES: Yes. I think there is a preliminary, which the
9 Prosecution might need to elaborate themselves on.
10 But basically, we filed an exhibit list a few days ago concerning
11 the exhibits we intend to use with this witness.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
13 MR. JONES: Some of them have a prefix R, which as I learnt for
14 the first time relates to Rule 70 material. The exhibits which we intend
15 to use were all disclosed to us by the Prosecution. I have the receipts
16 and the dates, if need be.
17 Yesterday I was alerted to the fact that the Prosecution perhaps
18 was still needing to secure certain clearances in order for that material
19 to, I suppose, enter the public domain and for that reason I delayed using
20 them yesterday.
21 I've received this morning a list indicating which of the
22 documents received clearance and which haven't. There are still some
23 which haven't and which, of course, I would like to use. What I propose
24 doing is, I can shift those exhibits to tomorrow so that in the meantime I
25 understand the Prosecution is still seeking clearances and then perhaps
1 we'll end up finishing a bit early today but then that can be dealt with
3 I should say that our position is that we've received these
4 documents, they were disclosed to us without any indication that they were
5 confidential or anything of that nature. We do intend to use them. If
6 need be, some expedience such as sitting in closed session or filing the
7 exhibits under seal.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Sitting in closed session doesn't solve the problem,
9 in Rule 70 material. If it comes to the worst, then the only solution
10 that there is, Mr. Jones, is that fortunately you are aware of the
11 contents. You can make use of the contents without referring to the
12 specific document. And proceed accordingly, but there is no other way.
13 Do I take it, Mr. Wubben or Mr. Di Fazio, I don't know who is
14 handling this --
15 MR. WUBBEN: Mr. Di Fazio.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Di Fazio, but that basically you are in the
17 process of receiving clearances from the sources that are Rule 70
19 MR. DI FAZIO: The situation is that these were handed over to the
20 Prosecution some time ago. I wanted to satisfy myself that they were --
21 clearance had been received, put matters into train to make that enquiry.
22 We're still awaiting that notification.
23 There is every possibility that clearance will be provided;
24 however, we are yet to receive it. And I'm grateful to Mr. Jones for
25 being so accommodating and agreeing to rearrange, in effect, his
1 cross-examination so that he can extend more time to the Prosecution to
2 make those enquiries and hopefully get to the bottom of the matter as fast
3 as possible.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Now, the -- okay, I thank you for that information,
5 Mr. Di Fazio. Now I draw your attention to Rule 70(B), please. "If the
6 Prosecution is in possession of information which has been provided to the
7 Prosecutor on a confidential basis and which has been used solely for the
8 purpose of generating new evidence, that initial information and its
9 origin shall not be disclosed by the Prosecutor without the consent of the
10 person or entity providing the initial information. And shall in any
11 event not be given in evidence without prior disclosure to the accused."
12 Now, I take it that if the accused or Defence are already in
13 possession of these documents, that presumes that there has been clearance
14 already from whoever gave you the documents in confidence. Am I correct,
15 or not?
16 MR. DI FAZIO: You are correct and that would be in the normal
17 course of events, and I hope and expect that we will eventually find the
18 source of the clearance for these particular documents that Mr. Jones is
19 talking about.
20 The problem that the Prosecution has is essentially a record
21 keeping one.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Oh, I see.
23 MR. DI FAZIO: What we have is, I can't -- when I found the
24 documents, I said, where is the clearance for this material? I want to be
25 satisfied about it so that I, myself, might be able to use the documents.
1 And matters were put -- enquiries were started and it's the inability to
2 find that clearance that is the source of the problem in this particular
4 JUDGE AGIUS: I see. That makes me less optimistic, as I was when
5 I started speaking. Let's wait a bit, Mr. Jones, and see how this
6 develops and then we will take it up from there.
7 MR. JONES: Right, yes.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: I take it if you have them, it's either because the
9 Prosecution has made a humungous mistake by disclosing to them to you
10 without clearance or else because there has effectively been clearance.
11 MR. JONES: Yes. That's why our position is ultimately we should
12 be able to use them, but we're prepared to desist in using them for a
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I appreciate that.
15 MR. JONES: And there may be a certain amount of shuffling of
16 exhibits, a certain amount of wielding that we will have to do on our
17 side, so I trust you will bear with us because it affects the order on
18 which I was going to present.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Obviously. Obviously. But I take it I have your
20 word, Mr. Di Fazio, that there is someone actively engaged in trying to
21 take this clearance up, wherever it may be?
22 MR. DI FAZIO: They're very, very busy.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Otherwise there will be guillotines in
24 place in this courtroom later on in the day. Yes, I'm making it clear.
25 Yes, Madam Usher, can you escort the witness, please.
1 In the meantime, Mr. Jones, if you want to make use of the
2 contents, once you have the documents, the presumption is that they have
3 been handed to you, the legal presumption is that they have been handed to
4 you legally, in a legal fashion, and I suppose you can easily, without any
5 problems at all, make use of that information, not necessarily of the
6 document. In other words, for the time being, until we clear this up, I
7 don't think I can authorise you to say, there is this document released
8 by, or provided by -- which states the following.
9 You can put to the witness the contents or the substance of the
10 contents, of those documents that you are interested in, without
11 indicating or giving an indication to the witness what document or what
12 source you are relying upon or that document relies upon.
13 MR. JONES: Yes, yes.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: And you can move along in that manner.
15 MR. JONES: Yes. Where possible, I will try to distill a
16 proposition from the document and put it.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, if you could do that. I mean obviously but,
18 otherwise, the presumption has to be that you have them legitimately and
19 you have come into possession of them in a legitimate manner.
20 [The witness entered court]
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Colonel. Please take a seat and we
22 are going to proceed with the cross-examination. Again, I'm sorry we
23 called you about 12 minutes late, but, as usual, we start every morning
24 here with problems, be they technical or procedural or otherwise.
25 WITNESS: PYERS TUCKER [Resumed]
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Jones, please you may proceed.
2 Cross-examined by Mr Jones: [Continued]
3 Q. Yes, good morning, Colonel Tucker. I hope you are well rested.
4 A. Thank you.
5 Q. A general question before we go back to the diary, because we
6 haven't with that yet. I'm going to deliberately go very slowly today for
7 the interpreters. I trust you will bear with me.
8 You described yesterday some pretty disturbing matters, people
9 getting in knife fights over the food and air drops, people not having
10 food in Srebrenica for days on end. People sleeping out on the streets,
11 freezing cold.
12 Are you still troubled by your memories from your stay in
14 A. Yes, I am.
15 Q. You were there for a little over two weeks; would that be right?
16 A. Yes, that is correct.
17 Q. And to the many months that other people, including our client was
18 present in Srebrenica?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. I also want to deal with a matter I touched on yesterday, but
21 without having the exhibit in front of me, you will recall I referred to
22 Philip Morillon's book 'Croire et Oser'. And, in fact, I will pass up
23 copies of that exhibit now, the relevant pages.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Did he write his book in English or in French?
25 MR. JONES: In French.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: In French. Has it been translated into English?
2 MR. JONES: My apologies, it hasn't. I was working on the basis
3 that the working languages of the court were English and French and I'm
4 hoping the interpreters --
5 JUDGE AGIUS: No, no. I understand French, I'm just curious
6 whether there is such an important book as this has been translated into
7 French by anyone.
8 MR. JONES: Sorry has the book been translated?
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, the book, right.
10 MR. JONES: I don't believe so but I stand to be corrected.
11 Q. Now if I could direct your attention firstly to page 165. You
12 will see at the bottom of the second paragraph, where there is the
13 reference to the famous quote, "Je n'ai pas senti l'odeur de la mort". I
14 didn't smell the odour of death.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And that refers to what General Morillon said when he went to
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. Now, if I could read the next passage, and I will do the best with
20 my school boy French. [French spoken]
21 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. I don't know what's happening. Of
22 course I could follow you in French. But although Judge Brydensholt and
23 Judge Eser and myself are the ones who ought to follow most, there are
24 others also who need to follow what is being said and I did not receive
25 interpretation. So I take it that there was no interpretation to the
1 outside world or to whoever doesn't understand French.
2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter is asking whether Mr. Jones
3 wouldn't mind repeating because French was not -- you know scheduled,
4 scheduled. Please repeat.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So what we will do, Madam Usher, could I
6 ask you, please, to put this on the ELMO, page 165.
7 MR. JONES: Perhaps I should suggest --
8 JUDGE AGIUS: It's the penultimate paragraph. Penultimate
9 paragraph, page 165.
10 MR. JONES: If in fact given Colonel Tucker's French is no doubt
11 much better than mine, perhaps, you wouldn't mind reading that paragraph.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it was little to say, that
13 there hadn't been any dead in this battle, including innocent civilians,
14 victims of the bombing. I meant to say that there had been no massacre.
15 My duty was to have to try and calm or reduce hatred and try to favour
16 peace first in the minds.
17 MR. JONES:
18 Q. All right. Thank you. Isn't it correct to say when General
19 Morillon made that comment he wasn't saying there hadn't been deaths of
20 innocent civilians, he was only saying he hadn't seen evidence of a
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. And is it also your understanding that he partly down played the
24 scale of the crisis as reflected in that paragraph, because he felt it was
25 his role to calm down hatred and animosity?
1 A. No. It was his role to calm down hatred and animosity, but that
2 was by telling the truth. And he did not see, in what he saw, in other
3 words, he did not see what he did not see. He had no evidence that
4 convinced him that a massacre or massacres had occurred.
5 Q. It's true isn't it, that on that day, General Morillon only saw a
6 very small part of Cerska and he didn't go in the outlying areas?
7 A. What General Morillon told me when he returned from Cerska was
8 that he and his party had only walked in and around the buildings of the
9 village of Cerska and had not gone up into the hills or into the woods of
10 the surrounding area.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: And what date would this be? What --
12 THE WITNESS: The 6th of March.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: 6th of March. Okay. Thank you.
14 MR. JONES:
15 Q. Now, turning the page, on page 166, there's a section dealing with
16 Konjevic Polje. Again, if I could ask you just to read the first
17 paragraph in French and if the booth could interpret that into English.
18 A. Is that the top page of 166, from --
19 [Interpretation] I learned then that the Serbs had not stopped
20 their offensive and that following Cerska, they bombed Konjevic --
21 [No Interpretation] Sorry, I'm hearing the translation
22 simultaneously in my ear and it is very confusing to read. I will start
24 [Interpretation] I learned then that the Serbs had not stopped
25 their offensive and that following Cerska they had bombed Konjevic Polje,
1 driving the inhabitants under the horrified gaze of the blue helmets and
2 Abraham saw women and children die. He saw his own vehicles being hit,
3 some of them destroyed, and he had to withdraw on orders with the
4 inhabitants fleeing into the mountains, taking away their wounded because
5 there was nothing else to -- left to be done on this part.
6 Q. Right. And does that passage reflect your understanding of what
7 happened in Konjevic Polje after General Morillon left? Sorry.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Again, this would be, what day?
9 THE WITNESS: The -- where he talks about the bombardment of
10 Konjevic Polje, that would have been after the 6th of March. I had no
11 hard information as to when that happened. It was only when we were in
12 Srebrenica, on the 11th and 12th of March, that we were told that that had
14 JUDGE AGIUS: If you look at the next page on page 167, in fact,
15 there is the third paragraph, J'arrive le dix mars. So, it had to be
16 between the 6th and 10th in any case.
17 MR. JONES: Yes. Yes. We can probably fix the date with other
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Exactly. But I just asked in case the witness
20 could pinpoint that. Yes, Mr. Jones.
21 MR. JONES:
22 Q. Yes, so subsequently, did you understand that that is in fact what
23 had happened?
24 A. Yes, it is.
25 Q. And just three more passages, if you could please read the next
2 A. [Interpretation] I was then convinced that the Serbs, despite what
3 they promised, were resolved and determined to clean up the area of any
4 Muslim presence up to the end in the area. Paris shares this analysis. I
5 talked about it with general Wahlgren in Zagreb and I told him I feared
6 that Srebrenica would very soon have the same fate as Cerska.
7 Q. Thank you. And then just before I ask you about that, if we could
8 just see the next paragraph on page 167. If you could please read that
10 A. The one starting --
11 [Interpretation] Refugees, most of them are women and children,
12 flow in the tens of thousands. They live on the street without any
13 shelter. Srebrenica is an impasse from which they cannot escape. The
14 weakest start dying of hunger. Any attack on their city will be a
16 Q. And do those reflections reflect what you believed as well at the
18 A. Yes, I did.
19 Q. And finally, on page 171, in the penultimate paragraph, there's a
20 mention of Philip von Recklinghausen who you mentioned. You also
21 mentioned Tony Birtley. Do you know who Tony -- did you know who Tony
22 Birtley was?
23 A. Yes. Tony Birtley was a UK national. He was a free-lance
24 reporter, at that stage working for ITV, not BBC.
25 Q. And the last sentence there says: [Interpretation] He confirmed
1 what we saw as soon as we arrived. Srebrenica is hell. [No
2 Interpretation] And do you share that opinion?
3 A. I do.
4 Q. I would ask if this document could be given an exhibit number,
5 this extract.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly, Mr. Jones. This will become --
7 THE REGISTRAR: D217.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Defence Exhibit D217.
9 MR. JONES:
10 Q. I'm going to take you back to the diary now, so if you could have
11 that in front of you. Thanks. I forget which exhibit number it is.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: P510 ...
13 MR. JONES: I thank you, Your Honour. Your Honour, I'm just
14 reminded, we do have the issue of -- still of how the diary will be dealt
15 with, the issue which Your Honour mentioned?
16 JUDGE AGIUS: As you notice, you may have noticed yesterday, I did
17 not raise the matter again. I was waiting to see how deep into it both of
18 you would have bitten and then I would have put the question at the very
20 MR. JONES: Okay, we can proceed that way.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think that's the only way of going about it.
22 I will not make any further pronouncements in the course of
23 cross-examination for sure.
24 MR. JONES: We have a position, and I can state that in due
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you.
2 MR. JONES:
3 Q. Colonel, if you could turn to page 3456, please, which is where we
4 left off. Okay. Just to reorient ourselves, this is the 14th of March
5 and you read paragraph A, the bottom half. If you could now just, please,
6 read B and C.
7 A. These people believe they will be killed in the next few weeks.
8 The Serb offensive is alleged to have started 10 days ago and would appear
9 to be relentless to eating the enclave up village by village. It is not a
10 quick three-day attack. Serb aircraft from Serbia are confirmed as
11 supporting these attacks.
12 Q. Thank you. What was your source for this intelligence?
13 A. Which part?
14 Q. The Serb offensive is alleged to have started ten days ago?
15 A. We were told that by the -- by members of the War Presidency and
16 that we'd been told that earlier in Konjevic Polje by Colonel Oric.
17 Q. Was it that this intensified offensive had started ten days
19 A. Yes. In fact, when I was in Zvornik later in Major Pandurovic's
20 office, he had taken us into that office and up on the wall was a map
21 which showed the boundaries of his forces, his force's front line, on a
22 series of dates. And, in fact, the start date of that offensive was the
23 7th of February. But I did not know that at the time that this was
25 Q. So that you had information that, in fact, the offensive might
1 have started considerably earlier than ten days before the 14th of March?
2 A. Yes, but I only had that information subsequently.
3 Q. As far as the offensive which was going on while you were in
4 Srebrenica, do you have any estimate of how many people were killed by
5 Serb shelling in the town of Srebrenica during that time?
6 A. While we were in Srebrenica, there was negligible shelling of
7 Srebrenica and the town. The United Nations military observers, who had
8 been south of Srebrenica, they had themselves seen and witnessed shelling
9 of outlying villages, which were at the edge of the Srebrenica enclave in
10 the way that I had described yesterday.
11 Q. And were they reporting major casualties?
12 A. They were reporting numbers of casualties, but not in -- not major
13 numbers of casualties. We were far more concerned about people --
14 refugees dying of starvation, because the refugees were uprooted and only
15 had any food that they could carry. We were told that many of them had
16 been on the march for about five days and they had not eaten in five days.
17 Shelling was, as I had described yesterday, which was sporadic,
18 three shells an hour into a village. That's not going to cause large
19 numbers of casualties but it is sure going to terrify the population.
20 The other reason for the refugees being in dire need of food and
21 being starving is that the inhabitants -- the local inhabitants of
22 Srebrenica and the War Presidency appeared to be doing nothing to actually
23 help the refugees. The people, the inhabitants of Srebrenica had stocks
24 of food, but which they were, I suppose understandably, keeping for
25 themselves, they were not making anything available to the refugees. It
1 was the refugees who were our main concern in Srebrenica.
2 Q. And in that regard, when you touched on that subject yesterday, I
3 think you also said that soldiers hadn't helped. I want to ask you a
4 question or two about the concept of soldiers in Bosnia, because you also
5 told us that even someone in a uniform with a weapon wasn't necessarily
6 indicative that they were a soldier. First, would you accept that, that
7 that's not indicative?
8 A. The definition of soldier, as is understood in a democratic
9 country in Bosnia is not particularly relevant. The male population of
10 Bosnia provided they were more than 19, 20 years old, will probably have
11 had their national service and therefore know how to use a weapon. So
12 therefore every male within Bosnia who is more than 20 can hold weapons
13 and understand the basics of military tactics.
14 That does not mean they are soldiers, though, and if they are
15 attacked, then anyone will grab whatever weapon they have available to try
16 and defend themselves. The issue of soldiers is to what extent they were
17 organised in and subject to military command and subject to military
19 Q. Thank you. That's a very helpful definition. Applying that
20 definition, when during your testimony you've referred to soldiers in
21 Srebrenica, isn't it right that in fact you're not able to say whether
22 they fit into that conventional definition of belonging to a hierarchy?
23 You're speaking of someone who may have been in a uniform or been
24 able-bodied; would that be fair?
25 A. When I refer to soldiers, what I'm referring to are people who
1 were visibly following orders and acting in an organised and controlled
2 manner, as opposed to many of the people in Srebrenica, refugees who were
3 wearing bits of military uniform simply because they were good heavy and
4 warm, that did not mean they were necessarily soldiers. When I refer to
5 soldiers, I mean people who were following orders and who were acting in
6 an organised and controlled way.
7 Q. Sergeant you don't speak or you didn't speak at the time
8 Serbo-Croatian as it was known?
9 A. No, I don't.
10 Q. So when you talk about people visibly following orders, you
11 weren't actually hearing orders being issued in and around the town, were
12 you? That's an inference.
13 A. No. To give specific examples, when we arrived in Konjevic Polje,
14 and we were escorted by a couple of Colonel Oric's officers and a couple
15 of what I took to be bodyguards, Colonel Oric spoke to them and they then
16 went away and did things and they came back and they said things. Now,
17 what was said, I can't comment on.
18 Similarly, in and around the PTT building, there were soldiers who
19 were guarding the place, both downstairs at the front entrance and
20 upstairs, the radio room and the meeting room and for a couple of days
21 when we were in that -- that other room in the top floor. It was clear, I
22 mean you don't need to understand the language, to be able to see that
23 there is somebody giving orders and there is somebody else who is
24 receiving them and following instructions.
25 Q. So you're inferring on the basis of someone speaking to someone,
1 someone going off and coming back and saying something in some cases
2 you're inferring an order being issued on that basis?
3 A. Yes. There is one further basis and that is Mihailov, who speaks
4 Serbo-Croat and he was an important source to me of information locally
5 about what was going on and who was saying what to who, et cetera.
6 Q. All right. I'm not going to belabour the subject, but I put it to
7 you, on certain occasions anyway, some occasions when you inferred an
8 order from that behavior, it was simply people exchanging information and
9 nothing more.
10 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, if the witness has already said he didn't
11 understand the language and this Mihailov was there to tell him, he can't
12 comment on what was transpiring between them.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: It's classic case of the counsel now speculating
14 instead of the witness. Move to the next question, Mr. Jones.
15 MR. JONES:
16 Q. If we can go back to the diary, 3457 is the next page. And we
17 have airdrop sitrep: 6 aircraft dropped just north of Srebrenica,
18 population fighting over bundles, three to six people killed during each
20 Now at this stage, were these still pallets which were falling or
21 were they MREs?
22 A. They were pallets of MREs.
23 Q. Now, did you see each night or many nights when you were in
24 Srebrenica, a spectacle of many, many people from Srebrenica going out to
25 the hills at night to await the airdrops, burning fires on the hills and
1 that sort of thing?
2 A. Yes. What would happen is that, as it started getting dark, the
3 refugees who were all scattered around the PTT building -- as I described
4 previously -- would slowly head north and the place would empty and there
5 would be hardly anyone left because they had all gone up to where the drop
6 sites were.
7 And then during the night they -- after the drops, they would
8 slowly drift back. It took about an hour and a half, two hours walk to
9 get from the PTT building up to the drop sites, above the town.
10 Q. During this -- during these events, would you hear shots being
11 fired from the -- from that direction?
12 A. Yes. The odd shot, burst of machine-gun fire.
13 Q. You've gone into this in some detail yesterday, but would it be
14 fair to summarise, this as a fight for survival -- struggle for survival,
15 in which the fittest were basically getting their hands on the food,
16 basically, in which the law of the jungle prevailed?
17 A. Yes. And you touched on something that was of considerable
18 concern to us. It was the strongest and fittest who were getting the
19 food, not the weakest, who actually needed it. And that's a recurring
20 concern that we had and that the War Presidency did not appear to be doing
21 very much to gather food and make sure the weak women and children
22 actually got it rather than the strong.
23 Q. Did they ever tell you there was very little they could do?
24 A. No. They never made that excuse. I think that they were so
25 demoralised that even the basics that they could have done, they weren't
1 doing. It was only when Larry Hollingsworth, the UNHCR person who was
2 with us, he actually organised them and showed them how to set up a
3 refugee reception centre and an accommodation unit to actually move
4 refugees in an organised way into empty unused buildings and so on, and to
5 organise the collection of food that was dropped in order that -- and as
6 time went on, and their morale improved, they started getting a bit better
7 at that.
8 Q. Thank you. If you could turn to the next page, 3458. I'm looking
9 at the very bottom that goes into 3459. It's the comment "Serbs furious
10 that there are some UNMOs in", I think it is "Sreb". Is it correct that
11 the Serbs -- you understood that the Serbs, firstly, were furious that
12 there were United Nations military observers in Srebrenica.
13 A. Yes. The Serbs were furious and we know that because we had a
14 report from a meeting between some UNMOs and General Milovanovic at the
15 silver mine, at the entrance to the route that we had come in. And he had
16 been furious with his local commander for letting us go past that route.
17 Secondly, is Milovanovic, when we met him at the yellow bridge,
18 said that there was no agreement for military observers to be deployed
19 into Srebrenica and that you, General Morillon, had just taken them in
20 without the approval of the Serb -- Bosnian Serb Assembly. And it was
21 returned to in most meetings that we had with the Serbs.
22 Q. Aside from that slightly bureaucratic explanation which they gave,
23 was it your opinion that, in fact, the Serbs didn't want the outside world
24 to know what was going on in Srebrenica?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. If you can skip forward to 3463 and that's 15th of March. The
2 Prosecution asked about this page and the next couple of pages. And
3 there's the reference, which I think was read out, to shelling and bombing
4 at a low rate until arrival. But then reference to cluster bomb casings
5 and 128-millimetre rocket mortars. Motors.
6 A. Motors. It's the only thing that is left over from 128-millimetre
7 rocket when it explodes.
8 Q. So as an artillery officer, you would be familiar with both of
9 these weapons. Can you tell us a lit bit about cluster bombs, first of
11 A. A cluster bomb is a fairly new type of weapon which is a package
12 containing many small bombs about 700 or 750 of them. And when the bomb
13 is dropped, when it is a short distance above the ground, a small
14 explosive charge scatters these many -- think of them as little hand
15 grenades which then independently explode. Cluster bombs are for use
16 against infantry and personnel in the open. They are not any use against
17 armoured vehicles or buildings.
18 Q. So is it right that there can be a pretty devastating effect of
19 cluster bombs being dropped on a civilian population?
20 A. Yes. We found a cluster bomb casing in the south of the main part
21 of the town and we could see where the -- all the little bomblet's had
22 exploded, had scarred a couple of apartment blocks. In other words, this
23 cluster bomb had been dropped on a city of civilians.
24 Q. An then 128-millimetre calibre, that's a very large calibre, isn't
1 A. It's not that large a calibre, but it's a -- it's a rocket of a
2 multiple rocket-launch system. So it's not individual rockets. It's
3 these batteries of them. And they just fire very quickly, one after the
4 other. And again, it is an area weapon for use against soft targets,
5 people. It is not really that much use against armoured vehicles or
7 Q. And these weapons -- taking, first of all, the multiple rocket
8 launcher, these were weapons of the JNA, which the Bosnian Serb army had
9 inherited. Would that be your understanding?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And you mentioned armoured vehicles. The fact is the Bosnians
12 didn't have any armoured vehicles, did they, in Srebrenica?
13 A. There was one tank. There was one T55 tank which we were told had
14 no fuel, available fuel. They captured and it was in the middle of the
16 Q. It was captured from the Serb?
17 A. It was captured from the Serbs.
18 Q. If you turn to the next page, you were also asked about these
19 groupings in the area. Page 3464. In fact, I withdraw that, that's been
20 dealt with, I think, thoroughly yesterday. So we will move on from that
21 page to 3467. Again, this is the 15th of March, I think you will agree.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And this is your note, isn't it, of a meeting between General
24 Morillon, General Milovanovic and a third person.
25 A. Colonel Tolimir, Zdravko Tolimir.
1 Q. And these are all officers of the Bosnian Serb army?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Then with the line after it, which looks to be like a J,
4 represents what General Morillon said?
5 A. It is M and a bracket.
6 Q. Near the top there, he appears to be saying: "Propose to solve
7 your problem by demil area, deploy," I suppose that refers to the Canadian
9 A. Yes. What he was proposing was to solve your, as in the Serb
10 problem, by demilitarising the area and by deploying a Canadian company.
11 Q. And that would solve the Serbs problem because the Muslims
12 wouldn't be fighting anymore?
13 A. The Muslims wouldn't be carrying out the attacks on the Serbs,
14 Serb civilians, that they were getting so angry about and were using as
15 their excuse for continuing their offensive.
16 Q. You confirmed, haven't you, you're not aware -- you don't actually
17 know where Serb civilians were ever targeted by --
18 A. I have no personal knowledge and was not shown any such
19 information. We were taken to Kravica and were told of things, but we
20 were not in a position to confirm or deny anything.
21 Q. All right. If we turn to the next page, 3468. This is still
22 General Morillon speaking. We've got two sentences, lines -- actually, we
23 can -- it's the numbers on the side, lines 9 to 11, "deploy UN soldiers to
24 demilitarised area, like" --
25 A. "Status of UNPA in Krajina, police and UN soldiers only allowed in
1 the area." General Morillon was making an analogy to the situation in the
2 Krajina UNPAs.
3 Q. When he refers to police, that would be civilian Bosniak police;
4 would that be right? Was that the understanding?
5 A. No. My understanding is that it was police of either side, but
6 not soldiers.
7 Q. Not military police?
8 A. Not military police.
9 Q. Now if we go a bit further down, you have line 16 to 18, "I know
10 you wished to clean out this nest of terrorists. I will do it for you and
11 save you many, many casualties".
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. That's General Morillon speaking to the Serbs and referring to
14 Srebrenica as the nest of terrorists; is that correct?
15 A. He was speaking in language that the Serbs would understand. That
16 was the language which the Serbs had been using for General Morillon to
17 refer to them, otherwise would have been difficult in the circumstances.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: In other words speaking a language that the Serbs
19 would digest better, in other words?
20 THE WITNESS: Yes. He was repeating back to the Serbs the things
21 that they had been saying to him.
22 MR. JONES:
23 Q. You will forgive me if I dwell on this, but it may go to the
24 attitude of the Bosnian towards General Morillon and the United Nations
25 when we see that phrase. General Morillon had been in the enclave for
1 three days at this point, I suppose, is that about right?
2 A. Yes, about that.
3 Q. He had seen the suffering which you had seen, the women and
4 children starving, people on the streets. Was that really good practice
5 of him to refer to Srebrenica as a nest of terrorists?
6 A. Sat here, I can understand why you raise more than an eyebrow.
7 Where we were, the situation was desperate and what General Morillon
8 wanted was to achieve the objectives that we've been through before. The
9 Serbs were highly excited, very angry, much more angry than we had seen
10 them in the previous three months that -- four months that we had been in
11 Bosnia. And they were absolutely determined that these were terrorists
12 and they were going to sort them out.
13 And what General Morillon wanted to do was to calm them down and
14 so he was using language that he did not believe, but that in the
15 conversation there, then, in the heat of the moment, there then is what I
16 wrote down, I recorded, as to what General Morillon said.
17 What I categorically refute is that General Morillon considered
18 the Bosniaks in Srebrenica all to be terrorists. He was using the
19 language which had been used, shouted at him by the Serbs. Please do not
20 take this out of the context that this actually occurred in.
21 Q. I want to examine the context a bit more, because it follows from
22 that, doesn't it, that the Serbs were furious against the enclave,
23 considered the people there terrorists and they were bent on some sort of
24 revenge; correct?
25 A. Yes. Revenge was the word uppermost in my mind as to what the
1 Serbs were after. There was continual complaint about war criminals in
2 the pockets and whenever we talked about evacuation of injured, the caveat
3 from the Serbs was always: the women and children, fine; the men, not.
4 The men, we want to search and check against lists that they claimed they
5 had of war criminals and that those who they claimed were war criminals,
6 they would take off to and put through their legal system.
7 Q. In this climate, did you and General Morillon consider that if the
8 Muslims were disarmed, there was a grave risk that there would be an
9 appalling massacre, at this time?
10 A. And that is why General Morillon was so adamant about the
11 introduction of UN military observers, because without UN military
12 observers, it was impossible for there to be any kind of guarantees of
13 anything and exactly the issue you describe was possible.
14 Q. But when you speak of UNMOs, we're talking about half a dozen or a
15 dozen individuals observing a situation. Surely more than that is
16 required to defend the enclave against possible attack.
17 A. General Morillon had, by that stage, already issued orders for 36
18 UNMOs to be deployed and to be prepared for deployment. He had four with
19 them and there were a further four who followed shortly behind, the ones
20 who bumped into Milovanovic at the silver mine.
21 These are to observe a cease-fire. This is not in any way shape
22 or form a defensive force able to protect in military action.
23 Q. And what was the estimate for the size of the defensive force
24 which would be required?
25 A. We made no plans at that time about a defensive force. General
1 Morillon was talking about deploying the Canadian battalion which was held
2 up at Zvornik, into Srebrenica. And shortly after I left, they made
3 arrangements, in fact for a company of them to deploy into the -- into
5 While I was there, the focus of effort was on getting UNMOs -- UN
6 military observers deployed.
7 Q. And accompanying which was deployed which was what, between 100,
9 A. Typically a Canadian company, about 150 men.
10 Q. And are you aware that subsequently, when it came to estimating
11 how many soldiers would be needed to protect the enclave, that was
12 considered a woefully inadequate number, that many, many companies would
13 be required?
14 A. If you were going to protect the enclave, you would have needed
15 four, six, 8000 soldiers; not the kind of numbers we're talking here. And
16 General Morillon had nothing like that resource available. There was
17 nothing like that resource going to be available in the near future. What
18 there was available and what could be deployed quickly was UN military
19 observers and that is why he focussed on that.
20 Q. It's right, isn't it, that nothing like 8000 soldiers, UN soldiers
21 were ever deployed to defend the enclave?
22 A. That is correct. My understanding that is purely from reading the
23 media is that DutchBat was about 600 or so. But at no stage was that ever
24 a credible defensive force.
25 Q. Now, you were talking about Naser Oric's attitude to the proposal
1 to demilitarise the enclave and, of course, we're not here to judge him
2 for being a hawk or a dove.
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. But did you -- I take what you said yesterday as not being a
5 criticism of him, that he was contemplating fighting to the very end in
6 and among the buildings as an alternative to demilitarising.
7 A. I'm sure that Colonel Oric has far more and far worse experience
8 of the Serbs than I do, and I can understand why he did not want to
9 consider demilitarisation, that he was very anxious about what the risks
10 that that incurred and General Morillon and I were very aware that there
11 were risks.
12 Q. But despite his opposition, he was, in fact, overruled, wasn't he,
13 in the sense that there was a demilitarisation?
14 A. That happened after I left.
15 Q. If we could turn to the next page, 3469, it's a matter I am going
16 to come back to. But at line 15, there's reference "murder Turajlic". Do
17 you see that? I will ask you --
18 A. Line 15?
19 Q. "Murder Turajlic".
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, as I said, I will come back to this and it's with regard to
22 the attitude that the Bosnian towards United Nations, but doesn't that
23 refer to the murder of the Bosnian vice prime minister when in the custody
24 of the United Nations near the airport? Murder by Serbs.
25 A. That is correct. Though the way that events were portrayed there,
1 the way it actually happened, there are differences. You're correct.
2 Q. I believe you were involved in discussions as to whether this
3 should be, or you and General Morillon, as to whether there should be an
4 investigation into the responsibility of the French Colonel for that
6 A. There was an investigation. It was carried out by General
7 Valgon, in fact. And it lasted for about three weeks.
8 Q. But the perpetrator wasn't convicted, wasn't he, because immunity
9 was granted to UN witnesses against testifying?
10 A. The perpetrator was a young Serb soldier who was identified by
11 General Mladic. The Serbs refused to hand him over. General Mladic
12 claimed that the Serb soldier had been court-martialled and punished. I
13 have absolutely no way of confirming whether or not -- whether or not that
15 Q. Right. Thank you. We will come back to that with documents in
16 due course. Now if you go to 3474. Again, I'm just looking towards the
17 bottom where General Morillon appears to be saying -- perhaps you could
18 read those three lines, something "I departed government of -- I deprived
19 you of military victory". Could you read those three lines?
20 A. From which number?
21 Q. 3474.
22 A. Yes. And line number?
23 Q. It would be 21 to 23.
24 A. "Morillon: I deprived you of military victory. It would have
25 been a real catastrophe to your cause". This is General Morillon saying
1 to the Serbs. I think this is still the Milovanovic meeting, that he,
2 General Morillon, by going into Srebrenica had deprived the Serbs of a
3 military victory on the ground in Srebrenica and saying that: "If you,
4 the Bosnian Serbs, had a military victory on the ground, it would have
5 been a catastrophe, a diplomatically -- politically to your cause".
6 Q. And do you know what General Morillon meant when he referred to
7 "your cause"? What did you understand to be the Serbs cause?
8 A. The Serb's cause, my understanding of the Serb's cause -- I can't
9 comment on what General Morillon thought at that instant when he said that
10 -- was the establishment of a independent Serb republic.
11 Q. Carved out of the --
12 A. Bosnian Serb republic, Republika Srpska.
13 Q. Yes.
14 Q. Which would break away from the United Nation's recognised
15 republic of Bosnia?
16 A. Which was part of, at that moment in time, international
17 recognised single entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
18 Q. So as a representative of the United Nations, is it really correct
19 that General Morillon was seeming to endorse the dismemberment of the
20 United Nations' member state?
21 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, the what -- witness has
22 made quite clear, he said that he can't comment on what was going through
23 General Morillon's mind at that particular time. And as I understand what
24 has transpired in the questions and answers thereafter, the witness's
25 views about what was happening at that particular time.
1 Now, if that's relevant so be it. But I thought that the enquiry
2 was what was going through General Morillon's mind and the meaning of that
3 answer, at 3474.
4 Now if we can get some insight into that of course I have no
5 objection and the witness may be able to provide that insight. But the
6 way the questions have developed so -- from that point onwards appear to
7 be Colonel Tucker's views. And if you regard that as appropriate, then so
8 be it. But we must be clear about the views that are being expressed
9 being Colonel Tucker's views, because he said that he didn't understand --
10 or didn't know what was going through General Morillon's mind at the time.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. You would have been completely right,
12 Mr. Di Fazio, had the question been: Would you agree that
13 General Morillon was actually endorsing the dismemberment of the United
14 Nations member state of BiH. But the question isn't that.
15 The question was, is it really correct -- really correct, and pay
16 attention to the words used by Mr. Jones, please, because I think this is
17 a very carefully studied question. Is it really correct that
18 General Morillon was seemingly endorsing or seeming to endorse ... In
19 other words in his dealing with General Milovanovic -- or whatever his
20 name is --
21 MR. DI FAZIO: Perhaps I misread it --
22 JUDGE AGIUS: -- was General Morillon.
23 MR. JONES: Giving the impression.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Giving the impression that he was sort of --
25 MR. DI FAZIO: Perhaps I jumped the gun.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Sympathetic or whatever, which I think this being
2 essentially a process of negotiations that was ongoing.
3 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: -- at the time. I think the witness can easily,
5 without any problems at all, answer it.
6 MR. DI FAZIO: Understood in that light, I have no objection to
7 the question.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: You don't go to negotiate and the first thing you do
9 is antagonise the person you are trying to negotiate with. In fact you
10 try to show as much sympathy as possible with his or her cause, even if
11 you are at heart miles away.
12 MR. DI FAZIO: I understand that. As I said understood in that
13 light, then I've got no problem with the -- with the line of enquiry. I
14 just want to be absolutely sure that everyone is clear about what the
15 witness is saying.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: But of course he can answer the question. The
17 question is certainly not: "What did General Morillon inwardly feel
18 about the Serbian cause." That's not the question. I wouldn't let him
19 answer it in any case, if that had been the question.
20 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you. My fears are allayed.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Di Fazio. Mr. Jones, would you like
22 us to repeat the question.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, please.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Jones. It's your question.
25 MR. JONES: Right.
1 Q. In this meeting, did General Morillon give the impression that he
2 was sympathetic to the cause of dismembering a member state of the United
4 A. Absolutely not. Not in this meeting nor in any other. He merely
5 recognised that, as the judge said, people who are negotiating with had
6 different points of view and their cause was their point of view.
7 Q. You spoke yesterday about cease-fires and the general policy of
8 cease-fires and I'm coming at that subject to get at this topic. Isn't it
9 correct that in the early months of the war, the Serbs seized something
10 like 90 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina by violent ethnic
11 cleansing operation, expelling Muslims from their homes?
12 A. I think the percentage of 90 is a substantial overstatement. But,
13 yes, they did take a majority of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
14 Q. What percentage would you estimate?
15 A. About sixty.
16 Q. And isn't it right that at this stage - we're talking about March,
17 1993 and even a bit before - that cease-fires were basically consolidate
18 the status quo?
19 A. Yes, that is correct.
20 Q. Did you -- sorry you were going to add something?
21 A. It was our view that from April through to November, the Bosnian
22 Serbs had carried out a deliberately planned policy of occupation and
23 ethnic cleansing and that from the end of November, they believed, by
24 their perverted logic, that they had seized all the territory that they,
25 to their perverted logic, had a right to. And that's the reason,
1 incidentally, why the front line, the confrontation line was such a
2 militarily illogical line, if you were intending to defend something. And
3 that from December 1992 onwards, the single intention of the Bosnian Serb
4 military was to consolidate what they had taken and get the territory that
5 they had taken recognised to get Republika Srpska recognised. And what
6 they wanted was a cease-fire throughout all of Bosnia and for the fighting
7 to stop, with them holding what they had taken.
8 Q. So when you the met with Bosnian, Bosnian government
9 representatives, did you detect sometimes a certain skepticism about your
10 talk of cease-fires, given that it would consolidate that invidious
12 A. No. The situation was more complex than that. The -- it was our
13 perception and by our perception I mean it was the headquarters'
14 perception that the Bosniaks did not want to accept the status quo which
15 had been forced upon them by superior military force, by the Bosnian Serbs
16 and that they were, therefore, going to carry out military action as and
17 where they could in order to try and reverse that situation. And what
18 they never wanted to do was allow or give recognition of the current
20 Now, in their military actions that they carried out, invariably
21 the Serbs had more heavy weapons, but not very many infantry. And the
22 typical course of events was that the Bosniaks would carry out an attack,
23 somewhere. That it would make initial advances and have initial success
24 because the Serbs did not have many soldiers, did not have many infantry.
25 The Serbs would then use heavy weapons, tanks, artillery, and so on to
1 repulse the attack and regain the territory which the Bosniaks had
2 initially gained and would then carry out a punishment shelling of the
3 area from where the attack had come in order to try and deter the Bosniaks
4 from carrying out future attacks.
5 Now of course the Bosniaks did not want to accept that, because
6 they felt that they had lost territory which they wished to regain.
7 Now when things started getting bad for the Bosniaks, because the
8 Serb military superiority of force was giving the Serbs the advantage,
9 that was when the Bosniaks then requested cease-fires and were requesting
10 support by the United Nations, by General Morillon, for cease-fires. So
11 General Morillon was going into - and this is not just General Morillon,
12 this is all people in the UN in Bosnia at that time - were going into
13 negotiations. They were requesting cease-fires in areas where things were
14 going badly for the Bosniaks and the Serbs were saying: But the -- you,
15 United Nations, are only acting as a tool for the Bosniaks and arranging
16 cease-fires to prevent us from reversing a military situation. And what
17 we, the Serbs want, is a ceasefire across all of Bosnia, not just in one
18 convenient place so that the Bosniaks can carry out a tactical regrouping,
19 bring up more men, bring up more ammunition and then start fighting again.
21 Q. So this pattern of what you described as raids on the Bosniak
22 side, that's very much part of the whole military strategic position in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time?
24 A. It was exactly that. And it was of -- I described the situation
25 where, from April through to November, it had been a battle of con quest
1 by the Serbs, but the Serbs had then sat down and said we've taken what we
2 need to take.
3 It is our belief, from intelligence, et cetera, that the Bosniaks,
4 seeing the Serbs ceasing their attacks and further seizure of territory,
5 believed, mistakenly, that the - that the Serb military had overstretched
6 themselves, had overreached themselves. And they then ordered a series of
7 counter attacks. Those counter attacks started in Sarajevo, at the
8 beginning of December, where they had a twin-pronged attack from Mount
9 Igman and from Stup around the side of Sarajevo airport.
10 That attack resulted in some of the heaviest fighting around
11 Sarajevo that had ever taken place and resulted in the loss of most of
12 Stup to the Bosnian Serbs and was some very vicious fighting.
13 When we started seeing, in the international media in January,
14 reports of an offensive in the eastern enclaves from the inside of the
15 enclaves outwards and reports of Bosniak forces having even attacked
16 across the river Drina and actually held some territory in Serbia itself
17 for a while, this was considered to be further attempts by the Bosniak
18 Presidency to move on to the offensive. However, they had gravely
19 misjudged the force and the power that the Bosnian Serbs had available.
20 They had believed that the Bosnian Serbs were -- had overstretched
21 themselves. In fact they had simply stopped because they had taken what
22 they believed was correct.
23 Now, the Bosnian Serbs had misjudged the Muslims, the - sorry, the
24 Bosniaks - resoluteness and they were surprised, they were taken by
25 surprise by the -- they had not expected these attacks. And it took them
1 until the 7th of February to organise themselves in the eastern enclaves
2 in order to start their counter offensive, which then began as what I
3 described as the Pacman-style attack of slowly but remorselessly village
4 by village, but not in a massive way so the international community would
5 then see a big bombardment or anything, but they would slowly,
6 remorselessly eat into the enclaves for a number of reasons: For
7 revenge, for what they claimed was the murders of Serb civilians of which
8 had taken place, and the anger that the Serbs showed about that was much
9 more than the excuses you described yesterday, weren't those kind of
10 excuses used everywhere, yes, they were used everywhere, but in -- but in
11 respect of Srebrenica they were really, really angry. I mean there was a
12 difference in the anger that the Serbs had.
13 Secondly, there was also the logistic resupply issue that I
14 described with the map yesterday, and --
15 Q. I would like to come to that issue, if I can stop you there
16 because that's a very, very full answer. I'm going to take a few points
17 just briefly arising from what you've -- what you've said. You've said
18 that one of the motives for the Serbs' remorseless attack on Srebrenica
19 was revenge. I put it to you that there was a much more simple reason for
20 it, which was that the enclaves were extremely inconvenient to the Serbs
21 and they needed to be extinguished because they were in eastern Bosnia and
22 they were a nuisance.
23 A. I would entirely agree that there were -- there was that reason as
24 well, but there were two reasons. There was what I would describe as the
25 military logistic reason, but there was also this -- this revenge issue,
1 which came up again and again.
2 Q. Right. Now, taking the logistic resupply issue -- first of all
3 Sarajevo - obvious point - was under siege at this point. Correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And what you've described as attacks coming out of Sarajevo could
6 also be described as attempts to break the siege?
7 A. What I was describing earlier, actually yesterday or the day
8 before, was attacks from north of Sarajevo. In other words I -- when I
9 showed you on the map the corridor from the sides, the flanks of the
11 Q. You can break the siege from the outside as well as from the
12 inside? Can't you?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Now this logistic resupply issue -- I won't deal with the map now,
15 but is it correct that the Serbs' complaint was essentially we're having
16 difficulty in maintaining our siege of Sarajevo because our logistics
17 route from Zvornik to Pale is being disrupted.
18 A. Yes, absolutely. And Colonel Oric was making it very difficult
19 for them.
20 Q. So I hope this doesn't come across as flippant, but the poor old
21 Serbs had to run a gauntlet in order to keep up the siege of Sarajevo; is
22 that correct?
23 A. Exactly. Karadzic, in a meeting in the middle of February, after
24 a meeting with General Morillon, took General Morillon aside and asked if
25 he could help with a personal matter and said that a nephew of his had
1 left Zvornik, a few days previously in a car, with four other people from
2 Zvornik to go to Pale but had never arrived in Pale. Could General
3 Morillon enquire with the Presidency forces whether they had any knowledge
4 of what might have happened. And we enquired and we never found anything.
5 Q. Right. Well, when I said the "poor Serbs", I was being ironic.
6 Isn't it right that the siege of Sarajevo involved terrible sniping and
7 shelling and killing of many, many innocent people?
8 A. Yes, it did.
9 Q. But were you, as the United Nations, listening to this complaint
10 by the Serbs, they were having trouble keeping up the siege, this is a
11 serious complaint?
12 A. It was not -- I never described it and it was not -- it was never
13 described to us by the Serbs as "they were having difficulty keeping up
14 the siege". It was making things difficult for them.
15 Q. Now, I will talk for a moment on the subject, although I mean to
16 come back to it. But I put it to you, what emerges from this is such a
17 moral or amoral -- amoral miasma and amoral role by the United Nations
18 that the Bosnian were understandably extremely skeptical, not to say,
19 hostile, when you met with them to discuss these issues. Would you
20 accept that?
21 A. Yes, I would.
22 Q. Finally, just on this subject, you've accepted, I think, that the
23 Bosnian were outgunned, massively outgunned?
24 A. Yes, they were.
25 Q. And that's due to two factors mainly, isn't it: That the Serb
1 army -- first perhaps you can tell us as a military man, the JNA was what,
2 the fourth largest army in Europe before the war?
3 A. Numerically, yes.
4 Q. And it left all its hardware with the Bosnian Serbs when -- after
5 May 19th, 1992?
6 A. To Bosnian Serb army, yes.
7 Q. Yes. And secondly, the UN was maintaining an arms embargo on
8 Bosnia which meant that the Bosnian couldn't get arms to defend
9 themselves. Would you accept that?
10 A. Yes. There was a third factor and that was that the Bosnian Serb
11 army was being supplied, resupplied from Belgrade.
12 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, still on the --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel and witness please make sure
14 to make pauses between question and answer.
15 MR. JONES: Yes. Apologies. I'll just take a few more pages
16 before the break.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: It's up to you. We have about eight minutes left
18 before the break.
19 MR. JONES:
20 Q. Page 3483. It's just a passage at the bottom. This is a sitrep,
21 is it, is that correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And it is the 16th of March. "Town", could you read A.
24 A. "A, tension largely dissipated. People, particularly refugees,
25 still, however, in fear for their lives".
1 Q. So that refers to the fact that after General Morillon said he
2 would stay, some tension dissipated but people were still in fear for
3 their lives?
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. Now, if you could turn to 3491, and that's the 17th of March.
6 Just to clarify that it's correct, isn't it, that shells did actually
7 start falling or were falling when you were in Srebrenica?
8 A. These shells that had fallen on the morning of the 17th of March,
9 were the first shells to hit the town or near the town since we had
10 arrived in Srebrenica.
11 Q. Do you know if those shells killed anyone?
12 A. We were told that three people were killed and about ten were
14 Q. Now, finally, before the break, 3493. This is the 17th of March.
15 If we see 4 -- could you read 4, please.
16 A. "I demand today humanitarian aid convoys by road or by helicopter.
17 We cannot wait any longer". That commander has no cigarellos left.
18 Q. That's right, isn't it, actually, that General Morillon asked for
19 brandy and Davidoff cigars to be specially dropped?
20 A. No, he didn't. That was said flippantly and General Jones, in
21 fact, said that he had arranged for them to be put into the airdrop of
22 radio batteries and microphone for the TACSAT that we had requested.
23 Whether they ever were, I don't know.
24 Q. All right. Thank you. That may be an appropriate moment for a
25 break. I'll being moving on to a new area.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. We'll have a 25-minute break starting
2 from now. Thank you.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, before we proceed any further, Mr. Di Fazio,
6 are there any developments on what your stuff -- were supposed to be
7 pursuing this morning, or checking?
8 MR. DI FAZIO: No, there aren't. If Your Honours please. I've,
9 during the break, continued to make enquiries, spoken to persons whom I
10 hope will be able to expedite the final confirmation of this clearance and
11 -- but I can't report anything positive to you at this stage.
12 [Technical difficulty]
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. One moment, because when things go wrong, they
14 go wrong. We have a problem, a technical problem, which we have
15 encountered before, these last couple of weeks.
16 I think we need technical assistance. The transcript scrolling is
17 jammed. And we need -- Colonel, this will take around about two or three
18 minutes, so there is no point in leaving the courtroom while it is fixed.
19 In the meantime, I do enjoin you, as much as I can, to sort this
20 out, because if Mr. Jones all of a sudden decides to change tactics and
21 become difficult, I think we will have problems.
22 MR. DI FAZIO: I appreciate the urgency of the situation, Your
23 Honours, and I'm trying to get to the bottom of it as fast as I can.
24 Whether we're going to have the matter resolved by the end of this session
25 or not, I don't know, because there's a problem of time difference between
1 those who may be able to assist us.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: These matters are usually exchanged non verbally, so
3 I would imagine that there should be a record. I don't suppose that non
4 verbals are thrown here and there.
5 MR. DI FAZIO: Anyway, I stress that it's a matter of grave
6 importance to the Prosecution as well.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Yes. Yes, Mr. Jones.
8 MR. JONES: I said I would only be difficult from tomorrow. So...
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Technicians are coming. So is Christmas. Sorry
10 about this. It's something that I cannot help when it happens. Is there
11 an idea what is causing this? Is it a fault in the system itself? Or
12 what is it?
13 I see. I see. I think what's going to happen now is what
14 happened last time. Today's sittings will be recorded in -- now it seems
15 that they are trying to save it all in one file. If this doesn't work, we
16 will have a second file and then the two will be amalgamated later on.
17 We'll let them do what needs to be done.
18 MR. JONES: Your Honour, just thinking to make some use of the
19 time, I had the idea of the witness being provided with a copy of an
20 exhibit which he can then look at during the next break. I can even pass
21 it up to him now.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think so. That's a very good suggestion, Mr.
23 Jones. I appreciate that, sir.
24 MR. JONES: It occupies the witness, I think, if he wishes to be
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Jones, I thank you all for being patient with
2 us. These things happen. There is very little we can do. We need to
3 wait and I appreciate the quick intervention of our technicians to solve
4 these problems that we get from time to time. I do appreciate that,
5 because your quick intervention sometimes saves us a lot of time. Yes,
6 Mr. Jones.
7 MR. JONES:
8 Q. Yes, thank you, Your Honour. For the record, I gave or I arranged
9 for the witness to have a copy of the chapter from Larry Hollingsworth
10 book "Merry Christmas, Mr. Larry". I would just ask, have you read that
12 A. No, I haven't actually.
13 Q. I will ask if possible during the next break, if you could have a
14 read of it. Now, we were on page 3495 of the diary, or at least I'm
15 moving on to that page. For the record, it would be the 17th of March?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. And if you could just read 1a down to General.
18 A. The heading of that section is "1200 hours, sitrep on airdrop.
19 One, general", and general means nothing specific, not General as in the
20 military rank. "A, pallets are retained by those who find them. They are
21 willing to kill to keep what they find".
22 Q. And you've explained that already. That's for the record though,
23 that is, Muslims killing Muslims over food?
24 A. That is Bosniaks killing Bosniaks.
25 Q. When you spoke -- when you and General Morillon spoke to Naser
1 Oric, he explained, didn't he, that raids were being carried out, not just
2 for weapons ammunition, but also for food?
3 A. The things which he said it was ammunition, weapons, food and
5 Q. Now, I've handed you a copy of the chapter of Larry Hollingsworth
6 book, partly because if you turn to the next page, 3496, there's a
7 reference to his name there. And I'm going to ask you to read most of
8 this page, although I may ask you to stop at various points.
9 So if you could start with the paragraph at the top, Larry
11 A. "Larry Hollingsworth describes the situation as the worst he has
12 scene in the entire time -- in his entire time in the former Yugoslavia.
13 Situation here unlike any other in Bosnia-Herzegovina".
14 Q. If I could stop you there. I think there's also "in SR" after the
16 A. The situation in Srebrenica, as the worst he has seen in his
17 entire time in the former Yugoslavia.
18 Q. Now, you spoke about the limited efforts by the war committee to
19 deal with the problem of distribution. Isn't it right, looking at the
20 next paragraph, 2B, could you first read that, please.
21 A. "Local authorities have sent soldiers to try and recover some
22 supplies. As yet, no success".
23 Q. And then the next sentence, please as well?
24 A. "Local authorities do not have enough disciplined soldiers to
25 secure any airdrop".
1 Q. So it's right that you understood or you had intelligence to the
2 effect that it was impossible to secure the sites, given the resources
3 available to the authorities?
4 A. That is correct. By the "authorities", what I'm referring to here
5 is the Srebrenica war committee.
6 Q. And as far as you are concerned, they were the interlocutors on
7 that matter, they were people to speak to on this issue?
8 A. They were the local people. The way that I describe is Hajrudin
9 Avdic as the mayor of Srebrenica.
10 Q. Would it be right to say as far as matters concerning the town and
11 matters of civilian law and order were concerned, you would go to Avdic
12 and you would go to Oric for matters regarding military matters in the
13 broader area. Would that be a fair summary?
14 A. In the general sense, yes.
15 Q. Now, following a bit further down, we have the assessment --
16 reference to the law of the jungle which you've spoken about. In fact, if
17 we look at D, it looks like General Jones did send a parcel for the
19 A. "D, have little hope of recovering our pallet dedicated to
20 commander. Repeat law of the jungle rules". What actually happened is
21 that the pallet for General Morillon was dropped by separate aircraft in a
22 different location, the other side of Srebrenica. In other words, on the
23 road between Srebrenica and Potocari which is the opposite direction from
24 where the main airdrops were.
25 We tried to go out to recover it. We heard it coming down and
1 land about 300, 400 metres away. But by the time we got there, it had
2 already been found by the refugees, Bosniaks, and had been ripped apart
3 and there was nothing left. However, the next morning, the batteries and
4 the microphone and the spare antenna and about 20 or 30 kilograms of food
5 were handed in.
6 Q. While a displaced person perhaps enjoyed the brandy and cigars
7 dedicated to the commander?
8 A. If they were in there, I hope he did enjoy them.
9 Q. If you would turn to page 3497. It's 17th of March still.
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And does it say "from Kiseljak 1300" in the middle there? Perhaps
12 you could explain what that refers to.
13 A. Yes. "From Kiseljak 1300" is information that was provided to us
14 from Kiseljak as opposed to information that I was providing from
15 Srebrenica back to Kiseljak.
16 Q. And could you read 1 under that.
17 A. "Is MMWG still in progress?" And "MMWG" is "mixed-military
18 working group" which was the tripartite meetings that were being held in
19 Sarajevo with Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosniak Presidency, under
20 the auspices of the United Nations in Sarajevo. These meetings took place
21 at the airport.
22 Q. It's really the next bit which I would be grateful if you could
23 read out "refugee status"?
24 A. "Refugee sitrep from Larry Hollingsworth. Larry Hollingsworth had
25 been spending a lot of time in the town and with the -- with members of
1 the war committee, trying to help organise them because he had a lot of
2 experience with these kind of situations".
3 And Larry Hollingsworth gave a lengthy debrief to me which I
4 passed back over the radio, over the next few pages. "The general
5 situation, worse than any scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 18 houses burned,
6 100 destroyed, all houses damaged. Town elders, tired, lethargic, unable
7 to make decisions, have little or no control. All information
8 contradictory. All facts vague. Pre-war population of Srebrenica only
9 6.500. Population of opstina was 38.000. Population in Muslim pocket,
10 70.000. Population now in Srebrenica, plus/minus minus 20.000. I am
12 "Population in 50 kilometre radius is now 80.000. I have no
13 evidence of this. And they do not hold 50-kilometre radius of territory."
14 Q. If I can stop you there. This was from Larry Hollingsworth, this
16 A. That's correct. It was information he had gathered from speaking
17 with people in the town, the war committee and so on.
18 Q. Was he generally a reliable source, in your dealings with him?
19 A. Yes. He was one of the most reliable people that was there and he
20 was by far the best of the UNHCR people.
21 Q. We saw earlier in this diary, I won't mention the name of the
22 person, but him giving you a description of a fellow employer as being
23 perhaps prone to exaggeration. Would it be correct to say that Larry
24 Hollingsworth was not prone to exaggeration?
25 A. No. He was utterly trustworthy, in our view.
1 Q. Then if you could read -- you can skip the next paragraph and then
2 at the bottom: "New arrival refugees", to the bottom of the page, please.
3 A. "New arrival refugees had no food for five days or had few
4 possessions. Are ragged and very dirty. Town people and longer term
5 refugees clearly distinguishable. There are still some cars, horses and
6 even small flock of sheep. There are two shacks selling meat; however,
7 diet for most people is berries and yellow flour from hazelnut trees.
8 This they grind down to meal from which a bright yellow loaf is made.
9 Wood is plentiful. In the evening there are many fires. Water is mainly
10 from river that looks contaminated".
11 Q. I will stop you there. Thank you. One correction. I think you
12 probably referred to cows and horses rather than cars.
13 A. Sorry. You are correct. It is cows, and horses.
14 Q. There was very little or no fuel for cars, was there, at this
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Then this information about this surrogate bread being made by
18 grinding down flowers from trees, is that something you yourself saw?
19 A. Yes. I was even given some of it to eat.
20 Q. It's pretty unpalatable stuff, I would imagine?
21 A. It's like eating saw dust.
22 Q. If you could carry on on the next page, 3499, from "the streets
23 are filthy", please.
24 A. "Hospital dirty and overcrowded. Four doctors and one surgeon.
25 All tired. Now enough drugs and medicines for -- less for antibiotics.
1 Bed strength 100. Now 200 patients. A further 100 in a temporary
2 ambulante. 24 war wounded. New arrivals at hospital this morning.
3 Average death rate, 20 per day. Surprisingly, birth rate has increased.
4 300 born in hospital since 12 July 1992. Airdrop concept excellent. The
5 planes are on time and accuracy remarkable. However, very little is
6 gathered for the common good. Airdrop scene is unbelievable. Planes not
7 visible. Shoots only heard as they crash to ground. Drops zone is
8 crowded with starving people. Gun fights, knivings and fights are common.
9 The distribution is to the fittest and strongest. The hospital claims
10 four per night die at airdrop scene".
11 Q. All right. Thank you. I will stop you there. Again this is from
12 Larry Hollingsworth?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. Did you understand that he had actually gone and witnessed with
15 his own eyes the airdrop scene?
16 A. Yes. He actually went up on to the plateau.
17 Q. And you went to the hospital. Is what is said about the hospital
18 there consistent with what you saw?
19 A. The conditions are entirely consistent. The description of four
20 doctors and one surgeon differs from my recollection. From my
21 recollection there was actually only one doctor. There were three
22 Medecins Sans Frontieres doctors and the rest were -- the rest were
23 nurses, all nursing assistants or people.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: You wouldn't know, Colonel, who this one surgeon
25 that there is reference to here, would be?
1 THE WITNESS: No. I don't. This is what Larry Hollingsworth told
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you.
4 MR. JONES:
5 Q. Just on the airdrops. It was major Rex Dudley, wasn't it, who was
6 coordinating the drops?
7 A. Yes. He was the American major and he had a sergeant chapel with
8 him with a TACSAT radio set in order to coordinate the airdrops.
9 Q. And was he an intelligence officer?
10 A. Yes, he was.
11 Q. Was he a source for a lot of your intelligence of the military
12 situation in the area when you were there?
13 A. I would say he was the source for about a third of it. About a
14 third came from the UN military observers and about a third came from the
15 War Presidency and a couple of occasions we met with Colonel Oric.
16 Q. Now, just again on this page, four lines from the bottom, there is
17 no registration of refugees. Is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. So would the correct picture be people arriving the whole time,
20 some of whom would be able-bodied men, possibly soldiers?
21 A. But starving.
22 Q. And the authorities having no idea who was there?
23 A. That is correct. Sentence reads, "no registration of refugees nor
24 any enthusiasm to feed and house new arrivals".
25 Q. And then -- I will wait for the translation. Then the next page
1 3500, at the conclusion, again this is 17th of March, if you could just
2 read the conclusion there?
3 A. "Conclusion: Situation bad. Need urgent convoy of 100 metric
4 tons to feed desperate people, followed by second 100 metric ton convoy at
5 earliest opportunity. Other convoys on weekly basis".
6 Q. Whose conclusion was that?
7 A. That was Larry Hollingsworth's conclusion.
8 Q. I'm just going to skip forward a little bit now in time. If you
9 go to page 3506, please. For the record, this would be the 18th of March,
10 I believe. Just picking up on that reference about the need for a convoy,
11 paragraph 4 there reads, does it not: "This convoy must come in", must in
12 capitals, "people are dying".
13 A. Yes. The context here is that UNHCR had -- are refused to allow
14 convoy to go forward because they would not accept the conditions that the
15 Serbs were placing upon the passage of the convoy, whether it had escorts
16 or didn't have escorts or whether it dropped off some of its food in
17 Bratunac to Serb refugees along the way. This particular convoy was a
18 military convoy, in other words, under the command of General Morillon.
19 And General Morillon was exasperated at that stage with what he perceived
20 as being politicking by UNHCR for reasons he didn't particularly
21 understand. And this was in addition to all the obstacles that the Serbs
22 were putting in the way and he was getting angry and he said: "This
23 convoy I command. I am ordering you move now. The situation is
25 Q. Then turning the page to 3507. The Prosecution asked you some
1 questions about this. I believe the military situation was read in a
2 summary way. So just -- I just want to take these points briefly. It
3 says there, "the Bosnian military situation is deteriorating even faster.
4 Bosnian loosing around five villages a day. At current Serb rate of
5 advance they would have taken the enclave -- entire pocket in two weeks'
7 So, is it right, that's the sitrep which you sent to General Jones
8 in Frankfurt on the 18th of March?
9 A. Yes. That's correct.
10 Q. Now looking at the refugee situation, which starts at the bottom,
11 two refugee situation. We see, it's going to 3508: "Refugees still
12 streaming into Srebrenica unabated". Is that the word?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. "UNHCR rep is succeeding in getting some refugees off the streets
15 into damaged accommodation".
16 A. That is referring to Larry Hollingsworth and his efforts.
17 Q. And on that point, would you agree that the buildings in
18 Srebrenica were largely without windows, due to the impact of bombing and
19 shelling, shattering those windows?
20 A. There were -- most windows were still in place. However, wherever
21 there had been shells, then around that particular spot, there would be no
22 -- no windows. So for example, the PTT building itself, when we were
23 there, I think all the glass was in all the windows, but there were other
24 houses and places in Srebrenica where there was no glass, for example, in
25 the centre of town where I described that we found the cluster bomb casing
1 and the evidence of -- there was no glass in any of those windows.
2 Q. Were there repeated calls for plastic sheeting to be sent to the
4 A. Yes, there were.
5 Q. What was that to be used for?
6 A. To cover over windows in order to keep heat in.
7 Q. Just on this page again, it may have been dealt with, but meeting
8 with Naser Oric last night, there's a reference to Bosnian military
9 authorities being desperate, morale being rock bottom and then Oric
10 stating that they would fight to the bitter end. You confirmed that was
11 the contents -- or the gist of the meeting?
12 A. Yes. That was the gist of the meeting the previous evening. By
13 Bosnian military authorities, I was referring to Colonel Oric.
14 Q. Now turning to the next page, 3509, the very top, a meeting with
15 the president of the war committee and he is stating that Bosnians would
16 be willing to hand in their weapons. Would it be right to say that you
17 regarded Hajrudin Avdic, to whom that refers, as a player in your
18 negotiations? He was someone who you considered had authority to discuss
19 matters of this nature?
20 A. Hajrudin Avdic was -- we considered Hajrudin Avdic to be an
21 authority in Srebrenica and regarding civilian affairs and the
22 organisation in the town. Because we had only been able to meet with
23 Colonel Oric once, in other words, the previous evening, General Morillon
24 had not -- not asked Hajrudin Avdic what he thought, as he was there and
25 he engaged Hajrudin Avdic in conversation on a number of times. What did
1 he think about things in the way that any responsible negotiator would
2 engage the opinions of all those he's able to speak with.
3 Q. You told us over the last couple of days that, as a general
4 policy, you or General Morillon would want to deal with the people who
5 could actually make things stick. Would it be fair to say that obviously
6 that is your objective, it makes a lot of sense, but you didn't always
7 speak to the person who necessarily was the person you needed to speak to?
8 A. No. We spoke with the people who were able to -- able to speak
9 with. By that stage, we had already detected a frostiness between the war
10 committee and Colonel Oric, in as much as whenever we requested to speak
11 with Colonel Oric or asked for messages to be passed they said, yes, they
12 would try and pass them on. But they were -- they did not like Colonel
13 Oric or did not -- there was some kind of distance and animosity that we
14 didn't particularly understand. And so, therefore, it was clear, in our
15 minds, that there were differences of opinion.
16 Q. When you in fact told -- and I may be skipping around a bit, but
17 before your briefing in Sarajevo, there were different factions even
18 within Srebrenica, different power groups?
19 A. No. I was referring to the struggle that we believed that was
20 taking place around that time between the Bosniak authorities in Tuzla and
21 the Bosniak authorities in Sarajevo.
22 The situation being that the authorities in Tuzla believed that
23 the authorities in Sarajevo were willing to sacrifice other Bosniak issues
24 in order to save their skins in Sarajevo and that they, the Bosniak
25 authorities, in Tuzla, were much more effective against the Bosnian Serbs
1 and much better fighters.
2 What we, in Bosnia-Herzegovina command, were not clear of was
3 Colonel Oric; Sarajevo's man or was he Tuzla's man? That's what we didn't
5 Q. Right. Well, going back to this relationship with the war
6 committee, and I don't want to ask you to speculate because you told us
7 you weren't sure what the frostiness was, but you have described morale as
8 being rock bottom. Do you think Colonel Oric regarded perhaps the war
9 committee as being defeatist in attitude? Could that be a source?
10 A. He was very disparaging about the war committee and he did not --
11 it was clear from his meeting with us that he did not think much of them.
12 Q. Now just at the bottom of that page, again, there's a reference in
13 the last two lines to the safe -- well, perhaps, it's best if you read the
14 whole paragraph. "Commander's assessment. General Morillon considers..."
15 A. "General Morillon considers that opening of an air corridor for
16 helicopters remains one of the major conditions to guarantee the safety of
17 the population and to guarantee the safety of the evacuation of the
18 wounded men".
19 Q. Right. I will stop you there. Now, you were in Srebrenica on the
20 24th of March 1993, weren't you, for the evacuation by helicopter?
21 A. No. We were prevented from getting back into Srebrenica. We were
22 actually outside -- in fact, we were at the Karakaj bridge between
23 Bratunac and Srebrenica when I was trying to communicate on the HF radio
24 to Srebrenica and suddenly the -- my radio transmissions were jammed and
25 as I was remarking to General Morillon, they're jamming us, I saw the
1 first helicopters fly -- not overhead, but I saw them flying towards
3 Q. Were you aware that the Serbs on that day shelled the evacuation?
4 A. Yes, I am. The Serbs shelled the helicopter landing site. They
5 killed and injured a number of soldiers amongst whom were two of the
6 Canadian soldiers of the armoured personnel carrier that was with us.
7 I went and examined, later, the shell craters in the HRS and
8 interviewed a number of people about the shell fire. And what happened is
9 that early in the morning, the Serbs did what is called registering a
10 target. It's where you fire with one gun a couple of shells until that
11 gun targets -- shells are landing on target. Then you stop. And the
12 correction that you apply to that one gun you then apply to other guns, so
13 that then every gun is pointing in parallel to be able to fire at the same
15 Later in the day, when the helicopters came in, then the Serbs
16 started shelling the landing site and caused a number of deaths and
18 When I was -- so that meant that the Serbs had to have somebody
19 who was watching, could physically see the helicopter landing site.
20 Q. A forward controller?
21 A. A forward controller.
22 Q. And they walk it in right into the target?
23 A. Yes. Except they had already done that with what the exercise I
24 call the registration of the target at the beginning of the day, so that
25 they could later open fire, knowing, that unless the weather had changed
1 and the wind had changed direction, that the shells would land in the
2 right spot.
3 I later, when General Morillon and I left Srebrenica and we were
4 driving down the road from Zvornik to Pale, we came across an obstacle
5 where a jackknifed lorry had blocked the road for about six hours and we
6 used the armoured personnel carrier to drag this truck out of the way.
7 There is a long cue of traffic there and waiting there was a staff car
8 with a Serb Colonel and a Serb -- Bosnian Serb special forces officer who
9 started talking with me about having been on training courses with the --
10 with the SES and he described to me events which had happened at the PTT
11 building in a way that I was absolutely certain that that man had been
12 watching what had happened.
13 He then described that he knew how to direct artillery fire and I
14 believe it was that man who directed that artillery fire.
15 Q. Thank you. And so for our purposes, we have General Morillon
16 basically signalling that for the enclave safety to be assured -- the
17 enclave safety, but for the population to be reassured, evacuation of the
18 wounded by helicopter was a necessary gesture or condition.
19 A. No. The context was that the Serbs were threatening that they
20 would allow women and children to be evacuated but not the men, because
21 they claimed that they were war crimes in amongst the men. So therefore
22 we needed the helicopters to evacuate the men so that they would be passed
23 -- so they would not pass through Serb hands.
24 Q. And by shelling the evacuation, the Serbs were signalling that
25 they would have none of that?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Now, if I could pass up the next exhibit to everyone else which is
3 a chapter on Srebrenica from "Merry Christmas Mr. Larry", because I have a
4 question in that regard. Sorry with the usher's assistance, please.
5 In the meantime for the Colonel, I can indicate it's page 207, and
6 it's paragraph 4. I will just read it. "General Morillon was not having
7 the success he wanted in arranging helicopter evacuation. The Serbs were
8 not happy. They suspected that "war criminals" would be included in the
9 evacuation. Their definition of war criminal seemed to be any male
10 between the age of 16 and 60".
11 In fact, that reflects very much just what you've told us?
12 A. Exactly.
13 Q. Would you agree that the Serbs were not letting out any -- were
14 not prepared to let out any men on the pretext that they were war
16 A. No. What the Serbs were telling us was that there were war
17 criminals amongst the men, that they had lists of who these war criminals
18 -- these alleged war criminals were and that they wished to establish the
19 identity of every single man who was evacuated from Srebrenica in order to
20 establish whether any of them were war criminals before letting them pass.
21 They did not say to us that any Bosniak male is a war criminal.
22 In other words, as per here. What they said is they had a list of war
23 criminals with which to check -- anybody who was evacuated against that
25 Q. And that's what they said in July 1995 as well, isn't it?
1 A. I wasn't there.
2 Q. Right. Moving on to page 3514, that's the 18th of March.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment before you move to page 35 --
4 MR. JONES: Yes. I need an exhibit number, please.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. We will give this exhibit number D218.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: D218. Colonel, while we are with this -- you still
8 have this document, photocopies from this book still in your hands. Can I
9 direct you to -- there are some photos starting on page 211. If you skip
10 a couple and you arrive at the photo where you have top right -- top left,
11 an historic General Morillon behind the window with the megaphone. It
12 says, "A historic moment, General Morillon declaring Srebrenica under the
13 protection of the United Nations. Courtesy of Tony Birtley".
14 Then just below that, there is: "Me with Dr. Nadret Mukanovic,
15 the legendry surgeon of Srebrenica after the war in the safety of Tuzla
16 hospital". Do you have an explanation why Larry Hollingsworth would
17 describe Dr. Nadret Mukanovic as the legendary surgeon of Srebrenica?
18 THE WITNESS: I have no explanation. It was not our experience
19 and observation that Dr. Mukanovic had anything to do with the Srebrenica
20 hospital at the time that we were there. What happened subsequently, I
21 obviously cannot comment on.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: If I could take you to page 207, please which is the
23 same page where you were referred to -- which you were referred to earlier
24 on by Mr. Jones. You have penultimate paragraph: "I organised a meeting
25 with the authorities and with Nadret from the hospital. Based on Simon
1 Mardell's list, it shows 97 patients. We received ten trucks, that would
2 be roughly ten patients per truck. The journey from Srebrenica to Tuzla
3 would take up to 8 hours. It would be a bumpy, miserable ride but ten to
4 a truck would give them room to breathe".
5 Does that give you the impression, at least, that the author of
6 this book projects or depicts Nadret Mukanovic as someone who had the
7 major say when it came to the hospital in Srebrenica?
8 THE WITNESS: No. What it describes to me is that he was making
9 decisions outside the hospital, not actually inside the hospital. As a
10 member of the -- of the war committee.
11 MR. JONES:
12 Q. If I may pursue that a little.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Mr. Jones.
14 MR. JONES:
15 Q. If you could turn to page 192. Very top: "We entered the
16 hospital, turned left and climbed the stairs. At the top of the first
17 flight, there were patients on beds in the corridor?
18 A. Sorry, can you repeat the page number.
19 Q. Sorry. 192.
20 A. Yes. Sorry.
21 Q. "We entered the hospital", et cetera. "We were met by the
22 surgeon, Dr. Nadret Mukanovic who was a captain in the army". A bit
23 further down. "By this time he was an experienced war surgeon but a
24 troubled man with deep dark rings around his eyes, a man who moved in wild
25 jerky bursts. He spoke with great warmth and admiration about Simon
1 Mardell". Concluding with, "I have his patient assessment list here".
2 Then you will see for the next page there is what is described on page 193
3 as a "desperate litany of the needs of the hospital" which Dr. Mukanovic
4 told the internationals.
5 In fact, it's a subject I am coming to but I suggest to you that,
6 Dr. Mukanovic was not a loiterer outside the hospital who was not a real
7 doctor but was very much a heroic figure in the war hospital. Do you
8 accept you might have misjudged him?
9 A. What I told you is what I saw. I was not present at these
10 meetings, so I cannot comment on them.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Perhaps, Mr. Jones, you can refer the witness also
12 to what there is on page 208.
13 MR. JONES:
14 Q. Yes. Where Nadret is in the operating theatre? Is that the
15 section which Your Honour has in mind?
16 JUDGE AGIUS: It continues, "I found him operating on a patient".
17 It says, "Larry, good, please have you a torch? Can you shine it in here?
18 He's asked pointing to the open stomach of the patient he was assisted by
19 another doctor", et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. Do you have any reason
20 why you would doubt --
21 THE WITNESS: I have no reason to doubt it if this is what Larry
22 said he saw, then that's what Larry said he saw.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: And I won't belabour this point further, Mr. Jones,
24 or should we leave it at that and move to something else?
25 MR. JONES: We can leave it -- there was on this subject one more
1 subject I wanted to put. I'm slightly skipping ahead. But some war
2 hospital, which I believe is Exhibit D119 - there is no need for us all to
3 have in front of us - but it's a chapter called Nadret, about Dr.
4 Mukanovic. It says on Page 75, "But he wore tinted eyeglasses in part to
5 protect his blepharitic eyes from painful light."
6 Q. So I did want to suggest to you that the fact that Dr. Mukanovic
7 was wearing sunglasses was not an affectation as you might have suggested,
8 that he had a medical condition requiring him to wear sunglasses?
9 A. Quite possible.
10 Q. Okay. I will leave the subject now. Can I ask you please to turn
11 to page 3514 of the diary. This is the 18th of March. And a sitrep. I
12 take it again this is intelligence from the UNMOs, that the "rate of
13 incoming artillery fire has increased substantially since last visit"?
14 A. Yes. That's a report made by the UNMOs to me.
15 Q. Can you read the next sentence, please.
16 A. "UNMOs came under direct shell fire twice. Having to leave
17 vehicle and take cover with rounds of artillery fire that is landing
18 within 100 metres of them".
19 Q. I actually wanted you to read the last sentence of the previous
20 paragraph, which refers to counting 80 rounds per hour.
21 A. "Rate of incoming artillery fire had increased substantially since
22 last visit. UNMOs counted 40 rounds per hour in immediate vicinity".
23 Q. Thank you. And that's in the immediate vicinity of Osmace and the
24 grid references we have at 1, is that correct?
25 A. Yes, that's correct.
1 Q. Then it's also stated at C that UNMOs collected cluster bomb ...
2 A. Dispensers.
3 Q. Dispensers?
4 A. Particularly at Osmace. Cluster bomb dispensers are actually the
5 empty cases.
6 Q. So Osmace was coming under severe attack in this whole period,
7 would that be the intelligence you had?
8 A. I would need to check elsewhere in the diary, but certainly at
9 that time.
10 Q. If you could turn to the next page, 3515. 18th March. It's 2c,
11 which I am interested in. "Craters along the main refugee withdrawal
12 routes would indicate that claims by refugees are being shelled whilst
13 fleeing were true."
14 So is that the intelligence as well?
15 A. Yes. That was provided by the UNMOs.
16 Q. And as a person who has spent time in Bosnia and as a military
17 man, would you think of any reason why you would shell people who were
18 already fleeing?
19 A. Yes, to terrorise them further.
20 Q. Thank you. Now, moving forward to the 21st of March -- sorry,
21 first, page 3520. This is just to clarify an aspect of the negotiations
22 which you had. It's one, near the top: "No Serbs in Tuzla who wish to
23 leave. Any who wish to leave did so beginning of war".
24 A. At beginning -- at the beginning of the war.
25 Q. Right. Now, is it right -- is my understanding correct that a
1 constant refrain from the Serbs was that the Serbs in Tuzla should leave,
2 should be allowed to leave?
3 A. Should be allowed to leave and it was their belief or their
4 allegation that the Bosniak Presidency forces and authorities were
5 preventing them from leaving.
6 Q. Did you ever receive any credible evidence this that was the case?
7 Or intelligence?
8 A. When we were in Tuzla, we met with UNHCR people -- we also met
9 with Tuzla authorities and we asked them about this and their opinion was
10 that the majority had -- who had wanted to leave had already left and that
11 of the remainder, the majority wanted to stay, but there was a small
12 number who actually did genuinely want to leave but were afraid to say so.
13 And that seemed a reasonable representation. We had no reason to
14 disbelieve that that was the case.
15 Q. Would you agree that this was an example of what I think was
16 referred to as linkage, where the sides would try to link an issue with an
17 issue of their own so that --
18 A. Somewhere else, yes. It was a constant bedevilment of all
19 negotiations in Bosnia.
20 Q. What were the Serbs linking this issue with Tuzla Serbs to, do you
22 A. They were linking the release of Tuzla Serbs with the evacuation
23 of people from Srebrenica and with the delivery of humanitarian aid into
24 Srebrenica. In other words, they were saying they would not allow either
25 of those two latter to happen until the Serbs civilians in Tuzla were
1 allowed to leave Tuzla.
2 Q. Did you fear that that sort of blackmail in essence could lead you
3 to be participating in ethnic cleansing, in the sense that you would be --
4 you were under pressure to make Serbs leave Tuzla in order to be able to
5 feed starving people in Srebrenica?
6 A. We were not in any way involved with making Serbs leave Tuzla. As
7 far as we were concerned, if any Serbs wished to leave Tuzla, and
8 requested to do so, then we would help them. But we were not going to do
9 so at anybody's request.
10 Regarding your second question, which was: Was that effectively
11 aiding and abetting ethnic cleansing? What was it, saving lives or ethnic
12 cleansing? I don't know.
13 Q. We may come to some of those philosophical issues and we may not.
14 For the time being, I just want to refer you to 3521 in the diary. This
15 is the 20th of March, I think you will agree.
16 You will see there is a 3 --
17 A. Yes. I think it's the 20th of March, yes.
18 Q. And paragraph 4 or point 4 which I will tried to read. "For BHC
19 Kiseljak, Bosnia-Herzegovina command, Kiseljak only ..."
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. "Command."
22 A. "Commander trying to get some Serbs held by Bosnians in Srebrenica
23 released tomorrow."
24 Q. Right. Now, this was on the 20th of March, correct?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. This appears to have been an initiative of General Morillon to
2 release any Serbs held in Srebrenica; correct?
3 A. No. Serbs held in Tuzla.
4 Q. It says SR, I believe.
5 A. Sorry. You are absolutely correct. This is -- this is nothing to
6 do with the -- I was confused by the previous subject that we were talking
7 about. No. This is talking about prisoners.
8 Q. There may be a problem with interpretation. I'm informed that my
9 client is not receiving or any -- any of the Bosnian speaking --
10 JUDGE AGIUS: That's a problem indeed. I have to address your
11 client through you, Mr. Jones. Could you please ask him what was the last
12 interpretation that he received?
13 MR. JONES: Okay. It was my last question and we have
14 interpretation now, so I think I can probably resume.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. We can solve it very easily. First, I
16 want to make sure he is receiving interpretation now.
17 MR. JONES: Yes.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: So could you please repeat your last question, Mr.
19 Jones, and you, Colonel, please, try to answer the question.
20 MR. JONES:
21 Q. I will put it this way. Does this state, on page 3521, point
22 4: "For BHC Kiseljak only. Commander trying to get some Serbs held by
23 Bosnian in SR released tomorrow"?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Now is it right this was an initiative, in a sense, of
1 General Morillon already on the 20th, that he was trying to achieve this?
2 A. General Morillon had been asking and had mentioned to Colonel Oric
3 on the 17th that he wished to -- he was suggesting to Colonel Oric, it was
4 pointless holding prisoners. If you have any, give them up. Please give
5 them over, at least to help create some small amount of goodwill.
6 Q. But Colonel Oric never acknowledged or never gave any indication
7 that he was holding anyone on the 17th of March?
8 A. No, he didn't.
9 Q. So is General Morillon guessing that there might be prisoners, or
10 he was basing himself on information which he had received from the Serbs?
11 A. No. From -- and I can't remember whether it was Major Dudley or
12 from Mihailov, one of them had said that they had, in speaking with or
13 hearing from people in the town, that there were some prisoners held
14 somewhere in the town, so therefore General Morillon believed that there
15 were prisoners but didn't know where.
16 Q. Right. So either from Major Dudley or from Mihailov. And so when
17 we turn to the 21st of March, which I am coming to, as far as the
18 appearance of a prisoner who was then being returned to the other side,
19 this was not some spontaneous occurrence out of the blue. This was a
20 follow up, an initiative by General Morillon; is that right?
21 A. General Morillon had asked -- suggested to Colonel Oric that it
22 would be good to hand over or release any prisoners, if he had any.
23 Having heard from Major Dudley or Mihailov that people in the town said
24 they were prisoners, General Morillon had also, obviously, asked the --
25 the War Committee, president of the War Committee, "Are there prisoners in
1 the town?" And the response was, "I don't know. It's not my -- it's not
2 my authority. It's not my issue." General Morillon said, "Well, if you
3 do know of where they are," then, again, he suggested they should be
4 released. "Why don't you do so?" And -- or asked that they are released.
5 When, on the next --
6 Q. Yes. Yes. I'm coming to that. Thank you.
7 So in other words, the identical request which General Morillon
8 made about releasing prisoners was made to Colonel Oric and to the War
10 A. That is correct. But with neither admitting or recognizing
11 that -- that they held prisoners.
12 Q. Now, speaking of the meeting on the 18th of March, you described
13 how Oric appeared --
14 A. 17th.
15 Q. The 17th. My apologies.
16 That he appeared downcast, but that he was almost confiding in
17 General Morillon. Is that right?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. Did you always find in your dealings with Colonel Oric that he was
20 candid with you?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And on the 17th of March, in that meeting, as far as you could
23 tell, was he speaking with complete frankness on all the subjects that
24 were discussed?
25 A. That was our impression. It was as if he could speak with
1 General Morillon about these issues, but there was nobody else that he
2 could speak with about them and certainly not with the War Presidency.
3 Q. At that meeting he was talking about some pretty desperate things,
4 fighting to the last man, that sort of thing. He wasn't holding anything
5 back, was he?
6 A. No. Not in -- not in our opinion.
7 Q. So did it strike you, when he didn't acknowledge or didn't respond
8 to the request about prisoners, that he wasn't being evasive but perhaps
9 he simply didn't know anything about it?
10 A. We could not draw any conclusion. We didn't know. He had far
11 more dangerous and worrisome issues on his mind than -- I do not wish to
12 sound callous, but than -- than prisoners. There was much, much more on
13 his mind than prisoners.
14 Q. Now, turning to the events of the 21st of March. You described --
15 you described what you saw, a person who resembled, as you put it, a
16 victim of the concentration camps practically. I take it, then, that was
17 a dramatic memorable experience?
18 A. Yes, it was.
19 Q. Now, we established your entries in the diary for the 21st of
20 March starting on 3524. Now, there you refer to something occurring at
21 0800, I couldn't fully decipher it.
22 A. It is "21 March, 0800, HF from BH Command Kiseljak"; in other
23 words, an incoming message.
24 Q. And then on the next page, 3525, "Meeting in Bratunac"; is that
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. At what time on the 21st of March did this release occur?
3 A. It would have been about 9.30, something -- it was in the morning.
4 It was literally just before we went to Bratunac. In fact, that was why I
5 was down by the vehicles, getting ready to depart to Bratunac.
6 Q. It's true, isn't it, firstly, that you didn't make a
7 contemporaneous note and it's not a --
8 A. No, I did not. The only reference to the event is actually when I
9 reported it the next day.
10 Q. Yes. And that's on 34 -- my apologies. One moment. Yes. Sorry.
11 3536. If there is "we released a wounded Serb prisoner. We know of two
12 more Serbs held by Bosnian forces in SR whose command is trying to get
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. That's the only mention in the diary, isn't it?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. You dealt with the post-it note earlier which you put in many
18 years later. Was that post-it after you had been contacted by the
19 Prosecution in relation to this case, that that was added?
20 A. To be honest, I can't remember. What I do remember is that this
21 prisoner release was something that was very vivid in my memory. And I
22 didn't touch any of my diaries for Bosnia for about five or six years
23 after the event. And then I started looking back again.
24 And I was searching where on earth was the reference to the
25 prisoner. And I was looking through it and that's why it was, if you
1 remember you made the comment yesterday, it was inserted in between
2 because I then found, oh, that's where it was.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Have you given evidence in any other trial here in
4 this Tribunal?
5 THE WITNESS: Yes. The Ganic -- sorry. Galic.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
7 MR. JONES:
8 Q. Now, this message was sent by TACSAT, is that correct, 3536?
9 A. Yes it was. It says at the top of the page, "21 March, 2100 by
10 TACSAT to Kiseljak".
11 Q. So does that mean in Kiseljak there would be a printed message
12 with this text included?
13 A. Yes. I would expect there to be.
14 Q. Now, I need to go through this instant with you in some detail.
15 First of all, let's start with the PTT building. If you could tell us,
16 firstly, which internationals were there when this car arrived as you
17 described it.
18 A. The Canadian crew of the APC, Mihailov, I believe General Morillon
19 was actually still inside the building. Those are the only ones that I
20 can explicitly recall.
21 Q. For the Canadian crew, are you able to recall the names of those
22 members of the crew?
23 A. Yes. I can tell you who the five members of the crew were. It
24 was not all five who accompanied us. It was usually only two or three who
25 accompanied us. And -- did you want me to give you the names?
1 Q. Yes, please. Yes. I believe they're in your diary.
2 A. Yes, they are. It was Sergeant Morrison, he was the commander,
3 Master Corporal Paris, Private Charron, Private Parrell, and Private
5 Q. All right. So it was two or three of that crew, but you don't
6 know which of them it was?
7 A. I can't remember which. It was probably not Sergeant Morrison,
8 but it probably was Colonel Paris and Private McAllister, because they
9 were usually the person who commanded the vehicle and McAllister was the
11 Q. And they were there when as you described it this Mercedes pulled
12 up, did a hand-brake turn, they would have seen what you saw?
13 A. Whether they had their heads up at that time or whether they were
14 inside the vehicle at that moment, I can't recall. But they were around
15 the vehicle. They were with us when we went up to follow the Mercedes.
16 Q. As far as the arrival of the Mercedes is concerned, I'm not going
17 to belabour it because our client isn't charged with reckless driving, but
18 I wonder if you would agree any car driving in Srebrenica would be a prime
19 target for shelling by the Serbs, as indicative that an important person
20 was inside.
21 A. In principle, yes, though no such shelling was taking place of
22 that kind at that time. There was no sniping going on at that time.
23 Q. Srebrenica was surrounded by hills, correct, and the Serbs
24 occupied the high points?
25 A. No, they didn't. The hills surrounding Srebrenica there were not
1 in the hands of the Serbs. That was the point I was making earlier about
2 the forward observation officer, who was -- he was in those hills at an
3 earlier occasion, and must have been able to see in. But the Serbs did
4 not hold the high ground.
5 Q. Just to clarify that. The helicopter evacuation, on the 24th of
6 March, was very much in the town of Srebrenica, wasn't it? It was a
7 football pitch which was in the environ, if I can put it that way, of
9 A. Srebrenica is a long thin town. And the football pitch is at the
10 very end of the town, closest to Potocari. In fact, from the football
11 field, you could not even see the PTT building, never mind the rest of the
12 town. There was a bend in the valley.
13 Q. Now going back to the 21st of March, and I'm going to suggest to
14 you and I don't want you to answer at this stage, but that you are
15 mistaken about saying that it was Oric who you saw coming out of the car
16 and whom you saw subsequently. So I am going to be referring to the
17 person whom you claim was Oric, rather than Oric.
18 Firstly, throughout this whole episode, do you say that the person
19 you saw was able to move about in a fully functioning way, had no problems
20 walking or generally getting around?
21 A. No. He was swaggering. Sorry. No. He was not -- he was
22 entirely fit and healthy and he was, in fact, so fit and healthy that he
23 was swaggering.
24 Q. With the usher's assistance I would like to pass up two exhibits
25 which are medical certificates. I will start with the first one and deal
1 with them separately, dated 18th of January, 2000. Sorry, if you would
2 give me a moment, Your Honours.
3 You will see, this is a certificate to the effect that Naser Oric
4 was in fact wounded on the 15th of March, 1993 in Pricevac by pieces of a
5 tank grenade and I will further suggest that in fact it was damage to his
6 Achilles tendon which he suffered.
7 Now, do you say the person you saw was not limping or on crutches
8 or being supported by other people?
9 A. That is correct. Neither had the -- Colonel Oric -- or the person
10 who we met in Konjevic Polje been limping in any way, nor had the person
11 who we met on the 17th been limping or moving in any way that indicated he
12 was incumbered.
13 Q. Well dealing with Konjevic Polje firstly, that was before the 15th
14 of March, wasn't it?
15 A. It was the fifth and 6th of March.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: 1993?
17 THE WITNESS: 1993, yes. Sorry sir.
18 MR. JONES:
19 Q. And as far as the meeting on the 17th was concerned, I think I'm
20 correct in saying -- but correct me if I'm wrong -- you described how Oric
21 was there one minute and not there the next. Did you actually see him
23 A. No, I didn't.
24 Q. He was seated when you saw him?
25 A. He was getting up and walking around and sitting down and he was
1 very troubled. And I saw him leave that meeting.
2 Q. And I will also pass up another exhibit which is on the same theme
3 as the first one but dated the 2nd of August, 2004.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: So this first one I take it you are tendering.
5 MR. JONES: Yes, yes please, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: This will be D519.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: And the next one will be D520.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.
10 MR. JONES: That seems rather high numbers for our exhibits. I
11 thought we were up to --
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Sorry. It is D219 -- 219 and 220. Not 519. Thank
13 you, Mr. Jones.
14 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour. In fact, if I may, I don't
15 have questions about the second document. I would be putting the same
16 point to the witness, which hardly seems worth it. I would ask for --
17 well you have given it an exhibit number, so I can move on.
18 Q. Now, on this thing, it's correct isn't it that in your diary you
19 didn't mention seeing Oric specifically on that day?
20 A. No, not in the diary. The record is as we've already described.
21 Q. Now, you then described how you went to another location following
22 the Mercedes. Who, among the internationals, if I can put it that way,
23 went to the second location?
24 A. Obviously the crew of the Canadian armoured personnel carrier,
25 Mihailov, General Morillon and myself. As I say there may have been
1 others, but I can't remember. Those are -- the ones I've just told you
2 are the ones I remember.
3 Q. You were in the APC, were you, with the others?
4 A. Yes, I was.
5 Q. But you don't remember who else was there, apart from the
6 Canadians, Morillon and Mihailov?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. You do maintain that you have a clear recollection of this event?
9 A. All too clear.
10 Q. Were any UNMOs present either at the PTT building or at the second
12 A. There may well have been.
13 Q. But you don't remember?
14 A. No.
15 Q. How about the Americans, Chapple and Dudley?
16 A. No. I'm pretty sure they were not there. But there may have
17 been -- may have been UNMOs.
18 Q. Sorry. You're pretty sure that Chapple and Dudley were not there?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. Now, in terms of any conversations which took place that day
21 between the person who you say is Oric and Morillon, you weren't actually
22 present for those conversations, were you? You weren't within earshot?
23 A. I was within ear shot for a brief period at the very beginning.
24 The conversations were between this person and Mihailov.
25 Q. Now was that at the PTT building or at the second location?
1 A. No. This was outside the PTT building.
2 Q. Right. So for that conversation, you don't know what was said?
3 A. No. Because it was in Serbo-Croat.
4 Q. Right. Thank you. And then the second location, I think it was,
5 you described -- well perhaps it wasn't even at the second location, but a
6 conversation which General Morillon related to you which he had had with
7 the person you say was Oric. Is that correct?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. And you weren't present for that conversation?
10 A. No, I wasn't.
11 Q. And that conversation would have been conducted in what language?
12 A. That would have been conducted in Serbo-Croat between this person
13 and Mihailov with Morillon present.
14 Q. Did Mihailov speak French?
15 A. Yes. Fluently. He was a French foreign legion soldier.
16 Q. So barracks, French perhaps. Did you see this man, the prisoner
17 placed on a stretcher at any point?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Do you recall who the stretcher bearers were?
20 A. Yes. Canadians. It was a Canadian stretcher that was taken out
21 of the armoured personnel carrier.
22 Q. And this person, this prisoner was removed from a private house as
23 you described it by Bosniaks?
24 A. From behind the private house. He was brought along the side of
25 the house. In other words not out through a door. So where he came from,
1 I cannot say.
2 Q. And he was being held by Bosniaks?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Who then outside handed him over to blue helmets?
5 A. Yes. Between this building and the armoured personnel carrier
6 which is in the middle of the road, so sort of where the pavement would
7 have been if there had been a pavement.
8 Q. And during this process, the person you say was Oric was present,
9 but not one of the people actually --
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. I was going to say, actually holding the prisoner?
12 A. No, no.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Can -- sorry to butt in at this stage. If I were to
14 show you a street diagram of the PTT and its environs, would you be able
15 to indicate to us more or less where this house was?
16 THE WITNESS: More or less. I could not -- if you were to show me
17 photographs of houses, I would be able to say not that one, not that one.
18 It could look like that one.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Does the Prosecution have a street diagram of
21 MR. DI FAZIO: Not that I can think of as I stand here. I know
22 there is an overhead photograph that we've got of Srebrenica that may be
23 of some use. In fact it may even be in evidence.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: That is in evidence.
25 MR. DI FAZIO: But I don't recall anything that is more detailed
1 off the top of my head. I can certainly find out and cause enquiries to
2 be made today, soon, now. And I will try and get whatever information we
3 can provide to the Trial Chamber.
4 MR. JONES: Perhaps in re-examination. I wasn't planning to show
5 the witness --
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I would imagine so. But what other public
7 buildings in Srebrenica do you recollect, apart from the PTT and the
9 THE WITNESS: I don't recollect any other public buildings,
10 official buildings. I recollect private houses. I recollect blocks of
11 flats and I recollect shops and a -- I recollect a department store.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Jones.
13 MR. JONES:
14 Q. Thank you. Now, at the second location when the prisoner was
15 handed over to the Canadians, were you on the street or standing around,
16 what were you doing?
17 A. I was stand -- we had all -- we weren't sure what to expect. We
18 stopped the vehicle. And when the two Bosniaks with the -- this prisoner
19 between them came round the side, round the side of the house, we then
20 realized what it was. We loaded the ramp of the armoured personnel
21 carrier, and we all got out and I got out and stood there. The two
22 Canadians got the stretcher out. The two Bosniaks helped lay the -- the
23 Canadians lay the man on the stretcher.
24 Q. And did you recognise either of these two Bosniaks?
25 A. No. There was ... In dark winter camouflage uniform.
1 Q. You can't say anything of what their affiliation would be?
2 A. I have no idea.
3 Q. Did you see any members of the war committee present?
4 A. No.
5 Q. So you only recognised internationals or you only remember
6 recognizing the Canadians as being at the second location. You can't
7 mention any other names of people who might have seen this?
8 A. No. There might have been other people who happened to be passing
9 in the street, but this was, it was actually completely unexpected and we
10 drove there, stopped and -- but that's what happened.
11 Q. Right. Now, on this occasion, you had seen -- you had met Oric
12 twice, I think, is that correct? Once in Konjevic Polje and once on the
13 17th of March?
14 A. Yes, that's correct.
15 Q. Each meeting had been relatively brief?
16 A. Well, the -- in Konjevic Polje it had been a couple of hours the
17 first night. About half an hour in the morning. And then probably about
18 three quarters of an hour around lunch time.
19 On the evening of the 17th it had been probably a couple of hours.
20 Q. And you saw him seated most of the time?
21 A. During that -- during that time, but he had -- as I said, he had
22 arrived at Konjevic Polje. It would be wrong to say that I only saw him
23 seated, but, yes, it would be correct to say that most of the time that I
24 was in his presence he was seated.
25 Q. Now I would suggest to you, in fact, at this time in Srebrenica
1 there's quite a few able-bodied men with beards. There is nothing
2 particularly distinctive about Naser Oric's appearance. I would suggest
3 to you that you could be mistaken when you say that it was Oric who you
4 saw on that day.
5 A. I believed -- correct or incorrectly -- that I was seeing Oric,
6 but more significantly to me, it was Mihailov who had the conversations
7 with him. And it was -- and Mihailov had said, Oric said this, Oric said
8 that, et cetera. So it never occurred to me that this might be anyone
9 else, and to be honest, as I'm here, I did not personally carry out the
10 conversations with Colonel Oric, because obviously I didn't speak
11 Serbo-Croat, but Mihailov did. And I would find it surprising if
12 Mihailov, in speaking with somebody, would realise that he was speaking
13 with somebody else.
14 Q. So your statement that it was Oric is based not so much on any
15 physical identification or recognition, but on what Mihailov said? Would
16 that be correct?
17 MR. DI FAZIO: That's not what the witness has said.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Exactly. Exactly.
19 MR. DI FAZIO: Quite -- it's too clear -- two clear basis for his
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Point taken, Mr. Di Fazio, but, please, let the
22 witness answer the question. I think he is intelligent enough to know
23 what the question is.
24 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes, but I think I am able to clarify a matter of
25 this importance.
1 MR. JONES:
2 Q. Given what you have just said about Mihailov, is it right that
3 your belief that it was Oric is based largely on what Mihailov told you?
4 A. No. It is based on my seeing what I believe I saw, which was
5 reinforced by what Mihailov said.
6 Q. Finally, do you know where Mihailov is today, if he is living or
7 what his current whereabouts are?
8 A. My belief is that he is -- that he retired from the French army,
9 but you would need to speak with General Morillon to -- I'm sure Morillon
10 knows where he is.
11 Q. Will you give me one moment?
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
13 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, while Mr. Jones confers,
14 there is a matter that I would like to raise with you before we adjourn
15 for this particular session, that could be done in the absence of the
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Okay. We've got one, two minutes before the
18 break -- before we get to the break in any case, Mr. Jones. Shall we stop
20 MR. JONES: Yes, yes.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Usher, please escort the witness. We will reconvene
22 in about half an hour's time, Colonel. Thank you.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Di Fazio.
25 MR. DI FAZIO: Can we just briefly go into private session,
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's go into private session.
3 [Private session]
20 [Open session]
21 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: So from what I gather, having heard you, Mr. Di
23 Fazio, and you Mr. Jones, I think we need a good 30-minute break, during
24 which you will carry out what you said.
25 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Then you will update us immediately as soon as we
2 resume. Thank you.
3 --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 1.05 p.m.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Di Fazio, can you update the Trial
7 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes. The issue I raised with you in private
8 session has been resolved satisfactorily, copies of the diary have been
9 made available.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you. Yes, Mr. Jones.
11 MR. JONES: Yes. Obviously in terms of the plan, we haven't had a
12 chance to look at the diary, but tomorrow I plan to deal with anything
13 arising from that, and then the other documents, if we can resolve that.
14 So I will try to just finish the diary today and maybe some other
16 Q. Going back now to the diary on the 21st of March, 1993. Do you
17 have 3525 open, please.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. So did you, in fact, once this prisoner had been put in the APC,
20 did you then all travel to Bratunac and then you had this meeting?
21 A. Yes, we did.
22 Q. And it appears to be a meeting with General Morillon, yourself,
23 Mihailov. Denuyft was an UNMO, wasn't he, from Belgium?
24 A. Yes, the names right here are Morillon, Denuyft, who is a Belgian
25 major, Commandant Beary. Commandant is major in the Irish army. It's
1 quite possible that those, when I said earlier, that there may have been
2 UNMOs present, logically, it would suggest that if there were UNMOs
3 present, it would be those.
4 Q. Present at the PTT building?
5 A. At the PTT building. And for their present -- at the PTT
6 building, at the initial arrival, I can't comment, but they would much
7 more likely be present at the handover of the prisoner, because we
8 departed straight from there to Bratunac.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speakers kindly pause between question
10 and answer.
11 MR. JONES:
12 Q. Thank you. Just for clarification, did both the UNMOs and the
13 Canadians wear blue helmets?
14 A. The Canadians certainly wore blue helmets. I wore blue helmet.
15 Mihailov wore blue helmets. The UNMOs usually wore a blue beret, not
17 Q. Right. And then on the Serb side, did you actually meet with
19 A. No, we didn't. We had been told that Mladic would be there. We
20 actually met with General Gvero and the president of the Bratunac
22 Q. Would that be Milan Gvero?
23 A. General -- yes, I think it is it Milan Gvero. We met him many
24 times over the previous number of months.
25 Q. You may or may not be able to help us with that but is that the
1 same Milan Gvero who has been indicted by this Tribunal for crimes against
3 A. I believe so.
4 Q. I assume that there is no dispute that Mladic is the same Mladic
5 is the same Mladic who is indicted for genocide in relation to Srebrenica
6 to the events in July of 1995. Among others.
7 A. I hope he burns in hell.
8 Q. Thank you. The next page, 3526, there is a comment lines 19 to
9 21, 21 isn't there. It is Morillon speaking. And he says: "My intention
10 to demilitarise Srebrenica, Muslims hand weapons to UNPROFOR, only allow
11 police with side arms".
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. That's confirming what you said earlier, that civilian police with
14 side arms and UNPROFOR?
15 A. Not soldiers and not military police.
16 Q. Now, if we turn to 3528, it's the same meeting. And is it correct
17 that Morillon says: "You have already won. I'm trying to help you, too,
18 for you to capture Srebrenica" --
19 A. Which page?
20 Q. I'm sorry. 3528.
21 A. Yes, I'm with you.
22 Q. Yes. I'm trying to help you underlined, too, you to capture
23 Srebrenica would be diplomatic disaster?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. And crime against humanity. If you just stop now would be very
1 good for your image?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. Do you know why General Morillon considered that it would be a
4 crime against humanity for the Serbs to take Srebrenica?
5 A. I can't comment specifically, but in general, because doing so
6 would cause many casualties amongst the large number of refugees and
7 civilians who were concentrated in the pocket and who were under -- in the
8 terrible kind of conditions we have discussed over the last couple of
10 Q. Would it be fair to summarise that on the 21st of March, 1993,
11 that basically everyone knew at that stage that if Srebrenica fell to the
12 Serbs, there would be massacres?
13 A. That was -- that was our belief, that there would be very many
15 Q. Now, I think you went to a funeral Kravica?
16 A. The funeral itself was at a church in Bratunac, on the outskirts
17 of Bratunac. We then went after that to the Kravica location.
18 Q. Right. Now, are you aware that Kravica was the centre of Serb
19 nationalism going back at that to the Second World War?
20 A. No, I wasn't.
21 Q. Were you aware of its tactical significance?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Can you explain that?
24 A. The tactical significance is that it was a town which was on the
25 road between Konjevic Polje and Bratunac, and if that road was held by the
1 Bosniaks, then for Serbs to go from Bratunac to Konjevic Polje, Konjevici,
2 which by that stage they had captured, they would have had to go all the
3 way around via Zvornik.
4 Q. All right. Now, you had many conversations with the Serbs about
5 the attack or action on Kravica on Orthodox Christmas, 1993. Wasn't that
6 one of the complaints that had occurred on Orthodox Christmas, that that
7 was considered particularly atrocious?
8 A. The accusation was A, that the people had been killed. Secondly,
9 was that it had been deliberately done on the Orthodox Christmas in order
10 to -- Balkan diplomacy.
11 Q. Now, you were actually in Sarajevo, weren't you, on that day,
12 Orthodox Christmas 1993?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I've looked at pages 15 and 16 of your 2002 statement for Galic.
15 I'm not going to put that in front of you. I just refer to it. The ERN
16 number for the record is 02192822 and 02192823.
17 Under the heading Bosnian Serb year end celebrations, it says: "On
18 Christmas Eve, exactly at midnight, every Bosnian Serb heavy weapon around
19 Sarajevo started firing and continued firing into the city for about 20
20 minutes. It did the same again on the Serb Greek-Orthodox Christmas Eve,
21 7 January."
22 And then on page 16, the next page: "It was like a fireworks
23 display, except lethal. For example I watched a rapid-fire 40-millimetre
24 Bofors gun sited above the residency, hammering out a tune "x x xxxx x x"
25 for twenty minutes", the Xs to signify that tune for 20 minutes, "firing
1 hundreds of rounds into the city."
2 Do you recall that?
3 A. Yes. It was horrific.
4 Q. It's right, isn't it, the Serbs did wage war on their holiday,
5 their Orthodox Christmas, killing people?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. So it's fair to say they didn't treat it as a day of peace and
8 goodwill to mankind?
9 A. There were no days of peace and goodwill at that unfortunate time.
10 Q. And just for the diary a bit longer. I'm skipping forward, if you
11 will give me a moment. 3546. This would be on the 21st of March.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. I know it's rather difficult to read, but 6c.
14 A. 6c reads: "Commander intends leaving Srebrenica Wednesday 24
15 March with medivac, if UNMOs have been deployed." That was referring to
16 planned helicopter evacuation that we mentioned previously.
17 Q. An then if we look at B. Sorry about taking it in reverse order.
18 Can you read that, please.
19 A. "Commander awaits success of evacuation of Serbs from Tuzla before
20 continuing to try and get UNMOs in."
21 Q. So is it right that General Morillon accepted that linkage to a
22 certain extent, that UNMOs coming to Srebrenica was conditioned on Serbs
23 leaving Tuzla?
24 A. No. The linkage that he was tacitly accepting was people from
25 Tuzla, Serbs from Tuzla leaving Tuzla and people from Srebrenica leaving
1 Srebrenica. General Morillon had, by that stage, insisted with the Serbs
2 that there could be no linkage regarding getting UNMOs in or out. UNMOs
3 coming in was something which the Serbs had to accept. And initially they
4 did not, that is back on the 17th and 18th. But by that stage, they
6 Q. If we turn to the next page, 3547, we see number five there.
7 Doesn't that read: "Commander wishes to be informed by HF radio the moment
8 the convoy with Serbs leaves Tuzla.
9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters please ask the witness to read
10 the diary a bit more slowly, please.
11 A. "Five: Commander wishes to be informed by HF radio," that's
12 high-frequency radio, "the moment the convoy with Serbs leaves Tuzla. He
13 will then immediately go to Bratunac to get the UNMOs in. UNMO should
14 stand by and be ready to move as soon as the convoy leaves Tuzla."
15 Q. So in the end, wasn't it a classic absolute trade-off, that even
16 down to the moment Serbs left Tuzla, only then could UNMOs go in.
17 A. It was certainly coincidental timewise.
18 Q. What I'm driving at is basically this: Didn't the Serbs in fact
19 call the shots pretty much for what was going on in the enclave, including
20 deployment of UN personnel?
21 A. Sadly, yes.
22 Q. And just moving to the last few entries. 3550. This would be the
23 23rd of March.
24 A. 23 March, 12.40 Zvornik Karakaj bridge.
25 Q. Sorry. I'm on 3550. Perhaps I've -- is that correct?
1 JUDGE AGIUS: It's 3550. He's read the line halfway down the
3 MR. JONES: Yes. Sorry. I'm actually referring to the very first
4 two lines. Is it right that you met the imam of Srebrenica and that he
5 reported that 40 villages in the south-east were under threat?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Now we move forward to 3555. This is the 24th of March. Just if
8 you could clarify. These notes record, do they not, the Serbs shelling
9 the evacuation of the wounded from Srebrenica?
10 A. Yes. That is correct.
11 Q. Can we turn to the next page, 3556. And looking to the
12 second-to-last paragraph at the bottom, could you read that and explain
13 what that is about.
14 A. "Regional government utterly disprove of General Morillon's
15 approach which leads to ethnic cleansing." And that is reference to the
16 point of view stated by the Tuzla authorities, from -- we met them in
17 Tuzla and why they did not wish to allow the Serb -- the Serbs in Tuzla to
18 leave Tuzla and why they did not wish people, refugees in Srebrenica to
19 leave Srebrenica.
20 Their point of view was that that was tantamount to ethnic
21 cleansing and the supporting and the facilitation of ethnic cleansing.
22 Q. Wasn't that a view also expressed by Oric to you and General
24 A. I cannot recollect that coming up in discussion in that manner
25 between Colonel Oric and General Morillon.
1 Q. Okay. And then moving forward to just the last few final entries.
2 At 3559. This would be the 24th of March. This is a meeting with
3 President Milosevic in Belgrade. Would that be right, minutes of that
5 A. Yes, it is.
6 Q. See on 3559, the second paragraph, can you read what that says.
7 A. "World focussed on Srebrenica. Your friends in Bosnia are mad
8 enough to continue the offensive. Bosnians only have small arms and" --
9 Q. Okay, we can stop there. We've touched already on the complete
10 disequilibrium in terms of weaponry between Serbs and Muslims. Which that
11 refers to, I take it?
12 A. Correct. And it also refers to the Bosnian Serbs. That is, as
13 opposed to Milosevic.
14 Q. In fact I think you told us just even a small rocket launch in
15 Srebrenica was like gold dust?
16 A. That is correct.
17 Q. Now, if we can move forward to 3565. This would be the 24th of
19 A. 3565 is the 26th of March. The meeting in Belgrade with Mladic
20 and Gvero and a number of others.
21 Q. And so on 3565, starting from line 18, could you just read out
22 what General Morillon said and what that was about.
23 A. "This madman betrayed promise. You gave your personal guarantee
24 for airlift. This madman, who has obviously lost his nerve, fired at UN
25 helicopters and location of evacuation of heavily wounded. Luckily
1 results were limited at two wounded soldiers and three civilians killed."
2 Q. Thank you. Then just further down, about six lines from the
3 bottom: "We'll give you proof of madness." If you can carry on from
5 A. "We'll give you proof of madness when shelled UN soldiers at
6 stadium -- when crowd waiting and on helicopters in Srebrenica.
7 Initiative of this brute could have disastrous consequences on world
9 Q. All right. Now, General Gvero, what did you understand his
10 position was at this time in the Bosnian Serb army?
11 A. Our understanding was that Gvero was like the second in command,
12 but that he was not particularly effective. Mladic called all the shots.
13 Tolimir was the vicious Rottweiler, the political commissar. Gvero was
14 the lap-dog who was trotted out.
15 Q. And when you speak about negotiating or facilitating cease-fires
16 in Srebrenica between the Muslims and the Serbs, isn't it right the
17 Bosniaks were having to deal on the other side with people like Gvero,
18 having to put their people in trust in people like Gvero?
19 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, there's been no evidence of
20 any negotiations that this witness has touched upon between Bosniaks and
21 the -- and the Serbs. This witness has only given evidence of his
22 facilitating and his acting, so it's not -- a point not without
24 I have not heard of any direct negotiations between the Bosniaks
25 and the Serbs.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: I did. I did. Earlier on in his testimony he did
2 mention that tripartite or tripartite meetings that were going on between
3 the Presidency, Sarajevo, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian --
4 MR. JONES: I know. I recall that.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: So that's the only thing I recall. Of course I
6 stand could be corrected.
7 MR. JONES: If I could rephrase that. I didn't mean to suggest
8 there were direct contacts. I can rephrase the question, if that would
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I think if you do that perhaps we will surpass
11 this impasse or whatever.
12 MR. JONES:
13 Q. Yes. During this period, Colonel, you and General Morillon were
14 going back and forth between the parties, weren't you, trying to
16 A. That is correct.
17 Q. And on the Serb side, the people who you were trying to make deals
18 with, which you would then present to the Bosniaks, were Gvero, Mladic,
19 Karadzic, those people?
20 A. Yes. We believed that it was only when we spoke with Mladic that
21 things would happen. We believed that Gvero was put in front of us in
22 order to obstruct and to delay.
23 Q. Did the Bosniaks ever say to you: We can't trust these people,
24 these Serbs?
25 A. All the time.
1 Q. Sir, if you will bear with me for a moment. Yes. I'm finished
2 with the direct, except for one thing. If you could just help us with
3 page 3601, which in the original is probably right towards the back. And
4 it's just really seeking clarification or confirmation that the list of
5 names there, UNMOs were deployed in Srebrenica when you were there?
6 A. That was -- the list at the top of that page is the list of UNMOs
7 who we left in Srebrenica when we departed on the 28th. It's not the list
8 of the UNMOs who were in Srebrenica throughout.
9 Only Mike Beary and for some of the time Ronnie Denuyft were
10 there throughout the time. Trevor Jardins, Fernando Martine -- Martinez,
11 Peter Naglik and David McDonald, were new and had arrived in Srebrenica
12 over the last couple of days.
13 Q. Were you there when Captain McDonald got injured out on his
15 A. No.
16 Q. Your Honours, I've finished with the diary. There are new areas I
17 can go to. At the same time, a natural sequence would be now to go
18 through the Defence exhibits, many of which we have the difficulty with.
19 So perhaps this would be a good moment to adjourn.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think we made answers clear earlier on this
21 morning. Because of the problem that you touched upon earlier on, and on
22 which I take it the Prosecution is still labouring --
23 MR. DI FAZIO: We are. And of course, in the circumstances, we
24 have absolutely no objection to an early adjournment, if that is what Mr.
25 Jones is seeking.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. But of course -- we have no problem with
2 adjourning either, given the situation as it obtains now. However, I
3 don't want the situation to remain as it is tomorrow morning.
4 In other words, we must report progress on that issue tomorrow
5 morning. Otherwise there will be problems obviously.
6 MR. JONES: Yes. Our position is --
7 JUDGE AGIUS: You don't need to reiterate your position, Mr.
9 MR. JONES: Yes. Thank you.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: I told you what the presumption at law is, so please
11 don't force our hands.
12 MR. DI FAZIO: We appreciate the urgency of the situation.
13 MR. JONES: Your Honour, I'm sorry one other thing.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Do we need the witness here?
15 MR. JONES: No. Precisely. In his absence I can make a point.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Colonel I thank you once more. We will reconvene
17 tomorrow. I think it is in the morning again, 9 o'clock.
18 THE WITNESS: May I confirm that I may take the Larry
19 Hollingsworth document with me.
20 MR. JONES: Yes. I would be happy to because I might ask about
22 [Witness stands down]
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Good afternoon to you.
24 Yes, Mr. Jones.
25 MR. JONES: Yes. Just to say our position on the diary is that
1 only the pages which have been referred to in evidence should be exhibited
2 and not pages which haven't been referred to in evidence. And that's why
3 I've gone through pretty lengthy process of getting confirmation of
4 different points on different pages.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: What about the context in which some of the pages
6 that have been made use of can be understood? You skip pages, for
7 example; so does Mr. Di Fazio. But what is contained in page 10, for
8 example, can only be properly understood if we read also what is on page 9
9 or on page 11 or on page 20 or on page 21.
10 MR. JONES: Yes. Well,...
11 JUDGE AGIUS: This is the problem that we have. I mean it's --
12 plus other things. I mean, I know that strictly speaking, whatever may be
13 contained in the diary which the witness has not been asked to comment
14 about, does not in itself constitute proof of what it says.
15 However, in remote cases sometimes it can constitute corroborative
17 MR. JONES: May I say, Your Honour, I did even before we started I
18 went through every page of the diary and for that reason it's now my
19 position to the whole diary being exhibited. I mean really, it is a
20 matter which I trust the Chamber's wisdom to deal with it as you see fit.
21 It was really just in light of Your Honour's invitation for us to have a
22 position that I put that position.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I appreciate that, Mr. Jones. But you also
24 need to appreciate one thing. For example, if the witness in one page or
25 on one page he says "no distribution as yet of foods or medicine" and on
1 another page, which you may have not referred to says "Distribution has
2 just started", now obviously how do you expect us to ignore that?
3 Now what weight we will give it at the end of the day is our
4 business. But it could constitute corroborative evidence at the end of
5 the time, even if the -- it has not been put to the witness.
6 If witnesses come forward and say something or make an affirmation
7 and they only corroborative evidence that there is may be found in one of
8 pages in this diary, what's the position there?
9 MR. JONES: Yes. I suppose -- it does all go to weight and the
10 fact that the witness hasn't confirmed one entry. I would submit makes it
11 of less weight that entries which he has confirmed.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Obviously if you want to cut and paste and take as
13 many pages out of this diary from our sight, you are free to do that.
14 It's up to you. But what you leave there we have every right to read if
15 it has been tendered in evidence as one document.
16 I mean, there are other instances where obviously it was not the
17 case, where you stated, We are tendering the entire document, but we are
18 only basically making use of one page and that is what is relevant to this
19 case, and we are ourselves said, Okay, we'll take it that this Trial
20 Chamber will only refer to that page and will ignore completely the rest.
21 That -- of course we'll keep our word there. That's our commitment.
22 But with this particular diary, having -- being familiar with
23 diaries, in this Tribunal and also elsewhere, I know what the difficulty
24 -- where the difficulty lies. It's not as easy as you think. Because a
25 diary has context of its own which starts on day 1 and finishes on day 100
1 or whichever. And it's difficult to dislodge one extract out of the
2 context in which it happens to be written. The context in time, context
3 of events, temporal. I don't know what --
4 MR. JONES: Yes.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Anyway, do you want to -- are you finished Mr.
7 MR. JONES: Yes. All of what Your Honour says makes perfect sense
8 and the whole -- so far the whole thing has been exhibited -- well, not
9 the whole thing because there are --
10 JUDGE AGIUS: No, no.
11 MR. JONES: And we don't oppose that. My submissions really go to
12 weight, that matters confirmed by the witness have more weight than those
13 he didn't confirm. I will leave it at that.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Yes.
15 MR. DI FAZIO: That being the case, the Prosecution would adopt
16 the position that you should admit into evidence the entire document and
17 with respect, we have no problems with the approach that Mr. Jones has
18 suggested, that you may refer to entries upon which this witness has not
19 touched or spoken about, but that you would have to give less weight to
20 those entries because he hasn't explained them, but that you would be
21 permitted and the Prosecution would be permitted and the Defence would be
22 permitted to refer to those particular entries.
23 Now, and that seems, with respect, the simplest way of approaching
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Gentlemen, I can just put one question to the
1 witness and say: Witness, do you confirm, under oath, that there is no
2 false representation in that diary of yours, that everything that is
3 included there reflects the truth of the situation as it was reported to
4 you or as you assessed it, at any given moment? And how does that sound
5 to you, Mr. Di Fazio?
6 MR. DI FAZIO: That sounds fine, if Your Honours please. Don't
7 forget, there is also the evidence that I elicited regarding
8 contemporanaity of the notes, reasonable contemporanaity, in any event.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: But such a question would actually, then, increase
10 the status and the status of the contents of the diary.
11 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Especially those parts which he is not being asked.
13 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Ladies and gentlemen, I want to make myself clear in
17 case -- I wanted to make myself clear, in case anyone may have
18 misunderstood me. When I said I could put that question to the witness, I
19 didn't mean to say that I was going to put that question to the witness.
20 In fact, you can rest assured that it is not my intention to put
21 that question to the witness.
22 If you want to put that question to the witness yourselves, you
23 are free to do so. But not me or any of my two colleagues.
24 MR. JONES: I anticipate that the answer from the witness would be
25 quite nuanced in any event.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, exactly. Yes. No more business to transact
2 today. We'll adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9.00. I think we are
3 sitting in another courtroom tomorrow, or this one?
4 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, courtroom 3.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Courtroom three. Thank you.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.40 p.m., to be
7 reconvened on Thursday, the 17th day of March, 2005, at
8 9.00 a.m.