1 Thursday, 17 March, 2005
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam -- Mr. Registrar, could you call the
6 case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Mr. President. Case IT-03-68-T, the
8 Prosecutor versus Naser Oric.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. Mr. Oric, can you follow the
10 proceedings in a language that you can understand?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours, ladies
12 and gentlemen. Indeed, I can.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you, you may sit down. And good morning
14 to you. Appearances for the Prosecution.
15 MR. DI FAZIO: Good morning, Your Honours. My name is Di Fazio.
16 I appear for the Prosecution together with my colleague, case manager
17 Ms. Donnica Henry-Frijlink. Mr. Wubben will join us later in the morning.
18 Thank you.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, and good morning to you and your team.
20 Appearances for Naser Oric.
21 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours; good
22 morning to my learned friend. My name is Vasvija Vidovic. Together
23 with Mr. John Jones I appear on behalf of Mr. Naser Oric. We have with us
24 today our legal assistant Ms. Jasmina Cosic, Miss Adisa Mehic, also our
25 legal assistant, and our case manager, Mr. Geoff Roberts.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you and good morning to you and your team.
2 Before we bring in the witness, any updating on the issues that we
3 discussed yesterday?
4 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes. Can I just address you in private session
5 about that.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Let's go into private session, please.
7 [Private Session]
11 Page 6066 redacted. Private session.
22 [Open session]
23 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 WITNESS: PYERS TUCKER [Resumed]
2 Cross-examination by Mr. Jones: [Continued]
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Colonel Tucker. You may sit down.
4 And good morning to you, Colonel Tucker.
5 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: We will be proceeding and hopefully finish with the
7 cross-examination this morning. I am correct, I hope?
8 MR. JONES: Yes, yes. Probably by the second break.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead.
10 MR. JONES:
11 Q. So good morning from me too, and welcome to this larger courtroom.
12 I have a special request from the booths that we go very slowly today.
13 Apparently we were much too fast yesterday, so we need to both make an
15 Now, did you have the opportunity to read the chapter on
16 Srebrenica in Larry Hollingsworth's book?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. So thank you for doing that. It's a long chapter, so I don't
19 propose to go into it in any detail, just a few passages which I will deal
20 with now while it's fresh in your memory.
21 Now, Larry Hollingsworth describes there your entry into
22 Srebrenica on the 11th of March, 1993 and how the Belgian truck with the
23 Kevlar lining hit a mine, et cetera. You were present at that?
24 A. No, I was up with General Morillon, but I personally did not go to
25 the truck after it had blown up, but I heard the explosion and spoke with
1 and interviewed the people who had been there in order to establish what
2 had happened.
3 Q. Now, it's at page 187 -- you don't need to have it in front of
4 you, I will just read it -- "My --" this is referring to Hollingsworth.
5 "My heart rate had increased. I was huddled against the window,
6 squinting and peering. This was Srebrenica. The name was known in
7 Washington, New York, in London. Known because no one could get in."
8 Now, obviously that is not literally true because your group got
9 in. But do you agree, first, that when you were in Sarajevo hearing about
10 Srebrenica, that it was famous for being utterly inaccessible?
11 A. I would describe it infamous.
12 Q. Yes, thank you, that's probably a better term. And when you were
13 there, did you feel that sense of utter isolation?
14 A. Yes, in a way.
15 Q. Now, you mentioned radio contacts from Srebrenica with the outside
16 world. Would you agree with this characterisation, that this was no more
17 than, in a way, cries for help to be heard, these broadcasts?
18 A. Yes. They were definitely cries for help, but there were also
19 other things going on in parallel. They weren't only cries for help.
20 There were other activities going on as well.
21 Q. Now, for Bosniaks -- let's bring up Bosniaks now. Obviously
22 UNPROFOR had more freedom of movement, but Srebrenica was completely
23 physically cut off from Tuzla by Serb occupied territory.
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Now, on the same page, page 187, I will quote, "Our guide, a
1 small, very friendly man, was in uniform and was introduced as the
2 military commander of the town. That he may have been, but we knew that
3 the real defender of the region was Naser Oric whom we had met in
5 Were you with Larry Hollingsworth at this stage when this military
6 commander was introduced?
7 A. Where was this and when was this?
8 Q. This was at the very moment of arrival on the first evening.
9 A. As we arrived outside the -- what we later came to know was the
10 PTT building, but remember we had just arrived, it was just a building,
11 there were some soldiers who rushed around getting hold of who I later
12 heard were the War Presidency. Yes, there was a man who was described as
13 a local military commander. He was not the overall commander in
14 Srebrenica. I mean, I guess he was the person who was effectively on duty
15 that evening there.
16 Q. Do you recall someone being introduced to you as the military
17 commander of the town?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And that was a different person from the mayor?
20 A. Yes. The mayor, and by that I mean Hajrudin Avdic, was never in
22 Q. Now at page 211, and in fact actually it would be -- I think it
23 probably would be helpful if you had it in front of you at this stage.
24 It's Exhibit D218. And just while that is being prepared, I'm going to
25 ask you questions about when the aid convoy came in and then the aid was
1 unloaded and then people were loaded onto the lorries. And if I
2 understand correctly, you were actually at the Serb lines at this point,
3 you weren't actually in Srebrenica.
4 A. This is on the next morning. General Morillon and I went down to
5 the front line ahead of the departure from Srebrenica of the convoy, so
6 the scenes that Larry describes in there and which I also saw on
7 television reports, I was not present at that. I was actually at the --
8 the yellow bridge to make sure that the Serbs didn't do anything stupid
9 when the convoy arrived there.
10 Q. Thank you. It is page 211 and I understand from your answer that
11 you have read this again last night. But I will read the scene into the
12 record. "I jumped off." That's the lorry. "There was no one from
13 authority in sight. I ran into the PTT building and bounded up the
14 stairs. The mayor was hiding in the room with the stove. I dragged him
15 out and down the stairs. 'What the hell are you going to do about this?'
16 I yelled? In his customary lethargic way he went back into the building
17 and returned with a policeman who began firing into the air with a
18 Kalashnikov rifle. For maybe 30 seconds there was silence and peace, then
19 the mayhem broke out again as family fought family for a place on the
20 trucks. The police tried another burst of fire. It was totally ignored.
21 I pleaded with the mayor to let us at least get the wounded off first,
22 then we would fill up the vehicles, but it was a waste of time. He was
23 powerless. We were all powerless. Mob rule had taken over."
24 And now I appreciate that you weren't personally there when this
25 occurred, but you said you saw it on television and perhaps spoke to the
1 people who witnessed it at firsthand.
2 A. I did.
3 Q. And one question again for you as a perhaps the military man:
4 Shooting a rifle into the air is actually quite dangerous, isn't it? In
5 fact, the bullets, as they come down, can injure or kill a person.
6 A. Yes. But celebratory fire, totally different context. Everybody
7 in the Balkans fired off large amounts of ammunition into the skies with
8 complete disregard for where anything would land.
9 Q. You've spoken of knife fights at air drops of the food, and now we
10 have this scene. Would you agree that in Srebrenica, based on your
11 observations, that it was impossible at that time to control crowds of
12 civilians from fighting for food or fighting for their survival?
13 A. Speaking personally, I agree it would be very difficult. However
14 I must also say that if clear leadership had been shown, it would have
15 been more possible. It perhaps would have been possible.
16 Q. You're aware that when these convoys set off, women were throwing
17 their children onto the lorries and --
18 A. Yes. It troubled a lot of people. A lot of people who were there
19 said that it affected them very badly, seeing the state that people were
20 in. And I saw these same people in the convoy when they arrived at the
21 yellow bridge and when they met the Serbs effectively for the first time,
22 and they were very, very, very afraid.
23 Q. And did you see that people actually got crushed to death and
24 asphyxiated on those lorries because of the crush of people?
25 A. I heard reports of it, but did not see that in the trucks. I
1 actually accompanied the Serb policemen who climbed up into the back of
2 each truck, because I did not want a Serb to be left alone with the
3 refugees. And when I climbed into the back of each truck, yes, they were
4 very crowded, but the reports which I heard later, I cannot substantiate
5 or otherwise.
6 Q. Just to fix this date, and this would be on what day, the 12th of
8 A. No. This would be the day after the convoy came in, so I
9 think it would be the 21st. It would have to be the 21st of March. THE
10 convoy came in on the evening of the 20th and went out on the morning of
11 the 21st.
12 Q. Thank you. Sorry, I missed the reference to the next day. I
13 thought you meant the next day after your arrival. So that is clear.
14 Now if you could turn to page 212, it's the next page, fourth
15 paragraph. There's a quote: "I was just leaving the building when Tony
16 Birtley approached me: "Larry, will you do me a favour. Will you take my
17 films out and give them to ABC in Tuzla. I took them from him and stuffed
18 them in my vest pockets."
19 Now, you told us, I think it was on Monday, about how Tony
20 Birtley's pictures left Srebrenica. So isn't it right that in fact the
21 way they left Srebrenica was by Larry Hollingsworth taking them off
22 someone as a favour of one man to another, indeed one countryman to
23 another. It wasn't as if there was some pouch system involving UNMOs as
24 it seemed to be suggested.
25 A. There was never any pouch system or anything like that. Tony
1 Birtley had in fact asked General Morillon how should he get his tapes out
2 of Srebrenica, and General Morillon said give it to one of the UNMOs or
3 you can give it to someone from UNHCR and I think actually suggested that
4 Larry Hollingsworth would be one of the most reliable people. I would add
5 that, to my belief, that was not the only -- Tony Birtley was passing out
6 a series of tapes and other materials. So was Philipp von Recklinghausen
7 and this was merely one occasion on which they went out.
8 Q. And isn't it true that it was in fact -- there was a big risk that
9 the Serbs would find these photographs and confiscate them, and that in
10 fact that happened with Philipp von Recklinghausen's photographs, if you
12 A. I can't comment about Philip von Recklinghausen's photographs, but
13 yes, there certainly was risk and we discussed it with Larry and asked him
14 would he be willing to do that, because we believed it was important that
15 the world saw these images.
16 Q. As I say this is a long chapter so I'm not going to go through it
17 page by page, but having read it, and particularly the description of
18 conditions of life in Srebrenica, is there anything which you would
19 quibble with in terms of that description, or is it consistent with what
20 you saw and heard yourself in Srebrenica?
21 A. No. I would describe it as remarkably accurate description of the
22 situation there, and many of the things which I have in my diary are
23 almost word-by-word reflected in here, and it is certainly as I remember
24 it and as I have recorded it in my diary.
25 Q. Okay. Thank you very much. And this has an exhibit number
1 already, so you can just put it to one side.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. It's D 218.
3 MR. JONES: Yes.
4 Q. Now, while we're still filling in the picture of life in
5 Srebrenica, I would like to ask you about several topics. The first
6 concerns Srebrenica's fighters, if I can put it that way.
7 Now, concerning the fighting forces in and around Srebrenica, in a
8 statement which you gave to the Prosecution for the Galic case which is
9 dated the first of May 2002, you said in relation to the eastern enclaves,
10 the following. And I needn't put it in front of you, I will just read it
11 and if you disagree, then you can tell me.
12 "While there was certainly some soldiers and civilians in the
13 enclaves who had taken up arms to defend themselves, the vast majority
14 were unarmed civilians."
15 Just for the record, that's page 17, ERN 02192824.
16 Now, do you confirm that is a correct statement?
17 A. Absolutely.
18 Q. Now, from your observations and experience in Srebrenica, would
19 you agree that the fighters, firstly, didn't stay at barracks but stayed
20 at home with their families and other DPs?
21 A. Or wherever there was any shelter.
22 Q. And that there were no armouries organised and that people just
23 had with them what weapons they possessed or were able to capture from the
25 A. That is what I saw. I did not see any armouries or any locations
1 where ammunition or weapons were stored, certainly.
2 Q. I'm going to put to you what another witness -- I won't say their
3 name -- but said about the organisation or lack of organisation of
4 Srebrenica's armed forces and tell me if you agree on the basis of your
5 intelligence and observations or if you disagree.
6 "It was left up to the people in Srebrenica to decide whether they
7 wanted to be soldiers or not. Because there was no way you could force
8 them to become one. If you wanted to force them to become a soldier, you
9 have to provide them with a gun, with a rifle, and you don't have one.
10 Then the person is going to say, 'Okay, but then you have to provide me
11 with meals, you have to take care of my family, and then I will go and man
12 the positions.' So in essence this was on a voluntary basis, take it or
13 leave it."
14 Now is that consistent with what you saw and observed in
15 Srebrenica of the fighting forces?
16 A. It is consistent with what I saw with my own eyes, though I heard
17 reports from Mihailov and from Major Dudley that there had -- or that
18 people within the town had told them of occasions when people had been
19 forced to do things that they had not wanted to do.
20 Q. Now, going back to the quote from your statement in Galic:
21 "Civilians in the enclaves who had taken up arms to defend themselves..."
22 the question I'm going to ask you is partly as a French speaker and as a
23 military officer, educated at Sandhurst and elsewhere, are you familiar
24 with the expression "lever en masse"?
25 A. Yes, I am.
1 Q. That refers, does it not, to persons who, on the approach the
2 enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without
3 having time to form themselves into armed units; would that be correct?
4 A. Close. It's not entirely accurate, but it is good enough. Where
5 it is not correct is that "lever en masse" means that they are called to
6 arms, not spontaneously come to arms. "Lever" means raised.
7 Q. All right. Thank you very much. Now you told us yesterday that
8 the Serbs had occupied 60 percent of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at
9 the beginning of the war. So would you agree essentially they were
10 invading troops on that territory?
11 A. On the territory that they occupied and forced the people who were
12 living there, usually Bosniaks, sometimes Bosnian Croats out of the area,
14 Q. So as a matter of military terminology, would you agree that
15 Srebrenica's fighters, as far as you could tell, were lever en masse in
16 this sense?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now regarding the tactical position in Srebrenica you told us you
19 received about a third of your intelligence from Major Dudley.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, could the witness please be shown War Hospital, which is
22 Exhibit D119, and it's pages 154 to 155. Have you -- are you familiar
23 with that book by Sheri Fink?
24 A. No, I'm not.
25 Q. It's another book in which your name features, so you can add it
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 to your reading list. In fact I can read the passage in the meantime.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, go ahead. Go ahead, Mr. Jones. Let's lose as
3 little time as possible, please.
4 MR. JONES:
5 Q. Yes. It's page -- starts at page 154, last paragraph. And it's
6 referring to Dudley, in the enclave and around the time of late March
7 1993. It says, "Constantly shadowed by two Bosnian minders he has also
8 mapped the perimeter of the enclave and attempted to understand what the
9 Muslims and Serbs in this part of Bosnia are fighting about. He has
11 I will stop there so you have it. It's page 154.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam Usher, if we can put it on the ELMO, please,
13 and then the witness can follow from the monitor.
14 MR. JONES: It's the bottom paragraph of page 154 and going over
15 to page 155.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Don't worry, I think it will appear.
17 MR. JONES: In fact it's going on to page 155. "He has concluded
18 that the value of Srebrenica is eminently defendable and identified
19 positions from which it can be protected. He explained to some key
20 Bosnian soldiers that they should dig up the roads and block the trails
21 leading into the town and set up defence in depth - forward positions with
22 multiple fall back positions. This way the light infantry could fight off
23 an armoured Serb attack. When the Bosnians argued they couldn't pull it
24 off, he advised them to get out. The place is the Alamo, he thinks, it
25 isn't going to last."
1 The Alamo is part of military lore [Realtime transcript read in
2 error "law"], isn't it? It's the last stand of a besieged --
3 A. In Mexico, yes.
4 Q. Just for the record, "lore," rather than "law."
5 Now, when you first arrived in Srebrenica, in fact there was a
6 very large log or tree, wasn't there, placed across the road?
7 A. That was at Konjevic Polje. Not at Srebrenica.
8 Q. Right. Do you agree with the assessment as set out by Major
9 Dudley in that extract?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Can you tell --
12 A. Where I -- in terms of the geography, yes, it was mountainous,
13 hilly terrain and, in principle, it should be fairly easy to defend. The
14 point he is not taking or did not appear to take into account is that you
15 need weapons with which to do that and the -- and you need anti-tank
16 weapons, particularly those 66 millimetre, and they had, I may have said
17 they were gold dust, but there was just no way they had the weapons with
18 which to mount a serious defence of that area.
19 Q. So in fact the tactical position was worse for the Bosnians than
20 described by Major Dudley?
21 A. In my view, yes.
22 Q. You dealt a lot with General Morillon imploring Oric in March of
23 1993 to cease his offensives. My question is seeing the talk of the Alamo
24 there, and your reports of Oric speaking of fighting in and among the
25 houses and dying there with his people, do you maintain that Oric was
1 doing anything other than waging a desperate defence?
2 A. No.
3 Q. To fill out the picture of Srebrenica a little more, you told us
4 about the hospital and a pile of human body parts; fingers toes, hands,
5 limbs was on the hospital slope. Now you also spoke about this in your
6 statement in Galic and you said -- and the reference is 02192833, page 26,
7 first paragraph: "Larry Hollingsworth -- again -- UNHCR man -- later
8 persuaded the town committee to get it cleared away." That's this pile of
9 limbs. "As part of his efforts to shame them into cleaning up the town
10 and improving hygiene. The problem was that most people believed the
11 Bosnian Serbs were going to kill them and the only question was when. In
12 these extraordinary circumstances, they had simply given up trying and
13 normal attitudes to matters like hygiene, food, tidying up, cleanliness,
14 et cetera, simply fell into disuse. What was the point? They already
15 considered themselves the walking dead."
16 Quite simply, do you confirm that?
17 A. Yes, I do. I would add, in clarification, that that was very much
18 for the -- that was the refugee situation. The situation for some of the
19 original inhabitants of Srebrenica or people who had their own houses and
20 so on was slightly better, but not much.
21 Q. And on the same page, concerning the water supply, you said,
22 "Water came from the river that flowed through Srebrenica but was polluted
23 with offal, human excrement, urine, washing water and oil." Now as far as
24 you're aware, was that the water supply for most of Srebrenica's
1 A. As far as I knew.
2 Q. And a comparatively trivial matter in light of what we discussed,
3 but you told us you took paper from your diary, I think, to light
5 A. To light fires, yes.
6 Q. Isn't it right that paper was also very scarce in Srebrenica when
7 you were there?
8 A. It was.
9 Q. Now, we have a number of documents to take you through now and to
10 do it in an orderly way I will go through chronologically and for reasons
11 which I won't get into we're going to need to go in and out of private
12 session for that exercise. So in fact, we should probably go into private
13 session now.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's go into private session for a while, please,
16 [Private session]
11 Page 6083 redacted. Private session.
13 [Open session]
14 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. And proceed with the caveat that if you are
16 going to refer specifically to the document, in other words, it needs to
17 be stated who is the author, what kind of a document it is. Then
18 obviously we have to go into private session again.
19 MR. JONES: Yes. May I quote from the document without --
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes, yes, yes.
21 MR. JONES:
22 Q. Yes. Did you form the opinion, in Sarajevo, that the Serb policy
23 was to blockade in eastern enclaves essentially to use starvation as a
24 tool of war against the Srebrenica enclave?
25 A. Yes, it was our opinion.
1 Q. Now on the second page of this document, paragraph 3, we see
2 reference to the following: "In close consultation with UNPROFOR, we
3 decided to proceed with our obligations to provide urgent assistance to
4 the destitute populations of Srebrenica, garage, and other locations in
5 eastern Bosnia as one part of our overall distribution of aid to all those
6 in need".
7 Now as assistant to the commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, you
8 worked with UNHCR in working out where aid was most needed.
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. In late 1992 the assessment was that aid - food and other
11 essentials - was desperately needed in Srebrenica and the other enclaves;
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. I would ask if this document could be given an exhibit number,
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. It will be given an exhibit number
18 MR. JONES: Under seal too.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: But temporarily under seal, until we clear this
20 matter up. What is the next number, is it D? 221, yes. So this will
21 become Defence Exhibit 221. Thank you. It will be temporarily under
22 seal, Registrar, please.
23 MR. JONES: We will need to move into private session for the next
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Move into private session for a while, please.
1 [Private session]
11 Page 6087 redacted. Private session.
11 Page 6088 redacted. Private session.
9 [Open session]
10 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session.
11 MR. JONES:
12 Q. All right. Now, dealing now with your -- the briefing for your
13 trip to Srebrenica, which comes next in time, you've told us how you had
14 meetings with Mr. Lagumdzija and General Halilovic in which they mentioned
15 to you that a Colonel Oric was, I don't know, their man in Srebrenica?
16 A. Not Lagumdzija. Lagumdzija was the minister of refugee affairs.
17 I can't recall us ever meeting Lagumdzija together with Halilovic.
18 Lagumdzija we might have met with Ganic, or Lagumdzija on his own.
19 Q. In fact Lagumdzija at that time was vice-president of the
20 government, wasn't he? He wasn't actually a minister for refugees. Or...
21 A. That is possible, he had been minister of refugees earlier and
22 continued to have to speak with General Morillon about refugee affairs.
23 Q. In any event so it is Halilovic who told you the commander in
24 Srebrenica was Colonel Oric?
25 A. It was either Halilovic or Ganic, who we met at the same time
1 after meeting President Izetbegovic prior to going into Srebrenica and
2 Konjevic Polje.
3 Q. And can you give us a rough or even precise date for that meeting?
4 A. 3rd or 4th of March. We met both of them, I think, on both days.
5 Q. All right.
6 MR. JONES: If with the Usher's assistance, if the witness could be
7 shown a Prosecution exhibit, P358. The ERN is 01754001 to 01754011.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Jones.
9 MR. JONES: Just for the record, this is an intercept which we
10 haven't accepted as authentic, but it is a Prosecution exhibit and I put
11 it to the witness in that context.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Unless he proves to you that it is authentic.
13 MR. JONES: Not exactly. I suppose if it is authentic certain
14 consequences follow.
15 Q. Now, just to explain, this purports to be an intercept of
16 conversations from the 24th of March, 1993, so nearly three weeks after
17 your meeting with General Halilovic, and I would refer you to Page 5 of 6
18 in the English. It's under III, and I will read it into the record:
19 "Sefer called Hasim [illegible] because he forgot to tell him something."
20 "S" -- which is for Sefer -- "Listen please, I forgot. Do you have any
21 information on Naser?" Then the answer is: "Sure, personal data," et
22 cetera. "S: Uh-huh." The other person: "I do not have." S: "What is his
23 last name?" The other person: "Oric." S: "Are you sure?" The other
24 person: "Sure. Naser Oric." S: "He is probably the commander of the
25 Municipal Staff there." The other person: "Yep." S: "Did he establish
1 some kind of a brigade there or a unit?" The other person: "No. Not
2 officially, as far as I know, not."
3 It continues, obviously, but my question to you is this: Are you
4 positive that Halilovic in fact used the word "Oric," that he knew Oric's
5 last name and referred to Colonel Oric when you had meetings with him? Do
6 you maintain that?
7 A. I maintain that he said that Colonel Oric was his local commander
8 and that -- the commander of Bosniak forces and that he would try to get
9 in touch with him in order to ensure that we had safe passage into the
10 Srebrenica enclave.
11 Q. So when you went to Srebrenica, it was with the name Colonel Oric
12 on your mind as the --
13 A. Indeed. In fact, when we came across the tree obstacle that you
14 commented on a little bit earlier, when we first reached the Bosniak front
15 lines and we were halted by the Bosniak soldiers on the front line, we
16 asked them: Can you tell Colonel Oric that General Morillon is here and
17 he would like to see him.
18 Q. I've looked in the new diary which was -- I'm going to refer to it
19 as the new diary, in fact it is the one before in time which was disclosed
20 to us yesterday, and searched in vain for any meeting in which there is a
21 reference to General Halilovic telling you he would contact -- you should
22 contact -- sorry, he would contact Colonel Oric.
23 Do you agree that there is perhaps no such reference in your
25 A. Entirely possible. It was not a, an issue that was of --
1 considered of import. When we would go into an area, we would meet with
2 whoever was the local commander. That his name was Oric was not
3 particularly significant and was not something that the -- that I was
4 concerned about or particularly worried about keeping a record of.
5 Q. All right. Now, there is in the diary a meeting on the subject
6 which is with Siber?
7 A. Yes, Colonel Siber.
8 Q. Yes. And while we're at it, are you aware that he was a Croat?
9 A. Yes, he was. Unusual in the circumstances.
10 Q. Was it in fact so unusual, or wasn't the ABiH in fact proud of its
11 multi-ethnic composition?
12 A. That's why I say it was unusual.
13 Q. You know Jovan Divjak as well, I suppose. You were aware --
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. High ranking member of the --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Serb?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. For the record, it was a high-ranking member of the army of
20 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Jovan Divjak.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Jones.
22 MR. JONES:
23 Q. Now, I would like to show you a page from that diary. In fact I
24 have to get my copy in front of me and I don't know if it is possible to
25 put a page from that in front of the witness. It's the -- it is actually
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 a new disclosure, not the diary which we looked at so far. In fact I will
2 present my copy. That's probably easiest.
3 All right. We're putting that page on the ELMO and the reference
4 R0170974 and you can see the heading "Srebrenica" at the top. This is a
5 meeting of the 7th of February, 1993 with Siber among others. Could you
6 read what is written under Srebrenica.
7 A. "Srebrenica. Cease-fire implemented the day you tell me you are
8 ready. Cease-fire for three days. After that meeting between local
9 commanders under the chairmanship of UN military observers. When are you
10 ready to order cease-fire? Best place is Tuzla. Idea was on ground on
11 confrontation line. Will instruct local commander to be at - somewhere -
12 tomorrow at 1200 hours. Then meeting Thursday 1200 hours somewhere on
13 confrontation line. Siber will phone Rasik about frequency and call sign
14 for contact to be made."
15 Q. Do you agree there is a reference to a local commander but no
16 reference to Oric?
17 A. Correct.
18 MR. JONES: Now we need to move into private session for the next
19 exhibit on the same subject.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's move into private session, please.
21 [Private session]
11 Page 6095 redacted. Private session.
11 Page 6096 redacted. Private session.
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
13 MR. JONES:
14 Q. Now do you remember being proofed by the Prosecution when you came
15 to the Hague? By proofing I mean that you were --
16 A. Which occasion?
17 Q. When you gave testimony here, on this occasion, last week.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now do you recall speaking of meeting Oric in Konjevic Polje,
20 describing him as, among other things, "bearded and intense"?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And then I'm quoting from the notes we have, anyway: "Introduced
23 himself as the commander of the Bosniak forces in Srebrenica (may have
24 said eastern Bosnia)." May have said eastern Bosnia.
25 Now, when you gave evidence on Monday, you said and I'm quoting:
1 "Q. What did he say he was?
2 "A. He said he was the commander of the Bosniak forces in Eastern
4 I put it to you that you went from saying maybe that was how he
5 introduced himself, but that your original -- your initial impression was
6 what he only said he was the commander of the pocket. You testified all
7 of a sudden you were clear and categorical that it was a much broader
8 area, the whole of eastern Bosnia, that Oric commanded.
9 A. The language eastern Bosnia, Srebrenica and Gorazde were used by
10 many people intermixed. Some people, when they referred to eastern
11 Bosnia, meant Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde. Others meant only Srebrenica,
12 Zepa. I would not be able to be specific, to say absolutely categorically
13 it was Srebrenica that was said, or eastern Bosnia. At various times,
14 both were said.
15 Q. That's my point really, that eastern Bosnia encompasses a lot more
16 Srebrenica, doesn't it?
17 A. Yes, it does.
18 Q. It includes Gorazde?
19 A. In many people's minds, yes.
20 Q. You're not suggesting that at any point anyone told you that Oric
21 was a commander of Gorazde as well?
22 A. No.
23 Q. All right. Or Zepa?
24 A. We were unclear about that. In our minds, Zepa was the enclave of
25 Kamenica, Cerska, Srebrenica, and Zepa formed one area, whereas Gorazde
1 was definitely separate. Quite how -- whether the Bosniaks held
2 contiguous territory from Zepa to Srebrenica at that time, we weren't
4 Q. I was going to come to that when we look at the map which you
5 drew. You've heard the name Avdo Palic, have you not, who is the
6 commander of Zepa?
7 A. I would need to check my diary. I can't recall it now, sat here.
8 Q. And in your note of 5th, 6th March you say, "Naser was commander
9 of the Srebrenica pocket," rather than eastern Bosnia, I think it's
10 correct to say.
11 A. Yes. Sat here, that is what I would say after all of the meetings
12 that I had, is my belief.
13 Q. It's my suggestion which I put to you is that with time, the
14 impression which you at least are conveying of Colonel Oric in the
15 situation there has gone from one in which you knew of a person who was a
16 commander in a pocket, to a position where today you seem to be more
17 confident in expressing the opinion that he was commander in a much more
18 organised sense of a larger area.
19 Now would you accept that the former is the case? It was an
20 organised structure in Srebrenica, firstly?
21 A. No. I would not maintain that -- would it be appropriate for me
22 to, to explain what my beliefs were? I can't prove them, but I can say
23 what my beliefs were.
24 Q. Well, we'll come to your beliefs --
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. -- by another route. I wouldn't want to invite a general
2 expression of beliefs just like that.
3 Now, on the subject of your meeting with Naser Oric in Konjevic
4 Polje, didn't Naser Oric also make requests of Morillon and the United
5 Nations, in other words it wasn't just one way, including a cease-fire,
6 including humanitarian aid, but most importantly a request for the UN to
7 station peacekeepers on the access points over the Drina?
8 A. Yes, yes, he did specifically request that. I believe it is in my
9 diary and...
10 Q. Basically to deploy UN monitors on the borders of the state,
11 the sovereign state of RBH to prevent foreign aggression from Serbia?
12 A. Yes. That was his concern because he had told us about forces,
13 Serb forces coming across the Drina from Serbia proper.
14 Q. Do you accept General Morillon never made any serious attempt to
15 address that request?
16 A. What General Morillon tried to address was step 1, which was to
17 get UNMOs into the pocket. Where they would be stationed was step two.
18 Q. You agree, do you, from what you knew of that period and from what
19 you have told us of the Serbs calling the shots, they never would have
20 countenanced United Nations observers on bridges into Serbia?
21 A. We never tested it, but your speculation I would share.
22 Q. Now, skipping ahead for a moment, as we discussed, General
23 Morillon was in Konjevic Polje. After he left there were shellings and
24 people were killed and injured. When your party were in Srebrenica, women
25 among others blocked your path so you couldn't leave. That's been
1 presented during your examination-in-chief as a hostage scenario. I want
2 to put a different scenario to you, which is that the people in
3 Srebrenica, women and displaced persons, had heard of Morillon's comments
4 broadcast around the world about Cerska, that he had -- that he had been
5 there and that he hadn't smelt the odour of death. And that they were
6 revolted by that. And they feared that Morillon would also downplay the
7 appalling situation in Srebrenica. Is that something, firstly, which you
8 would accept?
9 A. I would be very surprised if any of the refugees in Srebrenica had
10 had access to any radios and indeed any communication whatsoever.
11 Q. Do you accept, though, that because their lives depended on it in
12 a way, they tried to keep him there long enough so that he would broadcast
13 to the world the reality of the situation in Srebrenica, which the world
14 did not know about and which the Serbs didn't want the world to know
15 about, so that that would then be broadcast and people would know?
16 A. Yes, I believe that.
17 Q. Once he made the broadcast, or made the broadcast as you
18 described, isn't it true he in fact he and your team were free to move
19 around the enclave and in fact free to leave, after a certain period of
21 A. Yes. But the point was always made that we had to leave someone
22 in Srebrenica.
23 Q. Do you accept that your captivity lasted for, say, no more than
24 say 24 hours, if that?
25 A. I would -- I would be reluctant to call it captivity. I would
1 call it "very strongly encouraged to stay in one place." For example, our
2 weapons were never taken away from us.
3 Q. You've seen in Larry Hollingsworth's book the reference to
4 semantics. Would you have done the same as these women if you had been in
5 their position?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Now, I want to go back to the document which we saw a moment ago
8 which was given an exhibit number, and I don't think we need to go into
9 private session, and I will quote from it.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: If in the interpretation there is reference to the
11 source of that document, then obviously we need to go into private
13 MR. JONES: Yes. There is no reference to the source.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Then go ahead, Mr. Jones.
15 MR. JONES: Okay. It is -- well, to a certain extent there is a
16 reference to the source.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: So let's play it safe. We'll go into private
19 [Private session]
11 Page 6103 redacted. Private session.
1 [Open session]
2 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session. Thank you.
3 MR. JONES:
4 Q. But later you said on the 17th of March, that Oric was deeply
5 depressed and downcast.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And the military situation in the enclave was deteriorating all
8 the time, wasn't it, while you were there?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. So the situation was even worse on the 21st of March 1993, would
11 you agree?
12 A. It was getting worse every day. Serb attacks were continuing
14 Q. Now, I think you said that it was at the meeting on the 17th of
15 March, 1993 - correct me if I'm wrong - that Oric said something about his
16 men going beyond what was necessary and you said "killing ten people when
17 five people would do."
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. First, this was translated from Serbo-Croatian, wasn't it, so you
20 don't know --
21 A. Correct. It was Mihailov who was doing the translating.
22 Q. So you don't know the exact words that were used.
23 A. No.
24 Q. So it follows from that, doesn't it, you don't know whether he
25 said, when he said "his men," whether maybe he said "his people" went
1 beyond what's necessary, or something of that nature.
2 A. I think -- I think he was talking -- because he tended to refer to
3 "my people" rather than "my men," as in the English meaning of men as in
4 men, military soldiers.
5 Q. The "my people" could refer to Bosniaks firstly?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And it could include civilians?
8 A. It could.
9 Q. Nor do you know, do you, whether when he was talking about 10
10 people being killed, whether that referred to Serb soldiers being killed
11 as opposed to five Serb soldiers, or do you know?
12 A. It was Serbs. I specifically remember thinking at that time
13 does he mean soldiers, does he mean civilians? I wasn't sure.
14 Q. Now, you said that he had said "sadly," sadly this occurred.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. So I take it at the time -- even at this time when there was the
17 appalling offensive going on, he expressed regret at the loss of Serb
19 A. Yes, he was. He was not -- his whole demeanour was one of -- he
20 wished it were otherwise, and one of regret.
21 Q. Finally on this subject, as a military man, would you agree -- you
22 referred to discussion of the impracticality of taking prisoners, that
23 doesn't necessarily mean that every one of the enemy gets killed, you can
24 leave them an escape route, for example, if you can't take prisoners.
25 A. Yes. That's correct.
1 Q. Did you ever learn that that is what was done in Kravica in the
2 attack on the 7th of January, 1993? That an access was left for the Serbs
3 to flee towards the Drina?
4 A. I have no knowledge or no information on that.
5 Q. Now, going back to the 21st of March, 1993 and the hand-over of
6 the Serb prisoner, I just have one more clarification really on that. I
7 asked you yesterday about the presence of any members of the war
8 committee. I said,"Did you see any members present?" and you said "No."
9 May I take it from that that you don't --
10 A. Sir, I cannot remember. They may have been present. I can't
11 confirm one way or the other.
12 Q. That was the clarification I sought. Thank you. Now a couple of
13 final matters before the break. You were interviewed by the Prosecution
14 in relation to this case in late 2002, I believe.
15 A. That was for the Galic case.
16 Q. When were you first interviewed by the Prosecution in relation to
17 this case, if you recall?
18 A. In 2002. Yes, I think so. Yeah.
19 Q. And now, was that the first time you told anyone -- it just turned
20 out that way -- that it had been Oric whom you saw, whom you say you saw
21 on that day, the 21st of March, 1993?
22 A. I think that it's the first time I told anyone involved with this
23 court. I'd had no reason to talk about that. I had certainly mentioned
24 it, as I did many other things that had happened in Bosnia, to -- in
25 previous years, in conversation with former colleagues, et cetera.
1 Q. And when you referred to this, you were consulting your
2 recollection, rather than anything you wrote down contemporaneously?
3 A. That's right.
4 Q. Just dealing with being interviewed by the Prosecution, that was
5 nearly a decade after events, correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 MR. JONES: Your Honours, I see the time. It is slightly early
8 but we have a technical issue, which is -- I want to show a video and
9 because this is an e-court, it makes it more difficult.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Don't ask me how it works. I do have an indication
11 because I did the course, but ...
12 MR. JONES: We can solve it during the break.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: It is pretty easy and it's actually easier than in
14 the other booths -- other courtrooms. So we will have a break. 25
15 minutes, to be on the safe side. Thank you.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Good morning, Mr. Wubben.
19 MR. WUBBEN: Good morning, Your Honours. For the record, you
20 confirmed my name as lead counsel for the Prosecution. Not only I share
21 this bench, also Miss Sanja Bokulic is here, next to our case manager.
22 She's assistant case manager, and on short term project as whenever needed
23 for acting case manager.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you for that information, Mr. Wubben.
25 Yes, Mr. Jones.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MR. JONES: Right. Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. Now, just before the break, we were dealing with the 21st of March
3 again, briefly, 1993. Now, said that the person you saw step out of the
4 Mercedes was swaggering. Would it be right to say that is not consistent
5 with the behaviour of Oric which you had seen before then?
6 A. Yes. I was extremely surprised.
7 Q. And did part of your surprise come from the fact that, that he had
8 been downcast the last time you had seen him and the situation certainly
9 hadn't improved since then?
10 A. Yes. That is correct.
11 MR. JONES: Now, for a variety of purposes, we want to show a
12 little video clip but part of it is to observe the demeanour of Naser
13 Oric. And by way of introduction, the video we're going to show, it's
14 P427 we're going to show an extract of. And it's of Konjevic Polje on the
15 6th of March, and so we will also see some of the people, hopefully, in
16 the video, possibly including yourself. That remains to be verified.
17 And the starting point, we're going to start at 30, so, yes, if
18 the video could be played, please. And we want to check, of course, that
19 the witness can see. There is no sound.
20 [Videotape played]
21 MR. JONES:
22 Q. Do you have an image in front of you?
23 A. I now do.
24 Q. Right. Okay, we can just play it and -- now, that's the APC of
25 the British soldiers?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Do you know who that tall man in the foreground is? Can you stop
3 for a second.
4 A. In the blue UN helmet?
5 Q. His back to us.
6 A. His back? Not entirely sure. I see what -- actually, he has his
7 back to us.
8 Q. Is it right -- is -- I'm not saying that that is
9 Major Alan Abraham, but there was a tall --
10 A. Major Alan Abraham was a tall -- a tall British major. He was the
11 commander of the unit whose armoured vehicles we had.
12 Q. His nickname was "The Draft," I believe?
13 A. I did not know that, but it does not surprise me.
14 Q. Do you recognise the person sitting there on the APC as a Mr. --
15 major, or captain at the time, Sterrenberg [phoen]; do you know --
16 A. Yes, I know the name, but the picture is not distinct enough for
17 me to be able to confirm that that is who I remember it as.
18 Q. We will play on, if you recognise anyone as we go along, then
19 please say.
20 A. Yes.
21 [Videotape played]
22 A. My screen is blank.
23 Q. Will you pause. Right. That's a problem.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Usher, please.
25 THE WITNESS: From when you spoke, I did not see any -- any
1 pictures. I now have a still.
2 MR. JONES: Okay. We can carry on, then.
3 [Videotape played]
4 MR. JONES:
5 Q. Do you recognise that person?
6 A. Yes, I did recognise that as obviously Morillon.
7 Q. And is that --
8 A. That's Mihailov.
9 Q. And that's you, isn't it, there, indicating?
10 A. Yes, yes, that's myself on the right. And that's Mihailov behind
12 Q. And this is Morillon meeting with the people in Konjevic Polje on
13 the 6th of March, 1993?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Do you recognise the person who General Morillon is speaking to?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Would the name Senso Sahilovic [phoen] mean anything to you?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Now I'm just going to play this a bit longer because I want to ask
20 if you recognise this gentleman who has just come into the screen with a
21 yellow hood.
22 A. At the bottom?
23 Q. Yes. Bottom right. Of course his back is to us, but I --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- I suggest it is our client, Naser Oric. And we can establish
1 that from other sections of this video, but if you --
2 A. Yes, he's got -- he's got the beard, certainly, that he had, that
3 I recollect.
4 [Videotape played]
5 MR. JONES:
6 Q. Part of the reason why I'm asking you to look at this clip, is
7 that -- there we go --
8 A. Yes. That is more like it, yes.
9 Q. Is that, would you agree, in this scene, there is no prima
10 donna-ism, if I can put it that way, on his part, he is simply standing
11 there behind other people, listening to what is going on?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Then that's the --
14 A. That's my --
15 Q. That's him departing from Konjevic Polje?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Is that Major Sterrenberg on the right?
18 A. You mean getting into the vehicle or do you mean in the --
19 Q. In the camouflage.
20 A. -- in the camouflage? I would need to rewind the clip.
21 Q. That's not terribly important.
22 A. That's Mihailov looking straight at you.
23 Q. Thank you very much. We can stop the video there.
24 Now, at the first meeting with Naser Oric in Konjevic Polje, there
25 were men there whom you said you could tell from what they said and from
1 their body language, that they were, subordinates of Oric or something of
2 that nature.
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Firstly, obviously you couldn't understand what was said, could
5 you, because you didn't understand --
6 A. No. I could never understand what was said.
7 Q. Secondly, I'm obviously not going to ask you to reenact the body
8 language from which you inferred this relationship, but I take it they
9 weren't fawning or bowing to Oric or anything like that?
10 A. No. To me, it seemed, if you will pardon my expression, a very
11 professional set up.
12 Q. Would you accept that inferences about superior-subordinate
13 relationships based on body language is somewhat flimsy?
14 A. No. I wouldn't say they're flimsy. I would say that they were
15 proper. I mean, when I say there was a superior-subordinate relationship,
16 it was an entirely proper relationship. There wasn't any threatening or
17 angry shouting. But it was -- it was profession -- it looked
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. And competent.
21 Q. Right. Thank you. And I take it you would accept that any
22 inferences about superior-subordinate relationships based on body language
23 would be confined simply to those half a dozen individuals that --
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Now just a couple of more questions on the topic of your first
1 arrival in Srebrenica. You said that the people, the authorities in
2 Sarajevo said they would contact the people in Srebrenica to alert them of
3 your arrival. Isn't it also true that Mihailov, as you drove slowly into
4 the enclave was shouting and waving a UN flag?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. And isn't it true that that could very easily alert the local
7 fighters to your arrival?
8 A. That was the whole intention.
9 Q. You said that the people you met were, I think you said were
10 Oric's men because they took you to him. I put it to you that actually
11 the most you can say, from those observations, is that you were met by
12 some people who took you to Oric. Not that they were his men,
14 A. Yes. You are correct.
15 Q. Now, I mentioned we would turn back to this map with the lines
16 that you drew. Did you personally draw the lines?
17 A. Yes, I did.
18 Q. Right. So if the witness could be shown P511, which is the map.
19 And while that is being --
20 A. I drew those lines on Sunday. In other words, a couple of days
22 Q. And your evidence was that this map represents the position in
23 terms of confrontation lines, et cetera, in early February 1993.
24 A. No. It represents what our belief was. Whether it was accurate
25 is, of course, a different issue, because we didn't have troops -- UN
1 troops on the ground with which to confirm one way or the other.
2 Q. Right. Well I'm going to suggest to you a number of ways in which
3 it is inaccurate and it is not a criticism, obviously, but it is to have
4 an accurate map. If it could be placed on the ELMO, it is probably
5 easiest. Actually, may I make a suggestion a belated suggestion. I
6 folded the map in such a way that maybe it would be easier to put it on
7 the ELMO. At any rate that is the way I would do it, which you have done
8 already. Thank you.
9 Now, firstly, this map does tend to suggest that at that time the
10 enclaves of Zepa, Srebrenica, Cerska and Kamenica are all part of a
11 contiguous Bosniak-held territory. I put it to you that that is simply
12 wrong for a number of reasons. Firstly, if you see -- do you see
13 Podravanje, almost exactly between Srebrenica and Zepa? There is a
14 cross --
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 Q. I would suggest and you may or may not be able to help us with
17 that, but there were Serb lines in the Jilay [phoen] -- you also see Jilay
18 a bit further on - the Jilay-Podravno area.
19 A. Yes, I see it.
20 Q. Any Bosniak trying to walk between Zepa and Srebrenica ran a grave
21 risk of being killed in a Serb ambush. Is that something you could help
22 us with?
23 A. We believed that it was possible to walk between these places, but
24 that there were patrols or forces from both sides who moved in the areas,
25 and it was certainly not free passage, but behind a secure front line.
1 That was our understanding at the time. And in fact, Murat Effendic, one
2 of the things we asked him about was, just how did you move that? What is
3 possible? And that was one of the things he described to us.
4 Q. Did he describe it to you, though, as a dangerous passage?
5 A. Yes, he did. He said, you would -- you were never quite sure who
6 would appear around the next corner.
7 Q. Thank you. You see Milici, which on this map, following up from
8 that road where we saw Podravanje, Jilay, Milici?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. I suggest to you that that was a town which was completely in Serb
11 hands in February 1993. Again, is that something which you can help us
12 with, or do you maintain that it was Bosniak?
13 A. No. I can't confirm whether it was or was not. The data points
14 that we had were that Kamenica was in Bosniak hands, Cerska was in Bosniak
15 hands, Zepa was in Bosniak hands, Srebrenica was in Bosniak hands. From
16 the description of -- sorry, Konjevici we obviously knew was in Bosniak
17 hands. And from descriptions that we had from people like Murat Effendic,
18 from the mayor of Gorazde, et cetera, was that broadly speaking that was
19 what was held. But what I have drawn here is based upon the main towns
20 that I have just described to you.
21 The fact that the line here goes this side of the village or that
22 side, I cannot comment whether Milici was held by Bosniaks in the end of
23 January then captured by the Serbs. I just don't know. It's not my --
24 not my ability to provide information.
25 Q. Right. Well, on this map, as part of the key, you have a circled
1 green as a significant location.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. I take it, or may I take it from what you've said, that another
4 way of seeing that is that those circles around Zepa, Srebrenica, Cerska,
5 Kamenica, means that those areas were certainly in Bosniak hands?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. But as for the rest of it, you really weren't so sure as to where
8 confrontation -- confrontation lines went, where there were risks of
9 ambushes by enemy forces and that sort of thing.
10 A. No. I would even -- whereas there was a confrontation line here,
11 in other words a front line which was held and there were guards and so
12 on, there was -- my understanding was there was no real confrontation line
13 around Srebrenica. The only place where there was an analogous
14 confrontation line was in this area here, between Bratunac and Potocari.
15 There may have been elsewhere, but in all of these other areas there was
16 no front line. There was just steeply -- steeply mound -- steeply wooded
17 hills, mountains, and very small numbers of people.
18 So anyone who wished to infiltrate in any direction could do so,
19 probably at -- obviously at some risk, but there was no guarded front
20 line, was my understanding.
21 Q. Right. So as far as this map is concerned, when we see this thick
22 red line going around Zepa, Srebrenica, Kamenica and Cerska, I take it
23 then that we should not understand that to be a solid contiguous Bosniak
25 A. Absolutely not. Absolutely not.
1 Q. Thank you. And in fact, just staying with that map for a moment,
2 we see Osmace there, south of Zeleni Jadar.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. That was mentioned, that location was mentioned in your diary a
5 lot, wasn't it --
6 A. Yes, that's right.
7 Q. -- in the context of shellings and bombings by --
8 A. Yes. The UNMOs went down from Srebrenica on quite a few occasions
9 to observe what was going on in that area, and there quite few references
10 in my diary that we have already discussed.
11 Q. Finally, I would put it to you that Sase at this time too was in
12 Serb hands even though it appears to be in Bosniak territory?
13 A. Sorry, where is Sase?
14 Q. Sase is towards the east, towards the Drina from Srebrenica.
15 A. Yes, it may well be. Bear in mind that what I was trying to
16 depict here was the beginning of February and whereas the time of my diary
17 and my time in Srebrenica was obviously in March, by which time the Serb
18 offensive had been going on for quite some time.
19 Q. Yes. In fact, with the Serb offensive the enclave shrunk to next
20 to nothing in a matter of a few weeks, didn't it?
21 A. Yes. It shrank, my understanding is, to literally just around
22 here, by the 25th or so of March.
23 Q. Finally, on Gorazde, you depicted these dotted lines to suggest
24 some movement between the Gorazde enclave, but I would suggest, and tell
25 me if you agree, that Gorazde was a completely different enclave.
1 A. It was, indeed. By movement what I mean is nighttime
2 infiltration, at risk. Not just walk up the high street. It's absolutely
3 not the latter.
4 Q. If a few adventurous souls managed to clamber through the hills
5 and get there.
6 A. Very brave and courageous souls.
7 Q. Thank you. I have finished with this map, thank you very much for
8 those clarifications.
9 With the usher's assistance I would like to move to the next
10 exhibit. My information is -- well there is no ERN number, certainly no R
11 prefix, so we needn't go into closed session. This is a statement by
12 Sadako Ogata the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, dated --
13 JUDGE AGIUS: This is a document which has been supplied to you by
14 the Prosecution or is it a document that you acquired yourselves?
15 MR. JONES: In fact, Your Honour, you can see from the footer that
16 it's in the public domain, available from the Internet.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Oh, I see. All right. So we don't have any
18 problems with this possibly being classified by Rule 70. So let's
19 proceed, Mr. Jones.
20 MR. JONES: Yes. It's a statement to the United Nations Security
21 Council on the 11th of March, 1993. Now, page 2 and 3 of this document
22 deal with the situation in Srebrenica. If I could just direct your
23 attention to the last paragraph on page 2, firstly: "My biggest concern
24 remains the government-held enclaves in Eastern Bosnia where access has
25 not only been hampered and delayed but in many instances has been denied
1 altogether. I've been increasingly disturbed by the prohibition of relief
2 as a weapon of war, and of ethnic cleansing. The creation of yet another
3 fait accompli."
4 Now you've confirmed, haven't you, that your opinion was the Serbs
5 were using starvation as a weapon of war against the enclaves?
6 A. Absolutely.
7 MR. JONES: I would simply ask for a defence exhibit number for
8 this document.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: This will be given defence exhibit number D215 --
10 225. It will be kept in the record in the normal way. It is not under
12 MR. JONES: No, indeed. Sorry, we have another exhibit which is
13 going to be passed up. This, too -- this has - I stand to be corrected by
14 the Prosecution - it has an R prefix, but I received from the Prosecution
15 a list or our list with "okays" next to various entries and I understand
16 this one is one of the ones that has been cleared.
17 MR. DI FAZIO: Could I have a moment, please.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Can you verify this, Mr. Di Fazio, please, because
19 it is important, before we proceed. It's the document which has, as the
20 last four digits, 46762, 6762.
21 MR. JONES: If it assists, I have copies.
22 MR. DI FAZIO: No problems with that. Thank you.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: So we can proceed in open session for this document,
24 Mr. Jones.
25 MR. JONES: Thank you. And I am obliged to my learned friends for
1 that confirmation.
2 Q. Now this, firstly, is signed by Ronnie Denyft.
3 A. Denyft.
4 Q. Denyft. I always have problems pronouncing his name. He was the
5 Belgian UNMO.
6 A. He was SMO North, senior military observer north, who was the
7 senior UN military observer in the north-eastern section of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina and he was based in the hotel just north of Zvornik.
9 He had a headquarters there.
10 Q. Okay. And this is -- it's undated but it must be between, I would
11 suggest between the 14th and 17th of March, 1993. Because those dates
13 A. My recollection is that he left Srebrenica shortly after the
14 General's declaration that he would stay and that he came back in again,
15 into Srebrenica, a number of days later.
16 Q. So this is a special report on a situation in the Srebrenica area,
17 signed by that gentleman. And the ERN is R004762 to R004761.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: It's a regressive mode of numbering the pages.
19 MR. JONES:
20 Q. Yes. I have three questions on this document. Firstly, paragraph
21 7, if you see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. There's a reference to UNMOs seeing airplanes from Serbia coming
24 and bombing Muslim villages on the 13th of March, 1993. Can you confirm
1 A. Yes. Those are the things we were talking about yesterday and you
2 asked me about those entries in my diary where I had recorded those
4 Q. Then the general situation is set out in paragraph 10. This
5 confirms, doesn't it, what you told us?
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, usher, could we place it on the ELMO, please.
7 MR. JONES:
8 Q. Yes. This paragraph, if you can have a look at it, confirms what
9 you told us, that very large numbers of people were living out in the
10 streets in temperatures of up to minus 20, burning plastic buckets for
12 A. Yes. That is correct.
13 Q. Do you agree that in this document there is no mention of Naser
14 Oric, firstly.
15 A. That would be correct, because when Major Denyft left the pocket,
16 we had not yet met Colonel Oric in Srebrenica itself. Our only meeting
17 with him was the one at Konjevic Polje a number of days previously.
18 Q. Right. And in that paragraph, however, we do see the military
19 commander tries to do something but he is helpless. And that was echoed
20 in your diary entry at 3442, I think it was?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Local commander appears helpless. Is that the same local military
23 commander of the town of Srebrenica?
24 A. Yes. That's -- that is who I was referring to and I assume that
25 that must be who Major Denyft was referring to.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. You don't recall that person's name?
2 A. No, to be honest.
3 Q. I would ask simply for an exhibit number for that document?
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. This will be given defence exhibit number
6 MR. JONES:
7 Q. Thank you, Your Honour. Now the next exhibit which we have -- in
8 fact we understand it hasn't been cleared, so we need to move briefly into
9 private session.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, can I see it first, please.
11 MR. JONES: It is R0046756. If it has been cleared in the
12 meantime --
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I said I am going to see it first. In the
14 meantime I expect Mr. Di Fazio to check properly.
15 MR. DI FAZIO: That's one of the problematical ones.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I see why. Let's go into private session for
17 a couple of minutes.
18 [Private session]
14 [Open session]
15 THE REGISTRAR: Open --
16 JUDGE AGIUS: As long as you don't identify, from your reading the
17 author of this -- if you mean to identify the author, obviously we need to
18 go into private session again.
19 MR. JONES: It's one question and then we can move into open
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, okay. So do -- you have authorisation to read
22 the part that you meant to ask the witness about?
23 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes, I know we're in open session. Go ahead,
25 Mr. Jones.
1 MR. JONES:
2 Q. I can -- we're in open session and I am permitted to read that
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Provided you do not read beyond that in a
5 manner which would expose or reveal the identity of the author of -- of
6 that letter.
7 MR. JONES:
8 Q. Okay. Well, the quote is: "here around me there are thousands of
9 children in great danger of starving to death unless road and air convoys
10 are able to get here."
11 Now, is it right that that was a message sent out -- I won't say
12 by whom, but by the person whom we've seen in the document on the 13th, I
13 believe the 13th of March, 1993?
14 A. Yes. And that text is all in my note -- in my diary.
15 Q. Thank you. So this would be a question of assigning an exhibit
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. This document is being tendered by the defence
18 and is being admitted and marked as Defence exhibit D227.
19 MR. JONES:
20 Q. Thank you Your Honour. I just have a few more exhibits to tender.
21 With the Usher's assistance, the next exhibit, again, has no "R" prefix so
22 I assume it's -- it's okay. It's a document from the headquarters, Bosnia
23 command, of 18th of March, 1993.
24 Firstly, this was sent --
25 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, before we proceed. Mr. Di Fazio, since
1 this is not any different from some of the other documents that were
2 classified or covered with confidentiality.
3 MR. DI FAZIO: That's right.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Could you please check?
5 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes. Can you just give me a moment. Thank you.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I apologise to you, Mr. Jones. Before we
7 proceed, I think we need to clear this.
8 Incidentally, while Mr. Di Fazio is checking, making his
9 verifications, the previous document D227 will be kept under seal for the
10 time being until we get the clearance to make it public.
11 MR. JONES: Yes, thank you. If it assists the Prosecution I can
12 provide information that this was received 23 -- received by us on the
13 17th of December, 2003.
14 MR. DI FAZIO: That's correct. I think that that's the bunch that
15 is causing us these difficulties.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: I asked you to verify, Mr. Di Fazio, first of all,
17 because I think it is my responsibility to make -- to ensure that rule 77
18 is observed. And, secondly, because if you have a glance at the B/C/S
19 translation of the document, at the top-right corner.
20 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: You see, clearly, an "R" right in front of the ERN
23 MR. DI FAZIO: Yes.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: So I take it that that document also is covered by
25 the confidentiality bond that is covered by rule 70.
1 MR. DI FAZIO: That's right. I don't think there is any doubt
2 about that.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: That's what I think too, but it is my duty to raise
5 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours please, I suggest that we go into
6 private session while we deal with this document and we will, of course,
7 make the same enquiry with respect to this one that we will in respect of
8 all of the others.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
10 MR. DI FAZIO: That's the safe course.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So all right, Mr. Di Fazio.
12 Mr. Jones, did you get the message?
13 MR. JONES: I did. I will be able to deal with this document
14 briefly, but I wonder, I might mention at this moment, that the next
15 document has the ERN R0122481 and my information is that that has been
16 cleared but it seems worth it to mention that now.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Now that you have mentioned it, I think the
18 Prosecution team can verify that.
19 MR. DI FAZIO: I can. That's cleared, but it's just this one
21 JUDGE AGIUS: This one isn't as yet. So let's go into private
22 session again for a minute or so.
23 [Private session]
11 Page 6129 redacted. Private session.
3 [Open session]
4 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Jones.
6 MR. JONES:
7 Q. Yes. In that meeting with General Morillon and Naser Oric, didn't
8 he in fact, on this same theme, talk not just about fighting to the bitter
9 end but of dying with his people?
10 A. Yes. He talked of many things. In fact, that meeting was, to the
11 day, 12 years ago.
12 MR. DI FAZIO: Have we given an exhibit number to the document?
13 MR. JONES: No.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: We haven't as yet, Mr. Di Fazio.
15 MR. JONES:
16 Q. At that meeting then, 12 years ago to the day, Naser Oric had
17 resigned himself to dying in the near future?
18 A. He was not somebody who gave the impression of someone who would
19 give up. He never gave us the impression that he thought he was going to
20 die. He was always going to keep going, keep trying. I think you
21 understand what I mean.
22 Q. Yes. Thank you.
23 MR. JONES: So, yes, I will ask for an exhibit number for this.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. This document, which will be kept under seal
25 for the time being is being tendered as a defence document and is being
1 marked as D228.
2 MR. JONES:
3 Q. Now, the next document we've received the information just now
4 that that is okay and has been cleared, it's a fax from Mr. Leentjes of
5 the 20th of March, 1993. The ERN is R0122481 to R0122484. I would ask
6 you to look at the assessment. First, I will just read paragraph 8 into
7 the record.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Usher, could you put the document on the ELMO,
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Jones, may I ask you, the markings on this page,
11 both on the left -- to the left and to the right of paragraphs 8 and 9,
12 are those in the original or are those your work?
13 MR. JONES: They're not our work. That's been in the document as
14 we received it.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Can you confirm that, Mr. Di Fazio?
16 MR. DI FAZIO: It's in mine as well, if Your Honours please. I
17 can't tell you who made those markings.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: All right, okay. Thank you, let's proceed.
19 MR. JONES:
20 Q. Okay. Paragraph 8, and this is, is it not, the 20th of March,
22 A. Yes. The date, time group is 20, 2355, Alfa March.
23 Q. So: "The Serb attack on the Srebrenica enclave continues
24 unabated. Despite the recent success of General Morillon to get the
25 relief convoy into Srebrenica, the Serbs seem intent to continue this
1 offensive as part of a general aim to continue to capture areas which can
2 be taken at little cost. Currently, the Serbs are clearing up to four to
3 five villages per day. They have received a lot of support from across
4 the border in Serbia during this offensive. The Serbians have supported
5 the BSA, Bosnian Serb army, with artillery fire, aircraft bombers and
6 ammunition resupply convoys, as well as having allowed the Serbs to stage
7 from within Serbian borders to attack from the east and south of the
9 As far as your intelligence was concerned at the time, does that
10 accurately describe the military situation on that day?
11 A. It is entirely accurate, as far as I'm aware. The only one that I
12 cannot comment on is the and ammunition resupply convoys. I had no
13 information specifically of that specific element, but all the rest, yes.
14 Q. Thank you. Then paragraph 9 deals with the refugee situation.
15 And I will quote that: "This offensive is creating a refugee situation of
16 huge proportions. The number of refugees in the Srebrenica enclave is
17 assessed to be around 80.000. It is estimated that there are 20.000
18 refugees in Srebrenica alone, and an additional 20.000 in Zepa. The
19 condition of many of the refugees is very poor. There are an estimated
20 200 seriously wounded and an additional 100 less seriously wounded. A
21 death rate of 20 persons per day is reported. The pending massive medevac
22 to Tuzla or any other single location would create a severe problem
23 because of overcrowding in the city hospital there."
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the Defence please slow down.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Jones, I am being asked to intervene and
1 ask you to please slow down when you are reading.
2 MR. JONES: Yes.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
4 MR. JONES:
5 Q. All right. Does that accurately describe the refugee crisis as it
6 was on that day? The 20th of March, 1993?
7 A. Yes. Those were the numbers that Larry Hollingsworth had reported
8 and that are in my diary. The only thing that I cannot comment about is
9 the difficulties of overcrowding at the Tuzla hospital.
10 Q. In fact whose assessment was this?
11 A. This was headquarters, Bosnia-Herzegovina command in Kiseljak's
12 assessment. Colonel Leentjes would have drafted it. However it would
13 have been authorised by General Cordy-Simpson, in other words it was the
14 headquarters' collective assessment taking information from myself, which
15 I was providing over the radio, together with information that they gained
16 from other sources.
17 Q. Now I'm going to move on to the next page, paragraphs 10 and 11.
18 I will read them as slowly as I can. Paragraph 10 firstly. "If
19 Srebrenica falls then the refugees have little option but to move south
20 towards Zepa. As pressure from the diminishing enclave to the north
21 increases, refugees would then see Gorazde as their final haven. The
22 route there is a very tenuous corridor. It is a route used only in
23 extremis and only by fit persons. Of those refugees who attempt the
24 journey, only the very strongest would survive. The Serbs anyway are
25 unlikely to allowed unhindered passage to Gorazde as this enclave would
1 then represent a threat to the Serbs given its recent influx of refugees.
2 Moreover, refugees would arrive in Gorazde only to find conditions already
3 becoming quite harsh there also."
4 Now firstly, what is said about the journey to Gorazde is
5 consistent with what you told us in relation to the map just now?
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. And did you share, at the time, this very pessimistic forecast of
8 what is likely to happen if Srebrenica fell?
9 A. No. This is an assessment which is produced outside of my
10 knowledge. My own view, at that time, and my own view now, is that it
11 would be entirely unrealistic for refugees to be able to move from
12 Srebrenica to Zepa or Gorazde because refugees had been flooding in the
13 opposite direction into Srebrenica. For them to go back that way, they
14 would run straight into the Serbs who were attacking out behind them.
15 I think that Colonel Leentjes when he wrote that was not entirely
16 away quite how far the Serb front lines had advanced and I would -- I
17 personally believe it's entirely incredible that any refugees at all could
18 have reached Zepa or Gorazde from Srebrenica at that time.
19 Q. It would have been a journey of several days to Zepa, correct, at
20 that time, which only the fittest could --
21 A. Yes. That is if the Serbs had even allowed it to pass, and I
22 don't believe they would.
23 Q. Now the next paragraph, 11, finally. "If free passage (with
24 transport) cannot be arranged for the refugees in the Srebrenica pocket
25 within the next 7 to 14 days, indications are that the Serbs will carry
1 out a genocidal 'cleansing' of the entire enclave, resulting in the
2 potential death of up to 80.000 human beings. In any case, there is
3 little hope that current efforts to get the Serbs to halt their attack
4 will be successful. They are unlikely to stop this offensive until the
5 enclave is cleared one way or another."
6 Isn't it right, firstly, that even then -- this is -- we all know
7 what happened in July of 1995. This is 20 March, 1993. But there were
8 warnings then if Srebrenica fell the result would be genocide, i.e. huge
9 massacres of the Muslims there.
10 A. Yes. That was our nightmare as well and the reason -- the
11 indications, that came from the statements by the Serbs that they were
12 going to sort out the - I use "sort out" in inverted commas - the -- what
13 they called war criminals in the Srebrenica pocket.
14 Q. Did you ever hear the Bosniak expression "kad-tad," or at least
15 rather than in Serbian, "kad-tad," meaning one day we'll get our moment to
16 recover --
17 A. No. Not in the way you just described it. Because I wasn't
18 following the Serbo-Croat in conversations. What I did pick up time and
19 time again from Mihailov was revenge.
20 Q. I would like to ask for an exhibit number if it hasn't been given
21 yet to that document.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: No it hasn't been given an exhibit document yet,
23 Mr. Jones. This document is being tendered and admitted and it will
24 become Defence Exhibit D229.
25 MR. JONES: Thank you. In that regard I would like to read what
1 appears in your statement in the Galic case. And when speaking about the
2 Serb attacks in the enclave, gobbling up village by village, as you
3 described it, you said, and the reference is page 24 of that statement of
4 May, 2002.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: In your assessment, Mr. Jones, whether the witness
6 ought to be given a copy of his statement or not --
7 MR. JONES: Yes.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: -- if there is going to be any lengthy reference to
9 his statement, I suggest that he be given a copy.
10 MR. JONES: Yes. It is simply one sentence and, if the witness
11 agrees with that sentence, then I won't pursue it.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: But at any time, Colonel, if you would like to
13 have --
14 THE WITNESS: I understand, sir, thank you.
15 MR. JONES:
16 Q. And the ERN is 02192831, and it says: "The impression generated
17 amongst the civilian population was of a relentless unstoppable momentum
18 that could only end with eventual death of everyone inside the enclave."
19 A. That is my -- that is correct and that is my belief as to what the
20 situation was.
21 Q. Can you also confirm from what you gathered from conversations
22 with people in Srebrenica, that at that time, March 1993, they were
23 looking to Naser Oric as a sort of legend, as he's been described, to save
24 them from that appalling fate, if possible, if anyone could.
25 A. I need to place this in the context of the situation. The people
1 there, particularly the refugees, they believed they were going to die.
2 As I've described previously, it was not a question of "if," it was only a
3 question of when. Against that background, yes, there was this hero,
4 Naser Oric, but he had very few weapons, he had very few soldiers. The
5 Serbs had many weapons, the Serbs had many soldiers. They didn't believe
6 that he would actually be able to help them and defend them. But they
7 believed that he was doing his best.
8 Q. Now, would you agree, that -- well, you've described Oric as the
9 commander of this pocket, as being responsible for all of these people in
10 one form or another. The 27-year-old commander, that is a huge
11 responsibility to bear.
12 MR. DI FAZIO: Well, if Your Honours please, it's not a quibbling
13 matter, and the evidence of the witness, as I've understood it thus far,
14 is that he was the military commander in the area and I think the witness
15 has been at pains to make a distinction between civilian authorities and
16 military authorities.
17 Now, I have no problem, of course, with Mr. Jones eliciting
18 evidence of the image of the defendant during that time, of course I have
19 no problem with that, but we've got to be precise about what the witness
20 has said about the position of Mr. -- of Mr. Oric.
21 MR. JONES: May I respond? I'm happy to confine it to military
22 matters. We agree that the evidence is only that he was responsible for
23 military matters. I can simply -- I can put it much more simply --
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Except when you try to direct the witness to
25 distinguish between saying "my men" and "my people." But I suggest that
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 you try to restrict your questions to the military aspect or the military
2 role that your client was fulfilling at the time.
3 MR. JONES: Yes.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: The rest is a perfectly legitimate question and
5 please go ahead.
6 MR. JONES:
7 Q. If you confine your answer to the military aspects. As a military
8 commander, with this appalling possibility of the lines falling, the town
9 falling, and ensuing massacre, do you agree as a decorated military man,
10 that this is a terrible burden for a commander, certainly a young
11 commander to bear?
12 A. He was operating in the most adverse and most difficult of
13 circumstances and I cannot imagine having to operate in such
15 Q. You agree that would exert a terrible psychological pressure on
16 someone, from your military experience, to be in that situation?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Finally on this matter, in it's opening speech, the Prosecution
19 described Naser Oric as "a warlord drunk with power." Is that how Naser
20 Oric struck you in your dealings with him?
21 A. That is not how he occurred to us on the -- on any occasion, other
22 than that one occasion on the 21st, around the hand-over of the prisoner.
23 Q. Would that behavior, to the extent that if it was indeed Naser
24 Oric, in your opinion, could that be explained by the appalling
25 psychological pressure?
1 A. I am not in a position to sit in judgement over such things.
2 Q. All right. Thank you.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't think he is qualified either to --
4 MR. JONES: This is really based on his observation, but that's
5 fine, Your Honour.
6 I believe we've given an exhibit number, have we, to the last
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes.
9 MR. JONES: I lost track. So we have another exhibit now, which
10 again there is no R prefix.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Let me see it before. I want to make sure that --
12 MR. JONES: Yes, indeed.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: What is this?
14 MR. JONES: This is a document from -- well, perhaps I won't
15 mention the source.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I think I better see it first because I want
17 to make sure. Was this document given to you by the Prosecution,
18 Mr. Jones?
19 MR. JONES: It was provided to us by the author. By the source.
20 And he didn't place any restrictions on its use.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: So it is not a document that was provided to you by
22 the Prosecutor.
23 MR. JONES: No.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Unless you think that when it was given to you it
25 was covered with -- by confidentiality, then we can proceed.
1 MR. JONES: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Proceed.
3 MR. JONES:
4 Q. Now, this is a document from Dr. Simon Mardell of the World Health
5 Organisation, dated the 12th of April, 1993. Now, you obviously met
6 Dr. Simon Mardell?
7 A. I did.
8 Q. You're familiar with his, I will put it, very adventurous or
9 daring act of volunteering to walk into the enclave from Konjevic Polje to
10 see the situation in Srebrenica on your first visit to Konjevic Polje?
11 A. He was a brave and committed man.
12 Q. Would you also describe him as reliable and measured?
13 A. Yes, I would.
14 Q. Now, this report is about the appalling, I would suggest appalling
15 shelling suffered by Srebrenica on the 12th of April 1993. Again, this is
16 after you left the enclave, but there is a reason why I will be putting
17 this to you.
18 I will just read from the beginning: "Subject: Slaughter of
19 civilians in Srebrenica. The sitreps of Louie Gentille today at 1654 --"
20 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel please slow down when
22 MR. JONES: Sorry.
23 Q. "The sitreps of Louie Gentille today at 1654 and 1911 hours
24 describe appalling casualties from shelling of the densely packed town of
25 Srebrenica. If in his earlier report he is forced to use the phrase
1 'after a day of terror and horror,' we can only guess at the scenes later
2 which have led to a total of 56 dead and 73 seriously wounded."
3 Then further on he says: "With a population of around 60.000,
4 many of whom are displaced from what has previously been acknowledged as
5 ethnic cleansing, then the present situation can only be described as an
6 impending Holocaust." Then in the next paragraph he cautions, in a
7 sense, the Serbian people of what will follow if a genocide is perpetrated
8 by their leaders.
9 Do you see all of that?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. You're familiar with this -- this shelling on the 12th of April?
12 A. Yes, I read about it in the -- in the media. And Louie Gentille
13 is a UNHCR officer from the UNHCR Belgrade office.
14 Q. Just for the record, in the chapter from Larry Hollingsworth's
15 book at pages 215 to 216, he expresses in his hottest-part-of-hell speech
16 a similar sentiment to the one which you expressed for General Mladic in
17 his case for the army commander who ordered that shelling.
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. So would you agree from this document that Dr. Mardell, too,
20 appears to have feared in April 1993 that the Serbs would carry out a
21 genocide in Srebrenica?
22 A. I cannot comment about this document, as it was in April. However
23 when I spoke with Dr. Simon Mardell in Srebrenica around the 11th, 12th,
24 13th March, his opinions of -- then were the opinions which are reflected
25 in this document.
1 Q. Would it be fair to summarise the situation thus emerging from
2 these documents and from your intelligence, that the Bosniaks in
3 Srebrenica were and knew they were surrounded by deadly foe who could
4 easily reap death and destruction and was willing to do so?
5 A. And they fully expected him to do so.
6 Q. I would ask for an exhibit number for this document, please?
7 JUDGE AGIUS: This will become Defence Exhibit D230.
8 Q. We have just a few more exhibits now. The next one, again, there
9 is no "R" preface, but again perhaps Your Honour would like to see the
10 document first?
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. We have the same problem that we encountered
12 earlier on. It's true that in the English version there is no "R" number,
13 but in the B/C/S translation thereof, there is. So unless Mr. Di Fazio
14 announces that confidentiality has been lifted, we will need to treat this
15 document as we did with the others.
16 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: So let's go into private session for a while,
19 [Private session]
11 Page 6144 redacted. Private session.
3 [Open session]
4 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. I thank you, registrar. We are in open
6 session, Mr. Jones.
7 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. Isn't it also the case though that your radios were more modern,
9 more reliable, more secure, and in a great many ways far superior to the
10 equipment which you saw in the PTT building?
11 A. No. The equipment in the PTT building was more reliable and
12 was -- seemed to have better quality sound than the HF radios that we
13 used. The TACSAT radio was secure but it was very difficult to use
14 because you had to get up high on the mountain in order to be able to get
15 a shot on the satellite.
16 Q. Would you agree that the radio in the PTT building was only as
17 reliable as the generator --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- tied to the stream --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- which kept it going?
22 A. Yes. The comment a few days ago about the power of that radio, if
23 it had had full power -- full, normal electricity, that was a very
24 powerful, far, far more powerful than anything we had in our vehicles.
25 Their issue was they had very little electricity.
1 Q. Now going back to this, firstly, just on Major Dudley, did you
2 find, from your dealings with him, that he was generally a reliable source
3 of intelligence when you had opportunity to have independent verification?
4 A. Yes. He seemed reliable. He was -- no, I won't say anything
6 Q. Okay. And if I can deal with this document quite shortly. As far
7 as your report was concerned, isn't it right, from this, that on the 22nd
8 of March -- on the 22nd of March, 1993, you were reporting a relentless
9 Serb attack on the south-east of the pocket?
10 A. Yes. That information came from Major Dudley. It came from the
11 UNMOs - that's the Osmace direction - and it was reported to us by
12 Colonel Oric and it was reported to us by the members of the War
13 Presidency. We had no doubt about it.
14 Q. Now, you told us, I think yesterday, that it was on an occasion of
15 a meeting with the Serb commander that you saw, in his office when the
16 offensive started, and that was early February 1993?
17 A. Yes. That's correct that was Major Pandurevic's office, who --
18 Major Pandurevic is, in my view, of some considerable note. He seemed to
19 be General Mladic's right-hand man, in the area. And I described
20 previously that Mladic seemed to push Gvero forward instead of himself.
21 If we wanted to really know what Mladic was up to and wanted, it was:
22 What was Pandurevic doing. And in his office, there was this -- I wasn't
23 sure whether it was a tactical situation map or whether it was the plan,
24 but it showed the front line from the Serb perspective every two days or
25 so, starting from the 7th of February. And the deduction drawn from that
1 was that it was a record, or the plan, for the successive offensive
2 against the enclave to capture the enclave.
3 Q. So when one is dealing with this offensive in early 199 --
4 February, is it correct that it started - as far as you understand, as far
5 as you are able to gather - at the beginning of February 1993 and it went
6 right up to mid-April 1993 with the demilitarisation of the enclave; i.e.,
7 two months?
8 A. Yes. That is correct. And the indication from that map - but I
9 have no other source of confirming - was that the Serbs started that
10 attack and planned it to start on the 7th of April -- 7th of February,
12 Q. 3.
13 A. Sorry. 1993.
14 Q. You didn't ask Major Pandurevic about it at the time?
15 A. No. When he came back into the office, he saw that the map was on
16 the wall and he quickly pulled the curtain over it.
17 Q. Right.
18 MR. JONES: If I could have an exhibit number, please, for that?
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. This document is being tendered and received
20 and marked as Defence Exhibit D231.
21 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour. And we have another exhibit,
22 which I think we need -- we need to go through the same exercise again.
23 There is no ...
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Let me see it first to make sure.
25 MR. JONES: It's exactly the same story as for the last
1 document --.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Right, so --
3 MR. JONES: -- provided to us by the author.
4 MR. DI FAZIO: Well ...
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Let's go into private session. There is no
6 indication, because I don't have the B/C/S.
7 MR. DI FAZIO: I think Mr. Jones said it was provided by the
9 MR. JONES: Yes, that's correct. I don't think we need to go into
10 private session.
11 MR. DI FAZIO: If it's from someone other than us, there is
12 nothing we can do about it.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So we don't need to go into private
14 session for this. Let's proceed.
15 MR. JONES:
16 Q. Yes. Right. So if you could look at this document. And firstly
17 I would ask whether you agree that the date as stated there, 23rd of
18 February, 1993, in light of the fact that it deals with a summary of the
19 visit of 5 - 12 March 1993 is probably wrong.
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. So the main thing is it is a summary of that visit by Dr. Simon
22 Mardell to Konjevic Polje and Srebrenica.
23 A. He could only have provided this report after having been in
24 Srebrenica having walked into there from Konjevic Polje.
25 Q. And now, this is obviously a detailed report on the condition of
1 the medical facilities and the public health situation as seen by
2 Dr. Mardell in Srebrenica in March 1993.
3 Firstly, I would ask you to look at page 3, medical conditions in
4 the villages around Srebrenica. Second paragraph: "Many of the villages
5 have lice as well as scabies. Some patients are dying from pneumonia and
7 I would simply ask you this: Were you aware, from your time in
8 Srebrenica, of a general problem of lice infestation?
9 A. Yes, I was. It had been mentioned by a number of people. Larry
10 Hollingsworth also mentioned it. In fact, it's mentioned in his Merry
11 Christmas, Mr. Larry as well.
12 Q. That follows basically, doesn't it, from a mass of unwashed bodies
13 in close proximity. That's what happens.
14 A. Entirely to be expected, unfortunately.
15 Q. And I would also draw your attention to the following, on page 5.
16 It's paragraph 3, displaced people, it's a reference to different groups
17 of people. The bit which I am going to ask you about is the section which
18 reads: "This group of people exists on food they beg from neighbours or
19 steal from Serbian farms. Some families had members shot while attempting
20 the latter."
21 It's simply this: Are you aware, from your conversations with
22 people in Srebrenica, that Serbs were shooting displaced persons,
23 Bosniaks, when they went to try and steal food from Serb areas?
24 A. We had no knowledge of -- I've certainly not heard anywhere of
25 displaced people going and stealing food from Serbs.
1 It would have been very foolhardy for them to do so. But I have
2 no information that that happened.
3 Q. Okay, thank you.
4 MR. JONES: I would just ask for an exhibit number for this
6 JUDGE AGIUS: This document will become Defence Exhibit D232.
7 MR. JONES: Would Your Honours bear with me for one moment.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, certainly.
9 MR. JONES: All right. We have 'til 12:30, don't we, I think.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
11 MR. JONES: I think I can probably conclude before the break.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
13 MR. JONES:
14 Q. There are just a few final matters which I need to tie up with, so
15 if I am skipping around, you'll know why.
16 On the radio, again, in the PTT building, as far as you were
17 concerned, that was under the control of the war committee, wasn't it, or
18 the War Presidency?
19 A. Yes, completely.
20 Q. That's fine. In your prior statement, I believe it's in Galic,
21 you refer to the "propaganda machines of the Bosnian Serb side." Were you
22 -- first of all that's -- do you recall that?
23 A. Yes, yes, I do.
24 Q. You're aware - you were aware, weren't you, of a whole propaganda
25 war that was being waged at the same time as the military conflict?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Now, you heard or you referred to a story which you heard from the
3 Serbs that Bosniaks had actually captured part of the Serb territory;
4 i.e. --
5 A. Across the --
6 Q. Serbia.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Are you aware that that was a complete fabrication?
9 A. It is quite possible. It was simply reported in the international
10 media and we had no means of corroborating it or not.
11 Q. And the same would apply, wouldn't it, to claims by Dr. Karadzic,
12 Mladic and others that from late January until March - I can't remember
13 the exact figure, but it was thousands of Serb civilians killed?
14 A. There is a number they kept on referring to and it was either
15 1.260 or 1.360. It's in my diary somewhere.
16 Q. Did you form the opinion or have reason to believe that that was
17 part of the propaganda war, those sorts of allegations?
18 A. We believed it was entirely possible. We had no, no means of
19 corroborating that one way or the other. The only thing that we did know
20 was that there was a grave of about 50 people south of Zvornik which was
21 dug up. We were shown photographs of that, and SMO North in fact, Major
22 Denyft was taken there. Though, who was in it, as in the -- where the
23 bodies came from and who had put them, I was not in a position to comment.
24 Q. When you say "entirely possible," I take it you mean it was
25 entirely possible it was part of the propaganda war?
1 A. Yes. We were not in a position to know what the truth was.
2 Q. Isn't it right in your prior statement in the Galic case, I
3 believe that you stated that it was Serbian soldiers who were in that
4 grave. Is that right, that that is something which you --
5 A. That's what we were told.
6 Q. Okay. Now, we have two final exhibits -- or actually, no, four
7 final exhibits. The first two are completely open sources. It's the
8 report by the United Nations into the events surrounding the fall of
9 Srebrenica in July 1995.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: What's the relevance of that?
11 MR. JONES: It's extremely relevant, Your Honour. I will explain
12 in a few words, if Your Honour wishes. In July 1995 -- we know the events
13 of 1995. The United Nations later commissioned a report into the events,
14 and that report looked into the whole -- the whole history of the enclave
15 and of the propaganda campaign by the Serbs which I've referred to, and
16 the reason I want to get into this area is that I think it is perfectly
17 relevant and useful to Your Honours to know that there was constantly the
18 use of the pretext of raids from inside the enclave as an excuse to
19 prosecute the war effort by the Serbs.
20 I want to put to this witness that proposition.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, go ahead. Go ahead, Mr. Jones.
22 MR. JONES: Thank you.
23 Q. Yes, there are two documents. Just to explain: One is a report
24 on the report by the United Nations correspondent, Washington file. The
25 other is the actual report itself. I want to start just with one
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 paragraph from the report. It's paragraph 479. And I quote:
2 "Serbs repeatedly exaggerated the extent of the raids out of Srebrenica
3 --" "The Serbs repeatedly exaggerated extent of the raids out of
4 Srebrenica as a pretext for the prosecution of a central war aim to create
5 a geographically contiguous and ethnically pure territory along the Drina
6 while freeing up their troops to fight in other parts of the country. The
7 extent to which this pretext was accepted at face value by international
8 actors and observers reflected the prism of moral equivalency through
9 which the conflict in Bosnia was viewed by too many for too long."
10 My first question is, going back -- and we're dealing with early
11 1993, was your intelligence or was your understanding that Serbs wished to
12 eliminate the enclave so they could free up their troops elsewhere for use
13 elsewhere in the country?
14 A. It was our opinion that the Serbs desperately wanted to free up
15 troops because one thing, the one thing that the Bosniaks had was overall
16 numerical superiority and they had very, very long extended front lines,
17 confrontation lines. And they wished to free up -- or we believed that
18 the Serbs wished to free up the troops who were surrounding the enclave in
19 order to be able to redeploy those to other areas.
20 Q. So would you agree that this statement there about pretexts used
21 by the Serbs could equally apply to late 1992, early 1993?
22 A. What I can say is that we were in negotiations with all sides to
23 that conflict for many months and pretexts were used all the time.
24 We can observe that the vehemence and the anger with which the
25 pretext around Srebrenica were voiced - not by one or two people only but
1 by most of the Serbs we came in contact with - was of a different -- it
2 was more -- it was more angry. There is a difference.
3 Now, why there was a difference we were not in a position to be
4 able to confirm. We could certainly conceive of a number of military
5 reasons why they would want to clear the enclave. The one you mentioned,
6 shortening their lines, is one. Secondly, to prevent the continuous
7 attacks that were occurring on their road from Zvornik down through Han
8 Pijesak to Pale and Sarajevo is a -- is a second one. Sorry, is a second
9 military reason that we -- that the Serbs told us that that was one of the
10 things that they were very concerned about, as I gave in previous
12 Q. Right. Now, you were an international actor in this -- on this
13 scene and this is perhaps a personal question. But do you feel that in
14 your dealings you were guilty of viewing the conflict through a prism of
15 moral equivalency which was inappropriate in retrospect to the situation?
16 A. Were we there to try and save lives or to make political
17 statements? We tried to save lives and certainly I took that my task both
18 moral and the orders given to me by my government and passed through the
19 Security Council, were to try and save lives.
20 I was not in the game of making neither General Morillon, in the
21 game of making political statements or supporting any political
23 Q. Would you agree, and this relates to passage in the other exhibit,
24 that you were peacekeepers in a situation where there was a peace to keep?
25 A. Yes. We were under Section 6 of the UN Charter, not Section 7.
1 You're aware of the difference, are you?
2 Q. Sorry. Chapter or section?
3 A. Sorry. Chapter.
4 Q. Yes. Peacekeeping versus action by the Security Council.
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Yes. This Tribunal is a peacekeeping measure under Section 7.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Exactly. Do you want to tender this document,
8 Mr. Jones?
9 MR. JONES: Yes please.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document, which is an extract from the
11 report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
12 53/35 of 1998, Srebrenica Report, to wit: Paragraph 479 thereof, is being
13 tendered by the Defence and is being admitted and marked as Defence
14 Exhibit D232. -- Sorry, 233.
15 MR. JONES: Thank you
16 Q. Now, in this regard, I would like you to quickly what I'm calling
17 your new diary, the one you disclosed to us -- I'll pass the page up. It's
18 R017 --
19 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. What about the other five pages?
20 MR. JONES: Oh, I was treating them jointly. I would ask for an
21 exhibit number for that as well. I asked a question which related to page
22 2 of 5, which refers to keeping the peace where there is no peace to keep.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: I know you did. So this other document which is
24 a -- is it an article, this? I think so.
25 MR. JONES: Yes.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: An article authored by Judy Aita, with the
2 Washington file, United Nations -- Washington file, United Nations
3 correspondent. And which refers to the report on Srebrenica United
4 Nations fate and its failure to control evil. And apparently dated 11th
5 of -- 16th of November of 1999 and consisting of four pages, is being
6 tendered and -- by the Defence and marked as Defence Exhibit D234.
7 MR. JONES: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. Colonel, do you have your new diary, the diary which predates that
9 diary in front of you?
10 A. No. The original is back at my home.
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. JONES: I would ask if it could be handed to the witness in
13 this form simply because he might need to refer to earlier pages, but it
14 is the highlighted section which I want to ask about and it is, as I say,
15 R0170980, which is page 75. I think it refers to a meeting of the 8th of
16 February 1993 in Pale.
17 THE WITNESS: With Lukic.
18 Q. With Dr. Lukic, exactly. Is it right that General Morillon said
19 to him, in relation to Serb obstruction to aid going to Srebrenica, "Your
20 refusal to discuss aid to Srebrenica, et cetera shows that maybe those who
21 criticised our mandate were right."
22 A. Yes. Lukic was very hard line and completely inflexible.
23 Q. So is it right that yourselves, you and General Morillon, were
24 aware of criticisms of your mandate, even then?
25 A. Yes. Very aware. It came up in just about every interview that
1 journalists had with General Morillon from the end of October, 1992
3 Q. In that regard, if I could pass up the next exhibit, which is an
4 extract from a book by Martin Bell called "In Harm's Way" and it is page
5 -- pages 119 -- 191. My apologies are that there was some underlining
6 which was by me because it was my copy and I didn't have time to find
7 another copy.
8 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honour's please I just wonder if Mr. Jones
9 proposes to do anything with that diary entry.
10 MR. JONES: For the moment, I don't. For the simple reason I
11 don't want to tender the whole diary because I haven't had the time to
12 review its many pages. So I'm not tendering it.
13 MR. DI FAZIO: I understand Mr. Jones' position. I'm not pressing
14 for that but I just wanted to know what was going to happen.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: He didn't mention anything so I took it he didn't
16 want to.
17 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you.
18 MR. JONES:
19 Q. Thank you thank you. And yes, thank you, you can just return that
20 to me. Thank you.
21 Q. There was mention the other day of philosophical issues of
22 peacekeeping. I don't -- obviously this isn't the forum for that. But
23 simply in relation to the criticisms of the mandate as set out in your
24 diary, would that be reflected in the following passage which I will
25 read -- page 190: "A Bosnian army officer dismissed it scornfully as a
1 spoonful of aid so we can be healthier when we are hit by mortars and
2 grenades. They wanted guns but were getting feta cheese, and Medecins
3 Sans Frontieres asked: How can we think of passing food through the
4 window while doing nothing to drive the murderer from the house?
5 And then in fact the next sentence refers to General Morillon
6 coining the phrase [French spoken] "angelisme."
7 Do you recall General Morillon coining that phrase?
8 A. Yes. And I remember he had a couple of meetings with Martin Bell
9 and they discussed all of these sorts of issues.
10 Q. And finally, further down there is Dr. Alain -- I'm not sure if I
11 can pronounce his name, but the Secretary-General of Medecins Sans
12 Frontieres: "Humanitarianism has served as an alibi for political
13 impotence. It has never been further removed from what it asserts itself
14 to be: a significant gesture of fraternity and hope. When the accounts
15 are drawn up, when we finally know Bosnia's fate, humanitarianism will
16 find itself sitting in the dock with the accused, a companion to the
17 territorial conquest and ethnic cleansing, even to a certain extent making
18 them possible."
19 Would you agree that that is--
20 THE INTERPRETER: Can counsel please slow down for reading for
22 MR. JONES: My apologies yet again. Fortunately, I have finished
23 my reading for the day.
24 Q. Would you say that that reflect the sort of criticisms which
25 commentators were making of your mandate?
1 A. Yes, it reflects some of the criticisms. I have some opinions
2 about them, but this is not for -- not the time or place.
3 MR. JONES: I would ask for an exhibit number for this extract.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: So this will become D235.
5 MR. JONES: I notice it appears to have the autograph of Martin
6 Bell. I can't recall whether he signed it or not, but I won't ask the
7 witness to authenticate it even though it would make my copy even more
9 Q. Finally, you hadn't mentioned it yourself but I think it should go
10 into the record. You were in fact awarded the Military Cross, weren't
11 you, for your time in Bosnia, including serving in Srebrenica?
12 A. And in particular the 20th of March at the yellow bridge.
13 Q. You managed to prevent the Serbs crossing the bridge and entering
14 the enclave.
15 A. That was when General Morillon went out to go and get the convoy
16 and the Serbs took that as the yahoo moment: Now he's out of the way.
17 Now we can go in.
18 Q. Right.
19 MR. JONES: And we have a final exhibit which is the supplement to
20 the London Gazette, 12th of June, 1993. If that could be shown to the
22 Q. Just if you can once you receive it, confirm it is the citation
23 and that the matters referred to -- just for the record, really. That is
24 the Military Cross, which is, is it, the second highest order of gallantry
25 after the Victoria Cross?
1 A. That's correct.
2 MR. JONES: I would ask for that to have an exhibit number.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: This will be Defence Exhibit D236.
4 MR. JONES: I have no further questions, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Jones. I think we will now have a
6 30 minute break. Do you have a long re-examination, Mr. Di Fazio?
7 MR. DI FAZIO: I was just about to ask -- address you about that.
8 Not particularly long. There is a few issues that I need to raise. We
9 will -- I think 20 minutes or 25 minutes or so.
10 However -- however, I wonder if we could assume that we don't have
11 to call any other witnesses today, because that will definitely eat into
12 the second -- if Your Honours have questions as well, I don't --
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I mean -- I don't think -- I think we need to
14 talk sense, let's put it like that. Forget about another witness --
15 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: -- after all this. He would walk in and walk out.
17 MR. DI FAZIO: That's my point. So I thank you.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: So in any case, the next session has a maximum of
19 45 minutes of which you're taking 20 to 25. We will take another maybe
20 five or ten and then we will call it a day. Thank you.
21 --- Recess at 12.30 p.m.
22 --- Upon resuming at 1.00 p.m.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Di Fazio.
24 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you, Your Honours.
25 Re-examined by Mr. Di Fazio:
1 MR. DI FAZIO:
2 Q. Colonel Tucker, the last exhibit that was given to you
3 -- presented to you was D236. The publication in the London Gazette of
4 the award of the Military Cross to you. And it says, a part of it
5 says: "Every day Major Tucker would ensure that the main headquarters was
6 debriefed and the necessary staff taskings were then able to be given.
7 With such poor communications the whole of the United Nations command and
8 control could easily have broken down without his total dedication."
9 In order for you to ensure that the main headquarters was
10 debriefed and that the necessary staff taskings were able to be given in a
11 competent manner, was it necessary that your diary reflect as accurately
12 as possible what you had seen, what you heard and what had been reported
13 to you?
14 A. My diary was a means to an end. The end was the actual reports,
15 of which the court has seen a number of copies.
16 Q. Thank you. But my point is this: In order for your final reports
17 to fulfil this task for which you received the award, your diary had to
18 be, as far as you could make it, an honest and accurate reflection of
19 what --
20 A. Indeed.
21 Q. -- information. Thank you. I just want to ask you some questions
22 about the evidence that came out this morning, but perhaps before I get on
23 to issues that arose this morning, while we're still on the topic of the
24 diary, are you aware of your ever having made an inaccurate or dishonest
25 note in your diary, for whatever reason?
1 A. There were certainly occasions when I wrote in my diary
2 information which was given at the time, which I subsequently found to be
4 Q. Yes. That is one thing. I understand that. But your reporting
5 of what was the information that was given to you, as far as you're aware,
6 was accurate and honest, regardless of whether the source --
7 A. To the best of my ability.
8 Q. Thank you. If we can turn to your evidence from today. You were
9 asked questions about crowd control and it was suggested to you that it
10 was impossible to control crowds or at least very, very difficult. Your
11 answer was that it was perhaps possible with clear leadership.
12 The means of crowd control, were they available in the sense of
13 the presence of soldiers or police who were armed and able to marshal
14 crowds, were those means present in Srebrenica while you were there?
15 A. In Srebrenica, while I was there, I believe so, yes. What was
16 lacking was the ability or the will to use them.
17 Q. And does that comment apply in respect of the starving and
18 desperate refugees that you saw?
19 A. No. I'm talking about the soldiers. By soldiers, I mean people
20 who had weapons.
21 Q. Yes. You just told the Trial Chamber that you believe that the
22 means of crowd control was there, available, namely soldiers who were
23 armed. That is so, isn't it?
24 A. Soldiers and policemen. I could not, by looking at them, tell the
25 difference between a policeman and a soldier.
1 Q. I'm just talking about the means of crowd control. Just the means
2 of crowd control. And that crowd control, is it your opinion, from what
3 you saw and heard and observed, that means of crowd control could have
4 been applied had the leadership been there, had the will been there, the
5 determination been there to desperate people such as the starving refugees
6 that you saw?
7 A. Yes. And it's more than just there, then, at that particular
8 moment. It's if the refugees had been received and had been directed, to
9 accomodation, if food had been distributed, if the refugees had been shown
10 evidence of competence, they would have built up trust and it would have
11 been much easier. It was more than just physically having people there
12 then at that particular instant.
13 Q. Thank you. You were also asked some questions regarding the pouch
14 system for getting material out of the enclave. And you were asked some
15 questions about the journalist Mr. Birtley.
16 MR. JONES: Sorry. The non-existence of a pouch system. I think
17 that needs to be clear.
18 MR. DI FAZIO: Certainly. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to misquote
19 the evidence.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Correct. And thank you for the observation,
21 Mr. Jones. Thank you.
22 MR. DI FAZIO: Thank you.
23 Q. The absence of a pouch system. I think the thrust of your
24 evidence would be, would it not, that there was no formal system in
25 existence for getting documents and other material out of the enclave.
1 A. There was no formal system, but when requested, particularly by
2 the journalists, we did everything in our power to try and facilitate, to
3 make sure that that did get out.
4 Q. Thanks. When you were crossing the lines of confrontation from
5 Srebrenica into Serb --
6 A. Bratunac.
7 Q. Yes. In Bratunac and crossing from one area into an area held by
8 the opposing force, were you searched?
9 A. On two occasions we were searched. But that's two occasions out
10 of 30.
11 Q. And what was the extent of the search on those two occasions?
12 How intrusive of it?
13 A. The search on both occasions was a detailed search of the vehicle,
14 but never a search -- never a body search. So they got everything out of
15 the vehicle, put it out on the road, looked in every part of the vehicle,
16 looked inside our backpacks and briefcases, but they never body searched
18 Q. Thank you. You were also asked questions regarding the concept of
19 lever en masse, and you agreed that -- I haven't got the precise evidence
20 before me, but I think the thrust of it is that you agreed that it was a
21 -- that it is a spontaneous taking up of arms in the face of an
22 encroaching --
23 JUDGE AGIUS: He did not agree to that. In fact, he drew a
24 distinction between spontaneous and the meaning of lever et cetera, and he
25 explained the difference.
1 MR. DI FAZIO:
2 Q. Could you -- I'm sorry, would you be so kind as to reiterate your
4 A. The point being that "lever" means "raise" as opposed to
5 spontaneous call to arms. In other words, that there were people who were
6 required to go and fight as opposed to just purely being volunteers.
7 Q. And did that situation apply, as far as you could see, in
8 Srebrenica or not?
9 A. I was told that that situation pertained in Srebrenica.
10 Q. Thank you. You were cross-examined at length regarding the notion
11 of war crimes or allegations of war crimes on the part of the Serbs and
12 its use as a pretext for -- basically for aggression and for refusal to
14 And you agreed that that was a pretext that was used in 1992 and
15 1993. Does that, in any way, affect your opinion or your -- I won't say
16 opinion. Your evidence, both in examination-in-chief and again today,
17 that there was an altogether different quality that you detected on the
18 part of the Serb complaints regarding war crimes in that early part of
20 A. Two points. To start with, you said that I had agreed that the
21 Serb complaints about war crimes were a pretext. I did not say that.
22 What I said is that they could have been a pretext. I was not in a
23 position to confirm one way or the other. The first point.
24 The second one is that -- sorry. I must read back to --
25 Q. Certainly.
1 A. Yes. There was a different quality, a greater anger, a greater
2 fury on the side of the Serbs when they were referring to these
3 allegations of attacks on unarmed civilians around the Srebrenica area.
4 That did not mean that we were able to confirm whether or not they took
5 place. What I can say is that the level of heat, excitement and anger was
6 of a different level to that that's usually pertained when one side or the
7 other was making accusations about the other side.
8 Q. Thank you. You were asked if the -- if it was a Serb war aim to
9 eliminate the Srebrenica pocket in early February. And you answered that
10 was your opinion, I think based on intelligence and -- well, I can't
11 remember what it was based on but certainly you expressed the answer that
12 it was your opinion.
13 Had that been your opinion earlier in 1993 and in the latter part
14 of 1992?
15 A. No. It had been our opinion that up until, broadly speaking,
16 December, January -- sorry, December 1992, January 1993, the Serbs were
17 content - I use the word advisedly - to leave the enclaves as they were
18 and simply to -- and deny them food.
19 Q. Thank you. You -- I hope my note is accurate. I note that this
20 morning, in cross-examination, you were asked about the idea of keeping
21 peacekeepers on the Drina river, and I think you said that it was a
22 suggestion by Colonel Oric at the Konjevic Polje meeting that peacekeepers
23 be set up.
24 Now, first of all, is my note correct? I think that's what you
25 said this morning, isn't it?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Yes, okay. Can you recall how that topic arose, either on the 5th
3 or 6th of March, at that first initial meeting with Colonel Oric?
4 A. Colonel Oric had reported that Serb forces had been crossing -- or
5 forces had crossed from Serbia into Bosnia-Herzegovina by those routes,
6 and when General Morillon was talking about the concept of deploying UN
7 military observers in order to monitor a cease-fire, Colonel Oric made the
8 point, amongst other places, they particularly need to be there as well.
9 Q. Was that a useful suggestion, from your perspective?
10 A. It was a useful suggestion and a valid one. And had we been able
11 to deploy UNMOs in sufficient numbers, that certainly is one of the things
12 we would have tried to do, but it never got there.
13 Q. Given that he made that suggestion, is it the case that he was
14 fully engaged with you, willingly talking about the very idea of some sort
15 of demilitarisation or cease-fire - I don't know which - involving
17 A. My recollection is that, whereas Colonel Oric was in favour of
18 cease-fires, he was not and he absolutely rejected any notion of
19 demilitarisation or disarmament.
20 Q. Thank you. So it was the suggestion of -- his suggestion of
21 peacekeepers being located on the Drina River, made in the context of
22 cease-fire discussions.
23 A. That is correct; not of demilitarisation.
24 Q. Thank you. You were asked a number of questions regarding the
25 hostage situation -- well, I will use my -- I use that word advisedly. I
1 know that there are differing views about it.
2 The situation that you spoke about where your freedom of movement
3 was impeded. And I don't know if it was quoting from a document or
4 whether it was just put to you, but the notion that the refugees were
5 revolted by Morillon, General Morillon, not having smelt the odour of
6 death at Konjevic Polje may have led to their fears that you - I mean your
7 party - might downplay the situation in Srebrenica.
8 In the time that you were there and you were receiving information
9 from Mihailov, did you ever hear of that particular concern? Were you
10 aware of it?
11 A. No. Not at all. And I believe it incredible that the refugees in
12 Srebrenica at that time would have had access to radios and would have
13 even heard it. It was only the Tuzla authorities and the Bosniak Tuzla
14 authorities and Bosniaks in Sarajevo who were very angry with General
15 Morillon about that.
16 Within the enclave, that was never -- never mentioned or never
17 held against the General or raised in conversation or discussion with us.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 MR. JONES: Just for the record it was Cerska, the odour of death
20 statement, not Konjevic Polje.
21 MR. DI FAZIO: Sorry. My apologies. Thank you for that
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Once more, thank you, Mr. Jones, for your
24 observation. You were correct.
25 MR. DI FAZIO:
1 Q. You were asked if War Presidency or war committee members may have
2 been present at the -- on the occasion on the 21st of March where the
3 prisoner was released, and your evidence was you can't say if they were or
4 were not. Were there any in the vehicle that you were in, as you
5 travelled, from the point where the Mercedes turned up to the point where
6 you collected --
7 A. No. Definitely not. There were only UN personnel in the -- I was
8 in the armoured personnel carrier and General Morillon was in a Jeep.
9 Q. You were asked about various entries relating to the prisoner
10 during the course of your cross-examination, two entries in particular. I
11 don't need to take you to them. I just remind you that you were
12 cross-examined about the note the previous day and to the effect that
13 General Morillon is going to seek the release of Serb prisoners, and then
14 the following day, the 21st, that is in fact what happened.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Sorry. If Your Honours will just bear with me.
17 Yes, yes. And you have also testified in examination-in-chief
18 that there was a stretcher in the AP -- in the vehicle, whatever it was.
19 Was that stretcher there by arrangement?
20 A. No. It was a permanent piece of the equipment in that vehicle.
21 It was always there.
22 Q. Had General Morillon made arrangements to collect a prisoner and
23 transfer him to the Serbs, would there have been any reason that you are
24 aware of, that you know of or can think of, as to why you would not be
1 A. I don't particularly understand the question.
2 Q. Well, if General Morillon had made arrangements at some prior
3 stage, prior to the 21st, when the episode you spoke about occurred, to
4 collect and transfer a prisoner from within the enclave to Serb-held
5 territory, are you aware of any reason as to why you might not be informed
6 of such arrangements?
7 A. Not that I can think of.
8 Q. Thank you. I don't need to show you the document, but this
9 morning you were shown an Exhibit D -- which is now D224, 224. And in
10 effect, it's the -- you've seen the document this morning and it deals
11 with events at Konjevic Polje.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And there is reference throughout the document to "Nasar,"
14 N-A-S-A-R, often in inverted commas. And you were also asked questions
15 regarding your understanding of the name of the person that you were
16 speaking to at Konjevic Polje.
17 Can you enlighten as to why it is that you would have referred to
18 this person Nasar, in inverted commas, in that report? Is there any
19 reason that you can think of?
20 A. We weren't -- we weren't sure, as I said earlier, as to which was
21 his first name, which was his surname. Because when we were in Konjevic
22 Polje, the locals all referred to Naser, as opposed to Oric. And because
23 I think somebody made the comment that, well, surely, Naser doesn't end in
24 "ic," so again that is why we were puzzled. And we had only had the
25 intelligence briefings that I had referred to previously.
1 We had had the Serbs on a couple of occasions mention Colonel Oric
2 and we had the mention by the Presidency. So we were in no particular
3 doubt as to, broadly speaking, who this person was, but I wasn't sure
4 whether I was correctly referring to him by Naser or Oric, and ranks were
5 very -- on the Bosniak side, ranks were very loose.
6 Q. Thanks. Okay. I want to ask you about some questions that
7 were put to you on the 15th. That's two days ago. You were being asked
8 about, again, the situation, hostage situation or impeded movement
9 situation, call it what you will.
10 You were referred to an entry - again, I don't need to show it -
11 in your diary. It's at 3442. That's the ERN number, and the quote that
12 you were referred to was the quote that said, "Maybe Naser Oric could
14 A. Yes, I recall the entry.
15 Q. And this is the way the -- it went: "The sentence paragraph 5
16 'Maybe Naser Oric could help,' isn't that expression of your opinion or
17 whoever provided this information, that maybe -- that he could maybe help
18 with the problems you had with the -- you had with the women's committee?
19 "Yes, that is correct.
20 "So you certainly didn't consider that he was behind what the
21 women's committee was doing at that stage?"
22 And you answered: "Not at that stage."
23 You weren't asked if at any later stage you formed any other view,
24 and that's what I want to know.
25 A. We formed the opinion later that it was possible that -- sorry.
1 We knew that the women's committee and the refugees had been marshaled by
2 soldiers and there'd been whistles used to make the refugees surge forward
3 at -- at times, and this had been controlled by soldiers.
4 What we were not sure of at that time while we were at Srebrenica
5 of who was who had given the orders and the instructions to the soldiers
6 to behave like that. Was it the war committee? We were certain at the --
7 that Hajrudin was involved because he had -- his demeanour towards us. I
8 think I recorded in the meetings that morning -- had changed completely
9 and he wouldn't look us in the eyes any more. And so we believed that he
10 was implicated in some way.
11 We wondered whether, because these were soldiers who were
12 involved, whether Naser Oric might have been involved, but we had no
13 evidence one way or the other.
14 The only thing I would add is that after the war there was a
15 documentary, as there were many on Srebrenica, and I saw a documentary in
16 which Hajrudin Avdic was interviewed and in which he said that he received
17 instructions from Sarajevo to prevent General Morillon from leaving and to
18 keep him in Srebrenica.
19 Q. Thank you very much.
20 MR. DI FAZIO: If Your Honours just give me a moment, I may be
21 able to avoid a question.
22 Q. You were being asked questions regarding demilitarisation and the
23 attitude of Colonel Oric and it ended up with this question from Mr. Jones
24 and this answer from you.
25 Question: "But despite his opposition he was in fact overruled,
1 wasn't he? In the sense that there was a demilitarisation." And you
2 answered: "That happened after I left."
3 Now I think I know what you mean, but I want to be absolutely
4 clear. Are you saying that he was -- yes, he was in fact --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Would the counsel please speak into the
7 MR. DI FAZIO: Sorry. Are you saying that yes, in fact, he was
8 overruled on the issue of demilitarisation? Or are you saying that
9 happened after you left and you can't comment on it, you have no
10 information about the process of demilitarisation and his attitude towards
12 A. I can tell the court that in the conversation that he had with
13 General Morillon an on the 17th, he was adamantly opposed to anything to
14 do with demilitarisation. That I can confirm.
15 That demilitarisation of Srebrenica took place after I left, as a
16 matter of record.
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. Now the process which led to that demilitarisation, I'm obviously
19 not in a position to be able to comment on.
20 Q. That's what I was driving at. Thanks very much. Could I ask you
21 to remain outside the courtroom after you've finally left. I would like
22 to speak to you.
23 MR. DI FAZIO: I have no further questions in re-examination.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Di Fazio.
25 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honour, may I -- I am -- I'm certainly not
1 proposing to re-cross-examine. There is, however, one question which
2 arises from -- it's a linguistic issue and I fear if I don't clarify it
3 there might be --
4 JUDGE AGIUS: No, please go ahead. Very soon the witness will be
5 gone and then it will be too late.
6 MR. JONES: Thank you very much, Your Honour, and it goes to what
7 is called the sum or fallacy, and that's why I'm asking the question.
8 Re-cross-examination by Mr. Jones:
9 Q. You were asked, page 96, line 24, about whether people were
10 required to fight as opposed to being volunteers. And you were asked,
11 "Did that situation apply as far as you could see in Srebrenica or not?"
12 And you replied, "I was told that that situation pertained in
14 I just want to be clear you're not saying that applied to every
15 single person, that they were required to fight.
16 A. Absolutely not. The vast majority of people were volunteers. But
17 I had some reports of some people being -- some, as in a very small
18 number, being "forced to fight."
19 Q. Right. Thank you.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: He has explained it already before.
21 MR. JONES: Yes, I thought for the record.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Jones. Judge Brydensholt.
23 Questioned by the Court:
24 JUDGE BRYDENSHOLT: You have explained that you also, in the first
25 half of February 1993, had rather intense discussion with the leadership
1 of all three parties so to speak. And that you, during that period, heard
2 the first accusations regarding the attacks and killing of people,
3 civilian population, especially in Kravica, but I understand that was a
4 more general accusation against what has happened out this enclave around
6 Do you know if General Halilovic became aware of those
8 A. Yes. Because when we were -- when accusations were made to us by
9 one party about events that they -- actions they claimed the other side
10 had done, we would, at the next meeting we had with the other side, would
11 report that and say, the other side has made this claim. Would you -- can
12 you explain, is there anything you can provide to help us understand that.
13 If there is any truth in it, then please stop that action or give orders
14 for that action to stop.
15 JUDGE BRYDENSHOLT: Do you recall what kind of a response you got
16 from the general?
17 A. Two responses. The first one was, our forces are not attacking
18 civilians. It is our civilians who are being attacked. And secondly, we
19 are surrounded, our forces are surrounded. They have to make attacks in
20 order -- in order to seize the means with which to -- with which to
21 survive and defend ourselves. So that was one aspect.
22 The second aspect is that, yes, we are carrying out military
23 attacks against the Serb line of communication between Zvornik and Pale
24 and Srebrenica, and those attacks are not only being made from out of the
25 enclaves, but also being made from positions north of Sarajevo on the
1 other side of that corridor that I showed you on the map.
2 JUDGE BRYDENSHOLT: Well, did you, during that period, ever hear
3 anything regarding burning down of villages, Serb villages, to make it
4 impossible for them to be populated again by Serbs?
5 A. We told Halilovic that -- and Ganic as well and Izetbegovic too,
6 that those accusations were made, because initially the Serbs were general
7 and Kravica itself was only mentioned about the middle of February. I
8 would need to check my diary. Then when we had the specific name, we then
9 reported that: "This is a specific accusation. Do you know about that?"
10 And they said, "We have no knowledge of this."
11 JUDGE BRYDENSHOLT: Well then quite another question. You just
12 mentioned that on the Bosnian side the ranks were very loose. Do you
13 remember when you met the man you suppose was Colonel Oric, did he have
14 any distinctions which shows him as a colonel.
15 A. Never. No. No one in the Srebrenica pocket had any badges of
16 rank that were -- that were identifiable or meaningful.
17 JUDGE BRYDENSHOLT: On the 21st of March, when you got this
18 prisoner delivered so to speak, of course you have explained to us that he
19 had all signs of starvation.
20 Did he -- was he a wounded man? Could you see any sign of
21 physical mistreatment, apart from, of course, the starvation and the
22 situation that he was unable to walk?
23 A. I think he had some bandages and his face was -- it was difficult
24 to tell, because his face was so dark and he was -- he had obviously not
25 shaved, but I think he had bandages as well.
1 JUDGE BRYDENSHOLT: In the -- on the face, on the head or, do you
2 recall anything about this? Or where it was?
3 A. I can't remember where on his body the bandages were. What I do
4 remember is that for some reason we -- or one of our soldiers pulled up
5 his shirt, or whatever, to look at his stomach, because there was -- there
6 was some -- I can't remember the reason why, but we looked at his stomach
7 area, but I can't recall the reason why.
8 JUDGE BRYDENSHOLT: Thank you.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Judge Brydensholt. Judge Eser.
10 JUDGE ESER: I will be grateful to get some clarity, more clarity
11 with regard to the different types of commanders or the language of
13 In your diary, I could give you the page if you need, you speak of
14 local commander and, did I understand you correctly that this context,
15 local commander, was in terms of the War Presidency?
16 A. Yes. Local to Srebrenica. In other words, under the influence
17 of, maybe even under the orders of the War Presidency, but not in the more
18 broad sense.
19 JUDGE ESER: If I may turn your attention to Exhibit D226, which
20 was a special report on the situation in the Srebrenica area, and just
21 keep you -- it was a report by Belgian general, you know whom I mean?
22 Would you say the military commander tries to do something, but he is
23 helpless, now to what person may he refer to in this context? The
24 military commander, the question was -- general situation in Srebrenica.
25 The local people seems to be quite healthy but the refugees are starving
1 as they do not know the dropping zones distribution of the food is the
2 first person to get it keeps it for himself.
3 A. Is that the report by Major Denyft?
4 JUDGE ESER: Yes.
5 A. He would have been referring to the local military commanders.
6 JUDGE ESER: Now, in the -- if I may turn your attention to the
7 extract from the book by Larry Hollingsworth. It was already cited this
8 morning by the Defence. On page 2 -- 187, he would write: "Our guide ...
9 was in uniform, was introduced as a military commander of the town."
10 Now, you told us that there have been quite a few soldiers who
11 guided you, but Hollingsworth goes on: "That he may have been, but we
12 knew that the real defender of the region was Naser Oric whom we had met
13 in Konjevici." Would you confirm this evaluation.
14 A. Yes, I would.
15 JUDGE ESER: Now, with regard to the relationship of the War
16 Presidency and the man called, supposed to be Naser Oric. You already
17 told us something, but what I wanted to make clear, when you had talks
18 with him, with Naser Oric, did, at any time, he have some sort of
19 deliberations back and forth with the members of the War Presidency?
20 A. Not that I am aware of. My understanding is that he came in from
21 outside the PTT building, that was before I was there, and that he then
22 walked out. And it was only with -- with Colonel Oric that we spoke.
23 There was nobody from the War Presidency present.
24 JUDGE ESER: And aside from the local commander, in terms of War
25 Presidency and Colonel Oric, have there been any -- or did you observe any
1 other military leaders who had a saying in your negotiations, or have
2 there been any other people, calling themselves some sort of leader, had
3 been connected or involved in your negotiations?
4 A. Yes. There was -- I think his name is Bektic, Nedzad. I would
5 need to refer to my diary to confirm the name, who was described as a
6 local commander. And he certainly spent a lot of time subsequently with
7 Major Dudley, and he and Major Dudley became quite friendly.
8 JUDGE ESER: My question was, did you observe that there had been
9 deliberations between Colonel Oric and this person who you mentioned?
10 A. No. I never saw Colonel Oric have any conversations or
11 discussions with any of the other people who we met in Srebrenica.
12 JUDGE ESER: So may I sum up this point: You would say that when
13 Naser Oric made decisions, you did not observe that he had any -- needed
14 any agreement with other people?
15 A. I can't --
16 JUDGE ESER: I asked for his experience, nothing else.
17 A. I did not see anything like that.
18 MR. JONES: It's the "needed" the "needed any the agreement."
19 That is not something one can observe.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, thank you, Mr. Jones.
21 JUDGE ESER: Okay. Now then another point is a question of crowd
22 control. In your diary, on page -- what is it, ending in the 3464, you
23 wrote: "There are 3 groupings in the area. Local population, refugees
24 and soldiers. There is little coordination between the 3 groups."
25 Now, was this merely a description or did you also want to express
1 that this was a failure or a weakness which could have been avoided?
2 THE WITNESS: Yes. It was our opinion that there should have been
3 more coordination and concern shown between the groups. And it was our
4 opinion - very easy for us to say, very difficult in the circumstances, I
5 appreciate - but it was our opinion that that was a major failing and
6 would have made the situation much better in Srebrenica had there been
7 much more coordination.
8 JUDGE ESER: Once more, I would like to turn your attention to the
9 excerpts from the book by Larry Hollingsworth, where on page 212, he is
10 also dealing with a situation that was difficult to control, the crowd
11 getting on the trucks and so on, and he writes: "They had nothing else to
12 do." The authorities. "Could the local authorities prevent the people
13 from boarding the trucks?" And then he continues: "I felt that Naser
14 Oric and his troops could, but that the rest could not." Could you
15 confirm this assessment.
16 THE WITNESS: It's more complex than that. It's at two levels.
17 One is, if the war committee had been more organised previously, as I had
18 described earlier today, and built up a situation of trust with the
19 refugees, such that the refugees believed and felt and trusted the war
20 committee, that was one thing. The second thing is that Naser Oric wasn't
21 there. And he may or may not have been able to control it, I don't know.
22 But he wasn't there.
23 JUDGE ESER: Thank you. No further questions.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you, Judge Eser. I would love to
25 put a lot of questions to you, Colonel, but that would mean keeping you
1 another day here, which I am bent on avoiding at all costs.
2 I wish to thank you for having accepted to come over and give
3 testimony in this case against Naser Oric. It has taken a few days. It
4 must have been extremely tiring. I must say you come out of it in the
5 best manner possible.
6 On behalf of the Tribunal on behalf of Judge Brydensholt and Judge
7 Eser and on my own behalf, I wish to thank you once more. And on behalf
8 of everyone presents here, I wish you a safe journey back home. You will
9 now be escorted by Madam Usher and given all the assistance you require to
10 facilitate your return home. Thank you.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
12 [The witness withdrew]
13 JUDGE AGIUS: So we've got one minute. Tomorrow I think we are
14 sitting in the afternoon. Not in the morning. Correct me if I am wrong.
15 Yes, Mr. Wubben, yes.
16 MR. WUBBEN: Yes, that's correct, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. You have a new witness tomorrow. I don't
18 suppose you're going to finish with that witness tomorrow.
19 MR. WUBBEN: Indeed, Your Honour. We need more time than only
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So we will reconvene tomorrow afternoon at
22 quarter past two.
23 MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honour. May I make one comment.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
25 MR. JONES: And I do so with the greatest reluctance, but I would
1 like to just state the following. Our client obviously looks to the Bench
2 to give him a fair trial, to consider the evidence presented by the
3 parties, and of course to ask questions which help to clarify the
5 If questions are to be put by part of the Bench which -- every one
6 of which appears to be an attempt to create another building block for the
7 Prosecution case, that's not fair to our client who has a right to look to
8 Your Honours to be weighing the evidence as presented by the parties. I
9 don't want to say any more on the matter there, but I would just implore
10 Your Honours to ask questions which yes, clarify the evidence but which
11 don't seek to help the Prosecution make their case against our client. I
12 will say nothing more.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we discussed this earlier. I don't think
14 you have a clear and correct vision of what the role of the judges in this
15 Tribunal are according to the Statute, the documents, the official
16 documents that created this Tribunal and also the practice of this
17 Tribunal. Please, I repeat, do not for a moment consider that the role of
18 the judges in this Tribunal is only a passive one, to listen and just to
19 clarify things. We also have a responsibility to promote reconciliation
20 and to ensure that the truth comes out. Thank you.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,
22 to be reconvened on Friday, the 18th day of March,
23 2005, at 2.15 p.m.