1 Tuesday, 13 December 2005
2 [Open session]
3 --- Upon commencing at 9.23 a.m.
4 [The accused entered court]
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam Registrar, good morning to you. Could
6 you call the case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is the case
8 number IT-03-68-T, the Prosecutor versus Naser Oric.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Madam.
10 Mr. Oric, can you following the proceedings in your own language?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours, ladies
12 and gentlemen. Yes, I can follow the proceedings in my own language.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. You may sit down. Good morning to
15 Appearances for the Prosecution.
16 MR. WUBBEN: Good morning, Your Honours, and also good morning to
17 my learned friends of the Defence. My name is Jan Wubben, lead counsel
18 for the Prosecution. In my team also, Mrs. Patricia Sellers, Ms. Joanne
19 Richardson, and our acting case manager, Ms. Sanja Bokulic.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Wubben, and good morning to you and
21 your team.
22 Appearances for Mr. Oric.
23 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. Good
24 morning to the learned friends from the OTP. My name is Vasvija Vidovic,
25 and together with Mr. John Jones I appear for Mr. Naser Oric. We have
1 with us our legal assistant, Ms. Jasmina Cosic, and our CaseMap manager,
2 Mr. Geoff Roberts.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Madam Vidovic, and good morning to you
4 and your team.
5 Any preliminaries before we bring in the witness?
6 Yes, Mr. Wubben.
7 MR. WUBBEN: Yes, we have some documents to tender. I give the
8 floor to Ms. Richardson.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Richardson.
10 MS. RICHARDSON: Thank you. Good morning, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning to you.
12 MS. RICHARDSON: Your Honour, at this time the Prosecution would
13 like to submit, to tender some replacement exhibits that were submitted to
14 the Court on November 29th when Mr. Mirsad Mustafic testified, so I would
15 like to hand those up, again as replacement documents. We have complete
16 sets beginning with Prosecution Exhibit P600. I believe with respect to
17 this document the last page was missing.
18 And the next, Prosecution Exhibit P605 --
19 JUDGE AGIUS: P600.
20 MS. RICHARDSON: And with respect to P605, Your Honour, I'd just
21 like to state for the record that we are submitting the additional pages
22 to this exhibit and that is ERN 03425954 and 03426125. The previous pages
23 were submitted, and that -- those are 03925949 and 5951. And that's a
24 complete set of that particular exhibit.
25 And also we have Prosecution Exhibit P607, and this is a complete
1 translation of this exhibit.
2 MR. JONES: Your Honour, we're not particularly happy or clear
3 about what this procedure is, about exhibits replacing other exhibits.
4 The witness might have had something to say about additional pages. It's
5 something certainly we're reserving our position. It's entirely new to
6 us. And so before any replacement takes place, we'd appreciate it if you
7 would hear our submissions.
8 MS. RICHARDSON: Your Honour, I don't have a problem with that.
9 With respect to the final exhibit that we just submitted, it's a --
10 JUDGE AGIUS: P607.
11 MS. RICHARDSON: A complete -- right, correct. That's a complete
12 translation and simply a replacement of the previous exhibit. We've had a
13 chance to revise the translation that we submitted before. I don't think
14 the Defence would have a problem with that. But of course they can put
15 the objection on the record.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So the position will be as follows. We
17 expect to hear back from you, Mr. Jones, if you have an objection. When I
18 say "Mr. Jones," or Madam Vidovic, if you have an objection about having
19 these three documents replacing the previous ones. For the time being, of
20 course the previous ones will remain in the record, and the matter will
21 become final when we meet again in January. If we have not heard any
22 objection on your part. All right?
23 MS. RICHARDSON: And finally, Your Honour, we do have CDs for the
24 Trial Chamber. These are copies of the Oric interview, Prosecution
25 Exhibit 328 and P329. The Defence already received their copies. So we'd
1 like to tender these to the Court. It's a part of P328 and P329. We
2 understand that there was a problem with the previous CDs, so we're
3 replacing those. And as I say, before the Defence already received their
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. I think you can hand them over to our
6 respective secretaries later on.
7 Yes, Madam Vidovic.
8 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] If Ms. Richardson has completed what
9 she wanted to say, we have an -- a matter that is of earlier date which we
10 would like to raise today.
11 Yesterday at about 9.30 in the evening, 12 CDs were placed in our
12 locker, and could the receipt number 266A be distributed to everyone so
13 that Their Honours can follow our discussion.
14 These CDs -- or rather, one of these CDs containing -- contains
15 documents, and 11 CDs contain video footages. All of them were delivered
16 to Defence under Rule 66(B) and 68 and relate to witness Tony Odly [as
17 interpreted]. As you know, the witness should start testifying the day
18 after tomorrow. Your Honours, I stated Tony Birtley. It hasn't been
19 entered clearly into the transcript. He should begin his testimony the
20 day after tomorrow, which means -- or rather, tomorrow, my colleague has
21 drawn my attention to that fact. We literally have only this afternoon to
22 review the CDs and to proof the witness. What transpires from the annex
23 is that the Defence -- the material was provided to the Defence as a
24 result of the ISU searches.
25 Your Honours, I have no more words to express our dissatisfaction
1 with the way the OTP proceeds in relation to their obligations under
2 Rule 68. As I stated, these materials were delivered to us both under
3 Rule 66(B) and under Rule 68; therefore, exculpatory material.
4 I reviewed this morning only one of these CDs and was quite
5 shocked by the contents. I could see there are many persons who were
6 repeatedly mentioned in the course of this trial, including some of our
8 Your Honours, had we had the material before, we would certainly
9 have used in the best interests of our client. We have simply been
10 deprived of the possibility to use the material. If you recall - and this
11 matter was raised on several occasions - our first request to the
12 Prosecutor was to be supplied with all the video materials which had to do
13 with the situation in Srebrenica. From the very start, we also asked to
14 be given material concerning our witnesses. Mr. Birtley figured on our
15 list already in June this year, and I can't see why these searches had not
16 been carried out earlier.
17 I believe this brings us again into a very difficult situation
18 which poses great concern to us because we cannot properly prepare
19 Mr. Tony Birtley's -- prepare for Mr. Tony Birtley's testimony.
20 Your Honours, I don't know what else I should do to remedy this
21 situation that has arisen as a result of the OTP's actions concerning
22 Rule 68. We have done our best. We have used all our resources to
23 utilise the materials we received in respect of our witnesses as best we
24 could. I hope that I have been quite clear, and I will give the floor to
25 my colleague now.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Jones.
2 MR. JONES: Yes, I just wanted to add one matter, Your Honour.
3 I'm actually dealing with these next two witnesses, Colonel Dudley and
4 Tony Birtley. We have an extremely short space of time to proof these
5 witnesses. It really is a matter of one afternoon with Tony Birtley.
6 We've spent, in preparing for this trial, countless hours reviewing video
7 material that we already have to see if there's anything in which a
8 witness appears, so we can put it to him, so we can get his reaction.
9 In just the five minutes when I was looking over the shoulder of
10 our CaseMap manager, who was just quickly reviewing the files, I see even
11 this witness who is coming today talking to the camera -- it's something I
12 have never seen before. It's -- basically there's a whole video, I can
13 tell you just looking at it, of what is known as rushes, unedited
14 material, taken by Tony Birtley, a witness who is coming either tomorrow
15 or the day after tomorrow. I have got no opportunity now to actually show
16 this material to Lieutenant Colonel Dudley. I have also seen at least
17 three or four Defence witnesses, and in that I include people who were on
18 the Defence list at one point and who if we had seen video material in
19 which they are speaking it might have made difference, a Rule 92 bis
20 witness I've seen. And this is in the last five minutes just looking over
21 the shoulder of my colleague.
22 That's one CD. There are 12 CDs. Why on earth didn't the
23 Prosecution do this at the start of the trial? Why on earth didn't they
24 do it when they received our witness list? The very day that a witness is
25 starting saying, here you go, Defence, here are 12 CDs. It will take two
1 or three days for us to look through it, to get through that material.
2 And it's just impossible. I don't see how we are going to do our job
3 under these circumstances.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, let's hear what the Prosecution has to say on
5 this. And then Madam Vidovic or Mr. Jones, or both of you, please tell us
6 what you want.
7 Yes, who is going to deal with this? Mr. Wubben.
8 MR. WUBBEN: Thank you, Your Honour.
9 Let me first put forward that when we had to deal with a certain
10 witness and try to elicit the relevant material from a Defence witness to
11 review it with a view to our obligations, 66(B) and 68, meaning 66(B) to
12 enable the Defence to inspect our books, and 68 to convey that to the
13 Defence. Firstly, the material handed over indeed include Rule 68, but
14 only recently it came to my knowledge that such material was included in
15 the videos handed over, meaning also that I can understand that it is a
16 hardship to examine this material by the Defence because I know it for
17 myself how it is and how voluminous the material is.
18 At the same time, it might enable me to sit down with the Defence
19 after this proceeding today and to point out the particular parts of the
20 video that underline to me that there is potential Rule 68 material in it.
21 When it comes to the submission that why not in an earlier stage?
22 Well, we learned only in the later stage of trial of course that Birtley
23 was a -- should be on the Defence witness list, but he's not the only one.
24 There were a lot of witnesses and all this triggered the material. And
25 you can't process it at once; you have to do it in a kind of schedule.
1 And unfortunately this witness triggered a lot of material, material which
2 the Defence should also be aware of when they are dealing with the witness
3 because why was the material triggered from -- by the ISU because of the
4 very fact that he is a journalist who made a lot of -- who shot a lot of
5 video footages and is referred to by his name in it and thus triggered by
6 the ISU. Meaning, it's not that I put the accent that the Defence could
7 know already by themselves all the footages that their witness shot, but
8 it's also a matter of knowing and being triggered by the very fact and
9 being aware that the Defence put a witness on the list that has to do with
10 a lot of material from a professional point of view that he shot,
11 including his contribution to the documentary and his well-known
12 documentary "Cry from the Grave."
13 This is what I can offer: To sit down with the Defence and to
14 point out what I know about the parts that include Rule 68, and thus
15 enabling them to immediately go to that aspect of the material provided,
16 Your Honour.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: In other words, you're suggesting that as far as
18 identification of Rule 68 material, rather than they go through the tapes
19 themselves and decide for themselves what is exculpatory or not --
20 MR. WUBBEN: Of course --
21 JUDGE AGIUS: -- they rely on you, in other words.
22 MR. WUBBEN: No, not to rely on me. That's their own discretion
23 to find for themselves. But I indicated in reviewing the material the
24 parts that underlines Rule 68. And that might help.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's do it this way. We are going to do the
1 following. We are going to give you ten minutes within which, if you
2 want, you sit down and talk if there is a possibility of a solution. But
3 I see Mr. Jones already saying, no, there is no possibility of any such
5 Yes, Mr. Jones.
6 MR. JONES: No, no, it's -- Your Honour, it's simply with the
7 greatest respect, that I don't think ten minutes now would lead to a
9 May I just say the following that, one, Mr. Wubben has just said
10 about the fact that there are a lot of material and the Prosecution has
11 just discovered it. We will excuse any situation that we're in no matter
12 how unfair to the Defence because that's always -- we could have 200 CDs
13 deposited on our door and be told that, well, there's a lot of material
14 and it's just been discovered. There has to be some remedy in it for the
15 accused to have a fair trial. There has to be something which is done --
16 may I just -- Your Honour, I just have two further points.
17 If there's material in these videos which could have impeached
18 Prosecution witnesses, or which could have supported our witnesses, there
19 has to be a remedy for that. It can't be that that situation is just
20 allowed to occur, and there's nothing for the Defence, no remedy
22 As far as the two matters mentioned by Mr. Wubben, the part of a
23 well-known documentary. I don't know how well-known the documentary is,
24 but what I was seeing was unedited rushes and that's simply -- that's
25 stuff which hasn't been broadcast at all. I don't want it to be thought
1 that this is in the public domain.
2 As far as sitting down is concerned, with the Prosecution, we have
3 to proof this witness this afternoon. We have a very short space of time,
4 we need to get on with that, and we have found throughout this trial that
5 we have a different view of what's Rule 68 exculpatory from the
6 Prosecution, and that's why I submit it wouldn't be worth our while to sit
7 down with the Prosecution and have the Prosecution point out what they
8 consider is exculpatory. We're in a better position to do that, but we
9 need to do it.
10 And so, one, I mean, it's for Your Honours to ensure that the
11 Trial Chamber makes sure the Prosecution complies with its obligations. I
12 can't think of a remedy now, apart from the fact that the Prosecution
13 shouldn't use any of this material either with this witness or with Tony
14 Birtley, because we really -- we do have a right to review all of this
15 material, and it is 12 CDs and will take two or three days to look at, and
16 that surely would be the most unfair, if on top of everything else this is
17 used in a cross-examination before we've even had a chance to analyse it.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: What is your specific -- or what are your specific
19 requests, Mr. Jones?
20 MR. JONES: Simply for the Trial Chamber to take whatever action
21 you deem appropriate to make sure that the Prosecution complies.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Is Mr. Birtley already here?
23 MR. JONES: Yes.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll withdraw --
25 JUDGE BRYDENSHOLT: Could I ask Mr. Wubben, how long time to you
1 foresee such conversation or meeting with the Defence would take for you
2 to point out what the Prosecution think is its obligation in relation
3 to 68?
4 MR. WUBBEN: I think -- Your Honour, I think that it should be
5 done within an hour. It means that I point on very documents this is what
6 I -- what my opinion is as a part of Rule 68.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Judge Eser.
8 JUDGE ESER: May I also have a question to both parties. If I
9 understood you correctly, Mr. Wubben, you suggested that you would
10 indicate to the Defence those parts of the videos which you think are
11 exculpatory. Is that your position?
12 MR. WUBBEN: Yes, Your Honour. Exculpatory, in my opinion, and
13 just to support the quick pointing out of any potential relevant part of
14 it rather than to go immediately through all of them. And, by the way, we
15 don't have transcripts for the rushes, but I can, for myself, note down
16 which part of it -- of that footage might be relevant in that respect,
17 Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ESER: Then I have a question to the Defence. Is it your
19 position that this would not help you sufficiently because you cannot
20 completely rely on what has been indicated to you by the Prosecution? You
21 want to go through all videos in order to find out whether there is any
22 exculpatory material?
23 MR. JONES: It's a combination of the two. It's due to the amount
24 of time that actually sitting down and doing this would not be useful -- a
25 good use of our time. If in writing, and I would suggest the Prosecution
1 could put in writing, which parts are exculpatory and then we can simply
2 take that and then look for those parts. But we will, obviously, have to
3 look through the whole -- all of the CDs because it's a question -- not
4 just of exculpatory but of how else this material might be used by the
5 Prosecution with our coming witnesses.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: The problem is that -- I don't look at these CDs
7 only from the Rule 68 perspective. I have to look at them wholistically,
8 once they are disclosed or they are in the possession of the Defence. The
9 Defence have to have the opportunity to go through them in their entirety
10 because a question that could be asked need not necessarily be related to
11 Rule 68 material. But I think in my mind, it is very obviously. However,
12 something which is out of courtesy, much more important than this at the
14 Usher, could you please escort into the courtroom Lieutenant
15 Colonel Dudley and the representatives of the US embassy, because I need
16 to explain to them that they need to wait a little bit more.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Lieutenant Dudley, good morning to you.
20 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: And welcome to this Tribunal. Mr. Johnson and Madam
22 Schildge, good morning to you too.
23 I've got some good news and some bad news. The good news is at
24 some later point in time we will hear the testimony of Lieutenant Dudley.
25 The bad news has already been communicated when I said "at some later
1 point in time." We have a problem. The problem does not relate -- please
2 make yourself comfortable, Lieutenant.
3 The problem does not relate to the lieutenant or to you --
4 [Trial Chamber and Senior Legal Officer confer]
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Lieutenant Colonel. The problem is in relation to
6 some fresh documents that have come to the surface this morning which the
7 Defence have not had time to go through and we need to clear this up
8 before we can even start with the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Dudley.
9 So my apologies to you and to you, sir. I hope you understand. It's not
10 something that we were anticipating; we were not anticipating it in the
11 least, and we actually were praying that nothing of the sort will happen
12 again, but it has happened and we need to address it and decide it in the
13 first place. Also because some of these documents could possibly be used
14 during the examination-in-chief or cross-examination of this witness.
15 So we will be withdrawing to my Chamber shortly, and we need some
16 time to think and deliberate on this matter and then come back with a
17 decision. Of course we will then proceed with the testimony of Lieutenant
18 Colonel Dudley. But we cannot start with that before we decide on this
19 issue which also impacts on whether we should be -- we would be hearing
20 the next witness then. All right? So I ask you to be kind enough to
21 bear with us and please accept our apologies. This is something that was
22 thrown upon us this morning quite unexpectedly and which we have to deal
24 Lieutenant Colonel, my apologies to you. Thank you.
25 We will now withdraw and we'll come back and we'll communicate to
1 you as soon as -- with you as soon as we are ready to start.
2 --- Break taken at 9.50 a.m.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 --- On resuming at 10.22 a.m.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Before we tell you how we propose to handle this
7 matter, are there any further statements that you would like to make?
8 Yes, Mr. Wubben.
9 MR. WUBBEN: Yes, I want to make it clear to this Trial Chamber.
10 I stated that we don't have transcripts for the rushes. That means that
11 when it comes to a review by the Prosecution for Rule 68 material, that we
12 were able to -- in this schedule of time -- we were able to disclose the
13 rushes but not able to define within these B/C/S -- within the B/C/S
14 language the parts of Rule 68. So we did make -- we were able to review
15 the documents, the hard copy of the documents, but not the rushes by
17 Thank you.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Jones.
19 MR. JONES: Yes, it's just to say in the meantime we've carried on
20 reviewing two of the CDs, and we've now see Becir Bogilovic, Tony Birtley,
21 Colonel Dudley, Thierry Pontus, Donald Paris, Captain McDonald, Ilijav
22 Pilav. We've seen all those people just in the last time. Just so Your
23 Honour appreciates what we're dealing with in terms of this video,
24 including an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Dudley which I have never
25 seen before until now and which is exculpatory and which I might have used
1 with him.
2 In terms of solution, perhaps the only solution at this point is
3 that we want to continue with Tony Birtley. It's very difficult -- it's
4 been very difficult getting him here. It would be impossible to get him
5 back, and that the Prosecution not be allowed to use any of this material
6 with this witness today or Tony Birtley, then at least we're not taken
7 off guard because we do need two or three days to review this material.
8 That's all I'd submit.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you have a position on what has just been stated
10 by Mr. Jones, Mr. Wubben? Are you prepared to not use any of the material
11 in your cross-examination?
12 MR. WUBBEN: When the Defence is not able to use the material with
13 Tony Birtley, so it's only a fair with a view to equality of arms not to
14 be used by the Prosecution as well, including, of course, today Mr.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. But does that cure or remedy the position from
17 the Defence point of view? Because the Defence can always come back and
18 say it did not have the opportunity to examine Mr. Birtley, as we would
19 have had we been privy to the contents of those tapes beforehand.
20 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honour, the Defence should be in the position to
21 fully proof Mr. Birtley. If they have not that position with a view to
22 the volume of the material, it should be given their position, regardless
23 of the planning for scheduling by the end of the week, then it must be in
24 part proofing and enabling the Defence to -- in a later stage to call him
25 on the stand.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: So our position is as follows -- there are various
2 options, actually, mainly two.
3 Option number one is the following. Particularly hearing what
4 Mr. Jones has just stated that at least in one or two of the tapes that
5 they managed to glance through quickly, there is, for example, an
6 interview with the witness we are about to start hearing,
7 Lieutenant Colonel Dudley.
8 Position -- option one would be the following. That we will not
9 start with Colonel -- Lieutenant Colonel Dudley today, but we'll start
10 with him tomorrow, during which time the Defence would have an
11 opportunity, at least to see whether there is any material that they would
12 like to put to Lieutenant Dudley, with the proviso, assuming that they
13 would not be in a position to go through all this material, their position
14 will be reserved to bring back Colonel Dudley at a later stage if they
15 need to put more questions to him. Accompanied with this would be that
16 it's fully understandable that it's -- the Defence requires time to go
17 through all this and proof Tony Birtley, that we don't hear the testimony
18 of Tony Birtley at all, and we'll make sure that he comes back at some
19 later point in time to give evidence when the Defence are in a position to
20 go through his testimony after proper proofing, taking into consideration
21 also the -- so that's option one, note only Birtley evidence testimony
22 this week. Delay of Colonel Dudley's testimony until the Defence is in a
23 position to go ahead with a proper examination. That's option number one.
24 Option number two is the following. We go ahead with the two
25 witnesses as scheduled with the following -- under the following
1 conditions. Condition number one is that the Defence will not at any time
2 use these tapes or documents or whatever they are, exhibits, in their
3 cross-examination while either of these two witnesses are testifying now
4 and -- that the Prosecution, yeah, will -- I'm sorry. I apologise to you.
5 Prosecution will not make use of these documents, as requested, et cetera.
6 And the Defence will have the absolute right to have these two witnesses
7 re-called at a later stage to continue testifying on any matter that the
8 Defence may choose to examine them upon. These are the two options, the
9 two practical options, that we foresee.
10 One moment.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Then obviously if there is a re-call, this embargo
13 on the Prosecution to make use will be lifted. Obviously then it will be
14 possible for the Prosecution to make use of.
15 These are the two options that -- we see there are other options,
16 obviously, but we tried to approach this matter in as positive a manner as
17 possible, trying to find a -- the most practical solution. One is maybe
18 practical -- more practical than the other from one respect, and the same
19 could be said to the other solution, may be practical than the other from
20 a approach.
21 I think before we decide what to do, we would like to know if you
22 have a preference to either of these two. And I would imagine you have a
23 preference for the second?
24 MR. JONES: Yes. Yes, we certainly favour option two. And I
25 should emphasise that we really -- there is the risk that we would lose
1 Tony Birtley altogether if we don't bring him now. He is moving to the
2 other side of the world. And he -- I know his commitments in the coming
3 months and so -- so that's one matter and the fact that they're here, that
4 we want to make progress, we would certainly prefer option two.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: But with this reservation -- and I'll make it clear
6 to Mr. Birtley that he will need to come over if there is need for him.
7 MR. JONES: Certainly, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
9 Yes, Mr. Wubben.
10 MR. WUBBEN: Your Honours, may I take it that we don't use the --
11 any of such documents disclosed whenever Defence cannot locate those
12 documents or choose to use those documents for examination-in-chief of
13 Tony Birtley, that we also should not use those documents or videos. But
14 whenever a particular video or document has been chosen, that we are
15 entitled to use that particular document as well during or cross.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Oh, I think -- I think this is simple enough not to
17 require any explanation. If in the process of the examination-in-chief of
18 either Colonel -- Lieutenant Colonel Dudley or Mr. Birtley, Mr. Jones
19 makes use of Exhibit Number 6 here and we see it here and questions are
20 asked, obviously you can ask the witness questions on that clip. I mean,
21 it's in the nature and in the substance of the cross-examination itself.
22 But if no use has been made of, say, all the rest, then for the moment you
23 cannot make use of that. Because I would take it that the Defence has not
24 had time to go through all this material. And it's understandable. I
25 mean, I don't know -- I have seen "A Cry from the Grave" before, but I've
1 seen the video. I mean, it's -- and I have forgotten it.
2 MR. WUBBEN: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Agreed Mr. Jones?
4 MR. JONES: Yes.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: So let's close this. This is how we will proceed,
6 in terms of the second option we proposed. Please do understand now that
7 we won't have a break at 10.30. We will proceed and then I will use my
8 judgement, obviously, as we go along, and we'll have a break, a reasonable
9 break, later on at a reasonable time. All right. Do I have the
10 cooperation of everyone on this? Yeah. Okay.
11 Let's proceed. Let's bring the witness in and the two officers
12 from the US embassy.
13 Incidentally, while this we were discussing inside about what we
14 had proposed to you tomorrow. You know that we had proposed to sit with
15 you around the table tomorrow after the sitting. We've thought about it,
16 and for the time being we've come to the conclusion we better postpone it
17 to some other point in time. So we may come back to you when we resume in
18 January, but for the time being we don't think that we should go ahead
19 with what we had proposed in the first place. In the meantime, of course,
20 we encourage the most dialogue possible between the two parts and the use
21 of courtesy in your dealings as much as possible.
22 [The witness entered court]
23 JUDGE AGIUS: So good morning, Lieutenant Colonel Dudley, once
24 more and welcome back. We have solved the problem that we had or so we
25 think. And we are now able to proceed with your testimony. Our Rules
1 require that before you start giving evidence you make a solemn
2 declaration equivalent to an oath in your jurisdiction, to the effect that
3 in the course of your testimony you will be speaking the truth, the whole
4 truth, and nothing but the truth. The text is going to be handed now to
5 you by Madam Usher. Please read it out and that will be your solemn
6 undertaking with this Tribunal.
7 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
8 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, sir. Please make yourself comfortable.
10 Could I ask the two representatives of the US State Department to
11 identify themselves for the record.
12 MR. JOHNSON: I'm Clifton Johnson, and I'm the legal counsel at
13 the US embassy.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
16 MS. SCHILDGE: I'm Heather Schildge. I'm the deputy legal counsel
17 at the US embassy.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, and welcome to this Tribunal.
19 The rule that we have adopted here in all cases, to my knowledge,
20 has been the following. The witness now has -- the witness now has
21 started or is about to start giving evidence. For all intents and
22 purposes, he is now a witness. And I understand, of course, that there
23 may be instances where you would like to intervene, in which case you
24 address the Trial Chamber. Draw our attention straight away to it. But
25 there should be no tete-a-tete communication with the witness.
1 I take it that the topics upon which cross-examination --
2 examination-in-chief and cross-examination are concerned have been
3 identified, so I invite both parties not to go beyond these issues which
4 have been authorised by the US government.
5 Yes, having said though -- that, Mr. Jones will be examining you
6 in examination-in-chief; that will be the direct, as you call it in your
7 country. And Ms. Sellers, a co-national of yours, will then cross-examine
8 you later on. Thank you.
9 Mr. Jones.
10 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour. I'm also a co-national of the
11 witness's, incidentally.
12 WITNESS: REX EDWARD DUDLEY
13 Examined by Mr. Jones:
14 Q. Good morning, Lieutenant Colonel, and apologies from me in the
15 delay in you being brought here. You're not -- yes. Can you hear me?
16 A. I'm okay now.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: You're okay now. Okay. Thank you.
18 MR. JONES:
19 Q. Yes. Now, if we could start with you giving the Court your full
21 A. I'm cutting on and off. Okay. There we go. My full name is Rex
22 Edward Dudley.
23 Q. If there's any problem, just let me know.
24 And please confirm, if you can, the following details: You were
25 born on the 1st of November, 1956, in Washington DC?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. You are American by nationality?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. You trained as a field artillery officer for four years and have
5 tactical experience in artillery?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. As a field artillery officer, are you familiar with the wide range
8 of artillery weapons, their calibres, their ranges, and other
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. I'm going to pause a lot for the interpretation, just so you know.
12 Do you also have training as an airborne officer?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. With whom did you serve?
15 A. I served with the 82nd Airborne Division. I also served with
16 southern European task force after I came out of Bosnia.
17 Q. Are you trained as a tactical and operational intelligence
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. Were you trained in being able to analyse military situations in
21 terms of weapons, tactics, terrain, and other key factors involving
22 military operations?
23 A. That is correct. That is one of my key areas of expertise.
24 Q. And are you a trained military observer?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Before -- you mentioned going to Bosnia. Before being deployed to
2 Bosnia, did you serve for 13 years as a combat intelligence officer?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. Is it right you've spent 20 years in the US army?
5 A. Yes. I retired in 1999.
6 Q. That was with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Following your stay in Bosnia, did you write any reports, articles
9 or manuals?
10 A. Yes. I wrote a pamphlet that was sanctioned by US military. It
11 was called "Tactics, Technicals and Procedures of the Warring Factions in
12 the former Yugoslavia." And I wrote an article for a US military
13 intelligence journal called the dagger's -- "On the Dagger's Edge." I
14 believe that was the title. And I wrote some other various after-action
16 Q. And apart from Bosnia, were you ever posted overseas?
17 A. Yes. I served with 2nd Infantry Division in Korea. I served with
18 various tactical and operational units in Germany. And I also served
19 again with 2nd -- with the southern European task force in Italy.
20 Q. And were you deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of
21 February 1993?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. And at that time were you based in an army base, American army
24 base, in Germany?
25 A. Yes, in Augsburg, Germany.
1 Q. And were you sent to Bosnia as the military information officer in
2 a four-man liaison team?
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. And did you then spend some time in Sarajevo getting orientated?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. During that time did you read situation reports and otherwise
7 inform yourself about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
8 A. Yes. That was my initial requirement, because the United States
9 government did not have much information at all on what was going on on
10 the ground in Bosnia.
11 Q. Now, did you have a communications device with you?
12 A. Yes, we did. As part of the four-man liaison team, we brought two
13 tactical satellite devices called TacSats.
14 Q. And does that allow encrypted communication?
15 A. Yes, it does.
16 Q. And what was your rank at that time?
17 A. I was a major.
18 Q. And when you were in Sarajevo, did you have information about the
19 situation in Srebrenica?
20 A. We had minimum information because that was an area where neither
21 the UNMOs nor the UNPROFOR had been allowed to operate very much. So
22 there was a great big information gap.
23 Q. Was there anything you knew at all?
24 A. We knew that the population was in desperate straits based on ham
25 radio reports coming out of the enclaves and the few non-warring faction
1 reports we got from both the UNMOs and from other observers like UNHCR
2 reporting the bad situation there. We also know that General Morillon had
3 just been in and come out of one area and was attempting to try to get in
5 Q. Now, when you were in Sarajevo, did you ever hear the name Naser
6 Oric or Colonel Oric mentioned?
7 A. State your question again, please.
8 Q. When you were in Sarajevo, did you ever hear the name Naser Oric?
9 A. No, I do not.
10 Q. And did you go to Srebrenica sometime in March in 1993?
11 A. That is correct. I went in as part of General Morillon's team to
12 try to enter Srebrenica.
13 Q. And what dates precisely were you in Srebrenica?
14 A. I was in Srebrenica from March 11th to March 28th, 1993. I
15 entered and left with General Morillon.
16 Q. So you spent 17 days on the ground?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Now, was one of the reasons that you were sent to Srebrenica that
19 you could provide secure satellite communications for General Morillon so
20 that he could speak to his HQ using a TacSat without being intercepted?
21 A. That is correct. That was one of the major problems with the UN
22 at the time is they had no secure devices.
23 Q. And was another part of your mission to coordinate air-drops?
24 A. That is correct. And that was -- my mission sort of switched. I
25 was initially there to provide secure communications for General Morillon.
1 And then once I was on the ground, I was also asked to coordinate all the
3 Q. And in terms of your qualifications, were at least two of the
4 reasons why you were picked for that assignment the first that you had
5 trained in airborne operations and secondly that you knew about
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. And I think you've told us your role in Srebrenica evolved during
9 your time there. Is that correct?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Now, in your way into Srebrenica, did you have an easy entry or
12 was your entry delayed?
13 A. It was delayed and it was difficult.
14 Q. And who delayed your entry?
15 A. The Serb -- the Bosnian Serb forces.
16 Q. Do you know why they delayed -- delayed you?
17 A. The key-point I want to make at this time is that we were delayed
18 because they did not want us to have access to the Muslim forces at that
20 Q. And in terms of convoys, do you know what, if anything, was the
21 attitude of the Serbs to UN aid convoys going into Srebrenica to provide
22 the population with food and medicines?
23 A. They wanted to keep them from going in to re-fit and re-equip the
24 enemy forces, as they saw them.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Sellers.
1 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, it's the first time I've spoken today,
2 so you'll note a bit of the gravelness [sic] in my voice, but I would just
3 ask if Defence counsel would clarify one question in relation to Bosnian
4 Serbs, the next related to Serbs. Are we now speaking of two different
5 groups or are we speaking of one group. Just for clarification, please.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
7 Yes, Mr. Jones.
8 MR. JONES: Well, I can stick with Bosnian Serbs, and I can put
9 the question again or a slightly different question.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. We can proceed along these lines.
11 MR. JONES: Thank you.
12 Q. You've mentioned that the Bosnian Serbs, was the term you used,
13 did not want you to have access and you said "to the Muslim forces at that
14 time." Was there a distinction made between Muslim forces in Srebrenica
15 and civilians in Srebrenica, or was all aid being blocked?
16 A. Aid was being blocked to both organisations, the Serbs -- the
17 Bosnian Serbs, as best as I can determine, considered the entire
18 population the enemy at that time.
19 Q. Okay. Thank you.
20 MR. JONES: Now, I'd ask if the witness can be shown Defence
21 Exhibit 983, D983. And just for the record, this is from the Drina Corps
22 command, 17 of March, 1993, submitted to the regular army staff.
23 Q. Can you have a look at that, Colonel, and I'll just ask you to go
24 down to paragraph 3. It's a document, as you see it, it's submitted to
25 the Republika Srpska army Main Staff. And it says: "Status in the
1 responsibility area. UNPROFOR convoys passed to Sarajevo Gorazde and
2 Tuzla but not to Srebrenica because they insisted that we let 7OT pass."
3 Now, my first question is if I suggest that OT could refer to
4 [B/C/S spoken], armoured transporters, would this make any sense? Would
5 you be able to make any sense of this?
6 A. Did you say armoured transporters or supply transporters?
7 Q. Armoured.
8 A. Armoured, okay. Are we talking about supplies being on these
10 Q. My question is simply: Does that -- is there any comment you can
11 offer on that sentence and in light of the date, 17th of March, 1993?
12 A. I know that we were trying to get convoys in there and the Serbs
13 didn't want them to go in. Did that answer your question?
14 Q. Yes. Thank you. And if we turn to the second page, paragraph 8,
15 and it says: "Conclusions, projections, and decisions for further combat
17 And it's the second part of that which I want to read: "I decided
18 the following," -- by the way, this is signed by commander Colonel
19 Milenko Zivanovic. "I decided the following, to conduct combat activities
20 with a part of the forces to Srebrenica in order to force civilian
21 population to surrender, break and destroy army formations of the enemy in
22 Srebrenica. Remaining forces are to defend the existing positions not
23 allowing the enemy to make any surprises or break through in any
25 And I just want to concentrate on those words "in order to force
1 civilian population to surrender."
2 Does that reflect what you told us, that in fact the Serbs
3 regarded the whole population as the enemy, the civilian population?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. And what -- I'm going to come back to that but I'm finished with
6 that document for the moment. What route in fact did you take to get into
7 to Srebrenica?
8 A. Could I have a map, please?
9 Q. Yes.
10 MR. JONES: We're going to distribute a map to the witness.
11 Q. And do you recall, just before that's passed up, whether you
12 were -- whether you were told that you couldn't take one route and were
13 directed to another route?
14 A. That is correct. General Morillon was told that the main route
15 into Srebrenica was not available because the bridge had been destroyed.
16 Therefore, we were diverted to a secondary route in Srebrenica.
17 Q. And if you look at the map which is being placed on the ELMO to
18 your right and if you mark preferably with a highlighter the road that you
20 A. I will trace it first with a pen and then I will highlight it.
21 From Bratunac we were diverted from the main redball road into
22 Srebrenica to a secondary road, which I'm going to trace first with the
23 pointer and then I'll highlight with a pen. We came up this narrow
24 winding road that was unpaved through the snow and where we were hit the
25 redball and then were able to come into Srebrenica. I will now highlight
2 Q. And did you encounter any mines on the way in?
3 A. Yes. We encountered one mine that blew up a supply truck, the
4 only supply truck that we had been able to bring in because the Serbs
5 didn't allow the other ones to come in. And the mine was approximately
6 right there where my pen is located.
7 Q. Can you mark that with an X, please?
8 A. I would be glad to. I've got one right here.
9 Q. Thank you. And could you also just sign the map, so we don't
10 forget, and then ask for an exhibit number.
11 A. [Marks].
12 Q. Thank you.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: You're initials, please, next to that "X" that you
14 marked on the map, please.
15 THE WITNESS: [Marks].
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. So this map will become Defence
17 Exhibit D99?
18 THE REGISTRAR: D996, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: 996.
20 MR. JONES: Thank you.
21 Q. So that road, in fact, was mined?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. And when, in fact, did you arrive in Srebrenica?
24 A. We arrived that night after nightfall, and I'm going to say
25 approximately 8.00 p.m.
1 Q. And did you arrive in a vehicle or on foot?
2 A. We -- I arrived in an armoured personnel carrier after the vehicle
3 I was riding in was blocked by the destroyed vehicle. So my
4 communications -- I had to walk through the snow for approximately six
5 kilometres. We were picked up by a Belgian Jeep, delivered to an armoured
6 personnel carrier -- the one armoured personnel carrier in the convoy. We
7 got inside of that, and then proceeded on to Srebrenica.
8 Q. So did you, in fact, walk on foot on a mined road?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. And were you with anyone else when you were walking along?
11 A. I had my communications sergeant with me and I had him stay
12 approximately 100 metres behind me in case I stepped on a mine.
13 Q. How did you ensure that you didn't step on a mine?
14 A. There was no way that I could ensure it.
15 Q. Did you encounter anyone that evening who might be described as a
16 fighter when you arrived in Srebrenica?
17 A. Yes, I did. Once we caught up with General Morillon and the M-113
18 armoured personnel carrier, we proceeded a little way and these shadowy
19 figures came out of the forest, walked our route, and then several of them
20 mounted on to the M-113, and we found out that they were local fighters
21 from Srebrenica. And they proceeded to escort us into the town.
22 Q. And how did they appear?
23 A. They were a rather motley group. They were armed with various
24 light arms, mostly hunting rifles. They were poorly clothed. They had a
25 wide variety of clothing on, basically anything to keep them warm. Same
1 thing with their shoes. And they did not -- they appeared more like
2 partisans than anything else, not a trained fighting force.
3 Q. And what were your first impressions of Srebrenica when you
5 A. Horrendous.
6 Q. What was the situation like in terms of any refugees?
7 A. As soon as we drove into the main town, we pulled up to the PTT
8 building, their post telegraph and telephone building. And we were
9 ushered into the building, but I could -- it was already dark. And there
10 were refugee families scattered throughout the town area blocking the road
11 on both sides of the road, huddled around fires trying to stay warm. The
12 key thing that I noticed, it was -- there was no light because there was
13 no electricity, and there was -- I mean, just several hundred refugees
14 just in that one little area next to the post telegraph and telephone
16 Q. And were you able to estimate during your stay in Srebrenica how
17 many refugees there were in the enclave roughly at that time?
18 A. Yes. I went through with -- I have to remember his name now. The
19 UNHCR --
20 Q. One moment. Yes, please don't mention the name of UNHCR
21 representative. If you need to, then we'll go into private session. But
22 for the moment you can see "UNHCR representative."
23 A. Fine. I went in with a UNHCR representative, and we went from
24 building to building, up and down Srebrenica counting windows and
25 estimating approximately how many people were actually in Srebrenica
1 itself. We came to the conclusion it was approximately 30.000 people in a
2 town that was only designed to hold about 10.000. Not to mention all the
3 refugees who were in the immediate outlying areas.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. One moment, Mr. Jones.
5 Ms. Sellers, do you require the name of this UNHCR representative
6 that the witness spoke to on that occasion? Because if you do, we'll go
7 into private session, we'll have his name, and then continue in open
8 session afterwards.
9 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, I'll inform of course the Defence and
10 Trial Chamber that we're aware of the name, and we would agree that the
11 name need not be mentioned.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. So let's go ahead then. Thank
14 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. So 30.000 people in the town, not to mention all the refugees who
16 were in the immediate outlying areas, you said. So overall how many
17 people in the pocket?
18 A. We estimated when we did the first head count there were between
19 50 and 60.000 people inside the pocket.
20 Q. Okay.
21 Now we're going to see a short clip of a video; it's D700. And as
22 we go along, if you want to make a comment, then just start speaking, and
23 we'll stop the video, and you can make your comment.
24 [Videotape played]
25 "The news seems to keep getting worse out of Bosnia, numbing us
1 with its relentlessness. But we get shocked anew each time we see the
2 pictures, and today for the first time we get a glimpse of life in Eastern
3 Bosnia, the isolated mountainous area where thousands of Muslim refugees
4 are slowly starving as the United States searches for ways to get food to
5 the people without getting involved in their war.
6 When the Serbs refused to let United Nations relief trucks travel
7 into the Muslim areas of Eastern Bosnia, the US started dropping supplies
8 from the sky. For weeks now the US air force, flying out of Weinheim air
9 force base, has carried tonnes of food and medicine to the people of
10 Bosnia while the American people wonder whether the supplies are getting
11 through, whether they're doing any good, and whether any of the factions
12 have devised a way to use food as a weapon.
13 We have seen the eery pictures of American planes dropping their
14 bulky beacons of survival. Tonight we see where the parcels land and
15 surprisingly, the first sign of an American military man on the ground in
16 Eastern Bosnia. He's witnessed the impact of the air-drops. These scenes
17 come to us from the town of Srebrenica, a place almost impossible to get
18 to. ABC's Tony Birtley finally managed it last week in what can only be
19 described as a heroic effort to let us see what is happening in
20 Srebrenica. Tony travelled by foot and by horseback to get into the
21 isolated area. Since he arrived, he's run out of food and been injured by
22 Serbian fire. But still, he smuggled out the story."
23 THE WITNESS: Stop the tape. I'd just like to state that that is
24 exactly what I saw when I drove in on the M-113. And those little family
25 groups huddling fires has been burned in my memory.
1 [Videotape played]
2 "... the hillsides to wait for what they call the planes from
3 God. After 11 months under Serbian siege, the US air-drops of
4 humanitarian aid are their only life-line.
5 In the dead of night, they make their way to the place where the
6 prepared meals have landed, most often on steep-sided hills where people
7 have to crawl up on their hands and knees. For some like this lady, it's
8 too much. She collapsed from exhaustion. But the shape of a US parachute
9 hanging in the trees showing the drop spot. Gun-fire echos around as the
10 army try to control the people and the supplies.
11 "I found this about 600 yards uphill. I don't know what it is.
12 It could be medicine or something."
13 MR. JONES:
14 Q. Sorry, I just want to ask you Colonel Dudley, do you recognise
15 where those scenes were?
16 A. Yes, I do. They were just to the south of Srebrenica and very
17 close to the fortress.
18 Let me show it on the map. Here is Srebrenica itself. This was a
19 Turkish fortress that was located approximately here, and the air-drops
20 were being dropped just south of them on a sloping hill. One of the key
21 problems with that location was that all the refugees knew that that was
22 where the air-drop was and so they could congregate there. And as soon as
23 they heard the airplanes coming, they would get out on to the drop zone
24 itself. And when you drop a pallet full of food or other heavy stuff with
25 parachutes, they fall rather rapidly, and if people get under them or
1 close to them, they get crushed or rather seriously injured.
2 The other problem is the local authorities had totally lost
3 control of this huge refugee population. So it was every person for
4 themselves. They act like wolves, fighting over the contents. And the
5 first night that I witnessed this I believe that at three people were
6 killed by the pallets and/or by gun-fire or by being stabbed. It was a
7 very vicious environment.
8 Q. Okay. Thank you.
9 MR. JONES: We'll continue with the video.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: For the record, the witness points to a section
11 below Srebrenica at 30 minutes, approximately once centimetre down from
12 the name.
13 Could you mark it with an "L" -- "LP," that's landing place.
14 THE WITNESS: [Marks].
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
16 MR. JONES:
17 Q. Is that location also known as the Stari Grad?
18 A. I can't say that for sure. I don't know that.
19 Q. Okay. We'll continue on with the tape.
20 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 [Videotape played]
22 "The lucky ones clutch their treasured packet of 12 meals and
23 head home. But in the morning the empty packets lying on the mountain
24 track showing that some were so desperate for food they couldn't wait.
25 "American planes have successfully air dropped aid into this area
1 for the last five nights running. The villagers say they received only
2 one prepared lunch packet. The rest has been taken by the army.
3 "Most people have been eating only bread made from hay and corn
4 for the last two months. That has finished. They now make it from the
5 flower from a hazelnut tree. The father of this family demonstrates how
6 much weight he has lost in the last 11 months. It is not a famine
7 situation here but it can be best described as slow starvation.
8 "This is what I eat. This is what we eat.
9 "We've got nothing to eat. We're starving to death.
10 "We're practically naked and barefoot. Look at us, we're all in
11 rags. We haven't had anything to eat.
12 "The air-drops have worked, but the people need land convoys
13 which are continually being blocked by the Serbs.
14 "So far we have been right on the money. I see [indiscernible]
15 packages everywhere. I see people carrying MRE supplies. However, we
16 need to change our distribution now to flour, sugar, oil, and other basic
17 necessities. These are very hungry people, and they need basic supplies,
18 not high-calorie items like MRE. Right now we have done the bare minimum
19 to keep them from starving and from dying. However, we need to do a lot
21 "General Philippe Morillon, the commander of the UN forces in
22 Bosnia, visited the town. He told the authorities that he would open up
23 road corridors to get food in and ordered the placement of military
24 observers in the town which he hopes will deter shelling that locals" --
25 MR. JONES: Sorry, I meant to stop a second ago.
1 Q. Did you recognise the UNPROFOR officer who was unloading?
2 A. Yes. He was a Canadian staff sergeant who was in charge of that
3 infantry squad who accompanied us into Srebrenica.
4 Q. Do you recall his name?
5 A. No. But if you can mention it, I know I would know it.
6 MR. JONES: I wonder if I'm allowed to lead that name.
7 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, we would have no objection from the
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Sellers.
10 Yes, Mr. Jones, you may lead.
11 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. Would it be Sergeant Morrison?
13 A. That is correct. That is exactly who it was.
14 Q. Okay. Thank you.
15 MR. JONES: And we will keep playing.
16 [Videotape played]
17 "...to get food in and order the placement of military observers
18 in the town that he hopes will deter shelling that locals say come to
19 [indiscernible] nearby Drina River in Serbia. But the Serbs have so far
20 failed to give their agreement to the General's plans.
21 "That's when General Morillon tried to leave. Hundreds of
22 refugees, many of them recent arrivals from Konjevic Polje blocked his
24 MR. JONES:
25 Q. Now, I just want to ask you: Do you recognise the man on the
1 right, first of all?
2 A. Yes. That is his Macedonian interpreter/body-guard, and he was
3 serving in the French Foreign Legion at the time.
4 Q. Yes, sorry. Just -- it was the man on the right who I was
5 starting with and then the man on the left. If you can talk us through
7 A. Oh. This is General Morillon, and this is his Macedonian
9 Q. Standing to his right but to our left?
10 A. That is correct. The two men with the blue berets on their heads.
11 Q. Thank you. We'll continue.
12 [Videotape played]
13 "Peace and food and believed that if the UN commander left, the
14 Serbs would start shelling.
15 "The tanks are above waiting to attack. If you will leave, they
16 will come and attack us.
17 "I heard the news that General Mladic will attack Srebrenica. We
18 just want bread. We want the blue helmets to protect us.
19 "They kept their vigil all night around fires, and in the end
20 General Morillon decided to stay until a cease-fire takes effect and the
21 Serbs allow UN helicopters to fly into Srebrenica.
22 "I discovered on arriving here that the situation was lost and I
23 feared myself. And I understood the real fear, anguish, panic, of this
24 population. And I wondered, too, that their desire for me to stay here
25 was probably the best solution in order to help them to survive.
1 "The refugee problem is so acute that people are being forced to
2 live in" --
3 MR. JONES: I think actually in the interests of time we can
4 probably stop there.
5 Q. Is there anything -- you've seen this video. Is there anything in
6 terms of depicting the situation which you would quibble with or as it an
7 accurate reflection?
8 A. That was a very accurate video, particularly the mobs of refugees
9 that were in and around Srebrenica. And I think the video showed how
10 desperate the people were.
11 Q. And the video, we saw there, if I may call it a crisis situation,
12 involving Morillon being held in the town against his will. Is that
13 something which you know about?
14 A. Yes, it was. When we first got into Srebrenica, we were all put
15 into the PTT building at night, and we were not allowed to leave. We
16 moved up to the second floor, and we were put into -- like in a dark, dank
17 large room, and we were not allowed to leave it. General Morillon
18 attempted to sneak out during the night to get out of town, and he came
19 back in when he was not able to liaison with who he was looking to liaison
20 with. The rest of us stayed up on the second floor. And again, those who
21 were blocking us in were not the authorities/soldiers. It was all the
22 refugees who had surrendered us and would not allow us to leave.
23 Q. And did they say why they didn't want you to leave?
24 A. Yes, it was very obvious. If General Morillon left, then the
25 Serbs would continue the shelling, and they were afraid they were all
1 going to get killed.
2 Q. And did this action by the refugees, did it appear to you to be
3 organised or spontaneous?
4 A. It was very much spontaneous. There was no leadership around to
5 deal with that spontaneous type of environment. These were just a bunch
6 of desperate women with their families. And it's actually interesting.
7 The women were the ones who were leading this protest, where usually in an
8 organised demonstration if you see man out there leading the chant, and
9 everybody everyone is in a semi-organised environment. This place was --
10 it was totally spontaneous. And they would -- they stayed there all
11 night, literally sleeping out in the snow and cold in order to block us
13 Q. Now, we have seen the video and a description of the state of the
14 people in terms of lack of food and shelter. Do you know why they were in
15 that situation?
16 A. They had been driven out of their village areas around the
17 perimeter of Srebrenica, slowly forced in as the Serb military was peeling
18 the onion or tightening the noose around the enclave of Srebrenica.
19 Q. Now, during your time in Srebrenica, did you also try to find out
20 who the players were in the enclave?
21 A. Yes. In order to do my job, particularly with coordinating the
22 air-drops, I needed to know who the key civil and military leadership was
23 in order to coordinate security and distribution of the supplies that were
24 brought in.
25 Q. Yes, I think the transcript doesn't reflect -- you said the key
1 civil and military leadership. Is that correct?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. Is that something you worked on a great deal?
4 A. Yes, it is.
5 Q. Is there any aspect of your training or background which equipped
6 you for that sort of analysis?
7 A. I had detailed training in establishing who the key leadership
8 was, what the terrain is like, what the weather is like, et cetera, so
9 that the leadership can make good decisions on the battlefield. So that
10 was one of my key jobs to decide who the key players were in order to do
11 the military mission.
12 Q. And during your time in Srebrenica, did you reach any firm
13 conclusions about that?
14 A. No. Who the actual leadership was within Srebrenica and who could
15 actually accomplish requirements always remained fuzzy for me. I was
16 never able to link up who was actually the key players in the Presidency
17 or in the -- if you can call it, the military leadership and how they
18 crossed over. Those lines were very, very fuzzy.
19 Q. And did you conclude that there was one player or multiple player
21 A. There were multiple players in this environment.
22 Q. And did you detect or find out about any clear delineation of
23 duties and responsibilities among those players?
24 A. I was able to get some vague ideas of first who was able to help
25 me get my mission accomplished, and this is who I focussed on. And then
1 the second as far as delineation of power groups, there was a War
2 Presidency group, there was Naser, who was in charge of the
3 semi-autonomous military group, and then there was the police in blue
4 uniforms who were basically in charge of taking care of the internal
5 security and control of the Srebrenica town itself.
6 Q. So the police were basically in charge of internal security in the
7 town of Srebrenica itself, in terms of -- in charge of law and order,
8 would you say?
9 A. I would say so.
10 Q. I'm going to come to each of those players one at a time. But my
11 question was whether you detected a clear delineation of duties?
12 A. No, I did not. That was one of the things I noticed was that the
13 different groups seemed to cross over and back again based on the
14 situation on the ground and what was going on. I would like to state here
15 also that everybody in the pocket, particularly the leadership, had almost
16 a lethargic attitude to the situation because they were literally worn
17 out, and they just felt that they couldn't accomplish much anymore. There
18 was an exhausted look on everybody's face.
19 Q. Now, you mentioned a War Presidency. Did you meet members of the
20 War Presidency?
21 A. Yes, I did. While I was in Srebrenica, I didn't know who was what
22 within the War Presidency, but I did notice that -- I got introduced to
23 some key people like the mayor and one member, I remember, with a dark
24 beard who was a member of the War Presidency and I had dinner at his
25 apartment house, but I never had much interaction with these people. I
1 attempted to get them to assist me, but none of them really stepped
2 forward and said, I will help you do your job.
3 Q. We're going to play a bit of a video. It's P318. And we're going
4 to play from 04.07 to 04.14.
5 Just while that's being brought up: Was the War Presidency and
6 these members, were they among the players whom you identified?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. And when you referred to the local authorities, does that describe
9 the War Presidency and the mayor and those players?
10 A. Yes. Let me state that one again. When I say the players or the
11 leadership within the Srebrenica pocket, there was a War Presidency, there
12 was the semi-autonomous military groups that had a leader in the sense of
13 Naser - he was just mentioned as the leader of that group - and then there
14 was the police, who seemed to be a separate organisation unto themselves.
15 And the hospital -- there was a hospital group, but again, they focussed
16 on the hospital.
17 Q. Yes. As I say, I'm going to come to these one at a time. So if
18 we just, first of all, look at this -- the video, P318. Do you recognise
19 that person?
20 A. I have to go to the video. One moment. Yes, that's the mayor of
21 the city of Srebrenica.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 MR. JONES: I don't know if for the record we can give a time.
24 Yes, 04.07.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you for that, Mr. Jones. It is indeed
2 MR. JONES: Thank you. And if we could now go to 4.22. Yes.
3 Q. Do you recognise anyone in that frame?
4 A. I'm attempting to get the picture -- oh, here we go. Yes, the man
5 on the left with the beard was a member of the Presidency.
6 Q. And was he the one who you had dinner with or was that someone
8 A. That was the one I had dinner with.
9 MR. JONES: If the witness could now be shown D872.
10 Q. And I simply want to ask you this: In terms of the War Presidency
11 and the mayor, how were they coping with the refugee and humanitarian
13 A. They were not. They were overwhelmed by the task, and they
14 appeared to have given up.
15 Q. Now, if you'll look at the next photo which is being placed on the
16 monitor, as for the man in the middle, do you recognise him?
17 A. Yes, that was the same man I had dinner with and he was a member
18 of the War Presidency. I don't know his name, unfortunately.
19 Q. And the person on the left and the person on the right, if you can
20 help us with that?
21 A. The person on the left is myself, with the sunglasses on, and the
22 person on the right is Senad, who initially became my body-guard/keeper
23 and later my interpreter. Those roles switched as he became comfortable
24 with me doing my job.
25 Q. Now, in that situation, right there in that scene, do you recall
1 that scene?
2 A. Yes, I do. I was trying to find out what the actual number of
3 refugees were -- excuse me, wounded people that we needed to evacuate.
4 And we had a very difficult conversation. We had a lot of people around
5 us. Again, this is by the PTT building, and the crowds were everywhere.
6 So I was having Senad, on the right, translate my English into Bosniak to
7 the War Presidency individual. And we were not clear in our communication
8 at all. So later on I had the three of us move off to a quiet location
9 where we could sit down and I could actually get the facts with how many
10 translations we needed to make it happen.
11 Q. Right. Okay. Now, let me take this step by step. Firstly before
12 I come to Senad, the person in the middle who you've mentioned, did many
13 people at the time in Srebrenica have beards like his?
14 A. Yes. Almost all the men who could grow a beard had a beard.
15 Q. Was it easy to distinguish among them?
16 A. No, it was not -- let me take that back. If they had striking
17 features or I had met them personally and had dealt with them, then, yes,
18 I could pick them out from a crowd. Otherwise, it was very difficult.
19 Q. Now going to Senad, do you remember his last name?
20 A. Not off the top of my head, but if I saw it in writing or it was
21 told to me I would be able to remember it.
22 Q. That's fine. We can leave that for now. So you said he was in
23 interpreting. In what language or languages did he interpret?
24 A. He spoke mediocre English and fairly good German because he lived
25 in Germany for a while, and of course he spoke fluent Bosniak --
2 Q. And were you speaking some German or how was your German?
3 A. My German was horrible. His English was pretty bad, too. And so
4 we would communicate back and forth in broken English and broken German.
5 Q. So it was actually very difficult, as you've told us, to
6 communicate sometimes?
7 A. That is correct. And we had to go over very simple issues
8 multiple times in order to make sure that we had communicated.
9 Q. And did Senad interpret between you and other locals while you
10 were in Srebrenica?
11 A. Yes, he did. After he -- we established a working relationship,
12 he was the key person I used to coordinate air-drop security and other
13 things that I was trying to accomplish in the town.
14 Q. And in fact, this dinner that you went to with the bearded man in
15 the middle, was Senad interpreting for you on that occasion?
16 A. To be honest, I cannot honestly recollect, but I'm almost positive
17 that he was the one who was there because nobody else could speak passable
18 English that I worked with.
19 Q. And do you know how long he had been in Srebrenica?
20 A. He had gotten there just prior to me arriving. I was going to say
21 January/early February time frame.
22 Q. And do you know where he came from and with whom he travelled?
23 A. He came out of Tuzla with a small group of fighting men, as he
24 told me. They had infiltrated through the Serb lines, and they had
25 brought a German reporter/photographer with them.
1 Q. And do you remember his name, the name of the photographer?
2 A. He was a tall, lanky guy. Again, I'm sorry for my name recall
3 right now, but if you give me the name I know I would know it. He was the
4 only German photographer in Srebrenica at that time.
5 Q. That's fine. I don't think there's anything in dispute who that
7 Was there anything about Senad's appearance that indicated he was
8 a recent arrival in the pocket?
9 A. Well, there were multiple indicators. If you take a look at the
10 photograph itself, you'll notice the difference between the War Presidency
11 individual with his shrunken cheeks, meaning he hadn't eaten very well for
12 a long time, and a lot of the other people had the same appearance. Senad
13 on the other side had relatively fleshy cheeks, had a light beard, was
14 relatively well-cleaned. There were no bags under his eyes because they
15 were still relatively fresh. He was in a complete uniform, which was very
16 fascinating to me. He has good combat boots on. He had a good functional
17 uniform. He had a full military vest that I believe came out of either
18 China or North Korea with banana AK clips in it. He had a AK assault
19 rifle that was also in very good condition, which was also a rarity inside
20 Srebrenica. Very few men actually carried assault rifles.
21 Q. And aside from assault rifle, having a clean uniform and combat
22 boots, et cetera, was that usual or unusual in Srebrenica?
23 A. That was extremely unusual.
24 Q. And do you remember roughly how old he was?
25 A. He was 20 years old at this time.
1 Q. And did you know if he's still living?
2 A. No. I had been informed later on -- well, I received a postcard
3 from him from Tuzla stating that he was alive. And then later on I was
4 informed that he had been killed in an automobile accident.
5 Q. Apart from Senad, was there anyone else, any local, who
6 accompanied you a lot in Srebrenica?
7 A. Yes. There was a local one-armed police officer by the name of
8 Zele. And I will remember -- his first name was -- give me two minutes.
9 He had been a drummer in a band. He had lost his arm -- right arm I
10 believe, and --
11 Q. Don't worry about the name. We can come back to that.
12 A. Djozic. And then the first name is going to come to me in just a
13 few minutes.
14 Q. Now you've told us he was a police officer?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. Is that civilian police or military police?
17 A. At the time I didn't know what he was. All the police were the
18 same to me. And I believe he was a civil policeman.
19 Q. Did he mention any sort of title that he had?
20 A. No subtitle. He was just -- he was introduced to me as a police
21 chief, and there was no delineation made at the time of whether he was the
22 chief of police or just a subordinate chief.
23 Q. And in fact, in terms of titles which you heard when you were in
24 Srebrenica, were there official titles which remained fixed or were they
1 A. In a few cases they remained fixed, like, you know, a member of
2 the War Presidency mayor. But other titles would sort of shift or evolve.
3 People seemed to give themselves self-promotions at a time.
4 Q. Did Zele perform any sort of liaison function for you?
5 A. Yes. Zele was very important to me because the civil police were
6 one of the few functional groups there that were organised and seemed to
7 have a good cohesive team. And so I used Zele to assist me in securing
8 drop zones that were close to the town, and I can give one instance of
9 that where he was vital for us. And then he also helped me to secure the
10 soccer stadium when we were doing the evacuation of the wounded. There
11 was no other force there that I could depend on of locals who were
12 dependable. If I would give them a mission, they would fail miserably.
13 Q. Now, did Zele ever point out to you where he worked?
14 A. Yes, he did.
15 Q. And what was that building, as far as you --
16 A. It was the police station.
17 MR. JONES: If the witness could be shown Exhibit P419, please.
18 Actually, may I look at the photographs because I see there's a
19 whole number and I can show which one ... it's ERN 036617724.
20 Q. If you can have a look and see whether that's the building or not
21 that was pointed out to you.
22 A. Yes, that's the building.
23 Q. And were you ever told whether there was a prison there?
24 A. Zele mentioned once when we were coming back through Srebrenica,
25 and he just casually pointed out, That's where I worked, and he mentioned
1 that he had had to confine a young Bosnian soldier in there who had
2 committed some sort of a crime. So, yes, there was some port of a prison
3 in that building.
4 Q. Now -- that's fine for those photographs. Thank you.
5 Now -- so now you've mentioned in addition to some -- the mayor
6 and this other member of the War Presidency, Senad and Zele, were they
7 among the players whom you identified?
8 A. I would say yes because they were competent enough or had enough
9 connections to get things accomplished.
10 Q. And -- yes. And you said that Zele was in the civil police.
11 MR. JONES: I would ask that you be shown D871 and see if you can
12 find his name on this list.
13 For the record, this is Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
14 Sarajevo Ministry of the Interior, Tuzla Security Services Centre,
15 Srebrenica public security station, list of the members of the Srebrenica
16 SJB, dated 25 April 1995.
17 Q. If you could turn to the second page, look down that list. Do you
18 see a familiar name?
19 A. Oh, there we go. Yes, his first name is Elvir Djozic. And I see
20 here he was a clerical officer.
21 Q. And that's who you recall as Zele?
22 A. That is correct. He was the only one-armed man in the town. He
23 was very recognisable.
24 Q. Now, as far as this civilian police is concerned, did you gain any
25 understanding during your time in Srebrenica as to where they were
1 operating, within which geographical area?
2 A. The civil police operated inside Srebrenica itself, as far as I
3 saw. They were a presence always in front of the PTT building helping us
4 with security. And whenever we had large crowds or other issues showing
5 up, those were the people who I always saw. I didn't see who I would call
6 the fighters, the village folk who picked up arms doing any type of
7 missions inside Srebrenica itself.
8 Q. Okay. So when you say "inside Srebrenica itself," you mean the
9 town, the town of Srebrenica itself?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. And I think you mentioned a hospital in Srebrenica. Did you go
12 there when you were in Srebrenica?
13 A. Yes, I went there multiple times to deliver medical supplies. I
14 also went inside the building when the Canadians had been wounded during
15 our attempt to do an air evacuation of the wounded Bosnians, and I also
16 went in there and took a tour of the hospital once.
17 Q. And was it a proper hospital building?
18 A. No -- well, it was a shell of a hospital building, but they had
19 none of the equipment or other facilities that you would expect in a
20 normal hospital.
21 Q. Now, did you liaise with the hospital and with UNHCR regarding
22 medical supplies to be dropped?
23 A. That is correct. That was one of my key goals is get the right
24 supplies on the air-drops so to help re-fit or re-equip the hospitals with
25 the basic necessities.
1 Q. And so were the hospital staff, again, among the players whom you
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You've told us there were multiple players in Srebrenica. In
5 terms of the military, was there one player in Srebrenica or many?
6 A. There were many players in the military. Would you like me to
7 elaborate on that?
8 Q. Yes, please.
9 A. The players in Srebrenica evolved, as best as I could determine.
10 When the war started, the outlying villages had a chief or popular leader,
11 and they basically picked up arms to defend themselves when the violence
12 started. As these villages collapsed, they would sort of group together
13 and move on to the next village. And so they would basically be local
14 fighters, through necessity, that had banded together around a chief, and
15 those were the small groups that I saw as fighters. And they would number
16 between 20 and a hundred people roughly in these village groups.
17 Q. Now, you mentioned Naser Oric earlier. As far as you know, did he
18 have his own group?
19 A. I can't confirm or deny that. I never saw him with his group or
20 heard that he had his own individual group.
21 Q. You referred to -- you used the term, I think, "semi-autonomous."
22 Can you explain what that means, please?
23 A. Certainly. These groups were not a trained military force, and
24 they were still very distrustful of even people from other villages. They
25 did not seem to work well in an organised fashion. They didn't have the
1 military training, communications, or other intelligence to plan out a
2 cohesive, organised, combined-arms operation. They basically worked in
3 small strike forces, going out and doing raids or securing a part of the
4 perimeter of Srebrenica, but that was about all they seemed to be capable
5 of doing. Did that answer your question?
6 Q. Well, I'm going to break it down into smaller -- smaller parts.
7 You referred to this organisation on a village level, and you've mentioned
8 the size of fighting units, I think you said between 20 and a hundred
9 people. So these groups which were semi-autonomous, is that what you
10 were --
11 A. Yeah, that's what I'm saying.
12 Q. And did you speak to people about the military situation in making
13 these observations?
14 A. Yes, I was. Because one of my key tasks because of the air-drop
15 operation was to see how well the front lines were holding because I
16 didn't want to put an air-drop too close to the front lines. So I was
17 figuring out how well these -- the defence of the perimeter was going to
18 last, and there was a concern that it was going to collapse at any time
19 while I was there on numerous occasions. Therefore, I focussed on
20 observing exactly how these military groups interacted, how they departed,
21 how they came back. And what I would see is that they would be defending
22 a specific part of the perimeter, using an area that they were personally
23 familiar with, and they would move out for 24 to 72 hours, and then they
24 would return and another group would go out there and replace them. They
25 had no formal communications except for a siren in town that I heard once
1 or twice sound off to assemble groups for mass mobilisation.
2 Q. Yes. Can I stop you there. You're giving a lengthy answer, and I
3 want to -- like I said, I want to take it bit by bit.
4 A. Certainly.
5 Q. You're anticipating matters which I'm going to come to. So if we
6 just -- if you can just give very short -- if possible, short answers to
7 the next few questions. Firstly, these groups organised on a village
8 level, were they conducting combined operations from what you could
10 A. No, they were not. They were conducting light infantry operations
11 on a small scale.
12 Q. Now, do you know if these fighters were living in barracks or with
13 their families?
14 A. They were living with their families.
15 Q. And did that have any effect on their way of fighting?
16 A. Yes, it did because they were very concerned about their families,
17 and a lot of them didn't want to leave their families to go up to the
18 front lines.
19 Q. Okay. Now, to your knowledge were the refugees among the
20 fighters? If that wasn't clear, let me put it again because it was meant
21 to be a simple question. Among the fighters, were there people who were
23 A. Well, in the sense that some of the fighters' families had been
24 chased into Srebrenica also, yes, some of the fighters were -- also be
25 classified as refugees from the villages that had been destroyed.
1 Q. And did that fact affect the way of fighting in Srebrenica?
2 A. Yes, it did because the fighters had a dual responsibility, as one
3 is to take care of the family but also try to keep the pocket from
5 Q. And so that might be described as dual loyalties?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And what was, in fact, happening to the pocket while you were
9 A. It was continually shrinking from both the south and from the
10 north. The Serbs had a pincher movement that was, again, slowly
11 collapsing the pockets, like -- peeling an onion is the best description I
12 can give.
13 MR. JONES: Now, I want to refer the witness to D199 I think it
14 is. It's the book "War Hospital," and I'm going to read a passage from
16 Q. But it's probably best if you have that in front of you. Thanks.
17 It's pages 154 to 155. And It's the following passage, it's the bottom,
18 the last paragraph, and it's referring to -- to yourself.
19 "Constantly shadowed by two Bosnian minders, he has also mapped
20 the perimeter of the enclave and attempted to understand what the Muslims
21 and Serbs in this part of Bosnia are fighting about."
22 Now, firstly, who are those two minders?
23 A. I'm sorry, I don't see the passage.
24 Q. It's the last paragraph on page 154.
25 A. Wrong page. Start again.
1 Q. Yeah. You'll see around the middle of the page it refers to you,
2 and then further down, the last paragraph:
3 "Constantly shadowed by two Bosnian minders, he had also mapped
4 the perimeter of the enclave and attempted to understand what the Muslims
5 and the Serbs in this part of Bosnia are fighting about."
6 Who would be the two minders?
7 A. That would be Senad and Zele.
8 Q. Yes. I think that's correct now.
9 It continues: "He has concluded that the valley of Srebrenica is
10 evidently defendable and identified positions from which it can be
11 protected. He explained to some key Bosnian soldiers that they should dig
12 up the roads and block the trails leading in to the town and set up
13 defence in depth forward positions with multiple fall-back positions.
14 This way, the light infantry could fight off an armoured Serb attack.
15 When the Bosnians argued they couldn't put it off, he advised them to get
16 out. The place is the Alamo [phoen], he thinks. It isn't going to last."
17 Now, firstly, do you recall that exchange with Senad and Zele?
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. And is that passage an accurate reflection of your thoughts in the
20 situation at the time?
21 A. Very much so.
22 MR. JONES: Apologies, this monitor has a tendency to shut itself
23 off every 30 minutes, which isn't very helpful.
24 Q. Now, can you explain a bit more what you were proposing there in
25 that passage?
1 A. Yes, I can. The Bosniaks inside Srebrenica were only doing light
2 infantry raids whilst there and/or manning the perimeter. They were not
3 providing themselves with any active defensive positions from which to
4 fight from. And therefore, the hardball road leading from both the north
5 and the south into Srebrenica were basically undefended by any type of
6 obstacles. Having been trained as an airborne officer and anti-armour
7 defence, I understood the importance of blocking avenues of approach to
8 armoured vehicles. And the key thing you do is block off any hardball
9 roads that can support an armoured defensive, which was both sides of the
10 valley. The Bosnians had done nothing to do that. Therefore, they
11 remained very vulnerable to high-speed, armoured approaches or attacks.
12 Q. I'm just waiting for the interpretation.
13 Now, you as a trained military officer were there advising them on
14 what they might do to prevent that happening, and they told you they
15 couldn't do it?
16 A. That is correct. There didn't seem to be the organisation or the
17 will to carry out an active defence.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Jones, we'll have a break at noon, so plan
20 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Now, were there many trained military men among the Srebrenica
23 A. No.
24 Q. And what was the general level of education or culture of the
25 people you met in Srebrenica?
1 A. This is not meant to be an insult to the people of Srebrenica, but
2 I found that a lot of the people were not much smarter than the animals
3 that they owned. I could -- they had a very low educational level, and
4 they had no concept of what I would call complex operations or how to
5 carry them off.
6 Q. And again, I don't know if you still have D199 in front of
7 you, "War Hospital," but if not there's a passage at page 94 and I can
8 just read it -- you do have it, yes. Okay. And this refers to a trip
9 made by a member of an NGO to the hospital describing the hospital. And
10 he says -- it's the bottom of the second paragraph: "A patient's broken
11 femur wasn't even stretched into traction, and the most vivid image in his
12 mind is of a crying little girl with her pathetic home-made splint. They
13 could have devised something better for her, he thinks. All of it lends
14 the impression of a medical team so overwhelmed by the situation that they
15 are no longer able to see what they can achieve. They have all but given
17 I'm just wondering whether that in any way is also -- was
18 reflected among the fighters to whom you spoke, that attitude?
19 A. Yes. I saw that the fighters were very demoralised at this time
20 because they were consistently losing ground and the Serbs seemed to be
21 gaining momentum, and there just seemed to be an apathy or lack of will to
23 Q. And what you proposed about these blocking manoeuvres was actually
24 a matter of survival, was it not?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. And they weren't able to muster the organisation to do it?
2 A. No, they were not.
3 Q. Now, we have a second part of a video -- in fact, I think we --
4 I'm sorry, we have a portion of a video. It's D700. It's another
5 portion, and I think we have time before the break?
6 JUDGE AGIUS: When I say "noon," it could be plus or minus a
7 little bit, Mr. Jones, so --
8 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour. I'll time it accordingly.
9 [Videotape played]
10 "... resigned to defeat. You've got to be resigned to injury, and
11 also you've got to be resigned to death. It's a totally mismatch. If it
12 was a big fight ... equivalent of Mike Tyson fighting some 15-year-old
13 with both arms tied behind his back. They don't have weapons to complete
14 on a level footing with what the Serbs have got. They have 1948, 1950
15 weapons. They have Kalashnikovs if they're lucky. They've got a couple
16 of tanks that they captured from the Serbs, but they can't fire them
17 because they ran out of ammunition a long, long time ago."
18 MR. JONES:
19 Q. Yes. In fact, it was just that portion we want to show you.
20 First, did you recognise the person speaking at the beginning?
21 A. That was Tony Birtley.
22 Q. Did you meet him in Srebrenica?
23 A. Yes. And we had several deep conversations and he seemed to like
24 to follow me around because I was an event that he could film.
25 Q. Now, we saw scenes there of people walking along with weapons. Is
1 that how you recall Srebrenica's fighters when you --
2 A. That was a very typical group of fighters right there, the age,
3 the dress, and the equipment they carried. Actually, those were
4 better-armed than most of them I saw.
5 Q. Now, when you were in Srebrenica, did you try to establish what
6 sort of structure, if any, the fighters had?
7 A. Yes, I did. Because I was again very interested in how well they
8 were going to be able to hold the perimeter knowing and seeing what the
9 Serb army also had at the -- available to them to conduct the operations.
10 Q. And did you analyse that from a tactical perspective?
11 A. Yes, I did. And that was my major concern is: Were these people
12 going to be able to hold this terrain.
13 Q. Now, how could you categorise Srebrenica's fighters? Were they
14 like regular soldiers, reserve soldiers, or some other type of fighters?
15 A. I looked at soldiers from three different levels. You have the
16 professional military person who's been trained, equipped, and prepared
17 for a specific operation. They're well-disciplined, and they know what
18 they're about. You have reserve soldiers who, with a little bit of
19 training, can usually be brought up to standard for a specific operation,
20 but you can't task them with complex operations because they just haven't
21 had the years of experience doing it again and again and again. The last
22 group is a citizen soldier who takes up arms for various reasons but he
23 might have had like a year's worth of conscript training, like the JNA
24 army did, but they haven't trained for years. They're out of shape,
25 poorly equipped, poorly armed, poorly disciplined, and they're doing it
1 out of necessity, not because they are an organised force.
2 Q. Okay. Now turning to Srebrenica, which was it?
3 A. Okay. In Srebrenica it was obvious. These people were mostly out
4 of the villages, and they had grouped together for mutual defence, so they
5 were that last category.
6 Can I make one more note here? I didn't meet a single trained
7 professional military man the entire time I was in Srebrenica that I know
9 Q. And now might have touched on this already, but what sort of
10 weapons did they have?
11 A. Well, first off, they were poorly equipped for the combat that
12 they were engaged in for the most part. They had individual hunting
13 rifles and/or shotguns, which seemed to be the predominant weapon. I saw
14 everything from a little spider machine-gun with a 22-calibre bullet,
15 which is totally useless in that environment, to a few good recent
16 Kalashnikovs. But again, the great majority of weapons were individually
17 owned weapons, old hunting rifles, shotguns, that type of stuff very few
18 machine-guns, and one of the things they seemed to be lacking was
19 ammunition, particularly for their automatic weapons.
20 Q. And did they have uniforms?
21 A. Not that you could call it a uniform, no. They were wearing
22 anything that was going to work in the environment in which they were
23 operating, whatever they could scrounge together.
24 Q. And did they wear signs of ranks?
25 A. None that I saw.
1 Q. Now, I think it might just be useful at this stage to go briefly
2 to Exhibit P -- one moment, please. P318, which we saw earlier. And I'd
3 like to go to 4.33, 04.33 -- sorry, it's a video clip.
4 Now, firstly, do you ever recall seeing that man when you were in
6 A. No. I do not remember seeing him while I was in Srebrenica.
7 Q. Thank you. Now, I want to ask you about the uniform which that
8 person is wearing. Have a very careful look and tell us if there's
9 anything about it which you can help us with.
10 A. There is one key item that I see on this uniform that I find very
11 interesting because he's wearing the exact same type of weapon carrier
12 that I was wearing. And that's that strap that goes over his shoulders
13 and comes down and attaches to a web belt which we carry ammunition and
14 other items in. This is very unusual because it looks like it's US
15 military equipment.
16 Q. Is that or is that not a uniform of the Bosnian army?
17 A. The one that he's actually wearing, it doesn't look like a -- I
18 can't see the camouflage, but it doesn't look like Bosnian army
19 camouflage. It looks almost like US military camouflage. But I can't
20 tell from this picture.
21 Q. When you were in Srebrenica, did you see people wearing different
22 types of camouflage?
23 A. I didn't see much camouflage at all, to be perfectly honest,
24 because they didn't have it available to them. I saw some synthetic pants
25 that were camouflage and camouflage jackets. But I saw mostly older dark
1 green or other old, worn-out type uniforms. But I didn't see a whole lot
2 of camouflage when I was there.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 MR. JONES: I think I prefer to have the break at this stage, if
5 that's okay. Thank you.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly, Mr. Jones.
7 We'll have a 30-minute break, which means we'll resume at 20
8 minutes past 12.00. Thank you.
9 --- Recess taken at 11.52 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 12.26 p.m.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Jones.
12 MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. Now, Colonel Dudley, are you familiar with the term "C3I"?
14 A. Yes, I am. It's a standard American military term.
15 Q. And I should say -- we've had complaints from the stenographer and
16 the interpreters about not pausing. So if I'm pausing before the next
17 question, that's what that's about.
18 What does it stand for, that term?
19 A. C3I means command, control, communications and intelligence.
20 Q. And does that refer, in essence, to what's required for effective
21 command and control?
22 A. That's exactly right. All four of those elements have to be
23 present in order for a military commander to conduct complex operations on
24 the ground.
25 Q. And from what you observed of the fighters in Srebrenica, did they
1 have what was required for command and control?
2 A. No.
3 Q. And I want to take it -- well, first of all, based on your
4 observations, did the conditions exist for a commander to be effective on
5 the ground?
6 A. In the situation in Srebrenica, I don't think any commander who
7 walked into that environment would be very successful.
8 Q. And do you make that observation in terms, as well, of the
9 training, equipment, and conditions necessary to organise military
10 operations into planned, sustained operations?
11 A. Yes. Not only was the equipment missing, but a key component,
12 communications, was also missing from that enclave.
13 Q. Now, how important are good communications to command and control?
14 A. Very, particularly for more complex combat operations. I would
15 like to make a point here is that the terrain of Srebrenica was very
16 broken up, very hilly, very compartmentalised, and therefore being able to
17 communicate with subordinate leaders or commanders on the ground, you
18 would have to have good, solid communications between a commander --
19 subordinate commanders to make sure that the forces stay coordinated in a
20 well-involved complex plan that people knew so they would deal with
21 various contingencies they would run into in their area of operation.
22 Q. And so as part of that, is it necessary to have rapid or indeed
23 instantaneous communications?
24 A. Yes, particularly if you're dealing with a -- if you were doing a
25 defence and you're dealing with the enemy leading an attack, you would
1 have to be able to react quickly to deal with various contingencies that
2 might arise. So communications would be vital to coordinate your forces,
4 Q. Now, do you know how the people of Srebrenica communicated with
5 the outside world when you were there?
6 A. Yes. They had a ham radio station located in the PT building up
7 on the second floor facing towards the south. That was their primary
8 means of communication with the outside world.
9 Q. Do you know who operated the ham radio?
10 A. Yes. There were two twins who basically owned that ham radio
11 station, and they traded off operating it. But every time I saw them,
12 they were almost always together.
13 Q. Okay.
14 MR. JONES: And if the witness could be shown D785.
15 Q. Do you recognise those men?
16 A. Yes. Those were the two twins I just mentioned.
17 Q. And was that the equipment which they operated or was there
18 something else?
19 A. That was the equipment they operated with. You notice that they
20 have a --
21 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we better put it on the ELMO, please.
22 THE WITNESS: They had this device which of course --
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you --
24 THE WITNESS: -- was for Morse code. And then they had the small
25 ham radio station that was operated -- was electrically generated from the
1 stream outside. It was a relatively simple device.
2 MR. JONES: I'm going to ask if the witness could be shown - it
3 will be on the monitor - Exhibit C2; it's actually a Court exhibit. There
4 are a number of photographs, and we have two which should appear on the
5 monitor under computer evidence, I believe.
6 Q. Now, first of all, do you recognise that building?
7 A. Yes, that is the PTT building within Srebrenica.
8 Q. And can you recall where these twins were operating?
9 A. Yes. This is the main entrance -- I'm sorry, I don't have another
10 picture to point at. You can see the main entrance is that oval hall on
11 the bottom left of the screen. They were right above that. You follow
12 the stairwell up the stairs and they were off to the left on the south end
13 of the building in a relatively small room. I believe there was a
14 wood-burning stove in that room, too.
15 Q. And there's another picture which I believe is a side-view.
16 A. Yes, there we go. That's the side that the twins were on, and
17 again they were up on the second floor, last window to the left of the
18 picture. And again, their electricity came from the stream that ran right
19 behind the PTT building.
20 Q. And were they dressed, just as we saw in the picture there, in
21 civilian clothes?
22 A. Yes. I particularly remember the one twin wearing that grey,
23 heavy jacket all the time.
24 Q. Was there any guard on duty barring entry to that room?
25 A. Not that I remember. We on the staff had relatively free access.
1 The only guards I remember were the civilian police who were on the
2 outside of the PTT building, and they were supporting our Canadian guards,
3 who were remaining security for ourselves inside that building.
4 Q. And the radio equipment that they had, was it sophisticated or
6 A. It was very basic ham radio equipment. I don't remember it being
7 very sophisticated at all.
8 Q. Now, if someone were to say the following about that ham radio,
9 would it be correct, and if you can help us with this, we would appreciate
10 it. If someone said that it was a big, solid, commercial piece of
11 machinery, two by three metres long by three metres high, with many
12 switches and knobs, what would you say to that?
13 A. That's a false statement. Because you can see in the picture
14 exactly what it consisted of.
15 Q. And do you know in the PTT building was there anything which might
16 approximate to that, what I've just described?
17 A. Yes. In an adjacent room, almost in the centre of the second
18 floor, there were two banks of inoperatable telecommunications equipment.
19 Basically it looked like a telephone switchboard type of setup, and there
20 were lots of loose wires and things hanging off of it, and it was
22 Q. So were these twins sitting by this machinery which you've just
23 described or by the ham radio that we saw a moment ago?
24 A. They were sitting by the ham radio station that was in the
1 Q. How much time did you spend in the PTT building?
2 A. To be honest, for the first couple of days I spent a lot of time
3 there until I got freedom of movement, and then when I came back to the
4 PTT building to sleep, which I usually did in the afternoon before night
5 operations started. So once things got exciting and I got freedom of
6 movement, not that much time.
7 Q. You're familiar with its layout?
8 A. Very familiar with its layout.
9 Q. And did you see any maps in the PTT building?
10 A. Yes. There was one map up on the second floor in a conference
11 room that was adjacent to where the ham operators were working out of.
12 Q. Was that old or new?
13 A. It was an old, outdated map, and I believe it was of most of
14 Eastern Bosnia.
15 Q. And from what you could see, was it being used for any purpose to
16 mark front lines or anything like that?
17 A. No, it was not. It was actually a little bit worn-out looking.
18 It also looked very outdated.
19 Q. And apart from the ham radio, what sort of communications did you
20 see in Srebrenica?
21 A. In that same room where I mentioned the ham radio operators, or in
22 the adjacent room, I can't quite remember which, they had torn-apart
23 Motorola radios that they were trying to piece together to form at least
24 one functional set. I don't know how successful they were in doing that.
25 Q. And you're familiar with communications. What's the range of one
1 of those Motorolas, assuming that they can be made functional?
2 A. Those Motorolas would have very short line-of-sight communication,
3 maybe from one end of Srebrenica to the other, but much further and
4 definitely not through a hill.
5 Q. Now, you had your TacSat with you as you described. At the time
6 was that a sophisticated piece of machinery?
7 A. At the time, that is correct.
8 Q. And did you have easy communications with your TacSat when you
9 were in Srebrenica?
10 A. No -- let me rephrase that. Initially, no, because we were in a
11 steep, mountain valley, which is where Srebrenica was located. And we had
12 to have line of sight with the satellite we were using to send our
13 communications through. And so we had a very short period of time,
14 particularly at night, when we could access that satellite, otherwise we
15 had to get out of that valley and set up on a ridge-line outside of the
16 town where we could have a much broader location.
17 Q. Now, while we're discussing command and control issues, did the
18 refugee situation have an impact on the potential for command and control?
19 A. Most definitely. The refugees were blocking -- they were taking
20 up logistics supplies, namely food. They were taking up medicine, what
21 little bit was available, and they were blocking the main roads in and out
22 of Srebrenica, which all made for problems.
23 Q. And you've described the hospital. Did the situation in the
24 hospital have an impact on command and control?
25 A. Yes, it did, in the sense that the soldiers knew that it was very
1 inadequate and therefore it would be hurting the morale, which would hurt
2 the ability for the commander to lead and control his forces. So in that
3 sense, a hospital being able to take care of a wounded soldier is vital to
4 a defensive operation, or even an offensive operation.
5 Q. And generally speaking in Srebrenica, how well were things
6 managed, from what you could observe?
7 A. Let me tell you about several incidents. I'll give just a couple
8 of examples and you can ask me if you want me to go further. When we
9 arrived there in Srebrenica, that was the first great example. The
10 refugees were crowding the streets and the civil authorities did not know
11 what to do with them because there were so many, and this problem
12 increased the entire time I was there.
13 The second example is when we were trying to find a secure drop
14 zone, the refugees were mobbing the drop zone sites, interrupting the
15 recovery of the supplies.
16 The third example is we had a special air-drop just to the north
17 of the PTT building and I had organised the local civil police force and
18 some of our own soldiers to quickly secure one pallet that was going to be
19 dropped for our specific uses, particularly radio batteries for the
20 tactical satellite device. The refugees got there before we could because
21 the pallet, unfortunately, landed on the wrong side of the hill and they
22 were all over it. Everything disappeared before the civil police could
23 get there to secure that pallet. The refugees were constantly causing
24 problems with basic military operations.
25 Q. Right. I'm going to take those briefly, but one at a time. The
1 air-drops, first of all can you just tell us: Was this Operation Provide
3 A. That is correct.
4 Q. And your function in relation to that was as a forward air
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. Now, why was it necessary, first of all, to drop aid to Srebrenica
8 from the air?
9 A. Because ground convoys were not getting in and they were out of
10 supplies, specifically food and medicine.
11 Q. We saw in the video that air-drops were taking place at night.
12 Why did they take place at night?
13 A. Because for two reasons: One, we were concerned about Serb
14 anti-aircraft guns shooting at C-130 aircraft, particularly when they were
15 coming in low for an air-drop; and the second one was that we were worried
16 about Serb artillery actually shelling the drop zone and killing lots of
17 civilians. And I believe there was an incident just before I got in where
18 that actually had happened close to the line of conflict between the armed
20 Q. Did that ever give rise to problems with fighters actually leaving
21 the lines to get food?
22 A. Yes. Everybody was out of food, and the fighters had two
23 concerns. One is, of course, trying to hold the line, but also they had
24 their own families that they had to worry about. So their priorities were
25 definitely dual-hatted.
1 Q. And the fact that fighters would leave the lines to get food, does
2 that reflect on the command and control situation you described?
3 A. Yes. Well, if your fighters are not being fed, then they have to
4 fend for themselves. That means that your fighters are deserting to
5 survive and keep their families alive; that means that you don't have a
6 coherent fighting force when you need them, particular in crisis times.
7 Q. Thank you. Now, were you also present when a convoy, a UNHCR
8 convoy, came into Srebrenica and then people were evacuated?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. And was General Morillon still in Srebrenica then?
11 A. On the ground convoy, yes, he led it in, I believe.
12 MR. JONES: We have a clip of a video. It's D700. It goes from
13 00 to 01.31.
14 [Videotape played]
15 "Tony Birtley, set the stage for us. What is it we're going to
16 see and hear next?
17 "I think we're going to see one of the scenes that will stay with
18 me and I think for the people who saw the video for many, many, many
19 years, and that is the sight of complete and utter desperation of people
20 who simply want to get out of a situation and are prepared to do anything
21 to do that.
22 "I couldn't believe what I was seeing. I think sometimes in
23 journalism there can be wont to steer towards hyperbole, but you could --
24 there was nothing you could say to describe what was going on, the sheer
25 panic and the desperation of the people. And to see women throw their
1 babies into the back of trucks and hoping that somebody will grab them and
2 take them to safety because the separation, for them, was far better than
3 having the youngster endure starvation and shells bullets. It was
4 terrible to witness. The scenes of people getting angry before the convoy
5 left. The UN heard about it, but they could do nothing. I think people
6 become so desperate, they're prepared to do absolutely anything. I think
7 it's the lowest level of humanity. I think these people are prepared to
8 steal, even kill, to survive, because nobody else is looking after them."
9 MR. JONES:
10 Q. Now, are those the scenes that you saw in Srebrenica?
11 A. Yes, particularly the two convoys that I saw.
12 Q. You saw on that video attempts by a man to control the crowd with
13 a gun. Is that something you saw?
14 A. Yes, that looked like it was one of the local guards in front of
15 the PTT building, and he is firing his Kalashnikov in the air, trying to
16 control the crowds. Of course they ignored him and pushed right by him.
17 Q. So was it possible on that day to control the crowd, from what you
18 could see?
19 A. No, the crowd was desperate to get out of there. They were
20 starved, they were sick, and they had no hope, and they were willing to
21 take, you know, tremendous risk, even death or serious injury, in order to
22 get on those trucks. You could see the old women trying to crawl on.
23 Q. Now, leaving that incident aside, were you also involved in an
24 attempt to evacuate the wounded from Srebrenica by helicopter?
25 A. Yes. General Morillon had left the pocket with Major Tucker and
1 his Macedonian warrant officer, and I had come back to find that they were
2 gone and found out I was the senior officer on the ground and was then
3 given the mission to organise this helicopter evacuation of wounded.
4 Q. We saw earlier today a photograph of you speaking through Senad to
5 a man in a beard. Was that related to that incident?
6 A. That sounds like -- that would sound about right, because a key
7 thing that we were trying to do then is get an accurate head count of how
8 many serious injuries -- seriously injured people we actually had to
10 Q. So is it right, then, that you were liaising with the War
11 Presidency, or at least a member of the War Presidency?
12 A. Yes. That -- again, I cannot recall for sure, but looking at the
13 picture and what was going on, that's correct.
14 Q. And did that evacuation go off safely?
15 A. No, it did not.
16 Q. What happened?
17 A. We had organised the night -- or the day before. We had a very
18 good operations plan. Everybody had specific duties and responsibilities
19 to carry out. With the Bosnian forces, particularly, it was the civil
20 police under Senad -- excuse me, not Senad, but under Zele who were going
21 to use the police to secure the outside of the perimeter. The Canadian
22 military, the one squad within 113 was going to secure the inside of the
23 perimeter. Zele was -- no, excuse me, Senad was going to get the trucks.
24 The UNHCR doctor -- excuse me, the Doctors Without Borders was going to
25 tag the wounded, and I was going to basically be in charge of the
1 operation, making it happen. I also left another officer at the hospital
2 to make sure we got the wounded moving onto the trucks once we got the
3 first evacuation out. We had talked it through, we had rehearsed it, we
4 were ready to go.
5 Q. What stopped it going ahead smoothly?
6 A. The morning of the operation I sent the civilian police down to
7 secure the outside of the soccer field perimeter. They moved out smartly
8 and did it. As soon as they arrived, some Serb artillery rounds struck.
9 One police officer was killed and at least two others were wounded. We
10 continued on with the operation.
11 Q. I'm going to refer again to D199. It's page 156, the "War
12 Hospital" book.
13 A. Can I have a copy, please?
14 Q. Yes. 156.
15 Now, it's the third paragraph, I think. "Major Dudley was with
16 his tactical satellite device beside a concrete wall, partly protected,
17 when one of the shells landed about 60 feet away. The huge craters in the
18 soggy ground suggest to him large-calibre shells shot by a Serb artillery
19 battery. The great accuracy of the strikes makes him think they've been
20 called in by a forward observer with a clear view of the evacuation from
21 the hills above."
22 Is that correct?
23 A. That is very correct. The shell landed right in the middle of the
24 soccer field, very close to where the air controllers - I believe they
25 were both French - were located right after the first wave of helicopters
1 had taken off.
2 Q. And your opinion was that the Serbs were actually with a clear of
3 the evacuation of the wounded and the blue helmets were actually shelling
4 the evacuation. Is that correct?
5 A. Fortunately for us, the first wave of helicopters had already
6 taken off and the trucks that had brought the wounded had also left for
7 the hospital to get the second load. So the only people inside the
8 stadium at that time were the two French air controllers and the Canadian
9 forces. I believe Tony Birtley was also on the ground with his video.
10 The rest of the forces, 113 and a couple of Jeeps, were up against the
11 concrete wall that was very close to the stadium and actually was inside
12 the stadium walls. So we were fortunate we did not have a whole lot of
13 people on the ground when the initial shelling started.
14 Q. Now, one thing we're interested here is the damage which can be
15 done by artillery. What sort of a crater was created by the shells?
16 A. This crater was huge, and the key thing I remember, it was almost
17 as big as from where my desk is here to that first table in front of me.
18 And it would be just about as wide, and it was above my head. And that
19 suggested to me either a very large calibre, like a 152-millimetre
20 artillery shell or more likely a huge mortar shell, because they had to
21 have a high angle of trajectory in order to lob it over the hills and into
22 that soccer stadium. And again, they put it right in the middle of that
23 soccer stadium.
24 Q. And can you tell us whether regular high-explosive rounds can
25 actually set fire to objects like buildings?
1 A. Yes. High-explosive rounds, particularly with dry wood, can
2 easily start a fire; either grass fire or a forest fire.
3 Q. And how about tracer fire?
4 A. Tracer fire most definitely can start, particularly grass fires,
5 but also forest fires, and it can also start fires inside of buildings if
6 they hit dry wood.
7 Q. And did you see tracer fire being used in the Srebrenica area?
8 A. Yes, I did. At that drop zone. You could see it in the video.
9 And I did not get close enough to the front lines at night to see Serb
10 tracer fire, but I would strongly suspect that they had it and used it.
11 Q. Now, you've referred already to Naser or to Naser Oric. Who, in
12 fact, mentioned him to you, mentioned that name?
13 A. The first time I heard his name was from my keeper/interpreter,
14 Senad. And I asked him who is the commander on the ground that I can
15 coordinate with. And he mentioned Naser as the person to do that with. I
16 then requested --
17 Q. Let me take it step by step. Now, do you recall, first of all,
18 the exact words Senad used in these discussions and whether that was in
19 English or in German or what precisely his words were?
20 A. I don't remember his words precisely. I requested to meet with
21 the local military commander, and he said that was Oric, Naser. Excuse
22 me, it was just Naser, that's the only term I actually heard the entire
23 time I was there. I requested to meet with him, and he said: I will see
24 if I can arrange a meeting, or words to that effect.
25 Q. Now, do you recall -- apart from Senad - and I'll come to that -
1 do you recall anyone else specifically mentioning Naser? Only if you can
2 remember a specific name.
3 A. No, I cannot remember anybody else specifically naming Naser as
4 the military commander.
5 Q. Or even referring to him, mentioning his name?
6 A. It would be possible, but it wouldn't register as a name that came
7 up in multiple conversations.
8 Q. Now -- and how was he referred to? Was it as Naser or as Naser
9 Oric or Oric?
10 A. The only term I ever remember hearing him referred to as is Naser.
11 Q. Now, were you able to verify, apart from anything which Senad
12 said, whether in fact Senad, I don't think you've given his last name,
13 whether Senad ever spoke to Naser Oric?
14 A. No, I cannot confirm it. I assumed that he was liaisoning with me
15 because Naser requested him to do so, but I can never verify that.
16 Q. And Senad, in fact, liaised with other people, didn't he,
17 including members of the War Presidency?
18 A. Yes, exactly. Just like that gentleman you saw me talking to with
19 him as the interpreter.
20 Q. And Senad, you told us, arrived in Srebrenica in -- I think you
21 said January or February 1993. Correct?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. And you said that you asked him to arrange a meeting with Naser.
24 Was he ever able to arrange that?
25 A. I know I requested at least three times that first week I was
1 there to try to meet with the local military commanders, or commander - I
2 don't know which - and he wasn't able to pull it off.
3 Q. Right. So in the first week you requested at least three times to
4 meet with either a local military commander or commanders. And Senad said
5 that he would see what he could do, but he didn't actually arrange a
6 meeting with -- between you and Naser. Is that correct?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. Did you ever see Senad in the company of Naser?
9 A. No, I did not. Let me state here, I -- while I was in the pocket,
10 I would not have known Naser if I saw him because I didn't have a face
11 with a name.
12 MR. JONES: I would like actually if the witness could now be
13 should D902.
14 Q. Now, this is dated -- well, it's HQ BH command Kiseljak, 15 March
15 1993. Period covered last seven days. And that's from the 7th to the
16 15th March 1993. And it says: "General situation: The area of
17 operations was quiet other than in Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves where
18 the media continues to focus international attention."
19 And if we turn to the second page we see under "Eastern Bosnia"
20 it's written: "The systematic cleansing of the Srebrenica enclave
21 continues in the form of a strong BSA offensive. It appears that the
22 Serbs are advancing from the north and east simultaneously. With the fall
23 of Cerska this week, BSA forces pushed east and south, pressuring
24 Konjevic Polje and Srebrenica respectively.
25 "The situation in Srebrenica is reported as being desperate as
1 civilian refugees are concentrating there. There are a large number of
2 wounded and they are reportedly without medicine and anaesthetics.
3 "(c) the condition of the Srebrenica defense is not clear amid
4 media reports of its imminent collapse."
5 And I'll pause there. This refers to a period when you were in
6 the pocket. Was this the situation, as far as you know, on the 15th of
7 March, 1993?
8 A. That's a very accurate statement, yes.
9 Q. Was there, or was there not at the time, some pretty desperate
10 fighting on the front lines?
11 A. Yes. And you could see it on the faces of the fighters as they
12 were returning to Srebrenica.
13 Q. Now, did you analyse the tactics, if any, that were being used on
14 the Muslim side?
15 A. Yes, I did. And again, I stated, as I stated before, I was very
16 interested to see if they were going to be able to hold the perimeter of
17 Srebrenica, and that was the key reason for analysing and asking exactly
18 how they were defending the pocket.
19 Q. And in fact, is part of what you concluded set out in this manual
20 which you contributed to on the tactics of the different sides in the
21 Bosnian conflict?
22 A. The key term I would like to use is the Muslims were using a term
23 called asymmetric warfare, and they were hitting the Serbs in the one weak
24 spot that they could, which was using surprise, small-unit raiding parties
25 to disrupt their operations. Most of these operations took place at night
1 or very early morning just before dawn to strike when and where they could
2 and as unexpectedly as they could. The only other tactic that the Muslims
3 used were small units going up to the front lines to hold specific parts
4 of the perimeter.
5 Q. Now, you say "asymmetric warfare," what was asymmetric about it?
6 A. The Serbs had overwhelming combined arms power. They had tanks,
7 they had AAA, air defence artillery weapons mounted on vehicles. They had
8 a wide variety of calibres of indirect-fire weapons, both mortars and
9 artillery and multiple rocket launches, and they had supporting aircraft
10 flying over from Serbia dropping bombs on the enclave. All the Muslims
11 had were small arms and some automatic weapons. I saw one tank in town,
12 but it didn't have ammunition. And they had very limited fuel, so it
13 wasn't any good to them even as a transport vehicle.
14 Q. And do you know where they got that tank from?
15 A. I'm assuming that they captured it from Serb forces when they
16 surprised them on one of their raids.
17 Q. Now, when we speak of tactics on the Muslim side, is this
18 something which were organised tactics or disorganised? How would you
19 characterise it?
20 A. I would prefer to use the term "semi-autonomous activities." As I
21 mentioned earlier, their communications were almost non-existent. They
22 had to use couriers, say the commander going around and rounding up his
23 own men or sending men that he had to get other people. And that was the
24 primary ways of communicating on the front lines, too, was sending
25 runners, because they had no land-lines or good FM radios to talk with.
1 And the few devices they did have were not secure, so the Serbs had the
2 capability of intercepting them. So the communications were almost
3 non-existent between different small unit commanders.
4 Q. And in these raids which you've described, are you able to say
5 whether or not they were able to actually hold territory and whether that
6 was one of the aims?
7 A. Well, that was one of their biggest weaknesses is that they could
8 not hold turf, particularly along main avenues of approach, because the
9 Serbs could overwhelm them with both indirect and direct fire.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Sellers.
11 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, could we just get a time period of
12 which the witness is now referring to?
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Ms. Sellers.
14 Yes, Mr. Jones, could you address this, please, with the witness.
15 MR. JONES: Yes. Well, perhaps it's a question for the witness.
16 Q. When -- These observations you made, what time frame would they
18 A. This was the same time frame that I was in Srebrenica, which was
19 11 March 1993 through 28 March 1993.
20 Q. All right. And those observations, meaning the raids and holding
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. Now, turning to the Serb side now and the Serb military presence
24 around Srebrenica, would you say the Serbs constituted an organised army
25 or not?
1 A. Yes. They were an organised fighting force at the brigade level,
2 and I would probably have to say at the division level.
3 Q. And what were their tactics towards Srebrenica when you were there
4 from what you could tell?
5 A. Would you like a detailed answer on this one?
6 Q. Yes, please.
7 A. Okay. The Serbs were mostly composed of reserve soldiers with
8 some professional officers leading them. Therefore, they were capable of
9 combined-arms operations if they were kept simple and set peace. And they
10 had developed a very specific way of clearing villages. They would use
11 indirect fire to shell the villages and immediate surrounding area,
12 chasing out all the refugees and destroying what -- a lot of buildings in
13 the process, trying to deny covering concealment to the defending Muslim
14 forces; I will call those light infantry forces. They would then move in
15 and use AAA guns and other direct-fire weapons, say tank rounds, to
16 further pulverise the area, destroying any other covering defences. If
17 they had tear gas available, they would use that also. They would then
18 finally send in their infantry, because they wanted to minimise their
19 casualties, with tanks and other armoured supporting type vehicles to
20 provide direct-fire support to the infantry and finally clear the town and
21 surrounding area.
22 Q. And in that regard and given your experience there and experience
23 beforehand, would it be perverse to pulverise, as you say, an area which
24 was held by the Muslims but which had been Serb beforehand?
25 A. No. If I were a Serb commander on the ground and a town that had
1 been formerly occupied by my people but had been abandoned, captured by
2 the enemy, was now in enemy hands, unless I needed it for my own
3 operations, destroying those buildings would be a legitimate military
4 target because I wanted to deny covering concealment to the enemy.
5 MR. JONES: I wonder if the witness could be shown D976, please.
6 Q. And while that's being passed up, did you hear of any accounts of
7 incendiary or inflammable devices being used by the Serbs?
8 A. Yes, I did. Specifically, the accusation of napalm was used, that
9 they had seen large, burnt-out areas, but I never saw any personal
10 evidence of that.
11 Q. Do you exclude the possibility of its use or you didn't see it?
12 A. I did not see it.
13 Q. Now, this document is dated -- is from the Bratunac Light Infantry
14 Brigade command, dated 4 February 1993, and it's a short document, so I
15 can read: "With its main forces the special brigade shall extend the
16 attack towards Kunjerac, while with its auxiliary forces it shall
17 coordinate with the 1st Infantry Battalion in carrying out the mission,
18 artillery on request."
19 Now, firstly, how would you understand auxiliary units?
20 A. Auxiliary units are not part of the actual unit in question here,
21 the special brigade. They are detachments. And "auxiliary" specifically
22 means to me, as a military term, that these are untrained or
23 paramilitary-type groups that aren't actually part of the organised
24 military force.
25 Q. And how do you understand the expression "artillery on request"?
1 A. When you provide artillery to a unit, you have either indirect
2 support, direct support, reinforcing general support. In this case,
3 artillery on request means that the artillery was in direct support, so
4 all the commander had to do was ask for it and he would receive it. This
5 also tells me that the Serbs had plenty of artillery to spare, since they
6 could afford to give a brigade commander in a specific operation all the
7 artillery you could need.
8 Q. Now, did you establish the location of Serb artillery in the
9 Srebrenica pocket?
10 A. I was able to locate at least -- I saw one point -- one directly
11 because it was shooting at me while I was trying to get to an outlying
12 town. I could see where the guns were firing from, I could see the shells
13 impacting close to my location. And then I was able to get reports,
14 multiple reports that confirmed that some from the UNMOs saw Serb
15 artillery on -- it looked like on the Serb side of the Drina to the north
16 of Srebrenica -- excuse me, to the south of Srebrenica, and then in one
17 vicinity Bratunac. So they were using artillery basically all around the
19 Q. And in observing this, did you get out and about the enclave? And
20 if so, how? How did you move around?
21 A. I usually took one of the Belgian or UNMO Jeeps because I didn't
22 want to burn up a lot of fuel and it was also a four-wheel vehicle that
23 would allow me to get off the main hardball road and off onto the little
24 the bunny tracks as I was looking for adequate drop zones. And yes, I did
25 get out and about just about every day.
1 Q. And would you say you got out and about more or less or the same
2 as the other UNMOs and UNPROFOR officers there?
3 A. I got out and about probably more than anybody in the enclave,
4 except for Tony Birtley.
5 Q. Now, I want to ask you about the next exhibit. It's D904, Defence
6 Exhibit 904. And again, HQ BH command, Kiseljak, 29 March 1993. Period
7 covered: Last seven days, 22 to 28 March, 1993. So that would refer to a
8 time period when you were in the enclave, correct?
9 A. Let's see. I was there 11 through 28 March, so, yes, it looks
10 like I was there for most of that time, 22 to 28 March, I was there on the
11 ground. That is correct.
12 Q. Again, the general situation we can see. I want to actually turn
13 to 3(a), which is on the next page. It says: "Eastern Bosnia. The BSA
14 offensive into the Srebrenica enclave continued its apparently inexorable
15 drive towards the centre, at Srebrenica from the north, south, and
16 south-east. Muslim towns and villages continued to fall in an almost
17 systematic fashion as BiH local commanders attempted to hold the line.
18 The following built-up areas were reported fallen to the Serbs this week:
19 Ljeskovic, Karacici and Gajic. The villages of Osmace and Subin were last
20 reported surrounded by BSA forces. Fighting was reported in and around
21 Zeleni Jadar, with the Serbs in the town itself on 25 March. As of 27
22 March, however, the town was still in BiH hands."
23 I want to ask you if you're familiar with any of those places;
24 specifically Osmace and Zeleni Jadar.
25 A. Yes, I do remember those names specifically. I don't remember
1 exactly where they were located on the map, but they were very close and
2 initially they were on the outside perimeter of Srebrenica.
3 Q. And was the situation as described there, is that as you recall
4 it? Is that accurate?
5 A. Very much so. Particularly, that was the last week that I was in
6 Srebrenica, and I remember going out on a road to the south of Srebrenica,
7 trying to recon on what was going on and see if I could get an air-drop
8 out there to feed the refugees who were streaming into Srebrenica, and
9 also hold them out there instead of overcrowding the town. I went out
10 there with a UNHCR representative, and I was told, Don't go, don't go,
11 there's too many Serbs on the road, they're coming this way, you'll get
13 Q. Okay. Now, before moving on to my next theme, I want to ask you a
14 bit about the public health situation. You've described that in detail,
15 and I think it's accepted mostly that the conditions, at least in the
16 hospital, and elsewhere, were appalling. In fact, did you personally see
17 children arriving at hospital after Serb mortar attacks?
18 A. Yes, I did. And I recorded one specific incident where I had just
19 delivered or was going to deliver medical supplies from an air-drop to the
20 hospital. And a cart-load of wounded civilians, particularly children,
21 pulled up. And I remember one girl sitting up in the cart, and she was
22 missing her face, basically, from the eyes down. It was all gone.
23 Q. And were such scenes usual or unusual in Srebrenica?
24 A. Unfortunately, they were very usual.
25 Q. Now, were medicines dropped as well as food with the air-drops?
1 A. Yes, and I was very concerned about prioritising what medicines
2 came in based on most need.
3 Q. Did those medicines find their way to the hospital, as intended?
4 A. Sometimes yes, sometimes no.
5 Q. Do you recall something involving typhoid vaccines?
6 A. Yes. That was another painful experience. The same time that we
7 had organised that other special pallet drop to resupply our headquarters
8 with the radio batteries and special food for our own forces, we were also
9 having a typhoid drop because we were very worried about water-borne
10 diseases breaking out and typhoid being one of the key problems. We,
11 along with the batteries I was so desperately wanting to get my hands on,
12 I was also desperately wanting to get this typhoid medicine to administer
13 to the population. Unfortunately, I found out that when the refugees got
14 a hold of the packet, the pallet, that dropped, they also got a hold of
15 the typhoid medicine. And not knowing what it was, they burned it.
16 Q. And was there a risk, or not, of epidemics at that time?
17 A. Yes. And we actually had a form of epidemic in the town. We call
18 it the Srebrenica crud, but it was a bad respiratory flu-like symptom that
19 people would get a really bad cramping in the stomach, they would be
20 throwing up, they would also have diarrhea. And it would really
21 incapacitate them. I ended up with it after I had left the pocket. And
22 several of our members in the group, the international group, also came
23 down with it while they were in Srebrenica. Again, when you have people
24 who are starved and worn out and crowded into dirty, filthy conditions,
25 they are very prone to epidemics breaking out.
1 Q. And then do you recall what the death rate was when you were
2 there, the daily death rate?
3 A. It varied upon each day. We would go from five to 20-plus,
4 depending on what had happened that day.
5 Q. And was it unusual to see people who looked malnourished?
6 A. No, that was the common look. Even our own forces after that
7 second week, since we were on half rations, were looking pretty
8 malnourished at the end of the period.
9 MR. JONES: I wonder if we could go into private session just
10 briefly. I have a question about a specific person.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly, Mr. Jones.
12 Let's go to private session for a while, please.
13 [Private session]
8 [Open session]
9 JUDGE AGIUS: We are back in open session, Mr. Jones.
10 MR. JONES: Right.
11 Q. Now, you've told how you went into Srebrenica with General
12 Morillon's group, and you've referred to General Morillon, his body-guard.
13 Was he often with General Morillon?
14 A. Yes. He was -- you could say he was glued at the hip with General
15 Morillon. He was his translator and his body-guard.
16 Q. Do you recall a Major Pyers Tucker?
17 A. Yes, I do. He was the third member of General Morillon's tight
18 little party.
19 MR. JONES: If the witness could be shown Exhibit D231 now,
21 Oh, I understand it's under seal. So as long as it's not placed
22 on the ELMO, that's not a problem. I'm in fact not going to ask about --
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Exactly. It depends on what your question's going
24 to be, Mr. Jones.
25 MR. JONES: The questions only involve the means by which this was
1 transmitted, which I think is acceptable.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. You can show it to the witness without
3 it being put on the ELMO and you can put the question.
4 MR. JONES: Yes.
5 Q. It's simply this: Do you see that in this document on the first
6 page there's a report by you sent by TacSat?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. That is a secure method of communication?
9 A. Yes. Particularly because I was transmitting grid zones over the
10 radio and I did not want people to hear that information.
11 Q. And on the same page, we see that Major Tucker sent a report by
12 HF. Now, what is HF?
13 A. HF is a form of radio communication, high frequency. And it's
14 basically a bounce system where you bounce it off the atmosphere and it
15 comes down to another location.
16 Q. And was that a secure method of communication?
17 A. In this case, no, it was not secure. This was the standard
18 UNPROFOR method of communication in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 Q. So the Serbs could have access to this sitrep with all the
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Was that good military practice?
23 A. Lousy military practice.
24 MR. JONES: And, actually, I'm finished with that -- that
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Jones.
2 MR. JONES:
3 Q. Did you talk much with Major Tucker when you were in Srebrenica?
4 A. No, we communicated very little.
5 Q. What sort of relations did you have with him?
6 A. To be honest, not very good. He wasn't very good about
7 communicating to the rest of the team General Morillon's intentions and or
8 was going to be happening next. It was a rather frustrating situation.
9 Q. Did you ever have problems with him regarding the radio?
10 A. Yes, let me relate one incident. And this is the same pallet that
11 we were having dropped to re-supply our forces within Srebrenica, and this
12 is where we had the typhoid medicine and the batteries. I knew it was
13 coming in and I needed a vehicle to go secure the supplies immediately.
14 He was on the radio sending a report or talking or something, and I was
15 begging him to get off of it so I could take this vehicle to recover the
16 supplies, and he would not do it.
17 Q. And was there any other way in which he possibly alienated either
18 you or others in the team?
19 A. He was a stand-offish individual. And, again, as I stated, he was
20 the aid to General Morillon, particularly since he spoke fluent French,
21 and he was the senior military man on the ground after General Morillon,
22 particularly being his aid. We were all working for General Morillon, and
23 we did not get General Morillon's intentions briefed to us. So we were
24 left in the dark.
25 Q. From that document we've just seen, it appears that two majors on
1 the ground were both sending independent reports. Is that correct and is
2 that good practice?
3 A. No -- that is correct, and no, it is not good practice. You
4 usually want to coordinate your reports, so you're speaking with one
6 Q. I think you've described how at one point you were left as a
7 senior officer without being forewarned?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. Did you provide Major Tucker with much information?
10 A. Initially I attempted to. That's a good standard military
11 practice, but then after a while I found him very uncommunicative and I
12 just sort of gave up.
13 Q. Did you ever tell him any stories about Naser Oric?
14 A. No. None that I remember.
15 Q. And did you hear -- ever hear anything negative about Naser Oric
16 when you were in Srebrenica?
17 A. No, I did not. I would like to state to you what I did hear, if
18 that is okay.
19 Q. Well, I'm dealing specifically with this issue, and I want to take
20 it step by step. Was Major Tucker a reliable source of information for
22 A. Rarely.
23 MR. JONES: Your Honours, will you give me one moment, please?
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly, Mr. Jones.
25 [Defence counsel confer]
1 MR. JONES: Your Honour, I have a fairly lengthy final section,
2 but I prefer to deal with it all in one go, so I would actually prefer to
3 finish early today and I can finish within 20 minutes, half an hour at a
4 maximum tomorrow. It's just that --
5 JUDGE AGIUS: You have 20 minutes now, if you want, if you think
6 you can finish in 20 minutes.
7 MR. JONES: I don't. That's why I say half an hour.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, exactly. If you require 30 minutes, then
9 obviously you won't be able to do that today.
10 Tomorrow morning I suppose you know already that we will be
11 starting at 8.00 and not 9.00. You have been informed about that.
12 Sir, you know about that, too?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: You think you will be in a position to finish your
15 cross-examination tomorrow?
16 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, I intended to do the cross-examination
17 within one day. It just depends on a couple of issues that are raised and
18 I'll have to consult with the team. But that's my intention. It might go
19 over very briefly into the next day.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.
21 So we adjourn here. Thank you so much, Lieutenant Colonel. We'll
22 see you again tomorrow morning at 8.00. And I think -- you need to decide
23 whether you will need Tony Birtley here tomorrow or you start with him the
24 day after. It's up to you.
25 MR. JONES: Yes. I think probably -- well, I'll consider that.
1 Thank you.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
3 Good afternoon, everybody.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.27 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 14th day of
6 December, 2005, at 8.00 a.m.