1 Tuesday, 11 July 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.44 p.m.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: May I apologise, first of all, for the delay in
7 starting caused by the efforts of the earlier sitting to complete the
8 trial that started at 8.00 this morning. These efforts were successful,
9 so in the end of the day I think the loss here is probably overall the
10 Tribunal's gain. So I'm very grateful to you for your patience.
11 Mr. Hannis.
12 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. I asked if I could raise
13 two brief matters before we resume with the witness.
14 First of all, I want to introduce a new member of your team.
15 Daniela Kravetz is sitting next to Mr. Stamp and will be assisting today.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
17 MR. HANNIS: And also, Your Honour, I wanted to raise with Your
18 Honours the possibility of reading in 89(F) summaries for witnesses whom
19 we introduce and use Rule 89(F) statements with.
20 I've handed up and handed out to Defence counsel a proposed
21 summary for the next witness to follow. It struck me that I think
22 sometimes if we just bring in the witness and then we start to try and ask
23 them questions, we're sort of starting out from a void. I believe you'll
24 see that this is a very brief statement. If you compare it to the
25 statement itself, I think you'll find it's accurate, it's entirely drawn
1 from the statement, and I would ask you to reconsider that possibility,
2 subject to any objections Defence counsel may have.
3 Thank you.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I should express my own view of this. I
5 consider this stage of a case as a time when evidence is given, not a time
6 when people summarise other people's evidence, and I question the reason
7 for doing it. If it's a public relations exercise just so that there's a
8 summary for the public out there, then in my opinion that's not an
9 appropriate exercise of the use of the courtroom. And as far as the
10 Judges are concerned, they can read the statement, don't need a summary.
11 So what's the purpose, Mr. Hannis?
12 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, it is partly a public relations matter
13 in that we have an interest in having public trials here. We have
14 expressed our interest in having as much of the proceedings as possible in
15 open court. Some of the people watching this trial from outside, Your
16 Honour, will not have the opportunity to see the written statements that
17 go into evidence for these witnesses. And some of the people watching
18 this trial, even if they could get their hands on the written copies of
19 the documents don't read, frankly. So, Your Honour, this is an
20 opportunity for them to hear what this 89(F) witness or the next 89(F)
21 witness is about.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, does any Defence counsel wish to comment on
23 this issue?
24 Mr. O'Sullivan.
25 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, I recall that one of your reasons
1 also for not wanting to proceed this way was because we don't want to
2 enter into disputes over whether or not the summary read into court
3 actually reflects what's in the actual 89(F) statement. And we certainly
4 don't want to be putting ourselves in that situation, and there's a danger
5 that that could happen. And we've received these summaries just before
6 the witness enters and we'd be trying to see whether it accurately
7 reflects or not the actual 89(F) statement. And that can lead to lots of
8 dispute and time being wasted.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: On the other hand -- no, I entirely agree. I was
10 accepting Mr. Hannis's assurance at the moment that the summary will be
11 entirely accurate.
12 But, Mr. O'Sullivan, yesterday -- now that I've had a chance to
13 read Ms. Mitchell's statement, we simply had it explained to us yesterday
14 in far greater detail than even the statement goes into. It was quite --
15 in my opinion, a quite unnecessary exercise or use of court time when that
16 statement was readily available or could have been readily available for
17 everyone to read.
18 So, it's in a sense, commendable to think of a way of shortening
19 the process by referring to a summary, but it just seems that -- to me
20 that there must be a better way of doing it by asking a few focussed
21 questions to identify what is the general nature of the witness's
22 evidence. And I would have thought that skilled counsel should be able to
23 do that without having to rely on a script which attempts to summarise the
25 Now, is there any other comment to be made on the matter?
1 Well, the Trial Chamber will consider the position and we'll make
2 a ruling on it at a later stage, possibly today. But for the moment, just
3 in case we don't make that ruling quite as quickly as you would like it,
4 Mr. Hannis, you should be prepared to introduce the next witness through
5 his evidence.
6 MR. HANNIS: I will, Your Honour. Thank you.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, before we continue with the evidence, I would
8 like to ask -- to have certain things clarified.
9 Mr. Stamp, we have the -- the principal statement for Ms. Mitchell
10 for this case is a one-page statement which is -- was completed on the 8th
11 of July, and it refers to a number of proposed exhibits. One is the
12 agreement for the Kosovo Verification Mission, one is Resolution 1199, the
13 third one is the report that's been challenged, and the fourth one is the
14 Kosovo atlas 2 of maps. Now, is the last item there the large bundle of
15 maps that we were handed?
16 MR. STAMP: [Microphone not activated].
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Is it something we haven't seen yet?
18 MR. STAMP: It is something you haven't seen yet. But as it was
19 referred to in the statement, it being a reference map really, it's
20 something that might assist you in looking for locations. I didn't have
21 an intention to --
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, how many maps of Kosovo do you intend to give
23 us? I mean, Kosovo is not an enormous place, and we want to have this
24 case simplified. It's the Prosecutor's challenge to make the case simple
25 for the Judges. Now, why are you setting out to make it as complicated as
1 you can on the surface, and why are you not content just to have one map
2 or even one book of maps that we can work with?
3 MR. STAMP: Well, I'm not actually setting out to make it
4 complicated. The thing about it is that the map on this list is a map on
5 the exhibits list that was filed. Some of the maps in the bundle are not
6 on the exhibit list, but as it turned out when I had a look at the maps at
7 some point in time, they seemed to me to be clearer, and it's a matter of
8 opinion, than those on the exhibit list. So we are in a position where we
9 would not want to -- to lose those maps which are not on the exhibit list.
10 And we have a situation as well where we have not been able to agree any
11 maps so far. I think we should be able to agree these maps.
12 So until we can agree the maps and until the matter is settled and
13 resolved, I think the Prosecution is just prudent to ensure that at the
14 appropriate time it makes application to tender the maps which are on the
15 exhibit list, just in case, out of an abundance of caution. Later on, the
16 bundle might not be received or used.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp, the Chamber is not in favour of
19 admitting documents out of an abundance of caution. The Chamber is in
20 favour of admitting documents that the Prosecution tendered to it that
21 will be helpful to the Chamber in reaching its decision. And presenting
22 more maps of Kosovo to us is, in our view, not helpful, and we are
23 inclined to refuse to admit this bundle of documents and ask you to go
24 back to the drawing-board with Mr. Hannis and sort out what maps you're
25 going to rely on, because he's already given us a bundle, which is an
1 expanded bundle of the Kosovo atlas.
2 Now, as far as the other items are concerned, you did make
3 reference in the course of the evidence to the Security Council
4 resolution, I think.
5 MR. STAMP: Yeah.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: And the agreement on the organisation. I now want
7 to ask you just a few other points of clarification about this evidence.
8 You say that there will be 12 witnesses who were people who provided
9 information to the KVM.
10 MR. STAMP: Yes.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: And they, I take it, relate to municipalities which
12 are the subject of charges, either in -- set out in paragraph 72 or 75.
13 You also said that there were roughly 2.800 documents, let's call them
14 that, which recounted the experiences of people who either had made
15 complaints of violent conduct or who were refugees explaining why they had
16 moved. Are these 2.800 identified people?
17 MR. STAMP: In the sense that they are named?
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
19 MR. STAMP: Yes, they are.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: And are the documents simply brief indications of
21 their accounts rather than detailed statements?
22 MR. STAMP: They are brief indications of their accounts. They
23 are just a format -- the question is the format is in the bundle of
24 documents, the format of the refugee questionnaire.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: And that was formulated by the OTP?
1 MR. STAMP: No, it was formulated by the KVM.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: They formulated them. All right. And these are
3 the documents you say that if the Defence asked to see them they would be
4 permitted to see them?
5 MR. STAMP: Indeed.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: They are not given to you under Rule 70?
7 MR. STAMP: They are given to us not -- they are given to us under
8 the strictest confidentiality, not under Rule 70, but for use of the
9 purposes of this case and other related cases. So the Defence would be
10 entitled to see them, and we would make them available.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: That's very helpful. Thank you very much.
12 Now, Mr. Fila, it's for you -- sorry, Mr. O'Sullivan.
13 MR. O'SULLIVAN: You may not want to enter into this debate right
14 now, but I would submit that there's more to this than just saying that
15 they're available to us upon our request.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I expect you to make what submissions you
17 wish to make on this issue when we decide -- or when you make submissions
18 about the admissibility of the two volumes of the report.
19 Mr. Fila, to continue with your cross-examination, please.
20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I shall continue, but I
21 will not repeat the history because I finished with that yesterday.
22 WITNESS: SANDRA MITCHELL [Resumed]
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Fila: [Continued]
24 Q. Mrs. Mitchell, in your work you used local staff, especially
25 interpreters and translators. Would you be able to tell us the ethnic
1 composition of your local staff, i.e., who your interpreters were, how
2 many of them were Albanians, how many of them were Serbs?
3 A. Use of interpreters was -- included both Albanians, Serbians,
4 Bosniaks, anybody in Kosovo. And how we used them depended on what the
5 tasking was for that day. For example, it was dangerous to send Serbian
6 interpreters to speak to the UCK. So Albanian interpreters would go, and
7 then whether people knew the language, the exact numbers would have
8 been -- again, depending on how many people are out in the field. Each
9 international staff member would have been accompanied by an interpreter.
10 Q. Can I assume, for example, that maybe 90 per cent of your
11 interpreters were Albanians? Would that be a fair assumption,
13 A. I don't think it would have been that high. I think it would have
14 been probably -- in our daily work we would be using 60 to 70 per cent
15 because we would have been also dealing with the Serbian authorities, the
16 VJ, and the MUP at the same time as part of ongoing activities, and there
17 we would have been using the Serbian translators, too.
18 Q. If you don't mind, your answers can be even shorter to economise
19 on time.
20 What I would like to know now, since I understand that you are a
21 lawyer by profession, did these interpreters have to take a solemn oath
22 that they would interpret accurately, like our interpreters do here in the
23 courtroom? Was that the case with your interpreters?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. They did take the oath?
1 A. They signed a confidentiality agreement, yes.
2 Q. I did not ask you that. I asked you whether they took the solemn
3 oath; I didn't ask you about the confidentiality agreement. Here you took
4 a solemn declaration that you would tell the truth. You did not sign an
5 agreement that you would testify. As a lawyer, I believe that you see the
6 difference, that you understand the difference. I believe my question was
7 simple enough. I referred to an oath, yes or no?
8 A. Yes. In the confidentiality agreement, the person says that they
9 will work honourably, translate correctly, et cetera. Did they take the
10 same oath I took today? No, they did not, but there was an oath contained
11 in the confidentiality statements.
12 Q. I understand. It was a descriptive answer, but I understand.
13 You were accommodated in houses and in hotels when you were
14 engaged in your mission. In addition to Kosovo Polje, did you stay
15 anywhere else on Kosovo in a house that was not owned by an Albanian? Can
16 you give us an example of that, Kosovo as the whole region?
17 A. Well, I personally have rented from both Albanians and Serbians
18 during my time in Kosovo.
19 Q. I asked you precisely. Save for Kosovo Polje, where else did you
20 stay in a Serb house? If you can't remember, it's not a problem at all.
21 A. I'm not sure why you're putting me in Kosovo Polje. I lived in
23 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I'm confused by the
25 JUDGE BONOMY: I suspect the assumption was that if you had been
1 in Kosovo Polje you would have stayed in the house of a Serb, but
2 elsewhere in Kosovo the likelihood is you would have stayed with an
4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Because only Serbs lived there.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Since you were in Pristina, then perhaps you could
6 explain whether you stayed with both in Pristina.
7 THE WITNESS: I did, sir, during my time there.
8 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
9 Q. You stayed in Serb houses in Pristina and Kosovo Polje and
10 elsewhere in Kosovo. Is that correct?
11 A. I didn't stay in any houses in Kosovo Polje, but I stayed in -- I
12 had a Serb apartment in Pristina --
13 Q. No, no, no. I did not ask about you personally. You had five
14 places or points in Kosovo, not you personally but other people. It would
15 not be appropriate for me to ask you where you personally lived. But your
16 staff, where did they stay in Kosovo? And I'm not asking you at all about
17 Kosovo Polje because Kosovo Polje is Serbian. So where did your staff
18 stay in Kosovo, as a region?
19 A. The --
20 Q. I don't mean you personally.
21 A. I apologise. The KVM had offices in Pristina. It had regional
22 offices in Pec/Peja, Gnjilane, Mitrovica, and Prizren. And then they
23 had -- we had another 30-plus field offices in all of the opstinas, in the
24 municipalities, including Kosovo Polje, Orahovac, Klina, Istok, Decan --
25 do you want me to name them all?
1 Q. No. I would like you to tell me at which of these places your
2 staff stayed in Serb houses, if you know; if you don't know, it's okay.
3 A. The staff would have stayed, usually for security reasons, would
4 stay in -- if it was a Serb-dominated area, you rented the property from
5 the Serbians; if it was an Albanian-dominated area, you rented from the
6 Albanians. And so -- again, I can go through it municipality by
7 municipality if --
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, but I think the question is do you have
9 direct knowledge of your staff staying in accommodation rented from Serbs?
10 And if so, can you say in what areas that happened?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do have knowledge. It would have been in
12 Mitrovica, in -- in the Strpci area, in the Gracanica area, in -- in
13 Pristina, in Prizren, in Pec. Pretty much everywhere. We didn't
14 distinguish upon ethnic lines.
15 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
16 Q. If I understand you well, at places where the majority population
17 was Albanian you stayed in Albanian houses; and where the majority
18 population were Serbs, then you rented from the Serbs. Was my
19 understanding correct?
20 A. Generally that's true, yes.
21 Q. As far as I know -- and I want to clarify something from your
22 statement. According to the SRY-OSCE agreement, the staff of your mission
23 should have been unarmed and there should have been a plane that should
24 have been used by your staff. Yesterday you told us that at one point in
25 March, probably on the 22nd of March, 1999, you had to leave Kosovo for
1 security reasons, if I understood you well?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Bearing in mind that you were not armed. And when I say "you," I
4 don't mean you personally, but all of you, all your staff, just to clarify
5 this matter --
6 A. I won't make the same mistake again, counsel. That's correct, it
7 was an unarmed mission.
8 Q. Who provided your security up to the 22nd?
9 A. The authorities responsible for Kosovo were also responsible for
10 ensuring our security, and then there was a NATO extraction force that was
11 put in place in Macedonia.
12 Q. As far as I can remember, only one member of your staff was
13 injured by somebody from UCK. Correct me if I'm wrong. I believe that
14 I'm right, though. Throughout your stay there, only one person was
16 A. I think that's my recollection, too, yes.
17 Q. Why did you then leave Kosovo on the 22nd or the 24th? Who did
18 you fear if your security was ensured by the Serbian authorities? If only
19 one member of your staff had been injured, who did you fear? Why did you
21 A. The reason for the withdrawal was because of the increased
22 presence of VJ, MUP, and additional security forces that were being
23 deployed into Kosovo starting in larger numbers than we had seen in
24 February -- January, February that year, and a continuing deterioration of
25 the situation, military exercises occurring in Vucitrn, fighting in
1 Kacanik, the displacement of the population. We were unable at that point
2 in time to carry out our mandate, and we were concerned that the fighting
3 was now escalating to a level that could not be contained and our staff
4 were at risk.
5 Q. Two days later, NATO launched its first air-raid. Did you not
6 know that? That is my question, actually. Were you aware of that fact?
7 Did you leave Kosovo because you were not looking forward to NATO bombs?
8 A. No. We left Kosovo because the security situation was
9 deteriorating as a result of the deployment and the conduct of the VJ and
10 the Serbian security forces.
11 Q. You did not have a clue then that NATO would start bombing Kosovo
12 only two days later. Is that what you're saying?
13 A. I was not privy to the operational plans of NATO, but I was
14 obviously watching the news, like most people, and heard the political
15 statements being made and the actions being taken in Brussels.
16 Q. We watch news as well. According to you, your mission continued
17 its work from elsewhere. It was no longer in Kosovo and it is still
18 operational. And what I'm going to ask you now is this -- let's go back
19 to the incidents first.
20 In your report you say that around 750 cases of violation of human
21 rights were encountered and documented between October and March while you
22 were there and that those incidents were never elucidated.
23 My question is this: Is it correct that you had three
24 representatives of the Yugoslav authorities, one who represented a federal
25 government, that was General Loncar; the other one who represented the
1 army, Colonel Kotur; and the third one, Mijatovic, who represented the
2 MUP. And you had daily meetings with them, or almost daily meetings. And
3 then you also had five main points where you had your liaison officers
4 with the army and the police. And if all this is correct, my question is:
5 How is it possible that you did not manage to elucidate so many cases,
6 despite the number of people who were involved in that? I believe you
7 understand my question?
8 A. Yes, sir, I do. We didn't get cooperation from our contact points
9 in the VJ, the MUP, and the people that you referred to. We got very
10 little cooperation from judges and prosecutors responsible for Kosovo. We
11 got stonewalled in every investigation basically. Authorities do not
12 admit to human rights violations and they hide evidence, and that's what
13 was happening. And that made it very difficult to get to the bottom of
14 many of the incidents that we were witnessing on the ground.
15 Q. I understand. In other words, you accept that you had daily
16 meetings and contacts with the Yugoslav authorities. We agree on that,
17 don't we, and those meetings were either in Pristina or on the ground.
18 Did you report all of those incidents to them? That's my question and
19 that is the long and the short of it.
20 A. Yes, sir, we did report every incident as it was brought to our
21 attention with the local officials and then up the chain of command, and
22 daily meetings were occurring between KVM verifiers and all the
23 authorities, including the UCK.
24 Q. What was the reaction of the Yugoslav authorities when you
25 reported those incidents?
1 A. If it was -- if it was an incident involving a man, the answer
2 usually was: It was terrorism. These were terrorists. And the Yugoslav
3 authorities had every right to deal with the situation in the way that
4 they needed to, because they viewed pretty much all Albanian men as being
5 members of the KLA, UCK, and called them terrorists.
6 If it was incidents involving women, they were denied. And
7 usually at that point in the conversation we were presented with evidence
8 of crimes against Serbs and the discussion would then go in that
10 Q. Very well. Thank you. Do you remember perhaps that the verifiers
11 discussed the incident in Kacanik with Colonel Kotur that even General
12 Dijenkijevic went there with the investigating judge in Rogovo to see what
13 had happened there. And let me remind you, a Serb policeman had been
14 killed by UCK terrorists; that's what we referred to them at the time.
15 Are you aware of that?
16 A. I am aware of an investigating judge in the Rogovo matter.
17 Kacanik doesn't ring a bell, but that's just I can't remember. I don't
18 deny that that would have happened.
19 Q. And now let me ask you something else. Yesterday I looked at your
20 statement and I saw that once you left Kosovo you spent most of your time
21 in Macedonia, Albania, and you worked with refugees there. And you told
22 us that you did not go to Montenegro. Are you aware of the fact that some
23 of the Albanian refugees fled to Crna Gora and to Serbia? Did you ever
24 deal with these refugees? Did you ever try to get to the bottom of why
25 they went to Montenegro and to Serbia proper?
1 A. Yes. We were definitely aware of the flow of refugees in the
2 directions of Montenegro and Serbia, but when the mission withdrew from
3 Kosovo, Serbian authorities invalidated all of our visas and denied us
4 access, either into Serbia or Montenegro. So we were unable to pursue
5 those particular refugees, and they're not included in this documentation.
6 Q. And to this very day you have not included them? Is that what
7 you're saying? Because the Milosevic regime was in place but is no
8 longer. Like so many things, this has also come to an end.
9 A. The mandate of the Kosovo Verification Mission ended when the NATO
10 air campaign ceased and the agreement was reached to withdraw the forces.
11 And so the mandate was gone, and I don't have anything to add to that.
12 Q. Let's go back to the very beginning. During the time that you
13 were there, between October and March, were you aware of the instances of
14 kidnapping? At least a hundred Serbs had been kidnapped. Maybe you will
15 not agree with the figure. Also some Albanians who were employed by the
16 Yugoslav authorities had been kidnapped. And to this very day, it is not
17 known where they are. There were killings, there were other things, and
18 are these incidents equally represented in our reports, like all the other
19 incidents? Because, if I may share my opinion with you, I would say that
20 you are very selective. And there is another information from some 80
21 villages Serbs had been expelled, even before the NATO campaign started.
22 Are you aware of that?
23 A. Yes, to all your questions contained in that bundle. I don't know
24 the number of a hundred, but it doesn't matter. There were kidnappings of
25 VJ officers by the UCK that I remember in December. That led to a
1 complete breakdown in the cease-fire at that point. There were also
2 kidnappings of Serbs that were being -- that were being reported, and we
3 did follow up on those, sir, and they are included in the report. We
4 tried as best we could to ensure that the -- all parties were living up to
5 the standards, including the KLA, the UCK. And those instances, you're
6 right, they haven't been solved. The issue of the missing is huge in
7 Kosovo still, particularly for the Serbian population, and there needs to
8 be answers.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: The question also included cases of Albanians who
10 were working for the Serb authorities.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Were there examples of that?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. There are examples in the report of
14 Albanians being beaten up, being detained illegally because they have a
15 friend that may have been a police officer or a Serb or they had
16 neighbours that they were friendly with. We were getting those reports as
17 well, and those are also documented, and they were being brought to the
18 attention of relevant UCK zone commanders at the time.
19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I would like to ask you this at the end. During the NATO campaign
21 that we called aggression and you call NATO action, during the NATO action
22 did Serbs leave Kosovo as refugees? Did you have information as to how
23 many Serbs had left Kosovo as a result of NATO campaign?
24 A. As -- yes. We were receiving reports that -- of displacement from
25 Kosovo cross the Brezova valley, into other parts of Serbia, internally
1 displaced, not crossing an international border. We were also receiving
2 reports of displacement within Kosovo, Serbians going to other Serb areas
3 to feel safer. The numbers, as best one could determine, after the
4 conflict when we went back in was it appeared as though there may have
5 been as many as 100.000 Serbs that left Kosovo, but again numbers get very
6 difficult in these issues. But those were the numbers that we were
7 working with. It's gone up since then, I might add.
8 Q. Yes, this happened when NATO came. In percentages, how many Serbs
9 left Kosovo? The 100.000 that you've mentioned, what would that be in
10 percentage terms, approximately?
11 A. If the Court will indulge me just to tell you how we used the
12 numbers. Population of Kosovo, based on a 1989 census that perhaps most
13 Albanians may or may not have participated in, so a population of maybe
14 1.7, 1.9 for the Kosovo population at the time we're discussing, 90
15 per cent believed to be ethnic Albanians; of that number, the remaining 10
16 per cent are minorities, the largest minority -- and here we use
17 the "minority" in quotes because we're talking about within Kosovo and not
18 within Serbia proper, was about 10 per cent. So 10 per cent of the
19 population, minorities. Of that -- you know, half of that would have been
20 Serbian. Of that Serbian population, maybe half left.
21 That's as -- that's as good as I can do on numbers without really
22 having reference guides.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, these figures don't work, but it's at least
24 an indication of a very large number or a large percentage.
25 THE WITNESS: There remains in Kosovo approximately 124 or 125.000
1 Serbs now.
2 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Let me just make sure that I have not skipped something.
4 I hope that you have spoken to some of these Serbs and asked them
5 why they had left, either you or one of your verifiers.
6 And this is my last question: Did any of these Serbs tell you
7 that they were happy for being bombed? Do you have a case like that?
8 A. Many of the Serbs that I've spoken to have said that they left
9 because of -- they feared the NATO bombing They didn't have the same fear
10 of the VJ and the Serbian police. And I don't recall anybody, not only in
11 Kosovo, but anywhere telling me that they were happy to be bombed. I had
12 no such cases, sir.
13 Q. I heard that yesterday about some other case.
14 Well, in any case, thank you very much.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.
16 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Sepenuk:
18 Q. Ms. Mitchell, I'm Norman Sepenuk, one of the attorneys for General
19 Ojdanic. Good afternoon.
20 A. Good afternoon.
21 Q. As I understand it, a decision -- the decision was made to
22 withdraw the KVM from Kosovo on March 20, 1999. Is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And who made that decision?
25 A. That decision was made by Knut Vollbaek who was the chairman in
1 office at the time for the OSCE and was the foreign minister of Norway.
2 Q. By the way, can you keep your voice up just a bit, please.
3 A. Sure.
4 Q. What was the name of the gentleman who made the decision?
5 A. Knut Vollbaek.
6 Q. And did you discuss -- You were the head of the human rights
7 division. Correct?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Okay. Did you discuss that with him?
10 A. No. My reporting chain was to Ambassador Walker.
11 Q. So when you said the -- when you gave us the reasons yesterday why
12 you thought that the KVM left Kosovo, that was your opinion?
13 A. No. That was the opinion -- that was the statements that were
14 told to me by the head of mission.
15 Q. You did speak to him then?
16 A. To Ambassador Walker.
17 Q. To Ambassador Walker. And give us his role again?
18 A. Ambassador Walker was the head of the Kosovo Verification Mission
19 called -- his office is the head of mission, and he would have reported to
20 Knut Vollbaek?
21 Q. And in answer to a question by Mr. Fila you said to -- as to
22 whether you had a clue that NATO was going to be bombing just a few days
23 later, you said: I was not privy to the operational plans of NATO, but I
24 was obviously watching the news like most people and heard the political
25 statements and the actions being taken in Brussels.
1 And if you saw it I take it your superiors saw it, too?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. So are you stating -- and I'm just asking. Are you stating
4 categorically that the NATO bombing played no part whatsoever in the
5 OSCE-KVM decision to leave?
6 A. No, I wouldn't say that. I'm saying that the security situation
7 resulted in the mission leaving, and the fact that NATO was planning to
8 intervene was an indication of the seriousness of the situation on the
10 Q. All right. Thank you. Now I want to ask a few questions about
11 the refugee monitoring forms used by OSCE personnel in interviewing
12 refugees who came to Albania and Macedonia.
13 MR. SEPENUK: And would the usher be good enough to post
14 Prosecution Exhibit 765.
15 THE WITNESS: I have it, sir.
16 MR. SEPENUK:
17 Q. Do you. We don't have it on our screen here. Perhaps there's --
18 MR. SEPENUK: Now we have it, Your Honour.
19 Q. Was -- if you -- do you immediately recognise this --
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. -- as the form that was used?
22 A. Yes, sir, I do.
23 Q. This was the form that was used by the OSCE investigators in both
24 Albania and Macedonia. Is that a fair statement?
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. And you'll note --
2 MR. SEPENUK: If the usher would just scroll up a bit. You can
3 stop right there -- no. Stop right there, please.
4 Q. And the first question is: "Describe the situation in the last
5 place of residence," and underneath that: "(a), circumstances of
6 departure/reasons for flight."
7 Is that correct?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Now, did the -- your investigators have these forms in-hand, I
10 take it, when they were interviewing the Albanians. Correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And were they filling them out as the Albanians were speaking? I
13 take it your investigators were writing down what they were saying?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. And these forms, after they were filled out, tell us what happened
16 to them.
17 A. These forms would have been filled out in refugee camps or in
18 vehicles. They were collected -- the way the field operation was is we
19 had teams going into the camps, and so there was a team leader, and the
20 team leader at the end of the night collected all of the statements.
21 Depending on how close the particular site -- location of the staff was to
22 either Tirana, Albania, Skopje, Macedonia, they were then delivered each
23 night to either me or my deputy in either of those offices. At that
24 time -- and if that wasn't the case, then they were brought in every three
25 or four days when somebody was going to be capitals, which was frequent.
1 At that point, they were numbered and one photocopy was made. The
2 document -- the original document was put in -- was put in a binder and
3 then immediately transferred to ICTY, to the Prosecutor's office, on a
4 daily basis. And the copies were put in similar binders and kept in
5 Skopje and in Tirana until such time that they were all then relocated to
7 Q. And what was furnished to the Prosecutor then, as I understand it,
8 was this Exhibit 765?
9 A. All of the completed documents, that's correct.
10 Q. In the handwriting of the investigator?
11 A. That's right.
12 Q. And the OTP would get it on virtually a -- would get it on
13 virtually a daily basis. Is that correct?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Okay. Now, were there forms then -- were there other forms -- and
16 by the way, I take it you felt that this was confidential?
17 A. Absolutely. And the last question on the questionnaire is an
18 authorisation, a consent, to share the information with ICTY. And it was
19 always locked up. We found it extremely -- we thought it was very
20 sensitive information in a ...
21 Q. Was the OTP the only group that received these statements?
22 A. They were the only ones that received the statements. The UN High
23 Commissioner for Human Rights had an office in Skopje, and ICRC could look
24 at the statements if there were issues relating to either of their
25 specific mandates. But they were not given copies ever.
1 Q. Nor were the other -- nor were, I take it, other organisations be
2 given copies, like the Human Rights Watch?
3 A. That's right.
4 Q. Is there a group called the International Crisis Group?
5 A. Yes, there is.
6 Q. And where are they based?
7 A. They're based in Brussels. There was a whole lot of people
8 collecting statements. We kept them out of our process completely. We
9 were aware it was going on, but their information was not incorporated
10 into ours, and at no time did we ever share the information with ICG or
11 anyone else.
12 Q. Okay. Maybe you can help us out with something. Last night --
13 MR. SEPENUK: And I'll address this to Your Honours -- and forgive
14 the choppiness for the next few minutes.
15 We received from the OTP about 6.00 last evening something called
16 an interview full report. And as a matter of fact, to clarify this, if
17 the witness could be shown -- incidentally, Your Honour, we just
18 discovered this last night and we only found out certain other things this
19 morning. So we apologise for not having it in the e-court proceedings.
20 But if the witness could be shown what we have marked as defendant
21 exhibit 3D00-001 and also D00-002, and we have copies for the Prosecutor
22 and the panel.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: In other words, these are documents 1 and 2, right?
24 I think we can do without the 0000s when we're trying to identify these.
25 One will do for me.
1 MR. SEPENUK: 1 and 2 it shall be, Your Honour, from here on out.
2 I promise.
3 And copies for the panel, please.
4 Now, do Your Honours have copies now?
5 And perhaps you can put defendant exhibit 1 on the ELMO, that
6 might take care of it for the Defence counsel.
7 [Defence counsel confer]
8 MR. SEPENUK:
9 Q. Do you see that document in front of you, which is defendant
10 exhibit 1?
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. And do you recognise that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And what is that?
15 A. It's a print-out from a database that was developed in Warsaw to
16 try to manage the volume of information so that it could be more easily
18 Q. So is -- and who prepared that document?
19 A. I don't know who prepared this --
20 Q. Who would have prepared a document like that?
21 A. Who would have prepared it? There was a team of six to eight
22 people that we had in Warsaw working on the refugee statements in the KVM,
23 and one of them or somebody from that staff would have entered that
25 Q. Is it fair to say that the information on this form, i.e.,
1 defendant exhibit 1, would have come from Prosecution Exhibit 765 that we
2 looked at first?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Okay. And would you now look at -- and by the way, before we
5 leave that, you'll notice on -- it's K0529763, it's the next page, it
6 talks about what happened. "Mass Serb police with painted faces,
7 soldiers, and paramilitaries forced the witness and other villagers out of
8 their houses."
9 Do you see that?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. Okay. So I'm reading correctly?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Okay. Now could you look at defendant exhibit number 2.
14 MR. SEPENUK: And if the usher would simply put that on the ELMO,
16 Q. And this is what we need your help on, and we're asking just for
17 clarification purposes. What is that document?
18 A. Well, it has ICG's name on it, so I'm assuming it's from the ICG
19 database that they would have developed based on a template that was being
20 used in the field at the time by many of the organisations.
21 Q. So that's -- the ICG is the International --
22 A. Crisis Group. Yeah.
23 Q. And can you notice what it says there about what happened? It
24 seems to be word for word the same.
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. And frankly, you know -- what's the explanation?
2 A. Yeah, people were getting interviewed -- this was a huge problem
3 in the field. People were getting interviewed and re-interviewed.
4 Sometimes we had organisations sort of following around our staff to
5 conduct additional interviews of people for their own mandated problems
6 and issues, and it was very frustrating. It was very, very difficult to
7 manage. And it was, at times, a problem. I'm not saying that this
8 particular case is one of those, but we also had reporters following our
9 staff around in the camps as well because they thought that we had the
10 best witnesses, and it's -- I'm not surprised to see this.
11 Q. Well, when you say you're not sure whether this particular case is
12 one of them, maybe I'm truly missing the point here.
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. But the ICG defendant exhibit 2, the description of the incident
15 and the reason for leaving is word for word the same as the OSCE
16 description. Is that correct?
17 A. Yes, sir. The documents speak for themselves, and I've given the
18 best explanation I can.
19 Q. So is the only conclusion that one -- that we can draw from this
20 is that somehow the ICG was privy to your information?
21 A. No. As I've stated, we had the measures in place to ensure as
22 best as we could the security and the confidentiality of the information.
23 There were a lot of people following and getting statements. People were
24 working together. The rule was, you know, the information was only being
25 shared with ICTY, and if, you know, somebody breaks the rule, they break
1 the rule. But it -- it -- that's as much as I can say on it, Your Honour.
2 Q. So what you're saying here is that at least based on what you're
3 saying it appears that one of your investigators shared information with
4 the International Crisis Group, against the rules of your organisation?
5 A. It's a possibility. It's also that possibility that this person
6 re-interviewed somebody that we had interviewed and came up with the same
8 Q. Word for word?
9 A. Sure.
10 Q. I -- that's your testimony?
11 A. Anything's possible. I've given you, you know, the reasons that I
12 can think of as honestly as I can. And if they shared a form, they shared
13 a form, and, yeah, the rule was broken.
14 Q. And --
15 MR. SEPENUK: I won't belabour it, Your Honour, but I have two
16 other exhibits, exhibits 3 and 4, which make the same points, and we would
17 tender those also as exhibits.
18 It's the same process, Your Honour, of word-for-word repetition,
19 the ICG repeating in its form word for word what the OSCE's form says.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: I think, Mr. Sepenuk, what you should do is ask the
21 witness to identify the other documents without going into the detail of
23 MR. SEPENUK: I will. Thank you, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: And then we've got numbers for them, presumably, as
25 well, and that rectifies any deficiency in the record.
1 MR. SEPENUK: Yes, Your Honour.
2 So if you would simply give the witness defendant exhibits 3
3 and 4.
4 Q. And if you look at defendant exhibits 3D3 and 3D4, and is it fair
5 to say that that represents the same process that I just questioned you
6 about, only with respect to another person?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Now I want to turn to another aspect. As I understand it, the
9 conclusions in your report, As Seen, As Told, which was Prosecution's
10 Exhibit 473 is based on some 27 to 2800 refugee interviews by the OSCE.
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. And those were refugees in Albania and Macedonia?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. Now, as I understand it further, there were thousands of
16 interviews that took place in Albania and Macedonia of refugees. Is that
17 a correct statement?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thousands?
20 A. Thousands.
21 Q. Tens of thousands?
22 A. I don't think it would be quite that high.
23 Q. But what? If you had -- if you had to give us your best estimate?
24 A. We had the largest number -- I honestly don't know how many the
25 other organisations would have interviewed --
1 Q. 20, 30.000, is that --
2 A. No, no, I think that's too high. I would think under 10.000.
3 Q. The figure was given to us yesterday by one of the Prosecutors,
4 tens of thousands, do you think that might be a little too high?
5 A. Well, it depends. If you throw in the journalists and researchers
6 and others, my number refers to those that may have been actually involved
7 in collecting this type of information.
8 Q. So these are thousands of interviews over and above the 27 and
9 2800 --
10 MR. STAMP: Just for the record, the figure given by one of the
11 Prosecutors yesterday referred to refugee data forms, not just taken in
12 Albania and Macedonia, but taken generally in respect to Kosova by
13 international organisations or governments, which the witness would not
14 know about.
15 MR. SEPENUK:
16 Q. So are these 27 --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one moment. My recollection yesterday was the
18 expression -- yeah, you -- the statement you made yesterday, Mr. Stamp,
19 was that there were tens of thousands of forms that were not made
20 available on the electronic disclosure system.
21 MR. STAMP: Indeed. In other words, I am saying that the
22 statement I made yesterday, unless I am mistaken, and I'm sure I could be
23 corrected, did not restrict the provenance of the forms to Montenegro and
24 Albania, which is the way the question is phrased now.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.
1 MR. SEPENUK: I'll ask another question, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, sure.
3 MR. SEPENUK:
4 Q. Ms. Mitchell, you may want to --
5 MR. SEPENUK: The ELMO is not going to be needed any more, so you
6 might want to --
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
8 MR. SEPENUK:
9 Q. Just so there's no doubt about it, am I correct in my
10 understanding that the OSCE itself conducted thousands of interviews?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. Okay. Over and above the 27, 2800? There were 2700, 2800 refugee
13 interviews that the As Seen, As Told was based on, but you're saying that
14 there was also thousands of interviews over and above that?
15 A. When I answered your question of whether the OSCE conducted
16 thousands of interviews, I'm including the 27, 2800 figure.
17 In addition to that, I would say you're looking at maybe 1.000,
18 1500 that would potentially have involved people that were met, briefed,
19 but then statements weren't taken for whatever reasons. It would be that
20 type of an activity, much briefer.
21 Q. So when you testified yesterday that there were thousands of
22 refugee interviews, which you did. I can refer you to the statement, if
23 you'd like. And when you testified in your statement twice, or at least
24 your submitted statement, that there were thousands of interviews, and
25 when you testified at the Milosevic trial that there were thousands of
1 Albanians interviewed, are you saying that you only meant another 1.000,
2 2.000 above the 27, 2800?
3 A. Well, I always included those numbers in the word "thousands."
4 Q. So all you meant there were 3300, 4.000 interviews? Give us your
5 best judgement, please.
6 A. Yeah, that would probably be about right.
7 Q. That would be about right. That's what you meant by "thousands"?
8 A. That's "thousands" to me.
9 Q. Okay. That's fine. Just asking. And do you have a record of all
10 those interviews? Were all of those interviews submitted to the OTP?
11 A. No, sir.
12 Q. And tell us how that came about.
13 A. Oftentimes you would talk to a group of people and you may get so
14 far in the interview and for a variety of reasons, they didn't directly
15 see something, you come quickly that they're talking about a story three
16 other people may have told. So it stops, and there's nothing written
17 down. Also, when we evacuated, a lot of the information we were unable to
18 bring out for purely logistical reasons. And so those would have been
19 destroyed at the time. So that's the explanation.
20 Q. So --
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Are the 750 complaints of violence, are they
22 included in the 2.800 roughly?
23 THE WITNESS: No.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: They are in addition.
25 THE WITNESS: That's correct.
1 MR. SEPENUK:
2 Q. So I take it that other than the 2700 or so that's been turned
3 over to the OTP, there doesn't exist to your knowledge any record of these
4 other interviews, whether it's 1500, 2.000, whatever the amount is?
5 A. Some, but I don't know the exact number. But we did also turn
6 over the files that we evacuated from Kosovo for the period from October
7 to March, whatever was evacuated, and I honestly don't remember how many
8 statements were in that.
9 Q. Who did you turn that over to?
10 A. That's -- it's also been incorporated into this report and they
11 would have -- it would have been turned over to ICTY -- excuse me, to the
13 Q. Right. And that's for what period, just so I'm certain.
14 A. The files, as soon as we began. So from October or November until
15 March, to the withdrawal of the mission.
16 Q. You mean June?
17 A. No, March.
18 Q. March. Okay. It didn't cover interviews after that? Because
19 we're talking about March, April, May, June, the entire period --
20 A. Yes. I'm not sure I understood, but let me just try to clarify.
21 Between the period of October and March, there was documentation
22 that was collected in Kosovo that is included in the report. Some but not
23 all of that documentation was withdrawn with us. That was subsequently
24 part of the analysis for the preparation of the report, and then it was
25 turned over for the period from the evacuation in March through June would
1 have been the refugee statements.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. Okay.
4 Q. And those -- any refugee statements you did make a record of was
5 turned over to the Prosecutor?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. Okay.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry to go back to the distinction between these
9 two groups of reports. The 750 roughly incidents of violence, are they
10 contained in the October to March batch or are they spread over that and
11 the later period?
12 THE WITNESS: The 750 figure that we're discussing is the October
13 to March batch.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: And is that roughly the number of files or --
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, that --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Or is there no relationship between --
17 THE WITNESS: That 750 would have been incident reports that would
18 have been completed. And those that were more specifically developed we
19 would have evacuated. If we didn't have enough, we destroyed them.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.
21 MR. SEPENUK: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. Ms. Mitchell, I just want to talk briefly or ask you briefly about
23 the OSCE relationship with the Albanian refugees who came from Kosovo to
24 Albania and Macedonia. Tell us the role of that bright orange car that
25 you spoke about yesterday.
1 A. When the mission was first deployed in October of 1998, vehicles
2 were moved from the missions in Bosnia and the region to jump-start the
3 operation, and they were all white. At the time these were Pajeros, and
4 at the time the MUP were driving white Pajeros. So it became a security
5 issue because the KLA often shot at the MUP, and we didn't want them
6 shooting at us, so we painted the cars a colour that could be -- without
7 distinction people would know who it was as a security measure, so they
8 were painted this bright fluorescent orange colour.
9 Q. And that was sort of symbol or that was part of your entree, was
10 it not, into the Albanian community. When they saw that bright orange
11 car, they knew it was OSCE people?
12 A. Yes, sir, all the communities.
13 Q. And as I think you've testified before, that gave you sort of an
14 entree again into the community so you can talk to them, find out what
15 happened to them, find out about their welfare, that kind of thing?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. And this was symbolic in that it opened up dialogue and lines of
18 communication with the Albanians?
19 A. That's right.
20 Q. And is it fair to say that you - and I mean the OSCE-KVM - had a
21 very special relationship with the Albanians?
22 A. In the refugee camps, yes.
23 Q. And it's also fair, I take it to say, that you didn't have a very
24 special relationship with the Serbs?
25 A. Well, we had a special relationship; it was just a different kind.
1 Q. Well, you didn't cover in your report why the Serbs left Kosovo
2 during the NATO air campaign, did you?
3 A. In the report we discussed why communities throughout Kosovo left.
4 There are reports of what happened to some of the Serbians in the villages
5 as they were being recounted to us by refugees.
6 Q. Right. But again, there was nothing specifically in the report as
7 there was about the Albanians as to why the Serbs left Kosovo during the
8 NATO air campaign?
9 A. We didn't have access to the Serbs. They didn't come to Albania
10 or Macedonia, and so we were not able to access them, which is the reason
11 for the -- that they're not included. It was an access issue.
12 Q. So I take it the answer to my question is yes?
13 A. As I said, though, that there -- we -- the report does cover the
14 effects of some of the Serbians. And in that context, there may be
15 explanations as to why they left. So I'm -- I just -- I know what you're
16 trying to get me to agree to, and I'm just uncomfortable with it, counsel.
17 Q. Well, I don't want you to agree to anything that's not so. And
18 let me refer to your testimony in Milosevic case, if I might. Page 7543
19 of 5 July 2002. And at that time you said, and I quote that: "As far as
20 the reasons why the Serbs left Kosovo during the NATO air campaign, I
21 would have to refer you to other human rights organisations that had
22 access and documented that -- documented that at the time. It's just not
23 covered in our reports, unfortunately."
24 Is that a fair statement?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Okay. Now, finally I'd like to turn to the relationship between
2 the OSCE and the OTP of the ICTY during the period we're talking about.
3 A. Mm-hmm.
4 Q. And as I understand it, you were the primary liaison of the OSCE
5 to the OTP. Correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And all of the information -- is it fair to say that all of the
8 information gathered by your group, in essence, was turned over to the
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And on a daily basis?
12 A. Just during the particular period of the refugee situation, not
13 during the period of October to March.
14 Q. Right. But any information regarding alleged violations of
15 international humanitarian law was indeed turned over to the OTP?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. And of course you obviously furnished a copy of your report
18 immediately to the OTP? That's Prosecution Exhibit 473, As Seen, As
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. And as a matter of fact, Justice Louise Arbour wrote the forward
22 to that report, didn't she?
23 A. Yes, he did.
24 Q. And what was Justice Louise Arbour's position at that time? This
25 was in 1999; correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And what was her position at that time?
3 A. I think she was still the Prosecutor here.
4 Q. She was the lead Prosecutor here, wasn't she?
5 A. Mm-hmm.
6 Q. So that's the same Justice Arbour who signed the initial
7 indictment in this case in 1999 against three of these defendants.
9 A. Correct.
10 MR. SEPENUK: That's all I have, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
12 Mr. Aleksic. Mr. Aleksic, do you have any questions?
13 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac?
15 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Since I'm the
16 fifth, a number of questions have already been asked. But now I only need
17 to manage my resources better. Therefore, the number of questions I have
18 will be less than that of my colleagues, and I will do as best I can not
19 to repeat any of the topics.
20 Cross-examination by Mr. Bakrac:
21 Q. [Interpretation] My name is Mihajlo Bakrac. I am counsel for
22 General Lazarevic.
23 In your statement dated the 2nd of July, 2002, you state that the
24 refugee monitoring plan was put together by you personally and that you
25 did so two days after the 22nd of March of -- rather, on which date the
1 verification mission withdrew from Kosovo. Is that correct?
2 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the usher to show
4 us Exhibit P764.
5 Q. Is this the plan of monitoring refugees that we just mentioned?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. First I'd like to clarify something concerning the refugee
8 monitoring plan that was dated the 22nd of March. And in your statement
9 you said you drafted the plan two days after the 22nd of March when the
10 verification mission left Kosovo?
11 A. I think we left Kosovo on March 20th, and I think this document is
12 dated March 22nd, is it? I can't see the second page, counsel.
13 Q. Yes, the 22nd of March. Hence my question, Mrs. Mitchell, is the
14 following: Why did you make the refugee monitoring plan as late as the
15 22nd of March of 1999 once you had left Kosovo? Why hasn't it been put
16 together earlier?
17 A. We were very busy in Kosovo and focussing at that point on trying
18 to document as much as we could while we were there. We -- it was
19 overwhelming once one realised that the population was going to be
20 expelled, and the events on the ground drove the development of the
21 refugee monitoring plan. It was not something that was contemplated at
22 the time that we were in the mission.
23 Q. Are you trying to tell me that before the 22nd of March, 1999, you
24 were very busy with more emergency or immediate tasks than to monitor
25 refugees, or is my interpretation incorrect?
1 A. We didn't have the refugees at that time. We had displacement,
2 yes, and displacement was increasing, but we didn't have the refugees and
3 we weren't there. We were inside Kosovo.
4 Q. That means that you thought that with the initiation of NATO air
5 strikes and after you leave Kosovo there would be an influx of refugees in
6 the surrounding areas, and that's why you created this monitoring plan?
7 A. We created the monitoring plan because we were evacuated to
8 Skopje, and shortly thereafter large numbers of people started pouring
9 over the borders telling us atrocious things, and we needed a way to
10 manage that particular activity and continue the mandate. It was driven
11 by the events that were happening. My job was to react at the operational
12 level, and that's how the plan was developed.
13 Q. That is clear, but you created this plan on the 22nd of March. At
14 that time there was -- there were no refugees in great numbers. And in
15 your statement on that date, you state that in Macedonia there were 8.000
16 refugees, and in Albania 18 and a half thousand. You made this plan
17 before the mass exodus began?
18 A. No, no. The people were already leaving Kosovo, sir, and had been
19 for several weeks and months prior to the evacuation because of ongoing
20 security actions by the VJ and the MUP. Shelling villages in Kacanik was
21 creating a flow into Macedonia.
22 Q. Very well. Since that was so, why did you make this plan as late
23 as the 22nd of March? Why hasn't it been created earlier once you
24 established that there were great numbers of refugees moving towards
25 Albania and Macedonia?
1 A. The operational mandate for the Kosovo Verification Mission was in
2 the province, the territory, of Kosovo. When we left, the mandate
3 continued -- the human rights mandate continued insofar as talking to
4 people from Kosovo that were now in Macedonia and in Albania. We didn't
5 do it beforehand because we weren't physically located there.
6 Q. It means that for as long as you were physically in Kosovo there
7 were no representatives of yours in Albania and Macedonia whatsoever? Are
8 you trying to tell me that?
9 A. There were representatives. The OSCE had missions, separate
10 missions, in Albania and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, but
11 we didn't have our human rights staff deployed there until after the
12 withdrawal of the mission.
13 Q. Mrs. Mitchell, correct me if I'm mistaken, but the Prosecution
14 exhibit you have before you speaks of the strengthening of the mission
15 rather than its establishment on the 22nd of March. Since it mentions the
16 increase in numbers, then it must have existed previously. Am I correct?
17 A. We're -- this particular proposal was discussing strengthening the
18 already existing OSCE missions in Albania and in Macedonia that had
19 separate mandates, to augment those missions with our staff because we
20 were not operational at that time in those areas. Did that clarify,
22 Q. Does that mean they had nothing to do with you?
23 A. Prior to the withdrawal of the mission, no, they had independent
25 Q. These independent mandates, did it mean that they had no right to
1 monitor refugee movement, to speak to them, and so on and so forth?
2 A. No. All the OSCE field missions have a human rights mandate for
3 anybody in the territory where their mandate continues. And so if it was
4 a refugee situation, they would fall under the human rights general
5 mandate for every mission. But they certainly didn't have the capacity to
6 respond to the influx and the numbers that were pouring over the border.
7 Q. They didn't speak to those refugees because of their lack of
8 personnel prior to your withdrawal from Kosovo. Are you trying to tell me
10 A. No, I couldn't say that. They may have been speaking to the
11 refugees that were coming over in the months that we were there. I don't
13 Q. If you say "maybe," Mrs. Mitchell, I would be most interested in
14 finding out whether you have such information or a document that would
15 confirm that, since you say that later on you formed a joint mission.
16 Perhaps this is merely an assumption on my part, but have you ever
17 encountered a document or a statement taken prior to your withdrawal from
19 A. I worked for the mission in Macedonia subsequently, and I know in
20 looking through some of their historical files that they were reporting on
21 the influx in the months prior to the withdrawal of the mission. So
22 they're in their weekly reports, but I don't know that I've ever seen any
23 specific statements in that regard along the lines of the forms that we've
24 been discussing today.
25 Q. That means that the statements were taken without any control on
1 your part and without any direction or instruction that was created later
2 on, as late as the 22nd of March? There was no procedure in place --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, I must say I'm not following this at
4 all. I don't understand the line you're pursuing.
5 The witness has told you that in Macedonia and Albania there were
6 no human rights offices at the time prior to the beginning of the influx.
7 And while they had a general human rights mandate, there was no system for
8 recording the accounts of these and that she set up the system when the
9 human rights officers moved from Kosovo and were available in Albania and
11 Now, is there something else that you're trying to establish from
13 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. I simply wanted to
14 clarify something, and perhaps I will manage to do so with my next
16 Mrs. Mitchell, in her statement and in her testimony yesterday,
17 stated that there were 200 people who were supposed to work with refugees.
18 Q. When were they employed? Out of that number, 75 were in Albania,
19 if I'm not mistaken?
20 A. This was a group that came from the larger 1300 that were
21 evacuated. Many were sent home, and then the mission shrunk down to
22 around 450 total, is the best of my recollection, of which 200 were
23 assigned to these particular tasks, and 75 in Albania, 125 in Macedonia.
24 Q. And they had specific duties after your withdrawal from Kosovo.
25 Is that correct?
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. Yesterday you mentioned - and it is also mentioned in your
3 statement - that those were mostly trained people. But if I understood
4 correctly, you said that you would allow for a possibility that some of
5 them were untrained as well?
6 A. The 200 that you're talking about were sort of the cream of the
7 crop, so these were the more highly trained of the larger mission
9 Q. Didn't you state yesterday that you carried out training for some
10 people? When was that?
11 A. That was -- that period that we're talking about, counsel, was the
12 period from probably November to early March, the type of training which
13 we tried to do throughout the mission. During the withdrawal, the
14 training strictly focussed then on interviewing techniques and management
15 of information.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, I'm afraid we'll have to interrupt you.
17 I've been allowing this to go beyond the allotted time, thinking that you
18 just had a brief cross-examination. But since it's obviously going to
19 take some time, we'll interrupt it now, and we will resume at quarter
20 to 5.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 4.19 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 4.47 p.m.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.
24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I'm ready to continue, Your Honour.
25 Q. Mrs. Mitchell, just before the break, if I'm not mistaken, you
1 said that during the withdrawal the training concerned with -- data
2 processing and interviewing refugees. Is that correct?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Could you please explain to me what it meant "during the
5 withdrawal." Does that mean that the training was conducted once you were
6 in Macedonia and Albania?
7 A. Yeah -- sorry. The trainings were conducted as teams were being
8 deployed and the operations were being set up in Macedonia and in Albania.
9 Q. I understand. Mrs. Mitchell, since you said that the mission
10 shrank and that you brought 200 people who were the best of the group, why
11 would such people require additional training?
12 A. Training/briefings on how the forms were going to be used, how
13 to -- procedures to ensure that women were involved if statements were
14 being taken by -- from women, particularly of a sexual, violent-type
15 nature. So these were briefings on managing people in distress,
16 recognising that they have other critical issues going on in refugee
17 camps. So these were more briefings/trainings to acclimate people to work
18 in that type of a very stressful environment.
19 Q. Does that mean that those people had no similar experience prior
20 to this training?
21 A. They did have similar experience. I mean, a lot of these people
22 were police officers, et cetera, but --
23 Q. Why was it necessary for them to receive such training since you
24 said they had previous experiences, that they were police officers, that
25 they were they were the creme de la creme? Why would they require
1 additional training? Could you please explain that to me.
2 A. I believe I've answered that, Your Honour. But these were --
3 Whether you call it a training, a briefing, it was on the management of
4 the information that was being collected, it was how to conduct
5 interviewing if children are there, if women are present, how to manage
6 the stress, how to watch out for your interpreter, these types of things
7 that needed to be re-emphasised in this kind of critical humanitarian
8 situation, which isn't usually covered in normal police training courses.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Have I correctly noted yesterday that when you were
10 actually in Kosovo of the monitoring force, only 75 were human rights
12 THE WITNESS: 75 were assigned to our department, that's right.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: So that we're now talking about 200?
14 THE WITNESS: That's correct.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: So you were taking in people who hadn't the human
16 rights working experience in Kosovo that some of your team had?
17 THE WITNESS: It's a bit of an administrative issue, to be honest.
18 I had 75 people in my department, but there was also other verifiers
19 managing police issues, military issues, that would have the same types of
20 skills and be doing the same types of activities but not necessarily in my
21 division, and then we brought them in.
22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. This is precisely
23 what I wanted to have clarified. The witness said that the mission was
24 down-sized to 200; whereas instead it was actually increased from 75 to
25 200 and that there was additional training conducted. In that regard I
1 have a follow-up question.
2 Q. Were there any local members of staff among the people trained in
3 the mission?
4 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I would beg to interfere to just respectfully
5 suggest that a question taken from a cross-examination statement is very
6 rarely used for another question of cross-examination unless there is
7 something really to clarify. And I'm seeing that some of the questions
8 are being taken from answers to questions raised in cross-examination.
9 This would only retract the matter without much help. I would request
10 that this may kindly be avoided.
11 Thank you, sir.
12 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Could you please provide an answer to this question: Among the
14 people who were additionally trained, were there any locals?
15 A. Yes, there were. But you also inaccurately stated a conclusion in
16 your question, which was I said the mission shrunk from 1300 to 450. The
17 human rights division did, in fact, expand.
18 Yes, we had local staff working with us in the camps in Albania
19 and in Macedonia. Where possible, these were people that were also
20 working with the KVM inside Kosovo.
21 Q. And the local personnel also took statements from refugees?
22 A. The local personnel were working with the internationals in the
23 translation, so they were part of the process.
24 Q. Can you recall on what date after your withdrawal from Kosovo you
25 arrived in Albania and on what date you arrived in Macedonia?
1 A. I believe the mission withdrew on March 20th, and that was
2 directly to Skopje. It was then, I think, early April, the 3rd or 4th,
3 when the OSCE Permanent Council took a decision to boost the capacity of
4 the mission in Albania because of the huge humanitarian crisis that was
5 being created in the north with 45.000-plus refugees a day crossing for a
6 three- or four-day period. And I believe all of that was around
7 April 3rd, 4th, 5th, something, and that was about the time that we then
8 deployed to Albania and in -- within two or three days had set up in all
9 12 prefectures, municipalities.
10 Q. Once you arrived in Macedonia and Albania, had the refugee camps
11 already been set up?
12 A. No.
13 Q. When were they set up?
14 A. I think Stenkovic 1 and 2 in Skopje were set up probably starting
15 around the 28th or 29th of March, a week or two after we got there, and
16 they were being set up as people were coming over. Both countries were
17 reacting to the in-flow. But in Macedonia many people stayed with host
18 families, so that the camps came on line -- I think it was the end of
19 March or early April.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: When you talk about setting up in all 12
21 municipalities, that's Albanian -- municipalities in Albania?
22 THE WITNESS: That's correct.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: And how many municipalities are there in Albania in
25 THE WITNESS: 12.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
2 THE WITNESS: I think they call them prefectures.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. From your testimony we heard that your people conducted interviews
6 with over -- or rather, with several thousand refugees. Do you have the
7 data on any of the refugees perhaps stating that they went to Macedonia or
8 Albania because of NATO bombings?
9 A. There were some statements to that effect, but the overwhelming
10 majority were -- the reason was because of the forced expulsion by Serbian
11 army and security forces.
12 Q. Mrs. Mitchell, if I were to tell you that I have information that,
13 for example, Pristina itself was bombed on 406 occasions, Prizren 362,
14 Djakovica, 268, Urosevac 266 times, doesn't it seem illogical that but a
15 few refugees confirmed that they actually fled the bombings and the number
16 of those people is insignificant?
17 A. No. I think it's very consistent. People leave because they're
18 forced to leave. If there's bombing, usually people hunker down in their
19 basements. But getting people out of their house at the scale of more
20 than 1 million is done with force and with the end of a gun, and in this
21 situation it was the Serbian police and army and security forces that
22 expelled the people from Kosovo. And that is what they told us and that's
23 what's in the report.
24 Q. I believe that the answer speaks for itself, and my last question
25 to you will be this. Did you find any shelters around Kosovo, shelters
1 against air-raids in villages, since you're saying that in such cases
2 people actually find shelter?
3 A. I don't recall seeing any bomb shelters. Usually people said they
4 went to the basements of their houses or the basements of buildings.
5 Q. And those basements were enough to protect them from bombing. Is
6 that what you're saying?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
11 Mr. Ivetic?
12 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour, I will have some questions for
13 cross-examination of this witness. If I could just get the podium for a
14 second to organise myself and hopefully go through these in an efficient
16 I apologise, Your Honour. It looks like the equipment doesn't
17 fit on the newly revised desk, so I'll have to make do with this method.
18 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:
19 Q. Good afternoon, Ms. Mitchell.
20 A. Good afternoon.
21 Q. My name is Dragan Ivetic, and along with my colleague Mr. Branko
22 Lukic I'm one of the attorneys representing Sreten Lukic in these
23 proceedings, and I hope to ask you a series of questions this afternoon,
24 and I will try not to unduly repeat topics that have been previously
25 exhausted by my colleagues.
1 But one thing at the get-go that I guess I have to ask is that I
2 believe I'm reading here in the transcript that you just responded to my
3 colleague, Mr. Bakrac, saying that something in the area of more than
4 1 million people were expelled by force from Kosovo and Metohija and that
5 that force was by the Serbian police and the Serbian military and that
6 that is what they told us. Are you now implying that over 1 million
7 people in Albania and Macedonia were interviewed by your mission?
8 A. Not at all. But the sampling that we interviewed of 2 and a half
9 thousand all had the exact same story, and we were hearing it from others,
10 whose statements we were unable to collect for -- because of the sheer
12 Q. And are you claiming that there were 1 million persons displaced
13 outside of Kosovo?
14 A. Outside of --
15 Q. More than a million, actually, is I think what you said.
16 A. Outside of Kosovo I think the reliable numbers are the UNHCR
17 numbers which I think are around 850.000, with estimations of internal
18 displacement of another 4 or 500.000. That's how that number is compiled.
19 Q. And, ma'am, you indicated that all the statements that you
20 received from these people were identical. Isn't that in direct
21 contradiction to what you said a few minutes earlier that you did have
22 statements that people left due to NATO bombings?
23 A. Yes, I believe my answer was that the overwhelming number of
24 statements indicated that the reason was not because of the NATO bombing.
25 And I did acknowledge that there were some statements to the effect that
1 NATO was the reason.
2 Q. Can I direct you to page 50, line 14, 15, and 16 of your
3 testimony, ma'am. You did not say that. You said: "All had the exact
4 same story."
5 So are you perhaps embellishing the facts somewhat?
6 A. No.
7 Q. So you stand by your statement that all had the same story?
8 A. I stand by the statement that all of the people that we
9 interviewed, the overwhelming number of them said they left because of the
10 conduct of the Serbian forces.
11 Q. Okay. Well, we'll get to some questions about how you selected
12 people to interview. But, first of all, I want to ask you some other
13 questions relating to the methodology that was utilised by your staff in
14 order to obtain the information for your report, the -- and when I
15 say "your report," I'm referring to the Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told.
16 So please, when I use the term "report," unless I state otherwise, that's
17 what I'm referring to.
18 Based upon the mission and goal of your staff at the time,
19 wouldn't it be fair to say that the purpose of this report was essentially
20 to do work for the Office of the Prosecutor here at the ICTY?
21 A. No.
22 Q. That is to say, rather than being merely a collector of facts, the
23 objective of the report was not only to collect facts but to make and
24 reach legal conclusions and present legal arguments that crimes had been
25 committed and to argue that perpetrators of those crimes should be brought
1 to trial?
2 A. That's the purpose of all human rights reporting, including this
4 Q. But I submit, ma'am, that the method in which you -- you used the
5 term "sample group," did you not, the sample that you selected for
6 interviews in the various camps?
7 A. It's -- I guess.
8 Q. Okay. With respect to the manner in which the sample group was
9 collected, first of all, isn't it accurate that this sample group
10 consisted of only 2.764 refugees?
11 A. I think that's the -- that sounds like the exact number, yeah.
12 Q. Okay. Because we've heard various numbers thrown around and I'm
13 trying to pin that down.
14 A. I don't have the report in front of me, but if it says it in that,
15 then that sounds about right. I usually say 2800.
16 Q. Fair enough. And these interviews were all conducted at the
17 refugee centres that you have described for us in Macedonia and Albania?
18 A. Some -- yeah, some were collected in the camps. Others were
19 collected from people that may have been in housed families in Macedonia.
20 Q. And from these 2.764 people that were interviewed, your staff
21 extrapolated from those results to reach conclusions and inferences based
22 upon the refugee population as a whole. Is that not correct?
23 A. The conclusions and inferences are of the situation, the human
24 rights situation, that was unfolding -- I find your question a little bit
25 confusing. Do you mind asking it again.
1 Q. Well, sure. The -- the responses you received from these 2.764
2 individuals which are contained in your report, the OSCE report, from
3 that, the report, which was completed by your staff, extrapolates and
4 draws conclusions relating to the entire refugee population, does it not?
5 A. It draws conclusions related to the entire human rights situation
6 that was going on, yes, and the causes for that displacement.
7 Q. Well, ma'am, in your testimony a few moments ago did you not in
8 fact extrapolate and make conclusions based upon what you knew these 2.764
9 individuals had said and relate it to the entire refugee population?
10 A. It was just -- it was more than that. It was also the follow-up
11 work and the verification when we went back into Kosovo. So yes, with
12 that caveat.
13 Q. Okay. And we had heard that during the interviews they were
14 either conducted in these orange OSCE trucks or in tents that were visibly
15 identified as being the OSCE, conspicuous to the public and to other
16 people. Is that correct?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. Okay. And I believe your staff found people to interview based
19 upon asking to speak only to victims of crimes. Is that accurate?
20 A. It was more that people flooded us and then with -- wanting to
21 give statements and we prioritised who we would take those statements
22 from. We were looking for victims and direct witness accounts.
23 Q. Now, ma'am, isn't it true that your report actually states that
24 rather than randomly asking people, your staff turned to Kosovo Albanian
25 leaders in the refugee centres, such as family patriarchs and imams, to
1 find people for you to interview?
2 A. Again, it was more to help filter as opposed to find, because we
3 were getting so many requests that we were relying on contacts, as you've
4 described, to help us find the best statements, so to speak.
5 Q. So you used these people to help you select the best statements?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. The best statements to prove the OTP's case here. Is that not
9 A. The best statements to describe what the events were in Kosovo and
10 what -- from people that were best able to articulate it. That's what we
11 were striving to do.
12 Q. And in fact is it fair to say that on occasion these people
13 interviewed consisted of multiple family members from the same family?
14 A. Sometimes, yes.
15 Q. And essentially this sample that you selectively picked and
16 interviewed was not a true representative sample of the greater whole of
17 the Kosovo Albanian population. Isn't that accurate?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Well, ma'am, let me ask you this: Are you familiar with the
20 concept of a sample group as used in statistics, sociology, medicine and
21 other professional areas of study?
22 A. Generally.
23 Q. I take it then that you have not had any extended formal training
24 or education in that area of study?
25 A. In the area of statistics or sociology, I mean I've had a few
2 Q. Did you have any persons with formal training in those areas
3 performing the analyses of the interview statements and preparing this
4 report which the Office of the Prosecutor has submitted to us
5 Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told?
6 A. Yes, I have legal training which --
7 Q. That wasn't my question, ma'am. I said did anyone in your
8 staff --
9 A. Oh, I'm sorry.
10 Q. -- have training in the area of statistics, sample group
11 methodology, inferential statistical analysis?
12 A. We had people who were trained lawyers and police officers that
13 had worked on large documentation processes. I couldn't say whether they
14 have this exact experience that you've just rattled. I don't know.
15 Q. Well, ma'am, if I can ask you. The method that you just described
16 of selecting your sample group, are you aware that it violates the basic
17 tenets of selecting a sample group in order to have a valid and proper
18 inferential and statistical analysis?
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Don't answer that question.
20 I'm perhaps misunderstanding the situation. But I thought that
21 this was a team of human rights workers out looking for evidence of human
22 rights breaches and not a market research organisation.
23 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, perhaps it's because you -- since
24 the report has not yet been examined by the panel, but the report itself
25 goes beyond just reporting what unnamed, unsworn interviewees stated. It
1 goes on to reach conclusions that are applied to a whole and --
2 far-reaching conclusions that relate to every single refugee and that
3 relate to every single municipality of Kosovo, to reach conclusions based
4 upon what actually happened, et cetera, and I intend to demonstrate the --
5 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm aware of that. What I don't understand is the
6 suggestion that they, that's the monitors carrying this out, selected a
7 sample group as if they were a market research organisation. I don't know
8 the basis of your question is proper in light of the evidence so far.
9 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, the evidence so far has been that
10 the -- at least the claims made by the witness have been that the mission
11 was not biased, that it was impartial, and that it was trying to seek
12 information. What I'm trying to establish is that the manner in which
13 they sought the information was, in fact, of a particular type of bias
14 such that they cannot use the results to try to reach far-reaching
15 conclusions to the entire area of Kosovo and the entire Kosovar population
16 that may have left their homes and for the reasons that they left those
18 JUDGE BONOMY: That may be a perfectly proper submission for you
19 to make in due course, that because of the job they were doing the
20 conclusions that are offered are not appropriate conclusions.
21 All I'm saying to you is that to suggest that they went out of
22 their way to select a sample group as a statistical exercise or something
23 like market research is an improper foundation for the question that
24 you're putting.
25 MR. IVETIC: That's not what I was implying. I was trying to
1 question the methodology used to see whether it was suspect or deficient.
2 JUDGE CHOWHAN: One thing more which I respectfully prompt him to
3 state. That there are many things which could be inferred from the report
4 itself while we go through the report and could be pointed out at the time
5 of arguments or any other appropriate time. And there's no need of some
6 of the things coming up if they are borne on the report.
7 Thank you for this interruption.
8 MR. IVETIC: But, of course, we still haven't had a ruling whether
9 the report will be admitted into evidence, and there are certain
10 objections to the report, so some of this is necessary, I believe.
11 Q. Again, ma'am, I take it then that we can conclude that nobody
12 involved in the analysis of the interviews was qualified to prepare an
13 inferential analysis, to apply it to the refugee population as a whole.
14 Is that accurate?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Okay. Is it accurate or is it that there was no such person?
17 A. I can't answer the question. I don't know the curriculum vitaes
18 of all the people that were involved in this.
19 Q. Did you offer training --
20 A. If that's what you're asking me to do. Not on statistical
21 compilations, no, I did not.
22 Q. Did the mission offer training on the concept of simple, random
24 A. No, sir.
25 Q. Okay. And are you familiar with the concept of a standard
1 deviation or standard of error?
2 A. Only from my old college days. Other than that, no.
3 Q. Does the analysis of your report contain a standard deviation or a
4 standard of error for its analysis and conclusions?
5 A. No -- I don't know. I can't answer that question, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I'm sorry to interrupt again. We have to see the
7 report itself and its intrinsic value at that time.
8 Supposing the report is not accepted, then you are saved of the
9 questions. Supposing it is accepted, the report is in a tenable shape and
10 with all these principles which you are very kindly enunciating, it could
11 be with that touch we can always see that. I mean, there would be -- you
12 have all the ample opportunity of your knowledge to be used for that
13 purpose. That is my request.
14 MR. IVETIC: But, Your Honour, since we have deferred ruling on
15 that until the conclusion of the cross-examination of the Defence,
16 unfortunately these are matters that we have discuss now.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Carry on, Mr. Ivetic.
18 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
19 Q. Now, do you know or have you had any -- have you read any
20 literature regarding how the size of a sample group affects the validity
21 of inferences drawn therefrom to a population whole?
22 A. Not in the recent few years, no.
23 Q. Was any such literature consulted for the compilation and
24 preparation of this OSCE report that you have been talking about today?
25 A. Not that I'm aware of.
1 Q. Okay. And for the sake of clarity -- you've testified that you
2 have information as to the total population of Kosovo Albanians that lived
3 in the territory of Kosovo Metohija during the time period in question.
4 Is that accurate? You indicated a figure earlier of approximately 1.5,
5 1.6 million?
6 A. I don't think I said 1.6.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And based upon that -- based upon that, wouldn't roughly the
10 sample group that you interviewed, 2.764 individuals, wouldn't that
11 roughly account for less than 0.20 of 1 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian
13 A. I have no idea. It was the capacity that we had in the field that
14 led to the number, not the other way around.
15 Q. Okay. And as a matter of fact, having read your report, isn't it
16 also accurate that some of the inferences and findings therefrom relating
17 to particular occurrences in particular municipalities are based upon only
18 one interviewee?
19 A. Where that's the case, it's generally noted in the report, yes.
20 Q. But it does exist, does it not?
21 A. Yes, it does.
22 Q. So in that case, your interview of one person led your staff to
23 conclude -- to make a conclusion, a legal conclusion, relating to an
24 entire municipality and an entire occurrence?
25 A. No. There was -- there was always additional factors. You'd have
1 to point to the specific reference for me to understand the context, but
2 the municipality reports included also information that we had before
3 leaving Kosovo. So it was more than just one interview.
4 Q. And I believe you testified that the training that was received by
5 the various KVM staff was ongoing from November through -- excuse me,
6 through March of 1999. Is that correct?
7 A. That was the period in time in which we were able to do the
8 trainings, but these were not weekly trainings.
9 Q. They were as-needed or as ad hoc maybe?
10 A. As needed and as we were able to pull the materials together and
11 prioritise, yeah.
12 Q. Well, would it be fair to say then yesterday when my colleague
13 Mr. O'Sullivan asked about the adequacy of the training of various staff
14 and certain complaints that had been voiced regarding that adequacy,
15 wouldn't it be fair to say that during the time period when the KVM
16 mission was in Kosovo, that is up until March 1999, insofar as training
17 was still ongoing, it was possible that some of the people in the field
18 were not properly trained?
19 A. Not properly trained to do what? They were all properly trained
20 to be witnesses, to do documentation, to interview, to record.
21 Q. Okay. And -- but they were not properly trained to analyse, were
23 A. Not all of them, no.
24 Q. Okay. Well, you earlier indicated that no one was trained to
25 perform an analysis of these figures to make an inference with respect to
1 the population whole?
2 A. That statement refers to the -- the team in Warsaw that was
3 actually compiling the report. The question I just heard from you was
4 people in the field in Kosovo, the verifiers.
5 Q. Okay. Let's go back for a second to the interviews by your staff
6 in Macedonia and Albania. Isn't it accurate that your report acknowledges
7 that there were inconsistencies between various persons talking about the
8 same occurrence?
9 A. There could be, yes.
10 Q. Okay. Not that there could be, there actually were?
11 A. There were at times, yes.
12 Q. Okay. And, again, I go back to the fact that you earlier stated
13 that everyone told you -- I take that back.
14 You earlier stated that all interviewees told you the same story.
15 Would you care to correct that now at this point in time, now that you've
16 agreed that there were inconsistencies in the statement. Wouldn't it
17 be -- isn't it impossible to have inconsistencies and yet to have everyone
18 be telling you the exact same story as you had earlier testified?
19 A. We're talking about thousands of crimes. In a particular crime,
20 there may be an inconsistency. In others, like the deportations, there
21 were very -- there were no inconsistencies. So it depends on the crime
22 you're talking about and the situation. There may have been
23 inconsistencies with regards to one actual event.
24 Q. I'm talking about your report which acknowledges inconsistencies
25 existing and which you acknowledge was true.
1 So were there inconsistencies in the statements made by
2 interviewees with respect to what's alleged in the 750-page report?
3 A. No. There were inconsistencies with regards to a specific event,
4 and where that happened that was noted in the report.
5 Q. Okay. Now, due to the fact that you lacked personnel, resources,
6 and other factors, isn't it also true that your report acknowledges that
7 was impossible to investigate fully and verify all these instances?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Okay. So at the time of the day we're really using a small sample
10 group drawn from a limited pool to reach -- to make far-reaching
11 conclusions that are essentially guesses or that are not verified. Is
12 that correct?
13 A. I would not agree to that.
14 Q. Okay.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please slow down. Could the
16 counsel please slow down.
17 MR. IVETIC:
18 Q. During your tenure at --
19 MR. STAMP: Excuse me, I think there's a request from the
20 interpreter's booth that counsel slows down.
21 MR. IVETIC: I will try to. I'm just mindful of the clock.
22 Q. Ms. Mitchell, during your ten years as the head of the human
23 rights department in the KVM operation, and prior to the withdrawal of
24 your mission, I believe you had testified that you had occasion to verify
25 certain criminal activity on the part of the -- on the part of Kosovo
1 Albanian armed groups, particularly the KLA. Is that accurate?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Okay. And in fact, during the time of the KVM mission's tenure in
4 Kosovo Metohija, isn't it true that the KLA conducted numerous attacks
5 against the Serbian police, Serbian civilians, and even Kosovo Albanian
6 civilians that were obstacles to their armed insurgency?
7 A. The report does document the conduct of the UCK as relates to
8 attacks against police, yes; at times against civilian -- excuse me,
9 Serbian civilians, as well as Kosovo Albanians. That is covered in the
11 Q. Okay. And isn't it true that the mission verified that the KLA
12 killed not only moderate Albanians who did not support their cause, but
13 also Serbs who were well regarded by both the Serbian and the Albanian
15 A. I believe there are reports to that effect, yes.
16 Q. Okay. And do you have statistics for the number of crimes or
17 human rights violations attributed to the UCK, the KLA, during the time
18 period that your mission was in Kosovo Metohija?
19 A. Statistics, no.
20 Q. Okay. Was that not part of the mission objective, to focus on
21 those crimes?
22 A. No, no, it was. They were documented. I just couldn't rattle off
23 statistics for you, and the information isn't registered in my mind in a
24 statistical way. Of course we documented them. We investigated them when
25 we could, and they're all included in the report.
1 Q. And during that time period are you also familiar with certain
2 publications that came out in the press, in particular in Pristina, Kosovo
3 Albanian newspapers that published lists of Serbs and Albanians that
4 were -- it's kind of like a hit list?
5 A. During what time period?
6 Q. Up to March of 1999, from the deployment through the departure of
7 the KVM mission.
8 A. I don't remember such reports during that time, but I do
9 afterwards hen the return -- when the refugees came back.
10 Q. Okay.
11 A. But I don't remember --
12 Q. You don't know whether that was from the time -- whether those
13 were -- papers were actually published prior to your departure -- to the
14 departure or whether they were published after?
15 A. I just remember seeing those types of newspaper articles that
16 you've described occurring after the end of the conflict, so to speak, and
17 the return of the refugees back into Kosovo. It may have happened
18 beforehand, but I don't remember it.
19 Q. Okay. And do you recall during the time period of the KVM mission
20 being in Kosovo Metohija that there was some incidents of the killings on
21 the part of the KLA which attracted some international attention. For
22 instance, do you recall the killing of six young Kosovo Serb youths in Pec
23 in a bar in December 1998?
24 A. The Panda Bar, yes, sir, I do.
25 Q. Okay. And do you also recall in -- I believe it was that same
1 month, that the deputy mayor of Kosovo Polje, an ethnic Serb, was abducted
2 and murdered by the KLA?
3 A. I do recall that report, yes.
4 Q. And regarding abductions and kidnappings which I believe you
5 touched upon in response to some questions from one of my learned
6 colleagues, is it also accurate that your report contains information from
7 the International Committee of the Red Cross stating that as of mid-March
8 1999, that is when your mission withdrew from Kosovo Metohija, there had
9 been 146 persons of various ethnicities, Serb, Albanian, Romani, Turk, and
10 otherwise, who had been abducted or otherwise unaccounted for in areas
11 controlled by the KLA?
12 A. I think that number sounds about right, yes.
13 Q. Okay. And do you recall that your staff -- or I should say the
14 KVM mission, someone from the KVM mission, had meetings with the KLA in
15 December of 1998 to try and determine the fate of persons who had been
17 A. The head of mission was quite engaged in the issue of the missing,
18 and there were regular discussions to try to obtain information about them
19 from all sources, including the KLA, yes.
20 Q. And do you recall in particular a gentleman by the name of Adem
21 Demaci, D-e-m-a-c-i, and a meeting in December of 1998?
22 A. Mr. Demaci was the spokesperson for the KLA, or political advisor,
23 something like this. And there were meetings with him. I wouldn't be
24 surprised if it happened in December, I just don't remember the event.
25 Q. Well, the -- would you -- the report -- your report indicates that
1 at that time Mr. Demaci confirmed that any Serbs abducted during that time
2 ought to be presumed to be dead. Does that fairly reflect the knowledge
3 that KVM had of the activities and the modus operandi of the KLA during
4 the time period you were on the ground over there?
5 A. I think that reflects what Mr. Demaci said.
6 Q. Okay. And in addition -- in addition to the KLA, weren't there in
7 fact other armed Kosovo Albanian factions operating in various areas of
8 Kosovo Metohija?
9 A. If I may, the KLA was not unified in a centrally coordinated way.
10 It had different zone commanders, and so it did tend to look different in
11 different parts of Kosovo. I don't know at times, you know, who was part
12 of the KLA and --
13 Q. [Indiscernible].
14 A. -- in a particular village. Only, you know, that natural village
15 defence groups would form and then they called themselves the KLA. It was
16 difficult to know.
17 Q. And are you familiar with an organisation called the FARK, the
18 Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosova?
19 A. The FARK, that rings -- yes. Yes, I remember that.
20 Q. And wasn't it accurate that there was various in-fighting between
21 these various armed Kosovo Albanian groups?
22 A. They -- in-fighting, I don't know. I know that they didn't have
23 the same type of organised structure and centralised command. They could
24 behave differently, depending on the zone commanders.
25 Q. Well, did you have any information as to the assassination of
1 Ahmet Krasniqi of the FARK who was reported to have been assassinated by
2 the KLA in Tirana?
3 A. I don't.
4 Q. Okay. Now, at the time that the OSCE-KVM mission was deployed on
5 the ground in Kosovo Metohija, at that time in the beginning wasn't it
6 true that in fact the KLA had been reported to have had ties to terrorist
8 A. I have no knowledge of that.
9 Q. Okay. With respect to the time period just prior to and beginning
10 with your deployment, are you familiar with the so-called October accords,
11 or October agreements between Holbrooke and Milosevic?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Okay. And are you familiar with the terms of those agreements
14 that were negotiated in October of 1998, generally speaking?
15 A. Generally speaking, yeah. I never saw the document, though.
16 Q. Okay. Did you have knowledge of the fact that one of the terms of
17 that agreement was for the Serbian police and the Yugoslav army to scale
18 back their force deployments within the Kosovo Metohija province?
19 A. I'm more familiar with the way that's defined in the agreement
20 between Geremek and Jovanovic, the OSCE and the foreign minister of
21 Yugoslavia, which I think also touched on that. I don't know the details
22 of the Holbrooke agreement.
23 Q. Well, have I accurately depicted what the purpose or the goal was
24 leading into the KVM deployment?
25 A. The goal -- one was a cease-fire, and the other was, yes, that
1 there would some scale-back, return to barracks I think was the language
2 that was used. And that there would also be a cease-fire, which both
3 sides violated.
4 Q. Well, now hold on, ma'am. In the -- in your report, the report
5 indicates that the KLA is the one that repeatedly violated the cease-fire.
6 Isn't that accurate?
7 A. Well, they did repeatedly violate it.
8 Q. In fact, I believe if I can direct your attention to Prosecution
9 Exhibit, I think it's P473.
10 MR. IVETIC: And if the court officer can turn to that exhibit.
11 And if you could turn to the page with the ERN number K0350454. That's --
12 the ERN page for the page in question is K0350454. It looks like it's
13 page 26 in the text, but I don't know in the scanned version since there
14 was an introduction and table of contents whether it would be the 26th
16 That's page -- that's 439. We need 454, so it should be about 16
17 pages advanced. I've been told that should be page 41 of the exhibit.
18 The page number is again K0350454.
19 Q. If I could direct the witness's attention to the beginning of the
20 second-to-last paragraph that begins, and I can -- Ms. Mitchell, does this
21 not say, and I quote: "There were frequent small-scale ambushes against
22 MUP forces by the UCK during the first two and a half months of 1999,
23 clearly breaching any conceptions of a cease-fire"?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. So would it be a fair to say statement to say then that following
1 the October accords, the KVM observed the activities of the KLA and that
2 the KLA, rather than complying with the cease-fire, re-armed, moved into
3 areas after the Serb forces withdrew, and attacked Serbian forces?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. Okay. Now did the KVM attempt to do anything regarding the KLA's
6 blatant violation of the cease-fire following its deployment?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Okay. Were you able to do anything to actually get the KLA to
9 stop attacking Serbian forces?
10 A. Not with any sustainability, no.
11 Q. Okay. So it was a fairly frequent and ongoing problem, was it
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Okay. And it was --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could speakers please pause between question and
17 MR. IVETIC:
18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... that there were approximately
19 1.854 attacks by the KLA during --
20 MR. STAMP: I'm sorry to interrupt, counsel. It's the same thing
21 again which I don't think you're picking up from the interpreters.
22 They're asking for a pause between the questions and the answers.
23 MR. IVETIC: I apologise. I'm not getting anything on the
24 headphones, so I will endeavour to slow down. I'm on zero.
25 Q. I guess let me ask the question in a different way. Would it be
1 accurate, ma'am, or do you have a recollection in 1998 that there were
2 approximately 1.854 reported attacks by the KLA against the Serbian
3 forces? Does that sound -- does that sound like in the ballpark?
4 A. I really don't remember every sentence of this report. If that's
5 in the report --
6 Q. Well, from your own personal experiences during the relevant time
7 period, does that range, that numerical range, comport to your
8 recollection of the frequency and the volume of the KLA attacks upon
9 Serbian police/Yugoslavian army units?
10 A. I couldn't say for all of 1998. We were only there for the last
11 few months, and so the number seems a little bit high for me in looking at
12 it from that perspective.
13 Q. Well, during the time period that -- the few months in 1998 that
14 the KVM mission was present, were there I would say frequently -- daily
15 attacks by the KLA? How frequent were they?
16 A. Yeah. It would go in waves, you know. You could have a quiet few
17 days, or a quiet week, and then there could be outbreaks suddenly in
18 numerous locations at the same time. I mean, I don't think -- my own
19 recollection was that we never had a cease-fire and --
20 Q. So that would be pretty frequent then?
21 A. It was pretty frequent. But not -- "daily" is maybe going a bit
22 too far that -- there were days when there wasn't any problems. They were
23 few and far between.
24 Q. But in any event, frequent enough so that you thought that there
25 was not a cease-fire in place?
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. Okay. Now while we're discussing the KLA, would it be fair to say
3 that the KVM personnel noted that the KLA were known to be at times
4 dressed in civilian clothing?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Okay. And would it be also true to say that the KVM staff
7 concluded in your report that the -- and I quote now: "The vast majority
8 of the rank and file KLA members remained villagers with a weapon."
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. Okay. And isn't it also a fact, confirmed by the findings of your
11 staff, that the KLA often was based and formed in villages around a
12 particular family group?
13 A. Yes. I just don't know if it was a family group or, you know,
14 sometimes you would have villages that just weren't all one family. But,
15 yes, they were definitely village-oriented.
16 Q. Okay. Such that it was possible for entire families to perhaps be
17 in -- either recruited or whatever in the KLA?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. Okay. And given your knowledge of Kosovo Albanian family
20 structure, would it be fair to say that most families were headed by a
21 patriarch figure?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. And getting back to the question we started off with, isn't it
24 true that your report states that again when you went into the refugee
25 camps you sought the assistance of family patriarchs to provide
1 interviewees or witnesses for you?
2 A. We sought the assistance of community leaders to assist, and some
3 may have been family patriarchs.
4 Q. Well, community leaders, were there any steps undertaken to ensure
5 that the community leaders contacted were not KLA friendly or KLA --
6 A. Oh, absolutely. We were dealing with the humanitarian
7 organisations and the human rights organisations that we had worked with
8 inside Kosovo and established links with.
9 Q. Where is that methodology discussed in your report?
10 A. In the report, I believe it's in the section that describes how
11 the information was collected in the camps and that different systems were
12 used in part of Macedonia where you had host families, where many people
13 were living with other Albanians. And so we used a different network in
14 that area, and I think it's in that section of this report.
15 Q. But you can't exclude that perhaps some of the people
16 interviewed --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could speakers please make a pause between
18 question and answer.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I think, Mr. Ivetic, that that's your third
20 warning, so it's perhaps appropriate for a yellow card to be waved now in
21 the hope that you will observe the pause that's necessary for the
23 Bear in mind that you're both speaking the same language, which
24 makes the interpreter's job difficult because the whole of question and
25 answer has to be translated by the one person for those listening on the
2 MR. IVETIC: I appreciate that, and now that I can hear the
3 messages on my headphones, I will be mindful of trying to slow down.
4 Q. As I was stating, you cannot exclude the possibility that those
5 persons interviewed may have been referred by KLA members or KLA
6 sympathisers, can you?
7 A. No, that is true.
8 Q. Now, going back to the -- strike that.
9 Going back to the dress practice of the KLA, we had talked about
10 how they often would -- strike that question.
11 We had talked about the fact that KLA members were known to wear
12 civilian clothing. Going further, isn't it a fact that your staff noted
13 or notes in the report that orders -- that it became known that orders had
14 been issued by the KLA leadership, for lack of a better term, to its
15 forces to hide their weapons, shed their uniforms and blend in with
16 civilians when need be?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. So, again, based upon that, you cannot exclude that persons that
19 were interviewed may have had affiliations with the KLA in that regard as
21 A. That's true.
22 Q. Okay. Now it's true, is it not, that the KVM mission -- I guess
23 that's a redundant phrase, but the KVM itself had indications that the KLA
24 was responsible for creating IDPs, and by IDPs I mean internally displaced
25 persons, in Kosovo and Metohija and intentionally using Kosovo Albanian
1 villages as front-line defences in their battles against the Serbian
2 police and the Yugoslav army?
3 A. I remember that in the Kacanik area, yes.
4 Q. Okay. And wouldn't it stand to reason that these IDPs could, if
5 they crossed a border, become refugees?
6 A. Of course.
7 Q. And therefore, ma'am, isn't it also true that you cannot exclude
8 the possibility that some of the 700.000-plus refugees that you did not
9 interview could have left due to this reason, namely the KLA?
10 A. That's true.
11 Q. Okay. And isn't it also a fact that in the report KVM estimates
12 that more than 100.000 Serbian IDPs, again internally displaced persons,
13 had left Kosovo Metohija for Serbia and/or Montenegro?
14 A. That's true, sir.
15 Q. Okay. And I believe that you had testified in the Milosevic case,
16 correct me if I'm wrong, that it was your knowledge that of the few
17 Serbian refugees that you had -- that the organisation had had contact
18 with, these refugees were fleeing exclusively because of the fear from the
19 NATO attacks on Kosovo Metohija?
20 A. The very few that we were able to interview, that's correct.
21 Q. Okay. And -- so again, it would stand to reason that we cannot
22 exclude that a portion of the Kosovo Albanian population that left the
23 territory of Kosovo Metohija during that same time period was leaving due
24 to a fear of the NATO attacks that were on place in Kosovo Metohija?
25 A. We cannot rule that out, no.
1 Q. Okay. Now, turning for a moment to the NATO attack on Yugoslavia,
2 including Kosovo Metohija, you would agree, would you not, that the
3 attacks by the NATO alliance inflicted considerable damage and loss of
4 life within Yugoslavia?
5 A. Considerable -- I can't answer that question. I can answer it
6 with regards to damage that occurred in Kosovo.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. But not all of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslavia.
9 Q. I believe I'm citing to [sic] your report.
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. So that was limited to Kosovo Metohija?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. So there was considerable damage and loss of life within Kosovo
14 Metohija that directly and approximately resulted from the NATO bombing.
15 Is that what your testimony is here today?
16 A. There was considerable damage. I don't know that we have an exact
17 number on the loss of life, but there was loss of life, yes.
18 Q. Okay. And flowing from that, would it then also be a possible
19 inference that with that situation people would not want to stay around?
20 A. A possible inference, yes.
21 Q. Okay. Now, furthermore, are you aware or did you receive reports
22 of civilians that fled their homes in other parts of Serbia, for instance
23 Belgrade, when NATO attacked Kosovo Metohija?
24 A. I'm aware of it because of the news, not because of any reports
25 that we would have received as part of the field operation itself.
1 Q. Okay. So dealing with those refugees would not have been part of
2 the mandate for your mission?
3 A. No. Our -- we were limited to movement in Albania and Macedonia,
4 and many of the Serbians that left would have gone -- stayed within other
5 parts of Serbia and Montenegro and we didn't have access there or a
6 mandate there.
7 Q. But you do have general knowledge of that?
8 A. Yes, from the news.
9 Q. Okay. Now, in fact, relating back to Kosovo Metohija -- or
10 limiting ourselves to Kosovo Metohija, it's a fact, is it not, that NATO
11 forces struck civilian targets, including convoys of Kosovo Albanians?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Okay. And do you have any information as to the intensity of the
14 NATO attacks on the territory of Kosovo Metohija during the time period
15 that the -- you know, that the -- after your mission had left?
16 A. The -- wherever -- whenever a refugee made a reference to NATO
17 bombings or NATO planes, that was noted. And the report does include
18 incidents, the convoy you're talking about. So where it was reported to
19 us by the refugees, it is included in the report, yes.
20 Q. And -- I'm sorry. And in that report there are several such
21 instances that were reported by refugees?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. Okay. Now, would that not also be a cause for fear among the
24 population of Kosovo Metohija?
25 A. Any -- yes. Any violence and the use of armed forces is going to
1 create fear, yes.
2 Q. So again this can be excluded as a cause for why people left their
4 A. That's true, yes.
5 Q. In fact, I believe your -- the OSCE report acknowledges that there
6 was even a legitimate function of the Serbian police escorting people who
7 were afraid of attacks by either the KLA or NATO aircraft. Isn't that
9 A. That's accurate. It's incumbent on security forces to try to
10 protect civilians, and there were some indications in some reports that
11 are also included in the report in this volume 1 of Serbian military and
12 police assisting and helping civilians at times during this period.
13 Q. Okay. And let's focus on some more examples of the specific
14 conduct of the police during the time period. Earlier we had talked
15 about -- strike that.
16 The KVM mission in Kosovo Metohija, it too was fired upon by the
17 KLA and suffered casualties arising therefrom?
18 A. I remember one, one casualty, yes. And cars were getting caught
19 at times in cross-fire.
20 Q. Okay. Well, let me see if I can refresh your recollection with
21 some instances.
22 Do you recall an instance sometime in January of 1999 where two
23 KVM personnel were wounded by a sniper on the road near Gornji Ratis,
24 Mr. Martin Feil [phoen] and Dejan Zojaga, and had to be basically sent to
25 the Pristina hospital?
1 A. I do remember an incident where there was a shooting and some sort
2 of an injury. It may have been the one you're talking about.
3 Q. And do you recall at that point in time that the Serbian police
4 came to the assistance of this person -- of these personnel?
5 A. They would have, yes.
6 Q. Okay. And would the -- do you also recall that these -- these
7 verifiers had accompanied a police convoy, despite warnings that their
8 safety couldn't be assured?
9 A. That does sound familiar, yes.
10 Q. Okay. And I believe yesterday you mentioned at one point in time
11 that the -- that the Serbian authorities, I don't know if you'd
12 specifically mentioned the police, but they had at times restricted the
13 movement or that you thought that they had restricted the movements of the
15 A. That's true.
16 Q. Or that they were uncooperative?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Couldn't another explanation for that be that they were concerned
19 for the safety of the various vehicles and personnel that were being
21 A. On a case-by-case basis that could be the case.
22 Q. Okay. So again we cannot exclude that rationale either?
23 A. No.
24 Q. And I believe there was an instance on January 9th, 1999, in the
25 area of Dasinovac in the Decani municipality where a KVM vehicle
1 containing verifiers was attacked by a rocket-launcher and by small arms
2 and infantry fire. Do you recall that instance?
3 A. I don't recall that one, no.
4 Q. Okay. Let's talk generally then. For any such instance, would it
5 be fair to say that the KVM would have contacted the local Serbian police
6 authorities to ask for assistance?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Are you aware of any instance where the Serbian police refused to
9 act and refused to offer assistance?
10 A. Refused to offer -- sorry. Refused to offer assistance for KVM --
11 Q. To evacuate --
12 A. For KVM staff in distress?
13 Q. Correct.
14 A. No, I'm not aware of any incidents where the police refused to
15 help in that situation.
16 Q. So would it be fair to say that the Serbian police were quite
17 cooperative with KVM in that regard?
18 A. With regards to extracting people if they got in trouble, it
19 didn't happen very often, fortunately, and when it did there was
21 Q. And you say it didn't happen very often, but it did happen
22 multiple times, did it not?
23 A. A few times.
24 Q. Was there an incident with the Red Cross where a Red Cross vehicle
25 had struck a mine and had been attacked by the KLA and the police came
1 with a helicopter to evacuate the personnel?
2 A. Do you remember the time frame for that?
3 Q. I believe it was in September of 1998.
4 A. Yeah, that's what I thought. I do remember it, but we weren't in
5 theatre at the time.
6 Q. At the time. Okay.
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. Now, isn't it also true that the Serbian Ministry of Internal
9 Affairs staff in Pristina staff engaged in regular, and I believe it was
10 daily contact, with the KVM?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. And as part of that daily contact, information was exchanged
13 regarding events that occurred and regarding any actions that had been
14 undertaken by the police against the KLA?
15 A. I wasn't at those particular meetings. They were handled by the
16 liaison departments of the mission. But that's my understanding of the
17 general nature of those discussions.
18 Q. And is it also your understanding that the Serbian Ministry of
19 Internal Affairs, that is to say the local police, would advise KVM prior
20 to any actions that they were undertaking against the KLA that were
22 A. Again, I don't have complete knowledge. At times that would
23 happen, but I wouldn't say that it was all the time.
24 Q. Well, for instance, in the oft-cited Racak operation, isn't it
25 true that an OSCE-KVM verifier vehicle was present at the scene
1 overlooking the operation from a hilltop, having been previously advised
2 by the police that such an operation was going to be underway?
3 A. I don't know if that's the reason the person was there, but there
4 was verifiers in the area. But I don't know what prompted that particular
6 Q. And -- but you do recall that the vehicle was there overlooking
7 the village of Racak?
8 A. I do recall that there were verifiers that saw something over
9 hills. I just don't know how much -- the time-frame that they were there,
10 how many hours, et cetera. But, yes, there was reports coming from that.
11 Q. And in fact, during the time period when your mission was in
12 Kosovo Metohija, wasn't it also true that the Serbian police would
13 cooperate with KVM and notify KVM when they came across any corpses of
14 unidentified dead bodies?
15 A. We received notification of dead bodies from the police, yes, as
16 well as from the UCK.
17 Q. Well, wouldn't it be fair to say that it would be illogical for
18 the police if they were engaged in killings to give you notice of finding
19 the dead bodies?
20 A. No, that would not be illogical.
21 Q. With the -- with any instances of misconduct on the part of police
22 officers, when you reported them, isn't it true that corrective measures
23 were applied by the local police?
24 A. No, that is not true.
25 Q. Okay. Can I direct your attention to your report -- one moment,
1 please. Again, this is Exhibit P473. The page number is K03504 --
2 JUDGE BONOMY: You've just, I hope, received an e-mail asking you
3 to identify the page number not by this ERN reference but the actual page
4 number of the document. That's the easiest way for it to be located.
5 MR. IVETIC: It would be, but unfortunately the page number is not
6 the sequential number of the scanned document since the -- the page number
7 I am showing is 49, and I believe on the e-court it's actually not
8 page 49, and I don't know which page it is since I'm looking at a hard
9 copy myself.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, hold on a minute.
11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
12 MR. IVETIC: I'm told it might be page 62.
13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
14 MR. IVETIC: That should be the document. And I would direct the
15 witness's attention to the end of that page, and then we'll lead on to the
16 beginning of the next page, and I quote: "In this case the OSCE-KVM
17 discussed with the victims about what they themselves could do and what
18 the OSCE-KVM could do and considered risks involved. They came to the
19 conclusion they should go to the local police in Decani and make a
20 complaint. The OSCE-KVM arranged the meeting and the group met with the
21 police commander, who was the deputy chief of police, on 2 February. The
22 complainants were very nervous, but the deputy chief of police calmed them
23 and acted in a very friendly fashion. He took all necessary notes, he
24 looked at the injuries and the belt that had been used. He became very
25 upset when he had been told about the radio that had been stolen, and he
1 said that that was the worst of it all. He apologised to the complainants
2 and assured them that something like this would not happen again and that
3 he would find and punish the policemen who behaved incorrectly.
4 "On 3 February, the OSCE-KVM met again with the police commander,
5 who assured them that the policemen who had taken the radio had been
6 identified and punished with a reduced salary. The policeman also had to
7 get a new radio, give it to the family and apologise which happened on
8 3 February. However, the second visit also had the affect that the family
9 once more had to have about 15 policemen on their premises, which they
10 again felt to be very threatening."
11 Q. Now, ma'am, from this description I personally don't see anything
12 that the police, when advised of misconduct, did wrong. Please point
13 me -- point it out to me.
14 A. Your question to me was whether or not the misconduct and
15 corrective action was applied in situations when misconduct was brought to
16 the attention of the authorities. And I would not agree that that was the
17 case all the time, counsel.
18 Q. I did not ask you --
19 A. And that was the -- that is why I answered as I did.
20 The report speaks for itself. There are reports contained like
21 this to show that the information was collected in an impartial way and
22 there reported. I was thinking of numerous other instances where
23 misconduct was brought to the attention of the authorities and no action
24 was taken.
25 Q. And ma'am --
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, would you please find a suitable place
2 to interrupt your cross-examination because we will need to have one more
3 break this evening.
4 MR. IVETIC: Okay. We could take it now, and I could see --
5 because I would only have probably a few follow-up questions. I can maybe
6 wrap them up and make sure that any questions are few, if any, after the
7 break, and then we can continue with whatever else we need to do.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. We will resume at half past 6.00 and
9 sit for just another half an hour.
10 --- Recess taken at 6.08 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 6.30 p.m.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.
13 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour. I believe I have just one or two
14 questions, then I'll be concluding my examination of Ms. Walker -- excuse
15 me, Ms. Mitchell, sorry.
16 Q. With respect to your work for the return of refugees to Kosovo
17 Metohija, are you aware of the fact that the Serbian authorities in 1999
18 established a Crisis Staff for the return of refugees and established ten
19 centres to assist refugees to return from Macedonia and Albania to Kosovo
21 A. Is this the Kosovo Coordination Centre, the CCK?
22 Q. It -- [Microphone not activated]
23 [Defence counsel confer]
24 MR. IVETIC:
25 Q. That was for IDPs, for IDPs, I apologise --
1 A. I'm sorry.
2 Q. Centre for IDPs.
3 A. No, I wasn't aware of that.
4 Q. Okay. In that case, no further questions then.
5 A. Just a clarification. I'm sorry. The -- can you restate the
6 question, because I am aware that there were IDPs in Serbia and that the
7 government was trying to take carry of them.
8 Q. This is in Kosovo Metohija, ma'am. That there were ten centres
9 established by the Serbian authorities to assist displaced persons to
10 return to their homes.
11 A. Okay, okay. No, I don't have that detailed information.
12 Q. Okay. Thank you.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 Mr. Stamp.
15 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you very much. Very briefly.
16 Re-examination by Mr. Stamp:
17 Q. You were shown an ICG database form and a comparison was made with
18 the OSCE data form. Just one question on that. Are you aware -- can you
19 comment on how the ICG managed and organised its data? Are you aware?
20 A. Yes. I've been asked to pause before answering. Yes, I am aware.
21 Q. And are you aware of how it is managed after it leaves them and it
22 arrives at the OTP?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Okay. Thank you very much.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
1 That does focus on a point that does concern the Trial Chamber.
2 These two examples that were produced were absolutely identical. There's
3 no room for this being accidental.
4 MR. STAMP: Indeed.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: And just because of the very detailed nature of the
6 material that's there. And of course the exchange of information in that
7 way is inconsistent with the scheme that the witness has outlined. So I
8 hope that you will either have somebody to explain this later or you will
9 carry out some sort of inquiry to be -- to enable you to explain it to us.
10 MR. STAMP: I --
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Because it could have an impact, obviously, on the
12 assessment of the witness's evidence.
13 MR. STAMP: Yes, I think I could explain it. I just asked her
14 that last question to indicate to the Court that she would not be aware as
15 to how these forms that she was shown, the last one, the ICG form was
16 created. So that could explain --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Will you have evidence to explain it?
18 MR. STAMP: If we need to call a witness to explain how we manage
19 data, raw data, in the OTP storage system, we probably could. But I think
20 it is something that I could indicate to the Court from investigations
21 made -- it's a matter of how raw data is managed in large databases and
22 how they are merged. There are different people bringing in large data.
23 At some point someone is contracted to put it in a database, and sometimes
24 reports from the OSCE might be merged by the ICG with their information.
25 So in other words, the ICG would have information, and at one
1 point they were contracted to work in creating a merged database of many
2 thousands of bits of pieces of raw data that we're getting. And in doing
3 that they merged information from other sources into their own data or
4 database. So you will see an ICG form that has materials identical to
5 another form from another source, because in creating a database there was
6 some merger. That is the explanation I have had.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: But that would presumably be contrary to any
8 protocol you had with them in coming to an agreement with them to handle
9 data when the material that comes from the KVM is - and I'm quoting the
10 witness - highly confidential, therefore you have no right have that or
11 permit the merger of that material, as I understand the position.
12 So are you saying that this is happening deliberately, in
13 contrary -- in contravention of the basis on which the material was
14 provided to you in the first place?
15 MR. STAMP: No.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Or are you saying something else?
17 MR. STAMP: No, no, I'm not. I'm not saying the material was
18 merged in the sense that it was disclosed to parties contrary to the
19 guidelines received from the OSCE. The -- the material had to be managed,
20 and in -- at that time the OTP had to employ persons to manage the
21 material. Among the persons who were employed contractually to assist the
22 OTP in managing the material was the ICG.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah.
24 MR. STAMP: And they were permitted in managing the material for
25 the OTP to merge their material with the material received from a variety
1 of parties.
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 MR. STAMP: Maybe I should also indicate that they really created
4 the software. We did the merging ourselves at the OTP, so we merged
5 various reports, and that is the reason why you might find a report headed
6 ICG with identical reports. It was done by as an aid searching through a
7 huge volume of material -- in 1999 and 2000.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: But what you're trying to suggest is that this
9 information was not available to the ICG for their purposes. Is that what
10 you're saying?
11 MR. STAMP: I --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: And this is a database for the OTP.
13 MR. STAMP: This is an OTP database, yes.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I have to say I remain skeptical and might
15 require a better persuasion that there's not at least been a breach of the
16 understanding on which the information was supplied to you, but that may
17 become clearer later.
18 And I also should add it may not matter a great deal. I don't
19 know. I'm simply expressing a concern about the material and looking for
20 more information if it can be provided.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated].
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Honourable Judge.
24 Microphone, please.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: I would like to thank you again for coming to the
1 Tribunal to give evidence. I think we've heard all we're going to hear
2 from you, but there's never any guarantee of that. But I hope that enough
3 has been explored with you in examination and in cross-examination to
4 bring your contribution to this case to an end. So thank you very much.
5 You're now free to leave.
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 [The witness withdrew]
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Ivetic, we have some time this evening, so
9 I think we could hear some of your submissions in light of the evidence.
10 MR. IVETIC: Well, essentially, Your Honour, the -- my part of the
11 submission is -- remains the same as was specified in the motion we filed
12 yesterday, that essentially the report contains statements by witnesses
13 that we have not been provided, that we can't tell -- they appear to be
14 unsworn from the examplars that have been placed before us. And the
15 Prosecution is seeking to introduce them into evidence in written form. I
16 submit that -- and it's my understanding that evidence in written form of
17 witnesses and their testimony has to be accomplished by Rule 92 bis. And
18 the requirements for Rule 92 bis are not satisfied by this exhibit, and
19 that's -- that would be pretty much the extent of my objections to it.
20 That in addition to the matters set forth in my motion, that essentially
21 the portions of the report that deal with legal conclusions that are left
22 for the Trial Chamber are not appropriate to be introduced into
23 evidence -- I mean, just because a witness happens to be a lawyer doesn't
24 mean that all of a sudden her -- their conclusions or that that report is
25 drafted by lawyers doesn't mean that their conclusions are binding upon
1 this Court or have any probative value, apart from just being opinions.
2 And I believe my colleagues have additional submissions on the specific
3 objections that they raised yesterday, so I don't know if Your Honour
4 wants to ask questions first.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Is your point about the legal conclusion -- or the
6 conclusions there in the report that are really matters for the Trial
7 Chamber to determine rather than for a witness to speak to in evidence, is
8 your point simply to draw our attention to that and to ask us to exercise
9 caution if we admit this evidence and to confine our attention to what
10 might be said to be evidence of fact, or does your submission on that
11 point -- I take your 92 bis point, but does your submission on that point,
12 does it go further and ask us if we admit the report to filet it before
13 deciding to weigh it.
14 MR. IVETIC: Well, the report itself is 750-plus pages.
15 Interspaced throughout that are a wide variety of these legal conclusions.
16 So it might be a very difficult task to try and excise them from the
18 JUDGE BONOMY: I appreciate very much the point you're making, but
19 I think -- and I also appreciate your recognition of the fact that common
20 sense has to prevail in this sort of situation. I think all the Judges
21 here are very well aware of the need to draw the line in this type of
22 evidence between what might be appropriate hearsay evidence and what goes
23 beyond that and amounts to conclusions that are for the Trial Chamber to
25 We thank you, Mr. Ivetic, for your assistance in this and for your
2 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan -- oh sorry, Mr. Visnjic.
4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your leave I would
5 like to say something with regard to some new elements that have just
6 appeared and that might have some impact on your decision to admit this
8 Yesterday Mr. Stamp said for the record something to this effect.
9 When answering the question put forth by my colleague, Sepenuk, with
10 regard to the material in the book, he said that these submissions do not
11 fall under Rule 70 -- 67(ii) or Rule 68. And amongst other things, he
12 said this was -- this contained evidence contrary to Rule 68.
13 What I would like to draw your attention to at this moment is
14 this. If we look at the list representing the list of exhibits by the
15 Prosecution which was disclosed to us -- we're talking about the list
16 65 -- the 65 ter list of witnesses dating -- dated 6th of July, 2006.
17 Today we have checked that list, and I can tell you that according to this
18 list a total of nine witnesses' statements have been disclosed in the same
19 format as the format of the statement of the International Crisis Group.
20 Out of these nine statements in the form of the International Crisis
21 Group, the Prosecution yesterday at the end of the session submitted 12
22 statements out of which five statements are the same as the statements as
23 the International Crisis Group, and today, in the course of the trial,
24 we've seen only two.
25 Also the Prosecution has disclosed seven other statements which
1 are actually OSCE statements which represent, according to them,
2 statements that fall under Rule 66(A)(ii). Contrary to what Mr. Stamp
3 said yesterday on the record, I simply wanted to verify that. And in
4 order to corroborate that I can put forth their statement dated 10 July
5 2006 in which they say as follows.
6 [In English] "And further in the discussion in the court session
7 today, please find enclosed 12 statements taken by OSCE."
8 JUDGE BONOMY: As I understand the explanation at the moment, and
9 I've indicated I think it requires to be supplemented, the -- there may be
10 seven which are in the OSCE form and another five which have gone through
11 some data management process carried out by ICG. That doesn't necessarily
12 mean that they become property of ICG. It's suggested that the initials
13 at the top simply reflect a fact that they had something to do with
14 managing the data. Well, we may hear more about that, but I think that's
15 the basis.
16 Now, are you saying that these are being disclosed to you for the
17 first time, or do you acknowledge that they have been disclosed at an
18 earlier date?
19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. What I'm saying is
20 that the seven of those statements have been disclosed for the first time,
21 and the other five --
22 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ...
23 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] And the other five also in the OSCE
24 form we received in the form of the International Crisis Group prior to
25 this disclosure. In other words, we have five duplicates containing the
1 same text and seven entirely new disclosures.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, this -- well, I suppose it may have a bearing
3 on the present point, but it may have a more significant bearing on the
4 admissibility of the evidence of the witnesses, rather than on the
5 admissibility of the OSCE report.
6 Now, is there anything else you have to say on this point,
7 Mr. Visnjic?
8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
9 My second comment has to do with Mr. Stamp's comment -- do not
10 contain the statements that our accompanying material to the book do not
11 contain anything that might point to the elements of --
12 [French on English channel].
13 -- being -- falling under Rule 68. On page 277 in the part that
14 describes events in Bela Crkva, there is an example, a detail which points
15 to the fact that during the course of these events, the OVK appeared and
16 told the villagers to move on because there were members of the Serbian
17 paramilitary approaching. And I am giving you this just to illustrate the
19 The fact is that the Prosecution has offered to us two witnesses
20 who would testify about the events in Bela Crkva. None of them, Your
21 Honour, mentions the OVK in the same context as in the book. I don't have
22 any knowledge about what other statements might contain because these
23 statements have not been disclosed. But I suspect, based on this example,
24 that none of them contains anything that should be disclosed to the
25 Defence according to the Rules of the Tribunal.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, I don't know if it's a translation problem
2 or I'm misunderstanding you, but you say that you suspect none of the
3 statements contains anything that should be disclosed to the Defence. Or
4 is that a mistake?
5 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. What I'm saying is
6 that the statements that have been offered to us and have been disclosed
7 to us do not contain anything about the OVK, whereas in the book there is
8 information about the OVK. And I am actually wondering -- and I can see
9 the footnote number 36 in the book where two statements by unknown
10 witnesses are mentioned. I suppose that it was the OSCE that obtained
11 that information on the basis of two unknown witnesses. We don't have
12 information as to what is in the statements, but I suppose that we can
13 find the same information there; in other words, that the OVK was there.
14 According to any theory, this is the minimum of exculpatory material that
15 is required by the Defence.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm still not following this submission very well,
17 Mr. Visnjic. Again, it may be translation.
18 What is it you're -- what is your actual submission here? What
19 are you asking us to do?
20 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] First of all, Rule 66. We want all
21 the witness statements to be disclosed to us, all of the statements that
22 have been taken by the OSCE.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: You don't need to tell me that. The Prosecution
24 have already told you what they're willing to do on that score. So we're
25 passed that stage.
1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Second of all, based on the material
2 that have been -- that has been disclosed to us by the Prosecution with
3 this book, accompanying this book, and they had that obligation according
4 to Rule 66(A)(ii) and according to Rule 68 and they have not complied with
5 that obligation, in my view. When we receive all this material, we
6 reserve the right to re-call the witness for additional examination
7 because for the time being this is still a big unknown. And if our
8 learned friends from the Prosecution have adhered to the rule, they should
9 have disclosed that material to us.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm surprised that that's all you reserve the right
11 to do, I may say, depending on what you discover. But I'm afraid it's for
12 you to discover it now. You've been told by the Prosecution that the
13 material will be made available to you. And if you then discover that
14 you -- something that indicates that a Rule 68 obligation's been breached,
15 then I would expect to hear from you.
16 So I note what you say, but I don't think I can do anything about
17 it at this stage.
18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to stop
19 there, and I believe that every breach of rule should -- let me put it
20 this way: It is clear that the Rule 66(A) has been breached in our case
21 because there was a binding Chambers order for these statements to be
22 disclosed to us, and this hasn't been done for at least seven witnesses.
23 As for Rule 68, I have tried to provide you with an example of
24 something that I can see in the book or that I can suspect there is in the
25 book, and I can't tell you anything else because I don't have enough
2 And thirdly, truth be told, it is very difficult for me to
3 understand that the Prosecutor has not given enough weight to the material
4 accompanying their book. I submit that they should have had it translated
5 and that they should have established what is in it exactly.
6 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I am sorry to intervene. This is a stage where
7 you point out a breach, there ought to have been a breach. But still we
8 are awaiting the information to come, and once you point out, at that
9 stage will you be able to point out a breach.
10 Presently it appears to be a -- just a hypothetical question
11 because that has not happened. We do expect that the Prosecution will
12 fulfil its obligations, and what you are saying today should be reminding
13 them of the same.
14 I would request that you wait for some time and see what happens.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Visnjic.
16 We'll have to adjourn now until tomorrow. We'll hear such other
17 submissions as Defence counsel wish to make on this issue and the
18 Prosecution response tomorrow afternoon.
19 Before adjourning, though, I would like to make it clear,
20 Mr. Hannis, that the Trial Chamber's not minded to change the guidance
21 that I gave you before that where witnesses are to appear in any event --
22 and I'm distinguishing that from the situation where the witness doesn't
23 require to appear at all, but that doesn't apply to any witnesses that you
24 are mentioning. Where the witness has to appear in any event, then we do
25 not want to hear summaries of the witness. We can read the statement, and
1 the Prosecutor who's leading the witness can obviously explore a few
2 issues with the witness to highlight the general nature of the evidence or
3 to highlight particular points and help to make the witness comfortable.
4 But it's the ruling of the Trial Chamber that what we're hearing is
5 evidence and not summaries of evidence in the context of live witnesses.
6 We'll adjourn now until 2.15 tomorrow.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,
8 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of
9 July, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.