1 Monday, 20 November 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.14 p.m.
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Good afternoon, Mr. Ciaglinski.
7 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Your cross-examination by Mr. Petrovic will
10 Mr. Petrovic.
11 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
12 WITNESS: RICHARD CIAGLINSKI [Resumed]
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Petrovic: [Continued]
14 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Ciaglinski, I would like to come back to the
15 point in fact where we left off on Friday. You told us in the course of
16 your testimony on Friday that there existed some higher level of the
17 commission for cooperation in Belgrade, and after that I asked you why you
18 were mentioning that for the first time, and this is what you answered:
19 [In English] "I am somewhat surprised because I speak about what I know
20 but I believe that others have spoken about what they know and it has been
21 discussed in their evidence."
22 [Interpretation] That's transcript page 6865. Could you please
23 tell us who are those others that testified about this, that you know of.
24 A. You can well imagine that as I was taking part in this, the trial
25 of Mr. Milosevic, I often used to read the transcripts which were
1 published on the ICTY web site. And somewhere in those readings and of my
2 general sort of knowledge of how things worked, I was aware that there was
3 a higher level representation in Belgrade.
4 Q. Very well. Could you then clarify what is your memory of the
5 events versus what you read from the transcripts and heard in the
6 testimony of others. How, more importantly, will we be able to
7 distinguish between your personal knowledge and the second-hand knowledge
8 that you gained from the media, the listening to the hearings, et cetera?
9 A. Well, from my personal knowledge I know that General Bo Pelmas was
10 in Belgrade and his job was to be the main conduit or a conduit of our
11 contact with Belgrade. So I am aware of that, and I did meet General Bo
12 Pelmas on several occasions.
13 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, on Friday you did not tell us this is what I know
14 and this is what I heard from others. All that you have told us, both
15 about the commission and other topics, you represented as your personal
16 knowledge, your own memory. Am I right?
17 A. Certainly what I told you was from my own personal knowledge, and
18 over seven years since the last trial, five, six, seven years, whatever
19 the last time was, you know, I have discussed, I have read, and it's very
20 difficult to remember exactly what was exactly my personal knowledge and
21 what is -- what I've read about and heard and discussed. But in general,
22 I would say that my knowledge was that Bo Pelmas was our representative in
24 Q. Thus you cannot make a clear distinction for us between what you
25 personally know and what you know from the transcripts and the newspapers.
1 Is that correct?
2 A. I'm telling you that --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on, please, there's an objection.
4 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, could we specify what we're talking
5 about. Are we talking about every single statement in his statement or a
6 particular item? I think it's an unfair question, if he's addressing it
7 to everything that was in his written statement. We need to go item by
8 item, otherwise it's a compound, complex question.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic, to what are you directing this point?
10 Is it everything the witness has said or is it one particular subject?
11 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I started my
12 examination today with a very specific topic, the issue of the commission,
13 that is the higher representation that the witness has mentioned. Further
14 answers of the witness went in the direction, indicating that all that he
15 has said relies both on his personal knowledge and what he has read. So
16 that does go to his testimony in general, but I will try to refocus and
17 come back to what we've started with.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Petrovic, I don't think you can draw from
19 the evidence so far that the witness was saying in regard to what I said
20 on Friday, I can't now tell you how much was personal knowledge and how
21 much is from what I've read. He is saying that there are circumstances in
22 which it is difficult to disentangle the two, and if you want to make a
23 point of that, I'm afraid you'll have to go into the detail.
24 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] I will try to do that, Your Honour,
25 through specific questions.
1 Q. So let us come back to the issue of the commission, or rather, the
2 various levels of the commission of which you said on Friday, if I'm not
3 mistaken, that you were first asked about it on Friday by me. And that
4 was why you first answered to that issue on Friday. Is that correct?
5 A. I believe so, yes.
6 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I have an objection here, too, because
7 if the question just refers to the commission, we need some clarification
8 whether we're talking about the commission in Pristina, that this witness
9 was a participant in; or the commission in Belgrade; or some other level
10 of the commission.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: No, I think that level -- that question was clear.
12 It was the issue of whether there were more than one level that
13 Mr. Petrovic directed his question to, and the witness has agreed that the
14 first time that that arose in his evidence was in answer to
15 cross-examination by Mr. Petrovic. So let's -- that question's been
16 answered. We can move to the next one.
17 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: I may say, it's not exactly my recollection, but
19 that may well be the case now the witness has answered it. I did think it
20 arose in the evidence in chief, but that can only be checked later.
21 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, maybe I can help you.
22 On page 6866, on Friday, there is a passage which I quoted loosely, but I
23 hope the witness does not mind. I don't think this is in dispute. If you
24 allow me, I will ask my next question.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please do so.
1 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, with all due respect, I believe that what you told
3 us, both today and on Friday, namely that you were first asked about
4 various levels of the commission, is simply not true. And why am I saying
5 that? On page 3276 of the transcript of the Milosevic trial, Slobodan
6 Milosevic explicitly asked you about the federal commission, and you said
7 this: [In English] "The only commission that I knew was the commission
8 headed by Loncar in Pristina. That was the level that I worked with."
9 [Interpretation] So to Milosevic's question about the federal
10 commission you answered there was one commission you know of and that is
11 the one that worked on your level in Pristina; I think that is a bit
12 different from what you are telling us today and what you told us on
13 Friday. You said there was one commission in Milosevic's time and now
14 you're talking about two different levels of the same commission or even
15 two different commissions. Could you explain the difference between your
16 testimony here and your testimony in the Milosevic trial, if you can, of
18 A. Of course I can. Memory has a habit of playing tricks on you, and
19 if you actually continued to read the transcript of the Milosevic trial,
20 you will find a section where it says: Do you know who General Pelmas
21 was? Which then triggered my memory and I think I said the same to the
22 words of the effect: Do you mean Bo Pelmas? So at the time -- it had
23 totally slipped my mind and that's why I didn't actually remember about
24 the commission at the higher level, but once it was -- when Pelmas's name
25 was mentioned, it came back.
1 Q. But in the course of that testimony you did not correct your prior
2 statement. You didn't say there existed a commission at a higher level
3 and a commission at a lower level, my level in Pristina. That is not in
4 the transcript, and if I am mistaken I stand to be corrected. Yes, Bo
5 Pelmas was mentioned, but nothing was said about the existence of two
6 different levels of the commission or even two different commissions?
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
8 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I'm not sure about that. I would ask
9 counsel to read to the witness the continuing section of the Milosevic
10 transcript --
11 JUDGE BONOMY: The page, Mr. Hannis?
12 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, it was at the bottom of the page that he
13 just cited, 3276, where the witness is reminded about Bo Pelmas, the
14 Swedish general, beginning at line 23 and continuing on to the next
15 question and answer on the following page.
16 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, is it necessary for me
17 to read that? If it is, I would appreciate a moment to find the passage.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I think if you go over the page you'll see
19 the answer the witness gave. The question Milosevic put at the top of
20 page 3277.
21 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Just a minute. The answer was --
22 here, Your Honour. If necessary, I can read the whole passage. So the
23 witness is answering to the question that I asked: [In English] "The only
24 commission I knew," [No interpretation], [In English] "And General Bo
25 Pelmas who also communicated on behalf of your mission with headquarters
1 in Belgrade, [No interpretation], [In English] I have no idea who General
2 Bo Pelmas is. This is the first time I heard his name."
3 [Interpretation] Then again [In English] "Swedish general who was
4 also your representative in Belgrade and he communicated with the
5 government in Belgrade. Sorry, Bo Pelmas, yes, sorry, I misunderstood the
6 pronunciation. I did see him. He was working in Belgrade. He was our
7 representative to government in Belgrade. He communicated with the
8 commission headquarters in Belgrade. Absolutely right."
9 [Interpretation] I don't see, Your Honour, with all due respect
10 that from that we can conclude that the witness was talking about two
11 levels of the commission or two commissions.
12 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, my learned friend apparently failed to
13 read the phrase "this commission that was set up by the Federal
15 JUDGE BONOMY: He did fail to read it, but there's no reason why
16 he can't cross-examine on this, Mr. Hannis, and we'll get it sorted out by
17 the witness if he wishes to continue with his examination on this point.
18 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] I think, Your Honour, that the
19 transcript is self-explanatory. I will not dwell anymore on it. I think
20 it's clear that what he said today and on Friday is very different from
21 what he said in 2001, and I think that makes clear my point. I'll move
22 on. Could we show --
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Could I just ask you one other question. Is one of
24 your points that there was no commission in Belgrade? Let's get to the
25 meat of this. Is there an issue over whether or not there was a
1 commission in Belgrade?
2 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the state of affairs
3 will soon be clarified. There was only one commission, and I was just
4 intending to put an exhibit before the witness, a Defence exhibit, that I
5 believe will shed appropriate light on your question.
6 So can the witness be shown the English version of 2D8.
7 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, do you have it in front of you, 2D8?
8 A. [Previous translation continues]... No. I'll try on my glasses.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: It's on its way.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Here we are.
13 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Would you kindly look at this document. It is very short, and
15 then I would like to ask you a couple of questions about it.
16 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down a bit so the
17 witness can see the whole page and the second page as well.
18 Q. Have you seen the second page? I can't really see what you are
19 seeing, Mr. Ciaglinski.
20 A. No. I've only seen the first page so far.
21 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Can we have the second page shown
22 as well. Thank you.
23 Q. Have you read it?
24 A. Yes, thank you.
25 Q. Can we agree, Mr. Ciaglinski, that this is a document whereby the
1 Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sets up the
2 commission for cooperation with the OSCE?
3 A. So it appears. I've never seen this document before, but --
4 Q. Yes, of course. Could you look please look at page 1 again, para
5 2, of this decision. In that paragraph 2, the tasks of the commission are
6 defined. Can you tell us whether the tasks of the commission defined in
7 this way are consistent with your perception of the affairs of which the
8 commission you cooperated with was in charge?
9 A. No, because this is the higher level commission, and the
10 commission I dealt with was the cooperation commission in Pristina, which
11 was the working level commission.
12 Q. Thank you. Do you stand by your claim that General Loncar headed
13 this commission that you dealt with?
14 A. The person in charge of the commission and who portrayed himself
15 as in charge of the organisation in Pristina was General Loncar.
16 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be shown
18 Q. Please look through this document, Mr. Ciaglinski. This document
19 is an amendment to the previous decision. Based on this document, would
20 you accept my assertion that General Loncar was one of the members of the
21 commission but certainly not the chairman of the commission or the
22 chairman of a separate commission that existed in Pristina?
23 A. From what I've seen, it is quite apparent that General Loncar was
24 a member of the commission; however, he was the representative of that
25 commission in Kosovo.
1 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] I don't believe the witness can
2 help us any more with this.
3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ciaglinski. I'll move on.
4 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] But, Your Honour, I hope --
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I hope that with these
7 two documents I have managed to explain our position on the issue of how
8 many commissions there were, whether there was a lower level and a higher
9 level commission, and I hope at least our position and the facts are
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, if it helps, I can indicate the picture I
12 have at the moment, and that is that there is a supervisory body set up at
13 federal level, but they've got to get down to work with the OSCE and deal
14 with day-to-day events on the ground. What the witness has described to
15 us is the operational element of the commission, whether it's 1 or 2 or
16 22, but the operational level in Kosovo on the ground seemed to him, from
17 his experience, to be headed by General Loncar. And I don't see anything
18 inconsistent with that and what's set out in these two documents.
19 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I quite understand
20 that this witness cannot tell us any more about it and I have no intention
21 of asking him any further questions. I just wanted to confront him with
22 these documents and now I'll move on other questions.
23 Your Honour, my colleague tells me that the record does not show
24 that this last document we've seen was 2D9.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that has now been corrected. Thank you,
1 Mr. Petrovic.
2 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, I would now like to briefly take up this meeting
4 of the 16th of January -- 6th of January.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Correction.
6 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. That you mentioned. Let us remind ourselves of what you said on
8 Friday; namely, that some major issues were discussed at that meeting,
9 convened on the 6th of January. And on pages 6829 and 6830 of Friday's
10 transcript, you spoke about what those issues were, the problem with the
11 helicopter, the KLA prisoners held in the prison in Nis.
12 First of all, I would like to ask you about those prisoners in
13 Nis. When did you receive permission to visit them? After you presented
14 that problem at the meeting, when did you actually receive the permission
15 to see them in their detention in Nis?
16 A. It was several days later, maybe seven, eight, nine, ten days.
17 Q. So you did not receive any approval at that moment; the approval
18 came ten days later. That's what we read in your statement, among other
20 A. Well, what happened was that Mr. Sainovic said that it would be
21 arranged, but there had to be procedures followed for the arrangement to
22 be made.
23 Q. Right. And actually, from your perspective, you don't know what
24 the procedures were, who gave approvals and what kind of approvals were
25 necessary. All you know is that at some point within ten days, General
1 Loncar called you up and told you, Mr. Ciaglinski, you can now visit the
3 A. I think during the meeting Mr. Sainovic did mention that judges
4 would have to be consulted and the judiciary would, obviously, have to
5 comment on it. However, because the whole thing was part of a deal to
6 release the soldiers, it was a foregone conclusion.
7 Q. But you received formal approval ten days later?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Very well. You also mentioned that at that meeting of the 6th of
10 January, Sainovic said something also about the relationship of the
11 mission and the KLA, or the attitude of the mission towards the KLA. I
12 would like to ask you a couple questions about that.
13 First of all, since I see that you followed this trial and
14 probably other trials before this Tribunal, do you know that there is a
15 significant number of Albanian witnesses who claim that the Kosovo
16 Liberation Army, in the period of your stay in Kosovo and during the
17 tenure of the mission in Kosovo, they availed themselves of this
18 opportunity to re-arm and reinforce their troops? Did you hear such
20 A. I think more to the point, I mean, I actually was aware that this
21 was happening on the ground. I didn't have to avail myself of the
22 testimony; I saw it happening.
23 Q. I will very briefly put before you part of the testimony of a
24 person who testified before this Chamber, Bislim Zyrapi, who was head of
25 staff of the KLA up to March 1998. In answer to one of my colleagues from
1 one of the Defence teams, from November 1998 to March 1999, that man was
2 Chief of the General Staff of the KLA. It's page 6020. He was asked
3 whether it was immediately after that, in October, November, December --
4 he was asked, in fact, whether it was fair to say that the KLA used this
5 period to consolidate and regroup their forces, and the head of the KLA
6 said, Yes, we used that time to consolidate. Further on, on page 6180,
7 the same witness answers questions about how many members of the KLA were
8 on the ground in March 1999; mentions 17 to 18.000 KLA soldiers.
9 So my first question, and, in fact, you confirmed this before;
10 namely, that you agree that the KLA used your presence to consolidate
11 themselves militarily in Kosovo. Is that correct?
12 A. I'm not sure that they used our presence, but they did consolidate
13 in that period, yes.
14 Q. Very well. Tell us, please, the documents that governed your
15 presence in Kosovo, did they envisage some specific obligations with
16 regard to the units and members of the Kosovo Liberation Army? Were there
17 any restrictions regarding their number on the ground, their deployment on
18 the ground, the level of their arming? Were there any such elements in
19 the documents governing your mission in Kosovo?
20 A. No.
21 Q. In documents governing your presence in Kosovo and Metohija, was
22 KLA limited as to the number and types of weapons on ammunition supplies
23 or supply of new weapons? Were there any restrictions with that regard
24 and with regards to the KLA?
25 A. No. But I believe that Christopher Hill, an American diplomat,
1 was in constant negotiation with the KLA and the OSCE were forever trying
2 to tell them to -- not to do what they were doing.
3 Q. The OSCE tried to recommend that there was no obligation imposed
4 to the KLA during the presence of the verification mission in Kosovo; is
5 it true?
6 A. In the Geremek agreement, there was no reference at all to the
7 restrictions placed upon the KLA.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic, that's the same question asked three
9 times, as I read it, or am I missing something? You got a really good
10 answer the first time I thought.
11 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Your Honour, I agree
12 with you. I don't want to enter into arguments. There are certain
13 nuances, but I agree and I'm going to move on.
14 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, apart from your presence enabled what we are
15 discussing right now, was there any active attitude or relationship
16 between your mission and the KLA in terms of specific and concrete help to
17 the KLA in certain aspects of their activities?
18 A. We did not aid the KLA in any of their activities. We were purely
19 trying to get them to be reasonable and not to re-arm and not to attack
20 the legitimate forces of Kosovo.
21 Q. You said on Friday that you once or on more occasions met
22 Commander Remi, one of the regional or zonal commanders of the KLA?
23 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, by your leave, I would
24 like to play a short segment from the BBC's documentary, The Fall of
25 Milosevic, where Commander Remi explains the nature of their relationship
1 with the mission and the consequences of such relationship to their
2 activities on the ground. If it pleases the Bench, it will take up to one
3 and a half minutes, and I will have placed into the e-court a transcript
4 of that documentary, 2D7, and pages 42, 43, 44 on e-court.
5 So by your leave, we would like to play this to the witness and we
6 would like to elicit his comments.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: The -- what is the source of the transcript that
8 you say you've given to the booth?
9 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Prosecution submitted
10 a transcribed documentary, the whole broadcast -- the whole programme, The
11 Fall of Milosevic, has been transcribed, and I've highlighted those pages
12 that are of interest to us in this -- at this point. So we can follow the
13 transcript concurrently with the playback, with the video, because it's
14 all in English, of course.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand the purpose of this.
16 Now, Mr. Hannis, what is the source of this transcript?
17 MR. HANNIS: This we received from the BBC. This is the BBC
18 version, the script to the video.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: So what we will have is the KLA commander speaking
20 Albanian and a transcript. Is that right?
21 MR. HANNIS: I think it's undertitled in English.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, can I tell you that -- and I thought I had
23 raised this before. This may be the first time we've had an excerpt from
24 this documentary in this trial, but in the Milosevic trial on a number of
25 occasions the subtitles were shown to be inaccurate in this documentary.
1 It's a tendentious piece of work in a number of respects, and we have been
2 very cautious with it. And I had hoped that a proper translation of this
3 was going to be done, Mr. Hannis. Was that not raised in the pre-trial
5 MR. HANNIS: We talked about that, Your Honour, but we're not
6 offering this. If we were offering it, we would provide a translation.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, but it's still the original transcript that's
8 with Mr. Petrovic.
9 So what I'm going to do is ask the interpreters to do their best
10 to avoid the use of the guiding transcript as far as possible; and if
11 possible, to give us a translation as they hear it. Now, I know it's
12 difficult in a situation where the witness is probably speaking very
13 quickly, but hopefully that's what will emerge.
14 Carry on, please, Mr. Petrovic.
15 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
16 I would like the video to be played to the witness.
17 [Videotape played]
18 "The balance of power in Kosovo was about to shift.
19 "[Voiceover]: [No interpretation].
20 "[No interpretation]. We tried to make use of the agreement to
21 bring supplies and to open new channels of communication."
22 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] This is the first part.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Stop there. I got virtually no translation of
24 that, possibly because of the difficulty of dealing with it, and therefore
25 I'm relying at the moment on the subtitles. Plainly, they are
1 satisfactory for your purpose, and I suspect this is a passage in which
2 these subtitles are fairly accurate. But it's strikes me you're asking
3 yet again a question to which you've already had a clear answer,
4 particularly from Mr. Zyrapi. And I'm concerned about why you're not
5 content to accept his figures and his account of events, since he was a
6 Prosecution witness.
7 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, by your leave, of
8 course that -- this is not contentious. Zyrapi is talking about passive
9 assistance provided by the OSCE mission to the KLA. Commander Remi goes a
10 step forward. This is not just a passive attitude that facilitates their
11 growth and development. He speaks about active cooperation and support
12 that he enjoys from the OSCE mission, and this is my point.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, please go on with your questions. Thank you.
14 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Let us now play back the second
15 part of this segment, some tens or 20-odd seconds.
16 [Videotape played]
17 "I was thinking that we had somehow, were leaning in the opposite
19 "Some of the monitors did lean and mostly one way.
20 "[Voiceover] The assistance we received is something which helped
21 us to find out our bearings and things which are helpful to every army.
22 It is normal the Americans and the British help us most.
23 "[No interpretation]."
24 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I now move on to
25 asking a number of questions?
1 Q. First, sir, I am -- whether this person - I don't mean President
2 Chirac, I mean Commander Remi, was that the person you met on several
3 occasions or once in 1998/1999?
4 A. Yes. The person that was subtitled to be Remi was indeed Remi who
5 I met with a group of others several times, yes.
6 Q. Commander Remi states several examples of assistance on the part
7 of the Americans and the British provided to his side in the conflict.
8 Does Commander Remi paint a true picture of the state of affairs on the
9 ground or not?
10 A. The impression I had from what he said and from the subtitles was
11 that the presence and sort of the cease-fire in Kosovo had allowed these
12 reinforcements and re-arming, but I don't remember at any point that he
13 said the OSCE had any part to play in this.
14 Q. Let me read out to you page 43. Let us not go back to the video.
15 It's easier to read this on the transcript. So it's page 43, otherwise
16 it's known as 2D7, and Remi says: [In English] "They were just what we
17 needed. Every enemy -- every army needs them to get coordinated right.
18 Of course it was the Americans and the British who helped us."
19 [Interpretation] That is more than passively observing what was
20 going on, at least in my opinion.
21 A. I have no idea what "get coordinated right" means. It means
22 nothing to me.
23 Q. When one warring party gets supplied with maps that may be used in
24 their efforts against the other party in a conflict, does this mean
25 anything to you; and this was specifically what he was referring to?
1 A. If you are referring to the maps that the KVM were using, the maps
2 were not very brilliant anyway, but in order to make sure that we were
3 talking from the same hymn sheet, from the same coordinates, there
4 probably were maps given to the KLA, as maps were given to the Serbian
5 side as well, the same maps. And these maps were never very good, and
6 that's why we eventually asked them, requested them, were given your maps
7 to use, which we did not pass on to anyone.
8 Q. But those maps were evidently a significant help to one of the
9 parties in the conflict, at least in accordance with what this man said on
11 A. I don't think his comment about "get coordinated right," I know
12 coordinated -- there's another word "coordinates" therefore implies maps.
13 But I don't think he's talking about maps at all.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the interpretation that we had, for what it's
15 worth in the circumstances, did not use maps, it used information. But
16 again it was done in circumstances which are not entirely helpful. And of
17 course a point of view is being made by this programme. It's like this
18 all the way through, whether it's one side or the other it's dealing with.
19 That's the impression I have, without saying that that's the entirety of
20 the programme.
21 So, Mr. Petrovic, if this -- if -- and this applies to everyone.
22 If there's going to be another occasion when this programme or any other
23 of a similar nature is to be used as part of the evidence, then we will
24 require a CLSS translation of the dialogue to be -- to accompany the
25 viewing of the film, otherwise there is going to be this ongoing
1 difficulty with interpretation. And so far as this one is concerned, the
2 Trial Chamber orders you to get a CLSS translation of the two clips that
3 you've actually shown so that we can then reflect the witness's answers
4 against what was actually said in the documentary.
5 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I am going to do so.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
7 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. So on the basis of a handful of facts that we dwelled upon and the
9 first fact was that at the very least the KLA used the presence of the
10 Kosovo Verification Mission to strengthen their ranks and regroup, where
11 does in this context you find the dissatisfaction of the Serbian side with
12 the developments on the ground? And can you understand their reasons and
13 some of the reasons of their dissatisfaction with the developments on the
14 ground together with your presence in the relevant period that we are
16 A. Well, I can tell you that some of the assumptions made about their
17 reinforcement are also interesting because there was no reduction of
18 forces on the border. And the only places that the weapons are coming
19 across were across the border; they were not being flown in or driven in.
20 They were coming across on the back of mules. Now, there was no reduction
21 of the Serbian forces and the Serbian forces were carrying out daily
22 operations. I can understand, and this is -- the dissatisfaction was
23 mentioned often to us in meetings at -- while the VJ troops are sitting in
24 the barracks, it was allowing the KLA to repossess various positions and
25 various trench lines around Kosovo; that's true.
1 Q. Good. I have some other questions for you. In your statement on
2 paragraph -- on page 5, paragraph 6 in the English version of course, you
3 mentioned that Sainovic was speaking on behalf of the Federal Government
4 in Belgrade when it concerned certain issues of interest to you. Do you
5 know that at the time we are discussing that Mr. Sainovic was
6 vice-president of the government of the Federal Government, and that would
7 be only natural for him to speak on the -- on behalf of the Federal
8 Government? Would that be natural to you to know that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. You mean it would be illogical for a vice-president of the army to
11 speak on behalf of the government where he is vice-president?
12 JUDGE BONOMY: The answer was the opposite, Mr. Petrovic. It was
13 the natural thing to expect him to speak on behalf of the --
14 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, yes. Of course. It
15 was interpreted differently to me but I find it satisfactory. Thank you.
16 I am going to try to shorten my questioning. Only a few questions more.
17 Q. On several occasions you mentioned that as time went by General
18 Loncar would visit to Belgrade -- visit Belgrade more frequently for
19 consultations and that he did not attend the meetings in Pristina. Can
20 you personally testify to the fact with whom General Loncar spoke in
21 Belgrade when he would be absent from Pristina? Could you testify
22 personally to that effect?
23 A. I wasn't with him, so how could I know?
24 Q. Thank you. Do you know that General Loncar became a member of the
25 cooperation commission with the OSCE mission at the direct insistence of
1 Slobodan Milosevic? Do you know that?
2 A. I thought it was more complicated than that, and I thought it was
3 because William Walker actually had previous experience with General
4 Loncar from another area in the Balkans, but I bow to your knowledge.
5 Q. You mentioned that at meetings with Milosevic, your meeting on the
6 6th of January, 1999, there were certain demands that were expressed. One
7 of them was the visit to the Nis detention, then the helicopter issue, and
8 the fuel issue. Is it true --
9 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Page 22, line 10, it doesn't say
10 meetings with Milosevic, we mean meetings with Sainovic. This is an
11 obvious mistake in the transcript.
12 Q. So is it true that the issue of the prisoners was dealt with
13 satisfactorily in accordance with your demands? Is it true that the issue
14 of fuel was subsequently and very soon was dealt with satisfactorily, in
15 accordance with your demands?
16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, there are two questions there. Can we
17 have one at a time?
18 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] I believe that response or reply to
19 both questions would be the same; but if not, Mr. Ciaglinski will correct
20 me. I can, of course, go one by one, but I'm trying to be as through with
21 this cross as soon as possible.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Bearing in mind there are two issues there,
23 Mr. Ciaglinski, could you address them separately, please.
24 THE WITNESS: Certainly, Your Honour.
25 In relation to the prisoners, we had an undertaking that that
1 problem would be resolved and the meetings would be arranged, and the fuel
2 problem did improve and our fuel supplies increased, but not everywhere.
3 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. My last question for you concerns the third issue that you
5 broached on that meeting and it goes for the helicopters. It is true that
6 the Serbian and Yugoslav side offered you a VJ helicopter that would be
7 painted white bearing the International Red Cross's symbol. Is it true
8 that this was the proposal of the Yugoslav and Serb side to you,
9 representatives of the OSCE mission?
10 A. The Geremek agreement had allowed for unlimited access to our
11 aircraft, and we had an aircraft on stand-by the whole time --
12 Q. Please, Mr. Ciaglinski. This is a simple question. Give us a
13 simple answer.
14 So for medevac purposes, did the Yugoslav and Serbian side offer
15 you a white-painted helicopter bearing International Red Cross symbol to
16 be placed at your disposal, yes or no?
17 A. We could not use the helicopter that was similar to the ones that
18 your forces used for attacking the KLA, which was a well-known model. And
19 therefore, yes, you are quite right we were offered that; we could not
20 accept it for our own safety reasons and for the safety of our verifiers.
21 It's very difficult to actually distinguish on a foggy day whether
22 it's a military helicopter bearing a white cross or whether it's a
23 military aircraft flying in to attack you, but you can distinguish the
24 type and the sound of the helicopter very easily.
25 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I have no
1 further questions.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Is the reference to the prisoners a reference to
3 Serb soldiers who had been taken prisoner?
4 THE WITNESS: No, sir. The --
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Or I --
6 THE WITNESS: It was the KLA who had been imprisoned back in
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, and you've referred to these, I think, 11 KLA
9 prisoners. But you in an earlier answer said that the visit was tied up
10 with the release of soldiers.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: These were the Serb soldiers who had been taken by
13 the KLA. Is that correct?
14 THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't think we went into detail, or perhaps I
16 missed the detail, but it is a subject that has arisen in another context.
17 The one other matter, Mr. Petrovic, I would like to deal with is
18 the translation of the transcript -- or the provision of a transcript of
19 any similar film. The matter did arise at a 65 ter conference on the
20 21st of June, where it was said that where any party wanted to rely on
21 particularly interviews from the Death of Yugoslavia or The Fall of
22 Milosevic, translation should be obtained well in advance of the evidence
23 being presented, and that meant official translations from this
24 institution or another acceptable institution - there are many places you
25 can get the translation - which the Defence could stipulate to. And the
1 point was being made, I think, to the Prosecution, but it was also made
2 whenever anybody wants to rely on this, that's what should happen.
3 So I think it appropriate to reiterate that and make it now an
4 order that unless that happens, these interviews will be skipped here
5 rather than presented in an unsatisfactory way. And as far as today's is
6 concerned, you can resolve the matter by obtaining the transcript that
7 we've asked you to do. Thank you.
8 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you allow me, I
9 relied with full confidence on the transcript provided by the BBC itself,
10 but I did compare what the BBC provided in a written document and what is
11 really pronounced in the English translation and I thought that was
12 satisfactory for the second passage. But in every following situation, we
13 will of course require a translation from the CLSS.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Petrovic.
15 Mr. Cepic.
16 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Cross-examination by Mr. Cepic:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Ciaglinski. My name is Djuro
19 Cepic, attorney-at-law. I have a couple of questions for you.
20 We heard earlier today and on Friday that you attended almost
21 90 per cent of meetings held between the commission of the Federal
22 Government on one hand and the Kosovo Verification Mission, of which you
23 were a member, on the other hand. I'm interested in meetings between the
24 KVM and the representatives of the Pristina Corps. I have information
25 that there were 101 such meetings. You attended a certain number of them,
1 didn't you?
2 A. I did.
3 Q. Among other things, on the 4th of May -- sorry, the 4th of March,
4 you accepted mediation or you accepted to mediate in the release of a
5 soldier whose uncle and father had been previously killed in the
6 municipality of Vucitrn. Milan Mitrovic is the name of the soldier. Do
7 you remember that?
8 A. I do, yes.
9 Q. Similarly, you briefed the other side at these meetings that there
10 was a high risk of KLA terrorist operations, wherein they would place
11 explosive devices in urban environments. Did you do that? Such a meeting
12 was held on the 5th of March, 1999.
13 A. I'm trying to understand the question, sorry.
14 Q. I'll try to rephrase it and make it clearer.
15 On the 5th of March, 1999, there was a meeting you attended, and
16 at that meeting information was given that there is a chance that
17 terrorists, members of the KLA, might place bombs in large towns and
18 cities. Is that correct?
19 A. I believe so, yes.
20 Q. Thank you. We'll move on to Podujevo. On the 26th of December,
21 1998, terrorists killed at his own doorstep the last Serb who lived in
22 Podujevo, Milo Radojevic. After that incident, in talking to officers of
23 the Army of Yugoslavia you said that it was a heinous crime, classic
24 terrorism, and you commended the Army of Yugoslavia on their professional
25 conduct. Is that correct?
1 A. Absolutely.
2 Q. Thank you. What I'm interested in is this: Apart from these
3 meetings, you also toured positions of the Army of Yugoslavia. Is that
5 A. I did.
6 Q. Thank you. On Friday in the course of your testimony you
7 mentioned that you visited three most important positions of the Army of
8 Yugoslavia and you named the locations. Can you tell me why precisely
9 those three positions were the most vital in the eyes of your mission?
10 A. Right. When I said "vital," these were the three positions that
11 were in one of the original agreements. They were company positions
12 [realtime transcript read in error "accompanied"], the large positions,
13 and the commanding a large territory from their positions. They were
14 high -- they commanded communications, they had good views and visibility,
15 so -- and we had trouble for some time being able to get into those areas,
16 but eventually a highly organised visit to these locations was organised
17 and allowed us to see all we wanted to see.
18 Q. Are you aware, Mr. Ciaglinski, that before your visit those same
19 units that you mentioned were also visited by the Kosovo Diplomatic
20 Observers Mission, KDOM, in the month of October, and this inspection gave
21 rise to no objections whatsoever. Are you aware of that?
22 A. It was before I arrived, so I can't confirm that.
23 Q. Just one more question about the KDOM. Do you know, perhaps,
24 since at that moment you were not in Kosovo, that that mission conducted a
25 large number of verifications and inspections, especially of anti-aircraft
1 weaponry? And again, they had no comments, no objections.
2 A. I've seen reports of that, yes, which I read in Pristina.
3 Can I just say that there was a mistake, sir. In line 14,
4 15:19:36 which it says "they were accompanied positions," they were
5 company positions, as in companies of infantry or companies of troops.
6 Q. Thank you for that.
7 On Friday you said that you encountered problems when you wanted
8 to tour barracks or military installation without prior announcement, and
9 the same occurred when you tried to visit a unit in the border area. As
10 an officer you should know, Mr. Ciaglinski, that especially in the border
11 belt, due to security measures, because of possible ambushes and patrols
12 of the army, all visits had to be announced 24 hours earlier and one had
13 to be accompanied by a liaison officer. Is that correct?
14 A. Not entirely correct, no, because the actual agreement states that
15 if we wish to visit a military unit on the border belt, that was the
16 procedure; but they -- also in a document it does say that we have full
17 freedom of movement and access, and that must include the border belt
19 Q. Well, you did visit the border belt and conducted verifications
20 there, didn't you?
21 A. Yes. Often with great difficulty, and towards the end not at all.
22 Q. Thank you. Are you aware that there was an agreed procedure,
23 agreed among the regional centres of the Kosovo Verification Mission and
24 the garrisons of the Army of Yugoslavia, whereby the 3rd Army prescribed
25 that the presence of a liaison officer from the Army of Yugoslavia was
2 A. I, in fact, helped draft and disseminate that order to our units.
3 But this was in March, this was when the situation was becoming very grave
4 and very dangerous and it was thought to be a sensible way to carry out
5 our work in the border belt.
6 Q. Similarly, on the 24th of January, 1999, or, rather, a team of the
7 Kosovo Verification Mission headed by you visited Junik, a place
8 north-west of Pristina. And there you talked to local ethnic Albanians,
9 who told you they experienced no problems with members of the VJ, and you
10 also visited a VJ unit there. Is that correct?
11 A. I can't remember if I was actually accompanied by Colonel Kotur
12 when I visited Junik, so that's what they did say. And I also visited a
13 VJ unit, yes, correct.
14 Q. Thank you. In the course of your testimony on Friday you said
15 that the VJ would usually use for their drills, which were allowed under
16 the agreement, surfaces of 10 by 10 kilometres or even 20 by 20
17 kilometres. You also said you knew very well that the area next to the
18 air-field south of Podujevo was an old practicing ground for the Army of
19 Yugoslavia. Do you know of any other such grounds that the Army of
20 Yugoslavia used; and if you do, can you tell us which are they?
21 A. This is a question we often asked, to which we were never given an
22 answer where the training areas really were. But, for example, I imagine
23 there was a training area quite close to Prizren, near the barracks, and
24 the regional centres might have known better because they were actually on
25 the ground in those regions. But in general, I was told that the Yugoslav
1 army could train where it wanted.
2 Q. In your statement you mentioned that at that time the army
3 significantly increased the number of its garrisons. Can you tell us as
4 an officer, what is a garrison?
5 A. It's -- obviously, it's semantics where a garrison is a fixed
6 location where there are a large number of troops with support facilities.
7 We probably -- well, I should have maybe say it is -- that they
8 increased -- is it the number of troops in the garrisons, did I say, or
9 they increased the number of garrisons? I can't remember.
10 Q. You said the number of garrisons. And what would you say was the
11 definition of garrison in Yugoslavia? A location with its immediate
12 environs where units or a unit of the army is deployed, so a garrison is
13 considered to be the whole area where that unit is deployed?
14 A. Well, I said a garrison normally is referred to as a static,
15 permanent location, whereas the units were deploying into the field, and
16 so maybe I used the word "garrisons," when referring to those incorrectly,
17 but they were large formations in the field.
18 Q. Can we then take it that in the village of Bukos, where reference
19 was made to the establishment of a permanent garrison, this reference is
21 A. Well, Bukos probably was an area where there had been a previous
22 garrison. Am I correct?
23 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, I am not answering questions here; I'm asking
25 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Can we please see 5D26 now, please.
1 Q. Speaking of Bukos, I'll put to you a daily report of a unit of the
2 Army of Yugoslavia that had frequent and good communication with
3 Mr. Aleksandar Lubarenko [phoen], one of the members of the KVM. Before
4 we see this material, Mr. Ciaglinski, do you know that oftentimes in
5 practice one would receive wrong information and only subsequent insight
6 into the situation on the ground would allow members of the mission to see
7 what was actually going on?
8 A. So are you saying that wrong information was passed to the OSCE
9 headquarters in Pristina?
10 Q. No, I'm speaking in general. Did it happen that you would first
11 receive wrong information, both in the regional centres and the Main Staff
12 in Pristina, in the headquarters in Pristina, and then when you and the
13 other verifiers go out into the field you realise that the situation is
14 quite different?
15 A. I wouldn't say that it was a general situation, but our verifiers
16 were taken from every walk of life and some of them did not know how to
17 interpret what they saw on the ground. We did try and train them. There
18 were only a few experienced people with military know-how, and it's
19 possible -- and it did, I'm sure, happen that often what they thought they
20 saw wasn't quite what had actually happened. And that's why we did
21 follow-up visits.
22 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Could the registrar now play this
23 exhibit, show us this exhibit.
24 Q. As I said before, Mr. Ciaglinski --
25 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Can we see item 3 on this page.
1 Scroll down a bit.
2 Q. It says: "Between 1200 and 1600 hours Mr. Windmar and other
3 gentlemen from the KVM toured Bukos and Brusnik villages and Mr. Lubarenko
4 personally saw that not a single house was torched or destroyed, although
5 they had had information before that everything had been torched."
6 Did you have similar -- did you receive similar information,
7 Mr. Ciaglinski?
8 A. I really can't remember this particular report, no.
9 Q. I'm asking you in general. Did such things happen in other
10 situations as well?
11 A. [No audible response].
12 Q. Thank you. During the cross-examination by my learned friend
13 Mr. Petrovic you said that the KLA forces built up both their weaponry and
14 troops across a large swath of territory. Do you know that a large number
15 of attacks took place, both against civilians and members of the army and
16 the police while the mission was present in Kosovo?
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I suspect you're going to tell me there's an
18 answer missing, Mr. Ackerman.
19 MR. ACKERMAN: Exactly, Your Honour, you've seen it, 12
20 through 14, that seems to be all messed up somehow.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: But let's go back to it once this question's been
23 Can you deal with this question first of all.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, of course there were attacks
25 going on by both sides during our presence in Kosovo, during the mission's
1 presence in Kosovo.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic, what was the answer to your previous
3 question? Did such things happen in other situations as well?
4 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] If I understood correctly the witness
5 said: "If they did," and that was all.
6 THE WITNESS: I don't think I actually finished the answer, Your
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, would you care to do so now to complete the
10 THE WITNESS: Well, if these incidents did indeed happen that
11 Mr. Cepic is referring to, I certainly wasn't aware of anything on this
12 scale where something was completely misinterpreted.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 Mr. Cepic.
15 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ciaglinski. Let us just go back to the losses.
17 During the mission's presence in Kosovo, one member of the mission got
18 killed and two were wounded. Is that correct?
19 A. I was certainly not aware that anyone was killed, not of -- not
20 the -- not of the KVM, no.
21 Q. I'm talking about members of the Kosovo Verification Mission in
22 Srbica. I'll tell you the date when one was killed then two were wounded
23 on the 15th of January, 1999, near Decani, and Mr. Ramush Haradinaj took
24 responsibility for those, which he admitted to you in your interview or
25 conversation on the 20th of January, 1999.
1 A. I think I understand the confusion, and it's one which was cleared
2 up last time, Your Honour. In the Serbian and eastern European
3 translation, often the word "shot" is "killed." And in our
4 language "shot" means possibly wounded, or wounded, while wounded, not
5 necessarily killed. And as I was at this incident throughout the entire
6 time, I know exactly what happened.
7 Q. If we're talking about the wounding of these two persons, isn't it
8 true they were wounded by members of the KLA on the 15th of January, 1999?
9 For the record, please.
10 A. Yes --
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, to complete the record, are you saying there
12 were three wounded?
13 THE WITNESS: No.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Only two?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
17 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Two members of the mission were wounded near Decani, and before
19 that one was killed in a place called Srbica. Isn't that true?
20 A. No. No member of the mission was ever killed.
21 Q. Very well. Thank you. Do you know that over 180 persons were
22 killed during the mission's presence in Kosovo, civilians, non-Albanians,
23 Albanians? Do you know that?
24 A. Certainly during our time there, that's not true. I believe a lot
25 of our mission members, Albanians who remained, were killed after we left
1 because it's possible that some documents had been left behind which were
2 used by your side to carry out the deeds. But certainly during my time, I
3 was not aware of that, no.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: That may be --
5 THE WITNESS: Sorry, I wasn't aware that anyone from the mission
6 had actually been killed until the 23rd of March.
7 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. No, no, I'm talking about citizens, civilians, members of the MUP
9 of the Republic of Serbia, that is the police of Serbia, and members of
10 the Army of Yugoslavia. So while the mission was in Kosovo, exactly 183
11 citizens of Yugoslavia got killed. Do you know this number?
12 A. I accept that number if that's what you say.
13 Q. They were killed by the KLA.
14 A. If you say so. I don't know. But I'm prepared to believe that
15 that's a number which could have been feasible.
16 Q. Do you also know that as a result of KLA activities and the fact
17 that they took control of large territories another 36 villages were
18 cleansed of Serbs and other non-Albanians while the mission was in Kosovo?
19 A. I believe that there was some of that type of cleansing going on
20 by the KLA, yes.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the KLA, the so-called KLA,
22 intensified its attacks on the eve of negotiations in Paris, that is in
23 addition to the ongoing attacks it intensified them intentionally,
25 A. I can confirm that the attacks were intensified, yes.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you know that the so-called KLA, especially in the
2 area of Nerodimlje and Kacanik, frequently used civilians as human
4 A. No.
5 Q. Sir, in a Prosecution Exhibit P641, which is Appendix DZ8, it says
6 in 4A that KLA brigade commander in the area of Nerodimlje and Kacanik
7 disallowed the evacuation of captured persons which was interpreted by the
8 KVM as an attempt to use these people as live -- as human shields. Does
9 this refresh your memory? This comes from your own mission's report.
10 A. [Previous translation continues] ... of that report, so I can't
11 remember it, no. I didn't read everything that was published. There was
12 a lot.
13 Q. Thank you. One of the things that you said in your testimony and
14 in your statement and in the Milosevic trial is that you spent quite a bit
15 of time with Colonel Kotur; up to three to four hours a day. You stated
16 that he was an intelligence officer. Do you stand by that assertion,
17 Mr. Ciaglinski, that he was an intelligence officer?
18 A. If I may, I could just expand. I always suspected that he was an
19 officer dealing as part -- or part of special forces just by what he knew,
20 the way he behaved, and what he wore. When I did actually read his
21 transcripts when Mr. Milosevic used him as a witness, where he did
22 actually confirm he was an intelligence officer, as I was, he said.
23 Q. What would you say if I told you that in the Milosevic
24 transcript - and that's an indisputable fact also - Mr. Kotur said that he
25 was not an intelligence officer, that he played a different role. In the
1 Milosevic trial, Mr. Kotur said that he was a chief of infantry.
2 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] My learned friend wants to say
4 MR. HANNIS: Could we have a transcript reference if this is going
5 to be disputable.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.
7 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I don't have it handy.
8 I need some time to find the reference, but I can find it during the
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, you'll shortly have time to do it. You can
11 move on to something else just now.
12 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. You also stated that Mr. Kotur in 1998 and 1999 was responsible
14 for the operations of the VJ in the area of Pec and Djakovica towns. What
15 would you say if I told you that in view of his position and the functions
16 he discharged then, in 1998 and 1999, he was neither authorised or in a
17 position to lead any operations?
18 A. I'm sorry, I thought I said before the period of 1998 and 1999,
19 because -- I mean, he'd been in Kosovo for most of his career, Colonel
20 Kotur, and he'd been a brigade commander in that area, and that's what I
21 would have been referring to.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Cepic, we'll break there, I think, and
23 you can return to these matters when we resume.
24 MR. CEPIC: [No interpretation].
25 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll break for about 20 minutes.
1 Mr. Ciaglinski, could you leave with the usher, please, and we'll
2 see you in 20 minutes' time.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 JUDGE BONOMY: And we'll resume at five past 4.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 4.09 p.m.
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.
9 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Before I go
10 back to the topic that we had explored earlier and for reasons of clarity
11 I'd like to refer to Mr. Hannis with regard to what Mr. Kotur stated in
12 the Milosevic trial. The transcript page 47.482, row 23 and 24, Mr. Kotur
13 expressly stated that he was head of the infantry within the Pristina
14 Corps at the time. So much about that. Thank you.
15 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: The reference has been wrongly transcribed, it
17 should be 47.482. Thank you.
18 Mr. Cepic.
19 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, before the break you said that Mr. Kotur during
21 the period of 1998 was not responsible for operations in the area of Pec
22 and Djakovica, but in your statement dated 2000 in the English version,
23 page 6, paragraph 5, you state verbatim: "Although I never saw Kotur with
24 his unit, it is known to me that during summer 1998 was responsible for
25 the operations of the VJ in Pec and Djakovica."
1 So, Mr. Ciaglinski, contrary to what we heard from you today.
2 Would it be helpful to you if I told you that Mr. Kotur throughout 1998
3 and in 1999 was head of the infantry in Pristina Corps in Pristina and
4 therefore could not be responsible for the operations as stated by you?
5 MR. HANNIS: [Previous translation continues] ... missing from the
6 quote. I'm looking at page 38, line 25: "Although I never saw Kotur with
7 his unit, it is known to me that during summer 1998 was responsible." I
8 assume there is a pronoun missing. He was responsible?
9 MR. CEPIC: He was responsible.
10 [Interpretation] If you allow me, Your Honours, the whole
11 paragraph refers to Mr. Kotur. It's very well stated in the statement.
12 Q. So if we go back to your statement, Mr. Ciaglinski --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ciaglinski, can you clarify this. In your
14 statement you say what Mr. Cepic has quoted, and I thought you said a bit
15 earlier that you must have been referring to pre-1998 when you said that.
16 THE WITNESS: What I was referring to, Your Honour, was that in
17 the period -- the period 1998/1999 was the period that the OSCE were in
18 Kosovo, and it was a period preceding that, so in the summer of 1998. I
19 stick by what I said, in that he told me he was an officer in the
20 Pristina Corps.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
22 Mr. Cepic.
23 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, isn't it true that on the 20th of March, 1999,
25 you, together with the overall KVM, you left Kosovo?
1 A. Was it the 23rd or the -- I thought it was the 23rd we left.
2 Q. On the 20th.
3 A. Well, when the -- I left with the entire -- I was with General
4 Drewienkiewicz and Ambassador Walker. We were the last vehicle of the
5 convoy to leave. So on whichever day the KVM left Kosovo, that was the
6 day I left Kosovo. I did not leave before.
7 Q. It is the 20th of March, Mr. Ciaglinski, let us clarify that at
8 least. After that, you did not go back to Kosovo before the 13th of June
9 when you returned together with NATO troops as a British officer. Isn't
10 that true?
11 A. That's true, yes.
12 Q. And you could not be aware in great detail with regard to the
13 situation and the developments and the combat between the KLA on the one
14 hand and the Serbian forces on the other, could you?
15 A. Only what I saw in the NATO headquarters and what I heard from
16 refugees who were leaving Kosovo.
17 Q. I'm saying this for the following reason. In this courtroom we
18 had head of KLA, Mr. Zyrapi, testifying before this Chamber that -- and
19 who said that fight between the KLA and Serbian forces were conducted in
20 different locations, in different time-frame, from the map that you drew
21 and annotated for us.
22 A. Well, it doesn't agree with the information that we were receiving
23 in Skopije.
24 Q. As far as NATO headquarters is concerned and your presence there,
25 on Friday in your testimony on page 85, rows from 14 to 19, you stated
1 that sometimes you would be in the intelligence cell of the NATO
2 headquarters and that they could survey TV and radio communications. To
3 the best of your knowledge, how long did the surveillance last, TV and
4 radio communications and telephone communications, in Kosovo?
5 A. Well, I can tell you because when I was in Kosovo itself it was --
6 I had no idea in what was happening in terms of communications
7 surveillance because I was not working for NATO. I was part of the OSCE.
8 It wasn't until I actually went to Macedonia and Skopije, then I was just
9 aware of it happening at that time and the comment I made in relation to
10 the Racak orders.
11 Q. So we may infer that during January/February you -- there was
12 surveillance of radio and telephone communications in Kosovo; correct?
13 A. I don't know how you can infer that, but it's highly likely that
14 GCHQ, our communications centre in the UK, and other organisations, other
15 country's organisations would have monitoring radio traffic communications
16 in the Kosovo area.
17 Q. Throughout the presence of the KVM in Kosovo; correct?
18 A. I don't know.
19 Q. Thank you. In the course of your testimony and on Friday you
20 mentioned the operation of the army conducted on the Podujevo-Pristina
21 road next to the village of Lebane. Am I right in saying that you reached
22 that place after the operation had started; correct?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Thank you. You ought to be aware that some actions, and some of
25 which you verified, that were directed against the VJ in the border belt
1 and that were conducted autonomously were in keeping with the high
2 standards. Am I right?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. Thank you. In the Milosevic trial, you stated in parts of your
5 testimony in -- on pages 3174 pages -- lines 31 to 37, that when units
6 were around Podujevo, that recruits were stopped from leaving their units
7 after their expiry of their service. Do you know that the Federal
8 Government was in charge of prolonging the service of recruits because of
9 the escalation of attacks against military units and civil institutions
10 took that decision and not the military. Are you aware of that?
11 A. I am aware of the first part of your statement, but I don't know
12 who made that decision, no.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic, going back a question you said -- or you
14 put the proposition that operations which the witness verified that were
15 directed against the VJ in the border belt were in keeping with the high
16 standards. I take it you mention operations directed by the VJ?
17 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you. This was the
18 proper spirit of that question. I'm sorry that it was taken differently.
19 My intention was to highlight that the VJ conducted themselves and their
20 operations in accordance with the high standards.
21 Q. Is that right, Mr. Ciaglinski? You have to state it in your
22 microphone because otherwise it's not in the transcript.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: No, it was the question and you've clarified it.
24 Mr. Hannis.
25 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I have a question about the transcript
1 reference. Counsel said page 3174, lines 31 to 37. The lines only go
2 to 25 and I don't see anything on that page referring to Podujevo. Could
3 he double-check for me, please.
4 MR. CEPIC: We've been discussing about different issue right now.
5 About transcript for Milosevic case, it is 3147 page, lines from 7 to 23.
6 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
7 MR. CEPIC: Completely different.
8 Your Honour, if you allow me to continue, please.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please.
10 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, for the benefit of the transcript, let us make
12 this clear. Isn't it true that the VJ conducted their operations in the
13 border belt in keeping with the high standards, is it true? And you
14 verified some of these operations. Please state your answer into the
16 A. Well, I answered as you questioned me the first time in the
17 spirit, and I was in the spirit as --
18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Thank you. Thank you very
20 I'm sorry, I interrupted you in false belief that I received a
21 full answer from you, but could you verify yes or no.
22 A. Yes, it was conducted correctly. The answer is yes.
23 Q. Thank you very much. We've discussed at length the situation in
24 the area of Podujevo, has been mentioned on several occasions, and this
25 most important communication from Podujevo to Pristina, very important for
1 Kosovo; and further on to the administrative border with Serbia. Is it
2 known to you that on the 18th of December KLA members drove 186 Serb
3 families from the town of Podujevo and from the surrounding villages. Is
4 it known to you?
5 A. No.
6 Q. But on the other hand, it is very known to you the incident dated
7 27th December 1998 when the so-called KLA kidnapped a Serb civilian,
8 Zdravkovic, and with the help of your intervention he was released. Am I
10 A. The -- what I said no to in the previous question was I did not
11 realise it was 186 Serb families and I did not know that they had been
12 driven from the town of Podujevo. I was aware that a number of families
13 had been driven out from the surrounding villages.
14 And the -- your second question was: Yes, I was involved with the
15 release of the civilian Zdravkovic.
16 Q. I apologise. If I am allowed to go back to the first question.
17 The number of expelled families corresponds to the figure I quoted, and
18 that's 186, to your knowledge.
19 A. I said I don't know the number.
20 Q. Thank you. With regard to the incident dated 27th of December
21 when, thanks to your intervention, a Serb civilian was released, you
22 stated also that in that region there was a high concentration of members
23 of the so-called KLA ranging from 1.000 to 2.000 fighters, that they were
24 well armed. Is it correct?
25 A. It is correct.
1 Q. What confuses me, Mr. Ciaglinski, is the following. On Friday for
2 the first time you stated, which you failed to state in your previous
3 statements and in the Milosevic trial, that a wounded Albanian was
4 exchanged, who was then taken to a clinic and who later on died from his
5 wounds. This goes for a KLA fighter. Could you explain this difference
6 in your statement and why haven't you stated this in any of your previous
7 statements or testimonies?
8 A. I think in the initial testimony there was a mention that there
9 was an Albanian rescued as well. I mean, I haven't got the document in
10 front of me, but I'm sure you'll prove me right or wrong in due course.
11 But the reason I didn't mention it was it didn't seem to be of great
12 import because we were talking about the rescue of the Serb and the
13 prevention of conflict. As the situation developed we had to get the Serb
14 out. The only way we could do it was to do a deal. Deals are not unusual
15 in these situations.
16 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honour, I would note it is reflected in his
17 written statement.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
19 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Could you make the reference as to the
20 paragraph in the witness's written statement.
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, it's page 5 -- 5 of the English, the
22 end of the top paragraph.
23 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] As far as I can see, this goes for a
24 completely different context. It refers to a wounded MUP and a wounded
25 Albanian, and it is not within the context of the events of the 27th of
1 December. My learned colleague Hannis could correct me if I'm wrong.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: It seems, on the face of it, to start with a
3 reference to the 27th of December in the first full paragraph on page 4.
4 However, I suspect that all of this is not really advancing matters very
5 much. It seems a very minor point, a matter of detail that's not really
6 going to be of any significance in the overall context of the evidence of
7 the witness.
8 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Agreed.
9 Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. I would briefly go back to the area of Podujevo. On the 27th
11 of -- that we have an abducted Serb who was released with the help of
12 you. On the 26th we have the last Serb killed in Podujevo. You confirmed
13 that at the beginning of your cross-examination. All these events fall in
14 December of 1998, and in the Milosevic trial you said that in the same
15 village of Lapastica, where there was a large stronghold of the KLA where
16 this Serb was abducted, that the -- a physician was killed as well. And
17 my learned colleague tendered a photograph of that event.
18 When this physician was killed and several other persons, you did
19 not -- you were not there, Mr. Ciaglinski, when this happened. Is it
20 correct? You visited a couple of days later to verify the whole incident.
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. Thank you. Furthermore, you described a position close to that
23 village, the tank hill, as it's been labelled. Did you know the
24 composition of the unit and its strength on that hillock? Would it be
25 true if I said that one damaged tank was positioned there, one tank
1 damaged by the KLA, while the tank was used in a regular military exercise
2 and that there were some 20 VJ soldiers to secure that tank? Is it
4 A. No.
5 Q. Is it known to you that on the 20th and between the 20th and 23rd
6 December 1998 VJ exercise was conducted on the Prepolac saddle between
7 Podujevo and Pristina and that the whole elaborate -- or study on that
8 exercise was handed over to the KVM?
9 A. I did not see this document.
10 Q. Maybe it would jog your memory if I were to mention that upon the
11 return of that unit on the 21st of December, 1998, fire was opened on VJ
12 members injuring three soldiers and damaging the tank that was located on
13 that hill. Do you know of this instant, Mr. Ciaglinski?
14 A. The tank on the hill in that position was never damaged; it was a
15 fully operational tank, so I don't know what you're talking about.
16 Q. Mr. Ciaglinski, there are certain reports that Defence is going to
17 tender on the damage of vehicles on that location. Did you mention and
18 notice that the tracks were taken off of that tank and that there were
19 damage -- there was damage by a shoulder-propelled grenade launcher?
20 A. No.
21 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I've
22 exhausted my questions for this witness.
23 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Ciaglinski.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Cepic.
25 Mr. Ivetic.
1 MR. IVETIC: Actually, Your Honour, at the break I believe
2 Mr. Ackerman asked if he could precede my cross with his own and I've
4 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.
5 Mr. Ackerman.
6 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman:
8 Q. Colonel, my name is John Ackerman and I represent General
9 Pavkovic. I think I'll be quite brief. You're unique as a witness here
10 because you listen to the questions and answer them, which causes things
11 to move much more rapidly.
12 There's a matter about which I'm confused and which I'm simply
13 going to ask you to help me try to understand. In your statement, it's
14 paragraph 10, if they're numbered consecutively on page 2, you'll know
15 immediately what I'm referring to. You say this: "The role of arms and
16 weapons verification was a complete and utter disaster and was eventually
17 abandoned. We were repeatedly denied permission to access VJ company
18 group positions, barracks or facilities."
19 Now, with regard to your mission in Kosovo you told us on Friday
20 that you basically relied on three documents that you carried around with
21 you; correct?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. And in the Milosevic case on page 3142, lines 8 through 12,
24 Milosevic asked you this question: "What kinds of issues were of
25 particular relevance contained in that document to your particular task?"
1 And I think this might have been referring to the Shaun Byrnes document.
2 And you said: "Well, it was very important that the verification went
3 according to the agreements, and therefore we tried to sort of keep both
4 sides to these two documents."
5 Now, would I be correct in assuming you still take the position
6 that it was very important that verification went according to the
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And I'm curious about what it means when you say there at the
10 bottom: "We tried to sort of keep both sides to these two documents."
11 When you mean -- what do you mean when you say "both sides"?
12 A. Well, although there was no specific mention in the document and
13 nobody from the KLA side signed anything, we did try to maintain some
14 order and peace and prevent the KLA from getting in a position where they
15 would provoke the VJ and the MUP from action. So it was our intention, if
16 you like, it was beyond -- almost beyond what we were asked to do to
17 actually try and maintain law and order and reduce killing to the minimum.
18 Q. But I think sort of, you know, the language keeping the KLA to
19 these two documents was probably a stretch since they hadn't signed them
20 or agreed to them in any way?
21 A. Correct. But as Mr. Hill was trying to get them to agree to
23 Q. And that was a pretty laudable thing for him to be doing and I
24 agree with that.
25 The document that you call the Shaun Byrnes document, and that's
1 Exhibit P394, is an agreement between the mission and MUP and has no
2 effect on the VJ, had nothing to do with the VJ, did it?
3 A. I don't have the document in front of me, but I think it was to do
4 with the MUP positions.
5 Q. If you would like to look at any document that I refer to, we can
6 certainly make it available to you because I don't want to -- want you to
7 feel like you're being misled in any way. So just tell me if you want to
8 see that document. I can put it up on the screen for you.
9 A. Thank you.
10 Q. Would you like to see it? Why are you looking to Mr. Hannis?
11 A. I thought he might throw a copy over to me.
12 Q. All right. Let's put it up on the screen.
13 MR. ACKERMAN: P394, please.
14 THE WITNESS: I'm a very trusting person and, you know, it's part
15 of my military training. And if you tell me something, you know, why
16 should I doubt what you're saying?
17 MR. ACKERMAN:
18 Q. Well, I'm going to try very hard to live up to that as we go
19 through this.
20 A. Thank you.
21 Q. It says right at the top that it's an understanding between KDOM
22 and the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia; in other
23 words, MUP.
24 A. Mm-hmm.
25 Q. Correct?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. All right. Can we move on now?
3 Another document that you -- that you say that you had with you as
4 you moved around was a document which is P395, and this is a document that
5 arose out of a meeting in Belgrade on 25 October 1998, and it bears
6 signatures of Sainovic, Djordjevic, Nauman and General Clark, and perhaps
7 Milosevic. And again, this document - and you can certainly look at it if
8 you want - didn't have any provisions regarding access to VJ company group
9 positions, barracks, or facilities?
10 A. I believe that's true.
11 Q. All right. And what you told us yesterday, and was -- the
12 document you actually relied on for such access was -- it was shown to you
13 as P658. It's also in evidence as P432 and that's the agreement on the
14 OSCE-Kosovo Verification Mission; correct?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. And I'd like to put P432 up on the screen and just look at that
17 document for a moment and -- the page that's relevant is page 3 under
18 specific terms of reference.
19 MR. ACKERMAN: And, Your Honour, I think this is essentially the
20 same document as P658, the difference being that this is a copy of the
21 original document with the actual signatures appearing at the end rather
22 than a -- I've lost the English word, rather than a copy of it without the
24 Q. And if you look there under specific terms of reference, the
25 paragraph that you were referring to in your testimony yesterday and that
1 you relied on was that first one. "The verification mission will travel
2 throughout Kosovo to verify the maintenance of the cease-fire by all
3 elements. It will investigate reports of cease-fire violations. Mission
4 personnel will have full freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo
5 at all times."
7 A. Okay.
8 Q. Now, from what I understand and to try and get this all in some
9 kind of perspective, this process all started, did it not, with an
10 agreement between Richard Holbrooke and Slobodan Milosevic to institute a
11 cease-fire in accordance with a resolution of the United Nations numbered
12 1199. Is that your understanding?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. And 1199 we have in evidence as P658, and we can look at it if we
15 want to. Put I'm interested in paragraph 1 of that document, which I
16 think is the first operative paragraph, where the Security Council
17 says: "Demands that all parties, groups, and individuals immediately
18 cease hostilities and maintain a cease-fire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of
19 Yugoslavia, which would enhance the prospects for a meaningful dialogue
20 between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
21 Kosovo Albanian leadership and reduce the risks of a human catastrophe."
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman, P658 is the agreement in its other
23 form. Does it also contain the United Nations resolution?
24 MR. ACKERMAN: No, I have messed up and put down the wrong number.
25 Oh, boy. Now I'm -- I don't know, Your Honour, what number I need.
1 Maybe --
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, is it vital that the document's on the
4 MR. ACKERMAN: I don't think it's vital.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let's proceed and see if we can manage
6 without it.
7 MR. ACKERMAN: I don't think so.
8 Q. So that that part of the resolution states the demand for a
9 cease-fire, and this is the cease-fire that was basically accepted in
10 Milosevic's agreement with Holbrooke; correct?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. And then further down in that document at paragraph 4(B) the
13 Security Council demanded measures to "enable effective and continuous
14 international monitoring in Kosovo by the European Community Monitoring
15 Mission and diplomatic missions accredited to the Federal Republic of
16 Yugoslavia, including access and complete freedom of movement of such
17 monitors to, from, and within Kosovo unimpeded by government authorities
18 and expeditious issuance of appropriate travel documents to international
19 personnel contributing to the monitoring."
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.
21 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honour, to interrupt. If I could be
22 of assistance, it's P456, the Security Council Resolution.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll note that that's the position. Thank you.
24 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic. I appreciate that.
25 Q. Now, we just looked at that paragraph of the verification mission
1 agreement and we saw what it said. And it appears, does it not, to be an
2 effort to -- to put in the agreement what it was that was demanded by the
3 United Nations in that paragraph 4(B) that I just referred you to?
4 A. I think -- I believe that there -- there is a connection,
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. I mean, what the intentions of the drafters were, I don't exactly
9 Q. Now, if we could go back then to P432 and look at that paragraph
10 again, just so we'd have it on the screen as we talk about it. And that's
11 on page 3, under terms of reference, the first paragraph.
12 First of all, as regards access under here, it's clear that the
13 mission is to travel throughout Kosovo to verify the maintenance of the
14 cease-fire by all elements, isn't it?
15 A. That's what it says, yes.
16 Q. Okay. And to carry out that mission it says: "Mission personnel
17 will have full freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo at all
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Okay. Now, there's no other part of that document which
22 specifically provides for access to barracks or facilities of the VJ, is
23 there? You're relying on this language?
24 A. Yes. Because what else does it mean when it says, you know, full
25 freedom of movement and access?
1 Q. Well, let me suggest to you this: The mission is to verify the
2 maintenance of a cease-fire. You don't have to go into barracks, you
3 don't have to go into facilities of the VJ to determine whether they're
4 shooting or not, do you?
5 A. I believe that the actual -- the full mission was greater than
6 that. It wasn't just to verify the cease-fire. We then talked about
7 organising elections, et cetera. So, you know, I don't agree with you,
9 Q. Well, I didn't expect you to agree with me. The problem is the
10 document says something different than what you're contending and
11 that's -- and I think that was a dispute that existed from the beginning
12 between your monitoring mission and the Serbian authorities, wasn't it?
13 A. What we said all along about this document, that the document was
14 drafted in haste and the language could have been better. But as it was
15 written, we had freedom of movement and access throughout Kosovo at all
17 Q. But there was a dispute going on between you and the government
18 from the very beginning about whether it had the meaning that you were
19 trying to put on it, wasn't there?
20 A. The dispute began the first time we tried to do a verification in
21 the barracks, yes.
22 Q. And throughout the monitoring mission, that dispute was never
23 resolved, and it was not resolved because the agreement was very vague on
24 this subject and not as specific as, perhaps, you would have wanted it to
25 be. Isn't that true?
1 A. Absolutely. I didn't draft it. Greater men than I drafted it.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Can we take it then from your answer that that
3 dispute was articulated by the Serb side and that explanation given for
4 refusing access?
5 THE WITNESS: Correct, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
7 MR. ACKERMAN:
8 Q. So if we go back then to your statement, page 2, paragraph 10,
9 where you say: "The role of arms and weapons verification was a complete
10 and utter disaster and was eventually abandoned," there simply was no role
11 of arms and weapons verification; there was simply a role of verification
12 of cease-fire, wasn't there?
13 A. I believe in the -- in amongst the three documents, there was a
14 verification role, besides which a letter was written to Belgrade, to
15 Mr. Milosevic, explaining what we intended to do, to which there was no
17 Q. Well, we're talking about agreements here and not just letters
18 that people wrote. And I think the documents speak for themselves and the
19 Tribunal -- the Chamber's going to be able to look at them at their
21 I want to go to another matter now. I want to ask you if you know
22 of a weapon called a Baret 50-calibre sniper rifle?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And do you know that the KLA had several of those in Kosovo?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Can you tell the Chamber generally about the capabilities of that
2 50-calibre sniper rifle.
3 A. Well, in brief, you can kill someone a mile away.
4 Q. Well, the information I have is that it has a range of a couple of
5 miles and can actually destroy an armoured vehicle. Is that wrong?
6 A. It's not wrong, but the operational range -- I mean, most weapons
7 have enormous manufacturer's stated ranges, but the operational effective
8 range is usually less, and this is -- probably a mile is about the correct
9 range for killing someone.
10 Q. Well, using a 50-calibre sniper rifle of this magnitude against an
11 individual is kind of an overshot, isn't it? Isn't it more effective
12 against vehicles and things of that nature?
13 A. Not at all. I mean, it's -- at long ranges, this is the weapon of
14 choice of many armies.
15 Q. All right. I want to go now to --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman, was this particular weapon one of
17 those listed by Mr. Zyrapi?
18 MR. ACKERMAN: No, it was not, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Was he asked?
20 MR. ACKERMAN: He was not.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
22 MR. ACKERMAN: It came up in -- it's mentioned in the Milosevic
23 testimony of this witness. He talks about 50-calibre sniper rifle and
24 that got my curiosity and that's how I got to this question, Your Honour.
25 Q. Beginning at paragraph 15 of your statement, which is on page 4,
1 you spoke about incidents in the Podujevo area and I want to talk about
2 Podujevo just for a little while. I assume that when you arrived in
3 Kosovo or before you arrived there you received some briefings about the
4 situation as it existed and had existed before your arrival and the
5 activities of the MUP and the VJ and the KLA?
6 A. Yes, a very brief outline of what was happening.
7 Q. And I assume you got some kind of a briefing about the recent
8 history of the Podujevo area or not?
9 A. Not really, no.
10 Q. Were you aware that what was going on in that area and had been
11 going on for some time was an effort by the KLA to cut off the
12 Nis-Podujevo-Pristina road and the communication along that road? Were
13 you aware of that?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And can you tell the Chamber what was the importance of that line
16 of communication?
17 A. I think I mentioned it on the Friday, but it was the main
18 re-supply route and the main transit route, or road route, between Kosovo
19 and the rest of Serbia.
20 Q. And so that's why the KLA was making those efforts and it was a
21 continuing effort on their part, wasn't it?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. I want to look at just a couple of exhibits quickly, if we can,
24 4D82 is the first one. And we just need to see the English version of
25 that. And these documents both predate your arrival, so I don't expect
1 you would have seen them or would know anything about them.
2 MR. ACKERMAN: That's the Serbian version. We need the English
4 Q. Now, what you see here is a 3rd Army command document dated
5 15 October 1998 addressed to the General Staff of the Yugoslavia army, and
6 it's a regular combat report; correct?
7 A. I believe so. I've never seen one before but, yes, I'll take your
8 word for it.
9 MR. ACKERMAN: If we go to page 2, paragraph 4, maybe.
10 Q. You'll see the language there, the first paragraph under 4, "the
11 situation in the territory," talks about KLA activity going on in the
12 Podujevo area as early as the date of this combat report, does it not?
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. And just while we're on this particular document, I'd like you to
15 look also at paragraph 5.1, and this is 15 October 1997 [sic], and
16 paragraph 5.1 is probably on the next page under the heading "activities."
17 It says: "The commands and units of the army continued with carrying out
18 tasks from the order of the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ," and
19 then it refers to a confidential order and a certain date and so forth.
21 A. Yeah, mm-hmm.
22 Q. So it appears, does it not, that the VJ was responding to orders
23 from the Chief of the General Staff at that time, who was General Perisic;
25 A. Yes --
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Ackerman, it doesn't seem to me to be a
2 legitimate use of cross-examination to present this witness with these
3 documents. He's answered a very specific question about the situation
4 when he arrived, which is entirely inconsistent, I imagine, with what
5 you're now presenting to him. But bear in mind the discussion we had
6 earlier about the appropriate stage for presenting this kind of evidence.
7 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes, I understand that, Your Honour. I'm satisfied
8 with what has happened.
9 [Defence counsel confer]
10 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, there's a translation problem,
11 page 59, 14 --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Should 1998.
13 MR. ACKERMAN: Should be 1998.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
15 MR. ACKERMAN:
16 Q. Okay. I want to go to another matter here.
17 At paragraph 45, which is on page 9 of your statement, and this is
18 referred to by Mr. Cepic, that's that situation that you observed on the
19 Podujevo-Pristina road at a place called Lebane, and I'm not going to go
20 back into your language in regards to that, but you spoke about this in
21 the Milosevic trial, and you were asked about it and you said this: "The
22 reason I put this in the statement was to actually show that when the VJ
23 had carried out an operation, they actually performed this within all the
24 legal frameworks and acted humanely and decently, and also performed well
25 as a military unit."
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. Okay.
4 MR. ACKERMAN: I now want to look at another document, it's 4D34.
5 Q. And this is another one of those OSCE-KVM restricted fusion
6 workers -- working papers reports, and this is for a period between
7 26 February and 4 March of 1999. If you'll look at that first
8 paragraph -- let me just preface it with this.
9 You were shown a number of these reports in the Milosevic case, I
10 know, and on several occasions you said something to the effect that if
11 it's in the report it's probably correct, or something like that. Do you
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. This one says: "The KLA appeared to have taken the fight to the
15 Serbs in a number of ambushes and attacks, notably in the Djeneral
16 Jankovic salient, an area previously quiet. To date and in comparison
17 with the activities of the Serb forces in recent months, the VJ has," and
18 the word "been" is probably missing there, "somewhat less aggressive."
19 Are you familiar with that situation at all and would you agree
20 with that analysis?
21 A. The problem with working papers is that working papers were not a
22 definitive opinion -- well, a fact -- factual record. I mean, these were
23 working papers where people are trying to come up with some ideal
24 solutions. So when it says that there they were somewhat less aggressive,
25 I don't know. I mean ...
1 Q. Well, these were people that were on the ground observing the
2 situation that were trying to provide an analysis of what it is they were
3 seeing, isn't it?
4 A. No. The fusion working papers are actually done by people who
5 were sitting in an office in Pristina, not on the ground.
6 Q. Well, but based upon what they were learning from people on the
8 A. Yes, on reports coming in from the ground.
9 Q. Okay. Okay. I want to ask you now about a -- an answer you gave
10 in Milosevic. This is at pages 3285 and 3286. You said this: "Yes, I
11 mean in a conflict, for example, the -- if you are being attacked by
12 terrorist groups, of course a government does have the power and the right
13 to defend itself."
14 And then the question: "And what else did the government do put
15 protect civilians and representatives of the government from terrorists?"
16 Your answer is: "One of the things it did is used
17 disproportionate force on many occasions."
18 Now, can you explain what you mean by the use of "disproportionate
19 force," not in specific incidents, but I hear this a lot and it seems to
20 me that it means when one party to a conflict uses weaponry that's much
21 more advanced than what the other party to the conflict is able to use.
22 A. Yes. Going back a little bit, when I talk about the VJ, certainly
23 during most of my time in Kosovo and almost until the time we left, almost
24 until we left, the VJ behaved correctly. It was not using excessive force
25 until the last few weeks of March.
1 Now, going back to what I mean by excessive force is if, for
2 example, you have a sniper --
3 Q. Well, your word is "disproportionate force." That's what I'm
4 interested in.
5 A. Disproportionate force. So if you have a sniper sitting in the
6 window of a house firing at opposition forces to come in with heavy
7 artillery and to wipe out the entire village to kill the sniper I would
8 call disproportionate force.
9 Q. Okay. How about a few weeks later when NATO was engaged in
10 bombing Serbia with -- by using cruise missiles and cluster bombs and
11 weapons of that sort, would you call that a use of disproportionate force?
12 A. I'm afraid I've, you know, sort of -- I can't comment on an
13 operation that I wasn't actually controlling or running. I mean, I don't
14 know what targets you're referring to. Were these empty factories in
15 which there were no people in the evenings, or were they fully manned by
17 Q. Well, you certainly know that the Serbs didn't have cruise
18 missiles and cluster bombs and aircraft like NATO had in any way to --
19 A. No. But you yourself said that, you know, we're talking about,
20 you know, using a more advanced weapons system. And I didn't say using a
21 more advanced weapons system. Disproportionate force to me is just
22 overreacting by completely obliterating a target when the target is minor.
23 Q. All right. I think that's a fair answer. I have one final
24 question I want to ask you, and I don't know if you know the answer to
25 this or not. I just am curious. In the course of a campaign like NATO
1 was involved in, a bombing campaign basically, which we've seen in Kosovo,
2 we've seen in Iraq, we've seen many places recently, in your experience in
3 the military, the -- the information about targeting, is that information
4 that is widely disseminated or is it closely held? Is it highly secret or
5 not? What do you know about targeting information in terms of the kind of
6 secrecy that is attached to it?
7 A. It's, obviously, secret, and it needs to be kept within a small
8 group; otherwise, you would have things happening like widely reported in
9 NATO when somebody was passing targeting information to the Serbian side
10 at the start of the bombing campaign.
11 Q. And that was happening, to your knowledge?
12 A. Well, it stopped when action was taken within the headquarters.
13 Q. Okay. And the reason that passing that kind of information along
14 is so closely held is, among other things, the danger it provides for the
15 pilots that might be flying those missions?
16 A. Well, of course.
17 Q. Yeah. Any other reason?
18 A. Well, it's just for the entire planning. I mean, if you -- if the
19 enemy were -- are aware of where you're going to hit them, it's not really
20 a surprise. It's not a -- they would clear the area, they would remove
21 their forces, they would remove personnel, or they would sort of go for
22 camouflage and deception and all these sort of things. So, yes, obviously
23 if the enemy knows where you're going to strike him, the enemy will take
24 wise proportions to prevent it.
25 Q. All right. That's all I have. Thanks very much.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.
2 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:
4 Q. Good day, Colonel Ciaglinski, I am Dan Ivetic, and I am one of the
5 attorneys for General Lukic today, and I am going to have some questions
6 for you.
7 Now, I see from your statement and your testimony here today
8 before this Tribunal that you are a professional soldier. From this can
9 we conclude that you did not at any time but particularly relative to your
10 involvement in the KVM undergo any formal schooling relative to the
11 training and operative knowledge necessary to be an active policeman or
12 police officer?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. And am I also correct that you have never been employed as a
15 civilian policeman in any country, have you?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. And now you told us that upon volunteering for the OSCE-Kosovo
18 Verification Mission you underwent some training prior to being deployed
19 on the ground.
20 First of all, about this training, how long did this training
22 A. About a week.
23 Q. Okay. And what functions did this training cover? For instance,
24 did your training for the KVM deployment include any training in police
25 procedure and operations, such that you personally would be versed in the
1 police duties, functions, and responsibilities of the MUP of the Republic
2 of Serbia?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Okay. And did your training include any element focusing on the
5 structure operations of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of
6 Serbia and the laws that were in effect at the time?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Now, sir, isn't it correct that other people within your mission
9 did in fact receive such training and in fact spent time in the field
10 dealing with the Serbian police, the so-called police verifiers?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. Okay. Now, wouldn't you agree with me, sir, that as far as
13 specific appraisals of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior personnel are
14 concerned, you would have to defer to these other individuals within your
15 mission that, (a), had more experience or did receive more extended
16 training in police functions; and (b), spent significant time in the field
17 and had first-hand knowledge of work with the police?
18 A. Assuming that the police were carrying out policing-type actions
19 and not army-type actions, yes.
20 Q. Okay. Now, when you were deployed to the field in Kosovo-Metohija
21 as part of the KVM on the 5th -- on or about the 5th of December, 1998,
22 was the KVM mission at that point in time already in place and
23 functioning, or elements of it?
24 A. Elements of it were, yes.
25 Q. And prior to that period of time or prior to the period of time
1 when the KVM mission as a whole came on line, do you know who, if anyone,
2 was undertaking the functioning and the jobs that were later taken up by
3 the KVM?
4 A. Yes, the KDOM.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. The KDOMs, yes.
7 Q. And the KDOM had been in the area for quite some time at that
8 period. Is that correct?
9 A. Yes, the French and the American one were, yes.
10 Q. Now, were you briefed at any time upon your arrival of the
11 existing security concerns and situations that existed on the territory of
12 Kosovo-Metohija at the time that you were deployed?
13 A. Do you mean briefed by the Serbian side or ...
14 Q. By the -- by either KDOM or anyone within the KVM.
15 A. I personally wasn't, but people would have been, like my boss, for
17 Q. Okay. You've mentioned a couple times your boss, General
18 Drewienkiewicz, or DZ, as you call him. Do you recall who the personnel
19 were that made up the upper echelons of the hierarchy in KVM mission in
20 Kosovo-Metohija and what their specific duties and responsibilities were?
21 A. Well, I can't go through all of them by name, but I can tell you
22 that obviously Ambassador Walker was in charge and that there were four or
23 five, or thereabout, deputies, one of which -- one of whom was General DZ
24 and the other one was Keller, for example.
25 Q. Would these four or five deputies all be persons who had a higher
1 function than, for instance, yourself within the hierarchy of the KVM?
2 A. Of course.
3 Q. Okay. And specifically when talking about yourself and your role
4 within the hierarchy or the mission, where did you fit in within this
6 A. Well, I was working directly to DZ, so of middling sort of in the
8 Q. Did you have any immediate subordinates that you can recall?
9 A. My job was -- well, if -- yes, because if I was, for example, my
10 job as liaison to the Serbs -- to the commission for cooperation, then I
11 would actually be directly responsible for passing that information to and
12 making sure that the people with similar responsibilities in the regional
13 centres were carrying out their duties in accord with that.
14 Q. Am I correct that there were -- I apologise. I have to slow down
15 since we're both speaking English for the interpreters' sake.
16 A. All right.
17 Q. Am I correct, then, that there were several individuals who also
18 reported directly to General Drewienkiewicz during the KVM mission in
19 addition to yourself?
20 A. Oh, yes.
21 Q. Okay. Now, do you recall who the specific communications or
22 liaison officers of the KVM were who were responsible for dealing with the
23 Serbian MUP?
24 A. Yes, I believe the person that -- in the KVM headquarters that
25 dealt with them the most -- just -- the name just shot out of my brain.
1 I'm thinking too far ahead. Guy Sans [phoen].
2 Q. And do you recall if Mr. Sans remained in this position the entire
3 time of the KVM's deployment in Kosovo-Metohija?
4 A. I think for most of the time.
5 Q. Okay. Now, in your statement you stated that you had limited
6 access to "MUP sites." What are these MUP sites that you're referring to?
7 I mean, are we talking about police stations or ...
8 A. No, we would never actually -- we were never asked to go and
9 investigate a police station. A police station is a police station. We
10 were more actually interested in deployments of MUP in the field.
11 Q. So you're -- when you say "MUP sites," is that referring to all or
12 any MUP --
13 A. Any deployed MUP in the field, yes.
14 Q. Okay. Now, you would agree with me, I hope, that by the time you
15 arrived in Kosovo-Metohija in December of 1998, the Serbian police
16 maintained so-called observation posts near various roadways per the
17 agreement that we've referred to as the Byrnes agreement and that these
18 observation points were not on the road themselves but were nearby to the
19 road, serving as a security point that did not physically block off the
20 road. Am I correct?
21 A. Yes. But there were also roadblocks on the road, other ones.
22 Q. Now, when you talk about these other ones, first of all, do you
23 know that at the same time, in addition to these observation points we
24 discussed and the trafficking crime prevention check-points or roadblocks
25 that you mentioned, that these still existed and were used by the MUP
1 outside of Kosovo-Metohija in other parts of Serbia and that they were
2 used by the traffic police in the regular and ordinary course of their
3 duties and functions?
4 A. Well, if they were -- I used to travel regularly to Nis and I
5 can't ever remember being stopped by one or seeing one.
6 Q. Okay. Now, in reference to these various deployments out in the
7 field, would you please explain or describe for us what you meant when you
8 used the terminology in your statement of "MUP check-point" in reference
9 to your surprise inspection that you say took place on or about February
10 of 1999?
11 A. These are the check-points that you referred to earlier yourself,
12 which are the ones not exactly on the road but near the road or in the
14 Q. So are we talking about these observation points or the traffic
15 check-points, since I mentioned both?
16 A. We're not talking about traffic check-points, no.
17 Q. Okay. So we are talking about the observation check-points that
18 were per the Byrnes agreement?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to this, as you described it, limited
21 access that you had relative to MUP sites or MUP deployments, were -- did
22 you personally eye-witness the denial of access in any of these instances
23 or were you relying upon information sent to you from the field?
24 A. I actually organised the event for the inspection to be carried
25 out, and therefore I was trying to coordinate it, and therefore I was
1 personally not going around and looking at these. We had a large number
2 of teams who went out to carry this out.
3 Q. Okay. Now, I was actually asking about the denial of access,
4 since it would appear that with the surprise inspections you did gain
5 access to these deployments. Is it your testimony that as part of this
6 surprise inspection in the early part of 1999 that you were denied access
7 to the observation points that were set forth in the Byrnes agreement?
8 A. We were denied access to those points, yes.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly make a brief because
10 between questions and answers for the interpreters to be able to follow.
11 MR. IVETIC:
12 Q. We got ahead of ourselves there. I'll try and slow down between
13 question and answer.
14 Now, when we talk about this unannounced inspection that you
15 coordinated of all these MUP observation points that you say took place on
16 or about February of 1999, are you certain about this date or is it
17 possible that the inspection was actually carried out in January of 1999?
18 A. It could have been in January 1999.
19 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to this inspection, you state that you
20 had confirmed the MUP to be breaching the agreement as to the number of
21 check-points permitted to operate all over the entire territory of Kosovo.
22 Now, in your statement you fail to identify the specific agreement you're
23 talking about. Now, as someone who received -- as someone who was on the
24 ground to verify compliance with several agreements, what particular
25 agreements guided you in terms of making this assessment and organising
1 this inspection of MUP observation points in the field?
2 A. It was obviously the Byrnes agreement.
3 Q. Now, we've already seen that agreement at Exhibit P394 when my
4 colleague cross-examined you. First of all, how about the other agreement
5 signed by Geremek and Foreign Minister Jovanovic, regarding the
6 establishment of the OSCE-KVM mission? Did you in fact consult with that
7 agreement as well while undertaking your inspection?
8 A. No. Because part of the Byrnes agreement and part of the KDOM's
9 future was, I think, discussed in one of the agreements, whereby the KDOM
10 would eventually be absorbed and their work would be absorbed by the OSCE
11 mission. So it was a rolling thing that just rolled into the rest of it.
12 Q. But you would agree with me, I hope, that the Byrnes agreement
13 itself is a one-page document, whereas the KVM agreement signed by Geremek
14 and Jovanovic is a multi-page document that tends to complement each
15 other. Is that correct?
16 A. I would say they certainly do complement each other, yes.
17 Q. Okay. Now, as part of your surprise inspection of MUP deployments
18 in the field, I believe you mentioned that in addition to the observation
19 points you saw a number of patrols and other deployments. Is that
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And you've -- saw this as being a violation of the Byrnes
24 A. If I said so at the time, I presume there was a reason why I said
25 it, and I can't remember if patrols were mentioned in the original Byrnes
2 Q. Okay. Well, when dealing with either of the Byrnes or the KVM
3 agreement, the Geremek agreement, did you actually take it upon yourself
4 to interpret these agreements or were there staff members of the KVM who
5 interpreted the requirements of the agreements for you?
6 A. I believe they were interpreted -- well, I know they were -- it
7 was not my decision. I was too down, too low in the food-chain, if you
8 like. So it would certainly have been agreed with DZ, with certainly
9 Ambassador Walker, so I'm sure these decisions weren't taken lightly.
10 Well, I know they were not taken lightly. And there were legal experts in
11 the KVM itself who would also have been -- and the police also.
12 Q. All right. Well, let's focus, then, for a couple of moments on
13 the Byrnes agreement, first of all, and again that's Exhibit P394, I
15 MR. IVETIC: If we can have it up on e-court if the witness
16 requires to look at it as I discuss various portions of it. It is one
17 page, so I think we could just have the entire agreement up there at this
19 Q. Sir, would you be surprised to learn that the agreement between
20 Shaun Byrnes and the MUP provides that in determination of increased
21 security concerns, the MUP may increase the number of patrols and utilise
22 armed vehicles on the road where observation points are located using even
23 up to 7.9-millimetre machine-gun armaments on their vehicles and that the
24 only obligation on the part of the MUP is to give notice to KVM. And
25 that's, I believe, subpart 2 of the Byrnes agreement.
1 A. Mm-hmm.
2 Q. I'm sorry, sir, we have to make sure that our answers are
3 conclusive yes or no. I understand "mm-hmm," but the interpreters may
5 A. Yes, I was waiting for you to -- I wasn't actually confirming
6 anything. I was waiting for you to continue because I thought you hadn't
8 Q. Okay. Well, first -- well, let's limit ourselves to that section
9 for the time being. Are you aware of that -- the existence of that
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And are you aware of any increased security concerns that were in
13 place in January or February of 1999, since you're not sure when the
14 inspection took place, that the MUP gave notice to KVM of increasing
16 A. I was very aware, we all were aware, of the increased security
17 concern. However, I am not aware and -- of any notification given to us
18 because had that been done then we would have known about the actual
19 places to look for these additional points.
20 Q. I'm not at this point in time talking about additional points.
21 I'm talking about patrols. Patrols would be mobile, would they not?
22 A. Yes, patrols would be mobile.
23 Q. Okay. Now, indeed the Byrnes agreement does not in any way limit
24 the number or frequency of patrols, does it?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Now, if we look further at the Byrnes agreement, we see that
2 the -- if we look at the beginning dealing with the observation points
3 specifically, that at the time this agreement was entered into on the
4 25th of October, 1998, it was foreseen that the parties would meet
5 subsequently to re-evaluate the number and type of observation points
6 permitted, depending on the changing security situation. That's, I
7 believe, in paragraph 1 of the agreement.
8 Now, did you take any steps to ascertain what the results of any
9 such subsequent discussions between the MUP and Mr. Byrnes or anyone else
10 were prior to conducting your inspection and calling the Serbs in breach
11 some several months later?
12 A. We obviously discussed -- we were in constant contact with
13 Mr. Byrnes and he was well aware that we were doing this.
14 Q. Again, I believe I asked if you had undertaken any steps to
15 ascertain what were the results of the subsequent discussions between the
16 MUP and Mr. Byrnes, his associates, or anyone in the KVM regarding the
17 final number of observation points that were going to be permitted under
18 this agreement.
19 A. I know nothing about this at all.
20 Q. Okay. Would that be, again, because you were too low on the
21 food-chain to know about any such discussions?
22 A. Not necessarily, no. Because I was -- although I was low on the
23 food-chain, I did actually sit next to General DZ and I often had meetings
24 with Shaun Byrnes. I sat in on meetings with the Ambassador Walker, and I
25 tended to know quite a lot of what was going on.
1 Q. Well, in your statement, in your testimony in Milosevic, and I
2 believe in your testimony here, you have talked about 29 observation
3 points being permitted under the Byrnes agreement. I count fewer than
4 that, based upon the agreement itself. Isn't that correct?
5 A. It certainly looks like it, yes.
6 Q. Okay. Now --
7 A. 27, is it.
8 Q. So it is 27?
9 A. Mm-hmm.
10 Q. And yet would you say that you were the main official at KVM in
11 charge of enforcing this agreement?
12 A. It's -- I mean, we actually wrote a report which was handed across
13 to General Loncar in which it actually told exactly where we had been,
14 what the points were we actually checked out. It is possible that in my
15 statement when I said 29 check-points, maybe I looked down at the number
16 on the agreement, which is October 29, as opposed to actually giving the
17 correct number, which was 27.
18 Q. That's interesting. We'll get back to that, I think, with some
19 other documents.
20 First of all, let me ask you, you mentioned a report. Would your
21 report, based upon your activities, have been forwarded to your superiors
22 within the KVM as well?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to your report, at least in your
25 testimony you say it talks about the entire territory of Kosovo and
1 Metohija. Are you aware that this Byrnes agreement, specifically the
2 first part and paragraph 3, limit its application to a -- to a triangle
3 within Kosovo and Metohija, such that the terms of the -- all the terms of
4 the Byrnes agreement do not apply uniformly across the entire territory of
5 Kosovo-Metohija. Isn't that correct?
6 A. But these are the areas that we actually examined, those points of
8 Q. Okay. Now --
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Sounds like a good place to interrupt you,
10 Mr. Ivetic.
11 MR. IVETIC: Oh, yes, that would be fine, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Another break, Mr. Ciaglinski. If you could leave
13 again --
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: -- please, with the usher.
16 [The witness stands down]
17 JUDGE BONOMY: And we shall resume at 6.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 5.31 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 6.00 p.m.
20 [The witness takes the stand]
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.
22 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. Sir, before the break we were talking about this inspection
24 conducted by the KVM on police deployments on communication routes. Now,
25 we've already heard how you are not specially trained as a police observer
1 or verifier, but based on your limited knowledge or everyday knowledge and
2 common sense, have you ever known the police, any police, when conducting
3 patrols to stop their vehicles to get out and perform their regular duties
4 by way of a traffic or, as we call them, public safety stop?
5 A. Yes, I have.
6 Q. Now, focusing specifically upon your inspection that you
7 coordinated as part of the KVM of these police deployments, you have
8 testified that there were a number of sites far in excess of the 29, now
9 that we've seen it's 27, that were permitted under the Byrnes agreement.
10 You say there were almost 40 such sites. Now -- that were manned by the
11 MUP. Now, am I correct that within this number of 40 -- approximately 40
12 sites, you could be including police patrols that had been parked and
13 traffic check-points that were established for purposes of traffic control
14 or are these all observation points?
15 A. There was always a major distinction between operational MUP units
16 and the police, traffic police. I don't think I -- or maybe on one
17 occasion I saw real traffic police wearing their little white belts and
18 quite different uniforms to the -- these sort of operational MUP units,
19 and I don't believe that these units were the regular little patrol car
20 with nice friendly policemen with white belts. So that's the answer to
21 your question.
22 Q. Well, are we saying, then, that this number of approximately 40
23 was exclusively these observation points rather than traffic points or
24 traffic stop points?
25 A. No, there were traffic stop points, but they were not the sort of
1 nice friendly policemen that, you know, have stopped me in the past in the
2 countries I've worked in. These were military-type units.
3 Q. This number of 40, though, what is that? Are those observation
4 points or are they traffic points?
5 A. It's both.
6 Q. Both. Okay.
7 MR. IVETIC: I would ask for the usher to put up Exhibit P432,
8 specifically page 4 of that exhibit on e-court.
9 Q. And while we're waiting for that document, sir, I would like to
10 ask you if you are aware of the fact that the KVM agreement between the
11 OSCE and the FRY dated 25 October 1998 signed by Mr. Jovanovic and
12 Mr. Geremek, specifically at Article 3, section 3, excludes from the
13 purview of the KVM mission any and all roadblocks established for purposes
14 of traffic and/or crime-fighting concerns.
15 Are you aware of that, sir?
16 A. Sorry, I'm looking for the paragraph in the document.
17 Q. Paragraph 3; it's right at the top of the screen.
18 A. Oh, I see it. Right. That's right. So what we're saying is that
19 if we find them, we report them; which is what we did.
20 Q. Sir, if you read there that first sentence even says: "The
21 verification mission will look for and report on roadblocks and other
22 emplacements which influence lines of communication erected for purposes
23 other than traffic or crime control."
24 In fact, the KVM had no authority and no reason to look at traffic
25 or crime control stops erected by the MUP. Is that correct?
1 A. How would you differentiate? They didn't have a big sign saying:
2 This is a crime control stop.
3 Q. Well, I'm asking you, sir, how you differentiated between them
4 since you were the one who coordinated this inspection --
5 A. Well, we certainly looked at the -- at the actual output or what
6 these things actually did and how they functioned.
7 Q. And I believe you testified that you had the Byrnes agreement and
8 this agreement in your pocket at all times.
9 A. Mm-hmm.
10 Q. Is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. So therefore you would have knowledge of the fact that no traffic
13 or crime control stop points could be considered a violation of any
14 agreement since they were outside of either of these agreements. Is that
16 A. Only if you could define what a traffic or crime control stop
17 point was, as I mentioned.
18 Q. Okay.
19 THE INTERPRETER: May we remind the speakers to make the pause,
21 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... didn't seek to
22 establish the purpose of any particular block, roadblock, that you
24 THE WITNESS: I personally wasn't at these particularly sites,
25 sir, so, I mean, it's possible that the people examining them might have
1 asked those questions.
2 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, your question was actually not in the
3 transcript because the interpreter was speaking at the same time. So I
4 actually didn't even hear the first half of it.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: I simply said that I took it that the witness
6 didn't seek to establish the purpose of any particular roadblock that he
7 reported. And he made the point that he wasn't personally involved in
8 dealing with any.
9 MR. IVETIC: Okay. Can I proceed, Your Honour, or was that -- was
10 there more?
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Please carry on.
12 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
13 Q. Now, sir, am I correct that this type of no warning spot check of
14 MUP installations was conducted infrequently, that is to say, that the
15 check you are talking about is the one unique such inspection that KVM
16 undertook of these locations?
17 A. This was the one coordinated inspection in the areas that were
18 designated. However, the regional centres and the other sort of patrols
19 that would go out would report back if they saw any of these types of
21 Q. What I'm trying to determine is that in fact this inspection that
22 you're describing, whether it's in January or in February of 1999, that's
23 the only one where in one day all of the 27 observation points were
24 observed by the KVM verifiers?
25 A. Absolutely.
1 Q. Okay.
2 MR. IVETIC: I'm going to ask the court officials to put up 6D110
3 on the e-court.
4 Q. And, sir, as we're waiting for that document what I'm going to be
5 showing you is what purports to be a daily update by the OSCE-KVM dated
6 6th January 1999 that we received from the Office of the Prosecutor.
7 Now, sir, looking at this document, at least the first page of
8 this document, does this appear to be the format utilised by the OSCE-KVM
9 during the time-period that you were a part of that organisation to report
10 daily events or undertakings?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And before we go further into the document, would it be the
13 standard and regular operating procedures of the KVM mission to include
14 such things as your spot check of the MUP observation points in such a
15 daily update?
16 A. Are you referring to the -- to the organised event of the 27th --
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. It might be mentioned. I don't know. It was a one-off, so when
19 you say "regular," one is not regular, but ...
20 Q. Okay. Well, if we can look at section 1 of this document.
21 MR. IVETIC: If we can scroll down just a little bit more so it's
22 easier. That should be enough right there. Thank you.
23 Q. If you can look at developments in the mission area, number 1.
24 First of all, it looks as if this report covers the period of 5 January
25 1999, and it describes the verification undertaken on that day of all 27
1 MUP OPs and reports that not all the OPs were manned. First of all, what
2 does MUP OP refer to? Is that the observation points that we've been
3 talking about?
4 A. I suppose it must have.
5 Q. And does this document refresh your recollection as to the fact
6 that the spot check of the MUP observation points was, in fact, conducted
7 in January, specifically January 5th, 1999, and not February of 1999?
8 A. Fine, whatever you say. If it's written down, I agree.
9 Q. Okay. And I guess it's possible the verification 2/99 might have
10 been misinterpreted by you as being February of 1999 if you see in the
11 first line of that statement.
12 A. Mm-hmm.
13 Q. So we're talking about the same event, it would appear; is that
15 A. Yes, I would say.
16 Q. Now, we see here that the inspection did not reveal what you have
17 testified to; namely, that of the 27 OPs, not even all 27 of those were
18 found to be manned by the MUP. Isn't that right?
19 A. That's what it says there.
20 Q. And you would not be contradicting the written findings of your
21 own mission, would you? You're not in a position to do that?
22 A. No, but I know that there were more than 27 check-points manned.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. And the report must be somewhere in your files, I presume.
25 Q. Well, we'll see about that, sir. Now, taking into account that
1 the document appears to be talking about the inspection, I would ask
2 for -- actually, it doesn't have to be moved. Right at the top of this
3 selection of the document, sir, do you see the preamble to the report that
4 states that: "It appears the MUP and the VJ have stepped up their efforts
5 to restrict freedom of movement in and out of villages. This is probably
6 aimed at providing security for ethnic Serbs during Christmas."
7 Now, taking into account that the Orthodox Christmas falls on
8 January the 7th, and the spot check that you undertook occurred on the
9 5th of January, you would have to agree that providing extra security
10 during the holidays is, indeed, a normal function of the police in any
11 country, is it not?
12 A. Absolutely.
13 Q. And that would be especially true if there had been threats or
14 actual attacks undertaken during that same time-period. Isn't that
16 A. I don't disagree.
17 Q. Okay. Now, do you recall, sir, that during the same period of
18 time, January of 1999, during the time-period leading up to and during the
19 Serbian Orthodox Christmas, that the findings of the KVM indicated
20 a "province-wide terrorism" affecting the province of Kosovo and Metohija?
21 A. Sorry, do you want an answer from me?
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. Yes, I do recall.
24 Q. Okay. And in fact, I believe that was reported.
25 MR. IVETIC: Let's see exhibit -- Prosecution Exhibit P634,
2 Q. Now, this is a report attached to the OTP witness statement of
3 Major General DZ or Drewienkiewicz.
4 A. Mm-hmm.
5 Q. And I would direct your attention to the fourth page of this
7 MR. IVETIC: That should be fine. We're going to need the whole
9 Q. And, first of all, I would direct your attention to serial 58 in
10 the middle of the page dated January 5, where it says: "All 27 OPs
11 inspected," and the comment is "most occupied by the MUP."
12 A. Mm-hmm.
13 Q. Does this refresh your recollection as to whether in fact there is
14 any report about more than 27 observation points being occupied by the MUP
15 on the day of this inspection of all the MUP OPs?
16 A. There was a -- I told you again, I'll repeat it, there was a
17 document produced actually showing exactly where they were that was a KVM
18 document that was passed to the liaison.
19 Q. Now, you can't think of any reason why your superior officer would
20 alter your report and report something different than what you reported,
21 can you?
22 A. The only thing that -- from memory -- I can't remember -- did we
23 actually say in the Byrnes agreement, did it actually say that 27 were the
24 actual MUP points that were being -- that was allowed and only so many of
25 those 27 could be manned at any time? I can't remember.
1 Q. I was asking you, sir. If you can't remember, I think we're at a
3 A. Well, I can remember, and I know that more than 27 were occupied.
4 Q. Well, sir, you --
5 A. There were 27 allowed ones plus additional ones that we came
7 Q. Well, sir, your testimony was that almost 40 were manned and
9 A. Exactly.
10 Q. And in fact the report of your own organisation, at least two
11 reports now that we've gone through, clearly identify that not even the 27
12 were manned. Isn't that correct?
13 A. But there were 27 designated ones.
14 Q. Well, if you would consider -- let me ask you this: Would you
15 consider the manning of almost 40 points, in excess of the 27 that is
16 permitted, would you consider that a grave breach of the Byrnes agreement?
17 A. If it had been -- if we had been warned beforehand about it, then
19 Q. Would you consider grave breaches of the agreement to be
20 chroniclised [sic] in General Drewienkiewicz's summary here, if in fact
21 such a grave breach existed?
22 A. The comments are very, very brief, and they don't pretend to sort
23 of be exhaustive and cover all the -- all the points that we're talking
24 about now.
25 Q. Okay. You indicated that you may not be privy to all the
1 information. Is it possible that if in fact the KVM had received prior
2 notice of other deployments, those deployments would then not be in breach
3 of the agreement and therefore would not be reported in this report or in
4 the other report that we saw.
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Could that be one of the reasons?
7 A. Correct. Because we had an agreement about the number of points,
8 and movement around Kosovo was becoming very, very difficult and
9 restricted for everyone, so we wanted to find out how many points were
10 actually being manned, and on that day there were about 40.
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. IVETIC: And if we can go down two more lines on this same
14 Q. We see the entry for the 7th of January, again the Serbian
15 Orthodox Christmas, and we see there that the KVM notes an identification
16 of trend of unattributable killings, and the comment is "province-wide
18 You testified that you recalled this particular instance where the
19 KVM indicated a province-wide terrorism. Was that a province-wide
20 terrorism as a result of KLA activity?
21 A. Well, this is DZ's abbreviation. I mean, there was terrorism
22 throughout Kosovo, but what does it mean, "province-wide terrorism"? It's
23 as wide as it was broad.
24 Q. Okay. Now, let's see what you mean by terrorist actions, because
25 I believe in your direct examination you said that you call a spade a
1 spade, and if you saw a terrorist attack you would label it as such.
2 Now, dealing with armed attacks undertaken by the so-called KLA
3 upon police patrols, this type of activity by the KLA was indeed
4 considered by the Kosovo Verification Mission to be an act of terrorism.
5 Is that correct?
6 A. It was certainly considered by me to be an act of terrorism and
7 eventually I think accepted by the KVM, yes.
8 Q. Okay. And just to briefly refresh your recollection.
9 MR. IVETIC: Let's have Prosecution Exhibit P638 on e-court. That
10 should be a short document, a press release from the KVM. I believe it
11 consists of two pages. We'll need page 2. Oh, actually, that's the page
12 we need.
13 Q. And, sir, if I can direct your attention to the screen, it would
14 appear that this is a press release regarding a serious breach of the
15 cease-fire near Prizren. And if you look down to the fourth paragraph you
16 see that the KVM -- we just lost it. The fourth paragraph. "The KVM
17 considers that such terrorist attacks and breaches of the cease-fire
18 undermine efforts to reach a political solution of the conflict."
19 And this is dealing with an attack upon two MUP personnel that
20 were witnessed by the KVM administrator. So this indeed shows that the --
21 it is not just your personal opinion that these attacks were terrorist
22 attacks. The KVM regarded the actions of the KLA as being terrorist
23 attacks. Is that not correct?
24 A. Upon January -- the beginning of January, yes, it was becoming
25 more accepted. Because one of the main talking points at nearly all our
1 meetings with General Loncar and his commission was, you know, what is a
2 terrorist attack and, you know, will we accept that when the KLA have
3 organised attacks that they are terrorist attacks.
4 Q. Okay. Now --
5 JUDGE BONOMY: What -- what does it matter?
6 THE WITNESS: Well, because it depends who's doing the actual
7 fighting, sir. If, for example -- well, who's being attacked. If there's
8 a Serbian action against the village where there are KLA and the KLA are
9 engaged and killed, then that's a legitimate action. If, however, the
10 village is shelled because it might have one gunman in there or someone is
11 said to occupy a house and they shell the whole village, I can't call the
12 entire village or all the villagers terrorists; whereas quite often that
13 would be the actual term used by the Serbian side, that all Albanians were
14 basically regarded as terrorists.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: I had misunderstood. I thought the preoccupation
16 was with whether you called the KLA terrorists or not, but that wasn't the
18 THE WITNESS: That was another issue as well, sir.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. Well, what does it matter whether you call
20 them terrorists or anything else, or a liberation army or whatever? Does
21 it matter for our purposes?
22 THE WITNESS: It didn't matter to us but it mattered to the
23 Serbian side hugely. If we referred to them as a liberation army, they
24 said they are liberating nothing, they are terrorists.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, whatever they do is criminal conduct, is it
2 THE WITNESS: Yes.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.
4 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
5 Q. Now, Colonel, I would like to move just for a moment to your
6 testimony relating to the Racak incident and your recollection of finding
7 out about alleged intercepts of communications between the Serbs after you
8 had left Kosovo and become an officer within the NATO structure again.
9 First of all, sir, with respect to those alleged intercepted
10 communications, am I correct that you yourself did not actually listen to
11 or hear any such intercepts first-hand but were relying upon second-hand
12 information about their existence?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Okay. Now, when did you first hear about the same, about these
16 A. I think the very first time it was still in Kosovo -- it's
17 because -- I tried to be very fair to everyone, both sides, and therefore
18 I never accepted things at face value. And I wasn't sure whether Racak
19 was exactly how it was portrayed. And I raised this reservation a few
20 times, and I was basically told by that time in Kosovo that, If you knew
21 the following, would that change your mind?
22 Q. Who told you this?
23 A. DZ.
24 Q. And do you recall when DZ told you that?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Okay. Now, you talked about the fact that within the NATO
2 structure you heard talk about these communications. Was DZ your source
3 for that as well?
4 A. No, he wasn't. These were the people that actually dealt with
6 Q. And as far as these people talking about these intercepts were
7 concerned, did they talk about the source of their information?
8 A. No, these things are hugely confidential and classified, and I
9 think they were telling me more than they should anyway.
10 Q. Okay. Now, as part of the ordinary intel-gathering process
11 employed by NATO, isn't it true that newspapers and news journals are also
12 regularly monitored for obtaining value intel?
13 A. Yes, I mean, all covert and overt sources are examined.
14 Q. And I presume you were not involved in the gathering of intel
15 relating to these intercepts?
16 A. I had nothing to do with it at all.
17 Q. Okay. So therefore, you have no way of knowing and you cannot
18 exclude the fact that this information about these intercepts may have
19 come from overt sources, i.e., news journals and newspaper accounts of the
20 alleged intercepts, rather than the actual intercepts themselves?
21 A. Well, I did not ask for any confirmation from my sources in
22 Skopije, but I had no reason to believe that they were telling me lies.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. Or inventing the facts or repeating facts from newspapers. It's
25 not something the intel world does.
1 Q. Do you say that based upon your personal knowledge and experience
2 within the intel world?
3 A. Well, it's no secret that I was a defence attache in two countries
4 in the former eastern Europe, and I worked very closely with intel
6 Q. Okay. Now, we've been talking very generally about these alleged
7 intercepts. Can I conclude from that fact that you have no knowledge or
8 credible information about the identities of the individuals alleged to be
9 engaged in the communications that were alleged to have been intercepted?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. Okay. Now, if we can move on to another topic. As far as the
12 operations of the Kosovo Verification Mission are concerned, am I correct
13 that a great number of your interpreters were, in fact, local Kosovo
15 A. They certainly were, but mine wasn't.
16 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Now, we've heard some testimony here from a
17 Baton Haxhiu, editor of Koha Ditore, that he was utilised as a translator
18 by Jan Kickert and Wolfgang Petritsch when talking to the KLA. Are you
19 familiar with any of these three individuals?
20 A. Well, I hadn't met the editor of Koha Ditore, but I was aware of
22 Q. How about the other two?
23 A. I had nothing to do with them.
24 Q. Okay. But you are aware of who they are?
25 A. I've heard their names.
1 Q. Now, during his testimony, Mr. Haxhiu testified that in fact he
2 deliberately mistranslated what the KLA was telling these western
3 observers so as to tone down the message and make it more palatable for
4 western ears. Did you in fact have any knowledge or experience that the
5 information western observers in Kosovo were hearing from Albanian
6 translators was in fact doctored or misrepresented in such fashion?
7 A. Well, I was certainly aware that occasionally my own Serbian
8 interpreter, when the discussions were getting quite heated, would
9 actually tone down the whole conversation, the interpretation, so as to
10 avoid any further sort of unpleasantness than I was involved in with the
11 work. So I wouldn't -- I mean, certainly the Albanian interpreters, at
12 times also to -- if they were talking with KLA, discussions would be
13 heated as well, and so I am sure there are occasions when the interpreters
14 would have toned down what they were saying. It happened to me, I know,
15 with my Serbian interpreters, and it probably happened to the Albanian
16 interpreters working with the KLA -- with our people, conversing with the
18 I mean, I had experiences of dealing with Rahman, and he was
19 holding a gun to my head. And so the interpreter was, you know, very
20 careful what he said at the time.
21 Q. You would agree with me, would you not, that this possibility
22 could provide for some serious concerns as to some of the critical
23 information being provided to field operatives of the KVM?
24 A. I think the gist was usually correct. You know, it's -- I'm an
25 interpreter myself of a couple of languages and I know how difficult it is
1 to get it exactly right.
2 Q. Okay. Now, if we can move on to another issue within the KVM. Is
3 it correct that William Walker and others around him, particularly my
4 fellow Americans in the mission, appeared to have a different agenda from
5 the rest of the mission, namely that they were sent there by the State
6 Department to remove Milosevic at all costs?
7 A. How could I possibly know this?
8 Q. Well, did you hear anything within the hierarchy of the KVM that
9 you were involved in, anything from DZ, for instance?
10 A. No, nothing from DZ, no.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. I mean, possibly after the whole thing was over, during the last
13 few years, there have been many discussions about what the hidden agendas
14 of various nations were.
15 Q. Do you recall any event or discussion wherein Mr. Walker tried to
16 veto a report about wounded MUP personnel and kidnapped VJ soldiers that
17 General Drewienkiewicz wanted to forward along and that General
18 Drewienkiewicz had to override Ambassador Walker based upon a majority
19 vote of the other members of the upper echelons of the KVM hierarchy?
20 A. I don't remember the specific event, but I can tell you that quite
21 often the -- the immediate information you received after an incident was
22 so confused, it was better to wait a bit and wait until the whole thing
23 had actually crystallised.
24 So, for example, in my own incident in Decani when I was attacked,
25 everybody assumed it had been the Serbs who had actually attacked us for
1 some reason, and that was going to be the report that was being sent back
2 to our capitals, but I was quite adamant and trying to stop this because I
3 didn't believe it was true. And as it happened it wasn't the Serbs; it
4 was the KLA. It's very difficult to get the right interpretation straight
6 Q. Well, my question for you is aimed at the inter-workings of the
7 KVM hierarchy. Do you recall that there was a sharp division between the
8 hierarchy such that in this instance that I've referenced General DZ had
9 to take a poll or vote amongst the top members and the majority rather
10 than everybody agreed to send a report along and then that report was
12 A. Well, I don't remember this particular incident, but I can tell
13 you that --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: That's a good enough answer. The question has
15 already been answered.
16 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
17 Q. Now, if we can look at -- well, first of all, am I correct that
18 the KVM mission had a department for analytical assessments that
19 essentially was the intelligence arm of that organisation?
20 A. Yes, I've already mentioned, it was called the fusion centre.
21 Q. Okay. Now, do you recall the fusion centre reaching a conclusion
22 or finding that the KLA was expected to fabricate incidents and even carry
23 out killings of Albanian civilians in order to ascribe the deeds to the
24 MUP and the Yugoslav army?
25 A. I think we examined all sorts of possibilities. This could have
1 been quite easily discussed.
2 Q. Okay.
3 MR. IVETIC: If we can have Exhibit 6D109 on the screen. The
4 English version for the witness and for the Court, I believe, would
6 Q. Now, this is a document that we've received --
7 MR. IVETIC: And for the Court's information, this is a draft
8 translation from the OTP. So this document at this point in time is being
9 tendered pursuant to identification, and we'll need to get an official
10 translation, I think, before it's accepted fully as an exhibit.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you not happy with the OTP translation?
12 MR. IVETIC: I am happy with it, but I don't know what the Court's
13 standing order or rule on that would be, if --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, unless Mr. Hannis objects to this being
15 accepted as a translation, it seems appropriate to me to accept it.
16 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
17 MR. HANNIS: I have no objection at this time, Your Honour.
18 MR. IVETIC: Okay. Thank you.
19 Q. Now, sir, this is the minutes on which a meeting between
20 Mr. Nikolaev of the KVM mission and the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign
21 Affairs dated January 12, 1999. Now, if we look at item number 3 here
22 it -- first of all, do you recall Mr. Nikolaev and what his position
23 within the KVM was?
24 A. I think he was a reconstruction man.
25 Q. Okay. Now, we see here that in item 3 the minutes detail
1 Mr. Nikolaev giving a briefing of the assessment conducted by the
2 department for analytical assessments on the KLA?
3 MR. IVETIC: And I think the part that we want is actually on the
4 next page, the top thereof.
5 Q. Where the minutes, at least, describe Mr. Nikolaev as talking --
6 MR. IVETIC: We can scroll down a little bit more. A little bit
7 more. There -- right there.
8 Q. The second bullet point from the bottom where it says: "The KLA
9 is expected to fabricate incidents, and even carry out killings of
10 Albanians in order to ascribe the deeds to MUP and Yugoslav army
12 Does that refresh your recollection as to whether in fact this
13 particular conclusion or finding was in fact one reached by the KVM
14 department for analytical analysis, the fusion centre?
15 A. Certainly we discussed these, every single possibility and this
16 certainly was a possibility that they might participate in. And if you're
17 trying to look for discrepancies between the opinions of the higher
18 echelons of the KVM, I think it is rather good that it was open to debate,
19 that not everyone sang from the same hymn sheet, that, you know, we would
20 look at it, discuss it, take a vote on it, if necessary, and move forward.
21 Q. Were you a part of the vote undertaken among the deputies of the
22 KVM mission?
23 A. No.
24 Q. So your position was not that high up on the hierarchy, the
25 overall hierarchy?
1 A. No. I've said this before.
2 Q. Okay. Now, we have already looked at one fusion report -- one
3 fusion centre report. My colleague, Mr. Ackerman, that's Exhibit 4D34.
4 I'd like to return to it for just a moment to highlight some points that
5 were not discussed. I believe this is a multi-page document. We'll start
6 at the first page.
7 Sir, were you one of the individuals within the KVM hierarchy who
8 was privy to such restricted information as the KVM fusion working papers?
9 A. I was.
10 Q. Okay. So you would be familiar with this type of document. Now,
11 looking at --
12 A. I did not read all of them.
13 Q. I wouldn't expect that you would remember all of them if you had
14 read them all after this period of time.
15 But looking at this first page of this fusion working paper, first
16 of all, the summary at the beginning, which is a little bit blurry on the
17 screen, but it talks about Djeneral Jankovic, and in summary it talks
18 about 100 KLA that crossed over from Macedonia to the Djeneral Jankovic
19 area that joined with the local militia and then encouraged the locals to
20 leave and how this event had been misreported as a Serb massacre.
21 Now, does this -- do you recall this event, first of all?
22 A. I do.
23 Q. And do you recall any other events wherein KLA activities, i.e.,
24 forcing people to leave, were -- or attempted to be utilised by the KLA to
25 try to pin the blame upon the Serb forces, either the MUP or the VJ?
1 A. Not off the top of my head, no, but I'm sure you'll remind me in
2 due course.
3 Q. All right. Now, if we look at -- well, pages 4 and 5 of this
4 report we don't, I don't think, need to go to them, talk about the KVM
5 assessment that the ethnic Albanians will continue to work on
6 international sympathy for their cause, and therefore KVM staff are being
7 warned to expect movements of large amounts of people at the orders of the
8 KLA for maximum media exposure of displacement.
9 Do you recall receiving such instructions or warnings from KVM or
10 were you involved in perhaps giving such warnings to the KVM officials in
11 the field?
12 A. No, because as I said, my major function was to liaise with the
13 Serbian authorities and to facilitate our people in the field to be able
14 to visit and go around the field. I was not dealing with the KLA. And we
15 did this specifically so that I wasn't then accused of passing information
16 between the two or even endangering myself by knowing something that the
17 other side might want to find out from me.
18 Q. Okay.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, this document does not deal in fact in
20 the areas you've been exploring. Now, we've had this witness for some
21 considerable time. A very wide range of issues have been explored. Is
22 there anything of direct relevance to your case that you now have to deal
24 MR. IVETIC: Yes, there is, Your Honour. I've got several areas
25 that I'm trying to hit because of course this witness has been used to
1 introduce a large number of these KVM documents and in fact was initially
2 proposed as a three-hour Rule 92 ter witness and so I do have areas and
3 I'm trying to go through them as fast as I can with --
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, at the moment, as I say, we're not dealing
5 with fact. What is the next subject you have to deal with?
6 MR. IVETIC: The next subject I have to deal with is with respect
7 to the reports of two other KVM individuals who operated with the Serbian
8 MUP, who were police verifiers, one was, and the other was a KLA verifier
9 who have accounts of things that I would like to ask this witness.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: And do these challenge what this witness has said?
11 MR. IVETIC: I don't know. I'm going to find out whether they
12 challenge what he said --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: You must know whether they challenge what he has
14 said so far.
15 MR. IVETIC: He has not, I believe, testified to -- they do
16 contradict what he has said in his statement, yes, as far as the actions
17 of the MUP and the access to --
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's the sort of thing I would expect you
19 to be concentrating on in view of the time.
20 MR. IVETIC: All right. Well, I can -- as I said, that was my
21 next area. I can move along to it.
22 Q. Now, Colonel, we earlier talked about deferring to persons with
23 more mission-specific training and who were in the field. I would like to
24 ask you about two individuals who were in the KVM. First of all, are you
25 familiar with Captain Roland Keith, a 32-year veteran of the Canadian
1 Armed Forces and a police verifier with the KVM?
2 A. Yes, the name rings a bell.
3 Q. Okay. And how about Christopher John Clark, a 16-year veteran of
4 the British Army, seconded to the KVM in October of 1998 and one of the
5 operations officers responsible for management and coordination of field
7 A. I know him very well.
8 Q. Now, before we go on to these two individuals and what they had to
9 say about their experience in the KVM, are you familiar with the fact that
10 in addition to holding most of the villages surrounding the town of
11 Glogovac, the KLA had a command headquarters in the village called
12 Gornje Obrinje?
13 A. I don't know where they had their headquarters because I -- after
14 my first few weeks I decided I would not go to any of their headquarters
15 in case I accidentally mentioned some of my meetings with my Serbian
17 MR. IVETIC: All right. Well, we'd like to then have
18 Exhibit 6D106 up on the screen, and I'll try and short circuit the
19 questioning on this by directing you to page 7 of the document. This is
20 the OTP witness statement of Christopher John Clark, one of the KVM
21 verifiers, who was with the -- who was observing the KLA. And at this
22 page, sir, he indicates that if the KVM wanted to speak with the General
23 Staff of the KLA, they went to Gornje Obrinje, because that's where they
24 could find them. You have nothing to contradict Mr. Clark and would in
25 fact defer to him as being someone who was with the KLA as you were not.
1 Is that --
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Don't answer that question.
3 Mr. Ivetic, this is not a challenge to this witness's evidence.
4 It's something about which he has said clearly he has no knowledge. Now
5 I'm expecting you at this stage in this cross-examination to be dealing
6 with matters which are directly challenging the witness and necessary for
7 your case, because this can all be presented in the Defence case.
8 MR. IVETIC: All right, Your Honour.
9 Q. Now, is it your testimony that the Serbian MUP observation points
10 and check-points that were established were not operated in such a way to
11 be the normal functioning of the police, that there was some kind of
12 ulterior or negative operation of these deployments?
13 A. Most of the MUP in Kosovo operated, as I said, not in the police
14 fashion but in the military fashion, and that was the major difference.
15 It was a function that I certainly wasn't so conscious of in any countries
16 that I worked in, and it wasn't the sort of duties that the police in most
17 countries that I know of operate in.
18 Q. Now, are -- is it your testimony that there were -- that there was
19 any abuse at any check-points -- at all the check-points that were
20 operated by the Serbian MUP?
21 A. I'm sure that there were instances of abuse of personnel, locals,
22 making it difficult for our own patrols to operate as well.
23 Q. You don't have any first-hand knowledge of any such allegations,
24 do you?
25 A. Reports were being made every single day. I was reading. There
1 were just so many that I -- it's not something that I carry around in my
3 Q. All right. Well, if Captain Roland, on the one hand, at
4 page 33460 of his testimony in the Milosevic case, lines 1 through 12,
5 said that he personally observed a number of these operations in progress
6 and that it was his observation that there was not any abuse or physical
7 harm to any inhabitants conducting lawful business who transited these
8 Serbian police check-points, you would have to defer to him and the other
9 individuals on the ground, would you not?
10 A. I suppose the actual killer phrase there is "lawful business." I
11 mean, who defined what lawful business was?
12 Q. Well, I take it that the KVM verifiers on the ground would have to
13 define what they were seeing based upon their experience and knowledge.
14 Isn't that correct?
15 A. And I'm sure that they did this and this is Captain Roland's
16 interpretation. It's one person.
17 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to your testimony that in fact there
18 were -- there was a denial of access and problems with obtaining
19 cooperation from the Serbian MUP, again the testimony of Roland Keith
20 states at page 33465, lines 15 through 20 of the Milosevic case, that in
21 his area of responsibility he regularly dealt with the Serbian police
22 stations in Kosovo Polje and Obilic, for instance, and was received
23 hospitably and professionally by the Serbian police, and at all times they
24 cooperated with all his requests and he was not obstructed in any way from
25 carrying out any of his duties or responsibilities by them.
1 Now, did you in fact receive reports from this individual and
2 others in the course of your deployment with KVM to show that, in fact,
3 the Serbian police stations were cooperating with the KVM observers?
4 A. Well, from my own experience, I sort of would go along with that
5 completely. I didn't say we had problems with police stations; I said we
6 had problems with deployed units.
7 Q. Okay. Now, is it correct that during the time-period from October
8 through February of 1999, when there was this tension and this campaign of
9 terrorism, that in fact the KVM reporters on the ground reported back up
10 the chain to you and to the other parts of the KVM hierarchy that while
11 the -- while the Serbs were generally adhering to the cease-fire and other
12 agreements, the KLA was not and was in fact being quite provocative?
13 A. Yes, I would -- in general I would say that, yes.
14 Q. Do you specifically recall a meeting on the 5th of January -- on
15 the 5th of March, 1999, with a Lieutenant-Colonel Adamovic of the MUP,
16 wherein you expressly said that same point to Mr. Adamovic? And that the
17 international community was losing patience with the KLA, whereas the
18 police were showing restraint?
19 A. Well, I just answered that.
20 Q. Okay. All right. Now, throughout his testimony, which is, I
21 believe, Exhibit 6D113, Captain Roland of the KVM commented on the regular
22 and altogether normal police duties being performed by the Serbian MUP,
23 for instance, transcript page 33490 of the Milosevic proceedings. Now,
24 you have testified in the Milosevic case that the MUP was not carrying out
25 ordinary policing duties and were not out in the streets preventing crime
1 and traffic, et cetera.
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I have a foundation objection about
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Hannis.
5 MR. HANNIS: We don't know where Captain Roland was, what part of
6 Kosovo he was in, where he was working, how many events he saw, and
7 without that information I don't think it's an appropriate way to
8 cross-examine this witness.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well -- yeah.
10 Mr. Ivetic, it doesn't seem to me proper cross-examination at all.
11 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, I'm trying to short circuit this
12 because of the shortness of time.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: You're just using up time unnecessarily. It's not
14 making any real progress at all on this. You can call Roland Keith in
15 your own case and make all these points.
16 MR. IVETIC: We intend to.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, please do. But let's move on to something
18 that this witness can speak directly about and with authority.
19 MR. IVETIC: All right.
20 Q. Now, let's turn to the appearance and armament of the MUP that you
21 saw in Kosovo. Now, from your testimony and in your statement, it would
22 seem that you are surprised by the fact that the police were utilising
23 long-barrelled rifles. Is that correct? That they were armed with
24 long-barrelled weapons, in addition to short-barrelled side-arms?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. I suppose your training for the KVM mission did not include the
2 historical fact that since World War II, not only the Serbian police but
3 in fact the police of all the republics covering the territories of the
4 former Yugoslavia were armed with long-barrelled weapons and not just
5 side-arms, including assault rifles, and this extended even to traffic
6 policemen? Am I correct that you did not have this covered in your
8 A. I have also worked in eastern Europe, and I worked in Berlin in
9 the 1980s, and East Berlin, where I was very aware of how these things
10 were done. And normally -- only very abnormally would the police openly
11 go around with long-barrelled weapons.
12 Q. Did your previous experience include the former Yugoslavia, which
13 is what I was limiting my question to?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Okay. Now, on the topic of the appearance of police you state in
16 your statement that unit affiliation would be difficult at times because
17 the insignia would be removed. Now, despite this assertion you could
18 always plainly identify a police officer or a police member, I should say
19 rather than officer, so there's no confusion, policemen, because of the
20 presence of the remaining markings on the uniform or the webbing of the
21 uniform. Isn't that correct?
22 A. Yes. I know what the VJ army wore and how they looked, and these
23 people were not VJ army. So if you're saying they were not policemen,
24 then what were they?
25 Q. No, what I'm saying is with respect to policemen, sir, would you
1 agree with me that if you were close enough to discern that a uniform is
2 camouflaged, either camouflage green or blue. At that point in time you
3 can easily discern whether someone is police or not due to the visible
4 police emblems, insignia, and markings on the uniform, the vest, or
5 webbing as it's called. Isn't that correct?
6 A. If you could get close enough, possibly, if they had the insignia
7 on. They didn't always have it on.
8 Q. Isn't it a fact that the webbing always had the insignia on?
9 A. No.
10 Q. I'm being told to slow down.
11 A. I do read Cyrillic, and even if it wasn't Cyrillic, then I would
12 recognise it.
13 Q. That was my point, that it's on the uniform, the Cyrillic
15 A. If it was there, then I would recognise it.
16 Q. Okay. Now, from what I recall of your previous testimony you
17 confirmed that the Serbian police did not have their own tanks but did
18 have blue armoured personnel carriers. Am I correct that there were
19 occasions known of to you where the KVM personnel wherein the KLA captured
20 MUP vehicles and then used them in their combat operations?
21 A. It happened very infrequently. I think there was an occasion
22 where there was a captured MUP vehicle and it was used by the KLA.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: The transcript has wrongly attributed the capturing
24 to the MUP. I think the question was where the KLA captured the MUP
25 vehicles and used them in operations.
1 MR. IVETIC: That is correct. Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. And do you recall in the incident that you are talking about
3 whether in fact the captured MUP vehicle was then utilised by the KLA in
4 combat activities?
5 A. I believe it was, yes.
6 Q. Okay. Then I don't think we need to go to 6D106, which talks
7 about that at page 12.
8 Now, based upon your knowledge and experience from the KVM and the
9 reports that were sent to the KVM, even though you were not with -- you
10 were not charged with observing the KLA, did you have knowledge of the
11 fact that the KLA had an internal security force specifically responsible
12 for conducting acts of retribution against the local Albanian and Serbian
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Don't answer that again.
15 Mr. Ivetic, please concentrate on matters that you know this
16 witness will be able to deal with. You have not got complete freedom so
17 far as time is concerned, and I don't think you're exercising your use of
18 time responsibly at the moment.
19 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, the Prosecution has introduced
20 thousands of pages of exhibits with this witness that I'm sure are -- he
21 has just as little or maybe just as much knowledge as he does of my
22 questions that I'm asking him.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, I wasn't aware that they had introduced
24 thousands of pages of exhibits. And if that is the case, then I will
25 change my approach to this. Thousands of pages?
1 MR. IVETIC: I don't know the exact number but it's a significant
2 amount of pages with respect to --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Thousands of pages, Mr. Ivetic?
4 MR. IVETIC: I don't know the exact number, Your Honour. I may
5 have misspoken about the exact number.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: I think you may be well out of order in that
8 Now let's be realistic about this, otherwise we're going to have
9 to have a Status Conference soon and look at the whole issue of the use of
10 time. As counsel, your team has been the one who -- which has made far
11 more use of time than anyone else so far. That's going to have to be
13 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, the witnesses have also spoken
14 quite -- in detail about the activities of the Serbian police, and as the
15 only defendants who have --
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, indeed that's the case, but there are
17 occasions when you have to exercise restraint. You've to look at
18 everybody's interests. You've been given a very free hand up until now.
19 But at the moment you're not demonstrating a responsible approach to this
20 and you will have to change that quickly, otherwise I'll bring your
21 cross-examination to an end.
22 MR. IVETIC: All right. I will move on then specifically to
23 questions relating to the MUP staff.
24 Q. Now, sir, you stated, I believe, that you visited Colonel
25 Mijatovic of the MUP on at least ten or more than ten occasions. Isn't it
1 correct that despite your claim that Mijatovic rarely came to the meetings
2 with you and with Loncar that in fact Colonel Mijatovic met every single
3 day with the KVM personnel specifically assigned as liaisons for the MUP,
4 the staff of Mr. Guy Sans and the other KVM persons charged with MUP
6 A. It is possible that these meetings took place. As I understand,
7 they did.
8 Q. Okay. Now, you talk of the MUP building where Mr. Lukic and
9 Mr. Mijatovic were based as being a command structure with a huge antenna.
10 Now, am I correct that when you returned to Pristina after KFOR moved in,
11 this building had been -- had been bombed by NATO?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you know that in fact the building had been evacuated prior to
14 the bombing and that in fact it was bombed on the 24th of March and was
15 unused and empty from the 24th of March onwards?
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Let me ask you, do you have a basis of -- do you
17 solid information about this?
18 THE WITNESS: About what, sir?
19 JUDGE BONOMY: About this question you've just been asked, about
20 the circumstances in which that building came to be bombed and who was in
21 it at the time.
22 THE WITNESS: I knew who was in it -- during my time in Kosovo,
23 that's where I would have meetings with Mijatovic --
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed. But you're being asked about when you
25 returned to Pristina and you learned that it had been bombed, and you're
1 now being asked if you knew it had been evacuated prior to the bombing and
2 the date of the bombing?
3 THE WITNESS: No.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: I mean, Mr. Ivetic, this is most unreasonable, and
5 I want now a list of the subjects that you're about to cross-examine on
6 before I make a final decision on bringing this to an end.
7 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: These are quite unnecessary questions to pose to
9 this witness and a complete waste of time.
10 MR. IVETIC: I respectfully disagree, Your Honour. I am talking
11 about -- first of all, I have the topic of the burning documents that he
12 testified to when he returned to Pristina, which is the area -- one of the
13 areas I'm going into now, and then his specific testimony relative to
14 interactions with Mr. Lukic and the structure of the MUP staff. And those
15 are the areas that I have to complete.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, there are plainly very important
18 matters yet to be covered, and hopefully briefly, but you have run the
19 risk, a serious risk, of prejudicing your own client's interests by the
20 way in which you've conducted this cross-examination, by not prioritising
21 your cross-examination at all. Tell me why you needed to ask that
22 question of this witness about the bombing of the building in Pristina.
23 MR. IVETIC: It's very important --
24 JUDGE BONOMY: The bombing may be important. But why did you have
25 to ask this witness about it?
1 MR. IVETIC: It's important to set the ground work for his
2 observations of documents being removed from that building and being
3 burned and when those documents would have been the building in the first
4 place and if they --
5 JUDGE BONOMY: If it was that building.
6 MR. IVETIC: If it was that building, correct.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: And that's your position that it is that building,
8 is it?
9 MR. IVETIC: Well, I was going to ask him because it's my
10 understanding that there is a three-building compound that was occupied by
11 the MUP -- the SUP of Pristina, the MUP staff, and this would be the
12 building that was being vacated pursuant to the Kumanovo agreements for
13 the KVM to take over, and as part of the Kumanovo agreements all the
14 documents and the archives in that building were to be removed and to be
15 disposed of.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, what was the relevance to these issues of when
17 the bombing took place and whether there were personnel in the building at
18 the time?
19 MR. IVETIC: The fact that it is trying -- the Prosecution is
20 trying to assert that these burning documents are in fact identity
21 documents being destroyed of persons that are relevant to the indictment,
22 when in fact these documents would have been in the building prior to any
23 of the events in the indictment.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that. But answer me the question I've
25 just asked you, which is: What is the relevance of the date of the
1 bombing and whether there were personnel in the building when the bombing
2 took place, bearing in mind that it's three months before the witness's
3 return to see this event.
4 MR. IVETIC: It would set the time-period for when the building
5 was vacated. The building was vacated prior to -- the building was
6 vacated while the OSCE was removing itself from Kosovo, and now the
7 witness testified previously that he left on March the 24th. I think now
8 he's changed that testimony to being sometime prior to March the 24th, but
9 I really don't know when he left. There were OSCE verifiers that did
10 leave after --
11 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated].
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: You're now trying to confuse the issue because
14 plainly the events that you're about to raise occurred long after the 24th
15 of March.
16 Anyway, that's -- concludes our proceedings now for today, but we
17 are now faced with a difficulty in programming evidence, and that
18 difficulty we are going to have to address. But that's something we have
19 to reflect upon.
20 Mr. Hannis.
21 MR. HANNIS: I have a scheduling difficulty I have to bring to the
22 attention of the Court and Defence counsel. Mr. Brunborg, our
23 demographics expert, is -- was scheduled to testify Wednesday. We have
24 two additional witnesses between this witness and him. But I would
25 propose to do what we've done in past weeks and take a break from wherever
1 we are, put Mr. Brunborg on Wednesday and complete him and then resume.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, thank you, Mr. Hannis, for alerting us to
4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters would like to note that we've
5 been having enormous difficulties today with the speed of the proceedings.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Ciaglinski, we have to break there for
8 the evening. We will see you again tomorrow afternoon. Meanwhile, please
9 no discussion with anyone at all about any aspect of your evidence at all,
10 and return to resume at 2.15 tomorrow afternoon.
11 Can you now leave the courtroom with the usher, please.
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 [The witness stands down]
14 JUDGE BONOMY: And we will resume at 2.15 tomorrow.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.05 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 21st day of
17 November, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.