1 Monday, 3 November 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good afternoon to everybody in and around the
7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
9 number IT-04-81-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
11 Could we have appearances for today, starting with the
13 MR. HARMON: Good afternoon, Your Honours. My name is
14 Mark Harmon, and Carmela Javier also appears with me today. Thank you.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: And for the Defence.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Good afternoon. For the Defence, Novak Lukic,
17 Danijela Tasic, Chad
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Harmon, I just asked that the witness -- I
19 asked the witness be kept out just for me to raise a witness with you.
20 Just so I understand where we're going with this witness, what is he
21 coming to demonstrate?
22 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, he is coming to confirming his previous
23 testimony in particular parts. He will be called to testify about --
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: I've read through all that.
25 MR. HARMON: Okay. He will be --
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: But what message are we supposed to get from all
2 that testimony?
3 MR. HARMON: Well, he is going to be a witness who was present in
5 by virtue of his being the Chief of the UNMOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina
6 He subsequently went to Belgrade
7 of the UNMOs for a considerable period of time. He received reports
8 about the events in Bosnia
9 by his organisation, the United Nations, UNPROFOR, and the UNMOs. It was
10 disseminated to him. It consisted of information that was from various
11 parts of the former Yugoslavia
14 General Wilson, in Belgrade
15 those reports were from the Belgrade
16 in Belgrade
18 complaints were made to them specifically about Sarajevo and the events
19 in Bosnia
20 That's what he will be testifying about, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: I understand all that. As I said, I've read that.
22 MR. HARMON: Okay.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: The thing is, all his testimony, for starters, is
24 pre the indictment period. I want to know how it relates to the accused.
25 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour. It relates this way. I made this
1 remark in my opening statement. The events that occurred when General
2 Perisic became Chief of the General Staff in August of 1993, particularly
3 in respect of events in Sarajevo
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. He's coming to explain --
5 MR. HARMON: He will be testifying about notice --
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. That's all I wanted to know.
7 MR. HARMON: Thank you.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
9 May we call the witness in, please.
10 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, he will also be testifying generally
11 about the events in Sarajevo
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, about which notice is supposed to have been
13 received according to the Prosecution.
14 MR. HARMON: That's correct.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: I understand.
16 Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Just so I'm clear about what Mr. Harmon just said
18 with regard to who's going to be testifying generally to the events in
20 he's going to be testifying about and the issue of notice, because if
21 there is not, then it raises another -- it raises another difficulty.
22 MR. HARMON: Of course there is a nexus, Your Honour. That's why
23 we're calling General Wilson.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, one can never assume too much.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.
2 [The witness entered court]
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good afternoon, sir.
4 May the witness please make the declaration.
5 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
6 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. You may be seated.
8 Yes, Mr. Harmon.
9 WITNESS: JOHN WILSON
10 Examination by Mr. Harmon:
11 Q. General Wilson, could you state your name and spell your last
12 name for the record.
13 A. My name is John Brian Wilson, W-i-l-s-o-n.
14 Q. General Wilson, I will not ask you about your qualifications.
15 They are contained in your previous written evidence, and I will be
16 summarising those at the end of certain portions of this examination.
17 Prior to coming into court today, did you have an opportunity to
18 review a statement that you provided to the Office of the Prosecutor on
19 the 5th of June and the 19th and 20th -- of 1995, I'm sorry, and the 19th
20 and 20th of December, 2002?
21 A. Yes, I did.
22 Q. And did you have an opportunity to review as well the four
23 associated exhibits that were part of that statement, those being
24 intercepted communications, one from the 28th of May 1992, one from the
25 20th of May, 1992, one from the 21st of May, 1992, and an undated
2 A. Yes, I did.
3 MR. HARMON: Could we call up the statement of General Wilson.
4 It bears 65 ter number 09307, and I'd like to turn to page 2 of the
5 e-mail -- of the e-court document. That's, I think, page 1 of the -- I'd
6 like the next page, if I could.
7 Q. Now, is this, General Wilson, the cover sheet of the statement
8 that you reviewed?
9 A. Yes, it is.
10 Q. All right. Now, you indicated to me that you wished to make a
11 correction on one page of that statement.
12 MR. HARMON: So if the usher could please turn to page 13 of the
13 e-court document, I'll quickly go through these corrections.
14 Q. This relates to paragraph 58 of the statement, General Wilson.
15 It is the fifth line of the statement, and the line starts with the word
16 "Departed in December 1992 ..." You wish to strike the words "in
17 December 1992" and correct that with the words "on 15 November 1992." Is
18 that correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Okay. Now, General Wilson, with that correction having been
21 made, are the contents of your statement true and accurate, to your
22 knowledge and belief?
23 A. Yes, they are.
24 Q. And if you were asked to speak of the same events, would you
25 confirm your statement today?
1 A. I would.
2 MR. HARMON: Then, Your Honour, I would ask that General Wilson's
3 statement and the four associated exhibits be introduced into evidence,
4 and I can give the usher the 65 ter numbers. The statement itself bears
5 65 ter number 09307; the --
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: That statement, then, will be admitted into
7 evidence. May it please be given an exhibit number.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be Exhibit P137.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
10 MR. HARMON: I will now read the exhibit -- the four associated
11 exhibits with the statement; 65 ter exhibit 09308, the intercept from 28
12 May, 1992; the second exhibit is 65 ter number 09309, an intercept of the
13 20th of May, 1992; the third associated exhibit bears 65 ter number
14 09310, an intercept of 21 May 1992
15 bears 65 ter number 09311, an undated intercept.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, if I might. With regard to paragraph, I
18 believe it is, 96 of the statement itself, to the extent there is
19 language in that paragraph that is speculative in nature and is also
20 calling for an opinion which is not necessarily within the purview of
21 this particular witness, I would object. Other than that, I have no
22 objections to the information as contained in paragraph 96 and the
23 associated exhibits, and specifically I'm referring to the language of "I
24 think this transcript," "I think this intercept," and "I do not know."
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Harmon.
1 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, the witness gave his best opinion in
2 respect of what those intercepts related to. If the Court wishes to
3 strike those intercepts, I have no particular objection. I think that --
4 I leave it to the Court's discretion. I introduced these four exhibits,
5 Your Honour, for purposes of completeness of the record. That's my
6 purpose of introducing these exhibits.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I might make a suggestion, Your Honour. Then
8 why don't we defer -- defer a ruling, if that's not too hasty a measure,
9 and see how the testimony progresses.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let's do it that way.
11 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I intend to ask no questions about any
12 of these exhibits. They are just included and incorporated into the
13 record for purposes of completeness.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon. We'll defer a
15 decision on the matter.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Then I have one other brief comment or remark so
17 I have an understanding.
18 With regard to the statement that is being introduced by the
19 Prosecution, I note that a number of paragraphs have been redacted.
20 Since Mr. Harmon has indicated that he is introducing the exhibits for
21 the purpose of completeness, my question becomes: Do those particular
22 paragraphs that he has redacted, in his opinion, fall outside of or are
23 not caught by that particular doctrine, that being the doctrine
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Not caught by that particular ...
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Doctrine, that being the doctrine of
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm going through my copy, and I don't see
4 anything redacted. I'm not sure whether we have the same thing -- the
5 same document. Well, I see on the -- the one on the screen is still
6 redacted. That's paragraph 62.
7 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I --
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you have anything to say, Mr. Harmon?
9 MR. HARMON: I do, Your Honour.
10 We selected certain portions of the statement because we deemed
11 them to be relevant. Subsequently, after the Court made a decision on
12 unscheduled incidents, particularly events relating to a particular time
13 period, there were subsequent redactions that were made in this statement
14 and they are in this statement because of the -- because of the previous
15 order of the Court.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe I -- I believe I understand what
17 Mr. Harmon has said. I don't necessarily agree with the position he's
18 taken, but I think, once again, the fullness of time will reveal my
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
21 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, if what counsel is suggesting is that
22 the whole statement go in unredacted, if I understand that to be his
23 position, I'm certainly in a position to entertain that and would
24 consider that as well.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: I didn't understand him to say that. I understood
1 him to be asking whether the paragraphs that are redacted are not caught
2 by the fullness, completeness of statement, and I guess until and unless
3 he asks for them, you are the dominus litus.
4 MR. HARMON: Okay.
5 Q. General Wilson, let me turn now to your previous testimony. You
6 have testified previously in the case of the Prosecutor versus
7 Momcilo Krajisnik. You testified on the 17th and 18th of May, 2005.
8 Have you had an opportunity to review both of your transcripts, the
9 transcripts from the 17th of May, 2005, and the transcript from the 18th
10 of May, 2005, in the Krajisnik case?
11 A. Yes, I have, counsel.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: You referred to a number of exhibits, Mr. Harmon.
13 Are you still going to come back to that?
14 MR. HARMON: You mean the four exhibits that were --
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's right. We've assigned an exhibit number to
16 one only.
17 MR. HARMON: Okay. Well, I understood we were going to defer
18 consideration, but if the Court -- if we're going to assign additional
19 numbers to them now, I'm happy to do that.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, my understanding seems to be that, in fact,
21 the document which has been assigned an exhibit number is the statement
23 MR. HARMON: That's correct.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Two paragraphs of which have been redacted, and
25 then the others were the exhibits to the statement, and I didn't hear any
1 objection against those exhibits, the exhibits themselves, not the end
2 part of Mr. Wilson's statement where he thinks -- or what does he say?
3 "I think this," "I don't know."
4 MR. HARMON: So we have admitted -- so there's no objection, I
5 take it, to Exhibit P137, which is General Wilson's statement?
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: At this stage, no.
7 MR. HARMON: And that's where we remain at this point, and if I
8 may, Your Honour, and if the Court, please, may I then turn to his
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Please do.
11 MR. HARMON: All right.
12 Q. General Wilson, you've just confirmed that you have reviewed the
13 transcripts of your previous sworn testimony from the 17th of May, 2005,
14 and the 18th of May, 2005. Did you also have an opportunity to examine
15 six associated documents with that testimony? And let me just describe
16 what they were. One is a map of the deployment of UNPROFOR forces in
18 municipalities. One was a final report prepared by you about your tour
19 with UNPROFOR. One was a record of discussions with Mrs. Plavsic and
20 General Mladic on the 25th of May, 1992. One was a record of a meeting
21 between yourself and General Mladic dated the 30th of May, 1992. And one
22 was an excerpt, or excerpts, from a document entitled "Analysis of Combat
23 Readiness and Activities of the Army of Republika Srpska," a document
24 which was dated the 5th of April 1993.
25 A. Yes, I did review those documents.
1 Q. Now, you indicated to me that you wanted to make five corrections
2 to the transcript of the 17th of May, 2005.
3 MR. HARMON: So if we could call up, please, 65 ter number 09312,
4 which is the transcript of your evidence on the 17th of May, 2005. And
5 if we could turn first to page 3 of the e-court document.
6 Q. And the first correction is on line 7 of this document.
7 You indicated that in line 7 the number -- the word "six" is
8 incorrect, and the word "four" should be put in its place. Is that
10 A. That's right.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: I apologise, Mr. Harmon, but my eyes seem to be
12 failing me. Could you give me the page number, if you don't mind.
13 MR. HARMON: 13030.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you so much.
15 MR. HARMON:
16 Q. If we could turn to the second correction which is page 5 of the
17 e-court document. The transcript page number is 13032. And the change
18 is found on line 13.
19 The words at the end of that sentence "in December of 1992"
20 should be stricken, and in its place the words "on 15 November 1992"
21 should be substituted in its place. Is that correct, General Wilson
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. If we could next turn to page 6 of the e-court document, page
24 13033, and focus on lines 10 to 13. At the end of line 10 and the
25 beginning of line 13, you indicated that the words "a brigade comprised
1 of approximately 5.000 men" should be stricken, and at the end of that
2 particular sentence, a new sentence should be added: "The area of Sydney
3 comprised 5.000 men." So the correction is that a brigade did not
4 consist of 5.000 men, but you were the area commander of Sydney and that
5 area consisted of a command of over 5.000 men; is that correct?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. If we could turn to the next document, which is page 15 of the
8 e-court document, referring to page 13042, line 6. On that page, the
9 word in the middle of the line "commands" is incorrect. It should be
10 "commanders." Is that correct, General Wilson?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. And the last correction. If we could turn to page 32 of the
13 e-court document, which is page 13060, line 25, the correction should be
14 that the words "the 2nd," which appear toward the end of line 25, should
15 be stricken, and in its place the words "late May" should be substituted.
16 Is that correct, General Wilson?
17 A. That's also correct.
18 Q. Now, with those corrections having been made, General Wilson, are
19 the answers to the questions that were put to you in your previous
20 examination accurate?
21 A. They are.
22 Q. And if you were to be asked the same questions today, would your
23 answers be the same?
24 A. They would.
25 MR. HARMON: Then, Your Honour, I would ask that both transcripts
1 and the associated exhibits with General Wilson's previous testimony be
2 admitted into evidence. The transcript of the 17th of May, 2005, in the
3 Krajisnik case bears 65 ter exhibit number 09312. I don't know how the
4 registrar wishes me to proceed. I can read all of these, the transcripts
5 and the exhibits, at once and be given numbers, or I can wait until an
6 exhibit number is given after each one. Whatever is most convenient.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: It would have been perhaps convenient to read them
8 in chronological order.
9 MR. HARMON: Okay, I will --
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: If you can do that.
11 MR. HARMON: I would be glad do that.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
13 MR. HARMON: Okay. The transcript of the 17th of May, 2005, is
14 65 ter exhibit 09312. The transcript for the 18th of May, 2005, is 65
15 ter exhibit 09312.01. In chronological order, the exhibits that were
16 associated with the transcript are 65 ter exhibit number 09313, a map of
17 deployment of UN forces. The second associated exhibit is 65 ter exhibit
18 09314, which is an Opstina map of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The third
19 exhibit -- when Your Honour is referring to chronological order, Your
20 Honour, does that mean in chronological order of the 65 ter exhibit
21 numbers or in the package that was presented to the Court?
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: I had in mind a chronological order of the 65 ter
24 MR. HARMON: That's fine. I can do that.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which, in fact, would have started -- I'm not
1 quite sure we are on the same page about the fate of 65 ter 09308 and 9,
2 10, and 11. But I see you have -- you've skipped them, but go ahead.
3 MR. HARMON: Okay. 65 ter -- the next exhibit is a report, a
4 final report, by -- in chronological order, Your Honour, 65 ter exhibit
5 09315, which is General Wilson's discussion with Mrs. Plavsic and General
6 Mladic on the 25th of May, 1992. The next exhibit is 65 ter exhibit
7 09316, which is a record of a meeting between General Wilson and
8 General Mladic on the 30th of May, 1992. Then there is exhibit -- 65 ter
9 exhibit 06940, a final report prepared by General Wilson about his tour
10 with UNPROFOR and there is a 65 ter exhibit 00379, which is an excerpt of
11 the combat-readiness -- an analysis of the combat-readiness and
12 activities of the Army of the Republika Srpska.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: You ask that numbers be assigned to those?
14 MR. HARMON: Yes, please.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Registrar, starting from 65 ter 091 --
16 09312, could you please assign those documents an exhibit number.
17 THE REGISTRAR:
18 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Harmon, if I may come back to the question of
20 chronological order, what do you understand the fate of 65 ter 09308,
21 09309, 09310, 09311, to be?
22 MR. HARMON: I understand that there is an objection for -- to
23 those exhibits based on the certain wording that General Wilson has
24 contained in paragraph 96 and that we are deferring the admission of
25 those documents until a later time.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: I obviously was not on the same page with counsel.
2 I thought the objection was to the several paragraphs virtually at the
3 end of the statement of Mr. Wilson which refer to, "I think," "I don't
4 know," not necessarily to the actual exhibit itself. Mr. Guy-Smith is
5 rising to his feet. Maybe he is going to clarify what it was he was
6 objecting to.
7 Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe that we were on the same page and that
9 my objection was specifically what the Court has just said.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: So just the wording of those four paragraphs.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Correct.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's what is being objected to.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Not the documents themselves.
15 MR. HARMON: Fine, Your Honour. Then I ask that those documents
16 be admitted as well.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. The last document -- I'm sorry, what's
18 wrong with me today. The last document to be admitted was Exhibit 137.
19 Can you assign a number to 65 ter number 0938 and sequentially up to the
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter 0938 will become Exhibit
22 P139 -- I apologise, P138.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Registrar, assign to them all. 09309?
24 THE REGISTRAR: That will become Exhibit P139.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: 09310?
1 THE REGISTRAR: That would become Exhibit P140.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: 311?
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P141.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: 312?
5 THE REGISTRAR: That would be Exhibit P142.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: 09312.01?
7 THE REGISTRAR: That would be Exhibit P143.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: 09313?
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit Number P144.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: 09314?
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit Number P145.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: 09315?
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P146.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: 09316?
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P147.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: 06940?
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P148.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: And finally, 00379?
19 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit Number P149.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Harmon.
23 MR. HARMON: May I now read a summary, Your Honour, of
24 General Wilson's written evidence?
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may.
1 MR. HARMON: Thank you.
2 The witness, General John Wilson, is a retired career military
3 officer from Australia
4 positions in the Australian army and he participated in United Nations
6 From March 1992 he was Chief of the United Nations Military
7 Observers, a subordinate part of the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia
8 capacity he was involved in various high-level negotiations with
9 political and military representatives of the warring factions, including
10 negotiations to open the airport in Sarajevo, negotiations to evacuate
11 JNA barracks in Sarajevo
13 In December 1992 General Wilson became the military adviser to
14 Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, and later Ambassador Stoltenberg at the
15 international conference for the former Yugoslavia, where he also served
16 as the UNPROFOR liaison officer to the conference.
17 General Wilson's written evidence describes the deployment of
18 United Nations military observers in Bosnia and the work they and he
19 performed, observations relating to shelling and sniping of civilians in
21 about ethnic cleansing in Eastern Bosnia, descriptions of negotiations in
22 which he participated, and interactions he had with representatives of
23 the various the parties engaged in the conflict, including Ratko Mladic,
24 Radovan Karadzic, Biljana Plavsic, Slobodan Milosevic, and Zivota Panic.
25 His written evidence describes complaints by Lord Owen made directly to
1 Bosnian Serb representatives during peace negotiations about --
2 complaints about ethnic cleansing and military operations directed
3 against the civilian population.
4 That concludes my summary, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Harmon. Is that it?
6 MR. HARMON: That's it, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
8 Mr. Guy-Smith.
9 MR. HARMON: I've concluded my summary. Now, if I may proceed
10 with my examination, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry. You may proceed.
12 MR. HARMON:
13 Q. Now, General Wilson, you were Chief of the United Nations
14 Military Observers from March 1992 until December 1992. Could you
15 explain to the Trial Chamber what United Nations Military Observers were
16 and what were their duties and responsibilities? What was the mandate
17 that they had?
18 A. The military observers in UNPROFOR were a group initially of some
19 75 officers drawn from different countries, I think about 20 different
20 countries were represented. They were usually between the rank of
21 captain and lieutenant colonel. Nearly all of them were professional
22 officers, although some reserve officers may also have been represented.
23 Their task was broadly to liaise with the parties in conflict, to
24 participate in negotiations, to assist the parties to achieve agreements
25 or to effect the exchange, perhaps, of prisoners of war or bodies that
1 resulted from conflicts, and they were a source of information for the
2 United Nations to find out what was going on in the area.
3 The specific mandate of the UNPROFOR military observers was under
4 the Vance Plan, was to deploy in areas of growing ethnic tension within
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was namely in the area of Bihac and also in
6 Mostar. They were the only elements of UNPROFOR that had an operational
7 task within Bosnia-Herzegovina when UNPROFOR was established in March
8 1992. The remainder of UNPROFOR's operational focus was in the UNPAs in
10 Q. General Wilson, as part of their duties and responsibilities, did
11 they send daily reports to UNPROFOR headquarters and to you about what
12 was happening in their areas of responsibility?
13 A. They did. They were required to provide reports on two channels;
14 one with the UN forces that they were supporting and one directly to my
15 headquarters. Those reports were summarized and forwarded up the command
16 chain to UNPROFOR headquarters.
17 Q. Now, I would like to direct your attention, General Wilson, to
18 paragraph 73 of your statement.
19 MR. HARMON: That is 65 -- I'm sorry, that would be Exhibit
20 number -- P137, and I would like to turn to page 15 of the e-court
22 Q. Specifically, I'd like to focus your attention about four lines
23 from the bottom of that paragraph. It says, in part, and I'm going to --
24 it says:
25 "On this occasion and later meetings in early June, I observed
1 the relationship between Panic and Mladic, and it was clear that Mladic
2 acted in a subordinate manner towards Panic. Panic actually forced the
3 issue to hand over weapons -- handover of weapons on Mladic despite his
4 strenuous objections."
5 First of all, to be perfectly clear, who was Panic and what
6 position did he hold?
7 A. General Panic, as I understood, was the commander of the JNA.
8 Q. And what was the position of General Mladic?
9 A. General Mladic was, or claimed at the time to be the commander of
10 the VRS.
11 Q. Can you describe to the Trial Chamber the circumstances under
12 which you met General Panic in Sarajevo
13 A. We had been negotiating with the Bosnian Serb leadership and the
14 Presidency to effect the evacuation of the JNA out of three barracks in
16 the largest of the three, was the Marshal Tito barracks, and they were
17 lengthy and complicated negotiations. Essentially what the JNA
18 represented at those negotiations was to effect the evacuation at
19 whatever cost. The Presidency's position was to extract as many
20 concessions as they could from the Serb leadership before the evacuation
21 was allowed. The Bosnian military position or the Bosnian Serb position
22 was that the evacuation should be effected without any concessions being
23 made at all.
24 It became quite clear that the Presidency was not going to assist
25 in the evacuation unless there were significant concessions made; namely,
1 the handover of weapons which they believed belonged to them.
2 General Mladic's position was that he was adamantly against such a
4 General Panic arrived from Belgrade to take part in the
5 negotiations. I transported him from the Lukavica barracks across to the
6 PTT building to participate in those negotiations and later to take him
7 to Marshal Tito barracks so he could brief the commander there on the
8 results of those negotiations. I also transported him back to Lukavica
9 barracks, and on the occasion that I picked him up at Lukavica barracks
10 and also when I delivered him back there, I was able to see the
11 interaction between Generals Panic and Mladic. I was also aware that
12 General Panic had made it clear in the negotiations that the JNA was
13 prepared to hand over weapons to effect the evacuation, despite
14 General Mladic's objections, and it was General Panic's position that
15 prevailed in the end. The weapons were handed over, and General Mladic
16 had to accept that situation.
17 I noted in the interaction between General Mladic and General
18 Panic that there was a clear superior and subordinate interaction between
19 the two, the paying of military compliments. The way that General Mladic
20 addressed General Panic, to me, made it quite clear that General Mladic
21 was subordinate to General Panic.
22 Q. Now, let me turn -- let me turn, then, General Wilson, when you
23 say he was subordinate, your statement says he acted in a subordinate
24 manner towards Panic.
25 A. Yes. Yes, it does. And I'm saying there that it was --
1 collectively his actions, the way they talked, the demeanor of both men,
2 made it clear to me that he was acting in a subordinate manner to a
3 superior officer.
4 Q. All right. Let me turn to a different area and that -- I want to
5 just, first of all, focus on where your headquarters were located,
6 General Wilson. I'll just summarize this. I'd like you just to affirm
7 that this is the case.
8 Initially, you had temporary headquarters in the Holiday Inn in
10 the Holiday Inn to the PTT building in Sarajevo; is that correct?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. And the PTT building is in the urban area of Sarajevo; is that
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. And you remained in -- personally remained in Sarajevo until the
16 24th of June, 1992.
17 A. I did.
18 Q. Okay. You relocated, then, in late July to -- strike that.
19 You remained in day-to-day control of the United Nations Military
20 Observers until the 15th of November, 1992.
21 A. I did.
22 Q. Okay. Now, General Wilson, while you remained in Sarajevo, did
23 you have -- did you personally observe the shelling of the city?
24 A. I did observe the shelling of the city.
25 Q. And how did you have an opportunity to observe that shelling?
1 A. Well, I was able -- initially I was residing in an apartment
2 block in Sarajevo
3 immediate vicinity. It was very heavy and sustained fighting. After I
4 had relocated my accommodation to the PTT building, it was quite possible
5 from the PTT building, which is a glass and aluminum structure and quite
6 a tall building, to be able to observe the vast majority of the area --
7 of the Sarajevo
8 MR. HARMON: Now, if we could turn to P137, if I could turn to
9 page 11 of the e-court document.
10 Q. I want to direct your attention to paragraph 47. I'd like to
11 direct your attention to paragraph 47 of your statement. In paragraph 47
12 of your statement, General Wilson, you say that: "The Presidency troops
13 did not have a great number of heavy weapons." You saw 81 millimetre
14 motors and you describe -- let me ask you this: Can you describe the
15 disparity in terms of the calibre of weapons, heavy weapons, between the
16 Presidency forces and the Bosnian Serb forces?
17 A. Yes. It was thought at the time that -- and I had seen certainly
18 map evidence to support this, that the Presidency -- wrong, that the
19 Serbian military forces around Sarajevo
20 200 artillery and mortar barrels that they could direct at the city. In
21 terms of military power, this is a significant capability. In addition
22 to that, they also had a large number of other weapons, such as
23 anti-aircraft weapons which they were able to use in a ground role, a
24 direct-fire role. Additionally they had armoured forces that could also
25 deploy their main armament to engage targets in the city.
1 The Presidency forces, as indicated in my statement, had a very
2 small number of what I'd describe as heavy weapons. That's mortars or
3 artillery pieces. I only saw two or three tanks that were in their
4 possession. There was a significant disparity in the weight of fire that
5 both sides could bring to bear.
6 Q. General Wilson, did you have occasion to see a mobile mortar?
7 A. I did. I was observing one day from the -- high up on the PTT
8 building, on the road which ran down to the city. I saw a truck with an
9 81 millimetre mortar mounted on the back. It was firing a short number
10 of rounds, two or three rounds, out, I presume, against the Serbian
11 military forces and it was then quickly redeploying. Now, the reaction
12 to this fire was a return of artillery fire by the Bosnian Serb forces.
13 It was a significant return of fire involving very heavy calibre
14 artillery, I assess probably 150-millimetre artillery, plus
15 120-millimetre artillery. There were a large number of rounds which were
16 fired back into what was a civilian area. These rounds hit certainly the
17 road area but also a large number of rounds hit surrounding accommodation
18 buildings causing significant damage.
19 Q. Now, if I could turn your attention, General Wilson, to paragraph
20 53 of your statement.
21 MR. HARMON: That's page 12 of the e-court document.
22 Q. Paragraph 53 of your statement should appear in front of you. It
24 "General shelling and sniping in Sarajevo was such a common
25 occurrence that they were not investigated. It became part of the
1 day-to-day reality in Sarajevo
2 From your perspective as a career military officer, can you
3 provide the Trial Chamber with your general observations about both
4 shelling and sniping in Sarajevo
5 A. Yes, I can. For a period of approximately six weeks prior to the
6 time that I left Sarajevo
8 it was very heavy. It was directed virtually at the whole of the city,
9 so it was widespread. It was intense for, on some days, 16 hours. It
10 started at 5.00 in the morning and go through until 11.00 at night. It
11 was indiscriminate, in my view, in that it engaged widely dispersed
12 targets that had no clear military value to them.
13 On other occasions the artillery was clearly in support of ground
14 assaults taking place. But for the most part, the artillery being
15 directed into the city was, in my view, indiscriminate, widespread, and
16 did not take account of the fact that civilians were residing in the
18 "Sniping" is a term, I think, which can be interpreted in a
19 number of different ways. The pure technical description of a sniper is
20 a highly trained marksman who can engage a target at a thousand or 1.200
21 metres with a great degree of accuracy. The local people in the former
23 sniper. I think in the case of Sarajevo
24 individual riflemen who were engaging targets within the city. Once
25 again, this was common, particularly down in the downtown area, where
1 individuals would engage, quite often civilians travelling on trams or as
2 pedestrians in the street.
3 On numerous occasions, to fulfil my UN responsibilities, I was
4 required to go downtown and the vehicle in which I travelled, I would
5 say, 70 or 80 per cent of the time, was engaged by this small-arms fire.
6 It was too dangerous to go down to the city in other than an armoured
7 vehicle. And the people of Sarajevo
8 for the six weeks that I was in Sarajevo
9 Q. General Wilson, now I want to focus your attention on a slightly
10 different topic, and that is, what information about what was happening
11 in Bosnia
12 you were in Sarajevo
13 A. Well, I think the most important preamble here is that most
14 international media left Sarajevo
15 didn't return until sometime in early June. So, to the best of my
16 knowledge, the only media in the city at that time were former Yugoslavia
17 republic reporters.
18 In the PTT we had the facility to be able to translate the
19 written media that was produced in the city, and when we had electricity,
20 we were able to watch the local Sarajevo TV.
21 Additional to that, from Sarajevo
22 regular operational reports which indicated their knowledge of what was
23 happening in Sarajevo
24 written form which summarized what was happening in the media in the
25 former Yugoslavia
1 Q. When you say "summaries from the media from the former
4 A. Yes, mainly, to my memory, Zagreb
5 Q. And what, if anything, did those media summaries relate in
6 respect of, one, the events in Sarajevo
7 sniping; and, two, events in Bosnia
8 A. Yes. I made --
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: The question posed is vague as to time, and if we
12 could have a bit for focus, that would be appreciated.
13 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour, the first question that I asked
14 General Wilson and I've been directing my questions to him about deal
15 with the time period he was in Sarajevo
16 later the media coverage that was available when he was in Belgrade
17 these questions and the last question is to be understood as relating to
18 the time he was in Sarajevo
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could we take those two questions one by one?
20 MR. HARMON: Yes.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Please.
22 MR. HARMON:
23 Q. Could you please tell the Trial Chamber, General Wilson, in the
24 media summaries that were coming from the former Yugoslavia, including
25 those from Belgrade
1 and what was reported about the shelling and sniping that was occurring
2 in Sarajevo
3 A. The media summaries indicated that there was extensive coverage
4 of the military attacks against the city, both in the form of artillery
5 and also small-arms fire.
6 Q. And was that being reported in the Belgrade press, to the best of
7 your recollection?
8 A. Yes, it was.
9 Q. Okay. Now, in respect of other events in Bosnia, ethnic
10 cleansing, for example, focusing on the Belgrade media reports that you
11 were receiving, was there any reference to the practice of ethnic
12 cleansing in the events on the ground relating to it?
13 A. Well, it certainly would not be addressed as that and, indeed,
14 the Belgrade
15 generated by the war. I have no recollection of a detailed account of
16 ethnic cleansing per se or any great mention of the number of Muslim or
17 Croat refugees that had been created by the conflict.
18 Q. And in terms of the television coverage of events that were
19 occurring in Sarajevo
20 that coverage consisted of?
21 A. The television coverage was provided by Sarajevo Television. It
22 was graphic footage of attacks against civilians with, in the case of an
23 attack on the 27th of May against a bread line, continual replaying of
24 quite graphic shots of casualties, wounded. This sort of coverage would
25 go on for hours, repetition of that sort of scenery.
1 Q. And while you were with UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, did you get
2 coverage from the international media, CNN, SkyNews, BBC, and the like?
3 A. After some time we were able to receive CNN, BBC news, by
4 satellite transmission, but it took us some couple of weeks after
5 UNPROFOR headquarters relocated to Belgrade before my headquarters was
6 able to have this facility.
7 Q. And what do you recall the international media was broadcasting
8 in respect of the events in Sarajevo
9 A. In my view, they were fairly accurately representing what was
10 taking place there. It was also quite clear that what was happening in
11 the former Yugoslavia
12 world for that time and for many months after.
13 Q. And when you say what was happening -- your evidence was "in my
14 view they were fairly accurately representing what was taking place
15 there," what was it they were showing on the video -- on the television
16 that was taking place?
17 A. Well, it depends on the timeframe we're talking about, but until
18 the international media were able to get back into the city, they were
19 reliant on other people, I presume, for TV footage. But my recollection
20 is that there were certainly statements by journalists as to what was
21 happening, and later when the cameras were able to get into the city,
22 there was actual footage of shelling, civilian casualties, damage being
23 caused to the city.
24 Q. Okay. Now, General Wilson, you relocated from Sarajevo on the
25 24th of June. You went to Belgrade
1 late July 1992. During that period of time, General Wilson, did you
2 have -- did you continue to receive media compilations from UNPROFOR
3 headquarters which included reports of -- summaries of the media
4 throughout the former Yugoslavia
6 A. Yes, we did.
7 Q. And were those summaries similar to the summaries that you've
8 described in your previous -- in your earlier testimony?
9 A. Yes, exactly the same.
10 Q. Now, while you were in Belgrade
11 about what was happening in Sarajevo
12 A. Yes, there was, but I don't speak Serbo-Croat so the exact
13 content of them, I don't know. But certainly the visual content seemed
14 to suggest that there was very heavy fighting going on down in Bosnia
15 Q. And was there television coverage through CNN and through BBC and
16 SkyNews that was being received in Belgrade while you were there?
17 A. We had the facility for that. I don't know whether the local
18 people there did or did not.
19 Q. Can you tell me, General Wilson, what was your impression about
20 the people of Belgrade
21 in Sarajevo
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'll have to object to that question. The
25 impression of the people of Belgrade
1 I'll --
2 MR. HARMON: I'll reframe the question. I don't mean the entire
4 Q. Let me ask you, General Wilson. In terms of the people with whom
5 you had contact -- strike that.
6 Did you have contact with people in Belgrade, who, first of all,
7 discussed the events with you in Sarajevo
8 A. Yes, I did. When I left Sarajevo
9 reoccupied my accommodation in the Yugoslav Hotel. Since I'd lived in
10 that hotel for several months before going to Yugoslavia, I was quite
11 well known there to the domestic staff and they were -- some of them
12 spoke to me and asked me for my opinion as to the likely safety -- the
13 safety of their relatives down in the city. They indicated that they had
14 seen reports of what was happening in Sarajevo, and they were greatly
15 concerned for the safety of their family down there.
16 Q. Okay. General Wilson, I want to change the topic. I want to
17 fast-forward to the period when you acted as a military advisor to
18 Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, and Ambassador Stoltenberg at the ICFY
19 negotiations. In your trial testimony you were asked questions about
20 Lord Owen and Lord Owen bringing to the attention of the Bosnian Serb
21 leaders events that were taking place, ethnic cleansing and the like, and
22 your testimony found at transcript pages 13080 to 13083, as well as
23 13110, you indicated, to put it succinctly, that Lord Owen spoke
24 directly, bluntly, and non-diplomatically to Karadzic and others about
25 what was happening in Bosnia
1 A. Yes, I did make that statement.
2 Q. Now, what you weren't asked, and what I want to ask you about
3 briefly about was the parties to the ICFY negotiations also included
4 representatives from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, for example,
5 Slobodan Milosevic, and the FRY foreign minister; is that correct?
6 A. Yes, they did.
7 Q. Did Lord Owen express similar concerns to Slobodan Milosevic and
8 FRY officials about events that were occurring in Bosnia?
9 A. Yes, he did, and it was done in basically two forums, in
10 one-on-one meetings, basically between General Milosevic and the
11 co-chairman. The co-chairman would generally raise whatever issue was
12 paramount at that time. It might be the cutting off of electricity or
13 water to the city. It might be the provision of emergency aid. It could
14 be the intensity of military action against the city at that time.
15 At various stages they would use a different approach with
16 General Milosevic. In the early days they would ask for his support and
17 intervention, and he would usually respond that he would try and use his
18 influence, but he had limited influence over the Bosnian Serb leadership.
19 Later they would become more direct and ask that he take urgent action.
20 In many cases he would disassociate himself with the actions of the
21 Bosnian Serbs. He would agree that their actions were inappropriate, but
22 he would claim that he had no authority, no way of influencing them.
23 There's a second forum in which he would be -- the co-chairman
24 would be negotiating with the Bosnian Serb leadership, mainly Karadzic,
25 Milosevic, maybe Plavsic, and President Milosevic would be present and it
1 would not be possible to progress the negotiations because the Presidency
2 were refusing to participate until some military or humanitarian crisis
3 was resolved. This was quite a common event and was quite common for
4 Lord Owen to speak very directly to the participants there about what was
5 happening and to demand their intervention and to point out to them the
6 inappropriateness of this conduct.
7 Q. What kind of conduct was he specifically describing when he was
8 directing his comments to Milosevic and describing -- and to Karadzic and
9 other participants in the ICFY negotiations?
10 A. There were many of these meetings and, of course, many such
11 discussions, but to summarize, it would certainly deal with the nature of
12 military action being conducted in Bosnia in general and in Sarajevo
13 particular, but also be matters of a humanitarian nature and specifically
14 about the conduct of ethnic cleansing which continued right through my
15 period with the ICFY.
16 Q. Just to follow up, in your answer, General Wilson, you said:
17 "There were many of these meetings, and, of course, many such
18 discussions, but to summarize to would certainly deal with the nature of
19 the military action being conducted in Bosnia in general and in
21 Did he go -- what did he say about the nature of the military
22 action being conducted in Bosnia
23 A. Well, it certainly depends upon the event or the particular time,
24 but typically -- I can quote an example. The turning on and turning off
25 of electricity -- I'm sorry, you asked for military action.
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. Yes. Shelling, I think, is a particularly good example because
3 shelling tended to fluctuate during 1993. It continued through 1993 but
4 was more intense at some times rather than others, and Lord Owen would be
5 asking for moderation of artillery fire being directed at the city.
6 Q. Okay. Finally, let me direct your attention, General Wilson, to
7 Prosecution Exhibit P146.
8 MR. HARMON: If I could have that pulled up on the screen, and I
9 would like to go to page 1, the bottom of page 1, of that particular
11 Q. The paragraph, which is paragraph 4, I want to direction your
12 attention to, is paragraph 4 and it carries over to page 2 as well. So
13 let me just read that part of what is on paragraph 4:
14 "In regard to the proposal of opening Sarajevo airport, the
15 General said the airport was the most practical resupply route for
16 humanitarian assistance."
17 I'm sorry, I'm reading from the wrong paragraph. Let me go back
18 to paragraph 3:
19 "International military intervention could only bring
20 catastrophe on Sarajevo
22 Can you just explain what that paragraph -- the context of that
23 paragraph, General Wilson?
24 A. This was a meeting that we had with General Plavsic to talk about
25 the possibility of opening the airport for the delivery of assistance of
1 humanitarian aid. This was an aside. At that time there was some
2 discussion in the international media that some of the western European
3 nations might be prepared to take military action against the Bosnian
4 Serbs to -- unless they were to moderate their behaviour against
6 General Mladic's -- I'm reporting here his statement to me that
7 if there was some form of foreign military intervention, he would attend
8 to level the city of Sarajevo
9 demonstrated for ten days or so before this meeting that he was quite
10 capable of mounting quite a ferocious level of artillery fire against the
11 city and therefore his threat was quite believable, and hence I reported
12 this threat to my superior in headquarters UNPROFOR.
13 Q. I would just like to direct your attention to a correction, if I
14 may, Your Honour and General Wilson. It appears on line 17, the first
15 part of your answer where it says:
16 "This was a meeting that we had with General Plavsic."
17 A. Sorry, General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic.
18 Q. All right.
19 MR. HARMON: I have no further questions, Your Honour. Thank
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before you sit down, line 17 of which page?
22 MR. HARMON: Line 17 of page 34 says --
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Line 17 of page 34 says -- can you explain the
24 context of that paragraph.
25 MR. HARMON: I have 34 -- Your Honour, I have -- my LiveNote is
1 rapidly disappearing, line 34, the answer to the question appears at 15
2 minutes --
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Line 34.
4 MR. HARMON: Line 17 of page 34.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you not able to stop it so that it does not
6 disappear? I can see it at line 19.
7 MR. HARMON: I can see it at line 19 on this. I can't see as
8 well as I used to be able to, Your Honour. I apologise.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon.
10 Mr. Guy-Smith. Yes, you are right.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well, then.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
13 We're virtually two minutes from the break, so we'll take a break
14 and come back at 4.00. Court adjourned.
15 --- Recess taken at 3.29 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 4.00 p.m.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
20 Q. You have been involved in a military career for the greater share
21 of your life, have you not, sir?
22 A. Just a little over 34 years.
23 Q. I won't ask you how old you are; it's none of my business. But a
24 fair period of time. And I take it that you, in the work that you've
25 done and the tours of duty that you have experienced, you've seen a fair
1 amount of different conditions of war. Would that be a fair statement?
2 A. That's true, counsel.
3 Q. And one of the things that's kind of unique about the situation
4 in Sarajevo
5 I'm excludeing here, of course, Stalingrad
6 a city that was comprised of competing factions and civilians and the
7 battle itself was in the city proper, which is kind of a unique
8 situation, wasn't it?
9 A. I don't think it was unique. I was involved in the Battle of
11 Q. Okay. Since you've mentioned the Battle of Beirut, one of the
12 things that is unique about warfare that occurs within an urban
13 environment is that the rules of engagement become much more difficult to
14 keep a bright line on. Would that be a fair statement?
15 A. No, I don't believe so. The rules of engagement are quite clear.
16 It's the interpretation of them that's perhaps a little more difficult.
17 Q. I'm not a military man, and I'm sure you can help me in that
19 And with regard to the issue of interpretation of the rules of
20 engagement and now with regard specifically to Sarajevo, one of the
21 realities was that in the city proper there were barracks that at one
22 point were manned by JNA members; correct?
23 A. Yes, they were.
24 Q. And that was, as a matter of fact, if I'm not mistaken, the
25 Marshal Tito barracks were barracks where supplies of both water and
1 electricity had been cut off by the, as I think you called them, the
2 Presidency forces on a number of occasions; correct?
3 A. Yes, I'm aware they had done that.
4 Q. In your opinion, would that be a legitimate military act, to cut
5 off the electricity or water in a region of town where there are military
7 A. Are you talking there about cutting off electricity/water to the
8 barracks or to the city?
9 Q. I'm talking about cutting off water and electricity to an area of
10 the city where there are barracks.
11 A. And --
12 Q. And the reason that's why I asked you previously the question
13 about the rules of engagement, because that's why I think we're
14 immediately find ourselves in an issue of interpretation, or maybe we
15 don't, but that's what I'm trying to understand.
16 A. So if the aim, if you can limit it entirely to the barracks, that
17 would be your aim. If it was impossible to only limit it to the barracks
18 and you had to include part of the city, that would probably be a
19 legitimate action.
20 Q. Okay. And those are the kinds of discretionary decisions that
21 have to be made by whoever is a commander during the period of time that
22 they are engaged in that particular action.
23 A. Not only by commanders, by individual soldiers too.
24 Q. Okay. Now, I want to just fast-forward for a moment. Are you
25 aware of the fact that NATO bombed Belgrade
1 transformer and radio stations?
2 A. I'm unaware of that. I'm aware that NATO bombed targets in
4 Q. Okay. Would, in your opinion as a man with some substantial
5 military experience, would the bombing of a radio station or a television
6 station be a legitimate military target?
7 A. It could be, provided you minimised collateral damage.
8 Q. Okay. And by the same token, would the bombing of or the
9 destruction of the transformer that supplied electricity to your enemy,
10 in an urban environment where there are civilians admittedly, would that
11 be a legitimate military target?
12 A. That's a grey area, I must say.
13 Q. Uh-huh. Well, much of war is grey, is it not?
14 A. It is, indeed.
15 Q. Now, would it be fair to say that when you arrived in Sarajevo
16 the battle that you saw was, I think, what would be characterized, and I
17 don't know if it was the parlance that was being used then but I know
18 it's the parlance being used now, of asymmetric war?
19 A. I'm not aware of the precise definition of that. It's an
20 American term.
21 Q. Well, I happen to be American so that's probably the reason I'm
22 using it. And what I'm referring to here, and perhaps you have a more
23 precise term or a term that could help the Chamber in a way that I can't,
24 is that you have disparate munitions or artillery or ammunition between
25 the opposing forces, and you have disparate manpower. Those are the --
1 that's what I'm putting into the formula. I don't know whether that's
2 sufficient or not.
3 A. If you're saying that there's a gross discrepancy between the
4 ability and the capabilities of both sides, is that your definition?
5 Q. Yeah, absolutely.
6 A. Well, if that's your definition, then I accept that.
7 Q. Okay. Is that what you found when you came to Sarajevo, that
8 there was a gross disparity between the two sides? And by that I mean
9 between the ability and capabilities of the two sides.
10 A. To be pedantic, when I first came to Sarajevo there was no
11 fighting at all.
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. But as the situation developed, yes, it's true, there did appear
14 to be a great weight in favour of the Bosnian Serb military forces as
15 opposed to what I'd describe as the Presidency forces.
16 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the issue of the Presidency forces,
17 you had -- you had made yourself aware, I would take it, before you came
18 to Sarajevo
19 could, of the Presidency forces, how many there were, didn't you?
20 A. No. When UNPROFOR deployed to Sarajevo in March of 1992, the
21 operational focus of UNPROFOR was in Croatia, with the exception of my
22 military observers who had an operational focus around Mostar and Bihac.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. What was happening in Sarajevo
25 the headquarters was deployed.
1 Q. Gotcha.
2 A. What the military forces were, there was absolutely no interest.
3 Q. There came a point in time when they became of some importance to
4 you, did there not?
5 A. After the conflict broke out, yes.
6 Q. When would that have been?
7 A. It happened on the 14th of May.
8 Q. And on the 14th of May, when the conflict broke out, at that
9 point in time did you educate yourself as to the number of forces that
10 existed with the Bosnian Presidency, to the best that you could,
12 A. Sure. That began my education, yes.
13 Q. And could you give the Chamber an indication of what the strength
14 was of those forces. And I'm not at this point talking about artillery
15 or munitions because obviously I think it's well understood by all that
16 there was a discrepancy or a disproportionate, shall we say, possession
17 of those, but in terms of manpower.
18 A. Sure. When the war broke out on the 14th of May, the Presidency
19 forces described their fighting elements as police forces. They made no
20 particular claim to an army. It was only in the period perhaps a couple
21 weeks later that I was able to meet somebody who described himself as
22 commander of the army and a defence minister, in fact. But on the 14th
23 of May, the forces that were fighting on behalf of the Presidency were
24 police forces, armed with small arms. I actually met some of these
25 fighters in the building -- my accommodation building where I was
1 residing in in Dobrinja, Nedzarici.
2 I only caught glimpses of the forces on the Serbian side. I
3 certainly saw their way to fire. I saw fleeting views of their infantry
4 during assaults around the area of what was known as the Rainbow Hotel.
5 Does that answer your question?
6 Q. We're getting closer.
7 A. Okay.
8 Q. After a couple of weeks, since you've given us a start date of
9 the 14th, after a couple of weeks - and for purposes of my question, I'm
10 not trying to tie you down to a particular date at all; I'm just trying
11 to get a rough sense of time - after a couple of weeks, did you make at
12 that point a determination, after you'd had an opportunity to meet with
13 these gentlemen, what the size of the forces were of the Bosnian
14 Presidency, after they transformed themselves what I understand to be,
15 what they previously called themselves as police forces into an army?
16 A. Sure. To my knowledge they made no claim to a particular number,
17 but given the size of the city that they were defending, and they were
18 defending it against infantry probes, they must have had some, I
19 estimate, tens of thousands of people on the confrontation lines. If you
20 want an educated guess, it would be in the order of 30.000.
21 Q. Okay. And with regard to those 30.000 as an educated guess, and
22 I understand it's that, and I'm not -- once again I'm not trying to tie
23 you down to anything, but with regard to those 30.000 forces, were those
24 forces deployed throughout the city? Were they in specific areas? Could
25 you tell us what you learned in that regard? Once again, I'm talking at
1 that initial time, a couple weeks after May 14th.
2 A. If I could correct my previously educated guess, I would say
3 perhaps 15.000.
4 Q. Very well.
5 A. I believe they were deployed on the confrontation line, and not
6 in depth, if you understand the military term.
7 Q. I do. But could you define it for the Chamber and more
8 importantly for the record so that we all have the same understanding.
9 A. A military force is deployed in attack and defence normally in
10 echelons, in lines, if you wish, so that it adds depth in defence, in
11 particular, that an attacking force has to get through. It's both depth
12 in manpower and depth in fire-support, in fire-power.
13 Q. Now, we now find ourselves, if my calculations are correct, we
14 now find ourselves in June; correct? Starting May 14th, we're now at the
15 beginning of June.
16 A. If you wish to nominate that period, yes.
17 Q. I wish to be accurate, and that's what I'm trying to get to, is
18 an accuracy here with you with regard to certain things.
19 At that point in time were you involved in negotiations by then
20 with the various parties?
21 A. Yes, I was. Those negotiations started in perhaps the third week
22 of May and continued through until about the 5th of June.
23 Q. What knowledge did you have in the third week of May with regard
24 to the status of Mr. Karadzic vis-a-vis who he represented and what
25 importance he was to your negotiations, if any?
1 A. I was learning about the political situation in the third week of
2 May. Dr. Karadzic, my understanding, was the President of the Bosnian
3 Serb republic and presented himself as such.
4 Q. And with regard to General Mladic, by the third week of May, what
5 had you learned with regard to the status of General Mladic?
6 A. That was somewhat more debatable.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. I had known General Mladic since January of 1992 when he was the
9 JNA commander in Knin. And when he arrived in Sarajevo sometime in the
10 middle of May, I believe, he claimed then to be the commander of the
11 emerging VRS; however, the JNA commanders that we were -- the JNA
12 representatives in the negotiations over the evacuation of the barracks
13 did on a number of occasions indicate that Mladic was a loose cannon. He
14 was carrying out individual irresponsible actions.
15 Q. As a matter of fact, not only was he carrying out, as you've just
16 put it, independent irresponsible actions, he was acting also, to use
17 your language in your testimony - and I refer counsel to page 13068 of
18 the prior testimony - that he was "out of control and acting
19 independently and irrationally."
20 Now, you've told us that one of the things that you did in your
21 assessment of --
22 MR. HARMON: Could I just ask that counsel, when you refer to a
23 page, if you can give me a line site.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Absolutely. Lines 17 through 19.
25 Q. One of the things that you've mentioned to us here today is that
1 your determination about the relationship of people was predicated in
2 part on their demeanor, and I'd like to talk to you for a moment with
3 regard to the -- your assessment of the demeanor of General Mladic.
4 Having heard from representatives of the JNA that he was acting
5 in such a fashion, being out of control, did you try to make an
6 independent assessment for your purposes with regard to the accuracy of
7 such a concern that was being voiced by those representatives?
8 A. Yes, I did, counsel.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. I --
11 Q. And in that regard --
12 A. Can I answer that?
13 Q. Sure.
14 A. On a number of occasions in late May and early June I -- with
15 this discussion I'd had with the JNA representatives in mind, I had said
16 to General Mladic that it was understood that he wasn't responsive to
17 political direction or anybody else's direction. He was a lone maverick
18 and he made it quite clear on a number of occasions that he was
19 responsible to and responsive to the political leadership of the Bosnian
20 Serb people.
21 Q. And when you say that he was "responsible to and responsive to
22 the political leadership of the Bosnian Serb people," you would be
23 referring to his Commander-in-Chief, that would be Dr. Karadzic, would
24 you not?
25 A. I don't know that he was the Commander-in-Chief, but he was
1 certainly his political boss.
2 Q. He was his superior.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And he, General Mladic, was subordinate to Dr. Karadzic.
5 A. General Mladic said that, yes.
6 Q. Okay. Well, as a matter of fact, not only did he say that but
7 you, in terms of your observations of the negotiations that occurred, saw
8 that, and by that I mean you have pointed out to us that there were
9 essentially differing views about the negotiation of what I'll call the
10 freedom of the airport.
11 A. That's true.
12 Q. One of the views, that being the view of the JNA representative,
13 that would have been General Panic and others, is -- I'm sorry, not "is"
14 but "was," that they were willing to give up everything; correct?
15 A. They were certainly flexible about what they were prepared to
17 Q. And to use your language in your previous testimony at page
18 13059, lines 11 through 18, you said: "The JNA position was to effect
19 the immediate evacuation of their forces at any cost as quickly as
20 possible." And the evacuation of their forces and the airport
21 negotiations, as a matter of fact, were all tied up with one another,
22 were they not?
23 A. No, I saw them as separate issues. And, in fact, Mladic said he
24 wouldn't negotiate on the airport arrangement until the barracks had been
1 Q. That's what Mladic said.
2 A. Mladic.
3 Q. I see. Well, then, let's talk about the barracks negotiation for
4 a moment here.
5 With regard to the Presidency position, that would be the Bosnian
6 Presidency position, and their position was to bargain for the release of
7 these forces to obtain arms and ammunition and concessions for
8 humanitarian activity within the city.
9 A. That's true.
10 Q. Okay. Now, when you say that the release of these forces -- that
11 the bargaining there was for, among other things, to obtain arms and
12 ammunition, what did they want? What did the Bosnian Presidency want in
13 terms of arms and ammunition in terms of this negotiation?
14 A. Okay. The detail of the negotiations was conducted by one of my
15 officers, a Colonel Hoglund, so he was in the meetings for the many hours
16 that they progressed. I was called in at critical times, so I'm not
17 aware of the detail, bids and counter-bids, that took place. I am aware
18 that in the end that two, I recall, but I read somewhere else that three
19 semi-trailer loads of small-arms weapons were handed over to the
20 Presidency forces as a result of the deal that was struck between
21 General Panic and the Presidency forces.
22 Q. Now, with regard to -- with regard to the Bosnian Presidency
23 forces' negotiations, considering what your mandate was, irrespective of
24 the type of munitions that were being negotiated for, I take it that what
25 the Presidency was negotiating for was more weapons, not less.
1 A. They wanted more.
2 Q. Okay. And that was for the purpose of continuing - and I'm
3 asking the question if you took this into your calculations when you were
4 trying to close these negotiations - that was for the purpose of
5 continuing the war efforts. They didn't ask for more weapons just on a
6 whim; they wanted more weapons so they could be armed for purposes of
7 making themselves stronger with regard to what was going on. Correct?
8 A. I mean, I don't know what their purpose was, but it would be a
9 reasonable assumption that they wanted to continue the fight.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry.
11 Counsel, when you say "more weapons," you're saying they wanted
12 more weapons than the Bosnian Serbs had, or did they want more weapons
13 than they would have been offered, if there was any offer at all?
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I -- thank you. Clearly, not a very clear
15 question and I will clear -- clean it up.
16 Q. In following the Judge's question, the -- without getting into
17 the details, because that, I understand, you were not privy to. What the
18 Bosnian Presidency wanted was more weapons than they had at the time for
19 their forces.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Okay. Obviously, they would have liked more weapons than the
22 Serbian forces had, but that's a different issue.
23 A. Yes. There were various ambit bids. They wanted a greater
24 number than they got in the end, yes.
25 Q. And that in and of itself is not an uncommon thing to occur
1 during these negotiations processes; right?
2 A. No. That's normal in that part of the world.
3 Q. Because, after all, as we all know, war is not illegal. Nations
4 can fight against each other. There's nothing wrong with that; right?
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry to be pedantic.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm sorry to be moving in the wrong way, then.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're not moving in the wrong way. When you say
8 "what the Bosnian Presidency wanted was more weapons than they had at the
9 time for their forces," what do we mean? Do we mean they had maybe 10
10 tanks, and they wanted 11 or 20, or do we mean they wanted to amend what
11 they had, even if it was only by one, so what they had before is more
12 than -- is less than what they now have by one or two.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay, I understand.
14 Q. I don't know whether or not, by virtue of your position in terms
15 of the negotiations, you have that particular kind of information with
16 regard to the various ambits that the Bosnian Presidency were seeking to
17 achieve, and if you can be of some help to us in that regard, I would
18 appreciate it.
19 A. I think as an illustration one -- if one proposed that the
20 Presidency forces may have had 15.000 small-arms weapons before the
21 negotiations commenced, the negotiating process was to acquire an
22 additional, say, 5.000 weapons, so at the end of the process they would
23 have 15.000 weapons. That's what the negotiation was about. They would
24 end up with more weapons at the end of it than they had before they
25 commenced the negotiations.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Are we good?
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH:
5 Q. Now, the Bosnian Serb position, which was being at that time
6 championed by Mladic, if I'm not mistaken, was not to hand over any
7 weapons; correct?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Okay. Which was in direct contradiction with the JNA position.
10 A. Exactly.
11 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the evacuation of the barracks, the
12 barracks were ultimately evacuated somewhat successfully, and by that I
13 mean young JNA soldiers left the barracks; correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And with regard to Marshal Tito barracks, during the time that
16 they were evacuated from those barracks, I take it that the agreement
17 between the parties, and the parties then being, if I'm understanding
18 correctly, the Bosnian Presidency, General Panic on behalf of his young
19 soldiers, and General Mladic on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, was that
20 these forces would be evacuated and during that period of time there
21 would be no attack upon them.
22 A. That was the agreement and that's what, in fact, happened.
23 Q. During the evacuation of those barracks, the Marshal Tito
24 barracks, no injuries or casualties were suffered.
25 A. Not that I'm aware of.
1 Q. And there were also other barracks that were being evacuated at
2 the same time. When I say "same time," I don't mean precisely the same
3 time, but around that period of time, where there were other JNA
4 soldiers, and is your answer the same with regard to them? That they,
5 too, suffered no casualties?
6 A. No. On the fourth barracks to be evacuated, in the last --
7 within the urban area of Sarajevo
8 went missing actually during the process of leaving the barracks and
9 arriving outside the city. Now, what exactly happened to those people is
10 unclear. They ran up against a position, and there was some firing that
11 took place.
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. They may have been killed. They may have been taken prisoner.
14 They may have deserted. But there was some 30 missing --
15 Q. When you say --
16 A. If I can finish.
17 Q. I apologise.
18 A. One might attribute that this operation was less than successful
19 was because of a poorly planned and executed evacuation. They began this
20 evacuation at twilight. With quite a large convoy and without warning
21 anybody along the route they were coming, it was almost inevitable
22 something like this would happen.
23 Q. When you say that "it was almost inevitable something like this
24 would happen," I take it, then, what you mean by that that the forces of
25 the Bosnian Presidency in such a situation, seeing such a convoy, would
1 find it necessary to fire upon them, for some reasons, none of which we
2 know about.
3 A. I don't know if it was Presidency forces that fired on them. It
4 could have been Serb forces.
5 Q. Oh, really?
6 A. It happened in the dark, and there was mass confusion. I don't
7 think anyone can accuse the Presidency forces of that particular
9 Q. So in your mind, once this occurred, did this create any
10 difficulties with regard to the negotiation process that you were in for
11 further negotiations, once these young men had been fired upon by
12 whomever they had been fired upon?
13 A. To be honest, the parties seemed to shrug their shoulders and
14 accept that it was an incident, and they moved on.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. But I certainly learned a very strong lesson from it, that we
17 should insist upon a properly planned operation before we became involved
18 in it.
19 Q. Now, with regard to the next negotiation, and if I'm
20 chronologically accurate, during that period of time you were engaged in
21 shuttle diplomacy because, in fact, the Bosnian Presidency refused to
22 negotiate with their certain Serb counter-parts; is that a fair
24 A. That's true.
25 Q. And were those Bosnian Serbs that they refused to negotiate with
1 or were those members of the JNA that they were refusing to negotiate
3 A. They were refusing to meet the political leadership of the
4 Bosnian Serb organisation.
5 Q. I see. That was something that was communicated, was it not, to
6 the Bosnian Serb leadership.
7 A. Yes, it was, and it was an arrangement that continued on through
8 to my time in Geneva
9 Q. And with regard to their refusal to negotiate with the Bosnian
10 Serb leadership, did that, in your mind, constitute difficulties
11 concerning their stated purpose to retain a fully integrated ethnically
12 inter-twined Bosnia-Herzegovina?
13 A. I don't know I'm competent to answer that. I mean, it made
14 negotiating logistically more difficult, but I've got no idea what the
15 political impact was. That's not my expertise.
16 Q. Well you, as a matter of fact, took the position, did you not,
17 that the Bosnian Presidency stated political position was to retain a
18 fully integrated ethnically intertwined Bosnia-Herzegovina? That was
19 clear in 1992 and subsequently all through 1993. You've testified to
20 that, and I refer the Court and counsel to page 13052, lines 9 through
22 A. I'm repeating statements made to me on numerous occasions by the
23 Bosnian Serb leadership in making that statement.
24 Q. I see. You personally experienced, however, the reality of the
25 situation, which is that one group refused to meet with the other group.
1 A. Yes, I'm aware of that.
2 Q. Okay. It makes it a little difficult to come to an accord,
3 doesn't it, if one group refuses to meet with the other group?
4 A. Well, physically refused to meet with them but certainly were
5 prepared to consider the negotiating position of the other side.
6 Q. Okay. Now, I'm trying to understand something, which is with
7 regard to the airport negotiation, is it your testimony that in that
8 regard, the demeanor that you saw between the participants was such that
9 you determined during the negotiation for the airport that Mladic was
10 subordinate to Panic?
11 A. That was the opinion I formed.
12 Q. Okay. And the difficulty that was occurring at that time was
13 that Mladic was refusing to hand over the airport; correct?
14 A. That was his negotiating position.
15 Q. Okay. Now, do you recall that Karadzic took Mladic into a room
16 because of his incalcitrance, and you could hear Karadzic screaming at
17 Mladic, and after the screaming session was over, Karadzic came out and
18 said there will be no further problems. And I'm, essentially I'm
19 paraphrasing what I understood your testimony to be, but I'm trying to
20 get to, rather than your testimony, the reality of what occurred.
21 A. Once again, to be pedantic, I don't know the reason for Karadzic
22 taking Mladic into the other room, but yes, there was a violent
23 disagreement which you could hear through the walls of the room we were
24 in, and when they returned to the negotiations, it's true that Karadzic's
25 position prevailed.
1 Q. Okay. In that regard, Karadzic's position at that time was the
2 precise position of Panic, which is, Let's get the airport negotiated and
3 taken care of, and both of them were in disagreement with General Mladic,
4 the individual who at least one party, and by that I mean Panic, had
5 indicated some concern about, let's say, his control issues and clearly
6 you had seen or heard -- you didn't see it, you heard that there was some
7 need to use a fair measure of force upon the man in order to bring him to
8 the table.
9 A. To the best of my recollection, Panic -- General Panic, head of
10 the JNA, was not involved in the airport negotiations at all.
11 Q. I see.
12 A. The military representative there was General Mladic, and I at
13 the time understood his authority extended over the JNA forces which
14 remained in the Sarajevo
15 the airport. Panic, as I recall, was only interested in the evacuation
16 of the barracks. The last of them was -- wrong. He was only interested
17 in the barracks.
18 Q. And in your conversations with General Mladic, General Mladic
19 made it very clear to you, and I think it was probably something that was
20 of importance to you in trying to determine who the players -- not only
21 who the players were but what their lines of authority were. He made it
22 very clear to you that he was subordinate to the political leadership of
23 the Bosnian Serbs.
24 A. Both through his statements on a number of occasions and also by
25 his demeanor, yes.
1 Q. Okay. Now, during the time that you were in Sarajevo, did you
2 have working for you in UNPROFOR a British officer named Pyres Tucker?
3 Does that name ring a bell?
4 A. The name doesn't ring a bell.
5 Q. Did you receive information from any UNPROFOR Canadian officers
6 concerning indications that it was common knowledge through
7 investigations carried out by the United Nations that Muslim forces did
8 on occasion shell their own civilians?
9 A. I can't remember such a conversation. I can remember a report
10 that was associated with the bread line attack. It was a crater analysis
11 of where the mortars had landed which could not rule out the possibility
12 that there were potential mortar positions along the line of attack so --
13 Q. That was an investigation that was carried out by the French;
15 A. The French, yes.
16 Q. And that was an investigation that you discussed in your
17 statement, I believe at paragraph 51 of the statement that you were
18 discussing with Mr. Harmon earlier today, that the French had done the
19 investigation and they couldn't come up with a conclusive determination
20 as to who had done that particular shelling; correct?
21 A. That's true.
22 Q. I see. Did you receive information -- first of all, do you know
23 of a gentleman by the name of Richard Mole, or Mole? I could be
24 pronouncing it incorrectly.
25 A. A general? I think so. I think I know a lieutenant colonel.
1 Q. Well, he may be a general now.
2 A. Perhaps we can talk about him, and I might recall him.
3 Q. He was a senior UNMO from September to December.
4 A. Of 1992?
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. Yes. I know him well.
7 Q. Somebody you had contact with?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Did you receive any information from him that there were
10 potential incidents that occurred where the Presidency forces may well
11 have been, I don't want to say "targeting," but I'll say attacking their
12 own areas so they could assist in the view that the population of
15 A. I don't recall such a report.
16 Q. Okay. Are you aware of -- it may have been after your time
17 there, are you aware of any of the opinions of, I believe, his name is
18 Michael Rose with regard -- once again, this same issue, of whether or
19 not some of these forces were, in fact -- and by that I mean the Bosnian
20 Presidency forces were, in fact -- that there had been information that
21 they were at some point firing on their own areas?
22 A. I was well gone by the time Michael Rose appeared.
23 Q. Okay. Okay.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I might be of some assistance to my colleague,
25 that's information taken from the Galic trial judgement at paragraph 211.
1 Q. During the time that you were in Sarajevo, were you aware of the
2 fact that there was a tunnel that was in the control of the Presidency
4 A. Not while I was in Sarajevo
6 Q. Do you know whether or not that tunnel was a tunnel that the
7 Presidency forces allowed the civilian population to depart from or not?
8 A. I don't know who went through the tunnel, but I do know that the
9 political leaders of the Presidency were able to move about when the city
10 was invested, so I presume that they may have had the opportunity to use
11 that tunnel.
12 Q. Did you receive information in your capacity as an observer that
13 that tunnel was being used for purposes of bringing any weapons or other
14 aid and materials to the Bosnian Presidency forces?
15 A. I'm unaware of the detail of what went through the tunnel, but I
16 think it's reasonable to assume that some sort of assistance for their
17 military action would have gone through the tunnel.
18 Q. Okay. Did you receive any kind of information -- what I should
19 say, really, similar information with regard to the use of the airport
20 for bringing in material supplies to the Bosnian Presidency forces?
21 A. I would think that's highly unlikely.
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. A system was set up which allowed the Serbs to actually supervise
24 the detail of the cargo outside the country where it was led. It's
25 highly unlikely that any sort of contraband like that would make it
1 through the airport.
2 Q. With regard to September of 1992, you were at that point
3 involved, I believe, in another negotiation, were you not?
4 A. Yes, the evacuation of the JNA from the area surrounding
6 Q. And just briefly with regard to that particular negotiation, am I
7 accurate in stating that in October 1992, the JNA unilaterally executed a
8 well-conducted withdrawal broadly in accordance with the agreement that
9 you had negotiated, and the Croatians, on the other hand, failed to
10 adhere to the --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Harmon.
12 MR. HARMON: I'm going to object. I don't see any relevance to
13 the issues in this case.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Surely. To the extent this is a prefatory
16 question to my next question which deals with whether or not this
17 gentleman obtained information concerning the Bosnian Presidency forces
18 and the Croatian forces combining together for purposes of conflict.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: How is this question that you intend to ask
20 predicated on the previous one?
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, first of all, if there has been a -- if
22 there has been a violation by one of the parties to a negotiated
23 disagreement and that party then, here the Croatians, then begin to work
24 with the Bosnian Presidency for purposes of resisting their perceived
25 enemy at the time and that information is communicated to the other side
1 or they become aware of it, it certainly impacts on ultimate issues
2 concerning how one views intent and notice and the reaction of the
3 Serbian -- and by that I'm not referring to the Bosnian Serbs but the
4 Serbian political structure in future days. And it really deals directly
5 with some of the issues that were raised by Mr. Harmon in his opening
6 statement with regard to forecasting in 1992 a series of events that
7 ultimately, as I understand his theory of prosecution, are, shall we say,
8 that gestate through that period of time and are given birth at the point
9 in time that our client becomes the Chief of Staff of the VJ.
10 But if that seems a too long a road to take, and in looking at
11 you, I have that sneaking suspicion it may well be, I'm willing to --
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're welcome to interpret my body language.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you so much. Maybe I've gotten wrapped up
14 in General Wilson in that. I have one or two questions.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll allow the question.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you so much.
17 Q. That the Croatians, however, failed to adhere to the guidelines
18 of the agreement and subsequently invaded Serb-held territory in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina with elements of their regular army.
20 Now, first of all, I understand that was your particular view of
21 what occurred in terms of the negotiation that you had put together;
23 A. Yes, but there was never an agreement between the two parties on
25 Q. I see. Did you -- did you have discussions with any members of
1 the Bosnian Serbs concerning this particular subsequent invasion?
2 A. No, only General Bobetko, General Bobetko of the Croatian forces,
3 and a JNA general whom I can't recall his name.
4 Q. Okay. And when you say "a JNA general," was that somebody you
5 had been actively involved in in terms of these negotiation processes?
6 A. We had a couple of hours' discussion during this process.
7 Q. I take it -- and I understand you don't remember his name, but I
8 take it that he was somewhat exercised by the fact that he had engaged
9 in -- not he, but the JNA had engaged in a unilateral withdrawal and then
10 an area that they had withdrawn from was invaded. He was not particular
11 pleased about it, was he?
12 A. Well, I never saw him after he had executed the withdrawal. But
13 I have to say that he acted in the most professional manner. He took
14 note of what their proposal was but indicated that he would not sign any
15 bit of paper. It would then be a point of honour to him that he didn't
16 want to be associated with the withdrawal of the JNA from territory. But
17 when the withdrawal was executed some days later, it was done in a very
18 professional operation.
19 Q. Now, in terms of the parties that you're dealing with, and I
20 understand that the withdrawal was done professionally, and I take it by
21 that there was no fire and no -- there were no casualties in terms of the
23 Were these discussions that you had in terms of the success of
24 these kinds of withdrawals, were these discussions that you had with
25 Dr. Karadzic in terms of after the withdrawal was successful?
1 A. No. At that time I had no negotiation -- I had no role in
2 negotiating with the Bosnian Serb political leadership at all.
3 Q. Okay.
4 A. I was a subordinate officer working out of UNPROFOR headquarters.
5 Those negotiations from the end of June no longer involved me and would
6 have been carried out, more than likely, by Mr. Thornberry, the senior
7 political officer, and perhaps General Morillon or General Mackenzie.
8 Q. So your duties passed into another area then, I take it?
9 A. Yes. And I was used as a -- you might call it a project
10 negotiator. When something came up that there was nobody else obvious to
11 do it, then I was invited to do that task.
12 Q. Sounds like you were used as a closer on a fair number of
13 different occasions.
14 A. I had been there a while.
15 Q. You mentioned to us in your direct testimony that when asked,
16 Slobodan Milosevic indicated in one-to-one conversations that he had
17 limited influence on the other parties, and I take it by that
18 specifically the influence would be upon Dr. Karadzic or General Mladic,
19 when he said he had limited influence.
20 A. He did make that statement from time to time. He had a variety
21 of responses, and that was one of them.
22 Q. And the other one that he -- that he mentioned, as I understand
23 it, was that he had no authority over these individuals.
24 A. Well, he never at any point claimed any authority. The question
25 was the degree of influence that he may or may not have.
1 Q. Okay. And when you're talking influence, influence is a
2 relatively, and I'm sure it's something that you were quite familiar
3 with, is a relatively popular tool in the world of diplomacy and
4 negotiation, is it not?
5 A. Yes, it is, but it's a very broad term.
6 Q. Indeed so. Indeed so. And with regard to that term, the term of
7 "influence," it takes into account such issues as political favors,
8 economic issues.
9 A. Yes, it does. It could also include the turning off of any aid
10 or support that might be provided, both in material or political, or
11 diplomatic sense also.
12 Q. It could be the imposition of an embargo or the lifting of an
14 A. A water type one, yes.
15 Q. As a matter of fact, you saw, you experienced both of the use of
16 this kind of influence by the international community with regard to the
17 general situation. By that I mean the embargoes, whether they were
18 successful or not being an entirely different matter?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. They may have been limited influence, a great deal of influence,
21 but nevertheless you would not say that in that situation, when those
22 particular kinds of events were occurring, by that I mean international
23 embargoes, that that would be a matter of control now, would you?
24 A. Certainly one of influence. I'm not sure what you're implying by
25 "control." I mean, the embargo attempts to influence, if you wish, or to
1 push the authorities in the former Yugoslavia
2 can't physically make them do it. There's not a gun at the head. It's a
3 strong suggestion that this would be a good idea.
4 Q. With regard to the issue of the threat of bombing, which also was
5 something that was discussed on a number of different occasions, but
6 during your tenure in Sarajevo
7 influence, which is, Listen, if you don't come up to the table and start
8 doing what we believe is appropriate - and once again, I'm not putting
9 value judgements on any of these things - there is this option that you
10 may be bombed.
11 A. Yes, it's a threat.
12 Q. It's a threat.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Now, that particular threat was a threat, as I recall it, that
15 was the same threat that Mladic engaged in in the paragraph that you were
16 so kind to discuss with Mr. Harmon, in which he says, if I understand,
17 basically, If you bomb us, then we're going to -- or I'm going to shell
19 A. Yes. General Mladic is very believable. I mean, he had -- his
20 very recent actions in the two weeks before that made such a threat very
21 believable. Another characteristic of General Mladic was generally what
22 he said he'd do, he did it. Whether he liked the consequences is another
23 matter, but he was a man of his word.
24 Q. Sure. And in the context of the negotiations that you were going
25 through and that you were privy to, one of the things that you always had
1 to gauge was exactly what you just mentioned, which is when the party
2 says something, are they going to follow through?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And that's something that is being done by all of the parties
5 with regard to these negotiations, whether they be in peace, but more
6 specifically when these negotiations are occurring in a war setting.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And --
9 A. And I might say that General Mladic, with 200 pieces of artillery
10 surrounding a city, is a more credible threat than a rather vague threat
11 done through the international media that air attacks might under certain
12 circumstances be launched.
13 Q. Well, that was a threat that just took a long time for NATO to
14 get to the point of when they made the determination to do that. But
15 when they decided to pull the trigger, they pulled the trigger.
16 A. But at the time that paragraph was drafted, Mladic was more
17 incredible than the international air threat.
18 Q. In your estimation?
19 A. In my estimation.
20 Q. Okay. Did others share your view in that regard?
21 A. I don't know what I was told. I'm sorry.
22 Q. Do you know whether or not the information with regard to
23 international bombing of that region, whether the information was
24 communicated throughout Bosnia
25 example, Milosevic this?
1 A. No. I had no contact with Mr. Milosevic --
2 Q. Do you know whether others discussed this with Mr. Milosevic?
3 A. I don't know. I wasn't present.
4 Q. Were you involved in any discussions where the issue of how
5 Milosevic would respond to the notion that NATO or the international
6 community was going to bomb Belgrade
7 A. I was certainly aware and received cable traffic that there was
8 support from the -- from President Milosevic in regard to opening the
10 Q. He didn't want to get bombed, did he?
11 A. I don't know why he said that.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I could have a moment.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
14 [Defence counsel confer]
15 MR. GUY-SMITH:
16 Q. One final question, which is surrounding Sarajevo there are a
17 number of high points; correct?
18 A. There are.
19 Q. And one of them is, I believe, an area called Mount Igman
20 A. Yes, although I'm unaware of its exact location.
21 Q. During your tenure in Sarajevo
22 of the Bosnian Presidency forces?
23 A. Mount Igman
24 in the Geneva
25 carried out some military operation which resulted in the capture of that
1 feature. There had been a counter-attack, a successful counter-attack,
2 by the Bosnian Serb forces who had cleared the Presidency of that
3 position, and that to allow the negotiations to proceed, a UN force was
4 placed on the mountain and the opposing forces, the Presidency and the
5 Serb forces, withdrew from that area. It was a sort of demilitarization
7 Q. Okay.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Wilson, what do you mean, at page 66, line 12,
9 by "cleared the Presidency" of that position?
10 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, sir, I don't have the document in front
11 of me.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: No, page 66 on your screen. On your screen, line
13 12, you said:
14 "There had been a counter-attack, a successful counter-attack, by
15 the Bosnian Serb forces who had cleared the Presidency of that position."
16 THE WITNESS: I meant to say there, Your Honour, the Presidency
17 military forces. The Bosnian Serb military forces through a
18 counter-attack had driven the Presidency military forces, the Muslim
19 forces, away from the objective that they had recently captured.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH:
22 Q. And to your recollection, was Mount Igman
23 UNPROFOR forces by Serbian forces or by the Bosnian Presidency forces?
24 A. I understand by Serbian forces.
25 Q. I see. Okay. Thank you, General.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.
2 Mr. Harmon, any re-examination?
3 MR. HARMON: Yes.
4 Re-examination by Mr. Harmon:
5 Q. I have a question just on one point, General Wilson. My
6 colleague referred to a portion of your previous testimony Exhibit 142,
7 the transcript of you previous evidence on the 17th of May, 2005, in
8 which part of your answer reads as follows:
9 "I raised those issues." "Was there some concern from the JNA
10 representatives at the barracks negotiation that Mladic was out of
11 control and acting independently and irrationally?"
12 So my question is there was some concern of JNA representatives.
13 Which representatives expressed that concern?
14 A. That would have been General Boskovic, who was at that stage
15 leading the negotiations, and also Colonel Kardelj, I think his name was.
16 He was the JNA liaison officer to UNPROFOR and was participating also in
17 the negotiations.
18 Q. So at page 54 of the transcript, when my colleague asked you:
19 "Did General Panic express concern about control issues over Mladic," and
20 you essentially said yes, do you wish to clarify that answer that you
22 A. Then I've given an incorrect answer. The only disagreement that
23 I recall between General Panic and General Mladic was over the issue of
24 weapons in terms of the barracks negotiations.
25 Q. And so to clarify the question and answer, General Panic was not
1 one of those individuals from the JNA who expressed concern about control
2 issues over Mladic.
3 A. No. And to my knowledge, General Panic did not talk to General
4 Mladic about his conduct of, say, artillery attacks on the city, and if
5 he had, I wouldn't have understood it because I don't speak the language.
6 Q. Thank you very much.
7 MR. HARMON: I have no further questions.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon.
9 Questioned by the Court:
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just one question. Did you testify in the Galic
12 A. No, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
14 Any questions arising from the questions from the Bench?
15 MR. HARMON: No, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith?
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: None, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Wilson, thank you very much for coming to
19 testify. This brings us to the end of your testimony. You are now
20 excused. You may stand down. And travel well back home.
21 [The witness withdrew]
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Harmon.
23 MR. HARMON: Ms. Sutherland will lead the next witness, who is an
24 expert witness, Patrick Treanor, Your Honour. If we can have a few
25 minutes to readjust.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed, you do.
2 MR. HARMON: Thank you.
3 [The witness entered court]
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good afternoon, Mr. Treanor.
5 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the witness please make the declaration.
7 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
8 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. You may be seated.
10 Madam Sutherland.
11 WITNESS: PATRICK TREANOR
12 Examination by Ms. Sutherland:
13 Q. Mr. Treanor, can you state your full name and date of birth for
14 the record.
15 A. My name is Patrick Joseph Treanor. I was born on 14 February
17 Q. Before I deal briefly with your academic qualifications and your
18 relevant work experience, I just want to remind you that as we both speak
19 the same language, we need to remember to pause between questions and
21 A. Yes, thank you.
22 Q. Mr. Treanor, you received a Bachelor of Arts degree in modern
23 languages from the College of the Holy Cross in Massachusetts, USA
24 1968; correct?
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. You received a Masters degree in Russian and Eastern European
2 studies in 1970 from the Yale University Graduate School
3 in the United States?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. You received a Doctor of Philosophy from the University of London
6 in the United Kingdom in 1999 after completing a course of study at the
7 School of Slavonic
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. And having said that, receiving the doctorate, you would prefer
10 in these proceedings to be referred to as Mr. Treanor; is that correct?
11 A. That's also correct.
12 Q. You began your professional career as an intelligence analyst in
13 the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress in 1977 until
14 1980, and that work involved analysis of Yugoslav military and related
15 affairs; correct?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. In late 1980 you began work as a historian and later senior
18 historian in the Office of Special Investigations of the US Department of
19 Justice, until 1994.
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. During that time you assisted in the investigation and litigation
22 of cases of alleged Nazi war criminals living in the USA, and your
23 responsibility centered on the identification, research, and analysis of
24 wartime and post-war documentation, including Yugoslav documents;
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. The work involved planning and carrying out independent
3 investigative research at archives in several countries in North America
5 A. That is right.
6 Q. From July 1994 to the present, you've been engaged first as a
7 research officer for the Office of the Prosecutor and subsequently as
8 Head of the Legal Research Team and Senior Research Officer, a post you
9 assumed in February 1998?
10 A. The name of the team is the Leadership Research Team. Yes, I
11 became the head of that team in 1998. I became the acting head at the
12 end of 1997.
13 Q. And in that position you conducted your own research and
14 supervised the research efforts of others on your team?
15 A. That is right.
16 Q. That work primarily involved the collection and analysis of
17 original documentary and published materials relating to the organisation
18 and activities of the various parties involved in the conflict in the
19 former Yugoslavia
20 governmental organs and the SDS?
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please slow down for the
22 purposes of the interpretation.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could you please slow down, Madam Sutherland.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes.
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: My apologies to the interpreters.
1 Q. The materials included the records of governments, political
2 parties, and military units --
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: I've been somewhat patient, obviously, because I
5 understand the intent to get some information out of the way, but I think
6 at this point, it may be of some importance for the witness to testify as
7 opposed to answer yes-or-no questions, as regards to what he did.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Sutherland.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND:
10 Q. Mr. Treanor, what materials did you review -- have you reviewed
11 over the last 14 years?
12 A. Well, over the last 14 years, I've been involved in the
13 collection of documents in the region of the former Yugoslavia, which
14 involves reviewing documents in situ. I've also reviewed documents that
15 were collected by other OTP staff, either in the region itself or via
16 request for assistance from authorities in the region.
17 The types of documents that I've reviewed fall into several
18 categories. I'll just name them. One category would be what we call
19 open sources, that is, newspapers and magazines from the region of the
20 former Yugoslavia
21 collect as many newspapers and magazines published in the region during
22 the periods of the conflict and the years before and indeed after. We
23 now have a collection of some 31.000 separate issues of newspapers and
24 magazines. We also made -- we have also made an effort to collect the
25 Official Gazettes of the various entities in the former Yugoslavia. I
1 think we have complete -- or at least almost complete sets of the
2 Official Gazettes of all the entities in the former Yugoslavia for the
3 period of the conflicts there, and by "the conflicts," I mean the period
4 from, say, 1991 to 1995, as well as for some periods -- years before
5 those dates and after those dates.
6 Our original documentation includes records of political parties,
7 records of governments, and military records. The type of records that I
8 particularly work with would include documents such as minutes of
9 meetings, transcripts of meetings, orders, decisions, correspondence.
10 I've also reviewed numerous, if I can use the term, "intercepted
11 communications" between members of various parties to the conflicts
12 there. Those would be conversations that were intercepted by another
13 party to the conflict and have been made available to OTP in various
15 I think that about covers it, in general terms.
16 Q. As team leader of the LRT, is it common practice to supervise the
17 production of reports for investigations and trial teams?
18 A. Yes. A part of my duties is to -- certainly to assist my staff
19 in doing their research, guiding them to appropriate collections of
20 documents, for instance, and to review their work product, as well as to
21 prepare my own analyses, which would also include incorporating analyses
22 which had been made by other members of the team into a joint -- into a
23 joint product.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Sutherland, would that be a convenient time?
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll take a break and come back at a quarter to
2 6.00. Court adjourned.
3 --- Recess taken at 5.16 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 5.45 p.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Sutherland.
6 MS. SUTHERLAND:
7 Q. Mr. Treanor, what's your proficiency in the language that's
8 commonly referred to as Serbo-Croat?
9 A. I have a very good reading knowledge of the language. I can
10 conduct rudimentary conversation, certainly, and understand it fairly
12 Q. You testified before this Tribunal previously, once in the Brdjanin case
13 in July and October 2003 and then in the Krajisnik case in February 2004; is
14 that correct?
15 A. I believe those dates are correct, yes.
16 Q. In preparation for and in support of that testimony, did you
17 prepare some reports that were subsequently tendered into evidence in
18 those cases?
19 A. Yes. I think there was one report for the Brdjanin case and
20 another report for the Krajisnik case. Each of those reports was
21 submitted under my name; however, other individuals worked in the
22 preparation as well.
23 Q. And you prepared for this case, did you not, the report entitled
24 "the Belgrade
25 1995," which is dated the 1st of September, 2008?
1 A. Yes, that's the latest version.
2 Q. That report describes several aspects in the breakup of the SFRY
3 in the years 1990 to 1995, and it concerns in particular the goals of the
4 Serbian leaders during this process and the state structures they sought
5 to create for the Serbian people in pursuit of those goals; does it not?
6 A. Yes --
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm going to object as leading. It also calls
10 for a series of conclusions which the report may or may not actually
11 define, and I would ask once again that the gentleman answer questions
12 and develop his testimony as apart to having the Prosecution testify and
13 having him answer yes or no.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Ms. Sutherland.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, that sentence was contained in the
16 in the introduction to the report, and I was clearly just summarising
17 what the report was about before we got into particular questions about
18 the aim of the report to which Mr. Treanor would be answering the
19 questions to. So that was my last question on that matter.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, but may you put questions, please, to
21 Mr. Treanor, and let him answer and testify.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Thank you.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
24 MS. SUTHERLAND: Would the Registry please call up 00646.01.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: You said 066 or 006?
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: I understood the number to be 06646.01, Your
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
4 MS. SUTHERLAND:
5 Q. Mr. Treanor, do you recognize that this is the report that you
7 A. Yes, I do.
8 Q. What is the aim of the report?
9 A. Well, in the report I describe within the context of the
10 dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which
11 I'll refer to as the SFRY, the goals that were adopted by the Serbian
12 leadership within that process. The Serbian leadership is a group which
13 I define as those persons holding the highest level, civilian and
14 military positions within Serbia
15 FRY; the Republic of Serbian
17 I describe in particular the developments of those entities,
18 again within the context of the dissolution of the former SFRY with the
19 focus on the goals that those leaders had set for themselves.
20 Q. Can you provide the Court with some understanding of the nature
21 of the documents that are cited in that report and upon which you relied,
22 further issues you focused on and the conclusions you drew?
23 A. Yes. The types of documents I use in the report are the type
24 that I described at the beginning of my testimony as the type of
25 documents I generally work with. They are official documents of the
1 various Serbian entities, documents such as minutes and transcripts of
2 meetings, laws, decisions, constitutions. There are also some press
3 items that are used. Those are -- typically are the, say, speeches of
4 leaders that were given on particular occasions and published in the
5 press. I also use some UN documents, such as UN Security Council
6 resolutions, presidential statements, and -- I think those are the main
7 categories of documents.
8 Q. What methodology did you use in the criteria, what criteria were
9 chosen by you in reviewing and selecting these documents?
10 A. Well, let me answer that question by saying that -- going back to
11 the fact that I've been engaged in collecting and reviewing documents
12 from the former Yugoslavia
13 course of that process, I have personally made an effort, and others in
14 OTP have made an effort, to systematically collect various categories of
15 documents. I mentioned earlier the open sources of the press, for
16 instance, Official Gazettes. But more importantly, I think, for this
17 case we have categories of documents, such as the records of various
18 types of meetings.
19 So I've made it my business to collect and review, for instance,
20 all the records of meetings of the Bosnian Serb Presidency, as the
21 Presidency of Republika Srpska; all the records of meetings of the
22 Bosnian Serb assembly; the records of meetings of the FRY's Supreme
23 Defence Council, the SDC. So there are whole categories of documents
24 which I have reviewed and made notes or summaries of, and that material
25 is part of my tool bag, if you will. When I'm asked to produce a report,
1 I go into my collection of summaries and notes on documents, most of
2 which are embodied in a CaseMap format. Our team has its own CaseMap. I
3 put many of the documents in there myself and other people put things
4 there as well under my direction. So I have all that available to me
5 when dealing with a specific request for a report. So that material is
6 pre-existing, if you will.
7 When I get a request for a report such as this one, I then go
8 into that body of material and review items that I -- that I think --
9 review and select items that I think may be relevant to the subject, to
10 the report. The report, of course -- writing a report of this nature
11 takes place within the context of certain constraints, the most important
12 being time and space. Ordinarily, the trial team wants it pretty fast
13 and also wants to keep it short, concise, for the benefit of the Trial
15 So within the -- within the framework of the type of material
16 that I've been describing, which is based on a systematic review of
17 various categories of documents from the region, I produced this report.
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honours, in keeping with your order of the
19 27th of October, I will, at the completion of Mr. Treanor's testimony, be
20 seeking to tender his CV, the report, and the documents that are cited in
21 that report.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Madam Sutherland, but I'm not
23 quite sure that your question has been answered. Your question was
24 specifically what methodology was being used and what criteria were used.
25 We've been told, for instance, "that I think for this case we have
1 categories of documents, such as the records of various types of
2 meetings." Now, on what criteria do we choose some and not others, and
3 how do we determine relevance?
4 MS. SUTHERLAND:
5 Q. Mr. Treanor?
6 A. Well, the categories of documents that I have reviewed include
7 the records that we have available in OTP, and again they become
8 available after efforts to obtain them for, for instance, the highest
9 level policy-making bodies of the entities in the former Yugoslavia and
10 some of the political parties.
11 So in the case of this report, particularly important are the
12 records of the Presidency of the SFRY, the records of the assembly of the
13 Republika Srpska, the Official Gazettes of the FRY --
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry to interrupt you. You've told us that,
15 sir. The question is: What criteria do you use to pick on certain types
16 of records and not others? You said, as I said earlier, "for this case
17 we have categories of documents such as the records of various types of
18 meetings," and a little later you said you pick them on the basis of
19 relevance. The question is: How do you determine relevance and how do
20 you -- what criteria do you use to pick on certain documents and not
22 THE WITNESS: Let me clarify that. I have, as I say, available
23 to me these various collections of records, and I select from those
24 various collections those portions of individual records which, in my
25 judgement, are relevant to the topic in the report.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: On what criteria is your judgement based, sir?
2 THE WITNESS: Well, my judgement is based on my knowledge of the
3 subjects and my -- my personal judgement as to whether a particular item
4 is relevant to the topic that I was requested to produce a report on.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, but, you see, you're testifying as an expert.
6 As an expert we expect that you have certain expertise, certain
7 principles within your area of expertise that guide you in making your
8 selection. I'm trying to find out what those are.
9 THE WITNESS: Right. Well, I'm a historian by profession, and we
10 don't use a -- some sort of numerical or --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's the --
12 THE WITNESS: -- analytical framework of that sort. It's based
13 on the judgement of the individual researcher as to what is "relevant."
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed. That's the problem, sir, because then it
15 may very well be that you left certain documents that are relevant and
16 brought in documents that are not relevant if you don't have a system of
17 doing things, and this is the problem. And if you say you don't use some
18 sort of -- well, the sentence is incomplete. Then the question becomes:
19 How do we take this report as an expert report? Because if you say
20 you're a historian, anybody can write history, is that what you're
21 saying, and pick up facts that he wants to pick up, based on his personal
23 THE WITNESS: Well, training for a historian involves doing
24 research and producing an analytical product, and extensive analytical
25 product, usually referred to as a thesis or a dissertation on a
1 particular topic, and that product of thesis or dissertation on a
2 particular topic. And that product of thesis or dissertation is reviewed
3 by usually senior people in the field, and they pass judgement on it.
4 There is, as I said, there is no mathematical key to how you select
5 documents. It's a judgemental question, and one develops one's judgement
6 in this field by, A, reading history and, B, doing research.
7 JUDGE DAVID: Mr. Treanor, are there any objective structures in
8 the report constituted by the historical and factual data, and have you
9 used a course of discretion in selecting certain facts from others?
10 Because I imagine that there is no historical work without at least some
11 hypothetical presumptions that later on are verified on the facts, which
12 is to say that there is no history without some degree of subjectivity,
13 but at the same time that history should not be purely arbitrarily
14 impersonal. Is the subjectivity based on the selection of the most
15 relevant facts in relation to some hypothetical lines of thinking that
16 are expressed in the conclusions of the report?
17 I don't know if I am confusing you or clarifying the situation,
18 because I believe that in any historical report, there are always some
19 degree of subjectivity, but it's not the subjectivity that is purely
20 personal of the researcher but a subjectivity that consists of selecting
21 certain paths of thinking according to the general overall perspective of
22 the situation. Is that your case?
23 THE WITNESS: I think you might have helped a bit, Your Honour.
24 As a general matter, I would say that that is the case. As you've
25 stated, there is always an element of subjectivity or even ideological
1 approach that each person is imbued with when they approach particular
2 material and seek to analyse it.
3 Perhaps it would assist if I note -- if I noted the following:
4 In tracing the developments of the various entities that I mentioned, I
5 sought to do that - again, I sought to do that; perhaps I didn't succeed
6 - in a uniform fashion by picking the same types of documents from each
7 entity which chronicle their development from the beginning of some sort
8 of declaration to the establishment of an autonomous area to the
9 establishment of a republic. What does the constitution say about what
10 the organs of that power will be? Who occupied the offices? Again, I
11 attempted to do that for each of the entities that I was describing.
12 JUDGE DAVID: There is in paragraph 4 of the introduction: The
13 focus, you said, is rather on the goals of the Serbian leaders and the
14 extent to which they achieve them. The facts recorded thus do not by any
15 means represent the whole history of the conflict of the region, but
16 there will be essential elements in any such telling."
17 So you have started already saying what are the objectives of the
18 research, the goals of the research. This goal was given to you by the
19 Prosecution or --
20 THE WITNESS: That's correct.
21 JUDGE DAVID: -- or were you free in the selection of the goals?
22 THE WITNESS: The Prosecution asked for a report on a -- of a
23 particular nature, and that's what I've described in the introduction.
24 JUDGE DAVID: So we must say that your research is not absolutely
25 personally value-free because you have been given a task to comply with
1 in the sense that you have been given a purpose and a task, some
2 objectives. Now, the important point is that you have rendered, to the
3 extent of your knowledge, with methodology, tools, and so on, the best
4 product that you were able to achieve. Are you sure that this is the
5 best you could -- that you could have achieved in producing the
6 prescribed goals?
7 THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, the task was set by the trial team
8 and within the framework of that task, I was free to do whatever I wanted
9 to, basically. Could I have produced a better product? Given more time
10 and more space, it would have been more complete and much longer. But I
11 think that the main outlines of the topic are in the report.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Did you say the task was given by the Trial
14 THE WITNESS: No, by the trial team. I'm sorry, I may have
15 misspoken. The trial team.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Trial team.
17 JUDGE DAVID: Thank you.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, I'm going to pick up something now that was
19 said in answer to Judge David's questions.
20 You say: "As you have stated, there is always an element of
21 subjectivity or even ideological approach that each person is imbued with
22 when they approach particular material and seek to analyse it."
23 Were you driven by that in compiling your report?
24 THE WITNESS: Well, I think that based on the theoretical
25 literature on this topic with which I have some familiarity, although not
1 a deep one, I'm told that, as Judge David was saying, that everyone sort
2 of has some sort of bias or another, and then they may not realize it. I
3 mean, I'm from the United States. It's a liberal democracy. We believe
4 in equal rights in the United States and the equality of all its
5 citizens, et cetera, et cetera, so that's the -- something that I suppose
6 will affect my approach to anything, as opposed to somebody who, for
7 instance, might have come from the former Soviet Union and believed in --
8 was a Marxist, et cetera, et cetera. So that type of bias operates
9 subconsciously or unconsciously.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't understand your reference to the
11 United States and Russia
12 that subjectivity and ideological approach in compiling this report?
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I was trying to describe what my
14 ideology is. That was my reference to the United States. That
15 informs --
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: And how did you apply that ideology in the
17 compilation of this report?
18 THE WITNESS: As I indicated, I think that that type of thing is
19 generally -- operates subconsciously or unconsciously. I couldn't say
20 how I consciously applied it. Someone else who has a different -- from a
21 different ideological background may have approached this in an entirely
22 different way.
23 JUDGE DAVID: Mr. Treanor, in addition, just because of your
24 answer, there is no question that every work of history or in the social
25 sciences is surrounded by implicit ideological options, but one thing are
1 the ideological options, and the second thing are the strict structure of
2 an objective research. You have obtained a Ph.D. in a US university, or
3 in any other university, and certainly your masters will have a
4 structure, your research, in such a way that you will maximize the
5 objective in parenthesis of the factual data and of the interpretation of
6 the data in order to get it purer from obscure ideological connotations,
7 implying that certainly values are there in any thinking. Are you
8 following me?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE DAVID: And so you might have some options from what part
11 of the world you come, but there is a universal set of rules concerning
12 the minimal standards of a scientific objective piece. Are you
13 following? Are you in agreement with this?
14 THE WITNESS: Yes.
15 JUDGE DAVID: And my question is to you: Despite this
16 ideological bending that anyone from various part of the world has, are
17 you convinced that you have insisted upon the most extreme objectivity on
18 factual -- on factual data and underlining interpretations?
19 THE WITNESS: Well, yes, I believe that's true, and let me give
20 an explanation to that directly related to the report.
21 The report is based on certain documents, which I've mentioned,
22 and the -- each paragraph is referenced to a particular document and
23 generally each paragraph is a description or a summary or an extract from
24 the contents of that document. I sought to make no -- draw no
25 interpretive conclusions from any document or any set of those documents.
1 In other words, just -- I sought to simply lay out in a string, if you
2 will, usually chronologically in each section, what the contents of each
3 document that would be important to consider in the context of this
4 report, what that document says, again without drawing any conclusions of
5 my own or putting any interpretation on them.
6 Now, it's given, of course, that I selected the documents based
7 on my judgement, and I selected the portions of the documents that I
8 wanted to use, and I'm the one that is responsible for the -- for the
9 summaries of the documents, but -- as opposed to a standard work of
10 historical research where the historian will feel free, indeed feel
11 compelled, to make various interpretations and judgements. I sought to
12 refrain from that.
13 JUDGE DAVID: Thank you very much.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Sutherland.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND:
16 Q. Mr. Treanor, for the purposes of your testimony, you also
17 selected a number of documents to assist the Court in understanding your
18 report; is that right?
19 A. Yes, I selected a number of documents that were not cited in the
20 reports that I thought might also be useful. Again, when I wrote the
21 report, there were certain constraints of time and space in producing it
22 for the purposes of this testimony. Of course, we're not going to use
23 nearly all the documents that are cited in the report, so I thought it
24 might be beneficial to introduce some new ones which would shed
25 additional light on some of the matters raised in the report.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: With Your Honours' leave, Mr. Treanor has
2 binders of documents in front of him which have the B/C/S versions of the
3 documents, and I would seek Your Honours' leave that he be allowed to
4 refer to those. I have shown them to my colleague Mr. Gregor Guy-Smith,
5 so he has reviewed those binders.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: That is correct. I have reviewed the binders. I
8 do have a question, however, with regard to the issue of the
9 interpretation and translation of that material. As I understand what
10 we're about to do is that Mr. Treanor, who has some proficiency in
11 reading the language, is, I take it, going to be commenting and
12 translating, he's going to be performing the function of a translator and
13 potentially an interpreter - and I make a distinction as between the two,
14 for obvious reasons - with regard to source documents themselves which I
15 think, quite frankly, poses a problem. Because if we do not have
16 official interpretations of those documents, something which all parties
17 can rely upon, and I don't know whether or not Mr. Treanor has had the
18 opportunity to take the proficiency examination of an interpreter or
19 translator, such that there is a common basis for his understanding of
20 the language and the subtleties of the language specifically as it deals
21 with matters before the Tribunal and any kind of legal issues that could
22 occur, I believe that we may run into a rather unfortunate problem with
23 regard to the issue of translation as well as interpretation with regard
24 to the content of those documents upon which he relies, which he wishes
25 to share with the Chamber.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Sutherland.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Mr. Treanor is going to give his opinion on the
3 documents. The documents are going to come in e-court. There's a
4 translation there, and there's also the B/C/S version. In order to
5 assist him, he has the documents, the B/C/S version of the documents, in
6 front of him so that he can go to those documents in order to give his
7 opinion to whatever question I may put to him.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: And you say there's an official translation of the
9 documents that you are going to show him here?
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, the Rule 65 ter translations so there is --
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Then I'm not bothered.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: To the extent -- to the extent that there may
14 be -- we'll see how this progresses. There may be a distinction between
15 what Mr. Treanor believes the document says and what the official
16 translation presents could be an entirely different issue. But for the
17 moment I think we'll be okay.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Based upon the specific methodology, and I'm
20 pleased of hear of a methodology that we're going to be using.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may proceed, Madam Sutherland.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND:
23 Q. Mr. Treanor, can we begin then by discussing the documents you
24 selected, and perhaps we can begin with the speech of the President of
25 the Presidency of Serbia
1 Assembly on the 26th of June, 1990.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: And if document number 06812 could be brought up
3 onto the screen, please. In the B/C/S it's page number 1, and in the
4 English translation it's on page number 3.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Sutherland, did you say 06813 or 2?
6 MS. SUTHERLAND: 06812, Your Honour.
7 Q. Perhaps you could start, Mr. Treanor, by just putting briefly
8 that speech into context.
9 A. Yes, certainly. This speech was given in June 1990, as has been
10 mentioned. At that time the process of the dissolution of the SFRY was
11 progressing to the extent that at the beginning of 1990, the ruling party
12 of the SFRY, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, essentially
13 dissolved. Yugoslavia
14 After the -- indeed, in some cases before the dissolution of the
15 League of Communists of Yugoslavia, non-communist parties were formed in
16 the various republics of the SFRY, and those parties, and indeed some
17 members of the League of Communists in the various republics, raised the
18 demand for multi-party elections, which hitherto had not taken place in
19 the SFRY. Such elections had taken place in Slovenia and Croatia
20 spring of 1990, in April, and those elections resulted in the victory of
21 non-communist parties in those republics; that is, non-communist parties
22 elected the majority of members of the assemblies of those republics.
23 Now, in Serbia
24 parties were in the course of being formed in the summer of 1990, and
25 they were raising the demand that multi-party elections be held in Serbia
1 also. The ruling party in Serbia
2 was willing to accede to that but first they wanted to amend -- adopt a
3 new constitution for Serbia
4 elections would be held under the new constitution and the elections
5 would be for the bodies that were set up by the new constitution and with
6 the authorities established in the new constitution.
7 This speech is given by Slobodan Milosevic, who was the President
8 of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic
9 assembly in connection with the adoption of a new constitution. The
10 situation in June in that respect was that the League of Communists of
12 whether the new constitution should be adopted before the elections or
13 after the elections. That referendum, in fact, was held at the end of
14 July and resulted in --
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: We certainly are past the month of June when the
16 speech was given, and his answer was to put the speech in context.
17 Anything then after the speech certainly doesn't give us any context.
18 I also think that there's another difficulty here in the answer
19 to the extent we're talking about putting the speech in context, which
20 is, and I'm referring to line 90, where it indicates -- I'm sorry,
21 page 90, line 2, where Mr. Treanor indicates "the ruling party in Serbia
22 the League of Communists of Serbia, was willing to accede to that, but
23 first they wanted to ..." and then he discusses amending the
24 constitution. But later on he indicates, and that's on page 90, at line
25 12 and 13 -- starting at line 10, that "the situation in June in that
1 respect was that the League of Communists in Serbia was proposing that a
2 referendum be held on the issue of whether the new constitution be
4 So I'm not sure whether or not he's speaking from a standpoint of
5 contextually of, in fact, what was occurring with the League of
6 Communists at that time. And rather than go through, I think, a rather
7 arduous or torturous process of cross-examination with this kind of
8 particular detail, since he is, for purposes of discussion, dealing with
9 the context of a speech, I would appreciate it if rather than put value -
10 which is what he's doing now, he's making subjective value judgements
11 with regard to what was occurring - he gives us the context, meaning the
12 factual information, that was present at the time, which he obviously
13 received from those documents that he specifically chose.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Sutherland.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, the referendum is part of the
16 context of the speech.
17 Q. If I can ask Mr. Treanor, can you tell the Court what Belgrade
18 position was to the breakup of the SFRY?
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry.
20 THE WITNESS: I think we can go to the speech now.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: You have been asked a question now.
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, he's going to answer the question in
23 relation to that.
24 THE WITNESS: In the speech Slobodan Milosevic sets out certain
25 positions in regard to the issue of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia
1 which is -- forms the subject of the passages that we've selected to --
2 I've selected to focus on here. I'm not sure how to direct you to the
3 proper --
4 MS. SUTHERLAND:
5 Q. If we can blow up what is on the second column, above the bullet
6 point in the B/C/S, and then on page 3 of the English translation,
7 starting with the text "That is why this draft on the constitution of
9 A. The portion I would like to focus on is further down in this
10 column, toward the bottom, in which Slobodan Milosevic notes that
11 basically that if the SFRY were to be changed into a confederation as
12 opposed to a federation, then the issue of the borders of the republics
13 of the federation would be opened. He says that he does not consider a
14 confederation to be a state and that therefore the borders of the
15 republics cannot be changed into -- cannot remain as borders if the
16 federation were to cease to be a federation and become a confederation.
17 Q. And --
18 A. And he concludes in the next column by saying that if that were
19 to happen, the question of the borders of Serbia would then become an
20 open political question.
21 Q. And that's on page 4 of the transcript -- the English
22 translation, I'm sorry.
23 Did the idea of assisting Serbs outside of Serbia find any
24 additional expression at that time?
25 A. Well, it finds expression elsewhere in this document. If we can
1 move over to the next column, the last column on the extreme right, and
2 blow that up.
3 In that portion he notes that the -- the Serbia that will be
4 established under the new constitution, which will be a unitary state, a
5 unitary state of Serbia
6 will have power throughout the territory of Serbia
7 there had been two autonomous provinces in Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina,
8 which had extensive powers. Those have been eliminated -- actually, they
9 had been eliminated by constitutional amendment previously, and that
10 situation would be enshrined in the new constitution as well. He says
11 that this new unitary Serbia
12 interests of Serbs outside of Serbia
13 Q. And does this idea of --
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, I don't know whether at this point,
15 and this is whether or not Mr. Treanor is reading from the original as he
16 interprets it, but if I'm following his response, he is referring to the
17 second full sentence which I read in English as not that this new unitary
19 interests of Serbs outside of Serbia
20 same time be certain guarantee for protection of the interests of Serbian
21 people who live out of Serbia
22 from that which Mr. Treanor has suggested. I don't know if that's
23 occurred because he was reading from the document as he interprets it or
24 whether or not he is being now liberal with the language of
25 Mr. Milosevic's speech. But I think it's kind of important that with
1 regard to the road that we're going down, that we are quite accurate and
2 that we rely upon here the translation as it is set forth, because
3 certainly a position to defend the interests is quite different than a
4 guarantee for protection of the interests, and it embodies a series of
5 not only political but social principles that are distinct from that
6 which I think Mr. Treanor is driving at in his answer.
7 My concern is that we are verbatim accurate in this regard and
8 that we should not -- we should not slip into interpreting that which has
9 been said and been translated.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Sutherland.
11 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, Mr. Treanor does not have to read
12 verbatim the translation. He can put his own opinion to the words that
13 are written on that page. The very fact that certain words are written
14 there doesn't mean that it's true. He can -- he can tell you his
15 interpretation of what that text means.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: In that event, why should we have this text here?
17 Why doesn't he just close this text and he gives us his opinion?
18 MS. SUTHERLAND: He can do that, but this is to assist Your
19 Honours. This is the --
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now, when we are going out here to write the
21 judgement and Mr. Treanor is not here, we're going to be looking at this
22 document, we're going to be looking at the transcript, and if we find
23 that there are inconsistencies between what he says and the document,
24 what do you suggest we do?
25 MS. SUTHERLAND: He's putting his view of what he believes that
1 paragraph means, so it's the weight that you want to give to his
2 testimony. And if my colleague wants to cross-examine him on any of
3 these matters, then he can do that.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think before he gives his opinion, he must tell
5 us the facts first, as they stand, and then he can give his opinion on
6 those facts.
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.
8 Q. Mr. Treanor, did the idea of assisting Serbs outside of Serbia
9 find any additional expression at that time?
10 A. Yes. At this time, just a few weeks later, the --
11 Q. If I can just pause there.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: If we could have Rule 65 ter number 06739 called
13 up, please.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are we done with the speech?
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.
16 Q. If you can go to page 10 of the B/C/S version and page 11 of the
17 English translation, please.
18 A. Yes. A few weeks after the speech in the Serbian assembly that
19 we just saw, the Socialist Party of Serbia was founded. It was founded
20 as an amalgamation of the League of Communists of Serbia and the
21 Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia, which were two
22 preexisting political institutions from the SFRY.
23 At the founding congress on the 16th of July, 1990, the party
24 adopted a programme, a rather extensive programme covering all sorts of
25 social, economic, and political issues. And we find in the programme
1 points that deal with the Serbs outside of Serbia.
2 At the top of the page, I would like to draw your attention to
3 that passage, Your Honours. At this point I'm -- I must admit I'm a
4 little bit confused as to what you want me to do, whether to summarize
5 the passage or to give it my own translation. I have been in other
6 courtrooms and different Trial Chambers have adopted different approaches
7 to that, so I'd appreciate guidance as to your approach.
8 In considering that issue, I would venture that the report I've
9 written and the testimony I'm given -- I'm giving is mine. It's my
10 report and my testimony. I have, as I mentioned, been through this
11 process before, and I'm aware that the translations that are provided are
12 often inaccurate and need correction on the one hand, and on the other,
13 of course what you are offered in the report and my testimony is my
14 understanding of the documents rather than the understanding of a
15 translator, however good the translation may be.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: The short answer is do what your counsel asks you
17 to do. We can't prescribe to you what to do. And if what you do is
18 found unacceptable by your counsel's opposite number, he will rise onto
19 his feet.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND:
21 Q. Mr. Treanor, just touching on the translations, if you will, for
22 a moment, and you said that sometimes they are incorrect. Is it the case
23 that in this institution, due to the limited resources from CLSS, that
24 the Office of the Prosecutor has draft translations done from a certain
25 unit and that those translations are then submitted into the court, and
1 unless either of the parties find discrepancies with those translations,
2 then they can be admitted into the court?
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe that -- the answer to that question may
4 certainly be well outside the purview of this particular witness's
5 knowledge. That is a matter that exists as between the parties
6 themselves and is -- with regard to that, it's one of a number of
7 solutions that have been found. But it, many times, depends on the
8 importance and critical nature of the translations that exist, whereas
9 here the witness has indicated there are inaccuracies, and we do not know
10 what those inaccuracies are, and if the Prosecution is inviting me at
11 this point in time to wholesale make such an agreement with them, I
12 respectfully decline because of the important nature of the words that
13 have been translated and the meaning that is going to be given to those
14 words by this Chamber as a result of how this witness testifies.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND: I certainly wasn't --
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes.
17 MS. SUTHERLAND: -- I wasn't asking my friend to concede
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
20 MS. SUTHERLAND: I was simply making a distinction that there are
21 differences of translations. Some are in final form and some are in
22 draft form. If I can move on, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: You can --
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: I apologise.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Go ahead.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Perhaps it would be of some guidance, then, with
2 regard to the exercise that we're engaged in right now whether we're
3 dealing with draft translations or final translations and what we are
4 going to do in the future with regard to the import of this information,
5 which is independent of the issue of the witness's offer to operate, as I
6 understand it, at least in some regards, as a summary witness, which
7 raises other legal considerations.
8 MS. SUTHERLAND: He's not being offered as a summary witness.
9 He's giving his opinion as to what this document states.
10 Your Honour --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: I have a problem, and the problem I have is -- I
12 have it with both counsel. You put the proposition, Madam Sutherland, to
13 the witness that, due to the limited resources in CLSS, the Office of the
14 Prosecutor has drafted translations done from a certain unit and that
15 those translations are then submitted into court. Mr. Guy-Smith says
16 that that is a matter that exists as between the parties themselves and
17 is with regards to that, it's one of a number of solutions that have been
19 I'm left with the impression that the parties are agreed that
20 some translations were not translated by official Tribunal translators.
21 Is that understanding correct?
22 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: That is my understanding as of now. In this
24 session I now understand that.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: And that is a position that is held by both
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. Being in court today, I now understand that
3 we do not have official translations with regard to all documents that
4 are being presented to this Chamber.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: Before this session, I would not have been able
7 to say that. That's something I learned in the course of what's going on
8 here. Perhaps I made an assumption --
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, from --
10 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, can I assist please?
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, please, ma'am.
12 MS. SUTHERLAND: This has been going on in this institution for a
13 number of years, and it is quite easy to work out whether it's a CLSS
14 translation or it's done by a unit within the Office of the Prosecutor.
15 If it's done within the Office of the Prosecutor, it will have the words
16 "ET" before the translation number at the top of the page, or it, in
17 fact, says "Draft Translation." If it's done by CLSS, then it's a
18 revised translation, and it has the words -- or it may, in fact, even be
19 a draft translation done by the CLSS, but it has the words "EDT" at the
20 end of the number.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes. That may very well be so, ma'am. It hasn't
22 happened in this chamber.
23 Let me come back to you, Mr. Guy-Smith. I don't understand you.
24 Your statement to the effect that it's one of a number of solutions that
25 have been found, and this solution has been found as between the parties,
1 like you said, that suggests you had prior knowledge.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: I do -- I do apologise for not being more
3 specific. The reference that I am making there is to the prior trials
4 that I have been involved in where there has been a draft translation or
5 there has been another document and the Prosecutor has offered the draft
6 translation as being the document upon which we could rely --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: -- and I have said -- I have said both yes and
9 no. That's what I meant by "the agreement between the parties." So that
10 when we come to the Chamber, we say, as the Chamber has said to us on
11 occasion, This is a draft translation; are the parties comfortable with
12 it? And we have said yes, and we have said no. That's what I meant by
13 that. Not with regard to this particular case. That issue never came
14 up. We have never had that discussion, and I did not consider that we
15 would be having a translation discussion. I didn't -- I didn't consider
16 we'd be in that world with this particular witness.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, can we get on to the same page. We
18 are not discussing other cases, we are discussing this case.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: With regard --
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now, if what you're referring to relates to other
21 cases, then that's not what we are talking about. We are talking about
22 this case. And the language that you use relating to that -- to the fact
23 that you say that that is a matter that exists as between the parties
24 themselves, which parties are you referring to?
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: With regard to this specific case, I clearly used
1 a language that was inexact and inappropriate, and I apologise to the
2 Chamber for doing that, because with regard to this particular case there
3 is nothing that exists between the parties with regard to this issue.
4 Nothing. So to the extent that I used inexact language, let me be very
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before you sit down and before I hand over to
7 Madam Sutherland, what, then, do you suggest be done with this
8 translation that is apparently not by a qualified CLSS employee?
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: At this point my concern is that this translation
10 is now going to be interpreted by the witness, thereby removing us
11 further from potentially what actually was said in the original document,
12 and that is something that I would object to.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's about as far as I can go for the moment
15 because thus far what we have experienced is the presentation of a
16 document in the original language and in English and then a factual
17 recitation of what that document says by the witness, which is already
18 distinct from the specific language that exists in English.
19 So I have -- since I think we're at a point where a number of
20 these words are going to have great intent, and by "intent" I mean
21 meaning, with regard to some kind of fundamental issues that exist in
22 this case, I have grave concerns about operating on the basis of a
23 translation that is, as the witness has said, inaccurate, upon which he
24 is now going to render an opinion.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Sutherland.
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, Mr. Treanor didn't say that this
2 translation was inaccurate. He was making --
3 Q. Is that correct, Mr. Treanor?
4 A. That's right. I was not referring to this particular document.
5 I was speaking in general.
6 Again, if I can explain my work, perhaps, in more detail. We
7 discussed earlier at some length the process of review and selection of
8 documents. I do that, and the people that work for me do that, working
9 with the original documents. We don't work from translations.
10 Why don't we work from translations? Well, first of all, we
11 don't need to. Second of all, typically, the documents that we're
12 working with haven't been translated yet. When I wrote this report, very
13 many of those documents had not been translated. I'm not sure which ones
14 were, which ones weren't, but I know that recently there's been quite a
15 push put on to get documents in the report -- that are mentioned in the
16 report, used in the report, translated. So I infer from that that many
17 of them were not translated.
18 Again, that doesn't bother me because I don't use the
19 translations, I use the original documents. And as I indicated before,
20 what I offer in the report and what I seek to offer the Court now is the
21 meaning of these documents to me and not the meaning that those documents
22 may have to someone else. I'm not calling into question any particular
23 translation, and not this one which, by the way, appears to be the
24 official SPS translation of the document, although I'm not a hundred per
25 cent certain of that. But that's what it appears to be. It's just that
1 in my experience, I have run into occasions where the translations that
2 were offered were, in fact, incomplete and inaccurate. So I -- which is
3 just another reason for me to not to be bothered with translations at
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: But I heard you say at the beginning of your
6 testimony, Mr. Treanor, that you have - excuse me - a basic reading
7 knowledge of the language.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Basic.
10 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't think I said "basic." I believe I
11 said I had a very good reading knowledge of the language.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't think you said "good" either. I'm clearly
13 left with the impression that it was not a good knowledge. I don't know
14 the line and the page, but that's the impression I was left with.
15 MS. SUTHERLAND:
16 Q. Mr. Treanor, how long have you been reading the B/C/S language?
17 A. Approximately 35 years. I've been using it in my research, in my
18 official capacity, and as a translator for about that period of time.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Anyway, Madam Sutherland, you have an objection
20 from your learned friend. Any response to it?
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: I'm sorry, I've lost it on the page, and I don't
22 recall it. If you could summarize it for me, I would be grateful.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith said if we are using unofficially
24 translated documents which may, in fact, be inaccurate and then we still
25 get a personal opinion of the witness on them, we're moving further away
1 from what the original document said and on that basis, he would object.
2 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, there's two issues there. The
3 first one is on unofficial translated documents. Mr. Guy-Smith has just
4 come onto this case, but this case has been dealing for a long time with
5 draft translations, and that's just the nature of the beast. We have in
6 this institution eight trials running simultaneously, or we're supposed
7 to be having eight trials running simultaneously. CLSS do not have the
8 resources to translate thousands and thousands and thousands of pages of
9 documents in relation to those trials. And so we have to, everybody has
10 to rely on the draft translations that have been done by CLSS because
11 they haven't -- they don't have the resources to revise them before we
12 need to use them in the courtroom, or the other department that does the
13 draft -- that does the unofficial translations. And it's been the
14 practice for quite a number of years that those translations are accepted
15 into the court unless the parties object to them, and then they are sent
16 for revision. But if there's no objection, then those draft unofficial
17 translations are accepted.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: You do have an objection to them, number one,
19 ma'am, number two, and that's what we discussed, the objection to using
20 them. And number two --
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I can just touch on the second issue, Your
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I just finish with what you've told us.
24 You say it's been a number of years. How long have we been
25 having eight cases running at the same time? Is it a number of years?
1 MS. SUTHERLAND: At least four years, maybe three years.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Eight cases?
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour. I mean, don't quote me on it.
4 I know that for at least two years.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: And because of that are you saying we should run
6 the risk of unfair proceedings because of likely mistakes?
7 MS. SUTHERLAND: No, Your Honour. I just said unless the Defence
8 objects to a document, if they don't object -- it's not unfair to the
9 accused, if the Defence don't have a problem with the translation. This
10 institution would come to a grinding halt if we had to get a revised CLSS
11 translation of every single document that we seek to tender into
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: I understand that indeed it may happen that the
14 opposite number doesn't object, but that does not remove the fact that if
15 indeed the inaccuracy has slipped the attention of the opposite side or
16 he has no way of finding out whether it is an inaccurate and it does slip
17 in, then there is unfairness either to the Prosecution or to the Defence,
18 and that is why CLSS was established.
19 MS. SUTHERLAND: CLSS have a very limited number of staff.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: I understand that.
21 MS. SUTHERLAND: The completion strategy, we would still be here
22 in 2020 if we had to wait for the translation of the number of pages that
23 are going through the courts at the moment. And a lot of these bigger
24 cases are so document heavy, as opposed to where you may have one accused
25 from Prijedor in a camp case, as opposed to the leadership cases where
1 they are very document oriented. I mean, that's the -- that's the
2 reality, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is that your response to the objection?
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, as I said, unless the Defence
5 object --
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought they said they're objecting. You asked
7 me to summarize what the objection was, and I told you -- I summarized it
8 for you.
9 MS. SUTHERLAND: If I understand Mr. Guy-Smith well, he's now
10 saying he's objecting to the draft translation of any document we seek to
11 tender? Is that right?
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would you like to clarify yourself, sir?
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. With regard to those documents that
14 Mr. Treanor is using which are draft translations, in the absence of
15 information at the present time concerning the accuracy of those
16 translations, we object. With regard to any other witness, we may reach
17 a different point depending on who the witness is and what the import is
18 of those translations. But given the experience that we have had thus
19 far in a very limited period of time concerning the issue not only of
20 translation but also his interpretation of what is being said, we have no
21 alternative but at this point to object because we are concerned that we
22 will not be dealing accurately with the information that's contained
23 therein and cannot intelligently respond thereto.
24 [Prosecution counsel confer]
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 [Defence counsel confer]
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Sutherland.
3 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, if I can just briefly say that
4 we've been disclosing a lot of documents over a number of years, and we
5 advised the Defence that they have a number of Serbo-Croat readers on
6 their team. If they have any objection to the documents, then one would
7 assume that they would bring them up with us before now, instead of at
8 the moment the witness is testifying.
9 But if I can say, Your Honour, if we can address this issue with
10 you in court tomorrow, we would prefer to do that, the whole translation
11 issue of the documents.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're expanding the problem. At this stage we're
13 dealing with this document before us. If, however, you do want to talk
14 about the whole issue of translation, you're welcome to do so at an
15 opportune moment. Bear in mind that at this stage you have an objection
16 in your hands, and it is no answer to that objection to refer to the
17 translations that have been done over the years. I would like a response
18 that is focused on what is before us right now.
19 I note the time. You might perhaps want to respond to this
20 objection, pertinently to what we are doing now, tomorrow. You're
21 welcome to do so. And then if you want to expand the document to all
22 translations, we'll do so.
23 MS. SUTHERLAND: Your Honour, I will take you up on your offer to
24 go into the matter tomorrow and answer the objection.
25 Just on one matter, though. In relation to Mr. Treanor's
1 proficiency, I would just direct Your Honours to page 74 of the LiveNote,
2 lines 12 to 16, that is, his reading proficiency in the language.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Page 74? Line?
4 MS. SUTHERLAND: Twelve to 16.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
6 My apologies to you, Mr. Treanor. My apologies to you.
7 THE WITNESS: No need to apologise, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: There is a need to. If I misinterpreted you --
9 misquoted you, there is always a need.
10 THE WITNESS: I thank you for your apology.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Sutherland, would this then be an
12 opportune moment?
13 MS. SUTHERLAND: Yes, Your Honour, given the time.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Court adjourned to tomorrow, quarter past
15 2.00. Same courtroom. Court adjourned.
16 You do know, Mr. Treanor, that being in this witness stand, you
17 don't have to talk to anybody. You don't need to be told this, in any
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Very well. Court adjourned.
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.
22 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 4th day of
23 November, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.