1 Monday, 26 January 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning to everybody in and around the
6 courtroom. Madam Registrar, will you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
8 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-81-T,
9 the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Could we have appearances
11 for the day starting with the Prosecution.
12 MR. THOMAS: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
13 everyone in and around the courtroom. Mark Harmon, Barney Thomas,
14 Rafael La Cruz and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. For the Defence.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning
17 everyone. Milos
18 Gregor Guy-Smith and Novak Lukic on behalf of the Defence.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.
20 Could we move into private session just for a short while.
21 [Private session]
20 [Open session]
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are back in open session.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Mr. Thomas.
23 MR. THOMAS: Prosecution calls Dr. Charles Kirudja, please.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning, Mr. Kirudja.
2 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: May you please make the declaration.
4 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
5 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
6 WITNESS: CHARLES KIRUDJA
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may take a seat.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Are you okay, Mr. Kirudja? Are you
10 well this morning.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, as well as I can be. Thank you.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Yes, Mr. Thomas.
13 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours.
14 Examination by Mr. Thomas:
15 Q. Doctor, can you begin please by providing us with your full name
16 and date of birth?
17 A. My name is Charles Kirudja. I was born in Kenya on April 20th,
19 Q. Your current occupation is?
20 A. I'm a retiree from the UN.
21 Q. Could you give us, please, very briefly an indication of your
22 background prior to your involvement in the former Yugoslavia?
23 A. Prior to my posting to Belgrade
24 serving in various capacities at the United Nations beginning 1977.
25 Those capacities included about seven years where I was involved
1 in a field involving what national corporations and their influenced
2 activities around the world. It was a special department of the UN at
3 that time tasked with tracing all the affects, political, economic, and
4 social at that time.
5 Then I was transferred from that role to the department of
6 finance and budget where I remained until about 1984, something like
7 that. Then I was re-assigned --
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought you were seven years in the other
9 department starting from 1977.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, seven years, 1977 brings up to --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: To 1984.
12 THE WITNESS: That's what I just said, just about 1984.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought 1984 you were starting the new --
14 THE WITNESS: No, 1984 is what I was going to tell you. And at
15 that time, I was then assigned in the office of the controller and posted
16 four years later to a department that had been created in 1988, following
17 the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union from Afghanistan
18 United Nations had been tasked to pick up the pieces of the humanitarian
19 crisis that had been created in Afghanistan
20 effort was the Late-Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, who I was tasked to assist
21 in organising that effort based in Geneva. And in that capacity, I was
22 both the administrator of a fund where the international community had
23 put their contributions, humanitarian and cash, for the effort.
24 From Geneva
25 Soviet Union, in Iran
1 countries were inclusive of the tasks that we were assigned to do.
2 About 1989 or thereabouts, I was then returned back to the
3 United Nations and given the task of dealing in the office of finance
4 that dealt with peacekeeping activities, rather than the general
5 financial and budgetary affairs of the UN.
6 1992, then I was posted to Belgrade.
7 Q. Before I talk about your postings in the former Yugoslavia, can
8 you tell us what your academic qualifications are, please?
9 A. I graduated from the University of Nairobi
10 commerce, specialising in management of business activities, operations
11 research and management science. I then was given a scholarship by the
12 Canadian foreign office and arrived in Canada 1972 at the University of
14 went to the University of Western Ontario where I graduated the PhD in
15 business management operations research in 1977. And then the
16 United Nations recruited me directly from London, Ontario, Canada
17 University of Western Ontario.
18 Q. Moving now to your time in the Balkans, what was your first
20 A. We arrived in Belgrade
21 from there, I was posted on a fact-finding tour by bus from Belgrade
23 based; and from Erdut, I was asked to proceed to Daruvar where
24 Sector West was based, and from Daruvar I received a fax notifying me
25 that I was to take over in Topusko in Sector North where I would be at
1 that time acting as chief civil affairs officer.
2 MR. THOMAS: Before we go any further, Doctor, you have mentioned
3 some areas which we should identify for the Trial Chamber, please. And I
4 wonder, Your Honours, if I could have a map from the court binder up on
5 the screen; it is 65 ter number 09234. At number 1 in the booklets, Your
7 Q. First of all, Doctor, do you recognise that map as one of the
8 territories of the former Yugoslavia
9 A. Yes, I do recognise it.
10 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, could we please tender the blank map
11 as a Prosecution exhibit.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: The map is admitted into evidence. May it please
13 be given an exhibit number.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P469.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
16 MR. THOMAS:
17 Q. The first area I'd like you to -- perhaps before I can you to
18 mark these areas on the map, Doctor, you mentioned Sector North, Sector
19 East, Sector West, can you explain what these sectors are? Not
20 geographically what they are, but what they were actually -- why they
21 were termed that way, what they were?
22 A. The mission that the Security Council had authorised to these
23 areas of the former Yugoslavia
24 known as the Vance Plan concluded between Belgrade and Zagreb
25 [phoen] as the basis of this mission by the Security Council.
1 That Vance Plan had delineated areas of conflict within the
2 former Republic of Yugoslavia
3 of the parties at that time had an impact. Those areas designated by the
4 Vance plan formed a number of designated "opstinas" or municipalities, if
5 you like; and those areas spread all over parts of Croatia. And for
6 administrative purposes when the UN began to implement the terms of the
7 Vance Plan, they were designated as Sector East, which was in east
9 comprised a some of opstinas; and Sector South, which also comprised the
10 remaining number of opstinas, which were all in what they used to call
11 the Krajina area.
12 Q. Doctor, I'm going to ask Mr. Usher, please, to provide you with
13 an electronic pen, and ask you, please, as best you can with the passage
14 of time to mark roughly for us on the map before you on the screen those
15 various sectors.
16 A. Counsel, this map with my old eyes has become very, very
17 concentrated and it's very -- the density of it would make it hard for
18 me, actually, to do that.
19 Q. We can --
20 A. If you have a larger map where I can see the outlines of the
21 opstinas that I have named, I could do that. Right now, I see a patch of
22 green, white and all of the little lines in between.
23 Q. Would it assist you, sir, if we enlarged the area of Croatia
24 A. That would be very helpful. Could you do it again? I still
25 can't read the names there.
1 MR. THOMAS: Perhaps if we go to 65 ter number 09246,
2 Your Honours, and that is map 7 in the booklet.
3 Q. And, Doctor, if that's still --
4 A. No, I can begin to see the outlines of Sector North as --
5 Your Honour, if you are looking at this screen that I'm looking at, and
6 if you can see my pen, there is the extension of the opstina called
7 Kostanica that is to the west.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't see your pen unfortunately.
9 THE WITNESS: You don't see my pen and I don't see what you are
10 looking at, the same map. That map -- excuse me. I apologise, Your
12 The opstina of Kostanica was part of the Sector North, and it
13 comes down going westwards from Kostanica you pick up the opstina of
14 Petrinja which was also part of Sector North, and then you come down to
15 the opstina of a Dvor na Uni, which was in Sector North. West of
16 Petrinja, you go to Glina, which was the opstina also inclusive of Sector
17 North. And then from Glina you go westward, and you will see the opstina
18 of Vrgin Most. I will name them when you can see them on the map, Vrgin
19 Most and then as you proceed west of Vrgin Most, then you go to -- going
20 down along the border south-west, you get to Slunj which was also a part
21 of Sector North and part of the opstinas that are inclusive of Sector
22 North. Vojnic and then going southwards, the border of Sector North,
23 would have ended somewhere in Korenica and that was basically and roughly
24 what was our Sector North.
25 Northwards, there are some rivers that you can trace around,
1 Mreznica, Kupa river, and westwards there should be another river. Maybe
2 it is Korana, I've forgotten -- maybe it's Korana. I've forgotten the
3 name. Those were roughly the boundaries of Sector North, and it was that
4 area where we were located. My office being at Topusko.
5 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Doctor. Your Honours, could we tender
6 the blank map, please, as a Prosecution exhibit.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: The blank map number 7 is admitted into evidence.
8 May it please be given an exhibit number.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P470.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
11 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. Thank you,
12 Madam Registrar. Thank you, Mr. Usher.
13 Q. Doctor, what was the position that you held when you first --
14 when you were first posted to Sector North?
15 A. At that time, the position had been described the chief civil
16 affairs officer; and shortly thereafter, it was revised to civil affairs
18 Q. And how long did you hold that position?
19 A. From 1992 to 1994, I believe.
20 Q. During that period, were you or was your area of responsibility
21 Sector North?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And you were posted physically in Sector North throughout that
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. What were your duties?
2 A. My duties were to ensure that the terms of the Vance Plan as
3 endorsed by the Security Council as the core functions of the mission
4 were implemented and implemented in full.
5 Therefore, I had the responsibility alongside the military sector
6 commander to advise the initial aspect of that mandate which were all
7 military. And it was military in the sense that the terms of the
8 Vance Plan required that there be a total demobilisation, decommissioning
9 of military materiel and personnel.
10 And also to ensure that all military personnel are put out of
11 business, so to speak, except for the police which had been made in the
12 terms of the Vance Plan an exception to that. The only authority that
13 were to remain in all the sector activities was the authority of
14 civilians who ran the opstina beginning with the mayors, as well as the
15 police. The police were to be reintegrated and made reflective of the
16 communities that occupied the place before, and they were only to carry
17 light weapons with their, quote, side-arms at that time.
18 Then the mandate, if all went well, all weapons had to be locked
19 into common storage was known as a double-key system, where the UN would
20 take control of those weapons along with the local authorities. The
21 mandate envisaged from there we would be tasked with ensuring a safe and
22 voluntary return of the people who had been displaced from those areas.
23 And for that, our part of the mission had police contingent, UN police
24 contingent, that we would work with to ascertain that the conditions for
25 voluntary return were taken hold on the ground.
1 And finally, we had to render humanitarian assistance for all
2 those who had been affected during that war and after. Basically that
3 was the responsibility that the civil affairs coordinator had, and the
4 rest was the responsibility of the military commander for the
5 implementation of the military aspects of the mission.
6 Q. Did your duties, therefore, require you to deal directly with the
7 military leaderships of the forces concerned?
8 A. Yes. Actually, the earlier part of the mission was almost
9 exclusively a military endeavour because when we arrived in the area, the
10 combatant, the people who were fighting were still in their foxholes.
11 There were tanks facing each other. There were people armed eye to eye
12 across the confrontation lines. Most of the houses and residences had
13 been destroyed, and people had already run away from the area. So the
14 only thing that was -- the only activity that was there was a military
16 Our duty was, therefore, to immediately engage all the warring
17 parties on both sides of the confrontation line from Sisak through
18 Karlovac to Ogulin to Rijeka
19 the military command on the Serb side and on the Croat side; and as time
20 went on in March or so on the Bosnian border that was bordering Sector
21 North. So most of our time from April all through to June or July was
22 heavily a military involvement of the sector commander and myself to try
23 to achieve the earlier goal, I said, of getting the parties to
25 Q. You spoke earlier of the two signatories of the Vance Plan having
1 been Zagreb
2 military forces engaged in the conflict that you were concerned with?
3 A. I'm sure you were aware this was originally one country called
5 the Vance Plan, there was a military known as JNA.
6 JNA was a national military. The JNA deployed in the areas that
7 became the United Nations protected area, Sector North and Sector South
8 formed one military command, and that military command was based in
9 Bihac. And that military command, I believe, was the 10th Corps. And
10 the 10th Corps was based in the -- and the command was in Bihac. And at
11 that time, Lieutenant-General Spiro Nikovic was in command. So most of
12 our earliest engagement began with him, to identify all the command
13 structure and the deployment of the military in Sector North.
14 Specifically, we learned he had divided or the 10th Corps had
15 divided Sector North into two regional command. One command was known as
16 Banja, and the command was located at that time when we arrived in
17 Petrinja. And there was the command called Kordun that was based at the
18 time we arrived somewhere near Topusko, somewhere in the wooded area,
19 near Topusko that was the command and a bit of it in Vojnic but mostly it
20 was called Kordun.
21 Part of Sector North also involved Lika command, which took the
22 whole opstina of Slunj and part of Korenica and Plaski. Plaski was
23 another opstina that I didn't mention in my earlier. So we had to
24 identify who was in command, and then because the Security Council also
25 had made the mandate of UNPROFOR at that time to be within the area that
1 I'm referring in Sector North across the line of confrontation, there
2 were the Croatian side of the military. So we had to identify on the
3 Croatian side who was in command. And we did, ran the command from Sisak
4 through Karlovac and then across to the side that are called on Ogulin
5 side running all the way to Rijeka
7 On the Croatian side, they had formed, there were much more
8 organised since there were the signatories with Belgrade and they had
9 been recognised as an independent country so they were overtly, more
10 clearly organised when we arrived and committed to dealing with UNPROFOR
11 and they had a commander in Sisak, General Budnji [phoen]. And in
12 Karlovac, they had a commander, but at that time they had put the entire
13 organisation under one civilian leader whom we dealt with where he would
14 come into a room with his military command, and that civilian was the
15 Deputy Prime-Minister Ramljak.
16 Q. Just going back to the JNA command for a moment, did you come
17 across a Colonel Cedomir Bulat?
18 A. Yes, Cedo Bulat was the commander of the Kordun wing of the 10th
19 Corps in Sector North.
20 Q. Was he there throughout your period in Sector North?
21 A. Yes, he was the longest serving of all the commanders from when I
22 arrived to when the sector was taken over by the Croats by force. He
23 remained in that capacity the longest.
24 Q. Once you had identified the appropriate people to deal with
25 within the respective commands, within the respective command structures
1 of the two armies, did you then engage each side in accordance with what
2 you were required to do?
3 A. We did our best, under very trying circumstances. I can't say we
4 achieved most of what we started out, but I believe we did achieve a lot
5 of what we had started out.
6 Q. How long were the JNA engaged in Sector North?
7 A. General Spiro Nikovic was tasked with the responsibility of
8 demobilising his entire command. He engaged us from the time we arrived,
9 I arrived in April there, to a certain date in May, I believe, which I
10 don't recall the date, when we had reached an agreement, both on the
11 Croatian side and on the Serb side that the warring parties would
12 withdraw their forces to a designated distance from the confrontation
14 And the Serbs insides the UNPA had been given a general order
15 that said something like anyone of the commanders that was not indigenous
16 in that area, meaning born there but serving with the JNA, were to be
17 recalled from their command, and leave only what they began to call
18 Territorial Defence forces commanded in more or less the same structure,
19 but under the control of those who were indigenous, meaning born in the
20 area. That included Cedo Bulat, who was born somewhere near Vrgin Most,
21 originated from there. I don't know for sure that he was born there, but
22 I know his house and family, where it was. But on the Banja command, the
23 general who was there, at the time, had to leave because he had
24 originated from Montenegro
25 series of commanders taking over very quickly but the last and longest
1 serving there was Colonel Tabak [phoen] in Banja. That particular
2 situation for Spiro ended when he himself, Spiro Nikovic was also a
3 Montenegrin, but he didn't complete or see to completion the negotiation
4 of the demobilisation that he had reached with us. He called us one
5 evening and we met in his office in Bihac, and we abruptly announced that
6 he had been recalled, and he had to hand-over to somebody else.
7 Q. Besides your dealings with military authorities to carry out your
8 own mandate, were you required as part of your duties to meet with any of
9 the political authorities in Sector North?
10 A. Yes. We had also for the purposes of achieving that requirement
11 of the Vance Plan that the area returned to the control of civilian
12 authorities, meaning the mayors and police. So I had to go to every
13 capital of each opstina and identify who was in civil control, as well as
14 in police and military control.
15 Q. In your dealings either with the military or the political
16 authorities, did you encounter any articulated concept of a greater
18 A. Remember, you come into a situation where people are still
19 engaged in communal hostility, and the first question is they want to
20 engage you is the righteousness of their course: Why they are fighting.
21 When we ask, Why are you fighting, why are you fighting each other;
22 invariably you will hear, we no longer can live together and we have to
23 go our separate ways. And if you ask who are we in a country that was
24 previously a homogenous country, you quickly understood whether the
25 speaker was, we the Serbs and on the other side the Croats. And if you
1 come down southwards towards the border with Bosnia, there were the
2 Muslims. So we, depending on the speaker, was we the Croats, we the
3 Serbs, and the Muslims don't enter into that kind until much later, you
4 don't hear about we can't live together from the Muslim side. Mostly you
5 heard that from the Serb side.
6 Q. And would you hear that from the military authorities or the
7 political authorities?
8 A. Most of the military officers you meet are not given to giving
9 speeches or explain why they are doing things. You heard it mostly from
10 the civilians.
11 Q. Were the political authorities with whom you dealt all based in
12 Sector North?
13 A. No, as I mentioned to you, a good part of the controls of the
14 military was in Bihac, meaning the part of the opstinas, in Bosnia
15 running all the way from Bosanski Novi to Krupa, to Velika Kladusa to
16 Bihac; and these were people we had to deal with.
17 Q. The Serb articulation or the articulation by the political
18 authorities with whom you dealt of this concept of a greater Serbia
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm going to object because that
20 mis-characterizes the gentleman's testimony.
21 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, I can rephrase that question because
22 it does paraphrase what the doctor is saying, and I appreciate that that
23 can cause some difficulties.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed. And I think so far the doctor said we,
25 the Croats; we, the Serbs and much later; we, the Muslims.
1 MR. THOMAS: Yes, sir.
2 Q. Doctor, you spoke of -- and I'm just talking about the Serbs at
3 the moment, about how they would speak of the inability to live in
4 cohabitation, if you like, with the other ethnic groups in Sector North.
5 Was this a theme that carried on throughout your time in Sector North, at
6 least as far as the Serbs were concerned?
7 A. Yes, and let me clarify. When I say from the military side you
8 don't hear that particularly said. That didn't mean it didn't come out
9 in a different way. It did come in a different way. The military, for
10 example, if I ask them why are you fighting, in one of my written
11 testimony, I do give an account of Spiro Nikovic explaining to us what he
12 was fighting for and why he stopped where he stopped.
13 I mentioned Sector North stops in the northern opstinas of
14 Vrgin Most and Petrinja going across, they were the confrontation lines
15 stopped around rivers, Mreznica, Kupa, and Korana on the west side going
16 down to Slunj. He said, I could take - I remember - I could have taken
18 because those cities were predominantly Croats, why do we need to take
19 them? So we needed a natural area that was mostly Serb and that mostly
20 Serb was in those opstinas.
21 When he was explaining on the Bosnian side why are you fighting
22 there also, he would say, for example, most of those areas, 80 percent
23 are Serb, so we need to control areas which are mostly Serb. Doesn't go
24 beyond that. But you could see that it not too different a concept when
25 the civilians vouch we can't any longer live together.
1 Q. Engaged in this role in Sector North, were you ever required to
2 engage the FRY authorities?
3 A. Not from Sector North. I later on got to engage the FRY
4 authorities when I was posted in Belgrade.
5 Q. Okay. You spoke of the soldiers who were left behind from the
6 JNA, if I can use that term, but the ones who remained as those born on
7 the territory forming a Territorial Defence force, and defence of what?
8 A. As he knew well, that Vance Plan made no distinction when they
9 said we want all the weapons decommissioned and put in control -- in
10 storage points controlled between the UN forces and the local
11 authorities. They were not to be removed from the area, but were to be
12 put in storage.
13 However, he explained, General Spiro Nikovic when we were
14 negotiating that there are still dangers that our people faced if we
15 pulled out. The Territorial Defence forces would be left with
16 sufficient -- sufficient weapons so they can defend themselves. And
17 those weapons included heavy weapons like artillery, armoured vehicle,
18 tanks, all except air force kind of weapons that would project fighting
19 beyond those areas. Those weapons would be pulled and taken by the JNA
20 as it was as they were pulling out.
21 I remember General Spiro was very honest in his attempt to deal
22 with us and he would provide at our request an explanation of why he was
23 doing what he was doing. At one point, he did tell us, bear in mind, for
24 our own understanding we didn't know what was unfolding every week after
25 week and about May he says, There is a new reality in the former
3 name them. Those republics he named were: Serbia and Montenegro
4 rump, remainder of the former Yugoslavia
5 and Republika Srpska and Republic Serbian Krajina, RSK. So what he
6 called the remaining is what is today the new republics except those two
7 RS and RSK, which he expected to be separate republics. And that made it
8 understandable why he would insist certain weapons be left for the
9 defence of our people, left behind.
10 Q. When the JNA did withdraw, did they leave the weapons behind as
11 he said they would?
12 A. Yes, they were left behind, and we did collect them and put them
13 in storage.
14 Q. When did you move -- or when did you leave Sector North?
15 A. Late 1994.
16 Q. And that was -- and where did you go?
17 A. I was named Chief of Staff for the civilian side of the mission
18 in Zagreb
19 Q. And how long did you remain in that position?
20 A. Short. Because from there I was asked to proceed as the delegate
21 of the special representative of the sector general to Belgrade
22 Q. And did you take up that post?
23 A. Yeah, I did.
24 Q. And would that have been -- do you know exactly when you began
25 that -- commenced that post?
1 A. Really I've forgotten a lot of things especially about when I did
2 these things.
3 Q. If I suggested August 1994, does that sound right?
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. And what were your -- first of all, Mr. Akashi was the special
6 representative to the Secretary-General?
7 A. He was the second. The first one was Stoltenberg.
8 Q. But you as delegate were reporting to?
9 A. Was reporting to him.
10 Q. To Akashi
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And what were your duties or what did you expect your duties to
13 be as delegate of the special representative in Belgrade?
14 A. A lot has -- had changed by that August 1994 in the UNPAs, but
15 the signatories and the drivers of the reality going on their remained
16 still the authorities in Belgrade
17 The course of events in the sectors still was being discussed,
18 driven, negotiated, if you like. There was a contact group of countries
19 that were assisting the parties and the UN. There was a bigger forum
20 based in Geneva
22 well as in the broader area known as Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
23 Secretary-General and the UN was involved in all of that, and the special
24 representative of the Secretary-General needed to engage the authorities
25 in Belgrade
1 in Belgrade
2 engaging the authorities on that score.
3 There was also a no-fly resolution against Yugoslavia, Security
4 Council Resolution 761, that also required us to monitor and engage the
5 former -- the authorities in Belgrade
6 Lastly, there was the question of the Prevlaka peninsula which
7 fell within the country then known as -- republic then known as
9 therefore, was to engage both the leadership in Belgrade, at that time
10 President Milosevic, and the leadership in Montenegro, at that time
11 President Bulatovic.
12 Q. Doctor, you've mentioned a couple of groups or organisations that
13 I should probably get you to explain just a little bit more for us. The
14 first is the contact group and the contact group plan. Can you just
15 describe what those were, please?
16 A. A lot went on in the sectors but the sum effect of what was going
17 on by the time we are talking about in August 1994 was an idea that
19 in resolving the conflict in the former part of Croatia that there was
20 fighting, and grant those sectors, the authorities in those sectors sort
21 of semi-autonomy, autonomy within Croatia
22 that outcome of some autonomy for those -- for the Serbs who lived in
23 those areas. The contact group formed around some of the most
24 influential countries like Germany
25 leader of the contact group at that time was the ambassador from Germany
1 There was United States and there was Russia, and I forget what the other
2 countries were but there were six of them. And that was what the contact
3 group was trying to reach and the negotiated outcome and autonomy.
4 Q. And what was the -- geographically what was the compass of the
5 contact group plan?
6 A. Basically was to have -- since it never happened, it was a much
7 negotiated, argued, or debated concept. If there were to be an autonomy,
8 what would be the nature of that. Since it never happened, it is hard to
9 give you a concrete thing because whatever was being proposed was at one
10 point being opposed by the other side. So whatever it was that didn't
11 happen is simply there was no autonomy, and when the autonomy and the
12 discussions around autonomy failed, then Croatia took action that
13 resulted to what you know as an overrun of all the sectors.
14 Q. If the JNA had retreated from Croatia leaving behind the Serb
15 Territorial Defence force in respect of those disputed areas, why was it
16 necessary to engage the FRY authorities in relation to the contact group
18 A. The Serbs who took over control of sectors north, south, west,
19 and east ended up basically not following the Vance Plan and begun
20 activities aimed at making reality of their goal of an RSK Republika
21 Serbian Krajina in what was a territory that Croatia had always
22 eventually projected that they had control over that area.
23 In order for us to deal with the events in that area, with
25 manner that we can agree with whether it's semi-autonomy or full return
1 to autonomy, that's -- we have to be engaged. So the engagement of
3 But for the engagement of the Serbs who began to control and
4 project that control inside those areas, the question was are they doing
5 it all by themselves without anybody's assistance because this begun as
6 an integrated Yugoslavia
8 These soldiers whether they were first JNA or they had transformed
9 themselves to TDF, they were drawing some pay, some support of all kind
10 including money from, the question was did that flow, did the payment
11 from did it stop from Belgrade
12 The communications lines when they wanted to communicate, where
13 did these communications lines originate from? The currency, the money,
14 where did this originate from? Therefore there was an umbilical linkage
15 always to Belgrade
16 those areas, Belgrade
18 Q. When you did engage Belgrade
19 to engage? Did they accept that they needed to engage?
20 A. Very clearly they always had like Zagreb, their own policy view
21 about what they wanted to see happen there. That eventually begun to
22 digress from what their kin and kith who were in those territories were
24 Towards the end, I go towards the end of the process, Belgrade
25 with Milosevic in charge at that time had already reached a policy
1 agreement that whatever would happen in those areas had to be settled
2 through peaceful negotiation and no military. They did not never changed
3 that they wanted to see a negotiated outcome, no military.
4 Events of course were not always totally controllable by either
5 side. When there was a reality of an RSK, there was other events
6 happening in and around Pale about the Republika Srpska and the two
7 realities had a lot of common confluence around and if not a common
8 policy. In the end, there did emerge a deviation because the negotiated
9 process never bore fruit. Even if the Belgrade people wanted it to bear
11 Q. Now, Doctor, just before I leave this point and I've strayed from
12 where we were at a little while ago, but the second organisation you
13 mentioned which might require some explanation is ICFY, the International
14 Conference on Former Yugoslavia
15 got the name right; and secondary, who were the members of this group and
16 what was their function?
17 A. Very briefly, this was an umbrella forum on one side co-chaired
18 or co-driven by the UN on one side and by the European Union on the
19 other. And the co-chairs initially of that organisation were Lord Owen
20 representing the European Union side and Stoltenberg representing the
21 United Nations side. There was also recognition that there were issues
22 that involved the entire former Yugoslavia
23 in sectors or in Bosnia
24 issues that were much broader. And the forum was to kind of put a
25 lasting umbrella to the outcome of the solutions that were being sought
1 in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Croatia
2 To that extent they were engaged on the ground with us. I did
3 meet on the ground with Lord Owen. He had come there several times to be
4 informed about what was going on on the ground. Cyrus Vance himself did
5 come, but he was basically representing the contact group as the original
6 inspirer of this Vance Plan but in the context of the contact group.
7 But and also in broader involvement of his own country in the
8 process, and that would, of course, put him at every aspect of that
9 including ICFY. Therefore, the group that was in ICFY would endorse
10 negotiations that came from the ground as valid. Specifically, the
11 result of the contact group which we spoke. At one time, we were given
12 to understand, we were close to getting an agreement for autonomy that
13 Serbs led by Martic at that time and the Croatian government would agree.
14 Most of those negotiations were not even in the former
16 and the Croat into Geneva
17 groups, under the ICFY because the headquarters -- that's where ICFY was
18 and at times also in Vienna
19 of attempted solutions to the issues that were on the ground arising from
20 the various flash points in former Yugoslavia
21 Q. In general terms during your posting in Belgrade, which of the
22 FRY authorities did you most often deal with?
23 A. Most of the times I did deal with the FRY authorities over issues
24 that involved the sectors and that was President Milosevic. At that time
25 he was the president of Serbia
1 know, there was another president for the former Yugoslavia jointly
2 meaning Republic of Serbia
4 Q. Just pause there for a moment, Doctor. Could you just explain
5 that dynamic a little bit for the Trial Chamber. We have the president
6 of the FRY, on the one hand; and the president of Serbia on the other
7 hand. Can you just explain why it was that Milosevic was the key player?
8 A. This was never understood in the media, but it was always
9 understood in the international community where anybody who was involved
10 from the leadership of other countries that would come in Belgrade and
11 they would meet not Lilic; I never met him so, therefore, I don't even
12 remember very much because it was the president of Serbia whom we met
14 There was a prime minister in both -- also of Yugoslavia, that I
15 remember because his Deputy Simic we did meet with. However, the control
16 of the reality de facto, I'm not talking about de jure; de facto
17 authority, de facto influence was with the president of Serbia
18 time, Milosevic.
19 Q. Was that the situation as well prior to your arrival in Belgrade
20 in August 1994?
21 A. Yes, even before I arrived.
22 Q. Was it the position when you left Belgrade?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. When was that, can you recall when you departed Belgrade?
25 A. June 1995.
1 Q. Presumably -- let me ask you another question.
2 On how many occasions would you say you've met Milosevic?
3 A. I actually never kept count, but I did meet him so many times,
4 and each meeting was not a short meeting, it was always long meetings
5 lasting anywhere between four and six hours.
6 Q. You've spoken of this theme of greater Serbia emerging during
7 your time in Sector North --
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Once again that mis-characterizes the gentleman's
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Thomas.
11 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, I'd like to find the appropriate
12 passage in the transcript, so I can get that right. I wonder if it would
13 be an appropriate time to take the break now, and I can pick up on that
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. That's an appropriate time
16 we'll take the break and come back at quarter to 11.00. Court adjourned.
17 --- Recess taken at 10.14 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 10.46 a.m.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Thomas.
20 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Doctor, you mentioned that during your time in Belgrade
22 became apparent that Milosevic's preference was for a negotiated
23 settlement rather than an military option in response to the contract
24 group plan, for example. At what point did that preference on the part
25 of Milosevic become apparent?
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: I take it you mean his own personal knowledge of
2 that, or are we talking about something else?
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: He is just asking the question. And the witness
4 will tell whether he has any personal knowledge of it or not.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: I understand that, but the way the question is
6 framed, it would seem that the point is a point in time that would either
7 become a truth or a non-truth based upon -- and by that I'm talking about
8 time, based upon what this witness say, so there may well be other
9 information that his preference, meaning Milosevic's preference, existed
10 in a much earlier time or not at a much earlier time. I think Mr. Thomas
11 understand the thrust of my question.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: It says when it -- at what time did it become
13 apparent, so it may have existed long before it became apparent, all the
14 lawyer wants to know is when it became apparent to the witness, if at
16 Mr. Thomas.
17 MR. THOMAS:
18 Q. Dr. Kirudja, when did it first become apparent to you that
19 Mr. Milosevic's preference was for a negotiated settlement?
20 A. Mr. Milosevic himself said so. If you ask me whether he had said
21 it before I heard it, I wouldn't know that. But he did say in several
22 instances where there was an issue, there was an issue, for example, when
23 the first action taken Croatian authorities to retake western Slavonia
24 We had a meeting called by Mr. Akashi because of that event.
25 There was an incident where we met with him when, for example,
1 the NATO shot down some planes flown by some RSK officials from the field
2 in Udbina. During this event, there was violence created over an issue
3 like shooting down the plane or taken by force, by the Croatian
4 authorities, western Slovenia
5 In instances, I'm not saying it's only limited to those instance,
6 Milosevic would always in addressing the UN delegations repeat, This is a
7 preference I have that there be a negotiated solution. And he believed
8 and he repeated many times passionately, that if he wasn't, I remember
9 words to the effect: If you left us in the same room, myself and
10 president Tudjman, we could agree to negotiate this solution.
11 But I understand you would say there are forces at all sides that
12 are opposed to this negotiated solution, and he termed those forces as
13 forces that want a war solution, specifically in both RSK and Bosnia
15 a war solution. But he would also hasten to say, They will not succeed.
16 In the case, he will say, look, for example, the supporters of such a war
17 option like the member of parliament aligned with [indiscernible]. He
18 lost his position recently in advancing this war position.
19 He repeated this, so it's not a secret that he said that. The
20 time sequence of when he said any of these things I have referred to,
21 Your Honour, these events took place a long, long time, and I can't give
22 you an exact time sequence about this.
23 Q. Doctor, you referred to one of your topics of engagements with
24 the FRY authorities as being the no-fly zone, and I think you mentioned
25 Security Council Resolution 781. Can you just explain what the no-fly
1 zone is or was?
2 A. It was a much older resolution coming about the same time the
3 resolution enabling the mission started. The same time when the Security
4 Council was authorising this nation to get ahold of the events that were
5 unfolding in the whole of Yugoslavia
6 wanted also to ensure that the seat of Yugoslavian power, which was then
8 their force, to project beyond where it was. So they were forbidden to
10 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, could we please have Exhibit 65 ter
11 02190 on the screen.
12 Q. Dr. Kirudja, you can see from the title that we are looking at
13 Security Council Resolution 781 adopted on the 9th of October, 1992
14 the Security Council?
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Thomas, I see on the B/C/S side it's
16 Resolution 780 of 6 of October, 1992. Instead of 9th of October, 1992
17 and instead of being -- okay. Now we've got it.
18 MR. THOMAS: The relevant passage that I'd like to draw
19 everyone's attention to is on page 2 of both version, please. Numbered
20 paragraphs 1 and 2.
21 Q. Now, Doctor, do you see paragraphs 1 and 2 establishing the ban
22 on military flights and also enabling the United Nations protection force
23 to monitor compliance with that ban?
24 A. Yeah, I can see 1 and 2.
25 Q. Are those the relevant parts of the resolution -- are these what
1 is relevant to your description of the no-fly zone? Are we talking about
2 the same thing?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Okay. First of all, the ban is on all military flights in the
5 air-space of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is apparent enough. But I am
6 interested also in paragraph 2 which enables:
7 "The protection force to monitor compliance including the
8 placement of observers when necessary at air-fields in the territory of
9 the former Yugoslavia
10 Was UNPROFOR able to place the necessary observers at those
11 relevant installations?
12 A. Yeah, we had a contingent of United Nations military observers in
13 the control rooms at a Surcin airport.
14 Q. And where is Surcin airport?
15 A. In Belgrade
16 Q. What was the function of those UNMOs?
17 A. Actually, I never went inside there, myself; but they would brief
18 me routinely. They were to observe what was going on there for whatever
19 was in violation of the resolution as they interpreted it themselves.
20 Q. Do you know specifically what they were looking at or looking
22 A. Unless there was an event like an event that I describe in one of
23 my reports, routinely I wouldn't know what they were looking for. But if
24 there was a specific event like the one that is discussed in one of my
25 reports, I know what they were looking for. They were looking for the
1 tapes of -- or radar to confirm whether or not that event took place.
2 Q. Let me ask the question another way.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, Mr. Thomas. I do hate to interrupt.
4 If you could do us a kindness here. Mr. Perisic is having difficulty
5 reading on the screen the exact portion that you were discussing with
6 Mr. Kirudja. If you don't mind terribly just reading it out so that he
7 gets the precise language, I'd appreciate it. I do apologise for
8 interrupting. I really am sorry, I was just given a note.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: I suggest you also talk via the Bench.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I apologise to the Bench for that, too, yes.
11 MR. THOMAS: That's no problem, Your Honours, I can read that
12 into the record.
13 Q. The relevant passage is, I'm reading the numbered paragraphs 1
14 and 2 in the English version, page 2.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: I suspect what Mr. Guy-Smith is saying is that the
16 B/C/S is not numbered. Therefore, Mr. Perisic is finding it difficult to
17 pin-point the exact paragraph that you were reading. So reading the
18 English version is not likely to be helpful to him, maybe. If you can
19 point at the B/C/S one.
20 MR. THOMAS: I think, sir, the relevant -- it would appear, sir,
21 that it is the starting at the fifth paragraph on the page that's on the
22 screen at the moment. But I will defer of course to my native B/C/S
24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Here, the only problem is that the
25 B/C/S version is not numbered like the English version. I believe the
1 general will be able to follow now, but perhaps it would be a good
2 idea -- it's exactly as was explained. It's the fifth paragraph in the
3 B/C/S. I believe Mr. Thomas identified the paragraph correctly.
4 MR. THOMAS: All right.
5 Q. Doctor, were the UNMOs stationed at Surcin airport?
6 A. Yes, they were.
7 Q. And was their function to monitor this resolution as or monitor
8 the ban as set out in this resolution?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And was their task to report to you or to others if there were
11 any breaches of the ban?
12 A. Their task was to report what they observed through a
13 well-defined channel among which was their own superior which the UNMO
14 line went to the chief military observer, and then to the force
15 commander. And then on the civilian side, they would brief from the
16 local to the headquarter civilian line.
17 Q. Was there an appreciation on the part of the FRY authorities that
18 access needed to be given to the UNMOs to undertake that task?
19 A. They did it rather willingly and effortlessly considering there
20 was also a sanction resolution, not this one, against the remaining
23 Q. Just on that a topic, was compliance or otherwise with Resolution
24 781, this resolution, something that would be relevant when it came to
25 deciding whether or not sanctions should be lifted or extended?
1 A. I don't recall the sequence of -- I think the sanctions of the
2 resolution came after since this is in 1992. I think the sanctions, I'm
3 not sure, you can check that, and I don't know whether this resolution
4 influenced it or not.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: And if I may just get clarification, Doctor. When
6 you said there were sanctions against the remaining Yugoslavia
7 you mean by remaining Yugoslavia
8 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, when the old well-known Yugoslavia
9 fell apart and Slovenia
10 way, Bosnia-Herzegovina voted to secede, then the authorities
11 reconstituted Yugoslavia
12 joint what was known as Montenegro
13 resolution formed the new Yugoslavia
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is that what was called the FRY?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, it was not actually recognised by the UN.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Thomas.
18 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. Could we tender as Exhibit
19 please Security Council Resolution 781, which is the one on the screen
20 says 65 ter 02190.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's admitted. May it please be given an exhibit
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P471.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
25 MR. THOMAS: Just so I can clarify a comment you just made,
1 Doctor, about the sanctions resolution, could we have P00202 on the
2 screen, please.
3 Q. Now, Doctor, you will see that we are looking at Resolution 757
4 adopted on the 10th of May, 1992.
5 MR. THOMAS: If we look, Your Honours, please, at page 3 of both
7 Q. If you look under paragraph 4 there, Doctor, we see a number of
8 sanctions referred to. They spill over on to the next page, and please
9 tell if you need to go on to the next page, but is this what you refer
10 today as the sanctions resolution?
11 A. Yes, yes.
12 Q. Once the sanctions resolution was imposed, was the lifting of the
13 sanctions or the reduction of the sanctions something that was upper most
14 in the mind of the FRY authorities?
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Objection. Calls for speculation.
16 MR. THOMAS:
17 Q. To your knowledge?
18 A. Do you want me to answer that question?
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, you may proceed.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, it was. And part of the reason why I
21 remembered it because in the execution of the no-fly resolution, they
22 would remind me as a representative of the UN, a point I always noted,
23 Look, we are trying to do the best under the sanctions resolution. Like
24 these machines require spare parts, and we can't do it so easily with our
25 hands so tied by the sanctions resolution. Yes, it was foremost in their
2 MR. THOMAS:
3 Q. You've referred to the authorities saying that they needed spare
4 parts for certain machines. What machines are you talking about?
5 A. Particularly on this incident that I referred to, the UNMOs would
6 go into the radar room and find out some equipment, I don't know exactly
7 what equipment they reported, not functioning; and they are asking why is
8 this not functioning, and state spare parts problem.
9 Q. Are we going back now to the UNMOs monitoring the no-fly zone?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. In early February 1995, did you become aware of possible
12 violations of the no-fly zone by the FRY?
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. Perhaps before I move on to that topic, in addition to the no-fly
15 resolution, were there other issues concerning the border between the FRY
16 and the Republika Srpska at that time?
17 A. Counsel, Republika Srpska was not something we as the UN knew as
18 an existence. If you mean with Bosnia-Herzegovina was the border
19 between -- a recognised border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
20 that border is actually defined by the river Drina.
21 Q. At the time of these possible violations, early February 1995,
22 was the border between the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina open?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Who had closed it?
25 A. The authorities in Belgrade
1 Q. And when had they closed it?
2 A. Unfortunately, I don't remember the exact date.
3 Q. Why did they close it, to your knowledge?
4 A. I learned why they exposed -- and the reason you see a reluctance
5 in answering why, is because this mandate and the whole issue involving
6 that border, the FRY authorities made sure that it doesn't involve the
8 It involved the European Union and the FRY authorities, and
9 whatever may have been official reasons involving it didn't come my way.
10 I can only, of course, tell you my understanding since I needed to
11 understand what was going on what was it about. It was about Milosevic
12 being taken to task many times when he met in the international community
13 including ourselves that there were movements of materiel and personnel
14 involved in the conflict in Yugoslavia
15 wasn't helping. Taking him to task many times this way, he said, if you
16 don't believe us, we will close the border to ensure this doesn't happen
17 except for humanitarian -- humanitarian supplies which obviously we
18 couldn't deny passage.
19 And then from there on, the monitors he agreed would be supplied
20 by the European Union, and he set up this organisation for monitoring,
21 and it was headed by our former chief military observer in his capacity
22 as a European, General Pellnas from Sweden.
23 Q. Do you know until what date the border was closed?
24 A. No.
25 Q. From your own observations and your own dealings in Belgrade
1 the time, did you have any observations as to whether this was effective,
2 ineffective, whether anything materially changed with the closing of the
4 A. The simple answer to that is that it was really not my
5 responsibility even to find out whether it was effective or not.
6 Q. The monitors that were supplied to monitor this border closure
7 were supplied by whom?
8 A. To my knowledge, the European Union.
9 Q. I want to move now to these helicopter flights that were -- or
10 this issue which arose in early February 1995.
11 Before we go on to some documents dealing with that, can you just
12 generally explain to the Trial Chamber what occurred?
13 A. Very generally, and I would -- if Your Honour agree, I would like
14 to see that report. It's about three pages, to refresh my memory about
15 it. It is a report I wrote to Mr. Akashi, and unlike other reports, it's
16 a coded cable. Coded meaning it did carry lots of sensitivity in its
17 content, so I wouldn't have sent it in an ordinary way. There are
18 routine reports that we made. That was not a routine report.
19 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, could we please have 65 ter 03283 on
20 the screen, please.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, 02?
22 MR. THOMAS: Sorry, 03283.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
24 MR. THOMAS:
25 Q. Doctor, do you recognise that as the report that you wrote to
1 Mr. Akashi on the subject?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Before we go into some aspects of that report, what prompted this
4 report? What was the first information you received, do you recall?
5 A. This mission has -- it was a complex United Nations mission with
6 reporting channels that involved the total sources from civilians, from
7 police, from military observers.
8 Military reports from people on the ground are daily sitreps
9 wherein prior to this report, and they are circulated to all senior
10 management, we get our supply of reports on a daily --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just to clarify the record, can you explain what
12 sitreps are.
13 THE WITNESS: Situation reports.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
15 THE WITNESS: Daily situation reports. And those come from all
16 channels. So prior to this report, a flash report comes that a
17 contingent of UN forces. The Dutch contingent specifically in Srebrenica
18 reported a contingent of helicopters that flew across the border towards
19 their direction, towards their base. When military sitreps come that
20 way, they just report the facts and not the reasons, not anything.
21 And of course, it comes back later to what was this all about.
22 UN Belgrade, what this all about.
23 MR. THOMAS:
24 Q. At the same time, what was happening to the UNMOs at Surcin
25 airport who were tasked to police the no-fly zone or the ban on military
1 flights into Bosnia-Herzegovina?
2 A. Their sit report were report on this particular day we couldn't
3 go in, we were not allowed to go in. We normally can go routinely to
4 observe. Their sit report says we were not there, we could not go, we
5 were not allowed.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: To go in where?
7 THE WITNESS: To the airport, to the control room.
8 MR. THOMAS: I'd like to turn, Your Honours, please, to page --
9 in the same document, to page 9 of the English version and page 11 of the
10 B/C/S version, please.
11 Q. Doctor, do you recognise that as an annex to your report dealing
12 with the restriction of movement to the radar room that the UNMOs
14 A. Separated from the report, I can only assume because again it's a
15 long time ago, it's an attachment I didn't write. So in and of itself
16 couldn't be recognisable by me unless it is physically attached to the
18 Q. I understand, I understand.
19 Could you read the document quietly to yourself and tell us if
20 that accords with your recollection of what occurred at the time.
21 A. I've read part of the front page, and it is now clear reminiscent
22 of what I was trying to say earlier, that the UNMOs at this time, it's
23 Colonel Goodmanson [phoen]. Colonel Goodmanson comes to my office, and
24 he is reporting this incident, and this is what happened. It was unusual
25 in the sense in which there was unfriendliness on the part of the
1 authorities over this issue which was unusual. I said earlier there
2 always was a friendly and cooperative relationship until this occasion.
3 And because it didn't -- it stood out from the ordinary way unnecessarily
4 aggressive and argumentative on a simple issue can we go in where we have
5 always gone in to observe what we have always observed. That is
6 reflected in the report that you saw earlier in one of the paragraphs
7 where I'm thinking this was also made purposely so that we can take note.
8 My report itself characterises it as an incident staged so that we can
9 take note.
10 MR. THOMAS: I understand. This page deals with events or
11 restriction of movement on the 2nd of February. I want to also turn,
12 please, to page 8 -- sorry, Your Honours, the previous page before this
13 one in the English. Thank you. And two pages back in the B/C/S, please.
14 Q. Doctor, this is also an annex to the same report?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. First of all, there will be some terms that might need further
17 clarification. If you look at the title, "Summary of ROM ..." The
18 previous report, if it's of any assistance, dealt with restriction of
19 movement. Would ROM appear to be an abbreviation of the same thing?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And Surcin ATC?
22 A. Where does it occur?
23 Q. Is ATC, do you know what ATC would stand for?
24 A. No.
25 Q. The report appears to deal with matters involving staff at
1 air-traffic control, could that be the --
2 A. Yeah, sorry, yeah.
3 Q. If you look down at the entry on the 9th and 10th of February,
4 1995, "Oral protest forwarded to SLO air FRY".
5 A. Yeah, senior liaison officer. SLO, senior liaison officer.
6 Q. Thank you. The next entry begins with "DSMO."
7 A. Deputy -- senior military observer.
8 Q. Thank you. On the seconds line, at the end, we have "but LO off"
9 and then a name?
10 A. Liaison officer.
11 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, do you recognise that document as
12 what it purport to be, namely a summary of restriction of movement over
13 those days?
14 A. Again part of ordinary sitrep, that's what you would recall a
15 situation report, they did that routinely every day.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. THOMAS: If we move back to page 1 of the document, of the
18 exhibit, please, Your Honours.
19 Q. Now, paragraph 1 introduces the steps that you took in response
20 to these possible violations, and the authorities with whom you spoke.
21 Again, just a couple of abbreviations and acronyms that we might need
22 your assistance on. Firstly, the third line after Colonel Vuksic, we
23 have, "Responsible to JA General Kovacevic." JA standing for?
24 A. Yugoslav Army.
25 Q. And was that an abbreviation that you yourself used consistently
1 in your reports and in your dealings?
2 A. Yeah.
3 Q. All right. And the second to last line in that paragraph, "The
4 SRFC in Belgrade
5 A. Is the senior representatives of the force commander, a military
6 official located in my office at that time.
7 Q. Part of UNPROFOR?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you. Now, in paragraph 2, you summarise the response of
10 the FRY authorities to the allegation regarding these cross border
11 helicopter flights. What I'm interested in is paragraph 3, which is on
12 the next page of both documents, please, Your Honours.
13 You make two requests in subparagraph (a) and subparagraph (b) to
14 the FRY authorities. The first appears self-explanatory that access be
15 restored to the UNMOs to the radar screens.
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. Can you just assist the Trial Chamber why you made the second
18 request the tapes of radar observations, and any relevant flight logs?
19 A. Please repeat.
20 Q. Paragraph (b) you also requested that the tapes of radar
21 observations and any relevant flight logs from the period 1-4 February be
22 provided to UNPROFOR.
23 A. Because this matter had reached the Security Council as the
24 previous paragraph show. The previous paragraphs show this matter was
25 now a Security Council matter.
1 Q. You are talking about paragraph 3 on the same page?
2 A. Right.
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. I had on instruction gone to see Mr. Cicanovic about this matter
5 and registered the point made at (a) on this.
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. Not said here and there had been decision there would be a
8 military investigation to ascertain these claims about the airport. And
9 part of that investigation involved if there are planes doing a no-fly
10 violation in a situation where there is a radar system, was it captured
11 by the radar? If not, why not. Central to that investigation would be
12 the tapes that were kept by the FRY authorities.
13 Q. Thank you, Doctor. And I should also highlight that in
14 paragraph 3, you also make the point that the present information made it
15 inconclusive, at that time at least, as to whether or not helicopter
16 flights had crossed the international border or could be identified as
17 belonging to or associated with any of the warring sides?
18 A. Right.
19 Q. At that point did you have any reason to dispute the reports from
20 those in Srebrenica who had reported the flights?
21 A. I was never in the habit of disputing military observers or
22 police observers on the ground saying on this day and this day we saw
23 that. That for me wouldn't have been a disputable matter.
24 Q. Thank you, Doctor.
25 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, could I tender, we needn't tender the
1 whole document. The page that is we've referred to will be sufficient.
2 Those are --
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I might. I suggest we do tender the whole
4 document because there might be some further questions about this
5 particular document, so rather than going through some of the
6 difficulties we have with incomplete documents being tendered, I would
7 suggest we tender the entire document.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: How many pages is the document?
9 MR. THOMAS: In total, sir, I think it's 10 or 12.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: What is your response to your learned friend?
11 MR. THOMAS: The -- sir, the Prosecution has no need of the other
12 pages. They flesh out matters already referred to in summary and the
13 report to which we have referred. I have no difficulty putting the
14 entire document in, however, if that's ultimately going to be a lot
15 easier than going through the process of being under cross-examination.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. The document then is admitted into
17 evidence. May it please be given an exhibit number.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P472.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
20 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. Thank you,
21 Madam Registrar. Can we please have 65 ter 03282 on the screen, please.
22 Sorry, Your Honours, I think I've got the wrong document. Sorry, 65
23 ter 03281. My apologies. No again the wrong one. Sorry, Your Honours.
24 It will take me a second. 03280. My apologies again.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is that it now?
1 MR. THOMAS: It is. Thank you, Your Honour. Thank you,
2 Mr. Usher.
3 Q. Doctor, you will recognise this as a further code cable you sent
4 to Mr. Akashi on the 16th of February on this issue?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You begin by stating in the first paragraph that UNMO access to
7 the radar screens has been restored.
8 A. Can you increase it, sir, please. My aging eyes are struggling
9 on this. Yes.
10 Q. And the tapes have been -- or the tapes are available for
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Why did you make the comment that you can't be too sure or that
14 it would be your bet that the tapes will contain nothing implicating the
15 FRY authorities?
16 A. In the first place, this precedes several meetings I had
17 including one with the FRY authorities. And you showed that in an
18 earlier thing. You also showed that they said it didn't happen. And if
19 you want the tapes, you can have them.
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. I knew the fact that they are going to give me the tape, the
22 tapes won't be incriminating. They are coming from the government
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. I don't know any governments that hands over incriminating
1 records. I'm speaking in general now. We were given the tapes willingly
2 with the proviso that we didn't do this, and, therefore, I was sure that
3 it would be a big surprise if they were proved wrong by the tapes. That
4 is why my bet.
5 Q. If that were the case, why do you make the next comment, the
6 first comment in paragraph 2?
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which comment, Mr. Thomas?
8 MR. THOMAS:
9 Q. Sorry Your Honours:
10 "Confidential local sources here leave little doubt that those
11 flights happened and were from the JA."
12 A. That was me trying to corroborate what our own soldiers were
13 saying. So the local people say yeah, they were, they happened. But
14 they were not captured on tape. Therefore, the rest of the thing is how
15 come they weren't captured on the tape -- in the tapes.
16 MR. THOMAS: I'd like to turn over the page, please, in each
17 document. Or on each version.
18 Q. And, Doctor -- just the first two paragraphs, that will be fine.
19 Doctor, in the first two paragraphs on this page, and take a
20 moment to read them if you need to.
21 A. Again, counsel, I'm having difficulty reading them. They are too
22 small for my eyes.
23 Q. We can fix that, sir.
24 A. Yeah, I recall this.
25 Q. In those paragraphs, you set out your interpretation of these
1 events and why they occurred. Please explain that if it requires further
3 A. Counsel, I don't think these paragraphs require more. They speak
4 for themselves. More so because I was writing it to my boss, and I
5 couldn't leave what I was saying to his guess.
6 Q. All right. In the third paragraph on that page, which is the
7 second paragraph on the top of page 3 of the B/C/S version, Your Honours.
8 You provide some further corroboration for your interpretation; is that
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Was this the first time you had detected this tension between the
12 military and the political leadership in Belgrade over the peace process?
13 A. I can't say it is the first time partly because the nature of
14 the -- of all these issues where civil authorities and military
15 authorities are involved. It is in the nature of these thing that there
16 be tensions. The events usually are troubling. Most of the things are
17 troubling. Honest people can have different points of view. Interests
18 are always varied. Yes, the nature of this is to have tension.
19 Q. You spoke earlier of Milosevic being in favour of a settled or a
20 settlement option and other forces or other groups being interested in a
21 war option. Just talking generally now, did that tension always appear
22 to exist as far as you could tell?
23 A. Not chronologically. Events change, players change, interest
24 changed. Except one player from my time there, Milosevic. He was never
25 changed, but I don't think his ideas and positions were static either.
1 Q. I understand.
2 MR. THOMAS: Can we tender, please, that document as a
3 Prosecution exhibit, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: That document is admitted into evidence. May it
5 please be given an exhibit number.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P473.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
8 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. Thank you,
9 Madam Registrar. Now, before I call up the next document, I'll just
10 check that this time I have it right, Your Honours. 65 ter 03281 please.
11 Q. Now, Doctor, up until now we were dealing with possible
12 violations that occurred early in February 1995, but you will see here
13 that we have another report related to cross-border flights, this time
14 from, you dated, 1st of March [Realtime transcript read in error,
15 "July"], 1995.
16 You see that, Doctor?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. First of all, in the second paragraph of your report, you link
19 that to emergency medical evacuations from fighting at Mount Vlasic
20 you tell us where Mount Vlasic
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Before that, I believe my colleague misspoke
22 himself on line 15, he said the document is dated July 1995. I believe
23 he meant March 1995.
24 MR. THOMAS: I certainly didn't intend July, Your Honours. The
25 1st of March, 1995.
1 Q. But, you see, Doctor, that you refer to fighting at Mount Vlasic
2 near Travnik. Can you tell us where this is?
3 A. Counsel, this way outside my area of operations. The reports
4 coming to me indicated it. I wouldn't be personally as conversant
5 physically in that area as I would where I was located.
6 Q. I understand.
7 A. Right.
8 Q. Was it -- on whose territory was it?
9 A. This is was in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 MR. THOMAS: Okay. Now, in the context -- if we just turn over
11 to the next page, please, in both versions. Thank you.
12 Q. There are three paragraphs I'm interested in. Paragraphs 2, 3,
13 and 4 on both versions. And can you confirm for us that what you've
14 included in those paragraphs is information that were made available to
15 you about the involvement of JA forces?
16 A. Yes, I recall this paragraph as well as the other one you
17 referred to.
18 MR. THOMAS: Thank you. We tender that document as well, Your
19 Honours, as a Prosecution exhibit.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: So admitted. May it please be given an exhibit
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P474.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
24 MR. THOMAS: If I could have 65 ter 03282 on the screen, please.
25 Thank you.
1 Q. Doctor, do you see that again as another -- if we can get it
2 blown up again. Another code cable from you to Mr. Akashi dated
3 31 March 1995
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. You will see from the second paragraph that this deals again with
6 further possible helicopter cross-border violation, this time at the end
7 of March?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And then in the two paragraphs we see the first two paragraphs of
10 the report you link it to activities, military activities, and also refer
11 in paragraph 1 to:
12 "Involvement of the Yugoslav Army on the side of the BSA in the
13 most active and critical battle spots in BiH."
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. I want to turn first in the third paragraph, and there you are
16 more specifically referring to the involvement of the 63rd Para-Troop
17 Commando Brigade of the Yugoslav Army?
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. And thereafter in that paragraph, you describe the reason for
20 their involvement, the ABiH. Sorry the army of Herzegovina Bosnia
21 specific targets and so on?
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours, can I tender that document
24 as an Prosecution Exhibit.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: So admitted. May it please be given an exhibit
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P475.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
4 MR. THOMAS:
5 Q. Now, to just confirm that these cross border -- possible
6 cross-border flights were investigated to see if they could be
7 substantiated by material taken by the radar tapes; is that right?
8 A. No, counsel, the only incident that was subjected to serious
9 investigations rather by those who were reporting it --
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. -- was the incident involving the helicopter flights because it
12 became a Security Council issue.
13 Q. I understand.
14 A. This was one more of the hundreds of various events that we would
15 report but would not subject to investigation unless there was a reason
16 for doing so.
17 Q. Can you confirm for us that in relation to the investigation that
18 was undertaken, those February flights that involve the Security Council,
19 that that investigation was inconclusive?
20 A. To my understanding, it was. But it was done by General Pellnas.
21 The monetary group of the border. The one we discuss earlier. That was
22 the one that was given the mandate for the official investigation. I saw
23 it, I spoke to General Pellnas and it was. I can't prove it, that this
24 happened other than the fact that those who saw the flights vouch that it
1 Q. Are the two compatible, those who saw the flights on the one hand
2 and the inconclusive report on the other?
3 A. The report said just we saw the flight. If they said they saw
4 them, you don't have other than your eyes physical evidence of what
5 happened. If that physical evidence is missing from the flight
6 observation point of view, and the motivation for doing it is also being
7 disputed, then the only thing you can reach is it's not conclusively
9 Q. Doctor, did you ever meet General Perisic?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Were you ever aware of General Perisic meeting General Mladic?
12 A. There is an incident that I show in one of my written reports,
13 and it is an incident that occurred as I visited Glina sometime in
14 October, I believe, or something like that.
15 Q. Just pause. Where is Glina?
16 A. Glina is in the former Sector North where I was based, where I
17 had served for longest and the people on the grown I knew them well. As
18 well as the people I used to interact with.
19 Q. And October of which year?
20 A. I think it's -- unless I check on the report. 1994 or 1995 for
21 me seem to be so blurred, those two years.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, I believe that you are suggesting an
23 answer to the witness. There is no October that's been discussed.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: If you look at page 52, line 12. There is the
25 answer of the witness.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: My apologies. My apologies. Thank you.
2 MR. THOMAS:
3 Q. Doctor, let me ask you this. Where were you posted at the time
4 that you heard --
5 A. I was posted in Belgrade
6 Q. Okay.
7 A. And I was taking a trip back into the sector, I had some business
8 I had to do there.
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. Now, these authorities, the people I used to meet, knew me well
11 and they knew I was in Belgrade
12 met, they took the opportunity to say, Hey, this happened here; and the
13 context was all over the local media, the fallout between the two sides
14 those who were seeking the peace and those who were not seeking the peace
15 was all that they could talk about. It was all about their life, it was
16 whether or not trouble will start back. So they took the opportunity to
17 say even General Perisic was here with Mladic to try to sort out the
18 various oppositions that is were happening including in our part. That
19 was the incident.
20 Q. Apart from this meeting, are you aware of any other meetings
21 between Mladic and Perisic?
22 A. No, no.
23 Q. Are you aware of what sort of relationship existed between
24 Milosevic and Mladic?
25 A. Never met Mladic. But I did meet that many times as my testimony
1 shows with Milosevic. There were issues that involved that would bring
2 him to occasionally say something involving the various parties, and
3 from -- for him, I mean Milosevic to say something.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Doctor, if I may just take you a little back.
5 These people who told you that Perisic had come to sort out things with
6 Mladic, did they also tell that you they were present during their
7 meeting, the meeting of the two people?
8 THE WITNESS: No, no.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you know whether they were present during that
11 THE WITNESS: No, I was sure they weren't present, but they said
12 they know about it.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Did they tell you how they know about the subject
14 of the meeting?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes. It is because, as I said earlier, this is
16 their life, this is their interest when involved in the peace process.
17 They were involved in negotiating including the contact group.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: They were, but they don't know what Perisic and
19 Mladic were talking about, do they?
20 THE WITNESS: Yes. They said it was all about this fallout that
21 some of us want to support Milosevic, some of us want not to support it.
22 They are politicians.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: They are politicians. What I'm trying to find out
24 from you is whether they had personal knowledge of this or were they just
25 speculating that this is the purpose of the visit?
1 THE WITNESS: They didn't themselves say we were there.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Right.
3 THE WITNESS: That's clear, there's no doubt about that.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: And they told you the subject of discussion
5 because that subject was general discussion in the area.
6 THE WITNESS: It was their life.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: So they were guessing?
8 THE WITNESS: Yes. Guessing about the subject, no. The subject
9 is something that they were involved in. That is, do we support this
10 side or do we support this side?
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Who?
12 THE WITNESS: The support Milosevic attempt.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Wait a minute, wait a minute. When you say this
14 was something they were involved in, are you talking about Mladic and
15 Perisic or are you talking about the general people.
16 THE WITNESS: General people.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: The general people.
18 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: And these people who told you were not party to
20 the meeting between Perisic and Mladic.
21 THE WITNESS: No.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: They cannot tell us exactly what they discussed?
23 THE WITNESS: Correct.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
25 MR. THOMAS:
1 Q. Doctor, just getting back to Mr. Milosevic and General Mladic,
2 you were talking about your encounters with Mr. Milosevic, and I'm
3 wanting to know from you if from those you are able to tell us what if
4 anything you can of the relationship between Mr. Milosevic and
5 General Mladic?
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: I think the question is vague as its presently
7 put. What if anything about the relationship, the political
8 relationship, social relationship, psychological relationship. I don't
9 believe the question as put is specifically focused or the witness to be
10 able to really give an answer.
11 MR. THOMAS: I can be more specific, Your Honour.
12 Q. If we deal firstly with the political relationship, are you able
13 to describe that from what you knew from your encounters with Milosevic
14 and others and from your duties?
15 A. The most I can say about this, and this is absolutely the most I
16 can say, is that he would comment only when --
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Who is he?
18 THE WITNESS: Milosevic. He would make a comment when there is
19 an issue. There's fight, we are trying to stop it, for example. There
20 was a shooting of planes by NATO and the sides that caused it. There are
21 players involved. During those negotiations, he would say what he wanted
22 to say of his view and to let us know his view about these players. One
23 of the reasons we went to see Milosevic plainly speaking was that we
24 believed he had influence with the players associated with any particular
25 event that we are discussing.
1 He would say so and so, this is what I think he is doing, so and
2 so is, I will speak with so and so, and see if we can sort out this
3 issue. Then he will speak either provingly or disapprovingly. I never
4 heard him speak disapprovingly or any -- any way other than differential
5 of Mladic. Very little times it even came out. Very little. So it
6 would be a differential one, if it came at all. But it would be
7 different, for example, in contrast with Karadzic because of his open and
8 public differences or views of the outcome. So that's the most I can
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: On that differential note, would it be
12 MR. THOMAS: It would, sir.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll take a break and come back at half past
14 12.00. Court adjourned.
15 --- Recess taken at 12.01 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.31 p.m.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Thomas.
18 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours.
19 Q. Doctor, just before the break you were telling us about what
20 Mr. Milosevic told you about his professional relationship with
21 General Mladic. Did he provide any clues as to his personal relationship
22 with General Mladic?
23 A. Counsel, at no time would Mr. Milosevic speak personally. He was
24 very, very tuned to the issue of the time, and I wouldn't characterise
25 anything I said about him as any disclosure of anything personal.
1 Q. Finally, Doctor, I want to ask you about your time in Belgrade
2 and specifically your dealings with the FRY political and military
3 leadership there. What I want to ask you is now well informed were they?
4 How informed were they about both political and military events, both in
5 the FRY and outside the FRY?
6 A. It was my sense of it that they were very informed mostly to the
7 ground about any of the issues and events surrounding whatever it is we
8 came to discuss with them. My sense of it was that they were extremely
9 well informed.
10 Q. Does that apply to the -- both the political and the military
12 A. Yes. Whatever it took or central to the issue. If it was
13 political, that was central to any specific event, they were on top of
14 all details. If there was a military angle to it, they were also very
16 Q. Many of the issues that you would have discussed would have been
17 very specific, but necessarily would have needed to have been viewed
18 against a much broader context?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. Can you comment on how well they were informed of the broader
21 issues affecting the whole territory?
22 A. Yes. Let me give you an example. When we were there, my time as
23 representative of the -- special representative of the Secretary-General,
24 I mean delegate of the representative of the Secretary-General, there was
25 a stream of high-level visitors, delegations, both from individual
1 countries, also representing forums, like ICFY. The address was also
2 Mr. Milosevic's office as then-president of Serbia, where that office is
3 located in Belgrade
4 The issues ranged all the way from broad negotiations of what the
5 outcome would envisage in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the final status and
6 disposition of those areas in Croatia
7 reach, his contact was always from the bottom to the top. But the last
8 time, for example, I ended my mandate in there UN staff had been taken
9 hostages in Sarajevo
10 getting all these various nationalities released. At the same time, he
11 was negotiating with the American representative, I believe it was
12 Robert Fraser, about the outcome. He was always involved from top to
13 bottom. From the smallest disposition of an issue, to the broader
14 international out come.
15 MR. THOMAS: Doctor, thank you those are all the questions I have
16 for you at this stage. My learned friends for the Defence will have some
17 questions for you, if you kindly answer them.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you Mr. Thomas.
19 Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you, if I could have but a moment to set
22 Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
23 Q. Good afternoon, Dr. Kirudja.
24 A. Good afternoon, counsel.
25 Q. How are you doing?
1 A. Fine, thank you.
2 Q. Good. These events --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Please speak into the microphone,
4 Mr. Guy-Smith.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH:
6 Q. I have a problem, I often drop my voice and the people in the
7 interpretive booth yell at me and rightfully so.
8 I'm wondering can I be heard now just to be sure? If anybody can
9 give me an indication of whether or not my voice is doing all right, that
10 would be great.
11 THE INTERPRETER: It's fine, thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you very much.
13 Q. These events occurred quite a number of years ago, and I'm sure
14 that the situation for you was not only remarkable but also memorable;
15 but as you've said, with regard to some of the details of the matters,
16 that you couldn't remember all of the exact details; right?
17 A. I believe specifically, I was addressing details like sequence of
19 Q. Right.
20 A. Details like specific dates and specific event.
21 Q. Absolutely.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. And you gave a statement, I think you probably gave many
24 statements, but you gave a statement to the Office of the Prosecutor in
25 September of 1999, about ten years ago, a little give or take a few
2 A. Yes. Correct.
3 Q. And at that time just would it be fair to say that when you gave
4 that statement, that your memory with regard to the details not only of
5 time, but of certain events was fresher than it is as you sit here today?
6 A. Logical.
7 Q. You first arrived in the region in April; correct?
8 A. Right.
9 Q. And that was April of 1992?
10 A. Right.
11 Q. And before you came to the region, you educated yourself as best
12 you could concerning the situation on the ground; correct?
13 A. Your Honour, that particular statement is difficult to place.
14 When you are assigned, Your Honour, a UN mission, you are not supposed to
15 do other than the orientation inside the UN of what the mission is. I
16 had two or three years before been involved in Afghanistan a different
17 situation. It is not a study I'm referred to do nor am I required to
18 know beyond the official terms of reference for the mission. To that
19 extent, I did educate myself.
20 Q. And when you say, as you just did, that you are not required to
21 know beyond the official terms of reference for the mission, could you
22 explain to the Chamber what you mean by that specific statement? When
23 you say "official terms of reference"?
24 A. It's easy to summarise by the enabling resolution putting the
25 mission to action. As it is an international document, it's rather a
1 complete document because the resolution will refer to all the background
2 material that led to the situation, to the reason the Security Council
3 was involved, to the terms of what they want done, and the result they
4 expect. It's rather comprehensive thing.
5 Q. And with regard to your specific research prior or education
6 prior to arriving at Belgrade
7 That you educated yourself with regard to reference of the mission?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And in that regard, as you've testified here, you understood that
10 there was the Vance Plan?
11 A. Right.
12 Q. You understood the parameters of the Vance Plan?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. And you understood your specific duties and obligations with
15 regard to attempting to effectuate the plan as best you could?
16 A. Right.
17 Q. And the Vance Plan envisioned both a civil and military
18 component, did it not?
19 A. Yes, it had those components.
20 Q. Now, part of your duties obviously because I take it you are not
21 a military man, were to liaise with the military component that were
22 involved in the Vance Plan?
23 A. True.
24 Q. Who found their expression under such organisations as UNPROFOR
25 and the UNMOs; right?
1 A. True.
2 Q. And to the extent that you -- before you arrived once again in
4 liaise with these groups, did you educate yourself with regard to any of
5 the military difficulties that were occurring prior to your arrival? Was
6 that part of your reference?
7 A. If you are talking about educate myself in materials extraneous
8 to what I described.
9 Q. No, absolutely not. You've told me you didn't do that.
10 A. Right.
11 Q. Okay. Upon your arrival to Belgrade, you were immediately
12 seconded to a particular area; correct? Within a couple of days?
13 A. Mm-hmm, yes.
14 Q. And when you arrived in that area, did you learn at that point in
15 time upon your arrival as to whether or not your mandate to assist in the
16 effectuation of the Vance Plan was going to be -- I would say
17 hassle-free, but I would say something more subtle than that, which is
18 there were difficulties presented upon your arrival. There were
19 immediate problems in terms of the way that the parties were dealing with
20 the plan as it stood?
21 A. That's true. And it was obvious from day one the crossing in the
23 people on both sides; so it wasn't like you had a choice but quickly get
24 an understanding, this is a war zone.
25 Q. I'm sure that's the case. With regard to the issue of this being
1 a war zone, there was obviously an immediate and direct concern that you
2 had because part of the plan was the notion, and relatively important
3 part of the plan, of demobilising the forces?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. The demobilisation of the forces independent of being something
6 that was important on its own, was necessarily connected to the parties'
7 view of what I think you have identified as the opstinas or the
8 municipalities; correct?
9 A. Partly correct. It was also trying to understand what each of
10 the parties understood we were coming to do. And it was graphically
11 demonstrated to us when we arrived at the confrontation lines in Sector
12 North where one side actually thought we were relief party to take their
13 positions in the foxholes.
14 Q. When you say one party thought you were to --
15 A. Relieve them in their positions at the confrontation line in
16 their foxholes.
17 Q. Which party was that?
18 A. The Serb side.
19 Q. And the other party, the Croatian side, what was their position
20 with regard to what your mandate -- why you were there?
21 A. They also figured we are out come there and throw them out of
22 their foxholes.
23 Q. So at the moment that you arrived, there was clearly a severe
24 misunderstanding of what your purpose was that you had to clarify?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Which I take it that you did in rapid haste?
2 A. We were forced to. One, to say we didn't come to do that, and on
3 the other side, you have to pull back to your positions.
4 Q. Okay. Now, during those initial days, were there any discussions
5 about precisely which areas, once again I'm talking about the opstinas,
6 were to fall under whose, and I use the word authority in a loose sense
7 for the moment, really what I'm driving at here is if you could explain
8 to the Chamber, the pink zone problem?
9 A. Yes, I will. And very quickly. Your Honour, this was a
10 culmination of what the learned counsel has been trying to say, that
11 there had to be a clarification of not only our mandate, but also the
12 borders, the jurisdiction borders of that mandate. It was not like most
13 things made by committees, assemblies, watertight. What Vance Plan had
14 said was your mandate will cover these opstinas, and they proceeded to
15 name those opstinas in an annex to his agreement between Belgrade and
17 Those opstinas in the maps that prevailed before the war had
18 boundaries, the civic boundaries of those opstinas. From the Croatian
19 side, they would trace the civic boundaries of those opstinas in their
20 utmost side closest to their side of the war, and trace that as the
21 boundary of where the opstinas would be. That where the UN mandate was
22 to terminate beyond those civic boundary, they didn't expect that we had
23 any mandate regardless of the situation on the ground.
24 From the point of the Serbs, not so. Their interpretation was we
25 have waged this war and we have come to a clear line of confrontation
1 where our forces are deployed. They drew a map tracing that
2 confrontation line and that map often ignored the opstinas boundaries and
3 cut across them.
4 When the two maps are put together, there was an area which
5 became known as pink zones because our military coloured it pink zones
6 because the military mapping itself turned it pink. It became a major
7 issue about those opstinas which were not in the Vance Plan named, and
8 those which the Serbs included because they had waged the war to the
9 border which, if you recall, Your Honour, I said it roughly traces the
10 natural rivers that they wanted to be their natural boundaries.
11 Then because of the dispute about what should be done in those
12 areas where they had a difference of opinion, the matter went all the way
13 to the Security Council and became Resolution 762, I believe.
14 Q. Thank you for that answer. I'd like to read to you from your
15 statement and see whether or not this is a fair, concise summary of that
16 which you just said. And I refer counsel to page 10, which is:
17 "The Vance Plan based the boundaries of the UNPAs," the UNPAs
18 would be the United Nations Protected Areas --
19 A. Right.
20 Q. "Along the confrontation line as understood by Mr. Cyrus Vance
21 months before the arrival of UNPROFOR In April 1992. The Vance Plan was
22 ambiguous on whether the borders of the UNPAs corresponded to the civic
23 boundaries of the previously demarcated 'opstinas'" -- which is what I
24 think what you were just referring to, "which is apparently what our
25 Croat interlocutors understood, or simply, if the 'borders' of the UNPA
1 reflected the dividing frontline at the time of UNPROFOR's arrival --
2 which is what the Serb side understood. The areas disputed between the
3 Serb and the Croats eventually became known as the 'pink zones,'" and
4 you've told us why, "the disposition of which became the subject of a
5 specific resolution of the Security Council that essentially amended the
6 original Vance Plan."
7 A. Correct.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I interrupt you, Mr. Guy-Smith, I'm not sure
9 I'm the only one who is hearing noises in their earphones like somebody
10 is rummaging on something.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: I hear noises every once in awhile but I've
12 decided -- I'm glad to know that you hear them too because I thought it
13 was just me.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: They are getting worse and worse.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. Let me see. Let me try something and if
16 this is the noise that you are hearing. Is that the noise you are
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, that's it.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's better.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: We apologise. I take that upon myself.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH:
24 Q. Now, the issue of the pink zones and the amendment to the
25 Vance Plan concerning the pink zones is actually one of the first things
1 that you had to concern yourself with when you arrived in Sector North;
3 A. Correct. Among the many other first things.
4 Q. I understand there were many first things.
5 When you first got to the area, the political situation was as
6 follows, and I'm talking about in April of 1992: At that point in time
7 FRY, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had yet to be recognised by anyone,
8 either internally or internationally, as a state; correct.
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. Croatia
11 had they been recognised by then?
12 A. They had been recognised.
13 Q. And Bosnia-Herzegovina was up in the air at that time when you
15 A. There, counsel, I can't be exact. But I do recognise by March of
16 1992, what was a very peaceful Bosnia had begun to mobilise for war, and
17 the result was their disagreement with the recognition of the declaration
18 of independence of Bosnia
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. So I'm seeking from you the time-line you are thinking about
21 because it was around that time. It too got into this recognition
23 Q. Okay. The Republika Srpska was in April had not yet been
25 A. I hadn't even heard the word.
1 Q. And the Republika Srpska Krajina once again, was that something
2 that had been created independent of whether or not it had international
4 A. First time I heard it has to be about May.
5 Q. Okay. When you arrived, you were -- and by you I mean the UN
6 mission, was relying on the JNA?
7 A. Totally.
8 Q. Totally.
9 A. First few weeks.
10 Q. And that would have been consistent, would it not, in your
11 opinion, with the position that had been taken by Milosevic with regard
12 to entering into the Vance Plan, that there was a necessity for the
13 United Nations mission to be there, and they of course were going to need
14 to be supported? Logistically needed support?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. The reason was our own failure to get our logistics in order. It
18 was not an expectation that the JNA should provide us with the logistics,
19 but they did. They did it voluntarily and it was appreciated because it
20 would be worse if they fought us, we wouldn't go in.
21 Q. As a matter of fact, and I think you commented about this in your
22 statement, that it was somewhat ironic that the JNA provided the basics
23 because if they hadn't, the whole mission would have ground to a halt?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. And that was in April of 1992?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. It soon became evident, and now I'm moving to the end of April,
3 that the nature of things were going to change dramatically, and by that
4 I mean that among other things, FRY had come into existence, and as a
5 legal matter, I'm not asking you to comment on the legal matter, Doctor;
6 but as a legal matter, you were informed that the authorities in Belgrade
7 understood that by virtue of the fact that now there was a new nation
8 state that had been created, there were certain places that the army,
9 specifically the JNA, could no longer be? And I believe that
10 General Nikovic discussed this with you?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. And that as a matter of fact, was part of the discussion that you
13 had with him when you were working out how the JNA would remove itself
14 from the area?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. To your knowledge, before the break-up of the former Yugoslavia
17 were there Territorial Defence units in each of the respective republics?
18 A. Not to my understanding. It was a uniform command called the
19 10th Corps in that area.
20 Q. To your knowledge, prior to the break-up of the former
22 JNA, and groups of individuals who were involved in what we will call
23 Territorial Defence units?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Okay. When you were discussing with General Nikovic, and just so
1 we are clear, he was the commander of the JNA and the commander of that
2 entire region; right? When you were discussing the new political reality
3 with General Nikovic - and I'm using some of the language that I found in
4 your statement again because I think it's quite accurate - he indicated
5 that it did not belong in its previous area of responsibility dealing
6 with Croatia
7 were going to have to leave, and there were a series of practical
8 problems that had to be sorted out?
9 A. Those are very exact words that he used.
10 Q. And in that regard, did you assist him in your assessment of how
11 to sort out some of these practical problems, or did he come to you with
12 what I'll term as an evacuation plan so that you had an understanding of
13 what the thinking was of the JNA in terms of evacuating the area?
14 A. Counsel, we didn't have to entertain that kind of thing. We
15 wanted him to give us a demobilisation as requested by the Security
16 Council, how he is going to do it, and how soon is he going to do it.
17 Q. Okay. Now, at that point in time because there was this issue of
18 those that were born in the area remaining, and those that were not born
19 in the area having to go, the issue of what was going to happen to the
20 assets of the JNA obviously was something of great importance?
21 A. Certainly.
22 Q. Did you have discussions with him about what you believed to be
23 in your representative capacity, the most appropriate way of those assets
24 being dealt with?
25 A. We didn't even to determine that, that was determined for us in
1 the terms of reference for the mission. The terms of reference for the
2 mission required that weapons be demobilised and put into storage in
3 designated areas with one key, symbolic key really, to be held by the
4 mission and the symbolic key to be held by the local authorities. And
5 there, counsel, it is a concession that weapons, some of the weapons it
6 was understood weren't going to leave.
7 Q. Okay. What was clear and what you learned from
8 Lieutenant-General Nikovic was it was the intention of the JNA to leave
9 behind and I'm quoting from your statement again and see whether or not
10 this is an accurate quote, "A clear and clean situation militarily and
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And he gave you a full account of how the JNA and TDF units were
14 previously deployed into different groups; he focused on the withdraw of
15 the JNA in handing over military control to UNPROFOR. And your
16 estimation at that time, it would be fair to say, would it not, that he,
17 the general of the JNA appeared surprisingly forthcoming both in
18 substance and in attitude?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. He was cooperative?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. And he was as a representative of the JNA well disposed to seeing
23 that the United Nations mandate was implemented fairly and in full?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Did he say something to the effect of, and I quote, Therefore
1 what UNPROFOR agrees with Belgrade
2 A. I took that to mean he is going to make a proposal of how to
3 leave what you just referred to as a clear and clean situation because he
4 was requested by us, but his channels were different than ours. Our
5 channels go through the force commander of the UN. His went to Belgrade
6 When that proposal that is developed from the ground is accepted, what
7 disagreed would then apply.
8 Q. Okay. Now, as you said some ten years ago, one of the other
9 parties to this, however, had a slightly different view. And you said as
10 it turned out, however, the local Serbs had a different agenda?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I'd like to talk for a minute about that different agenda, if I
13 could. You learned that they intended to consolidate their own whole on
14 the contested territory in Croatia
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, when you learned that, is that a reference to the UNPAs, or
17 is that a bit more far reaching than the UNPAs or the pink zones?
18 A. I meant what they themselves considered the extent of something
19 they called Republika Srpska Krajina, and that extended in all of the
20 sectors: north, south, Slavonia
22 Q. Now, I may have got the wrong impression from your testimony
23 earlier today, and if I did, please correct me; and if I didn't then you
24 can help here, which is, I was led to believe that it was your view that
25 what happened was that the Territorial Defence forces just were set up by
1 the JNA, and when the JNA left it was your position that the Territorial
2 Defence forces was what the JNA left in situ as it were? Is that what
3 you said? Is that a fair rendition of what you said?
4 A. I don't think so.
5 Q. Let me ask you if this is a fair rendition then of what actually
6 occurred in your estimation, which is that the local Serbs found a
7 loop-hole in the Vance Plan. And the loop-hole in the Vance Plan was one
8 that excluded police units from the armed group that were to be
10 A. That's what I said.
11 Q. Okay. So what happened then is that the local Serbs, the local
12 Serbs proceeded to set up their "Territorial Defence forces (TDF),"
13 right at the heels of the JNA withdrawal?
14 A. Yes. It's not the JNA that set them.
15 Q. It was the local Serbs that set this up. So the Vance Plan as
16 constituted unfortunately had not one ambiguity which was the one we
17 spoke to with regard to the pink zone, but there was another ambiguity
18 here which is how does one define a police force?
19 A. I'm not sure, counsel, I ambiguity and loop-hole are synonymous.
20 Because that's where you --
21 Q. Fair enough.
22 A. The loop-hole they found is not an ambiguity, it's a whole.
23 Q. Okay. So it's worse?
24 A. If you --
25 Q. Fair enough. I'll put it to you in another term, then. There
1 were, at least up until this point, in the discussion of the Vance Plan,
2 there were two structural difficulties that allowed for interpretation
3 and/or misinterpretation with regard to how to achieve its purpose?
4 A. Right.
5 Q. Now, even with the problems that were created in terms of the
6 structural difficulties that existed, in your capacity, you never
7 received any resistance from Belgrade
8 to implement the Vance Plan, did you?
9 I mean, you never were in a situation where you received
10 information, for example, from Milosevic where he throws up his hands and
11 says, Listen, this plan is full of holes, we can't make this work, let's
12 go back to the drawing table?
13 A. No, not in that sense.
14 Q. When you first got there, once again I'm now referring to Sector
15 North, you had occasion to deal with a gentleman by the name of
16 Lazarevic; correct?
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. I notice the smile on your face, and I take it that the dealings
19 with this particular individual were less than satisfactory?
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. In all respects. He was -- would it be fair to say he was a
22 scoundrel at best?
23 A. He was a thorn in our flesh.
24 Q. Not someone you can rely on too terribly much?
25 A. It took us awhile to figure that out.
1 Q. Do you as you sit here today recall when the JNA finally withdrew
2 from the area?
3 A. Let me say this: We went with the difficulties up to a point
4 where we were happy we had reached a demobilisation. The weapons were
5 handed over. We had designated storage points. The remnants of JNA who
6 were born there were in civilian uniform, and the militia which is a
7 local term for the police were in the blue uniform, and for awhile there
8 was an air that we are getting somewhere with this Vance Plan.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: And what is a civilian uniform?
10 THE WITNESS: Blue, blue uniforms as opposed to the military
11 fatigue. Fatigues that military, you know, all the military.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, you said:
13 "We had designated storage points, the remnants of the JNA who
14 were born there were in civilian uniform, and the militia which is a
15 local form for the police were in the blue uniform."
16 THE WITNESS: Yes.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm quoting what you said.
18 THE WITNESS: Correct.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now, what is civilian uniform as distinct from the
20 blue uniform?
21 THE WITNESS: I meant civilian clothes like you and me, not even
22 a uniform at all.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. That's what I wanted to correct.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes. They were in their suits and they were
25 in their casuals.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: They were in mufti, in civilian clothes.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH:
4 Q. Now, I'd like to get some clarity on another brief issue, which
5 is that when you were speaking with General Nikovic concerning the new
6 political reality, he told you that there would be six countries created
7 from the former Yugoslavia
8 follows: Slovenia
10 parenthetical remark - the Serbian Krajina, Macedonia
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
12 A. Right.
13 Q. Now, I want to move forward now, if I could, to this whole issue
14 concerning what I'm going to call generally speaking the helicopters and
15 the tapes, which have a series of component parts obviously, and we'll
16 talk about the various component parts.
17 But as an initial matter - so that we are all very clear - the
18 idea was that at the Surcin airport, there would be observers from
19 United Nations military observers present in the room to make a
20 determination as to whether or not everything was okay or whether or not
21 there were, in fact, violations. And if there were violations, the
22 importance of that was twofold or maybe even more than that, but
23 certainly the importance of violations were something that needed to be
24 immediately reported because of the concern that had been expressed in
25 the resolution about no-fly zones.
1 And second of all, there was also at that time another issue
2 which is whether or not sanctions which had been previously imposed would
3 remain, would increase, or would lessen, because sanctions, as a matter
4 of fact, were one of the true bargaining chips that you had, and when I
5 say you, I mean United Nations had at its disposal in terms of trying to
6 regulate, and I use the word advisedly, but I think it's a fair word, to
7 regulate the madness at the time.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now --
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I just interrupt. Apart from the stenographer
11 is there anybody else who is typing or moving around with a mouse?
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: I am. I was making a joke.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, I don't know whether I'm the only one but
14 there is just this noise in the earphones that --
15 MR. THOMAS: Sorry, Your Honour, I must confess that I was, but
16 it shouldn't be picked up. The microphones are off here, but if it's
17 being picked up, then we'll stay away from keyboards and mousses.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: I would appreciate if that could happen because it
19 looks like my microphone is extra sharp today.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm with you. I'm having the same issues.
21 Q. Now, one of the natural consequences of the sanctions that were
22 imposed were that certain items that were necessary to make the radar
23 function were not available in the radar room?
24 A. A claim was made to that effect, and I underscore the word, a
25 claim was made.
1 Q. With regard to the claim that was made to that effect, was a
2 claim made to the effect that certain of the machines in the room had to
3 be cannibalised in order to make other machines work? And by
4 cannibalised, I mean they were taken apart so that you could have a
5 couple of operative machines?
6 A. I think I heard something to that effect, but it came in a
7 context that made me -- made it hard for me because for that you don't
8 have to make sure that are UNMOs are not there.
9 Q. Well, initially isn't what occurred that -- and I'm trying to see
10 whether or not because I think you reflect this in one of your reports,
11 but an animosity kind of built up; there was tension.
12 A. Quickly.
13 Q. There was a tension in the workplace, too many people in a small
14 room, and there were a lot of extraneous issues and somebody got mad and
15 acted badly. It had great international effect, but I'm trying to stay
16 in the room for the moment?
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. Because initially what happened was that the UNMO observing
19 station was taken over by one else, and the observer was no longer at a
20 station in particular but was able to peer over someone's shoulder;
22 A. Counsel, those two details for me since I wasn't presently there
23 to respond to.
24 Q. I'd like to go back then to -- just for a moment to see if we can
25 clarify this, and it's the -- it's P472.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could have P472 up on the screen, please,
2 and I'm referring to page, I believe it's 8 of 10. And I'd like to go to
3 the very first line entry which is 1 February 1995. And the very first
4 entry. If you could make that larger for Dr. Kirudja, please, so he
5 doesn't have to squint.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I see it.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH:
8 Q. It says:
9 "The supervisor switched off the screen used by the UNMO from
10 this moment only 'over-shouldering, over-shoulder monitoring' was
12 A. I see that.
13 Q. Well, that means what I'm talking about is a practical effect
14 apart from the inter-radar room politics that were going on, from a
15 practical effect, the UNMO had the ability to monitor although not in the
16 fashion that had been envisioned?
17 A. Can you, counsel, be sure of that?
18 Q. I'm saying just by basis of the sitrep that we received that he
19 had over-shoulder monitoring?
20 A. That's what I'm asking. If I'm required to be in front of it for
21 monitoring, I'm no longer in front of it. Maybe I can cast a glance.
22 Can you conclude I'm monitoring?
23 Q. Fair comment. Fair comment. Looking later, going back to the
24 page again looking further down, if we could, 7 until 10 it says:
25 "UNMO have no access to any screen and is restricted to sit
1 at the writing desk next to the supervisor." Could you help us there?
2 Is the supervisor the UNMO is sitting next to an UNMO supervisor or is it
3 a radar -- someone in the radar?
4 A. No, I went out read easily there is a supervisor of this
5 facility. It's a government facility.
6 Q. Okay. So while he is while the UNMO is at the writing desk for
7 that period of time, it would seem that there may not be any
8 over-the-shoulder monitoring ability?
9 A. I would say so.
10 Q. There's obviously a distinction between at least in the author's
11 mind who put the sitrep together for your information to forward on, that
12 a there is a distinction between the two?
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. Okay. Thank goodness ultimately the whole issue is resolved.
15 A. Right.
16 Q. And the way that it's resolved is that there is an analysis of
17 the tapes. Do you know if they ever got the spare parts?
18 A. As I said to you earlier, after the whole thing was sorted out,
19 there was no talk of spare parts. The machines were working.
20 Q. Okay. So this could all be attributed to bad mood in the work
21 environment which obtained international dimension, unfortunately?
22 A. No, counsel. No.
23 Q. Okay. With regard to the tape analysis that occurred, the tape
24 analysis ultimately revealed, if you recall, and if not there's some
25 documents we can pull up, but ultimately revealed a couple of thing that
1 is had been maintained by the authorities at FRY for sometime, that in
2 fact there were some flights. And those flights were, in fact,
3 countenanced flights, I believe there were four medical flights, four
4 humanitarian flights, and two evacuation flights.
5 A. Certainly, counsel, it's better to check the document more
6 accurately. My memory of it was that there were something they called
7 traces seen on the tapes. There was a reference to some traces that they
8 couldn't discern or what they were. But it is also a record that -- an
9 evaluation says there was some flights. If this was the flight seen by
10 the Dutch soldiers or some of the things that you have referred to early
11 on, it is not certain. That's my recollection but it's certainly a good
12 thing to be clear about what the report says, and I know you have it
14 Q. We will get to that in a minute.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could have, I believe, it's page 6 of
16 that -- page 6 of the report for a quick second. Thank you.
17 Q. I'm referring to the observations that you made on the 13th of
18 February, 1995.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if we could have paragraph 13 made a little
20 bit bigger so those of us who are older can see better. I fortunately
21 have my glasses on.
22 Q. "It is evident from the above that the FRY authority have
23 provided not new information, but new arguments in support of those
24 inclined to back their position at the SC."
25 Could you tell us what SC means?
1 A. Security Council.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 "From their viewpoint, they're innocent until proven to the
4 contrary. Further they are clearly putting out the signal that they too
5 have not lost the right not to be compelled to be witness against
6 themselves. They have left, however, the door open to patching up the
7 quarrel started by the hitherto unidentified supervisors ordering the
8 UNMOs away from the radar screens. This situation will probably be fixed
9 in a couple of days."
10 Those were your observations at the time. And with regard to in
11 support of those inclined to back their position to Security Council, I
12 take it what you are referring to is that there were certain members of
13 the Security Council at the time who were of the position, specifically
14 the Russian Federation that you mention on page 3 of this report, who
15 were in a line with and supported the position, the general position
16 taken here of not being compelled to be witness against themselves?
17 A. Counsel, you are right generally in your surmise, but I want this
18 paragraph to be understood it's not really conjecture, and me musing
19 about what happened. I did actually have a discussion of those views
20 expressed on paragraph 13 with Mr. Cicanovic, who was the head of the
21 foreign minister dealing with this matter in the Security Council. And
22 he put it very clearly that we take the position there were no flights.
23 And if anyone else has proof we had is up to someone else to provide us
24 with the information or with the evidence. So it's not as speculative as
25 it might seem.
1 Q. You just used the term -- I'm done with that particular exhibit
2 thank you so much.
3 You just used the term "surmise," and I appreciate that you did
4 because if I understand the sequence of events with the recognition that
5 the document that we just dealt with was issued by you on the 13th of
6 February. On the 16th of February, which is document you authored, we've
7 discussed briefly before, that's P473, which we'll get to, the subject
8 is, "The helicopter flights, a maybe epilogue."
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And you use as a basis for some of your musings, and I'm not
11 using the term in an insulting fashion, but I think rather one in which
12 you went through a deductive process based upon the information that you
13 had, that the helicopter flights, in fact, were an indication of a crack,
14 if I might, in the political stability of Milosevic's position?
15 A. Strategy, not position.
16 Q. Okay. Fair enough. And that you believe, and if we could have
17 the document up, that would be nice.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Page 2. First paragraph.
19 Q. You state that:
20 "Surprisingly all pieces of this story, rather incredulously, I
21 might admit, to the episode as being an internal affair by the JA
22 calculated to send a daring message to Milosevic. That message has to do
23 with the efforts of the international mediators trying to get Milosevic
24 to agree to a package involving the recognition of
25 Croatia/Bosnia-Herzegovina and the lifting of sanctions."
1 Now, I want to pause here for a moment, and at this time have
2 some of the following discussion with you, which is: Did you have
3 confidential source information that you were relying upon to --
4 independent of what we see here that is of assistance to you in this
5 deductive process that you are going through?
6 A. I had a variety of sources, Your Honour, in writing this report.
7 When I look at them, I have to remind myself especially the document
8 itself, the one you are referring to, as contrasted with the document you
9 referred earlier in your comment prepared in New York in the whole
10 testimony. That was prepared for testimony to this court. This document
11 was not prepared for testimony in a court. It was not a document that
12 intended to be reviewed other than by it's recipient in a confidential
14 We had, therefore, many sources, and the intention of even what
15 is there, the content, is to improve our discussions and negotiations
16 with FRY authorities so that we -- if we knew or thought we knew what the
17 reasons behind things were, so much for our negotiations. Therefore, the
18 sources which I discussed and used included the totality of what was
19 available to us, first in our normal flow, military, civil, as well as
20 civilian sources. And some of them were private in that sense.
21 Q. With regard to this specific matter, you say here, it's -- if you
22 go down to the bottom of this particular page, please:
23 "Three days ago my sources further inform me ..."
24 Could you tell us which sources those were.
25 A. No, not now.
1 Q. When you say no, not now, I mean --
2 A. What date is this document?
3 Q. This document is the 16th of February, 1995, so a long time ago.
4 I understand.
5 A. Thank you.
6 Q. So as you sit here today, you don't recall who those sources
8 A. No, and since I didn't want to identify them, it remains vague
9 and I wouldn't want to speculate now because I would have then to tell
10 you which part of this report came from who, and I can't do that.
11 Q. It's like a double-key system?
12 A. Yeah, almost.
13 Q. "Three days ago my sources further informed me, a letter signed
14 by some 80 JA generals and colonels began to circulate."
15 Did you ever see such a letter?
16 A. I remember this would appear in the local language and usually
17 for all my sources, I reply on interpretation and translation. So
18 originals of this kind of thing are not something that I would know
19 about. So if somebody transcribed it and brought it to us, then that is
20 all we needed to know.
21 Q. So then as you sit here today, you don't recall ever seeing such
22 a letter?
23 A. No, no, no.
24 Q. And the letter you further go on to say:
25 "It reportedly warns Milosevic that if he recognises Croatia
1 BiH and therefore, disowns the RSK and the RS, they will disobey the
2 supreme council and commander and join the fighting forces of these two
3 Serb states."
4 Now, before we go any further, in 1995, do you know who was the
5 Chief of Staff and head commander of the Yugoslav Army? I may be able to
6 help you out, that was this gentleman here, Mr. Perisic.
7 A. I was going to tell you because I was dealing with this liaison,
8 a Colonel Vuksic.
9 Q. Vuksic, yes.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And what you are referring to there when you refer to the
12 commander, that is the commander that you are referring to, isn't it?
13 And the reason I'm asking you that question is because in the statement
14 that you prepared some ten years ago concerning this matter, for purposes
15 of testifying, as you've told us, the language that you used is as
17 "... they would disobey the Supreme Defence Council and the JA
19 So you've defined it, and "... joined the military forces of the
20 RSK and RS."
21 That's on page 59 of your statement for purposes of counsel.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, that piece of information there is a piece of information,
24 as I understand it, that was based upon somebody else's giving you an
25 idea of what was going on? You never saw a document that established
1 that there were 80 generals who said this?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. Okay. Now, part of the importance of your surmise on this issue
4 of what I'm discussing is the Milosevic -- I am going to call it the
5 Milosevic dilemma, if I might, at the time was based directly upon the
6 issue of the helicopters. They were tied into each other as you thought
7 of at the time; correct?
8 That's what it seemed to be at the time for you. You had the
9 suspicious helicopter incidents, you reported about it on the 13th of
10 February, and on the 16th of February, you are dealing with a helicopter
11 incidents as well as this other piece of information that you believe
12 exists with regard to the general's letter, so you are seeing at that
13 point in time in your mind some schism that's occurring that is of
14 importance for purposes of internal understanding for further
16 A. Correct. But I would like to rephrase that, it is more or less
17 the last piece of a puzzle originating for a longer period, and there
18 were other pieces of that puzzle --
19 Q. Sure.
20 A. -- that are not mentioned or summarised, but those you have
21 summarised are part and parcel of the collage of these pieces.
22 Q. Now, in your mind, in your mind, what was the -- the importance
23 of this particular information from the standpoint of the sensitivity of
24 the international negotiations that are going on at the time? Because,
25 as I read it, it seems as if we are at a very delicate, in your
1 estimation, we are at a very delicate point in terms of how to proceed
3 A. We were.
4 Q. Right.
5 A. We were.
6 Q. Okay. And was part of the concern then a concern about how best
7 to assist Milosevic and obviously Perisic because you include him in
8 achieving the peace based upon the information you believe to be true?
9 A. Actually, nowhere in my testimony would indicate, since I don't
10 believe I had reached any conclusion, which side of this divide that you
11 are describing he fell, your client fell, into. There's nothing in that
12 testimony that would allude to that, nor do I think I ever, to this day,
13 made up an understanding of which side of that.
14 Q. Let me go back then to the other issue that I was -- raised with
15 you before, because perhaps we need some clarification. Which is on page
16 59 of your statement, you say, the one that you prepared for testimony,
17 you say:
18 "Indeed, three days prior to the aforementioned flights into
19 Srebrenica, 80 JA generals and colonels publicly warned Milosevic that if
20 he recognised Croatia
21 would disobey the Supreme Defence Council and the," and I place the
22 emphasis here, "JA commander."
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. And that would have been General Perisic?
25 A. Right.
1 Q. Okay. That's assuming that it's true?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. And that your information is accurate?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. Okay.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm a minute before what I believe would be an
7 appropriate time. Your Honour, would this be an appropriate time?
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, you still have some more questions to ask.
9 Are you moving on to a new topic?
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: I would be moving on to a new topic, yes.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. We'll take a break and adjourn for the day
12 tomorrow morning at 9.00 in courtroom II. Court adjourned.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.
14 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 27th of January
15 2009, at 9.00 a.m.