1 Tuesday, 27 January 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 8.57 a.m.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning to everybody in and around the
7 courtroom. Madam Registrar, will you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,
9 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-81-T,
10 the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Could we have appearances
12 for today, starting with the Prosecution.
13 MR. THOMAS: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning, everybody
14 in and around the courtroom. Mark Harmon, Barney Thomas, Rafael La Cruz,
15 and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution this morning, sir.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. For the Defence.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Good morning, Your Honours. Daniela Tasic, Chad
18 Mair, Milos Androvic, Tina Drolec, Novak Lukic, and I'm Gregor Guy-Smith
19 and, also, good morning to everyone else.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Good morning to you, Dr.
22 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just to remind you, sir, that you are still bound
24 by the declaration you made at the beginning of your testimony yesterday
25 to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing else but the truth.
1 THE WITNESS: Duly noted.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
3 Mr. Thomas.
4 MR. THOMAS: Sorry, Your Honour. We're into cross-examination.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are we on cross-examination? I'm so sorry to you,
6 Mr. Guy-Smith. Sorry. Still asleep.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Not a problem.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
9 WITNESS: CHARLES KIRUDJA [Resumed]
10 Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith: [Continued]
11 Q. One of the areas that you mentioned yesterday was the issue of
12 the sanctions and that the question of sanctions was a question that was
13 foremost in the minds of those individuals that you were talking to when
14 there were difficulties, and I'm specifically talking about - just to get
15 us up to speed for a moment - the issue of radar.
16 Now, as I recall your testimony and as I recall the state of
17 affairs, if there was a violation of either 781 or 820 of the Security
18 Council resolution, then further sanctions could be imposed even from
19 those that had already been deposed. Is that a correct statement?
20 A. No. I don't think you could draw that conclusion from either the
21 terms of those resolutions themselves or any other experience with the
22 resolutions. They are not written to indicate what may after -- may
23 succeed them. Normally, that's the -- I'm just speaking very broadly.
24 Q. There did come a time when there were suspension of certain
25 aspects of the sanctions; was there not?
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: By that I'm referring to -- if we could have 65
2 ter 2178 up on the screen, and I'm going to need, I believe it's the next
3 page. And if we could go down to the -- the language -- thank you very
5 Q. The resolution reads, it decides that the restrictions imposed,
6 and there's referring to resolution 757 and resolution 820, and as you go
7 down further, it says -- after triple I, it says:
8 "... shall be suspended for an initial period of 100 days from
9 the day following the receipt of the Security Council of a report."
10 Do you see that language?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Are you familiar with that particular activity?
13 A. No. These are headquarters matters drafting the spirit of
14 resolutions. These are UN headquarters matters. The testimony was on
15 mission operational activities. It wouldn't relate directly to
16 resolutions on how they are crafted or what inspired them in very broad
18 Q. With regard to the issue of there being a suspension of any
19 restrictions that had been imposed, is that information that you would
20 have been given or that you would be privy to with regard to the mission
21 that you were under?
22 A. Any resolution that affects the mission is brought to our
23 attention. We would know its terms.
24 Q. With regard to this particular resolution, which is dated the
25 23rd of September, 1994, is this resolution a resolution that you were
1 familiar with, sir?
2 A. I can't say very much so. I was not as familiar with the details
3 of this as the original 781.
4 Q. Okay. But with regard to just the general principle of
5 restrictions having been lifted against the former Republic of Yugoslavia
6 -- I'm sorry, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is that something that
7 you were aware of?
8 A. I can't say too aware of in the sense of influencing a particular
9 issue we were dealing with.
10 Q. I'm just speaking generally in terms of the issue of whether you
11 were aware of the restrictions having been suspended, the action taken by
12 the Security Council?
13 A. At what point in time?
14 Q. September 1994.
15 A. I'm not sure it was foremost on my mind.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. Can we have the next 65 ter Exhibit
17 number. That's 5008, which is resolution 970.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just before we do so, what do you want to do with
19 this one?
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Oh, can I have that marked as an exhibit, please.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: 65 ter 2178 is admitted into evidence. May it
22 please be given an exhibit number.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D25.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH:
1 Q. Now, just very quickly, what I'm going to do now, Doctor, is I'm
2 going to show you -- there are a series of resolutions. Each of these
3 resolutions deal with the issue of suspension of restrictions. I'm going
4 to ask you whether or not you are familiar with any of them in regards to
5 the work that you were doing whilst in the field, and they all revolve
6 around the exact same matter.
7 The next resolution is that of 970, which is -- the date is 12
8 January 1995. And once again, if we go to page 2, you'll --
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: And you say that's 65 ter 5008.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Correct.
11 Q. And if you look at paragraph 1, it says:
12 "It decides that the restrictions and other measures referred to
13 in paragraph 1 of resolution 943 shall be suspended for a further period
14 of 100 days from the adoption of the present resolution."
15 A. Could you remind me what the resolution 943 suspended? What
16 particular -- did you show me resolution 943 a minute ago?
17 Q. I did. That was the one I just showed you.
18 A. Okay. Thank you. Go ahead.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: You were just a little too fast for us. What does
20 it suspend?
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: It suspends the restrictions that are contained
22 in particular paragraphs of 820. We would have to go back to --
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: So it's a carrot.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. That's a perfect way of putting it.
25 Q. And with regard to this resolution, which was past the 12th of
1 January, 1995, I take it that your answer would be the same, which is you
2 don't as you sit here today recall --
3 A. I think you are being kind to me, yes. Thank you. I couldn't
4 tell you in 1995 this resolution was foremost in my mind and at any point
5 in time.
6 Q. Understood. If I could have that --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now, this one is a further carrot for further good
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: I think that's a good way of putting it.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: This one on the screen now.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe so, yes.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Because it talks of a further restriction, further
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. Could I have that admitted as a Defence
15 next in order.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is so admitted. May it please be given an
17 exhibit number.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D26.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could I have next up on the screen 65 ter number
21 2177, which is resolution 988. The date of this resolution is 21 April
22 1995, and it extends the suspension that we -- of restrictions up through
24 Q. Do you recall this resolution?
25 A. Not particularly.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. Could I have that admitted as next in
2 order, please.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's admitted. May it please be given an exhibit
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D27.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could I have 65 ter 2175 called up on the screen,
8 please. This is resolution 1003. It's dated 5 July 1995, and it extends
9 the suspension until September.
10 Q. And I take it once again your answer will be the same?
11 A. No. At this point you wouldn't have been talking to me. I had
12 already left the mission in June.
13 Q. Okay. And at that point --
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: And in any case, where does this one suspend? I
15 didn't see the suspension in the previous one also. Is it on the next
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: It's on the next page.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we just turn to the next page.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH:
22 Q. Okay. But by this point --
23 A. I'm not in Belgrade
24 Q. Okay. And once you left Belgrade
25 particular situation obviously shifted, and you then were occupied with
1 other matters?
2 A. Right.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could I have this admitted as next in order?
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is so admitted. May it please be given an
5 exhibit number.
6 THE REGISTRAR: That would be Exhibit D28, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay.
9 Q. Well, then, it would be pointless to ask you about then -- there
10 were a couple of more, but it would not be appropriate to ask you about
11 those because obviously you were off of mission at that point.
12 A. Thank you.
13 Q. I'll refrain from asking questions with regard to those.
14 Now, I want to turn for a moment to the issue of the border
15 closures, if I could, and once again, the border closures was another
16 component part of some of the concerns that the authorities in FRY had
17 with regard to sanctions as well as your legitimate concerns about what
18 was happening crossing the border; correct?
19 A. Whether the border was closed or not, I don't see how it relates
20 to any concern we might have had.
21 Q. Okay. Well, in the event that the border -- in the event the
22 border is open and there are materials that are crossing the border that
23 are in violation of the resolution, that would be something that you
24 would be concerned about in your capacity in your mission; correct?
25 A. Let me state a little bit. I think the border closing, if I
1 recollect, was a decision taken by the FRY authorities themselves. They
2 made clear that it was their decision, not a UN decision.
3 Secondly, the resolutions that you are referring to were on the
4 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and if it's a resolution on the Federal
5 Republic of Yugoslavia
6 was inside. So crossing the border or not crossing the border, I'm at a
7 loss how it relates to the resolutions.
8 Q. Okay. I understand -- I understand your answer, and perhaps I
9 can -- I can be a bit clearer. The issue of -- of FRY's commitment to
10 closing the land border was involved -- was involved in your
11 consideration of the reports you sent back to New York in terms of
12 whether or not FRY was meeting its commitments or not. Is that a fair
14 A. No, because the border was being monitored, as we discussed
15 earlier yesterday, by EU ICFY monitors. The business of reporting
16 whether that commitment was being honoured or not did not rest with us.
17 It rested with that group of people, monitors. So it wouldn't be correct
18 for you to say "our reports" on crossing the border --
19 Q. Okay. I understand. I'm sorry. But you were involved in
20 transmitting that information to Mr. Akashi?
21 A. No.
22 Q. I'm going to -- I know it was a long time ago, and I'd like to
23 show you a document, see whether or not that refreshes your recollection
24 with regard to this issue.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: And could we have 1D 4756 brought up on the
1 screen, please.
2 Q. Now, this is a document, the date of this document is the 20th of
3 March, 1995. First of all, I'd like to just take a look at the very
4 beginning of it because it seems to come from you, and there seems to be
5 a some kind of signing after your name, so if you would just look at the
6 document for a moment and see whether or not this is a document that came
7 across your desk and was something that you were involved in sending to
9 A. Counsel, take time to look carefully at this document. This
10 document is a continuation of the issues involving Surcin, and it says --
11 I draw your attention to the last paragraph of the report before
12 certification section, and it deals with information provided by UNMOs at
13 Surcin airport.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. Excuse me. It is also prefaced in this report that
16 Brigadier-General Nermin who is the second head of the group that makes
17 these reports, as I said to you earlier, provided to me. And therefore,
18 it is -- clearly nowhere in this report you would conclude that we used
19 to report Mr. Akashi. This was a specific matter at a specific time
20 about this particular issue of Surcin airport. We discussed that
22 Q. Okay. So I take it in paragraph -- looking down at the paragraph
23 3 here, what you are doing there is you are indicating to Mr. Akashi what
24 the intent is of both the certification as well as the attached report?
25 A. Yes. This is a matter that we were particularly seized on. It
1 was before the Security Council, and if there was any matter in Belgrade
2 that needed to be brought to the special representative of the
3 Secretary-General, then it was made to give him for information about --
4 it was a point made to give him for the information about that.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we turn to page 3, please, of this
6 document, and I'd like to go -- depending how it fits on the page --
7 Q. The document, we'll start at the second paragraph where it says:
8 "It will be recalled on 4 August 1994, the following measures
9 were ordered by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
11 they list what those measures were, and that is what you were talking
12 about when you were earlier talking about the unilateral decision about
13 the authorities in FRY to close the border?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. Okay. Now I'm definitely with you, and if we go to the bottom of
16 the page, please. Looking at the very last paragraph and at the very
17 last two lines it says:
18 "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro
19 continuing to meet its commitment" --
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry. Where are you reading?
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: At the very last two lines:
22 "... is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border
23 between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia..." and then if we go
24 to the next page, it says: "...and Montenegro) ..." and it continues.
25 A. Yes, I note.
1 Q. This is information that was supplied to you that you then passed
2 on with regard to an issue that was of some importance?
3 A. Right.
4 Q. If we could go to the bottom of the page that we're on right now.
5 Now, at the -- this paragraph, I'm starting with the language:
6 "The mission has received from the authorities an analysis of
8 This indicates that there was -- that these are the items that
9 were confiscated by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
10 that were along the border; correct?
11 A. Your Honour, the mission doesn't refer to our mission. The
12 reference is to the mission of ICFY, the mission observing the border
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thanks.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH:
16 Q. Among the items that were confiscated were 12.4 tonnes of petrol,
17 13.2 tonnes of diesel, and in there a variety of other items that are
18 contained therein; correct?
19 A. Right.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if we are to go to the next page, the top of
21 the next page, the very top, the last sentence in the first paragraph.
22 Q. It says:
23 "In the opinion of the mission coordinator, this reflects a
24 tightened degree of control on the border to Bosnia and Herzegovina
25 the FRY customs during the last month."
1 Now, first of all, just for purposes of clarification, the
2 mission coordinator that we are referring to here is the mission
3 coordinator dealing with ICFY; correct?
4 A. The monitoring mission.
5 Q. The monitoring mission?
6 A. Right.
7 Q. Correct.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: And finally, if we could turn to page 7. I'm
9 sorry, the -- yes, page 7 of this document.
10 Q. And looking at paragraph 5, which deals specifically with the
11 cooperation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
12 conclusion there is that:
13 "The cooperation of the authorities of the Federal Republic
15 A. Right.
16 Q. This is information that was important for you to pass on to
17 others so that there was an understanding of whether or not there would
18 be a continuation of the restrictions and what the general state of
19 affairs was with regard to the closing of the border during the time that
20 you were there; correct?
21 A. No, counsel. All those points you have noted are incidental to
22 the purpose for which this report was passed, and they are valid but they
23 were not the reason the report was passed.
24 And secondly, we wouldn't have been addressing the issue
25 ourselves as to whether or not the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
1 honouring its commitment or how well it was cooperating with the mission.
2 That was their business directly and separately.
3 And thirdly, if it would result to any effect on sanction
4 remaining or being revised, that, too, wouldn't be the reason why this
5 was attached to our documents.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Why was the information passed by you?
7 THE WITNESS: It's the conclusion on the report about Surcin
8 airport. If you recall the introduction paragraph, there was about
9 Surcin airport.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sure. But having dealt with Surcin airport in the
11 introductory paragraph, why go into this great detail about --
12 THE WITNESS: I couldn't cut the report and just tell him, Just
13 look at this paragraph. It was easy to pass it in its entirety.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: So this is a report by the ICFY mission.
15 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which you pass in its entirety, but you're drawing
17 attention to Surcin.
18 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: And you have no interest in the rest.
20 THE WITNESS: Well, I may have had an interest, but there
21 wouldn't have been a reason for me to send it for any other reason.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's what I mean. You have no work-related
23 interest in the matter as at the time.
24 THE WITNESS: At that time. Certainly, it was not also my
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH:
3 Q. And to the extent that the report dealt with the issue of a
4 certification, that was a certification to what end, to your knowledge?
5 A. Again, it's a long time, but the sequence of events which I can't
6 be so certain today was we remained for a long time with an issue about
7 the contents of those tapes which had to be checked by experts, and the
8 experts would say we reviewed the tapes and this is what we found, and we
9 needed that process certification. That's what the reference was about,
10 if I recall correctly.
11 Q. Okay. --
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: You needed to have the process of checking the
13 tapes certified?
14 THE WITNESS: Yes.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH:
16 Q. And so that the issue is fully ventilated, and I'm being entirely
17 fair to this particular document, if we could just turn for a moment to
18 page 10 of 10. I believe if we go to the third full paragraph, this is
19 the starting -- go down a little bit, please. I am sorry, down means up.
20 My apologies.
21 This is what you are referring to, the language that starts --
22 the paragraph that starts with the language "In March..." which talks
23 specifically about that issue?
24 A. Yeah.
25 Q. Okay.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: If this could be -- the report in its entirety is
2 ten pages, Your Honour. I referred to pages 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10, so I'm
3 happy to just have those admitted or have the entirety of the report
4 admitted, whatever --
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: The only thing is that according to the witness,
6 it's the introductory paragraph and this paragraph that deal with Surcin
7 that were of interest to him. The rest doesn't seem to be of interest to
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, since it's the entirety of the -- since the
10 entirety of the document was a coded cable that was sent by him, by
11 attaching this, what I would ask is that the entirety of the report then
12 be marked as an exhibit.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought you started off by asking that a couple
14 of pages be admitted. Now you are asking for the whole document?
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I'm happy to do it either way, whatever
16 works for -- I'm appreciative of the Chamber's concern about having too
17 much paper. So I'm more than happy to have admitted as an exhibit page
18 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10, which are the pages we discussed.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Let's admit those pages then. May they
20 please be given an exhibit number.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Those pages would be Exhibit D29, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. This is ID 4756?
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's correct, Your Honour.
24 Q. Briefly yesterday when we were -- at one point we were discussing
25 the issue of the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I may
1 have once again misapprehended what you said, but there came a point in
2 time when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was recognised as a state by
3 the United Nations, but it was not recognised as a successor state to the
4 former Yugoslavia
5 A. I remember -- vaguely remember that.
6 Q. Is that a correct statement?
7 A. Yes, yes.
8 Q. And that was reflected in a number of resolutions, too, was it
10 A. Again, I have a vague memory about that, and I think it happened
11 when I was already back in New York
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could have 65 ter 2127 up on the screen,
14 Q. And looking at -- looking at the first numbered paragraph, it
16 "It considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
18 Socialist Federal Republic
19 therefore recommends to the General Assembly that it decide that the
20 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should apply for membership in the United
21 Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General
23 And I admit that I deleted from that the parenthetical "Serbia
24 and Montenegro
25 time that there was an attempt by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
1 enjoy membership in the United Nations and specifically to obtain the
2 same status of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
3 A. Thank you. Your Honour, let me take this advantage to amend what
4 I said earlier. The date is 19 September 1992 on this resolution, and
5 the reason I had this vague memory, I was in New York when this matter
6 was discussed. It's not because I had left the mission and gone back. I
7 hadn't even left New York
8 why I had that vague idea that I was in New York when this matter was
9 being discussed, and I meant not back to New York; before I even went to
10 the mission.
11 This matter continued to be debated long before the resolution
12 was passed and when we were preparing for the mission itself, which, as
13 you recall yesterday, Your Honour, I entered in April 1992. So this
14 matter had been simmering for some time, and that explains why I think I
15 knew about it in New York
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: And it ripened around the 19th of September, 1992
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, yeah.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could I have that admitted as an exhibit, please.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
20 please be given an exhibit number.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D30.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: And could I now have 65 ter 2125, which is
24 resolution 821, up on the screen.
25 Q. The issue concerning whether or not the Federal Republic
2 importance to how -- well, to how you could respond to them in your
3 mission, did it not?
4 A. Actually, it did come up a couple of times, when I was already in
5 the mission, when I engaged some of the officials of the former
7 former Yugoslavia
8 the context of the contact group and the negotiations we spoke about
9 earlier yesterday, how these events should -- disposition of these UNPAs.
10 And always when that matter came up, I recall now, we always noted, that
11 was not a matter being negotiated or being discussed on the ground in the
12 mission. It was a matter to be resolved and be discussed in the forum I
13 described yesterday as ICFY forum, the International Conference on the
14 Former Yugoslavia
15 the UN side and Mr. Owen on the European side. That issue rested there.
16 Q. And with regard to -- with regard to this issue, now some six
17 months later, the Security Council resolution takes the same position --
18 and we'll get to page 2 in a second - which is that FRY is not a
19 successor state and, therefore, is not in a position to participate in
20 the work of the General assembly. So FRY still has to apply for
21 membership to the United Nations.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could go to the second page, please.
23 Q. And there, I mean, the reaffirmation is clear. The Federal
24 Republic of Yugoslavia
25 automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic
1 the United Nations and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that
2 further to the decisions taken in the resolution 474/1, it is decided
3 that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro
4 participate in the work of the economic and social council. And the
5 matter is still under advisement; it's still being considered?
6 A. It remained that way for some time.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I could have that document marked as next in
8 order, please -- admitted next in order, please.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is admitted. May it please be given an exhibit
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D31.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH:
14 Q. I'd like to take a moment here and go back to - that can come off
15 the screen; I'm done with it - and go back to something that you
16 discussed yesterday with regard to the battles at Mount Vlasic
17 Majevica hills. That's now marked as P475. I want to ask you just a
18 very quick question about that, which is that you indicate on the
19 document: Confidential sources indicate that 3 to 400 units of the 63rd
20 para-troop have joined. And what I'd like to ask you is, who are these
21 confidential sources?
22 A. I didn't disclose them then, and I don't have a very good
23 recollection now, but I had a group of staffers in my office working on
24 the department of public information side of my office. The office had
25 several sides. This was staffed by a wonderful group of young men and
1 women whose job was on a day-to-day basis to ferret out, to find out
2 information that needed to be informed, and when they would come across
3 certain information that was of a sensitive nature, they wouldn't
4 themselves put on their daily sitrep for the information, and around that
5 route there developed confidential sources around that route, and that's
6 the most I can say about that.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: They did espionage for you?
8 THE WITNESS: Pardon?
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: They did espionage for you?
10 THE WITNESS: If you like.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH:
12 Q. Did you in any way keep a -- continuing with the espionage theme,
13 did you keep a little black book anywhere so there's document of this
14 information anywhere?
15 A. When I first give testimony in these courts - and I've been here
16 for so many times, for so long - I had a whole pile of my notes that the
17 Court saw - sorry, this pile was here - hand-written for which I could
18 authenticate any particular issue the Court raised in detail. That was
19 during Milosevic's trial, of which I'm sure the Court has a record.
20 Q. So I -- to the extent those notes exist, they are somewhere else?
21 A. Out of this country.
22 Q. Okay. If we needed them, you could get them to us, I take it?
23 A. I wouldn't be able to promise that.
24 Q. Okay. We'll consider it, then perhaps take it up at a further
25 point in time, depending. We'll see.
1 A. I don't even recall whether they may be referring to any
2 particular issue you are raising now.
3 Q. Okay. By that you mean the issue of the confidential sources
4 giving you information?
5 A. Yeah.
6 Q. That particular kind of information with regard to troop movement
7 would be relatively important information concerning some of the other
8 things that we've been discussing here with regard to the border being
9 closed, the meeting of the -- the meeting of the resolutions that had
10 been imposed both against FRY as well as the self-regulation that FRY had
11 engaged in, wouldn't it?
12 A. No.
13 Q. I see. And why wouldn't that be the case, that the movement of
14 troops would not be of critical interest to the Security Council with
15 regard to the situation in terms, not only of the resolutions, but
16 generally in terms of the state of play?
17 A. For the same times I give you, Your Honour, this matter was not
18 my responsibility. It was on that group when we were discussing that
19 document, for that same reason I explained.
20 Q. Okay. Yesterday, you discussed very briefly that you had become
21 aware of a meeting between General Perisic and General Mladic in Glina;
23 A. Right.
24 Q. And if I understood your testimony correctly with regard to that
25 issue, you indicated that somebody had told you that there had been such
1 a meeting; they were not present at that meeting; no one else was present
2 at that meeting who reported to you having been present at that meeting;
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. And you made a conjecture that the meeting had in fact taken
6 place by virtue of the importance of the matter that was being discussed?
7 A. Right.
8 Q. And the importance of the matter that was being discussed was the
9 border closure?
10 A. The effects of the border closure.
11 Q. Thank you. The effects of the border closure.
12 A. To their lives.
13 Q. Now, do you remember if you spoke with a specific individual
14 about this issue, or was it generalised conversation?
15 A. I believe I did indicate there was one particular individual who
16 met me and told me about it, plus the other people that I knew that were
18 Q. Okay. And as you sit here today, do you recall who that
19 particular individual was?
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. Okay. And is the name Martinovic?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. That's the individual you were referring to?
24 A. Right.
25 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the position that you've taken in
1 terms of the -- and I'm getting to the deduction because there were a
2 variety of different events that had occurred from which you deduced that
3 there was perhaps potential troubles in the palace?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. What you said when you were preparing your statement for
6 testimony is as follows, and I just want to see whether this is accurate
7 because it's a bit more - shall I say - qualified than what you've told
8 us here yesterday:
9 "Martinovic took the opportunity to complain about Milosevic's
10 closure of the border between FRY and Republika Srpska. Martinovic was
11 always very well informed about events in and outside the RSK, and much
12 of what he said had turned out to be true. I recall Martinovic gleefully
13 informing that approximately two weeks earlier, VJ Chief of Staff Momcilo
14 Perisic and VRS commander Ratko Mladic had met in Glina. Martinovic
15 claimed that the two had discussed with local authorities efforts to link
16 up like-minded officers, but did he not have any further details."
17 And you go on to say -- and I'm sorry, I took this in reverse
18 order. I didn't mean to do that. But you say:
19 "If Martinovic's information turned out to be correct in this
20 regard, I believe that Perisic would never have come to Glina in the
21 company of Mladic without Milosevic's approval. This is especially true
22 if one considers that it was about this time that Milosevic and Karadzic
23 had a well publicised parting. Indeed, since Milosevic had closed the
24 border between the FRY and the RS, he had to make sure that the military
25 was happy so as to preclude the possibility of a military revolt over his
1 fallout with Karadzic."
2 A. I stand by that.
3 Q. You stand by that. Okay. So the issue here is, if the
4 information turned out to be correct, if what Martinovic said is true,
5 and you had -- you have no objective evidence in terms of Martinovic's
6 claim of this meeting?
7 A. It's a fair comment.
8 Q. Is that a fair comment?
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. Okay. However, if it did turn out to be true, then what the
11 natural conclusion of the situation would be, something to the following
12 effect: If General Perisic was not able to move without the permission
13 of Milosevic, then Perisic's meeting - in the event such a meeting
14 occurred - would have been for the purpose of maintaining peace. It
15 would have been for the purpose of keeping things calm as opposed to for
16 the purpose of firing things up, wouldn't it?
17 A. That would be your conjecture.
18 Q. Okay. Well, you met Milosevic, and I think it would be fair to
19 say that your appreciation of Milosevic was that he was clever man?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Savvy man?
22 A. All of that is same.
23 Q. Same?
24 A. Same thing.
25 Q. And certainly not an individual who would place his faith in
1 another who he did not trust to carry out his mission; right?
2 A. One of the longest discussions we have had in the previous trials
3 was how he got people to do his own bidding without appearing to do so.
4 I want to reprise that discussion here, but it wouldn't be what your
5 learned counsel are approaching that way. My sense of it was that it was
6 always a very smart way. When I testified about when we saw him when he
7 wanted to send a message to somebody, he had so many different ways of
8 doing it without appearing to do so.
9 Q. I appreciate that. And what I'm concerned about at this moment
10 is that if such a scenario occurred, it's the choice of his messenger
11 that I'm focusing on for the moment, rather than the -- let's say the
12 strategy that he used to obtain that which he wished. And the choice of
13 his messenger, General Perisic, is a choice of somebody who he would have
14 trusted, and once again, that's assuming that this event ever occurred.
15 A. The most I would add to your comment, counsel, is that it was
16 also my knowledge that no high official would remain in their position
17 for very long if he didn't want them to be there.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. So you can make that conjecture anyway, but that is how I see it.
20 He wouldn't - your client, that is - not have been -- not have remained
21 in that position in opposition to what Milosevic wanted.
22 Q. I understand. Thank you.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just before we go further, this little discussion,
24 interesting as it is, was hypothetical. It was based on the hypothesis
25 that Martinovic was correct in his reporting. What if he was not
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: On the issue of the meeting itself or on any
3 aspect --
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: On the very issues that we are discussing.
5 THE WITNESS: Is that a question to me or to counsel?
6 MR. GUY-SMITH:
7 Q. I believe that it's -- if it's not a question to you, it's
8 certainly a question to me to ask of you, so I think the Chamber is
9 interested in --
10 A. Specifically.
11 Q. In the matter which is --
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm trying to understand where that discussion is
13 supposed to take us, and I'm putting the question in this form that,
14 okay, I've heard what has been said based on that hypothesis, and my
15 question is, if the reverse is true, what then happens to the hypothesis?
16 Does it change the fact of these things, then Mr. Perisic would have been
17 fired, then Mr. Milosevic would not have had confidence in Mr. Perisic,
18 the choice of messenger would be different, what would have been the
19 result? Because we are not talking about facts now. We are talking
20 hypotheses, and for purposes of the case, I'm not quite sure where we are
21 going with the hypothesis. If you are able to cast light?
22 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I agree with you that where the
23 counsel was to go with this questioning, I take it, is his own idea, so I
24 am responding. I have no clue where he wants to take --
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sure. I understand. But my question to you,
1 then, is, supposing Martinovic was not correct?
2 THE WITNESS: Then -- if he wasn't correct, then the meeting
3 never took place, and I wouldn't have commented about it at all.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: But you ... And how would, then, that situation
5 affect the relationship between Milosevic and Perisic?
6 THE WITNESS: I wouldn't know, Your Honour. But on this issue,
7 though, for further clarification of the Court, the fallout and the
8 effect of the closure of the border is not only in the context of the
9 report on Martinovic. Elsewhere in the document, you have -- you may see
10 references to other information that there were even public meetings in
11 the orthodox church decreeing that issue, this issue that there was a
12 wide public effect of the closure, the effect of the closure of the
13 border in the body politic of the Serb group. That was not even a
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: That is another matter. That is one matter.
16 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: The matter at hand here is the alleged meeting
18 between --
19 THE WITNESS: Momcilo Perisic and --
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: And Ratko Mladic.
21 THE WITNESS: -- and Ratko Mladic.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's right.
23 THE WITNESS: That said, I --
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: And what they are alleged to have discussed at the
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, and that's the one I spoke to earlier, yeah,
2 that effect of that closure. And I'm saying, even if I didn't hear it in
3 the context of Martinovic, I had heard it elsewhere. Not about the
4 meeting, I mean, about the issue.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Fair enough.
6 THE WITNESS: Yeah, and that Milosevic was hard at work. That I
7 already knew because I heard Milosevic himself saying so, that he wants
8 the groups that support his quest for a negotiated outcome to win over
9 what he called war proponents, and without knowing, I had heard that from
10 Milosevic, but Martinovic was very smart. He knew my position. I had
11 travelled in the area from Belgrade
12 me that issue has come all the way here on the ground. Glina is inside
14 trying to say, that that issue of divisions of those who are supporting
15 this course and those who are opposing it had come all the way here.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now, for purposes of this trial, given the fact
17 that you are not sure, you have put it as a hypothesis, is this
18 information on this paragraph any information that this Court can do
19 anything with, and if so, what is the thing that you want us to do with
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it's between the two counsels when
22 they pick information to ask me about. I wouldn't myself pick which
23 information. My testimony is very long, has covered six different
24 trials. So whichever they pick, it wouldn't be my role.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: No. What counsel reported -- read to you a little
1 earlier stands in black and white in your statement at page 47.
2 THE WITNESS: Right.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: So when you made that statement, it looks like you
4 felt at the time that it was important to know about this, but you are
5 telling us -- you are giving us information which is based on a variable?
6 THE WITNESS: That original intent of that paragraph, the first
7 trial that information was used is Milosevic's trial. The issues in
8 Milosevic trial and how he effected -- remember, there was a different
9 angle to that trial than you may have. I don't even know the angle you
10 have here. It is how --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: I have no angle. I'm circular.
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you. And how did he project his influence?
13 Those are issues in that other court, and I'm sure, Your Honour, you can
14 see what import that was. At that time, I don't even think this client
15 was anywhere, I don't know, it being -- around it to be brought before
16 you. So that information was those of the Prosecutor side who talked to
17 me to figure out how did this happen, how did this man project his
18 influence, how did he operate. That was the angle at that time, and
19 since it remained on record, it comes up.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: My only problem is that this paragraph gives a
21 projection of this man based on a variable.
22 THE WITNESS: True.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: And not based on fact.
24 THE WITNESS: True.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Unfortunately, here, we are about facts. Whatever
1 decision we make on this issue, we would have it as factually established
2 that they did or did not meet.
3 THE WITNESS: I understand your point, Your Honour. What I said,
4 the most I can say is what I said.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: I guess I can't take the matter any further.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH:
7 Q. I want to move on to another issue, which is, with regard to your
8 time in Belgrade
9 A. August.
10 Q. That would have been August of?
11 A. 1994.
12 Q. 1994.
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. And from the time that you arrived in Belgrade in August of 1994,
15 did you basically remain there until your duties were finished in the
17 A. You mean as an assignment, not physically?
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. I'm sure you moved around.
21 A. Thank you.
22 Q. I hope you weren't just in one place all the time.
23 And during the period of time that you were in Belgrade
24 point in time, that's when you had dealings both with I think military
25 and political parts of the FRY leadership. With regard to the political
1 leadership, you've mentioned clearly some of the individuals that you
2 dealt with who were players in that, although Milosevic as you've told us
3 was technically not representative of FRY but, rather, of Serbia
4 regard to the military leadership, who did you deal with on the military
6 A. My office was organised to have people reporting to my office on
7 the military side, on the police side, and on civilian side, and on
8 administration. The report you saw yesterday showed a certain senior
9 representative of the force commander. At that time was Colonel Kracmar
10 - I think that name in one of the document did crop up - as well as a
11 senior military observer from Sweden
12 people would liaise routinely with their counterpart in the military. In
13 the case of your client, we had a Colonel Vuksic.
14 Q. Colonel Vuksic?
15 A. Yeah, who my Colonels dealt with, and if we needed to discuss an
16 issue, they first would discuss at their levels; if the issue was sorted,
17 I didn't have to meet anybody. And there was no issue when I was in
19 That's why I said I never met Mr. Perisic.
20 Q. Okay. Did you meet with Colonel Vuksic?
21 A. In one meeting, yes. I remember one report we did, and I think
22 in the context of one issue, I forget which one, probably the radar
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. Probably the radar issue and maybe another issue.
1 Q. So when -- when you said yesterday with regard to the following
2 question was asked of you, and this is at page 2850:
3 "Finally, Doctor, I want to ask you about your time in Belgrade
4 and specifically your dealings with the FRY political and military
5 leadership there. What I want to ask you is how well informed were they?
6 How informed were they about both political and military events both in
7 FRY and outside the FRY?"
8 Your specific dealings as I understand what you've just told us
9 was the meeting that you had with Colonel Vuksic over the radar issue;
10 correct? Okay. And it is from --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: If you would just say "that's correct." Then we
12 have it on the record.
13 THE WITNESS: I apologise, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's fine. I understand.
15 THE WITNESS: Nodding doesn't get into your record. Thank you.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH:
17 Q. And so your awareness of their information level is predicated
18 upon the one meeting you had with Colonel Vuksic concerning a specific
19 issue plus the information you received from those people who were
20 working with you?
21 A. Learned counsel, I don't think you yourself believe what you have
22 asked me. It is not Mr. Vukotic [sic]. The question by counsel was on a
23 broader meeting of all the individuals that form mountains and mountains
24 of reports here. It wasn't on Mr. Vuksic.
25 Q. Okay. The reason why -- you've mentioned that Mr. Vuksic is the
1 military individual that you dealt with, that you met for one time. So
2 I'm going to read you your answer to the question yesterday:
3 "It was my sense that they were very informed mostly to the
4 ground about any of the issues and events surrounding whatever it is we
5 came to discuss with them. My sense of it was they were extremely well
7 And then my colleague asked you the following question:
8 "Does that apply to the -- both the political and the military
10 And I'm focusing on the military leadership because I know from
11 your testimony the extent to which you met with the political leadership
12 because you've told us about that. So that's where the thrust of my
13 question is coming. And this is your answer, sir. You say at line 12:
15 Obviously, that's responding to the question, Does that apply
16 both to the political and military leadership.
17 "Whatever it took are central to the issue. If it was political,
18 that was central to any specific event. They were on top of all details.
19 If there was a military angle to it, they were also very informed."
20 So when I was reviewing the transcript, I was a bit confused. So
21 perhaps you can help me here, which is, as I understand your testimony
22 with the additional information you've given us today, is the answer that
23 I just read to you an answer that involves only the political leadership
24 because that's who you dealt with, but, however, with regard to that, if
25 there was a military discussion that was being had with the political
1 leadership, that they were also very well informed? Or do you mean
2 something else?
3 A. I mean what I said. And, Your Honour, I understood the counsel's
4 -- the opposing counsel's question broader than the narrow aspect being
5 taken by the learned counsel on the other side.
6 We have testimony in front of you covering a very long period of
7 time, multiple issues, where a lot of officials who participated on the
8 FRY as well as on the opposing side of that -- of the conflict. Running
9 all the way to discussions, negotiations in Geneva, I alluded to, where
10 they were represented by military people, we didn't go into all the
11 details around that because they would come complete on their side with
12 their military and official. They will meet the other side complete with
13 their political and their military. We spoke about when we had meetings
14 on -- with the President, they always had aides. In this particular case
15 he is referring to, he is correct, in his client, the only military
16 person identified in this small instant, is the liaison officer who we
17 dealt with, and he is correct to that. But I still maintain the broader
18 question I answered about the level of information that others had was
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. If I may ask the question slightly
22 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: At the broader level that counsel for the
24 Prosecution asked you the question yesterday.
25 THE WITNESS: Yeah.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Who in the military leadership did you refer to in
2 answering that question when you talked of them being well informed?
3 THE WITNESS: We have even begun in his question all the way from
4 Spiro Nikovic to all the control, the colonels who ran different parts of
5 the whole line, their reporting superiors, all the way to Belgrade
6 took the entire line of all the contacts that we had made from the ground
7 to Belgrade
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not quite sure whether that was the question
9 you wanted to ask, Mr. Guy-Smith.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, it's not.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: You ask yours.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH:
13 Q. Okay. As I understand your testimony, when you were in Belgrade
14 you met with political leaders of FRY and you met with, on one occasion,
15 Colonel Vuksic, as a military leader; correct?
16 A. [No verbal response]
17 Q. The one occasion that you met with Colonel Vuksic as you sit here
18 concerned the issue that we've spent a fair amount of time about, which
19 is the radar and the helicopter issue; right?
20 A. [No verbal response]
21 Q. Apart from Colonel Vuksic as a part of the military leadership of
22 FRY, the higher levels, you met no other military leaders? I understand
23 you met people on the ground. You met people who were involved in
24 operational matters.
25 A. I don't have the recollection of the document that I want to
1 refer to, but since Vuksic arranged the meeting, that meeting had other
2 generals named in a certain document I don't recall. They can find it
3 out. He was a liaison arranging a meeting. That meeting had
4 higher-ranking officials that we met with. I don't recall their names,
5 but it is somewhere.
6 So it's not correct, counsel, that I just met Vuksic. Vuksic
7 arranged the meeting.
8 Q. Okay. So apart from meeting Vuksic on the one occasion, then you
9 have recollection of meeting some generals --
10 A. On this specific issue that you are referring.
11 Q. On the specific issue of the helicopters?
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. Okay. So do you remember how many generals you met?
14 A. On this specific issue or in general?
15 Q. No, on this specific issue.
16 A. No, I have just finished saying I wish I could find a document
17 that summarises that meeting.
18 Q. Okay. Now apart from this specific issue where Colonel Vuksic
19 was the liaison and helped set this meeting up, there were no other
20 meetings that you had with military leadership in Belgrade concerning
21 military issues, were there?
22 A. Where the military are alone, no. But we have had meetings where
23 the force commander de Lapresle, other meetings that are arranged at a
24 much higher level where the force commander, the special representative
25 of the Secretary-General, especially when there were air-strikes, NATO
1 air-strikes, a room full of brass and stars, and met all them.
2 Q. And there when you said de Lapresle, I take it you are referring
3 to de Lapresle, the French --
4 A. Our side of the military.
5 Q. Your side of the military.
6 A. Meeting on their side. They can't meet other than with their
8 Q. And during those meetings, do you recall who their counterparts
10 A. I need a refreshment of all these things. You can't ask me about
12 Q. I understand it was a long time ago, and unfortunately, I can't
13 help you there because I have no record of such a meeting.
14 A. There are records.
15 Q. I don't disbelieve you, sir. I just don't have them.
16 A. Right.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'd like to move to one final area, but I note
18 the time, so I won't move to a final area. Would this be an appropriate
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: It will be. We'll take the break and come back at
21 quarter to 11.00 a.m.
22 --- Recess taken at 10.14 a.m.
23 --- On resuming at 10.45 a.m.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. I want to turn now to hopefully one final issue, and you
2 mentioned that yesterday, and it's the issue of the release of the
3 hostages, which I believe occupied you in June of 1995 and was an issue
4 of some grave importance.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. With regard to that specific issue, so we can set the scene, if
7 possible, there has been NATO bombing. NATO has bombed some VRS
8 positions; correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And in response to the NATO bombing, the Bosnian Serbs have taken
11 United Nations soldiers hostage?
12 A. Right.
13 Q. And the players - if it's fair to use the term in this particular
14 scenario - are in large measure from your -- for your purposes General
15 Mladic, who is dealing with Mr. Stanisic?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. Mr. Stanisic is Milosevic's special envoy, that's Mr. Jovica
18 [Realtime transcript read in error, "Uvika"] Stanisic, correct?
19 A. Yes. I'm not sure it's special envoy.
20 Q. Okay.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, if we could have 1D 4956 up, please, and if
22 we could go down a bit on that.
23 Q. In paragraph 1, it says:
24 "At 1400 hours today, I was requested to an urgent meeting with
25 President Milosevic's special envoy, Mr. Stanisic." And just that --
1 that was the reason I used the term. I was using the term because I had
2 read it in the cable.
3 A. Thank you for your correction.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now that we see which Stanisic this is, may we
5 just correct the record. It's Jovica Stanisic, not Uvika.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I stand corrected. He was
8 special envoy for this particular task, but he was something else in his
9 other roles, that's why I would say that I'm not sure he was special
10 envoy, but you are right. We regarded him as a special envoy for this
11 particular task.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH:
13 Q. And during this meeting, there were a number of things that Mr.
14 Stanisic told you about the information that he had received?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And he also told you what his plan was in terms of obtaining the
17 release of the hostages, and there was some concern about his plan, and
18 if we could go to paragraph 6, which is on the next page, and reading at
19 paragraph 6:
20 "At the beginning, Stanisic was only thinking of gaining a
21 dignified and secure release of the UN personnel and not their equipment.
22 I appointed to him that they were to be released without their equipment
23 and later left in the hands of captors. This may not be seen as an
24 'unconditional' release so emphatically demanded by such countries as
1 plan included the contingent's own equipment, particularly the protective
3 And Stanisic thought about it and then wanted to get more
4 information so he could figure out how to do that. Is that a fair
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Also at the same time, he told you that both he as well as
8 Milosevic were extremely concerned about this particular group of
9 hostages that were being held under the authority of Mladic, and
10 specifically, they were concerned because of the reports that that they
11 may be running out of rations, and I've said held by Mladic, which is not
12 something that's contained in your particular language in the remaining
13 of paragraph 6, but I'm asking if that's accurate.
14 If we could go to the next page of paragraph 6 so that the
15 gentleman can see the remaining part.
16 A. Suffice it to say - and if you want to go into details, we can go
17 - Mr. Stanisic's concern was a lot more than you have said.
18 Q. Okay. I'm sure we can go into more details, and probably we'll
19 get there. If you think now is an appropriate time, I am happy to do
20 that with you at this moment.
21 A. And secondly, I need to look at my records. I don't think your
22 characterization of Mladic is reflected in my report.
23 Q. No, it's not. I was saying specifically that it's not reflected
24 there, and I did add that specific awareness because I think it's
25 something that bears out to be true as we go on in terms of this
1 discussion, but it's certainly not reflected right there.
2 Okay. If we could go to paragraph 8, once again, the issue of
3 helicopters comes up, and there was some concern that you had about
4 helicopters, and you state:
5 "I took the opportunity to seek a clarification from Stanisic
6 about the information two nights ago that three helicopters were on their
7 way to bring in more hostages to join the 108 then at Novi Sad. He said
8 there was a misunderstanding on the part of our liaison officer at Novi
9 Sad. There were indeed three helicopters, but they were going to pick up
10 three additional hostages."
11 Does that mean that they were picking the hostages up for
12 purposes of bringing them to a secure place outside of the control of the
14 A. Your Honour, to simplify the understanding of this matter is that
15 is alluded to on paragraph 8, this issue of hostages took place in three
16 different phases. At this point, we were discussing the last three
17 phases involving some 146 also hostages that the captors had refused to
18 release. The first groups had been released and brought in various ways,
19 by helicopter, by bus, but there were many more. We are only talking
20 about the last -- the negotiation with Stanisic, that is. We are talking
21 about the last batch of hostages --
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. -- where the issue was the refusal to release them.
24 Q. Okay. And when you say "the refusal to release them," we'll talk
25 about that in a moment, but I'd like to continue with the paragraph, if I
1 might, which is -- you go on to say:
2 "Such is the state of security that they needed three helicopters
3 for this purpose. They were under instructions ..." and I take it by
4 that you mean helicopters. Is that fair, that they were under
5 instructions -- you are talking about the helicopters, what they were
6 supposed to do?
7 A. They, I mean Stanisic and the people operating. He was the one
8 conducting the operation.
9 Q. Okay. I understand that better now.
10 A. "They were under instructions from both President Milosevic and
11 General Perisic to do their utmost to obtain the release of those
12 additional three on a day that was also rainy with poor flying
13 conditions. The story goes to show the extent to which the FRY
14 authorities are prepared to go to put an end to this unhappy situation."
15 And that is both factual information that you obtained as well as
16 your assessment of what the FRY authorities' position was with regard to
17 the hostages that had been taken?
18 A. True.
19 Q. Now, in paragraph 9, Stanisic asks you for -- not you personally,
20 but he asks for specific information so that when he meets with Mladic
21 the next day, he can have a discussion with him which is intelligent
22 because he has some concerns about whether or not the information that he
23 has received from Mladic is in fact accurate given the position that
24 you've articulated.
25 A. Yes.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. I have discussed pages 1, 2, and 3 of this
2 particular document. It's a four-page document. I would ask that the
3 four pages be admitted unless the Chamber is only inclined to admit the
4 first three, but just for purposes of completion it makes sense.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: They are so admitted, all four of them. May it
6 please be given an exhibit number.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D32.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH:
9 Q. The next day, in fact, you were successful in meeting with
10 Stanisic, which makes good sense because you were planning on meeting,
11 and this is, as I understand it, after he has met with Mladic.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if we could have 65 ter 1D 4960 pulled up.
13 Q. Now, you indicate in paragraph 2 that you had provided
14 information to Stanisic, which I'm taking is the information that he had
15 requested, so that he was in a position to have an intelligent discussion
16 with Mladic, and that was a status basically of -- the status meaning
17 what these hostages may have had with them and other factors surrounding
18 them; correct?
19 A. One clarification.
20 Q. Sure.
21 A. The core issue here was that Stanisic claimed inability to
22 identify the remaining captors [sic]. The word "remaining" is important
23 because they had identified and obtained the release of a prior two
24 batches. On this last batch, he would claimed -- he had claimed that,
25 I'm not able even to identify who these remaining UN hostages were, what
1 they -- the equipment or in what circumstances they were being held; I
2 need some assistance from the UN command to identify them because of some
3 major concern both he and Milosevic - those are his words - that these
4 hostages are in the hands of groups opposed - back to the issue we were
5 discussing earlier - groups opposed to the peaceful process, and they
6 could be hurt so that we can be blamed. Therefore, I need much more
7 details to secure their release from forces we don't have current control
8 of. That was the key issue.
9 Q. And based upon the information that you were able to provide
10 Stanisic with, paragraph 3 of this particular coded cable states that:
11 "Stanisic appeared certain, on the basis of the information
12 supplied by the UN, that Mladic was withholding a few things from him
13 about the situation with the hostages. He indicated satisfaction that
14 the additional information had enabled him to revise his approach to the
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. So you were able to -- at that point, what happened then was he
18 was to your knowledge able to figure out that Mladic was not being - and
19 I'm putting this broadly - was not being entirely candid with regard to
20 the hostage situation, and based upon information that you had received
21 from military personnel, Stanisic was able to confront him and move --
22 move his plan forward. By that, I mean Stanisic's plan to get the
23 hostages back. Is that a fair statement?
24 A. More or less. All he said to me is that this was helpful, we can
25 proceed, and he felt better. He even had a personal fear that he himself
1 was at jeopardy, and he said, My own life would be at risk when I'm doing
3 Q. And by saying that, he meant that when he was in the presence of
5 A. The moment he crossed the border inside.
6 Q. Right.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may just ask a little question. When you say
8 he said, that's Stanisic "... I need much more details to secure the
9 release from forces we don't have current control of." Which forces are
11 THE WITNESS: Serbian forces.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which Serbian forces? Serbian forces in Serbia
13 THE WITNESS: No, in Bosnia
14 MR. GUY-SMITH:
15 Q. Those Serbian forces --
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Bosnian Serb forces?
17 THE WITNESS: Yes.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH:
19 Q. And those Bosnian Serb forces were the forces that were under the
20 command of General Mladic?
21 A. I can't say that, Your Honour.
22 Q. Okay.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'd like to go to page 2 of the document, and if
24 we could go to the third paragraph.
25 Q. Clearly, the NATO strikes had impressed the parties, and there
1 was a concern related to you from both Karadzic as well as Mladic that
2 there were going to be further NATO strikes; right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And he asks if it would be possible that in his negotiation with
5 Mladic and Karadzic in terms of trying to get the hostages back, he could
6 do the following, and I'm referring to the last sentence in the third
7 paragraph where you state:
8 "In this context, he asked if the SRSG ..." and for purposes of
9 the record, that would be?
10 A. Mr. Akashi.
11 Q. Mr. Akashi. "... could help him in his next move with Mladic and
12 Karadzic to be in a position to convince them ..." "Them," you are
13 referring to Mladic and Karadzic; correct?
14 A. Mm-hmm.
15 Q. "... that they should not worry that NATO air-strikes will follow
16 the release of the hostages."
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. And you discussed this matter with him, and you said that you
19 would communicate to Mr. Akashi this particular request. Whether or not
20 the request would be honoured or not honoured was a different matter, but
21 that you would communicate to him because you understood the sensitivity
22 of the issue and that this may be a way of in fact ensuring the return of
23 the hostages without anybody being hurt.
24 A. I certainly did discuss and conveyed and got an answer.
25 Q. And the answer that you got was?
1 A. This issue was not one that was only of concern by the UN. NATO
2 was a different force. Therefore, there were other interests on this
3 matter beyond the UN.
4 Q. Understood.
5 A. The NATO air-strikes, Your Honour, it would be good to keep in
6 mind, could only at that time be used and, again, two-key system. Even
7 if NATO wanted to do the bombing, they couldn't do on their own. They
8 needed a second authorisation from the SRSG. In other words, they would
9 have to get this authorisation to do that. The SRSG couldn't also order
10 a NATO strike if NATO itself doesn't authorise. So there were two. So
11 this request to ask for a guarantee that NATO wouldn't make a strike was
12 an issue that involved much more than what they were asking.
13 So I conveyed that matter. Later on, I got on the phone with
14 General Rupert Smith who commanded the UN side of -- the UN side of the
15 process, and he provided -- he was initially absolutely reluctant to do
16 anything Stanisic wanted. But after some time, he saw it fit to give us
17 the information Stanisic wanted to identify the troops. But on anything
18 else, the answer was categorical: No conditions, release them and
19 release them quickly.
20 Q. There was also one other matter -- well, I'm sure there were a
21 series of matters, one other matter that I would like to address, and
22 that was who they were going to be released to, and there was a question
23 about whether or not they would be released to the Sarajevo group,
24 UNPROFOR, or to Stanisic.
25 A. True.
1 Q. Okay. And you discuss that in -- if we could see the next page.
2 Thank you. That's perfect. And it's the second paragraph in which this
3 is discussed, and you say that in your view that it would be best to
4 release them to UNPROFOR in Sarajevo
5 was that he put that proposal to Mladic.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Now, why did you suggest that he put the proposal to Mladic as
8 opposed to Karadzic? Did you have some information that the ability to
9 have the hostages released was in the hands of Mladic?
10 A. I just briefly summarise, counsel, that Stanisic was apprehensive
11 that he had no control of the outcome of this last batch of hostages.
12 Q. Understood.
13 A. The reasons he gave was that the forces holding them were not in
14 our "control." And because he refers to Mladic whom he was going to talk
15 to, and, of course, further to my memory of my conversation with General
16 Rupert Smith, these hostages were taken in Sarajevo, and he is the
17 commander over there, so --
18 Q. When you say "he is the commander" --
19 A. Rupert, the UN forces.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. The UN forces that were taken hostages. He was the commander,
22 and he is in Sarajevo
23 Q. So it made sense to you for the forces to go back to the
24 commander --
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. -- on that side.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. But with regard to that he should put the proposal to Mladic,
4 because that's your recommendation?
5 A. Yes, because I had sensed there was a parallel interest in
7 they wanted the last credit for releasing these hostages all to
8 demonstrate that they were doing this and it was through them that this
9 happened. Since we -- I myself wasn't -- the parties I represented were
10 indifferent about who got the credit, we wanted just the release of the
12 Q. Okay, and you express that in this paragraph. You say that:
13 "Stanisic felt, however, that Mladic had a vested interest in
14 wanting to be seen to be handing over to Stanisic the UN group that he,
15 Mladic, had been all along blocking and not admitting to Stanisic that
16 this was happening."
17 So clearly, you received information from Stanisic that Mladic
18 was effectively, while this was going on at least up until the point that
19 he received the information that you were kind enough to give him from
20 General Smith, that Mladic had been lying to him.
21 A. I wouldn't really know that much what -- counsel, talking to
22 Stanisic, you have to bear in mind, that is a man who spoke very few
23 mentioned things when just the two of us in his office and probably with
24 an interpreter. He was not a person who spoke too much if you get what
25 I'm trying to say.
1 Q. I do, and --
2 A. He didn't explain that much. He only explained the bits that he
3 wanted dealt with, so he would say, These are the forces and they're in
4 command of this person. He wouldn't give me reasons.
5 Q. Okay. I'm asking the question because, this is your language,
6 Doctor, which is, Mladic had been all along blocking and not admitting to
8 A. That was my -- yeah, from him.
9 Q. Okay. So that's going back once again to the question I asked
10 before. Effectively, Mladic was lying to Stanisic with regard to the
11 hostage situation?
12 A. It's a logical conclusion you can make.
13 Q. Continuing:
14 "The FRY authorities in Belgrade had taken very dim view of Serbs
15 being seen as "terrorists" holding "hostages," and apparently Mladic may
16 have been giving them a different picture opposite to what they see now
17 from the UN."
18 Which is further confirmation of what we were just talking about
19 a second ago with regard to the fact that they -- one had no control over
20 Mladic, and two, that he was effectively lying to them about what was
21 going on.
22 A. It may be have presenting -- that's why I'm reluctant with the
23 word you are using. He may have been presenting them with a different
24 explanation, and remember, the issue of who was more representing Serbian
25 interests, the forces aligned to Milosevic or the other forces at this
1 stage, who was more representative of the national interest. This whole
2 taking of hostages was a combination of that [indiscernible] I discussed
3 earlier in the context of Martinovic and everybody being seized on this
4 matter and finally taking the UN hostages. It was almost, at least from
5 my point of view, the last pit that culminated into that. So if Mladic
6 was telling them this is the better course to pursue and his soldiers
7 believed him, probably, but in Belgrade
8 Milosevic would not have wanted and he hated the idea that they were
9 being portrayed as hostage-takers. It didn't advance his cause.
10 Q. Thank you for that response.
11 Finally, the result of your conversation with Stanisic that day
12 was -- although he used, as you say, few words, what he did was he
13 undertook to pressure Mladic to deblock the UN group and simply let them
14 go to their units, which was precisely the position that General Smith
15 had taken from the outset, which is, Give me back my men; right?
16 A. Actually, he didn't let them go to their units.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. He brought them by bus, and we went to meet them at Nis.
19 Q. They did get back?
20 A. Yeah, in Nis
21 Q. They didn't get back according to -- according to this
22 suggestion, in Sarajevo
23 A. No, they didn't.
24 Q. They had to go to Nis
25 A. Nis
1 colleagues will know that.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: The colleagues may know, but the Court needs to
3 know too.
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH:
6 Q. After dealing with this particular situation, another one of the
7 volatile situations that you had to deal with, this was pretty much the
8 last of the major --
9 A. Tasks.
10 Q. -- tasks.
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. And you then left the region and went on to other matters?
13 A. Back to New York
14 Q. Back to New York
15 A. Right.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: I thank you for your time.
17 THE WITNESS: Thank you, counsel.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.
19 Mr. Thomas, any re-examination?
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: I apologise. If I might, if I could have the
21 last document admitted.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry. Let's see. Yes, Document 1D 4960 is
23 admitted into evidence. May it please be given an exhibit number.
24 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D 33, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Yes, Mr. Thomas.
1 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours.
2 Re-examination by Mr. Thomas:
3 Q. Doctor, there's just one matter that I want to go back to with
4 you, and this is the topic of the reported meeting between General
5 Perisic and General Mladic in Glina. My learned friend put to you
6 passages from your statement which dealt with this meeting, and then
7 there was subsequently, you will recall, a lot of discussion about what
8 stock the Trial Chamber could put in your description of those events.
9 And putting the passages to you, my learned friend used certain parts and
10 not others. The order was changed. Different things were emphasised,
11 not for any purpose other than because that was the context of the
12 questions that he was putting to you.
13 But what I want to do, Doctor, is to read to you the entirety of
14 the paragraph from your statement where you deal with this meeting and
15 the information you received about this meeting, and then afterwards I'll
16 ask you for any comment that you might have, whether there's anything you
17 want to change or add to that. All right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. The paragraph reads as follows:
20 "Sometime around 15 September" -- sorry.
21 "Sometime around 15 October 1994, I was in Glina briefly and met
22 Boro Martinovic, the RSK official with whom I had contact while I was
23 serving in Sector North. I recall Martinovic gleefully informing me that
24 approximately two weeks earlier, VJ Chief of Staff Momcilo Perisic and
25 VRS commander Ratko Mladic had met in Glina. Martinovic claimed that the
1 two discussed with the local authorities efforts to link up like-minded
2 officers and the RSK, RS, and FRY, but he did not have any further
3 details. Aware that I was then posted in Belgrade, Martinovic took the
4 opportunity to complain about Milosevic's closure of the border between
5 the FRY and Republika Srpska (RS). Martinovic was always very well
6 informed about events in and outside the RSK, and much of what he had
7 said" -- sorry. "... and much of what he said had turned out to be true
8 in the past.
9 "If Martinovic's information turned out to be correct in this
10 regard, I believe that Perisic would never have come to Glina in the
11 company of Mladic without Milosevic's approval. This is especially true
12 if one considers that it was about this time that Milosevic and Karadzic
13 had a well publicised parting. Indeed, since Milosevic had closed the
14 border between the FRY and the RS, he had to make sure that the military
15 was happy so as to preclude the possibility of a military revolt over his
16 fallout with Karadzic ."
17 Now, first of all, Doctor, I want to ask you if, years on, you
18 have anything that you wish to change at all about that account?
19 A. Counsel, I wouldn't want to change a word of the entire
20 paragraph. I took a lot of pains to put it the best way I could put
21 information that you read, and I wouldn't add to it.
22 Q. You wouldn't add to it?
23 A. Or deter from it.
24 Q. Thank you. Doctor, that was the only matter I wanted to clarify
25 with you. Their Honours may have some questions. If you'd kindly wait
1 there for the moment.
2 A. Thank you.
3 Questioned by the Court:
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Just one question, Doctor.
5 In the questions that you were asked particularly by the Defence now
6 towards the end of the cross-examination, you seemed to -- to shy away
7 from calling the Bosnian Serb forces the VRS. Am I right?
8 A. That's the term they used. We didn't use.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's true.
10 A. Yeah.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: And this is precisely why I'm asking you the
12 question, because you have used that term in this very paragraph that has
13 just been read to you. You say:
14 "I recall Martinovic gleefully informing me that approximately
15 two weeks earlier, VJ Chief of Staff Momcilo Perisic and VRS commander
16 Ratko Mladic had met to link up like-minded officers in the RSK, RS, and
18 I have noticed, also, that you shy away from using RSK or RS. Is
19 there any explanation you can give as to why you did so and yet you used
20 these terms in your report?
21 A. Yes, Your Honour, and I am glad you asked.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
23 A. The underlying report -- that is an extract from underlying
24 documents, "documents" of the UN. I happen to be the author and
25 signatory. When I was writing those official documents, I use the
1 references that the UN uses inside, or if I depart from it, reported
2 speech, I'll put it between quotes to signify somebody else talking about
3 that paragraph or phrase. When I abstracted from the UN document for the
4 purposes of testimony the paragraph now that you refer to, I should
5 actually have put quotes between those words, VRS and RS, because you
6 wouldn't find them in the underlying reports, which were intended for
7 discussions. The reason was simple.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: I can almost see it.
9 A. It was very simple. The UN didn't recognise an RSK or an RS or a
10 VRJ. They didn't. But that doesn't mean Martinovic is bound by that.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: I understand.
12 A. He would tell me these are the people he met, and to come closer
13 to recollection of what I heard, I retain what they said, what the person
14 speaking said.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now, if I may go back to the one question that Mr.
16 Thomas asked you now in re-examination, the change you would like to make
17 to this paragraph or if, in fact, to this report is to put quotes
18 wherever RSK, RS and VRS appear.
19 A. Yes, but it is not real material because I have no such
20 reluctance when I'm talking to you on this. When I was reporting inside
21 the UN, I have to do it the way it's acceptable, but you said earlier, if
22 you are dealing with the factual reporting, that's what it was, and I
23 have no qualms calling them VRS because that's what he called them when
24 he talked to me.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Any questions arising from
1 the Bench's questions? Mr. Thomas? Just for the record?
2 MR. THOMAS: No, Your Honour. Thank you.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. That brings us to the
6 conclusion of your testimony, Doctor. Thank you so much for taking time
7 off from your very busy retired schedule. You are now excused. You may
8 go back home. Travel well back home.
9 THE WITNESS: I thank you and your colleagues in the Court for
10 being patient with me.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
12 THE WITNESS: You are welcome.
13 [The witness withdrew]
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Before I ask you for the next witness,
15 Mr. Thomas, can we complete yesterday's little matter that we held in
16 private session. I've received a message that you are clear that we can
17 deal with this matter in open session.
18 MR. THOMAS: Certainly. The Prosecution's position is that it
19 can be dealt with in open session, Your Honour. I don't know the
20 attitude of my learned friends about that.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: We agree.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Then we will stay in open
24 Now, in relation to the content of the disposition, do the
25 parties have any remark to make other than those recorded in the
1 disposition transcripts? Mr. Thomas.
2 MR. THOMAS: No, thank you, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith?
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Does the Prosecution then move for the
6 record of Mr. Nikola Tosovic's deposition to be accepted by the Trial
7 Chamber and admitted into evidence?
8 MR. THOMAS: Yes, please, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: With all annexes to it?
10 MR. THOMAS: Yes, Your Honour, except for those marked as not
11 seeking to be tendered within the body of the deposition itself.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Any comment on that, Mr. Guy-Smith?
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: None, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. The deposition with all its
15 annexes that are tendered is so admitted. May they please be given an
16 exhibit number.
17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Apparently there are quite a number of
19 documents. We'll not give them one exhibit number. We'll give them
20 several exhibit numbers, and the Registrar will do that out of court and
21 give an internal memo to tell us how they have been allocated exhibit
23 Thank you very much. That brings that matter to its conclusion.
24 Mr. Thomas, our next witness.
25 MR. THOMAS: Will have to be on Thursday, Your Honour. Mr.
1 Kirudja was completed in advance of the time that we expected him to
2 take. We recognise that that was a possibility late last week, but it
3 was impossible at that stage to have somebody on stand-by for this
4 afternoon, especially given that we're not sitting tomorrow, I
5 understand. So the next witnesses are scheduled for Thursday. There are
6 two 92 ter witnesses scheduled for Thursday, sir.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Then thank you so much. Let's see, when
8 are we sitting on Thursday? Then we'll stand adjourned to Thursday, the
9 29th of January, 9.00 in the morning in Courtroom I. Court adjourned.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.28 a.m.
11 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 29th day of
12 January, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.