Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 2883

 1                           Tuesday, 27 January 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 8.57 a.m.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good morning to everybody in and around the

 7     courtroom.  Madam Registrar, will you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning,

 9     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-81-T,

10     the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Could we have appearances

12     for today, starting with the Prosecution.

13             MR. THOMAS:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning, everybody

14     in and around the courtroom.  Mark Harmon, Barney Thomas, Rafael La Cruz,

15     and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution this morning, sir.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  For the Defence.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Daniela Tasic, Chad

18     Mair, Milos Androvic, Tina Drolec, Novak Lukic, and I'm Gregor Guy-Smith

19     and, also, good morning to everyone else.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Good morning to you, Dr.

21     Kirudja.

22             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Just to remind you, sir, that you are still bound

24     by the declaration you made at the beginning of your testimony yesterday

25     to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing else but the truth.

Page 2884

 1             THE WITNESS:  Duly noted.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

 3             Mr. Thomas.

 4             MR. THOMAS:  Sorry, Your Honour.  We're into cross-examination.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Are we on cross-examination?  I'm so sorry to you,

 6     Mr. Guy-Smith.  Sorry.  Still asleep.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Not a problem.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

 9                           WITNESS:  CHARLES KIRUDJA [Resumed]

10                           Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith: [Continued]

11        Q.   One of the areas that you mentioned yesterday was the issue of

12     the sanctions and that the question of sanctions was a question that was

13     foremost in the minds of those individuals that you were talking to when

14     there were difficulties, and I'm specifically talking about - just to get

15     us up to speed for a moment - the issue of radar.

16             Now, as I recall your testimony and as I recall the state of

17     affairs, if there was a violation of either 781 or 820 of the Security

18     Council resolution, then further sanctions could be imposed even from

19     those that had already been deposed.  Is that a correct statement?

20        A.   No.  I don't think you could draw that conclusion from either the

21     terms of those resolutions themselves or any other experience with the

22     resolutions.  They are not written to indicate what may after -- may

23     succeed them.  Normally, that's the -- I'm just speaking very broadly.

24        Q.   There did come a time when there were suspension of certain

25     aspects of the sanctions; was there not?

Page 2885

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  By that I'm referring to -- if we could have 65

 2     ter 2178 up on the screen, and I'm going to need, I believe it's the next

 3     page.  And if we could go down to the -- the language -- thank you very

 4     much.

 5        Q.   The resolution reads, it decides that the restrictions imposed,

 6     and there's referring to resolution 757 and resolution 820, and as you go

 7     down further, it says -- after triple I, it says:

 8             "... shall be suspended for an initial period of 100 days from

 9     the day following the receipt of the Security Council of a report."

10             Do you see that language?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Are you familiar with that particular activity?

13        A.   No.  These are headquarters matters drafting the spirit of

14     resolutions.  These are UN headquarters matters.  The testimony was on

15     mission operational activities.  It wouldn't relate directly to

16     resolutions on how they are crafted or what inspired them in very broad

17     sense.

18        Q.   With regard to the issue of there being a suspension of any

19     restrictions that had been imposed, is that information that you would

20     have been given or that you would be privy to with regard to the mission

21     that you were under?

22        A.   Any resolution that affects the mission is brought to our

23     attention.  We would know its terms.

24        Q.   With regard to this particular resolution, which is dated the

25     23rd of September, 1994, is this resolution a resolution that you were

Page 2886

 1     familiar with, sir?

 2        A.   I can't say very much so.  I was not as familiar with the details

 3     of this as the original 781.

 4        Q.   Okay.  But with regard to just the general principle of

 5     restrictions having been lifted against the former Republic of Yugoslavia

 6     -- I'm sorry, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is that something that

 7     you were aware of?

 8        A.   I can't say too aware of in the sense of influencing a particular

 9     issue we were dealing with.

10        Q.   I'm just speaking generally in terms of the issue of whether you

11     were aware of the restrictions having been suspended, the action taken by

12     the Security Council?

13        A.   At what point in time?

14        Q.   September 1994.

15        A.   I'm not sure it was foremost on my mind.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  Can we have the next 65 ter Exhibit

17     number.  That's 5008, which is resolution 970.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Just before we do so, what do you want to do with

19     this one?

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Oh, can I have that marked as an exhibit, please.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  65 ter 2178 is admitted into evidence.  May it

22     please be given an exhibit number.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D25.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:

Page 2887

 1        Q.   Now, just very quickly, what I'm going to do now, Doctor, is I'm

 2     going to show you -- there are a series of resolutions.  Each of these

 3     resolutions deal with the issue of suspension of restrictions.  I'm going

 4     to ask you whether or not you are familiar with any of them in regards to

 5     the work that you were doing whilst in the field, and they all revolve

 6     around the exact same matter.

 7             The next resolution is that of 970, which is -- the date is 12

 8     January 1995.  And once again, if we go to page 2, you'll --

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And you say that's 65 ter 5008.

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Correct.

11        Q.   And if you look at paragraph 1, it says:

12             "It decides that the restrictions and other measures referred to

13     in paragraph 1 of resolution 943 shall be suspended for a further period

14     of 100 days from the adoption of the present resolution."

15        A.   Could you remind me what the resolution 943 suspended?  What

16     particular -- did you show me resolution 943 a minute ago?

17        Q.   I did.  That was the one I just showed you.

18        A.   Okay.  Thank you.  Go ahead.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You were just a little too fast for us.  What does

20     it suspend?

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  It suspends the restrictions that are contained

22     in particular paragraphs of 820.  We would have to go back to --

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So it's a carrot.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.  That's a perfect way of putting it.

25        Q.   And with regard to this resolution, which was past the 12th of

Page 2888

 1     January, 1995, I take it that your answer would be the same, which is you

 2     don't as you sit here today recall --

 3        A.   I think you are being kind to me, yes.  Thank you.  I couldn't

 4     tell you in 1995 this resolution was foremost in my mind and at any point

 5     in time.

 6        Q.   Understood.  If I could have that --

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Now, this one is a further carrot for further good

 8     behaviour.

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I think that's a good way of putting it.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  This one on the screen now.

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I believe so, yes.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Because it talks of a further restriction, further

13     suspension.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.  Could I have that admitted as a Defence

15     next in order.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It is so admitted.  May it please be given an

17     exhibit number.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D26.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could I have next up on the screen 65 ter number

21     2177, which is resolution 988.  The date of this resolution is 21 April

22     1995, and it extends the suspension that we -- of restrictions up through

23     July.

24        Q.   Do you recall this resolution?

25        A.   Not particularly.

Page 2889

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  Could I have that admitted as next in

 2     order, please.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It's admitted.  May it please be given an exhibit

 4     number.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D27.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could I have 65 ter 2175 called up on the screen,

 8     please.  This is resolution 1003.  It's dated 5 July 1995, and it extends

 9     the suspension until September.

10        Q.   And I take it once again your answer will be the same?

11        A.   No.  At this point you wouldn't have been talking to me.  I had

12     already left the mission in June.

13        Q.   Okay.  And at that point --

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And in any case, where does this one suspend?  I

15     didn't see the suspension in the previous one also.  Is it on the next

16     page?

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  It's on the next page.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can we just turn to the next page.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:

22        Q.   Okay.  But by this point --

23        A.   I'm not in Belgrade.

24        Q.   Okay.  And once you left Belgrade, then your attention to this

25     particular situation obviously shifted, and you then were occupied with

Page 2890

 1     other matters?

 2        A.   Right.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could I have this admitted as next in order?

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It is so admitted.  May it please be given an

 5     exhibit number.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  That would be Exhibit D28, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.

 9        Q.   Well, then, it would be pointless to ask you about then -- there

10     were a couple of more, but it would not be appropriate to ask you about

11     those because obviously you were off of mission at that point.

12        A.   Thank you.

13        Q.   I'll refrain from asking questions with regard to those.

14             Now, I want to turn for a moment to the issue of the border

15     closures, if I could, and once again, the border closures was another

16     component part of some of the concerns that the authorities in FRY had

17     with regard to sanctions as well as your legitimate concerns about what

18     was happening crossing the border; correct?

19        A.   Whether the border was closed or not, I don't see how it relates

20     to any concern we might have had.

21        Q.   Okay.  Well, in the event that the border -- in the event the

22     border is open and there are materials that are crossing the border that

23     are in violation of the resolution, that would be something that you

24     would be concerned about in your capacity in your mission; correct?

25        A.   Let me state a little bit.  I think the border closing, if I

Page 2891

 1     recollect, was a decision taken by the FRY authorities themselves.  They

 2     made clear that it was their decision, not a UN decision.

 3             Secondly, the resolutions that you are referring to were on the

 4     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and if it's a resolution on the Federal

 5     Republic of Yugoslavia, its application was not across the border.  It

 6     was inside.  So crossing the border or not crossing the border, I'm at a

 7     loss how it relates to the resolutions.

 8        Q.   Okay.  I understand -- I understand your answer, and perhaps I

 9     can -- I can be a bit clearer.  The issue of -- of FRY's commitment to

10     closing the land border was involved -- was involved in your

11     consideration of the reports you sent back to New York in terms of

12     whether or not FRY was meeting its commitments or not.  Is that a fair

13     statement?

14        A.   No, because the border was being monitored, as we discussed

15     earlier yesterday, by EU ICFY monitors.  The business of reporting

16     whether that commitment was being honoured or not did not rest with us.

17     It rested with that group of people, monitors.  So it wouldn't be correct

18     for you to say "our reports" on crossing the border --

19        Q.   Okay.  I understand.  I'm sorry.  But you were involved in

20     transmitting that information to Mr. Akashi?

21        A.   No.

22        Q.   I'm going to -- I know it was a long time ago, and I'd like to

23     show you a document, see whether or not that refreshes your recollection

24     with regard to this issue.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And could we have 1D 4756 brought up on the

Page 2892

 1     screen, please.

 2        Q.   Now, this is a document, the date of this document is the 20th of

 3     March, 1995.  First of all, I'd like to just take a look at the very

 4     beginning of it because it seems to come from you, and there seems to be

 5     a some kind of signing after your name, so if you would just look at the

 6     document for a moment and see whether or not this is a document that came

 7     across your desk and was something that you were involved in sending to

 8     Akashi or not.

 9        A.   Counsel, take time to look carefully at this document.  This

10     document is a continuation of the issues involving Surcin, and it says --

11     I draw your attention to the last paragraph of the report before

12     certification section, and it deals with information provided by UNMOs at

13     Surcin airport.

14        Q.   Okay.

15        A.   Excuse me.  It is also prefaced in this report that

16     Brigadier-General Nermin who is the second head of the group that makes

17     these reports, as I said to you earlier, provided to me.  And therefore,

18     it is -- clearly nowhere in this report you would conclude that we used

19     to report Mr. Akashi.  This was a specific matter at a specific time

20     about this particular issue of Surcin airport.  We discussed that

21     yesterday.

22        Q.   Okay.  So I take it in paragraph -- looking down at the paragraph

23     3 here, what you are doing there is you are indicating to Mr. Akashi what

24     the intent is of both the certification as well as the attached report?

25        A.   Yes.  This is a matter that we were particularly seized on.  It

Page 2893

 1     was before the Security Council, and if there was any matter in Belgrade

 2     that needed to be brought to the special representative of the

 3     Secretary-General, then it was made to give him for information about --

 4     it was a point made to give him for the information about that.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we turn to page 3, please, of this

 6     document, and I'd like to go -- depending how it fits on the page --

 7        Q.   The document, we'll start at the second paragraph where it says:

 8             "It will be recalled on 4 August 1994, the following measures

 9     were ordered by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

10     (Serbia and Montenegro) to come into effect the same day... " and then

11     they list what those measures were, and that is what you were talking

12     about when you were earlier talking about the unilateral decision about

13     the authorities in FRY to close the border?

14        A.   Correct.

15        Q.   Okay.  Now I'm definitely with you, and if we go to the bottom of

16     the page, please.  Looking at the very last paragraph and at the very

17     last two lines it says:

18             "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is

19     continuing to meet its commitment" --

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry.  Where are you reading?

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  At the very last two lines:

22             "... is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border

23     between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia..." and then if we go

24     to the next page, it says:  "...and Montenegro) ..." and it continues.

25        A.   Yes, I note.

Page 2894

 1        Q.   This is information that was supplied to you that you then passed

 2     on with regard to an issue that was of some importance?

 3        A.   Right.

 4        Q.   If we could go to the bottom of the page that we're on right now.

 5     Now, at the -- this paragraph, I'm starting with the language:

 6             "The mission has received from the authorities an analysis of

 7     confiscation."

 8             This indicates that there was -- that these are the items that

 9     were confiscated by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

10     that were along the border; correct?

11        A.   Your Honour, the mission doesn't refer to our mission.  The

12     reference is to the mission of ICFY, the mission observing the border

13     crossing.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thanks.

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:

16        Q.   Among the items that were confiscated were 12.4 tonnes of petrol,

17     13.2 tonnes of diesel, and in there a variety of other items that are

18     contained therein; correct?

19        A.   Right.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And if we are to go to the next page, the top of

21     the next page, the very top, the last sentence in the first paragraph.

22        Q.   It says:

23             "In the opinion of the mission coordinator, this reflects a

24     tightened degree of control on the border to Bosnia and Herzegovina by

25     the FRY customs during the last month."

Page 2895

 1             Now, first of all, just for purposes of clarification, the

 2     mission coordinator that we are referring to here is the mission

 3     coordinator dealing with ICFY; correct?

 4        A.   The monitoring mission.

 5        Q.   The monitoring mission?

 6        A.   Right.

 7        Q.   Correct.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And finally, if we could turn to page 7.  I'm

 9     sorry, the -- yes, page 7 of this document.

10        Q.   And looking at paragraph 5, which deals specifically with the

11     cooperation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the

12     conclusion there is that:

13             "The cooperation of the authorities of the Federal Republic of

14     Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be good."  Correct?

15        A.   Right.

16        Q.   This is information that was important for you to pass on to

17     others so that there was an understanding of whether or not there would

18     be a continuation of the restrictions and what the general state of

19     affairs was with regard to the closing of the border during the time that

20     you were there; correct?

21        A.   No, counsel.  All those points you have noted are incidental to

22     the purpose for which this report was passed, and they are valid but they

23     were not the reason the report was passed.

24             And secondly, we wouldn't have been addressing the issue

25     ourselves as to whether or not the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was

Page 2896

 1     honouring its commitment or how well it was cooperating with the mission.

 2     That was their business directly and separately.

 3             And thirdly, if it would result to any effect on sanction

 4     remaining or being revised, that, too, wouldn't be the reason why this

 5     was attached to our documents.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Why was the information passed by you?

 7             THE WITNESS:  It's the conclusion on the report about Surcin

 8     airport.  If you recall the introduction paragraph, there was about

 9     Surcin airport.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure.  But having dealt with Surcin airport in the

11     introductory paragraph, why go into this great detail about --

12             THE WITNESS:  I couldn't cut the report and just tell him, Just

13     look at this paragraph.  It was easy to pass it in its entirety.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So this is a report by the ICFY mission.

15             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Which you pass in its entirety, but you're drawing

17     attention to Surcin.

18             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And you have no interest in the rest.

20             THE WITNESS:  Well, I may have had an interest, but there

21     wouldn't have been a reason for me to send it for any other reason.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's what I mean.  You have no work-related

23     interest in the matter as at the time.

24             THE WITNESS:  At that time.  Certainly, it was not also my

25     responsibility.

Page 2897

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 3        Q.   And to the extent that the report dealt with the issue of a

 4     certification, that was a certification to what end, to your knowledge?

 5        A.   Again, it's a long time, but the sequence of events which I can't

 6     be so certain today was we remained for a long time with an issue about

 7     the contents of those tapes which had to be checked by experts, and the

 8     experts would say we reviewed the tapes and this is what we found, and we

 9     needed that process certification.  That's what the reference was about,

10     if I recall correctly.

11        Q.   Okay.  --

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You needed to have the process of checking the

13     tapes certified?

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:

16        Q.   And so that the issue is fully ventilated, and I'm being entirely

17     fair to this particular document, if we could just turn for a moment to

18     page 10 of 10.  I believe if we go to the third full paragraph, this is

19     the starting -- go down a little bit, please.  I am sorry, down means up.

20     My apologies.

21             This is what you are referring to, the language that starts --

22     the paragraph that starts with the language "In March..." which talks

23     specifically about that issue?

24        A.   Yeah.

25        Q.   Okay.

Page 2898

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If this could be -- the report in its entirety is

 2     ten pages, Your Honour.  I referred to pages 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10, so I'm

 3     happy to just have those admitted or have the entirety of the report

 4     admitted, whatever --

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The only thing is that according to the witness,

 6     it's the introductory paragraph and this paragraph that deal with Surcin

 7     that were of interest to him.  The rest doesn't seem to be of interest to

 8     him.

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, since it's the entirety of the -- since the

10     entirety of the document was a coded cable that was sent by him, by

11     attaching this, what I would ask is that the entirety of the report then

12     be marked as an exhibit.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I thought you started off by asking that a couple

14     of pages be admitted.  Now you are asking for the whole document?

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, I'm happy to do it either way, whatever

16     works for -- I'm appreciative of the Chamber's concern about having too

17     much paper.  So I'm more than happy to have admitted as an exhibit page

18     1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10, which are the pages we discussed.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Let's admit those pages then.  May they

20     please be given an exhibit number.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Those pages would be Exhibit D29, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  This is ID 4756?

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That's correct, Your Honour.

24        Q.   Briefly yesterday when we were -- at one point we were discussing

25     the issue of the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I may

Page 2899

 1     have once again misapprehended what you said, but there came a point in

 2     time when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was recognised as a state by

 3     the United Nations, but it was not recognised as a successor state to the

 4     former Yugoslavia.

 5        A.   I remember -- vaguely remember that.

 6        Q.   Is that a correct statement?

 7        A.   Yes, yes.

 8        Q.   And that was reflected in a number of resolutions, too, was it

 9     not?

10        A.   Again, I have a vague memory about that, and I think it happened

11     when I was already back in New York.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could have 65 ter 2127 up on the screen,

13     please.

14        Q.   And looking at -- looking at the first numbered paragraph, it

15     indicates:

16             "It considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and

17     Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former

18     Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United Nations and

19     therefore recommends to the General Assembly that it decide that the

20     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should apply for membership in the United

21     Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General

22     Assembly."

23             And I admit that I deleted from that the parenthetical "Serbia

24     and Montenegro."  This was an issue -- were you aware of the issue at the

25     time that there was an attempt by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to

Page 2900

 1     enjoy membership in the United Nations and specifically to obtain the

 2     same status of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

 3        A.   Thank you.  Your Honour, let me take this advantage to amend what

 4     I said earlier.  The date is 19 September 1992 on this resolution, and

 5     the reason I had this vague memory, I was in New York when this matter

 6     was discussed.  It's not because I had left the mission and gone back.  I

 7     hadn't even left New York in April when I learned of this matter.  That's

 8     why I had that vague idea that I was in New York when this matter was

 9     being discussed, and I meant not back to New York; before I even went to

10     the mission.

11             This matter continued to be debated long before the resolution

12     was passed and when we were preparing for the mission itself, which, as

13     you recall yesterday, Your Honour, I entered in April 1992.  So this

14     matter had been simmering for some time, and that explains why I think I

15     knew about it in New York.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And it ripened around the 19th of September, 1992?

17             THE WITNESS:  Yes, yeah.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could I have that admitted as an exhibit, please.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The document is admitted into evidence.  May it

20     please be given an exhibit number.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D30.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And could I now have 65 ter 2125, which is

24     resolution 821, up on the screen.

25        Q.   The issue concerning whether or not the Federal Republic of

Page 2901

 1     Yugoslavia was going to enjoy the status of being a successor state had

 2     importance to how -- well, to how you could respond to them in your

 3     mission, did it not?

 4        A.   Actually, it did come up a couple of times, when I was already in

 5     the mission, when I engaged some of the officials of the former

 6     Yugoslavia, particularly that point about the status and successor to the

 7     former Yugoslavia.  But, Your Honours, specifically this issue came up in

 8     the context of the contact group and the negotiations we spoke about

 9     earlier yesterday, how these events should -- disposition of these UNPAs.

10     And always when that matter came up, I recall now, we always noted, that

11     was not a matter being negotiated or being discussed on the ground in the

12     mission.  It was a matter to be resolved and be discussed in the forum I

13     described yesterday as ICFY forum, the International Conference on the

14     Former Yugoslavia in Geneva, which was being run by Mr. Stoltenberg on

15     the UN side and Mr. Owen on the European side.  That issue rested there.

16        Q.   And with regard to -- with regard to this issue, now some six

17     months later, the Security Council resolution takes the same position --

18     and we'll get to page 2 in a second - which is that FRY is not a

19     successor state and, therefore, is not in a position to participate in

20     the work of the General assembly.  So FRY still has to apply for

21     membership to the United Nations.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could go to the second page, please.

23        Q.   And there, I mean, the reaffirmation is clear.  The Federal

24     Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue

25     automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic in

Page 2902

 1     the United Nations and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that

 2     further to the decisions taken in the resolution 474/1, it is decided

 3     that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not

 4     participate in the work of the economic and social council.  And the

 5     matter is still under advisement; it's still being considered?

 6        A.   It remained that way for some time.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If I could have that document marked as next in

 8     order, please -- admitted next in order, please.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It is admitted.  May it please be given an exhibit

10     number.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D31.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:

14        Q.   I'd like to take a moment here and go back to - that can come off

15     the screen; I'm done with it - and go back to something that you

16     discussed yesterday with regard to the battles at Mount Vlasic and

17     Majevica hills.  That's now marked as P475.  I want to ask you just a

18     very quick question about that, which is that you indicate on the

19     document:  Confidential sources indicate that 3 to 400 units of the 63rd

20     para-troop have joined.  And what I'd like to ask you is, who are these

21     confidential sources?

22        A.   I didn't disclose them then, and I don't have a very good

23     recollection now, but I had a group of staffers in my office working on

24     the department of public information side of my office.  The office had

25     several sides.  This was staffed by a wonderful group of young men and

Page 2903

 1     women whose job was on a day-to-day basis to ferret out, to find out

 2     information that needed to be informed, and when they would come across

 3     certain information that was of a sensitive nature, they wouldn't

 4     themselves put on their daily sitrep for the information, and around that

 5     route there developed confidential sources around that route, and that's

 6     the most I can say about that.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  They did espionage for you?

 8             THE WITNESS:  Pardon?

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  They did espionage for you?

10             THE WITNESS:  If you like.

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:

12        Q.   Did you in any way keep a -- continuing with the espionage theme,

13     did you keep a little black book anywhere so there's document of this

14     information anywhere?

15        A.   When I first give testimony in these courts - and I've been here

16     for so many times, for so long - I had a whole pile of my notes that the

17     Court saw - sorry, this pile was here - hand-written for which I could

18     authenticate any particular issue the Court raised in detail.  That was

19     during Milosevic's trial, of which I'm sure the Court has a record.

20        Q.   So I -- to the extent those notes exist, they are somewhere else?

21        A.   Out of this country.

22        Q.   Okay.  If we needed them, you could get them to us, I take it?

23        A.   I wouldn't be able to promise that.

24        Q.   Okay.  We'll consider it, then perhaps take it up at a further

25     point in time, depending.  We'll see.

Page 2904

 1        A.   I don't even recall whether they may be referring to any

 2     particular issue you are raising now.

 3        Q.   Okay.  By that you mean the issue of the confidential sources

 4     giving you information?

 5        A.   Yeah.

 6        Q.   That particular kind of information with regard to troop movement

 7     would be relatively important information concerning some of the other

 8     things that we've been discussing here with regard to the border being

 9     closed, the meeting of the -- the meeting of the resolutions that had

10     been imposed both against FRY as well as the self-regulation that FRY had

11     engaged in, wouldn't it?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   I see.  And why wouldn't that be the case, that the movement of

14     troops would not be of critical interest to the Security Council with

15     regard to the situation in terms, not only of the resolutions, but

16     generally in terms of the state of play?

17        A.   For the same times I give you, Your Honour, this matter was not

18     my responsibility.  It was on that group when we were discussing that

19     document, for that same reason I explained.

20        Q.   Okay.  Yesterday, you discussed very briefly that you had become

21     aware of a meeting between General Perisic and General Mladic in Glina;

22     right?

23        A.   Right.

24        Q.   And if I understood your testimony correctly with regard to that

25     issue, you indicated that somebody had told you that there had been such

Page 2905

 1     a meeting; they were not present at that meeting; no one else was present

 2     at that meeting who reported to you having been present at that meeting;

 3     correct?

 4        A.   Correct.

 5        Q.   And you made a conjecture that the meeting had in fact taken

 6     place by virtue of the importance of the matter that was being discussed?

 7        A.   Right.

 8        Q.   And the importance of the matter that was being discussed was the

 9     border closure?

10        A.   The effects of the border closure.

11        Q.   Thank you.  The effects of the border closure.

12        A.   To their lives.

13        Q.   Now, do you remember if you spoke with a specific individual

14     about this issue, or was it generalised conversation?

15        A.   I believe I did indicate there was one particular individual who

16     met me and told me about it, plus the other people that I knew that were

17     involved.

18        Q.   Okay.  And as you sit here today, do you recall who that

19     particular individual was?

20        A.   Yeah.

21        Q.   Okay.  And is the name Martinovic?

22        A.   Correct.

23        Q.   That's the individual you were referring to?

24        A.   Right.

25        Q.   Okay.  Now, with regard to the position that you've taken in

Page 2906

 1     terms of the -- and I'm getting to the deduction because there were a

 2     variety of different events that had occurred from which you deduced that

 3     there was perhaps potential troubles in the palace?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   What you said when you were preparing your statement for

 6     testimony is as follows, and I just want to see whether this is accurate

 7     because it's a bit more - shall I say - qualified than what you've told

 8     us here yesterday:

 9             "Martinovic took the opportunity to complain about Milosevic's

10     closure of the border between FRY and Republika Srpska.  Martinovic was

11     always very well informed about events in and outside the RSK, and much

12     of what he said had turned out to be true.  I recall Martinovic gleefully

13     informing that approximately two weeks earlier, VJ Chief of Staff Momcilo

14     Perisic and VRS commander Ratko Mladic had met in Glina.  Martinovic

15     claimed that the two had discussed with local authorities efforts to link

16     up like-minded officers, but did he not have any further details."

17             And you go on to say -- and I'm sorry, I took this in reverse

18     order.  I didn't mean to do that.  But you say:

19             "If Martinovic's information turned out to be correct in this

20     regard, I believe that Perisic would never have come to Glina in the

21     company of Mladic without Milosevic's approval.  This is especially true

22     if one considers that it was about this time that Milosevic and Karadzic

23     had a well publicised parting.  Indeed, since Milosevic had closed the

24     border between the FRY and the RS, he had to make sure that the military

25     was happy so as to preclude the possibility of a military revolt over his

Page 2907

 1     fallout with Karadzic."

 2        A.   I stand by that.

 3        Q.   You stand by that.  Okay.  So the issue here is, if the

 4     information turned out to be correct, if what Martinovic said is true,

 5     and you had -- you have no objective evidence in terms of Martinovic's

 6     claim of this meeting?

 7        A.   It's a fair comment.

 8        Q.   Is that a fair comment?

 9        A.   Yeah.

10        Q.   Okay.  However, if it did turn out to be true, then what the

11     natural conclusion of the situation would be, something to the following

12     effect:  If General Perisic was not able to move without the permission

13     of Milosevic, then Perisic's meeting - in the event such a meeting

14     occurred - would have been for the purpose of maintaining peace.  It

15     would have been for the purpose of keeping things calm as opposed to for

16     the purpose of firing things up, wouldn't it?

17        A.   That would be your conjecture.

18        Q.   Okay.  Well, you met Milosevic, and I think it would be fair to

19     say that your appreciation of Milosevic was that he was clever man?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Savvy man?

22        A.   All of that is same.

23        Q.   Same?

24        A.   Same thing.

25        Q.   And certainly not an individual who would place his faith in

Page 2908

 1     another who he did not trust to carry out his mission; right?

 2        A.   One of the longest discussions we have had in the previous trials

 3     was how he got people to do his own bidding without appearing to do so.

 4     I want to reprise that discussion here, but it wouldn't be what your

 5     learned counsel are approaching that way.  My sense of it was that it was

 6     always a very smart way.  When I testified about when we saw him when he

 7     wanted to send a message to somebody, he had so many different ways of

 8     doing it without appearing to do so.

 9        Q.   I appreciate that.  And what I'm concerned about at this moment

10     is that if such a scenario occurred, it's the choice of his messenger

11     that I'm focusing on for the moment, rather than the -- let's say the

12     strategy that he used to obtain that which he wished.  And the choice of

13     his messenger, General Perisic, is a choice of somebody who he would have

14     trusted, and once again, that's assuming that this event ever occurred.

15        A.   The most I would add to your comment, counsel, is that it was

16     also my knowledge that no high official would remain in their position

17     for very long if he didn't want them to be there.

18        Q.   Okay.

19        A.   So you can make that conjecture anyway, but that is how I see it.

20     He wouldn't - your client, that is - not have been -- not have remained

21     in that position in opposition to what Milosevic wanted.

22        Q.   I understand.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Just before we go further, this little discussion,

24     interesting as it is, was hypothetical.  It was based on the hypothesis

25     that Martinovic was correct in his reporting.  What if he was not

Page 2909

 1     correct?

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  On the issue of the meeting itself or on any

 3     aspect --

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  On the very issues that we are discussing.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Is that a question to me or to counsel?

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 7        Q.   I believe that it's -- if it's not a question to you, it's

 8     certainly a question to me to ask of you, so I think the Chamber is

 9     interested in --

10        A.   Specifically.

11        Q.   In the matter which is --

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm trying to understand where that discussion is

13     supposed to take us, and I'm putting the question in this form that,

14     okay, I've heard what has been said based on that hypothesis, and my

15     question is, if the reverse is true, what then happens to the hypothesis?

16     Does it change the fact of these things, then Mr. Perisic would have been

17     fired, then Mr. Milosevic would not have had confidence in Mr. Perisic,

18     the choice of messenger would be different, what would have been the

19     result?  Because we are not talking about facts now.  We are talking

20     hypotheses, and for purposes of the case, I'm not quite sure where we are

21     going with the hypothesis.  If you are able to cast light?

22             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I agree with you that where the

23     counsel was to go with this questioning, I take it, is his own idea, so I

24     am responding.  I have no clue where he wants to take --

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure.  I understand.  But my question to you,

Page 2910

 1     then, is, supposing Martinovic was not correct?

 2             THE WITNESS:  Then -- if he wasn't correct, then the meeting

 3     never took place, and I wouldn't have commented about it at all.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But you ... And how would, then, that situation

 5     affect the relationship between Milosevic and Perisic?

 6             THE WITNESS:  I wouldn't know, Your Honour.  But on this issue,

 7     though, for further clarification of the Court, the fallout and the

 8     effect of the closure of the border is not only in the context of the

 9     report on Martinovic.  Elsewhere in the document, you have -- you may see

10     references to other information that there were even public meetings in

11     the orthodox church decreeing that issue, this issue that there was a

12     wide public effect of the closure, the effect of the closure of the

13     border in the body politic of the Serb group.  That was not even a

14     secret.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That is another matter.  That is one matter.

16             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The matter at hand here is the alleged meeting

18     between --

19             THE WITNESS:  Momcilo Perisic and --

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And Ratko Mladic.

21             THE WITNESS:  -- and Ratko Mladic.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's right.

23             THE WITNESS:  That said, I --

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And what they are alleged to have discussed at the

25     time.

Page 2911

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, and that's the one I spoke to earlier, yeah,

 2     that effect of that closure.  And I'm saying, even if I didn't hear it in

 3     the context of Martinovic, I had heard it elsewhere.  Not about the

 4     meeting, I mean, about the issue.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Fair enough.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, and that Milosevic was hard at work.  That I

 7     already knew because I heard Milosevic himself saying so, that he wants

 8     the groups that support his quest for a negotiated outcome to win over

 9     what he called war proponents, and without knowing, I had heard that from

10     Milosevic, but Martinovic was very smart.  He knew my position.  I had

11     travelled in the area from Belgrade.  He knew that, but he wanted to tell

12     me that issue has come all the way here on the ground.  Glina is inside

13     Croatia, not in Belgrade, not in Serbia territory.  That's what he was

14     trying to say, that that issue of divisions of those who are supporting

15     this course and those who are opposing it had come all the way here.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Now, for purposes of this trial, given the fact

17     that you are not sure, you have put it as a hypothesis, is this

18     information on this paragraph any information that this Court can do

19     anything with, and if so, what is the thing that you want us to do with

20     it?

21             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, it's between the two counsels when

22     they pick information to ask me about.  I wouldn't myself pick which

23     information.  My testimony is very long, has covered six different

24     trials.  So whichever they pick, it wouldn't be my role.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  No.  What counsel reported -- read to you a little

Page 2912

 1     earlier stands in black and white in your statement at page 47.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Right.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So when you made that statement, it looks like you

 4     felt at the time that it was important to know about this, but you are

 5     telling us -- you are giving us information which is based on a variable?

 6             THE WITNESS:  That original intent of that paragraph, the first

 7     trial that information was used is Milosevic's trial.  The issues in

 8     Milosevic trial and how he effected -- remember, there was a different

 9     angle to that trial than you may have.  I don't even know the angle you

10     have here.  It is how --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I have no angle.  I'm circular.

12             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  And how did he project his influence?

13     Those are issues in that other court, and I'm sure, Your Honour, you can

14     see what import that was.  At that time, I don't even think this client

15     was anywhere, I don't know, it being -- around it to be brought before

16     you.  So that information was those of the Prosecutor side who talked to

17     me to figure out how did this happen, how did this man project his

18     influence, how did he operate.  That was the angle at that time, and

19     since it remained on record, it comes up.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  My only problem is that this paragraph gives a

21     projection of this man based on a variable.

22             THE WITNESS:  True.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And not based on fact.

24             THE WITNESS:  True.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Unfortunately, here, we are about facts.  Whatever

Page 2913

 1     decision we make on this issue, we would have it as factually established

 2     that they did or did not meet.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I understand your point, Your Honour.  What I said,

 4     the most I can say is what I said.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I guess I can't take the matter any further.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 7        Q.   I want to move on to another issue, which is, with regard to your

 8     time in Belgrade, when did you arrive in Belgrade the second time?

 9        A.   August.

10        Q.   That would have been August of?

11        A.   1994.

12        Q.   1994.

13        A.   Yeah.

14        Q.   And from the time that you arrived in Belgrade in August of 1994,

15     did you basically remain there until your duties were finished in the

16     region?

17        A.   You mean as an assignment, not physically?

18        Q.   Yes.

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   I'm sure you moved around.

21        A.   Thank you.

22        Q.   I hope you weren't just in one place all the time.

23             And during the period of time that you were in Belgrade at that

24     point in time, that's when you had dealings both with I think military

25     and political parts of the FRY leadership.  With regard to the political

Page 2914

 1     leadership, you've mentioned clearly some of the individuals that you

 2     dealt with who were players in that, although Milosevic as you've told us

 3     was technically not representative of FRY but, rather, of Serbia.  With

 4     regard to the military leadership, who did you deal with on the military

 5     side?

 6        A.   My office was organised to have people reporting to my office on

 7     the military side, on the police side, and on civilian side, and on

 8     administration.  The report you saw yesterday showed a certain senior

 9     representative of the force commander.  At that time was Colonel Kracmar

10     - I think that name in one of the document did crop up - as well as a

11     senior military observer from Sweden called Colonel Gudmundsson.  These

12     people would liaise routinely with their counterpart in the military.  In

13     the case of your client, we had a Colonel Vuksic.

14        Q.   Colonel Vuksic?

15        A.   Yeah, who my Colonels dealt with, and if we needed to discuss an

16     issue, they first would discuss at their levels; if the issue was sorted,

17     I didn't have to meet anybody.  And there was no issue when I was in

18     Belgrade that would have required me to discuss at a higher level.

19     That's why I said I never met Mr. Perisic.

20        Q.   Okay.  Did you meet with Colonel Vuksic?

21        A.   In one meeting, yes.  I remember one report we did, and I think

22     in the context of one issue, I forget which one, probably the radar

23     issue.

24        Q.   Okay.

25        A.   Probably the radar issue and maybe another issue.

Page 2915

 1        Q.   So when -- when you said yesterday with regard to the following

 2     question was asked of you, and this is at page 2850:

 3             "Finally, Doctor, I want to ask you about your time in Belgrade

 4     and specifically your dealings with the FRY political and military

 5     leadership there.  What I want to ask you is how well informed were they?

 6     How informed were they about both political and military events both in

 7     FRY and outside the FRY?"

 8             Your specific dealings as I understand what you've just told us

 9     was the meeting that you had with Colonel Vuksic over the radar issue;

10     correct?  Okay.  And it is from --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If you would just say "that's correct."  Then we

12     have it on the record.

13             THE WITNESS:  I apologise, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's fine.  I understand.

15             THE WITNESS:  Nodding doesn't get into your record.  Thank you.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:

17        Q.   And so your awareness of their information level is predicated

18     upon the one meeting you had with Colonel Vuksic concerning a specific

19     issue plus the information you received from those people who were

20     working with you?

21        A.   Learned counsel, I don't think you yourself believe what you have

22     asked me.  It is not Mr. Vukotic [sic].  The question by counsel was on a

23     broader meeting of all the individuals that form mountains and mountains

24     of reports here.  It wasn't on Mr. Vuksic.

25        Q.   Okay.  The reason why -- you've mentioned that Mr. Vuksic is the

Page 2916

 1     military individual that you dealt with, that you met for one time.  So

 2     I'm going to read you your answer to the question yesterday:

 3             "It was my sense that they were very informed mostly to the

 4     ground about any of the issues and events surrounding whatever it is we

 5     came to discuss with them.  My sense of it was they were extremely well

 6     informed..."

 7             And then my colleague asked you the following question:

 8             "Does that apply to the -- both the political and the military

 9     leadership?"

10             And I'm focusing on the military leadership because I know from

11     your testimony the extent to which you met with the political leadership

12     because you've told us about that.  So that's where the thrust of my

13     question is coming.  And this is your answer, sir.  You say at line 12:

14             "Yes."

15             Obviously, that's responding to the question, Does that apply

16     both to the political and military leadership.

17             "Whatever it took are central to the issue.  If it was political,

18     that was central to any specific event.  They were on top of all details.

19     If there was a military angle to it, they were also very informed."

20             So when I was reviewing the transcript, I was a bit confused.  So

21     perhaps you can help me here, which is, as I understand your testimony

22     with the additional information you've given us today, is the answer that

23     I just read to you an answer that involves only the political leadership

24     because that's who you dealt with, but, however, with regard to that, if

25     there was a military discussion that was being had with the political

Page 2917

 1     leadership, that they were also very well informed?  Or do you mean

 2     something else?

 3        A.   I mean what I said.  And, Your Honour, I understood the counsel's

 4     -- the opposing counsel's question broader than the narrow aspect being

 5     taken by the learned counsel on the other side.

 6             We have testimony in front of you covering a very long period of

 7     time, multiple issues, where a lot of officials who participated on the

 8     FRY as well as on the opposing side of that -- of the conflict.  Running

 9     all the way to discussions, negotiations in Geneva, I alluded to, where

10     they were represented by military people, we didn't go into all the

11     details around that because they would come complete on their side with

12     their military and official.  They will meet the other side complete with

13     their political and their military.  We spoke about when we had meetings

14     on -- with the President, they always had aides.  In this particular case

15     he is referring to, he is correct, in his client, the only military

16     person identified in this small instant, is the liaison officer who we

17     dealt with, and he is correct to that.  But I still maintain the broader

18     question I answered about the level of information that others had was

19     impressive.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  If I may ask the question slightly

21     differently.

22             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  At the broader level that counsel for the

24     Prosecution asked you the question yesterday.

25             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

Page 2918

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Who in the military leadership did you refer to in

 2     answering that question when you talked of them being well informed?

 3             THE WITNESS:  We have even begun in his question all the way from

 4     Spiro Nikovic to all the control, the colonels who ran different parts of

 5     the whole line, their reporting superiors, all the way to Belgrade.  So I

 6     took the entire line of all the contacts that we had made from the ground

 7     to Belgrade.  That was what I was answering to.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm not quite sure whether that was the question

 9     you wanted to ask, Mr. Guy-Smith.

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  No, it's not.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You ask yours.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:

13        Q.   Okay.  As I understand your testimony, when you were in Belgrade,

14     you met with political leaders of FRY and you met with, on one occasion,

15     Colonel Vuksic, as a military leader; correct?

16        A.   [No verbal response]

17        Q.   The one occasion that you met with Colonel Vuksic as you sit here

18     concerned the issue that we've spent a fair amount of time about, which

19     is the radar and the helicopter issue; right?

20        A.   [No verbal response]

21        Q.   Apart from Colonel Vuksic as a part of the military leadership of

22     FRY, the higher levels, you met no other military leaders?  I understand

23     you met people on the ground.  You met people who were involved in

24     operational matters.

25        A.   I don't have the recollection of the document that I want to

Page 2919

 1     refer to, but since Vuksic arranged the meeting, that meeting had other

 2     generals named in a certain document I don't recall.  They can find it

 3     out.  He was a liaison arranging a meeting.  That meeting had

 4     higher-ranking officials that we met with.  I don't recall their names,

 5     but it is somewhere.

 6             So it's not correct, counsel, that I just met Vuksic.  Vuksic

 7     arranged the meeting.

 8        Q.   Okay.  So apart from meeting Vuksic on the one occasion, then you

 9     have recollection of meeting some generals --

10        A.   On this specific issue that you are referring.

11        Q.   On the specific issue of the helicopters?

12        A.   Yeah.

13        Q.   Okay.  So do you remember how many generals you met?

14        A.   On this specific issue or in general?

15        Q.   No, on this specific issue.

16        A.   No, I have just finished saying I wish I could find a document

17     that summarises that meeting.

18        Q.   Okay.  Now apart from this specific issue where Colonel Vuksic

19     was the liaison and helped set this meeting up, there were no other

20     meetings that you had with military leadership in Belgrade concerning

21     military issues, were there?

22        A.   Where the military are alone, no.  But we have had meetings where

23     the force commander de Lapresle, other meetings that are arranged at a

24     much higher level where the force commander, the special representative

25     of the Secretary-General, especially when there were air-strikes, NATO

Page 2920

 1     air-strikes, a room full of brass and stars, and met all them.

 2        Q.   And there when you said de Lapresle, I take it you are referring

 3     to de Lapresle, the French --

 4        A.   Our side of the military.

 5        Q.   Your side of the military.

 6        A.   Meeting on their side.  They can't meet other than with their

 7     counterpart.

 8        Q.   And during those meetings, do you recall who their counterparts

 9     were?

10        A.   I need a refreshment of all these things.  You can't ask me about

11     --

12        Q.   I understand it was a long time ago, and unfortunately, I can't

13     help you there because I have no record of such a meeting.

14        A.   There are records.

15        Q.   I don't disbelieve you, sir.  I just don't have them.

16        A.   Right.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'd like to move to one final area, but I note

18     the time, so I won't move to a final area.  Would this be an appropriate

19     time?

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It will be.  We'll take the break and come back at

21     quarter to 11.00 a.m.  Court adjourned.

22                           --- Recess taken at 10.14 a.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 10.45 a.m.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 2921

 1        Q.   I want to turn now to hopefully one final issue, and you

 2     mentioned that yesterday, and it's the issue of the release of the

 3     hostages, which I believe occupied you in June of 1995 and was an issue

 4     of some grave importance.

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   With regard to that specific issue, so we can set the scene, if

 7     possible, there has been NATO bombing.  NATO has bombed some VRS

 8     positions; correct?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And in response to the NATO bombing, the Bosnian Serbs have taken

11     United Nations soldiers hostage?

12        A.   Right.

13        Q.   And the players - if it's fair to use the term in this particular

14     scenario - are in large measure from your -- for your purposes General

15     Mladic, who is dealing with Mr. Stanisic?

16        A.   Correct.

17        Q.   Mr. Stanisic is Milosevic's special envoy, that's Mr. Jovica

18     [Realtime transcript read in error, "Uvika"] Stanisic, correct?

19        A.   Yes.  I'm not sure it's special envoy.

20        Q.   Okay.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, if we could have 1D 4956 up, please, and if

22     we could go down a bit on that.

23        Q.   In paragraph 1, it says:

24             "At 1400 hours today, I was requested to an urgent meeting with

25     President Milosevic's special envoy, Mr. Stanisic."  And just that --

Page 2922

 1     that was the reason I used the term.  I was using the term because I had

 2     read it in the cable.

 3        A.   Thank you for your correction.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Now that we see which Stanisic this is, may we

 5     just correct the record.  It's Jovica Stanisic, not Uvika.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I stand corrected.  He was

 8     special envoy for this particular task, but he was something else in his

 9     other roles, that's why I would say that I'm not sure he was special

10     envoy, but you are right.  We regarded him as a special envoy for this

11     particular task.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:

13        Q.   And during this meeting, there were a number of things that Mr.

14     Stanisic told you about the information that he had received?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And he also told you what his plan was in terms of obtaining the

17     release of the hostages, and there was some concern about his plan, and

18     if we could go to paragraph 6, which is on the next page, and reading at

19     paragraph 6:

20             "At the beginning, Stanisic was only thinking of gaining a

21     dignified and secure release of the UN personnel and not their equipment.

22     I appointed to him that they were to be released without their equipment

23     and later left in the hands of captors.  This may not be seen as an

24     'unconditional' release so emphatically demanded by such countries as

25     Britain and France.  It was important, I stressed, that the 'cross-over'

Page 2923

 1     plan included the contingent's own equipment, particularly the protective

 2     equipment."

 3             And Stanisic thought about it and then wanted to get more

 4     information so he could figure out how to do that.  Is that a fair

 5     statement?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Also at the same time, he told you that both he as well as

 8     Milosevic were extremely concerned about this particular group of

 9     hostages that were being held under the authority of Mladic, and

10     specifically, they were concerned because of the reports that that they

11     may be running out of rations, and I've said held by Mladic, which is not

12     something that's contained in your particular language in the remaining

13     of paragraph 6, but I'm asking if that's accurate.

14             If we could go to the next page of paragraph 6 so that the

15     gentleman can see the remaining part.

16        A.   Suffice it to say - and if you want to go into details, we can go

17     - Mr. Stanisic's concern was a lot more than you have said.

18        Q.   Okay.  I'm sure we can go into more details, and probably we'll

19     get there.  If you think now is an appropriate time, I am happy to do

20     that with you at this moment.

21        A.   And secondly, I need to look at my records.  I don't think your

22     characterization of Mladic is reflected in my report.

23        Q.   No, it's not.  I was saying specifically that it's not reflected

24     there, and I did add that specific awareness because I think it's

25     something that bears out to be true as we go on in terms of this

Page 2924

 1     discussion, but it's certainly not reflected right there.

 2             Okay.  If we could go to paragraph 8, once again, the issue of

 3     helicopters comes up, and there was some concern that you had about

 4     helicopters, and you state:

 5             "I took the opportunity to seek a clarification from Stanisic

 6     about the information two nights ago that three helicopters were on their

 7     way to bring in more hostages to join the 108 then at Novi Sad.  He said

 8     there was a misunderstanding on the part of our liaison officer at Novi

 9     Sad.  There were indeed three helicopters, but they were going to pick up

10     three additional hostages."

11             Does that mean that they were picking the hostages up for

12     purposes of bringing them to a secure place outside of the control of the

13     VRS?

14        A.   Your Honour, to simplify the understanding of this matter is that

15     is alluded to on paragraph 8, this issue of hostages took place in three

16     different phases.  At this point, we were discussing the last three

17     phases involving some 146 also hostages that the captors had refused to

18     release.  The first groups had been released and brought in various ways,

19     by helicopter, by bus, but there were many more.  We are only talking

20     about the last -- the negotiation with Stanisic, that is.  We are talking

21     about the last batch of hostages --

22        Q.   Okay.

23        A.   -- where the issue was the refusal to release them.

24        Q.   Okay.  And when you say "the refusal to release them," we'll talk

25     about that in a moment, but I'd like to continue with the paragraph, if I

Page 2925

 1     might, which is -- you go on to say:

 2             "Such is the state of security that they needed three helicopters

 3     for this purpose.  They were under instructions ..." and I take it by

 4     that you mean helicopters.  Is that fair, that they were under

 5     instructions -- you are talking about the helicopters, what they were

 6     supposed to do?

 7        A.   They, I mean Stanisic and the people operating.  He was the one

 8     conducting the operation.

 9        Q.   Okay.  I understand that better now.

10        A.   "They were under instructions from both President Milosevic and

11     General Perisic to do their utmost to obtain the release of those

12     additional three on a day that was also rainy with poor flying

13     conditions.  The story goes to show the extent to which the FRY

14     authorities are prepared to go to put an end to this unhappy situation."

15             And that is both factual information that you obtained as well as

16     your assessment of what the FRY authorities' position was with regard to

17     the hostages that had been taken?

18        A.   True.

19        Q.   Now, in paragraph 9, Stanisic asks you for -- not you personally,

20     but he asks for specific information so that when he meets with Mladic

21     the next day, he can have a discussion with him which is intelligent

22     because he has some concerns about whether or not the information that he

23     has received from Mladic is in fact accurate given the position that

24     you've articulated.

25        A.   Yes.

Page 2926

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  I have discussed pages 1, 2, and 3 of this

 2     particular document.  It's a four-page document.  I would ask that the

 3     four pages be admitted unless the Chamber is only inclined to admit the

 4     first three, but just for purposes of completion it makes sense.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  They are so admitted, all four of them.  May it

 6     please be given an exhibit number.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D32.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 9        Q.   The next day, in fact, you were successful in meeting with

10     Stanisic, which makes good sense because you were planning on meeting,

11     and this is, as I understand it, after he has met with Mladic.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And if we could have 65 ter 1D 4960 pulled up.

13        Q.   Now, you indicate in paragraph 2 that you had provided

14     information to Stanisic, which I'm taking is the information that he had

15     requested, so that he was in a position to have an intelligent discussion

16     with Mladic, and that was a status basically of -- the status meaning

17     what these hostages may have had with them and other factors surrounding

18     them; correct?

19        A.   One clarification.

20        Q.   Sure.

21        A.   The core issue here was that Stanisic claimed inability to

22     identify the remaining captors [sic].  The word "remaining" is important

23     because they had identified and obtained the release of a prior two

24     batches.  On this last batch, he would claimed -- he had claimed that,

25     I'm not able even to identify who these remaining UN hostages were, what

Page 2927

 1     they -- the equipment or in what circumstances they were being held; I

 2     need some assistance from the UN command to identify them because of some

 3     major concern both he and Milosevic - those are his words - that these

 4     hostages are in the hands of groups opposed - back to the issue we were

 5     discussing earlier - groups opposed to the peaceful process, and they

 6     could be hurt so that we can be blamed.  Therefore, I need much more

 7     details to secure their release from forces we don't have current control

 8     of.  That was the key issue.

 9        Q.   And based upon the information that you were able to provide

10     Stanisic with, paragraph 3 of this particular coded cable states that:

11             "Stanisic appeared certain, on the basis of the information

12     supplied by the UN, that Mladic was withholding a few things from him

13     about the situation with the hostages.  He indicated satisfaction that

14     the additional information had enabled him to revise his approach to the

15     problem."

16        A.   Correct.

17        Q.   So you were able to -- at that point, what happened then was he

18     was to your knowledge able to figure out that Mladic was not being - and

19     I'm putting this broadly - was not being entirely candid with regard to

20     the hostage situation, and based upon information that you had received

21     from military personnel, Stanisic was able to confront him and move --

22     move his plan forward.  By that, I mean Stanisic's plan to get the

23     hostages back.  Is that a fair statement?

24        A.   More or less.  All he said to me is that this was helpful, we can

25     proceed, and he felt better.  He even had a personal fear that he himself

Page 2928

 1     was at jeopardy, and he said, My own life would be at risk when I'm doing

 2     this.

 3        Q.   And by saying that, he meant that when he was in the presence of

 4     Mladic?

 5        A.   The moment he crossed the border inside.

 6        Q.   Right.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If I may just ask a little question.  When you say

 8     he said, that's Stanisic "... I need much more details to secure the

 9     release from forces we don't have current control of."  Which forces are

10     these?

11             THE WITNESS:  Serbian forces.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Which Serbian forces?  Serbian forces in Serbia?

13             THE WITNESS:  No, in Bosnia.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:

15        Q.   Those Serbian forces --

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Bosnian Serb forces?

17             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:

19        Q.   And those Bosnian Serb forces were the forces that were under the

20     command of General Mladic?

21        A.   I can't say that, Your Honour.

22        Q.   Okay.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'd like to go to page 2 of the document, and if

24     we could go to the third paragraph.

25        Q.   Clearly, the NATO strikes had impressed the parties, and there

Page 2929

 1     was a concern related to you from both Karadzic as well as Mladic that

 2     there were going to be further NATO strikes; right?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And he asks if it would be possible that in his negotiation with

 5     Mladic and Karadzic in terms of trying to get the hostages back, he could

 6     do the following, and I'm referring to the last sentence in the third

 7     paragraph where you state:

 8             "In this context, he asked if the SRSG ..." and for purposes of

 9     the record, that would be?

10        A.   Mr. Akashi.

11        Q.   Mr. Akashi.  "... could help him in his next move with Mladic and

12     Karadzic to be in a position to convince them ..."  "Them," you are

13     referring to Mladic and Karadzic; correct?

14        A.   Mm-hmm.

15        Q.   "... that they should not worry that NATO air-strikes will follow

16     the release of the hostages."

17        A.   Correct.

18        Q.   And you discussed this matter with him, and you said that you

19     would communicate to Mr. Akashi this particular request.  Whether or not

20     the request would be honoured or not honoured was a different matter, but

21     that you would communicate to him because you understood the sensitivity

22     of the issue and that this may be a way of in fact ensuring the return of

23     the hostages without anybody being hurt.

24        A.   I certainly did discuss and conveyed and got an answer.

25        Q.   And the answer that you got was?

Page 2930

 1        A.   This issue was not one that was only of concern by the UN.  NATO

 2     was a different force.  Therefore, there were other interests on this

 3     matter beyond the UN.

 4        Q.   Understood.

 5        A.   The NATO air-strikes, Your Honour, it would be good to keep in

 6     mind, could only at that time be used and, again, two-key system.  Even

 7     if NATO wanted to do the bombing, they couldn't do on their own.  They

 8     needed a second authorisation from the SRSG.  In other words, they would

 9     have to get this authorisation to do that.  The SRSG couldn't also order

10     a NATO strike if NATO itself doesn't authorise.  So there were two.  So

11     this request to ask for a guarantee that NATO wouldn't make a strike was

12     an issue that involved much more than what they were asking.

13             So I conveyed that matter.  Later on, I got on the phone with

14     General Rupert Smith who commanded the UN side of -- the UN side of the

15     process, and he provided -- he was initially absolutely reluctant to do

16     anything Stanisic wanted.  But after some time, he saw it fit to give us

17     the information Stanisic wanted to identify the troops.  But on anything

18     else, the answer was categorical:  No conditions, release them and

19     release them quickly.

20        Q.   There was also one other matter -- well, I'm sure there were a

21     series of matters, one other matter that I would like to address, and

22     that was who they were going to be released to, and there was a question

23     about whether or not they would be released to the Sarajevo group,

24     UNPROFOR, or to Stanisic.

25        A.   True.

Page 2931

 1        Q.   Okay.  And you discuss that in -- if we could see the next page.

 2     Thank you.  That's perfect.  And it's the second paragraph in which this

 3     is discussed, and you say that in your view that it would be best to

 4     release them to UNPROFOR in Sarajevo directly, and your recommendation

 5     was that he put that proposal to Mladic.

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Now, why did you suggest that he put the proposal to Mladic as

 8     opposed to Karadzic?  Did you have some information that the ability to

 9     have the hostages released was in the hands of Mladic?

10        A.   I just briefly summarise, counsel, that Stanisic was apprehensive

11     that he had no control of the outcome of this last batch of hostages.

12        Q.   Understood.

13        A.   The reasons he gave was that the forces holding them were not in

14     our "control."  And because he refers to Mladic whom he was going to talk

15     to, and, of course, further to my memory of my conversation with General

16     Rupert Smith, these hostages were taken in Sarajevo, and he is the

17     commander over there, so --

18        Q.   When you say "he is the commander" --

19        A.   Rupert, the UN forces.

20        Q.   Okay.

21        A.   The UN forces that were taken hostages.  He was the commander,

22     and he is in Sarajevo.

23        Q.   So it made sense to you for the forces to go back to the

24     commander --

25        A.   Yes.

Page 2932

 1        Q.   -- on that side.

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   But with regard to that he should put the proposal to Mladic,

 4     because that's your recommendation?

 5        A.   Yes, because I had sensed there was a parallel interest in

 6     Belgrade both all the way to Milosevic, passing through Stanisic, that

 7     they wanted the last credit for releasing these hostages all to

 8     demonstrate that they were doing this and it was through them that this

 9     happened.  Since we -- I myself wasn't -- the parties I represented were

10     indifferent about who got the credit, we wanted just the release of the

11     --

12        Q.   Okay, and you express that in this paragraph.  You say that:

13             "Stanisic felt, however, that Mladic had a vested interest in

14     wanting to be seen to be handing over to Stanisic the UN group that he,

15     Mladic, had been all along blocking and not admitting to Stanisic that

16     this was happening."

17             So clearly, you received information from Stanisic that Mladic

18     was effectively, while this was going on at least up until the point that

19     he received the information that you were kind enough to give him from

20     General Smith, that Mladic had been lying to him.

21        A.   I wouldn't really know that much what -- counsel, talking to

22     Stanisic, you have to bear in mind, that is a man who spoke very few

23     mentioned things when just the two of us in his office and probably with

24     an interpreter.  He was not a person who spoke too much if you get what

25     I'm trying to say.

Page 2933

 1        Q.   I do, and --

 2        A.   He didn't explain that much.  He only explained the bits that he

 3     wanted dealt with, so he would say, These are the forces and they're in

 4     command of this person.  He wouldn't give me reasons.

 5        Q.   Okay.  I'm asking the question because, this is your language,

 6     Doctor, which is, Mladic had been all along blocking and not admitting to

 7     Stanisic.

 8        A.   That was my -- yeah, from him.

 9        Q.   Okay.  So that's going back once again to the question I asked

10     before.  Effectively, Mladic was lying to Stanisic with regard to the

11     hostage situation?

12        A.   It's a logical conclusion you can make.

13        Q.   Continuing:

14             "The FRY authorities in Belgrade had taken very dim view of Serbs

15     being seen as "terrorists" holding "hostages," and apparently Mladic may

16     have been giving them a different picture opposite to what they see now

17     from the UN."

18             Which is further confirmation of what we were just talking about

19     a second ago with regard to the fact that they -- one had no control over

20     Mladic, and two, that he was effectively lying to them about what was

21     going on.

22        A.   It may be have presenting -- that's why I'm reluctant with the

23     word you are using.  He may have been presenting them with a different

24     explanation, and remember, the issue of who was more representing Serbian

25     interests, the forces aligned to Milosevic or the other forces at this

Page 2934

 1     stage, who was more representative of the national interest.  This whole

 2     taking of hostages was a combination of that [indiscernible] I discussed

 3     earlier in the context of Martinovic and everybody being seized on this

 4     matter and finally taking the UN hostages.  It was almost, at least from

 5     my point of view, the last pit that culminated into that.  So if Mladic

 6     was telling them this is the better course to pursue and his soldiers

 7     believed him, probably, but in Belgrade, and I know that for sure,

 8     Milosevic would not have wanted and he hated the idea that they were

 9     being portrayed as hostage-takers.  It didn't advance his cause.

10        Q.   Thank you for that response.

11             Finally, the result of your conversation with Stanisic that day

12     was -- although he used, as you say, few words, what he did was he

13     undertook to pressure Mladic to deblock the UN group and simply let them

14     go to their units, which was precisely the position that General Smith

15     had taken from the outset, which is, Give me back my men; right?

16        A.   Actually, he didn't let them go to their units.

17        Q.   Okay.

18        A.   He brought them by bus, and we went to meet them at Nis.

19        Q.   They did get back?

20        A.   Yeah, in Nis, not in --

21        Q.   They didn't get back according to -- according to this

22     suggestion, in Sarajevo?

23        A.   No, they didn't.

24        Q.   They had to go to Nis, which is about how far away?

25        A.   Nis is a large town out of -- away from Belgrade.  Your

Page 2935

 1     colleagues will know that.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The colleagues may know, but the Court needs to

 3     know too.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 6        Q.   After dealing with this particular situation, another one of the

 7     volatile situations that you had to deal with, this was pretty much the

 8     last of the major --

 9        A.   Tasks.

10        Q.   -- tasks.

11        A.   Yeah.

12        Q.   And you then left the region and went on to other matters?

13        A.   Back to New York.

14        Q.   Back to New York.  A different lifestyle?

15        A.   Right.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I thank you for your time.

17             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, counsel.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.

19             Mr. Thomas, any re-examination?

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I apologise.  If I might, if I could have the

21     last document admitted.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry.  Let's see.  Yes, Document 1D 4960 is

23     admitted into evidence.  May it please be given an exhibit number.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D 33, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Yes, Mr. Thomas.

Page 2936

 1             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 2                           Re-examination by Mr. Thomas:

 3        Q.   Doctor, there's just one matter that I want to go back to with

 4     you, and this is the topic of the reported meeting between General

 5     Perisic and General Mladic in Glina.  My learned friend put to you

 6     passages from your statement which dealt with this meeting, and then

 7     there was subsequently, you will recall, a lot of discussion about what

 8     stock the Trial Chamber could put in your description of those events.

 9     And putting the passages to you, my learned friend used certain parts and

10     not others.  The order was changed.  Different things were emphasised,

11     not for any purpose other than because that was the context of the

12     questions that he was putting to you.

13             But what I want to do, Doctor, is to read to you the entirety of

14     the paragraph from your statement where you deal with this meeting and

15     the information you received about this meeting, and then afterwards I'll

16     ask you for any comment that you might have, whether there's anything you

17     want to change or add to that.  All right?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   The paragraph reads as follows:

20             "Sometime around 15 September" -- sorry.

21             "Sometime around 15 October 1994, I was in Glina briefly and met

22     Boro Martinovic, the RSK official with whom I had contact while I was

23     serving in Sector North.  I recall Martinovic gleefully informing me that

24     approximately two weeks earlier, VJ Chief of Staff Momcilo Perisic and

25     VRS commander Ratko Mladic had met in Glina.  Martinovic claimed that the

Page 2937

 1     two discussed with the local authorities efforts to link up like-minded

 2     officers and the RSK, RS, and FRY, but he did not have any further

 3     details.  Aware that I was then posted in Belgrade, Martinovic took the

 4     opportunity to complain about Milosevic's closure of the border between

 5     the FRY and Republika Srpska (RS).  Martinovic was always very well

 6     informed about events in and outside the RSK, and much of what he had

 7     said" -- sorry.  "... and much of what he said had turned out to be true

 8     in the past.

 9             "If Martinovic's information turned out to be correct in this

10     regard, I believe that Perisic would never have come to Glina in the

11     company of Mladic without Milosevic's approval.  This is especially true

12     if one considers that it was about this time that Milosevic and Karadzic

13     had a well publicised parting.  Indeed, since Milosevic had closed the

14     border between the FRY and the RS, he had to make sure that the military

15     was happy so as to preclude the possibility of a military revolt over his

16     fallout with Karadzic ."

17             Now, first of all, Doctor, I want to ask you if, years on, you

18     have anything that you wish to change at all about that account?

19        A.   Counsel, I wouldn't want to change a word of the entire

20     paragraph.  I took a lot of pains to put it the best way I could put

21     information that you read, and I wouldn't add to it.

22        Q.   You wouldn't add to it?

23        A.   Or deter from it.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Doctor, that was the only matter I wanted to clarify

25     with you.  Their Honours may have some questions.  If you'd kindly wait

Page 2938

 1     there for the moment.

 2        A.   Thank you.

 3                           Questioned by the Court:

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Just one question, Doctor.

 5     In the questions that you were asked particularly by the Defence now

 6     towards the end of the cross-examination, you seemed to -- to shy away

 7     from calling the Bosnian Serb forces the VRS.  Am I right?

 8        A.   That's the term they used.  We didn't use.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's true.

10        A.   Yeah.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And this is precisely why I'm asking you the

12     question, because you have used that term in this very paragraph that has

13     just been read to you.  You say:

14             "I recall Martinovic gleefully informing me that approximately

15     two weeks earlier, VJ Chief of Staff Momcilo Perisic and VRS commander

16     Ratko Mladic had met to link up like-minded officers in the RSK, RS, and

17     FRY."

18             I have noticed, also, that you shy away from using RSK or RS.  Is

19     there any explanation you can give as to why you did so and yet you used

20     these terms in your report?

21        A.   Yes, Your Honour, and I am glad you asked.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

23        A.   The underlying report -- that is an extract from underlying

24     documents, "documents" of the UN.  I happen to be the author and

25     signatory.  When I was writing those official documents, I use the

Page 2939

 1     references that the UN uses inside, or if I depart from it, reported

 2     speech, I'll put it between quotes to signify somebody else talking about

 3     that paragraph or phrase.  When I abstracted from the UN document for the

 4     purposes of testimony the paragraph now that you refer to, I should

 5     actually have put quotes between those words, VRS and RS, because you

 6     wouldn't find them in the underlying reports, which were intended for

 7     discussions.  The reason was simple.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I can almost see it.

 9        A.   It was very simple.  The UN didn't recognise an RSK or an RS or a

10     VRJ.  They didn't.  But that doesn't mean Martinovic is bound by that.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I understand.

12        A.   He would tell me these are the people he met, and to come closer

13     to recollection of what I heard, I retain what they said, what the person

14     speaking said.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Now, if I may go back to the one question that Mr.

16     Thomas asked you now in re-examination, the change you would like to make

17     to this paragraph or if, in fact, to this report is to put quotes

18     wherever RSK, RS and VRS appear.

19        A.   Yes, but it is not real material because I have no such

20     reluctance when I'm talking to you on this.  When I was reporting inside

21     the UN, I have to do it the way it's acceptable, but you said earlier, if

22     you are dealing with the factual reporting, that's what it was, and I

23     have no qualms calling them VRS because that's what he called them when

24     he talked to me.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Any questions arising from

Page 2940

 1     the Bench's questions?  Mr. Thomas?  Just for the record?

 2             MR. THOMAS:  No, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:  No, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.  That brings us to the

 6     conclusion of your testimony, Doctor.  Thank you so much for taking time

 7     off from your very busy retired schedule.  You are now excused.  You may

 8     go back home.  Travel well back home.

 9             THE WITNESS:  I thank you and your colleagues in the Court for

10     being patient with me.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

12             THE WITNESS:  You are welcome.

13                           [The witness withdrew]

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  Before I ask you for the next witness,

15     Mr. Thomas, can we complete yesterday's little matter that we held in

16     private session.  I've received a message that you are clear that we can

17     deal with this matter in open session.

18             MR. THOMAS:  Certainly.  The Prosecution's position is that it

19     can be dealt with in open session, Your Honour.  I don't know the

20     attitude of my learned friends about that.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  We agree.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Then we will stay in open

23     session.

24             Now, in relation to the content of the disposition, do the

25     parties have any remark to make other than those recorded in the

Page 2941

 1     disposition transcripts?  Mr. Thomas.

 2             MR. THOMAS:  No, thank you, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith?

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:  No, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  Does the Prosecution then move for the

 6     record of Mr. Nikola Tosovic's deposition to be accepted by the Trial

 7     Chamber and admitted into evidence?

 8             MR. THOMAS:  Yes, please, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  With all annexes to it?

10             MR. THOMAS:  Yes, Your Honour, except for those marked as not

11     seeking to be tendered within the body of the deposition itself.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  Any comment on that, Mr. Guy-Smith?

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  None, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.  The deposition with all its

15     annexes that are tendered is so admitted.  May they please be given an

16     exhibit number.

17                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Apparently there are quite a number of

19     documents.  We'll not give them one exhibit number.  We'll give them

20     several exhibit numbers, and the Registrar will do that out of court and

21     give an internal memo to tell us how they have been allocated exhibit

22     numbers.

23             Thank you very much.  That brings that matter to its conclusion.

24             Mr. Thomas, our next witness.

25             MR. THOMAS:  Will have to be on Thursday, Your Honour.  Mr.

Page 2942

 1     Kirudja was completed in advance of the time that we expected him to

 2     take.  We recognise that that was a possibility late last week, but it

 3     was impossible at that stage to have somebody on stand-by for this

 4     afternoon, especially given that we're not sitting tomorrow, I

 5     understand.  So the next witnesses are scheduled for Thursday.  There are

 6     two 92 ter witnesses scheduled for Thursday, sir.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Then thank you so much.  Let's see, when

 8     are we sitting on Thursday?  Then we'll stand adjourned to Thursday, the

 9     29th of January, 9.00 in the morning in Courtroom I.  Court adjourned.

10                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.28 a.m.,

11                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 29th day of

12                           January, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.