1 Wednesday, 4 February 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.13 p.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good afternoon to everybody in and around the
6 courtroom. Madam Registrar, will you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon Your Honours. Good afternoon
8 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-81-T,
9 the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Particularly today because
11 there are people hiding behind poles, I would like to have appearances,
12 please, for the both parties starting with Prosecution.
13 MR. THOMAS: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon to
14 everyone in and around the courtroom. Mark Harmon, Barney Thomas,
15 Lorna Bolton, Salvatore Cannata, and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution,
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Thomas.
18 And for the Defence.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Good afternoon, Your Honours, and to all in the
20 courtroom. Daniela Tasic, Nikki Sethi, Tina Drolec, Milos Androvic,
21 Eric Tully, Chad Mair, Novak Lukic, and I'm Gregor Guy-Smith for the
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I think I may have mispronounced one of the
25 intern's names, but I'll take care of it at a later point in time and I
1 do apologise to Nikki.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Not a problem. Thank you very much.
3 Mr. Thomas.
4 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. The Prosecution calls
5 Martin Bell, please.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
7 [The witness entered court]
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good afternoon to you, Mr. Bell.
9 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Will you please make the declaration.
11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, you may be seated.
14 Yes, Mr. Thomas.
15 WITNESS: MARTIN BELL
16 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, sir.
17 Examination by Mr. Thomas:
18 Q. Mr. Bell, can you begin, please, by giving us your full name and
19 your date of birth.
20 A. My full name is Martin Bell and I was born on the 31st of August,
22 Q. What is your current occupation?
23 A. I'm a goodwill ambassador for UNICEF and a writer and a
25 Q. Did you spend the large part of your career as a war
1 correspondent employed by the BBC
2 A. Yes, sir, from about 1966 to 1997.
3 Q. Could you just very briefly describe for Their Honours, the
4 conflicts which you covered during that time?
5 A. It started with the Nigerian civil war, the Middle East wars in
6 1967 and 1973, the Vietnam war, wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua
7 first Gulf war, and the wars of ex-Yugoslavia, chiefly in Croatia and in
9 Q. In 1997, what did you do after leaving the BBC?
10 A. In 1997, I accidently fell into politics and I became for four
11 years a member of the House of Commons.
12 Q. That was as an independent MP?
13 A. Yes, I was the -- I was the first independent elected since 1951.
14 Q. During the course of your career did you receive any formal
15 awards for journalism or otherwise?
16 A. Oh, bits and pieces, yes. But they don't really mean very much
17 to me, and one even from the queen. But you know, I think my chief
18 benefit was experience.
19 Q. The award you received from the queen was an OBE, Order of the
20 British Empire?
21 A. Yes, that is true. I think I got it for being the reporter most
22 shot at in 1993 or something like that.
23 Q. What does your current work with UNICEF involve?
24 A. UNICEF have a variety of real celebrities which they can't send
25 to war zones and so they send me because I'm -- I should be able to look
1 after myself in these places.
2 Q. And what is your function?
3 A. As a witness, as a fundraiser, as someone who gives encouragement
4 to their staff, locally and nationally, and someone who raises the
5 profile of these issues at home.
6 Q. And to again just briefly for the Trial Chamber's information,
7 could you just tell us, please, what sort of areas, what sort of
8 situations you've been sent to in that capacity?
9 A. Some have been non-war zones, like Malawi, but they're are mostly
10 scenes of conflict or recent scenes of conflict, Afghanistan, Darfur
11 Democratic Republic of the Congo, places -- places like that.
12 Q. Now, Mr. Bell, plainly you have acquired a lot of knowledge over
13 the years about many different conflicts, but this afternoon I want to
14 focus on your time in Sarajevo
16 A. I first went to Sarajevo
17 occasion of the referendum on independence, and then when the war started
18 in the first week in April, I went back and I stayed there on and off for
19 much of the next three and a half years. Not just in Sarajevo, but in
20 central Bosnia
21 Q. And what were you doing in Sarajevo during that time?
22 A. I was the main reporter for BBC television there throughout the
23 early months of the war, from April 1992 until I was wounded at the end
24 of August 1992. I went back in rather reluctantly at the end of 1992 and
25 worked a great deal in 1993 on the side war between Muslims and Croats in
1 central Bosnia
2 returned to Sarajevo
3 Q. During the period between the end of 1992 when you were wounded,
4 and when you say you returned to Sarajevo in March of 1994, did you spend
5 time in Sarajevo
6 A. Yes, I did, even when I was based in Vitez and Gornji Vakuf. I
7 used to make day trips or longer trips to Pale. I spent a lot of time
8 with the Serbs. I had a reputation among the Sarajevo press corps, I
9 suppose, of being pro-Serb. I wasn't, I was neutral and I had a very
10 good friend who was one of the defenders of the Serb-held suburb of
11 Grbavica and I used to go and see him. And one of the points that I
12 would make is that there was no monopoly of suffering in this particular
14 Q. From March 1994 onwards until the end of the war in Bosnia
15 the signing of the Dayton Accords, where were you largely based?
16 A. I was based, I suppose, at the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo for much
17 of that time. Towards the end, I was based in Gornji Vakuf because the
18 implementation of the Dayton Accords was done largely in the south of the
19 country by British troops and they were -- in December 1995 they
20 became -- they took off the blue helmets and they became NATO troops, and
21 they broke through the former frontlines and implemented the agreement.
22 So I was with them on that occasion.
23 Q. During the -- during the period of between March 1994 until the
24 end of the war, were you covering also other parts of Bosnia, were you
25 travelling out of Sarajevo
1 A. Yes, I did. There were -- it was increasingly hard by then to
2 get the attention of my editors to what they perceived as a long-running
3 war so they were losing interest in it. But I did quite a lot in
4 northern Bosnia
5 was especially intense in the summer of 1995. There were attempts, if
6 you remember, there was the -- there was the kidnapping of UN troops in
7 Pale, this was in May of that year. There was an attempt, there was a
8 very strong attempt by the BiH, the Bosnian army, to break out of the
9 encirclement in June. So I was in Sarajevo
10 Q. I want to go back now to the situation in Sarajevo in 1992. In
11 terms of your first arrival there and the outbreak of war in April 1992,
12 what did that do to the city? What did that do to the civilians and the
13 city of Sarajevo
14 A. It was a little bit as if the Great War were being refought in a
15 modern urban environment. And so many people were trapped in these
16 high-rise buildings. I mean trapped in the sense there was no
17 electricity so the lifts didn't work, the winter of 1992 to 1993 was a
18 very bitter winter. A lot of the -- there was no water-supply so the
19 only water they could get either out of the river or from standpipes
20 which were themselves under fire. I mean, I think looking back it was a
21 truly desperate time for all of the people on Sarajevo, I would say, on
22 both side of the lines.
23 Q. By that time, the winter of 1992/1993, were the confrontation
24 lines in Sarajevo
25 A. Yes, they were. I would say they probably -- there was a
1 tremendous battle in Sarajevo
2 after that the confrontation lines changed very, very little until
3 November/December 1995. Occasionally a trench line would be lost, a
4 group of houses would change hands, but you know, I think if you looked
5 at the map in the end of 1995, it's roughly where the frontlines were
6 established in the early summer of 1992.
7 Q. If I were to show you a map, would you feel comfortable providing
8 us with some general indication as to where the confrontation lines were?
9 A. Yeah, sure.
10 Q. All right.
11 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, if we could please have Exhibit P 439
12 on the screen, which is map number 8 in the court binder.
13 Q. Mr. Bell, just while that's appearing on the screen, you've
14 testified previously in this Tribunal?
15 A. Yes, that's true.
16 Q. Firstly as a witness for the Defence in the Blaskic case?
17 A. Yes, that is true.
18 Q. And more recently as a Prosecution witness in the
19 Dragomir Milosevic case; is that right?
20 A. That is right, yes.
21 Q. I think they were using this technology in the Dragomir Milosevic
22 case. You can see that we have an image on the screen. The image can be
23 blown up and manipulated without altering the image in various different
24 ways. You will recognise the image as a map of Sarajevo?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. For the purposes of marking the confrontation lines, do you need
2 a closer view?
3 A. Yes, I would like that.
4 Q. Is that sufficient or too close?
5 A. No, that's sufficient.
6 MR. THOMAS: All right. What I'm going to do is ask Mr. Usher if
7 he can provide you with a means to electronically mark the screen in
8 front of you.
9 Q. And what we are looking for, Mr. Bell, is as best you can to
10 simply mark the confrontation line.
11 A. I hope I'm looking in the right direction, but you will notice
12 that right in the middle on what we call the Bridge of Brotherhood
13 Unity, the Serbian lines came right down to there, so it was not a case
14 of Serbs on the hills around and the Bosnian government forces trapped
15 inside. They came right down there and the suburbs of Ilidza and
16 Grbavica were both in the Serbian hands right through to the Dayton
18 Q. If we can just pause for a moment there. First of all, can you
19 using the marker circle the Bridge of Brotherhood
20 have just --
21 A. I don't have a clear enough view. I need it -- need to be closer
22 than I see it here.
23 Q. Okay. We'll leave that for a moment. Can you circle the areas
24 of Ilidza and Grbavica that you've referred to?
25 A. Yeah. Ilidza was at one end of the airport runway.
1 Q. If you could just mark that with an I.
2 A. Okay.
3 Q. Grbavica?
4 A. Grbavica I'm having difficulty with because I'm going too far
5 back but I would guess it would be around here.
6 Q. Now, would it help if we got in closer?
7 A. It might do. It's a rather -- it's a very detailed map.
8 Q. All right.
9 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, I don't intend to tender this version
10 of the map. If we could go into just a little closer, please.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Why don't you want to tender it?
12 MR. THOMAS: Because I'll get the markings done on a clearer
13 version of the map by Mr. Bell.
14 Q. Again, if we start with the Bridge of Brotherhood
15 you see it on the map there this time?
16 A. The bridges are not very clearly marked, but I would guess it's
17 probably around here.
18 Q. Okay. If you could just mark that with a B.
19 A. [Marks]
20 Q. Can you just mark that with the letter B, Mr. Bell? Yes, thank
22 A. [Marks]
23 Q. Okay. Can you mark with a circle the area of Ilidza.
24 A. Yes, it was around about -- it's this end of the runway.
25 Q. Mark that with the letter I, please.
1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. It's the left-hand marking that we see on the map?
3 A. I think the key thing is that the Serbs were at both ends of the
4 runway. Ilidza there and Lukavica barracks at the other end, I'll just
5 mark that.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 A. And the government forces were on either side including this,
8 I'll mark it here, this is Dobrinja. I'll mark it with a D. That was
9 the old press village in the winter Olympics and the other side of it is
10 the village of Butmir
11 government forces at both sides of the runway and the Serb forces at both
13 Q. Now, when you are talking about the government forces you are
14 talking about the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; is that --
15 A. Yes. We have great difficulty with the terminology because they
16 had some Serbs fighting for them as well, what they called the loyal
17 Serbs, but I would normally call them Bosnian government forces.
18 Q. All right.
19 MR. THOMAS: If we could tender that, please, as a Prosecution
20 exhibit, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Its admitted. May it please be given an exhibit
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P514.
24 MR. THOMAS: I'd like to go again, please, to the blank map,
25 P 439.
1 Q. Now, Mr. Bell, if you could draw on this map what you were about
2 to draw for me a few minutes ago, which was the confrontation line,
3 please. And if you need to go in closer, please say so.
4 A. This will be actually quite difficult to do. It was something
5 like, like down here and out and a much bigger range around. I mean,
6 this is a highly inaccurate but it would be something of that order.
7 Q. All right. Just a couple of questions about that. The area that
8 you've marked as being held by the Serbs, Ilidza?
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. Do we see that on the map there?
11 A. Yes, it's roughly this end of the -- this end of the -- of the
12 runway. I've probably drawn the -- I probably put the line too not
13 sufficiently. That I will amend because actually it came quite close to
14 the end of the runway.
15 Q. Okay. There is a means of erasing the line if you need to use
16 that, please say so and Mr. Usher will help you.
17 A. Well, I think I've corrected it, that should suffice.
18 Q. What I'd like to do is erase the redundant part of that line so
19 that when we look at this map in several months' time, it's clear.
20 A. Yeah.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Usher, can you help by erasing, please.
22 THE WITNESS: Okay.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: If you will please connect the correct line now,
24 Mr. Bell. Thank you so much.
25 MR. THOMAS:
1 Q. Do we see on that map the area of Hrasnica?
2 A. Yes, it was the -- it was beyond -- I mean, it's such small print
3 but it was really beyond Butmir on the -- on the sort of southern edge of
4 that map.
5 Q. Was that within the confrontation lines or --
6 A. It was -- it was -- it was -- I wouldn't say it was a frontline
7 village but it came under -- under bombardment especially in 1995 with --
8 with rockets.
9 Q. The area within the line that you have drawn was occupied by the
10 forces of which army?
11 A. There were -- within they were the forces of the Bosnian
12 government, BiH.
13 Q. Okay. If we could just, if you don't mind just righting ABiH in
14 there, please.
15 A. [Marks]
16 Q. And presumably on the other side of the line?
17 A. On the other side of the line were the forces of the Bosnian
19 Q. Known as the VRS?
20 A. Known as the VRS. I'll fill that in.
21 Q. And can you circle for us the area of Hrasnica?
22 A. I'm doing this from memory because I can't see it. But I -- it's
23 roughly towards the bottom of Mount Igman
24 Q. Would you mark that with an H, please?
25 A. [Marks]
1 Q. And Hrasnica was held by the forces of which army?
2 A. It was held actually by the forces of the BiH, in which case I
3 obviously again have to reconnect this line. I'm going to have to -- it
4 was more like that because both Butmir and Hrasnica were held by the --
5 by the Bosnian government forces.
6 Q. All right. Again with Mr. Usher's assistance, if you would just
7 remove the redundant line, please.
8 A. I have to apologise for this, it's a long time ago.
9 Q. We all understand, Mr. Bell.
10 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. If I could please tender
11 that map as a Prosecution exhibit.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's admitted. May it please be given an exhibit
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P515.
15 MR. THOMAS:
16 Q. Now, you've explained that these lines change little from the
17 time when you first arrived in Sarajevo
18 did the position or the shape of these lines mean for the population
19 which occupied that part within the lines of encirclement, the civilians
20 in the area marked ABiH?
21 A. Mostly they were overlooked by high ground, especially, I would
22 say, on the south side of the city, and they would then be within line of
23 sight of snipers in some areas; but at the same time, the -- Grbavica,
24 for instance, was in line of sight of snipers from the other side
25 operating out of the old parliament office building and vantage points
1 like that. So there was no -- I mean, I don't think anyone lived safely
2 in that city at that time.
3 Q. All right. Was there an easy means of entry into and exit from
4 the city for the civilians in ABiH-held territory?
5 A. There was no easy means at all. There was in the latter half of
6 the war a tunnel constructed underneath the airport runway which provided
7 a means of reinforcement and supplies to come into the city. But for
8 any -- anyone who wanted to leave, unless they had the right permissions
9 and the right influence, I mean, they were more or less, they had to
10 endure the whole siege. We were in a different state because we had
11 United Nations passes and we were able with difficulty to come through
12 Bosnian Serb roadblocks in Ilidza and elsewhere.
13 Q. You mentioned the high ground being occupied by the VRS.
14 MR. THOMAS: What I want to refer you to now is map or photograph
15 number 10 in the booklets, Your Honour, which is 65 ter number 09242.
16 Q. Mr. Bell, do you recognise that as an aerial photograph of
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. You've spoken of the airport and is that what we see in the
20 bottom right-hand corner?
21 A. That is so.
22 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, could I firstly tender the unmarked
23 photograph as an exhibit.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is it not already been tendered?
25 MR. THOMAS: Not to my knowledge, Your Honour. No.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. So admitted. May it please be given an
2 exhibit number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P516.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
5 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. Thank you,
6 Madam Registrar.
7 Q. Bearing in mind the confrontation lines that you drew for us on
8 the other map and your comment about the VRS holding the high ground, can
9 you point out again with the pointer, mark the areas of high ground that
10 were held by the VRS?
11 A. I think there is one area in particular which I shall ...
12 If I can, this area here is high ground that they held with a
13 commanding view of some of the streets below.
14 Q. Were there any areas of high ground held to the north of the
16 A. This -- the high ground I shall mark now, again it's approximate,
17 had on it the television transmitter and was actually used as a
18 training-ground by the BiH Army for awhile. The lines of conflict are
19 further north, were further out than that, so you are talking about the
20 high ground commanding the city centre, it's the area that I've outlined
21 on the right-hand side.
22 Q. All right. If you could just mark that right-hand circle,
23 please, with VRS.
24 A. [Marks]
25 MR. THOMAS: And, Your Honours, if --
1 Q. One question, actually, Mr. Bell, before we leave that
2 photograph, do we see on the area of the photograph where this tunnel was
3 that you spoke of?
4 A. It would be roughly, I can sort of put it in here. I never took
5 it myself because I went around it because the entrances were often under
6 mortar fire, but it was roughly on the line that I've given there.
7 Q. All right.
8 MR. THOMAS: Now, Your Honours, if I could please tender the
9 marked photograph as an exhibit.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Before we do that, could we have a marking of
11 some sort, either a BiH indicating the training grounds or T for the
12 television transmitter so that --
13 THE WITNESS: Shall I put T or BiH because it's --
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Whatever. Whatever works because otherwise
15 months from now we won't have an indication of what that is either.
16 MR. THOMAS: No problem with that, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: I have thought if we've got VRS written on the
18 right-hand side, we probably might write ABiH on the left.
19 THE WITNESS: Of course in both cases it's not the only place
20 they were --
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Understood.
22 THE WITNESS: -- I'm just marking high ground on either side of
23 the city centre.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Quite understood. Maybe put a T on the tunnel,
25 next to the tunnel. Then the map as marked is admitted into evidence.
1 May it please be given an exhibit number.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P517.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
4 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours, Madam Registrar.
5 Your Honours, I wonder if we could have, I'm not sure if it's
6 possible to do this on the same screen, but photograph number 12 from the
7 booklet which is 65 ter number 09241.
8 Q. Maybe we can start with that image, Mr. Bell --
9 MR. THOMAS: Which, Your Honours, is the page marked "left" in
10 photograph 12 of the booklets that Your Honours have, and is the
11 left-hand half of Exhibit 65 ter 09241.
12 Q. You spoke of a tower -- a hill with a television tower on it. Is
13 that what we see in the photograph?
14 A. Yes, sir, that's what you see.
15 Q. And has the photograph been taken from the high ground that you
16 marked as occupied by the VRS in the previous photograph?
17 A. It could have been taken from there, but it might possibly have
18 been taken from the Olympic village which was on ground held by the ABiH.
19 Q. I see.
20 MR. THOMAS: If we -- can we scroll to the right, Mr. Usher?
21 Q. By scrolling to the right, does that assist you?
22 A. Yes, it does. And by scrolling to the right, I would say it was
23 more likely taken from the old Olympic village because the high ground
24 overlooking the city centre was to the right. You see the yellow
25 Holiday Inn.
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. What we call the Sniper's Corner would be about, oh, 400 yards to
3 the right of that. And that was overlooked by high ground controlled by
4 the Bosnian Serbs.
5 Q. And that was, as we look at the photograph, off to the right-hand
6 side of the photograph?
7 A. That is right.
8 Q. Would the vantage or the view from the VRS positions bear any
9 resemblance to the sort of view that we see in this photograph?
10 A. A marginal resemblance, but in fact they were -- they were
11 closer. They were looking down the -- latterly down the side-streets.
12 You'll see there was a hill beyond the Holiday Inn. I used to camp out
13 there with my camera in July 1995. It was a dangerous place but an
14 excellent vantage point; we called it Gypsy Hill. So in fact, I would
15 have said that the VRS soldiers, if they were so minded, would have
16 actually had a clearer view than the one taken from this position.
17 MR. THOMAS: All right. Your Honours, could we tender this
18 photograph, please, as a Prosecution exhibit.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's admitted. May it please be given an exhibit
21 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P518.
22 MR. THOMAS:
23 Q. Now, you've spoken of the Holiday Inn which we see is the yellow
24 building in the middle of the photograph as it appears on the screen at
25 the moment. And is that where you were stationed for a time in Sarajevo
1 A. Yes. Not at the very start of the war because it was damaged in
2 the early days, but from about June 1992 I stayed there on and off
3 because I was away in central Bosnia
4 until the end of the war. It was the main press headquarters even though
5 one side of it was uninhabitable because it was damaged by shell fire and
6 other fire.
7 Q. Which side was uninhabitable?
8 A. What you see -- it would be the right side. The side roughly
9 facing the tall building beside it which is the parliament office
11 Q. All right. And that was as a result of fire from which forces?
12 A. That would be as a result of fire from the Bosnian Serb-held
14 MR. THOMAS: All right. So that we can now begin to orientate
15 ourselves relative to the map that we have already viewed, I'd like to go
16 back, please, to Exhibit P439. And if we could close-up, please, on the
17 main part of the city. Thank you, Mr. Usher.
18 Q. Mr. Bell, are you able to mark on the map, as it presently
19 appears on the screen, the location of the Holiday Inn?
20 A. I would imagine, though it's a very indistinct map to me, it's
21 about there.
22 Q. If you could just mark that with an H, please?
23 A. [Marks]
24 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, if we could please tender that as a
25 Prosecution exhibit.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's admitted. May it please be given an exhibit
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P519.
4 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. Thank you,
5 Madam Registrar.
6 Q. Now, you mentioned, Mr. Bell, the --
7 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Mr. Usher. We don't need your help
8 anymore. Thank you.
9 Q. You mentioned, Mr. Bell, the plight of civilians in the ABiH-held
10 territory, and the sniping and shelling. Can you please tell us, first
11 of all, what the situation in that respect was like at the end of 1992,
12 beginning of 1993?
13 A. Well, this was a war fought, looking at it from my perspective,
14 against all the Geneva
15 military and civilian targets, except of course that the civilians were
16 not able to defend themselves. They had to come out for food and water
17 and fuel if they could gather it and many of them spent, especially the
18 children spent much of those three and a half years in cellars.
19 Q. What would happen to civilian who were outside?
20 A. I had an experience in -- I was doing a report in early 1993 and
21 we discovered there was a water point, a stand pipe, a tap which people
22 had to come out to within range of the Bosnian Serb positions and people
23 were regularly shot as they fetched their water. Sometimes the trams
24 were targeted in a similar way. There was -- to me one of the iconic
25 images of the war - and this was towards the end - is a French armoured
1 personnel carrier shuttling roughly between the parliament office
2 building and what we knew as Sniper's Corner, and for once UNPROFOR, the
3 UN Protection Force was doing some protecting and they -- the civilians
4 would walk with the -- the armoured personnel carrier went at walking
5 pace and it would protect the civilians who were obviously sheltered on
6 the safer side of it. I mean, I've never seen -- I've never been in a
7 war quite so merciless as this.
8 Q. You've spoken of the effect in terms of trams, in terms of
9 needing to fetch water. What were the -- besides the effects of sniping
10 and shelling directly, what did this do to day-to-day life in Sarajevo
11 A. Well, it -- it really closed down. The business -- people's only
12 business - and this applies to both sides of the lines - was survival,
13 just getting through -- getting through the day. Especially difficult in
14 the winter because it's a very cold winter there. There was -- there
15 were no -- the gas was turned off for most of the time. There was no
16 electricity. There was no source of food apart from what the
17 United Nations could bring in. So the people really, really suffered
18 on -- to an extent that I hadn't seen in all my other wars, to be quite
20 Q. How frequent were the -- and again, focusing on the period the
21 end of 1992, beginning of 1993 for a moment, how frequently were
22 civilians getting shot and civilians getting shelled by the VRS forces?
23 A. This was not something that happened at a steady rate over three
24 and a half years. Apart from the first winter of the war, 1992 to 1993,
25 which was particularly grim, there would be in the early months of the
1 year, I think January, February, middle of March, something of a
2 cease-fire and this is when there were actually cease-fire negotiations.
3 But when the snow and the ice melted about the middle of March, you would
4 find that the pace of the shelling and the fighting quickened and there
5 was a lot of, I mean, there were some -- there were main force
6 engagements like the attempt by the BiH Army to break the siege of
8 would say that some times were much worse than others.
9 Q. Were you in any position to assess whether or not civilians were
10 specifically targeted?
11 A. Common sense says yes. I remember a cameraman in the Holiday Inn
12 just sort of zeroing his camera one morning, poking it out of the window
13 to make sure that it worked and there was an old lady getting out of a
14 van and going into a house, so he just -- he was just making sure and as
15 he did so she was shot. I think it's highly unlikely that she was shot
16 by accident. It would seem -- common sense would say she was targeted.
17 Q. Were there areas of the city which were more prone to attacks on
18 civilians than others?
19 A. Yes, roughly speaking those areas where the snipers and the
20 gunners on the VRS side of the lines would have a clear line of sight
21 down one of the side-streets. You understand that the main street goes
22 from one end to the other, but the side-streets were especially
23 vulnerable and this is where the notorious Sniper's Corner was, and they
24 actually had a road sign saying, "Beware snipers," which was up for three
25 and a half years. But of course, having said that you were vulnerable to
1 mortar fire wherever you were.
2 Q. All right. Was that vulnerability to mortar fire consistent
3 throughout the three and a half year?
4 A. No, I don't think the level of fighting was consistent throughout
5 the three and a half years. I would say it was at its worst in the
6 summer of 1992 and again in that resurgence of the fighting in summer of
8 Q. What were the respective strengths and weaknesses in terms of
9 weaponry and manpower of the two forces?
10 A. The Serbs obviously had the advantage in heavy weapons, in
11 armoured personnel carriers, in tanks, they even had a tank in the suburb
12 of Grbavica. In bombs and rockets. The BiH Army, although it was much
13 more lightly equipped, had the advantage in numbers. Numerical
14 superiority. The Serbs by about the fourth -- third year of the war were
15 seriously defeated -- depleted. They had, I mean every -- this was a
16 citizens army. Everyone who could bear arms did bear arms, but the main
17 units of the Romanija Corps, the corps that surrounded Sarajevo, were
18 seriously under strength, lacking officers, lacking sufficient NCOs.
19 And even though when we were -- we could -- I had very good
20 relations with the Serbs right up to August 1994 and I would -- and
21 Karadzic and others would sometimes take us around their frontlines and
22 show us the spirit of these soldiers. I mean, it was all part of what we
23 call the information campaign, but I noticed up there there were a lot of
24 very old men, and I raised this with Jovan Zametica who was a Cambridge
25 don who was his foreign policy advisor whom I knew very well. I said,
1 Jovan, you know, you are going to lose, why don't you deal, and he said -
2 I'll never forget this - he said, We don't care.
3 So there was an imbalance between the two forces. The heavy
4 weapons on one side, but the manpower on the other. And of course,
5 towards the end of the war, the Bosnian government forces found ways of
6 getting more weaponry, especially anti-tank weapons.
7 Q. So how did this imbalance manifest itself in the military
9 A. It manifested itself in a growing ability of the Bosnian army
10 seriously to threaten the Serbs' stranglehold on the city. About
11 June 1995, we had some amazing images where they actually broke out for
12 awhile and over the old Pale road. They had -- they tried to break the
13 siege from the outside, but suffered very severe casualties.
14 So what you got towards the end of the war which you hadn't
15 really had so much before was exchanges of fire between main force units
16 on either side, which didn't make the civilians any safer, but there were
17 times when it was a war of one army against another.
18 Q. So what would the response of the VRS be?
19 A. Well, I noted that what would happen, and the government forces
20 were, I mean, I remember reflecting at one time that Harry Silajdzic who
21 was a senior member of the presidency, I felt he had the effect of a
22 whole brigade of marines or something, because he could -- what would
23 happen was that the government forces might snipe or make some aggressive
24 move to try and break the siege and then they would really get hit very,
25 very hard with artillery, with tank fire, you could see this in the early
1 months of the war. So then the -- Silajdzic would turn around and say,
2 Look what are they doing to us, we are the victims, why will the world
3 not move to save us? And you had this especially in 1995 with the use of
4 aircraft bombs powered by rockets and indeed by the use of phosphorus
5 which was also used then.
6 Q. I want to ask you a little bit about these bombs that you've just
7 described. Which forces used these aircraft bombs propelled by rockets?
8 A. Any force would use whatever it had. And the Bosnian army
9 actually had very little in terms of heavy weapons. When the Croats were
10 besieging Gornji Vakuf in the side war in 1993 to 1994, they were
11 actually rolling sea mines down hills into the village. You used
12 whatever you had.
13 Now, by then there was a no-fly zone in force and the government,
14 the Serb side had these aircraft bombs that it couldn't use because it
15 couldn't use its aircraft so it devised a means of getting them propelled
16 by rockets. There was, while was there I think there was three of these
17 cases, one was in Vlasenica, one was in the bus depot which was a
18 UN vehicle compound opposite the television station, and one of course
19 was actually in the well of the television station itself, which did
20 great damage.
21 Q. Can you describe what you know of the effect of these bombs?
22 A. I only came in after they had been fired and these were, I
23 believe, 500-pound aircraft bombs and they were completely devastating.
24 They were the heaviest weapons used, I mean, relative to the tank and
25 artillery shells used from the early days of the war, these were the
1 heaviest weapons that were employed throughout the whole course of it.
2 Q. The ones which you saw or the sites that you went to, were they
3 at military installations or were they in civilian areas?
4 A. Hrasnica I didn't see because I couldn't get there. The
5 UN compound was a UN compound. It was a former bus depot so by
6 definition it had no military -- no competent military inside it, and the
7 television station was also a civilian installation by definition.
8 Q. Besides the buildings themselves, were the immediate surrounding
9 areas civilian or military?
10 A. I know of no military installations anywhere near the television
11 station and the bus compound opposite it. The principal army
12 headquarters were down-town; and the other military areas, if you like,
13 were on the -- on the frontlines. But not around those target zones, no.
14 Q. Generally speaking, where were the -- geographically, where were
15 the ABiH troops deployed?
16 A. They were deployed obviously round the, round the edges. They
17 were -- they would -- you would sometimes find them billeted in schools,
18 but you were not aware of a -- living in a city with a great mass with a
19 standing army in it. This was a war fought very piecemeal, house by
20 house and sector by sector. And apart from when I -- we did a story
21 about the Bosnian government forces training on that hill near the
22 television tower, that is the one time I've seen them en masse, apart
23 from the attempt to break the encirclement in June 1992 where they were
24 moving very rapidly up hill and under covering fire, but it looked like a
25 ruined city, but I would say not a militarised [Realtime transcript read
1 in error "mill tear terrorised"] one in any obvious way.
2 Q. When you talk about the troops being deployed around the edges,
3 what do you mean?
4 A. Could you mind if I just correct something. There's -- that word
5 should be militarised, not "mill tear terrorised," three lines up. I'm
6 not accusing anyone of being a terrorist here. Sorry. That's right.
7 Thank you. Sorry.
8 Q. Yes, Mr. Bell, when you mentioned the troops, the ABiH troops
9 being deployed around the edges, what are you talking about?
10 A. I'm talking about the frontlines, sir. This was a war in which,
11 you know, the frontlines could be as little as 30 metres from each other.
12 It was house to house, and very often there would be a kind of a local
13 cease-fire either explicit or just agreed between commanders, but there
14 were -- but every inch of ground was fought for from, oh, I'd say May
15 1992 onwards.
16 Q. You spoke earlier, Mr. Bell, of the gas being turned off, the
17 electricity being turned off, and you've described people having to go to
18 certain collection points for water. Why would that be?
19 A. The gas came into Sarajevo
20 main. The one consistent source of water throughout, of course, was the
21 Miljacka River
22 their water from it, carrying it in handcarts, in any way, because you
23 can -- you know, these people had to come out to get their water. It was
24 one of the effects of fighting a war, I would say an early 20th century
25 war in a late 20th century urban environment. This is why the war,
1 terrible as it was, out in the -- out in the country-side was not -- did
2 not have as severe an effect as the war in the cities. Not just
4 Q. When you were in Sarajevo
5 what were you reporting?
6 A. I was reporting initially the result of the referendum campaign,
7 and then I was reporting the start of the war, the street fighting in
9 We went up to Zvornik. We still had a degree of movement. I was
10 reporting the politics of it. I spent a lot of time in Pale with Jovan
11 Zametica, with Karadzic, with Nikola Koljevic, his vice-president. You
12 know, we tried to be as comprehensive as we could in rather difficult
14 Q. Did that reporting include what was happening to the civilians?
15 A. Yes, it did. It was -- it very much did. The report I did from
16 outside Zvornik, we were watching, I think, 20.000 civilians on the move
17 in that one day. And since civilians were the principal casualties of
18 this war, a lot of the reporting was about their plight.
19 Q. Including the reporting from Sarajevo?
20 A. Including the reporting from Sarajevo. On both sides of the --
21 on both sides of the lines, yes.
22 Q. The -- at the time you were there, in late 1992, early 1993, how
23 large was the international press contingent in Sarajevo?
24 A. There were about -- I wouldn't have thought that even at the
25 height it was more than about 50. It was a very difficult place to get
1 to. The costs of protection were high, the logistics were difficult, so
2 those of us present throughout were actually relatively few, which, from
3 my point of view, had the advantage that you could get to the main
4 people. You could get to the UN generals, you could get to the Bosnian
5 Serb leadership. It wasn't done through spin doctors and press officers.
6 No, there were not that many of us and we bonded together pretty
8 Q. Was everybody interested in the same sort of stories that you
9 have described?
10 A. There was more of an agreed agenda than I think there is now.
11 Yes, on the whole. There were no tabloid press there very much. I don't
12 think there were any great differences between us in the way that we
13 covered the story, except that I probably spent more time with the Serbs
14 than most of the rest.
15 Q. What sort of networks, press agencies, and other organisations
16 were represented at that time?
17 A. There were the -- obviously Reuters was there, Associated Press
18 was there, AFP
19 But we put together a -- because it was so dangerous, I took the
20 initiative and knocked some heads together and we actually formed what we
21 called the Sarajevo Agency Pool so that the cameramen and women were not
22 competing with each other to go into the most dangerous places, and I
23 think we saved some lives with that. So it was an unusually close-knit
24 and non-competitive group of people.
25 Q. And what was that group of people doing with its footage?
1 A. They went -- those footage went out on satellite exchanges all
2 over the world. I know that because the story that I sent from -- about
3 the refugees being driven out of the villages around Zvornik, and Zvornik
4 itself by a paramilitary leader called Zeljko Raznjatovic. Hisnom de
5 guerre was Arkan, I knew him very well. He -- that -- we started off
6 with some footage taken by a cameraman of mine in Zvornik of the dead
7 Muslims being carried out and the Serbian flag hoisted, and whatever I
8 said clearly offended this warlord and because it was seen in -- it was
9 seen in Belgrade
10 next day to try and reduce the risk to him. His name was Dragan and he
11 was seriously threatened.
12 So yeah, these images went around Europe and we went around the
13 world, especially in the early phases of the war.
14 Q. When you returned in early 1994 and through to the end of the
15 war, were the same sorts of stories being reported in the international
16 press from Sarajevo
17 A. No, I rather feel that a degree of war fatigue set in. At the
18 same time, the -- what they call in the military field security tightened
19 up a lot, so you couldn't just roll around everywhere with your armoured
20 vehicle, you were stopped and blocked, and there was much more of an
21 attempt to manipulate the press. But the images of -- from May 1995
22 through to the, really, through to Dayton, they were so graphic that they
23 were going around the world as much as in that first summer of the war,
25 Q. During the period of March 1994 through to the end of the war,
1 was there a constant international press presence in Sarajevo
2 A. It was constant but I would have thought it waned, interest
3 diminished to the news editors of Europe and the United States
4 long war which had been going on a long time. You know, I was already
5 competing with a change in the news agenda in which a royal divorce, for
6 instance, is thought to be much more important than a European war. But
7 that -- towards the end May, June, July 1995, that lack of interest had
8 gone away and people really did want to know.
9 Q. Does that mean there was no coverage of what was happening to
10 civilians during this time?
11 A. No, there was always coverage. The Sarajevo agency pool had two
12 especially able Bosnian cameramen who got everywhere. We kept working,
13 we kept working hard, and I found that by early summer of 1995 my own
14 editors in London
15 probably the climactic phase of the war. I think this really came home
16 after the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995, it then became a war, shall
17 we say, on the conscience of the world.
18 Q. Were you involved in reporting of the Srebrenica massacre?
19 A. Only from the outside. It was denied. It took really quite a
20 few weeks and even months for the true reality to dawn. The first -- I
21 mean, we knew these people had disappeared but we couldn't prove they had
22 been killed, but there were some aerial photographs taken by the
23 Americans which suggested so. I would think it was not really until
24 about September 1995 that the -- you know, it was possible for people to
25 deny this had happened. Well, after I suppose September 1995 it was no
1 longer possible, and I think this contributed to the political initiative
2 that ended the war.
3 Q. Can you tell me what Eurovision is?
4 A. Eurovision is a syndicate of all the European broadcasters.
5 Besides its, you know, the song contest and all the other things, it's
6 core is an exchange of news footage between its broadcasters and they all
7 take in each others news feeds, or they did then, at a regular time every
9 Q. Was it operating during 1992 to 1995?
10 A. Yes, it was. In fact, our initial satellite dish when we were
11 based -- when we first got in in April 1995, we were based in the
12 Hotel Srbija in Ilidza actually, in Serb-held territory, and our dish was
13 a Eurovision dish. It was actually provided by the European broadcasting
14 union, so the Eurovision was at the heart of this enterprise.
15 Q. Just in practical terms, what would happen to footage, what would
16 Eurovision do with it, what would other subscribers do with the
17 Eurovision footage?
18 A. Before we formed the Sarajevo
19 news agencies, Reuters which was then called Viz News, and what was then
20 WTN, World Television News, and APTN, which was -- they would -- they
21 would offer up their images of the day and an adjudicator in Geneva
22 decide to take this agency's or that agency's. After we formed the
24 on the ground who would scoop up everything that was available and send
25 it at a given time to the European networks.
1 Q. Do you know whether the Eurovision pool of material was regularly
2 accessed by subscribers, did they download or retrieve footage on a
3 regular basis?
4 A. Well, I used to get letters from all corners of Europe, so they
5 obviously did. You have to understand, there was no -- apart from CNN,
6 there was no rolling news at that time. But there were all the large and
7 even the small European broadcasters, they showed intense interest. We
8 had -- I mean, I could see that by the people coming through. We had
9 Irish television, German television, French television, Austrians, I
10 mean, everybody was there, and they were there because they had seen this
11 on their screens and they wanted to send their own people and own
12 correspondents. So it was -- I spent -- after Croatia, I think you have
13 to understand this was the first war in Europe since 1945 so it would
14 have been surprising if there had not been this interest.
15 Q. Were there any Serb networks who or which subscribed to
16 Eurovision, Republic of Serbia
17 A. Well, I wasn't in Belgrade
18 Yugoslav television was a member of the European broadcasting union in
19 good standing and so obviously -- well, it certainly received what we
20 sent or my cameramen wouldn't have been threatened whenever it was, it
21 was in April 1992. And of course, there were, I mean, if you could
22 consider the Serb's own interest in Bosnia, it would have been
23 extraordinary if they turned their backs on it which they didn't.
24 And of course we had quite a lot of Serbian journalists came in
25 as well. The Associated Press correspondent was a Serb. A lot of the
1 networks initially sent their reports -- of the agency sent their reports
2 through Belgrade
3 Serbian journalists were quite heavily involved, yes.
4 Q. Just give me a moment, please, Mr. Bell.
5 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, that's all I have for Mr. Bell at the
6 moment. I've just been handed a note which might suggest that there are
7 one or two errors in the transcript which I'd want to have a look at in
8 case they need any further clarification from Mr. Bell. I wonder if we
9 could take the adjournment now and I can use that time to find those
10 mistakes and see whether Mr. Bell is required to comment on those at all.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Very well, then. We'll take a break and come back
12 at 4.00. Court adjourned.
13 --- Recess taken at 3.25 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 3.59 p.m.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Thomas.
16 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. Yes, there are a couple of
17 passages in the transcript which I'd like to refer back to Mr. Bell,
18 please, Your Honours. The first is at page 27, line 12. And I wonder if
19 we could have that passage appear on the screen before Mr. Bell, please.
20 THE WITNESS: You want me to fill in the gap?
21 MR. THOMAS:
22 Q. Sorry, Mr. Bell --
23 A. You wish me to fill in the gap?
24 Q. Let me just find where we are for a moment. Yes, you see the
25 reference to 27:1 on the left-hand side? Do you --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. If you scroll -- if you go down to the number 12?
3 A. Yes, that name is Jovan, J-o-v-a-n, Zametica, Z-a-m-e-t-i-c-a.
4 Q. Thank you. And then you --
5 A. Nikola Koljevic, K-o-l-j-e-v-i-c.
6 Q. Thank you very much.
7 MR. THOMAS: And Your Honours, there's one more passage, please,
8 page 31, line 10.
9 Q. And you were talking -- first of all, do you see the reference to
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And if you go down to line number 10 under there?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. We were talking about Eurovision?
15 A. Yes, I've made -- I've maken [sic] a mistake there. It's April
16 1992, of course, when we first got in.
17 Q. Thank you. Mr. Bell, thank you. Those were the only matters I
18 wanted to raise with you. My learned friends for the Defence will have
19 some questions for you if you would kindly wait there for us, please.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you. Keep forward.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please use the other microphone.
23 Thank you.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Is this better?
25 THE INTERPRETER: Perfect. Thank you.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Good.
2 Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
3 Q. If you'll excuse me, Mr. Bell, I have a tendency to drop my voice
4 and I get into trouble because they can't hear me and can't interpret
5 then they yell at me, and I'd rather not have that happen too terribly
6 much while we are talking to each other.
7 I've had occasion to read all of your testimony in all of the
8 cases previously and I've had occasion to read the book or one of the
9 books that you've written, "In Harm's Way." And I think I'd like to
10 start my examination based upon what I've seen previously as well as what
11 I've seen today, echoing the remarks that were made by Judge Jorda in
12 which he said:
13 "I also thank you for the quality of your testimony to which you
14 always try to take the high ground vis-a-vis this dreadful conflict."
15 And in my discussions with you today, I'm really searching for
16 that kind of a balance, because you are uniquely situated to comment on
17 and give us some understanding of a number of, I think, very important
18 issues that surround this particular litigation and this particular
20 You said on your direct testimony that this war, unlike other
21 wars that you had reported, was different. You mention at one point that
22 it was a re-enactment or perhaps a Great War again, and you also
23 mentioned that it was an early 20th-century war being fought late in the
24 20th century. And I'd like to start there for a moment, if I could. And
25 could you explain to us what the distinctions that you believe existed in
1 this war were based upon your experience for many years as a war
2 correspondent in many theatres of operation?
3 A. I think I would start by saying I sometimes felt, especially in
4 central Bosnia
5 That is, the weapons used in Bosnian war were almost entirely, apart from
6 the aircraft bombs, I suppose, the same weapons used in the Great War.
7 They were assault weapon, they were mines, they were machine-guns, and so
8 on. But the difference, I think, was that the extent to which in a late
9 20th century war in an urban environment civilians were so much caught up
10 in it and it wasn't just that there was no distinction between the
11 soldiers and the civilians. I sometimes felt the civilians were being
12 targeted, and political leaders would use the sufferings of their people
13 to advance their political cause. And the same thing happened in the war
14 in Croatia
15 that I have reported, I found this the most shocking.
16 Q. And when you say that political leaders used the suffering of the
17 people sometimes to advance their cause, earlier in your direct
18 testimony, you had mentioned one of the things that occurred as a result
19 of what would happen when the BiH would attempt to break out of an area
20 and then they would be hit with this heavy response and there would be,
21 then, a response from a gentleman whose name has just escaped me. I
22 can't remember what his name was --
23 A. Oh, Silajdzic maybe?
24 Q. Silajdzic, yes. In that regard, he, then, would go forth and
25 say, See what they are doing to us. And I'm wondering, is that what you
1 are talking about or is that an example of what you are referring to when
2 you are talking about in one sense the political leadership using the
3 suffering of their people to advance their cause?
4 A. Yes, at the same time the political leadership would have been,
5 from their own point of view, quite sincere. I remember Haris Silajdzic
6 taking to task General Sir Michael Rose, who was UNPROFOR commander, in a
7 very public way and attempting to humiliate him.
8 I think I would like to make a distinction between main force
9 unit clashes like the one I described when the BiH forces attempt to
10 break the siege in the summer of 1995, and the day-to-day shelling and,
11 as I see it, sniping of and targeting of civilians. I mean, this was a
12 war with where both these things happened.
13 Q. In this war, do you find that the - I'm trying to figure out how
14 to say this properly - that the status of the media was distinct from
15 that of the other wars that you've reported? I'm trying -- and to be
16 perfectly honest with you, I'm trying to edge up to, I think, where you
17 know this discussion is going.
18 A. Yeah. I'll be as helpful as I can. When the war began in April
19 1992, the international community as such was hardly on the ground. The
20 UNPROFOR had its headquarters in Sarajevo when the war began, but they
21 left hurriedly in May 1992. So as far as the international community was
22 concerned, there were one or two European monitors, but as far as the
23 peoples of Bosnia
24 the international community were the international press. And therefore,
25 there would be obviously an attempt to influence us, to get us to put
1 their point of view and we understood this.
2 So it was an unusual war in that respect as well.
3 Q. That, I think, falls or flows into a comment that's often made,
4 it's an old saw, and I certainly, from what I've seen, am not accusing
5 you in this in any respect whatsoever, but the first casualty of a war is
6 truth. And to the extent that that is something that is of concern, I
7 think as a reporter it's clearly something that must have been to concern
8 not only to you but of to your colleagues? That you made sure that you
9 were both objective and telling the truth?
10 A. Yes, sir. And anything you do is fragmentary because you are
11 concentrating on what you find at a particular time and a particular
12 place. But especially in the early months of the war, we did have most
13 remarkable access to both sides. And I'll be honest, that one of the --
14 one of the problems I had dealing with my editors, and they were not
15 unique in this, was that they got themselves very early into a mindset of
16 good Muslims and bad Serbs, if you see what I mean.
17 Q. Yes, I do.
18 A. And when an ambulance with Serbian soldiers was intercepted and
19 hijacked and eight or nine Serbs were killed in cold blood, I had great
20 difficulty impressing on my editors that this had actually happened. But
21 I think, you know, obviously you ask yourself, What did I get wrong? I
22 think I'd stand by just about everything I wrote and said at the time.
23 Always accepting that it was necessarily fragmentary and I could only be
24 where I was and not somewhere else.
25 Q. I believe, as you've commented, one of the things that is true
1 about war is that war is in fact local?
2 A. All wars are local, yes.
3 Q. All wars are local. As a matter of fact, that's a point that you
4 raise in your book which is that what is going on on the ground at the
5 time is in fact what is most pressing to all those that are involved in
6 that issue?
7 A. It's the field where you fight, it's the ditch where you die.
8 Q. You said that you initially, if I'm not mistaken, you initially
9 came to the area with regard to the referendum process?
10 A. Referendum, mm-hmm.
11 Q. And I'd like to, for a moment, see if what you said in your book
12 still holds true, and that's with regard to the issue of what I would
13 call the Genscher push, which I think you understand what I mean, to
14 recognise the independence. And in your book you say, and this is on
15 page 35, which I believe is pages 2 and 3 in e-court, you say:
16 "The then Secretary-General of the United Nations Javier Perez de
17 Cuellar, in the final days of a distinguished term of office" --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Thank you for slowing down when reading.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH:
20 Q. -- "wrote to the president of the council of ministers, Hans van
21 den Broek of Holland
22 Cyrus Vance after meeting many of the main players including the Bosnian
23 leadership. More than one of his high-level interlocutors described the
24 explosive consequences of such a development as being a potential time
25 bomb ... and I'm deeply worried that an early selective recognition could
1 widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive situation especially in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina and also Macedonia
3 uncoordinated actions should be avoided."
4 Lord Carrington wrote to a similar effect, I'm going to skip a
5 couple of lines: "... an early recognition of Croatia would undoubtedly
6 mean the break-up of the conference. There is also a real danger,
7 perhaps even a probability that Bosnia-Herzegovina will also ask for
8 independence and recognition which would be wholly unacceptable to the
9 Serbs in the Republic. This might well be the spark that sets
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina alight."
11 Some years later after reflection, and I know it's in your book,
12 do you still hold that same position?
13 A. Yes, I do. I was passed all the documents relating to the debate
14 on the recognition of Croatia
15 an absolutely pivotal event, and all the predictions made by Carrington
16 and others, they all sadly were proved true.
17 Q. Did you, during the time that you were in the region, discuss
18 with Serbian leadership or Serbs at all the fact of the European decision
19 to recognise these particular quests for self-determination and
21 A. I almost certainly discussed it during -- in the margins of my
22 reporting on the referendum campaign in March 1992, because by then the
23 decisions on Croatia
24 that, like all civil wars, the civil war in Bosnia -- well, it was more
25 than a civil war, but it was partly a civil war. It was slow to start
1 because the people of Bosnia
2 happen once it started. So I almost certainly did discuss this with the
3 Serb leadership, Karadzic and Koljevic especially. This is when I got to
4 know them first.
5 Q. We may have a moment to speak about Mladic. I take it this is
6 something that you did not speak with General Mladic about?
7 A. Well, General Mladic was not in the frame at that time. He was a
8 general in the JNA based elsewhere. I never knew him as well as the
9 others because I was dealing with the political leadership, but I did at
10 one time in August 1992, I prevented him -- I intervened to prevent him
11 throttling the Reuters correspondent Kurt Schork, whom he'd taken against
12 in a big way.
13 Q. As a matter of fact, you suggested that if the other side would
14 control theirs then you would control yours, because Mladic was somewhat
15 upset what with the Reuters correspondent was accusing him of; right?
16 A. That is true, yes, sir.
17 Q. What I'm trying to come to is an understanding because part of
18 what we are dealing here -- with here is the issue of, in a very real
19 way, perception of that which is being said. And I want to frame it in
20 the following way, and if it's a fair characterization, tell me; and if
21 it's not a fair characterization, tell me that too. You say at page 103
22 of your book, that's page 9 of the e-court, you say:
23 "At the same time, and rather to my surprise, I found the Serbs
24 quite easy to like on a personal and social level. Once they even sought
25 to use me to pass a message to the British government, though I protested
1 to them it was none of my business. They could be warm hearted and
2 hospitable and even almost innocent in a," and this is what I'm driving
3 at here," 14th-century kind of way, which is not to excuse them, but
4 rather to suggest that they belong to a different age. Yet they were
5 doing damage in this one and the problem was to get through to them."
6 When I think of the 14th century, I think of the plague, the
7 Hundred Years' War, it was a time when society was relatively shut down,
8 and the people were unnecessarily isolated and concerned about
9 information that came from the outside. And I'm wondering if that is a
10 fair characterization of your experience with the Serbs, and if that's
11 what you meant with regard to that particular language?
12 A. I refer to the 14th century because I had in mind the battle of
13 Kosovo Polje, which I think was 14 -- 1389 and which is the defining
14 event in their history, so I wrote somewhere in this book or elsewhere --
15 and this is not to criticize them at all, but the Serbs are a people who
16 live their history like no other people on earth. That's not to
17 criticize them, it's just one of the interesting things about them.
18 Q. And as a matter of fact -- and do I apologise to both the Court
19 and counsel. Mr. Mair has just suggested to me that it might be helpful
20 to mention that I'm referring to 1D 005556 when I'm referring to those
21 pages in Mr. Bell's book, and to that extent I do apologise. If we could
22 have that brought up generally. My apologies both to the Court as well
23 as to you, Mr. Thomas.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: How many 5s?
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: Three 5s and a 6.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH:
3 Q. Now, with regard to the -- with regard to the self-same kind of
4 idea, you also mention, and this is when you are referring to the Bosnian
5 Serbs as opposed to any other group, I think, and this is page 113 of
6 your book, sir, and that's page 12. You say:
7 "... mostly their fierce isolation was self-imposed. They [were
8 prisoners of their politics and their history, but I've sometimes
9 wondered whether the mechanisms and dynamics of television may have
10 also -- may also have had something to do with it.
11 "Throughout the war we did not flit around evenly between one
12 side and the other. Mostly, though I tried to break the habit, we did
13 not flit at all. We stayed on the government side of the lines and
14 reported from that perspective. For the kind of TV news operation that
15 we were mounting is not a free running enterprise, it has a certain
16 centre of gravity, and that is hard to move."
17 First of all when you are dealing with the issue of their fierce
18 isolation, I take it by that you are referring to characters, and I use
19 the term in a loose sense for the moment, such as Karadzic? Or are you
20 referring to just the people in general?
21 A. I think I think both, sir. I mean obviously I got to know many
22 of soldiers, civilians, at all levels, including what was at one time a
23 sort of peace movement within the Bosnian/Serb army led by Major Mauzer
24 from Bijeljina. So it wasn't just the leadership. I mean, I knew and I
25 liked a lot of these people but I felt there was -- that they're so
1 easily set in a sense of paranoia that the world was against them. And
2 the reason I wrote that was machinery was much more primitive than it is
3 now so we would be camped around a satellite dish, and the satellite dish
4 started in Serb territory but then it migrated. And it was -- you know,
5 to reach the Serbs once the war had started, you had to cross an active
6 frontline. You might get shot at across the -- crossing the airport, so
7 there was every reason to confine yourselves to government-held
8 territory. Well, I got badly shot up once crossing the runway, but I
9 still tried after that, and it was only in August 1994 that the Bosnian
10 Serb territory was closed off to us.
11 Q. I see. So up until August of 1994, and I not only do I
12 understand why you may not wish to travel but it makes eminently good
13 sense to me, and as a matter of fact, I take it that's one of the reasons
14 that you created the Sarajevo
15 lives as opposed to be recklessly out there trying to grab bits of
16 sensational news. But considering that you have this understanding of
17 them that they were prisoners of their politics and their history, with
18 regard to the issue of the television reporting that was going on from a
19 standpoint of what I'm going to call for a moment, if it makes sense,
20 their isolation, did you ever get any sense that they believed that the
21 information that was coming across the television was propaganda and was
22 not to be believed?
23 A. Some of them certainly believed this. One of the first things
24 they did was to set up their own television service which they did with
25 the help of some editing machines that they hijacked from the BBC,
1 actually. So they could put out their own version of events. But even
2 as late as August 1994, they had us over, there was a referendum on the,
3 what was called the contact group plan, and we were led around the
4 trenches and we were invited to interview anybody we liked. And the
5 purpose of this was to show that the Bosnian Serbs were unanimously
6 against the contact group plan. So they continued to deal with us up
7 until that time.
8 And I found if you had a reputation for being, the word the
9 soldiers liked to use was "correct," they thought you were correct you
10 could still do business with them.
11 Q. And they thought you were correct?
12 A. Mostly they thought I was correct.
13 Q. That's my understanding. And when you use this term "correct,"
14 actually, this is something that you've discussed in some previous
15 testimony at some point. Could you explain to us what that term means?
16 And from the standpoint of the Serbian interpretation of what it means to
17 be correct?
18 A. The Serbian interpretation of being correct is this is a man who
19 is reporting facts as he finds them and as he knows them and he is not
20 coming to see us with a preconceived notion.
21 Q. Okay. Now, early on you met with a gentleman who said that the
23 A. Ustasha.
24 Q. Ustasha, yeah. Thank you very much. Did that view find voice in
25 those Serb that you spoke with?
1 A. If I remember, and you have the book in front of you and I don't,
2 I think it was the commander of a Serbian artillery battery laying down
3 fire on the frontlines. And I had to convince him that I was not Ustasha
4 which is to say a Croatian Fascist, and he was, in the end, most
5 forthcoming and gave me a wonderful insight into the Serbian mindset of
6 the time.
7 Q. I'm -- another point you mention, and this is at page 109, and
8 it's -- incidentally your memory is spot on. This is page 109, and it's
9 page 11 of the document. You are talking about after a point that
10 Milosevic had travelled to Pale to urge the Bosnian Serb parliament to
11 ratify the plan. And further on that page you say:
12 "Those who could dispersed to Belgrade and the rest returned to
13 the trenches. The Serbs closed their ranks against the outside world of
14 which we, in the press, were the most visible and intrusive symbol, so
15 they set about curbing the intrusions."
16 And then you explain that access became more difficult and a
17 series of other things became increasingly hard from the standpoint of
18 being able to deal with them.
19 And I think one of the things that happens in both in a
20 courtroom, as well as other places is the things are drawn in black and
21 white, which obviously is not only inaccurate but also a bit naive. But
22 with regard to the issue of, once again, the perception that the Serbs,
23 and for the moment it's the Bosnian Serbs, had with regard to the
24 reporting that was going on, did you ever get a sense from them that they
25 didn't trust it? And by that I meant, the images that were being put
2 A. They certainly believed that the Bosnian government side were
3 waging a propaganda war. As they closed off their frontlines so we
4 couldn't get to them anymore, the only journalists in Pale with one or
5 two exceptions were -- would be Serbs or Greeks or Russians, people of
6 the Orthodox religion. And it was just impossible for us to report
7 accurately what was going on except what we could see from their
8 television service.
9 For instance, the first we knew of the kidnapping of a
10 military -- UN military observers in May 1995 was when we saw it on our
11 screens. So that's what we were -- that's what we were reduced to. We
12 didn't have the personal experience of talking to Karadzic, talking to
13 Mladic. And I think our reporting obviously suffered from that. I
14 wouldn't say it was biased, but it wasn't as -- we didn't have the same
15 freedom at the end of the war that we had at the beginning of the war.
16 Q. You mentioned at one point in your book, and you state -- and
17 this is page 139, which is 20 in the e-court:
18 "The satellite is as much a weapon of war as is the snipers
19 rifle, and the sound bite is extension of warfare by other means. A
20 modern-day Machiavelli or Klausewitz instead of conceding those to his
21 adversary will co-opt them for himself."
22 A. Yes, sir, the modern military thinkers, people like General Sir
23 Rupert Smith, have written intensively -- extensively on the importance
24 of the information campaign. I mean you can -- you can win militarily,
25 but lose politically and that's been the fact ever since Vietnam
2 Q. I think we could agree that Vietnam was the first time that the
3 military understood in a very particular sense the power of the media?
4 A. Yes, I would accept that, yes.
5 Q. Yeah. It stopped the war and brought down a president
7 A. Yes, well, I mean having said that, the first of our great war
8 correspondents William Howard Russell from the Crimea, brought down a
9 government in 1855 --
10 Q. That is true.
11 A. -- so there is a history.
12 Q. And part of the importance of that history is to be able to
13 accurately and dispassionately present to whatever the population is
14 whether it be viewing or reading population, the circumstances that are
15 surrounding the political and military will of the state that is waging
16 the war?
17 A. That is true.
18 Q. Yeah. I want to turn for a minute to the issue of UNPROFOR. And
19 in your book you talk about "mission creep," but before we get to the
20 issue of mission creep, which I understand to be defined as being given
21 essentially a loose mandate and ultimately the activities on the ground
22 evolve the purpose of what the people are there for. Is that fair?
23 A. I'd put it slightly differently. That a peacekeeping force
24 becomes deployed and by the time it gets on the ground, the situation
25 facing it has changed in such a way that it has either not to fulfill the
1 mission or to redefine the mission as it goes along.
2 Q. With regard to the presence of UNPROFOR, would you agree with me
3 that its mandate was that, in the first instance, of peacekeeping, as
4 opposed to peacemaking?
5 A. Yes. Except that there was always the ambiguity of its name.
6 The UN Protection Force which suggested that parts of its mission was do
7 some protecting and by the time it arrived, it was a force of
8 peacekeepers in a country where there was no peace to keep.
9 Q. So it was in an anomalous position because it had a mandate that
10 it could not perform?
11 A. Yes, sir. I quote one of its spokesman in the book, Alexander
12 Ivanko, something to the effect was that we would love to do our mission
13 if only someone in New York
14 Q. And during the period of time that you were in the region, did
15 you ever see that New York
16 by "its" I mean UNPROFOR's mission was?
17 A. Did they explain to UNPROFOR? Not in any coherent way. Both the
18 British generals who commanded UNPROFOR in Sarajevo found this deeply
19 contradictory. And in the end, General Smith got permission essentially
20 to change the rules because the old rules were unworkable.
21 Q. With regard to UNPROFOR, we heard yesterday some testimony with
22 regard to the black-market transfer of fuel and foods, which is something
23 that I believe you also were aware of. I'm not saying privy to, but you
24 were aware of that, and you, as a matter of fact, discuss specifically
25 the, I believe it was the Ukrainian unit that was involved in
1 black-marketing fuel and other goods. Is that correct?
2 A. Yes. The UNPROFOR was a force of very -- of national contingents
3 of very different abilities, but I mean, there was never any suggestion
4 of wrong-doing in that respect made against, shall we say, the British,
5 the French or the Dutch.
6 Q. Understood. Do you know if the information, this is obviously
7 something in your capacity as a reporter, the information that UNPROFOR
8 units, certainly not the British, the French or the Dutch, but that
9 UNPROFOR units were engaged in black-market smuggling with individuals in
10 the area was a topic of discussion with the Bosnian Serbs?
11 A. I was aware of this -- these allegations only at secondhand
12 because for most of this phase of the war, I was out of Sarajevo and
13 based in central Bosnia
14 Q. Did you ever become aware of a particular protest by Mladic with
15 regard to an UNPROFOR vehicle being used for moving weapons from one area
16 of the region to another?
17 A. No, sir. He may well have made the protest, but I was not aware
18 of it.
19 Q. Since I've mentioned General Mladic, I want to know whether or
20 not -- well, I don't want to know whether or not. You state that Mladic
21 was a maverick who accepted the political instructions that suited him
22 and disregarded the rest.
23 A. I would add also, with respect, sir, that he was, which is not
24 always the case with generals, he was widely admired by the soldiers
25 under his command.
1 Q. Understood.
2 A. I mean, he was a soldier's soldier.
3 Q. He was on the line, he was on the ground?
4 A. Sure. He was out, he was out with them a lot. He was not an
5 armchair general.
6 Q. More like Patton and some of the others?
7 A. I've declared -- I've compared him once to General Schwarzkopf, I
9 Q. Okay. Gotcha. Now, with regard to this issue, which is that he
10 accepted the political instructions that suited him and disregard the
11 rest, during your time in the region did you perceive that there were
12 equal powers between the military and the political arm, or that Mladic
13 was under the command of Mr. Karadzic?
14 A. I was aware of tensions between them. One of my friends was a
15 British army major who was the liaison officer at Pale, the Bosnian Serbs
16 headquarters, and I became aware in the later phases of the war that
17 these tensions increased, especially after Dr. Karadzic started wearing a
18 military uniform. And I quote somewhere in the book Karadzic regretting
19 that they perhaps had made too much of a hero out of Mladic, so there
20 were some serious, serious differences of opinion towards the end.
21 Q. Did you in your capacity as a reporter determine whether or not
22 when Karadzic rendered any orders, Mladic followed them or not?
23 A. I don't think it was that kind of relationship, with respect,
25 Q. Okay.
1 A. Mladic would sit in on a lot of the important meetings with the
2 mediators, but I would doubt very much if he regarded himself, Mladic, as
3 an implementer of political decisions.
4 Q. His position, I believe, is best voiced by his statement that
5 history will judge him, which I'm sure it will, but --
6 A. Yes, this was his reason for not dealing with the press. He said
7 something like, I don't care about the press because I will be judged by
9 Q. With regard to the structure of the dissemination of the
10 information that was compiled, I'd like to see if I can get a clear
11 understanding of that for myself, and perhaps for the Chamber and perhaps
12 I'm the only one that is a bit confused here. The information when it
13 first, and I'm talking about -- let's say, shall we split this up in
14 terms of the way that the information was obtained, between the first
15 period of time up to 1993 and then thereafter; is that fair?
16 A. That's fair.
17 Q. During the first period of time when information was obtained,
18 where did that information go? Physically, what happened to the clips,
19 the footage?
20 A. The footage would be taken all around the city and to some extent
21 all around the country. It would be assembled either initially in the
22 hotel in Ilidza where we were and later in our offices in the television
23 station. Because there was a pool, a lot of it would be traded, so you
24 could have a report from Sarajevo
25 agency cameraman, your own cameraman, it might come from the French, it
1 might come from the Germans, but obviously I would put a premium on what
2 I had been present at myself and could witness personally.
3 Q. Okay. Now, once you had the clip -- I'm sorry. Once you had the
4 information in terms of the visual image, was that then sent out of the
6 A. Yes. These images -- I mean, there are two sorts of information;
7 there's the image and there's the facts. And it's the job of the
8 reporter to assemble them and put them together in a coherent way and
9 we -- ever since the arrival of the light hand-held camera in the early
10 1980s, we did our editing on site. One of our satellite dishes actually
11 had a sniper's bullet through it, it was that close, and this gave us a
12 wonderful freedom. Therefore you didn't have somebody calling you on
13 your mobile phone and telling what you the feeling of the editorial
14 meeting was in London
15 of patrolling. I just went around the city seeing what I could find,
16 which is -- you can't do that these days.
17 Q. No. When you had a completed, what I'll call product or
18 completed story, that would be sent where?
19 A. It would be sent to my -- to the BBC in London. They had main
20 television bulletins at 1 p.m.
21 ten to 6
22 Q. Now, with regard to the other members of the reporting staff, I
23 take it that what they were doing was something different than from what
24 you were doing, by that I mean that you were not being sent to all of the
25 television stations around the world, they had their own reporters?
1 A. They had their own reporters. The French guy was particularly
2 impressive. Some of the others tended to, to my mind, they spent too
3 much time in bunkers, and also, to my mind, not enough of them tried to
4 seek out the Serbs. Because I always felt that the Serbs held the key to
5 this war.
6 Q. And with regard to some of your colleagues, I believe that you
7 mentioned that one of your colleagues -- or is it true that one of your
8 colleagues did a fair amount of his reporting or her reporting, but I
9 think it's a he, from the presidency?
10 A. That is true, yes.
11 Q. Who was that?
12 A. That was in the early weeks of the war, that was John Burns of
13 the New York
14 reporter, but he had some excellent sources inside the presidency.
15 Q. Now, as you sit here -- as you sat there then, could you tell us
16 what the, if you could, the psychological effect would be on people
17 viewing, specifically the Serbs viewing such reporting coming from the
18 presidency with regard to the issue of bias?
19 A. Well, for a start, they wouldn't have the sort of access to
20 newspaper reports that they had to television reports, which came back to
21 them. And I would go on to say in defence of Mr. Burns, that he also
22 sought out the Serbs.
23 Q. I'm not being critical of Mr. Burns whatsoever, it's really --
24 it's really because we understand that the true power of the image that
25 is translated in television, and which is what I'm really driving at
1 here. I mean, to see a reporter at the presidency building reporting
2 would -- in a war where there are clearly two sides would lead one to
3 believe that there was a concern about at least this international
4 reporter if not many international reporters having a bias against the
5 Serbs. That's what I'm asking you. If it's accurate, that's fine; and
6 if it's not accurate, that's also fine, because I think you're in a
7 better position to tell us than not.
8 A. With respect, sir, I don't think it is accurate because the image
9 of a newspaper reporter is not beamed around the world. His words are.
10 It is the image of the television reporter who is beamed around the
11 world. And if I had done my three and a half years inside and outside
12 the presidency then I might well have been perceived to be biased, but
13 this was not the case.
14 Q. When you discuss the issue of -- well, you state that the
15 corruption of language, you talk about corruption of language and
16 corruption of thought, which is obviously something comes out of a book.
17 With regard to the issue here of the corruption of language and
18 corruption of thought, in terms of the choice of words that were used,
19 and I'm not talking about you in specific, but as a general proposition,
20 considering some of the subjects we've talked about in terms of the use
21 of the media by the respective parties, do you think it would be fair to
22 say that by virtue of what -- we could call it David and Goliath kind of
23 presentation by the media that there was in fact at a presentation level
24 a corruption of language and thought?
25 A. Speaking for myself, my words were always very low-key, and one
1 of the arts of television is it shows things. You drop the adjectives,
2 you drop the adverbs, the pictures are so powerful. So I think newspaper
3 reporting and television reporting are completely different in that
4 respect. I was at one time accused of, I think by the British foreign
5 secretary, of being a founder member of the something-must-be-done club
6 on Bosnia
7 didn't need to because the pictures made the case for me. That's not
8 biased, that's as best you can showing things as they are, sir.
9 Q. With regard to the power of image and the choice of image,
10 obviously that would influence the viewer, independent of -- independent
11 of the accuracy or inaccuracy, you would agree, would you not?
12 A. Sure.
13 Q. And the repetition of image would also have that same effect?
14 A. That is true.
15 Q. And is it fair to say there came a point in time in your thinking
16 with regard to the entire issue of reporting that you made a
17 determination to accept that the old BBC
18 detachment were casualties and that, in fact, although you never, shall
19 we say, verbally argued for, you made a determination that something was
20 to be done and you proceeded, as did some of your colleagues, to go about
21 doing that?
22 A. This is very interesting ground. I came to the conclusion that a
23 reporter can be impartial or fair, but not between the armed and the
24 unarmed, between the aggressor and the victim. For instance, some of the
25 most powerful images in those years I got on the Bosnian Serb side of the
1 lines in Grbavica where people hung carpets and sheets on wires across
2 the road to blind the snipers on the other side. So it wasn't to that
3 extent sort of one-sided. I was able to show that Serbs also were being
4 sniped at and I think that was very important part of the story. But I
5 was also very critical of the media towards the end of the war, I felt
6 the whole thing was being reported from a corridor, perhaps 2 miles long,
7 of the main road down the centre of Sarajevo.
8 The worst casualties in the whole thing were in Tuzla in May
9 1995, where nearly 90 people were killed in a single bombing and that got
10 hardly any coverage at all. Hardly any. And I was and remain very
11 critical of some of our practices.
12 Q. I take it that you do from what I've read and what I've heard you
13 say in some speeches.
14 I'd like to, if I could, for a moment shift gears because I've
15 been alerted to something with regard to P 515.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we, first of all, have P 515 pulled up.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before we go to P 515, what do you want us to do
18 with 05556?
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Nothing at this time, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH:
22 Q. I just wanted you to take a look at this image just for a moment,
23 okay? And now what I'm going to do, just so you've seen it, you've
24 indicated a couple of things among others, parts of it may be inexact.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: Now what I would like to do is if I could,
1 please, have the map that we used -- is there the ability to increase
2 this now or is it still in the same position that we can't increase it?
3 If we could just enlarge the area right around where it says "VRS." Can
4 we make that any bigger?
5 Q. I don't know if that is of any help to you. Looking at this
6 particular area and specifically going to where there are those black
7 boxes below the V, what I'm wondering is --
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: And now if we could make it smaller again just
9 for the moment.
10 Q. Do you recognise that area as also being part of the ABiH
12 A. No, this is -- we are at now the Lukavica end of the runway and
13 that was held by the Bosnian Serbs.
14 Q. Okay. Thank you. You mentioned during your direct testimony,
15 Mr. Bell, that some units of the BiH were billeted in schools. Do you
16 have a recollection of how many units were billeted in schools?
17 A. My only experience of this was when I, as I explained, I went to
18 do a report about the Bosnian BiH Army training to break out of the siege
19 and the unit, we went and found them in a school, that's it. But for the
20 rest of it, I think there must have been sort of billeted among the
21 people. I mean, it was not -- for much the war this was not a formed
22 army and professional force like the -- as the Serbs had, though they
23 formed themselves and trained themselves and became professional in the
24 course of the war. It was very loose-knit. I mean, the Serbs never
25 respected a lot of them because they wore trainers, if you would believe
1 that. I mean, they didn't have boots.
2 Q. That meant they weren't correct soldiers or they weren't soldiers
3 at all?
4 A. Yeah, we are going back to the definition of correct, you see.
5 Q. Right. I see, yes. So --
6 A. But of course they were underestimated at the Serb's peril,
7 because they were very good snipers as well.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could go back to 1D 005556 for but a
10 Q. In your book you make the following statement which is that one
11 of the lessons that's learned in peacekeeping is that all threats will be
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. And with regard to your experience in the war here, would it be
15 fair to say that a number of the threats that were made by the
16 United Nations were not only tested, but upon them being tested, the
17 United Nations was found wanting in delivering that which they had
19 A. Yes, I think this was especially the case in 1994 of the -- what
20 we now see as the pin-prick -- pin-prick attacks in response to breaches
21 of the cease-fire or movements of the -- of heavy weapons. It was
22 only -- it was only in the late summer of 1995 that General Smith
23 correctly assessed the forces, the balance of forces, what he had and
24 what the Bosnian Serbs had, and he was able to take advantage of the --
25 his -- the UNPROFOR commander in Zagreb was on holiday, it was one of his
1 children's weddings, and General Smith could then turn the key and use
2 effective force which essentially changed everything.
3 Q. And in so doing, what he effectively did is he changed the policy
4 because he had command for a day in the sense that the other gentleman
5 was no longer in the seat of control, so he was able to take control?
6 A. With the permission of New York. It was not a maverick decision.
7 Q. That I understand. You mention also in your book that television
8 by its very nature has an aptitude for illusion anyway and that reality
9 is somehow diminished by being framed in the modest rectangle in the
10 corner of living-room. And to the extent that we are dealing with an
11 image that is being shot across the world, to what extent, if you have
12 any thoughts about this being in the business of reporting for some many
13 years now, to what extent does what your reality is on the ground
14 understood by those that are watching it through the box?
15 A. I have written extensively about this. I've sometimes come out
16 of scenes I was in, whether from Vukovar or Tuzla or Sarajevo
17 you bring them back and you edit them and you think, Is that all there
18 was, because you don't have the smell, you don't have the scene going on
19 all around you. And there was another element that I also get into that
20 we were forced by timid editorial decisions to take out nearly all the
21 bloodshed because we didn't want to upset people, and this had the effect
22 of sanitizing and actually, I would say, falsifying some of the coverage,
23 but I fought this battle with my editors for many years and I lost it.
24 Q. Pity.
25 A. It is a pity.
1 Q. Yes. I want to get an understanding of something you said
2 earlier on which is when you said trainers, I --
3 A. I mean shoes, I mean soft shoes.
4 Q. Okay. Yeah. Because sometimes trainers are the --
5 A. No, I mean the --
6 Q. Soft shoes.
7 A. I mean you are going to war in basketball shoes. That's what I
9 Q. We see that happening increasingly throughout the world these
10 days, do we not? Basketball shoes or bare foot, for that matter.
11 A. Absolutely, yeah.
12 Q. Do you think that in a certain sense, and I'm asking this based
13 upon the experience you've had for all these years, that this war, and I
14 hate to use the term, but this war was the first of the new wars that we
15 are going to see and that as a result of it being a new war, all
16 responses to it were at best confused?
17 A. Yes, this is what General Smith now describes as war among the
18 people. And the Iraq
19 was war among the people. The last time there was a set-piece tank
20 battle was 1973, so we are out of the phase of industrial war into a
21 different sort of war and the Bosnian conflict, what, 97.000 dead, was
22 definitely one of those sorts of war.
23 Q. And in that situation, once again based upon your experience, I
24 take it that there's a fair amount of, I used the word before, confusion,
25 but I'll use a different word which is there is a lack of clarity in
1 terms of how these wars are going to be waged. I'm not referring to the
2 rightness or the wrongness of it, but rather because we are dealing with
3 a series of factors that we heretofore have not dealt with before, that
4 internally there now are issues that have not been raised before, that we
5 are for the first time having to address?
6 A. I think that's a fair comment. The old cliche about the -- the
7 old phrase the fog of war comes to mind here, with another new element
8 that we haven't really had time to get into here which is the
9 dissemination of atrocity stories, whether true or false, and the
10 responsibility on the journalist not to go with secondhand information.
11 That is, I was again and again told about this or that atrocity and I
12 said, Show me, and they would say, No, sorry, the road is mined, we can't
13 take you. And I just -- I would never report it because that can do so
14 much damage and it did. People --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down.
16 THE WITNESS: People believing the worst of another ethnic group
17 and sometimes these prophecies become self-fulfilling, so I think that in
18 this new kind of war there is an added obligation on the journalists to
19 get their facts right and to be very, very careful.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH:
21 Q. And with regard to this war, if you were to give a grade to, I am
22 not asking for to you give a grade to yourself, but a grade to the
23 journalists that were involved in this new experience which had many
24 factors that had heretofore not been addressed, understanding that's the
25 case, do you think that they came up to the grade?
1 A. I think I'd give the best an Alpha minus because, you know, we
2 all make mistakes and some I wouldn't rate at all, honestly, sir.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I could have but a moment.
4 [Defence counsel confer]
5 MR. GUY-SMITH:
6 Q. I have to confer with those that know better than I do.
7 A. I know the feeling, sir.
8 Q. Thank you very much for your time, Mr. Bell. I really do
9 appreciate it and I'm once again thankful for your candour and your
10 thoughtfulness, and I mean that in a very sincere fashion.
11 A. I appreciate that. Thank you.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you Mr. Guy-Smith. Mr. Thomas.
13 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, sir, just briefly.
14 Re-examination by Mr. Thomas:
15 Q. Mr. Bell, you were asked a series of questions, in fact there was
16 a lot of discussion about the part that the media had to play in
17 depicting the war and also guiding the various decisions that were made
18 by the parties concerned. And you also spoke in your evidence about
19 meetings and access you had to political and military authorities
20 involved in the conflict. What I want to ask you is whether you got a
21 sense of whether those authorities were aware of the role that the media
22 might potentially play in this conflict?
23 A. Yes, I believe they were. They were very keen on getting their
24 point of view across in the world media. And there was another unusual
25 dimension to this, that if they were involved in sensitive negotiations
1 over a prisoner exchange or a body exchange, they would actually ask for
2 the international media to be present because they felt that in the
3 presence of television cameras from the outside world, it would make the
4 other party more likely to honour the obligations it had entered into.
5 So quite -- I think actually without intending to we may even have done a
6 little bit of good in that respect.
7 Q. Did you get a sense whether the political and military
8 authorities were themselves paying attention to what was being reported?
9 A. I think they were. The -- some of the military commanders would
10 actually have their own -- their own cameramen with them, it was part of
11 the old Yugoslav way and some of the most vivid pictures we received in
12 the whole war came from a young man who was the cameraman of
13 Colonel Ruskic [phoen] who was -- appeared before this court, so there
14 were many different sources.
15 Q. Was this a feature of what was happening at the end of the war or
16 was there -- this awareness of the power of the media, if you like,
17 from 1992?
18 A. I think by the time, by 1995 all parties to the conflict had
19 become acutely aware of the power of the media, and that is why we found
20 ourselves increasingly hemmed in and restricted as time went by.
21 Q. Are you able to give us your indication as somebody who was there
22 throughout the period as to a particular point in time where people
23 started realising the potential power of the media in this conflict?
24 A. I think it was probably after the ending of the side war between
25 Muslims and Croats which ended in February 1994, and then we faced a
1 war -- apparently a war without end between the Muslim Croat Federation
2 on one side and the Bosnian Serbs on the other. And as I became
3 increasingly aware of the weakness of the Bosnian Serbs in manpower, but
4 of course I couldn't -- by then I couldn't get -- have the personal touch
5 I had earlier, and I found that on the BiH side, the roadblocks were
6 going up all over the place.
7 Q. Mr. Bell, thank you. That's all I have for you. Their Honours
8 may have some questions for you.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I might, with the Chamber's indulgence and my
10 colleagues, I forgot to ask Mr. Bell one question. If I could be
11 permitted to do so. It does not cover anything that Mr. Thomas has just
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Thomas.
14 MR. THOMAS: I have no objection, Your Honour, provided if
15 there's any issue arising, I be afforded the same opportunity.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed. Mr. Guy-Smith.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you very much for the courtesy.
18 Further Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
19 Q. And I do apologise to you, I've been through your book so many
20 times and noted different things that I just forgot this. You said in
21 your book, and I'm going back to this one issue, this is on -- it's
22 page 114, which would be 13 of 1D 005556. I'm reading from the middle of
23 the paragraph:
24 "In this self-critical mode, I would ask myself when had we ever
25 shown a civilian victim of sniper fire on the Serb side of the lines,
1 when had we reported from their hospitals, when had we heard from the
2 Sarajevo Serbian news in Grbavica rather than Oslobodjenje" -- did I
3 pronounce it properly?
4 A. Oslobodjenje.
5 Q. "Oslobodjenje, the celebrated newspaper on the government side
6 which was an icon of journalism and a symbol of the city's ordeal."
7 And my question to you is with regard to the newspaper and the
8 government side, when did Oslobodjenje start becoming a newspaper on the
9 government side?
10 A. Well, it was Sarajevo
11 started the Serbs then published their own version of Oslobodjenje which
12 was actually edited by a friend of mine. So there were two rival
13 versions of Oslobodjenje.
14 Q. Okay. And with regard to the Oslobodjenje that you are refer to
15 here that is the Oslobodjenje of the ABiH side, to put it in those terms?
16 A. Yeah, it's headquarters were ruined, it was one of the iconic
17 images ever the war, the state of its headquarters. But I'm being
18 critical of my own profession there, but that's one of my failings, I
19 question a lot.
20 Q. I certainly find no fault in the work that you've done. I think
21 many that have seen what you've done find absolutely no fault in it
22 either, sir, and I thank you.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Thomas.
24 MR. THOMAS: Nothing, sir, thank you.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. We'll take a break and come
1 back at quarter to 6.00. Court adjourned
2 --- Recess taken at 5.14 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 5.45 p.m.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before we proceed, may the record show that we are
5 sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis during this session as Judge David had to
6 be absent for reasons beyond his control, and Judge Picard is sitting on
7 my left simply because her desk is -- she is locked in that side and her
8 papers are on that side.
9 You had finished. Do you have any questions for the witness?
10 Questioned by the Court:
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Bell, I've got just two questions for you.
12 The first one is: On which side of the war was Haris Silajdzic and what
13 was his position?
14 A. He was at that time the prime minister of the Republic of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so he was on the government side of the lines.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. And at page 61 of the
17 transcript, starting from line 1, you were asked a question that -- well,
18 it was put to you that "... amongst others we are dealing with a series
19 of factors that we heretofore have not dealt with," and you quickly
20 answered to say, "I think that's a fair comment." What factors are these
21 that you are dealing with at that time?
22 A. There are two that come to my mind immediately, Your Honour. One
23 is the power of the medium of the media and especially of television to
24 shape the response of governments, especially when they do not have a
25 settled policy. It's been described once as the CNN factor, I believe.
1 So this imposes an extra responsibility on the journalists involved.
2 And the other is the nature of the war, the -- that this was not
3 an old-fashioned war, although the weapons were old-fashioned, it was a
4 war among the people in which the suffering of civilians was so evident
5 that the suffering of civilians also to some extent shaped the world's
6 reactions and I think required governments to respond finally, although
7 they were very slow to do it in a way that they wouldn't have been
8 obliged to in a less media-driven age. I think that those are the new
9 elements, sir.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Any questions arising from
11 the questions by the Bench, Mr. Thomas.
12 MR. THOMAS: No sir, thank you.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: None, Your Honour. Thank you.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
16 Thank you very much, Mr. Bell. This concludes your testimony and
17 let me take the time to say thank you for taking the time off your busy
18 schedule to come and testify at the Tribunal. You are now excused. You
19 may stand down and please travel well back home.
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
22 [The witness withdrew]
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Thomas.
24 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. Ms. Bolton will lead the
25 next witness. That concludes my business before you, and that of
1 Mr. Cannata this afternoon, if we could please be excused.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: You are excused. Madam Bolton.
3 MS. BOLTON: Good evening, Your Honours. The next witness for
4 the Prosecution will be Mesud Jusufovic.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mesud Jusufovic.
6 MS. BOLTON: He is a 92 ter witness, Your Honour.
7 [The witness entered court]
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good afternoon, sir.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: May you please make the declaration.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
12 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
13 WITNESS: MESUD JUSUFOVIC
14 [Witness answered through interpreter]
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. You may be seated.
16 Yes, Madam Bolton
17 MS. BOLTON: Thank you.
18 Examination by Ms. Bolton:
19 Q. Sir, could you begin by stating your name for the record?
20 A. I am Mesud Jusufovic. 17th of February, 1960.
21 Q. Sir, I understand that on the 3rd of April, 2002, you had
22 occasion to testify in the matter of Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And yesterday you had occasion or the opportunity to listen to
25 the recording of your testimony, an audio recording of your testimony in
1 those proceedings; is that correct?
2 A. That's correct.
3 MS. BOLTON: Sorry. I think I had my headphones on the wrong
4 channel and I didn't hear the response to that.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: What channel are you on?
6 MS. BOLTON: Now I'm on channel 4, is that the correct channel?
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's the correct channel.
8 MS. BOLTON:
9 Q. Sorry, sir. And was the recording that you listened to yesterday
10 in a language that you understood?
11 A. Yes, it was in my language.
12 Q. And were the answers that you provided in that previous testimony
13 true and correct?
14 A. Yes. All of the answers were correct and true and I stand -- I
15 remain by that.
16 Q. If I asked you those same questions today, would you answer them
17 in the same manner?
18 A. Yes, I would give the same answers.
19 Q. I should point out one thing, and that is that when you were
20 questioned the last time, back in 2002, about your occupation, at that
21 time you were the commander of the professional fire brigade in Sarajevo
22 is that correct?
23 A. Yes, that's exactly so.
24 Q. And you've since been promoted?
25 A. Yes, within the last six months I became the civil defence
1 secretary within the canton of Sarajevo
2 Q. And with the exception, then, of that area of your testimony
3 being different, was the remainder of your testimony from 2002 still
5 A. Yes, correct.
6 MS. BOLTON: I wonder if, Madam Registrar, if you could please
7 bring up 65 ter 09412. Your Honours, that is an official transcript of
8 the audio recording that the witness listened to yesterday, and it has
9 been redacted to indicated the portions of the transcript that the
10 Prosecution is seeking to have filed pursuant to 92 ter and I would ask
11 that it be marked as an exhibit.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is admitted into evidence. And it may be so
13 marked, please.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P520.
15 MS. BOLTON: And with the Court's permission, Your Honours, I
16 have a few clarifying questions I'd like to ask and then a brief summary
17 of the witness's evidence I'd like to read.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Very few indeed, yes.
19 MS. BOLTON: Very few, yes.
20 Q. Sir, during your previous testimony in the Galic matter, you had
21 indicated that there were many buildings and monuments that were set
22 ablaze by Bosnian Serb army shells during the conflicts; is that correct,
24 A. Yes, that's correct.
25 MS. BOLTON: And, Madam Registrar, if you could bring up
1 65 ter 03061, please. There should also be an English translation of
2 that document.
3 Q. I'll ask the witness if you recognise the document that's in
4 front of you, sir?
5 A. Yes, I recognise it.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: The only thing being that there is no English
7 version on the screen.
8 MS. BOLTON: Okay. I have the ERN number, pardon me for a
10 [Prosecution counsel confer]
11 MS. BOLTON: I am informed that there's a problem in that the
12 English version doesn't seem to be appearing. If I could proceed with
13 the questioning of the witness, I think it will become quite clear what
14 the document is and perhaps we could find the English version at a later
15 point in time.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may proceed, ma'am.
17 MS. BOLTON: Thank you.
18 Q. Sir, do you know who authored this document?
19 A. This is the record that we have in our fire brigade on the
20 computer and when I needed this for the purposes of this court then we
21 just printed this list showing all facilities that had been shelled. I
22 think that I signed it, that my signature is on this document.
23 MS. BOLTON: If we could actually go to the third page of this
25 Q. Is that your signature, sir?
1 A. Yes, this is my signature.
2 Q. And in terms of the kind of facilities, there's 120 names listed
3 of facilities, did you include every single place in Sarajevo that there
4 was a fire at?
5 A. No, not all of the locations. Only the more important facilities
6 and locations that were shelled and set on fire.
7 Q. And what time-period does this document cover, sir?
8 A. This document pertains to the period from the 5th of April, 1992
9 until the 10th of August, 1994.
10 Q. And were there any fires as a result of shells at public
11 buildings that post-dated August 10th, 1994?
12 A. Naturally there were. Throughout the war civilian facilities
13 were shelled, especially cultural and historical monuments, as well as
14 buildings where people resided in large numbers.
15 MS. BOLTON: I wonder if this item could be marked as the next
16 Prosecution exhibit, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is admitted into evidence. May it please be so
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P521.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
21 MS. BOLTON:
22 Q. A few more questions, sir. One of the things you indicated in
23 the Galic proceeding was that there were approximately 67 Serbian members
24 of the fire brigade that left just prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
25 I'm wondering if you could tell me if they left of their own volition or
1 if they were terminated?
2 A. Based on my conversations with these people, because not all of
3 them had left, 67 firefighters of Serb ethnicity left whereas 10 of them
4 remained, they to me confirmed that they had a meeting with
5 Radovan Karadzic and that he had instructed them to leave Sarajevo, and
6 they simply didn't show up for work one day.
7 Q. Another issue that you discussed in your testimony, sir, was the
8 fact that there was a number of members of your brigade who were killed
9 or injured during the war, and I just wondered if you had a total count
10 of the number of firefighters who were killed during the conflict?
11 A. During the conflict 12 firefighters were killed and 58 of them
12 were wounded.
13 Q. And of the 12 that were killed, how many were killed while on
15 A. Three were killed on duty. Two while putting out fires, and one
16 was killed while he was repairing the fire engine within our
18 Q. And for those three people, what was the cause of death?
19 A. The cause of death was a shell. If you wish, I can give more
21 Q. We'll just deal with the total numbers for now, sir.
22 Turning to the people who were wounded, how many of those
23 firefighters were wounded in the course of duty?
24 A. Thirty-eight were killed while on duty.
25 Q. Sorry, you just said killed, I thought we were talking about
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: At least that is what the interpretation said.
3 MS. BOLTON: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I didn't hear your comment.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: At least that is what the interpretation came
5 across as. I don't know whether the witness had said killed, but the
6 interpretation said killed.
7 MS. BOLTON:
8 Q. My friend is shaking his head and I think it was an
9 interpretation error, that you actually said wounded, and I just want to
10 clarify. We are talking about people who were wounded, not killed;
12 A. I said wounded.
13 Q. So 38 of the 58 were wounded on duty; is that correct?
14 A. That's right. Out of those 38, there are those who had been
15 wounded on a number of occasions. I, for example, was wounded twice.
16 Q. And with respect to those 38 including yourself, what were the
17 causes of the wounds?
18 A. The cause of the wounds were always the shells. When we went out
19 to put out fires, they would increase the shelling of the area where we
20 were putting out fires. In Sarajevo
21 when there was a location on fire. All the citizens fled from there
22 because they knew that the people from the hills would fire at the
23 firefighters, and that this is why it was so dangerous.
24 Q. What do you mean by people from the hills?
25 A. I'm referring to the Serbian army.
1 Q. And to the best of your knowledge, were any of those
2 38 firefighters who were injured while on duty acting in a military
3 capacity at the time?
4 A. No. Within the fire brigade there were no members of the army.
5 There couldn't have been any because we worked almost continuously. Most
6 of the firefighters remained within the fire brigade because it was a
7 major problem to come to work and to go home from work without falling
8 casualty to shelling. That is to say, that none of the firefighters were
9 members of the army.
10 Q. The last thing I want to ask you about, sir, is in your previous
11 testimony you spoke about attending fires in hundreds of buildings and
12 you told the Court in those proceedings that with the exception of
13 responding to fires at the Tito barracks, where UNPROFOR soldiers were
14 stationed, that you saw no evidence of any of these buildings being used
15 for military purposes. And I want to clarify whether you personally
16 attended all of the fires you are talking about?
17 A. I couldn't have been at all fires. It was physically impossible.
18 There were situations where there were 15 fires simultaneously at
19 different places. Mostly fires were set up by incendiary rounds, mostly
20 in areas where there were monuments or where people resided. If people
21 had nowhere to reside, they had to leave Sarajevo. That is to say, that
22 all of those were civilian facilities.
23 Q. So in cases where you couldn't personally attend the fires,
24 what's the source of your information that these weren't military
1 A. Out of the firefighters -- or, rather, from the firefighters who
2 went out to work, we would get reports. It is possible that sometimes
3 there were some military facilities because we firefighters do not pay
4 attention to what is on fire. We go out to put out fires. I, myself,
5 always went only to fires where there were civilian facilities burning.
6 Q. Just with respect to the list that you have already identified
7 for us, Prosecution Exhibit 520, were you aware of any of those
8 facilities being used -- sorry, 521. Were you aware of any of those
9 facilities being used for military purposes at the time of the shellings?
10 A. Based on what I know, no. I came to the fire brigade about the
11 20th of June, 1992. From that time on, I don't know of any cases.
12 MS. BOLTON: At this juncture, with the Court's permission, I'd
13 just like to read a brief summary of this witness's testimony.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, you may, ma'am.
15 MS. BOLTON: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 In 1992, Mr. Jusufovic was the third highest ranking member of
17 the Sarajevo
18 Radomir Spaic who was a Serbian gentleman. Commencing in early 1992,
19 Mr. Spaic ordered the transfer of much of the forces equipment to Pale,
20 which was an area controlled by Bosnian Serbs. That included the
21 transfer of fire trucks, radio equipment, fuel, as well as other
23 By the time the shelling of Sarajevo commenced in April 1992, the
1 In addition, there were 67 Serbian members of the fire brigade
2 who left the force just prior to the outbreak of the hostilities, taking
3 additional equipment with them.
4 The VRS forces used both ordinary shells and incendiary shells
5 containing phosphorus. Even non-incendiary shells often sparked fires.
6 Fires were a daily occurrence and the firefighters were constantly busy.
7 The VRS targeted all kinds of buildings in Sarajevo including apartment
8 buildings, schools and hospitals, as well as food and waterlines.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Slow down, please. The stenographer can't keep
10 pace with you.
11 MS. BOLTON: Certainly.
12 Immediately prior to shelling a monument or building, the VRS
13 would typically shell the fire stations. And the witness presumes that
14 the VRS was endeavouring to prevent the fire brigade from responding to
15 the fire. Firefighters were routinely fired at by snipers and targeted
16 by shells, both while they were en route to fires and while they were
17 fighting fires.
18 To avoid being hit by shells or snipers, members of the fire
19 brigade learned to park their vehicles in locations where they would be
20 sheltered from incoming explosives. They learned not to enter buildings
21 through the doors, but instead to make holes in the walls and enter the
22 buildings through those holes.
23 They learned to crawl by windows inside the building to avoid
24 sniper fire. And despite these tactics, many fire fighters were wounded
25 and some were killed by shells, grenades, and sniper fire.
1 The brigade's ability to fight fire was compromised by the fact
2 that the VRS controlled the electrical and water supplies. Frequently
3 the only source of water was the well at the brewery, and fire trucks
4 came under fire whenever they attended the brewery to refill their tanks.
5 The professional brigade was assisted by volunteers, both the
6 professional brigade and the volunteer societies were civilian
7 organisations, neither had ties to the army or police.
8 The brigade responded to fires in hundreds of buildings during
9 the conflict, and the witness did not personally see nor did he hear of
10 evidence that any of the buildings, with the exception of the Tito
11 barracks, were being used for military purposes at the time.
12 Those are all of my questions, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before you sit down, ma'am, in your reading of
14 that statement, at the beginning you said at page 76, line 6:
15 "Commencing in early 1992, Mr. Spaic ordered the transfer of much
16 of the force's equipment to Pale."
17 Which force is this?
18 MS. BOLTON: This is the Sarajevo
19 transferred to Pale area.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Is that you, Mr. Lukic?
21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
22 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:
23 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Jusufovic.
24 A. Good afternoon.
25 Q. My name is Novak Lukic, I will be putting questions to you on
1 behalf of the Defence team of Mr. Perisic. You have experience in
2 testifying before this Tribunal and you know that you need to wait -- I'm
3 actually here to remind you that you need to wait after my question. You
4 see, I'm being reprimanded by the Presiding Judge already, so please try
5 to answer my questions slowly so that the transcript can be accurate, and
6 interpretation as well.
7 When the war started, and you said that that was sometime in
8 April of 1992, you lived in Vratnik, and this is where you were based
9 throughout the war. That's where you lived; correct?
10 A. Yes, correct.
11 Q. At that time you and a group of citizens residing there organised
12 yourselves within one month and you set up barricades and checkpoints in
13 that neighbourhood in the area where you lived; correct?
14 A. No, we did not set up barricades, we dug out trenches near the
15 barracks in Vratnik.
16 Q. You were the commander in that location?
17 A. If one may call the leader of 30 to 40 people a commander, in
18 that case, yes.
19 Q. And how was it that you became the commander? Who appointed you
20 to that post?
21 A. On the 5th of April, the shelling started and people started
22 fleeing to their homes. Most of them came to the culture hall and those
23 who were present concluded that we had to defend our families, our
24 children, our wives because we had the previous experience in Croatia
25 and it was then that we decided that we had to organise ourselves to
1 defend Vratnik, and there were 20 to 30 of us there and the people said
2 that I should be the one leading the effort.
3 Q. And what were you doing at that time? What was your occupation?
4 Were you already working as a firefighter then or not?
5 A. I've been a firefighter since 1983.
6 Q. As far as I remember, for awhile you were a taxi-driver?
7 A. From 1980 until 1986 I was a taxi-driver.
8 Q. In Sarajevo
9 A. Yes, in Sarajevo
10 to this day.
11 Q. Would you agree with me that already in March of 1992 barricades
12 were set up and checkpoints throughout Sarajevo both by the members of
13 the SDS
14 A. In March there were barricades, I know of them because my wife
15 used to work in Grbavica and she couldn't go to her office. But I don't
16 know that the SDA set up any barricades. I know only of the Serbian
18 Q. So you don't know that the SDA members set up any barricades?
19 A. I don't know about that.
20 Q. Would you agree with me that the army of BH was set up in
21 April of 1992 on the basis of the decision of the presidency of BH?
22 A. It is possible that there was a decision of the presidency, but
23 there was no army at the time. There were only the units in existence,
24 such as the unit that I was a member of.
25 Q. And when did you become aware or, rather, when do you consider
1 that the BH Army was set up and that it existed in Sarajevo?
2 A. I think that the Territorial Defence, not yet the army at the
3 time, but the Territorial Defence was set up sometime in late May or
4 early June, as far as I can remember, because this is when I joined the
5 fire brigade.
6 Q. Do you know what happened when you joined the fire brigade, when
7 you rejoined the fire brigade, if I may refer to it so, what happened
8 with your neighbours who also organised themselves, those 30 to 40 men,
9 did they join the army?
10 A. When the mobilisation order was issued, everyone had to be
11 assigned to some unit. Most of these men were in the Territorial Defence
12 which later became the BH Army.
13 Q. Do you know if the presidency of the Bosnia-Herzegovina had
14 declared a state of war?
15 A. I really don't know that.
16 Q. Are you aware that all men of military age had to be mobilised
17 into some kind of unit or a work detail?
18 A. Yes. Everyone had to be in some kind of unit, either in civilian
19 protection or the army or the Territorial Defence, or the police.
20 Q. Do you agree with me that the forces which were loyal to the
21 BH presidency in spring of 1992 took over the strategic vital facilities
22 in Sarajevo
23 A. I don't know that BH Army members took up some positions. I know
24 that before April the Yugoslav People's Army was busy digging in the
25 tanks and building up positions around Sarajevo. This we could see on
1 TV. And when people ask what this was, Kukanjac explained -- or, rather,
2 I'm not sure if it was Kukanjac or someone else, but somebody said that
3 they were protecting these positions from an external enemy. And then
4 later on, they used this as positions from which they shelled Sarajevo
5 Q. In your evidence in the Galic case, on page 6522, line 9, you
6 said, and this was redacted later or, rather, it was changed, altered, it
7 did not enter into this portion of the transcript, so I'd like to refresh
8 your memory. Line 9, I will read this in English, you said:
9 "[In English] [Previous translation continues] ... who had left
10 they have also shelled us and they have also shelled our fire station."
11 [Interpretation] And then after this, in answer to Judge Orie's
12 question, on page 6524, line 25, you said that you meant that they
13 actually joined and fought as members of the Serbian army but not that
14 they specifically shelled you.
15 A. Yes, I think what I meant was that they had joined the Serbian
16 side, but the reason why I thought they were shelling us was because they
17 would advise us in advance. They would tell us -- they would call the
18 station and say, Now your -- a shell is coming your way, and then they
19 would announce, Five more shells are going to land on your station.
20 Q. Well, but in any case from what you've said here and the portion
21 that you've corrected, there is no reason for to you believe that they
22 were personally trying to shell you?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could you tell us, were all the hills -- were all the positions
25 on the hills around Sarajevo
1 A. Well, I don't know many of these positions, but I know that
2 members of the BH Army were on Trebevic, on Brijeg, then I think on
3 Spicasta Stijena.
4 Q. Well, let me be more specific, do you know who held the Zuc hill?
5 A. I think the Zuc hill was held by the BH Army.
6 Q. What about Mount Igman
7 A. Mount Igman
8 movements there of the army. There was the BH Army and then the Serbian
10 Q. Do you know whether the BH Army had mortars?
11 A. While I was there, we didn't have anything. We would observe
12 from Lapusnica them shelling us, this was from about 800 metres, and we
13 would just lie there because there was nothing we could shell them with
14 or there was nothing we could shoot and reach them.
15 Q. Just a moment, so when you say "when I was there," you mean when
16 you organised yourself, but what I'm referring to is the period while you
17 were a fireman, a firefighter. Up until the Dayton Accords, since you
18 were in contact with many people and were -- attended many events, do you
19 know or did you hear that the BH Army had mortars on the Sarajevo
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, Madam Bolton.
22 MS. BOLTON: Thank you. Sorry. My friend began that question by
23 assuming that in fact the witness was talking about the period of time
24 when he was in the, I guess, neighbourhood defence and I think he should
25 actually put that question to him. I don't know if that is what he's
1 talking about or isn't, but I think the witness needs to clarify that,
2 and my friend not to just assume that is the period of time he is talking
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Isn't that for you to clarify that in
6 MS. BOLTON: It's simply that I understood from the guide-lines
7 that we were supposed to be asking succinct, sort of one question at a
8 time and then moving on, so that was the basis for my objection. I can
9 clarify it otherwise, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: I suggest you do so.
11 MS. BOLTON: Okay. Thank you.
12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I think the witness understood me and
13 the portion where he was describing this particular time he was even
14 nodding, so I didn't feel it was necessary to explain what period this
15 was referring to. But let me go back to my question.
16 Q. Can you remember throughout the war period, did you have any
17 information that the BH Army had some mortars in the Sarajevo theatre of
19 A. Well, I cannot claim this with any certainty because I had no
20 ties with the army because we were continuously busy putting out fires,
21 so I really don't know. We were -- it's possible during the war that
22 they acquired them, but I'm not sure.
23 Q. Did you hear stories or see evidence that the BH Army had
24 long-barrel weapons as well?
25 A. I did not see this myself. I don't know.
1 Q. Did you ever hear of stories of this?
2 A. I did not.
3 Q. Would you agree with me that during the war in Sarajevo there
4 were some 35.000 members of the BH Army in Sarajevo and about as many
5 around Sarajevo
6 A. I really don't know what the figures were, but it's possible that
7 there were as many.
8 Q. You say that you did not have any contact with the army. As
9 firefighters, you belong to the civilian protection, if I understand you
10 correctly, is this correct, the professional fire brigade?
11 A. The professional fire brigade and all the volunteer firefighters,
12 and there were five such societies in the town, they were under civilian
13 protection and they were units of the civilian protection.
14 Q. Did you have meetings with your superiors from the civilian
16 A. On several occasions I did.
17 Q. Did you have some official meetings with police members?
18 A. I think no.
19 Q. To be more precise, was there at any point in time during the war
20 did you have any kind of meetings with the BH Army representatives?
21 A. No, I did not have any meetings with BH Army members. We only
22 had meetings in the town hall where we were invited to come to meetings
23 by the mayor.
24 Q. Can you recall if there were any army representatives there, any
25 army members there?
1 A. If my memory serves me, no, because the army was not really into
2 the civilian administration. They didn't really care for this.
3 Q. On page 6533, in line 7, among the sites that were shelled, you
4 also mention the Holiday Inn. You say that it was a very attractive
5 target, and you also say on the same page, in line 23, that you had to
6 attend or respond to fire calls from that position over 500 times, that's
7 at least what you said, up until the summer of 1994. Can you please
8 answer the question?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. The Holiday Inn was open as a hotel throughout the war; correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. The 500 fires until the summer of 1995 were so bad that -- and
13 you were so successful in putting out those fires that the hotel remained
14 open throughout the period?
15 A. That's correct, because we would be there on time. We were on
16 the spot to put out the fires.
17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] All right. I would now like to show
18 you Exhibit 521. Could we please pull it up on the screen.
19 Q. First I'd like to ask you something about this document. You
20 just mentioned that you printed this out from your database of the
21 records that were kept for that period. My question is this: First of
22 all to say what the title of this document is, Fires on High Profile
23 Facilities. Could you please tell us what do you understand to mean --
24 or what do you understand is meant by high profile facilities? What was
25 the criterion?
1 A. Well, it was a facility where a lot of people lived or important
2 cultural and historic monuments, significant for our people's history and
4 Q. Would you please leaf through all these three pages and tell us
5 whether these facilities are -- whether most of them are public
6 buildings, not residential buildings.
7 A. From what I can see here there are no apartment buildings, no
8 residential buildings.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now see the last page,
12 Q. I will now put some questions about some of these individual
14 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 1 again.
15 Q. Under 3, it says the MUP motel. MUP stands for the Ministry of
16 the Interior; correct? That's a police facility; correct?
17 A. Yes, MUP means the Ministry of the Interior.
18 Q. And that was a police facility?
19 A. No, that was a hotel owned by the MUP.
20 Q. All right. Under 4, it says, MUP, the Vraca facility. Could you
21 tell us what this is?
22 A. This is the police academy where -- police academy with cadets,
23 so there was an attack on this school and a fire there. These cadets
24 were young people between the ages of 14 and 19.
25 Q. And this was in early 1992, in the beginning of the conflict,
1 right, on the 10th of April?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Under 18, we see it says, Magros Wholesaler Point. Is this a
4 commercial facility?
5 A. Magros is a company. It is a commercial company.
6 Q. Under 38, we see a Magros store. That is another commercial
7 facility; correct?
8 A. Yes, they sold food there.
9 Q. Under 27, I see that you mention the Holiday Inn on the 24th of
10 May, 1992, and there is no further mention of the Holiday Inn 500 fires
11 on this list. What is the reason?
12 A. The mention that was made here on the 24th of May, 1992, was
13 because we actually went to the hotel from the fire brigade premises
14 because we did not have a unit on the premises of the hotel itself. But
15 because it was impossible to get to this hotel across Marin Dvor because
16 it was being shelled all the time, we set up a unit in the basement of
17 the Holiday Inn and we had fire hoses all around the hotel so that the
18 fires were put out by the men who were stationed on the premises of the
19 Holiday Inn. And that is why there is no further mention of it on this
21 Q. Were these other fires also recorded in your database?
22 A. No, they weren't. They were only logged in a log-book by the
23 duty officers because we would respond -- we would record an intervention
24 when a vehicle left our premises.
25 Q. So what is listed here are the fire events or fire incidents
1 where you actually had to send fire trucks from the station?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. And for those about 500 Holiday Inn fires, you have no records at
4 your police -- at your fire station whatsoever?
5 A. No, we don't.
6 Q. Under 62, on the next page, the word "barracks" appears. Is this
7 is civilian facility?
8 A. It doesn't mention here which barracks it is. It saysVojvoda
9 Putnika Street
10 barracks where the UNPROFOR soldiers were stationed.
11 Q. On the 21st of August, 1992, do you remember that? Based on the
12 date, do you remember when that fire was?
13 A. No, I don't remember.
14 Q. Under number 73, we see the word "cold storage depot" and the
15 "slaughter-house." Can you explain what that was, the cold storage
16 depot, please?
17 A. In a part of the town called Stup there is a cold storage depot
18 and a slaughter-house. They slaughter cattle there.
19 Q. Do you remember how tall that building is, how many storeys?
20 A. No, I don't remember. People from the fire station in Stup went
21 out to put that fire, I didn't go myself.
22 Q. Another question related to that facility: Was the separation
23 line close to that facility, close to the cold storage depot?
24 A. Yes, the combat line was close. And I just realised on the
25 28th -- this happened on the 28th, I was wounded then and I wasn't able
1 to walk, I had to use crutches so I couldn't go out to respond to that
3 Q. Can you tell me please what is written under 76, it says OS
4 Skenderija. What was located in those premises? OS, what does OS stand
5 for, please?
6 A. I don't know. I have no idea what it could mean.
7 Q. Could it be that the TO staff was located in Skenderija? Do you
9 A. Well, Skenderija is quite a large area. I live now in
10 Skenderija. I don't know where the staff was located. The staffs had to
11 be located somewhere, the headquarters and where they were located in
12 Skenderija area I couldn't say.
13 Q. At any rate, Skenderija was not a residential building, was it?
14 A. No. As we have already said, there is no residential buildings
15 in this list.
16 Q. I'm now interested in the location under 85, it is also mentioned
17 under 97. What is this location called Zica?
18 A. That's a factory manufacturing wire.
19 Q. Do you know where the premises of Zica are located? It says here
20 Dzemala Bijedica Street. What area of Sarajevo
21 A. I think that that is in the area of Ali Pasin Most because we
22 have a firefighters association there called Ali Pasin Most.
23 Q. Very well.
24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Now could we have, please, a copy of
25 the map 9244 under Rule 65 ter, please.
1 Q. Mr. Jusufovic, given what your profession was and that you were a
2 taxi-driver, I will expect you will orient yourself on the map of
4 map in just a minute, please.
5 Can you recognise Sarajevo
6 A. Yes, I'm familiar with this area in Milicka where the tram rails
8 Q. Could I ask the usher please, when I asked you about the Zica
9 factory, could you now please draw a cross and a number 1 on the spot
10 where this Zica factory was located?
11 A. I really can't find it, I know where Bascarsija is.
12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in. If not,
13 then I will try with a different map.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this doesn't have to be
15 accurate, but I think it was somewhere here around this bridge because I
16 see that it says here Ali Pasin Most, or Ali Pasin Bridge
17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Could you please put a cross there and number 1.
19 A. [Marks]
20 Q. Can you say approximately where the cold storage depot was? Can
21 you draw the location on the map. It doesn't have to be very accurate,
22 but just the general area.
23 A. Near Stup, in this area where Stup is.
24 Q. Could you please put number 2 next to it?
25 A. [Marks]
1 Q. Now, I asked you about the Magros facility, do you know where
2 that is located?
3 A. No.
4 Q. What about kindergarten Osmi Mart nearCengic Vila
5 approximately where that kindergarten is located?
6 A. I don't know where the kindergarten building is but I can see the
7 area called Cengic Vila on the map.
8 Q. Could you put number 3 next to it, please.
9 A. [Marks]
10 Q. Have you heard of the elementary school Petar Jokic? And if you
11 know it's approximate location, it would be useful.
12 A. I have heard of it. I believe that such a school exists but I
13 have no idea where it's located.
14 Q. What about the school called Pavle Goranin, you were asked this
15 in the previous trial where you testified?
16 A. I really don't know.
17 Q. What about elementary school Slobodan Vukovic?
18 A. Have you any idea how many elementary schools there are in
20 Q. Well, I'm asking you about specific ones.
21 A. I don't know.
22 Q. All right.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I now tender this map into evidence,
24 Your Honours.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: The map is admitted. May it please be given an
1 exhibit number.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D40.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Jusufovic, would you agree with me that throughout the war
6 the schools were not open in Sarajevo
8 A. Yes, that's correct. I don't know when that started, but after a
9 certain period of time, the people simply didn't send their children to
10 school any more because it was dangerous for them.
11 Q. Would you agree with me that during the war there were huge
12 problems with electricity supply in Sarajevo?
13 A. Yes, I agree with you. More often we did not have electricity
14 than the opposite.
15 Q. There were certain rules about the priorities, who had priority
16 in electrical supply, and who set up those rules, was it a ministry or
17 some other relevant state bodies?
18 A. Most likely that was so. We were never considered a priority.
19 We, the fire brigade, had a generator for power supply.
20 Q. Would you agree with me that the hospitals were a priority as
21 well as the army?
22 A. Most likely it was so.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now have on our screens
24 1D 005592, please.
25 Q. Mr. Jusufovic, I suppose that you are not familiar with this
1 document and I will put a couple of questions to you regarding this
2 document. It says here to the command of the 102nd Motorised Brigade or,
3 rather, the command of the 102nd Motorised Brigade and it is from the
4 first six months of 1993, because the date is illegible. And then it
5 says that the subject is priority and it was sent to the command of the
6 1st Corps.
7 My question to you is this: Do you know that in the compound of
8 the Zica factory where you went out to put out fires, that the command of
9 the 102nd Motorised Brigade of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was located
11 A. I'm not familiar with that because sometimes you had a facility
12 that during one period of time was used for one purpose, and then later
13 on for a different purpose. At any rate, when we went out there to put
14 out fires, there was no army there.
15 Q. Would you agree with me, I'm now asking you as a professional,
16 you are now a commander within the civilian protection, so I'm asking you
17 that capacity, if the army wants to use a civilian facility, then it is
18 not a good idea to announce to everybody that the army wants to use that
20 A. To tell you the truth, I never studied any military matters. I
21 have nothing to do with the army and I don't know how they decide what is
22 secret and what is not.
23 Q. Very well. I'm asking you as an official of civilian protection,
24 I'm asking you in that capacity.
25 A. We in civilian protection have no secrets. We keep no secrets.
1 Q. Now, tell me please, given that you went to certain locations
2 where there were fires, including the fires listed here, do you know that
3 within residential buildings there were also military units and military
4 facilities located in those areas?
5 A. I didn't see that.
6 Q. But you heard that in the building where the Loris company was
7 located, and that was a building of mixed use, residential and
8 commercial, that there were members of the BH Army on the ground floor?
9 A. Well, the Loris building is some 150 to 200 metres long and it
10 has several entryways and that building is located on the frontline, and
11 people lived there. So we would come to the residential portion of that
12 building and it was the upper floors that were mostly at risk. And you
13 were quite correct, and I stated this last time, I think, that I knew
14 that somewhere within that building there was also a portion used by the
16 Q. When you say somewhere, you mean somewhere within that Loris
18 A. Yes, that's correct, because the Loris facility comprises some
19 20 buildings.
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can we please tender
21 this document into evidence.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
23 please be given an exhibit number.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D41.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Lukic please come closer to the
2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I'm trying to conclude as soon as
3 possible so I'm imposing an unreasonable pace on myself. Now could we
4 see 1D 005591, please.
5 Q. We only managed to find the draft translation of this document,
6 we found it on EDS
7 heading, it says that this is the document of the command of the
8 102nd Motorised Brigade. I think the date is the 14th of September,
9 1993. I will read out only the first portion, this is an order. I'm
10 hereby ordering the Hladnjaca cold storage facility shall be exclusively
11 used for sniper nests as an observation post and VP of certain resources.
12 This was signed by the commander. And let me ask you this now: Do you
13 know that the BH Army had snipers?
14 A. I don't know about that, but I think that every army has them.
15 Q. When it comes to this facility, the cold storage facility
16 Hladnjaca it is located relatively close to the frontline; correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document into
19 evidence as well, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Admitted into evidence. May it please be given an
21 exhibit number.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D42.
23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I have concluded with my
24 cross-examination. Thank you, Mr. Jusufovic.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You are welcome.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Madam Bolton, do you have any
3 MS. BOLTON: I do, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: How long will it take?
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
6 MS. BOLTON: Sorry. I would hope 5 to 10 minutes.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: I would hate to impose on the interpreters and the
8 rest of the staff so maybe we might as well take an adjournment until
10 MS. BOLTON: I'm in the Court's hands, yes.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll be -- we are back in courtroom II at quarter
12 past 2.00 in the afternoon. Court adjourned.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.
14 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 5th day of
15 February, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.