1 Wednesday, 20 May 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning to everybody in and around the
7 Madam Registrar, will you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning
9 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-81-T,
10 The Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
12 Could we have the appearances for the day, starting with the
14 MR. SAXON: Good morning, Your Honours. Dan Saxon, April Carter,
15 and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
17 And for the Defence.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Good morning, Your Honour. For the Defence,
19 Eric Tully, Vera Manuello, who is a new intern who has requested that she
20 get to come to court and see what goes on in court; Milos Androvic,
21 Deirdre Montgomery, who is one of our legal assistants who has recently
22 taken and passed the bar, and we congratulate her. Tina Drolec,
23 Daniela Tasic, Chad Mair, Novak Lukic, and I'm Gregor Guy-Smith on behalf
24 of Mr. Perisic.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.
1 Yes, Mr. Saxon.
2 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, the Prosecution calls Sir General
3 Rupert Smith.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
5 MR. SAXON: He will be testifying pursuant to Rule 92 ter.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
7 [The witness entered court]
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning, sir.
9 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Will you please make the declaration.
11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. You may be seated.
14 Mr. Saxon.
15 MR. SAXON: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 WITNESS: RUPERT SMITH
17 Examination by Mr. Saxon:
18 Q. Sir, is your name Sir General Rupert Smith?
19 A. Yes, it is.
20 Q. Are you a citizen of the United Kingdom?
21 A. Yes, I am.
22 Q. Sir Rupert, did you provide a statement to an investigator of the
23 Office of the Prosecutor on 14 August 1996
24 A. Yes, I did.
25 Q. And during the past weeks, have you had the opportunity to review
1 that statement?
2 A. Yes, I have.
3 Q. Does that statement, from 1996, accurately reflect what you said
4 at that time?
5 A. Yes, it does.
6 Q. And if you were examined today on the same questions, would your
7 answers be the same?
8 A. Yes.
9 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, at this point, I would tender what is
10 65 ter 9460, a redacted version of the witness statement from 1996.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: 9460 is admitted into evidence. May it please be
12 given an exhibit number.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P2348.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
15 MR. SAXON:
16 Q. And Sir Rupert, before I go on, I should remind both of us. We
17 both speak the same language and to be kind to the interpreters we should
18 both try to pause briefly between questions and answers. We'll both try
19 to do that, please.
20 A. Okay.
21 Q. Sir Rupert, do you recall testifying before this Tribunal in the
22 trial of Slobodan Milosevic, on the 9th of October, 2003?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. During the past weeks, have you had the opportunity to review the
25 transcript of that testimony and related exhibits?
1 A. Yes, I have.
2 Q. And does the transcript of your testimony from October 2003
3 accurately reflect what you said at that time?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And if you were asked the same questions today, would your
6 answers be the same?
7 A. Yes.
8 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, at this time I would tender
9 65 ter 9461.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted. May it please be given
11 an exhibit number.
12 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2349, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
14 MR. SAXON: And I would also, Your Honour, seek to tender seven
15 related exhibits, and I will say them one by one. 65 ter 5777.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
17 exhibit number.
18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2350, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
20 MR. SAXON: 65 ter 5778.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mm-hm. It's admitted.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P2351.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
24 MR. SAXON: 65 ter 5779.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
1 exhibit number.
2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2352.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
4 MR. SAXON: 65 ter 5780.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
6 exhibit number.
7 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2353, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
9 MR. SAXON: 65 ter 5781.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
11 exhibit number.
12 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2354, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
14 MR. SAXON: 65 ter 5782.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
16 exhibit number.
17 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2355, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
19 MR. SAXON: 65 ter 5765.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
21 exhibit number.
22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2356, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
24 MR. SAXON:
25 Q. Sir Rupert, do you recall testifying before this Tribunal in the
1 trial of Dragomir Milosevic, on the 7th of March, 2007?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. During the past weeks, have you had the opportunity to review the
4 transcript of that testimony and related exhibits?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And does the transcript of that testimony from March 2007
7 accurately reflect what you said at that time?
8 A. Yes, it does.
9 Q. And if you were asked the same questions today, would your
10 answers be the same?
11 A. Yes.
12 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I would seek to tender 65 ter 9467.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
14 exhibit number.
15 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2357, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
17 MR. SAXON: And, Your Honour, there are three related exhibits
18 that I will ask to be admitted into evidence.
19 The first one is 65 ter 8610.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
21 exhibit number.
22 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2358, Your Honours.
23 MR. SAXON: The next document, Your Honour, is 65 ter 8609.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted too. May it also please be given
25 an exhibit number.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2359, Your Honours.
2 MR. SAXON: The next document, Your Honour, is 65 ter 5784.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
4 exhibit number.
5 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2360, Your Honours.
6 Q. Sir Rupert, do you recall testifying before this Tribunal in the
7 trial of Mr. Popovic et al. on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of November, 2007?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 Q. And during the past weeks, have you had the opportunity to review
10 the transcripts of that testimony and related exhibits?
11 A. Yes, I have.
12 Q. And do the transcripts of your testimony from November 2007
13 accurately reflect what you said at that time?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And if you were asked the same questions today, would your
16 answers be the same?
17 A. Yes.
18 MR. SAXON: Your Honours, first I would seek to tender
19 65 ter 9462, which is the redacted version of Sir Rupert's transcript
20 from 5 November 2007
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
22 exhibit number.
23 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2361, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
25 MR. SAXON: Next I would seek to tender what is 65 ter 9463,
1 which is redacted transcript of Sir Rupert's testimony on the 6th of
2 November, 2007
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
4 exhibit number.
5 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2362, Your Honours.
6 MR. SAXON: And I would seek to tender 65 ter 9464, redacted
7 version of Sir Rupert's testimony from the 7th November 2007.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's also admitted. May it please be given an
9 exhibit number.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2363, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
12 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, there are seven associated exhibits to
13 these transcripts, and I would seek to tender 65 ter 5769.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: 5769, that's admitted. May it please be given an
15 exhibit number.
16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2364, Your Honours.
17 MR. SAXON: I would seek to tender P5770 -- excuse me, 65 ter
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
20 exhibit number.
21 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2365, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
23 MR. SAXON: I would seek to tender 65 ter 5771.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
25 exhibit number.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2366, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
3 MR. SAXON: I would seek to admit, Your Honour, 65 ter 5772.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
5 exhibit number.
6 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2367, Your Honours.
7 MR. SAXON: I would seek to tender, Your Honour, 65 ter 5785.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
9 exhibit number.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2368, Your Honours.
11 MR. SAXON: I would seek to tender 65 ter 5775.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
13 exhibit number.
14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2369, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
16 MR. SAXON: And I would seek to tender 65 ter 5774.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
18 exhibit number.
19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2370, Your Honours.
20 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, may I have the Chamber's permission,
21 please, to read a brief summary of Sir Rupert's evidence.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: You do.
23 MR. SAXON: Sir General Rupert Smith served in the army of the
24 United Kingdom for 34 years. From 23 January 1995 through
25 20 December 1995
1 protection force or UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Every morning
2 General Smith was briefed about the military and political events that
3 occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the previous 24 hours. In
4 addition to Rupert Smith's immediate staff, members of the UNHCR, the
5 ICRC, and other agencies present in Sarajevo participated in these
6 meetings. Every afternoon a second smaller meeting occurred, comprised
7 of General Smith, and his headquarter staff where the events of that
8 day --
9 The Court's indulgence, please.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: You have the indulgence, sir.
11 MR. SAXON: Where the events of that day or other more long-term
12 inquiries were discussed. General Smith also visited his sector
13 headquarters as frequently as he could, and also exchanged information
14 with journalists.
15 In addition, during his tenure, General Smith met and/or had
16 telephone conversations with military and political leaders of the
17 Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs as well as leaders of the federal
18 republic of Yugoslavia
19 Mladic, Radovan Karadzic, and Slobodan Milosevic. One of General Smith's
20 priorities was the resolution of difficulties in implementing the
21 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, or COHA entered into between the
22 belligerent parties. General Smith's evidence and related documents
23 describe a number of these discussions, the activities of UNPROFOR and
24 NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1995, and in particular, the
25 efforts of UNPROFOR to deliver humanitarian aide, the use of NATO air
1 power in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, and how members of the army of
2 Republika Srpska took members of UNPROFOR hostage during the spring of
4 General Smith' evidence and associated documents discuss the
5 shelling and sniping of civilians in the city of Sarajevo, and, in
6 particular, the results of the UNPROFOR's investigation into the incident
7 referred to as Markale II, which is Shelling Incident 9 in Schedule A to
8 the indictment.
9 General Smith's evidence describes efforts by the army of the
10 Republika Srpska starting in late February or March 1995 to put pressure
11 on the eastern enclaves or safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
12 including Srebrenica.
13 General Smith's evidence and associated documents also describe
14 the events in Srebrenica that occurred during July 1995 and UNPROFOR's
16 General Smith's evidence and associated documents also describe a
17 meeting which General Smith attended in Belgrade on 15 July 1995 with,
18 inter alia, Slobodan Milosevic, Ratko Mladic, Carl Bildt,
19 Thorvald Stoltenberg, and Yasushi Akashi and discussions at that meeting
20 about Srebrenica. It was agreed by all the participants that the
21 presence of Ratko Mladic at that meeting in Belgrade would be kept
23 General Smith's evidence explains that the primary purpose of
24 UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1995 was to support
25 the delivery of humanitarian aid. When General Smith needed to use armed
1 forces -- armed force to defend UNPROFOR forces in 1995, he would do so.
2 But such actions were taken to protect UNPROFOR units rather than to
3 alter the balance of force or forces in the conflict.
4 Finally, General Smith's evidence describes the centralised
5 command and control system in use by the army of Republika Srpska during
7 Your Honour, with your permission, there is one passage of
8 General Smith's prior testimony that I would seek to clarify with him.
9 May I do so?
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may do so, sir.
11 MR. SAXON:
12 Q. Sir Rupert, in your testimony in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic
13 in October of 2003, at page 27320 of the transcript, starting at line 10,
14 and going on to page 27321, line 5, you describe, or you testify about a
15 meeting that occurred in Belgrade
16 present, as was Slobodan Milosevic, General Mladic, Mr. Akashi,
17 Mr. Stoltenberg, and others.
18 Do you recall that testimony?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And on page 27321, you were asked the following question by the
22 "In what terms did the accused" - referring in that case to
23 Slobodan Milosevic - "instruct Mladic and with what apparent authority?"
24 And your response was: "They were -- he was clearly the superior
25 of Mladic. He, that is Mr. Milosevic, referred to Mladic by his
1 Christian name and Mladic was deferring to him."
2 Do you recall that answer?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. Sir Rupert, when you used the term "superior" in that response,
5 what did you mean?
6 A. I meant it in the -- in the social sense. When you enter a room
7 and you see people interacting you can usually tell who is the -- people
8 are deferring to and the way they talk to each other and behave to each
9 other. It's like a pecking order, if you like, when looking at a group
10 of people. That's how I meant it.
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, at this time, I will pass the witness.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
14 May I just ask one question, before you start, Mr. Guy-Smith, if
15 you don't mind.
16 General Rupert, it may very well be that you explained this in
17 your testimony which isn't detailed on paper. I'm just interested to
18 know why the participants in the meeting of the 15th July 1995 decided to
19 keep Ratko Mladic's presence in the meeting a secret.
20 THE WITNESS: My -- this is some time ago, and I -- I can't --
21 we've talked about this so much now, I can't remember precisely the
22 discussion as such.
23 But I -- my memory of it is that he was clearly and known to be
24 the commanding the Bosnian Serb forces, and this was immediately after
25 Srebrenica, the fall of Srebrenica. And it -- it -- I think nobody
1 wanted to expose at that time the connection that -- with -- between
2 Mladic and Milosevic. It was important to get this meeting and get the
3 Srebrenica dealt with the aftermath of Srebrenica dealt with, rather than
4 to expose that Mladic was actually there in Belgrade.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
6 Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
7 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
9 MR. SAXON: Before my learned friend begins, if it would assist
10 the Chamber, the same topic is discussed at page 17531 of the Popovic
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. We'll look at it.
13 Mr. Guy-Smith.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
15 Q. Good morning, sir.
16 A. Good morning.
17 Q. Before coming to testify here today, you had the opportunity to
18 review quite a bit of what you have previously said, both in statements
19 and in testimony; correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Okay. And with regard to the very first statement that you were
22 discussing with Mr. Saxon, which has now been introduced as P2348, I take
23 it that when you reviewed that particular statement, the statement you
24 reviewed was not redacted. True? By that I mean you read your entire
1 A. Yes, I think so, yes.
2 Q. Okay. Before testifying here today, did you have occasion to see
3 which parts of your statement had been redacted?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Uh-huh, okay.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could please then have 1D01-1445. I'm
7 sorry, Mr. Saxon, just for your purposes, have you received -- I just
8 want to make sure you received it all. By that, I'm making sure that
9 he's received all of our disclosure because --
10 I apologised, Your Honour, it's just that he was looking a bit
11 befuzzled. I just wanted to make sure that he received --
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, still do what you --
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you very much, yes.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're welcome.
15 You did receive it, sir?
16 MR. SAXON: I did receive it, Your Honour, and I'm still
17 confuddled, but on a higher level than I was before.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Welcome to the club.
19 Thank you. You may proceed, Mr. Guy-Smith.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could turn to, I believe, it's going to be
21 page 18 of the document.
22 Q. Starting at -- at the second full paragraph where it says: "On
23 the 19th of July, I met Mladic ..." and continuing with that paragraph.
24 A. Uh-huh, right.
25 Q. Can you read it, or you need bigger?
1 A. It would help if it was bigger.
2 Q. Usually helps me too.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Can we have that a little bit bigger.
4 THE WITNESS: That's smashing. Thank you very much.
5 Q. Not a problem.
6 A. Do you want me to read that whole page or just that paragraph?
7 Q. Actually, I just want you to read that one paragraph to start.
8 A. Okay.
9 Q. Do you confirm -- do you confirm that that's what you said at the
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And do you stand by what it says there?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Okay. With regard to this particular page -- you can skip the
15 next two paragraphs and then if you would read the last three
16 paragraphs on the page. And if you could just read them to yourself very
17 quickly. And once again I'm going to ask you the self-same question,
18 because these paragraphs have been redacted from the information that has
19 been presented in your exhibit.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
21 MR. SAXON: I believe I may be confuddled, to use Mr. Guy-Smith's
22 term. But it's my understanding that of the last three paragraphs, only
23 one of them has been redacted. That is, the redacted version of the
24 statement that I have in front of me, and that would be paragraph 88.
25 Paragraph 85 has also been redacted.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: How do you know which is paragraph 88 and which is
2 paragraph 85?
3 MR. SAXON: Well, the version that has been admitted which was
4 part of the 92 ter package was numbered, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: But on the screen we're not looking -- we're
6 looking at 1D011-1445 [sic].
7 MR. SAXON: I just wanted to make sure I was on the same page as
8 my colleague. That's all, Your Honour.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Why don't we do this. If we go to P2348.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you want to have P2348 side by side with
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: [Overlapping speakers] ... Yeah. I see -- now I
13 understand what occurred here. There was -- we have a mis-numbering.
14 Thank you.
15 Q. With regard to page 18, there are two paragraphs there that are
16 deleted. Those are paragraphs 85 and 88. And my question then would be:
17 Do you stand by what you said there?
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: In the deleted paragraphs?
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
20 Q. That would start with, "he explained" -- 85 would then be: "He
21 explained that Zepa ..."
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. Okay.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. Turning to page 19 quickly. In both, if
25 we could. We have 19 as being a page which has been redacted in its
1 entirety. Thank you.
2 Q. If you could quickly read that page.
3 A. Can we move down the page, please. Thank you.
4 Q. Would you like it larger, incidentally?
5 A. It's okay. It's only a couple of paragraphs to go.
6 Q. Okay.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
8 MR. SAXON: Completely up to Mr. Guy-Smith, if it would assist
9 the witness, I have a hard copy, unredacted. No? Okay.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, if that would assist the witness, I'm more
11 than happy for him to have it, if the Chamber deems that to be
13 MR. SAXON: I have to tell you that since it's my hard copy,
14 there are --
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Even if there are interlineations in it, I don't
17 MR. SAXON: All right. Fine.
18 THE WITNESS: I have read what's on the screen now.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: You can pass it on --
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. Go ahead. I'm trying to do this as
21 quickly as I can for you, sir. If we can go to -- having read that, do
22 you confirm that's your statement --
23 A. That's my statement, yes.
24 Q. -- and the information contained therein is similarly accurate?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And you would say the same again if you were asked the same
2 questions or make the same statement in the -- even in the absence of
3 questions being made?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you very much.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could turn to the next page, page 20.
7 And if you could -- we'll find that 20 suffers a similar fate
8 that 19 suffered, so if we could - meaning that it was entirely
9 redacted - so if we could make a bit bigger.
10 THE WITNESS: Please, yeah.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: For ease of reading.
12 Q. Is that good, or would you like it bigger?
13 A. That's okay.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. And could we go down the page, please.
16 Q. Absolutely.
17 A. Yeah, I've read it.
18 Q. And once again, I take it that's your statement which you confirm
19 as you sit here today?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. I'd like to ask a couple of questions before we go on with the
22 same exercise, which is: If you take a look at the second sentence from
23 the last in the top paragraph which starts with the language:
24 "The meeting was significant because I saw at firsthand Mladic
25 operating as a commander at a strategic level ..."
1 A. Could the page be moved, please.
2 Q. Surely. You would like it moved up or, I'm sorry, down, I guess
4 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... Yes, I want to see the top. I'll
5 make sure it's moved.
6 Q. Sure. Okay. This is referring to the meeting that had you with
7 Mladic on the 31st of July?
8 A. I just read, and I can't see it now.
9 Which paragraph are you pointing out?
10 Q. It starts with, "I had a meeting with General" -- one, two, the
11 third paragraph down.
12 A. Got it.
13 Q. You got it?
14 A. Yeah.
15 Q. And I'm now going to the last two sentences:
16 "The meeting was significant because I saw it firsthand, Mladic
17 operating as a commander at a strategic level playing a central command
18 role to meet the joint HV/HVO offensive."
19 Now, could you explain for us just for the moment because I
20 noticed the word "operating as a commander" -- the phrase "operating as a
21 commander at a strategic level." What does that mean, operating at a
22 commander as a strategic level, militarily? What is the significance of
23 that statement?
24 A. In this case, I had dealt with Mladic on specific issues, entry
25 to Srebrenica or something like that. Here I was actually dealing with
1 him, dealing with a strategic issue in which he was having to consider
2 factors and operate at a higher level to that that I had normally been in
3 contact with him about.
4 Q. Okay. If you could be of some help to us, as I understand it,
5 militarily speaking, there are those that operate at strategic level and
6 those that operate at -- I'm sorry, those that function - put it that way
7 - at a strategic level and those that function at an operational level.
8 Is that a fair statement?
9 A. Yes. But it doesn't help you much.
10 Q. Okay. Well, I'm looking for help here.
11 A. Okay. Well, a senior commander might or might not be dealing
12 with a strategic matter. He is still, if you like, potentially able to
13 deal with a strategic or a large-scale matter. It is -- depending on the
14 circumstances he might find himself dealing with really quite a low-level
15 matter for some reason, perhaps this hasn't -- is deeply interesting to
16 him for another purpose or something like that.
17 So in the case of my relationships with General Mladic, in --
18 during that year, most of our dealings were over quite specific issues
19 which you might say were of a -- of a local and tactical nature in their
20 detail. However strategic it might have been, in that this was the
21 UNPROFOR commander dealing with the Bosnian Serb army commander.
22 Here, I'm actually witnessing him, engaged with him indeed, over
23 a bigger issue of -- in which he is handling this major offensive.
24 Q. I see. Now --
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let me just also understand, what is this major
1 offensive? Is the operation in Zepa an operational issue or a strategic
3 THE WITNESS: I would say the Zepa incident was clearly
4 strategic. This was a collapse of an UN Safe Area.
5 The issue -- the actual matters, though, that we were dealing
6 about, prisons exchanges, whether I had access down that road or
7 whatever, are -- are the sort of tactical detail of the day. So on the
8 basis on which our conversations were taking place, were done in the
9 detail. In this case, he -- this offensive is a combined offensive by
10 forces of the -- of Croatia
11 forces in Bosnia
12 Bihac and -- and I can't precisely remember where they are at this stage,
13 but they are certainly threatening, if they are not already on Bosnian
14 territory inside Bosnian borders and are engaged with the Bosnian Serb
15 army. And there's a refugees and so forth, all beginning to flood into
16 the Banja Luka area, and so on. And this -- and we're debating this.
17 This is -- we're not down in the detail. We're dealing with this whole
18 new situation, and I'm seeing him operate at a different level than the
19 detail around a pocket.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH:
22 Q. Just if I might, to make sure that we're clear on our terms.
23 There are -- there's the ability to operate at a strategic level, the
24 ability to function at an operational level, and I believe you introduced
25 a new term here, which is "tactical." And so is there a distinction
1 between those three manners of functioning? I'm going to use the word
2 "function," because obviously if we use "operate" twice, it gets to be
4 So is there a difference between the function between an
5 operational level and a tactical level? I believe you -- you have
6 explained how to -- what the function is, at a strategic level. I
7 believe you have.
8 A. If I could -- at the risk of becoming a school room lecturer, I
9 will try and bring this as simple as I can.
10 Q. That would be good.
11 A. At the strategic level, and this is all from a military point of
12 view, at the strategic level, you are translating the political intention
13 into a military action. There clearly has to be a linkage in the two,
14 and you are deciding on such matters as the objectives that are to be
15 achieved, the allocation of forces and resources to achieve those
16 objectives, the priorities of their achievement, et cetera. And trying
17 to achieve a coherent pattern in the whole.
18 I will now leave out the operational level for the moment and go
19 to the tactical.
20 Q. Excellent.
21 A. The tactical is where you actually do the business. If I could
22 take a -- an example, a metaphor for this; consider a building of a major
23 building project. You have an architect and his advisors who translate
24 the vision of the person who wants the building into a plan. He
25 constructs a design. That is in effect the strategic activity. But at
1 some point a man has to come and lay bricks and put windows in and so
2 forth, and those are the tactical activities.
3 Now normally, if it is a small house you don't need anybody in
4 between the two. But as you get a bigger and bigger project, perhaps the
5 building of a major hotel or shopping complex or whatever, now there is a
6 degree of complexity in this, and there are subsidiary decisions that lie
7 between the purely tactical and the strategic. And that is, if you like,
8 the equivalent of the operational level in military affairs.
9 Q. Okay.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: In the metaphor, who would that be?
11 THE WITNESS: Well, I would -- it is normally the theatre
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: In the metaphor, in the building.
14 THE WITNESS: In the metaphor, oh, it's your protect management
15 team. When you see these big projects, you see a big border up, don't
16 you, with all the different firms, and then there's an even bigger sign
17 on top of it, and that's such-and-such.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: The architect, project manager, and then builder.
19 THE WITNESS: Correct.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
21 THE WITNESS: It's a dangerous metaphor because we can go too far
22 down that road, but it ...
23 MR. GUY-SMITH:
24 Q. With regard to the issue of the strategic level as defined as
25 being putting the political intention into a military level, in this
1 situation - and by "this situation," I mean the one in which you were
2 involved in, for the moment, in July - the political intention would be
3 found in the government of the Republika Srpska, which was headed by
4 Karadzic. Correct?
5 A. In a -- in a -- if you like, in a formal textbook construct, yes,
6 you could probably put it there.
7 Q. And with regard to that response, you were aware, were you not,
8 that not only was there a president of Republika Srpska but there also
9 was an Assembly that did those things that all assemblies do, which is
10 voting on all matters that affect the republic.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And that, too, would be part of the -- for purposes of the model
13 that we're referring to, in terms of what one does at a strategic level
14 that, too, would be a place that a military commander at the strategic
15 level would find his or her - I think it is probable his, for the most
16 part, still in the world - direction, with regard to how to proceed;
17 correct? Not only the president but also the Assembly.
18 A. I mean, how theoretical are we being? If it would help you, I
19 said that the business of strategy for the military point of view is to
20 translate the political intentions into military matters. The general is
21 on that interface. He is a political actor in that sense. And, of
22 course, he knows what is going on in the political sphere.
23 Q. Well, obviously with regard to Mladic that will become an issue
24 that we will discuss at some point today, I'm sure.
25 A. Hmm.
1 Q. Now you go to say in the same paragraph:
2 "It exposed Mladic's key position. He had moved to western
4 witnessed him with in Zepa."
5 With regard to this particular sentence, when you refer to his
6 "key advisors," are you -- who are you referring to there?
7 A. I can't -- other than I think Gvero was there, General Gvero, I
8 can't remember who else I was referring to.
9 Q. If I were to mention either Tolimir?
10 A. I'm -- I wouldn't be surprised if he was there, either. But I
11 don't remember that -- whether he was in that list of people.
12 Q. On this particular --
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. With regard to the issue of those -- of those individuals that
15 you had recognised through your intelligence as being key advisors, could
16 you do us the kindness of telling us who you would identify, in that
17 fashion, who Mladic's key advisors were.
18 A. From memory, Tolimir would have been one of them.
19 Q. You mentioned Gvero?
20 A. Gvero, yes.
21 Q. And --
22 A. Those are the only two names that come to mind. I'd have to see
23 a list and -- and refresh my memory considerably to -- to enlarge on
25 Q. Let me ask you just one of the names. Does the name Miletic ring
1 a bell?
2 A. Yes, it does.
3 Q. Okay. And do you recall --
4 A. I don't immediately recall his position, or as we understood it
6 Q. Okay. If I were to suggest to you that he was the Chief of
7 Staff, would that be of assistance?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And what about Milovanovic?
10 A. Another name. But, again, I would have to refresh my memory as
11 to the relationships of all of these people.
12 Q. And lastly, Colonel Indic?
13 A. Yes. I don't think he would have moved. He was Sarajevo
15 Q. Okay. He was kind of a unique individual, was he not, in terms
16 of military construct?
17 A. No. Why was he unique?
18 Q. Well, I'm asking, because he was someone who had the ear of
19 Mladic and was outside the chain of command.
20 A. He was their liaison officer that we dealt with, and he appeared
21 to have some very direct links to Mladic, yes.
22 Q. Okay.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't understand what you mean he "was outside
24 the chain of command."
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
1 What I mean by that is he was -- he was able -- he was able to
2 give orders to individuals who had a higher rank than he did.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is that how you understood him, General Rupert?
4 THE WITNESS: No, not like that. Do you want to answer again
5 [Overlapping speakers] ...
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Overlapping speakers] ... Do you want again
7 after your --
8 THE WITNESS: Yeah. I understood him to be Mladic's liaison
9 officer based at Lukavica Barracks in Sarajevo.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH:
11 Q. Very well.
12 A. His business -- he was our point of contact and first point of
13 contact, if you like, with the Bosnian Serb forces around Sarajevo.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could go now down to the next paragraph.
15 So we should probably scroll, I guess, it's down.
16 Q. And I'd like to focus on, again, the last two sentences which is,
17 you say:
18 "I shared Mladic's concern at the situation as it was quite clear
19 that fighting would go spread. However, I pointed out that the HV
20 offensive could be justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter?"
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. With regard to that, what was the discussion that you had with
23 General Mladic concerning Article 51 being available as a justification
24 for this particular offensive?
25 A. I cannot recall. I need you to, first of all, get me the
1 Article 51 of the UN Charter. Because I can't remember what it is. Nor
2 do I -- on knowing that might help me to reconstruct what our
3 conversation was about. But I deduce from what is in front of me that he
4 was complaining that the Croatian army was the -- should have been
5 stopped or shouldn't have been there or something to that effect.
6 Q. Okay. Article 51, if all will trust me reads:
7 "Nothing in the Present Charter shall impair the inherent right
8 of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
9 against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council has
10 taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
11 Measures taken by members in the exercise of the right of
12 self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
13 shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
14 Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
15 action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
16 international peace and security."
17 So I take it from -- from that, that it was your position that
18 the HV offensive was a matter of self-defence. Correct?
19 A. To be absolute -- to be sure that I am -- that is my position, I
20 would like to understand more of what Mladic and I were talking about.
21 But I don't remember that.
22 Q. You don't remember that?
23 A. As to why I had --
24 Q. Why you alluded to Article 51.
25 A. I'm only, as it were, trying to think back to that particular
1 event, and I can't remember what the issue, the particular issue was that
2 led to that.
3 Q. All right. The reason I was asking the question is because you,
4 in this part of your statement, refer to a very specifical -
5 "specifical," I'm doing it all day - specific article of the
6 United Nations charter. So I thought that perhaps you could be of some
7 help to us there.
8 A. [Overlapping speakers] ...
9 Q. [Overlapping speakers]... fine.
10 Going to the next sentence, you state:
11 "It was interesting to observe that Mladic showed overwhelming
12 concern for the integrity of the Republika Srpska and expressed little
13 interest about the possibility of an HV offensive into the Krajinas."
14 So I take it by this, what was -- what was being discussed in the
15 conversation was what I -- what I'll term what he believed to be the --
16 the importance of the geographic integrity of the Republika Srpska as he
17 had defined it.
18 A. It was more -- I mean, that's how it -- it can be interpreted, I
19 agree. But the -- my memory of that particular point was that much of
20 the rhetoric and discussions about Republika Srpska had in the past
21 included our brother Serbs in the Krajinas. And this -- the presentation
22 was that the -- we were all of one people, we, the Serbs, were all of one
23 people, that we must understand this as an entity. And what I'm
24 referring to there was that when -- now, when the pressure was on, this
25 wasn't so apparent at all and that Mladic is interested only in the
1 boundaries of Republika Srpska, as opposed to the Krajinas, where the
2 Croatian Serbs lived.
3 Q. And so -- and so we're clear, this conversation, being a
4 conversation, as you termed it, at a strategic level entertains obviously
5 then the political intention of the Republika Srpska?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. As being interpreted by Mladic, yes.
9 Q. I understand.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could go to -- if we could go to the next
11 page, which is 21, and take a look at the very first paragraph.
12 A. Yes.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: And go to the very bottom of the page and take a
14 look at the last paragraph. And then we're going to have to go over to
15 the next page to complete that particular paragraph.
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. Now, with regard to the first full sentence in the page that
18 you're looking at: "He also reiterated the Bosnian Serb wish to be
19 involved in the peace process acclaiming that the FRY are distant from
20 this war."
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. With regard -- with regard to that statement, I take that he
24 evidenced some concern that he would not be involved in the peace
25 process, or that other parties were trying to do things that were
1 antithetical to what he believed was appropriate resolution for peace.
2 A. I don't recall his making any judgement about his motivation.
3 Q. Did he say something to the effect that, you know, Gee willikers,
4 we'd want to be part of it too.
5 I mean, how did this come up?
6 A. I don't really remember.
7 Q. Okay. Well, if you don't remember, you don't remember.
8 Okay. Once again with regard to those two paragraphs, do you
9 confirm that was your statement?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And you confirm the information that is contained therein?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And it's accurate?
14 A. Yes.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we go to page 23, please.
16 [Defence counsel confer]
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Oh, okay. I apologise, I made a mistake, 24,
19 Q. Very -- very first paragraph.
20 A. That's the one beginning: "... early October ..."
21 Q. Yeah. And then --
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: If then if we could go back to page 23. I'm
23 sorry, there was a question that I wanted to ask you with regard to that.
24 Which is the paragraph which is -- one, two, three, it's the
25 fourth paragraph, which I believe is paragraph 112. We don't need -- we
1 can work off of the P2348, that's fine. Either way, it makes no
3 It says: "On 10 September, the Force Commander had a second
4 meeting with Mladic, the latter refused to negotiate without a stop to
5 the bombing."
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Now, with regard to the bombing that is occurring here, could you
8 -- you help us out in terms of which particular bombing was occurring
9 that Mladic was stating he refused to negotiate unless it stopped?
10 A. Yes. The -- from -- and we don't need to check the dates, but
11 the very end of August a series of attacks are initiated which include
12 bombing by NATO's 5th Tactical Air Force. There's a pause after about
13 three days, and then it -- it starts again. So this is in the second
14 stage of that, from my memory, and the -- the siege of Sarajevo
15 lifted, aid is flowing in at that stage, but bombing is continuing. But
16 at exactly what stage it is reached by the 10th of September, I'm not
17 sure without, looking at a chronology.
18 Q. With regard to the issue of stopping the bombing, when you were
19 meeting with Mladic, did you inform him that you were not in a position
20 to stop the bombing, being a commander of UNPROFOR, and that the issue of
21 the bombing halting was a matter that had to be raised with NATO?
22 A. By that stage, I mean, I'm not at that meeting.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. I'm --
25 Q. I apologise, I understand that. But do you know if that was a
1 topic of the conversation, that there was division between the UNPROFOR,
2 UNPROFOR authority and the NATO authority? And the reason I'm asking you
3 this question is because, obviously, at some other -- at times the
4 question about the division of authority became -- became an issue.
5 But if you do know, that's great; if you don't know, that's fine
7 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH:
9 Q. I understand that he was not at the meeting.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Saxon.
11 MR. SAXON: The question appears to call for speculation. The
12 gentleman says he was not at the meeting.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH:
14 Q. If you know.
15 A. No, I don't know.
16 Q. Okay.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Would this be an appropriate time, Your Honour?
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Absolutely.
19 We will take a break and come back at a quarter to 11.00.
20 Court adjourned.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 10.47 a.m.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. If I could, Your Honour, with regard to the
25 document that we were discussing that had been up on the screen, if I
1 could have introduced into evidence, those paragraphs that we were
2 discussing, which were paragraphs 85, 88 to 100, and 104 which had been
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: They are admitted. May they please be given an
5 exhibit number.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, those paragraphs will be
7 Exhibit D96.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
10 Q. You have said: "War no longer exists."
11 "Confrontation, conflict, and combat undoubtedly exist all
12 around the world," and you have defined a number of places where that
13 occurs. "States still have armed forces which they still use as a symbol
14 of power, nonetheless, war is cognitively known to most non-combatants.
15 War is battle in the field between men and machinery. War is a massive
16 deciding event and a dispute in international affairs. Such war no
17 longer exists."
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. I'd like to discuss with you, obviously, I saw the smile on your
21 face, and I'm sure you know from where that comes, or from whence that
23 A. Yes, I do, yes. Opening paragraph.
24 Q. Which is the opening paragraph in "The Utility of Force: The Art
25 of War in the Modern World," a book that you, yourself, penned, sir?
1 A. Yeah.
2 Q. With regard to the events in Bosnia, and specifically concerning
3 what has been called the siege of Sarajevo, would you define that as the
4 classic war that we, as non-combatants, are used to, or is this the new
5 kind of confrontation, if you understand my question?
6 A. I think I understand it. It was the part of the -- it was -- the
7 fighting around Sarajevo
9 Q. Okay. Now, I'd like to see if we could get some understanding,
10 because I believe that you have indicated that there are number of
11 specific factors or considerations that one needs to address, I think
12 you've called them major trends, with regard to understanding
13 confrontations and conflicts. Correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And those are the ends for which we are fighting, are changing
16 from the hard absolute objectives of interstate industrial war to more
17 malleable objections to do with the individual and societies that are not
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. We fight amongst -- that's the first. The second is we fight
21 amongst the people. The fact amplified literally and figuratively by the
22 central role of the media. We fight in every living-room in the world,
23 as well as on the streets and fields of a conflict zone?
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. I take it that by this you were alluding to the fact that the
2 media is now being used -- being used in a manner of weaponry by both
3 sides to the conflict that previously we did not see, the propaganda war
4 has become more pervasive in these conflicts?
5 A. No, I'm not making such a absolutely direct linkage as you
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. I -- remember, I call all six of those factors, of which you have
9 mentioned two, trends, and I don't in any way suggest that they are, you
10 know -- absolutely -- each one is the same in every case, or that are
11 combination is the same in any case.
12 Q. Okay. With regard to this trend, then, being the media trend, as
13 the media trend that you've recognised as being one of the trends that
14 now exists, was used with regard to the conflict in the entirety of the
15 former Yugoslavia
16 fought reached new heights in this conflict, as compared to others
17 previously held?
18 A. No. You are -- you are making a -- when I am talking about the
19 media in that trend of -- of fighting amongst the people, it divides, as
20 you explained, into two packets. There is the physical and literal
21 fighting amongst the people, and then there is the media. And somewhere
22 in that book I explain that the book are what they say they are, a
23 medium, within which you operate.
24 Now, use of propaganda is as old as time. And the -- I wouldn't
25 argue that it was any more or less in this particular case. If you go to
1 the Second World War, you can see it all there too. I don't think you
2 can scale things in the way you are asking me the question.
3 Q. Very well. With regard to the use of propaganda, would you be in
4 a position to comment as to whether or not propaganda was used more by
5 the Bosnian Presidency, and by that I mean the Muslims' side at an
6 international level, as opposed to the Bosnian Serb side, in terms of a
7 device to fight the war?
8 A. Would you define for me what you mean by "propaganda"?
9 Q. Sure. Propaganda is a statement which is used to influence a
10 party with regard to a particular event, which may or may not be true.
11 A. The event or the -- or the statement isn't true?
12 Q. The statement may or may not be true.
13 A. So advertising is propaganda?
14 Q. Well, according to Edward Bernays it most certainly is, yes.
15 A. In which case all parties were doing it in equal measure. I
16 cannot --
17 Q. You can't distinguish or delineate between them. Very well.
18 The third trend you note is that: "Our conflicts tend to be
19 timeless, since we are seeking a condition which then must be maintained
20 until an agreement on a definitive outcome, which may take years or
23 A. Mm-hm.
24 Q. The fourth is: "We fight so as not to lose the force, rather than
25 fighting by using the force at any cost to achieve the aim."
1 Could you expand on that particular trend, please?
2 A. The fighting not to lose the force?
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. I'm contrasting this with what I called "industrial war," the
5 previous paradigm, in which with conscription with industrialisation we
6 could risk and lose whole armies and create new ones. And you see this
7 happening on a number of occasions during, for example, the Second World
9 This allows you to conduct and take quite strategic risks, if you
10 wish to, because the consequence of failure isn't utterly catastrophic
11 because you have the capacity to build a new army.
12 In our current circumstances, and this is the argument in the
13 book, we can no longer take those strategic risks with your force, and so
14 you are conducting your operations on the basis that you cannot risk the
15 totality of the force. It would be strategically catastrophic. That's
16 the essence of the argument.
17 Q. The fifth is on each occasion, new uses are found for old
18 weapons. "Those constructed specifically for use in a battlefield
19 against soldiers and heavy armaments now being adapted for our current
20 conflicts, since the tools of industrial war are often irrelevant to war
21 amongst the people."
23 A. Yes. I think there is a bit more in that quote than just that
24 bit you have read. I'm explaining that it is much about the organisation
25 and so forth of the weapons as the -- as the actual weapon itself.
1 Q. Okay.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could have --
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, if I might just ask, where are we
4 going with these questions?
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Towards what occurred here in this particular
6 case and what this particular gentleman was doing.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: I hope we get there soon.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I will be there in a moment.
9 Could we please have 1D01-0620 up on the screen. And
10 specifically page 8.
11 Q. Just to make sure that we're on the same page, what I read was --
12 this particular language here. Which is "on each occasion new uses are
14 A. That's fine. I recognise that, but you're also reading from the
15 opening instruction in the book.
16 Q. Indeed so.
17 A. And there is a bit more about it further down the pages.
18 Q. I don't disagree with you.
19 A. And that's all I'm alluding to.
20 Q. Okay. And the last point being that: "The sides are mostly
21 non-state ..."
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, with regard to --
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: I don't need that any further.
1 Q. With regard to the conflict that you were involved in for
2 UNPROFOR, you first became aware of the general difficulties that
3 existed, I believe, prior to you being seconded to the area, correct? In
4 1992, you were working inside the British, I believe, Ministry of
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. I could be mistaken there.
8 A. I'd like it just comment on your first statement.
9 I don't think, at least initially, UNPROFOR was involved in the
10 conflict. UNPROFOR was part of the confrontation.
11 Q. I see. Could you -- could you help us there by what you mean by
13 A. I do not use conflict and confrontation as synonyms.
14 Q. Very well. A confrontation occurs and need not -- when two
15 parties or more parties, but we'll keep it to two, have a different
16 outcome and view.
17 A. It -- they don't have to resolve it by conflict. You go to
18 court, you can obey the traffic rules or whatever.
19 If you default, as it were, default to fighting about it, you
20 have a conflict and that is the distinction.
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. Can I expand on that if you want to, but ...
23 Q. No, I think I understand what you are saying here, and to the
24 extent it is of assistance, I'm sure we will be talking about a bit -- in
25 a bit.
1 You first receive -- you first became acquainted with the region
2 and the difficulties that were existing while you were still in London
3 working for the Ministry of Defence; correct?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. And during that period of time, were you involved in any of the
6 discussions -- well, let me ask you this first: Were there discussions
7 that existed with NATO forces before you went to Bosnia concerning the
8 use of NATO air-strikes?
9 A. Yes, but not with the NATO force. This was my involvement and it
10 was as staff officer in London
12 Q. And would it be fair to say that before you went to Sarajevo
13 there was a division of opinion with regard to the use of air-strikes in
14 the region? And by that I mean, there was an argument over whether or
15 not there should be bombing from the air as a sole mechanism, or whether
16 or not the air-strikes should be supporting ground troops?
17 A. No, there wasn't an argument in those terms.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. If it would help you?
20 Q. Surely.
21 A. You had two organisations in which different groups of states
22 were represented: The United Nations, on the one hand, and NATO on the
23 other. The -- what was on, if you like, and the nations who were -- had
24 forces deployed on the ground were in some cases represented in both
25 political entities, NATO and the UN, and in other -- other cases they
1 were only represented in one or the other. And there was certainly
2 different views in those two groupings which had to be brought together.
3 But it wasn't a question of whether they should be -- it was an either/or
4 between bombing or ground support.
5 Q. Were you involved in the discussions concerning this matter in
6 1992 and 1993?
7 A. Not in 1992. In 1993 and 1994, yes.
8 Q. Okay. And when you were involved in those discussions in 1993
9 and 1994, you were involved in your capacity, I take it as a member of
10 the British army and the Ministry of Defence --
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. -- is that correct?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Now, before we go any further for the moment, did you take into
15 consideration when you were negotiating with Mladic, to the extent that
16 you were, that the negotiations were oftentimes for what I will call side
17 benefits or side effects as opposed to having a negotiation for -- for an
18 actual -- actually, what was going on, and by that I mean, if you were
19 negotiating for a cease-fire, you had received information, quite
20 frankly, there were other things afoot. The negotiations were also being
21 used for purposes of war.
22 MR. SAXON: Your Honour --
23 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I understand the question.
24 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Saxon.
1 MR. SAXON: I think it is quite a compound question. Perhaps it
2 could be broken down.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Surely.
4 Q. When you were negotiating with Mladic for certain specific events
5 to occur, did you take into consideration the fact that those
6 negotiations were actually being used as part of the war; that Mladic was
7 not there to negotiate with you necessarily in good faith but, rather,
8 for purposes of obtaining some other benefit?
9 THE WITNESS: Again, I don't comprehend your question.
10 MR. GUT-SMITH: I'll retreat from the question.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, counsel is on his feet.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm sorry.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
14 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I'm going to object again to the use of
15 the term "the fact" in Mr. Guy-Smith' question, because I don't think
16 there's been any establishment of -- certainly during this
17 cross-examination of any such facts that he is referring to.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: In addition to that, Mr. Guy-Smith, I would like
19 to say I'm not quite sure whether you want Mr. Smith to be able to tell
20 you what went on in the mind of Ratko Mladic.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, that I don't want him to do.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah, but then when you say that Mladic was
23 negotiating, with a view to other benefits, how is he supposed to know
24 unless Mladic told him?
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: I will go at it another way.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
2 Q. When you went to the region, would be characterize your mandate
3 as being that one of peacekeeping?
4 A. No, I don't think it -- there was no -- the peace wasn't there.
5 There was a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement when I arrived but no
6 more. My mandate was essentially to protect and -- and ensure the
7 delivery of humanitarian aid.
8 Q. Since, as you put it, "there was a Cessation of Hostilities
9 Agreement and no more," what did you understand the rules of engagement
10 to be with regard to your presence there? What could you do; what
11 couldn't you do?
12 A. What did I understand the rules of engagement to be with regard
13 to -- well, the rules of engagement were given to me.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. And, again, essentially, the rules of engagement were wholly
16 reactive. We -- we, the UN, initiated nothing, in terms of the use of
17 force. You were reacting to a situation in which force was being used.
18 Q. And if force was being used, then, with regard to the rules of
19 engagement, you could respond in self-defence; correct?
20 A. The individuals in that situation, yes, could.
21 Q. Now, with regard to the notion of an air-strike, the air-strikes
22 were not within the rules of engagement, were they?
23 A. Not in the documentation, if you like, that was being issued to
24 the -- the commanders on the ground and their -- their subordinates. In
25 terms at the level I had, there were, in effect, rules of engagement,
1 which was a series of agreed documents as to how and in what
2 circumstances air-strikes could be called in.
3 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the rules of engagement that you're
4 referring to as to how and in what circumstances air-strikes would be
5 called in, were those agreements within the function of the mandate of
7 A. There isn't a mandate of peacekeeping.
8 Q. Okay. Were those documents within the mandate that you had?
9 A. Um --
10 Q. To engage in air-strikes?
11 A. I don't -- again, I'm finding this difficult to follow.
12 Q. I'll put it in other terms for you.
13 A. The -- go on.
14 Q. If you find it difficult to follow, I will put it in other terms
15 for you.
16 When a decision was made for an air-strike to occur --
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. -- where did you find the authority to do so?
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Whose strike? UNPROFOR strike -- have
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, UNPROFOR air-strikes.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: My question is whether UNPROFOR air-strikes?
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay [Overlapping speakers] ... I'll answer --
24 I'll take care of your concern.
25 Q. Were there UNPROFOR air-strikes?
1 A. The UNPROFOR commander or his superiors could request an
2 air-strike. The air-strike would have been carried out by the force
3 found from NATO.
4 Q. When the UNPROFOR commander or his superiors requested an
5 air-strike, what were the criteria used for that request to be made?
6 A. I'm -- would -- to be absolutely precise, I would need to look at
7 a whole range of documents which start with the United Nations
8 Resolutions and so forth that came out in the period during 1993 and
9 1994, covering these circumstances. But on the basis of my memory, there
10 were two reasons, if you like, for calling in an air-strike. The first
11 was in close air support in self-defence of -- sorry. The first was for
12 close air support in air -- in self-defence of a unit or UN -- an element
13 of the UNPROFOR on the ground.
14 Q. And the second?
15 A. And the second was to enforce the exclusion zones around -- I'm
16 sorry, the exclusion zones which I need to backtrack a bit. There are
17 things called safe areas, and over time these developed into the idea of
18 exclusion zones, which inside an exclusion zone, the heavy weapons were
19 either supposed not to be there or held in what were called Weapon
20 Collection Points. And as a means and air power was available to be
21 called for to enforce those exclusion zones, and I have to be reminded of
22 the date when they started, but it was sometime in 1994, if I recall
24 Q. Well, with regard to air power being called in to enforce the
25 exclusion zones, I take it that when there was a violation of the
1 exclusion zone by either side that UNPROFOR would first seek in its
2 capacity to remedy the situation by having whatever was violative of the
3 exclusion zone brought back into the -- the proper form. And by that I
4 mean, as I understand -- as I understand it, there were, for example,
5 certain areas where heavy weapons were not supposed to be.
6 A. Yes. And you didn't necessarily -- the idea did not -- you were
7 not expected to use air power as the first action, if a heavy weapon
8 appeared in an exclusion zone.
9 Q. Of course not.
10 A. You were expected to deal with the matter in a graduated way.
11 Q. When you say, "you were expected to deal with the matter in a
12 graduated way," by that you were referring to UNPROFOR was expected to
13 deal with that in a graduated way. Correct?
14 A. Correct, correct.
15 Q. Okay. And did the graduated way that UNPROFOR was expected to
16 deal with that include the threat of air-strikes if there was not
18 A. Oh, yes. That had been there since the -- that threat, that
19 prospect had been there from the outset of the establishment of those
20 exclusion zones.
21 Q. To your memory, was there ever a threat made to the BiH with
22 regard to violation of the exclusion zone by UNPROFOR? And by the
23 threat, being the threat of an air-strike?
24 A. UNPROFOR can't -- couldn't violate an exclusion zone.
25 Q. No, BiH, the Bosnian army.
1 A. But -- I thought you had said that it was -- a threat it was --
2 UNPROFOR had violated the exclusion zone.
3 Q. No, there should have been a comma there. To your memory, was
4 there ever a threat by UNPROFOR to the BiH?
5 A. [Overlapping speakers]...
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The speakers are kindly
7 asked not to speak at the same time.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Did you hear that?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Please don't speak at the same time.
11 THE WITNESS: The -- the exclusion zones, when they were
12 established and authorised by the Security Council and so forth,
13 contained in that authorisation the -- the threat, if we like to call it
14 that, that the NATO air power could to be used to enforce them. It was
15 to -- it was -- the exclusion zones applied to everybody.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH:
17 Q. Okay. Part of what -- I'm trying to understand here is the
18 function of UNPROFOR. We have heard testimony that UNPROFOR's role was
19 that of a peacekeeper, which you have rejected.
20 So I'm trying to get a sense of how you would characterize
21 UNPROFOR's presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least at the time that you
22 were there.
23 A. I rejected the title of peacekeeper on what you might think
24 rather narrow grounds, that there wasn't a peace to keep. And much of
25 the concept of being a peacekeeper, particularly at the time and in the
1 United Nations, was that you were, as it were, standing between two
2 people who were agreed, given your presentation, to remain at peace.
3 Perhaps an example would be Cyprus
5 Q. That certainly wasn't the case that you were dealing with.
6 A. Exactly. And that is why I said we weren't peacekeepers.
7 However, there is a very large number of people at the time in particular
8 who understood what we were doing and why they had sent us there and so
9 forth, to be more in that example, that spirit, if you like, that you're
10 not involved in the fighting as such. You're there to assist and
11 ameliorate the condition of refugees and so on and so forth.
12 Q. I understand what you said, and perhaps you can be of some
13 assistance here, and this may be because I'm naive, but I've heard there
14 is a distinction between being a peacekeeper and being a peacemaker. And
15 by that I mean, when one has the mandate of being a peacemaker, then they
16 can engage in active behaviours, such as offensives or bombings in order
17 to achieve an objective which is distinct from that of being a
19 A. I'd -- you may not -- I don't want to connect, I don't agree with
20 your direct connection of offensives or bombings and being a peacemaker.
21 Those are not necessarily a connection to be made there.
22 Q. Do you see a distinction between the function of peacekeeping and
24 A. Clearly, if you have made -- if you had been party to making a
25 peace, then you might, indeed, find yourself being party to keeping it,
1 so ...
2 Q. With regard to making the peace, what different activities would
3 exist, if any, in your mind? And I'm speaking militarily.
4 A. If -- if you -- if a political entity wishes to use its military
5 to create a condition of peace, then it can be done. But in doing that,
6 you have to decide what it is you want your military to do.
7 Q. Okay. With regard --
8 A. To that end.
9 Q. With regard to UNPROFOR's presence was - in your mind -- in your
10 mind in understanding - the United Nations's wish that the military be
11 used to create a condition of peace, as you have just stated?
12 A. No. Our military actions were all couched in the understanding
13 that they were there for self-defence, and then a bit later on, defence
14 increasing defence, if you like, of refugees and so forth within the
15 Safe Areas.
16 Q. And that was the function of UNPROFOR?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. The function of NATO was somewhat distinct? And that's a
19 question. In your -- in your understanding --
20 A. I was distinct, in fact, in that it wasn't on the ground; it was
21 in the air.
22 Q. And apart from it not being on the ground and in the air, NATO
23 was not in the same situation that UNPROFOR was in, and by that I mean
24 NATO had the ability to bomb in the absence of self-defence.
25 A. No.
1 Q. Is it your position that the bombings that NATO engaged in in
2 1994 and 1995 were self-defensive?
3 A. Not of NATO. But that's why they were there. Either in -- being
4 used in -- in -- within the self-defence of the UN force; or,
5 subsequently, in the exclusion zones.
6 Q. With regard to the exclusion zones those bombs certainly were
7 self-defence, were they?
8 A. As I said earlier on, the defence of the amelioration of the
9 situation in the Safe Areas, you begin to see developing during that time
10 the use of air power, use of force, in supporting that idea of the
11 exclusion zones. And then it then develops further in -- during 1995.
12 Q. And clearly what we're discussing here is information that was
13 communicated to both armies, and by that I mean to the Bosnian Serb army
14 as well as to the BiH?
15 A. Yes, it was -- these things were publicised and so forth, yes.
16 Q. Okay. You made a determination relatively earlier on in your
17 tenure that neither side was interested in maintaining what you have
18 termed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement; correct?
19 A. I think I would call it -- that was my view. Whether it was a
20 determination, I'm not sure.
21 Q. Okay. I will -- we'll use your term, then, which is "view."
22 And if I'm not mistaken, you determined --
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: You viewed.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm going to say "you determined," Your Honour,
25 and I will tell you why.
1 Q. You determined, and I'm now referring to your statement,
2 paragraph 34 that at the end of this series of meetings referring to
3 meetings that you had with General Mladic, "I had come to the conclusion
4 that the Bosnian Serbs had concluded that further fighting was
6 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
8 MR. SAXON: Just to assist the witness, can we at least let him
9 know what dates we're talking about.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: This would be March 7th --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: And could we give him the statement. Let him look
12 at it.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure. That's P2348. And could we go to -- I
14 believe it's page 9, paragraph 34.
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH:
17 Q. Sure. And I'm referring to the following language of yours.
18 "At the end of this series of meetings, I had come to the
19 conclusion that the Bosnian Serbs had concluded that further fighting was
20 inevitable and they had to reach some form of conclusion within the
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Okay?
24 A. Yeah.
25 Q. And this is when, I believe, you formed what you have called your
1 thesis; correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And could you describe for the Chamber what your thesis was.
4 A. First of all, it was a thesis. This was a basis on which I was
5 working. It wasn't necessarily, you know, what was going to happen or
6 anything like. This was my understanding of a situation where I couldn't
7 see everyone's cards.
8 The -- and it was essentially, as has already been said, that the
9 balance of forces and so on was such that this -- that both parties would
10 be seeking a conclusion during this year, if they could possibly arrive
11 at one. And that the eastern enclaves, which, from the Bosnian Serb
12 point of view, were in their rear, were absorbing a -- a proportion of
13 their manpower that they could more usefully use elsewhere.
14 Q. Could we just stop there for a moment. When you say that --
15 "from the Bosnian Serb point of view," in your thesis, had you analysed
16 the respective manpower that was available to the Bosnian Serbs and to
17 the BiH army?
18 A. Yes, that was what I meant when I said in the balance of forces
19 and so forth.
20 Q. Okay. And what -- what was the -- your analysis in that regard
21 and your findings?
22 A. Well, that the Bosnian Serbs had more space to defend than they
23 had people to defend it, in essence.
24 Q. Okay. Now, you indicate in the same paragraph that the UN were
25 being used as shields by the Bosnians and hostage by the Serbs.
1 And I believe -- this is another one of ideas that you came up
2 with, with regard to the presence of UNPROFOR in the area, which is the
3 hostage shield dilemma?
4 A. Again, this is -- at the time was centred on the eastern
5 enclaves, where the -- UNPROFOR's presence in the enclave allowed --
6 acted, to some extent, as a shield for the defenders, the Bosnian forces
7 on the inside. On the other hand, we, the UN, were also in the enclave,
8 and, therefore, getting to those people. Supporting those people, our UN
9 people, and to carry out our mandate of getting the aid and so forth into
10 those enclaves, we were hostage to the Bosnian Serbs.
11 Q. With regard to the first matter that you mentioned which is that
12 you were -- you, the UN, were present in the enclaves, as were members of
13 the BiH, could you tell us, with regard to your delivery of aid how you
14 distinguished the aid that you were giving to non-military -- as opposed
15 to military purposes?
16 A. You need to ask the UNHCR who were the people who were
17 distributing the aid or Medicins Sans Frontieres or whomsoever. My
18 business was to get it there and to -- and to deliver it and see it was
20 Q. With regard -- with regard to your purpose, you understood, of
21 course, that by getting it there, the UNPROFOR forces would be
22 necessarily perceived as taking one side, no matter what the
23 protestations were, didn't you?
24 MR. SAXON: Your Honour.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
1 MR. SAXON: If we're talking -- first of all, we're talking about
2 -- first of all, the question is unclear, necessarily perceived by whom?
3 Second of all, if we're talking about, again, people's perceptions, we
4 appear to be talking about speculation.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Let me rephrase the question then.
6 Q. As you told us, your purpose was to get aid to the enclave;
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. The aid that you got to the enclave included foodstuffs, fuel;
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Medicine; correct?
13 A. Yes, yes.
14 Q. Anything else?
15 A. Those would -- I mean, there was blankets and things, no doubt.
16 I would be -- you know, we would have to go and look at the lists and
18 Q. Fine. With regard to the aid that was being supplied, at the
19 time the aid was being supplied, you, in your capacity as an UNPROFOR
20 commander, were aware of the fact that there were soldiers in the
21 enclave; correct?
22 A. Yes. Bosnian soldiers or UN soldiers?
23 Q. Bosnian soldiers.
24 A. I'm assuming -- yes.
25 Q. And UN soldiers?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Did you ever receive any protests concerning the delivery of aid
3 to an enclave where there were Bosnian soldiers from the Bosnian Serb
5 A. Did you ever receive delivery of aid ...
6 I'm confused by the question. There were not Bosnian Serb forces
7 in an enclave.
8 Q. No. My question is, did you receive any protests from the
9 Bosnian Serb forces with regard to the delivery of aid where there were
10 Bosnian soldiers who were members of the BiH?
11 A. On the few occasions that we got aid in, there were -- there was
12 at least one that I can recall of a complaint, that -- and I can't
13 remember the specific -- but there was definitely a complaint.
14 Q. And the complaint revolved around the issue that you were aiding
15 one of the factions, excuse me, strike that word. One of the armies to
16 the conflict. Correct?
17 A. If I recall the complaint it was a great deal more specific than
18 that. It was that there were things that shouldn't be there, in -- in
19 the -- hidden in one of the trucks.
20 Q. What kind of things would that be?
21 A. It was weapons or ammunition. I can't remember the particular
22 detail. But I can remember that there was such an incident.
23 Q. So it went beyond the issue of just the delivery of aid.
24 A. Indeed. This was a specific case.
25 Q. In which -- in which there was a complaint that UNPROFOR assets
1 had been used to deliver weapons and munitions to --
2 A. There --
3 Q. Bosnian army members?
4 A. No. They had been found. It was stopped.
5 Q. Who stopped it?
6 A. The Bosnian Serb inspection. As they came in, they found it.
7 Q. I see. That must -- that must have diminished your credibility.
8 MR. SAXON: Objection. Objection, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
10 MR. SAXON: Again, it calls for speculation. Credibility in the
11 eyes of whom, from whom? We don't know.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH:
13 Q. Was it of concern to you that an UNPROFOR -- I'm going use the
14 word "convoy," and that could be too much. But was it of concern to you
15 that an UNPROFOR asset was stopped and weapons and munitions were found
16 by the Bosnian Serbs?
17 A. Yes, of course, it was of concern. And it -- it wasn't an
18 UNPROFOR asset. I'd go back and tell you, we were there to guard the
19 convoys, see them getting in. We didn't load the trucks or anything like
21 Nevertheless, thereafter, I made sure that there was a great deal
22 more attention paid to what went on the trucks and how they were managed.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Who -- who was providing this aid?
24 THE WITNESS: The primary agency was the UNHCR, who -- who
25 organised the actual deliveries and what went on the trucks and so on and
1 so forth.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: And this consignment in which weapons were found
3 was destined for?
4 THE WITNESS: I don't remember. My memory of the incident is in
5 the fairly early stages of 1995.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
7 Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH:
9 Q. I want to turn to paragraph 40 of your statement and just have
10 you confirm, I think, what you may have -- you may have already briefly
11 said, which is that you took the view, which is different than coming to
12 a conclusion, as you had done with the Bosnian Serbs that the Bosnian
13 government had no intention of extending the COHA, that's the Cessation
14 of Hostilities Agreement, beyond the end of April.
16 A. In paragraph 40.
17 Q. Yes?
18 A. Yeah, yeah.
19 Q. Okay. With that in mind, did that change the nature of what you
20 felt you were going to be able to do on the ground, where both parties
21 clearly were moving towards a -- breaking the Cessation of Hostilities
23 A. Well, it was -- fighting was already started.
24 Q. Mm-hm.
25 A. It certainly -- the situation had certainly changed, yes.
1 Q. Okay. Well, with regard to paragraph 43. This is in terms of
2 you having a meeting with Dr. Karadzic; that would be the president of
3 the Republika Srpska. Correct?
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. And you were meeting with Karadzic because Mladic refused to meet
6 with you, right?
7 A. He wasn't an alternative. It is true that Mladic was refusing to
8 meet with me and Karadzic was, so I met with him. But they weren't
10 Q. Okay, well, by virtue of the fact that Mladic refused to meet
11 with you was why you went to meet with Karadzic, correct, you contacted
12 Karadzic? Correct?
13 A. Yes. But that -- it isn't -- you're making it sound as though
14 they were alternatives. I was meeting with the head of the Bosnian Serb
15 and would have done so anyhow.
16 Q. You were meeting with the head of the Bosnian Serb what, sir?
17 A. The Bosnian Serbs. He was their president.
18 Q. I see. And why had you -- had your communication with
19 General Mladic ceased, if you know?
20 A. Amongst other reasons of which I'm not aware, because the one
21 that he was telling me about, was that I had rejected two of his liaison
22 officers from a headquarters in -- in fact the British headquarters in
23 Sector Sarajevo
24 back to his headquarters in -- at some point about two weeks before that,
25 I think, if I remember the timing correctly.
1 Q. Now, with regard to your meeting with Karadzic, Karadzic informed
2 you that we will counterattack where we have been attacked. Correct?
3 A. If I have written it yes, then, I write that there, yes.
4 Q. As a matter of fact, you put that in quotes as something that he
6 A. Then -- yeah.
7 Q. Was that statement made in reference to attacks by NATO, attacks
8 by the UN, attacks by the BiH, do you know? Can you help us out there?
9 A. Oh, I think it is the BiH. And the UN hadn't carried out any
10 attacks at all.
11 Q. Okay. In paragraph 44 there was a discussion with regard --
12 between you and Dr. Karadzic with regard to attacks by NATO; correct? Or
13 so you relate.
14 "He claimed that the BiH were attacking from Srebrenica on a
15 regular basis, and the BSA had taken casualties. Karadzic expressed no
16 concern about the threat of NATO and announced a clear preparedness to
17 take NATO on."
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Okay. Did he expand at all on that and how that was going to
20 occur? Did he tell you what his plans were, his thinking was in that
22 A. Well, other than I reported in that paragraph, 44, I don't think
23 he did that I can remember anyhow.
24 Q. Okay. And paragraph 45 you indicate that:
25 "This comment and his general tone made it quite clear that
1 Karadzic was exercising a high degree of political control and was
2 effectively in charge of the Bosnian Serb strategy and policy at this
4 A. That was my impression, yeah.
5 Q. Okay. You go on to say, "there was some speculation at the time
6 there was a rift between Karadzic and Mladic."
7 And when you say that there was some speculation, was that
8 speculation on your part, or was that speculation in the international
9 community, was there discussions about that? Can you please expand on
11 A. I -- I don't really remember how wide the discussion was. Can I
12 certainly remember that we were trying to understand, or I was trying to
13 understand with my immediate staff what the relationship was. So -- but
14 how wide that speculation existed, I can't recall.
15 Q. Okay. Within the context of your experience with General Mladic,
16 would it be fair to say that, based upon your experience with him in the
17 times that you met with him, that he indicated no interest in political
18 aspirations but confined himself to those of a military sort?
19 A. I -- no, I don't think I see it quite like that.
20 Q. How do you see it?
21 A. As I explained earlier, he was in that position where policy is
22 and the political factors are translated into the military. You cannot
23 detach yourself if you are to do that job from the political. Your
24 emphasise your weight, if you like, lies in the military, but you are
25 joined in the political process, or you can't translate the political
1 activity into military effect. And the -- and I think I cover that in
2 effect when I say in that paragraph 45: "My assessment, with the benefit
3 of hindsight, is that ..."
4 At the time his weight lay in preparing for the offensive. That
5 doesn't mean to say that he was detached from the political process.
6 Q. Okay. My point, and clearly we're not connecting, my point is
7 that you did not -- you did not in your experience with Mladic find that
8 he had political aspirations, did you?
9 A. I -- no. He never once mentioned that he wanted to be the
10 president, if that's what you mean.
11 Q. You have seen what's in my mind. And, as a matter of fact, he
12 made it very clear that he was following the political agenda of his
13 president, Dr. Karadzic, in your meetings with him.
14 A. No, I don't recall him saying it like that.
15 Q. Okay. Perhaps the language I'm using is inexact. But would it
16 be fair to say that you understood that was his intent?
17 MR. SAXON: Well, that calls for speculation.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
19 Mr. Guy-Smith.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH:
21 Q. Can you help us at all with the language --
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're rephrasing?
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure.
1 Q. Can you help us at all with any of the language that
2 General Mladic used that brought you to the conclusion that he was not
3 interested in being the president?
4 A. What I said was that I don't recall him saying that that's what
5 he wanted to be. I -- I don't --
6 Q. So it's the absence of this statement.
7 A. Yeah.
8 Q. Okay. Okay. In terms of the thesis that you had developed in
9 March concerning the COHA and the consequences that would flow from that,
10 I take it that you engaged in an analysis with regard to what would be
11 the consequences of the conflict starting up in the various enclaves;
13 A. No, it's not correct. And you are -- you're making more of a
14 thesis than I -- than I was at the time.
15 Q. All right. Okay. Did you take into consideration what the
16 consequences would be when the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was no
17 longer operative with regard to the enclaves?
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Saxon.
19 MR. SAXON: Well, I think the question has just been asked an
20 answered, Your Honour.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, I have asked a different question now.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Where was it asked and answered, Mr. Saxon?
23 MR. SAXON: The question -- the previous question, 8 to 12. And
24 then the answer beginning at 13. Appears to me to be the same question.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith?
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: It's not the same question. One deals with the
2 thesis, and the other deals with whether he took something into
3 consideration. Since he corrected me and said that I made more of his
4 thesis than there was, I'm asking a question to make a determination of
5 what -- whether or not he took this particular issue into account.
6 MR. SAXON: The concern I have, Your Honour, is what the
7 difference between engaging in an analysis regarding an event and taking
8 into consideration consequences of the same event?
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, a thesis has within it, a conclusion;
10 whereas an analysis has within it a series of factors that may reach a
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Allow the question.
13 THE WITNESS: Perhaps you could ask the second question again,
14 because I've lost it somewhere on this screen.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Did you take into consideration what the
16 consequences would be when the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was no
17 longer operative with regard to the enclaves?
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. It was the sort of things I was
19 thinking about was going to -- difficulty of getting the convoys in. In
20 fact, that was already proving difficult. The -- and generally
21 maintaining my ability to carry out my mandate of getting the aid and so
22 forth into those enclaves. That is what I was thinking about then, as I
23 recall it.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH:
25 Q. Okay. I want to move to the incident at Markale II for some
2 With regard to Markale II, at the outset there was a question
3 with regard to who was responsible for the bombing; correct?
4 A. Oh, we had to carry out an investigation, yes.
5 Q. Okay. And with regard to the investigation that was carried out,
6 there were, would it be fair to say, a number of different views as to
7 who was responsible? And let me explain to you what I mean by that.
8 You, I believe, during the time of the investigation, got a hold
9 of General Mladic concerning this particular event; correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You asked that General Mladic investigate as to whether or not
12 VRS forces were involved in the shelling that resulted in the Markale II
13 incident; correct?
14 A. I think I did that. But I -- I can't recall exactly what I asked
15 of him.
16 Q. Okay. I'm --
17 A. You may have a record there.
18 Q. I have a record. I'm going read you something and see whether or
19 not that refreshes your recollection as to whether or not you asked
20 General Mladic to investigate.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: And the document that I'm referring to is
22 R0662224 previously tendered exhibits, and I'm referring to page 25.
23 "At 1413 hours on the 28th August, General Smith spoke on the
24 telephone to General Mladic for ten minutes concerning the shelling of
1 briefed on the incident only five minutes before the call. General Smith
2 informed him of the circumstances of the shelling and the fact that an
3 excess of 30 people had been killed and more than 40 wounded.
4 "General Smith explained the seriousness of the incident, and his
5 surprise in light of our discussions last week on the process --" excuse
6 me, "on the progress of the peace process, General Smith informed me that
7 the shelling was in clear breach of the NATO ultimatum. Mladic stated
8 that his staff had confirmed that no fire orders had been issued to his
9 units. He agreed to check that no weapons had been fired without
11 Does that refresh your recollection as to whether or not had you
12 a conversation with Mladic --
13 A. Oh, I'm --
14 Q. Concerning -- concerning --
15 A. Yes. But I didn't actually ask him to investigate. He said he
17 Q. Okay.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would this be a --
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: This would be convenient, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll take a break and come back at half past
22 Court adjourned.
23 --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 12.31 p.m.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH:
2 Q. We've established that you did not did ask General Mladic to
3 investigate and that General Mladic did, as I understand it, engage in an
5 A. Mm-hm.
6 Q. Ultimately, he reported to you --
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: If it's of assistance to the Chamber, if we could
8 have P2370 on the screen. And I believe it is page --
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before we go to P2370, what do we do with
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm not going to use it.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if I'm not mistaken, it's going to be page 5.
14 Oh, no, that's not right. That's not right.
15 I'm sorry, let's --
16 MR. SAXON: If I can assist, it probably is page 9.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you so much.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Saxon.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Perfect. Thank you so much. And if we could go
20 down to the third entry, which is 291000, August 1995.
21 Q. And I'd like to refer to the second paragraph there.
22 You've had a discussion with General Mladic. In the discussion
23 that you had with Mladic, Mladic has said that, based upon his
24 information, that no BSA forces were involved in the attack on the
25 Markale marketplace.
1 You have indicated to him what your concerns are with regard to
2 the type of weapon that was found, as well as I think it would be fair to
3 say a series of other concerns, both internationally as well as, once
4 again, in an attempt to determine who was responsible.
5 Referring to the second paragraph, it states:
6 "Mladic stated that all positions had been checked and he was
7 sure that none of them had fired. He once again urged that a joint
8 commission be set up to investigate the incident, as there were a number
9 of indications to suggest that it had been orchestrated by the BiH."
10 Without going into the issue of whether or not it had been
11 orchestrated by the BiH or not, with regard to the -- the urging by
12 Mladic that a joint commission be set up to engage in the investigation,
13 to your knowledge, was this done?
14 A. No, there wasn't a joint commission.
15 Q. Okay. Was there, to your knowledge, ever a request by UNPROFOR
16 to involve any FRY officials in an investigation of the Markale incident?
17 A. No, I don't recall anything like that.
18 Q. One of the things that did occur --
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if we could have -- I'm done with that
20 exhibit now.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just before it gets off the screen, General Smith,
22 what would the number 291000 August 1995, how is that deciphered? What
23 does it mean?
24 THE WITNESS: Oh, it's British army speak, if you like. It's the
25 way dates are done so that's the 1000 hours on 29th of August, 1995.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Oh. You put the time in between the date.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes. I can't imagine why we do that, but that's
3 what we do.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you for that clarification.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: And could we now have P2356 up on the screen.
7 I'm sorry, because I have a face page for this document which is
8 not a part of -- of the document itself.
9 Q. I'm going to -- I'm going to read you something, and then I will
10 have to ask that there be a bar table submission. It's the page that I
11 have, which is the front page of this particular document.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: What do you mean a bar table submission?
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I have to discuss the matter, I think,
14 first of all, with Mr. Saxon. I have a face page which is a code cable
15 page which is from HQ UNPROFOR Sarajevo office of Lieutenant-General
16 Rupert Smith, and it's a form which there's -- then attached the document
17 that is here but --
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would you like to put that on the ELMO?
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Then we can all see.
21 THE WITNESS: Sorry, what do we have to do? Oh.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if we could scroll down a little bit.
24 Q. And I want to refer to the second paragraph which is: "We wish
25 to repeat our views and concerns raised" --
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Saxon.
2 MR. SAXON: I'm very sorry to interrupt, but I think there is
3 some confusion here. It's my understanding that the page we're looking
4 at here is actually the very first page of what is Exhibit P67, which is
5 -- I believe if we called up P67, I think we will see this, which is the
6 large final report about the incident known as Markale II.
7 This page that we're looking at here, you see up at the top
8 left-hand corner, it's dated the 8th of September. And it's my
9 understanding that what we were looking at a moment ago, P2356 is dealt
10 with separately.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Fine. That was the way it was sent to me. I'm
12 happy -- if it's P67, then I'm happy to have it as P67. It's already in
13 evidence. I have no reason to reinvent the wheel here. If the face page
14 is already part of another exhibit, I have no desire to reinvent the
16 And let's pull up P67, then.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
18 Just before we remove this one, once again, General, I see now
19 you have added a B. If you look at that top left corner -- [Overlapping
20 speakers] ...
21 THE WITNESS: Ah, yes, Your Honour --
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: The time has got a B now.
23 THE WITNESS: Those have got -- that's the time zone you're in.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you so much.
25 THE WITNESS: It's this globalized world.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
2 P67, please.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Great.
4 Q. Looking at the second paragraph, it says:
5 "We wish to repeat our views and concerns raised in our fax of
6 021925Z, September."
7 So what would that be?
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: 2nd of September -- [Overlapping speakers]
9 THE WITNESS: [Overlapping speakers]... we are entering a mine
10 field here of procedure.
11 One of the reasons you have this system is it goes on all the
12 signals and messages being sent, and it doesn't matter where they are
13 sent from anywhere in the world, you can work out in what order they
14 came. And the -- say you have the date, time, and the time has the
15 letter after it, if it's -- you need to. And if you're working between
16 New York
17 were sent, messages were sent. And Zulu is Greenwich mean time. And you
18 count two hours before Zulu is Bravo, all the way around the world, until
19 you come back to Z again.
20 And then -- and that's why that's there. And so a capable that
21 was coming from New York
22 certainly have the time zone in its title in order to be clear when the
23 thing was originating.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH:
25 Q. Okay.
1 "That this report should be treated with the considerable care
2 and discretion. We must continue to be cautious about revealing our
3 evidence and data to public scrutiny?"
4 Could you tell me what is meant by that?
5 A. Well, it's covered later on. We've got nothing to hide, but by
6 -- we don't want to enter into the debate that was going on at the time
7 of, he did it; no, he didn't; he did it, type of argument that was part
8 of the -- the speculation, if you like, that was going on around us at
9 that time.
10 Q. Okay. Okay. So when you're saying: "But by declaring our
11 information, we risk entering an expert argument which led a judgement.
12 Other so-called experts have been or continue to be selective in what
13 evidence they chose to consider and adduce to support their judgements."
14 Now with regard to the debate that was going on at that time, I
15 take it that the debate was who was responsible for the Markale incident;
17 A. Yes, yes.
18 Q. And in order to get to the bottom of this debate, the objective
19 scientific, if that is a proper term.
20 Let me rephrase that. The objective information that was
21 available was not necessarily in the hands of all of the individuals who
22 were part of this debate; is that correct? For example --
23 A. He did it, no; he didn't do it, type of argument that was going
24 on, was certainly not informed.
25 Q. But here you have this issue of other so-called experts. So with
1 regard to -- with regard to the issue of expertise, there were other
2 individuals who were weighing in with regard to who was responsible,
3 based upon an analysis of what evidence they had; correct?
4 A. I can't recall the substance of the debate or who all the other,
5 you know, people were. But --
6 Q. But do you recall a Russian colonel by the name of Demurenko?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And he weighed in on who was responsible with regard to this
9 incident, did he not?
10 A. He was involved in -- and again, I would have to see the
11 chronology of when who said what, but he was certainly involved at one
12 stage. I think, if I recall correctly, his fears or opinions changed.
13 But I can't -- I don't recall in what order everybody was talking.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Am I right that we're speculating here? The one
15 possibility is also that they might have had the same evidence, and it is
16 question of interpretation of evidence.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's what I'm trying to get to, and I will in a
18 moment, Your Honour.
19 Q. Which is -- but for a moment, since we have taken a slight
20 digression, and I apologise, Demurenko was a Russian who was a member of
21 UNPROFOR; correct.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And Demurenko made a public statement with regard to the issue of
24 the Markale incident; correct?
25 A. Yes, I think that is so.
1 Q. In which he --
2 A. Well, put it this way. I think his statement became public.
3 Q. Very well.
4 A. Whether he made a public statement, I don't know --
5 Q. And his public statement -- the statement that was made that
6 became public was a statement that attributed responsibility to some
7 party other than the Bosnian Serb army; correct?
8 A. I'm not sure that was what he said, no. I -- I don't think he
9 was as definite as that.
10 Q. Okay. So, as you sit here today, you recall him being in a
11 conjectural mode, perhaps, as to who --
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. -- was responsible --
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. -- and had not come up with a definitive view?
16 A. I don't recall a definitive view.
17 Q. Was the information that is contained in this report --
18 A. Which one?
19 Q. The report that is in front of us.
20 A. The report that is covered by this --
21 Q. Right.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. Was that information revealed to General Mladic, to your
24 knowledge? Was he sent a copy of this report?
25 A. No. I don't think he was.
1 Q. Was any member of --
2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask that the speakers
3 do not overlap.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH:
5 Q. Was any member --
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Did you hear that?
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: I did, indeed.
8 Q. Was any member of the FRY government, to your knowledge, supplied
9 with this report?
10 A. I -- not by my headquarters anyhow.
11 Q. And specifically do you know whether or not General Perisic was
12 supplied with this report?
13 A. I don't know.
14 Q. Okay.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just to complete the circle, do you know whether
16 any BiH authorities were copied with this report?
17 THE WITNESS: Not by my headquarters.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: That was, indeed, my next question, Your Honour.
20 I was going to get them all in there.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you. I am done with that exhibit. And it
23 has already been introduced into evidence, so we don't need to do
24 anything further with it.
25 Could I have -- I believe it is 1D01-0847, and I hope I'm right,
1 up on the screen.
2 And if we could have the assistance of the usher and put the ELMO
3 down so that I can -- I'm not seeing Sir Rupert's head cut in half by the
5 Q. All right. I'd like to you take a -- a look -- at this -- at
6 this map and see, first of all, by looking at it if you can familiarize
7 yourself with the area at all.
8 A. I think I'm looking at Sarajevo
9 Q. I think we can, yes.
10 A. But I can't read ...
11 Q. Right.
12 A. No good showing me that.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. If we could try to expand. There we go.
14 And once again. And once again. And if we could scroll down. And
15 scroll down some more. Up. Stop right there. If we can expand in bit.
16 Q. Looking at that, do you recognise the area?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. You'll note that there are a number of different markings that
19 are on this particular map. And my question to you is: Do you recognise
20 the area of those markings as being areas that were under the control of
21 the BiH?
22 A. Well, you've got to be a bit more specific. What markings are we
23 referring to?
24 Q. I'm referring to for example where it says 111 vbbr.
25 A. Uh-huh. But not where it says 1 Smbr at the bottom.
1 Q. Yes, and that too. I'm just dealing --
2 A. Then, no, I don't recognise that as being areas --
3 Q. Okay. Do you recognise 111 vbbr as being an area that was under
4 the control of the BiH?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And I'm going to ask you the same question for 112, 102, 101,
7 155, 105, and 152 and 115.
8 A. Yeah. Yes --
9 Q. Okay. With regard to the designation 1 smbr, that's not an area
10 that, in your estimation, was under the control of the ABiH?
11 A. Not at that time, no.
12 Q. Okay. Very well.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could pull -- make it smaller. Thank you.
14 Q. You will notice there are a couple of markings above where we
15 were before. And do you recognise those areas as being areas that were
16 under the control of the BiH?
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which markings, Mr. Guy-Smith?
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: 3 Spbr.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
20 THE WITNESS: No, that wasn't ABiH.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH:
22 Q. Okay. Now, you will notice that there is a dotted line that
23 seems to cover all of the areas that you do recognise as being under the
24 control of the BiH. Would you recognise that as being the confrontation
1 A. Oh, can I see two. And, yes, I -- there's a red one or a browny
2 one and a blue one.
3 Q. Right.
4 A. They more or less mark, as my memory had it, that that was the
5 confrontation line, yeah.
6 Q. Okay.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, take us along, gentlemen.
8 General Rupert, you said you can see two, and you can see one --
9 what are you -- what are those -- where's the two, and where is the one?
10 THE WITNESS: There's two lines, the dotted lines that surround
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Oh, you're not looking at the straight
13 line, solid straight line. Okay.
14 THE WITNESS: No, it's the dotted line.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. The dotted lines, okay. Then I'm with you.
16 Now, what -- what is the -- the question that you were asking,
17 Mr. Guy-Smith was [Overlapping speakers] ...
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Whether he recognises those as being the
19 confrontation lines.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: The dotted lines?
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, the dotted lines.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Right. And that the BiH forces were inside those
23 dotted lines? Is that what you asked a little earlier?
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's what I'm getting to, yes.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Sorry, because I thought you were referring
1 to the solid line.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: No. Okay.
3 Q. The question that was asked by His Honour is the question that I
4 was going ask you, which is within the blue dotted line, that would be
5 the area that's under control of the BiH; correct? And that would be the
6 confrontation line?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And the -- the brown dotted line, that would be the area that was
9 the confrontation line where the Bosnian Serb army would be in control.
10 A. On the outside.
11 Q. On the outside?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Right? Okay.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could I have that moved as defendant's next in
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is so admitted. May it please be given an
17 exhibit number.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D97.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH:
21 Q. One other question. With regard to this particular map, as you
22 look at it, do you recognise any of the areas that are within the
23 Bosnian-Herzegovina army's control as being points where they had a
24 mortar position?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Okay. Very good.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you. I'm done with that exhibit at this
4 Perhaps I'm not done; I'm being signalled.
5 [Defence counsel confer]
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: I have been -- I have asked by my colleague to
7 translate for you the following, which is if we look at the upper
8 left-hand corner of the map --
9 A. I need it to be --
10 Q. So do I. It's coming up.
11 There are some dates you will notice, where it says -- I'll have
12 Mr. Lukic read it in B/C/S, and it can be translated appropriately,
13 because otherwise I will make a mess of the language.
14 With the Court's indulgence.
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] May I read this and the interpreters
16 will then interpreter it for the record.
17 So in the upper left-hand corner, it says working map of the
18 Chief of Staff. And then it says in the next line, command of the
19 12th dKoV. And then the next line says start, 01.03.1995. There are
20 dots dividing the numbers, so I assume this is the date. And then it
21 says completion, the 16th -- or, rather, 16.15. And then it says 14th of
22 September, 1995. And in the right hand corner --
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Lukic
24 just hold on. Just hold on. Can we go back. We were not told what dKoV
25 stands for. What does that stand for? And Pocetak.
1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I can give you my interpretation.
2 That would be the 12th Division of the ground forces, but I don't want to
3 be the one giving you this interpretation.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Previous translation continues] ... interpret
5 Pocetak for us, please, and Zavrsetak. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. But those
6 figures following those words mean a little less to me, unless I know
7 what those words mean.
8 Can the interpreters help, please.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Pocetak means beginning; and Zavrsetak means
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] If you want me to translate for you
13 what it says here in the right-hand corner --
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Previous translation continues] ...
15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] It says the defence of the republic.
16 It's in the upper right-hand corner; that's what it says. And then it
17 says military secret.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry. Can we scroll to the right, please. Thank
19 you so much.
20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] So it says in capital letters the
21 defence of the republic. And then underneath it, military secret. And
22 then, strictly confidential.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] And in the lower right-hand corner of
25 this map, right at the bottom of this map, if we can scroll down a little
1 bit, it says Chief of Staff; and then underneath it, colonel; and then
2 underneath it, Rizvo Pleh.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which means? Rizvo Pleh?
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I believe it's this man's name, since
5 the beginning of both words are capitalised. So I assume it's the name
6 of the person.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
8 [Defence counsel confer]
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry about that, Mr. Guy-Smith. You may proceed.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Perfectly fine, Your Honour. Not a problem.
12 Q. I do apologise, but I want to go back and revisit something with
13 you for a moment.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could have P2366 up on the screen, please.
15 THE INTERPRETER: The counsel is kindly asked to speak into the
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: I shall.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if we could have -- I believe it's page 3 up
20 on the screen, which would be paragraph numbered 12. I'm missing ...
21 Q. We were talking earlier about the issue of fuel. And
22 paragraph 12 of this document, I think, speaks to some of that
23 discussion, which is that: "Over dinner, Mr. Akashi," and that would be
24 yourself, I'm sure sir, "General Smith, and General Janvier protested the
25 denial of fuel convoys to the eastern enclaves. The Bosnian Serbs
1 persisted with the line that UNPROFOR was providing supplies and fuel to
2 the BiH. Of note, Karadzic was heard to remark 'we regard humanitarian
3 and UNPROFOR convoys ... as commercial convoys for the benefit of the
4 Muslims. We are under double restrictions (sanctions), you can expect
5 more restriction.'"
6 With regard to the issue of -- of Karadzic's making this
7 statement, that "the UNPROFOR and humanitarian convoys were commercial
8 convoys for the benefit of the Muslims," can you expand at all in terms
9 of the conversation that was had about these supplies being used for the
10 BiH army? Can you take this any further with regard to what was being
11 said by Karadzic at that time?
12 A. Well, this was --
13 MR. SAXON: Well --
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Saxon.
15 Mr. Saxon is on his feet.
16 MR. SAXON: The problem with that question is that this
17 paragraph does not mention the BiH army. Is Mr. Guy-Smith suggesting
18 that that is what Mr. Karadzic was referring to?
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well.
20 Q. That's -- was Mr. Karadzic referring to the BiH army when he was
21 talking about providing supplies and fuel to the BiH?
22 A. Well, I don't recall. The -- certainly it can be said we were
23 providing it to those enclaves.
24 Q. When you say you were providing it to those enclaves, you're
25 referring to those enclaves where there were BiH army personnel.
1 A. There were -- yes.
2 Q. The army personnel there were such individuals as
3 Commander Delic; correct?
4 A. In one of them, yes.
5 Q. And Commander Oric?
6 A. The name rings a bell again, but I would have to refresh my
7 memory as to where. But, yes, there were commanders and defenders there.
8 Q. Okay. And do you by any chance have -- at the time, I'm not
9 asking right now because obviously time has gone by. Did you at the time
10 have intelligence with regard to the strength of those forces in those
11 enclaves where the name Delic was, and perhaps Oric?
12 A. Intelligence would be too precise a word.
13 Q. I'm sorry, that's a military word. Information.
14 A. We had information largely from our own observations of what was
15 in those -- what the number of defenders and so forth in those enclaves.
16 Q. Okay. Thank you.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm done with that exhibit now.
18 And if we could have now P2360 on the screen.
19 Q. This is a document that refers to a telephone conversation
20 between yourself and General Mladic on the 28th of May, 1995.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I'd like to start with page 1.
22 Q. Page 1, paragraph 1, it states that: "Mladic" -- it says "he
23 claims," so I'm putting Mladic's name in there.
24 "Mladic claimed General Smith was acting on the political
25 direction of the Bosnian government. Mladic demanded the immediate
1 cessation of all NATO combat and transport flights and the unconditional
2 release of detained Serb personnel by 1800 hours that evening."
3 Okay, first of all, do you recall Mladic accusing you of working
4 for the Bosnian government?
5 A. I don't recall the specific incident, no.
6 Q. Okay, with regard to the information that's contained in this
7 particular document, was this -- was this information made at or near the
8 time of the conversation that you had with Mladic?
9 A. Oh, yes. I'm -- I would be confident that this is a good report,
10 as it were.
11 Q. Okay. Thank you. So I take it you can't take us any further
12 with regard to how the conversation progressed with regard to the
13 accusation made by Mladic that you were working for the Bosnian
14 government on May 28th, 1995
15 A. No, I can't. Unless there is in a subsequent paragraph this
16 matter is addressed.
17 Q. Okay. I'm going to go to paragraph number 4, which is on the
18 next page.
19 And obviously there's a great deal of -- of concern at the time
20 by, I think, both Mladic as well as yourself, with regard to a situation
21 getting heated up that could potentially jeopardize the lives of a number
22 of individuals. But with regard to that, in paragraph 4 it says:
23 "Mladic accept the General Smith's offer to calm the situation
24 and advised him to take a tranquilliser in order to be fit to make
25 reasonable designations."
1 And I take it that was you telling Mladic that he needed to calm
2 down, or is this --
3 A. No. This is Mladic telling me to calm down.
4 Q. I see.
5 A. And stop bombing and doing unreasonable things.
6 Q. I see.
7 Now, with regard to -- with regard to you calming down, if you
8 could kindly tell us how Mladic was perceiving that you were bombing,
9 since, as I understand it, you were not and NATO was. How did this come
10 about that Mladic was accusing you of these bombings?
11 A. Yeah, because I had made it quite plain to Mladic and in a public
12 statement that if the weapons that had been removed by the Bosnian Serbs
13 from the weapon control points were not put back, then I'd request that
14 sanction be conducted by NATO. And they didn't go back, so I turned my
15 key for the bombing.
16 Q. And when you say you turned your key, I -- I understand that
17 there was a double key system between UNPROFOR and NATO, and both keys
18 had to be turned in order for the bombing to commence; correct?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. Now, was your turning of the key, in the subsequent bombing
22 A. No.
23 Q. What happened?
24 A. We didn't get the weapons back, and I had some -- and I cannot
25 remember the precise number, but it was in the order of 400 people taken
1 hostage eventually.
2 Q. I see. Now --
3 A. The --
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought the question referred to whether the key
5 did turn, and if he says it was not successful, it means that the bombing
6 didn't take place at that point.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Let's clear it up.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let's clear that.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH:
10 Q. Keys were turned. The bombing was ordered, right?
11 A. I'm sorry, I thought --
12 Q. Keys were turned --
13 A. Yes. Perhaps I should not have used the word "turned the key."
14 I requested NATO to carry out that action. NATO agreed to do so,
15 and it was carried out. It was not successful for the purpose that I had
17 Q. And the purpose that you had intended it for was to get the heavy
18 weapons back --
19 A. In the exclusion zone -- sorry, into the weapon collection zone.
20 Q. Into the weapon collection point?
21 A. Of that exclusion zone.
22 Q. Now, with regard to the bombing that occurred, where did that
23 bombing occur, if you recall?
24 A. Yes, it occurred in Pale.
25 Q. And with regard to casualties, were there casualties in Pale as a
1 result of that bombing?
2 A. I do not recall the extent of the casualties, no.
3 Q. So I take it by you saying you don't recall the extent of the
4 casualties, there were casualties, it's just that --
5 A. I can't say how many or what they were or --
6 Q. All right, fine?
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: But casualties, there were?
8 THE WITNESS: Again, I can't be sure.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH:
10 Q. And then the response to the bombing was that hostages were
12 A. Amongst other things, yes.
13 Q. I'll just deal with the hostages here for the moment.
14 A. Okay.
15 Q. Now, with regard to the purpose for which you were there, as I
16 understand it, this act, would it be fair to say escalated the problem -
17 and by that I mean the bombing - escalated the problem that existed
18 between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serb army, didn't it? The result of the
19 400 hostages being taken, it would be the escalation --
20 A. It certainly exacerbated it, yes.
21 Q. Okay, exacerbated. So would be it fair to say --
22 A. The point I'm making is the problem remained the same.
23 Q. So you were not --
24 A. [Overlapping speakers]...
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Overlapping speakers] ... It got worse.
1 THE WITNESS: Worse [Overlapping speakers] ... It just made it
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: [Overlapping speakers] ...
4 Q. So you were in not in a position where there was, at the time,
5 shall we say, a fair dialogue going on as between you and General Mladic
6 concerning lowering the heat.
7 A. I don't understand the question.
8 Q. Okay. What I'm trying to get at is, you had a purpose. Your
9 purpose was to get the weapons back.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You bombed, and you ended up having a bunch of hostages taken?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. So you and Mladic were not taking to each other in any
14 particularly effective way in terms of having a peace on the ground, in
15 terms of diminishing anything. And from the standpoint of -- armed
17 A. With the hostages being taken, and then the orders I was given as
18 a result of that, there wasn't any conflict.
19 Q. There wasn't any conflict?
20 A. Not at that point, no.
21 Q. Okay. Conflict -- we'll talk about that in a second.
22 Going back to paragraph 4. Mladic says:
23 "If you continue to exercise such unreasonable behavior, he was
24 sure there would be many in the UN who would find themselves in a
25 difficult and finally inextricable situation. He required all NATO
1 flights be stopped. He meant by all this all combat and transport
2 flights as the latter were used to move ammunition and other supplies to
3 the Muslims."
4 That's what he told you; correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And with regard to that, now, would it be fair to say, if you're
7 looking at it objectively, you are in open hostility with the
8 Bosnian Serb army. You're bombing, they're taking hostages, and he is
9 accusing of supplying the Bosnian-Herzegovinian army. Correct?
10 A. Let's go back to what I said to you about confrontation and
11 convict. No, we have stopped conflict.
12 Q. This is --
13 A. And the confrontation is most certainly there.
14 Q. I see, and the confrontation being the bombing and the taking of
16 A. No, the bombing is conflictual. It didn't work.
17 Q. And the time --
18 A. [Overlapping speakers]... we remain in a confrontation.
19 Q. And the taking of hostages, that is --
20 A. That is it part of the confrontation. The taking of them is
21 clearly a conflictual act. But we're now in situation where we are not
23 Q. Oh, I see.
24 A. I have been told by my own political authorities to stop. I am
25 not allowed to, as it were, go on bombing and. I'm not allowed to go and
1 - not that I could at the time - as it were, capture my -- recapture the
2 hostages. We are in a different situation, and I don't disagree that
3 we're in confrontation over these issues.
4 Q. Okay.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: The situation is tense, but there is no --
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: Tense, but no blood flowing.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: No blood flowing.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'd like to go to paragraph 6 of the same
9 document, where it says: "Mladic asked whether the UN troops were a
10 peacekeeping or an occupying force."
11 Q. Did the conversation go any further than that, or was that just
12 the bold statement that was made, if you recall?
13 A. I only suppose that this was a statement by Mladic rather than a
14 debate between us. Particularly is in the same paragraph we fall to
15 discussing the -- his soldiers that I have as prisoners.
16 Q. Now his soldiers that you have as prisoners, how were they taken?
17 A. They were taken by a French counterattack, after the French had
18 had some soldiers killed and a position taken, in which the attackers
19 dressed up at Frenchmen, Frenchmen in UN -- in the UN, and that is what
20 I'm referring to in -- or is referred to as the breach of the protocols.
21 Q. Okay.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not quite sure if I understand what you mean
23 by Frenchmen in the UN.
24 THE WITNESS: Well, they were in blue helmets and so forth. The
25 bit that's the UN is the blue helmet. But the rest of it was in French
2 MR. GUY-SMITH:
3 Q. And, finally, I'd like that take a look at paragraph 12 of this
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Which will be found, I believe, on the next page.
7 Q. And I am inferring something from the first sentence which is:
8 "General Smith said he was not in command of NATO forces, nor did he
9 direct their actions."
10 So I'm inferring that what has happened is that Mladic has
11 accused you of being responsible or in command of NATO forces and
12 directing the bombing. And that's a question: Did he do that?
13 A. I don't remember.
14 Q. Okay. Mladic says that he knew this was -- said he knew this to
15 be a lie as NATO could not act without his request," referring to your
16 request. And that's what I think you were talking about beforehand,
17 where you requested the action be taken and then NATO then would proceed
18 to do --
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. -- the bombing?
21 A. Yeah.
22 Q. Now, you were the one responsible for recommending an attack take
23 place, but you did not command the forces. Which would be correct from
24 what you a have told us.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Did you -- did you collaborate with your colleagues in NATO as to
2 what an appropriate target for the air-strike would be?
3 A. Oh, yes.
4 Q. Okay. Did you inform them based upon the information that you
5 had received as commander of UNPROFOR with regard to where particular
6 sensitive targets would be?
7 A. I don't -- I'm not sure I understand --
8 Q. Well, when you collaborated with your colleagues about what would
9 be an appropriate target --
10 A. I see what you mean.
11 Q. Yeah.
12 A. I don't recall the basis on which the information came, whether
13 it was my information or somebody else's, but we certainly discussed the
14 targets, yes.
15 Q. Okay. And did you inform Mladic when you told him that you were
16 not in control but that you had been responsible for recommending the
17 attacks, that you had been instrumental in making a determination of what
18 specific target would be under attack?
19 A. No, I don't think I told him that.
20 Q. Do you know whether or not that was information that Mladic
21 claimed to have intercepted?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. No.
25 Q. All right. Now, you also indicated -- you also took the
1 opportunity to talk about different types of air action.
2 Now, the first one, close air support, which was flown in direct
3 support of the UN force which was used in self-defence, I take that would
4 be where UNPROFOR unit had been specifically attacked?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. The second type, which is air-strike, such as the two against the
7 Bosnian Serbs last week," that was not one where there was a self-defence
8 issue but, rather, that's what you would call -- if I might, a coercive
10 A. You can call it what you will. That is the -- those air-strikes
11 are the ones that associated with the exclusion zones that I discussed
12 earlier in answer to one of your other questions.
13 Q. I understand that. And what I'm doing is I'm now taking that a
14 bit further, which is that the determination to use an air-strike in a
15 fashion other than in self-defence was the threat real -- was the threat
16 realized, which is why I'm calling it a coercive act?
17 A. [Overlapping speakers]... no, no, it is associated with those
18 exclusions --
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Enforcement of compliance. Is that what you want
20 to say by --
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I'm not ...
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let me just find out.
23 The first category of self-defence, was self-defence in that
24 sense limited only to an attack specifically against UNPROFOR forces, or
25 could it be against third parties too?
1 THE WITNESS: Eight -- at the early part of the year, the
2 interpretation was UNPROFOR or UNHCR and UNPROFOR, and an immediate
3 threat, patent, immediate, present threat.
4 As the year came on, and by later in the year this definition of
5 self-defence becomes greatly enhanced, greatly expanded.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: To include?
7 THE WITNESS: To include those under ones protection, so you are
8 now starting to deal with people in --
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Safe zones.
10 THE WITNESS: Safe areas, and so on and so forth.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. Thank you, I'm done with that exhibit.
12 Could we have P2364 up on the screen, please.
13 Q. And I want to refer specifically to paragraph 2(b) and discuss
14 for a moment the issue of the Tuzla
15 First of all, to your knowledge, were NATO forces used in
16 improving the air strip at Tuzla
17 A. I don't think NATO was at all, no. Not in 1994.
18 Q. To your knowledge, were American personnel in the area of the
20 feasibility of using the Tuzla
21 A. I don't know. I wasn't there.
22 Q. Okay. Did you receive any information with regard to such forces
23 being in the area?
24 A. No.
25 Q. When Mladic alleged the use of Tuzla airfield for the supply of
1 arms to the BiH covered by NATO, I take it there he was referring to the
2 BiH army; correct?
3 A. Where -- where are we?
4 Q. B, 2(b).
5 A. I beg your pardon.
6 Q. Not a problem.
7 A. I'm -- yes, I would -- I think can you infer that, yes.
8 Q. Okay. With regard to -- with regard to your statement that is
9 contained in this particular paragraph, when you told him that NATO was
10 not in any way associated with the alleged landings of air-crafts at
13 A. I don't remember whether -- exactly what I'm responding to. But
14 the -- I'm certainly and clearly stating there that NATO have nothing to
15 do with it.
16 Q. Okay. If NATO had nothing to do with it, to your knowledge,
17 would the entity who was then using the Tuzla airfield be UNPROFOR and
18 others, or who would it be?
19 A. If it was being used, in -- whenever this is, March of 1995, it
20 wasn't the UN, and it wasn't NATO. That's what I'm saying there.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Did the UN have any aircraft in --
22 THE WITNESS: We had some helicopters, and there was a number of
23 aircraft used by Zagreb
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: These aircraft in Zagreb belonged to the --
1 THE WITNESS: UN aeroplanes, yes. I mean, they were provided if
2 my memory serves me correctly, by Ukraine, but they were, as it were,
3 flying --
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Under the UN flag.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH:
7 Q. Thank you for that response.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm done with that exhibit.
9 Q. I want to ask you just a very brief question with regard to a
10 gentleman who I believe was on the ground before your time, and that was
11 General Wahlgren. Did you ever have any contact with General Wahlgren?
12 A. Not that I remember.
13 Q. Okay. What I'd like to do is I'd like to show you something and
14 see whether or not you would agree with the statement made.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have 1D00-2536 on the screen, and I'd
16 like to have page 22.
17 If we could go down to the -- scroll down. And you'll notice
18 about midway in the very last paragraph it states: "General Wahlgren
19 prophetically warned UN political authorities in New York, 'If one a
20 allowed no controls of the military or paramilitary units of the Bosnian
21 government, one would create a scenario which would encourage the use of
22 the safe areas as havens where forces could refit, rearm, train, and
23 prepare for further military operations.'"
24 And I take it that that is the prophecy that you then were
25 referring to when you said that there were BiH army members in the
1 enclaves? And perhaps I'm being a bit more expansive than you would like
2 to be.
3 A. I think it is more of a prophecy of the hostage and shield
4 situation. That's as I understand it. Can I be told what this comes
6 Q. Yes, absolutely. This comes from -- and if we can go to the very
7 first page. It comes from an article entitled, "Responsibility of
8 Command: How UN and NATO Commanders Influenced Air Power over Bosnia
9 written by Mark A. Bucknam of the United States air force, a colonel.
10 A. Okay.
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I could have for the moment, page 22 as
13 defendant's next in order.
14 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. With the cover page.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: The cover page and page 22 of this document are
18 admitted into evidence. May they please be given an exhibit number.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D98.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH:
22 Q. There came a time when a new coloured helmet was introduced into
23 the area, the green helmets of the RFF?
24 A. Hardly new, but, yes, the rapid reaction force, I think is what
25 you want, not the RFF.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: RRF.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH:
4 Q. The RRF was a force that was created to operate outside of the
5 direct strictures of the rules of engagement that applied to UNPROFOR.
7 A. No.
8 Q. That's a question.
9 A. No, it wasn't.
10 Q. Okay. What was the purpose of the creation of the rapid reaction
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: First of all, who created it?
13 MR. GUY-SMITH:
14 Q. Who created the rapid reaction force it?
15 A. It would be difficult to tie to down to a specific event and
16 decision, but you see the beginnings of it being formed by me in the
17 aftermath of the bombings at the end of May. And Britain and France
18 requested some artillery and more forces, and Britain and France
20 So you can probably date it from sometime in June as the origins
21 of the force being designated, if you like. It then takes some time to
22 appear, and it isn't formed up and complete until fairly late in August.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. You had asked a question, and I
24 interrupted, Mr. Guy-Smith.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH:
1 Q. Would it be fair to say, and I'm referring to once again your
2 book, that you made the determination that: "In the event I was forbidden
3 any offensive action, but the idea of the rapid reaction force gathered
4 momentum in London
5 such a force would deploy." And as you mentioned it would consist of
6 French and British infantry.
7 You go on to stay that: "The force was not to adopted UN blue
8 helmets and paint their vehicles white. It was an unmarked UN force.
9 This was fine by me. They were to fight, and I did foot want them to
10 look like the UN. I particularly wanted the guns. In comparison with
11 aircraft, guns were the appropriate -- appropriate target-locating and
12 fire-control systems, apply fire as accurately, can maintain the fire for
13 a longer, are not weather-dependant, and would be under my command. They
14 could, in the right quantities and deployment, defeat the Bosnian Serb
16 That's what you wrote.
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. That was its purpose?
19 A. That's what I wanted.
20 Q. And when you say that you wanted this particular force which was
21 not to adopt the UN blue helmets, would it be -- would it be fair to say
22 that this force was going to operate under your guiding hand privately
23 but not publicly?
24 A. It wasn't private. But it was -- it was -- it was eventually to
25 become under my command. It did not, as I say, all get there, until
1 after -- I'd have to look for the dates. But it's some time in
2 August that I've got the lot there.
3 Q. Okay. It's something that you did not --
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Saxon. I'm not quite sure, are you
5 objecting to the answer?
6 MR. SAXON: No, Your Honour. Simply, if we could have the page
7 number from the book that Mr. Guy-Smith has been reading from.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure. It's page 43.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. Do we have the title of the
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm sorry. I'm not sure which one you want.
12 It's page 354 and 355, and page 43 in e-court. I didn't scan the
13 gentleman's entire book into the system. Although I thought about it.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do we have the title of the book?
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, we do, Your Honour. It's 1D01-0620.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: The book is entitled "The Utility of Force: The
18 Art of War in the Modern World." It's written by Rupert Smith, who is
20 the Daily Telegraph.
21 Q. You indicated it wasn't private. You did not want Mladic to know
22 that you controlled these forces; correct?
23 A. That is correct, yes.
24 Q. Okay. And with regard to not wanting Mladic to know that you had
25 these forces, meaning that you controlled these forces, what was the --
1 and I use the word in a positive, not a negative sense. What was the
2 subterfuge or sleight of hand that you used to keep this information from
4 A. It wasn't to keep of information so much as to as to have him
5 understand the information in a -- in a way to my advantage.
6 Q. Okay. So you were using -- would it be fair to say that you were
7 using misinformation in order to --
8 A. No.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. This was entirely up to him to decide. This was an illusion, not
11 deception, like a --
12 Q. I thought that I said sleight of hand. I did.
13 A. The answer to your question is that I tried wherever possible to
14 make this force look as part of NATO and not part of the UN.
15 Q. I see. Were you concerned with the Bosnian Serb army's ability
16 to obtain intelligence information regarding this plan?
17 A. Clearly, yes.
18 Q. Okay. In that regard, what did -- what did you do to cloak the
19 wolf in another kind of cloth?
20 A. As you said, I didn't paint the vehicles white, and I didn't put
21 blue helmets on them.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Five, four, three, two ...
23 Would this be an appropriate time?
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: After Mr. Saxon.
25 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I'm wondering whether Mr. Guy-Smith can
1 indicate how much longer he thinks he will be in cross-examination. Both
2 parties had anticipated that this witness would finish today. And I'm
3 wondering if Mr. Guy-Smith does not have a great deal more, whether
4 perhaps we could either keep going, or could we sit for part of a session
5 this afternoon, depending on the Court's schedule?
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I was actually going to take the time to -- to go
9 through my notes to see what I could -- what I could cut out. I don't
10 think that I was -- I would be more than another hour. But whether --
11 I'm -- I don't want to commit right now, because there a couple of things
12 I've just got to go through to make sure that I've ...
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm happy to do whatever the Chamber wishes to
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: We can sit this afternoon, but 15 bis. One of us
17 is not going to be available. Yeah, if everybody else is available.
18 And I don't know whether there is a courtroom available.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe that -- I'm -- I was just informed that
20 Lukic and Lukic is in here. I don't know about the other courtrooms,
21 Your Honour. I don't know whether there is any availability.
22 Rather than scrambling about, why don't we just do it first thing
23 tomorrow morning and then proceed to base?
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think the Registrar is trying to make inquiries.
25 We'll find out once she comes from the phone.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. Fine. Obviously I'm in your hands.
2 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, I'm advised that the courtroom is available.
4 I don't know whether parties want to do. You have a Bench of 15 bis.
5 [Defence counsel confer]
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm -- I am willing to proceed. I must admit
8 that I'm a bit tired. I don't know whether the witness is similarly
9 tired and would like to take a break or not. I have another witness to
10 prepare for, for tomorrow. If I had my druthers I would prefer to start
11 again tomorrow fresh, and hopefully I would be able to do it even in a
12 shorter period of time than, my expectations are now, that we could have
13 a full day. But I remain in your hands.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: So you're opposing Mr. Saxon's request, but you
15 are in our hands. I'm not quite sure --
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm opposing Mr. Saxon's request, but I also
17 would in all fairness to Sir Rupert, I don't know whether or not he is a
18 -- this is will cause him difficulties one way or the other. And I'm
19 happy to take that into consideration. I have no desire to inconvenience
20 anyone here, be it the Chamber or be it the witness.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: My problem is that I have a sneaky suspicion that
22 Mr. Saxon's request is based on his expectations of how things are going
23 to unfold with the next witness tomorrow. And I think he is trying to
24 reserve tomorrow to ensure that he can finish with the next witness,
25 particularly it being the last day of -- or working week -- the last
1 working day of the week for us tomorrow.
2 [Defence counsel confer]
3 MR. SAXON: That is part of my concern, Your Honour, yes.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe the -- is the next witness a 92 ter
5 witness as well?
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: He is viva voce, I think. He is viva voce.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: I think they changed him again. I -- yesterday's
8 viva voce is today's 92 ter.
9 MR. SAXON: The next witness will be led under Rule 92 ter,
10 Your Honour.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: So it is not this witness we have been told is
12 coming. Well, we have a 92 ter witness here that we're not able to
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: There we are. So ...
15 Do you still insist on coming back this afternoon?
16 MR. SAXON: If Sir Rupert will not protest too much by coming
17 back tomorrow morning, I had not insist, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. It looks like, Sir Rupert, you've got the
19 key. I don't know whether it is single or double. Yeah, it's double,
20 fatigue and convenience.
21 THE WITNESS: Fatigue is not a problem. I can go on answering
22 questions; that shouldn't be a factor. I have arrangements, it being a
23 public holiday in Belgium
24 account of that, that makes me want to be in Brussels tomorrow morning,
25 however late it is that I get there, so that would be my preference. I
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Shall we then sit again this afternoon.
2 MR. SAXON: Yes, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll come back at quarter past two, and can we
4 say in this court. And then Lukic and Lukic will be shifted.
5 Court adjourned. Come back at a quarter past 2.00.
6 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.54 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 2.17 p.m.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, if you haven't finished in this one
9 session, you're not likely to have other bite at the cherry. Everything,
10 re-examination and all.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Understood. And it's my understanding that we're
12 now sitting pursuant to 115 bis.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Only 15 bis, not 115.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm sorry 15. Thank you.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. For the record.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH:
17 Q. I want to just ask you very quickly what the letters MMB mean in
18 relationship to the Rapid Reaction Force, if anything. Is that a term
19 that you use for multi-national, something or other?
20 A. Ah. It -- it might -- if my -- I think what it refers to is that
21 the force was formed under a brigade headquarters, which was called the
22 multi-national brigade, if I remember correctly.
23 Q. And with regard to the force being formed under that particular
24 brigade headquarters, was that, for the purposes that we've been
25 discussing, so that it was not seemed to be under your direct control?
1 A. That wasn't the reason for it, but it also helped to have that
3 Q. Okay. All right. Now, with regard to the Rapid Reaction Force,
4 it was your assessment that the Rapid Reaction Force would be used to
5 fight against the Bosnian Serb army, was it not?
6 A. Not strictly, no. But it was -- it could have been used to fight
7 against anybody.
8 Q. I understand. But the most probable party was the Bosnian Serbs;
10 A. They were the ones who were stopping me from doing what I was
11 told to do.
12 Q. They were getting in your way; correct?
13 A. Of discharging my mandated, yes.
14 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to your understanding of the discharge of
15 your mandate, would it be fair to say that there was a division of
16 opinion between you and Janvier concerning whether or not negotiations
17 would be fruitful?
18 A. At what stage?
19 Q. After the May bombing.
20 A. Yes. We did not agree on the way forward.
21 Q. And in that regard, General Janvier believed that fighting could
22 be prevented by negotiation; correct? In a nutshell.
23 A. No, I don't think that was his belief. But I think he ought to
24 speak for himself.
25 Q. Okay.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I could refer the Court and counsel to
2 page 17779.
3 Q. Which refers to a document that you were being asked about.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Page of what document actually?
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: This is a transcript of the proceedings in the
6 Popovic case, and it's of Friday, the 9th of November, 2007. And I don't
7 know whether or not -- you may not have that document, Your Honour,
8 because the Prosecution may have only supplied you with information up to
9 the 7th. So if could you have 1D01-1270 up. There were two other days
10 of testimony. And if we could go to page 17779, which is page 27 in
12 Q. I'm picking up on the answer that you just give which was: "No,
13 I don't think that was his belief, but I think he ought to speak for
15 You were asked to comment on a document, and it says,
16 "General Smith," starting at line 10, "General Smith and Janvier have
17 different opinions. General Janvier believes that it is possible to
18 return to situation before 26 May through negotiations. General Smith
19 does not believe that we can return to the situation, and the best we can
20 hope for is the status quo." It continues at line 15:
21 "General Smith also believes that this -- that," excuse me, "that
22 is the parties -- that is the two parties want to fight and nothing will
23 prevent them, not even UNPROFOR. General Janvier believes they can be
24 prevented from fighting by negotiations."
25 And you were asked the following question: "Does that fairly
1 encapsulate the differences between you and your commander?"
2 And your answer is: "Pretty well."
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Okay. Now, because of that difference of opinion with regard to
5 how matters might proceed in the future, and by that I mean negotiation
6 or fighting, you determined -- I'm sorry, I don't like that.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Because he hasn't referred to fighting as -- as a
8 resolution of the problem. Just nobody can stop them fighting, not even
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
11 Q. I don't mean to mischaracterize what you said there.
12 Because of the differences of opinion, did you also, at that
13 point, take it upon yourself to determine -- take it upon yourself to
14 decide that you would make certain orders with or without the approval of
15 your commander, Janvier?
16 A. No. He was my commander.
17 Q. Okay. With regard to the issues of how you were to proceed, I'd
18 like to ask you to comment on -- on the following statement, and this is
19 at page 17780 at line 12.
20 "General Smith intends to inform Zagreb about what he is going to
21 do and not ask for permission. The justification will be that an
22 operational commander attempts, tries to assure the security of his
24 A. Is this the same document that we've been in before?
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. And this is my testimony. So I'm being read something.
2 Q. Yes, you are.
3 A. And do I know where it's come from?
4 Q. You did at the time, yes.
5 A. Indeed. And I don't see that that's in contrary to my point,
6 that, no, he was my commander. I'm still telling him what I'm doing.
7 It's up to him to now stop me.
8 Q. I see. So it would be fair to say, then, that your position was
9 that if you were in disagreement with your commander about a particular
10 form of proceeding, as you've put it, that if you did something as a
11 result of operational issue, and your commander, Janvier, felt that was
12 inappropriate, he could stop you?
13 A. Yes. I told him what I was doing. It's more to put it -- you
14 and I might have a disagreement as to about a course of action. Yours is
15 more hopeful than mine.
16 Q. Mm-hm.
17 A. I might still follow your course of action because you're my
18 boss, but I might equally prepare for the worst case that I have
19 envisaged. And that is the situation that I'm doing here, and I'm doing
20 it in the knowledge of my commander.
21 Q. Just so I'm clear about what you're saying, if we can go to page
22 17781 when there is a further discussion with about this issue. You were
23 asked the following question:
24 "And why does he, does Fortin put it in the terms that you're not
25 going to inform Zagreb
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Where are you reading that?
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: 17781, line 3.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's where I'm reading.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now it's disappeared, that 3, line 3.
6 Yeah, and this is a mischaracterization of what was said earlier.
7 Earlier he was going to tell Zagreb
8 tell Zagreb
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm asking him about this question and his
11 Q. "And why does he, does Fortin put it in terms that you're not
12 going to inform Zagreb
13 Janvier might not have liked what you were going to do?"
14 And your answer --
15 A. Can we go down the page.
16 Q. Sure we'll get there. And your answer is, with regard to whether
17 or not you were going to inform Zagreb
18 "Indeed. I wasn't about to enter into an argument, bureaucratic
19 argument with either the United Nations or France, if I could avoid it
20 about where troops under my command were going to be positioned."
21 A. That's fine.
22 Q. That's fine. And you felt, as I understand it, that as a
23 military commander, you were in a position to make the appropriate
24 determination of how best to utilize your troops.
25 A. But I think you have taken this -- and I don't know that we're
1 talking about all my forces here. I think we're talking earlier in that
2 set of argument about what was to be done with the Rapid Reaction Force.
3 Q. Precisely.
4 A. And that is not all my forces.
5 Q. I see.
6 A. And the point was that I wasn't about to commit in the sense of
7 telling everyone what I was about to do, because I didn't know
8 necessarily what I was going do because the situation hadn't arisen.
9 Q. Okay. Thank you for the clarification.
10 I'd like to now turn to some -- some general propositions to see
11 if you would agree or disagree with them, okay?
12 A. Mm-hm.
13 Q. The first is that -- sorry, I need to get to a page.
14 By the beginning of 1994, ABiH had evolved into an effective,
15 light infantry force able to conduct modest offensive operations.
16 A. You want me to agree that or not?
17 Q. Sure. Is that something that you would agree to?
18 A. Loosely.
19 Q. Okay. And when you say "loosely," how would we get it tightened
21 A. Well, one would need, I think, to be -- see it in a context,
22 describing a bit more about what that was being put into.
23 Q. Very well. You arrived in the region on what date, sir?
24 A. January 1995. I can't give you a date without looking it up.
25 Q. That's fine. Were you aware of the Bosnian army offences of
1 March 1994?
2 A. I knew that it had taken place.
3 Q. Did you have any --
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Offences.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Offensives.
6 Q. With regard to you knowing that they had taken place --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Offensives.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Offensives, yes. Did I say offences, yeah,
9 offensives. Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. With regard to that, were you aware of the offensive to
11 Donje Vakuf?
12 A. I can't remember a specific one at that stage.
13 Q. Okay. The capture of the peak at Mala Suljaga.
14 A. No -- [Overlapping speakers] ...
15 Q. You're not in a position to remember a specific instance.
16 A. I cannot recall back there, a specific instance.
17 Q. Okay. Do you have any recollection of an offensive at the end of
18 March 1994 concerning Mount Vlasic
19 A. No.
20 Q. April, concerning the same area?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Would you have a memory of the ABiH spring offensive drawing to a
23 close approximately the 8th of June, 1994, when a cease-fire, I believe,
24 went back into place?
25 A. No. I remember a general run of fighting. The specifics of a
1 particular offensive, I don't remember at all.
2 Q. Okay. Turning your attention to the year 1995, would the figure
3 of 230.000 personnel in the ABiH army be a figure that you were familiar
5 A. I don't think I would have put it as high as that. But it -- the
6 -- I just don't recall.
7 Q. In March of 1995, you are obviously aware that the ABiH broke the
8 cease-fire and they struck at among other places, Mount Vlasic
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And that is actually the time that you're, as we called it,
12 thesis comes into existence?
13 A. It starts from there about, yeah.
14 Q. In May of 1995, at that time, there was a pressure that was
15 placed on the VRS because of the flow of Serbian refugees from
16 Western Slavonia
17 A. I remember them coming out of -- yes, of Western Slavonia.
18 Q. Yes. There were battles between January and February 1995
19 involving the 5th Corps of the ABiH in Bihac. Do you recall that?
20 A. In January and February?
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. I don't recall that, no. I think the cease-fire held over there,
23 too. But -- and it was later in that -- in that late winter, early
24 spring that it all broke down.
25 Q. Do you recall a surprise attack launched on the 13th and 14th of
1 January by the ABiH forces from the 501st Mountain Brigade concerning the
2 Klokot Reservoir in Mount Pljesevica
3 A. I don't remember that, no. I didn't say it didn't happen. I
4 just don't remember that.
5 Q. Very well. Do you recall an attack on the 20th of March, 1995
6 on Mounted Vlasic by the ABiH 7th Corps?
7 A. Whether it was the 7th Corps or not, yes, I do recall the attacks
8 on Mount Vlasic
9 Q. Do you recall the involvement of the 17th Krajina Mountain
10 Brigade, the 727th Mountain Brigade, and the 7th Muslimanske Brigade?
11 A. No. I don't remember the formation titles or ...
12 Q. Just for a moment, since I have mentioned the
13 Muslimanske Brigade. Did you receive information concerning the ABiH
14 recruiting Mujahedin fighters into their army?
15 A. There were allegations to that effect rather than me receiving
16 any information.
17 Q. And when you say there were allegations to that effect, those
18 allegations, I take it, were coming from the Bosnian Serb army?
19 A. Usually, yes.
20 Q. Okay. Apart in the Bosnian Serb army, did you receive such
22 A. I think I also hear it from journalists or a journalist, but I
23 don't recall it in any detail.
24 Q. And from Dr. Karadzic, did he discuss this with you in the
25 presence --
1 A. Yes, I don't remember.
2 Q. When I say discuss this with you, the presence of Mujahedin
3 fighters in the BiH?
4 A. Indeed. No, I don't remember if he did or not.
5 Q. Do you recall an attack on 26th of March, once again by the ABiH
6 -- various ABiH corps on Mount Stolice
7 A. If Mount Stolice
8 direction, if it is that mountain, then, yes, I do.
9 Q. Okay. Are you family with an operation called Operation Zora,
10 which was an ABiH operation in May of 1995?
11 A. I don't remember it by that name, but if you gave me the locality
12 I might be able to remember -- I might recall it.
13 Q. Okay. And then there was the June breakout offensive. Are you
14 familiar --
15 A. Breakout from where?
16 Q. From Sarajevo
17 A. Yes, yes.
18 Q. Now, the June breakout offensive was one in which you have
19 commented, and I'm referring to your statement, and that would be, I
20 believe, paragraph 68 of your statement. You say the following. If you
21 would like it up on the screen, I'm happy to pull it up.
22 A. Yes, please.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. I believe it is P2348, P2348.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before that what do we do with 1D01-1201?
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: I would move its admission.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
2 exhibit number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D99.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, yes, Mr. Saxon.
5 MR. SAXON: Before it's admitted, I think that's around
6 10 minutes ago, and I'm -- quite frankly, could my memory be refreshed as
7 to what document we're referring to.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Referring to the transcript of the proceedings
9 held on November 9th.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: In the Popovic case.
11 MR. SAXON: The entire transcripts or those pages?
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, those pages, those pages.
13 MR. SAXON: Very well, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO:
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: If you would like the entire transcript in, we
16 can do that too.
17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm not sure whether or not Mr. Saxon wishes to
19 have the entire transcript of those or not.
20 MR. SAXON: Just those pages are fine.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, can you remind us what was your
23 65 ter number of that thing or ...
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: It was 1D01-1270.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: 70, thank you so much. Are you asking --
1 [Microphone not activated]
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, please. And if we could go to paragraph 68
3 which I believe is on page 14, I think. No, it's 15.
4 Q. You state here on 16 June:
5 "The Bosnian army mounted a long-heralded attack to break the
6 siege of Sarajevo
7 thrown back with heavy casualties and the attack petered out?"
8 A. Could the page be moved so I can trade too.
9 Q. Of course. Can we make it a little bigger. Let's make it
10 bigger, that way you have the benefit of amplification.
11 A. It is also my fault, I was looking at the wrong paragraph.
12 Q. That's okay.
13 "This failure and the perceived failure of the UN led to a
14 growing view in the government that they wanted the UN to either
15 renegotiate the contract (mandate) and effectively ally themselves with
16 the Bosnians or to go."
17 And my question is, from whom did you receive this particular
18 information in the Bosnian government, that they wanted you to either
19 renegotiate the contract and ally yourself with them or to go?
20 A. They didn't want me to renegotiate it.
21 Q. Understood. I understand.
22 A. The -- my contacts -- nobody, I don't think, said that to me in
23 that degree of -- as a specific statement. There was an increasing
24 incidence, if you will, in the contacts I had made with the Bosnian
25 leadership that the -- as I say, further in that paragraph, that the
1 disadvantage of having the UN presence in that it, in their view
2 inhibited air-strikes and lifting of the arms embargo outweighed of the
3 advantages of having the UN there. And they were wanting the UN to
4 either go, as I say, or, in effect, decide that they were only on the
5 side of the Bosnians and nobody else.
6 Q. And I take it when you're referring to the government, you're
7 referring to such individuals as Dr. Ganic and the minister Muratovic?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Who you referred to in the next paragraph?
10 A. Do I? Oh, right.
11 Q. You do, yes.
12 A. Yes, those sorts of people would be the people that I gained this
13 impression from.
14 Q. With regard to your contacts with the Bosnian Serbs, you indicate
15 that you've had no contact with them for the month of June; right?
16 A. I don't think I did have contact with them, except possibly by
17 telephone or letter in that month.
18 Q. Well, this says I had no formal or informal contacts with the
19 Bosnian Serbs, so ...
20 A. There it is, yes, then in which case, I didn't.
21 Q. So for the month of June, all of your contacts were with the --
22 the Bosnia-Herzegovina government and army to the extent there were
23 contacts, and you had nothing to do with the Bosnian Serbs.
24 A. That isn't to say I wasn't trying to have contact; I just didn't
25 have the contact.
1 Q. Didn't suggest that you weren't trying to have the contact. The
2 reality of the situation is you didn't.
3 A. I didn't, no.
4 Q. I'd like to understand, if I could, the language that is
5 contained in the next paragraph which is 70, and specifically the second
6 sentence which is:
7 "A decision was taken within the UN that for the time being, the
8 force would continue to operate to peacekeeping principles."
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Okay, now I take it this was a decision that was made by the
11 Security Council or the Secretary-General?
12 A. It was certainly made, we're talking about June, aren't we? It's
13 -- and you have already -- we've already had the transcript of where I
14 think that's being discussed in a previous case. It's in June at a
15 meeting in Split
16 line we are to take. And that's the -- a decision was taken within the
17 UN that -- or at time that that's what we were to do.
18 Q. And with regard to the issue of to operate to peacekeeping
19 principles, how would you define that in the context of the decision that
20 was made here in paragraph 70 of your statement?
21 A. You recall that I described the understanding of peacekeeping.
22 Well, that's what I'm referring to there, that you -- you were not -- you
23 were only using force to defend yourself in a particular case. You were
24 not going to take series of actions where you were likely to finish up
1 Q. Okay. Thank you very much.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I'm done with that -- that document.
3 Q. I want to talk to you for a moment about the issue of command
5 Now, first of all, could you help us here, as I understand it,
6 there are two, and I use this in the grossest of terms. There are two
7 basic forms of command which I would say are the western form of command
8 and the Warsaw Pact form of command, which is somewhat distinct?
9 A. As long as we keep it in huge handfuls.
10 Q. I'm keeping it in huge handfuls for the moment.
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. With regard to the issue of -- of General Mladic's army, if I can
13 characterize it that way --
14 A. Mm-hm.
15 Q. -- General Mladic controlled his army from the top down. Is
16 that a fair statement?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Okay. And that meant that, with regard to what was occurring --
19 to use terms that we've used before, which was operationally and
20 tactically, those decisions were made by him or somebody that he
21 delegated to make those decisions, down to men in the field. Is that
23 A. Yes, yes.
24 Q. Okay. With regard to the individuals who were in Mladic's army
25 who you were aware of, were they in a position to make independent
1 judgements of the appropriate action to take operationally, based on your
3 A. Provided it was within the latitude of the orders they were
4 given, yes. The point being that there was usually little latitude in
5 their orders, as I understood them.
6 Q. Okay. And that would be distinct from what you would find in
7 what I'm going to characterize as a western army, where in your
8 experience there was more latitude in their orders.
9 A. Particularly -- not necessarily is that the case, but there is a
10 tendency to describe the result to be achieved as opposed to what to do.
11 And that, then, leads to greater latitude in execution.
12 Q. Mm-hm.
13 A. It is also -- tends to be done that way in multi-national forces
14 for all sorts of reasons, not least to do with different training,
15 different languages, and so forth.
16 Q. When you say -- with regard to multi-national forces, there's
17 greater latitude, is that what you're saying? I'm sorry. I'm not sure I
18 follow you there.
19 A. You tend to express your orders in terms of the result to be
20 achieved, as opposed to what to do.
21 Q. With regard to issues of delegation of authority and delegations
22 of power, is there a distinction that would be drawn between those two?
23 A. Not in those terms, no. This is how you -- what I'm describing
24 is how you express yourself and the amount of latitude you are given, and
25 you give to somebody.
1 Q. With regard to your experience of Mladic's army, did you find in
2 dealing with such individuals as Gvero, or, I believe, that you mentioned
3 that you had had contact with Indic, that they operated with, what I
4 would call, greater latitude than -- than others?
5 A. I don't think you can put those two individuals in such different
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry, Mr. Smith.
8 Mr. Saxon.
9 MR. SAXON: I withdraw the objection. [Microphone not activated]
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may proceed, Mr. Smith.
11 THE WITNESS: I don't think you can put those -- one is a
12 general, and the other one was either a major or a lieutenant-colonel,
13 and they are doing completely different things. So I don't think that we
14 can compare the two.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH:
16 Q. It is by virtue of the rank that they hold that, obviously, you
17 take exception with what I have just said?
18 A. And the jobs that they were doing, which is reflected in their
19 rank, I agree.
20 Q. Okay. Okay. At the meeting that was held on July 15th in
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. -- attended. At that meeting the people who were present, as I
24 understand it, were yourself; correct?
25 A. Mm-hm.
1 Q. Milosevic.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Mladic.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And I can't remember who else. Do you recall?
6 A. Oh, I see, you want me to fill in the gap.
7 Q. Yes, if you could.
8 A. There was Carl Bildt; the secretary, Akashi.
9 Q. Carl Bildt, Akashi
10 A. Stoltenberg.
11 Q. Stoltenberg, yes.
12 A. General de Lapresle.
13 Q. General de Lapresle, he was an UNPROFOR?
14 A. No. He was at -- he was, if I recall correctly, the military
15 advisor to Stoltenberg at the time.
16 Q. I see.
17 A. He had -- or to Carl Bildt. I'm not sure. I can't remember what
18 that particular relationship was. He had been the UNPROFOR commander in
19 a -- or, rather, the UN Protection Force commander in Zagreb a year or so
21 Q. And with regard -- with regard to this meeting, the purpose of
22 this meeting was what precisely, if you could tell us?
23 A. I didn't call the meeting.
24 Q. I understand that.
25 A. It was in the aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica, and the reason
1 that I was there and had been asked to come there was -- was all to do
2 with the recovery and withdrawal of the Dutch battalion that had been in
3 Srebrenica. That was why I had been called to the meeting. I don't know
4 at this range, and can't remember the stated purpose of the rest of the
5 meeting, although, clearly, it was to do with the aftermath of
7 Q. Was -- let me put to you this way. Was the agreements that
8 existed in terms of the meeting on the 15th of July, were those
9 agreements that had been fashioned by parties other than Mladic, to your
11 A. I'm sorry -- I'm sorry, I -- what agreements that existed?
12 Q. Well, the reason I'm asking you the question is because you make
13 -- you make the following observation in your statement, which is - and
14 this is paragraph 76 - which is the:
15 "The purpose of the meeting was to confirm a pre-cooked deal
16 imposed on Mladic by Milosevic." And then you go on to discuss the
17 things that you were just discussing with us.
18 A. Oh.
19 Q. So I'm trying to get some --
20 A. In which case, you have now helped my memory.
21 Q. Good.
22 A. If that's what the stated purpose had been, then my -- the --
23 there had clearly been discusses, and that I do now recall, of people
24 such as Carl Bildt, in Belgrade
25 going on in the days between the fall of Srebrenica and this meeting.
1 This -- this meeting, as it were, had flown -- flown in the - flowed
2 rather than flown - from these other meetings that had occurred
3 beforehand in Belgrade
4 Q. With regard to the notion of the pre-cooked deal that you have
5 mentioned in your statement, can you enlighten us any further with regard
6 to who were the participants to this deal?
7 A. In the pre-cooking?
8 Q. In the pre-cooking.
9 A. No, I can't.
10 Q. Okay. So with regard to the pre-cooking, is that something that
11 you were informed of, that there was a pre-cooked deal, or is that a --
12 A. No, as I say, you have now reminded me that I had become aware
13 and that I had then been -- that was probably in -- why I -- I became
14 aware when I was being asked to come to the meeting that they had these
15 other meetings beforehand.
16 Q. So with regard to your use of that particular phrase "pre-cooked
17 deal," it refers to the fact that there had been meetings and discussions
18 before your --
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. -- involvement, and no more than that?
21 A. Correct.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I could have but a moment.
23 [Defence counsel confer]
24 MR. GUY-SMITH:
25 Q. And, finally -- and perhaps we do need to pull up your statement
1 once again, 2384.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me?
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated] 2384 or 2348?
5 MR. SAXON: 48.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe you are right, and I am wrong.
7 And if we could go to paragraph 82, which is page 17.
8 Q. And specifically I wanted -- yes.
9 You said that you make the additional following observations from
10 this meeting:
11 "Mladic did not mention Pale or Bosnian Serb politicians once.
12 Some of his comments betrayed a naivete that Generals alone could provide
13 a political solution to the war. On the evidence of the meeting he
14 appeared not to have political ambitions."
15 We were talking about this earlier, and I'd like to see if you
16 can help here, because you use the language on the evidence of the
17 meeting, that he appeared not to have political ambitions. So I'm
18 wondering what evidence that was, apart from the fact that he said he
19 didn't want to be president, which is what you told us earlier?
20 A. I think what I said was that he didn't say it. It was a
22 Q. Okay. So is that what you mean by on the evidence of the
23 meeting? In the absence of that information, that is the evidence upon
24 which are you relying? I'm trying to figure out what you're saying here.
25 A. I don't -- I cannot give you evidence to support a negative.
1 Q. Well, I appreciate that. But there's -- as the sentence reads
2 there's a positive here, which is on the evidence of the meeting.
3 A. Well, that's how he behaved in the meeting.
4 Q. I see, okay.
5 A. I imagine.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Keeping in mind what you said about time, I'm now
8 in a position where I'm going to stop.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
10 Yes, Mr. Saxon.
11 MR. SAXON: If we could please call up what I believe now is
12 P2348, the statement of General Smith. It might be easier, D96.
13 D96, I believe were several paragraphs that the Defence tendered
14 that were not part of the redacted version of General Smith's statement.
15 No, this is not what I was looking for. It doesn't matter. I
16 will continue.
17 Re-examination by Mr. Saxon:
18 Q. General Smith, you will probably recall during cross-examination
19 you were shown a portion of your ICTY statement from 1996. And at
20 paragraph 98, my colleague asked you some questions and pointed out to
21 you a passage that indicated that, at that particular time, when the
22 Croat armies had begun their offensive in 1995, Ratko Mladic appeared to
23 have little concern - never mind - that most of Ratko Mladic's concern
24 was for the integrity of the Republika Srpska at that time.
25 Do you recall that?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. Okay. Can you just refresh our memories. What was
3 Ratko Mladic's position at that time?
4 A. He was the commander of the Bosnian Serb army.
5 Q. And, at that time, after the Croat forces had begun their
6 offensive, what was at stake for the Republika Srpska at that time?
7 A. Well, there were in the first instance there's a large flood of
8 refugees starting to appear.
9 Q. Mm-hm.
10 A. And, secondly, was that the fighting had now developed on to the,
11 if you like, the western half of Bosnian Serb territory, and this was --
12 has the effect of -- of splitting his forces, and he now had to in effect
13 deal with two armies, the Croatian one and the Bosnian one.
14 Q. And at that time finding himself in that position, what was
15 Ratko Mladic's first responsibility as commander of that army, if you
17 A. As a commander of the Bosnian Serb army --
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. -- it would be to try and defend his immediate responsibility
20 and preserve his own army over the others.
21 Q. All right. At page 30 today, lines 12 through 25, my colleague
22 discussed another paragraph from your statement. It was paragraph 104
23 which described a discussion that you had with Ratko Mladic. And at one
24 point, if you will recall, in your statement it describes how
25 Ratko Mladic reiterated that the Bosnian Serbs wished to be involved in
1 the peace process.
2 Do you recall that?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And the sentence continued, claiming that the FRY are -- for the
5 Republic of Yugoslavia
6 Do you recall?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. My question for you is this, if you know: If the Bosnian Serbs
9 were left out peace process, out of the peace negotiations, do you know
10 who, then, would speak about matters affecting the Bosnian Serbs in those
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: I take it that -- well, it calls for speculation.
14 MR. SAXON: I'm asking him if he knows or knew, at the time.
15 THE WITNESS: Can you remind me of the date of this? I'm -- I
16 don't have a page in front of --
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just hold it, General Smith. There is an
18 objection on the floor.
19 THE WITNESS: Sorry.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: We will give you an opportunity.
21 You're still on your feet, Mr. Guy-Smith. Your learned friend
22 says, if he knows. I don't know what --
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: It also assumes a particular fact which is not in
24 evidence which is that they would be left out of the peace process.
25 So there's a double problem with the question, as it is
1 constituted. It assumes a fact which is not in evidence which they would
2 be left out if -- so there is a conjuncture there, and there is a
3 speculation based on that conjecture.
4 MR. SAXON: Well, Your Honour, my colleague went over this point
5 during his cross-examination, the point of the statement which indicates
6 that the Bosnian Serbs, at that point, are not involved in the peace
7 process. Otherwise they would not need to say, We want to be involved.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, now Mr. Saxon is trying to determine what
9 was involved in the mind of Mladic. If -- if the witness knows what was
10 meant by the statement, that would be a different question. But that's
11 not the question which is presently posed.
12 MR. SAXON: The statement as it exist is he re-iterated the
13 Bosnian Serb wish, so that would be, I want to be involved in the
14 process. I told you before, and I'm telling. I'm re-iterating that's
15 what I want to do.
16 I can start with that question, if that is preferable.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah, go ahead.
18 MR. SAXON: May I, pursuant to the suggestion of the witness, may
19 I also give the date that we're talking about?
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, perhaps give the date.
21 MR. SAXON:
22 Q. This meeting took place on the 25th of August, General Smith.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which year?
24 MR. SAXON: Of 1995.
25 Q. And I'm wondering whether you can tell us what General Mladic
1 meant when he said he also reiterated the Bosnian Serb wish to be
2 involved in the peace process. Were they in the peace process at that
3 time or not, if you know?
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, the question, as phrased, I have difficulty
5 with what he meant.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, but, Mr. Guy-Smith, are you going to stand up
7 when you want to say --
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm trying to get it in quickly.
9 With regard to the question as phrased, it has problem again,
10 because once again -- he is seeking to divine what is in the head of
11 General Mladic.
12 MR. SAXON: Well, I'm following Mr. Guy-Smith's suggestion at
13 line 9 through 12 of 30 seconds ago. If the witness knows what was meant
14 by the statement.
15 Q. General Smith, do you know what -- what Mr. Mladic meant by that
17 A. I believe I do. The Lake
18 of Mr. Holbrooke is initiated in August, and the opening stages of
19 Mr. Holbrooke's diplomacy was to engage with the Belgrade and Zagreb
20 rather than the factions within Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I believe that
21 is the -- that is what is being referred to in that -- at that time.
22 Q. Okay. All right. Then I will go back to my original question.
23 Do you know that if the Bosnian Serbs were not part of the peace process
24 at that time who was speaking about matters that affected them?
25 A. I don't.
1 Q. Okay. Today, at pages 52 to 53 of the transcript, you were
2 describing a bit your thesis that you formed when you -- after you took
3 up your post in 1995, and particularly with respect to the eastern
4 enclaves. You said that the Bosnian Serbs had more space to defend than
5 people to defend it.
6 Do you recall that?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. My question for you is this: During the first part of -- first
9 half of 1995, did the army of the Republika Srpska attempt militarily to
10 address this problem?
11 A. If you mean by to try and free up forces and so forth --
12 Q. Mm-hm.
13 A. -- what I had anticipated as a result of forming that thesis,
14 that the enclaves would be what I call squeezed, that we would be denied
15 access, that life for those on the inside would get more and more
16 difficult, yes, those events occurred.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. And in so far -- then it may have freed up troops for other
20 Q. And within your response, would that include the enclave of
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You mentioned - this as at page 55, lines 15 to 16 - that only on
24 a few occasions was UNPROFOR able to get aid into an enclave. This was
25 during the first part of 1995.
1 Why was it that United Nations -- UNPROFOR convoys were only able
2 to get aid in to the enclaves on a few occasions?
3 A. We were not granted permission to get the convoys in.
4 Q. And who denied permission?
5 A. Mladic, or the Bosnian Serb army.
6 Q. Okay.
7 MR. SAXON: Can we see, please, D97.
8 Q. This is a map that my colleague used during cross-examination.
9 It shows the Sarajevo
10 Okay. As you will recall, Sir Rupert, this map -- and if we
11 scroll up to the top, please, where -- there was some language there in
12 the upper left-hand corner that Mr. Lukic kindly explained to us. I
13 believe was interpreted as this was beginning from March 1995 and was
14 completed on the 14th of September, 1995.
15 Do you recall that?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And then down below, if we can now move down a bit. We see
18 different positions that were recognised as, for example, being positions
19 held by forces of the Bosnian government army.
20 My question for you is this: Do you know whether this map, or
21 are you able to tell from this map, whether the positions of the military
22 units on it, the ABiH and army of Republika Srpska, were the positions
23 that they held on the 28 the of August, 1995, the day of the Markale II
25 A. No, I can't -- I don't -- you know, that map doesn't necessarily
1 tell me that at all.
2 Q. Okay. Do you know whether -- or did you know whether, in
3 August of 1995, whether UNPROFOR members had freedom of access to the VRS
4 positions around Sarajevo
5 A. No, they didn't.
6 Q. In P2360, paragraph 1, shown to you during cross-examination,
7 there was a claim, you describe the fact that Ratko Mladic claimed that
8 you were acting as -- under -- acting on the political direction of the
9 Bosnian government.
10 Was there any truth to that claim?
11 A. No truth at all.
12 Q. Page 88 of the LiveNote today, line 15, you were discussing what
13 happened after -- after the hostage situation was created in the end of
14 May 1995.
15 You mention that additional bombing was not possible or --
16 attempts to recapture the hostages. Very briefly, what was then the
17 scope of UNPROFOR's ability to act at that time, after those hostages
18 were taken?
19 A. We were extremely limited, and the only places that we had any
20 freedom of movement was in -- either inside an enclave, or within Bosnian
22 Q. And how about the ability to use force at that time?
23 A. Expect in the narrow definition of self-defence of the
24 individual, it -- it was -- there wasn't capacity to do that.
25 Q. Continuing on the concept of self-defence, at page 92 of the
1 LiveNote today, you were describing how in early 1995 self-defence under
2 the UNPROFOR's rules of engagement were interpreted as, I believe,
3 attacks or an imminent threat against members of UNPROFOR or UNHCR.
4 I have a question for you. It's my understanding that there
5 were, for example, members of UNPROFOR eventually deployed within the
6 exclusion zones around the enclaves. Is that correct?
7 A. Yes, they were within what were called Weapons Collection Points.
8 Q. And if one party to the conflict removed weapons from those
9 Weapons Collection Points within an exclusion zone, at that time, would
10 that have -- would that have fallen within the scope of a threat to the
11 UNPROFOR forces stationed in that exclusion zone?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Okay.
14 You mentioned that the -- you began to plan or think about
15 creation of a Rapid Reaction Force after -- in the aftermath of the
16 bombing in the end of May. This is at page 97 of the LiveNote.
17 At that time, what were you thinking that such a force would do?
18 What -- was there a particular activity?
19 A. No. The -- what I knew is that I didn't have a capacity to break
20 out from this situation of being a hostage, in the hostage and shield
21 sense. So while I did not have specific tasks and so forth in mind, I
22 knew I needed this ability, and that's why I started to develop that
24 Q. Okay. Finally, at -- in paragraph 68 of your statement, P2348,
25 you mentioned that UNPROFOR was seen in the eyes of the members of the
1 Bosnian government as an impediment to air-strikes and the lifting of the
2 arms embargo.
3 Why? Why was UNPROFOR seen as an impediment to that, to
5 A. Firstly, because we were the potential hostages, and therefore,
6 inhibited not only the process of actually deciding whether you would
7 have the air-strike, but also the consequences -- you began to take
8 account of the consequences thereafter.
9 And secondly, that this business of having two sets of opinions
10 as to whether or not to turn the key, and by having people on the ground,
11 you were that much more liable to see everybody's point of view than if
12 you didn't.
13 Q. Thank you very much, Sir Rupert. I have no further questions.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Saxon.
15 Questioned by the Court:
16 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] General, I have one or two
17 questions for you.
18 According to the written documents and the exhibits that we have
19 and the transcript -- and the Popovic transcript, in that case when you
20 testify you say on page 27239, you were asked if according to you that
21 meeting on the 15th of June that you attended in Belgrade, if according
22 to you Milosevic knew what had happened in Srebrenica, and if he was
23 aware of the massacre that had happened in Srebrenica. Since, at that
24 time, you, yourself, were not aware, if I understand correctly of that.
25 And you have answered to that question that, to your mind, he
1 knew, he had knowledge of what had happened.
2 Can you confirm that again?
3 A. Yes, I would confirm that answer in that -- in that document,
5 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.
6 I would like to put another question. As the commander of the
7 UNPROFOR, for the entire UNPROFOR -- for the entire Bosnia, rather, did
8 you know if the Serb soldiers, soldiers of the Serb army in Bosnia
9 present, whether it is in Republika Srpska or on the territory of the
11 Did you know if they were there and they were present?
12 A. Just to be sure I have understood that, did I know that there
13 were Serbs from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in the Bosnian Serb
15 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Of Serb army.
16 A. The only time I had evidence of this is when I was at Zepa in --
17 it would have been the end of July of that year, 1995, where we saw
18 people with what we understood to be insignia, things on their uniforms,
19 which indicated that they had -- that they had come from Yugoslavia, as
20 opposed to they were Bosnian Serb.
21 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] In your written statement, in
22 paragraph 1, while you mention General Mladic, you've stated that he was
23 depending of the VJ for military resources. What did you mean exactly?
24 Did you think of the equipment or men, and what is the basis of this
1 A. The origins of the equipments and so forth of the -- and the --
2 many of the officers and so on of the Bosnian Serb forces had -- were
3 from -- were directly from, drawn from the army, Yugoslavian army and as
4 it broke up, they provided the bulk of the forces that became the Bosnian
5 Serb army. Those that were in Bosnia Serbia -- sorry, those that were in
7 I have got muddled up in my countries. The army of the Republic
8 of Yugoslavia
9 the army then tended to break up as well in this process. The -- and
10 many of the Bosnian Serb forces, and particularly amongst the officers,
11 had been serving within the Yugoslavian army before the breakup. My
12 understanding -- and much of their equipment and the infrastructure they
13 were using was the infrastructure of the former army.
14 The -- and my understanding is that many of them were still being
15 paid on the basis of the pay systems and so forth of the -- of the former
16 army. And I think that's what I'm referring to in that -- in that
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
19 Any questions, Mr. Saxon? I hope not.
20 MR. SAXON: Then I will sit down, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: No, no, go ahead.
22 Further re-examination by Mr. Saxon:
23 Q. You mentioned at Zepa you saw insignia on some uniforms that
24 indicated that they came from Yugoslavia
25 insignia or some other kind of insignia?
1 A. I think they were -- I think the -- probably the correct
2 clarification would be paramilitary.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
5 Further cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
6 Q. Just so we're clear, with regard to the testimony that you
7 previously gave at page 27329, if I understand your answer, you were
8 asked the following question:
9 "Were you able to form a view about whether Milosevic had any
10 knowledge after the event of the killings at Srebrenica? Just yes or no
11 to that."
12 Your answer was: "Yes, I did form."
13 The question was: "How were you able to form a view? Before I
14 invite to you offer to the Chamber, because of a meeting that took place
15 on the 15th of July, there must have been, he must have understood, and
16 he had Mladic there, they must have known what had gone on."
17 You received no specific information, did you, that Mladic had
18 communicated to Milosevic what had gone on? It is an assumption on your
19 part as to what was shared as between Mladic and Milosevic. Correct?
20 A. That is correct, yes.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
23 General Smith, fortunately, now you will be able to pick up your
24 child from school tomorrow.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: This brings us to the conclusion of your
2 testimony. Thank you very much for taking the time off to come and
3 testify, and you are now excused. You may stand down, and please travel
4 well back home.
5 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your Honours.
6 [The witness withdrew]
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
8 Well, the Chamber stands adjourned to tomorrow, 9.00,
9 Courtroom I. Court adjourned.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.38 p.m.
11 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 21st day of May,
12 2009, at 9.00 a.m.