1 Thursday, 21 May 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning to everybody in and around the
7 Madam Registrar, will you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
9 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-81-T,
10 The Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
12 Could we have appearances for today, please, starting with the
14 MR. THOMAS: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
15 everybody in and around the courtroom. Dan Saxon, Barney Thomas, and
16 Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
18 And for the Defence.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Good morning to everyone. Daniela Tasic,
20 Chad Mair, Tina Drolec, Novak Lukic, and Gregor Guy-Smith on behalf of
21 Momcilo Perisic.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.
23 Mr. Thomas.
24 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. I called
25 Dr. Michael Williams, please.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
2 MR. THOMAS: And just as Dr. Williams is being brought to the
3 courtroom, Your Honours, I can advise that he is a 92 ter witness.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Thomas.
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning, sir.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning to you.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Will you please make the declaration, sir.
9 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
10 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. You may now be seated.
12 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
14 Mr. Thomas.
15 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 WITNESS: MICHAEL CHARLES WILLIAMS
17 Examination by Mr. Thomas:
18 Q. Dr. Williams, are you sitting as comfortably as you can be?
19 A. I am, thank you.
20 Q. I see that you don't have any blank sheets of paper in front you.
21 You are entitled to make notes if you need to, at any time. Please just
22 let us know if you would like to raise that opportunity.
23 A. I would appreciate a piece of note paper, if I may.
24 Q. Thank you, Madam Usher.
25 A. Thank you so much.
1 Q. Sir, can you begin, please, by giving us your full name and your
2 date of birth?
3 A. My name is Michael Charles Williams, and my date of birth is
4 11 June 1949
5 Q. And what is your current occupation?
6 A. I'm an under-secretary general of the United Nations. I'm
7 currently special coordinator for the UN in Lebanon.
8 Q. In March of 2000, did you provide a statement to OTP
9 investigators here at the Tribunal?
10 A. I did, indeed.
11 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, if we could please have 65 ter 09465
12 on the screen.
13 Q. Dr. Williams, do you recognise that as the first page of your
15 A. I do recognise it, and I would confirm that is the witness
16 statement I gave in March 2000.
17 Q. Can you confirm that that's your signature which appears at the
18 bottom of that page?
19 A. I would confirm it is, yes.
20 Q. Have you had the opportunity over the past few days to review the
21 contents of that statement?
22 A. I have. I have reviewed it thoroughly, and I can confirm that it
23 is -- the statement is true in every respect, as I recall.
24 Q. If you were asked to comment on the same matters again today,
25 would your comments be the same?
1 A. The comments would be the same, indeed.
2 Q. All right.
3 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, could that please be admitted as an
4 exhibit, at this stage marked for identification. There is once further
5 redaction which I have agreed with my learned friend following discussion
6 this morning. I'm hopeful that I can arrange for that to be done during
7 some time during the course of the morning and we can have that redaction
8 incorporated and uploaded into e-court before the conclusion of today at
9 which point the status can be changed from marked for identification.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document is admitted into evidence. May it
11 please be given an exhibit number and marked for identification.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P2371, marked
13 for identification.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
15 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. And, Madam Registrar,
16 could we please have 65 ter number 09466 on the screen.
17 Q. Dr. Williams, while that is appearing, can you confirm for us
18 that you testified in the case against Slobodan Milosevic in this
20 A. Yes, I did. I testified against Mr. Milosevic in June 2003.
21 Q. If you look at the screen, do you see there the first page of the
22 transcript of your testimony --
23 A. Yes, I do. Yes.
24 Q. Again, sir, have you had the opportunity to review the contents
25 of that transcript over the past few days?
1 A. Yes, I have, yeah.
2 Q. Do you confirm the contents of your testimony and of that
4 A. I would confirm both, yes.
5 Q. As being true and correct, to the best of your knowledge?
6 A. True and correct, to the best of my knowledge.
7 Q. If you were asked the same questions today, would your answers be
8 the same?
9 A. They would be, sir, yes.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, again, at this stage I would move for
12 admission of the transcript as an exhibit, please.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is so admitted -- yes, sir.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me. There are some difficulties that
15 exist with the transcript as it is constituted, as I understand what is
16 comprised of in a 92 ter package. I had a brief conversation with
17 Mr. Thomas about this issue.
18 One of the things that happens in this transcript, which is not
19 something that we have experienced necessarily before, and certainly not
20 to the extent that we experience it in this transcript, is there is
21 reference made to tabs which are exhibits, which the witness either
22 confirms -- or say what they say, but then the tab itself, the exhibit
23 itself, is not part of this 92 ter package. And, as I understand, it
24 will not be introduced in evidence.
25 There are references made to exhibits by, once again the use of
1 the word "tab" in which sentences of an exhibit are read out and the
2 witness comments either on the sentences for which I have no difficulty,
3 but also on occasion he comments on other matters that are contained in
4 an exhibit which is not before the Chamber.
5 There -- if you -- if you care, can I give you a couple of
6 examples of this so that you see the difficulty that presents itself.
7 At page 22960 the following question is asked, and the following
8 response is given. Starting at line 17: "Now if I can draw your
9 attention to Prosecution Exhibit 470, tab 35."
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: You said page 229?
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: 22960, line 17.
12 "Q. Now if I can draw your attention to Prosecution Exhibit 470,
13 tab 35, does this document corroborate some of your observations
14 regarding the border closure?
15 "A. I'm sorry, Mr. Groome, tab 35?
16 "Q. Yes, tab 35.
17 "A. Yes it does, yes."
18 We do not have introduced in this case, for example, tab 35.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. --
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: I can allude to a series of others [Overlapping
21 speakers] ...
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Overlapping speakers] ...
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: [Overlapping speakers]... which have the same
25 Therefore it be would the Defence's objection that the transcript
1 as it is presently constituted is based on facts that are not in evidence
2 and is therefore not a complete rendition whereby the Chamber can make an
3 intelligent determination of what is being said.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Thomas.
5 MR. THOMAS: Your Honour, first of all, the example that my
6 learned friend cites is an appropriate matter to bring to the
7 Trial Chamber's attention. I appreciate that that particular reference
8 is not a particularly helpful reference at all, in the absence of any
9 further discussion about the exhibit.
10 Throughout the transcript and the reason why the record is not
11 being burdened with the admission of all of these documents, throughout
12 the transcript there is it reference to the subject matter contained
13 within the particular exhibits and the relevant portions, relevant to the
14 questions which are then put to Dr. Williams. I accept that references
15 such as the ones that my learned friend has referred to, and I note that
16 this comes very -- a long way into the transcript, near the end, is one
17 that is not helpful. If it assists my learned friend and assists the
18 Chamber, if he has other references such as those which carry no further
19 comment other than to simply adopted a document which is not before the
20 Trial Chamber, I agree that those references should either be ignored or
21 deleted from the -- from the transcript.
22 I've discussed the matter with my learned friend this morning.
23 One suggestion he had was that we leave the transcript as marked for
24 identification for the moment. He can canvass various matters in
25 cross-examination. If there are any outstanding issues that he has
1 regarding portions of the transcript that are of no assistance in the
2 absence of the exhibit, then we can address those, either by arranging
3 for the exhibit to be tendered or for a necessary deletion to be made
4 from the transcript.
5 It's the Prosecution position that essentially the transcript
6 speaks for itself when one considers the references to the relevant
7 portions of the documents contained within the transcript, and on
8 occasion, where documents are considered to be of assistance to the
9 Trial Chamber, and there are three of those, we propose to tender those
11 But I wonder for the moment, Your Honours, I can suggest that the
12 suggestion made by my learned friend to me before proceedings, began this
13 morning be adopted; that we defer any final resolution of this matter
14 until the conclusion of cross-examination.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: I hear him.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: I did make that offer to Mr. Thomas before we
17 started the proceedings today.
18 I think that the matter may have to be deferred till after
19 cross-examination and Mr. Thomas and I have an opportunity to go through
20 the -- to go through the transcript with each other, because I'm not
21 going to be doing some of the work of the Prosecution during my
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Thank you so much. 09466 is now admitted
24 in evidence and marked for identification. May it please be given an
25 exhibit number.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours that will be Exhibit P2372, marked
2 for identification.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
4 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. Thank you,
5 Madam Registrar.
6 Your Honours, the tree exhibits I referred to or I have referred
7 to, again I have discussed this matter with my learned friend, there is
8 no need for those to come up on e-court. I can just signal the 65 ter
9 numbers and seek their admission and the allocation of an exhibit number
10 at this stage, if that is acceptable to the Trial Chamber.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Why do you want to adopt that procedure? Why do
12 we not have to see them?
13 MR. THOMAS: Simply, Your Honours, because I would not be asking
14 for any comment from Dr. Williams on these exhibits. They are commented
15 by him -- commented on by him already in the transcript that is part of
16 the 92 ter package.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
18 MR. THOMAS: The first of those is 65 ter number 05726. If that
19 could please be admitted as an exhibit, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: You said 0?
21 MR. THOMAS: 5726.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. And that's admitted into evidence.
23 May it please be given an exhibit number.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P2373.
25 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. The next exhibit is 65 ter
1 number 00863.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted into evidence. May it please be
3 given an exhibit number.
4 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2374, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
6 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours, Madam Registrar.
7 And the final, please, is 65 ter number 00864.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: 00864. It is admitted. May it please be
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P2375, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
12 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours. That, for the moment,
13 takes care of the 92 ter package. And I have a brief summary of the
14 evidence contained in that package.
15 From January 1994 until April 1995, Dr. Williams was director of
16 information for UNPROFOR based in Zagreb. During this time he was the
17 senior spokesman for the UN in the former Yugoslavia, and he coordinated
18 its information programme in the region. In this capacity Dr. Williams
19 was one of the most senior civilian UN officials and officially
20 accompanied the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
21 Mr. Akashi in his talks with government leaders and various factions
22 throughout the region.
23 Among those with whom Dr. Williams met were representatives of
24 the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership, including
25 Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic, as well as representatives of the FRY
1 leadership, including Slobodan Milosevic.
2 In addition to his other sources of information, Dr. Williams
3 observed firsthand the shelling and sniping of Sarajevo by forces of the
4 VRS. He comments upon the deliberate targeting of civilians and the
5 disproportionate use of force by the VRS. In every meetings that
6 Dr. Williams attended with the Bosnian Serb leadership and/or
7 General Mladic, the Bosnian Serb representatives present were made aware
8 of UN concerns regarding the humanitarian situation.
9 Dr. Williams describes the interrelationship among
10 Slobodan Milosevic, Dr. Karadzic, and General Mladic. He comments upon
11 the dependance of the Republika Srpska, upon financial, materiel, and
12 other support from Serbia
13 monitoring the border between the FRY and the Republika Srpska during a
14 period of sanctions imposed by the FRY in 1994, following the rejection
15 of the contact group plan by the Republika Srpska. Cross border
16 helicopter flights at night, between Serbia
17 a frequent problem and appeared to increase with the implementation of
18 sanctions. Dr. Williams describes also the evidence prior to July 1995
19 of tangible objective sides signs, that should the VRS take Srebrenica, a
20 humanitarian crisis on a grand scale would follow.
21 Your Honours, that concludes the summary of Dr. Williams'
22 testimony in the 92 ter package. There is a single matter of
23 clarification relating to his statement which I need put to him, and that
24 should conclude my questions.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Go ahead.
1 MR. THOMAS: Your Honours, if we could please --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the presiding Judge's microphone please
3 be turned off. There is too much noise. Thank you.
4 MR. THOMAS: Could we please have Exhibit P2371 on the screen.
5 Page 4 of the English, please, paragraph 4. And page 4 of the B/C/S,
6 paragraph 6.
7 Q. Dr. Williams, do you see the paragraph beginning with the words:
8 "UNPROFOR were always trying to negotiate a cease-fire ..."
9 A. Yes, I do. Yeah.
10 Q. You make a comment at the end of that paragraph. "We also tried
11 to negotiate greater humanitarian access, particularly to the eastern
12 enclaves and Sarajevo
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Could you just explain, please, to the Trial Chamber what you
15 mean by the eastern enclaves?
16 A. By the eastern enclaves, Your Honours, I refer to three of the
17 safe areas; namely, those of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica. The court
18 may recall that under Security Council Resolution 836 of, I believe,
19 May 1993, six towns in Bosnia
20 the three I earlier mentioned, were in the east, and presented great
21 difficulty in terms of the UN supplying their populations with food and
22 necessary humanitarian goods.
23 Q. Dr. Williams, thank you. That concludes, for the moment, any
24 questions I have for you. Would you please just remain there for
25 questions that my learned friend will have for you.
1 A. Thank you.
2 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
4 Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
5 Q. Good morning, Dr. Williams.
6 A. Good morning, Mr. Guy-Smith.
7 Q. I'd like to start with, if I could, discussing the relationship
8 between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Mladic and Mr. Karadzic.
9 As I understand your prior testimony, you have -- you've
10 indicated that Mr. Milosevic had influence over the Bosnian Serb
11 leadership, and by that I mean Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic. And that
12 what would occur is that, on occasion, various members of the
13 Bosnian Serb leadership would -- would assemble in Belgrade. And
14 Mr. Milosevic, as the president of the Republic of Serbia
15 best endeavours to exert [Realtime transcript read in error "excerpt"]
16 what would be political pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership.
17 Is that a -- is that an accurate statement?
18 A. I think that is an accurate statement. From time to time
19 Mr. Milosevic did seek to exercise an influence over the Bosnian Serb
20 leadership. I think a distinction can be made between, of course, the
21 political leadership and the military leadership of the Bosnian Serb
23 Q. Understood. And, as a matter of fact, that's probably not
24 particularly surprising that Milosevic was in that position, attempting
25 to exert influential, because at the time Serbia was, in fact, the
1 political power in the -- in that region; correct?
2 A. Correct, sir.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let just make sure we correct this before --
4 you're referring to "exert influence."
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just so that the stenographer gets it right
7 because twice now, she's write "excerpt."
8 MR. GUY-SMITH:
9 Q. And would it be fair to say that during the period of time, there
10 were a fair number of negotiations, bilateral negotiations with both
11 Karadzic and Mladic?
12 A. Oh, very much so, sir. Very frequently, almost on a monthly
13 basis I would say, in the period I was there from January 1994 to
14 April of 1995.
15 Q. And as a result of that, your assessment of Mladic was that he
16 had firm control over his forces and had a disciplined military
17 structure; correct?
18 A. That was the impression I drew, yes. And -- sorry, I heard
19 interpreter there.
20 Q. So did I. I think we're back on track.
21 A. Oh, good. Yes, and General Mladic, on a number of occasions,
22 demonstrated that he had control over his forces. On at least one
23 occasion talks, for example, that were held in Geneva in June of 1994, he
24 was in direct touch with forces then encircling Gorazde and instructed
25 them to vacate a certain ridge they were occupying, and that instruction
1 was carried through.
2 There was, as far as I could deduce, a clear line of military
3 command and control.
4 Q. And clearly based on the example you have just given, Mladic
5 exercised that control in, what we could call, both a firm and decisive
6 manner, did he not?
7 A. On that occasion, certainly.
8 Q. Okay. Now, there was -- there was another side to
9 General Mladic, was there not, the hot-headed side? The monomaniacal and
10 temperate side?
11 A. Perhaps that is a fair comment. Again I recall a critical
12 meeting chaired by president Milosevic in Belgrade on 23rd and 24th of
13 April 1994 at the height of the Gorazde crisis when, after 18 hours of
14 discussions, there was a eventual agreement on a cease-fire in Gorazde.
15 And when a French officer, I believe it was General de Lapresle, the
16 military commander of UNPROFOR, said, Look, thank goodness we have this
17 agreement now, Milosevic all of a sudden reacted in a very intemperate
18 manner and said, And you better make sure that this sticks. We cannot
19 tolerate any action by NATO. And his pose was assertive, if not
21 Q. Did you mean -- when you said Milosevic, you meant Mladic, did
22 you not?
23 A. Yes, I did, Mr. Guy-Smith. Thank you very much. I'm sorry.
24 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ... Thank you.
25 And he also said, I think, at one point something to the effect
1 of, We'll always send two shells for every shell fired by the Muslims?
2 A. Yes, he did. Generally if there was any firing out of Bosnian
3 territory towards Bosnian Serb held territory, the reaction was and
4 response was quick, and on the whole, I would say disproportionate.
5 Q. And you became aware obviously in your dealings with
6 General Mladic that -- that any provocation, no matter how slight, was
7 going to result in disproportionate response by him. That was one of the
8 features of this conflict, correct, unfortunate as it may be, obviously?
9 A. I think that's right, Mr. Guy-Smith. Some of this stemmed from
10 the armaments of the two forces, whereas the VRS, the Bosnian Serb army,
11 for example was very well equipped with artillery. This was not the case
12 on the Bosnian army side, on the Bosniak side. So from the very
13 armaments, it stemmed that the VRS response was often disproportionate.
14 Q. And there was another aspect to that, which is that when such a
15 response occurred, it became a feature of the conflict that such a
16 response could be used as a political advantage by -- in this situation
17 it would be the Bosnian Muslim side, the side opposite General Mladic.
18 It was one of the things that occurred as between the parties during this
19 time in the conflict.
20 A. I'm not quite sure I follow your assumption that this would be
21 used to a political advantage.
22 Q. Not would be; could be.
23 A. Could be, very good. I accept, yeah.
24 Q. And would it be fair to say that you were -- the majority of the
25 time when you were dealing the Bosnian Serbs, you were turning to
1 Milosevic in situations to try to bring his influence to bear upon the
2 Bosnian Serb party to the conflict?
3 A. That was true. But not all of the time, Mr. Guy-Smith. Often
4 the first recourse of Mr. Akashi, the Special Representative of the
5 Secretary-General, would be to try and deal directly with the
6 Bosnian Serb leadership.
7 Q. Understood.
8 A. Either through discussions in Pale, their capital, or through
9 direct telephone contact. If he felt that he was making no headway in
10 whatever the issue of the day was, then he would sometimes, first of all,
11 inform president Milosevic of this, and then seek his assistance in
12 trying to get some change in behaviour of the Bosnian Serb leadership.
13 Q. Okay. And based upon what you have just said, I think it would
14 be fair to say that you recognised that Milosevic was in a position where
15 he could bring influence to the table but not control of the parties.
16 A. I think that that's probably right, yes. I mean, president
17 Milosevic had no direct political control over the Bosnian Serb
18 leadership. In fact, of course, president Milosevic's leadership, the
19 old league of Yugoslav Communists stemmed from the Yugoslav communist
20 party. There was a direct line of continuity.
21 Q. Correct.
22 A. The Bosnian Serb political leadership by contrast, did not come
23 from Communist origins. They did not share the same political heritage,
24 and in that respect, were different. If I may add, I think it was
25 different with regard to the representative militaries. They did come
1 from the same background; namely, the old JNA, the old Yugoslav national
2 army. And I think because of that, certain bonds, certain relationships
3 still existed.
4 Q. Understood. With regard to the matter that you just raised which
5 is Milosevic coming from the old league of the Communist -- Yugoslav
6 Communist party, if I'm not mistaken, so did General Mladic?
7 A. Correct, Mr. Guy-Smith. Yes.
8 Q. And that was a feature of experience that was not shared with
9 president Karadzic; correct?
10 A. That's correct. For the most part, the Bosnian Serb leadership,
11 as I recall, the key figures, like Karadzic, the late Mr. Koljevic, and
12 so on, they were not part of the old national Yugoslav leadership.
13 Q. Okay. I'm -- I don't know if you would agree with me about this
14 or not, but obviously those that share the values and experience of what
15 I'll call the university days oftentimes have a -- a language, a library
16 of understanding from which they can both rely, as well as discuss
17 matters with each other in an easier fashion than somebody who has not
18 been galvanized by those years?
19 A. I think that is a very right assumption, yes.
20 Q. There came a time when the borders were closed, and by that I
21 mean the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that was as a
22 result of the Serbian -- the Bosnian Serbian rejection of the contact
23 group plan. Is that correct?
24 A. That's correct, sir.
25 Q. And when that occurred Milosevic made some kind of comment, and I
1 think you allude to it in your testimony, that this was not Brazil
2 I take it that he could keep the borders -- he could keep the borders
4 A. Well, I mean, it certainly wasn't Brazil, of course, because
6 Nevertheless, the borders between the Bosnian Serb republic and
7 between Serbia
8 observation, the nature of the terrain and the length of the border
9 presented many difficulties.
10 Q. And with regard to the closing of the border by Milosevic, this
11 was part of a process which was to assist in the imposition of sanctions.
12 And -- correct?
13 A. Yes, sir, you're correct.
14 Q. The sanctions that were being viewed at that time, certainly from
15 your position, I would think, demonstrated that the Federal Republic
17 at that time; correct?
18 A. I think by the time that the sanctions are imposed and
19 Mr. Milosevic, president Milosevic, had accepted the contact group plan,
20 there were clear political differences between, as it were, Belgrade
22 Having said that, how effective the closure of the borders, well,
23 I think is open to a question mark.
24 Q. Understood.
25 A. I also have to say that my opinion, and not my opinion alone, was
1 that the international community was given grossly inadequate facilities
2 for monitoring that border when it was closed.
3 Q. Okay. Be that as it may, the imposition of these sanctions and
4 the border closure was a device whereby he was trying to influence again
5 the Bosnian Serb leadership to take -- if we might call it a more
6 constructive or a positive role in the peace process, the one that he had
7 agreed to and adopted. By "he," I'm referring to Milosevic.
8 A. That's true, and that's certainly what president Milosevic said
9 to a number of interlocutors at the time; Mr. Stoltenberg from Norway
10 lord David Owen, as well as Mr. Akashi. He would frequently make rather
11 dismissive remarks about the Bosnian Serb political leadership and find
12 it unfathomable that they did not accept the peace plan that was on
14 Q. And this was just one of a series of -- series of attempts or
15 engagements on his part to try to restrain them, to influence them, and
16 to bring them into line with his position, the one that you have
17 mentioned, and that being the position of being engaged in the peace
18 process. Correct?
19 A. That's certainly the impression he gave, and I think there is
20 evidence to indicate that he did try and exert that influence from time
21 to time. However there's always a differences between what is said
22 perhaps in diplomacy and the realities on the ground, how effective he
23 was in instrumentalising the sanctions against the Bosnian Serb republic.
24 Q. He made the statement, if I'm not mistaken, at one point that, We
25 are for peace. We have made the close of peace, I believe, is a
1 statement that Milosevic had made.
2 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
3 Q. Okay.
4 Now, with regard to the -- the events I believe you -- in your
5 testimony you discuss Gorazde; correct?
6 A. Correct, sir.
7 Q. Now, with regard to Gorazde, it's your understanding, is it not,
8 that there were no members of the FRY leadership in Gorazde at that time,
9 in April -- I think it would be April of 1994.
10 A. No, there were not. At that time, Gorazde, as I indicated
11 earlier, was one of the six towns or cities declared safe areas by the
12 Security Council of the UN. And although it was encircled by Bosnian
13 Serb forces, the town itself was part of the Bosnian republic and had
14 Bosnian republic forces inside it.
15 Q. Okay. He received, I take it, to your knowledge, information
16 from Karadzic and Mladic concerning what was occurring?
17 A. He must have done. And one also needs to bear in mind that
18 Gorazde, itself, is very close to the Serbian border. It is no distance
19 at all.
20 Q. And with regard to any of the statements that he made in regard
21 to Gorazde, they may or may not be his own assessment in the sense of
22 what he has seen or heard but, rather, based on information that was
23 given to him by, for example, Mladic or Karadzic; correct?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. And with regard to the issues that you were presented with and
1 the issues that all the parties were presented with, this is one of the
2 common features of these kinds of negotiations, which is oftentimes
3 you're negotiating based upon information that you have received second,
4 third hand. And it's not necessarily either reliable or unreliable, but
5 it's information upon which you have to make a determination that you're
6 going use or not use, based upon the -- shall I put it, this term, the
7 necessity of the moment?
8 A. Yes. I should clarify that the UN itself did have some officials
9 and observers in the town of Gorazde
10 number of what are called UNMOs, UN Military Observer. The UN High
11 Commission for Refugees, also had several staff members there. And I
12 also had one member of my own office based there.
13 So there was a variety of reporting from the town from UN
15 Q. Okay. It would be fair to say that at point in time, vis-a-vis
16 your relationship with the Bosnian Serb leadership, and by that I mean
17 the international community, those relationships were, to put it mildly,
18 somewhat strained, were they not?
19 A. They were strained always when there was military action
20 undertaken by the Bosnian Serb forces, which in the period in which I was
21 present in the former Yugoslavia
22 whether it was Sarajevo
24 Q. And once again, this is another situation in which Milosevic was
25 involved in -- in a series of -- of what I'd call manoeuvres and in an
1 attempt to influence the Bosnian Serb leadership to change their
3 A. Yes. I mean, I think, you know, some of us felt that although he
4 was trying perhaps to influence that leadership, that he could have done
5 more to be effective in restraining it. One only had to look at the map
6 to realize that the Bosnian Serb republic, its institutions and its
7 military, were very dependant upon Serbia. And there was a feeling that
8 many of us had that Mr. Milosevic, while he did seek to exert his
9 influence from time to time, certainly over Gorazde in the end and over
10 the contact group peace plan, might have done so more strenuously at an
11 earlier date.
12 Q. So was his -- his failure to do so at an earlier date something
13 that was discussed with him?
14 A. Yes, it was. And Mr. Akashi would appeal directly to him, Look,
15 I call upon you to exercise your leadership to -- to restrain the Bosnian
16 Serbs from their repeated attacks on UN Safe Areas.
17 Q. When you use the -- when you use the phrase there, "exercise your
18 leadership," I take it that what you're talking about once again is an
19 issue of influence as opposed to an issue of control?
20 A. Formally speaking, yes, you're absolutely correct. I mean, he
21 did not have political control over the Bosnian Serb leadership. One has
22 to say that there's -- there's a continuum between control and -- and
23 influence. And it's not the case that these were two normal neighbouring
24 countries where one might seek to exercise brotherly influence or give
25 counsel to another. And the Bosnian Serb republic effectively had no
1 functioning economy. Its military, for logistical purposes, was highly
2 dependant upon Serbia
3 Q. You just said something here which I find kind of interesting
4 which is, "And it is not the case that these were two normal neighbouring
5 countries where one might seek to exercise brotherly influence or give
6 counsel to one another."
7 As a matter of fact, what we had at the time was quite a unique
8 situation, which is you had the breakup and essentially what I think you
9 would call a civil war between what had once been a -- a large country
10 held together with many different individuals in it and many different
11 factions in it. Not dissimilar perhaps to what occurred in the
12 United States during the civil war.
13 A. I mean, there are some similarities. In the US, of course, there
14 was a clear division between north and south, between the union and the
15 confederates. It was different in the former Yugoslavia, because one
16 national state broke up into many republics. And then within some of
17 those republics, particularly within Bosnia, there was for a long time
18 three contending forces; namely, the Bosnian Serb republic, the Bosnian
19 republic based in Sarajevo
21 Now after March 1994, there was a Federation between the
22 Bosnian Croat forces and the Bosnian republic in Sarajevo. So it's a
23 complicated picture.
24 Q. Well, that's precisely what I was driving at. It is a
25 complicated picture. And to the extent that there were old relationships
1 or former alliances, it was those upon which you were relying on, in a
2 certain sense, for purposes of influence which you understood what those
3 limitations would be and could be by virtue of the unique situation in
4 which you found yourself in. True?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Okay. I would like to show you a document to see whether or not
7 you have any familiarity with it.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: It's a document, 1D01-0212. It is from -- if we
9 could scroll to the bottom of the document.
10 Q. It is from Major-General Morillon. Do you know who that
11 individual was?
12 A. Yes, I do, sir.
13 Q. And who was that individual?
14 A. He was the -- at the time of this letter he was a commander of
15 the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, based in Sarajevo.
16 Q. And the letter is addressed to --
17 A. President Izetbegovic of the Bosnian republic.
18 Q. What was the army serving under President Izetbegovic that?
19 A. Would be the -- the Bosnian Muslim army. I think it's initials
20 were the ABiH.
21 Q. Okay. And with regard the information that's contained therein,
22 is this a subject that you were familiar with, that an 82-millimetre
23 mortar set up on the western side of Kosevo hospital within the hospital
24 grounds which had then been used to fire nine rounds using the hospital
25 as a screen?
1 A. I'm familiar with this incident from reports and I've also seen
2 this letter in the UN archives.
3 I should point out that to the Court, however, that this incident
4 was in January 1993 when I was not in Yugoslavia. In fact, at that time,
5 I was with the United Nations in Cambodia.
6 Q. I understand that. You are familiar with the incident?
7 A. I am, sir.
8 Q. Okay. Is the incident here the type of complaint that was made
9 by the Bosnian Serb leadership -- I'm sorry. Yes, by the Bosnian Serb
10 leadership about the activities of the ABiH? And by that, I mean using
11 such things as a hospital as a shield for purposes of waging their part
12 of the war. Whether -- whether or not you -- you put any stock in what
13 was being said or not.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
15 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honour?
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm just asking the Registrar to scroll this
17 document up. Thank you so much.
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, as I mentioned, I was not in Bosnia or the
19 former Yugoslavia
20 violation of the Geneva Convention. I am not aware of any similar
21 incidents during the time of my service in Bosnia. But such actions can
22 only be thoroughly condemned.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: I would like to have this admitted as defendant's
24 next in order, please.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: This document is admitted into evidence. May it
1 please be given an exhibit number.
2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D99, Your Honours.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH:
4 Q. When you say that you are not familiar with any similar
5 incidents, are you confining that statement to the use of a hospital as a
7 A. I -- I am, sir.
8 Q. Okay. Just wanted to make sure that -- I wanted to make sure
9 that -- that we were clear about the extent to which you were -- you were
10 making the point.
11 Did you, in your capacity, receive information about the ABiH
12 having a mobile mortar truck or tank within Sarajevo?
13 A. I'm not quite sure what you mean by that. But I would say that,
14 you know, mortars by definition are fairly portable weaponry. You can
15 almost fold it up and put it in the back of a car and take it somewhere
16 to fire and then fire off several rounds and then move on somewhere else.
17 It's not like a heavy artillery gun.
18 But that the Bosnian forces had that capability, I would not
19 deny. I mean, that's very true.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. And that they did use mortar attacks from Sarajevo from time to
23 Q. Okay. Thank you. Did you ever receive any information
24 concerning the -- the troop strength of the ABiH during the time that you
25 were in region?
1 A. Yes, we did. I mean, it varied, of course, and many of their
2 forces were encircled in the various enclaves.
3 Q. Yesterday we heard from a witness that the troop strength was in
4 the neighbourhood, I think, of some hundred thousands, or hundreds of
5 thousands; I don't remember exactly the precise figure. I had given him
6 a figure of 230.000, which he rejected. He said it was a bit too high.
7 In your estimation, could you tell us what figures you had. And
8 I understand this -- it's a guesstimate at best, but ...
9 A. It would be that, sir. But I would say that even 100.000, I
10 would regard as a sort of upper most.
11 Q. Okay.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Thomas.
13 MR. THOMAS: Sorry, Your Honours, we went from talking
14 specifically about Sarajevo
15 out from my learned fiend --
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: I --
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry can you just hold on.
18 Yes, Mr. Thomas.
19 MR. THOMAS: Just trying to find form learned friend whether the
20 question related to troop strength in Sarajevo, or whether it represented
21 the troop strength in total of the ABiH on the territory.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Before Mr. Thomas rose I saw the difficulty with
23 the question as posed and the answer as given, and I had a follow-up
24 question in mind.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah, would you like to clarify that.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure.
2 Q. With regard to the troop strength in Sarajevo, could you give us
3 a number? Is that -- is that the 100.000 that is in discussion, or would
4 you believe it to be something different?
5 A. I would hesitate to comment on this, but and you used it yourself
6 -- Mr. Guy-Smith used the expression of a sort of a guesstimate. I would
7 argue that 100.000 was perhaps the guesstimate for ABiH forces throughout
9 Q. Okay. Thank you.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: I hope that clarifies the issue.
11 Q. Did you ever receive any information that the BiH army had
12 barracks near the ice stadium in Sarajevo?
13 A. I do recall some ABiH forces being located near there, yes.
14 Q. Okay. Is that what --
15 A. I do recall ABiH forces being located near there. By the ice
16 stadium -- you mean the ice stadium?
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. Yeah, sorry, it's come up incorrectly on the transcription.
19 These refer to the old winter Olympics facilities in Sarajevo.
20 Q. Precisely.
21 Did you receive information that the ABiH fired mortars close to
22 UN positions at the PTT building?
23 A. There was that allegation on at least one occasion, I recall.
24 The PTT building would be in the post and telegraph building in Sarajevo
25 Q. The HG UNPROFOR? I'm asking the same question about that.
1 A. I can't recall a specific example, sir.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: What do you mean by HG?
3 THE WITNESS: Do you mean the headquarters?
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, HQ.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: I misspoke myself.
6 Q. The Tito barracks. Did you hear of?
7 A. I did not, sir.
8 Q. Okay. You've mentioned the matter of helicopter flights, and I'd
9 like to spend some time with you there.
10 In that regard, did you receive specific reports of helicopters
11 being flown cross border?
12 A. Yes, we did, sir. We had reports from UN military observers
13 located in a number of the enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, including Tuzla
14 of helicopter movements. Sometimes in substantial numbers. Often at
16 Q. And when you received such information, I take it that you made
17 appropriate protestations to the parties concerned?
18 A. Definitely. The Court will wish to recall that there was no-fly
19 zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was imposed upon a request by the
20 Security Council to NATO. So helicopter movements, unless authorised, on
21 occasion they might be authorised, for example, for purpose of medical
22 evacuation, would have been violations of Security Council actions.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: This no-flow zone was it Bosnia-Herzegovina-wide?
24 THE WITNESS: Correct, Your Honour.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH:
1 Q. And with regard to such protestations, did you receive responses,
2 and from that I mean responses from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
3 concerning whether or not they had been involved there flying helicopters
4 into the region?
5 A. There were responses. And there were a number of occasions I
6 have to say when we found the responses of the Federal Republic
8 occasion, UN military observers who had been deployed on the -- on the
9 FRY side, on the Serbian side of the border, had their access to radars
10 at a Yugoslav air base blocked by security officials there.
11 Q. Yes, we have heard consider testimony about that particular
12 incident earlier on, and, as a matter of fact, I think we learned, among
13 other things, there was a fair amount of disagreement within the room as
14 to who had what power to do what, which was ultimately ironed out.
15 Is that your recollection as well?
16 A. I do recall that. I mean, I think it is worth stating before the
17 Court that flying helicopters at night is not an easy matter for any air
18 force, even a very experienced and well equipped air force. It required
19 obviously a lot of coordination with ground communications and with
20 radar. And I'm -- particularly on one occasion I recall that our
21 observers reported the movement of 15 helicopters at night flying
22 easterly towards, I think, Serbia
23 Q. And with regard no that that particular assertion, was that
24 confirmed by the FRY authorities, or was that rejected by the FRY
1 A. To be honest, Mr. Guy-Smith, I cannot recall their precise
2 response on that occasion.
3 Q. Do you recall as you sit here today any of the discussions and
4 ultimate conclusions that were made with regard to the accuracy of the
5 information concerning helicopter flights? And by that I mean that there
6 were difficulties with some of the machines that were being used.
7 A. You mean some of the helicopters themselves, or some of the
8 machines monitoring the helicopter flight?
9 Q. The machines monitoring the helicopter flight.
10 A. You know, my experience in this fields of conflict is there are
11 often problems with the technical equipment. Having said that, the
12 forces that were doing this monitoring from the ground were forces as
13 part of the UN mission, but their national forces were NATO forces, there
14 were Dutch forces, in particular, I remember Norwegian forces. So these
15 were forces of considerable integrity and considerable technical acumen.
16 Q. I appreciate that. But it would be fair to say that what was
17 also available was objective information in the sense radar or other
18 tracking devices that would allow for an impartial determination of
19 flight patterns, flight distance, and other associated flight issues,
20 such as direction?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Okay. And that's what I'm talking about, is that there were
23 difficulties that were found and ultimately acknowledged by the parties
24 with regards to those particular machines.
25 A. Well, you know, there may have been difficulties on a particular
1 night, whether it's, you know, July 7th or February 14th or whatever.
2 And the -- but there was a pattern of aerial activity, and particularly
3 of helicopter activity, which indicated serious violations of the no-flow
4 zone and a possible if not probably concurrence in this activity by FRY
6 Q. You have used the term "pattern of aerial activity," which is a
7 relatively strong term, I would suggest. Could you tell us how many
8 helicopter flights fit into the pattern that you are alluding to here?
9 A. I --
10 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ...
11 A. Sorry.
12 Q. No.
13 A. I think my recollection is that in 1995, the frequency of
14 helicopter flights seemed to increase given my recollection of the
15 reports that we had. And particularly in the eastern part of Bosnia
16 Now, the Bosnian army, the ABiH forces, had a few helicopters,
17 not many, certainly not as many as the Bosnian Serb army had. And a lot
18 of these helicopter flights, as I indicated earlier, were at night, which
19 is no mean feat for any air force or army, and this needed quite some
20 considerable coordination.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: You indicated a little earlier that on one night
22 15 helicopters had been sighted.
23 THE WITNESS: Correct, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: You're talking of a person -- were they only --
25 were 15 sighted on one occasion only? Or you say more on -- what kind of
1 number could be seen on more than one occasion?
2 THE WITNESS: To the best of my knowledge, Your Honour, in the
3 period I was in the former Yugoslavia
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: What would have been the minimum?
5 THE WITNESS: The minimum would have been one, two, three,
6 flights. And perhaps that more the norm, sir, than 15.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: What about the regularity?
8 THE WITNESS: I think in the course of 1995, there were regular
9 flights. It would also be the case, Your Honour, that on some occasions
10 it would have been probable that not all of these flights would have
11 indeed have been picked up by UN radar systems.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: When you say "regular," how regular?
13 THE WITNESS: I would not say daily, Your Honour, but I would
14 certainly say that this would be happening several times a week.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: What do you mean by several? Can you give an
17 THE WITNESS: I would have said two, three, four, sir.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Does that answer your question?
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Hmm.
20 Q. But as you sit here today, you can give us no hard evidence with
21 regard to those helicopter flights that you have alluded to, no
22 documentation, can you?
23 A. Well, the -- my recollection, Mr. Guy-Smith, is that there was
24 documentation at the time.
25 Q. I appreciate what you're saying. I'm asking, but as you sit here
2 A. No.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Would this would be an appropriate time?
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: It would be indeed. We'll take a break and come
5 back at a quarter to 11.00.
6 Court adjourned.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 10.47 a.m.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before you continue, Mr. Guy-Smith, I think the
10 Registrar has something to correct.
11 Madam Registrar.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honours.
13 Earlier today at page 26, line 20, I assigned document number
14 1D01-0212 to have -- to be Exhibit D99, where the correct number for that
15 document should be Exhibit D100.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much, madam.
17 Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you so much.
19 If we could have 1D00-4766 on the screen, please. And if we
20 could scroll down.
21 Q. With regard to the issue of helicopter border crossings between
22 the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I'd like you to take a look at this
23 particular document, if you could, please.
24 And if you could indicate when you have finished reading the
25 first page, we can move to the second page.
1 A. Is it possible to scroll down to the bottom.
2 Q. Absolutely. Surely.
3 A. Oh, okay.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if we can move to the second page. And then
5 scroll up.
6 Q. Before we go any further, are you familiar with this document?
7 A. I am not, Mr. Guy-Smith. No.
8 Q. Okay.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could go to page 5 of the same -- thank
11 Q. This is a letter, obviously, we can see the date is the 11th of
12 April, 1995, and if we go to the third paragraph, I think it discusses
13 some of the things we discussed previously with regard to FRY's rejection
14 of flights back and forth. It says:
15 "On the basis of extensive investigation, however, the competent
16 Yugoslav authorities can confirm that throughout March 1995 there were
17 only six helicopter flights from the Republika Srpska to the Federal
18 Republic of Yugoslavia
19 was the transport of the critically wounded. Four of those flights were
20 effected with the authorisation of UNPROFOR and two without. Those two
21 were emergency medevac flights that had to be effected since the
22 transportees were in a life-threatening condition, and it was not
23 possible to wait for approval. Other than those, there were no flights
24 from the Republika Srpska to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and vice
1 It goes ton say: "It is absolutely excluded that the flights" --
2 If we scroll down, please.
3 "-- referred to in the report of the co-chairman except the six
4 medevac flights mentioned earlier, were those carried out by the
5 helicopters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republika
6 Srpska. The difference in the number of flights observed 26 by the
7 United Nations air field monitors the at Surcin airport and the number
8 which actually took place, 6, can be explained by the UNPROFOR reports
9 regarding parent violations of the ban on flights in the air space of
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina where, on several occasions, it is explicitly
11 stated that the alleged nights above the territory of the Federal
12 Republic of Yugoslavia
13 determined where the helicopters landed."
14 If we could turn to the next page please.
15 "A possible explanation is that what is involved are flights of
16 helicopters of the Bosnian Muslim side which flew from Central Bosnia to
17 the Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia
18 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Such a conclusion is justifiable from
19 the" --
20 A. Could you please read slowly.
21 Q. Yes.
22 "Such a conclusion is justifiable from the technical point of
23 view since it is illogical that the radar of the regional flight control
24 at Surcin airport (Belgrade
25 of helicopters at a greater distance (in the territory of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina) than at a shorter one over the territory of the
2 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia itself."
3 It goes on to say: "It is also possible that special electronic
4 devices were engaged to deliberately simulate flight patterns and put the
5 blame on the Bosnian Serb or the Yugoslav side.
6 "I should be greatly if you would have the present letter
7 circulated as a document of the Security Council.
8 And it's signed by Dragomir Djokic.
9 Are you familiar with this particular allegation, in terms of
10 their being six helicopter flights, as opposed to 26. Of those six
11 helicopter flights, four were approved by UNPROFOR, two not, because of
12 life-threatening situations?
13 A. I do remember this document. This, of course, is the explanation
14 put forward by the FRY authorities. Whether it is a plausible
15 explanation is a debatable matter. I would say it was highly
16 problematic. For example, the reference to Bosnian Muslim helicopters
17 possibly going into the eastern enclaves. To the very best of my
18 recollection, throughout my service with UNPROFOR, I was not aware of a
19 single reported flight, not one, into any of the three eastern enclaves,
20 Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica. And I remind the Court that, of course,
21 there were UN forces on the ground in each of those enclaves, which are
22 very, very small areas. And it would be impossible for a helicopter to
23 land without it being noticed in those enclaves by UN forces.
24 So I note the letter, I remember reading it at the time. It's
25 not one of the most convincing letters I have seen sent to the
1 Security Council.
2 Q. I appreciate your view of the letter. But my question is, rather
3 -- was actually limited to whether or not you were aware of it. You've
4 indicated that you are.
5 Now --
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. -- do you know whether there was a subsequent investigation with
8 regard to these particular flights?
9 A. I --
10 Q. And if you do, what the results were. So it's a -- I admit it's
11 a compound question, but ...
12 A. I think the answer, sir, is that I'm not aware. I note also that
13 this letter was dated the 11th April. And I left the UN service in
16 Q. Okay.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could that be admitted as defendant's next in
18 order, please.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: What do you want to admitted, this one or -- what
20 about the first one which the witness didn't know anything about?
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I think that if he didn't know anything
22 about it, under the Rules, it doesn't come in.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: So you're tendering this one only.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. I'm tendering pages 5 and 6.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Those pages are admitted into evidence. May it
1 please be given an exhibit number.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, pages 5 and 6 of 1D00-4766 will be
3 Exhibit D101.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH:
6 Q. Were you in -- in contact at all with Mr. Kirudja concerning the
7 issue of helicopters?
8 A. Yes, sir. Mr. Kirudja was the representative of UNPROFOR in the
9 FRY capital, the Serbian capital, Belgrade. He was a senior official
11 Q. And did you have -- did you have occasion to discuss with him at
12 any point in time what the -- what the ultimate conclusions were made
13 with regard to the whole issue of helicopters?
14 A. Not -- not the ultimate conclusions, as I recall. I do remember
15 a meeting with him in Zagreb
16 headquarters, where we discussed the matter. In fact, it was discussed
17 within a sort of senior staff meeting.
18 Q. Okay. And with regard to you discussing the matter with Mr.
19 Kirudja, did you come to an understanding that the issue of, what I will
20 call, helicopter flight violations was not as great as it seemed but
21 there was some concern?
22 A. There was a very serious concern. Mr. Kirudja, like myself, was
23 a civilian official of the United Nations, and, of course, the
24 observation of these helicopters, the documentation and so on, was
25 undertaken by our military colleagues, and the evidence was produced by
2 Q. I'm moving to another topic.
3 You, in your testimony, discuss the issue of keeping the air
4 bridge open. Could you, first of all, explain to the Chamber what an air
5 bridge is?
6 A. Yes, sir. By reference to the air bridge, I refer in particular
7 to the very regular flights between Zagreb
8 main connection to the outside world from Sarajevo. And these planes
9 brought UN personnel, civilian and military into Sarajevo. But perhaps
10 more importantly, they also brought supplies, particularly medical
11 supplies, to the besieged city.
12 From time to time there was also a road open to Sarajevo, but the
13 air bridge was pretty critical to the city.
14 Q. Apart from the air bridge that you've just mentioned, were you
15 cognizant of there being an air bridge between February of 1993 and
16 May of 1995 maintained from the Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory for the
17 needs of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde?
18 A. I'm afraid I don't quite follow your question, Mr. Guy-Smith.
19 Q. Was there -- was there an air bridge to those three areas that I
20 have just mentioned?
21 A. Okay, sorry. I follow you now.
22 Q. I apologise if I was confusing.
23 A. No, my misunderstanding, too, I think. There were no air fields
24 in these three eastern enclaves; Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, so it was
25 impossible to send in airplanes.
1 Three's eastern enclaves were, therefore, supplied by road. The
2 convoys to these towns would come from either the FRY, UNHCR, for
3 example, convoys went to these three enclaves. But also, on occasion,
4 there were convoys by road from Sarajevo
5 Q. Were you aware of the fact that there was an assertion that --
6 made by ABiH army personnel of the fact that there was an air bridge in
7 which there had been some number of flights, certainly not many, from
8 these areas that had to be maintained?
9 A. I'm not aware of that assertion. I find it difficult to believe.
10 I mean, three's are very small areas, particularly Zepa. I mean, it's a
11 village. Srebrenica and Gorazde are more substantial. But in both of
12 those places, to the best of my knowledge, there is no air field, no
13 landing strip, let alone what might be called an airport. And in both
14 Srebrenica, Gorazde, there were UN forces. I find it very, very
15 difficult to believe that they would not have noticed air movements
16 directly into very small areas.
17 Q. Okay.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: If I could have a moment, Your Honour.
19 [Defence counsel confer]
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have 1D01-1881 up on the screen. We're
21 struggling to see whether or not -- this document was sent for
22 translation. We're struggling to see whether or not the final
23 translation has in fact been achieved or not, and, if it has, we will try
24 to link it up.
25 I don't know if you speak Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian, so I'm
1 trying to get --
2 A. I do not sir.
3 Q. All right. Well, hopefully we'll be in a position where I can
4 have the final document for you in English. But if not, I'm going to
5 proceed for the moment reading you a rough translation, and if the -- the
6 usher would be kind enough at least to give a copy of this to my
7 colleague so that he can follow along.
8 This is a rough, and by that I mean, very rough translation. I'm
9 not asserting that it is, and we will ask for the actual translation to
10 be linked to the document at the time that we finally receive it.
11 This is a document that I understand comes from the ABiH RV and
12 PVO command, highly confidential, number 08/896-1, Zenica, date
13 17.02.1995. And it's entitled "Final Analysis of the Work of the Air
14 Bridge for Srebrenica and Zepa, to GS, ABiH, General
15 Enver Hadzihasanovic."
16 Now before we go any further just for purposes of clarity, would
17 you know what the letters GS stand for?
18 A. I do not. I mean, often it refers to General Staff in military
19 documents. I don't know if that is the case here.
20 Q. Let us proceed on that assumption.
21 It goes on to say: "Based on your oral order, we hereby deliver
22 you the analysis" --
23 THE COURT REPORTER: Slower please.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, to all that I'm speaking too fast for.
25 Q. -- "of the work/functioning of the air bridge for Srebrenica,
1 Zepa, and Gorazde, Deputy Commander Colonel, Hrustic Erdin."
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we scroll down to the second page, please.
3 Starting at number 1, introduction. And I understand this may not be an
4 official translation.
5 "In the time-period from 27/2/93 until 7/5/1995
6 is maintained from the RBiH territory for the needs of the Srebrenica,
7 Zepa, and Gorazde enclave. The primary goal of the maintaining of the
8 air bridge was the provision and delivery of a means for conducting
9 combat operations. The evacuation of the wounded, the functioning of the
10 organs of powers in the enclaves, for schooling of the officer Cadre on
11 the liberated territories of RBiH, and for maintaining the communication
13 "The establishment and maintenance of the air bridge has a
14 significance importance in providing the possibility for the defence of
15 the population and the territory in the condition of being fully
16 surrounded and blocked and next to the presence of UNPROFOR, who did not
17 fulfil their obligations under their mandated to protect the civilian
18 population in the territories of the enclaves. The morale of the
19 fighters and the civilian population is greatly boosted, not only because
20 of the provision of UBS
21 in a position at this point to translate, "but also because of the
22 feeling of not being completely abandoned or forgotten, but, rather, that
23 the organs of power RBiH are determined to take any measure to liberate
24 this part of the territory of RBiH
25 "A great courage was shown by the members of RV and PVO in the
1 establishing and maintaining of this air bridge, in spite of the fact
2 that the aggressor managed to take over the protected zones. What the
3 members of RV and PVO did made it possible for conducting of long lasting
4 combat operations and fight as well as ease the consequences of
5 withdrawal of civilians and the fighters towards the liberated
6 territories of BiH."
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you intend reading all this document, sir?
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, I do not.
9 Q. Section number 2 discusses the main tasks of the air bridge,
10 which includes transporting of weapons and equipment, fighters, material
11 for the functioning of both the military and civilian authorities,
12 maintenance of communication lines, transport of the wounded, and
13 transport of the food.
14 If we could scroll down, please, to, I believe, it's page 10.
15 And page 10 is an annex of the flights giving the date for Srebrenica.
16 Now, my question to you, sir, is obviously this is not a document
17 you have ever seen?
18 A. No, sir.
19 Q. I'm clear about that.
20 With regard to the information that is contained within the
21 document, I take it that this is information that you have never been
22 privy to, that there was any kind of, shall we say, air bridge or air
23 support that was being used by the ABiH army?
24 A. Correct, sir. I mean, I can't comment on the authenticity of
25 this letter at all. I would make two points, however. And as I recall
1 it, on page 1, the date of this letter was reportedly 17th of February,
2 1995. Then in paragraph 1, for which you only give a rough translation,
3 you -- you note, and it says clearly in the documents, analysis between
4 27th of February 1995 and 7th of May, 1995, i.e., after the date of the
5 letter itself. So I don't quite understand that anomaly.
6 There seemed to me other possible anomalies. But then finally
7 the data you referred to at the end, the alleged helicopter flights into
8 Srebrenica. I notice that all ten of those flights occur in a period of
9 one month, they are all between the 27th of February, 1993, and 30th of
10 March, 1993.
11 Now I was not in the Former Yugoslavia during that period. I
12 could not comment at all on that. They may or may not have taken place.
13 What I would say, again, is that during the period that I was there, from
14 January 1994 to April of 1995, I am not aware of a single flight into any
15 of these -- the three eastern enclaves, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde. That
16 was noted by the UN forces on the ground. Indeed, I find it very, very
17 difficult to accept that there would have been a flight.
18 Again, I repeat for the Court, I don't -- an aeroplane could
19 certainly not have gone into those places. A helicopter, possibly.
20 The Court also perhaps should be aware that, you know, during
21 this period, Gorazde itself, particularly in March/April 1994, was
22 critically under attack from the Bosnian Serb forces. I mean, it would
23 have been unfathomable then that a Bosnian army helicopter would have
24 managed somehow to got in through the Bosnian Serb attack on the town.
25 So I -- I have to say that I'm pretty skeptical of this document.
1 Q. Okay. I understand you're skeptical of the document.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: With regard to the issue of -- the date, there
3 may be a typo, but I would like to -- for the moment, I'd like to go --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Guy_Smith straighten the microphone,
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'd like to go to page number -- page number 12,
7 if I could.
8 Q. I understand your skepticism with regard to the issue of the
9 information that you have thus far and your appreciation of the
11 If you look at page 12, I think you will note at the top it
12 indicates that the areas Gorazde, that's where -- I think you were just
13 referring to. And I have been informed that the language at the very
14 top, that being Vazdusni Most is air bridge, Gorazde, and a then there
15 are a series of dates that follow with regard to the assertion, at least,
16 in this document of there being an air bridge at that time.
17 But since you have not seen the document, I take it for what you
18 said thus far, that you reject the notion out of hand that there would
19 have been any kind of air support for the ABiH army in those enclaves.
20 And by those enclave, I mean, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let's not embellish the witness's testimony. The
22 witness said helicopters possibly, not aeroplanes. Therefore, there
23 couldn't have been any air support.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay.
25 THE WITNESS: I wonder if I might comment further, Your Honour.
1 I would rule out of aircraft because of the absence of landing strips in
2 these three enclaves.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed. That's how I understood --
4 THE WITNESS: And possible -- it would feasible to land a
5 helicopter there. But even that, I'm very, very skeptical.
6 I note also in the last page, I think page 12 that Mr. Guy-Smith
7 brought my attention to, the first two alleged helicopter movements are
8 on, representatively, the 15th and the 23th of April, 1994. Now the
9 Court needs to be mindful of what the context was on those days. This
10 was at the height of a Bosnian Serb military attack on the safe area of
11 Gorazde. It was a period of intense military activity. Now, never were
12 these helicopter movements or alleged movements reported to the UN by the
13 Bosnian Serb forces because -- I mean, which I find surprising. They
14 would have been quick off the mark normally to have reported anything
15 like this. But also given the intensity of military action, the amount
16 of firing and shelling that was going on, the close engagement by Serb
17 artillery and armour, tanks, I find it very difficult to believe that a
18 helicopter got in on either the 15th of April or the 23rd of April. The
19 23rd of April we were in Belgrade
20 Mr. Guy-Smith alluded to earlier. This was also a period when NATO
21 aircraft were carrying out extremely close surveillance on the -- on the
22 Gorazde area, and the fact that it was never reported to us, that they
23 perceived or recorded helicopter or any other air movements is, I think,
25 So I have to say, I would seriously question the veracity of the
1 information on this page, and in particular the two alleged flights on
2 the 15th of April, 23rd of April.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: What is the basis of your scepticism that even
4 helicopters could land there?
5 THE WITNESS: Well, they could land there, Your Honour, but the
6 fact that NATO was carrying out very, very close surveillance; the fact
7 that military battle was going on, which, A, would have made it dangerous
8 for the helicopters to land; and, B, that the Bosnian Serb forces, they
9 never reported to us that the Bosnian army was violating the no-fly zone.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH:
11 Q. You're not suggesting, are you, that helicopters don't land in
12 theatres of operation where there's an ongoing conflict?
13 A. I'm -- I'm not suggesting that. But it's -- it's certainly more
14 difficult to do that, when, by this stage, that particular week, the 15th
15 to the 23rd of April, 1994
16 quarters in Gorazde, and I find it quite staggering that neither the
17 Bosnian Serb forces nor the UN forces on the ground reported these
18 helicopter movements to us.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. ...
20 [Defence counsel confer]
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Williams, is that a period of a week, or a
22 year? I think this period stretches from the 15th of April, 1994
23 21st of April, 1995.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. The whole -- but the two cases I
25 was referring to, in particular, Your Honour, were number 1 and 2.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
2 THE WITNESS: That's when the battle was at its most intense.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm with you.
4 THE WITNESS: Mm-hm.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH:
6 Q. Going to -- in view of the comments you've just made, and I
7 appreciate the fact that you are at somewhat of a disadvantage because of
8 the fact that this is not translated into English. I'm going to ask you
9 whether or not the language that is contained on line number 2, and that
10 is the very last entry, would change the testimony that you have just
11 given. And I'm going to request that Mr. Lukic read for us in Serbian
12 the language there so it can be translated.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which line 2 are you referring to, sir?
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Where it says -- it says 2, and the date is the
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: What line 2, page?
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: That would be page 12. I believe the page is up
18 on the screen.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Oh, you're looking at the exhibit. Not looking at
20 the transcript.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: I apologise. The page up on the screen.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Because you talk about the language that he uses.
23 That's why I'm looking at the transcript.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. With the assistance of Mr. Lukic, if you
25 could please read for us in Serbian what it says there, the prekinat
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Mr. Lukic.
3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, document marked
4 0185-4424, item number 2 says, 23rd of April, 1994. And in the last
5 column, entitled "Remarks," it says mission aborted, helicopter hit. And
6 the same is written under item 4. We have the same remark in the column
7 and it says: Helicopter hit.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH:
9 Q. Considering what you just said about there being an active
10 conflict at the time with regard to the first two entries and the fact
11 that there was a war being waged at the moment as being a condition that
12 would foreclose the use of helicopters, does that particular entry change
13 the testimony that you have given us here today?
14 A. No, I don't believe it does, Mr. Guy-Smith.
15 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I wonder if I might refer to an
16 incident which is in the testimony I gave in the case against
17 Mr. Milosevic in June 2003, which I think is related to this questioning
18 from Mr. Guy-Smith.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: I don't have a problem with that in a moment.
20 But I would like to follow up from where we were, first of all.
21 A. Okay.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: If the witness' answer is going to explain what he
23 has just been asked, I think he might be given an opportunity to do so.
24 Mr. Williams, can you please refer to the Milosevic testimony.
25 THE WITNESS: Well, what I was going to refer to was in that
1 testimony I referred to an incident which also happens around this time
2 in this week. I'm afraid I cannot recall the precise day, Your Honour,
3 where two British soldiers serving with the United Nations were hit by
4 incoming Serb fire. The UNPROFOR commander requested that he send into
5 Gorazde an UN helicopter to medevac these two wounded soldiers out of
6 Gorazde to hospital in Sarajevo
7 That took a long time negotiating with the Bosnian Serbs. It was
8 eventually allowed. Tragically one of the soldiers died on the flight to
10 The point I'm making is that even for the UN, it was impossible
11 to send a helicopter into Gorazde at this point without the acceptance
12 and permission of the Bosnian Serb military authorities. So I find it
13 very, very difficult to believe that the Bosnian army would be able to
14 infiltrate helicopters into a small town which, at this time, was a scene
15 of intense battle.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH:
18 Q. With regard to the -- the entry that is made there, assuming for
19 purposes of discussion that the translation and entry are accurate, this,
20 however, does change the complexion of your answer with regard to a
21 helicopter being able to land in a conflict area, does it not? If the
22 mission was aborted because the helicopter was shot, obviously there was
23 an expectation that the helicopter didn't get in.
24 A. Yes, I suppose so, yeah.
25 Q. Okay. Since we're on the subject of that which is in the air, I
1 would like to talk to you for a moment about Tuzla. And, first of all,
2 it's my understanding from your testimony that there was in fact an air
3 strip at Tuzla
4 May of 1993. It was an area that was -- I believe it was designated as a
5 safe area.
6 Is that correct?
7 A. Correct, Mr. Guy-Smith. Tuzla is quite a large town in northern
9 designated safe areas by the Security Council under Resolution 836.
10 There was a very substantial landing strip there and airport. In
11 fact it had been, I think, a major military airport for the Yugoslav air
12 force in pre-war days. Now, the UN had hoped to use this airport to
13 supply Tuzla
14 clear in my testimony, the UN did fly in one flight. I believe it was on
15 the 1st of March, 1994, and I accompanied Mr. Akashi, the SRSG, on that
16 flight. We had hoped to open an air bridge into Tuzla for supplying
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. That proved impossible, sir.
20 Q. Were you aware of a visit by NATO officials and members of,
21 amongst others, the United States air force, one Michael Hayden, the
22 recently retired director from the CIA, in 1994, to the Tuzla
23 A. I'm not aware of that, sir.
24 Q. Okay. Very good. That, we can take no further then.
25 You use some very specific language in your testimony which is --
1 and I'm referring Court and counsel to page 22955, line 11:
2 "What one saw was a fairly regular rotation of officers between
3 the JA and Bosnian Serb forces and Croatian Serb forces."
4 Because I'm sure there will be a dispute at some point later on
5 if this is not clarified. With regard to the issue of JA here, are you
6 referring to the JNA?
7 A. Yes, I am, Mr. Guy-Smith.
8 Q. I see. Okay. Thank you. With that taken care of, I have no
9 further questions in that -- in that regard.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we please have up on the screen 1D00-1843.
11 And if --
12 Q. First of all, per chance, are you familiar with this particular
14 A. We put out a regular series of publications in English and also
15 in -- in Serbo-Croat. I can't remember this one particularly. I mean,
16 when I say we put them out on a sort of regular monthly basis, both in
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you suggesting, Mr. Williams, that this is a
19 UN document.
20 THE WITNESS: It could be, sir. I can't see a date on the
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: If you don't know it, how do you even make that
23 assumption? You can't recognise the document, but how do you assume it
24 is an UN document?
25 THE WITNESS: Sorry, Your Honour, I didn't mean to assume it was.
1 What I meant to state was --
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, the question to you was, Do you know this
3 document? And you say, We produced publications; I can't remember this
4 one. Are you suggesting that it is one of those that you produced?
5 THE WITNESS: It may possibly be, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: That is it my question. Why do you go -- if you
7 don't know it at all, do you or do you not know it?
8 THE WITNESS: I do not know it with any certainty, no.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I suggest that we try to answer the questions
10 as succinctly as possible, because otherwise we get confused. We don't
11 know what you really mean.
12 THE WITNESS: Understood, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we can go to page, I believe it is going to be
15 page 13 of this document. And if we could -- thank you so much. If we
16 can make it a little bit bigger, and if we can scroll -- scroll down.
17 Q. In -- do you see where the word "among" is?
18 A. The sentence beginning "among the most compelling of these ..."?
19 Q. Yeah.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. It says: "Among the most compelling of these is the set of
22 challenges surrounding the expanded 'peace menu,' including preventative
23 diplomacy peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building."
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: The witness said he doesn't know this document.
25 Didn't you want to at least get us to what this document is and where it
1 comes from.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure. Okay, sure.
3 Q. This document is a document entitled "Peace Support Operations,
4 Mass Media, and the Public in the Former Yugoslavia." It was written by
5 Marjan Malesic and is a study, as I understand it, taken from -- by the
6 national board of psychological defence in Sweden with regard to the role
7 of the media in the conflict between Croatia
8 of the conflict.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: I have a problem, Mr. Guy-Smith. That the witness
10 says he doesn't know a document, and then you ask him a question. This
11 happened with the last document which you didn't tender.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: I didn't tender it, because as I said as I saw it
13 there is no -- under the guidelines --
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you please let me finish before you respond.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm saying this happened with the last document
17 that you asked him extensive questions about it, and you read extensively
18 from the document into the record, a document that he said he did not
19 know anything about.
20 You are doing the same thing here. And I think, obviously, if a
21 witness says he doesn't know anything about a document, that's the end of
22 the story about that document. You can't go on and ask him questions
23 about it.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. I think that if the document contains
25 information which is within the witness's purview, because they deal with
1 concepts that are germane to the litigation at hand, that questions can
2 be asked --
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: You can ask those questions without the document.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: But the document is --
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well. I understand the Court's concern and
7 the Court's objection.
8 With that in mind, let's take the document off the screen. So we
9 do not offend, because I don't wish to.
10 Q. With regard -- I'm going to posit a thought to you and ask you to
11 respond, which is that, with regard to peace, that among the most
12 compelling of these is a set of challenges surrounding the peace menu,
13 including preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and
14 peace-building. And what I'd like you to do, if could you, is define
15 those terms, if you're in a position to, and give us what differences, if
16 any, there might be between them. The first one being preventative
18 A. Okay I will do my best in that regard. Preventative diplomacy a
19 I would understand it in some sense, I mean, diplomats would argue --
20 some diplomats would argue that all diplomacy is preventative. That it's
21 work by nation states or by the UN to prevent conflicts and disagreements
22 before anything untoward happens.
23 The second term you referred to is peacemaking.
24 Q. Peacemaking, correct.
25 A. That, I understand, to be almost self-explanatory, that one is
1 trying to endeavour to make a peace agreement, whether it is between
2 states in conflict or between factions in conflict.
3 Thirdly, you refer me to peacekeeping, which can be -- again,
4 keeping the peace between states or between warring factions. It can be
5 on the basis of a formal agreement. It can be far more lose. And I'm
6 afraid that that has been the pattern of many conflicts int he past 20
7 years or so.
8 And then finally you refer to peace-building, which I understand
9 as building after a conflict, perhaps after an agreement has been
10 reached. In the Yugoslav context, for example, I would understand
11 peace-building as something that has happened in the aftermath of the
13 I hope that helps.
14 Q. I think it does. Can you help us at all with this, and perhaps
15 you can; perhaps you can't. Do you find there to be any distinction
16 between the function that the military performs in a peacekeeping, as
17 opposed to peacemaking operation, or do you find them to be same?
18 A. I don't find them to be absolutely the same, but there is a grey
19 area between the two. I mean, the dictionary definitions don't always
20 stand in conflict situations on the ground.
21 Q. Okay. And with regard to the fact that you use the word "loose,"
22 and I here I don't want -- I don't want to misquote you. You said:
23 "You refer me to peacekeeping, which can be keeping the peace
24 between states or between warring factions. It can be on the basis of a
25 formal agreement. It can be far more lose than" -- and I think what you
1 said was, "which I'm afraid it has been over the past number of years.
2 Now, with regard to the issue of that agreement being loose, are
3 you talking about the agreement that exists between the warring factions,
4 or are you referring to the agreement that exists between the
6 A. Particularly between the warring factions and -- you know, even
7 sometimes, dare I say it, mandates given to the UN by the
8 Security Council are not as precise as one would always wish.
9 Q. With regard to the last point you raised here which is in terms
10 of the mandates given to the UN by the Security Council, with regard to
11 the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would you take the position that the
12 mandate that was given to UNPROFOR was one of those mandates that lacked
13 precision which caused difficulty over time?
14 A. There were certainly difficulties, Mr. Guy-Smith. And in a sense
15 there was a succession of mandates because there was a succession of
16 Security Council Resolutions. And all these were adopted by the Council
17 over a period of several years whilst the conflict itself continued on
18 the ground fairly unabated between 1992 and 1995. I mean, there were
19 periods where there were lulls in the conflict, but more or less the
20 conflict continued throughout that three-year period.
21 Q. And with regard to what you just said, would it be fair to say
22 that, first of all, this was a very unique situation; this is the first
23 time that there had been this involvement of the international community
24 in an ongoing conflict of the nature that existed between 1992 and 1995?
25 I'm referring pretty much specifically to the actions of
2 A. I'm trying to think that through and to give you as accurate an
3 answer and response as -- as I can.
4 As the Court will be aware, many of the conflicts in the world,
5 since the end of the cold war in the late 1980s had been within states,
6 often perhaps prompted by the breakup of states. So it is the case that
7 often UN forces have been placed there to try and mitigate the
8 consequences of these conflicts and to advance UN Resolutions.
9 Q. Cyprus
10 asking the question, and I see that you are probably going to take
11 exception to that.
12 A. I am, actually.
13 Q. Okay.
14 A. Because the Cyprus
15 conflict there, going back to 1974 and the Turkish invasion. UN forces
16 are still there, 30 years on. The good new, as it were, is this is an
17 agreement and there have been no incidents or violence of any sort really
18 other than of an incidental nature in Cyprus. Now this was not the case
19 in Bosnia
20 with here between 1992 and 1995, there was a fairly level of conflict.
21 Now there are other cases where this is it the case.
22 Q. And with regard to mandate, to the extent which was -- and I'm
23 using a word which you may accept and you may well reject, and I
24 understand that, but to the extent that there was internal confusion as
25 to how best to proceed, did you experience that confusion manifesting
1 itself in such a way as to leave a lack of clarity for the warring
3 You have to accept, first of all, the issue of the confusion
4 before you can, I think, reach -- reach my question.
5 A. I mean these were very difficult mandates. The situation on the
6 ground was extraordinarily complex and was one, sadly, most of the time
7 of continuing warfare.
8 I'm afraid, Mr. Guy-Smith, I've lost the of end of your question.
9 Q. Well, the point is, in your experience --
10 A. Mm-hm.
11 Q. -- with the recognition of an internal confusion on the side of,
12 what I will call, the international community as how best to proceed, did
13 that confusion manifest itself so that the warring parties had a lack of
14 clarity as to who precisely was standing for what?
15 A. Mm-hm, okay.
16 Q. And perhaps if I put it in other terms. One of the words that
17 has been used oftentimes in describing UNPROFOR is impartial. Another
18 word is unbiased. Another word or concept is staying equal and not
19 taking either side.
20 A. Mm-hm. I think UNPROFOR strived to be impartial and unbiased,
21 and I think it was. The Court needs to be aware, of course, that
22 UNPROFOR was only deployed on the Bosnian government side of the battle
23 lines, as it were. The Bosnian Serb authorities always would not
24 tolerate any notion of UNPROFOR forces being deployed on their side of
25 the battle lines.
1 Some parts of the mandate were clearer than others; for example,
2 the Resolution 836. Very clearly that identified safe areas and which
3 were supposed to be not the scenes of conflict, and sadly all too often,
4 they were.
5 Q. With regard to ultimatums that were made by UNPROFOR personnel
6 that involved other organisations, such as NATO, did you, in your
7 experience, negotiating through these troubled waters find that by virtue
8 of the fact that there was a perceived connection between UNPROFOR and
9 NATO, that there was a view that UNPROFOR was in fact biased by the
10 Bosnian Serb leadership?
11 A. I mean, from time to time they would make that accusation. I
12 think, you know, there are two specific ultimatum, or ultimata, or
13 whatever the plural is, that you may be referring to. Following
14 consistent attacks on Sarajevo
15 February 1994 to give an ultimatum, that unless those attacks ceased,
16 then NATO would conduct air-strikes against Bosnian Serb forces.
17 There was a further ultimatum with regard to the enclave of
18 Gorazde in April 1994.
19 Now, those ultimatums came from NATO. NATO is a military
20 alliance which is in a position, if it so wishes, to deliver those
21 ultimatum. The UN and specifically UNPROFOR was not.
22 Q. I note that you draw a distinction between the two, and I
23 appreciate the distinction that you are drawing. However, it was common
24 knowledge that -- was it not, that NATO's becoming involved was
25 predicated upon UNPROFOR's request?
1 And if it is of any help, we heard yesterday from Sir Rupert
2 Smith with regard to this specific issue.
3 A. Yes, it was. I mean, we talked earlier, for example, the
4 question of helicopters and air movements and so on.
5 UNPROFOR would not have been in a position to maintain a no-fly
6 zone over Bosnia
7 and all of rest of it, and that was delivered by NATO, on request of the
8 Security Council.
9 Q. Okay. I think that we may be dancing around each other a bit,
10 and I don't mean to be at all. I'm driving at the issue of UNPROFOR
11 being in the minds of the Bosnian Serb leadership, in your experience,
12 I'm saying what they said to you, what you experienced in your contacts
13 with them, that UNPROFOR and NATO, there was no distinction as between
14 those two organisations in -- in their mind, as the way they were being
16 A. You know, sometimes they would make that accusation in the heat
17 of argument, as it were; in particular, Mr. Karadzic, as I recall. But I
18 think in reality they could see the distinction. UNPROFOR like any UN
19 peacekeeping force drew its contingents from around the world, countries
20 that were NATO countries, others which were not NATO countries, countries
21 in Africa
22 example, Bangladesh
23 the Bosnian Serbs were aware that the UN was also delivering, for
24 example, humanitarian supplies on their side of the lines. So I -- I
25 would not accept your assumption that they automatically saw NATO and
1 UNPROFOR as the same thing or ...
2 Q. Well, I'm sorry, it's not my assumption. My question was what
3 was your experience? And that's really what I was getting at. And I
4 think you have answered that particular question, that it's something
5 that happened -- it happened on some occasions, but it was, in your view,
6 not something that was necessarily a prevalent theme with regard to the
7 Bosnian Serb leadership in their discussions with you.
8 A. That's correct, sir.
9 Q. Okay.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we might break at this time, so that I have
11 the opportunity to speak specifically with our client. He has a great
12 interest in this particular examination, and I want to make sure that
13 those matters have been attended to.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll take a break and come back at half past
16 Court adjourned.
17 --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 12.30 p.m.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you. I would like to thank the Chamber for
21 the additional five minutes. It was most helpful.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. You're welcome.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH:
24 Q. You were asked a question here today. It's a question that you
25 were asked in your previous testimony as well, with regard to your
1 concerns about the humanitarian crisis, and specifically you were asked
2 about tangible objective signs. And you indicated, that your estimation
3 is, as certainly as early as February that concern was not only a concern
4 that you had, but also a concern, as I understood your testimony, that
5 other members of the international community had. Correct?
6 A. Correct, sir. Yeah.
7 Q. Also, it was a concern that Mr. Milosevic had expressed as well.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And, as a matter of fact, I believe that Milosevic had stated
10 that -- that he concurred that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
11 would deteriorate. True?
12 A. I recall him saying that, yes.
13 Q. And the question really was where -- and this is still talking
14 about in February. This was where the responsibility for the
15 deterioration would lay. And by that, I mean, Milosevic blamed it on the
16 international community's focus on, as I understand it, details and not
17 the situation as a whole.
18 Is that correct?
19 A. That would be the gist of his argument, I think, yes.
20 Q. Okay.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Thomas.
22 MR. THOMAS: Sorry, Your Honour. I wonder if we could just have
23 some clarification. February of what year?
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: 1995.
25 MR. THOMAS: Thank you.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH:
2 Q. Now, with regard to the matter at hand, and by that I mean the
3 tangible concern that existed, were you involved in your capacity with
4 any plans to militarily take over the area from -- by the international
5 community so as to foreclose these concerns?
6 A. Not at all, Mr. Guy-Smith. I'm not quite sure, militarily take
7 over what area now?
8 Q. Srebrenica. There was a concern that you had, and the question
9 that was asked was where there's tangible objective signs, that if the
10 enclave of Srebrenica were to fall --
11 A. Mm-hm.
12 Q. -- there would be a humanitarian crisis on a grand scale?
13 A. I understand.
14 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ...
15 A. [Overlapping speakers] ... Correct. I understand your question,
16 now, sorry, I didn't earlier.
17 Q. I apologise.
18 A. Throughout the period I served in former Yugoslavia, and
19 particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were a series of military
20 operations against the UN Safe Areas, four in particular. Number one
21 being Sarajevo
22 1994; and then, of course, finally, Srebrenica.
23 In all cases we had concerns, well grounded concerns, about the
24 civilian inhabitants of the safe areas and what would become of them in
25 the light of Serb attacks, let alone a Serb seizure of one of these safe
2 Now, as the Court knows this only happened in one case,
3 Srebrenica, and to a lesser extent, Zepa in summer of 1995. But I have
4 to say that in the conduct of the military operations, on many occasions
5 the Bosnian Serbs gave grave concern that their military actions broke
6 accepted practices of international humanitarian law. And this was seen
7 in Sarajevo
8 extraordinarily apprehensive when there were Serb attacks on safe areas.
9 Q. That's understood. As I understand the complexion of the
10 situation, certainly in February, you had Milosevic attempting to
11 influence the Bosnian Serbs for peace. You had the international
12 community attempting to influence the Bosnian Serbs for peace. And much
13 of these entreaties were falling on deaf ears?
14 A. Sadly, the case, Mr. Guy-Smith.
15 Q. I would concur with you, it being sadly the case. In the months
16 that ensued the conflict between the Bosnian Serbs and the BiH army
17 increased; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And it would be fair to say that both parties calcified, from the
20 standpoint of opting for war as opposed to obtaining a peaceful solution?
21 A. I wouldn't agree with you entirely, and I think to illustrate why
22 we need to revisit the concept of the safe areas.
23 As I indicated earlier this mourning in my testimony, these were
24 established by Security Council Resolution 836. Much of the military
25 activity consisted of attacks by the BSA on the Serb areas. Now, this is
1 it not to say, this is not say that there were not occasions firing from
2 within the safe areas on Bosnian Serb positions. But I would say that
3 this -- such outgoing fire, as it were, was much lighter than the attacks
4 pursued by Bosnian Serb forces.
5 I feel also I should draw the Court' attention to the
6 disproportionality and the armament of the relevant sides. That, on the
7 Bosnian Serb side, artillery, armour, helicopters, even ground air
8 missile defence systems were deployed. None of this armament was
9 available to the ABiH side, or, if it was, only in very small an
10 incidental quantities.
11 So there is there was a disproportion between the two fighting
13 Q. Yes, I understand that. But once again, what I was driving at is
14 that both sides had made the determination and that the option was -- was
15 war, not peace. And we heard yesterday from Sir Rupert Smith concerning
16 this matter, that there came a point -- I mean, he had a thesis about
17 that. But there certainly came a point where there were a continuing of
18 ABiH offensives throughout the spring and summer months of 1995.
19 A. Yeah.
20 Q. Okay. And, finally, I wanted to read you a question and an
21 answer of your previous testimony to be found at 22967, starting at line
23 "Question: In your view, as of February 1995, did Milosevic
24 equally appreciate the gravity of the situation in Bosnia?"
25 And your answer: "I think he did. We were stumbling all the
1 time from one crisis to another, from Sarajevo in February 1994, to the
2 Gorazde crisis in April 1994, to Bihac in October/November. And it was
3 obvious given the continued deterioration, and on the ground in Bosnia
4 and around the eastern enclaves that one could premise a further crisis
5 and deterioration in 1995."
6 I trust that you continue to stand by that remark.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. That's what we were talking about just before.
9 A. Yes, I definitely do, Mr. Guy-Smith, yes.
10 Q. And if I'm not mistaken, this remark takes also into account that
11 an appreciation of the gravity of the situation by the leadership of the
12 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia embodied in Slobodan Milosevic?
13 A. Yes, I think it does.
14 Q. All right. Thank you much, sir, for your time and your candor.
15 A. Thank you.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Thomas.
17 MR. THOMAS: Your Honour, I have no questions in re-examination.
18 Thank you.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 Questioned by the Court:
23 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] I have a question to ask.
24 You had several meetings with Milosevic. You were present at
25 those meetings with Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade.
1 According to what you observed, did Milosevic seem informed of
2 what was going on in -- in Bosnia
3 A. I think, on the whole, Your Honour, he was very well informed of
4 what was going on. Some of the detail maybe he didn't know. I recall in
5 particular the meeting, or meetings, over 18 hours on April 22nd and
6 23rd, 1994, in Belgrade
7 for a solution and showing some irritation, visible irritation, with the
8 Bosnian Serbs at their behaviour in continuing to attack the Gorazde
10 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] I have a second question, and if
11 you can't answer, just say so.
12 You said that -- that the FRY helped the Serbs of Bosnia, the
13 Serbian army in Bosnia
14 control on this army, there was a great influence from Milosevic on what
15 was going on with the Serbs in Bosnia
16 So my question is the following. As from the moment when
17 Milosevic -- or at least the FRY was helping the army, the Serbian army
18 in Bosnia
20 particular, practical pressure, material pressure, on the Serbian leaders
21 in Bosnia
22 wasn't in agreement with what was going on.
23 A. A difficult question, Your Honour. Sometimes, dare I say it,
24 statesman are not always as honest as they should be in their responses.
25 Certainly Mr. Milosevic said the right things about wishing to attain
1 peace in Bosnia
2 realize that.
3 Against that, it is very difficult not to conclude that the
4 Bosnian Serb army was -- was receiving substantial logistical assistance
5 from the FRY. In fact, during the course of 1994/1995 one witnessed that
6 their military capabilities actually increased. For example, the
7 deployment of ground to air missile systems, which are very, very
8 advanced in the Sarajevo
9 missile systems being reconciled and so on. And clearly the Bosnian Serb
10 forces were receiving assistance in this regard, and one has to assume
11 that it was coming from the FRY. But I cannot reconcile the
12 contradiction that you duly noted.
13 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Previous translation continues] ... questions
15 arising from the questions by the Judge?
16 MR. THOMAS: No, sir. Thank you.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
18 Further cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
20 Q. During 1994/1995, were you aware of illegal, and by that I mean
21 other nations or entities, supplying weapons to either side, either the
22 Bosnian Serb army or the BiH?
23 A. Yes -- yes, I was, Mr. Guy-Smith.
24 First of all, with regard to the BiH, the Bosnian army, there was
25 quite specific allegations and reports that their forces in Bihac, in
1 north western Bosnia
2 land, or, in some cases, even by air. This was an enclave which directly
3 abutted Croatian territory, so it was easily supplied in that sense, and
4 there were reports of movements by land and by air that were documented
5 by UN forces.
6 With regard to the Bosnian Serb forces, one saw them deploy very
7 sophisticated weapon systems, artillery, armour, helicopters,
8 ground-to-air missiles which had to be supplied from somewhere, and I
9 never saw an allegation that they were receiving weaponry from any source
10 other than from the FRY itself.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: The -- okay. Carry on.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH:
13 Q. At line 69, you indicated and one?
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: We don't have a line 69.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sorry, page 69, line 1, you indicated the -- one
16 has to assume that Serbian forces were receiving assistance in that
17 regard, and it was coming from the FRY.
18 You used the word "assume." And it's that where I wish to focus.
19 And I take it that your conclusion is based upon an assumption that that
20 is where the materiel was coming from because of sophistication.
21 A. Sophistication, the fact that armies are very resource-intensive.
22 Q. Understood.
23 A. They need fuel; they need arms; they need constant replenishment.
24 And this has to come from somewhere.
25 Q. Understood. And with regard to the sophisticated weaponry,
1 you've told us that weapons were being received from Croatia. And when
2 you say from Croatia
3 you mean through the territory of Croatia
4 A. This is a bit more -- definitely from the territory of Croatia
5 of that there was no doubt. And of course, in 1994, the relationship
6 between Croats and Muslims within Bosnia
7 relationship between Croatia
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. So that provided, as it were, political context, which perhaps
10 enabled arms supplies to one area in particular, the Bihac area of
11 north-western Bosnia
12 Q. I understand that. But once again you're making an assumption,
13 and that is that the supplies, the weapons -- and when you said supplies,
14 I take it you also meant weapons. Because I certainly don't wish to put
15 any words in your mouth, because it would be confusing to the Chamber, in
16 any way whatsoever.
17 You're making an assumption that supplies that came from Croatia
18 by virtue of the relationship between the Croatians and the Muslims were
19 from the Croatian government, perhaps, or from the Croatian military.
20 That's an assumption that you're making.
21 A. It's an assumption. But -- and from the government or from
22 agencies with -- within the government, and there were some flights
23 recorded from Croatia
24 that some of these may have been known to departments of the Croatian
1 Q. Okay. So that would be -- that would shift the position of where
2 the genesis of the weaponry comes from, to the knowledge that the
3 Croatian government may well have had with regard to the weaponry passing
4 through their territory; correct?
5 A. Correct, sir.
6 Q. Now, with regard to this particular issue, the issue of the
7 supply of weapons, there were allegations made that the United States was
8 supplying weapons; correct?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. And, as a matter of fact, there were allegations made --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Thomas.
12 MR. THOMAS: I'm sorry, Your Honours, first of all, my learned
13 friend hasn't been particular about who the United States was supposed to
14 -- or who the allegations say the US
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm not suggesting that they were -- that they
16 were being supplied to one side or the other, just that they were being
17 supplied. The issue here that I'm getting at is that there were a series
18 of allegations made with regard to the supplying of weapons to both the
19 ABiH and to the Bosnian Serb army from sources other than Croatia or FRY.
20 A. Yes, there were allegations, yeah.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Thomas.
22 MR. THOMAS: Sorry. Before this continues any further,
23 Your Honours, I'm very conscious that this is now strayed quite far from
24 the original question asked by Her Honour, which was limiting, which was
25 the question of whether -- and I'll find it so that I can quote it
1 probably, Your Honour.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe if you go to page 68.
3 MR. THOMAS: Which about the supply of the VRS, specifically the
4 supply of the VRS and that it came from the FRY. There was some initial
5 questions now about the supply of the ABiH, but now we just seem be
6 getting further and further down that path, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith asked whether there were any other
8 supplies of arms and ammunition to either side, and I understood the word
9 "other" to mean other than supplies from the FRY.
10 Now, if there are any allegations that the US was also supplying
11 arms that's a source other than the FRY, isn't it?
12 MR. THOMAS: I have no difficulty with that questioning.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: What you're difficulty? Because I haven't heard
14 any objectionable ground in -- what's your ground of objection?
15 MR. THOMAS: The sourcing of the ABiH army.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: The source?
17 MR. THOMAS: The sourcing or the supply of the ABiH army. This
18 is a new element that has now emerged in the question.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Because the Judge didn't refer to -- supply to
21 MR. THOMAS: Yes, sir.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I asked the question by virtue of the
24 response that was given by the witness, that he said the supplies were
25 coming through Croatia
1 think have I gotten as far as I need to go with that particular issue.
2 Q. In response to Her Honour's question, I'm now dealing finally
3 with the specific language on page 68, line 24, which is, you say, one
4 has to assume, and my question to you is what you're doing here is you
5 are speculating with regard to where the particular supplies came from?
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: You asked that question, and he told you his
7 grounds for his assumption. Now you're going back --
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Now I'm asking him specifically as to whether it
9 was speculative. And that is my last question.
10 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, should I proceed?
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may proceed, sir.
12 THE WITNESS: There was no doubt that the weaponry deployed in
13 1994/1995 by the VRS, by the Bosnian Serb army, included very
14 sophisticated weapons platforms not available to other forces, like the
16 I have never seen a report or even an allegation that the VRS was
17 supplied by some force other than Yugoslavia
18 indication whatsoever of -- of that.
19 One has to pose the question, therefore, that given an increase
20 in armaments to the Bosnian Serb forces during this period, from whence
21 did this come?
22 Now much earlier in my testimony this morning, I talked about a
23 sort of political break between the Bosnian republic and -- leadership
24 and the Yugoslav leadership of Mr. Milosevic. By contrast there were
25 very close ties, I think, between the Yugoslav army of the FRY and the
1 VRS of the Bosnian Serb republic. There had never been the sort of
2 rupture that there had been on the political level between Belgrade and
3 Pale. The two armies came out of the original army; namely, the Yugoslav
4 national army before the breakup of Yugoslavia. So there was an intimacy
5 from the very fact that the officer course, the logistics bases, these
6 had always been one at a certain time. And it is my belief that that
7 past was never completely broken with. And it is from that that I make
8 the deduction that the supplies of the VRS must have come from the FRY.
9 Q. I had indicated that that would be my last question. However,
10 the answer --
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Go ahead, Mr. Guy-Smith.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
13 Q. In your answer, you said, I have never seen a report or even an
14 allegation. And so I take it that by virtue of that, we're proving a
15 negative here, in the manner that you have put it.
16 A. They have to come from somewhere. One can look at the map, one
17 can study the history, one can know the personal ties between the two
18 military leaderships, one can know that they adopted similar military and
19 technical strategies and so on, and I think, at the end of the day, one
20 can make a deduction from this, which is what I have tried to do.
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. In all honesty.
23 Q. And perhaps not finally, but hopefully so, with regard to the
24 Republika Srpska, there was an Assembly and a president; correct?
25 A. Correct, Mr. Guy-Smith.
1 Q. There were a full set of laws that existed, including laws that
2 created an army; correct?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. And General Mladic had a Supreme Commander, that being the
5 president of the Republika Srpska, Mr. Radovan Karadzic; correct?
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think you must get to the point, Mr. Guy-Smith.
7 There has been no questions about that by the Judge. And if you're
8 making a foundation, get to the point quickly.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH:
10 Q. Can I get an answer to my last question, please.
11 A. Correct, Mr. Guy-Smith.
12 Q. In fact, what you had was the formation of an independent
13 military structure that was operated by and commanded by General Mladic.
15 A. Correct. But this doesn't come from nowhere, and it wasn't born
16 on day one.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you give us the relevance, please, the
18 relevance to the questions asked by the Judge?
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: It's relevant to an answer that he gave.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which answer?
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: The answer that is contained at page 74, lines 2
22 through 23. And that is my last question.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Lines 2, 3.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: I mean, the argument, in terms of the issue of
25 relevance, whether or not you have similar military structures or not,
1 whether or not you have individuals who have grown up together or gone to
2 school together does not necessarily take one to the point of making a
3 determination of there being certain kinds of relationships between
4 them --
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Overlapping speakers] ...
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: You asked me what the relevance was, so I'm
7 responding to your question. That was the relevance of my question.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry, I still don't see the relevance.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. Well, the relevance of my question deals
10 the fact that if there is an independent military structure, as I'm sure
11 the Chamber is aware having sat in previous trials, and as we will
12 certainly learn here, there's certain rules and regulations that must be
13 followed with regard to that military structure. And so to the extent
14 that you have fellow -- you have friends who have known each other for a
15 long time, it doesn't necessarily impact and make a logical deduction
16 that something would be necessarily true.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: It doesn't make a logical deduction, but the
18 witness has given you a number of facts on which he bases his inferences.
19 And I think the inference he is making is that where there is close
20 relationship between the people, the likelihood is that they will help
21 one another.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: I understand that -- [Overlapping speakers] ...
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Overlapping speakers] ... And that has nothing to
24 do with the structure of the military in the RS.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: But I think ultimately at a point in time in
1 terms of these proceedings it will. Because at some point in time the
2 Chamber is going to have to address this question.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Of course.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: It is very clear that some of the questions that
5 have come from the Chamber deal with this very issue.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: And there is clearly a concern about this
8 particular issue. And to the extent that at some point we're going to be
9 dealing with inferences and questions of structure as well friendships
10 are going to be central to that analysis is the reason why this question
11 was asked at that time.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: What I'm saying that is structure has nothing to
13 do with friendships. For purposes of relevance here.
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. We disagree on that, but that will come
15 into light at a later point in time.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: The witness refers to structure separately and
17 referred to friendship separately. He did say that the VRS came from the
18 JNA -- or didn't use the word JNA, however, but he said it came from the
19 same army, which may have referred to this -- the beginnings of the VRS.
20 Then he told about close relationships and that the relationships were
21 never -- he doesn't think that the relationships were ever broken.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: I appreciate that.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: I still think we have a difference of opinion in
25 terms of where this ultimately goes, but I understand precisely what the
1 Court's thinking is.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I have no further questions.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: On that note, Mr. Williams, thank you so much for
5 taking time off from you schedule for coming to testimony. This brings
6 us to the end of your testimony. You are now excused. You may stand
7 down. Please travel well back home.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
10 [The witness withdrew]
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Thomas.
12 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 First of all, I can indicate that the redaction that was required
14 to Mr. Williams's statement has been done, and I'm advised that the
15 appropriate version has now been uploaded into e-court. And therefore I
16 would seek that Exhibit P2371 -- or that the MFI status of P2371 be
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is so removed. May it please be removed,
19 Madam Registrar.
20 Yes, Mr. Thomas.
21 THE REGISTRAR: The status will be changed to exhibit,
22 Your Honours.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
24 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Secondly the transcript, P23727 should, at this stage, remain an
2 that we'll be able to resolve this. But it will need us to just consider
3 one or two extracts or one or two portions of that transcript. As I
4 said, Your Honour, I'm optimistic that we can advise in due course that
5 that has all been resolved, and it can be given an exhibit number.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: It hadn't been admitted, had it?
7 MR. THOMAS: It had, sir. 2372.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: So you want it to remain MFI?
9 MR. THOMAS: I do. Yes, sir. And that concludes finally, sir,
10 the evidence for this week. The next witness is scheduled for Monday.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Then the Chamber stands adjourned to Monday, the
12 25th of May, at quarter past 2.00, in Courtroom I.
13 Court adjourned.
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.09 p.m.
15 to be reconvened on Monday, the 25th day of May,
16 2009, at 2.15 p.m.