Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6393

 1                           Thursday, 21 May 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good morning to everybody in and around the

 6     courtroom.

 7             Madam Registrar, will you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 9     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-81-T,

10     The Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

12             Could we have appearances for today, please, starting with the

13     Prosecution.

14             MR. THOMAS:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

15     everybody in and around the courtroom.  Dan Saxon, Barney Thomas, and

16     Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

18             And for the Defence.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Good morning to everyone.  Daniela Tasic,

20     Chad Mair, Tina Drolec, Novak Lukic, and Gregor Guy-Smith on behalf of

21     Momcilo Perisic.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.

23             Mr. Thomas.

24             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  I called

25     Dr. Michael Williams, please.

Page 6394

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 2             MR. THOMAS:  And just as Dr. Williams is being brought to the

 3     courtroom, Your Honours, I can advise that he is a 92 ter witness.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Thomas.

 5                           [The witness entered court]

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good morning, sir.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Good morning to you.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Will you please make the declaration, sir.

 9             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

10     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.  You may now be seated.

12             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

14             Mr. Thomas.

15             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16                           WITNESS:  MICHAEL CHARLES WILLIAMS

17                           Examination by Mr. Thomas:

18        Q.   Dr. Williams, are you sitting as comfortably as you can be?

19        A.   I am, thank you.

20        Q.   I see that you don't have any blank sheets of paper in front you.

21     You are entitled to make notes if you need to, at any time.  Please just

22     let us know if you would like to raise that opportunity.

23        A.   I would appreciate a piece of note paper, if I may.

24        Q.   Thank you, Madam Usher.

25        A.   Thank you so much.

Page 6395

 1        Q.   Sir, can you begin, please, by giving us your full name and your

 2     date of birth?

 3        A.   My name is Michael Charles Williams, and my date of birth is

 4     11 June 1949.

 5        Q.   And what is your current occupation?

 6        A.   I'm an under-secretary general of the United Nations.  I'm

 7     currently special coordinator for the UN in Lebanon.

 8        Q.   In March of 2000, did you provide a statement to OTP

 9     investigators here at the Tribunal?

10        A.   I did, indeed.

11             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, if we could please have 65 ter 09465

12     on the screen.

13        Q.   Dr. Williams, do you recognise that as the first page of your

14     statement?

15        A.   I do recognise it, and I would confirm that is the witness

16     statement I gave in March 2000.

17        Q.   Can you confirm that that's your signature which appears at the

18     bottom of that page?

19        A.   I would confirm it is, yes.

20        Q.   Have you had the opportunity over the past few days to review the

21     contents of that statement?

22        A.   I have.  I have reviewed it thoroughly, and I can confirm that it

23     is -- the statement is true in every respect, as I recall.

24        Q.   If you were asked to comment on the same matters again today,

25     would your comments be the same?

Page 6396

 1        A.   The comments would be the same, indeed.

 2        Q.   All right.

 3             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, could that please be admitted as an

 4     exhibit, at this stage marked for identification.  There is once further

 5     redaction which I have agreed with my learned friend following discussion

 6     this morning.  I'm hopeful that I can arrange for that to be done during

 7     some time during the course of the morning and we can have that redaction

 8     incorporated and uploaded into e-court before the conclusion of today at

 9     which point the status can be changed from marked for identification.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The document is admitted into evidence.  May it

11     please be given an exhibit number and marked for identification.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P2371, marked

13     for identification.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

15             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  And, Madam Registrar,

16     could we please have 65 ter number 09466 on the screen.

17        Q.   Dr. Williams, while that is appearing, can you confirm for us

18     that you testified in the case against Slobodan Milosevic in this

19     Tribunal?

20        A.   Yes, I did.  I testified against Mr. Milosevic in June 2003.

21        Q.   If you look at the screen, do you see there the first page of the

22     transcript of your testimony --

23        A.   Yes, I do.  Yes.

24        Q.   Again, sir, have you had the opportunity to review the contents

25     of that transcript over the past few days?

Page 6397

 1        A.   Yes, I have, yeah.

 2        Q.   Do you confirm the contents of your testimony and of that

 3     transcript?

 4        A.   I would confirm both, yes.

 5        Q.   As being true and correct, to the best of your knowledge?

 6        A.   True and correct, to the best of my knowledge.

 7        Q.   If you were asked the same questions today, would your answers be

 8     the same?

 9        A.   They would be, sir, yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, again, at this stage I would move for

12     admission of the transcript as an exhibit, please.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It is so admitted -- yes, sir.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me.  There are some difficulties that

15     exist with the transcript as it is constituted, as I understand what is

16     comprised of in a 92 ter package.  I had a brief conversation with

17     Mr. Thomas about this issue.

18             One of the things that happens in this transcript, which is not

19     something that we have experienced necessarily before, and certainly not

20     to the extent that we experience it in this transcript, is there is

21     reference made to tabs which are exhibits, which the witness either

22     confirms -- or say what they say, but then the tab itself, the exhibit

23     itself, is not part of this 92 ter package.  And, as I understand, it

24     will not be introduced in evidence.

25             There are references made to exhibits by, once again the use of

Page 6398

 1     the word "tab" in which sentences of an exhibit are read out and the

 2     witness comments either on the sentences for which I have no difficulty,

 3     but also on occasion he comments on other matters that are contained in

 4     an exhibit which is not before the Chamber.

 5             There -- if you -- if you care, can I give you a couple of

 6     examples of this so that you see the difficulty that presents itself.

 7             At page 22960 the following question is asked, and the following

 8     response is given.  Starting at line 17:  "Now if I can draw your

 9     attention to Prosecution Exhibit 470, tab 35."

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You said page 229?

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  22960, line 17.

12             "Q.  Now if I can draw your attention to Prosecution Exhibit 470,

13     tab 35, does this document corroborate some of your observations

14     regarding the border closure?

15             "A.  I'm sorry, Mr. Groome, tab 35?

16             "Q.  Yes, tab 35.

17             "A.  Yes it does, yes."

18             We do not have introduced in this case, for example, tab 35.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. --

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I can allude to a series of others [Overlapping

21     speakers] ...

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  [Overlapping speakers]... which have the same

24     difficulty.

25             Therefore it be would the Defence's objection that the transcript

Page 6399

 1     as it is presently constituted is based on facts that are not in evidence

 2     and is therefore not a complete rendition whereby the Chamber can make an

 3     intelligent determination of what is being said.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Thomas.

 5             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honour, first of all, the example that my

 6     learned friend cites is an appropriate matter to bring to the

 7     Trial Chamber's attention.  I appreciate that that particular reference

 8     is not a particularly helpful reference at all, in the absence of any

 9     further discussion about the exhibit.

10             Throughout the transcript and the reason why the record is not

11     being burdened with the admission of all of these documents, throughout

12     the transcript there is it reference to the subject matter contained

13     within the particular exhibits and the relevant portions, relevant to the

14     questions which are then put to Dr. Williams.  I accept that references

15     such as the ones that my learned friend has referred to, and I note that

16     this comes very -- a long way into the transcript, near the end, is one

17     that is not helpful.  If it assists my learned friend and assists the

18     Chamber, if he has other references such as those which carry no further

19     comment other than to simply adopted a document which is not before the

20     Trial Chamber, I agree that those references should either be ignored or

21     deleted from the -- from the transcript.

22             I've discussed the matter with my learned friend this morning.

23     One suggestion he had was that we leave the transcript as marked for

24     identification for the moment.  He can canvass various matters in

25     cross-examination.  If there are any outstanding issues that he has

Page 6400

 1     regarding portions of the transcript that are of no assistance in the

 2     absence of the exhibit, then we can address those, either by arranging

 3     for the exhibit to be tendered or for a necessary deletion to be made

 4     from the transcript.

 5             It's the Prosecution position that essentially the transcript

 6     speaks for itself when one considers the references to the relevant

 7     portions of the documents contained within the transcript, and on

 8     occasion, where documents are considered to be of assistance to the

 9     Trial Chamber, and there are three of those, we propose to tender those

10     exhibits.

11             But I wonder for the moment, Your Honours, I can suggest that the

12     suggestion made by my learned friend to me before proceedings, began this

13     morning be adopted; that we defer any final resolution of this matter

14     until the conclusion of cross-examination.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I hear him.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I did make that offer to Mr. Thomas before we

17     started the proceedings today.

18             I think that the matter may have to be deferred till after

19     cross-examination and Mr. Thomas and I have an opportunity to go through

20     the -- to go through the transcript with each other, because I'm not

21     going to be doing some of the work of the Prosecution during my

22     cross-examination.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Thank you so much.  09466 is now admitted

24     in evidence and marked for identification.  May it please be given an

25     exhibit number.

Page 6401

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours that will be Exhibit P2372, marked

 2     for identification.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 4             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Thank you,

 5     Madam Registrar.

 6             Your Honours, the tree exhibits I referred to or I have referred

 7     to, again I have discussed this matter with my learned friend, there is

 8     no need for those to come up on e-court.  I can just signal the 65 ter

 9     numbers and seek their admission and the allocation of an exhibit number

10     at this stage, if that is acceptable to the Trial Chamber.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Why do you want to adopt that procedure?  Why do

12     we not have to see them?

13             MR. THOMAS:  Simply, Your Honours, because I would not be asking

14     for any comment from Dr. Williams on these exhibits.  They are commented

15     by him -- commented on by him already in the transcript that is part of

16     the 92 ter package.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

18             MR. THOMAS:  The first of those is 65 ter number 05726.  If that

19     could please be admitted as an exhibit, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You said 0?

21             MR. THOMAS:  5726.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  And that's admitted into evidence.

23     May it please be given an exhibit number.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P2373.

25             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  The next exhibit is 65 ter

Page 6402

 1     number 00863.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's admitted into evidence.  May it please be

 3     given an exhibit number.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P2374, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 6             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours, Madam Registrar.

 7             And the final, please, is 65 ter number 00864.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  00864.  It is admitted.  May it please be

 9     admitted.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P2375, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

12             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  That, for the moment,

13     takes care of the 92 ter package.  And I have a brief summary of the

14     evidence contained in that package.

15             From January 1994 until April 1995, Dr. Williams was director of

16     information for UNPROFOR based in Zagreb.  During this time he was the

17     senior spokesman for the UN in the former Yugoslavia, and he coordinated

18     its information programme in the region.  In this capacity Dr. Williams

19     was one of the most senior civilian UN officials and officially

20     accompanied the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,

21     Mr. Akashi in his talks with government leaders and various factions

22     throughout the region.

23             Among those with whom Dr. Williams met were representatives of

24     the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership, including

25     Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic, as well as representatives of the FRY

Page 6403

 1     leadership, including Slobodan Milosevic.

 2             In addition to his other sources of information, Dr. Williams

 3     observed firsthand the shelling and sniping of Sarajevo by forces of the

 4     VRS.  He comments upon the deliberate targeting of civilians and the

 5     disproportionate use of force by the VRS.  In every meetings that

 6     Dr. Williams attended with the Bosnian Serb leadership and/or

 7     General Mladic, the Bosnian Serb representatives present were made aware

 8     of UN concerns regarding the humanitarian situation.

 9             Dr. Williams describes the interrelationship among

10     Slobodan Milosevic, Dr. Karadzic, and General Mladic.  He comments upon

11     the dependance of the Republika Srpska, upon financial, materiel, and

12     other support from Serbia and describes the difficulty encountered in

13     monitoring the border between the FRY and the Republika Srpska during a

14     period of sanctions imposed by the FRY in 1994, following the rejection

15     of the contact group plan by the Republika Srpska.  Cross border

16     helicopter flights at night, between Serbia and the Republika Srpska were

17     a frequent problem and appeared to increase with the implementation of

18     sanctions.  Dr. Williams describes also the evidence prior to July 1995

19     of tangible objective sides signs, that should the VRS take Srebrenica, a

20     humanitarian crisis on a grand scale would follow.

21             Your Honours, that concludes the summary of Dr. Williams'

22     testimony in the 92 ter package.  There is a single matter of

23     clarification relating to his statement which I need put to him, and that

24     should conclude my questions.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Go ahead.

Page 6404

 1             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honours, if we could please --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the presiding Judge's microphone please

 3     be turned off.  There is too much noise.  Thank you.

 4             MR. THOMAS:  Could we please have Exhibit P2371 on the screen.

 5     Page 4 of the English, please, paragraph 4.  And page 4 of the B/C/S,

 6     paragraph 6.

 7        Q.   Dr. Williams, do you see the paragraph beginning with the words:

 8     "UNPROFOR were always trying to negotiate a cease-fire ..."

 9        A.   Yes, I do.  Yeah.

10        Q.   You make a comment at the end of that paragraph.  "We also tried

11     to negotiate greater humanitarian access, particularly to the eastern

12     enclaves and Sarajevo."

13        A.   Correct.

14        Q.   Could you just explain, please, to the Trial Chamber what you

15     mean by the eastern enclaves?

16        A.   By the eastern enclaves, Your Honours, I refer to three of the

17     safe areas; namely, those of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica.  The court

18     may recall that under Security Council Resolution 836 of, I believe,

19     May 1993, six towns in Bosnia were declared safe areas.  Three of these,

20     the three I earlier mentioned, were in the east, and presented great

21     difficulty in terms of the UN supplying their populations with food and

22     necessary humanitarian goods.

23        Q.   Dr. Williams, thank you.  That concludes, for the moment, any

24     questions I have for you.  Would you please just remain there for

25     questions that my learned friend will have for you.

Page 6405

 1        A.   Thank you.

 2             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 4                           Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

 5        Q.   Good morning, Dr. Williams.

 6        A.   Good morning, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 7        Q.   I'd like to start with, if I could, discussing the relationship

 8     between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Mladic and Mr. Karadzic.

 9             As I understand your prior testimony, you have -- you've

10     indicated that Mr. Milosevic had influence over the Bosnian Serb

11     leadership, and by that I mean Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic.  And that

12     what would occur is that, on occasion, various members of the

13     Bosnian Serb leadership would -- would assemble in Belgrade.  And

14     Mr. Milosevic, as the president of the Republic of Serbia, would use his

15     best endeavours to exert [Realtime transcript read in error "excerpt"]

16     what would be political pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership.

17             Is that a -- is that an accurate statement?

18        A.   I think that is an accurate statement.  From time to time

19     Mr. Milosevic did seek to exercise an influence over the Bosnian Serb

20     leadership.  I think a distinction can be made between, of course, the

21     political leadership and the military leadership of the Bosnian Serb

22     republic.

23        Q.   Understood.  And, as a matter of fact, that's probably not

24     particularly surprising that Milosevic was in that position, attempting

25     to exert influential, because at the time Serbia was, in fact, the

Page 6406

 1     political power in the -- in that region; correct?

 2        A.   Correct, sir.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Let just make sure we correct this before --

 4     you're referring to "exert influence."

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Just so that the stenographer gets it right

 7     because twice now, she's write "excerpt."

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 9        Q.   And would it be fair to say that during the period of time, there

10     were a fair number of negotiations, bilateral negotiations with both

11     Karadzic and Mladic?

12        A.   Oh, very much so, sir.  Very frequently, almost on a monthly

13     basis I would say, in the period I was there from January 1994 to

14     April of 1995.

15        Q.   And as a result of that, your assessment of Mladic was that he

16     had firm control over his forces and had a disciplined military

17     structure; correct?

18        A.   That was the impression I drew, yes.  And -- sorry, I heard

19     interpreter there.

20        Q.   So did I.  I think we're back on track.

21        A.   Oh, good.  Yes, and General Mladic, on a number of occasions,

22     demonstrated that he had control over his forces.  On at least one

23     occasion talks, for example, that were held in Geneva in June of 1994, he

24     was in direct touch with forces then encircling Gorazde and instructed

25     them to vacate a certain ridge they were occupying, and that instruction

Page 6407

 1     was carried through.

 2             There was, as far as I could deduce, a clear line of military

 3     command and control.

 4        Q.   And clearly based on the example you have just given, Mladic

 5     exercised that control in, what we could call, both a firm and decisive

 6     manner, did he not?

 7        A.   On that occasion, certainly.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Now, there was -- there was another side to

 9     General Mladic, was there not, the hot-headed side?  The monomaniacal and

10     temperate side?

11        A.   Perhaps that is a fair comment.  Again I recall a critical

12     meeting chaired by president Milosevic in Belgrade on 23rd and 24th of

13     April 1994 at the height of the Gorazde crisis when, after 18 hours of

14     discussions, there was a eventual agreement on a cease-fire in Gorazde.

15     And when a French officer, I believe it was General de Lapresle, the

16     military commander of UNPROFOR, said, Look, thank goodness we have this

17     agreement now, Milosevic all of a sudden reacted in a very intemperate

18     manner and said, And you better make sure that this sticks.  We cannot

19     tolerate any action by NATO.  And his pose was assertive, if not

20     threatening.

21        Q.   Did you mean -- when you said Milosevic, you meant Mladic, did

22     you not?

23        A.   Yes, I did, Mr. Guy-Smith.  Thank you very much.  I'm sorry.

24        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ...  Thank you.

25             And he also said, I think, at one point something to the effect

Page 6408

 1     of, We'll always send two shells for every shell fired by the Muslims?

 2        A.   Yes, he did.  Generally if there was any firing out of Bosnian

 3     territory towards Bosnian Serb held territory, the reaction was and

 4     response was quick, and on the whole, I would say disproportionate.

 5        Q.   And you became aware obviously in your dealings with

 6     General Mladic that -- that any provocation, no matter how slight, was

 7     going to result in disproportionate response by him.  That was one of the

 8     features of this conflict, correct, unfortunate as it may be, obviously?

 9        A.   I think that's right, Mr. Guy-Smith.  Some of this stemmed from

10     the armaments of the two forces, whereas the VRS, the Bosnian Serb army,

11     for example was very well equipped with artillery.  This was not the case

12     on the Bosnian army side, on the Bosniak side.  So from the very

13     armaments, it stemmed that the VRS response was often disproportionate.

14        Q.   And there was another aspect to that, which is that when such a

15     response occurred, it became a feature of the conflict that such a

16     response could be used as a political advantage by -- in this situation

17     it would be the Bosnian Muslim side, the side opposite General Mladic.

18     It was one of the things that occurred as between the parties during this

19     time in the conflict.

20        A.   I'm not quite sure I follow your assumption that this would be

21     used to a political advantage.

22        Q.   Not would be; could be.

23        A.   Could be, very good.  I accept, yeah.

24        Q.   And would it be fair to say that you were -- the majority of the

25     time when you were dealing the Bosnian Serbs, you were turning to

Page 6409

 1     Milosevic in situations to try to bring his influence to bear upon the

 2     Bosnian Serb party to the conflict?

 3        A.   That was true.  But not all of the time, Mr. Guy-Smith.  Often

 4     the first recourse of Mr. Akashi, the Special Representative of the

 5     Secretary-General, would be to try and deal directly with the

 6     Bosnian Serb leadership.

 7        Q.   Understood.

 8        A.   Either through discussions in Pale, their capital, or through

 9     direct telephone contact.  If he felt that he was making no headway in

10     whatever the issue of the day was, then he would sometimes, first of all,

11     inform president Milosevic of this, and then seek his assistance in

12     trying to get some change in behaviour of the Bosnian Serb leadership.

13        Q.   Okay.  And based upon what you have just said, I think it would

14     be fair to say that you recognised that Milosevic was in a position where

15     he could bring influence to the table but not control of the parties.

16        A.   I think that that's probably right, yes.  I mean, president

17     Milosevic had no direct political control over the Bosnian Serb

18     leadership.  In fact, of course, president Milosevic's leadership, the

19     old league of Yugoslav Communists stemmed from the Yugoslav communist

20     party.  There was a direct line of continuity.

21        Q.   Correct.

22        A.   The Bosnian Serb political leadership by contrast, did not come

23     from Communist origins.  They did not share the same political heritage,

24     and in that respect, were different.  If I may add, I think it was

25     different with regard to the representative militaries.  They did come

Page 6410

 1     from the same background; namely, the old JNA, the old Yugoslav national

 2     army.  And I think because of that, certain bonds, certain relationships

 3     still existed.

 4        Q.   Understood.  With regard to the matter that you just raised which

 5     is Milosevic coming from the old league of the Communist -- Yugoslav

 6     Communist party, if I'm not mistaken, so did General Mladic?

 7        A.   Correct, Mr. Guy-Smith.  Yes.

 8        Q.   And that was a feature of experience that was not shared with

 9     president Karadzic; correct?

10        A.   That's correct.  For the most part, the Bosnian Serb leadership,

11     as I recall, the key figures, like Karadzic, the late Mr. Koljevic, and

12     so on, they were not part of the old national Yugoslav leadership.

13        Q.   Okay.  I'm -- I don't know if you would agree with me about this

14     or not, but obviously those that share the values and experience of what

15     I'll call the university days oftentimes have a -- a language, a library

16     of understanding from which they can both rely, as well as discuss

17     matters with each other in an easier fashion than somebody who has not

18     been galvanized by those years?

19        A.   I think that is a very right assumption, yes.

20        Q.   There came a time when the borders were closed, and by that I

21     mean the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that was as a

22     result of the Serbian -- the Bosnian Serbian rejection of the contact

23     group plan.  Is that correct?

24        A.   That's correct, sir.

25        Q.   And when that occurred Milosevic made some kind of comment, and I

Page 6411

 1     think you allude to it in your testimony, that this was not Brazil.  And

 2     I take it that he could keep the borders -- he could keep the borders

 3     contained.

 4        A.   Well, I mean, it certainly wasn't Brazil, of course, because

 5     Brazil is a huge continental country, as we all know.

 6             Nevertheless, the borders between the Bosnian Serb republic and

 7     between Serbia proper did present problems for control, and even for

 8     observation, the nature of the terrain and the length of the border

 9     presented many difficulties.

10        Q.   And with regard to the closing of the border by Milosevic, this

11     was part of a process which was to assist in the imposition of sanctions.

12     And -- correct?

13        A.   Yes, sir, you're correct.

14        Q.   The sanctions that were being viewed at that time, certainly from

15     your position, I would think, demonstrated that the Federal Republic of

16     Yugoslavia was seriously against the Bosnian Serb leadership's position

17     at that time; correct?

18        A.   I think by the time that the sanctions are imposed and

19     Mr. Milosevic, president Milosevic, had accepted the contact group plan,

20     there were clear political differences between, as it were, Belgrade and

21     Pale.

22             Having said that, how effective the closure of the borders, well,

23     I think is open to a question mark.

24        Q.   Understood.

25        A.   I also have to say that my opinion, and not my opinion alone, was

Page 6412

 1     that the international community was given grossly inadequate facilities

 2     for monitoring that border when it was closed.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Be that as it may, the imposition of these sanctions and

 4     the border closure was a device whereby he was trying to influence again

 5     the Bosnian Serb leadership to take -- if we might call it a more

 6     constructive or a positive role in the peace process, the one that he had

 7     agreed to and adopted.  By "he," I'm referring to Milosevic.

 8        A.   That's true, and that's certainly what president Milosevic said

 9     to a number of interlocutors at the time; Mr. Stoltenberg from Norway and

10     lord David Owen, as well as Mr. Akashi.  He would frequently make rather

11     dismissive remarks about the Bosnian Serb political leadership and find

12     it unfathomable that they did not accept the peace plan that was on

13     offer.

14        Q.   And this was just one of a series of -- series of attempts or

15     engagements on his part to try to restrain them, to influence them, and

16     to bring them into line with his position, the one that you have

17     mentioned, and that being the position of being engaged in the peace

18     process.  Correct?

19        A.   That's certainly the impression he gave, and I think there is

20     evidence to indicate that he did try and exert that influence from time

21     to time.  However there's always a differences between what is said

22     perhaps in diplomacy and the realities on the ground, how effective he

23     was in instrumentalising the sanctions against the Bosnian Serb republic.

24        Q.   He made the statement, if I'm not mistaken, at one point that, We

25     are for peace.  We have made the close of peace, I believe, is a

Page 6413

 1     statement that Milosevic had made.

 2        A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4             Now, with regard to the -- the events I believe you -- in your

 5     testimony you discuss Gorazde; correct?

 6        A.   Correct, sir.

 7        Q.   Now, with regard to Gorazde, it's your understanding, is it not,

 8     that there were no members of the FRY leadership in Gorazde at that time,

 9     in April -- I think it would be April of 1994.

10        A.   No, there were not.  At that time, Gorazde, as I indicated

11     earlier, was one of the six towns or cities declared safe areas by the

12     Security Council of the UN.  And although it was encircled by Bosnian

13     Serb forces, the town itself was part of the Bosnian republic and had

14     Bosnian republic forces inside it.

15        Q.   Okay.  He received, I take it, to your knowledge, information

16     from Karadzic and Mladic concerning what was occurring?

17        A.   He must have done.  And one also needs to bear in mind that

18     Gorazde, itself, is very close to the Serbian border.  It is no distance

19     at all.

20        Q.   And with regard to any of the statements that he made in regard

21     to Gorazde, they may or may not be his own assessment in the sense of

22     what he has seen or heard but, rather, based on information that was

23     given to him by, for example, Mladic or Karadzic; correct?

24        A.   Correct.

25        Q.   And with regard to the issues that you were presented with and

Page 6414

 1     the issues that all the parties were presented with, this is one of the

 2     common features of these kinds of negotiations, which is oftentimes

 3     you're negotiating based upon information that you have received second,

 4     third hand.  And it's not necessarily either reliable or unreliable, but

 5     it's information upon which you have to make a determination that you're

 6     going use or not use, based upon the -- shall I put it, this term, the

 7     necessity of the moment?

 8        A.   Yes.  I should clarify that the UN itself did have some officials

 9     and observers in the town of Gorazde.  For example, there were quite a

10     number of what are called UNMOs, UN Military Observer.  The UN High

11     Commission for Refugees, also had several staff members there.  And I

12     also had one member of my own office based there.

13             So there was a variety of reporting from the town from UN

14     sources.

15        Q.   Okay.  It would be fair to say that at point in time, vis-a-vis

16     your relationship with the Bosnian Serb leadership, and by that I mean

17     the international community, those relationships were, to put it mildly,

18     somewhat strained, were they not?

19        A.   They were strained always when there was military action

20     undertaken by the Bosnian Serb forces, which in the period in which I was

21     present in the former Yugoslavia, I have to say was quite frequent,

22     whether it was Sarajevo or Gorazde or Bihac or some of the eastern

23     enclaves.

24        Q.   And once again, this is another situation in which Milosevic was

25     involved in -- in a series of -- of what I'd call manoeuvres and in an

Page 6415

 1     attempt to influence the Bosnian Serb leadership to change their

 2     position.

 3        A.   Yes.  I mean, I think, you know, some of us felt that although he

 4     was trying perhaps to influence that leadership, that he could have done

 5     more to be effective in restraining it.  One only had to look at the map

 6     to realize that the Bosnian Serb republic, its institutions and its

 7     military, were very dependant upon Serbia.  And there was a feeling that

 8     many of us had that Mr. Milosevic, while he did seek to exert his

 9     influence from time to time, certainly over Gorazde in the end and over

10     the contact group peace plan, might have done so more strenuously at an

11     earlier date.

12        Q.   So was his -- his failure to do so at an earlier date something

13     that was discussed with him?

14        A.   Yes, it was.  And Mr. Akashi would appeal directly to him, Look,

15     I call upon you to exercise your leadership to -- to restrain the Bosnian

16     Serbs from their repeated attacks on UN Safe Areas.

17        Q.   When you use the -- when you use the phrase there, "exercise your

18     leadership," I take it that what you're talking about once again is an

19     issue of influence as opposed to an issue of control?

20        A.   Formally speaking, yes, you're absolutely correct.  I mean, he

21     did not have political control over the Bosnian Serb leadership.  One has

22     to say that there's -- there's a continuum between control and -- and

23     influence.  And it's not the case that these were two normal neighbouring

24     countries where one might seek to exercise brotherly influence or give

25     counsel to another.  And the Bosnian Serb republic effectively had no

Page 6416

 1     functioning economy.  Its military, for logistical purposes, was highly

 2     dependant upon Serbia.  Buts this extended to other areas as well.

 3        Q.   You just said something here which I find kind of interesting

 4     which is, "And it is not the case that these were two normal neighbouring

 5     countries where one might seek to exercise brotherly influence or give

 6     counsel to one another."

 7             As a matter of fact, what we had at the time was quite a unique

 8     situation, which is you had the breakup and essentially what I think you

 9     would call a civil war between what had once been a -- a large country

10     held together with many different individuals in it and many different

11     factions in it.  Not dissimilar perhaps to what occurred in the

12     United States during the civil war.

13        A.   I mean, there are some similarities.  In the US, of course, there

14     was a clear division between north and south, between the union and the

15     confederates.  It was different in the former Yugoslavia, because one

16     national state broke up into many republics.  And then within some of

17     those republics, particularly within Bosnia, there was for a long time

18     three contending forces; namely, the Bosnian Serb republic, the Bosnian

19     republic based in Sarajevo, but also the Bosnian Croat forces around

20     Mostar.

21             Now after March 1994, there was a Federation between the

22     Bosnian Croat forces and the Bosnian republic in Sarajevo.  So it's a

23     complicated picture.

24        Q.   Well, that's precisely what I was driving at.  It is a

25     complicated picture.  And to the extent that there were old relationships

Page 6417

 1     or former alliances, it was those upon which you were relying on, in a

 2     certain sense, for purposes of influence which you understood what those

 3     limitations would be and could be by virtue of the unique situation in

 4     which you found yourself in.  True?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Okay.  I would like to show you a document to see whether or not

 7     you have any familiarity with it.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  It's a document, 1D01-0212.  It is from -- if we

 9     could scroll to the bottom of the document.

10        Q.   It is from Major-General Morillon.  Do you know who that

11     individual was?

12        A.   Yes, I do, sir.

13        Q.   And who was that individual?

14        A.   He was the -- at the time of this letter he was a commander of

15     the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, based in Sarajevo.

16        Q.   And the letter is addressed to --

17        A.   President Izetbegovic of the Bosnian republic.

18        Q.   What was the army serving under President Izetbegovic that?

19        A.   Would be the -- the Bosnian Muslim army.  I think it's initials

20     were the ABiH.

21        Q.   Okay.  And with regard the information that's contained therein,

22     is this a subject that you were familiar with, that an 82-millimetre

23     mortar set up on the western side of Kosevo hospital within the hospital

24     grounds which had then been used to fire nine rounds using the hospital

25     as a screen?

Page 6418

 1        A.   I'm familiar with this incident from reports and I've also seen

 2     this letter in the UN archives.

 3             I should point out that to the Court, however, that this incident

 4     was in January 1993 when I was not in Yugoslavia.  In fact, at that time,

 5     I was with the United Nations in Cambodia.

 6        Q.   I understand that.  You are familiar with the incident?

 7        A.   I am, sir.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Is the incident here the type of complaint that was made

 9     by the Bosnian Serb leadership -- I'm sorry.  Yes, by the Bosnian Serb

10     leadership about the activities of the ABiH?  And by that, I mean using

11     such things as a hospital as a shield for purposes of waging their part

12     of the war.  Whether -- whether or not you -- you put any stock in what

13     was being said or not.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated]

15             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, Your Honour?

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm just asking the Registrar to scroll this

17     document up.  Thank you so much.

18             THE WITNESS:  Yes, as I mentioned, I was not in Bosnia or the

19     former Yugoslavia at the time.  This was a particularly egregious

20     violation of the Geneva Convention.  I am not aware of any similar

21     incidents during the time of my service in Bosnia.  But such actions can

22     only be thoroughly condemned.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I would like to have this admitted as defendant's

24     next in order, please.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  This document is admitted into evidence.  May it

Page 6419

 1     please be given an exhibit number.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D99, Your Honours.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 4        Q.   When you say that you are not familiar with any similar

 5     incidents, are you confining that statement to the use of a hospital as a

 6     shield?

 7        A.   I -- I am, sir.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Just wanted to make sure that -- I wanted to make sure

 9     that -- that we were clear about the extent to which you were -- you were

10     making the point.

11             Did you, in your capacity, receive information about the ABiH

12     having a mobile mortar truck or tank within Sarajevo?

13        A.   I'm not quite sure what you mean by that.  But I would say that,

14     you know, mortars by definition are fairly portable weaponry.  You can

15     almost fold it up and put it in the back of a car and take it somewhere

16     to fire and then fire off several rounds and then move on somewhere else.

17     It's not like a heavy artillery gun.

18             But that the Bosnian forces had that capability, I would not

19     deny.  I mean, that's very true.

20        Q.   Okay.

21        A.   And that they did use mortar attacks from Sarajevo from time to

22     time.

23        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Did you ever receive any information

24     concerning the -- the troop strength of the ABiH during the time that you

25     were in region?

Page 6420

 1        A.   Yes, we did.  I mean, it varied, of course, and many of their

 2     forces were encircled in the various enclaves.

 3        Q.   Yesterday we heard from a witness that the troop strength was in

 4     the neighbourhood, I think, of some hundred thousands, or hundreds of

 5     thousands; I don't remember exactly the precise figure.  I had given him

 6     a figure of 230.000, which he rejected.  He said it was a bit too high.

 7             In your estimation, could you tell us what figures you had.  And

 8     I understand this -- it's a guesstimate at best, but ...

 9        A.   It would be that, sir.  But I would say that even 100.000, I

10     would regard as a sort of upper most.

11        Q.   Okay.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Thomas.

13             MR. THOMAS:  Sorry, Your Honours, we went from talking

14     specifically about Sarajevo to troop strength.  And I just want to find

15     out from my learned fiend --

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I --

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry can you just hold on.

18             Yes, Mr. Thomas.

19             MR. THOMAS:  Just trying to find form learned friend whether the

20     question related to troop strength in Sarajevo, or whether it represented

21     the troop strength in total of the ABiH on the territory.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Before Mr. Thomas rose I saw the difficulty with

23     the question as posed and the answer as given, and I had a follow-up

24     question in mind.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yeah, would you like to clarify that.

Page 6421

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure.

 2        Q.   With regard to the troop strength in Sarajevo, could you give us

 3     a number?  Is that -- is that the 100.000 that is in discussion, or would

 4     you believe it to be something different?

 5        A.   I would hesitate to comment on this, but and you used it yourself

 6     -- Mr. Guy-Smith used the expression of a sort of a guesstimate.  I would

 7     argue that 100.000 was perhaps the guesstimate for ABiH forces throughout

 8     Bosnia.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I hope that clarifies the issue.

11        Q.   Did you ever receive any information that the BiH army had

12     barracks near the ice stadium in Sarajevo?

13        A.   I do recall some ABiH forces being located near there, yes.

14        Q.   Okay.  Is that what --

15        A.   I do recall ABiH forces being located near there.  By the ice

16     stadium -- you mean the ice stadium?

17        Q.   Yes.

18        A.   Yeah, sorry, it's come up incorrectly on the transcription.

19     These refer to the old winter Olympics facilities in Sarajevo.

20        Q.   Precisely.

21             Did you receive information that the ABiH fired mortars close to

22     UN positions at the PTT building?

23        A.   There was that allegation on at least one occasion, I recall.

24     The PTT building would be in the post and telegraph building in Sarajevo.

25        Q.   The HG UNPROFOR?  I'm asking the same question about that.

Page 6422

 1        A.   I can't recall a specific example, sir.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What do you mean by HG?

 3             THE WITNESS:  Do you mean the headquarters?

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, HQ.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I misspoke myself.

 6        Q.   The Tito barracks.  Did you hear of?

 7        A.   I did not, sir.

 8        Q.   Okay.  You've mentioned the matter of helicopter flights, and I'd

 9     like to spend some time with you there.

10             In that regard, did you receive specific reports of helicopters

11     being flown cross border?

12        A.   Yes, we did, sir.  We had reports from UN military observers

13     located in a number of the enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, including Tuzla,

14     of helicopter movements.  Sometimes in substantial numbers.  Often at

15     night.

16        Q.   And when you received such information, I take it that you made

17     appropriate protestations to the parties concerned?

18        A.   Definitely.  The Court will wish to recall that there was no-fly

19     zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was imposed upon a request by the

20     Security Council to NATO.  So helicopter movements, unless authorised, on

21     occasion they might be authorised, for example, for purpose of medical

22     evacuation, would have been violations of Security Council actions.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  This no-flow zone was it Bosnia-Herzegovina-wide?

24             THE WITNESS:  Correct, Your Honour.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:

Page 6423

 1        Q.   And with regard to such protestations, did you receive responses,

 2     and from that I mean responses from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

 3     concerning whether or not they had been involved there flying helicopters

 4     into the region?

 5        A.   There were responses.  And there were a number of occasions I

 6     have to say when we found the responses of the Federal Republic of

 7     Yugoslavia authorities to be inaccurate.  And, indeed, on at least one

 8     occasion, UN military observers who had been deployed on the -- on the

 9     FRY side, on the Serbian side of the border, had their access to radars

10     at a Yugoslav air base blocked by security officials there.

11        Q.   Yes, we have heard consider testimony about that particular

12     incident earlier on, and, as a matter of fact, I think we learned, among

13     other things, there was a fair amount of disagreement within the room as

14     to who had what power to do what, which was ultimately ironed out.

15             Is that your recollection as well?

16        A.   I do recall that.  I mean, I think it is worth stating before the

17     Court that flying helicopters at night is not an easy matter for any air

18     force, even a very experienced and well equipped air force.  It required

19     obviously a lot of coordination with ground communications and with

20     radar.  And I'm -- particularly on one occasion I recall that our

21     observers reported the movement of 15 helicopters at night flying

22     easterly towards, I think, Serbia.

23        Q.   And with regard no that that particular assertion, was that

24     confirmed by the FRY authorities, or was that rejected by the FRY

25     authorities?

Page 6424

 1        A.   To be honest, Mr. Guy-Smith, I cannot recall their precise

 2     response on that occasion.

 3        Q.   Do you recall as you sit here today any of the discussions and

 4     ultimate conclusions that were made with regard to the accuracy of the

 5     information concerning helicopter flights?  And by that I mean that there

 6     were difficulties with some of the machines that were being used.

 7        A.   You mean some of the helicopters themselves, or some of the

 8     machines monitoring the helicopter flight?

 9        Q.   The machines monitoring the helicopter flight.

10        A.   You know, my experience in this fields of conflict is there are

11     often problems with the technical equipment.  Having said that, the

12     forces that were doing this monitoring from the ground were forces as

13     part of the UN mission, but their national forces were NATO forces, there

14     were Dutch forces, in particular, I remember Norwegian forces.  So these

15     were forces of considerable integrity and considerable technical acumen.

16        Q.   I appreciate that.  But it would be fair to say that what was

17     also available was objective information in the sense radar or other

18     tracking devices that would allow for an impartial determination of

19     flight patterns, flight distance, and other associated flight issues,

20     such as direction?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Okay.  And that's what I'm talking about, is that there were

23     difficulties that were found and ultimately acknowledged by the parties

24     with regards to those particular machines.

25        A.   Well, you know, there may have been difficulties on a particular

Page 6425

 1     night, whether it's, you know, July 7th or February 14th or whatever.

 2     And the -- but there was a pattern of aerial activity, and particularly

 3     of helicopter activity, which indicated serious violations of the no-flow

 4     zone and a possible if not probably concurrence in this activity by FRY

 5     authorities.

 6        Q.   You have used the term "pattern of aerial activity," which is a

 7     relatively strong term, I would suggest.  Could you tell us how many

 8     helicopter flights fit into the pattern that you are alluding to here?

 9        A.   I --

10        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

11        A.   Sorry.

12        Q.   No.

13        A.   I think my recollection is that in 1995, the frequency of

14     helicopter flights seemed to increase given my recollection of the

15     reports that we had.  And particularly in the eastern part of Bosnia.

16             Now, the Bosnian army, the ABiH forces, had a few helicopters,

17     not many, certainly not as many as the Bosnian Serb army had.  And a lot

18     of these helicopter flights, as I indicated earlier, were at night, which

19     is no mean feat for any air force or army, and this needed quite some

20     considerable coordination.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You indicated a little earlier that on one night

22     15 helicopters had been sighted.

23             THE WITNESS:  Correct, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You're talking of a person -- were they only --

25     were 15 sighted on one occasion only?  Or you say more on -- what kind of

Page 6426

 1     number could be seen on more than one occasion?

 2             THE WITNESS:  To the best of my knowledge, Your Honour, in the

 3     period I was in the former Yugoslavia, this was the maximum number.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What would have been the minimum?

 5             THE WITNESS:  The minimum would have been one, two, three,

 6     flights.  And perhaps that more the norm, sir, than 15.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What about the regularity?

 8             THE WITNESS:  I think in the course of 1995, there were regular

 9     flights.  It would also be the case, Your Honour, that on some occasions

10     it would have been probable that not all of these flights would have

11     indeed have been picked up by UN radar systems.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  When you say "regular," how regular?

13             THE WITNESS:  I would not say daily, Your Honour, but I would

14     certainly say that this would be happening several times a week.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What do you mean by several?  Can you give an

16     estimate?

17             THE WITNESS:  I would have said two, three, four, sir.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Does that answer your question?

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Hmm.

20        Q.   But as you sit here today, you can give us no hard evidence with

21     regard to those helicopter flights that you have alluded to, no

22     documentation, can you?

23        A.   Well, the -- my recollection, Mr. Guy-Smith, is that there was

24     documentation at the time.

25        Q.   I appreciate what you're saying.  I'm asking, but as you sit here

Page 6427

 1     today?

 2        A.   No.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Would this would be an appropriate time?

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It would be indeed.  We'll take a break and come

 5     back at a quarter to 11.00.

 6             Court adjourned.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 10.47 a.m.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Before you continue, Mr. Guy-Smith, I think the

10     Registrar has something to correct.

11             Madam Registrar.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you, Your Honours.

13             Earlier today at page 26, line 20, I assigned document number

14     1D01-0212 to have -- to be Exhibit D99, where the correct number for that

15     document should be Exhibit D100.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much, madam.

17             Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you so much.

19             If we could have 1D00-4766 on the screen, please.  And if we

20     could scroll down.

21        Q.   With regard to the issue of helicopter border crossings between

22     the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina, I'd like you to take a look at this

23     particular document, if you could, please.

24             And if you could indicate when you have finished reading the

25     first page, we can move to the second page.

Page 6428

 1        A.   Is it possible to scroll down to the bottom.

 2        Q.   Absolutely.  Surely.

 3        A.   Oh, okay.

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And if we can move to the second page.  And then

 5     scroll up.

 6        Q.   Before we go any further, are you familiar with this document?

 7        A.   I am not, Mr. Guy-Smith.  No.

 8        Q.   Okay.

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could go to page 5 of the same -- thank

10     you.

11        Q.   This is a letter, obviously, we can see the date is the 11th of

12     April, 1995, and if we go to the third paragraph, I think it discusses

13     some of the things we discussed previously with regard to FRY's rejection

14     of flights back and forth.  It says:

15             "On the basis of extensive investigation, however, the competent

16     Yugoslav authorities can confirm that throughout March 1995 there were

17     only six helicopter flights from the Republika Srpska to the Federal

18     Republic of Yugoslavia and vice versa.  The purposes of all those flights

19     was the transport of the critically wounded.  Four of those flights were

20     effected with the authorisation of UNPROFOR and two without.  Those two

21     were emergency medevac flights that had to be effected since the

22     transportees were in a life-threatening condition, and it was not

23     possible to wait for approval.  Other than those, there were no flights

24     from the Republika Srpska to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and vice

25     versa."

Page 6429

 1             It goes ton say:  "It is absolutely excluded that the flights" --

 2             If we scroll down, please.

 3             "-- referred to in the report of the co-chairman except the six

 4     medevac flights mentioned earlier, were those carried out by the

 5     helicopters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republika

 6     Srpska.  The difference in the number of flights observed 26 by the

 7     United Nations air field monitors the at Surcin airport and the number

 8     which actually took place, 6, can be explained by the UNPROFOR reports

 9     regarding parent violations of the ban on flights in the air space of

10     Bosnia and Herzegovina where, on several occasions, it is explicitly

11     stated that the alleged nights above the territory of the Federal

12     Republic of Yugoslavia faded away from the screen, and it could not be

13     determined where the helicopters landed."

14             If we could turn to the next page please.

15              "A possible explanation is that what is involved are flights of

16     helicopters of the Bosnian Muslim side which flew from Central Bosnia to

17     the Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia close to the border with the

18     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Such a conclusion is justifiable from

19     the" --

20        A.   Could you please read slowly.

21        Q.   Yes.

22             "Such a conclusion is justifiable from the technical point of

23     view since it is illogical that the radar of the regional flight control

24     at Surcin airport (Belgrade) is more reliable in directing flights tracks

25     of helicopters at a greater distance (in the territory of

Page 6430

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina) than at a shorter one over the territory of the

 2     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia itself."

 3             It goes on to say:  "It is also possible that special electronic

 4     devices were engaged to deliberately simulate flight patterns and put the

 5     blame on the Bosnian Serb or the Yugoslav side.

 6              "I should be greatly if you would have the present letter

 7     circulated as a document of the Security Council.

 8             And it's signed by Dragomir Djokic.

 9             Are you familiar with this particular allegation, in terms of

10     their being six helicopter flights, as opposed to 26.  Of those six

11     helicopter flights, four were approved by UNPROFOR, two not, because of

12     life-threatening situations?

13        A.   I do remember this document.  This, of course, is the explanation

14     put forward by the FRY authorities.  Whether it is a plausible

15     explanation is a debatable matter.  I would say it was highly

16     problematic.  For example, the reference to Bosnian Muslim helicopters

17     possibly going into the eastern enclaves.  To the very best of my

18     recollection, throughout my service with UNPROFOR, I was not aware of a

19     single reported flight, not one, into any of the three eastern enclaves,

20     Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica.  And I remind the Court that, of course,

21     there were UN forces on the ground in each of those enclaves, which are

22     very, very small areas.  And it would be impossible for a helicopter to

23     land without it being noticed in those enclaves by UN forces.

24             So I note the letter, I remember reading it at the time.  It's

25     not one of the most convincing letters I have seen sent to the

Page 6431

 1     Security Council.

 2        Q.   I appreciate your view of the letter.  But my question is, rather

 3     -- was actually limited to whether or not you were aware of it.  You've

 4     indicated that you are.

 5             Now --

 6        A.   Correct.

 7        Q.   -- do you know whether there was a subsequent investigation with

 8     regard to these particular flights?

 9        A.   I --

10        Q.   And if you do, what the results were.  So it's a -- I admit it's

11     a compound question, but ...

12        A.   I think the answer, sir, is that I'm not aware.  I note also that

13     this letter was dated the 11th April.  And I left the UN service in

14     Yugoslavia on the 17th of April -- 15th April, sorry, my recollection in

15     1995.

16        Q.   Okay.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could that be admitted as defendant's next in

18     order, please.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What do you want to admitted, this one or -- what

20     about the first one which the witness didn't know anything about?

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, I think that if he didn't know anything

22     about it, under the Rules, it doesn't come in.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So you're tendering this one only.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.  I'm tendering pages 5 and 6.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Those pages are admitted into evidence.  May it

Page 6432

 1     please be given an exhibit number.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, pages 5 and 6 of 1D00-4766 will be

 3     Exhibit D101.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 6        Q.   Were you in -- in contact at all with Mr. Kirudja concerning the

 7     issue of helicopters?

 8        A.   Yes, sir.  Mr. Kirudja was the representative of UNPROFOR in the

 9     FRY capital, the Serbian capital, Belgrade.  He was a senior official

10     there.

11        Q.   And did you have -- did you have occasion to discuss with him at

12     any point in time what the -- what the ultimate conclusions were made

13     with regard to the whole issue of helicopters?

14        A.   Not -- not the ultimate conclusions, as I recall.  I do remember

15     a meeting with him in Zagreb when he was on a visit there to our

16     headquarters, where we discussed the matter.  In fact, it was discussed

17     within a sort of senior staff meeting.

18        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to you discussing the matter with Mr.

19     Kirudja, did you come to an understanding that the issue of, what I will

20     call, helicopter flight violations was not as great as it seemed but

21     there was some concern?

22        A.   There was a very serious concern.  Mr. Kirudja, like myself, was

23     a civilian official of the United Nations, and, of course, the

24     observation of these helicopters, the documentation and so on, was

25     undertaken by our military colleagues, and the evidence was produced by

Page 6433

 1     them.

 2        Q.   I'm moving to another topic.

 3             You, in your testimony, discuss the issue of keeping the air

 4     bridge open.  Could you, first of all, explain to the Chamber what an air

 5     bridge is?

 6        A.   Yes, sir.  By reference to the air bridge, I refer in particular

 7     to the very regular flights between Zagreb and Sarajevo, which were the

 8     main connection to the outside world from Sarajevo.  And these planes

 9     brought UN personnel, civilian and military into Sarajevo.  But perhaps

10     more importantly, they also brought supplies, particularly medical

11     supplies, to the besieged city.

12             From time to time there was also a road open to Sarajevo, but the

13     air bridge was pretty critical to the city.

14        Q.   Apart from the air bridge that you've just mentioned, were you

15     cognizant of there being an air bridge between February of 1993 and

16     May of 1995 maintained from the Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory for the

17     needs of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde?

18        A.   I'm afraid I don't quite follow your question, Mr. Guy-Smith.

19        Q.   Was there -- was there an air bridge to those three areas that I

20     have just mentioned?

21        A.   Okay, sorry.  I follow you now.

22        Q.   I apologise if I was confusing.

23        A.   No, my misunderstanding, too, I think.  There were no air fields

24     in these three eastern enclaves; Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, so it was

25     impossible to send in airplanes.

Page 6434

 1             Three's eastern enclaves were, therefore, supplied by road.  The

 2     convoys to these towns would come from either the FRY, UNHCR, for

 3     example, convoys went to these three enclaves.  But also, on occasion,

 4     there were convoys by road from Sarajevo.

 5        Q.   Were you aware of the fact that there was an assertion that --

 6     made by ABiH army personnel of the fact that there was an air bridge in

 7     which there had been some number of flights, certainly not many, from

 8     these areas that had to be maintained?

 9        A.   I'm not aware of that assertion.  I find it difficult to believe.

10     I mean, three's are very small areas, particularly Zepa.  I mean, it's a

11     village.  Srebrenica and Gorazde are more substantial.  But in both of

12     those places, to the best of my knowledge, there is no air field, no

13     landing strip, let alone what might be called an airport.  And in both

14     Srebrenica, Gorazde, there were UN forces.  I find it very, very

15     difficult to believe that they would not have noticed air movements

16     directly into very small areas.

17        Q.   Okay.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If I could have a moment, Your Honour.

19                           [Defence counsel confer]

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we have 1D01-1881 up on the screen.  We're

21     struggling to see whether or not -- this document was sent for

22     translation.  We're struggling to see whether or not the final

23     translation has in fact been achieved or not, and, if it has, we will try

24     to link it up.

25             I don't know if you speak Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian, so I'm

Page 6435

 1     trying to get --

 2        A.   I do not sir.

 3        Q.   All right.  Well, hopefully we'll be in a position where I can

 4     have the final document for you in English.  But if not, I'm going to

 5     proceed for the moment reading you a rough translation, and if the -- the

 6     usher would be kind enough at least to give a copy of this to my

 7     colleague so that he can follow along.

 8             This is a rough, and by that I mean, very rough translation.  I'm

 9     not asserting that it is, and we will ask for the actual translation to

10     be linked to the document at the time that we finally receive it.

11             This is a document that I understand comes from the ABiH RV and

12     PVO command, highly confidential, number 08/896-1, Zenica, date

13     17.02.1995.  And it's entitled "Final Analysis of the Work of the Air

14     Bridge for Srebrenica and Zepa, to GS, ABiH, General

15     Enver Hadzihasanovic."

16             Now before we go any further just for purposes of clarity, would

17     you know what the letters GS stand for?

18        A.   I do not.  I mean, often it refers to General Staff in military

19     documents.  I don't know if that is the case here.

20        Q.   Let us proceed on that assumption.

21             It goes on to say:  "Based on your oral order, we hereby deliver

22     you the analysis" --

23             THE COURT REPORTER:  Slower please.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes, to all that I'm speaking too fast for.

25        Q.   -- "of the work/functioning of the air bridge for Srebrenica,

Page 6436

 1     Zepa, and Gorazde, Deputy Commander Colonel, Hrustic Erdin."

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we scroll down to the second page, please.

 3     Starting at number 1, introduction.  And I understand this may not be an

 4     official translation.

 5              "In the time-period from 27/2/93 until 7/5/1995, an air bridge

 6     is maintained from the RBiH territory for the needs of the Srebrenica,

 7     Zepa, and Gorazde enclave.  The primary goal of the maintaining of the

 8     air bridge was the provision and delivery of a means for conducting

 9     combat operations.  The evacuation of the wounded, the functioning of the

10     organs of powers in the enclaves, for schooling of the officer Cadre on

11     the liberated territories of RBiH, and for maintaining the communication

12     lines.

13              "The establishment and maintenance of the air bridge has a

14     significance importance in providing the possibility for the defence of

15     the population and the territory in the condition of being fully

16     surrounded and blocked and next to the presence of UNPROFOR, who did not

17     fulfil their obligations under their mandated to protect the civilian

18     population in the territories of the enclaves.  The morale of the

19     fighters and the civilian population is greatly boosted, not only because

20     of the provision of UBS and MTS," both of those are acronyms that I'm not

21     in a position at this point to translate, "but also because of the

22     feeling of not being completely abandoned or forgotten, but, rather, that

23     the organs of power RBiH are determined to take any measure to liberate

24     this part of the territory of RBiH.

25             "A great courage was shown by the members of RV and PVO in the

Page 6437

 1     establishing and maintaining of this air bridge, in spite of the fact

 2     that the aggressor managed to take over the protected zones.  What the

 3     members of RV and PVO did made it possible for conducting of long lasting

 4     combat operations and fight as well as ease the consequences of

 5     withdrawal of civilians and the fighters towards the liberated

 6     territories of BiH."

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Do you intend reading all this document, sir?

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  No, I do not.

 9        Q.   Section number 2 discusses the main tasks of the air bridge,

10     which includes transporting of weapons and equipment, fighters, material

11     for the functioning of both the military and civilian authorities,

12     maintenance of communication lines, transport of the wounded, and

13     transport of the food.

14             If we could scroll down, please, to, I believe, it's page 10.

15     And page 10 is an annex of the flights giving the date for Srebrenica.

16             Now, my question to you, sir, is obviously this is not a document

17     you have ever seen?

18        A.   No, sir.

19        Q.   I'm clear about that.

20             With regard to the information that is contained within the

21     document, I take it that this is information that you have never been

22     privy to, that there was any kind of, shall we say, air bridge or air

23     support that was being used by the ABiH army?

24        A.   Correct, sir.  I mean, I can't comment on the authenticity of

25     this letter at all.  I would make two points, however.  And as I recall

Page 6438

 1     it, on page 1, the date of this letter was reportedly 17th of February,

 2     1995.  Then in paragraph 1, for which you only give a rough translation,

 3     you -- you note, and it says clearly in the documents, analysis between

 4     27th of February 1995 and 7th of May, 1995, i.e., after the date of the

 5     letter itself.  So I don't quite understand that anomaly.

 6             There seemed to me other possible anomalies.  But then finally

 7     the data you referred to at the end, the alleged helicopter flights into

 8     Srebrenica.  I notice that all ten of those flights occur in a period of

 9     one month, they are all between the 27th of February, 1993, and 30th of

10     March, 1993.

11             Now I was not in the Former Yugoslavia during that period.  I

12     could not comment at all on that.  They may or may not have taken place.

13     What I would say, again, is that during the period that I was there, from

14     January 1994 to April of 1995, I am not aware of a single flight into any

15     of these -- the three eastern enclaves, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde.  That

16     was noted by the UN forces on the ground.  Indeed, I find it very, very

17     difficult to accept that there would have been a flight.

18             Again, I repeat for the Court, I don't -- an aeroplane could

19     certainly not have gone into those places.  A helicopter, possibly.

20             The Court also perhaps should be aware that, you know, during

21     this period, Gorazde itself, particularly in March/April 1994, was

22     critically under attack from the Bosnian Serb forces.  I mean, it would

23     have been unfathomable then that a Bosnian army helicopter would have

24     managed somehow to got in through the Bosnian Serb attack on the town.

25     So I -- I have to say that I'm pretty skeptical of this document.

Page 6439

 1        Q.   Okay.  I understand you're skeptical of the document.

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  With regard to the issue of -- the date, there

 3     may be a typo, but I would like to -- for the moment, I'd like to go --

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Guy_Smith straighten the microphone,

 5     please.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'd like to go to page number -- page number 12,

 7     if I could.

 8        Q.   I understand your skepticism with regard to the issue of the

 9     information that you have thus far and your appreciation of the

10     situation.

11             If you look at page 12, I think you will note at the top it

12     indicates that the areas Gorazde, that's where -- I think you were just

13     referring to.  And I have been informed that the language at the very

14     top, that being Vazdusni Most is air bridge, Gorazde, and a then there

15     are a series of dates that follow with regard to the assertion, at least,

16     in this document of there being an air bridge at that time.

17             But since you have not seen the document, I take it for what you

18     said thus far, that you reject the notion out of hand that there would

19     have been any kind of air support for the ABiH army in those enclaves.

20     And by those enclave, I mean, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Let's not embellish the witness's testimony.  The

22     witness said helicopters possibly, not aeroplanes.  Therefore, there

23     couldn't have been any air support.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.

25             THE WITNESS:  I wonder if I might comment further, Your Honour.

Page 6440

 1     I would rule out of aircraft because of the absence of landing strips in

 2     these three enclaves.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Indeed.  That's how I understood --

 4             THE WITNESS:  And possible -- it would feasible to land a

 5     helicopter there.  But even that, I'm very, very skeptical.

 6             I note also in the last page, I think page 12 that Mr. Guy-Smith

 7     brought my attention to, the first two alleged helicopter movements are

 8     on, representatively, the 15th and the 23th of April, 1994.  Now the

 9     Court needs to be mindful of what the context was on those days.  This

10     was at the height of a Bosnian Serb military attack on the safe area of

11     Gorazde.  It was a period of intense military activity.  Now, never were

12     these helicopter movements or alleged movements reported to the UN by the

13     Bosnian Serb forces because -- I mean, which I find surprising.  They

14     would have been quick off the mark normally to have reported anything

15     like this.  But also given the intensity of military action, the amount

16     of firing and shelling that was going on, the close engagement by Serb

17     artillery and armour, tanks, I find it very difficult to believe that a

18     helicopter got in on either the 15th of April or the 23rd of April.  The

19     23rd of April we were in Belgrade for talks with President Milosevic that

20     Mr. Guy-Smith alluded to earlier.  This was also a period when NATO

21     aircraft were carrying out extremely close surveillance on the -- on the

22     Gorazde area, and the fact that it was never reported to us, that they

23     perceived or recorded helicopter or any other air movements is, I think,

24     striking.

25             So I have to say, I would seriously question the veracity of the

Page 6441

 1     information on this page, and in particular the two alleged flights on

 2     the 15th of April, 23rd of April.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What is the basis of your scepticism that even

 4     helicopters could land there?

 5             THE WITNESS:  Well, they could land there, Your Honour, but the

 6     fact that NATO was carrying out very, very close surveillance; the fact

 7     that military battle was going on, which, A, would have made it dangerous

 8     for the helicopters to land; and, B, that the Bosnian Serb forces, they

 9     never reported to us that the Bosnian army was violating the no-fly zone.

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:

11        Q.   You're not suggesting, are you, that helicopters don't land in

12     theatres of operation where there's an ongoing conflict?

13        A.   I'm -- I'm not suggesting that.  But it's -- it's certainly more

14     difficult to do that, when, by this stage, that particular week, the 15th

15     to the 23rd of April, 1994, fighting was taking place at very close

16     quarters in Gorazde, and I find it quite staggering that neither the

17     Bosnian Serb forces nor the UN forces on the ground reported these

18     helicopter movements to us.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. ...

20                           [Defence counsel confer]

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Williams, is that a period of a week, or a

22     year?  I think this period stretches from the 15th of April, 1994, to the

23     21st of April, 1995.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.  The whole -- but the two cases I

25     was referring to, in particular, Your Honour, were number 1 and 2.

Page 6442

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

 2             THE WITNESS:  That's when the battle was at its most intense.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm with you.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Mm-hm.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 6        Q.   Going to -- in view of the comments you've just made, and I

 7     appreciate the fact that you are at somewhat of a disadvantage because of

 8     the fact that this is not translated into English.  I'm going to ask you

 9     whether or not the language that is contained on line number 2, and that

10     is the very last entry, would change the testimony that you have just

11     given.  And I'm going to request that Mr. Lukic read for us in Serbian

12     the language there so it can be translated.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Which line 2 are you referring to, sir?

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Where it says -- it says 2, and the date is the

15     23.4.94.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What line 2, page?

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That would be page 12.  I believe the page is up

18     on the screen.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Oh, you're looking at the exhibit.  Not looking at

20     the transcript.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I apologise.  The page up on the screen.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Because you talk about the language that he uses.

23     That's why I'm looking at the transcript.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  With the assistance of Mr. Lukic, if you

25     could please read for us in Serbian what it says there, the prekinat

Page 6443

 1     [phoen].

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Mr. Lukic.

 3             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, document marked

 4     0185-4424, item number 2 says, 23rd of April, 1994.  And in the last

 5     column, entitled "Remarks," it says mission aborted, helicopter hit.  And

 6     the same is written under item 4.  We have the same remark in the column

 7     and it says:  Helicopter hit.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 9        Q.   Considering what you just said about there being an active

10     conflict at the time with regard to the first two entries and the fact

11     that there was a war being waged at the moment as being a condition that

12     would foreclose the use of helicopters, does that particular entry change

13     the testimony that you have given us here today?

14        A.   No, I don't believe it does, Mr. Guy-Smith.

15             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I wonder if I might refer to an

16     incident which is in the testimony I gave in the case against

17     Mr. Milosevic in June 2003, which I think is related to this questioning

18     from Mr. Guy-Smith.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I don't have a problem with that in a moment.

20     But I would like to follow up from where we were, first of all.

21        A.   Okay.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If the witness' answer is going to explain what he

23     has just been asked, I think he might be given an opportunity to do so.

24             Mr. Williams, can you please refer to the Milosevic testimony.

25             THE WITNESS:  Well, what I was going to refer to was in that

Page 6444

 1     testimony I referred to an incident which also happens around this time

 2     in this week.  I'm afraid I cannot recall the precise day, Your Honour,

 3     where two British soldiers serving with the United Nations were hit by

 4     incoming Serb fire.  The UNPROFOR commander requested that he send into

 5     Gorazde an UN helicopter to medevac these two wounded soldiers out of

 6     Gorazde to hospital in Sarajevo.

 7             That took a long time negotiating with the Bosnian Serbs.  It was

 8     eventually allowed.  Tragically one of the soldiers died on the flight to

 9     Sarajevo from his injuries.

10             The point I'm making is that even for the UN, it was impossible

11     to send a helicopter into Gorazde at this point without the acceptance

12     and permission of the Bosnian Serb military authorities.  So I find it

13     very, very difficult to believe that the Bosnian army would be able to

14     infiltrate helicopters into a small town which, at this time, was a scene

15     of intense battle.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:

18        Q.   With regard to the -- the entry that is made there, assuming for

19     purposes of discussion that the translation and entry are accurate, this,

20     however, does change the complexion of your answer with regard to a

21     helicopter being able to land in a conflict area, does it not?  If the

22     mission was aborted because the helicopter was shot, obviously there was

23     an expectation that the helicopter didn't get in.

24        A.   Yes, I suppose so, yeah.

25        Q.   Okay.  Since we're on the subject of that which is in the air, I

Page 6445

 1     would like to talk to you for a moment about Tuzla.  And, first of all,

 2     it's my understanding from your testimony that there was in fact an air

 3     strip at Tuzla that had been used, I think, sometime in the beginning of

 4     May of 1993.  It was an area that was -- I believe it was designated as a

 5     safe area.

 6             Is that correct?

 7        A.   Correct, Mr. Guy-Smith.  Tuzla is quite a large town in northern

 8     Bosnia.  In May 1993, it was one of the six towns or -- that were

 9     designated safe areas by the Security Council under Resolution 836.

10             There was a very substantial landing strip there and airport.  In

11     fact it had been, I think, a major military airport for the Yugoslav air

12     force in pre-war days.  Now, the UN had hoped to use this airport to

13     supply Tuzla and the surrounding areas.  And, indeed, I think, as was

14     clear in my testimony, the UN did fly in one flight.  I believe it was on

15     the 1st of March, 1994, and I accompanied Mr. Akashi, the SRSG, on that

16     flight.  We had hoped to open an air bridge into Tuzla for supplying

17     Tuzla itself and northern Bosnia.

18        Q.   Okay.

19        A.   That proved impossible, sir.

20        Q.   Were you aware of a visit by NATO officials and members of,

21     amongst others, the United States air force, one Michael Hayden, the

22     recently retired director from the CIA, in 1994, to the Tuzla air strip?

23        A.   I'm not aware of that, sir.

24        Q.   Okay.  Very good.  That, we can take no further then.

25             You use some very specific language in your testimony which is --

Page 6446

 1     and I'm referring Court and counsel to page 22955, line 11:

 2             "What one saw was a fairly regular rotation of officers between

 3     the JA and Bosnian Serb forces and Croatian Serb forces."

 4             Because I'm sure there will be a dispute at some point later on

 5     if this is not clarified.  With regard to the issue of JA here, are you

 6     referring to the JNA?

 7        A.   Yes, I am, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 8        Q.   I see.  Okay.  Thank you.  With that taken care of, I have no

 9     further questions in that -- in that regard.

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Could we please have up on the screen 1D00-1843.

11             And if --

12        Q.   First of all, per chance, are you familiar with this particular

13     publication?

14        A.   We put out a regular series of publications in English and also

15     in -- in Serbo-Croat.  I can't remember this one particularly.  I mean,

16     when I say we put them out on a sort of regular monthly basis, both in

17     Croatia and Bosnia and also in Macedonia.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Are you suggesting, Mr. Williams, that this is a

19     UN document.

20             THE WITNESS:  It could be, sir.  I can't see a date on the

21     document.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If you don't know it, how do you even make that

23     assumption?  You can't recognise the document, but how do you assume it

24     is an UN document?

25             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, Your Honour, I didn't mean to assume it was.

Page 6447

 1     What I meant to state was --

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Well, the question to you was, Do you know this

 3     document?  And you say, We produced publications; I can't remember this

 4     one.  Are you suggesting that it is one of those that you produced?

 5             THE WITNESS:  It may possibly be, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That is it my question.  Why do you go -- if you

 7     don't know it at all, do you or do you not know it?

 8             THE WITNESS:  I do not know it with any certainty, no.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can I suggest that we try to answer the questions

10     as succinctly as possible, because otherwise we get confused.  We don't

11     know what you really mean.

12             THE WITNESS:  Understood, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we can go to page, I believe it is going to be

15     page 13 of this document.  And if we could -- thank you so much.  If we

16     can make it a little bit bigger, and if we can scroll -- scroll down.

17        Q.   In -- do you see where the word "among" is?

18        A.   The sentence beginning "among the most compelling of these ..."?

19        Q.   Yeah.

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   It says:  "Among the most compelling of these is the set of

22     challenges surrounding the expanded 'peace menu,' including preventative

23     diplomacy peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building."

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The witness said he doesn't know this document.

25     Didn't you want to at least get us to what this document is and where it

Page 6448

 1     comes from.

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure.  Okay, sure.

 3        Q.   This document is a document entitled "Peace Support Operations,

 4     Mass Media, and the Public in the Former Yugoslavia."  It was written by

 5     Marjan Malesic and is a study, as I understand it, taken from -- by the

 6     national board of psychological defence in Sweden with regard to the role

 7     of the media in the conflict between Croatia and Serbia during a portion

 8     of the conflict.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I have a problem, Mr. Guy-Smith.  That the witness

10     says he doesn't know a document, and then you ask him a question.  This

11     happened with the last document which you didn't tender.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I didn't tender it, because as I said as I saw it

13     there is no -- under the guidelines --

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can you please let me finish before you respond.

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm saying this happened with the last document

17     that you asked him extensive questions about it, and you read extensively

18     from the document into the record, a document that he said he did not

19     know anything about.

20             You are doing the same thing here.  And I think, obviously, if a

21     witness says he doesn't know anything about a document, that's the end of

22     the story about that document.  You can't go on and ask him questions

23     about it.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  I think that if the document contains

25     information which is within the witness's purview, because they deal with

Page 6449

 1     concepts that are germane to the litigation at hand, that questions can

 2     be asked --

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You can ask those questions without the document.

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Very well.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But the document is --

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Very well.  I understand the Court's concern and

 7     the Court's objection.

 8             With that in mind, let's take the document off the screen.  So we

 9     do not offend, because I don't wish to.

10        Q.   With regard -- I'm going to posit a thought to you and ask you to

11     respond, which is that, with regard to peace, that among the most

12     compelling of these is a set of challenges surrounding the peace menu,

13     including preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and

14     peace-building.  And what I'd like you to do, if could you, is define

15     those terms, if you're in a position to, and give us what differences, if

16     any, there might be between them.  The first one being preventative

17     diplomacy.

18        A.   Okay I will do my best in that regard.  Preventative diplomacy a

19     I would understand it in some sense, I mean, diplomats would argue --

20     some diplomats would argue that all diplomacy is preventative.  That it's

21     work by nation states or by the UN to prevent conflicts and disagreements

22     before anything untoward happens.

23             The second term you referred to is peacemaking.

24        Q.   Peacemaking, correct.

25        A.   That, I understand, to be almost self-explanatory, that one is

Page 6450

 1     trying to endeavour to make a peace agreement, whether it is between

 2     states in conflict or between factions in conflict.

 3             Thirdly, you refer me to peacekeeping, which can be -- again,

 4     keeping the peace between states or between warring factions.  It can be

 5     on the basis of a formal agreement.  It can be far more lose.  And I'm

 6     afraid that that has been the pattern of many conflicts int he past 20

 7     years or so.

 8             And then finally you refer to peace-building, which I understand

 9     as building after a conflict, perhaps after an agreement has been

10     reached.  In the Yugoslav context, for example, I would understand

11     peace-building as something that has happened in the aftermath of the

12     Dayton Agreement of 1995.

13             I hope that helps.

14        Q.   I think it does.  Can you help us at all with this, and perhaps

15     you can; perhaps you can't.  Do you find there to be any distinction

16     between the function that the military performs in a peacekeeping, as

17     opposed to peacemaking operation, or do you find them to be same?

18        A.   I don't find them to be absolutely the same, but there is a grey

19     area between the two.  I mean, the dictionary definitions don't always

20     stand in conflict situations on the ground.

21        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to the fact that you use the word "loose,"

22     and I here I don't want -- I don't want to misquote you.  You said:

23             "You refer me to peacekeeping, which can be keeping the peace

24     between states or between warring factions.  It can be on the basis of a

25     formal agreement.  It can be far more lose than" -- and I think what you

Page 6451

 1     said was, "which I'm afraid it has been over the past number of years.

 2             Now, with regard to the issue of that agreement being loose, are

 3     you talking about the agreement that exists between the warring factions,

 4     or are you referring to the agreement that exists between the

 5     peacekeeper?

 6        A.   Particularly between the warring factions and -- you know, even

 7     sometimes, dare I say it, mandates given to the UN by the

 8     Security Council are not as precise as one would always wish.

 9        Q.   With regard to the last point you raised here which is in terms

10     of the mandates given to the UN by the Security Council, with regard to

11     the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, would you take the position that the

12     mandate that was given to UNPROFOR was one of those mandates that lacked

13     precision which caused difficulty over time?

14        A.   There were certainly difficulties, Mr. Guy-Smith.  And in a sense

15     there was a succession of mandates because there was a succession of

16     Security Council Resolutions.  And all these were adopted by the Council

17     over a period of several years whilst the conflict itself continued on

18     the ground fairly unabated between 1992 and 1995.  I mean, there were

19     periods where there were lulls in the conflict, but more or less the

20     conflict continued throughout that three-year period.

21        Q.   And with regard to what you just said, would it be fair to say

22     that, first of all, this was a very unique situation; this is the first

23     time that there had been this involvement of the international community

24     in an ongoing conflict of the nature that existed between 1992 and 1995?

25             I'm referring pretty much specifically to the actions of

Page 6452

 1     UNPROFOR.

 2        A.   I'm trying to think that through and to give you as accurate an

 3     answer and response as -- as I can.

 4             As the Court will be aware, many of the conflicts in the world,

 5     since the end of the cold war in the late 1980s had been within states,

 6     often perhaps prompted by the breakup of states.  So it is the case that

 7     often UN forces have been placed there to try and mitigate the

 8     consequences of these conflicts and to advance UN Resolutions.

 9        Q.   Cyprus would be a good example of that, I would think.  And I'm

10     asking the question, and I see that you are probably going to take

11     exception to that.

12        A.   I am, actually.

13        Q.   Okay.

14        A.   Because the Cyprus one is interesting, and as much as there was a

15     conflict there, going back to 1974 and the Turkish invasion.  UN forces

16     are still there, 30 years on.  The good new, as it were, is this is an

17     agreement and there have been no incidents or violence of any sort really

18     other than of an incidental nature in Cyprus.  Now this was not the case

19     in Bosnia, in the years in which, I believe, that the Court is dealing

20     with here between 1992 and 1995, there was a fairly level of conflict.

21     Now there are other cases where this is it the case.

22        Q.   And with regard to mandate, to the extent which was -- and I'm

23     using a word which you may accept and you may well reject, and I

24     understand that, but to the extent that there was internal confusion as

25     to how best to proceed, did you experience that confusion manifesting

Page 6453

 1     itself in such a way as to leave a lack of clarity for the warring

 2     factions?

 3             You have to accept, first of all, the issue of the confusion

 4     before you can, I think, reach -- reach my question.

 5        A.   I mean these were very difficult mandates.  The situation on the

 6     ground was extraordinarily complex and was one, sadly, most of the time

 7     of continuing warfare.

 8             I'm afraid, Mr. Guy-Smith, I've lost the of end of your question.

 9        Q.   Well, the point is, in your experience --

10        A.   Mm-hm.

11        Q.    -- with the recognition of an internal confusion on the side of,

12     what I will call, the international community as how best to proceed, did

13     that confusion manifest itself so that the warring parties had a lack of

14     clarity as to who precisely was standing for what?

15        A.   Mm-hm, okay.

16        Q.   And perhaps if I put it in other terms.  One of the words that

17     has been used oftentimes in describing UNPROFOR is impartial.  Another

18     word is unbiased.  Another word or concept is staying equal and not

19     taking either side.

20        A.   Mm-hm.  I think UNPROFOR strived to be impartial and unbiased,

21     and I think it was.  The Court needs to be aware, of course, that

22     UNPROFOR was only deployed on the Bosnian government side of the battle

23     lines, as it were.  The Bosnian Serb authorities always would not

24     tolerate any notion of UNPROFOR forces being deployed on their side of

25     the battle lines.

Page 6454

 1             Some parts of the mandate were clearer than others; for example,

 2     the Resolution 836.  Very clearly that identified safe areas and which

 3     were supposed to be not the scenes of conflict, and sadly all too often,

 4     they were.

 5        Q.   With regard to ultimatums that were made by UNPROFOR personnel

 6     that involved other organisations, such as NATO, did you, in your

 7     experience, negotiating through these troubled waters find that by virtue

 8     of the fact that there was a perceived connection between UNPROFOR and

 9     NATO, that there was a view that UNPROFOR was in fact biased by the

10     Bosnian Serb leadership?

11        A.   I mean, from time to time they would make that accusation.  I

12     think, you know, there are two specific ultimatum, or ultimata, or

13     whatever the plural is, that you may be referring to.  Following

14     consistent attacks on Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serb army, NATO decided in

15     February 1994 to give an ultimatum, that unless those attacks ceased,

16     then NATO would conduct air-strikes against Bosnian Serb forces.

17             There was a further ultimatum with regard to the enclave of

18     Gorazde in April 1994.

19             Now, those ultimatums came from NATO.  NATO is a military

20     alliance which is in a position, if it so wishes, to deliver those

21     ultimatum.  The UN and specifically UNPROFOR was not.

22        Q.   I note that you draw a distinction between the two, and I

23     appreciate the distinction that you are drawing.  However, it was common

24     knowledge that -- was it not, that NATO's becoming involved was

25     predicated upon UNPROFOR's request?

Page 6455

 1             And if it is of any help, we heard yesterday from Sir Rupert

 2     Smith with regard to this specific issue.

 3        A.   Yes, it was.  I mean, we talked earlier, for example, the

 4     question of helicopters and air movements and so on.

 5             UNPROFOR would not have been in a position to maintain a no-fly

 6     zone over Bosnia, for that you need fighter aircraft and you need radar

 7     and all of rest of it, and that was delivered by NATO, on request of the

 8     Security Council.

 9        Q.   Okay.  I think that we may be dancing around each other a bit,

10     and I don't mean to be at all.  I'm driving at the issue of UNPROFOR

11     being in the minds of the Bosnian Serb leadership, in your experience,

12     I'm saying what they said to you, what you experienced in your contacts

13     with them, that UNPROFOR and NATO, there was no distinction as between

14     those two organisations in -- in their mind, as the way they were being

15     treated.

16        A.   You know, sometimes they would make that accusation in the heat

17     of argument, as it were; in particular, Mr. Karadzic, as I recall.  But I

18     think in reality they could see the distinction.  UNPROFOR like any UN

19     peacekeeping force drew its contingents from around the world, countries

20     that were NATO countries, others which were not NATO countries, countries

21     in Africa, countries in Asia, we had Indian, Indonesian forces, for

22     example, Bangladesh forces.  These were clearly not NATO forces.  Also,

23     the Bosnian Serbs were aware that the UN was also delivering, for

24     example, humanitarian supplies on their side of the lines.  So I -- I

25     would not accept your assumption that they automatically saw NATO and

Page 6456

 1     UNPROFOR as the same thing or ...

 2        Q.   Well, I'm sorry, it's not my assumption.  My question was what

 3     was your experience?  And that's really what I was getting at.  And I

 4     think you have answered that particular question, that it's something

 5     that happened -- it happened on some occasions, but it was, in your view,

 6     not something that was necessarily a prevalent theme with regard to the

 7     Bosnian Serb leadership in their discussions with you.

 8        A.   That's correct, sir.

 9        Q.   Okay.

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we might break at this time, so that I have

11     the opportunity to speak specifically with our client.  He has a great

12     interest in this particular examination, and I want to make sure that

13     those matters have been attended to.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We'll take a break and come back at half past

15     12.00.

16             Court adjourned.

17                           --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 12.30 p.m.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.  I would like to thank the Chamber for

21     the additional five minutes.  It was most helpful.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  You're welcome.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:

24        Q.   You were asked a question here today.  It's a question that you

25     were asked in your previous testimony as well, with regard to your

Page 6457

 1     concerns about the humanitarian crisis, and specifically you were asked

 2     about tangible objective signs.  And you indicated, that your estimation

 3     is, as certainly as early as February that concern was not only a concern

 4     that you had, but also a concern, as I understood your testimony, that

 5     other members of the international community had.  Correct?

 6        A.   Correct, sir.  Yeah.

 7        Q.   Also, it was a concern that Mr. Milosevic had expressed as well.

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And, as a matter of fact, I believe that Milosevic had stated

10     that -- that he concurred that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

11     would deteriorate.  True?

12        A.   I recall him saying that, yes.

13        Q.   And the question really was where -- and this is still talking

14     about in February.  This was where the responsibility for the

15     deterioration would lay.  And by that, I mean, Milosevic blamed it on the

16     international community's focus on, as I understand it, details and not

17     the situation as a whole.

18             Is that correct?

19        A.   That would be the gist of his argument, I think, yes.

20        Q.   Okay.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Thomas.

22             MR. THOMAS:  Sorry, Your Honour.  I wonder if we could just have

23     some clarification.  February of what year?

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  1995.

25             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you.

Page 6458

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 2        Q.   Now, with regard to the matter at hand, and by that I mean the

 3     tangible concern that existed, were you involved in your capacity with

 4     any plans to militarily take over the area from -- by the international

 5     community so as to foreclose these concerns?

 6        A.   Not at all, Mr. Guy-Smith.  I'm not quite sure, militarily take

 7     over what area now?

 8        Q.   Srebrenica.  There was a concern that you had, and the question

 9     that was asked was where there's tangible objective signs, that if the

10     enclave of Srebrenica were to fall --

11        A.   Mm-hm.

12        Q.    -- there would be a humanitarian crisis on a grand scale?

13        A.   I understand.

14        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

15        A.   [Overlapping speakers] ...  Correct.  I understand your question,

16     now, sorry, I didn't earlier.

17        Q.   I apologise.

18        A.   Throughout the period I served in former Yugoslavia, and

19     particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were a series of military

20     operations against the UN Safe Areas, four in particular.  Number one

21     being Sarajevo in February 1994; Gorazde in April 1994; Bihac in late

22     1994; and then, of course, finally, Srebrenica.

23             In all cases we had concerns, well grounded concerns, about the

24     civilian inhabitants of the safe areas and what would become of them in

25     the light of Serb attacks, let alone a Serb seizure of one of these safe

Page 6459

 1     areas.

 2             Now, as the Court knows this only happened in one case,

 3     Srebrenica, and to a lesser extent, Zepa in summer of 1995.  But I have

 4     to say that in the conduct of the military operations, on many occasions

 5     the Bosnian Serbs gave grave concern that their military actions broke

 6     accepted practices of international humanitarian law.  And this was seen

 7     in Sarajevo and in Gorazde in 1994, and for this reason, we were always

 8     extraordinarily apprehensive when there were Serb attacks on safe areas.

 9        Q.   That's understood.  As I understand the complexion of the

10     situation, certainly in February, you had Milosevic attempting to

11     influence the Bosnian Serbs for peace.  You had the international

12     community attempting to influence the Bosnian Serbs for peace.  And much

13     of these entreaties were falling on deaf ears?

14        A.   Sadly, the case, Mr. Guy-Smith.

15        Q.   I would concur with you, it being sadly the case.  In the months

16     that ensued the conflict between the Bosnian Serbs and the BiH army

17     increased; correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   And it would be fair to say that both parties calcified, from the

20     standpoint of opting for war as opposed to obtaining a peaceful solution?

21        A.   I wouldn't agree with you entirely, and I think to illustrate why

22     we need to revisit the concept of the safe areas.

23             As I indicated earlier this mourning in my testimony, these were

24     established by Security Council Resolution 836.  Much of the military

25     activity consisted of attacks by the BSA on the Serb areas.  Now, this is

Page 6460

 1     it not to say, this is not say that there were not occasions firing from

 2     within the safe areas on Bosnian Serb positions.  But I would say that

 3     this -- such outgoing fire, as it were, was much lighter than the attacks

 4     pursued by Bosnian Serb forces.

 5             I feel also I should draw the Court' attention to the

 6     disproportionality and the armament of the relevant sides.  That, on the

 7     Bosnian Serb side, artillery, armour, helicopters, even ground air

 8     missile defence systems were deployed.  None of this armament was

 9     available to the ABiH side, or, if it was, only in very small an

10     incidental quantities.

11             So there is there was a disproportion between the two fighting

12     forces.

13        Q.   Yes, I understand that.  But once again, what I was driving at is

14     that both sides had made the determination and that the option was -- was

15     war, not peace.  And we heard yesterday from Sir Rupert Smith concerning

16     this matter, that there came a point -- I mean, he had a thesis about

17     that.  But there certainly came a point where there were a continuing of

18     ABiH offensives throughout the spring and summer months of 1995.

19        A.   Yeah.

20        Q.   Okay.  And, finally, I wanted to read you a question and an

21     answer of your previous testimony to be found at 22967, starting at line

22     10.

23             "Question:  In your view, as of February 1995, did Milosevic

24     equally appreciate the gravity of the situation in Bosnia?"

25             And your answer:  "I think he did.  We were stumbling all the

Page 6461

 1     time from one crisis to another, from Sarajevo in February 1994, to the

 2     Gorazde crisis in April 1994, to Bihac in October/November.  And it was

 3     obvious given the continued deterioration, and on the ground in Bosnia

 4     and around the eastern enclaves that one could premise a further crisis

 5     and deterioration in 1995."

 6             I trust that you continue to stand by that remark.

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   That's what we were talking about just before.

 9        A.   Yes, I definitely do, Mr. Guy-Smith, yes.

10        Q.   And if I'm not mistaken, this remark takes also into account that

11     an appreciation of the gravity of the situation by the leadership of the

12     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia embodied in Slobodan Milosevic?

13        A.   Yes, I think it does.

14        Q.   All right.  Thank you much, sir, for your time and your candor.

15        A.   Thank you.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Thomas.

17             MR. THOMAS:  Your Honour, I have no questions in re-examination.

18     Thank you.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

20             Judge?

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22                           Questioned by the Court:

23             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] I have a question to ask.

24             You had several meetings with Milosevic.  You were present at

25     those meetings with Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade.

Page 6462

 1             According to what you observed, did Milosevic seem informed of

 2     what was going on in -- in Bosnia.

 3        A.   I think, on the whole, Your Honour, he was very well informed of

 4     what was going on.  Some of the detail maybe he didn't know.  I recall in

 5     particular the meeting, or meetings, over 18 hours on April 22nd and

 6     23rd, 1994, in Belgrade during the Gorazde crisis, where he was looking

 7     for a solution and showing some irritation, visible irritation, with the

 8     Bosnian Serbs at their behaviour in continuing to attack the Gorazde

 9     enclave.

10             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] I have a second question, and if

11     you can't answer, just say so.

12             You said that -- that the FRY helped the Serbs of Bosnia, the

13     Serbian army in Bosnia.  And you said that, nevertheless, if there was no

14     control on this army, there was a great influence from Milosevic on what

15     was going on with the Serbs in Bosnia.

16             So my question is the following.  As from the moment when

17     Milosevic -- or at least the FRY was helping the army, the Serbian army

18     in Bosnia, and from the moment Milosevic knew what was going on in

19     Bosnia, according to you, why didn't he exert more pressure, in

20     particular, practical pressure, material pressure, on the Serbian leaders

21     in Bosnia to try precisely to stop this?  Since you said yourself that he

22     wasn't in agreement with what was going on.

23        A.   A difficult question, Your Honour.  Sometimes, dare I say it,

24     statesman are not always as honest as they should be in their responses.

25     Certainly Mr. Milosevic said the right things about wishing to attain

Page 6463

 1     peace in Bosnia, and I think he did strive on some occasions to -- to

 2     realize that.

 3             Against that, it is very difficult not to conclude that the

 4     Bosnian Serb army was -- was receiving substantial logistical assistance

 5     from the FRY.  In fact, during the course of 1994/1995 one witnessed that

 6     their military capabilities actually increased.  For example, the

 7     deployment of ground to air missile systems, which are very, very

 8     advanced in the Sarajevo area and which would necessitated radar and

 9     missile systems being reconciled and so on.  And clearly the Bosnian Serb

10     forces were receiving assistance in this regard, and one has to assume

11     that it was coming from the FRY.  But I cannot reconcile the

12     contradiction that you duly noted.

13             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Previous translation continues] ... questions

15     arising from the questions by the Judge?

16             MR. THOMAS:  No, sir.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

18                           Further cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.

20        Q.   During 1994/1995, were you aware of illegal, and by that I mean

21     other nations or entities, supplying weapons to either side, either the

22     Bosnian Serb army or the BiH?

23        A.   Yes -- yes, I was, Mr. Guy-Smith.

24             First of all, with regard to the BiH, the Bosnian army, there was

25     quite specific allegations and reports that their forces in Bihac, in

Page 6464

 1     north western Bosnia, were receiving supplies from Croatia, either by

 2     land, or, in some cases, even by air.  This was an enclave which directly

 3     abutted Croatian territory, so it was easily supplied in that sense, and

 4     there were reports of movements by land and by air that were documented

 5     by UN forces.

 6             With regard to the Bosnian Serb forces, one saw them deploy very

 7     sophisticated weapon systems, artillery, armour, helicopters,

 8     ground-to-air missiles which had to be supplied from somewhere, and I

 9     never saw an allegation that they were receiving weaponry from any source

10     other than from the FRY itself.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The -- okay.  Carry on.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:

13        Q.   At line 69, you indicated and one?

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We don't have a line 69.

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sorry, page 69, line 1, you indicated the -- one

16     has to assume that Serbian forces were receiving assistance in that

17     regard, and it was coming from the FRY.

18             You used the word "assume."  And it's that where I wish to focus.

19     And I take it that your conclusion is based upon an assumption that that

20     is where the materiel was coming from because of sophistication.

21        A.   Sophistication, the fact that armies are very resource-intensive.

22        Q.   Understood.

23        A.   They need fuel; they need arms; they need constant replenishment.

24     And this has to come from somewhere.

25        Q.   Understood.  And with regard to the sophisticated weaponry,

Page 6465

 1     you've told us that weapons were being received from Croatia.  And when

 2     you say from Croatia, do you mean Croatia proper, the government?  Or do

 3     you mean through the territory of Croatia?

 4        A.   This is a bit more -- definitely from the territory of Croatia,

 5     of that there was no doubt.  And of course, in 1994, the relationship

 6     between Croats and Muslims within Bosnia improved, and also the

 7     relationship between Croatia and Bosnia itself.

 8        Q.   Okay.

 9        A.   So that provided, as it were, political context, which perhaps

10     enabled arms supplies to one area in particular, the Bihac area of

11     north-western Bosnia.

12        Q.   I understand that.  But once again you're making an assumption,

13     and that is that the supplies, the weapons -- and when you said supplies,

14     I take it you also meant weapons.  Because I certainly don't wish to put

15     any words in your mouth, because it would be confusing to the Chamber, in

16     any way whatsoever.

17             You're making an assumption that supplies that came from Croatia

18     by virtue of the relationship between the Croatians and the Muslims were

19     from the Croatian government, perhaps, or from the Croatian military.

20     That's an assumption that you're making.

21        A.   It's an assumption.  But -- and from the government or from

22     agencies with -- within the government, and there were some flights

23     recorded from Croatia into to Bihac.  And it's difficult not to conclude

24     that some of these may have been known to departments of the Croatian

25     government.

Page 6466

 1        Q.   Okay.  So that would be -- that would shift the position of where

 2     the genesis of the weaponry comes from, to the knowledge that the

 3     Croatian government may well have had with regard to the weaponry passing

 4     through their territory; correct?

 5        A.   Correct, sir.

 6        Q.   Now, with regard to this particular issue, the issue of the

 7     supply of weapons, there were allegations made that the United States was

 8     supplying weapons; correct?

 9        A.   Correct.

10        Q.   And, as a matter of fact, there were allegations made --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Thomas.

12             MR. THOMAS:  I'm sorry, Your Honours, first of all, my learned

13     friend hasn't been particular about who the United States was supposed to

14     -- or who the allegations say the US were supplying weapons to.

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm not suggesting that they were -- that they

16     were being supplied to one side or the other, just that they were being

17     supplied.  The issue here that I'm getting at is that there were a series

18     of allegations made with regard to the supplying of weapons to both the

19     ABiH and to the Bosnian Serb army from sources other than Croatia or FRY.

20        A.   Yes, there were allegations, yeah.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Thomas.

22             MR. THOMAS:  Sorry.  Before this continues any further,

23     Your Honours, I'm very conscious that this is now strayed quite far from

24     the original question asked by Her Honour, which was limiting, which was

25     the question of whether -- and I'll find it so that I can quote it

Page 6467

 1     probably, Your Honour.

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I believe if you go to page 68.

 3             MR. THOMAS:  Which about the supply of the VRS, specifically the

 4     supply of the VRS and that it came from the FRY.  There was some initial

 5     questions now about the supply of the ABiH, but now we just seem be

 6     getting further and further down that path, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith asked whether there were any other

 8     supplies of arms and ammunition to either side, and I understood the word

 9     "other" to mean other than supplies from the FRY.

10             Now, if there are any allegations that the US was also supplying

11     arms that's a source other than the FRY, isn't it?

12             MR. THOMAS:  I have no difficulty with that questioning.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What you're difficulty?  Because I haven't heard

14     any objectionable ground in -- what's your ground of objection?

15             MR. THOMAS:  The sourcing of the ABiH army.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The source?

17             MR. THOMAS:  The sourcing or the supply of the ABiH army.  This

18     is a new element that has now emerged in the question.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Because the Judge didn't refer to -- supply to

20     ABiH.

21             MR. THOMAS:  Yes, sir.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, I asked the question by virtue of the

24     response that was given by the witness, that he said the supplies were

25     coming through Croatia.  I do not need to dwell on that part of it.  I

Page 6468

 1     think have I gotten as far as I need to go with that particular issue.

 2        Q.   In response to Her Honour's question, I'm now dealing finally

 3     with the specific language on page 68, line 24, which is, you say, one

 4     has to assume, and my question to you is what you're doing here is you

 5     are speculating with regard to where the particular supplies came from?

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You asked that question, and he told you his

 7     grounds for his assumption.  Now you're going back --

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Now I'm asking him specifically as to whether it

 9     was speculative.  And that is my last question.

10             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, should I proceed?

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You may proceed, sir.

12             THE WITNESS:  There was no doubt that the weaponry deployed in

13     1994/1995 by the VRS, by the Bosnian Serb army, included very

14     sophisticated weapons platforms not available to other forces, like the

15     ABiH.

16             I have never seen a report or even an allegation that the VRS was

17     supplied by some force other than Yugoslavia or other than Serbia, and no

18     indication whatsoever of -- of that.

19             One has to pose the question, therefore, that given an increase

20     in armaments to the Bosnian Serb forces during this period, from whence

21     did this come?

22             Now much earlier in my testimony this morning, I talked about a

23     sort of political break between the Bosnian republic and -- leadership

24     and the Yugoslav leadership of Mr. Milosevic.  By contrast there were

25     very close ties, I think, between the Yugoslav army of the FRY and the

Page 6469

 1     VRS of the Bosnian Serb republic.  There had never been the sort of

 2     rupture that there had been on the political level between Belgrade and

 3     Pale.  The two armies came out of the original army; namely, the Yugoslav

 4     national army before the breakup of Yugoslavia.  So there was an intimacy

 5     from the very fact that the officer course, the logistics bases, these

 6     had always been one at a certain time.  And it is my belief that that

 7     past was never completely broken with.  And it is from that that I make

 8     the deduction that the supplies of the VRS must have come from the FRY.

 9        Q.   I had indicated that that would be my last question.  However,

10     the answer --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Go ahead, Mr. Guy-Smith.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.

13        Q.   In your answer, you said, I have never seen a report or even an

14     allegation.  And so I take it that by virtue of that, we're proving a

15     negative here, in the manner that you have put it.

16        A.   They have to come from somewhere.  One can look at the map, one

17     can study the history, one can know the personal ties between the two

18     military leaderships, one can know that they adopted similar military and

19     technical strategies and so on, and I think, at the end of the day, one

20     can make a deduction from this, which is what I have tried to do.

21        Q.   Okay.

22        A.   In all honesty.

23        Q.   And perhaps not finally, but hopefully so, with regard to the

24     Republika Srpska, there was an Assembly and a president; correct?

25        A.   Correct, Mr. Guy-Smith.

Page 6470

 1        Q.   There were a full set of laws that existed, including laws that

 2     created an army; correct?

 3        A.   Correct.

 4        Q.   And General Mladic had a Supreme Commander, that being the

 5     president of the Republika Srpska, Mr. Radovan Karadzic; correct?

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I think you must get to the point, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 7     There has been no questions about that by the Judge.  And if you're

 8     making a foundation, get to the point quickly.

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:

10        Q.   Can I get an answer to my last question, please.

11        A.   Correct, Mr. Guy-Smith.

12        Q.   In fact, what you had was the formation of an independent

13     military structure that was operated by and commanded by General Mladic.

14     True?

15        A.   Correct.  But this doesn't come from nowhere, and it wasn't born

16     on day one.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can you give us the relevance, please, the

18     relevance to the questions asked by the Judge?

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  It's relevant to an answer that he gave.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Which answer?

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  The answer that is contained at page 74, lines 2

22     through 23.  And that is my last question.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Lines 2, 3.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I mean, the argument, in terms of the issue of

25     relevance, whether or not you have similar military structures or not,

Page 6471

 1     whether or not you have individuals who have grown up together or gone to

 2     school together does not necessarily take one to the point of making a

 3     determination of there being certain kinds of relationships between

 4     them --

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  You asked me what the relevance was, so I'm

 7     responding to your question.  That was the relevance of my question.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm sorry, I still don't see the relevance.

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  Well, the relevance of my question deals

10     the fact that if there is an independent military structure, as I'm sure

11     the Chamber is aware having sat in previous trials, and as we will

12     certainly learn here, there's certain rules and regulations that must be

13     followed with regard to that military structure.  And so to the extent

14     that you have fellow -- you have friends who have known each other for a

15     long time, it doesn't necessarily impact and make a logical deduction

16     that something would be necessarily true.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It doesn't make a logical deduction, but the

18     witness has given you a number of facts on which he bases his inferences.

19     And I think the inference he is making is that where there is close

20     relationship between the people, the likelihood is that they will help

21     one another.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I understand that -- [Overlapping speakers] ...

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Overlapping speakers] ... And that has nothing to

24     do with the structure of the military in the RS.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  But I think ultimately at a point in time in

Page 6472

 1     terms of these proceedings it will.  Because at some point in time the

 2     Chamber is going to have to address this question.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Of course.

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:  It is very clear that some of the questions that

 5     have come from the Chamber deal with this very issue.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Indeed.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And there is clearly a concern about this

 8     particular issue.  And to the extent that at some point we're going to be

 9     dealing with inferences and questions of structure as well friendships

10     are going to be central to that analysis is the reason why this question

11     was asked at that time.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What I'm saying that is structure has nothing to

13     do with friendships.  For purposes of relevance here.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  We disagree on that, but that will come

15     into light at a later point in time.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The witness refers to structure separately and

17     referred to friendship separately.  He did say that the VRS came from the

18     JNA -- or didn't use the word JNA, however, but he said it came from the

19     same army, which may have referred to this -- the beginnings of the VRS.

20     Then he told about close relationships and that the relationships were

21     never -- he doesn't think that the relationships were ever broken.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I appreciate that.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I still think we have a difference of opinion in

25     terms of where this ultimately goes, but I understand precisely what the

Page 6473

 1     Court's thinking is.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And I have no further questions.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  On that note, Mr. Williams, thank you so much for

 5     taking time off from you schedule for coming to testimony.  This brings

 6     us to the end of your testimony.  You are now excused.  You may stand

 7     down.  Please travel well back home.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

10                           [The witness withdrew]

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Thomas.

12             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13             First of all, I can indicate that the redaction that was required

14     to Mr. Williams's statement has been done, and I'm advised that the

15     appropriate version has now been uploaded into e-court.  And therefore I

16     would seek that Exhibit P2371 -- or that the MFI status of P2371 be

17     removed.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It is so removed.  May it please be removed,

19     Madam Registrar.

20             Yes, Mr. Thomas.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  The status will be changed to exhibit,

22     Your Honours.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

24             MR. THOMAS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25             Secondly the transcript, P23727 should, at this stage, remain an

Page 6474

 1     MFI exhibit.  I've discussed it with my learned friend.  I'm confident

 2     that we'll be able to resolve this.  But it will need us to just consider

 3     one or two extracts or one or two portions of that transcript.  As I

 4     said, Your Honour, I'm optimistic that we can advise in due course that

 5     that has all been resolved, and it can be given an exhibit number.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It hadn't been admitted, had it?

 7             MR. THOMAS:  It had, sir.  2372.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So you want it to remain MFI?

 9             MR. THOMAS:  I do.  Yes, sir.  And that concludes finally, sir,

10     the evidence for this week.  The next witness is scheduled for Monday.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Then the Chamber stands adjourned to Monday, the

12     25th of May, at quarter past 2.00, in Courtroom I.

13             Court adjourned.

14                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.09 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 25th day of May,

16                           2009, at 2.15 p.m.