1 Thursday, 28 May 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning to everybody in and around the
7 Mr. Registrar, will you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And good morning, Your Honours. This
9 is case number IT-04-81-T, The Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
11 And could we please have the appearances for today, starting with
12 the Prosecution.
13 MR. HARMON: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning, counsel.
14 Mark Harmon and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
16 And for the Defence.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Good morning to everyone in the courtroom.
18 Daniela Tasic, Tina Drolec, Eric Tully, Chad Mair, Novak Lukic,
19 Gregor Guy-Smith on behalf of Mr. Perisic.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much, Mr. Guy-Smith.
21 Do we have a witness today?
22 MR. HARMON: Hopefully we have a witness today, Your Honour. I'm
23 not in charge of bringing him over here from the -- his accommodations.
24 I assume he is in the witness waiting-room.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Could we call him in, please.
1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
2 [The witness takes the stand]
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning, Mr. Butler.
4 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: We hope you're well rested. Just to remind you
6 that you are still bound by the declaration that you took at the
7 beginning of your testimony to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
8 nothing else but the truth.
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
11 Mr. Guy-Smith.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith: [Continued]
15 Q. We left each other last night having a brief conversation with
16 regard to the Mujahedin. And I'd like to spend a few more moments
17 talking about some of the contextual issues that involving around the
18 time of July 1995.
19 You had mentioned in your testimony that, I believe, that there
20 was also apart from the presence of Mujahedin within the Muslim Bosnian
21 army, there was also smuggling occurring that went through Tuzla
23 A. Well, sir, the smuggling was the continuing effort to move man
24 power and supplies into particularly the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica
25 and Zepa in order to keep the 28th Infantry Division supplied. I don't
1 know how that has to deal with the Mujahedin, in so much as I'm not aware
2 of any of them in those eastern enclaves.
3 Q. Very well. With regard to the issue of smuggling, were you aware
4 of a meeting that occurred in 1994 in Tuzla with various members of the
5 United States air force and Bosnian Muslim army members concerning
6 supplying ammunition and other necessary equipment to the army?
7 A. No, sir.
8 Q. Okay. In the research that you did, did you come across any
9 discussions about a secret airport or air strip was being built in a
10 place called Visiko?
11 A. No, sir.
12 Q. Then we won't talk about it.
13 In terms of -- I'm moving to your report now in a general sense.
14 Would it be fair to say that in your view --
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Harmon.
16 MR. HARMON: Could we have which report we're talking about.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Reports.
18 MR. HARMON: Oh, reports, I'm sorry. I thought I heard the
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: If you did, I dropped the S.
21 Q. Would it be fair to say that when you were engaged in your
22 analysis as you were writing your various reports that you attempted to
23 be as objective as you possibly could be?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. And as technically accurate as you could be?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. And I think, as a matter of fact, an expression of your concern
3 about accuracy was evidenced at the beginning of your testimony here
4 where you corrected I believe on two occasions some errors that you saw
5 in your report.
6 A. Yes, sir. That's been a component of most of the trials there
7 have been minor errors that have been identified that we've corrected
8 over time.
9 Q. Sure. And obviously whenever you come across -- whenever you
10 come across an error whether it be by review of your report or through
11 the process of examination or cross-examination, that's something that
12 you have remedied at a later point in time, if a later point in time came
13 about; correct? It's an evolutionary process.
14 A. Remedied in the sense of my discussion and testimony. I have not
15 updated the reports.
16 Q. But as you did here, actually it was in Courtroom II, but as you
17 did here when you came across an error, you at least alerted the
18 Prosecution with regard to that error?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. Okay. Now, before the formation of the VRS, there was -- and I'm
21 going to -- I believe for you familiar territory, the JNA, as a military
22 organisation that embodied the entirety of the SFRY, the former Republic
23 of Yugoslavia
24 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
25 Q. Okay. And with regard to the JNA, you had occasion to review a
1 number of documents in that regard in your analysis of the structure of
2 the VRS; correct?
3 A. Specifically we had access to documents from the former JNA
4 4th Corps and 17th Corps, which I did use as a model to determine whether
5 or not the VRS had organised along the same lines.
6 Q. Okay. And with regard to the issue of whether or not the VRS had
7 organised along the same lines, you studied, I take it, the former
8 situation that existed in the SFRY prior to its breakup; correct?
9 A. Not the historical context of the SFRY for the most part. My
10 interest was in the military doctrine and an organisation and processes
11 of the former Yugoslav national army.
12 Q. And when you use the term "military doctrine," I take it you're
13 talking about a principle that dictates military behaviour in the most
14 general of senses.
15 A. In -- in the term of doctrine, yes, it is the most general of
17 Q. Okay. Could you explain for the Chamber, if you could, what the
18 term "military doctrine" embodies.
19 A. The term embodies the general principles by which a military
20 force exists within a nation state. The doctrine of a particular
21 military force within a country, in turn, drives many of the other
22 factors that are necessary for a military to survive, such as a doctrine
23 will drive what type of equipment that that military will purchase over
24 time. It will drive the types of units that they want, how they want to
25 organise them, and how they want to man them. It will drive their entire
1 professional training and educational process. It drives their budget.
2 So within the former SFRY, for example, their doctrine was one
3 known as All People's Defence. And within that doctrine, that is how
4 they organised their armed forces.
5 Q. When you say within their doctrine, that is how they organised
6 their armed forces, you've mentioned All People's Defence. And I take it
7 at that point what you're talking about is what occurred in the former
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. And what was the All People's Defence?
11 A. Simply put, All People's Defence was a doctrine, a defence
12 doctrine that was driven by many of the lessens of World War II, where
13 the Yugoslav national leadership recognised that, particularly between
14 the former Warsaw Pact block and the NATO block in Europe that they would
15 be able to conventionally defend Yugoslavia
16 to the lessens of World War II and their occupation by the Nazis, their
17 defence doctrine took the view that they would have a nucleus of a
18 professional army and some conventional forces, but that in large part
19 all military-aged men would be capable of engaging in military activities
20 in a partisan or guerilla warfare type of campaign, the goal being to
21 make anyone's thought of occupying Yugoslavia so expensive in terms of
22 time, manpower, and other resources that they would not do so.
23 Q. Now, with regard to the doctrine as it applied to the All
24 People's Defence, you've mentioned partisan or guerilla warfare. Would
25 it be fair to say that what you're talking about there is that the entire
1 nation would be involved in mass resistance to an invader, either from
2 the west or the east?
3 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
4 Q. And with regard to the notion of the All People's Defence, the
5 All People's Defence necessarily included within it a decentralised form
6 of operation; correct? One that would be able to be easily used in a
7 guerilla warfare setting.
8 A. It was envisioned over time that the more centralised
9 conventional forces would fight the best that they could, and that in
10 order to buy the time for Territorial Defence units and those guerilla
11 forces to organise themselves while the actual military operations were
12 viewed as being along a decentralised manner, by municipality in many
13 respects they were still envisaged to be centrally organised by the top
14 leadership of the country.
15 Q. With regard to, once again, the Territorial Defence units would
16 it be fair to say that they were -- I'm going to put this in these terms:
17 That they were formed locally; they were under the direction of the
18 opstina. Correct?
19 A. They were not necessarily under the direction of the opstina, but
20 the opstina or municipality would be responsible for raising the forces.
21 They would be responsible for provisioning them to the best of their
22 ability. It was envisioned that that civilian organisation, then
23 structure, of the municipality would play a very large role in supporting
24 the continued existence of those particular Territorial Defence.
25 Q. Those defence units were trained for combat operations close to
1 home; correct?
2 A. Since those defence units were in effect made up of people who
3 had served their conscripted time in the JNA, they had the same ability
4 to do that. However, you know, it's not a question of training. They
5 were organised for local operations, is probably the more accurate way of
6 saying it.
7 Q. Fine. I'll accept that as a -- as a modification.
8 And with regard to where they were organised, by that mean if
9 they were organised in the lowlands or the mountains, the organisation
10 was based upon the particular geographic area in which they were located,
11 among other things; correct? Mountain fighting being different than
12 lowland fighting.
13 A. I'm not sure, because I didn't study the entire former SFRY in
14 that respect, whether that's accurate. What I can say is that most of
15 those Territorial Defence units were organised as light infantry units
16 which would make them capable of fighting in a variety of environments.
17 Q. Those individuals who were not fighting age, which I think was
18 between of, let's say, 16 to 64. The rest of the population, what was
19 their function, if you know, with regard to the All People's Defence?
20 A. I don't know what their specific functions would be, I mean,
21 other than generally to support the war effort.
22 Q. Okay. Now apart from the Territorial Defence aspect of the
23 military doctrine that you have been explaining to us in the former
25 JNA, independent of the Territorial Defence.
1 A. Yes, sir. The JNA stood as a separate arm of the armed forces.
2 Q. Okay. And they -- by that I mean the JNA, they standing as a
3 separate part of the armed forces were professional army. True?
4 A. Yes, sir.
5 Q. With rules and regulations that existed internally with regard to
6 such issues as command and control; correct?
7 A. That is correct, sir.
8 Q. And other organisational issues that were perhaps not necessarily
9 germane to the Territorial Defence in the former Yugoslavia, right?
10 A. It would depend on what issues you would be referring to. For
11 example, the same military officers who had a command in the JNA could
12 subsequently go over and, you know, have command issues or be part of the
13 Territorial Defence, so issues of command and control and many of those
14 particular regulations would be the same for both.
15 So it would depend on which particular area that you wanted to
16 discuss, whether or not the operating procedures of the JNA and the
17 operating procedures of the Territorial Defence would differ.
18 Q. Well, with regard to the former Yugoslavia, did you come to an
19 understanding of how those two forces would operate together? Would one
20 be subordinate to the other; would they work in tandem with each other?
21 A. In their particular doctrine, and in this case, what I refer to
22 is the provisional corps regulations. I mean, it envisions that in a
23 number of cases that the professional army and the Territorial Defence
24 would work in tandem on the modern battlefield.
25 Q. And with regard to them working in tandem in the modern
1 battlefield as you've described it, this was, once again, a military
2 doctrine that was essentially defensive in nature; correct?
3 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
4 Q. With regard to one of the things you mentioned earlier in your
5 testimony, which I believe was that the military doctrine embodies the
6 national objectives of the state, with regard to the Federal Republic
9 A. I couldn't tell you offhand which date after World War II that
10 would have occurred.
11 Q. I'm not talking about the Socialist Federal Republic
13 A. I assume at this juncture we're talking sometime after April of
14 1992, after Bosnia
15 independence. I couldn't tell you when the exact date would be on that.
16 Q. And with regard to the Republika Srpska, can you give us a date
17 for that?
18 A. The -- what would become the Republika Srpska, first, was known
19 as the -- was it autonomous Serb republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I
20 believe, started to surface in documents as at least a governmental body
21 as early as January of 1992. It later officially was redesignated the
22 Republika Srpska approximately November of 1992.
23 Q. With regard to the issue of the formation of the Republika Srpska
24 Krajina, did you in your analysis do any study of the Republic of Srpska
1 A. No, sir.
2 Q. Okay. Neither factual nor historical, in terms of an
3 understanding of the conflict?
4 A. Just broadly within in the terms that it existed, there was a
5 conflict related to that. But given that my focus was primarily on
6 Eastern Bosnia
7 Q. Now, with regard to the formation of the army, the VRS in the
8 Republika Srpska, could you tell us when the army was formed?
9 A. The army was -- I guess their official birthday is June of 1992
10 is when they called themselves when they were formed. The reality was
11 that it was a much more fluid process. For example, General Mladic was
12 appointed the commander of the army in early April 1992, and at that
13 point, from April, May, through June, most of his efforts were in fact
14 working to try and create the army. From an amalgamation of locally
15 raised units and former JNA units that in some form or another were left
17 Q. All right. With regard to what you've just said, that his
18 efforts were in fact working to try and create the army, in your research
19 an analysis, did you make a determination of how many actual JNA soldiers
20 remained at the Republika Srpska? I'm sorry, that assumes something that
21 that we haven't discussed yet, which is there come a time when the JNA
22 left the region; correct?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. And when was that?
25 A. I believe the JNA withdrew through the month of late April and
1 early May 1992. I they were out by either the 16th or the 17th
3 Q. And where did they go, if you know?
4 A. Most of the JNA formations that withdrew went to either Serbia
6 Q. And the JNA formations that withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina,
7 some of the JNA formations had previously been on a journey, having
8 previously withdrawn from the area of Croatia; correct?
9 A. Correct, sir.
10 Q. Now with regard to those that remained in the Republika Srpska?
11 Did you have an idea of how many actual individuals or soldiers remained?
12 A. I don't have that figure off the top of my head. I know that in
13 the VRS's an annual report for 1992 that they actually do provide those
14 figures of the professional soldiers an officers of the JNA who were
15 serving with the VRS. So I know that the answer is there; I just don't
16 know the figure off the top of my head.
17 Q. Okay. And with regard to General Mladic's effort to create an
18 army, you mentioned that this was an amalgamation of various forces, to
19 use the -- I think a relatively liberal term for the moment. And those
20 force would have been those remaining soldiers, correct, and the
21 Territorial Defence? Would be the two main components of that
22 amalgamated army?
23 A. Yes, sir. In some areas, for example, in the Krajina, where you
24 had large bodies of the former JNA that did remain, they organised as the
25 1st Krajina Corps and had you some professional units or the nucleus of
1 some professional units as well as a lot of the Territorial Defence units
2 that had been stood up by the municipalities that were ultimately
3 absorbed in the 1st Krajina Corps. In Eastern Bosnia, for example, where
4 none of the former JNA formations that were there remained, that corps
5 was formed by a variety of locally raised Territorial Defence units
6 exclusively. And I guess the last element that was integrated in the
7 army over time was some of these rogue paramilitary organisations that
8 were running around the Krajina and eastern Bosnia that were either
9 disbanded or absorbed into the regular army by the fall.
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have 65 ter 6073 on the screen, please.
11 Q. Now, with regard to some of the efforts that were occurring in
12 terms of the amalgamation issue that you have discussed, I'd like to you
13 take a look at this particular document and see whether this comports
14 with what you were saying. And I'm looking at the language at
15 paragraph 1, the decision.
16 A. Yes, sir. It reflects the initial routes as out of those local
17 or regionally based TO units and defence staffs.
18 Q. And is this one of the documents that you were analysing when you
19 were involved in your research with regard to the general issue
20 concerning the structure of the army and the evolution of the VRS?
21 A. Yes, sir, it was.
22 Q. Okay.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if we could go down to the bottom. Just
24 scroll down to the bottom. If we could have this admitted as defendant'
25 next in order.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Harmon.
2 MR. HARMON: Yes, could we go to the next page.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sorry.
4 MR. HARMON: It appears to not be complete on the English
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we go to the next page. Sorry, I
7 apologise, yes.
8 All right. As a matter of fact, thank you so much, Mr. Harmon.
9 You reminded me of something that I had forgotten for the moment.
10 Q. With regard to the explanation, it indicates in paragraph 1 that
11 the TO staffs shall remain in their existing formation and composition
12 and they shall be established TO staffs in newly established Serbian
13 municipalities along the same lines.
14 And I take what that means there, and you clearly understand this
15 from all of the research you've done, is that the TOs are going to remain
16 under the control of the opstinas. Correct?
17 A. Initially at this point in time it was a very decentralised
18 command and control model, and the local TOs engaged in military
19 operations or other activities strictly at the direction of their local
20 Crisis Staff or other municipal leaders. There wasn't the overall
21 national level, to use that word, command and control apparatus in place.
22 So most of that was at the local level.
23 Q. Okay.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have this marked -- admitted as
25 defendant's next in order.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
2 exhibit number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D102.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we now have P190 on the screen.
6 Q. And if you would take a look at Article number 2, understanding
7 that this -- this document deals with decisions made on the 12th of May,
8 does this reflect, in your opinion, the beginning of the evolution of the
9 Territorial Defence from being only under the control of the opstinas to
10 being integrated into the army?
11 A. Yes, sir, the appointment - I again, think I said April, so I'm
12 corrected if it's 12 May - the appointment of General Mladic as the
13 commander of the Main Staff of the army and the organisation of that
14 Main Staff subsequently is the efforts to take these Territorial Defence
15 organisations and start to meld them into a national type of army and one
16 that could start dealing with conflict-related issues on a national level
17 rather than at each individual municipal level.
18 Q. Okay. Now, at that point in time, and if you could be of some
19 help to me here, it seems to me that you have a bit of a dilemma, and the
20 dilemma being as follows, which is that you have a professional army that
21 has a military doctrine that envisions some of the aspects of the
22 Territorial Defence notion, and you have a Territorial Defence component
23 that is strictly defensive in nature in a civil war.
24 So it would seem to be somewhat of a dilemma in term of how best
25 to proceed forward. Would you agree?
1 A. I don't think that's an accurate characterization of the issue.
2 I think the problem that they were facing was that the -- there was no
3 national military hierarchy to look at the strategic big picture of the
4 military. And the problem that they were facing is that the municipal
5 Crisis Staffs were very often focussed on the immediate threat in their
6 particular municipality.
7 So you this had odd situation where military forces in one
8 municipality wouldn't be performing any duties, because they had already
9 accomplished the missions that they wanted to do and didn't see it as
10 their role to go and assist in another municipality. So there was no
11 large coordinated strategy to deal with these issues. They were all
12 being done piecemeal. And I think that was the doctrinal problem that
13 the Republika Srpska leadership had, is that while they had national
14 objectives with the six strategic goals, for example, they couldn't
15 realize those as long as they were continuing to operate on a very
16 decentralised manner at the municipal level.
17 Q. Well, the difficulty that existed, as a matter of fact, as
18 between the military doctrine at hand and the entire manner in which the
19 Territorial Defence had been set up is something that had been previously
20 recognised at the time of the JNA was involved in fighting; correct? And
21 if I might be of some assistance to you --
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have 65 ter 6292 on the screen, please.
23 Q. It might be the easiest way to get you to -- what I'm trying to
24 suggest to you. It's going to be page 5 in the B/C/S, which we're
25 ultimately going get to. And as soon as the -- is that the English?
1 There we go.
2 Okay. First of all, just if we could take a look at the dates
3 just so you know what the date is, which is 1991.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if we could go to page 6 of the document in
5 English and page 5 in B/C/S. And I'm specifically going to
6 paragraph number 4. And if we could have that blown up.
7 Q. Apart from the discussion about the JNA not wishing to be
8 involved in this particular war, as we get to paragraph 4, it says:
9 "This war is specific in many aspects.
10 "Exactly. The JNA was not prepared for this kind of war. Many
11 tradition ideas and values that we used to build our defence system upon
12 have been of no use to us at all. We had to approach an all-out
13 transformation of the army and of the doctrine of its use."
14 So this is clearly a dilemma that was faced by the JNA. And I
15 take it this is the same dilemma that was faced by General Mladic when he
16 was attempting to build his army, after May of 1992?
17 A. Well, for the first component of the JNA, I agree. I mean, the
18 reality is that I'm not aware that any major army, for that matter, has a
19 doctrine or practices portraying to the level of what happens when the
20 country falls apart in civil war. It is just not something envisioned
21 obviously and the JNA found itself right in the middle of that.
22 Q. Precisely.
23 A. Now, General Mladic, he had already been working through that
24 process, and his goal was basically taking the existing pieces that he
25 either had in Bosnia
1 from a largely decentralised force and creating an overarching command
2 and control element that would allow them to focus the existing force
3 towards more operational and strategic goals, as opposed to just being
4 involved in municipal-level activities.
5 Q. And, once again, in terms of talking about military doctrine,
6 would it be fair to say that at the higher levels it's really quite
7 conceptual, in terms of what military doctrine is, and as you go down to
8 the lower levels, then really what you're dealing with is operational
9 issues and tactical issues?
10 A. Yes, sir. And in fact recognizing this particular issue, the VRS
11 made the decision, based on all of their other manning and professional
12 educational shortfalls, that they were going to put the bulk of their
13 professional JNA-trained officers at these higher levels of command, and
14 consequently assume a risk at the lower levels of command which would be
15 filled by individuals who were often reservists and who had nowhere near
16 the professional training and background.
17 So, yeah, I agree. And in fact they recognised that risk and
18 reacted accordingly to them.
19 Q. And so we understand, with regard to military doctrine at the
20 lower levels, we're talking about such things, are we not, as, for
21 example, the number of kilometres that a unit of a particular size or
22 character should be able to cover?
23 A. Those things -- yeah.
24 Q. As an example.
25 A. Those things are covered in the combat regulations. But maybe as
1 a better example of that, when you look at a brigade structure, there
2 would be the effort to seed that key command group with professionally
3 trained JNA officers in a commander and Chief of Staff and maybe the
4 operations officer roles. Many of the subordinate commanders who were
5 not required to operate in such a sophisticated manner would be reserve
6 officers who would not have that expertise. So it was at the higher
7 levels of command is where they kind of tried to create that nucleus of
8 professional officers.
9 Q. Since you mentioned brigade, perhaps just for a moment we can
10 move to the side, and could you give us just a rough understanding of the
11 structure of the VRS in terms of brigades and corps, how that broke
12 itself down.
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. Just kind of general, how is an army put together?
15 A. Well, using the VRS, in April, when they organised, and through
16 May and June, the VRS initially consisted of the Main Staff which was the
17 command and control nucleus of the entire army. Under it, it had
18 initially five combat corps formations. A corps, in the VRS vernacular,
19 probably had between 25 and maybe 50.000, I think in one case even higher
20 than that, number of soldiers assigned, and those people would be broken
21 down into various subordinate components that were referred to as
22 brigades. Each brigade had between 3 and 5.000 soldiers. There would be
23 between some cases five, some cases seven brigades assigned to a corps.
24 Within each brigade, you would have a number of battalions, each between,
25 roughly, 500 or 700 people. You would have three, five, sometimes up to
1 six or seven battalions in a brigade, depending on how it was organised,
2 and then it keeps going lower. In each battalion you would have five or
3 six companies of roughly 100 people. So, I mean, that was how the
4 hierarchy was organised.
5 Q. And with regard to the formation of the VRS, one of the
6 difficulties that the VRS experienced with regard to the issue of
7 military doctrine was that it was an underpopulated army; correct? If
8 you follow -- I think you follow what I'm saying.
9 A. It wasn't necessarily an issue of the military doctrine. What it
10 was, was the fact that they did not have the requisite manpower to
11 accomplish the doctrine. The units themselves were chronically
12 under-manned because the war was not popular, desertion was a fairly
13 regular occurrence. And perhaps more importantly, the leadership of
14 those units were not properly manned either. Either having officers in
15 command positions at those lower levels who are not qualified, or the
16 fact that -- and, again, well known within the VRS, that a lot of the
17 officers who were of Bosnian Serb origin who were in the JNA did not
18 serve in the VRS for a variety of reasons.
19 Q. Okay. One of the things that I'm driving at here, and perhaps I
20 used the incorrect language, is that in terms of one of the fundamental
21 principles that guides military doctrine with regard to the issue of the
22 population of an army is that there is a recognition of a ratio that
23 should exist between attacking forces and defending forces. I think it
24 is a three to one ratio, is one of the fundamental principles that come
25 out, and it has come out through the ages of warfare. And that is what I
1 was driving at with regard to the issue of the army being an
2 underpopulated army, among other things.
3 A. I don't look at it those terms. I look at it in terms of when
4 one looks at the establishment of the army, their basic structure and
5 what their -- in my army we call it the table of organisation and
6 equipment, and it reflects the manning, that the units were chronically
7 undermanned for the size of the units and the type of units that they
9 Now your application of three to one at a particular point of
10 attack, you know, during the course of combat operations as one saw from
11 1992 to 1995, they would be able to generate the requisite ratios that
12 they needed by moving units in from other areas of the country, or in
13 other areas they would be able to compensate by using fires or other
14 forms of combat power.
15 So I don't look at it in the same view that you do, sir.
16 Q. Okay. And since you have introduced a new a concept here which
17 is the concept of fires, perhaps can you explain to the Chamber what
18 fires -- what the that means when you use that particular term.
19 A. Yes, sir. When I use the term "fires," I am referring to
20 artillery, mortars, things of that nature. It is considered to be a
21 combat multiplier rather than when one looks at how a military may attack
22 and how a military will generate combat power at the point of attack or
23 at a point on the battlefield where it wants to, troops, the manoeuvre
24 formations, fires, the artillery units, those are all part of that
1 Q. Now, with regard to the Bosnian Muslim army, would it be fair to
2 say that you do not have any exact figure for what the population was of
3 that army?
4 A. No, sir. But I am aware that the population of the Bosnian
5 Muslim army did well exceed that of the Bosnian Serb army.
6 Q. Okay. And with regard to the leadership of the Bosnian Muslim
7 army, those individuals, some of the individuals we were speaking about
8 yesterday, Mr. Rasim Delic, Mr. Halilovic, Mr. Hadzihasanovic, among
9 others, all had previously been in the JNA; correct?
10 A. I believe so, yes, sir.
11 Q. And you mentioned earlier that this was a unique situation
12 because what had happened was the country had fallen into a civil war.
13 What you had here was you had all participants in the conflict working
14 under some of the same, if not -- well, I put it that way, some of the
15 same historical understanding of how to wage a war. They all were
16 inculcated with the notion of All People's Defence.
17 A. Yes, sir. I mean, they were all trained the same way, so, as a
18 result, their views on how to conduct military operations all tended to
19 be very familiar.
20 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the issue concerning the amalgamation
21 of the various aspects of the VRS, was the VRS also comprised of an
22 independent police unit, or were those individuals who were actually part
23 of the armed forces?
24 A. I'm not familiar with what independent police unit you might be
25 referring to.
1 Q. I'm asking a question. I'm asking the question whether there was
2 an independent police units that you came across.
3 A. There was an independent protection regiment, the 65th Protection
4 Regiment that worked for the Main Staff, but within the structure of the
5 VRS there were no independent units.
6 If you are referring to the special police brigade that operated
7 not with the -- that wasn't under the army's control nominally; that was
8 under the Ministry of Interior. Is that what you're referring to?
9 Q. You -- yes. And the 66th?
10 A. I'm sorry, 65th Protection Regiment.
11 Q. And the 65th protection regiment that worked for the Main Staff,
12 what did you understand their responsibilities to be?
13 A. Buy the former doctrine --
14 Q. Let's --
15 A. Right. They were supposed to be in charge of protecting key
16 facilities and things of that nature. They basically worked for the
17 Military District command, and they were in charge of the security of
18 many of the key military logistical or other facilities.
19 During the actual conflict, the 65th Protection Regiment was used
20 as an assault force and would frequently be found all over the
21 battlefield engaged in combat operations.
22 Q. And you indicated they were under the Ministry of Interior. And
23 was there --
24 A. No, sir. The special police brigade was under the Ministry of
25 the Interior.
1 Q. Right.
2 A. The 65th Protection Regiment was directly under the command of
3 the Main
4 Q. Ah, okay. Good.
5 Now, with regard to the Drina Corps, the Drina Corps was not,
6 shall we say, a child of the JNA, was it?
7 A. Correct, sir. The corps headquarters had no former JNA lineage
8 as the other corps did.
9 Q. And when -- and when was the Drina Corps formed?
10 A. I believe the date that it was organised, at least the
11 headquarters was organised, is the 1st of November, 1992.
12 Q. Okay. And with regard to the Drina Corps when you said that they
13 had no JNA lineage, I take it that by that you mean they -- it was a
14 hodgepodge put together, as opposed to the other corps that had some form
15 of structure that had been pre-existing before the JNA left?
16 A. I wouldn't put it "hodgepodge," but certainly it did not have the
17 benefit of the nucleus of a former JNA Corps to build around, like, for
18 example, the East Bosnia corps which was made of the nucleus of the
19 former JNA 17th Corps or the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps headquarters which
20 was made up of the nucleus of the former JNA 4th Corps.
21 So that that respect when they created the Drina Corps
22 headquarters, it required them to pull resources from other elements in
23 order to create that. They did not have that JNA nucleus to build around
24 from the beginning.
25 Q. Okay.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Where did these elements come from, given the fact
2 that all other soldiers would have belonged to other units?
3 THE WITNESS: The -- in this regard, the soldiers themselves, the
4 brigades were relocated from one corps, the older, either East Bosnia
5 Corps or Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, which shared responsibility for Eastern
8 The personnel that made up the corps headquarters came from
9 either the Main Staff, the corps commander, for example, the 1st Corps
10 commander, General Zivanovic, before he was the corps commander in the
11 Drina Corps, he was the chief of artillery for the Main Staff. Other
12 officers would come in from other locations in the army, so they just
13 drew them from those locations. But the units that ultimately made up
14 the Drina Corps existed in -- as units in other forms and were just
15 simply resubordinated.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
17 Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
19 Q. With regard to the issue of command and control, could you give
20 the Chamber is rough understanding of what is meant by those terms.
21 A. In a military sense, command and control is the process by which
22 the individual who is in charge is able to issue orders. Those orders
23 flow down to the subordinates who would follow them, and that the
24 subordinates' compliance with those orders flows back up to the
25 individual who issued them.
1 Very simply put, and, of course, within the context -- you know,
2 much of what we call military doctrine revolves around the processes that
3 take place within that to ensure that those people give orders, that
4 they're transmitted down to subordinates, that they're complied, and the
5 compliance of those orders is again transmitted back up.
6 Q. With regard to the JNA and the Territorial Defence, I suggest to
7 you that this is an area where doctrines would diverge? And, if I might,
8 because I see -- I see your mind is turning ahead. Let me make the
9 following proposition to you, which you then can accept or reject, or
10 discuss with me.
11 Which is: the JNA command and control system consisted of unit
12 commands, institution directorates, specialized administrative and
13 command structure. The TDF consisted of territorial staffs, territorial
14 unit commands, territorial institution directorates, and specialized
15 administrative and command organs dealing with specific spheres in the
16 Territorial Defence?
17 A. Okay, I see where you're driving now.
18 Certainly the JNA command system was organised along more
19 traditional lines, and the Territorial Defences command and control
20 system was organised on a much more decentralised level to reflect the
21 fact that in an occupied country, the command and control system that the
22 JNA had in place would not be able to exist, just because obviously the
23 JNA would not be able to exist like that.
24 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the distinction between these two
25 doctrines as they relate to command and control, they would directly
1 affect, would they not, issues concerning subordination and discipline?
2 A. I disagree that they would affect issues dealing with
3 subordination. Potentially they would deal with issues related to
4 discipline. I -- again, I don't know many of the issues related to the
5 Territorial Defence because relative, particularly to where my field of
6 expertise is with respect to the Drina Corps in July 1995, it was
7 operating off of the JNA command and control model, not that of the
8 Territorial Defence.
9 Q. With regard to the issue you have just raised, which is that it
10 was operating off of the JNA model, I'd like a little help here, if I
11 could with regard to what I understand to be in command and control
12 areas, that they're basically two kind of command and control principles.
13 One is, as we have been discussing, the decentralised fashion, and one is
14 what we have left a little bit more open which is the centralised form of
15 command and control.
16 Are you with me?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. Okay. With regard to the VRS, is it your contention that they
19 were a centralised form of command and control with a subordinate staff
20 population that was - and I may be being a bit bold in my position - but
21 in large measure, populated by officers and reservists who had not
22 received that kind of training and had come from the military doctrine of
23 Territorial Defence, that being a decentralised form of command and
25 A. No, sir. I think -- it's inaccurate, because while you had
1 different models that the Territorial Defence and the JNA operated under
2 with respect to how they would be expected to perform in wartime, the
3 reality was that the officers were one and the same. The active
4 officers, I mean, even the reserve officers, they were not trained
5 differently; they all received the same training. And, you know, again
6 one of the reasons for me, why we never focussed on the
7 Territorial Defence model is that in April of 1992, I'm sorry, in June of
8 1992, I believe it is, the Republika Srpska creates their Law on Army and
9 the Law on Defence, which lays out exactly what the command and control
10 apparatus of the army will be.
11 So that is the model that they followed.
12 Q. Well, I suggest to you that -- that the reality of what was
13 occurring on the ground and the reality of what is written in the book
14 brings to mind there's many a slip twixt the cup and the lip, and that
15 the model that was written was not the model that was in fact followed?
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Guy-Smith kindly speak into the
17 microphone. Thank you.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, I will.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Harmon.
20 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, could Mr. Guy-Smith identify the
21 time-period he is talking because the question is extremely general.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure. Not a problem at all.
23 Q. I'm referring to the period of time that you were focussed on,
24 which is 1995, July.
25 A. Well, sir, as I guess you would take from the thrust of my
1 reports, and on command with respect to the Main Staff corps and brigade
2 and the narratives, I would disagree with that assertion.
3 Q. Yes, I would assume that you would.
4 I want to move to an issue where I'm sure we probably will agree.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Guy-Smith is inaudible, I'm sorry.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH:
7 Q. I'm going to move to an issue which I'm sure you and I will agree
8 upon which is the importance of the unity of command.
9 A. Correct, sir, that is an important principle.
10 Q. Could you please explain to the Chamber what unity of command
12 A. Hopefully I will paraphrase it correctly from the relevant Law on
13 the Army where it is discussed. But unity of command is the principle
14 that there is one commander, that the orders from that commander are to
15 be followed, that outside influences should not penetrate that
16 relationship. It's basically, it's singular command. And in the case of
17 the VRS ultimately, singular command of the army under the Supreme
18 Commander, which would be President Radovan Karadzic.
19 Q. I'm going add to a component to that and see if you agree. I
20 think it is something that you may have previously said which is that you
21 cannot have a function where you have multiple commanders in one unit.
22 A. I think even if one looks back at the trials of the Soviet army
23 facing the German invasion where they had multiple commanders and one saw
24 the results I think everybody learned a lessen that that doesn't work.
25 You have to have a singular commander.
1 Q. And the singular commander, I believe you mentioned for
2 Republika Srpska was Radovan Karadzic; correct?
3 A. By virtue of position of the President, he was in fact the
4 commander of chief of the armed forces, yes.
5 Q. And directly under him with regard to matters military would have
6 been General Mladic; correct?
7 A. With matters with respect to the VRS, yes, sir.
8 Q. Okay.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Would that be an appropriate time.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: If it suits you, you have two more minutes --
11 [Microphone not activated]
12 I was saying for the record I would like to mention something
13 that I forgot to mention at the beginning of the session this morning,
14 that we are still sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis.
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: I just -- I forgot something. If I could have
16 the 65 ter number which is 6292 admitted as defendant's next in order.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. And may it please be given an
18 exhibit number.
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D103.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
22 We will take a break and come back at quarter to 11.00.
23 Court adjourned.
24 --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.
25 --- On resuming at 10.46 a.m.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could please have Exhibit P2248 up on the
3 screen, and I'm going specifically be going to page 4, section 2 of that
4 particular document.
5 Q. With regard to the issue of unity of command --
6 A. I'm sorry, sir, if I could maybe conveniently stop you here.
7 Both versions I'm looking at are in Serbo-Croatian, so -- I am assuming
8 one version should be an English version.
9 Q. Oh, you can read Serbo-Croatian.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Harmon.
11 MR. HARMON: Mr. Butler has the documents in front of him,
12 perhaps he can refer to the -- [Overlapping speakers] ...
13 THE WITNESS: Here we go. I'm sorry.
14 MR. HARMON: -- set of documents in hard copy -- [Overlapping
16 MR. GUY-SMITH:
17 Q. Sure. If you prefer to use your hard copy.
18 A. Now that I know what we're talking about, that's fine.
19 Q. But if you want to go to your hard copy, please do so. Whatever
20 works best for you. It works best for me in hard copy because I'm going
22 A. Just works best for me in a language I can understand.
23 Q. Understood.
24 With regard to the issue of unity of command, you discuss in your
25 report the 1984 JNA brigade rules, I'm starting at section 2.0, with
1 regards to the responsibilities of a brigade commander.
2 And understanding that this is dealing with the issue of command
3 of a brigade, you state:
4 "The command of the brigade is part of an integrated system of
5 command and control which are based on adopted principles of command?"
6 And I believe we have, for the most part, already discussed those
7 issues, have we not?
8 A. Yes, sir. I mean, they were the adopted principles of command
9 that were articulated by the JNA and SFRY armed forces.
10 Q. Excellent. I'm not going to concern myself with the second
11 sentence, but with regard to the third sentence, it says:
12 "To this end command must integrated, continuous, secure,
13 flexible, effective, and operational?"
14 And you go on to say, once again quoting from a previous JNA
15 manual, which is a 1983 JNA manual for the work of command and staffs:
16 "The command relationship is based on the principle of unity,
17 unity of command and subordination. It is defined in the relationship
18 between the superior and his subordinate. The command relationship
19 pervades the entire system of the armed forces from the SFRY Presidency
20 to the soldiers."
21 I'd like to stop there for a moment. Because of what you have
22 told us here, I take it that when we were discussing earlier the
23 Supreme Commander, Radovan Karadzic, and his direct subordinate,
24 Ratko Mladic, that this is the exact principle that was adopted by the RS
25 that had pre-existed at the time of the JNA. Correct?
1 A. Yes, sir, that is a fair characterization.
2 Q. I'm going to continue here.
3 "It is an obligation to execute the tasks set by one's superior
4 or competent officers and organs in an accurate and proper manner."
5 And before we go any further, you have -- there are two different
6 concepts there. One is superior, and the other is competent officer. Do
7 you interpret the term here "competent officer" to involve an
8 understanding of a hierarchical relationship, or does it have to do the
9 ability of the officer to do something?
10 A. I attribute this within the hierarchical nature in so much as the
11 competent officer is one who is appointed to do a certain -- appointed
12 within the hierarchy to be able to give those types of orders.
13 Q. Okay. And you continue, so we'll continue:
14 "And act in accordance with the military regulations in their
16 And I take by that you're not only referring to the general
17 military regulations that were promulgated at the time but also orders
18 that would occur at the time of battle, for example?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. Okay. I want to go to the next sentence which is:
21 "Any disruption in the command relationship, such as
22 circumvention of or wrongful interference with the chain of command is a
23 sign of military disorganisation."
24 Now I take it that sentence embodies the concept that we were
25 referring to before when you were talking about the failed experiments
1 with multiple, I believe, you said Russians fighting against the Nazis in
2 World War II?
3 A. I think in this particular context where it is referring to is
4 more along the lines of a situation where other officers would come in,
5 or even non-military officers, political officials would come in and try
6 and give orders or try and influence the chain of command in a particular
7 military unit.
8 Q. Oh, I see. With regard to what you've just said, in terms of the
9 issues as they relate to military doctrine, being the mechanism whereby
10 the national objectives are engaged, if you have distinct national
11 objectives, would it, in your estimation, be fair to say that the attempt
12 to influence one national objective to another would be something that
13 would be of concern with regard to the language that is here, in terms of
14 wrongful interference? And that was probably in-artfully put.
15 A. Yes, sir, I don't understand what you're asking.
16 Q. Okay. Let me do that again for you.
17 With regard to the issue of the unity of command, the unity of
18 command necessarily flows from military doctrine; correct?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. Okay. And the military doctrine necessarily flows from the
21 national objective that exists at the time; correct?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. Okay. Where you have distinct national objectives; for example,
24 the difference between what was occurring in FRY during, let's say, 1994,
25 the embargo time, and the Republika Srpska, the attempt to influence
1 would be an example of the wrongful interference that we are discussing
2 here. Correct?
3 A. I guess where I would have difficulty in answering that question
4 is only in so much as I don't know what the national objectives of the
5 FRY were in that respect. It wasn't an area of particular study for me.
6 So I can't particularly --
7 Q. Oh.
8 A. -- help out on that question, sir.
9 Q. Looking at it, then, not in the specific abstract but the general
10 abstract, if you have competing national objectives, would the attempt to
11 influence be something that would be of concern with regard to the
12 language that is contained herein?
13 A. I'm -- you're too abstract now. I just don't track what you're
14 trying to ask, sir. I apologise.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you talking, Mr. Guy-Smith, are you talking
16 about completing national objectives within the same nation or in two
17 different nations?
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I'm actually talking about competing
19 national objectives within two different nations.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: But then -- and I guess this is it why the witness
21 can't follow you. I can't follow you too. Because -- because, sir,
22 within the particular nation, either of the two, each one has its own
23 objective, and there is nothing competing with that. If you have a
24 competing objective with another nation, that's what brings you to war
25 with that nation.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: True, Your Honour. And I was going in a slightly
2 -- in a slightly different fashion, and I will try one more time and then
3 perhaps --
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: But how does it fit into command and control?
5 That's what I don't understand because if -- you don't have command and
6 control over another nation.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: I understand. I understand.
8 Q. I'm not dealing with the issue of warring nations, okay. What
9 I'm -- what I'm dealing with here is where you have two nations that are
10 seemingly aligned in their general purpose during a conflict but they
11 have distinct objectives; one, for example, is attempting, during the
12 conflict to obtain peace; the other one, for example, during the conflict
13 is attempting to within the war. But they have some of the same
14 theoretical bases upon which they are existing.
15 In that situation, if one of the commanders of one nation state
16 attempts to influence a commander of another nation state, would that
17 fall into the concerns that exist here, or do you see this as being
18 something that just deals with the specific issue internally in a nation
20 A. I guess the best way to answer that is that it would be
21 situation-dependant. The rules that are envisioned here, particularly
22 when we are talking down to, you know, a brigade level, are fairly
23 specific. The abstract that you've mentioned, I mean, I guess I can
24 envision, you know, something similar along the NATO alliance where a
25 group of countries operates in general concert although one must
1 acknowledge that each nation state has their own individual objective
2 that, at the top levels of leadership, that they operate potentially at a
3 different hierarchical and control mechanism than you might see an
4 individual brigade of an individual national state at that lower level.
5 So, I mean, I think it is just too abstract to be able to give a yes or
6 no answer to. It is situation-dependant.
7 Q. Fair enough. But with regard to what you've said here which is
8 that at the top levels of leadership they operate potentially at a
9 different hierarchical control mechanism, that is something that you --
10 that you cannot comment on with regard to the research and analysis that
11 you did in terms of your study?
12 A. Well, I can with respect to the Republika Srpska.
13 Q. Okay.
14 A. Not with respect to --
15 Q. Anything else but the Republika Srpska.
16 A. Correct, sir. I mean --
17 Q. Fair enough.
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. That's fair. Which takes me to my next point which is that the
20 study that you have done is legitimately focussed on a level lower than
21 the top levels of leadership.
22 A. No, sir. I mean, within the framework of the Republika Srpska,
23 that -- the whole series of studies goes to the highest levels of
24 leadership within the Republika Srpska.
25 Q. Okay. And within any other republics, for example, the Republic
1 of Croatia
2 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, you did not do that analysis. It's
3 confined to the Republika Srpska.
4 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
5 Q. Fine.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could turn to -- still in the same
7 document, if we could turn to 2.7. And I'm just -- want to make sure
8 that something is understood.
9 Q. Within 2.7 you indicate that the issue of appointment is
10 addressed in Articles 153, 155, and 370 of the RS Law of the army.
11 Articles 153 and 155 deal with "the appointment of military personnel to
12 formation posts according to service requirements."
13 And with regard to the issue of "service requirements," how are
14 you defining that particular term?
15 A. I don't define it. I believe the definition that is attributed
16 to it is the service requirement being the coded positions in each of
17 these formations for how many colonels, how many majors, how many
18 captains. So the phrase "service requirements" is actually the -- the
19 posting structure of the military, how many -- what their manpower
20 requirements are.
21 Q. Excellent.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could now turn to page 18 of the same
23 document, section 4. I think it's coming up.
24 Q. If you have your hard copy there, so time doesn't go a wasting,
25 we are at the disciplinary authority of the VRS brigade commander and
1 Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff over subordinates section.
2 And with regard to this particular section, first of all, if we
3 could -- I think you'll take it as being true that the time-period that
4 we're talking about is -- is a time-period in which Karadzic has declared
5 a state of war.
6 A. In July of 1995, with respect to Eastern Bosnia, it was still an
7 imminent threat of state of war. It was not a fully formalised state of
8 war that was declared, with the exception of the Srebrenica municipality,
9 I believe, on the 15th of September. I'm sorry, 15th of July.
10 So for most of the Drina Corps are that I'm discussing, the legal
11 state is an imminent threat of war.
12 Q. If you can help me then.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could just, then, go to page 22 just for a
14 second here so I understanding something.
15 Q. And looking at section 4.11, it says:
16 "With respect to the time-period in question, RS President
17 Radovan Karadzic declared 'a state of war' in the Srebrenica Skelani
18 municipality on 14 July 1995
19 A. Correct, sir, but again as I said that does not encompass the
20 entire Drina Corps area. So that's why you have got to just make that
22 Q. And then you go to say:
23 "In addition this declared state of war was expanded to the
24 entire territory of the Republika Srpska 28 July."
25 A. Correct, sir.
1 Q. Which is somewhat distinct from what you said, which was 15th of
3 A. I'm sorry, I meant to say 15th of July.
4 Q. Okay, perfect. Great.
5 Now going back to this particular section, going back page 18. I
6 take it that the disciplinary authority here as it relates to brigade
7 commanders could also be found to resonate higher up the chain; correct?
8 A. Correct, sir.
9 Q. Okay. And so that the same disciplinary authority that you're
10 referring to here is the disciplinary authority that Mladic would have
11 over those below him; correct?
12 A. Yes, sir. I believe there are provisions under law that explain
14 Q. And, I mean, ultimately that Karadzic would have over the entire
16 A. Correct, sir.
17 Q. Okay. And with regard to those issues -- if we could now go to
18 the next section of your report, which is section 5.
19 And before we discuss section 5, did you have occasion, while you
20 were engaged in your research and analysis, to review the Law on Military
21 Courts and Military Prosecutor, and the guidelines and criteria with
22 regard to criminal prosecutions that were promulgated in the
23 Republika Srpska?
24 A. Yes, sir, I did.
25 Q. Okay. I take it that the first --
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have section 5, please, which is
2 page 23.
3 Q. And looking at section 5.0, I think it is pretty clear that as
4 early as the 13th of May, 1992, Karadzic has issued an order with regard
5 to the rules of international law of war on the army, right?
6 A. Correct, sir.
7 Q. Okay.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: Now, if we could turn to 1D03-0054.
9 We're having trouble getting it up. Great.
10 Q. Right now it's in a language I think you don't understand, and in
11 a moment it should be in a language that you do.
12 Okay. You will -- you will note that it this is a decree on the
13 proclamation of the Law on military Courts, and it's dated 30th December,
14 1993, and I take it that this is one of the documents that you analysed
15 with regard to the issues that involve themselves concerning criminal
17 A. Yes, sir, as part of the VRS military disciplinary process.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could I have this particular -- I'm not going to
19 go through this piece by piece. It's just it hasn't come into evidence
20 yet, and I think it is critical for an understanding of your report.
21 Could I have this as defendant's next in order, please.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
23 exhibit number.
24 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D104.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: The next document is 1D03-0046. And once again
2 I'm going to be asking essentially the same questions with regard to that
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Could you give the number again, please.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: 1D03-0046.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure.
8 Q. This document is a document that was produced in the Official
9 Gazette of the Republika Srpska on the 28th of November, 1994, and I take
10 it once again this is one of the documents that you relied upon with
11 regard to your analysis and research?
12 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: And could we have that marked as defendant's next
14 in order.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be so marked,
17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D105.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: And could we have next 1D03-0001.
19 Okay. Could we go to -- this is a 1992 document.
20 Could we go to the next page.
21 Q. And I'm doing this just because the first page had virtually
22 nothing on it. And I take it that this document, once again is a
23 document that you concerned yourself with when you were engaged in your
24 analysis with regard to the issues that you were asked to consider.
25 A. Correct, sir.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have this marked as defendant's next in
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be so marked.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D106.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH:
7 Q. Now you take that you also took -- took a look at the Republika
8 Srpska Law on the Army; Law on National Defence, February 1992; and Law
9 on Defence, June 1992?
10 A. Correct, sir.
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we then have sequentially 65 ter 6605.
13 After that will be 6569 and 6950 -- the first one, I do apologise, is
14 already in as -- it's in as Exhibit P191.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's 6605.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, I do apologise. It is already in as P191,
17 Your Honour.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is what we have here, 6569?
20 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: I honestly can't tell, until it gets bigger on
23 the screen, Your Honour. I do apologise. I just can't see it.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Welcome to the club.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. This is a document you relied on; correct?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. Okay.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could I have admitted as defendant's next in
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be given an
6 exhibit number.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D107.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: And I believe the last one in this series is
11 God, I hate going blind.
12 Q. Is this another document that you had an opportunity to use in
13 your research?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. Okay.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have marked as defendant's next in
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's admitted. May it please be marked.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D108.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH:
22 Q. With regard to your analysis, did you also have occasion to
23 review the manual for Command Staffs, which is, I think, entitled the
24 rule of -- role of corps of ground forces?
25 A. The manual for Command Staff is the --
1 Q. Hold on, let me --
2 A. -- is different.
3 Q. Yeah, I think it is different. I have written something here,
4 and something else -- let me just double-check. Yes, okay. The manual
5 for Command Staffs, which is 6397.
6 Did you have occasion to review that document? Obviously you
7 must have, because you corrected me.
8 A. Yes, sir, I relied on that as a component of my reports.
9 Q. Okay. That document -- that document, do you know if that
10 document ever moved from its draft position into a final position, and,
11 if so, when?
12 A. I am not aware that it ever moved from its draft position to a
13 final position. Actually, that wasn't uncommon with a number of the
14 regulations. But having said that, it was applied.
15 Q. Okay.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have that marked as defendant's next in
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: It is so marked. May it please be given a number.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D109.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would application of the document not ipso facto
21 mean that it is, therefore, in the final stage?
22 THE WITNESS: What the practice of -- and there are a number of
23 other documents that you will see regulatory things like this that are
24 listed as either draft or provisional. And it was not uncommon under
25 their particular system that they would publish and implement these as
1 draft regulations.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: And apply them.
3 THE WITNESS: Apply them. And then, based on years of lessons
4 learned, they would go in and finalize them over time.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH:
7 Q. There's a last document that I'd like to discuss with you, and
8 that's 6015. And it's the rule corps of ground forces, provisional.
9 Now, I don't know if you can be of any assistance. I need to ask
10 my colleague if they can be of any assistance because there are two
11 translations for this document.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which colleague?
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Probably the one that knows more about this stuff
14 would be is Carmela, honestly. I mean I think she probably -- I mean,
15 she understands the disclosure better than anybody at least on that side,
16 from what I understand, no insult meant to Mr. Harmon whatsoever.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Except that you can't talk to Ms. Javier.
18 [Prosecution counsel confer]
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe that the 5 September is the official,
20 but I'm not positive about that.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Harmon.
22 MR. HARMON: The translation; there are two translations. The
23 translation has -- the revised translation has a document ID 0039-5376ET.
24 That's the --
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. Then that's the one that we should --
1 that's the one ...
2 THE WITNESS: I am familiar with this document; I did rely on it.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. I'm just -- I would like the original
4 document and the appropriate translation moved in as defendant's next in
5 order, whichever one it may be, and I think that we can sort that out.
6 We can either sort this out immediately or sort it out it the very near
7 future. We'll take that matter up with Mr. Registrar, if that works for
8 the Court.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: That works for the Court.
10 It's admitted. May it please be given an exhibit number.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D110.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH:
14 Q. I'd like to backtrack for a moment, if I could.
15 When we were speaking earlier today, we were discussing, among
16 other things, the manner in which you dealt with what I'll call evolving
17 information concerning your reports and of the -- not only the notion but
18 the reality that when you came across a particular mistake, or error,
19 that you remedied it.
20 Do you recall that?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. Okay. Could you tell me what the word "asanacija" means?
23 A. Asanacija.
24 Q. Thank you. You speak better than I do.
25 A. Only on this particular word, sir, as -- as I expect you know,
1 there are a lot of different definitions that are associated with it.
2 The definition that I use and that I used in my reports and
3 testimony reflects the definition that we have from one of the JNA
4 manuals. I think it is a 1979-dated manual on those types of issues,
5 related to battlefield, health, medical services and safety-related
6 issues dealing with the refuge of war on the battlefield.
7 Q. Okay. And when you say -- is that the "refuge" or the "refuse"?
8 A. Refuse.
9 Q. That which is left over after the battle is done?
10 A. Correct, sir. Primarily reports dealing with biological waste
11 products, being, you know, dead animals, dead soldiers, things of that
13 Q. And with regard to that particular issue just generally, if you
14 could help me for a second, I take it that this is it not an uncommon
15 concern, at least militarily, that after there's a battle, something must
16 be done with the environs in order to make it habitable again.
17 A. Correct, sir. It's a basic, you know, battlefield sanitation
19 Q. Okay. And with regard to the testimony that you have given, I
20 believe, that you mentioned yesterday that you interpreted the word to
21 mean burying prisoners?
22 A. In the context of that particular document, yes, sir.
23 Q. Okay. When you say in the context of that particular document,
24 this is a conversation that you have had at a previous time, have you
25 not, in another trial?
1 A. Yes, sir. As you're quite aware, I suspect --
2 Q. I think I might be.
3 A. Colonel Pandurevic and his Defence team offer a different, both
4 definition and meaning to what that word is.
5 Q. Okay. And with regard to that, and I want to get right to that
7 I believe that's found in your Srebrenica narrative, is it not?
8 A. The revised narrative, yes, sir.
9 Q. Yes. And it's paragraph -- I want to say it's 13.12, but I could
10 be mistaken. No, I made a mistake.
11 This is it with regard to the Pandurevic discussion, and I do
12 apologise, because I have written down the wrong page number.
13 A. If you give me a few seconds, sir --
14 Q. Sure.
15 A. -- I believe I can assist you on that. I think I know where you
16 want to go on this.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: I was so careful about this one too. Dear, dear.
18 THE WITNESS: I believe you were at -- or where you want to be is
19 7.72, sir.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH:
21 Q. Yes.
22 Now, with regard to -- with regard to this particular part of
23 your report, how do you come to the different, what I would call,
24 translation of this word?
25 A. Well, sir, and again as I explained at some length during that
1 particular trial, the use of this word in context of what was happening
2 on the battlefield at the time is where I make the assertion that what he
3 is discussing is the burial of the bodies of the prisoners.
4 I say that because when one looks at the other activities that
5 are occurring, particularly knowing that on this particular day, the
6 Zvornik Brigade is not dealing with burying any of its own dead or issues
7 of that nature, I conclude that the only possible explanation, what
8 Colonel Pandurevic is trying to tell the corps command is the burdens of
9 burying the bodies of the dead prisoners. They were the only dead that
11 Q. Okay. All right. If we could go to P2245; I understand your
12 explanation, which is I understand not the revised report, but what we
13 would call the initial report that was authored on the 15th of May, 2000
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if we can go to page --
15 Q. I think you will find it at page 94, section 13.12.
16 And before I ask you any questions, if you could familiarize
17 yourself with that particular section, 13.12.
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. Okay. This is -- this is the area where I believe you had some
20 considerable discussion with, I believe it was Mr. Haynes concerning the
21 accuracy of your report and whether or not there were any errors
22 contained therein or not.
23 First of all, do you just recall the general conversation as
24 between yourself and Mr. Haynes about this matter?
25 A. Yes, sir, I believe, like I said, this was the particular issue
1 of my summarizing the conclusion here. His concern, of course, was I did
2 not do a direct literal lift of the language like I did earlier in the
3 report. I in fact summarized it for my conclusion.
4 Q. Okay. Well, as a matter of fact, it -- would it be fair to say
5 that with regard to the quoted language here, and I'm starting with the
6 sentence which is where you have been before, it's about -- it's a little
7 over halfway down in this particular paragraph: "Later that same
8 day ..."
9 A. Yes, sir.
10 Q. Okay. With regard to that, you agreed that the phrase "security
11 operations" was a technical error; correct?
12 A. Correct, sir.
13 Q. You conceded, with regard to the issue of the word that we were
14 just discussing which you pronounced much better than I have, that you're
15 putting that word in parentheses is not a proper translation; correct?
16 A. I don't know if I conceded that.
17 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ...
18 A. What I did say and maybe to shorten it all up, what I did say is
19 if there were any doubt, that the reader should go back to the original
20 context of -- or the original text of the actual document.
21 Q. Mm-hm. And, as a matter of fact, you were asked a question, if
22 I'm not mistaken, by Judge Agius with regard to whether or not there was
23 a literal translation or not. And what you said in that regard was to go
24 back to the actual text; correct?
25 A. Correct, sir. I mean, this is a summary that I -- and I
1 summarized for my conclusion whenever there is any doubt, and one of the
2 reasons why I so heavily footnote my document - and, in fact, on the
3 electronic version you can actually pull up the document in question that
4 has been footnoted - I always revert back to -- you know, the reader back
5 to the original document.
6 Q. And I believe with regard to the quoted language "security
7 operations," we've discussed that.
8 And the other one was the quoted language here, "let the
9 prisoners go," was that another place where there was a technical error
10 with regard to the information that's contained within the report?
11 A. Correct, sir. I believe the exact translation is "let them go,"
12 if I'm correct, yeah.
13 Q. With regard to these issues -- and the only reason I'm asking the
14 question is because when we started your testimony you were kind enough
15 to correct a discrete portion of your report by deleting some language in
16 a footnote so that your report would be technically accurate.
17 A. Yes, sir. But I'm operating under the assumption that everybody
18 has my prior transcripts and all the prior corrections that have been
19 made over the course of trials on this, and that the corrections that I
20 made was one that had not been caught previously.
21 Q. I see. So apart from what I have just noted, then, any other
22 corrections to be made to your report are, as you put it, to be found in
23 your prior testimony?
24 A. Yes, sir. I believe there were a couple of identified footnote
25 citations and things of that nature that were either transposed or in the
1 wrong location, and I think we have dealt with them as part of my prior
2 testimony, yes, sir.
3 Q. With regard to your testimony here, however, we have not had the
4 benefit of those corrections; correct? I don't mean here today; I mean
5 just since the time you have been with us.
6 A. Again, like I said, they're all former transcripts. I don't know
7 what has gone by with regard to that.
8 Q. Okay. You just -- you don't by any chance know off the top of
9 your head --
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just make sure you are near the mike,
11 Mr. Guy-Smith.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes.
13 Q. You don't know by any chance off the top of your head just how
14 many days you have testified in these prior proceedings?
15 A. Um, I'm thinking about 21.
16 Q. I'm thinking you're about right. Okay.
17 You mentioned to us in your testimony that the -- the column size
18 was somewhere between, I believe, 12 and 15.000.
19 A. That is correct. Those are the generally accepted numbers, sir.
20 Q. Okay. And in your narrative, I believe you mentioned that the
21 column size is between 10 and 15.000.
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. All right. And I understand that there may be a mere 2.000 in
24 terms of distinction between the two, but is -- are we to rely on the 10
25 to 15.000 figure or the 12 to 15.000 figure with regard to column size?
1 A. Sir nobody was standing at the beginning of the column with a
2 counter, so --
3 Q. All right, I appreciate that. But since you are the person who
4 has given both of those numbers, I'm just trying to figure out which
5 number we should rely upon with regard to the column size?
6 A. I'm comfortable with the 12 to 15.000.
7 Q. All right. When Pandurevic, on the 15th of -- I believe it was
8 the 16th, I'm sorry, July, decided to let the column through, this was in
9 reaction, as I understood it, to his appreciation which had been
10 developing the day before, of the magnitude of the military threat that
11 the column posed?
12 A. Yes, sir, I believe that's correct.
13 Q. Okay. And with regard to the military threat that the column
14 posed, I believe you've told us that it's estimated that one-third of the
15 column was armed.
16 A. Correct, sir.
17 Q. Okay. And that, I believe that in some of the footage some of
18 the last footage that we saw yesterday, we saw at least one or two
19 soldiers -- I'm sorry, one or two individuals in camouflage clothing, I
20 believe, carrying weapons.
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the decision that was made to let the
23 column through, that decision, would you characterize that as being an
24 independent decision, a decision that comes from a centralised command
25 structure, or a decision that comes from a decentralised command
2 A. I don't think that that would apply. I mean, the decision was
3 made by Colonel Pandurevic, the lawfully appointed commander after that
4 brigade. Colonel Pandurevic made the decision on his own and then
5 notified his superior command that he had done that. Obviously his
6 superior command did not view that as a decision that they wanted happen.
7 They -- they viewed that as something counter to the orders. But having
8 said that, I don't think that that particular decision is characterized
9 either as -- under a centralised or a decentralised structure. It
10 happened within the structure of the VRS.
11 Q. You raise an interesting point because you say that -- that his
12 superior command did not view that as a decision they wanted to happen;
13 they viewed that as something counter to the orders.
14 So with regard with that decision having been made counter to the
15 orders, I'm trying to get some understanding here with regard to how such
16 a decision by Pandurevic falls into the discussion that we've been having
17 in a more general sense, admittedly, concerning command and control.
18 Because it seems to me what you just said is that he didn't follow
20 A. That is correct, sir. He didn't follow orders of his superior
21 command, which were to essentially engage in and destroy the column to
22 the extent that he could. The orders that he gave as the brigade
23 commander, he was entitled to give as the commander. So, I mean, again,
24 I don't know how that particular discussion falls under a centralised or
25 a decentralised structure. He was operating within the centralised
1 structure of the army of the Republika Srpska. He gave an order that he
2 was entitled to give as the commander, even though it ran counter to the
3 guidance he had received from his superior organs. And then he informed
4 them of that.
5 Q. Let me just stop you there. You said guidance which is distinct
6 to an order. Is it your testimony that he received a guidance with
7 regard to how this should be handled or he received an order with regard
8 to the issue of this particular column?
9 A. My understanding is his orders were to engage the column. So I
10 don't want to make it sound like he had -- there was an option, an
11 optional thing. He was sent back from Zepa with various re-enforcements
12 in order to defend his zone and engage the column, and that is what they
13 expected him to do.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Is it correct that before he gave this order he
15 had sent a report to them telling them of the problems he was faced with
16 and asking for assistance?
17 THE WITNESS: If going back in time, when he arrives on 15 July,
18 he does report back to the superior command, as well as subsequently
19 informing them of the -- his growing perception of the strength of the
20 column and everything else. By the 16th of July, he makes the judgement,
21 as the man on the ground there, that he can't successfully engage the
22 column and that the best thing that he can do is to allow it to proceed.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: I understand that. Prior to the 16th, he had
24 reported the problems that he was faced with and asked for assistance
25 from his superiors.
1 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. And in fact prior to 16th he was heavily
2 involved in combatting the problem.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Did he get that assistance?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I think he did.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: He did get assistance?
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Through the day of the 15th as well as
7 the 16th, additional reinforcements were being rushed to the Zvornik
8 battlefield area, so he was receiving reinforcements.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: But still allowed the column to go through?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, he -- again, as the commander on the
11 ground, he made that decision in order to allow the column to pass --
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Was it because notwithstanding the
13 re-enforcements, the column was still overwhelming?
14 THE WITNESS: Well, sir, that is a point of contention in the
15 ongoing trial. It is my position, based on my reading from the documents
16 that that is it in fact correct. He made the judgement that even with
17 the reinforcements that were coming in, that he could not militarily
18 contest the passage of the column without taking a significant number of
19 casualties. His position is that he allowed the column to pass as a
20 humanitarian gesture.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
22 Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. With regard to the issue of any disciplining that would have been
25 done in relation to his decision to let the column pass, who would have
1 been his superior to make such a determination of discipline?
2 A. His first level superior to make that decision would have been
3 the corps commander, Colonel Radislav Krstic. Above that, would have
4 been General Ratko Mladic.
5 Q. And above Mladic, would there have been Karadzic, or would it
6 have stopped, in your estimation, based upon the laws that you have
7 analysed and reviewed, and your understanding of the history of this
8 discrete period of time?
9 A. No, sir. I believe that given the laws that I reviewed, that
10 certainly as the Supreme Commander and also you know the minister of
11 Defence, there would have been a political component as well, and
12 certainly Karadzic and the minister of Defence would have had a say in it
13 as well.
14 And when I talk about discipline it's not just if the context of
15 a military court martial, so to speak. It could also be a decision to
16 relieve him of his command.
17 Q. What other thing -- I understand the issue with court martial.
18 But apart from relieving him from his command, what other kinds of
19 discipline were available to be imposed?
20 A. Again, it depends on what context. If we're talking about a
21 disciplinary context of his failure to follow orders, it would have been
22 -- you know, he would have been potentially or could have been
23 potentially relieved of command and reassigned. It could have been
24 administratively demoted or sanctioned in another way. If we're talking
25 about the context of his involvement in the criminal acts related to his
1 decisions and those of the Zvornik Brigade certainly the military court
2 system would have been a process that should have been played.
3 Q. I see. Okay. Thank you. I'm going to move away from that issue
4 and go to something which is perhaps more concrete because we don't yet
5 have an understanding of -- of geographically the Srebrenica enclave.
6 And I'm hoping you can be of some assistance us in that regard. I don't
7 know if you still have the --
8 A. The map.
9 Q. -- the map.
10 A. I don't. Yes, sir, I do; it was folded.
11 Q. Which is P2400.
12 You indicated yesterday that the area that is encircled in
13 purple, as I understood it, represents the Srebrenica enclave?
14 A. Correct, sir.
15 Q. Okay. And within the -- within that enclave, there are a number
16 of different cities or settlements; correct?
17 A. Correct, sir.
18 Q. Now, I've heard the term "Bandera triangle," B-a-n-d-e-r-a. Is
19 the Bandera triangle a specific part of the Srebrenica enclave?
20 A. It is geographically an area that is to the south and west of the
21 town of Srebrenica.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could scroll -- I'm going to scroll down on
23 the screen. Excellent. Okay. It's an area which is -- and perhaps with
24 the help of the usher here ...
25 Q. Can you give us a -- an imagistic representation with the use of
1 the trusty electronic pen of the Bandera triangle.
2 A. I believe that is it the approximate area we are referring to.
3 Q. Okay. And the Bandera triangle contains within a part of the
4 Jadar river; correct?
5 A. I think so, yes.
6 Q. And the entire -- the entire area, the entire area of the
7 Srebrenica enclave -- that's fine, thank, you Mr. Registrar.
8 You know what, we should probably -- I'm not quite done, if you
9 could mark that -- inside of that triangle with a B to represent Bandera.
10 Could you do that? Do you have a pen?
11 A. Oh, I'm sorry.
12 Q. No problem.
13 A. I thought you were referring to the usher.
14 Q. Sorry, I don't think he can mark for you. Somehow I don't think
15 the Judges would like that too much. It is bad enough when either
16 Mr. Harmon or I testify, when I get too far astray here. Thank you.
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have that admitted as defendant's next
18 in order.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll do this just now. But just before we do
20 that, I don't whether you are able to help us, I see this map is very
21 scant on the legend.
22 Are you able to tell us what the dots on the perimeter of the
23 Srebrenica enclave marked with letters of the alphabet denote?
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I can.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: What do they denote?
1 THE WITNESS: They are the locations of United Nations outposts
2 that were along the perimeter. They had these observation posts. They
3 were identified alphabetically, and that is what dots depict.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
5 The map is admitted into evidence. May it please be given an
6 exhibit number.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, that will be Exhibit D111.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH:
9 Q. And with regard to the area that is contained within the -- the
10 purple outline, it's my understanding that area is approximately
11 60 square kilometres; correct?
12 A. I'll take your word for that. It sounds about right.
13 Q. I actually think I gleaned that from one of your testimonies, as
14 a matter of fact.
15 A. It's been a while, sir. But as I said, I think it sounds about
17 Q. Now, if we look at the left-hand side of the map, up where it
18 says Tuzla
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm sorry, if you could scroll down. Scroll
21 down, sorry -- I mean scroll up. Up, down. Okay, stop right there.
22 Q. If you see where it says BiH?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. And then it says Tuzla
25 A. Yes, sir, I believe that depicts the city environs of Tuzla
1 Q. Is where the city environs of Tuzla, is that also where the
2 airport was located?
3 A. I believe the airport is actually located outside and a little to
4 the south of the town.
5 Q. Okay.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm done with that exhibit.
7 Q. Would you agree with me that, on 16th of April, 1993, Srebrenica
8 was declared a demilitarised zone?
9 A. Yes, sir, I believe that's correct.
10 Q. Would you agree with me that it never became a demilitarised zone
11 and that there was a standing army within the Srebrenica enclave?
12 A. Yes, sir, I would agree.
13 Q. Would you agree with me that in 1995, at the time of the spring,
14 there were a number of different locations throughout the region,
15 specifically I'm referring to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska,
16 where an offensive was mounted by the Bosnian Muslim army?
17 A. Correct, sir.
18 Q. Would you agree with me that this time, this point in time, is
19 probably the most dramatic point in time where there is a breakdown
20 between the Bosnian government and UNPROFOR?
21 A. I don't know whether you would be correct or not. I didn't study
22 the relationship between the -- I assume when you're talking Bosnian,
23 Bosnian Muslim.
24 Q. Yes, thank you. I made a mistake I asked you not to make.
25 Precisely so. Bosnian Muslim.
1 A. I don't know the answer to that. That was not something that I
2 engaged in.
3 Q. Did you study at all in your analysis the concerns that the
4 Bosnian Muslim army had with regard to the difficulties that UNPROFOR was
5 creating for its successful winning of the war?
6 A. My -- my knowledge of that is, in large part, based on -- and I
7 think it's footnote 72 of my report, the 1999 United Nations report
8 dealing with Srebrenica, and particularly the eastern safe areas that
9 they published, and I believe in that particular report, there is a fair
10 amount of discussion on that particular issue.
11 Q. I take it you would also agree with me that the 28th Division of
12 the Bosnian Muslim army was -- had successfully been tying up a -- two
13 brigades of men from the Drina Corps after the spring offensive and prior
14 to July 1995?
15 A. I would expand it even more so. I would say that they were
16 successfully tying up at least two brigades of the Drina Corps from the
17 creation of the safe area in 1993 to that period.
18 Q. Okay.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would that be a convenient time?
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: That would be.
21 We'll take a break and come back at half past 12.00.
22 Court adjourned.
23 --- Recess taken at 12.02 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH:
2 Q. Following up from your last answer, would you agree that the
3 Bosnian Muslim army, in its condition having successfully tied up a
4 number of the Drina
5 who came from the same military doctrine that we have been discussing,
6 promulgated by the JNA from the same laws that we have been discussing in
7 the general sense, and obviously I think you've already told us were JNA
8 officers, as the VRS?
9 A. Well, sir, the manpower of that particular army, the officers
10 were, to the degree that they were former JNA officers, or trained by the
11 JNA, and the manpower, again, all did their mandatory conscripted service
12 within the JNA except for those, of course, the younger kids joining the
13 army who began their military service you know after the JNA had already
14 gone away. So to that degree, I think that's a fair statement.
15 Q. Okay. And, I mean, obviously because we're dealing with a
16 relatively unique situation that being of a civil war, in which a
17 standing army, that being the JNA, ultimately had a breakup in which
18 officers that had previously all been together went into separate armies
19 and oftentimes armies against each other, it makes sense, having come
20 from much of the same tradition, whether they be as we've just discussed,
21 Bosnian Muslims, or Bosnian Serbs, or Croatians, that they would follow
22 that which they had learned over many years as professional soldiers.
23 A. Certainly in the earlier years of the war. Gradually as they
24 learn their own lessons and develop perhaps unique tactics or unique
25 operational lessons from their own combat experience, they might differ.
1 But by and large everyone followed along the lines of the former JNA.
2 Q. As a matter of fact, I think that you even make such a comment in
3 what is at 2248 at paragraph 1. -- 1.4 where you indicate:
4 "However for a variety of reasons, few updated regulations were
5 published by the VRS during the war."
6 And your footnote is:
7 "Given the linkage of the between the Officer Cadre of the VRS
8 and the VJ, it is not surprising there was almost no migration away from
9 established JNA (and later) VJ military regulatory basis."
10 And then you have one notable exception was the publication of
11 the provisional regulations on service in the army of the Serbian
12 republic, issued on 18 August, 1992
13 A. Correct, sir, for the VRS, that is exactly right.
14 Q. What -- one final question with regard to something that you have
15 mentioned in your report, the same report, at P2248, and that's with
16 regard to -- you mention an organisation known as the 30th Personnel
18 Did you have occasion to study in your analysis the 30th
19 Personnel Centre?
20 A. Not the in-depth mechanics of the centre per se.
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. My knowledge of the centre reflects the fact that the former
23 professional officers of the JNA who were assigned to the VRS were still
24 administratively dealt with the by the VJ 30th Personnel Centre. That's
25 the degree that I am aware of it --
1 Q. Okay. And you can take it no further than that.
2 A. No, sir.
3 Q. Okay. I'm sorry. Helicopters.
4 Are you aware of the -- I'm going start with the findings that
5 were made in the Krstic Judgement, with regard to the issue of
6 helicopters. And by that I'm referring to paragraph 24 in which the
7 Trial Chamber heard credible and largely uncontested evidence of a
8 consistent refusal by the Bosnian Muslims to abide by the agreement to
9 demilitarise the safe area.
10 "The Bosnian Muslim helicopters flew in violation of the no-fly
11 zone. The ABiH opened fire towards Bosnian Serb lines and moved through
12 the safe area. The 28th Division was continually arming itself, and at
13 least some humanitarian aid coming into the enclave was appropriated by
14 the ABiH."
15 The reason I'm asking if you are familiar that, is you told us
16 that you had worked on the appeal of Krstic, and I take it that you may
17 have well read the judgement.
18 It goes on to say:
19 "To the Bosnian Serbs it appeared that Bosnian Muslim forces in
20 Srebrenica were using the 'safe area,'" which is in quotes, "as a
21 convenient base from which to launch offensives against the VRS and that
22 UNPROFOR was failing to take any action to prevent it. General Halilovic
23 admitted that Bosnian Muslim helicopters had flown in violation of the
24 no-fly zone, and he had personally dispatched eight helicopters with
25 ammunition for the 28th Division. In moral terms, he did not see it as a
1 violation of the safe area agreement, given that the Bosnian Muslims were
2 so poorly armed to begin with."
3 So --
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Harmon.
5 MR. HARMON: Just clarity on the question, Your Honour. Is the
6 question whether Mr. Butler is aware of that passage that Mr. Guy-Smith
7 has read from the Krstic Judgement? That the question?
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's the question.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: We're waiting for that question, all of us.
10 MR. HARMON: Thank you.
11 THE WITNESS: I've read the Judgement. I can't say that that
12 particular -- or at least parts of that come to mind. I am aware of
13 General Halilovic's comments.
14 Going perhaps back to the beginning where I base my knowledge of
15 that particular issue, and again, referring to footnote 72 of my revised
16 narrative, which is the United Nations report on Srebrenica, after our
17 exchange I wanted to be sure that I was in fact correct, and I would
18 refer the reader back to paragraph 222 of the United Nations report where
19 they in fact acknowledge their knowledge of these helicopter flights into
20 the eastern safe areas, and in May of 1995, the fact that one had been
21 shot down.
22 So that's where I'm basing as an initial point of departure, from
23 my knowledge. I'm also aware obviously of VRS documents which date their
24 knowledge of these helicopter flights occurring as well as their efforts
25 to interdict it.
1 MR. GUY-SMITH:
2 Q. In addition to that, are you aware of the testimony of
3 General Hadzihasanovic of the 6th of April, 2005, with regard to this
5 A. No, sir, I'm not.
6 Q. Okay. You've mentioned that your awareness of Halilovic's
7 testimony in this regard, although did you not rely upon it, as I
8 understand, are you aware of the fact that there was testimony also
9 received with regard to the specific issue, by that I'm just referring to
10 the issue of helicopter flights and the violation of the no-fly zone by
11 the Bosnian Muslim army from Mr. Radinovic?
12 A. I'm aware of -- I guess it was profess or Radinovic's testimony.
13 I don't know whether he specifically -- he was over a period of a number
14 of days too. I don't recall at this juncture whether or not he stated
15 that or not.
16 Q. Okay. Are you aware of the testimony of any members of UNPROFOR
17 or DutchBat with regard to that particular issue? Once again, the issue
18 of the flying of helicopters.
19 A. Again, I can't recall the testimony, whether that issue came up
20 or not.
21 Q. Okay. And finally, I'd like to show you a document -- or I
22 believe that we have agreement with regard to a document. And I'm
23 looking across the -- across the landscape to my colleague on the other
24 side, which is the document that had been previously discussed with
25 Mr. Williams, which is 1D01-1881.
1 You have a different number because you have a number from a
2 different case. But it's the same document. This is --
3 MR. HARMON: This is the document, the final analysis of the
4 Srebrenica and Zepa air lift [Overlapping speakers] ...
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: [Overlapping speakers]... that's correct. And
6 it's dated the 17th of February, 1996, and I believe there is an
7 agreement --
8 MR. SAXON: [Overlapping speakers] ... You were right. I agree
9 with Mr. Guy-Smith. We agreed that that this document should come into
10 evidence to clarify the matter of the helicopters.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
12 MR. HARMON: Thank you.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH:
14 Q. See, the helicopter discussion wasn't so bad after all.
15 MR. HARMON: I think we should give it an exhibit number.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Could we have an exhibit number on that, please.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes. That's admitted. May it please be given an
18 exhibit number, Mr. Registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit D112.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: And if I could have but one brief moment.
22 Q. Mr. Butler, I made you a promise at the beginning of my
23 examination of you, and I hope I kept my promise, and I haven't kept you
24 for too long. Thank you.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Harmon.
1 Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.
2 MR. HARMON: I have no questions, Your Honour. Thank you.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 Questioned by the Court:
6 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] I have one or two questions I
7 would like to put to you. I would like to clarify a few points in your
9 First of all, since you analysed all the military operations
10 around Srebrenica, in mid-July, did you see any documents stating that
11 there were VJ military in that area at that time?
12 A. No, ma'am.
13 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] That was my first question.
14 Furthermore, on looking at the map of this area, we see that the
16 the former republican -- Yugoslav republic. And the former Yugoslav
17 republic, in the north of the area.
18 So this is my question. On the other side of the river was there
19 the Serb army? Was the Serb army on the other side of the river? And
20 could they see what was happening close by?
21 A. It depends on what you mean by could they see what's happening.
22 As opposed to -- you know, did they have the means to know what was
23 happening? And the reason why I qualify that is, is obviously if you're
24 talking about sight lines across the Drina river, they're very limited.
25 But some of the activity, for example, in one particular instance one of
1 the survivors of an execution notes that the bus convoy that was taking
2 him from the Bratunac area to the area in Zvornik, actually at one point
3 crossed over one of the bridges into Serbian territory, drove up and then
4 re-crossed back over at Zvornik. There are other instances where
5 individuals who attempted to escape, actually swam or came across the
7 apprehended mostly by the local police forces there, and then those
8 forces in contact with the Republika Srpska military made arrangements to
9 turn them back over again to RS custody, with respect to Srebrenica.
10 So given the types of activity that was occurring, again
11 situation-dependant on which particular unit you're talking about and
12 where they are, you know, there were opportunities for them to know. If
13 you're limiting it to just mere sight line, it might be pretty difficult
14 in that respect.
15 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Thank you for your rather accurate
17 I have another question for you. This is something you discussed
18 in your report, and we have discussed it quite extensively. Personnel
19 from the Ministry of Interior, policemen. And this is not very clearly
20 explained in your report. I'm not quite sure whether these people
21 belonged to the military police or to the civilian police. I believe
22 that they -- the military police was present on the ground, and I believe
23 that the civilian police was also there, and what I'm talking about is
24 the Zvornik area.
25 Now, as far as the civilian police is concerned, in this
1 particular case, was it placed under the command or the order of the MUP,
2 or was it placed under the command of the military?
3 A. If we're talking about the police that are operating in the
4 Zvornik municipality from roughly the 15th and beyond, they remained
5 under the command of the head of the CSB, Mr. Vasic. However, they were
6 operating under the control of the army. They were actually sweeping
7 various areas of the battlefield, where they were engaged in either being
8 engaged against the column as well as securing some of the rear areas and
9 they were doing that under the control of the military commander,
10 Colonel Pandurevic.
11 When the RS police forces from, for example, the 2nd Sekovici
12 Detachment and the 1st P JP which moved from the road area on the morning
13 of the 15th and then moved to the Zvornik area as part of reinforcing
14 Colonel Pandurevic for his fight against the column, again, they still
15 remained under the command of Colonel Borovcanin. They operated under
16 the control of the Colonel Pandurevic, and that command relationship, as
17 it were, is codified under Republika Srpska law in the Ministry of the
18 Interior. And it notes that when these various police units are
19 operating in a military zone and operating in concert with the army, that
20 while the army commander has some ability -- while the police commander
21 remains in command of the unit, they operate under the direction of the
23 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] In your report, and this is
24 something I heard from Mr. Vasic, at one point in time he refused to
25 cooperate with the military when it came to mass executions, for
1 instance. That's what he says anyway.
2 A. Again, going back to the Republika Srpska Law on the Ministry of
3 the Interior, one of the aspects of that law is that before the police
4 forces fall under military control, that the minister of defence and the
5 minister of the interior jointly agree as to what the limits of those
6 tasks will be. And obviously both the army and the police commanders are
7 aware of what those limits are.
8 So as long as the military commanders are giving orders within
9 the limits of that defined resubordination, if you will, the police have
10 to follow them. If the military commander is giving orders outside the
11 limits of that prearranged agreement, then the police are not obligated
12 to follow them.
13 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
14 Now to follow up on this, I -- we also discussed Military
15 Tribunals, and we discussed the fact that the military, like
16 Colonel Pandurevic, could be court martialed because he had not obeyed
17 the orders.
18 I have another question in this regard. Was one single military,
19 who was prosecuted for the crimes that were committed in Srebrenica? And
20 when I say prosecuted, I mean prosecuted by the Military Tribunals in the
21 Republika Srpska.
22 A. Not to my knowledge, ma'am.
23 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] No one, according to what you
24 know, not a single one has been prosecuted?
25 A. No, ma'am.
1 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] I have one last question.
2 You discussed at length General Zivanovic's replacement by
3 General Krstic on the 13th of July. I don't know if you know about this,
4 because in your report you say that the reasons for his replacement were
5 not very clear.
6 Have you since had any documents that would shed some light on
7 the reasons for which he got replaced? And how important is it that he
8 got replaced?
9 A. There, at the time, particularly as these reports were drafted,
10 didn't know the answer to that. As the investigation has continued,
11 there were two general stories related to General Zivanovic being
12 replaced. One particular story is that he was replaced as a result of
13 his health reasons and, of course, General Zivanovic notes that when he
14 was interviewed by the ICTY. There's actually a very quick clip where
15 General Zivanovic is talking about his blood pressure being something
16 over like over 200 over 300 at this point.
17 So, I mean, his story is in fact that, you know, he ultimately
18 was relieved and retired as a result of his health.
19 There is another story floating around obviously, and again
20 difficult to corroborate, that he was identified using military resources
21 from the Drina Corps and from the 5th Engineers for his own personal
22 gain, and -- respect the construction of a chicken farm in some location.
23 General Mladic was very strict about those particular types of
24 issues. And the other story going around is that General Zivanovic was
25 in fact, you know, replaced because of his use of that, those military
1 resources for non-military issues.
2 I don't know that it -- that's particularly important to the
3 larger Srebrenica crime base, where it was important for us is because as
4 a component of General Krstic's proceedings, he hotly contested when he
5 assumed command of the Drina Corps.
6 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. It was very
7 clear in the trial against General Krstic. It was important to know, of
8 course, when he had actually assumed the command of the army. But in
9 this case, this might be somewhat less important.
10 That was my last question. Thank you very much.
11 A. Yes, ma'am.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: I wasn't going to ask any questions, but I just
13 want it ask -- get an answer to part of Judge Picard's questions that she
14 put to you and part of which was not answered.
15 At page 68, lines 11 to 12, she asked you whether -- I beg your
17 Lines 15 to 16. Line 16 specifically: Was there Serb army on
18 the other side of the river?
19 A. I can't specifically tell you where the VJ military units were
20 located along the Drina
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: But were they located along the Drina river at
23 A. I don't know -- again, I'm not familiar with the dispositions of
24 where those units would have been in July of 1995.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
1 Any questions Mr. Harmon?
2 MR. HARMON: Yes, I do, thank you.
3 Re-examination by Mr. Harmon:
4 Q. Judge Picard as you some questions, Mr. Butler, about could the
5 army see what was happening from the territory it occupied? In other
6 words, in the FRY, was there a direct line of sight to events that were
7 occurring in the Republika Srpska?
8 Let me take you to the map, P2400, Mr. Butler, and ask you --
9 first of all, there is an red dot near Kozluk contiguous with the river,
10 the Drina
11 of that dot is on the river.
12 Have you been to the Kozluk site, or do you know about where it
13 was located in respect of the Drina
14 A. Yes, I know where it is it located in respect of the Drina
15 Q. Where was the mass execution side?
16 A. It was actually right on the river-bank area.
17 Q. Okay. And on the river-bank area in the RS; correct?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And the other side was the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
21 A. Correct, sir.
22 Q. Okay. Now, in respect of -- you mentioned in your evidence that
23 some people fled the enclave and swam across the Drina river. They were
24 captured by what units, to your knowledge?
25 A. I don't know which units captured them per se. I know that where
1 the investigation gains visibility of them is that they are turned over
2 to the Serbian police who then coordinate with the VRS units on the other
3 side of the border to turn these people back over to the VRS custody.
4 Q. And were in fact people -- some of the people who went across the
5 river turned back over to the RS?
6 A. Yes, they were, sir.
7 Q. Do you know what -- do you know their fate?
8 A. I believe all of them were killed.
9 Q. Were some people who went across the river and were detained by
10 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia police in whatever formation, did they
12 A. For Srebrenica, the individuals for Srebrenica, I don't -- at the
13 state of my knowledge when I left, I don't believe so. For Zepa, I am
14 aware that those that crossed over the river did survive. So I can't say
15 whether or not the investigation has found any -- you know, in the recent
16 years has found any individuals from Srebrenica who made it across the
17 river who were then returned back to their custody and survived. I just
18 don't know the answer to that.
19 Q. So the answer to the question is you don't know the answer to
21 A. Yes, sir. I mean, I know what my state of knowledge is. I don't
22 know --
23 Q. All right.
24 MR. HARMON: I have no additional questions. Thank you.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Harmon.
1 Mr. Guy-Smith?
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. First of all, just a quick transcript
3 correction which would be on page 68, line 10, I believe that,
4 Mr. Butler's answer was, No, ma'am. And at the balance of that line is
5 to Judge Picard's question. So just to make sure that is taken care of.
6 Further cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:
7 Q. Do you know with regard to those people who went into FRY, when
8 they were stopped by the police, which police they were stopped by? Were
9 they stopped by the customs police? Were they stopped by the local
10 police? Do you know that?
11 A. No, sir, I don't.
12 Q. Okay. Do you know what the relationship those police had with
13 any part of the government, as to whether or not they were under the
14 auspices under the Ministry of Interior; were they under the auspices of
15 some other organisation, Ministry of Defence? Do you have any
16 information whatsoever --
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, if he doesn't know which police
18 they are, how would he know which department they fell under?
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Fine. Thank you.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH:
22 Q. With regard to the statement that you made, you told us that
23 there were people who crossed over the river who were, as I understand
24 it, not returned to the Republika Srpska.
25 A. Yes, sir. Related to those individuals fleeing from the Zepa
2 Q. Okay.
3 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you tell us the fate of those people from the
5 Zepa enclave?
6 THE WITNESS: It is my understanding that those individuals who
7 crossed the Drina
8 -- first of all, the RS wanted them back, that the Serbian government
9 refused and put them under the protection of the ICRC elements that were
10 in Serbia
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Judge Picard has one more question to ask. I'm
12 sorry, gentlemen.
13 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] It's to follow up on these
15 Were there people who crossed the river who managed to flee and
16 who were not arrested afterwards by the Serbian police or army?
17 THE WITNESS: I am not aware of any individual who came out of
18 that Srebrenica process who crossed the Drina river, managed to either
19 transit through Serbia
20 approached the Office of the Prosecutor and made that known.
21 So I'm not aware of anyone who fits that criteria, ma'am.
22 JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
24 MR. GUY-SMITH:
25 Q. Only with regard to the last question asked by Her Honour,
1 which is, I don't recall you mentioning any arrest by the Serbian army.
2 Now, you previously mentioned the Serbian police. The question has
3 become somewhat different from where we were initially.
4 Is it your understanding that the arrests that were made were
5 made by the local police?
6 A. My understanding is I don't know who made the arrests or that
7 initial detention. Where we gained visibility on them, from my
8 perspective, is that when they're in the custody of the local police
9 elements and that those police elements are contacting the military
10 counterparts in the VRS, primarily the Zvornik and the Bratunac Brigade,
11 identifying that they have individuals and that they want the VRS to take
12 custody of those individuals.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
15 MR. HARMON: [Microphone not activated] -- I just want to ask -- I
16 want to see if I can refresh Mr. Butler's recollection on something; it
17 may or may not refresh his recollection.
18 Further re-examination by Mr. Harmon:
19 Q. Mr. Butler, In reviewing intercepts, did you review any
20 intercepts where the Republika Srpska army demanded the return of -- to
21 use the -- I think I will be using, the terms of the intercept, Give me
22 back my Turks.
23 Do you recall an intercept like that? And could you tell us,
24 first of all, if you recall that intercept and what you know about that
25 intercept and its consequences?
1 A. Yes, sir, I do recall the intercept.
2 The intercept is a conversation with -- and Colonel Beara is one
3 of the correspondents. If I'm not mistaken, General Krstic is another
4 one of the correspondents. And they are discussing the fact that they're
5 aware that hundreds of Muslims from the -- you know, former Zepa enclave
6 had been crossing the Drina
7 further aware that the Serbs would not turn those individuals back over
8 to the custody of the Republika Srpska and, of course, the army personnel
9 were not happy with that development.
10 Q. So that leads me to my next question because I want to just
11 clarify this point.
12 You say in your answer that they were aware that these people
13 were in Serbia
14 over these individuals, you know, back to the custody of the authorities
15 of the army of the RS.
16 Which brings me to my question. Did the Serbian authorities in
17 that context of that intercept, to your knowledge, turn over the people
18 referred to in the intercept you've described? In other words was Beara,
19 was Krstic successful in getting from the authorities in Serbia
20 number of people they had in their custody?
21 A. With respect to Zepa, I believe the answer is no, sir.
22 Q. Okay.
23 MR. HARMON: I have no additional questions, Your Honour.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: I do not intend on playing ping-pong. I have no
25 further questions.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: No, I don't intend on doing that. I don't have
3 any further questions. And I do have one housekeeping matter that has
4 been brought to my attention by the Registrar. It does not relate to
5 Mr. Butler. So I'm be happy to take of it. Absolutely.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much, Mr. Guy-Smith.
9 Mr. Butler, thank you so much for coming. We know are you a busy
10 person, taking time off to come and testify. This brings us to the end
11 of your testimony. Are you now excused. You may stand down. Please
12 travel well back home.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, sir.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
15 [The witness withdrew]
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before I turn to you, Mr. Harmon, let's hear the
17 housekeeping matter from Mr. Guy-Smith.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, I have been informed most kindly by the
19 Registrar that I misspoke myself. And I called up the wrong 65 ter
20 number at page 43, line 4. Defence exhibit 108 should be properly 65 ter
21 number 6590, and I think what I did is I transposed the 9 and the 5. SO
22 the proper number is 6590.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's how we got it.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excellent.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: You misspoke earlier. You said 6950 and corrected
1 yourself later.
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Thank you very much.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
4 Mr. Harmon, next witness.
5 MR. HARMON: We have no additional witnesses for this week,
6 Your Honour, for the remainder of the day, which I understood --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Oh, yeah. To what date do we postpone?
8 MR. HARMON: Just a moment, Your Honour.
9 [Prosecution counsel confer]
10 MR. HARMON: I'm informed there are no witnesses for next week,
11 Your Honour, and I can give you the schedule through the Court legal
12 officer. I don't have it at my disposal, at my fingertips right now.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated] -- actually the 8th is a
14 public holiday. Is it further postponed to -- no, no, it is not. Shall
15 we postpone to the 8th then?
16 MR. HARMON: Yes.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: The matter stands adjourned until the 8th of June,
18 quarter past 2.00, Courtroom I.
19 Court adjourned.
20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.15 p.m.
21 to be reconvened on Monday, the 8th of June, 2009,
22 at 2.15 p.m.