Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 9077

 1                           Monday, 28 September 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 8.58 a.m.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good morning to everyone in and around the

 6     courtroom.  Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 8     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-81-T,

 9     the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.  Could we have the appearances

11     for the day, starting with the Prosecution, please.

12             MR. SAXON:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Dan Saxon, April Carter,

13     and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Saxon.  And for the

15     Defence.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Daniela Tasic,

17     Chad Mair, Novak Lukic, and Gregor Guy-Smith appearing on behalf of

18     Mr. Perisic.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.

20             Mr. Saxon.

21             MR. SAXON:  Your Honour, Ms. Carter will call the next witness.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

23             MS. CARTER:  The Prosecution calls Colonel Pyers Tucker.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Pyers Tucker.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  There may be some discussion with regard to

Page 9078

 1     Colonel Pyers Tucker's testimony.  I believe that Ms. Carter believes

 2     this is more appropriately a discussion which is had outside of his

 3     presence.  I, quite frankly, have no opinion in that regard, but I want

 4     to raise the issue because she raised it with me informally.  This deals

 5     with the contours and extent of his testimony.

 6             It's my understanding that it is the Prosecution's intent to have

 7     Pyers Tucker testify with regard to matters that are pre-indictment and

 8     not with regard to matters that deal with the indictment period.  And

 9     therefore, we would object on those grounds because of the issue of

10     relevance.

11             But above and beyond that, there's also a question as to what

12     subject matters the Prosecution intends on having Mr. Tucker testify with

13     regard to.  And in that regard, if one were to review the 65 ter summary

14     as it relates to Pyers Tucker, it is my understanding that his testimony

15     would be discrete and limited to those matters concerning Sarajevo.

16             The reason I take that position is because the Prosecution

17     indicates that, among other things - and I'm just going to get to the

18     guts of what the Prosecution says with regard to his 65 ter witness

19     summary.

20             "He met Galic at least once and was involved in a number of

21     instances where protests were lodged inter alia because of the shelling

22     and sniping of civilians."

23             That of course would deal with Sarajevo.

24             "His testimony will be particularly relevant as to command and

25     control and notice.  The witness worked as the assistant to

Page 9079

 1     General Morillon.  The witness will provide pre-indictment background as

 2     to the situation in Sarajevo.  The witness attended meetings with the

 3     military leadership of both warring factions including General Mladic."

 4             "He will discuss the assassination of BiH deputy

 5     prime minister Trialik [phoen] by a Bosnian Serb soldier in the presence

 6     of UNPROFOR officials."

 7             And we know from testimony that we have already heard, that

 8     occurred in the Sarajevo region.

 9             "Paragraphs of the indictment to which his testimony pertains.

10     Paragraphs of the indictment is 41 and background to the situation in

11     Sarajevo when Tucker took over and when he left."

12             And if we review paragraph 41 of the indictment it states:

13             "In this time-period, the commanders of the

14     Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the VRS, General Stanislav Galic (10 September

15     1992 to 10 August 1994) and General Dragomir Milosevic (10 August 1994 to

16     November 1995) and their superior General Ratko Mladic, continued in

17     extensive shelling and sniping attack on Sarajevo, mostly from positions

18     in the hills surrounding the city."

19             And that is the extent of the allegation as it relates to

20     paragraph 41.  And I believe that the testimony that is to be adduced

21     from this witness is specific in nature and relates to only Sarajevo.

22     The reason I raise this concern is because the proofing note that I have

23     received in large measure deals with the subject matter other than

24     Sarajevo; it deals with Srebrenica.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith, I'm not quite sure what this whole

Page 9080

 1     speech is, is it an objection?  Are you raising --

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes, it is.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I don't know what you are objecting to.  Can I

 4     suggest that as the situation arises, you stand up and object.  I really

 5     don't know what to --

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure, I was just trying to --

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I don't know what to ask Madam Carter to say.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I was trying to be some assistance to the Chamber

 9     because this issue is going to come up, and I wanted to give you some

10     information concerning the parameters and contours of what the concern

11     would be.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I appreciate that, Mr. Guy-Smith.  Unfortunately

13     it's just too much information for us to digest for purposes of an

14     objection.  Can I suggest that you raise your objection as and when the

15     objection arises.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure, not a problem.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.  Madam Carter.

18             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, not to be disrespectful to -- from

19     Your Honours most recent ruling, I do understand what Mr. Guy-Smith is

20     indicating, he is reciting the 65 ter summary that was submitted during

21     the pre-trial brief stage of this case in which we had limited the

22     65 ter summary solely to Sarajevo.  However, there was a motion on

23     1 May 2008, which was decided by this Court on 4 June 2008 which expanded

24     the 65 ter summary of Pyers Tucker to include Srebrenica.

25             I can recite the 65 ter summary in full, but I would guide

Page 9081

 1     Mr. Guy-Smith as well as the Court to the full summary that is dated

 2     1 May 2008.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, ma'am.  May I suggest also that you give that

 4     answer to Mr. Guy-Smith as and when he stands up to object.

 5             MS. CARTER:  Certainly, Your Honour.  And when Mr. Guy-Smith

 6     began his objection, he was also speaking to the pre-indictment evidence

 7     that will be given by this witness.  I had suggested that we deal with

 8     this before the witness comes in because the way I intend to respond to

 9     that objection would be inappropriate in front of this witness.  And

10     given the fact that the witness's entire testimony does relate to

11     pre-indictment period, I believe that it would be appropriate to respond

12     to that at this time.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Proceed, ma'am.

14             MS. CARTER:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Colonel Tucker will testify

15     to the 1992 to 1993 siege of Sarajevo and ethnic cleansing of Bosnia's

16     eastern municipalities by the Bosnian Serb army.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry.  Excuse me.  May I interrupt.

18             MS. CARTER:  Yes, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Are you responding to the objection?

20             MS. CARTER:  I am, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  On the pre-indictment area?

22             MS. CARTER:  Yes, Your Honour.  Following worldwide condemnation

23     of these actions, the United Nations passed numerous resolutions.

24     Perisic was on notice of these crimes yet he continued --

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's request:  Could you please read

Page 9082

 1     slowly.

 2             MS. CARTER:  Certainly.  Following worldwide condemnation of

 3     these actions, the United Nations passed numerous resolutions.  Perisic

 4     was on notice of these crimes, yet he continued Serbia's assistance to

 5     the VRS once appointed Chief of the General Staff of the VJ in

 6     August 1993.  This continued assistance led to the continued campaign of

 7     shelling and sniping in Sarajevo and the ultimate massacre at Srebrenica

 8     in July 1995.

 9             Your Honours, I would argue that pre-indictment evidence may be

10     admitted to establish pattern, a specific element of a crime, or to

11     provide context.  Admissibility turns on the finding that the evidence

12     has probative value to the indictment period.

13             Historically, this Chamber has admitted pre-indictment evidence

14     of notice and pattern.  This evidence has been admitted through

15     adjudicated facts, witness testimony, and exhibits.  And admitted

16     adjudicated facts concerning Sarajevo, the Trial Chamber found that

17     evidence which established a consistent pattern of conduct proceeding the

18     indictment might be relevant to prove Perisic's mens rea.

19             Later, the Trial Chamber has accepted the testimonies of

20     General John Wilson and Aernout Van Lynden related to the 1993 and 1992

21     as evidence of notice.

22             Most recently, the Trial Chamber admitted as evidence the notice

23     of the reports of the Special Rapporteur of the commission on human

24     rights spanning 27 October 1992 to 22 August 1995.  As the arguments

25     related to the relevance of Sarajevo have been previously set out, I will

Page 9083

 1     focus the remainder of my argument on Srebrenica.

 2             As detailed in the Prosecution's pre-trial brief, the prior

 3     ethnic cleansing was antecedent to the 1995 massacre charged in counts

 4     9 to 13 of the indictment.  The fate of Srebrenica was sealed upon the

 5     establishment of the strategic objectives to be carried out by the VRS,

 6     which included the separation of the Serbs from the non-Serbs and the

 7     elimination of the border between Serbia and Republika Srpska.  Cleansing

 8     operations began which were to be realisations of these objectives.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down for the interpreters.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter, the interpreters are complain that

11     you are reading too fast.

12             MS. CARTER:  Yes, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm not quite sure how reading that whole passage

14     that you are reading is in response to the objection.  Aren't you able

15     just to tell us that you know according to that document of which the

16     Defence has notice, if they do, that in fact you are supposed to cover

17     the pre-indictment period.

18             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, my understanding of the Mr. Guy-Smith's

19     objection is twofold.  One that the 65 ter summary bound us only to

20     Sarajevo, and two, that the evidence in full was irrelevant because it

21     dealt with pre-indictment information.  I responded first to the

22     objection in regards to the 65 ter summary, and now I'm dealing with the

23     relevance of pre-indictment information.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That was my understanding of what she was

25     responding to, Your Honour.

Page 9084

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  You may proceed then, if you understand

 2     each other.

 3             MS. CARTER:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Cleansing operations began

 4     which we were to be realisations of these objectives.  By

 5     19 November 1992, Directive 4 was issued stating the enemy groups in the

 6     wider area of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica, and Cerska have not been

 7     totally routed, and the decision was made to cleanse the territory of

 8     Republika Srpska.  The Drina Corps was tasked with forcing the Muslim

 9     population to leave Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde.  Further, paragraph 55 of

10     the indictment states that 1993 saw the International Court of Justice

11     and the United Nations issuing orders and resolutions condemning these

12     cleansing operations and calling for an end of hostilities.

13             By 8 April 1993, the International Court of Justice ordered the

14     FRY to take all immediate measures in its power to prevent genocide.  The

15     UN reaffirmed this order and noted that the actions in Eastern Bosnia

16     involved unlawful attacks on civilians and called for the FRY to

17     immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment, and services to

18     the VRS.

19             While serving as the military assistant to the commander of the

20     United Nations protective force from October 1992 to March 1993,

21     Colonel Tucker met with the Serbian and Bosnian Serb leadership and

22     witnessed the ethnic cleansing of the eastern municipalities.  This

23     cleansing operation was accomplished with the act of support of the FRY

24     including artillery fire from Serbia, air support, restriction of

25     UNPROFOR's movement, and the provision of salaries for VRS.

Page 9085

 1             Colonel Tucker is uniquely placed to describe the cleansing --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Please slow down.

 3             MS. CARTER:  -- the cleansing campaign both as an observer as

 4     well as a person in contemporaneous contact with the principal actors.

 5     The witness met with Radovan Karadzic --

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Slow down, slow down.

 7             MS. CARTER:  -- and Ratko Mladic in November 1992.  At that

 8     meeting, Karadzic explained to him in graphic detail the plans in store

 9     for the Muslim population.  Taking a census map, Karadzic explained that

10     all territories which were 50 per cent or more Serbian populated would be

11     cleansed, stating that they had no desire to live with the Turks.  This

12     operation began in the spring of 1992.

13             In March 1993, Colonel Tucker met with Colonel Vinko Pandurevic

14     future 30th Personnel Centre member.  Colonel Pandurevic had maps on his

15     wall that detailed a systematic cleansing of the eastern municipalities

16     including dates and lines depicting how far the advance had progressed.

17     Later as commander of the Zvornik Brigade, Colonel Pandurevic was one of

18     the commanders responsible for the July 1995 massacre.

19             Colonel Tucker met with several additional commanders who would

20     eventually be members of the 30th Personnel Centre as detailed in

21     Schedule E of the indictment.  Colonel Tucker met with

22     General Ratko Mladic, Major-Generals Zdravko Tolimir and

23     Lieutenant-Colonel-General Milan Gvero.  These men would also later be

24     principals in the 1995 massacre.

25             As Colonel Tucker's evidence is relevant and probative to the

Page 9086

 1     issues of notice, foreseeability, and pattern related to Sarajevo and

 2     Srebrenica, it is admissible and thus we would be requested to lead this

 3     evidence.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You may respond, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.  First of all, starting with the last

 6     comment made on lines 22 through 25 on page 8 and line 1 of page 9, there

 7     is no evidence presented of that in this case, and there is no proof of

 8     that in any case as of yet.

 9             I'd like to start with the very beginning of what Ms. Carter said

10     with regard to Mr. Perisic being on notice, and specifically she said on

11     page 5 at line 12:

12             "Perisic was on notice of these crimes, yet he continued Serbia's

13     assistance to the VRS once appointed Chief of General Staff of the VJ in

14     August 1993."

15             That may well be the theory of the Prosecution, but there is no

16     evidence of that.  There have been a number of occasions in which the

17     issue of nexus between the knowledge of Mr. Perisic and the act that was

18     being complained of or was attempted to be proved has been put into

19     question, specifically with regards to such issues as the issue of

20     foreseeability.  And this Chamber has previously ruled that where there

21     is no nexus, that such evidence is inappropriate and inadmissible.

22             I understand the Prosecution's theory here, but with regard to

23     the factual predicates upon which they presently rely, there are a number

24     of glaring holes and failures of proof.  And above and beyond that, once

25     again there has been no showing of a nexus between those events that

Page 9087

 1     occurred prior to General Perisic's obtaining the position of

 2     Chief of Staff and his knowledge of them.

 3             And in the absence of that, what the Chamber is being asked to do

 4     is hear evidence which is highly speculative with regard to what Perisic

 5     knew, what Perisic was aware of and the absence of any hard evidence, and

 6     the absence of any proof.  And unless the Prosecution is in a position to

 7     make an offer of proof whereby they can establish such a link, I would

 8     submit, as I did at the outset, that this evidence is irrelevant to the

 9     charges here.  Maybe in some other trial they may not be.  But to this

10     case, they are.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Objection overruled.

13             Madam Carter.

14             MS. CARTER:  At this time the Prosecution calls

15     Colonel Pyers Tucker.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  While we are waiting for Mr. Tucker, is there a

17     possibility of reducing the temperature in the courtroom?

18                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  While we are waiting, with regard to the response

20     made by Ms. Carter concerning the 65 ter, I do stand corrected, I

21     withdraw the objection.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We have ruled on the objection, Mr. Guy-Smith.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I appreciate --

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated]

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I was referring to the second part of that which

Page 9088

 1     you said that when the issue came up in the event that I felt it

 2     necessary to object when the specific issue came up, so I'm taking care

 3     of that to expedite proceedings and also to acknowledge what my opponent

 4     said.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 6                           [The witness entered court]

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Morning, sir.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Morning.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We're sorry we took time to call you, dealing with

10     some other administrative matters.  May you please make the declaration.

11             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

12     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Tucker.  You may be

14     seated.

15             Yes, Madam Carter.

16             Ms. CARTER:  May it please the Court.

17                           WITNESS:  PYERS TUCKER

18                           Examination by Ms. Carter:

19        Q.   Colonel Tucker, can you please introduce yourself to the Court.

20        A.   My name is Pyers Tucker.  I was a British Army officer from 1976

21     through to 1997 when I left the British Army.  During the time 1992 to

22     1993, I served as a United Nations officer on secondment from the

23     British Army in Bosnia as part of United Nations BH command.  During that

24     time, I was the personal staff officer of General Morillon.  And as such,

25     my main responsibility was to arrange for meetings between

Page 9089

 1     General Morillon and the various warring factions in Bosnia in order to

 2     try and execute the mission which the general, General Morillon, was

 3     obligated with from Security Council.  During that time, I took the

 4     minutes of many meetings, and I drafted reports for General Morillon

 5     which were then sent from Bosnia, from Sarajevo headquarters, to the UN

 6     headquarters in Zagreb --

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, at this point I would interject.  He

 8     was asked to introduce himself.  He now is engaged in talking about his

 9     day-to-day work.  The narrative form of his answer is inappropriate.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

11             MS. CARTER:  Certainly.

12        Q.   Sir, I'd like to begin at the inception of your career.  Can you

13     please describe what was your professional background and training in the

14     British military?

15        A.   In the British Army, I was in the artillery.  And my training was

16     the same training as all officers receive in the British Army but then in

17     particular I received training in artillery matters as an artillery

18     officer.

19        Q.   How did you become a member of UNPROFOR?

20        A.   The headquarters where I was serving in Germany was part of NATO,

21     and it was based in Moenchengladbach and that headquarters was appointed

22     to form the corps of the headquarters of the newly-formed United Nations

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina command.  And as an officer of the headquarters, I was

24     sent to the former Yugoslavia.

25        Q.   Why was the Bosnia-Herzegovina command established?

Page 9090

 1        A.   In July/August 1992, UNHCR identified that if nothing was done it

 2     was believed that over the winter of 1992 to 1993, I forget the exact

 3     figures, but it was something like 1.2 million people were at risk of

 4     dying from starvation unless something was done.  And as a result of

 5     that, about ten countries agreed in August 1992 to form this

 6     United Nations Bosnia-Herzegovina command and contributed a total of at

 7     that time about 7.000 soldiers in order to be deployed into Bosnia in

 8     order to facilitate UN Security Council resolution whose objective was

 9     the facilitation of the supply of humanitarian aid to those in need.

10             I can't remember exactly details, but that was the essence of it.

11        Q.   The supply of humanitarian aid to those in need, was that your

12     sole mandate as members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina command?

13        A.   That was the sole mandate.

14        Q.   Okay.  You were describing before your specific duties and

15     responsibilities, and you indicated that you often attended meetings.

16     Can you please tell the Court how many meetings did you have during your

17     time in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

18        A.   I was in Bosnia-Herzegovina for just under six months.  And in

19     that that time I took the minutes of about 190 meetings; in other words,

20     just over a meeting a day.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If I may just interrupt, Madam Carter, just to

22     understand your previous question.  When you say, That was your sole

23     mandate, was that the sole mandate of UNPROFOR or was that the sole

24     mandate of some other ...

25             THE WITNESS:  That was -- I cannot recall what the mandate of

Page 9091

 1     UNPROFOR as a whole was, but the mandate of BH command in Bosnia was the

 2     delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  BH command in Bosnia, BH command of what army or

 4     whose ...

 5             THE WITNESS:  The BH command in Bosnia was the force deployed in

 6     Bosnia of which General Morillon was the commander.  General Morillon was

 7     reported to, was subordinate to General Nambiar who was the commander of

 8     UNPROFOR which was based in Zagreb.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

10             MS. CARTER:

11        Q.   The meetings that you were setting up, who were they with?

12        A.   The meetings were primarily with the warring factions.  In other

13     words, it was with the Bosnian Muslims, in other words, the Presidency,

14     and their representatives inside Sarajevo and in other areas outside.  It

15     was with the Bosnian Serbs both military and political parlay and areas

16     around Sarajevo and occasionally also with the Bosnian Croats.

17             That was the vast majority of the meetings, though there were

18     also meetings outside of Bosnia in Croatia and in Serbia, as in Belgrade.

19        Q.   When you were meeting in Belgrade, who were you meeting with?

20        A.   We met in Belgrade once with a group of Serb army officers in the

21     Serb army headquarters in Belgrade.  And we later met with Milosevic and

22     a group of people at Milosevic's palace.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could have a time-frame for the meetings

24     you are referring to, since there are so many of them it might be of

25     assistance, times of these meetings.

Page 9092

 1             MS. CARTER:  Certainly.

 2        Q.   Narrowing to your meetings in Belgrade, can you tell me when you

 3     met with these individuals?

 4        A.   The first meeting with a group of senior Serb army officers was

 5     around January 1993, and the meeting with Milosevic was around

 6     25 or 26 March 1993.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Backing up a bit, you indicated that you also met with

 8     Bosnian Serb leadership, both political and military.  Can you please

 9     tell us who you were meeting with?

10        A.   The -- the only name who I have from the meeting in January was

11     General Panic, and there were a group of about six or seven colonels and

12     other colonels and generals in the meeting as well.

13        Q.   I'm sorry, we may have -- misunderstanding each other.  When you

14     indicated you met with General Panic, are you indicating that he was a

15     Bosnian Serb officer?

16        A.   No, no.  Sorry, I understood your question to be about Serb

17     officers.

18        Q.   And initially it was, but then I actually moved on to

19     Bosnian Serb officers.  My apologies.

20             Okay, moving to Bosnian Serb military and political figures that

21     you met, who did you meet with?

22        A.   We met with most of the senior Bosnian Serb officers starting

23     with General Mladic, General Milovanovic, General Galic, General Gvero,

24     and another 15 or 20 various generals and colonels.  I would have to look

25     at my minutes if you wanted me to find the names of all of them.

Page 9093

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Any of the political leadership?

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes, met with Karadzic, met with Madam Plavsic, met

 3     with - who is the guy who committed suicide? - Professor Koljevic.  And

 4     then in various towns and villages met with local political leaders.

 5     Also met with -- with the president of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and

 6     the -- again, I would need to look in my notes to recall the names of all

 7     of them.

 8             MS. CARTER:

 9        Q.   Sir, when did you first meet Karadzic?

10        A.   I first met Karadzic in October 1992 just before he went to

11     Geneva.  He was in Geneva at the end of October 1992.

12        Q.   When did he return from Geneva?

13        A.   I can't remember exactly, but it would have been a couple of

14     weeks later, because we met him again in Pale in November.

15        Q.   In the meeting in Pale, what did you discuss?

16        A.   We had a number of meetings with Karadzic over those weeks, and

17     one of the first meetings in Pale where -- this was the first time that

18     we, the new UN BH command, were meeting with Karadzic, General Mladic,

19     with Koljevic, and a number of other -- I think Gvero was there as well.

20     And Karadzic and General Mladic were at pains to try and explain

21     historical background as they saw it, and one of the things that they did

22     was get out a map which showed the ethnic distribution of Bosnia

23     according to a recently completed census.

24             And what they explained to General Morillon was that they had no

25     intention to seize land which did not belong to them.  And that they

Page 9094

 1     identified land that belonged to them as being land where more than

 2     50 per cent of the population was Bosnian Serb.  And that they did not

 3     want to live with -- together with the Bosnian Muslims.  They had

 4     suffered enough whenever they were governed by other people.  They wanted

 5     to live their own lives, separate from the Bosnian Muslims and --

 6        Q.   Sir, let me stop you there.

 7             MS. CARTER:  And if I can call up 65 ter 9233.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, right before we go into this, I would

10     at this time, based upon the proofing note that we've received, request a

11     full copy of Colonel Tucker's personal diary which is not in your

12     possession.  I understand it's in his possession.  We have some extracts

13     of it, but there's obviously information in his personal diary that we do

14     not have.  And considering some of the subject matter that's just been

15     raised, it would be appropriate for the Defence to have the entire diary

16     so that we can review it for purposes of cross-examination.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

18             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, the diary as was stated by

19     Mr. Guy-Smith is not in our possession.  However, it is in the possession

20     of Colonel Tucker.  I would not believe it would be the Prosecution's

21     call as to whether that should be provided to the Defence.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, I'm requesting the diary in all fairness at

23     this time so that we have the -- a basis upon which we can make a

24     determination with regard to those historical facts that Colonel Tucker

25     is alluding to.

Page 9095

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I am sorry --

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Perhaps I would ask Colonel Tucker if he would be

 3     willing to provide the Prosecution so a copy could be made of as a matter

 4     of courtesy.  And if he doesn't feel that's appropriate, then we can move

 5     from that position.  But that's where I'd start.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm not quite sure what this diary is all about.

 7     We've asked for 65 ter 9233 to come up.  Does this diary have anything to

 8     do with the 65 ter 9233?

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  This diary may well have something to do with --

10     no, to do with 9233, it does not.  It has to do with some of the

11     testimony that he just gave.  With regard to 65 ter 9233, I don't know

12     whether that's on our list, but I'm not -- that's a different issue.  So

13     before the witness examines that document, perhaps we could have a

14     discussion about that.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Well, let me find out, so you are just making a

16     request to Mr. Tucker to avail you his -- a copy of his diary?

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That's correct, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  You can sort that with Mr. Tucker.  It

19     doesn't call for a ruling from the Bench.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  But the difficulty is I'm not in a position to be

21     able to talk to Mr. Tucker.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You can do so when you start your

23     cross-examination.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  But I'm -- if that's the case, then I will be

25     asking the Court for an adjournment because I don't have his diary and I

Page 9096

 1     won't be in a position to review his diary before the cross-examination.

 2     And I'd rather not truncate the examination, so I'm trying to figure out

 3     a way of expediting the matter, which is why I'm raising it now.  I'm

 4     trying to be more efficient, not less, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I understand.  But the trouble is that the Bench

 6     doesn't know anything about this diary.  This topic of a diary just pops

 7     up; I don't know where it comes from.  And is it part of the pleadings?

 8     Has it ever been mentioned in the documents that have been --

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  It's been mentioned in his testimony when he said

10     he was referring to his, I believe he calls them his notes.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Now you are asking for his diary.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I would have to take a look at my minutes.

13     Perhaps it would be, I believe the word "diary" and "minutes" are

14     interchangeable.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I do not think so.  I think minutes are minutes

16     and a diary is a diary.  A diary notes your appointments and minutes are

17     a record of what takes place in a meeting.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I have a different understanding of the language

19     there than you do, but that's okay.  I'm asking for in whatever form he

20     has memorialised information concerning his impressions of meetings that

21     he had with the individuals that he has mentioned thus far in his

22     testimony, number one.

23             Number two, I'm requesting memorialisation in whatever form it

24     is, whether it be in minutes, a diary, a notebook, or any other

25     information above and beyond those individuals that he has specifically

Page 9097

 1     referred to for the period of time that he was the assistant to

 2     General Morillon and acting in that capacity he was a scrivener.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  He was a?

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Scrivener, one who takes notes.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Madam Carter, it looks like the request is

 6     slightly different.  I don't know whether you have any response to that.

 7     At least I understand it differently from a diary, the request for a

 8     diary.

 9             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, I believe that Mr. Guy-Smith took that

10     word because that is how I put it in the proofing note.  What is in the

11     possession of Colonel Tucker that he reviewed during our proofing section

12     is a hard-back book that did take all of the notes of meetings.  And so I

13     use the term diary, but we are talking about the same book that

14     Mr. Guy-Smith is requesting.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure.  But what is your response to his request?

16     He is asking for whatever form in which he memorialised what information

17     he had concerning the meetings that he had with the various people during

18     the time.

19             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, the document -- the item that he is

20     asking for was not in the possession of the Prosecution.  We have

21     previously taken extracts and disclosed those over the years.  The item

22     is the personal property of Colonel Tucker.  To the extent that

23     Colonel Tucker is willing to have that photocopied in its entirety, we

24     certainly would have no objection to that.  I've spoke within Ms. Javier,

25     she has indicated that if the staff would like to deliver - because we

Page 9098

 1     are in the same position as Mr. Guy-Smith, we can't talk to the witness

 2     either - if the witness would be willing to provide it, Ms. Javier would

 3     be happy to photocopy it for the benefit of the Defence.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Tucker, do you -- I'm sure you've heard what

 5     has been talked about, what is your response?  Are you inclined to

 6     release your diary or book, record, whatever it is, or are you not?

 7             THE WITNESS:  Providing that I get them back.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  I guess you would get them back.

 9             MS. CARTER:  Certainly.  So whenever it is convenient, I suppose

10     at the court break if we can -- or actually at the end of testimony today

11     that way we can make photocopies in the event that Colonel Tucker might

12     need them during his testimony today.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Indeed.  And obviously if he is going to be asked

14     about them, he needs to have his original, copies should be made for the

15     the parties.

16             MS. CARTER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm not quite sure whether -- is the intention to

18     tender those documents?

19             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, they're not exhibits on the

20     Prosecution's list.  I don't know if Mr. Guy-Smith intends to tender them

21     or what he might do with them.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  May an arrangement be made

23     that copies be made of Mr. Tucker's book.

24             MS. CARTER:  Thank you.  And, Your Honour, I -- unfortunately

25     when I called up the 65 ter number before I transposed numbers, the

Page 9099

 1     65 ter that I'm actually looking for is out of the map book, 65 ter 9223.

 2     It's map 4.

 3        Q.   Colonel Tucker, do you recognise the image on the screen?

 4        A.   Yes, this is the map which -- or looks very similar to the map

 5     which Karadzic and General Mladic and Koljevic showed to General Morillon

 6     at one of our first meetings in Pale.

 7        Q.   And when you were shown this map, you were describing before that

 8     there was a claim to any territory that was 50 per cent Serb; is that

 9     correct?

10        A.   That is correct.  And on this map was drawn a line which bounded

11     what Karadzic and General Mladic claimed was their land and was land of

12     the self-proclaimed, self-styled Republika Srpska.  And their logic was

13     that if the land was more than 50 per cent populated by Serbs, then it

14     was their land, and they were going to push out and had pushed out those

15     who were not Serb out of those territories.  And if the land was less

16     than 50 per cent Serb, then they had no claim or made no claim upon that

17     land.

18             And the inference of what they were saying was that this line

19     that they were -- had drawn on the map was what was effectively the

20     frontline of the fighting between the -- primarily between the Bosnian

21     Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims.

22        Q.   Colonel, as this is quite a colourful map, can you please

23     describe or point out which aspects that Karadzic was claiming were going

24     to be Republika Srpska?

25        A.   It's largely the blue areas, if I understand this map correctly,

Page 9100

 1     which are the over 50 per cent Bosnian Serb areas, and the frontline that

 2     they drew in order to describe the boundaries of their self-styled

 3     Republika Srpska basically adhered to the frontline as we United Nations

 4     understood it to be at that time.

 5             There were a couple of areas which were -- where their logic

 6     broke down because up in the north towards Brcko there was a very narrow

 7     piece of Bosnian Serb land with the Drina River on the north and the

 8     Bosnian Muslims on the south, and that was of strategic importance to

 9     them in order to link Western Serb territory with the Eastern Serb

10     territories.

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Once again, if we could have a date of this

12     meeting, that would be of some help.

13             MS. CARTER:  I believe it was given before, but I'll re-ask the

14     question.

15        Q.   Sir, can you please tell me when you had these meetings in Pale?

16        A.   This meeting, I believe, was at the beginning of November 1992.

17     We had actually first met with General Mladic and Karadzic in Lukavica on

18     the outskirts of Sarajevo, but that was just before Karadzic going to

19     Geneva.  And it was just before General Mladic's last attempt to seize

20     Sarajevo or at least cut Sarajevo in half, which was the 36-hour

21     offensive which was carried out around 29, 30 November --

22     30 October, 1992.

23        Q.   Sir, your answers have provided two additional lines of

24     questioning.  First, you indicated that the Serbs intended to push out

25     non-Serbs in the blue areas.  How did they --

Page 9101

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, that's a misstatement.  That would be

 2     the Bosnian Serbs there.

 3             MS. CARTER:  I stand corrected.

 4        Q.   Sir, how did the Bosnian Serbs intend to push out the

 5     non-Bosnian Serb population?

 6        A.   We know as United Nations from military fact that people were

 7     rounded up out of their houses, put into trucks, carted off, put in --

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I appreciate that the Court does not approve of

 9     objecting to an answer, but the question was quite specific and I would

10     ask Ms. Carter to direct the witness to answer the question.  The

11     question was a question of intent and how did the Bosnian Serbs intend to

12     do something.  The answer responds by not only hearsay, unattributed

13     hearsay, "we know from the United Nations" which is a relatively vague

14     answer.  This dealt with a meeting that he was having with two specific

15     people and to the extent in that meeting they exhibited their intent, he

16     can respond in that fashion.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.  Can you please answer.

18                 There's an objection, Madam Carter, would you like to

19     respond?

20             MS. CARTER:  Thank you, Your Honour, I'm happy to rephrase the

21     question if it pleases the Court.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It's not the question that is being objected to,

23     it is the answer that is not answering the question.

24             MS. CARTER:

25        Q.   Sir, if you could please answer the question as you were asked.

Page 9102

 1     How did Karadzic say he was going to accomplish the push-out of the

 2     non-Bosnian Serb population?

 3        A.   He didn't go into details.

 4        Q.   Were you aware at that time of how the push-out of the

 5     non-Bosnian Serb population was occurring?

 6        A.   Yes, because I was in the chain of command of the UN military

 7     forces in Bosnia, and our soldiers were reporting what they had seen.

 8        Q.   What were they reporting?

 9        A.   They were reporting that people were being rounded up or had been

10     rounded up out of their houses, houses had been put on fire, and people

11     had been taken away and then transported to frontlines and then released.

12     There were moves inside Sarajevo where people were being put on buses and

13     being transported out of Sarajevo.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  For the record, I would once again -- I would

15     object to any unsourced hearsay being elicited.  If the gentleman can

16     source the hearsay, that would be fine.  But otherwise, it is irrelevant

17     and of not much use to the Chamber.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What is unsourced hearsay?

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  "Our soldiers were reporting" who, what, when,

20     where, how?  How can you rely on that information?  It's information that

21     has no basis.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Especially when you are dealing with it from the

24     stand point of the military as we know.  Within the military there would

25     be -- if such reports are being made, then such documents would be

Page 9103

 1     available to the gentleman --

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We've understood your objection.

 3             Yes, Madam Carter.

 4             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, the very beginning of the response

 5     indicated that he was in the chain of command of the UN forces and those

 6     were the soldiers that he was receiving the reports from.  He directly

 7     sourced the information.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Do you know which specific soldiers he sourced

 9     them from within the chain of command?

10             MS. CARTER:

11        Q.   Sir, can you please describe the chain of command in the

12     BH forces, UNPROFOR forces?

13        A.   The main reporting that I saw in the chain of command was daily

14     reports which were produced by each of the battalions in UN BH commands.

15     These were compiled and sent every night from the respective battalions

16     to the headquarters of UN BH command.  And one of my responsibilities was

17     to read those reports every morning because they came in overnight, and

18     General Morillon and I would then discuss them first thing in the

19     morning, and that was a daily routine.

20        Q.   When you describe the reporting of what was occurring to the

21     non-Serb population, is this the same structure that you received that

22     information?

23        A.   Sorry, I don't understand the question.

24        Q.   The reporting structure that you just set out, is that how you

25     were learning about the non-Serb population?

Page 9104

 1        A.   Partially.  There was also the -- what I would refer to as the

 2     the "Jajce incident" which happened at the end of October, which is when

 3     the Bosnian Serb forces attacked, seized, and captured the town of Jajce.

 4     Reports from the British battalion in whose area that was taking place

 5     said that Jajce had become a collecting area for many refugees who had

 6     been ejected from Bosnian Serb territory.  And the town was then -- which

 7     was full of refugees was then attacked by the Bosnian Serbs and a long

 8     column of refugees was then fleeing from Jajce towards Travnik.

 9             And there were reports from the British battalion which had

10     soldiers in positions watching this retreat of refugees and the column of

11     refugees was reported by the British as being shelled with artillery from

12     Bosnian Serb forces to their north.  And because this was a live event,

13     this was not reported in the 24 hourly report that I was describing

14     because this was live action.  This was being reported throughout the

15     days in the end of -- towards the end of October.  That was one

16     particular event by which I formed the knowledge that I described

17     earlier.

18             The second was that in Sarajevo around the end of October,

19     beginning of November, there were a large number of Croats who were being

20     bused, I believe Serbs as well, though I can't remember exactly, who were

21     being bused out of Sarajevo down towards -- down in the direction of

22     Split.  I can't remember the exact routing anymore.  But that was the

23     second event which was taking place at that time.

24        Q.   Sir, you mentioned the Jajce incident.  How long was the refugee

25     column?

Page 9105

 1        A.   There were reports that the refugee column was about 30

 2     kilometres long.

 3        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Moving back to the meeting at Pale, what did

 4     Karadzic and Mladic tell you about the people -- the Muslim areas that

 5     were going to be a part of Republika Srpska?

 6        A.   They did not talk specifically about Muslim areas that were going

 7     to be a part.  They simply said that this, as the map that they were

 8     showing me with a line on it, was what they claimed was Republika Srpska,

 9     that they claimed international recognition of Republika Srpska, that

10     they were an independent country, an independent nation, and that they

11     did not want to have anything to do with the Bosnian Muslims.

12        Q.   Sir, the reporting that you heard about the pushing out of the

13     Muslim population, how long had that been going on?

14        A.   I only arrived in Bosnia towards the end of October 1992.  I had

15     only seen newspaper reporting prior to that.

16        Q.   And how long was it being reported that the Muslim population was

17     being pushed out?

18        A.   From newspaper reports, it would appear that that had started in

19     late April, early May 1992.

20        Q.   What media outlets were covering Bosnia at that time?

21        A.   In other words, May to the time before I deployed to Bosnia I was

22     reading UK, US newspapers and was seeing UK, US, and CNN television

23     broadcasting news outlets.

24             MS. CARTER:  I would call up P -- I'm sorry, if I can submit

25     65 ter 9223 into evidence.

Page 9106

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  9223 is admitted into evidence.  May it please be

 2     given an exhibit number.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honours.  This document becomes

 4     Exhibit P2693.  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  Yes, Madam Carter.

 6             MS. CARTER:  I would now like to bring up Exhibit P2440 at

 7     page 2, paragraph 5.

 8        Q.   Sir, when specifically did you arrive in Bosnia?

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I thought he just answered the question a little

10     earlier.  He said October 1992.

11             MS. CARTER:  I'm looking for a date, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  A date.  Thank you.

13             MS. CARTER:

14        Q.   Sir, can you tell me what day you arrived in Bosnia?

15        A.   I believe it was about the 26th, 25th of October, 1992.

16        Q.   Thank you, sir.

17             MS. CARTER:  If we can move to page 2, paragraph 5.

18        Q.   Sir, before you is the report of the Special Rapporteur of the

19     Commission on Human Rights, a Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki who toured Bosnia

20     from 12 to 22 October 1992.  What he found was that human rights

21     violations were being continued and that a great number of people have

22     lost their lives and thousands more find their dignity violated.

23     Furthermore, Mr. Mazowiecki found the Muslim population are the principal

24     victims.

25             Based on your experiences in October of 1992, do you agree with

Page 9107

 1     Mr. Mazowiecki's reporting?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3             MS. CARTER:  I now move to page 3 of the same report,

 4     paragraph 6.

 5        Q.   Mr. Mazowiecki also came to the view that the principal objective

 6     of the military conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the establishment

 7     of ethnically homogenous regions and that ethnic cleansing does not

 8     appear to be the consequence of the war, but rather the goal.

 9             Based on your experiences, do you share Mr. Mazowiecki's view?

10        A.   Yes, I do.

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, without further establishment of some form

12     of, at this point, expertise, that view, although I'm sure is a sincere

13     one and firmly held by Colonel Tucker, is personal and irrelevant.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Are you suggesting that Mr. Tucker is here as an

15     expert witness?

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Am I?

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Or that he should have -- he should be coming as

18     an expert witness to be able to give that view?

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Certainly to be able to give that kind of a view.

20     Absolutely.  These are clearly ultimate facts upon which this Chamber is

21     going to have to decide.  His personal experiences may well have brought

22     him to a particular conclusion, and with regard to his personal

23     conclusion, I would not have an argument with the gentleman.  But further

24     than that, I don't think that such opinions have any relevance.  And as a

25     matter of fact, in this regard, they are highly prejudicial, and I would

Page 9108

 1     submit that any -- that the prejudice outweighs the probative value in

 2     all respects.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

 4             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, the witness is basing this opinion on

 5     his personal knowledge and his conversations with the principals who were

 6     a part of this plan.  He described on the map that Karadzic showed him

 7     that that is precisely what they were doing.  So I am merely tying

 8     Mr. Mazowiecki's report to the evidence that the witness has just

 9     previously stated.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  This is the problem that we are now encountering

11     this objection because it doesn't seem apparent that you -- what you

12     asked this witness's opinion is based on what he himself saw and observed

13     and heard from the participants, but what he sees from this report.  I'm

14     sure he can give you that opinion without this exhibit on the screen.

15             MS. CARTER:  Certainly, Your Honour.  I merely showed the witness

16     the exhibit because the Court's previous ruling with regards to this

17     exhibit was that it was going to notice rather than the truth of the

18     contents therein.  So we -- in order to follow along with the Court's

19     ruling, I'm attempting to show it to the witness to put it in some

20     realtime context.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I think they are -- I also think they are doing

22     something else, which is self-evident from what she just said, which is

23     now they are attempting to establish the truth of the contents therein.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Which is -- this is --

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Which has already been ruled upon to their

Page 9109

 1     detriment.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Anyway, this is an exhibit, that's why

 3     she's not trying to confirm it.  In that event, then I think you should

 4     proceed and the objection would be overruled.  If that is the purpose of

 5     this document.

 6             MS. CARTER:  Certainly, Your Honour.

 7        Q.   Sir, following up on the Court's comments, the information that

 8     you see before you, you said you share Mr. Mazowiecki's views.  Can you

 9     tell me specifically what did you learn while on the ground in Bosnia

10     that leads you to these opinions?

11        A.   The first thing is the meeting in Pale with the census map that

12     I've just described to you.  The second was the military assessment that

13     we in UN Bosnia-Herzegovina command made, which was that by the end of

14     October, early November 1992, that the Bosnian Serbs had achieved their

15     military objectives.  In other words, they had achieved the seizure of

16     the land that Karadzic had described.  What they wanted thereafter was

17     recognition of the status quo that they had seized.

18             Their objective in all the negotiations with United Nations was a

19     cease-fire across the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina along all of the

20     frontlines.  What they objected to was the Bosnian Muslims who would

21     continue to attack in one place and then another, and then when the

22     Bosnian Serbs counter-attacked, then the Bosnian Muslims would plead for

23     the United Nations forces to broker a cease-fire.

24        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, moving back to the initial question, you

25     indicated that the reason you formed this opinion about the ethnic

Page 9110

 1     cleansing was based on your meeting with Karadzic as well as the

 2     information you were receiving from your troops.  Did anything else lead

 3     to your opinion in regards to the campaign of ethnic cleansing?

 4        A.   We were still receiving newspaper reports.  We had press people

 5     who every day looked at newspaper reporting and then produced summaries

 6     of extracts of the main news events, which were relevant to us in Bosnia.

 7        Q.   Sir, when you met with Karadzic - and I no longer need the

 8     exhibit - when you met with Karadzic in November 1992, what was

 9     UNPROFOR's position with regards to the plan?

10        A.   UNPROFOR's position, which General Morillon emphasised, was to

11     facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid to all people in need,

12     regardless of their ethnic backgrounds.  In order to -- one of the main

13     reasons, one of the main obstacles to the provision of humanitarian aid

14     was fighting, and so General Morillon offered the good offices of his

15     UNPROFOR personnel in order to assist the brokering of cease-fires

16     wherever there was fighting going on in order to facilitate the passage

17     of humanitarian supply convoys, relief convoys.

18        Q.   Thank you, sir.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Would that be a convenient point?

20             MS. CARTER:  Yes, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We'll take a break and come back at quarter to.

22     Court adjourned.

23                           --- Recess taken at 10.13 a.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 10.45 a.m.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Madam Carter.

Page 9111

 1             MS. CARTER:

 2        Q.   Colonel Tucker, you were describing the conflict in Sarajevo, or

 3     you mentioned the conflict in Sarajevo.  Can you please tell me, what

 4     were the tactics that the Bosnian Serb army was using inside of Sarajevo?

 5        A.   The Bosnian Serb army was not in Sarajevo.  It was surrounding

 6     Sarajevo.  The -- as I described earlier, the Bosnian Serb objective was

 7     recognition of the status quo that they had achieved.  However, the

 8     Bosnian Muslims did not accept that and so the Bosnian Muslims --

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Once again I would ask Ms. Carter to control the

10     witness.  The question was very specific, "What were the tactics the

11     Bosnian Serb army was using inside of Sarajevo."  And I believe he has

12     answered that question.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

14             MS. CARTER:

15        Q.   Sir, can you please tell me what military tactics was the Bosnian

16     Serb army employing with regards to Sarajevo?

17        A.   There was -- there were two tactics.  One was to reply with

18     overwhelming force using heavy weapons, to respond to any Bosnian Muslim

19     attacks out of Sarajevo.  The second was to randomly shell Sarajevo in

20     what -- and this is my interpretation as a military observer, terrorism

21     by artillery, by indirect fire.

22        Q.   Can you please describe what you are talking about, what was

23     going on with the shelling?

24        A.   There would be fairly continuous shelling throughout the day and

25     night, sometimes more intensively, sometimes less intensively, but there

Page 9112

 1     was not aimed at any particular military objective.

 2        Q.   How were the civilians being impacted by this tactic?

 3        A.   It caused uncertainty and nobody knew where the next shells would

 4     fall.  And often civilians were injured or killed by these shells, so

 5     they were under -- in a state of constant fear of where would the next

 6     shells fall.

 7        Q.   Can you give a specific example where the Bosnian Serb army

 8     replied with overwhelming force using heavy weapons?

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  First of all, that question is leading.  And

10     second of all, it's vague, meaning specific example in terms of date?

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

12             MS. CARTER:  With all due respect, Your Honour, the question

13     leads from page 34 starting at line 11 where he describes the two

14     tactics.  And one was to reply with overwhelming force using heavy

15     weapons.  I'm just trying to follow up on the previous response by the

16     witness.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Objection overruled.

18             MS. CARTER:

19        Q.   Sir, can you give an example of this overwhelming force?

20        A.   One example is when in early December 1992 the Muslims -- the

21     Bosnian Muslims attacked out of the Stup area, which is a suburb at the

22     western end of Sarajevo.  The Bosnian Muslims caught the Bosnian Serbs

23     initially by surprise.  The initial response from the Bosnian Serbs was

24     to concentrate as much artillery fire as they could.  Several days later,

25     they had managed to bring some reinforcements of their very limited

Page 9113

 1     regular infantry and armour, armoured vehicles to the area and then

 2     counter-attacked, and then recaptured the territory of which the

 3     Bosnian Muslims had temporarily captured.

 4             And they then, the Bosnian Serbs, then proceeded to shell very

 5     heavily the suburbs of Sarajevo from which the Bosnian Muslim attacks had

 6     taken place.

 7        Q.   Well, if they were shelling the place where the attacks had taken

 8     place, how was that inappropriate or overwhelming force?

 9        A.   Because they shelled not just the direct location of where the

10     attacks had taken place, but they shelled the suburbs behind there in

11     what I would describe as punishment attacks.

12        Q.   How many shells were falling on those suburbs?

13        A.   Many hundreds per day.

14        Q.   And how long did this attack occur?

15        A.   This particular attack around Stup went on -- the initial Muslim

16     attack was around a day, a day and a half, maybe two days long.  The

17     Bosnian Serb counterattacks then took another week and then petered out

18     over a further week.

19        Q.   You also described the random shelling of Sarajevo which you

20     called, but is not charged in this case, terrorism by artillery or by

21     indirect fire.  Can you please give an example of that tactic?

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Objection.  Not only relevance, but also with

23     regard to the issue of terrorism, that's a matter that has been discussed

24     on innumerable occasions.  It's something that, I believe, the

25     Prosecution has agreed would not be led.

Page 9114

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

 2             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, I'm -- the as I pointed out that is not

 3     charged, what I'm trying to determine is what he was referring to in the

 4     randomly shelling of Sarajevo.  And I was just putting it in his

 5     response, he gave that answer.  I'm merely trying in order not to lead or

 6     rephrase the witness's question using his own words.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I appreciate what Ms. Carter has said, but with

 8     regard to the issue of terror or terrorism, the Prosecution is well aware

 9     of the concerns and this is something that we have agreed upon during the

10     pendency of this trial, and I believe we are trying to get into the back

11     door with what we've agreed won't come in through the front door.  It's

12     inappropriate to be using that language at this time.  Whether or not the

13     witness has used those words, it is inappropriate to lead in that

14     fashion.

15             MS. CARTER:  Certainly.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I just asked my fellow Judges to confirm, it does

18     seem as if the Chamber is not aware of this agreement, and I don't know

19     whether -- is this an agreement between the parties from which the

20     Chamber was excluded or is this an agreement that the Chamber is supposed

21     to be privy to?

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well it comes from -- it comes from -- it

23     actually stems from a ruling that was made by the Chamber in May of 2007

24     with regard to the application of the Rule 73(B) amendment of the

25     indictment, I believe it's paragraph 16 of that particular ruling.  With

Page 9115

 1     regard to the agreement, I think it would be fair to say that it has not

 2     been a formal agreement.  However, every time this issue has come up, and

 3     there has been issues about what particular evidence would be led by

 4     specific witnesses and the issue of terror has been raised, it has been

 5     agreed that it would not be led.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But the question -- my question was, is this an

 7     agreement between the parties or is it an agreement to which the Chamber

 8     is supposed to be privy?

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I believe that it is a combination of an

10     understanding of the decision that was made by this Chamber with regard

11     to the the Rule 73 amendment of the indictment made in May of --

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can you quote the ruling, please.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure, the Chamber notes paragraph 16, May 2007.

14             "The Chamber notes that at least 22 witnesses are scheduled to

15     give evidence on terror in Sarajevo.  Two of the 22 witnesses are

16     scheduled to give evidence on the 'terror count.'  As the amended

17     indictment does not include a terror count, the relevance of this type of

18     testimony is not apparent.  Although the Prosecution alleges a

19     'protracted campaign of sniping and shelling upon Sarajevo,' there is no

20     indication in the amended indictment that a protracted campaign is being

21     alleged in support of charge of Terror against the accused.  Only one

22     indication on terror is given in the pre-trial brief:  The Prosecution

23     asserts that written" -- italicised -- "evidence will be presented in

24     support of the assumption that inter alia, the nature or purpose of the

25     aforementioned campaign was to spread terror amongst the Serbian

Page 9116

 1     population of Sarajevo.  However, this does not justify the presentation

 2     of extensive evidence on this aspect of the campaign.  Therefore, the

 3     Trial Chamber will instruct the Prosecution not to lead evidence on

 4     'terror' in relation to the Sarajevo count."

 5             Now, I understand that this is not evidence which is charged in

 6     the indictment, however, it seems to be inappropriate to be leading such

 7     evidence.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yeah, I just ask you to quote that for us.

 9             Madam Carter, it seems that there is a ruling here by Chamber

10     that evidence on terror shall not be led.

11             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, the evidence that I'm attempting to

12     lead is specifically the random shelling of Sarajevo.  That was described

13     as one ever the tactics.  I am a just trying to lead evidence about is

14     there a specific example of that tactic.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That is allowed.  You can go ahead.

16             MS. CARTER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

17        Q.   Sir, you indicated that the second tactic used by the

18     Bosnian Serb army was to randomly shell Sarajevo.  Can you please give a

19     specific example of that tactic?

20        A.   There was one event that I can describe which was on the night of

21     Christmas Eve 1992 when on the stroke of midnight every Bosnian Serb gun,

22     artillery piece, mortar, anti-aircraft gun surrounding Sarajevo opened

23     fire into Sarajevo firing as fast as they could for a period of about 15

24     or 20 minutes.  There was a 40 millimetre anti-aircraft gun mounted on

25     the hill-side above the Presidency, above the residency in Sarajevo which

Page 9117

 1     is where General Morillon's headquarters inside Sarajevo was, and which

 2     is where I was located at the time of this incident.  And this artillery

 3     gun is a rapid-fire anti-aircraft gun and fired a cadence of boom-boom

 4     boom-boom-boom boom-boom, boom-boom boom-boom-boom boom-boom, for about

 5     15 minutes firing into the city.

 6        Q.   Okay.

 7        A.   15 minutes.  Not five zero.

 8        Q.   Sir, unfortunately for the record we won't be able to get the

 9     specific boom booms that you gave out.  Are you indicating that there was

10     a repeated pattern to the shelling?

11        A.   Of that particular gun, yes.

12        Q.   Is it possible that that's simply how that gun-fires?

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   Why?

15        A.   Because it's an anti-aircraft gun and it would normally fire a

16     burst which would be four, five, six, maybe ten shells in rapid fire one

17     after the other.  The gun has a trigger and the gunner of that particular

18     gun was clearly pressing that trigger specifically in order to fire out

19     that particular pattern, cadence.

20        Q.   Now, you described that these tactics caused uncertainty in the

21     civilian population of Sarajevo.  How was this uncertainty portrayed

22     within the city?

23        A.   People were very afraid, people were very anxious, people did not

24     like going outside into the open.  And particularly into open areas, they

25     would run across open areas.

Page 9118

 1        Q.    Sir, what were the living conditions like for the people inside

 2     of Sarajevo.

 3        A.   The living conditions inside Sarajevo worsened during the winter

 4     and the cold and were appalling.  There was no heating.  There was

 5     virtually no gas coming into Sarajevo.  There was virtually no

 6     electricity coming into Sarajevo, so there was no heating.  Temperatures

 7     were down to minus 10, minus 15 degrees centigrade at times during the

 8     winter and every single piece of wood in the city was stripped out and

 9     every single tree and the roots were dug out of the ground in order to

10     burn.

11             There was very little water, and sanitation was very difficult,

12     and people were very hungry, and you could see that there were no fat

13     people in Sarajevo.  Everybody was thin.  People were permanently hungry.

14        Q.   Sir, was there any outsiders reporting about the events in

15     Sarajevo?

16        A.   There were international media present inside Sarajevo and in

17     particular they tended to stay in, I believe, it was the Holiday Inn

18     which was a predominant hotel in the middle of Sarajevo.

19        Q.   Which media outlets were covering the siege of Sarajevo?

20        A.   There were a number of independent journalists.  There were also

21     journalists who were tied to the BBC, to CNN, to Agence France-Presse,

22     and to US newspapers who would come into, at least Sarajevo, for a week,

23     two weeks, and would then seek interviews with General Morillon and

24     others and would then report and then leave, come back six weeks later or

25     whatever.

Page 9119

 1        Q.   Were any local or Balkan media outlets covering the siege of

 2     Sarajevo?

 3        A.   Inside Sarajevo there was "Oslobodenje" which was a Bosnian

 4     Muslim newspaper which continued to print even during -- even throughout

 5     the siege.

 6        Q.   Sir, I'd now like to move your testimony to the east and

 7     Srebrenica.  Can you please tell me, when did the eastern enclaves first

 8     come to your attention in your role as an UNPROFOR officer?

 9        A.   The eastern enclaves came to my personal attention the first day

10     that we arrived in Bosnia.  I was already aware of their existence

11     because of international newspaper reporting of attempts under the

12     previous commander of Sector Sarajevo, General MacKenzie, who had tried

13     to get humanitarian aid convoys into Gorazde escorted by Ukrainian, by

14     soldiers from the Ukrainian battalion based in Sarajevo.

15        Q.   Why were humanitarian aid convoys necessary in the eastern

16     enclaves?

17        A.   The eastern enclaves had been surrounded and isolated by the

18     initial Bosnian Serb attacks in May, June 1992, and when the Bosnian Serb

19     military had seized the land that I described earlier that General Mladic

20     and Karadzic showed me on the census map, they had seized those and

21     surrounded those areas, as I said, in May or June, but had not done much

22     more than isolate them.  They were in quite mountainous terrain which was

23     of little economic interest to the Bosnian Serbs who seemed to just leave

24     them be, but isolate them and --

25        Q.   Sir, let me stop you right there.  You are using the words

Page 9120

 1     "isolation of the eastern enclaves," and the initial question was:  Why

 2     were the humanitarian aid convoys necessary in the eastern enclaves.

 3     What was the ground-level reality for the people inside those enclaves?

 4        A.   Those enclaves were surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces who

 5     prevented food, any kind of supply, getting into those enclaves.

 6        Q.   Okay.  And can you please tell the Court what areas are

 7     considered the "eastern enclaves"?

 8        A.   The eastern enclaves were mainly centred around the town of

 9     Gorazde, around the town of Zepa, and around the town of Srebrenica, and

10     around the village of Cerska.

11        Q.   Now, you indicated that in May or June these areas were

12     surrounded and that the Ukrainians had tried to provide humanitarian aid

13     at some point.  Do you know when specifically the Ukrainian battalion

14     attempted aid to these enclaves?

15        A.   The dates before I arrived in Bosnia I do not know other than I

16     can recollect reading newspaper articles.  In the time -- from the time

17     that I arrived in Bosnia, the Ukrainian battalion made a number of

18     attempts, and again by -- from memory it would be about three or four

19     attempts to get to Srebrenica and about two attempts to get to Gorazde.

20             The -- they did manage to get a convoy into Srebrenica at the

21     beginning of December 1992, and that was the first humanitarian aid

22     convoy that reached Srebrenica since the beginning of the conflict.

23        Q.   What prevented these humanitarian aid convoys from getting into

24     the region?

25        A.   The Bosnian Serb forces and authorities put roadblocks on the

Page 9121

 1     road and prevented these convoys from proceeding and kept on coming up

 2     with different reasons as to why they would not be allowed to proceed

 3     from this roadblock further up the road, and eventually six hours later

 4     permission would come and then they would go and they would be stopped

 5     3 kilometres further, and so on.

 6        Q.   Did you bring this prevention to the attention of anybody?

 7        A.   Yes.  We -- this was one of the permanent subjects of

 8     General Morillon's discussions every time he met with any of the

 9     Bosnian Serb military or political people.

10        Q.   How often did this subject come up?

11        A.   At every meeting.  And these meetings were taking place with the

12     Bosnian Serbs almost daily.

13        Q.   What excuses were given as to why the convoys could not pass?

14        A.   One excuse was that the Bosnian Serbs demanded to search the

15     convoys to make sure that there were no weapons hidden in amongst the --

16     the humanitarian aid, the food and the medicines, et cetera.  When they

17     insisted on doing that, it meant that the food was all ripped apart and

18     that the food was spoiled.  They also used the excuse that there was

19     fighting on the road up ahead and that they could not guarantee the

20     safety of the convoy and that they were not allowed to pass.

21             Another excuse was that the locals living in the village, town,

22     or whatever had had suffered many losses and were up in arms and were

23     protesting about this convoy being allowed through and were blocking the

24     road and were not allowing the convoy to pass through.  Another excuse

25     was to claim that they would allow convoys through to Bosnian Muslim

Page 9122

 1     areas only when similar convoys were sent to Bosnian Serb refugee areas

 2     as well.  And they claimed that there was an imbalance in the amount of

 3     aid that was being provided to the refugees of the different ethnic

 4     backgrounds.

 5        Q.   Were these excuses acceptable to UNPROFOR?

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Relevance.

 7             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, I can rephrase the question.

 8        Q.   Sir, when you met with the Bosnian Serb political and military

 9     leaders and these excuses were given, how did UNPROFOR react?

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, I'm tempted to ask whether or not

11     Ms. Carter believes that the gentleman has a mouse in his pocket.  He can

12     testify as to how he reacted and what he said or he can testify as

13     regards to what he heard some other specific individual said, but to ask

14     the question how UNPROFOR reacted is a bit problematic because UNPROFOR,

15     as we learned from this witness, is a relatively large organisation that

16     as I understand it has its headquarters in Zagreb.  So I don't know

17     whether or not as the question is presently framed Ms. Carter is

18     suggesting that when there was a conversation between anyone in which

19     Colonel Tucker was present that Zagreb was involved or whether or not we

20     are speaking about specific individuals.

21             I would once again ask as I've asked before that we have some

22     specificity here because among other things we are referring to specific

23     conversations with regard to specific subject matters on specific dates

24     that will ultimately have an impact not only with regard to the

25     cross-examination, but also with regard to the kinds of factual

Page 9123

 1     determines that the Chamber is going to have to make.  And to ask this

 2     kind of a vague question is not helpful.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

 4             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, I'm indicating that the conversations

 5     are the ones that Colonel Tucker was in fact present at.  I believe that

 6     that is specific.  However, I can be even more specific.

 7        Q.   Sir, when you and General Morillon spoke with Bosnian Serb

 8     political and military personnel and you received these excuses, what was

 9     your response?

10        A.   General Morillon --

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, first of all, that assumes that within

12     each -- that in the context of each of the meetings they received the

13     same excuses.  And the reason I'm pressing the point for specificity is,

14     as Ms. Carter appreciates, this is a highly fluid time during the period

15     in which many many things were occurring.  So to ask broad-based

16     questions with regard to how specific -- with regard to what specific

17     people said and what was specifically done in regard to what was said is

18     not helpful.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter, are you able to elicit from the

20     witness specific responses to specific excuses that were given.  Maybe

21     take them one by one.

22             MS. CARTER:

23        Q.   Sir, when is the first time you brought the humanitarian aid

24     convoys to the attention of, we'll start with the Serb military, with

25     General Mladic?

Page 9124

 1        A.   In order to answer a question like that referring to events

 2     15 years ago or more, I would need to refer to specific meetings.  What I

 3     can say here now is that it was a subject in the first meetings that we

 4     had at the end of October, early November, and continued to be a subject

 5     of meetings throughout my time in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I presume we are talking of October, November

 7     of 1992?

 8             THE WITNESS:  That is correct, sir.

 9             MS. CARTER:

10        Q.   You indicated that it came up at your first meeting.  At your

11     first meeting, what was discussed?

12        A.   The need to allow humanitarian aid through to all those in need

13     regardless of which ethnic background that they came from.  And that --

14     and General Morillon pressed the point that it was the responsibility of

15     all in the region whether they were Serb, Muslim, or Croats, to help the

16     United Nations forces move humanitarian aid to where it was needed.

17     General Morillon also made the point, and there were a number of meetings

18     where Jose Maria Mendiluce from UNHCR was involved.  And who --

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  We've now -- once again I would ask Ms. Carter to

20     control her witness.  We are talking about the first meeting.  We are not

21     talking about anything but the first meeting.  If the question is about

22     subsequent meetings, then he can respond to those questions.  I really

23     must press the point here, Your Honour, and it will become evident

24     through the fullness of time why this is of importance.  The question

25     was --

Page 9125

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Maybe.  Okay.  Fine.  You can cut out that last

 2     sentence where the witness is saying that General Morillon also made the

 3     point and there were a number of meetings.  Can you deal with one meeting

 4     at a time, please, Mr. Tucker.  You were talking about the first meeting

 5     that you had in October, November 1992.  Are you able to tell us about

 6     that, if you remember?

 7             MS. CARTER:

 8        Q.   Sir, can you first provide a date.  What day did you first meet

 9     on the subject?

10        A.   I believe it was about the 27th or the 28th of October, 1992.

11        Q.   Okay.  When is the second meeting that you discussed this?

12        A.   It would have been in early -- around the 5th of November, 1992.

13        Q.   Who was present at that meeting?

14        A.   The first meeting with General Mladic --

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You got to make sure, Madam Carter, that you are

16     on a wave length with the witness.  You've asked him about the second

17     meeting and you followed up by saying who was present at that meeting,

18     the answer is the first meeting.  You were on the second meeting.

19             MS. CARTER:  Certainly.

20        Q.   Sir, can you please tell me -- well, we'll flesh out what you

21     were just saying.  Can you tell me who was present at the first meeting?

22        A.   There were a number of people present at the first meeting.  The

23     ones who I particularly recall were General Mladic, Dr. Karadzic,

24     Professor Koljevic, General Morillon, myself, and Adjutant Chief Mihailov

25     who was General Morillon's body-guard.  There were other people as well

Page 9126

 1     but I cannot, here, 15 years later, recall all their names.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And as to the second meeting, who was present there?

 3        A.   The second meeting was Karadzic, Mladic, I believe Gvero was

 4     there, and again General Morillon, myself, and Mihailov.  There were

 5     others there as well.  Typically there were about eight or ten people in

 6     total at these meetings.

 7        Q.   In relation to that second meeting, what did you discuss?

 8        A.   There were many things that we discussed.  One of them was the

 9     humanitarian aids to the eastern enclaves, but there was also the issue

10     of the deployment of the Canadian battalion into the Banja Luka area.

11     There was the deployment of the French battalion around Petrovac.  There

12     was permission for engineers to go into the no-man's land between --

13     surrounding Sarajevo in order to repair gas and electricity and water

14     facilities.

15        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, focusing on the humanitarian aid, what was

16     said about why the -- excuse me.  From BH command's position, what was

17     your concern at the second meeting?

18        A.   We repeated that humanitarian aid was being dispensed equitably,

19     and it was driven by the independently assessed need on the the ground as

20     opposed to a 50/50, and that General Morillon expected that the

21     Bosnian Serb authorities to do everything in their power to ensure that

22     this aid got through.

23        Q.   What was the Bosnian Serb response?

24        A.   General Morillon -- General Mladic and Karadzic said they would

25     do everything that they could, but that it was not easy because there

Page 9127

 1     were strong emotions on the ground and sometimes locals did not do what

 2     they were told to do.  They also asked for General Morillon to provide a

 3     proposed route so that General Mladic's staff could verify its or suggest

 4     alternatives so that the convoy would be able to reach its objective.

 5        Q.   Now, you mentioned that there were "strong emotions on the

 6     ground."  Are you aware or were you advised what those emotions were?

 7        A.   I cannot recall if at that specific meeting we were told, but it

 8     was always the same, which is that locals had suffered badly in the

 9     conflict and were objecting to aid passing through to the other side.

10        Q.   Okay.  Now, you said that was during the first week of November.

11     When was the third meeting?

12        A.   It was later in November.  I can't remember the exact dates.

13        Q.   At the time of the third meeting, had humanitarian aid gotten

14     through to the enclaves?

15        A.   No.  There was -- at the third meeting, the convoy was underway

16     and Mladic kept leaving the the room in order to go and speak on the

17     telephone with his people in order to -- or this is what he was telling

18     us, in order to try and make sure that the convoy got through.

19        Q.   Between the second and the third meeting, how much time had

20     passed?

21        A.   A couple of weeks.  This is meetings with General Mladic.  There

22     were many other meetings as well.

23        Q.   What were the other meetings?

24        A.   The other meetings were with the Bosnian Muslims.  At that stage,

25     General Morillon did not have any meetings with the the Bosnian Croats.

Page 9128

 1     I think he met Colonel Siber for the first time in November.

 2        Q.   When did the first convoy actually get through, and to which

 3     enclave did it reach?

 4        A.   I believe that a convoy reached Gorazde sometime in

 5     October/November, but the first convoy to reach Srebrenica was in -- at

 6     the beginning of December.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Tucker, can we just clarify.  I thought you

 9     said that the second meeting was around the 5th of November.  Now, and I

10     thought you said that by that time of that meeting no convoy had gone

11     through yet?

12             THE WITNESS:  No convoy had gone through to Srebrenica.  My focus

13     was on Srebrenica.  The convoys to Gorazde were being driven by

14     Sector Sarajevo of whom the Ukrainian battalion was a part.  And I can't

15     remember whether it was before the 5th of November or after the

16     5th of November that that convoy got through Gorazde.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

18             Yes, Madam Carter.

19             MS. CARTER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20        Q.   In regards to the eastern enclaves, and specifically with regards

21     to Srebrenica, are you aware of how many people were inside of the

22     Srebrenica enclave in October of 1992?

23        A.   No, we were not.  The United Nations did not have any of its own

24     personnel in the enclaves and the only reports that were available were

25     those from international news outlets who occasionally managed to get

Page 9129

 1     reporters into those areas.  That's the only information that we had at

 2     that time.

 3        Q.   Were you aware that the people in the enclaves were originally

 4     from those individual villages, or were they coming from somewhere else?

 5        A.   I cannot remember whether my initial information was from reading

 6     those original news outlets, but what we subsequently, when we got our

 7     own people into the enclaves, found out was that there were many refugees

 8     in those enclaves who had fled there from other parts of Bosnia and who

 9     had been driven out of where they had previously lived by Bosnian Serb

10     military, paramilitary, and police.

11        Q.   Okay.  When you say they were "driven out," are you aware of what

12     tactics were being used to drive these people out of their villages?

13        A.   The reports that these people -- or what these people told our

14     soldiers when they were in the enclaves is that typically soldiers or

15     people in military uniform or police uniform would come banging on their

16     doors and tell them they had five minutes or whatever to assemble in the

17     square or whatever, and that they were then put on to vehicles with

18     whatever they could carry, and were then taken to a frontline, and were

19     then told to get out of the vehicles and then walk in a particular

20     direction.  That was one approach.

21             The other approach was that people would hear that this was

22     happening in next village or the next suburb and they would not wait

23     until people came knocking on the door, and they themselves just picked

24     up what they could carry and of their own volition as it were would just

25     leave and try to find safety somewhere.

Page 9130

 1        Q.   You indicated that these people were reporting to the troops.

 2     Did they indicate why they would leave when they would hear about the

 3     pushes from the next village?

 4        A.   Because they believed --

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, I'm going to object to that question.

 6     There are a myriad reasons why.  This is during a war.  The question is

 7     absolutely irrelevant.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Objection overruled.  Please carry on.

 9             MS. CARTER:

10        Q.   Sir, I'll repeat my question.  You indicated that these people

11     were reporting to the troops that they were leaving because of the pushes

12     from the next village.  Did they explain to you why they would do that?

13        A.   Because they believed their lives were at risk.

14        Q.   From whom?

15        A.   From whoever was carrying out the, I'll use the word advisedly,

16     the ethnic cleansing.

17        Q.   How long had this ethnic cleansing been going on?

18        A.   I can say that it was going on whilst I was in Bosnia.  I

19     believe, from reading international media and television that it had been

20     going on in Bosnia since the beginning of the conflict since

21     April, May 1992.

22        Q.   Okay.  At any point in time were you able to enter the enclaves,

23     or specifically Srebrenica?

24        A.   I entered the Srebrenica enclave twice.  In fact, about six or

25     seven times, but the first time was not Srebrenica itself, it was

Page 9131

 1     Konjevic Polje which is about 15 or 20 kilometres to the north-west of

 2     Srebrenica.  And that was on the 5th and 6th of March, 1992.  I then,

 3     with General Morillon, went into the Srebrenica enclave again about the

 4     10th, 11th of March, 1992, and that was into Srebrenica itself.  And we

 5     were then in Srebrenica for the next two and a half to three weeks,

 6     albeit we left Srebrenica, the enclave that is, on a number of occasions

 7     to go and negotiate with Bosnian Serb military and authorities and then

 8     returned back into the enclave.

 9        Q.   Sir, you gave the dates in March of 1992, is that accurate?

10        A.   Sorry, 1993, my apologies.

11        Q.   If you were expressing concern about the humanitarian situation

12     in October and November of 1992, what took so long for you to go to

13     Srebrenica?

14        A.   The main reason was that we were working to priorities and in

15     October we knew about the enclaves but we had very little information

16     about the circumstances inside the enclaves, and there were other events

17     taking place which seemed more acute and, therefore, we focused on those.

18             The situation in the enclaves started escalating - and by

19     escalating what I mean is that the Bosnian Muslim authorities in Sarajevo

20     started increasingly demanding that United Nations and the international

21     community do more in order to get humanitarian aid into the enclaves.

22     And this started around middle of December 1992.  And it then steadily

23     increased in -- or rather, the Bosnian Muslim pressure on

24     United Nations -- on General Morillon steadily increased throughout

25     January, and that led to the setting up of airdrops of humanitarian aid

Page 9132

 1     into the enclaves because the United Nations was not succeeding in

 2     getting humanitarian -- land-based humanitarian convoys through.

 3             And then in February 1993 we heard reports about a lot more

 4     fighting going -- starting up again around the enclaves, and the Bosnian

 5     Muslim authorities were no longer only asking for humanitarian aid, but

 6     were also -- also started asking for aid for injured -- people injured in

 7     fighting.  In other words, up until December/January, the enclaves were

 8     simply surrounded and isolated, whereas in January/February, fighting

 9     started building up and escalating around the enclaves.

10        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, you had indicated that there were airdrops

11     and other calls for humanitarian aid in the enclaves at the end of 1992

12     and the beginning of 1993.  Who were you and General Morillon speaking

13     with in order to facilitate aid to the Srebrenica enclave?

14        A.   Everybody and anybody who General Morillon was able to meet with.

15     What I mean by that is that General Mladic refused to see

16     General Morillon anymore, and the last meeting that he had with

17     General Mladic was, I think, at the end of December, like the

18     26th of December.  Then he didn't meet Mladic again for -- I think the

19     next time he met Mladic was in Belgrade in March, at the end of

20     March 1993.

21             So in between he was having to meet with Karadzic, with

22     General Gvero, I think he was a colonel at the time.  There was a

23     Colonel Zarkovic.

24             .  He met several times with General Milovanovic, who is the

25     Chief of Staff, who is General Mladic's Chief of Staff.  He also met a

Page 9133

 1     number of times with General Galic who was the commander of the Serb

 2     force -- Bosnian Serb forces surrounding Sarajevo.  And he met in

 3     January/February with a number of Bosnian Serb politicians, members of

 4     the, I think they called it the assembly or the National Assembly of the

 5     Republika Srpska.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  May I just interrupt you before this line

 7     disappears from the screen.  Mr. Tucker, you said at page 54, starting

 8     from line 16 you said:

 9             "Then in February 1993 we heard reports about a lot more fighting

10     going on starting up again around the enclaves, and the Bosnian Muslim

11     authorities were no longer only asking for humanitarian aid, but were

12     also started asking for aid for injured people, injured in fighting."

13             In the notion of the United Nations, BH, what is that --

14             THE WITNESS:  BH command.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Command.  Was help to the injured not seen as

16     humanitarian?

17             THE WITNESS:  Yes, it was.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Just that I wanted -- thank you so much.

19             Thank you, ma'am.

20             MS. CARTER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

21        Q.   Sir, you noted in your recitation with regards to Mladic, that at

22     some point in time you met him in Belgrade at the end of 1993.  Was that

23     your only meeting with persons inside of Belgrade?

24        A.   No, we met in, as I mentioned earlier this morning, with the

25     Serb -- Serb Army high command in Belgrade in January 1993, and then we

Page 9134

 1     met at the end of March 1993 with Milosevic in Belgrade.  And the day

 2     after or the day after that we met in Belgrade with General Mladic,

 3     Gvero, and about ten other military and political people from the

 4     Bosnian Serbs.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, and perhaps I'm confused here, I do

 6     apologise.  With regard to the question that Ms. Carter has asked, it has

 7     as a reference point that he met with Mladic at the end of 1993 in

 8     Belgrade.  It's my understanding that Colonel Tucker was no longer in the

 9     region at the end of 1993.

10             THE WITNESS:  At the end of March 1993.

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.  So that's clear.  Just because as the

12     question reads it says -- because it's dealing with a series of meetings,

13     I have some concern that as the question is presently put there would be

14     the impression left that Colonel Tucker met with General Mladic in

15     Belgrade at the end of 1993.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.

17             MS. CARTER:

18        Q.   Sir, just to make sure we don't have our wires crossed in regards

19     to dates, when is the first time you met in Belgrade?

20        A.   In January 1993.

21        Q.   Okay.  Who did you meet?

22        A.   General Panic and a number of senior officers from the Serb --

23     Serb Army.

24        Q.   What did you discuss?

25        A.   We requested -- General Morillon requested their assistance in

Page 9135

 1     exercising influence over their Bosnian Serb brethren to restrain

 2     themselves and to allow humanitarian aid through and to prevent military

 3     excesses from taking place.

 4        Q.   What was the response?

 5        A.   The response was that they would, of course, do everything in

 6     their power.  However, they made the point that the Bosnian Serbs were an

 7     independent country and that whilst they could appeal to them, they had

 8     no authority over them, and had no -- had no power to direct them to act

 9     in any particular way.

10        Q.   I am now going to take up the chronology of your entrance into

11     Srebrenica and we'll discuss the later Belgrade meetings in a while.

12             What specifically were the circumstances where you entered

13     Srebrenica or near Srebrenica for the first time?

14        A.   The circumstances were that General Morillon had been

15     increasingly urgently requested by the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo to

16     go to Srebrenica to see for himself the situation on the ground, and to

17     see for himself how urgent the situation was, and to make sure that

18     humanitarian aid was no longer held up and blocked and would be made to

19     get through to the besieged people in the enclaves.

20        Q.   Can you describe your first entrance?

21        A.   The first entrance into the Srebrenica pocket was

22     5th, 6th of March, 1993.  And after eventually being allowed by the

23     Bosnian Serbs to go into the enclave, we found in Konjevic Polje that

24     there were not as many injured as had been reported to General Morillon

25     by the authorities in Sarajevo, but that the majority of the walking

Page 9136

 1     wounded in the refugees had passed through Konjevic Polje and had moved

 2     on to Srebrenica.

 3             The next day, General Morillon went up to the village of Cerska.

 4     To do so he had to again cross the frontline because the village of

 5     Cerska had been captured by the -- by Bosnian Serb forces several days

 6     previously.  And the refugees that I mentioned a couple of minutes ago,

 7     and the injured, were the ones who had come in the last few days from

 8     Cerska and who had escaped from Cerska before it was seized by the

 9     Bosnian Serbs.

10        Q.   That was your first entrance into the Srebrenica pocket.  Can you

11     tell me when the second time was?

12        A.   The second entrance into the Srebrenica pocket was about five

13     days later, four days later.  And because General Morillon having gone

14     into Konjevic Polje and Cerska, went back to Sarajevo to meet with

15     President Izetbegovic to tell him personally what he had seen, and

16     President Izetbegovic then asked him, and Morillon suggested to him that

17     it seemed as if Srebrenica was actually the place where the majority of

18     the refugees were.  So General Morillon said, I will now go back to

19     Srebrenica itself.  It then took about two or three more days before

20     General Morillon managed to get into Srebrenica.

21        Q.   Why did it take two to three days?

22        A.   Because he was stopped every 5 kilometres, every 10 kilometres,

23     at roadblocks.  And these -- at these roadblocks, you would be told that

24     whoever was Manning the roadblock did not have authority to let

25     General Morillon pass, so then there would be a wait of two, three, four

Page 9137

 1     hours.  General Morillon would try to get on the telephone with people,

 2     and then eventually he would be allowed through and he would be stopped

 3     at the next roadblock and he would be accompanied by -- General Morillon

 4     would be accompanied by ten vehicles and then part of the permission to

 5     go through past the roadblock would that be that he left two vehicles

 6     behind, so then it would be eight vehicles and then at the next roadblock

 7     it would be six vehicles.

 8             We then eventually reached Zvornik and then we were told that the

 9     mayor of Zvornik had to approve General Morillon passing and so we then

10     had to meet with the mayor of Zvornik, but he couldn't be found.  So then

11     we had to go and stay in the Hotel Yugoslavia which is just over the

12     river in Serbia proper.  We then met in the morning with the mayor of

13     Zvornik who wanted General Morillon to approve a resupply of chemicals to

14     a, I forget, something like an aluminium plant so that the plant could

15     start working again and if General Morillon would do that, then they

16     would allow General Morillon to ass.  General Morillon protested against

17     that linkage.

18             Then a Major Pandurevic turned up and Major Pandurevic is a

19     Bosnian Serb army officer who obviously had a lot of power and authority

20     in that part of Bosnia, and Major Pandurevic then said that he would help

21     and that he would give permission.  Eventually we left the mayor of

22     Zvornik's office and we were allowed to go to the bridge at Zvornik over

23     the Drina River, and there the Bosnian Serb captain who commanded the

24     bridge refused to let General Morillon cross.  And so there was another

25     stand-off for hours.  Eventually he was given permission to cross over

Page 9138

 1     into Serbia and he was told he had to go on the road from Zvornik to

 2     Bratunac, but on the Serbian side of the river, not on the Bosnian side

 3     of the river.

 4             On the other side of the river were two or three UNHCR convoys

 5     trying to go the other direction, in other words, cross the bridge from

 6     Serbia into Bosnia, and they had been held up there for four or five days

 7     or longer.  There was also the Canadian battalion, the 2nd Canadian

 8     battalion which was held up there and had been waiting there for three or

 9     four weeks just parked at the side of the road waiting for permission to

10     deploy into Bosnia.

11             We picked up an armoured personnel carrier from that Canadian

12     battalion and took it with us because we only had jeeps, and one truck of

13     supplies, of humanitarian aid of sugar and medicines, and we then

14     eventually reached Bratunac where we had to meet with the local Bosnian

15     Serb commander in Bratunac.

16        Q.   Sir, I don't mean to interrupt you, and you certainly have been

17     responsive to what took so long, but also the answer has taken quite a

18     long time as well and it appear that is that is the time for the break.

19     If the Court would like to break now or we can finish the answer.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  How much more do you have to finish this answer,

21     Mr. Tucker?  Do you think you can wrap it up and we can break?

22             THE WITNESS:  In two minutes, sir.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Two minutes.

24             MS. CARTER:

25        Q.   Sir, so we left this train in Bratunac, what happened once you

Page 9139

 1     reached there?

 2        A.   Just before we got to Bratunac, we were again held up on the road

 3     between Zvornik and Bratunac for two or three hours.  When we reached

 4     Bratunac, we were told that the bridge on the road from Bratunac to

 5     Srebrenica had been blown up the previous day and was now impassable, a

 6     bridge called the Yellow Bridge.  And then I looked at the map and found

 7     a small hill road that went up through the hills and the mountains into

 8     Srebrenica and the Serbs said, Oh, we don't know about that.  And so we

 9     said, Well, we'll try it.  And they obviously had no orders to stop us

10     from doing that.  And so rather reluctantly lets go up that route and

11     that's how we eventually, taking about eight or ten hours, managed to get

12     into Srebrenica.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  We'll take a break and come

14     back at half past 12.00.  Court adjourned.

15                           --- Recess taken at 11.59 a.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 12.29 p.m.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

18             MS. CARTER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19        Q.   Sir, when we left off just before the break, you were about to

20     enter Srebrenica proper for the first time.  Can you please describe what

21     you saw on that first day?

22        A.   We arrived in darkness, so it wasn't until a few hours later that

23     we could actually begin to see, and we then walked around Srebrenica in

24     order to see with our own eyes what the situation was.  The temperature

25     was well below zero.  There was thick snow on the ground.  There were

Page 9140

 1     thousands of refugees huddled in the streets and around buildings.  There

 2     was a wasteland next to the PTT building where there were wrecked cars.

 3     These wrecked cars didn't have any engines or wheels, but each car had

 4     about eight people living in it.  A couple in the engine compartment, a

 5     couple in the boot, and then four or five or six in the actual passenger

 6     compartment.

 7             We were taken to the school building in Srebrenica which was jam

 8     packed with people.  You could barely walk anywhere without stepping on

 9     people.  These people were very hungry, very cold.  The smell in the

10     place -- in any place where people were packed closely together in the

11     cold was indescribable.  It was a smell of rancid butter.  The smell of

12     human bodies who hadn't been washed in many -- in a long time.

13             We were taken to blocks of flats where there were 15, 20 people

14     to a room.  The stairwells in these blocks of flats, these apartment

15     buildings, the corridors, every space had people crouched desperately

16     with blankets and coats, and whatever they could around them.

17             People showed us what they were eating.  They were eating little

18     cakes made from a yellow flour which could be found on the hills

19     surrounding Sarajevo.  These people were, as I said, thin, obviously very

20     hungry.  Their eyes were dull.  These people had no hope.  They were

21     listless.  Basic hygiene wasn't being attended to.  People were not

22     supporting each other.  It was an extraordinarily depressing sight, and

23     it is one of the worst things that I have ever seen in my life.

24        Q.   Sir, as you were walk around the streets of Srebrenica, did you

25     have an opportunity to speak with anybody?

Page 9141

 1        A.   I personally did not directly speak with many people other than a

 2     couple of members of the Srebrenica war committee who happened to speak

 3     English.  We had General Morillon's body-guard who was a Macedonian and

 4     spoke Serbo-Croat, he was a foreign legion soldier, and whenever we

 5     wanted to talk with people, General Morillon would ask through his

 6     body-guard, and it's through this body-guard in most cases that we

 7     interacted with local people through language.

 8        Q.   Did you interact with the local people on that day?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   What did you learn?

11        A.   The people told us that they came from many areas, but most of

12     them had the people who were either out in the open or in the school or

13     in these apartment blocks had fled to Srebrenica within the last two,

14     three, four weeks.  And they had done so, and most of them came from

15     villages which had been within the Srebrenica enclave, but the Bosnian

16     Serbs had apparently started attacking again in early February and they

17     had started shelling villages, and these people had fled from these

18     villages.

19        Q.   Sir, when the villages were being shelled, was there any sort of

20     pattern or plan to that?

21        A.   The pattern that we observed was that the Bosnian Serbs would

22     start shelling two or three villages, and by shelling what I mean is one

23     shell every 20 minutes, then a pause of an hour, then three more shells.

24     So it wasn't a fierce Second World War style military bombardment, but it

25     was just desultory dropping of shells on a village.

Page 9142

 1             When they first started, the villagers described not really

 2     knowing what this was about.  However, after two or three days, then

 3     suddenly in a quick attack say 50 soldiers, 70 soldiers, infantry, a

 4     couple of tanks and a couple of armoured personnel carriers would then

 5     suddenly in a pincer movement attack a village and capture it.  And then

 6     a couple of days later it was the next village, then the next village.

 7     And the refugees told us that they very quickly spotted the pattern that

 8     the shelling was a precursor to the ground attack which would follow in

 9     two or three days' time.

10             So after the first few days when the fighting flared up around

11     the Srebrenica enclave, all it took was for the Bosnian Serbs to start

12     firing a few shells into a village for all the villager just to pick up

13     the bags and flee.

14             One of the tragedies was that in these villages in rural and

15     mountainous areas, these villages had stalk piles and stores --

16        Q.   Sir, let me stop you right there.  So you are indicating these

17     villages were falling in a pattern, but you also said what you observed.

18     Now, were you observing this pattern or were you only hearing it from the

19     villagers themselves?

20        A.   We were hearing the pattern reported to us.  The first time we

21     came across this was when we were speaking with villagers on that first

22     day in Srebrenica when we were walking around.  Secondly, is when we went

23     into Srebrenica, we had with us a number of UNMOs, who were unarmed UN

24     observers.  And after we arrived in Srebrenica, these UNMOs went out

25     every day into the enclave with Bosnian Serb guides.  And they went and

Page 9143

 1     their task was to go and see for themselves what was happening.  And they

 2     then reported back to General Morillon and myself and confirmed that they

 3     were seeing this pattern as well.

 4        Q.   Who was participating in these shellings?

 5        A.   Where the shells came from, obviously we did not know, but the

 6     soldiers who then attacked on the ground were Bosnian Serb [sic] soldier,

 7     so the assumption has to be that the shells were fired by the Bosnian

 8     Serb forces.

 9        Q.   And so just for clarification, at page 65, line 10, you indicated

10     it was Bosnian Serb guides that were taking you around to the village --

11        A.   Sorry, Bosnian Muslim guides inside the enclave who were taking

12     the UNMOs to the frontline in order to see what was going on.

13        Q.   Now, I stopped you earlier when you started describing the plight

14     of those who were pushed out of some of the smaller villages.  Can you

15     please tell us what made their situation unique?

16        A.   Their situation was that in their homes they had stores of food,

17     even though not much, they had something.  When they fled, they could

18     only flee with what they could carry or what their mule could carry.  In

19     other words, they had much less food with them.  So these displaced

20     refugees were the ones who were suffering the most from hunger and from

21     cold.

22        Q.   You were describing a very packed village in Srebrenica.  Did you

23     have an approximation of how many people were present in that a village?

24        A.   There were various people who had various estimates.  The talk

25     was from different people, by different people.  I mean, we had a couple

Page 9144

 1     of UNHCR people, we had a couple of WHO people.  There were some people

 2     from Medicins Sans Frontieres and a estimate varied from 20.000 to 40.000

 3     in and around Srebrenica itself.

 4        Q.   How long did you stay in Srebrenica on that first day or in that

 5     first period?

 6        A.   It was from about the 11th of March, 1993.  And I finally left

 7     Srebrenica on about the 28th of March.

 8        Q.   Okay.  During your time in Srebrenica, did you only communicate

 9     with those inside the village, or did you communicate outside the

10     village?

11     (redacted)

12     headquarters in Kiseljak.  We also had a US Army team with us who had

13     come with us in order to coordinate airdrops of humanitarian aid.  And

14     they had a satellite radio with them called a TacSat which they used to

15     speak with the United States European command in Frankfurt.  This same

16     radio was also able to speak with the United States aircraft carrier

17     which was in the Adriatic.

18        Q.   Okay.  Sir, outside of the communications that you had via phone

19     calls and that type of thing with your command, did you have any

20     communication with Serbian or Bosnian Serbian officials in regards to

21     what you saw?

22        A.   Yes.  We met -- General Morillon had a number of meetings with

23     Bosnian Serbs.  Initially with General Milovanovic, several meetings with

24     General Milovanovic which took place at the Yellow Bridge, which is this

25     bridge in between Bratunac and Srebrenica, which was over the river.  And

Page 9145

 1     that river was at the time the front line between the Bosnian Serb and

 2     Bosnian Muslim forces in that area.

 3             General Morillon also later had meetings with people in Bratunac

 4     itself, the mayor of Bratunac, the local Bosnian Serb commander in

 5     Bratunac.  He had meetings with Major Pandurevic on the outskirts of

 6     Zvornik.  He also met Pandurevic and another colonel, whose name I can't

 7     remember, near the bridge at Bratunac.

 8        Q.   Let me stop there.  When you met with Pandurevic, what did you

 9     discuss?

10        A.   The meeting with Pandurevic was mainly about letting

11     General Morillon pass and letting humanitarian aid convoys through,

12     because it seemed that Pandurevic had a lot of control over what happened

13     in the area.  Pandurevic -- General Morillon also requested Pandurevic to

14     do everything he could to stop the UNHCR convoys which were being blocked

15     in Zvornik, to stop them being blocked, and to allow them to go through.

16        Q.   Where specifically were you meeting with Pandurevic?

17        A.   We met with Pandurevic a number of times.  We met with him

18     outside by the bridge -- first time we met Pandurevic was in the mayor of

19     Zvornik's office on the way into Srebrenica.  We then met with him near

20     the the bridge at Bratunac.  We met with him in what looked like his

21     headquarters on the outskirts of Zvornik.  It was a military barracks and

22     we had been blocked and Pandurevic took us to his office in order --

23        Q.   Sorry.

24        A.   Whilst he was "seeking permission for General Morillon to

25     proceed."

Page 9146

 1        Q.   Can you please describe his offices?

 2        A.   His office was in a military installation, a barracks.  And

 3     inside his office on the wall by his desk there were some military maps

 4     hanging on the wall, and this map had marked on it the -- was showing the

 5     area of the Srebrenica enclave, and this map showed a series of lines,

 6     and the biggest line around the outside had the date 7th of February on

 7     it.  And then the next line, which was smaller, had the date of

 8     10th of February, and there were about six or seven further lines, each

 9     line more recent with the last line being a couple of days previous.

10             These lines looked as if they were describing the perimeter of

11     the Srebrenica enclave, and they showed a steady progression of

12     diminishing size of the enclave.

13             When Pandurevic led Morillon and myself into this office, he just

14     led us in and told us to sit down and he would get us a cup of coffee and

15     walked out.  When he came back in again, he realised that this map was

16     showing on the wall and there was a curtain over it, and he went and

17     pulled the curtain over the map so we couldn't see it anymore.

18             MS. CARTER:  May we briefly go into private session.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  May the Chamber please move into private session.

20                           [Private session]

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 9147











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21                           [Open session]

22             THE REGISTRAR:  We are back in open session, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

24             Madam Carter.

25             MS. CARTER:  If I can have one brief moment, Your Honour.

Page 9150

 1        Q.   Sir, when we left off on your testimony, you were describing the

 2     steady progression and diminishing size of the Srebrenica enclave as

 3     depicted on the map in Pandurevic's wall.  Can you please advise the

 4     Court, was this map consistent with what you and the other units on the

 5     ground were seeing in and around Srebrenica?

 6        A.   Yes, this map showed in more detail than we had available from

 7     our sparse reporting, but where we did have information, this map was

 8     consistent.  And as a trained military officer, that map seemed to

 9     indicate the progression of the Bosnian Serb assault onto the enclave of

10     Srebrenica.

11        Q.   Okay.  Outside of your meetings with Pandurevic, you indicated

12     that you also had meetings with other persons.  Once you learned about

13     this plan, who did you speak with?

14        A.   The plan -- seeing this map did not tell us anything we didn't

15     already know.  We knew that fighting had started around the Srebrenica

16     enclave -- heavy fighting had started towards the end of January, early

17     February, and that the enclave was being steadily made smaller.  And we

18     spoke with -- or General Morillon spoke with Bosnian Serb leaders, I've

19     already described meetings with General Milovanovic and others, at which

20     he requested them to stop the attacks on the enclave pointing out that

21     whilst they -- the Bosnian Muslims were very angry about the attacks

22     which the Bosnian Muslims had started carrying out from --

23        Q.   Sir, you were actually asked who did you speak -- did you speak

24     to anybody about the plan.  Did you have any other meetings either with

25     Bosnian Serb or Serbian officials with regards to this operation in and

Page 9151

 1     around Srebrenica?

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, I think -- excuse me.  I think at this

 3     point we are moving a bit far afield.  The initial question stems from

 4     the following:

 5             "Sir, when the villages were being shelled was there any sort of

 6     pattern or plan to that?"

 7             And the gentleman's response has been with regard to a pattern

 8     which has now been elevated by virtue of the questioning asked to a plan.

 9     And there is no indication here of a plan, of some kind of created plan.

10     What there is is an indication of a pattern of activity.  And from what

11     we understand, evidence of that pattern.  But whether that is elevated to

12     a plan of a particular form is not in evidence, and it is inappropriate

13     to be calling this a plan.  Unless, of course, he had a conversation with

14     some Bosnian Serb official in which they said, Yes, we have a plan and

15     our plan is whatever it may be.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

17             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, this line of questioning actually

18     spawns from the fact that Colonel Pandurevic had a map on his wall that

19     had a very distinct line, confrontation line, decreasing the village as

20     well as the information the colonel has provided in regards to the

21     shelling of those outlying areas.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  The difficulty -- the difficulty with what was

23     just said, of course, is the interpretation.  It may as well be

24     memorialising that which is going on as anything else.

25             There's an absence of information that is a plan.  There is not

Page 9152

 1     an absence of information as he has testified to, that he perceived a

 2     pattern.  And with regard to the issue of pattern, objectively speaking

 3     from what he saw, he saw a pattern.  But that doesn't elevate itself into

 4     a plan, which is what I'm getting at.  Because if there's a plan, that

 5     means that some individual or individuals got together and created such

 6     of which there is no evidence.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter, I will say indeed when you did ask

 8     the question about a plan, I almost asked you what plan is this you are

 9     talking about.  I think the discussion up to that point had been about a

10     pattern.  If you could try and stick to that.  And if the word "plan" had

11     come from the witness himself for the first time, I would have gone along

12     with you, but you seem to suggest the word.  So the objection is upheld.

13     Page 72 at line 14 to 16.

14             MS. CARTER:  If I could have just one moment to consult with

15     counsel.

16                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

17             MS. CARTER:

18        Q.   Colonel Tucker, did you discuss with either the Bosnian Serb or

19     the Serbian leadership what you were seeing in and around Srebrenica?

20        A.   Yes, it was the main topic of all meetings with the Bosnian Serb

21     authorities who General Morillon met with.

22        Q.   At any point in time did you learn anything about these

23     operations?

24        A.   The Bosnian Serbs told us that over the Orthodox new year, that

25     Muslims out of the -- in the Srebrenica enclave had attacked Bosnian Serb

Page 9153

 1     villages around the enclave and had killed many villagers.  Karadzic even

 2     said to General Morillon that 1.260 villagers had been killed.

 3             Karadzic in an earlier meeting in January had told

 4     General Morillon that the supply lines, the roads from Zvornik down

 5     towards Pale which had to go through some fairly narrow areas were being

 6     regularly attacked by Muslims, Muslim commandos from the Srebrenica

 7     enclave.

 8        Q.   Sir, let me stop you there.  What I'm asking about, did you learn

 9     anything about the Serbian -- Bosnian Serbian operations in and around

10     Srebrenica?

11        A.   Yes, but it's, as with everything in Bosnia, I am afraid it's a

12     long answer because it connects about three different things together

13     which is what I'm trying to explain.

14             The Serb, Bosnian Serbs said that -- sorry, Karadzic requested

15     Morillon to investigate the disappearance of his nephew who had

16     disappeared having left Zvornik towards Pale but had never arrived.

17     These were given as examples by the Bosnian Serbs as to military

18     activities and war crimes which they declared had been perpetrated by

19     Bosnian Muslims in -- from the enclaves, and that they were attacking the

20     enclave, and that this was deliberate in order to find the war criminals

21     who had carried out these massacres of Bosnian Serb villagers in order to

22     prosecute them.

23        Q.   In your time in Srebrenica, were the villagers who were coming in

24     to Srebrenica being held criminally or prosecuted?

25        A.   I am afraid I don't understand the question.  The villagers were

Page 9154

 1     just refugees, just fleeing into Srebrenica.

 2        Q.   So in regards to this conversation with Karadzic that they were

 3     targeting these villages in order to make arrests, was that consistent

 4     with what you were seeing coming into Srebrenica?

 5        A.   Partially.  What we were seeing coming into Srebrenica were

 6     refugees fleeing from these villages which were being attacked in the way

 7     I described earlier.  In all the conversation that General Morillon had

 8     with Bosnian Serb authorities about trying to get humanitarian aid into

 9     the enclaves, what the Bosnian Serb authorities said was that they would

10     allow women, and children, and old-age men free passage out of the the

11     enclaves at any time.  However, they demanded the right to interrogate or

12     question all men of combat age in order to satisfy themselves whether or

13     not they had been war criminals and guilty of these attacks on the Serb

14     villages.

15        Q.   You mentioned previously in your transcript that you met twice

16     more persons in Belgrade.  Can you please describe the first of those

17     meetings?

18        A.   The first of those meetings was with Milosevic.  The second was

19     with General Mladic.

20        Q.   Can you please set the scene for the meeting -- well, first off,

21     when was the first meeting with Milosevic?

22        A.   The meeting with Milosevic was around the 25th of March, 1992 --

23     sorry, 1993.

24        Q.   And when you met with Milosevic, was he the one and only person

25     you saw that day?

Page 9155

 1        A.   When we arrived at the -- at Milosevic's palace in Belgrade,

 2     there were about 20 military and other senior people present.  About half

 3     were in uniform, about half were in suits.  However, as we walked deeper

 4     and deeper into Milosevic's palace, guards guided more and more of these

 5     other people away so that in the end we actually sat down in a large

 6     dining room with only Milosevic and General Morillon, his body-guard, I

 7     think Thornberry was there as well.

 8        Q.   Were you having conversations as you were being led further and

 9     further into the --

10        A.   General Morillon was speaking with Milosevic through Mihailov,

11     his body-guard, but I was not privy to what was being said because I was

12     walking behind them.

13        Q.   What were the topics of conversation for that meeting?

14        A.   The main topic of conversation was to ask Milosevic to exercise

15     constraint on the Bosnian Serbs and to get the Bosnian Serbs to stop

16     their attacks on the Srebrenica enclave, and to stop their search for

17     revenge for the massacres that they claimed to have happened in January,

18     and to allow humanitarian aid through to the injured and to the starving

19     refugees in the enclave.

20        Q.   During your time in Srebrenica, what would have led you to

21     believe that Milosevic could assist you in these matters?

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, that assumes that's a fact not in evidence,

23     which is that is a period of time in which he had such a belief.  He

24     could have had the belief before or after he ever went to Srebrenica.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

Page 9156

 1             MS. CARTER:

 2        Q.   Sir, why would you pose -- why would General Morillon have

 3     proposed these requests to Milosevic?

 4        A.   General Morillon believed that Milosevic as a fellow Serb would

 5     have some influence over the Bosnian Serbs.  Milosevic made very clear in

 6     that meeting that he would do everything that he could, but that he had

 7     no authority or control over the Bosnian Serbs.

 8        Q.   You indicated previously that shortly after that meeting, you

 9     also had a meeting with Mladic in Belgrade.  Can you please advise the

10     Court how that came about?

11        A.   That meeting came about because General Morillon also asked

12     Milosevic to see if he could get Mladic to come to a meeting because

13     General Morillon told Milosevic that he believed that Mladic was the

14     Bosnian Serb with the most influence over what was happening around

15     Srebrenica.

16             And General Morillon requested Milosevic's assistance in getting

17     a meeting with General Mladic.  This is in the context that I mentioned a

18     couple of hours previously that Mladic had refused or started refusing to

19     meet with General Morillon anymore back in January.  So General Morillon

20     had not actually met with Mladic for a number of months.

21        Q.   How quickly was Milosevic able to accede to your request?

22        A.   Milosevic's assistant told General Morillon later that evening

23     that a meeting was being set up or had been arranged the next day in

24     Belgrade at a villa belonging to the Belgrade government, and that a

25     delegation from Republika Srpska would be attending, and that

Page 9157

 1     General Mladic would be there.

 2        Q.   What did this tell you, if anything, about that relationship?

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm going to object.  It calls for speculation in

 5     so many different ways.  The fact that the meeting is arranged as this --

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

 7             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, the witness after having numerous

 8     meetings with these individuals, is certainly able to discuss his

 9     observations as well as his opinions as to what was occurring.  Thus it's

10     not speculation.  He is stating the facts as they were known to him at

11     the time during those meetings.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  The fact that a meeting is arranged between two

13     individuals on an expedited basis when there is a perceived crisis is

14     hardly anything that necessarily tells you about the relationship as

15     between those two individuals.  I think that the logic behind the offer

16     of proof is lacking.

17             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, I can further respond, but in doing so,

18     I believe it may lead the witness, so I would prefer to stay in

19     generalities.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  In that event, then I will uphold the objection.

21             MS. CARTER:  Okay.  Your Honour, if the witness can be excused.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  In order to?  I've just upheld the objection.

23             MS. CARTER:  Okay.

24        Q.   Sir, how quickly was Milosevic able to summon Mladic,

25     specifically?

Page 9158

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I think that question has been asked and answered,

 2     Madam Carter.

 3             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, I believe he has a more specific

 4     answer.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Wait a minute, wait a minute, Madam Carter.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  She asked a specific question --

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can I just talk first, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  My apologies.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  At page 78, line 24, you asked:

10             "How quickly was Milosevic able to accede to your request?"

11             The witness did not answer that question.  He told you how

12     quickly he arranged the meeting.  And so we don't know how quickly

13     Milosevic acceded to the request.  He probably acceded almost

14     contemporaneously during the meeting; however, he said in his answer that

15     the meeting was arranged for the next day, so that is how quick the

16     meeting was arranged.

17             MS. CARTER:  I'll move on to another topic then, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you, ma'am.

19             MS. CARTER:

20        Q.   Sir, are you aware of the headquarters that Mladic had available

21     to him during your time in Bosnia?

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Again that assumes a fact not in evidence.  That

23     he had headquarters available to him.  The question also is leading in

24     nature.  She can ask a proper question with regard to this issue.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I thought you said you were going to another

Page 9159

 1     topic.  You want to talk about headquarters.

 2             MS. CARTER:  Yes, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Then that's the topic she wants to talk about, and

 4     the witness can tell us.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  The issue is headquarters available to him.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The question says: --

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Very well, I withdraw.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  -- "Are you aware of the headquarters that Mladic

 9     had available to him during your time in Bosnia?"

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  But that assumes that there were headquarters

11     available to him, and it's leading.  She can say, What physical location

12     did he have available to him at that time.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  A physical location is that he had his home

14     available to him, he had his --

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  But I don't know if he did or not.  He is a

16     Bosnian Serb operating in the Republika Srpska.  We are now in Belgrade.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But there are any number of physical locations

18     that can be available to him --

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, then --

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  -- in Belgrade, and if the topic that she wants to

21     talk about are headquarters, you can say -- yes, you can say that what

22     headquarters did have available to him may be slightly leading, but the

23     question is:  Did he have any headquarters in Serbia.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I misspoke myself.  I misspoke myself when I said

25     Belgrade, I should have said Bosnia.  If he is aware, he can ask what he

Page 9160

 1     is aware of, but to lead him to what he is aware of is improper.  And for

 2     purposes of getting through this, I withdraw the objection.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  Because I was going to rule

 4     against it.

 5             MS. CARTER:

 6        Q.   Sir, did you know if Ratko Mladic had headquarters available to

 7     him?

 8        A.   I cannot say whether or not they were headquarters.  What I can

 9     say was that he had a facility available to him in Belgrade.

10        Q.   Where was this facility in Belgrade?

11        A.   I do not know where it was in Belgrade.  Mladic referred to it to

12     Mihailov when they were speaking in Serbo-Croat and then Mihailov told me

13     and it was -- that's one specific case where this came up.  But what kind

14     of building, what kind of facility, where it was, I had no information.

15        Q.   So the extent of your knowledge is that there was a facility in

16     Belgrade somewhere, and you have no further information on that?

17        A.   That is correct.

18        Q.   Okay.  Outside of this facility being available to Mladic, are

19     you aware of any other links between Serbia and Srebrenica?

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I don't think that that question is appropriate

21     either.  What she's doing, she's asking a question with regard to what

22     she is trying to prove, the theoretical basis of what's in her head, but

23     there is no evidence that there's a link between Srebrenica and Serbia.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Any response?

25             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, I'm actually not even --

Page 9161

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  As a matter of fact, excuse me, as a matter of

 2     fact, au contraire, the witness has specifically testified that in the

 3     conversations that were had with Milosevic, Milosevic indicated that he

 4     would do what he could to assist, and depending on what language one

 5     chooses to use, I believe that the gentleman used a language of seeing

 6     whether Milosevic could have individuals in the Bosnian Serb persuasion

 7     exercise constraint.  So I think the issue was an issue of whether or not

 8     he could influence them in some fashion.  But with regard to a link, he

 9     indicated that he had no direct control or control over them.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Maybe you can give a comprehensive answer now that

11     you have heard the further part.  I'm not sure I'm following all this.

12             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, I'm actually not certain if we have a

13     relevance objection, if we have a leading objection.  I am not sure what

14     the objection is to be able to respond to it outside of a diatribe.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The objection was that the question is not

16     appropriate either.  I'm not aware of that kind of objection unless you

17     tell us how inappropriate the question is -- can be inappropriate because

18     it is irrelevant, because it's --

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  The question, as presently posed Your Honour,

20     assumes facts not in evidence.  As presently posed, it is speculative,

21     and as presently posed it is not relevant.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

23             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, it's impossible for the response to be

24     speculative given that he will only describe what is known to him, and he

25     certainly was in a position to know certain occurrences.  And not being

Page 9162

 1     relevant, given the fact that the reason we are in trial here today is in

 2     relation to Belgrade and specifically the military's involvement and

 3     actives in Republika Srpska, it certainly would be relevant.  Thus, I

 4     would ask permission to ask the question.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The only problem, Madam, I don't know whether this

 6     is what causes the confusion, is that you are talking about a link

 7     between Serbia and Bosnia.  The link could be the Drina bridge.

 8             MS. CARTER:  Okay.  I will choose a word beyond "link" and

 9     hopefully this will get us somewhere further.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So if you talk about human beings from Bosnia and

11     the human beings from Serbia, that might make it a little better.

12             MS. CARTER:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13        Q.   Sir, outside of this meeting set up with Mladic, are you aware of

14     any other Serbian involvement in the operations at Srebrenica?

15        A.   Yes, I am.

16        Q.   Okay.

17        A.   About the 13th or 14th of March, the UN military observers who

18     were inside the Srebrenica enclave, who I described earlier, reported

19     seeing some aircraft, some military aircraft fly from -- over Serbia,

20     across the Drina River, fly over Bosnia, drop bombs on two villages, and

21     then fly back over Serbia and disappear into the distance over Serbia.

22     That event was reported to me by two UNMOs.  I then reported that event

23     to my headquarters in Kiseljak, and I believe it was reported further up

24     the UN chain of command.

25             If you want specific details of that, I have them in my diary.

Page 9163

 1     The first aircraft was a biplane.  The second two or three aircraft were

 2     monoplanes.  And I can give you the grid references of the names of the

 3     villages that they dropped the bombs on.

 4        Q.   Sir, that amount of detail will not be necessary.  Were these

 5     bombs dropped within the time-period that the other villages were being

 6     shelled around Srebrenica?

 7        A.   These two particular villages which were bombed were villages on

 8     the perimeter of the Srebrenica enclave, and were subsequently captured.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But the question, Mr. Tucker, was were these

10     villages bombed within the time-frame that the other villages were being

11     also attacked.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

14             MS. CARTER:

15        Q.   Sir, is that the only involvement that you were aware of from the

16     Serb side?

17        A.   That is the only factual involvement.  There were other potential

18     involvements which were reported to me.

19        Q.   What was being reported to you?

20        A.   We were --

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, objection.  Hearsay, unless it's sourced.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Carry on, ma'am.

23             MS. CARTER:

24        Q.   Sir, what were you learning and who were you learning it from?

25        A.   We were being told by Muslim refugees of bridges being laid

Page 9164

 1     during the night over the Drina River and lorries being driven across

 2     these bridges and then further into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 3        Q.   Sir, in visual inspections, your personal visual inspections, did

 4     you see anything that would be consistent with this story?

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, before the gentleman answers that

 6     question, the word "consistent" is a dangerous word when dealing with

 7     observations.  And has really very little relevance because anything can

 8     be consistent pretty much when dealing with it along those lines.  So I

 9     would object at this point to the use of the terminology "consistent."

10     If there's a fact to be established as opposed to a speculative notion

11     with regard to an objective situation, then the question can be asked in

12     that fashion, but the word consistent is a word which is notoriously

13     known to be not particularly helpful when trying to deal with the proof

14     of objective facts.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

16             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, the witness is merely being asked to

17     describe what he personally saw.  Again, it is not speculation, but

18     rather his personal observations.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Maybe you might want to phrase the question

20     slightly differently to hone in on what the witness observed.

21             MS. CARTER:

22        Q.   Sir, did you see anything that supported these reports?

23        A.   I personally saw on the journey from Zvornik to Bratunac on our

24     way into Srebrenica on the left-hand side of the road, in other words,

25     the side of the road away from the Drina River, in a valley between

Page 9165

 1     hills, in a flat, open area, markings and tactical signage of which

 2     military use in order to line up vehicles and marshal vehicles in

 3     preparation for something.

 4             In my -- those tactical markings were similar to that which -- in

 5     my own army, the British Army, you would have marshalled large numbers of

 6     vehicles prior to moving them somewhere.

 7        Q.   Sir, did this area seem to be of old use or of continual use?

 8        A.   There were tire marks, wheel marks in the ground, which had been

 9     left fairly recently, so it had been used fairly recently.  How long

10     previously and to what purpose, I obviously cannot say.

11        Q.   Sir, as you are describing the bridges that were going over the

12     Drina in court today --

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sorry, I apologise I'm going to object to the

14     question at this point.  That's not the testimony that's been adduced,

15     describing the bridges going over the Drina.  What you have is you have

16     unsourced reports of something being built.  And the fashion in which

17     these questions are being asked assumes that these are now proven facts

18     which they are not.

19             If Ms. Carter wishes to ask the exact same question and discuss

20     it from the standpoint of these are reports that he received, then I have

21     no objection, but the record begins to look from the questioner's

22     standpoint as if these are facts which are proved, and they are not, and

23     its an inappropriate way to ask a question.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter, at page 85, line 24, you have an

25     answer that says:

Page 9166

 1             "We were being ..." -- the transcript says "sold," but I suppose

 2     it should be "told" -- "... by Muslim refugees of bridges being laid

 3     during the night over the Drina River and lorries being driven across

 4     these bridges, and then further into Bosnia-Herzegovina."

 5             So I guess the nub of the objection is that that's what he was

 6     told?  You go to keep saying according to what you were told, not --

 7     because it's not a fact; it's what he was told.

 8             MS. CARTER:  Certainly.

 9        Q.   Sir, when you were told by Muslim refugees of the bridges being

10     laid during the the night over the Drina River, and of lorries being

11     driven across these bridges and then further into Bosnia-Herzegovina, did

12     you find these Muslim refugees to be reliable reporters?

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, the question as posed is without

14     foundation, and that meaning, just the language on line 4, sorry, starts

15     on line 3:

16             "Did you find these Muslim refugees to be reliable reporters?"

17             There's no basis for that particular question to be answered by

18     this individual at this time, that they are reliable reporters.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Carter.

20             MS. CARTER:  Sir, the witness has indicated that this is what was

21     reported to him, I'm merely trying to elicit whether these reports and

22     reporters were believable.  This gentleman is the one who was speaking

23     with them and can certainly tell from his experience what did or did not

24     appear to be reliable information to him.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, the question of the reliability of the

Page 9167

 1     information is distinct from the question of the reliability of the

 2     author of the information which I'm sure Ms. Carter appreciates.  That

 3     doesn't deal, of course, with the fact that he did not speak to any of

 4     these individuals, but rather there was -- any conversation that was had

 5     was a conversation that was reported to a third party at best and maybe

 6     more since he did not speak to any of these individuals directly and he

 7     has so testified.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Which individuals directly?

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  The Muslim refugees, whoever they may be.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We don't know whether he did or didn't speak to

11     them; that's not what he said.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  As a matter of fact we do, Your Honour.  He said

13     that he did not have direct conversation.

14             MS. CARTER:  Your Honour, the witness said that because he does

15     not speak Serbo-Croat, he always used a interpreter, that's how he spoke

16     with the refugee, specifically the body-guard of General Morillon.  To

17     say that that is somehow removed, that would be -- required that anybody

18     sitting in the courtroom today listening to a translation could not rely

19     upon that translation.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, we've been in that situation as a matter of

21     fact in this court.  A question of reliability -- the question of the

22     reliability of the author of information is a question which requires a

23     fair amount of analysis.  But with regard to where we stand right now,

24     there's lack of foundation with regard to the question that's been asked.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  There is a difference, Madam Carter, between

Page 9168

 1     whether a statement or a person is reliable, and whether the listener

 2     believes the person.  Those are two different concepts.

 3             MS. CARTER:  I will try to narrowly focus this.

 4        Q.   Sir, how did you learn about the laying of the bridges and the

 5     lorries coming over the Drina?

 6        A.   I learned about it through two sources.  The first was that some

 7     of our UNMOs reported being told that by locals.  And secondly was in

 8     conversation through Mihailov with some refugees as we were walking

 9     around Srebrenica.  And Mihailov was asking them what were they seeing,

10     where had they come from, had they had any food, when had they last

11     eaten, et cetera.  This came up in, and a particular refugee said that to

12     Mihailov and Mihailov said it to me.  So I heard it from two sources.

13        Q.   Did you believe this report?

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, objection.  Relevance as to whether he

15     believed it or not.  It's not relevant whether he believed it, he

16     obtained the information.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Objection overruled.

18             MS. CARTER:

19        Q.   Sir, did you believe this information?

20        A.   I believed it was plausible.

21        Q.   Why?

22        A.   Because we in UN BH command believed that the Bosnian Serb army

23     was incapable of carrying on operations without resupply of particularly

24     fuel and spare parts from somewhere.  We had intelligence assessments

25     which showed that the Bosnian Serbs had huge amounts of ammunition and

Page 9169

 1     were not short of ammunition, but they were very short of fuel and spare

 2     parts.

 3             We frequently came across Bosnian Serb military vehicles at the

 4     side of the road just run out of fuel.  And we therefore believed that

 5     they had to be getting fuel and spare parts from somewhere and the only

 6     logical place where this fuel and spare parts could possibly come from

 7     was from Serbia.  So, therefore, we believed that in some way, shape, or

 8     form they had to be getting across the Drina into Bosnia.

 9        Q.   You indicate that the only logical place where the fuel and spare

10     parts could possibly come from was Serbia.  Why is this the only

11     plausible place?

12        A.   Because they were --

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sorry, he didn't say plausible, he said logical.

14     There is a difference.  Line 25.

15             MS. CARTER:  My sincere apologies the transcript was being

16     corrected at the point that I was trying to read out.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

18             MS. CARTER:

19        Q.   You indicated that the only logical place for the fuel and spare

20     parts could possibly come from was Serbia.  What made you believe this?

21        A.   Logic.  There was a no-fly zone imposed over Serbia, so and we

22     knew that no aircraft were flying into Bosnia.  On the -- to the north,

23     to the west, and to the south, the Bosnian Serbs were facing enemy on a

24     front line and there was no -- obviously no resupply of any kind going

25     across those confrontation lines.  The only friendly area was to the

Page 9170

 1     east, to Serbia, over the Drina River.

 2             And General Mladic and all his colleagues in the Bosnian Serb

 3     Army had previously been members of the Yugoslav Army, and were

 4     therefore -- had in the -- literally a number of months previously been

 5     part of the military organisation of Serbia, and, therefore, it seemed to

 6     us highly likely that that is where they were getting resupply,

 7     particularly of fuel, but also of spare parts.

 8        Q.   When speaking -- or, were you aware of any other support from

 9     Serbia?

10        A.   Yes.  We heard gossip from Serb -- Bosnian Serb officers that

11     senior officers of the Bosnian Serb army continued to be paid from

12     Belgrade throughout the conflict.

13        Q.   You indicate that this was gossip.  Did you maintain the opinion

14     that this was gossip?

15        A.   We initially heard this in the margins of the various meetings

16     that we were having.  This was when Mihailov was speaking with Bosnian

17     Serb officers and Mihailov told me afterwards that they were waiting for

18     their money from Belgrade.  When I was subsequently in the -- this is in

19     1996, when I was subsequently in the UK crisis management headquarters in

20     Northward which was responsible for the provisions of UK military forces

21     to IFOR and to SFOR, I was -- I had intelligence made available to me

22     which showed that this was in fact the case and that the Bosnian Serb

23     senior officers, I can't remember whether it was a rank of major upwards

24     or whether it was a rank of colonel upwards, salaries were being paid

25     from Belgrade.

Page 9171

 1        Q.   Sir, I'm going to move back to your time in Srebrenica.  You

 2     indicated that the people were starving and listless.  Was any more aid

 3     brought to these people?

 4        A.   The first aid that we managed to get into Srebrenica was the

 5     beginning of December, as I had described a number of hours previously.

 6     The second aid that arrived in the enclaves came from the airdrops which

 7     started in February.  However, that was fairly haphazard and extremely

 8     dangerous.  The third time that -- and the airdrops carried on now and

 9     then for a number of months.

10             The third specific time that aid arrived in Srebrenica was on a

11     convoy of which General Morillon persuaded the Bosnian Serbs to allow

12     through and which arrived in Srebrenica around the 17th or

13     18th of March, 1993.  Then a further convoy arrived around the

14     27th or 28th, and I believe that then a number of further convoys

15     arrived, but I left Srebrenica around the 28th of March, so don't have

16     specific information after that time.

17        Q.   I'd like to focus on the convoy in which Morillon led.  Can you

18     please describe --

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  How long are you going to be on that?

20             MS. CARTER:  Oh goodness.  It will take a bit of time,

21     Your Honour.  I apologise.  I didn't notice.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Would then this be a convenient time?

23             MS. CARTER:  Yes, Your Honour.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Prior to the adjournment I request that we

25     receive copies of the intelligence that were made available to

Page 9172

 1     Colonel Tucker that he testified to at page 92, line 13.  Since we don't

 2     have that information.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We will take a break and come back tomorrow at

 4     9.00 in the morning.  Same courtroom.  Court adjourned.

 5             May I just say, Mr. Tucker, that while you are still in the

 6     witness-stand, you may not discuss the topic with anybody, the case with

 7     anybody, not even with your counsel.

 8             Okay.  Court adjourned.

 9                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

10                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 29th day of

11                           September, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.