1 Monday, 28 September 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 8.58 a.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning to everyone in and around the
6 courtroom. Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
8 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-81-T,
9 the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. Could we have the appearances
11 for the day, starting with the Prosecution, please.
12 MR. SAXON: Good morning, Your Honours. Dan Saxon, April Carter,
13 and Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Saxon. And for the
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Good morning, Your Honours. Daniela Tasic,
17 Chad Mair, Novak Lukic, and Gregor Guy-Smith appearing on behalf of
18 Mr. Perisic.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.
20 Mr. Saxon.
21 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, Ms. Carter will call the next witness.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
23 MS. CARTER: The Prosecution calls Colonel Pyers Tucker.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Pyers Tucker.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: There may be some discussion with regard to
1 Colonel Pyers Tucker's testimony. I believe that Ms. Carter believes
2 this is more appropriately a discussion which is had outside of his
3 presence. I, quite frankly, have no opinion in that regard, but I want
4 to raise the issue because she raised it with me informally. This deals
5 with the contours and extent of his testimony.
6 It's my understanding that it is the Prosecution's intent to have
7 Pyers Tucker testify with regard to matters that are pre-indictment and
8 not with regard to matters that deal with the indictment period. And
9 therefore, we would object on those grounds because of the issue of
11 But above and beyond that, there's also a question as to what
12 subject matters the Prosecution intends on having Mr. Tucker testify with
13 regard to. And in that regard, if one were to review the 65 ter summary
14 as it relates to Pyers Tucker, it is my understanding that his testimony
15 would be discrete and limited to those matters concerning Sarajevo
16 The reason I take that position is because the Prosecution
17 indicates that, among other things - and I'm just going to get to the
18 guts of what the Prosecution says with regard to his 65 ter witness
20 "He met Galic at least once and was involved in a number of
21 instances where protests were lodged inter alia because of the shelling
22 and sniping of civilians."
23 That of course would deal with Sarajevo.
24 "His testimony will be particularly relevant as to command and
25 control and notice. The witness worked as the assistant to
1 General Morillon. The witness will provide pre-indictment background as
2 to the situation in Sarajevo
3 military leadership of both warring factions including General Mladic."
4 "He will discuss the assassination of BiH deputy
5 prime minister Trialik [phoen] by a Bosnian Serb soldier in the presence
6 of UNPROFOR officials."
7 And we know from testimony that we have already heard, that
8 occurred in the Sarajevo
9 "Paragraphs of the indictment to which his testimony pertains.
10 Paragraphs of the indictment is 41 and background to the situation in
12 And if we review paragraph 41 of the indictment it states:
13 "In this time-period, the commanders of the
15 1992 to 10 August 1994
16 November 1995) and their superior General Ratko Mladic, continued in
17 extensive shelling and sniping attack on Sarajevo, mostly from positions
18 in the hills surrounding the city."
19 And that is the extent of the allegation as it relates to
20 paragraph 41. And I believe that the testimony that is to be adduced
21 from this witness is specific in nature and relates to only Sarajevo
22 The reason I raise this concern is because the proofing note that I have
23 received in large measure deals with the subject matter other than
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Guy-Smith, I'm not quite sure what this whole
1 speech is, is it an objection? Are you raising --
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes, it is.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't know what you are objecting to. Can I
4 suggest that as the situation arises, you stand up and object. I really
5 don't know what to --
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure, I was just trying to --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't know what to ask Madam Carter to say.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I was trying to be some assistance to the Chamber
9 because this issue is going to come up, and I wanted to give you some
10 information concerning the parameters and contours of what the concern
11 would be.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: I appreciate that, Mr. Guy-Smith. Unfortunately
13 it's just too much information for us to digest for purposes of an
14 objection. Can I suggest that you raise your objection as and when the
15 objection arises.
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure, not a problem.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much. Madam Carter.
18 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, not to be disrespectful to -- from
19 Your Honours most recent ruling, I do understand what Mr. Guy-Smith is
20 indicating, he is reciting the 65 ter summary that was submitted during
21 the pre-trial brief stage of this case in which we had limited the
22 65 ter summary solely to Sarajevo
23 1 May 2008
24 the 65 ter summary of Pyers Tucker to include Srebrenica.
25 I can recite the 65 ter summary in full, but I would guide
1 Mr. Guy-Smith as well as the Court to the full summary that is dated
2 1 May 2008
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, ma'am. May I suggest also that you give that
4 answer to Mr. Guy-Smith as and when he stands up to object.
5 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour. And when Mr. Guy-Smith
6 began his objection, he was also speaking to the pre-indictment evidence
7 that will be given by this witness. I had suggested that we deal with
8 this before the witness comes in because the way I intend to respond to
9 that objection would be inappropriate in front of this witness. And
10 given the fact that the witness's entire testimony does relate to
11 pre-indictment period, I believe that it would be appropriate to respond
12 to that at this time.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Proceed, ma'am.
14 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour. Colonel Tucker will testify
15 to the 1992 to 1993 siege of Sarajevo
16 eastern municipalities by the Bosnian Serb army.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sorry. Excuse me. May I interrupt.
18 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you responding to the objection?
20 MS. CARTER: I am, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: On the pre-indictment area?
22 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour. Following worldwide condemnation
23 of these actions, the United Nations passed numerous resolutions.
24 Perisic was on notice of these crimes yet he continued --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's request: Could you please read
2 MS. CARTER: Certainly. Following worldwide condemnation of
3 these actions, the United Nations passed numerous resolutions. Perisic
4 was on notice of these crimes, yet he continued Serbia's assistance to
5 the VRS once appointed Chief of the General Staff of the VJ in
6 August 1993. This continued assistance led to the continued campaign of
7 shelling and sniping in Sarajevo
8 in July 1995.
9 Your Honours, I would argue that pre-indictment evidence may be
10 admitted to establish pattern, a specific element of a crime, or to
11 provide context. Admissibility turns on the finding that the evidence
12 has probative value to the indictment period.
13 Historically, this Chamber has admitted pre-indictment evidence
14 of notice and pattern. This evidence has been admitted through
15 adjudicated facts, witness testimony, and exhibits. And admitted
16 adjudicated facts concerning Sarajevo
17 evidence which established a consistent pattern of conduct proceeding the
18 indictment might be relevant to prove Perisic's mens rea.
19 Later, the Trial Chamber has accepted the testimonies of
20 General John Wilson and Aernout Van Lynden related to the 1993 and 1992
21 as evidence of notice.
22 Most recently, the Trial Chamber admitted as evidence the notice
23 of the reports of the Special Rapporteur of the commission on human
24 rights spanning 27 October 1992
25 related to the relevance of Sarajevo
1 focus the remainder of my argument on Srebrenica.
2 As detailed in the Prosecution's pre-trial brief, the prior
3 ethnic cleansing was antecedent to the 1995 massacre charged in counts
4 9 to 13 of the indictment. The fate of Srebrenica was sealed upon the
5 establishment of the strategic objectives to be carried out by the VRS,
6 which included the separation of the Serbs from the non-Serbs and the
7 elimination of the border between Serbia
8 operations began which were to be realisations of these objectives.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down for the interpreters.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter, the interpreters are complain that
11 you are reading too fast.
12 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not quite sure how reading that whole passage
14 that you are reading is in response to the objection. Aren't you able
15 just to tell us that you know according to that document of which the
16 Defence has notice, if they do, that in fact you are supposed to cover
17 the pre-indictment period.
18 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, my understanding of the Mr. Guy-Smith's
19 objection is twofold. One that the 65 ter summary bound us only to
21 dealt with pre-indictment information. I responded first to the
22 objection in regards to the 65 ter summary, and now I'm dealing with the
23 relevance of pre-indictment information.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: That was my understanding of what she was
25 responding to, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. You may proceed then, if you understand
2 each other.
3 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour. Cleansing operations began
4 which we were to be realisations of these objectives. By
5 19 November 1992
6 wider area of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica, and Cerska have not been
7 totally routed, and the decision was made to cleanse the territory of
8 Republika Srpska. The Drina Corps was tasked with forcing the Muslim
9 population to leave Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde. Further, paragraph 55 of
10 the indictment states that 1993 saw the International Court of Justice
11 and the United Nations issuing orders and resolutions condemning these
12 cleansing operations and calling for an end of hostilities.
13 By 8 April 1993, the International Court of Justice ordered the
14 FRY to take all immediate measures in its power to prevent genocide. The
15 UN reaffirmed this order and noted that the actions in Eastern Bosnia
16 involved unlawful attacks on civilians and called for the FRY to
17 immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment, and services to
18 the VRS.
19 While serving as the military assistant to the commander of the
20 United Nations protective force from October 1992 to March 1993,
21 Colonel Tucker met with the Serbian and Bosnian Serb leadership and
22 witnessed the ethnic cleansing of the eastern municipalities. This
23 cleansing operation was accomplished with the act of support of the FRY
24 including artillery fire from Serbia
25 UNPROFOR's movement, and the provision of salaries for VRS.
1 Colonel Tucker is uniquely placed to describe the cleansing --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down.
3 MS. CARTER: -- the cleansing campaign both as an observer as
4 well as a person in contemporaneous contact with the principal actors.
5 The witness met with Radovan Karadzic --
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Slow down, slow down.
7 MS. CARTER: -- and Ratko Mladic in November 1992. At that
8 meeting, Karadzic explained to him in graphic detail the plans in store
9 for the Muslim population. Taking a census map, Karadzic explained that
10 all territories which were 50 per cent or more Serbian populated would be
11 cleansed, stating that they had no desire to live with the Turks. This
12 operation began in the spring of 1992.
13 In March 1993, Colonel Tucker met with Colonel Vinko Pandurevic
14 future 30th Personnel Centre member. Colonel Pandurevic had maps on his
15 wall that detailed a systematic cleansing of the eastern municipalities
16 including dates and lines depicting how far the advance had progressed.
17 Later as commander of the Zvornik Brigade, Colonel Pandurevic was one of
18 the commanders responsible for the July 1995 massacre.
19 Colonel Tucker met with several additional commanders who would
20 eventually be members of the 30th Personnel Centre as detailed in
21 Schedule E of the indictment. Colonel Tucker met with
22 General Ratko Mladic, Major-Generals Zdravko Tolimir and
23 Lieutenant-Colonel-General Milan Gvero. These men would also later be
24 principals in the 1995 massacre.
25 As Colonel Tucker's evidence is relevant and probative to the
1 issues of notice, foreseeability, and pattern related to Sarajevo
2 Srebrenica, it is admissible and thus we would be requested to lead this
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: You may respond, Mr. Guy-Smith.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Yes. First of all, starting with the last
6 comment made on lines 22 through 25 on page 8 and line 1 of page 9, there
7 is no evidence presented of that in this case, and there is no proof of
8 that in any case as of yet.
9 I'd like to start with the very beginning of what Ms. Carter said
10 with regard to Mr. Perisic being on notice, and specifically she said on
11 page 5 at line 12:
12 "Perisic was on notice of these crimes, yet he continued Serbia
13 assistance to the VRS once appointed Chief of General Staff of the VJ in
14 August 1993."
15 That may well be the theory of the Prosecution, but there is no
16 evidence of that. There have been a number of occasions in which the
17 issue of nexus between the knowledge of Mr. Perisic and the act that was
18 being complained of or was attempted to be proved has been put into
19 question, specifically with regards to such issues as the issue of
20 foreseeability. And this Chamber has previously ruled that where there
21 is no nexus, that such evidence is inappropriate and inadmissible.
22 I understand the Prosecution's theory here, but with regard to
23 the factual predicates upon which they presently rely, there are a number
24 of glaring holes and failures of proof. And above and beyond that, once
25 again there has been no showing of a nexus between those events that
1 occurred prior to General Perisic's obtaining the position of
2 Chief of Staff and his knowledge of them.
3 And in the absence of that, what the Chamber is being asked to do
4 is hear evidence which is highly speculative with regard to what Perisic
5 knew, what Perisic was aware of and the absence of any hard evidence, and
6 the absence of any proof. And unless the Prosecution is in a position to
7 make an offer of proof whereby they can establish such a link, I would
8 submit, as I did at the outset, that this evidence is irrelevant to the
9 charges here. Maybe in some other trial they may not be. But to this
10 case, they are.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Objection overruled.
13 Madam Carter.
14 MS. CARTER: At this time the Prosecution calls
15 Colonel Pyers Tucker.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: While we are waiting for Mr. Tucker, is there a
17 possibility of reducing the temperature in the courtroom?
18 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: While we are waiting, with regard to the response
20 made by Ms. Carter concerning the 65 ter, I do stand corrected, I
21 withdraw the objection.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: We have ruled on the objection, Mr. Guy-Smith.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: I appreciate --
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: I was referring to the second part of that which
1 you said that when the issue came up in the event that I felt it
2 necessary to object when the specific issue came up, so I'm taking care
3 of that to expedite proceedings and also to acknowledge what my opponent
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Morning, sir.
8 THE WITNESS: Morning.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: We're sorry we took time to call you, dealing with
10 some other administrative matters. May you please make the declaration.
11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Tucker. You may be
15 Yes, Madam Carter.
16 Ms. CARTER: May it please the Court.
17 WITNESS: PYERS TUCKER
18 Examination by Ms. Carter:
19 Q. Colonel Tucker, can you please introduce yourself to the Court.
20 A. My name is Pyers Tucker. I was a British Army officer from 1976
21 through to 1997 when I left the British Army. During the time 1992 to
22 1993, I served as a United Nations officer on secondment from the
23 British Army in Bosnia
24 time, I was the personal staff officer of General Morillon. And as such,
25 my main responsibility was to arrange for meetings between
1 General Morillon and the various warring factions in Bosnia in order to
2 try and execute the mission which the general, General Morillon, was
3 obligated with from Security Council. During that time, I took the
4 minutes of many meetings, and I drafted reports for General Morillon
5 which were then sent from Bosnia
6 headquarters in Zagreb
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, at this point I would interject. He
8 was asked to introduce himself. He now is engaged in talking about his
9 day-to-day work. The narrative form of his answer is inappropriate.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
11 MS. CARTER: Certainly.
12 Q. Sir, I'd like to begin at the inception of your career. Can you
13 please describe what was your professional background and training in the
14 British military?
15 A. In the British Army, I was in the artillery. And my training was
16 the same training as all officers receive in the British Army but then in
17 particular I received training in artillery matters as an artillery
19 Q. How did you become a member of UNPROFOR?
20 A. The headquarters where I was serving in Germany was part of NATO,
21 and it was based in Moenchengladbach and that headquarters was appointed
22 to form the corps of the headquarters of the newly-formed United Nations
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina command. And as an officer of the headquarters, I was
24 sent to the former Yugoslavia
25 Q. Why was the Bosnia-Herzegovina command established?
1 A. In July/August 1992, UNHCR identified that if nothing was done it
2 was believed that over the winter of 1992 to 1993, I forget the exact
3 figures, but it was something like 1.2 million people were at risk of
4 dying from starvation unless something was done. And as a result of
5 that, about ten countries agreed in August 1992 to form this
6 United Nations Bosnia-Herzegovina command and contributed a total of at
7 that time about 7.000 soldiers in order to be deployed into Bosnia
8 order to facilitate UN Security Council resolution whose objective was
9 the facilitation of the supply of humanitarian aid to those in need.
10 I can't remember exactly details, but that was the essence of it.
11 Q. The supply of humanitarian aid to those in need, was that your
12 sole mandate as members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina command?
13 A. That was the sole mandate.
14 Q. Okay. You were describing before your specific duties and
15 responsibilities, and you indicated that you often attended meetings.
16 Can you please tell the Court how many meetings did you have during your
17 time in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
18 A. I was in Bosnia-Herzegovina for just under six months. And in
19 that that time I took the minutes of about 190 meetings; in other words,
20 just over a meeting a day.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: If I may just interrupt, Madam Carter, just to
22 understand your previous question. When you say, That was your sole
23 mandate, was that the sole mandate of UNPROFOR or was that the sole
24 mandate of some other ...
25 THE WITNESS: That was -- I cannot recall what the mandate of
1 UNPROFOR as a whole was, but the mandate of BH command in Bosnia was the
2 delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: BH command in Bosnia, BH command of what army or
4 whose ...
5 THE WITNESS: The BH command in Bosnia was the force deployed in
7 reported to, was subordinate to General Nambiar who was the commander of
8 UNPROFOR which was based in Zagreb
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
10 MS. CARTER:
11 Q. The meetings that you were setting up, who were they with?
12 A. The meetings were primarily with the warring factions. In other
13 words, it was with the Bosnian Muslims, in other words, the Presidency,
14 and their representatives inside Sarajevo
15 was with the Bosnian Serbs both military and political parlay and areas
16 around Sarajevo
17 That was the vast majority of the meetings, though there were
18 also meetings outside of Bosnia
19 Q. When you were meeting in Belgrade, who were you meeting with?
20 A. We met in Belgrade
21 Serb army headquarters in Belgrade
22 a group of people at Milosevic's palace.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: If we could have a time-frame for the meetings
24 you are referring to, since there are so many of them it might be of
25 assistance, times of these meetings.
1 MS. CARTER: Certainly.
2 Q. Narrowing to your meetings in Belgrade, can you tell me when you
3 met with these individuals?
4 A. The first meeting with a group of senior Serb army officers was
5 around January 1993, and the meeting with Milosevic was around
6 25 or 26 March 1993
7 Q. Okay. Backing up a bit, you indicated that you also met with
8 Bosnian Serb leadership, both political and military. Can you please
9 tell us who you were meeting with?
10 A. The -- the only name who I have from the meeting in January was
11 General Panic, and there were a group of about six or seven colonels and
12 other colonels and generals in the meeting as well.
13 Q. I'm sorry, we may have -- misunderstanding each other. When you
14 indicated you met with General Panic, are you indicating that he was a
15 Bosnian Serb officer?
16 A. No, no. Sorry, I understood your question to be about Serb
18 Q. And initially it was, but then I actually moved on to
19 Bosnian Serb officers. My apologies.
20 Okay, moving to Bosnian Serb military and political figures that
21 you met, who did you meet with?
22 A. We met with most of the senior Bosnian Serb officers starting
23 with General Mladic, General Milovanovic, General Galic, General Gvero,
24 and another 15 or 20 various generals and colonels. I would have to look
25 at my minutes if you wanted me to find the names of all of them.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Any of the political leadership?
2 THE WITNESS: Yes, met with Karadzic, met with Madam Plavsic, met
3 with - who is the guy who committed suicide? - Professor Koljevic. And
4 then in various towns and villages met with local political leaders.
5 Also met with -- with the president of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and
6 the -- again, I would need to look in my notes to recall the names of all
7 of them.
8 MS. CARTER:
9 Q. Sir, when did you first meet Karadzic?
10 A. I first met Karadzic in October 1992 just before he went to
12 Q. When did he return from Geneva
13 A. I can't remember exactly, but it would have been a couple of
14 weeks later, because we met him again in Pale in November.
15 Q. In the meeting in Pale, what did you discuss?
16 A. We had a number of meetings with Karadzic over those weeks, and
17 one of the first meetings in Pale where -- this was the first time that
18 we, the new UN BH command, were meeting with Karadzic, General Mladic,
19 with Koljevic, and a number of other -- I think Gvero was there as well.
20 And Karadzic and General Mladic were at pains to try and explain
21 historical background as they saw it, and one of the things that they did
22 was get out a map which showed the ethnic distribution of Bosnia
23 according to a recently completed census.
24 And what they explained to General Morillon was that they had no
25 intention to seize land which did not belong to them. And that they
1 identified land that belonged to them as being land where more than
2 50 per cent of the population was Bosnian Serb. And that they did not
3 want to live with -- together with the Bosnian Muslims. They had
4 suffered enough whenever they were governed by other people. They wanted
5 to live their own lives, separate from the Bosnian Muslims and --
6 Q. Sir, let me stop you there.
7 MS. CARTER: And if I can call up 65 ter 9233.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, right before we go into this, I would
10 at this time, based upon the proofing note that we've received, request a
11 full copy of Colonel Tucker's personal diary which is not in your
12 possession. I understand it's in his possession. We have some extracts
13 of it, but there's obviously information in his personal diary that we do
14 not have. And considering some of the subject matter that's just been
15 raised, it would be appropriate for the Defence to have the entire diary
16 so that we can review it for purposes of cross-examination.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
18 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, the diary as was stated by
19 Mr. Guy-Smith is not in our possession. However, it is in the possession
20 of Colonel Tucker. I would not believe it would be the Prosecution's
21 call as to whether that should be provided to the Defence.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I'm requesting the diary in all fairness at
23 this time so that we have the -- a basis upon which we can make a
24 determination with regard to those historical facts that Colonel Tucker
25 is alluding to.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: I am sorry --
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Perhaps I would ask Colonel Tucker if he would be
3 willing to provide the Prosecution so a copy could be made of as a matter
4 of courtesy. And if he doesn't feel that's appropriate, then we can move
5 from that position. But that's where I'd start.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not quite sure what this diary is all about.
7 We've asked for 65 ter 9233 to come up. Does this diary have anything to
8 do with the 65 ter 9233?
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: This diary may well have something to do with --
10 no, to do with 9233, it does not. It has to do with some of the
11 testimony that he just gave. With regard to 65 ter 9233, I don't know
12 whether that's on our list, but I'm not -- that's a different issue. So
13 before the witness examines that document, perhaps we could have a
14 discussion about that.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, let me find out, so you are just making a
16 request to Mr. Tucker to avail you his -- a copy of his diary?
17 MR. GUY-SMITH: That's correct, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. You can sort that with Mr. Tucker. It
19 doesn't call for a ruling from the Bench.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: But the difficulty is I'm not in a position to be
21 able to talk to Mr. Tucker.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: You can do so when you start your
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: But I'm -- if that's the case, then I will be
25 asking the Court for an adjournment because I don't have his diary and I
1 won't be in a position to review his diary before the cross-examination.
2 And I'd rather not truncate the examination, so I'm trying to figure out
3 a way of expediting the matter, which is why I'm raising it now. I'm
4 trying to be more efficient, not less, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: I understand. But the trouble is that the Bench
6 doesn't know anything about this diary. This topic of a diary just pops
7 up; I don't know where it comes from. And is it part of the pleadings?
8 Has it ever been mentioned in the documents that have been --
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: It's been mentioned in his testimony when he said
10 he was referring to his, I believe he calls them his notes.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Now you are asking for his diary.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: I would have to take a look at my minutes.
13 Perhaps it would be, I believe the word "diary" and "minutes" are
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: I do not think so. I think minutes are minutes
16 and a diary is a diary. A diary notes your appointments and minutes are
17 a record of what takes place in a meeting.
18 MR. GUY-SMITH: I have a different understanding of the language
19 there than you do, but that's okay. I'm asking for in whatever form he
20 has memorialised information concerning his impressions of meetings that
21 he had with the individuals that he has mentioned thus far in his
22 testimony, number one.
23 Number two, I'm requesting memorialisation in whatever form it
24 is, whether it be in minutes, a diary, a notebook, or any other
25 information above and beyond those individuals that he has specifically
1 referred to for the period of time that he was the assistant to
2 General Morillon and acting in that capacity he was a scrivener.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: He was a?
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: Scrivener, one who takes notes.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Carter, it looks like the request is
6 slightly different. I don't know whether you have any response to that.
7 At least I understand it differently from a diary, the request for a
9 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I believe that Mr. Guy-Smith took that
10 word because that is how I put it in the proofing note. What is in the
11 possession of Colonel Tucker that he reviewed during our proofing section
12 is a hard-back book that did take all of the notes of meetings. And so I
13 use the term diary, but we are talking about the same book that
14 Mr. Guy-Smith is requesting.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sure. But what is your response to his request?
16 He is asking for whatever form in which he memorialised what information
17 he had concerning the meetings that he had with the various people during
18 the time.
19 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, the document -- the item that he is
20 asking for was not in the possession of the Prosecution. We have
21 previously taken extracts and disclosed those over the years. The item
22 is the personal property of Colonel Tucker. To the extent that
23 Colonel Tucker is willing to have that photocopied in its entirety, we
24 certainly would have no objection to that. I've spoke within Ms. Javier,
25 she has indicated that if the staff would like to deliver - because we
1 are in the same position as Mr. Guy-Smith, we can't talk to the witness
2 either - if the witness would be willing to provide it, Ms. Javier would
3 be happy to photocopy it for the benefit of the Defence.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Tucker, do you -- I'm sure you've heard what
5 has been talked about, what is your response? Are you inclined to
6 release your diary or book, record, whatever it is, or are you not?
7 THE WITNESS: Providing that I get them back.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. I guess you would get them back.
9 MS. CARTER: Certainly. So whenever it is convenient, I suppose
10 at the court break if we can -- or actually at the end of testimony today
11 that way we can make photocopies in the event that Colonel Tucker might
12 need them during his testimony today.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed. And obviously if he is going to be asked
14 about them, he needs to have his original, copies should be made for the
15 the parties.
16 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not quite sure whether -- is the intention to
18 tender those documents?
19 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, they're not exhibits on the
20 Prosecution's list. I don't know if Mr. Guy-Smith intends to tender them
21 or what he might do with them.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. May an arrangement be made
23 that copies be made of Mr. Tucker's book.
24 MS. CARTER: Thank you. And, Your Honour, I -- unfortunately
25 when I called up the 65 ter number before I transposed numbers, the
1 65 ter that I'm actually looking for is out of the map book, 65 ter 9223.
2 It's map 4.
3 Q. Colonel Tucker, do you recognise the image on the screen?
4 A. Yes, this is the map which -- or looks very similar to the map
5 which Karadzic and General Mladic and Koljevic showed to General Morillon
6 at one of our first meetings in Pale.
7 Q. And when you were shown this map, you were describing before that
8 there was a claim to any territory that was 50 per cent Serb; is that
10 A. That is correct. And on this map was drawn a line which bounded
11 what Karadzic and General Mladic claimed was their land and was land of
12 the self-proclaimed, self-styled Republika Srpska. And their logic was
13 that if the land was more than 50 per cent populated by Serbs, then it
14 was their land, and they were going to push out and had pushed out those
15 who were not Serb out of those territories. And if the land was less
16 than 50 per cent Serb, then they had no claim or made no claim upon that
18 And the inference of what they were saying was that this line
19 that they were -- had drawn on the map was what was effectively the
20 frontline of the fighting between the -- primarily between the Bosnian
21 Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims.
22 Q. Colonel, as this is quite a colourful map, can you please
23 describe or point out which aspects that Karadzic was claiming were going
24 to be Republika Srpska?
25 A. It's largely the blue areas, if I understand this map correctly,
1 which are the over 50 per cent Bosnian Serb areas, and the frontline that
2 they drew in order to describe the boundaries of their self-styled
3 Republika Srpska basically adhered to the frontline as we United Nations
4 understood it to be at that time.
5 There were a couple of areas which were -- where their logic
6 broke down because up in the north towards Brcko there was a very narrow
7 piece of Bosnian Serb land with the Drina River on the north and the
8 Bosnian Muslims on the south, and that was of strategic importance to
9 them in order to link Western Serb territory with the Eastern Serb
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Once again, if we could have a date of this
12 meeting, that would be of some help.
13 MS. CARTER: I believe it was given before, but I'll re-ask the
15 Q. Sir, can you please tell me when you had these meetings in Pale?
16 A. This meeting, I believe, was at the beginning of November 1992.
17 We had actually first met with General Mladic and Karadzic in Lukavica on
18 the outskirts of Sarajevo
21 offensive which was carried out around 29, 30 November --
22 30 October, 1992
23 Q. Sir, your answers have provided two additional lines of
24 questioning. First, you indicated that the Serbs intended to push out
25 non-Serbs in the blue areas. How did they --
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, that's a misstatement. That would be
2 the Bosnian Serbs there.
3 MS. CARTER: I stand corrected.
4 Q. Sir, how did the Bosnian Serbs intend to push out the
5 non-Bosnian Serb population?
7 rounded up out of their houses, put into trucks, carted off, put in --
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: I appreciate that the Court does not approve of
9 objecting to an answer, but the question was quite specific and I would
10 ask Ms. Carter to direct the witness to answer the question. The
11 question was a question of intent and how did the Bosnian Serbs intend to
12 do something. The answer responds by not only hearsay, unattributed
13 hearsay, "we know from the United Nations" which is a relatively vague
14 answer. This dealt with a meeting that he was having with two specific
15 people and to the extent in that meeting they exhibited their intent, he
16 can respond in that fashion.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith. Can you please answer.
18 There's an objection, Madam Carter, would you like to
20 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour, I'm happy to rephrase the
21 question if it pleases the Court.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's not the question that is being objected to,
23 it is the answer that is not answering the question.
24 MS. CARTER:
25 Q. Sir, if you could please answer the question as you were asked.
1 How did Karadzic say he was going to accomplish the push-out of the
2 non-Bosnian Serb population?
4 Q. Were you aware at that time of how the push-out of the
5 non-Bosnian Serb population was occurring?
6 A. Yes, because I was in the chain of command of the UN military
7 forces in Bosnia
8 Q. What were they reporting?
9 A. They were reporting that people were being rounded up or had been
10 rounded up out of their houses, houses had been put on fire, and people
11 had been taken away and then transported to frontlines and then released.
12 There were moves inside Sarajevo
13 being transported out of Sarajevo
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: For the record, I would once again -- I would
15 object to any unsourced hearsay being elicited. If the gentleman can
16 source the hearsay, that would be fine. But otherwise, it is irrelevant
17 and of not much use to the Chamber.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: What is unsourced hearsay?
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: "Our soldiers were reporting" who, what, when,
20 where, how? How can you rely on that information? It's information that
21 has no basis.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
23 MR. GUY-SMITH: Especially when you are dealing with it from the
24 stand point of the military as we know. Within the military there would
25 be -- if such reports are being made, then such documents would be
1 available to the gentleman --
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: We've understood your objection.
3 Yes, Madam Carter.
4 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, the very beginning of the response
5 indicated that he was in the chain of command of the UN forces and those
6 were the soldiers that he was receiving the reports from. He directly
7 sourced the information.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you know which specific soldiers he sourced
9 them from within the chain of command?
10 MS. CARTER:
11 Q. Sir, can you please describe the chain of command in the
12 BH forces, UNPROFOR forces?
13 A. The main reporting that I saw in the chain of command was daily
14 reports which were produced by each of the battalions in UN BH commands.
15 These were compiled and sent every night from the respective battalions
16 to the headquarters of UN BH command. And one of my responsibilities was
17 to read those reports every morning because they came in overnight, and
18 General Morillon and I would then discuss them first thing in the
19 morning, and that was a daily routine.
20 Q. When you describe the reporting of what was occurring to the
21 non-Serb population, is this the same structure that you received that
23 A. Sorry, I don't understand the question.
24 Q. The reporting structure that you just set out, is that how you
25 were learning about the non-Serb population?
1 A. Partially. There was also the -- what I would refer to as the
2 the "Jajce incident" which happened at the end of October, which is when
3 the Bosnian Serb forces attacked, seized, and captured the town of Jajce
4 Reports from the British battalion in whose area that was taking place
5 said that Jajce had become a collecting area for many refugees who had
6 been ejected from Bosnian Serb territory. And the town was then -- which
7 was full of refugees was then attacked by the Bosnian Serbs and a long
8 column of refugees was then fleeing from Jajce towards Travnik.
9 And there were reports from the British battalion which had
10 soldiers in positions watching this retreat of refugees and the column of
11 refugees was reported by the British as being shelled with artillery from
12 Bosnian Serb forces to their north. And because this was a live event,
13 this was not reported in the 24 hourly report that I was describing
14 because this was live action. This was being reported throughout the
15 days in the end of -- towards the end of October. That was one
16 particular event by which I formed the knowledge that I described
18 The second was that in Sarajevo
19 beginning of November, there were a large number of Croats who were being
20 bused, I believe Serbs as well, though I can't remember exactly, who were
21 being bused out of Sarajevo
23 second event which was taking place at that time.
24 Q. Sir, you mentioned the Jajce incident. How long was the refugee
1 A. There were reports that the refugee column was about 30
2 kilometres long.
3 Q. Thank you, sir. Moving back to the meeting at Pale, what did
4 Karadzic and Mladic tell you about the people -- the Muslim areas that
5 were going to be a part of Republika Srpska?
6 A. They did not talk specifically about Muslim areas that were going
7 to be a part. They simply said that this, as the map that they were
8 showing me with a line on it, was what they claimed was Republika Srpska,
9 that they claimed international recognition of Republika Srpska, that
10 they were an independent country, an independent nation, and that they
11 did not want to have anything to do with the Bosnian Muslims.
12 Q. Sir, the reporting that you heard about the pushing out of the
13 Muslim population, how long had that been going on?
14 A. I only arrived in Bosnia
15 only seen newspaper reporting prior to that.
16 Q. And how long was it being reported that the Muslim population was
17 being pushed out?
18 A. From newspaper reports, it would appear that that had started in
19 late April, early May 1992.
20 Q. What media outlets were covering Bosnia at that time?
21 A. In other words, May to the time before I deployed to Bosnia
22 reading UK
23 broadcasting news outlets.
24 MS. CARTER: I would call up P -- I'm sorry, if I can submit
25 65 ter 9223 into evidence.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: 9223 is admitted into evidence. May it please be
2 given an exhibit number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. This document becomes
4 Exhibit P2693. Thank you.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. Yes, Madam Carter.
6 MS. CARTER: I would now like to bring up Exhibit P2440 at
7 page 2, paragraph 5.
8 Q. Sir, when specifically did you arrive in Bosnia?
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought he just answered the question a little
10 earlier. He said October 1992.
11 MS. CARTER: I'm looking for a date, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: A date. Thank you.
13 MS. CARTER:
14 Q. Sir, can you tell me what day you arrived in Bosnia?
15 A. I believe it was about the 26th, 25th of October, 1992.
16 Q. Thank you, sir.
17 MS. CARTER: If we can move to page 2, paragraph 5.
18 Q. Sir, before you is the report of the Special Rapporteur of the
19 Commission on Human Rights, a Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki who toured Bosnia
20 from 12 to 22 October 1992
21 violations were being continued and that a great number of people have
22 lost their lives and thousands more find their dignity violated.
23 Furthermore, Mr. Mazowiecki found the Muslim population are the principal
25 Based on your experiences in October of 1992, do you agree with
1 Mr. Mazowiecki's reporting?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 MS. CARTER: I now move to page 3 of the same report,
4 paragraph 6.
5 Q. Mr. Mazowiecki also came to the view that the principal objective
6 of the military conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the establishment
7 of ethnically homogenous regions and that ethnic cleansing does not
8 appear to be the consequence of the war, but rather the goal.
9 Based on your experiences, do you share Mr. Mazowiecki's view?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, without further establishment of some form
12 of, at this point, expertise, that view, although I'm sure is a sincere
13 one and firmly held by Colonel Tucker, is personal and irrelevant.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you suggesting that Mr. Tucker is here as an
15 expert witness?
16 MR. GUY-SMITH: Am I?
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Or that he should have -- he should be coming as
18 an expert witness to be able to give that view?
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Certainly to be able to give that kind of a view.
20 Absolutely. These are clearly ultimate facts upon which this Chamber is
21 going to have to decide. His personal experiences may well have brought
22 him to a particular conclusion, and with regard to his personal
23 conclusion, I would not have an argument with the gentleman. But further
24 than that, I don't think that such opinions have any relevance. And as a
25 matter of fact, in this regard, they are highly prejudicial, and I would
1 submit that any -- that the prejudice outweighs the probative value in
2 all respects.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
4 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, the witness is basing this opinion on
5 his personal knowledge and his conversations with the principals who were
6 a part of this plan. He described on the map that Karadzic showed him
7 that that is precisely what they were doing. So I am merely tying
8 Mr. Mazowiecki's report to the evidence that the witness has just
9 previously stated.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: This is the problem that we are now encountering
11 this objection because it doesn't seem apparent that you -- what you
12 asked this witness's opinion is based on what he himself saw and observed
13 and heard from the participants, but what he sees from this report. I'm
14 sure he can give you that opinion without this exhibit on the screen.
15 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour. I merely showed the witness
16 the exhibit because the Court's previous ruling with regards to this
17 exhibit was that it was going to notice rather than the truth of the
18 contents therein. So we -- in order to follow along with the Court's
19 ruling, I'm attempting to show it to the witness to put it in some
20 realtime context.
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: I think they are -- I also think they are doing
22 something else, which is self-evident from what she just said, which is
23 now they are attempting to establish the truth of the contents therein.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which is -- this is --
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: Which has already been ruled upon to their
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay. Anyway, this is an exhibit, that's why
3 she's not trying to confirm it. In that event, then I think you should
4 proceed and the objection would be overruled. If that is the purpose of
5 this document.
6 MS. CARTER: Certainly, Your Honour.
7 Q. Sir, following up on the Court's comments, the information that
8 you see before you, you said you share Mr. Mazowiecki's views. Can you
9 tell me specifically what did you learn while on the ground in Bosnia
10 that leads you to these opinions?
11 A. The first thing is the meeting in Pale with the census map that
12 I've just described to you. The second was the military assessment that
13 we in UN Bosnia-Herzegovina command made, which was that by the end of
14 October, early November 1992, that the Bosnian Serbs had achieved their
15 military objectives. In other words, they had achieved the seizure of
16 the land that Karadzic had described. What they wanted thereafter was
17 recognition of the status quo that they had seized.
18 Their objective in all the negotiations with United Nations was a
19 cease-fire across the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina along all of the
20 frontlines. What they objected to was the Bosnian Muslims who would
21 continue to attack in one place and then another, and then when the
22 Bosnian Serbs counter-attacked, then the Bosnian Muslims would plead for
23 the United Nations forces to broker a cease-fire.
24 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, moving back to the initial question, you
25 indicated that the reason you formed this opinion about the ethnic
1 cleansing was based on your meeting with Karadzic as well as the
2 information you were receiving from your troops. Did anything else lead
3 to your opinion in regards to the campaign of ethnic cleansing?
4 A. We were still receiving newspaper reports. We had press people
5 who every day looked at newspaper reporting and then produced summaries
6 of extracts of the main news events, which were relevant to us in Bosnia
7 Q. Sir, when you met with Karadzic - and I no longer need the
8 exhibit - when you met with Karadzic in November 1992, what was
9 UNPROFOR's position with regards to the plan?
10 A. UNPROFOR's position, which General Morillon emphasised, was to
11 facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid to all people in need,
12 regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. In order to -- one of the main
13 reasons, one of the main obstacles to the provision of humanitarian aid
14 was fighting, and so General Morillon offered the good offices of his
15 UNPROFOR personnel in order to assist the brokering of cease-fires
16 wherever there was fighting going on in order to facilitate the passage
17 of humanitarian supply convoys, relief convoys.
18 Q. Thank you, sir.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would that be a convenient point?
20 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: We'll take a break and come back at quarter to.
22 Court adjourned.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.13 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 10.45 a.m.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Madam Carter.
1 MS. CARTER:
2 Q. Colonel Tucker, you were describing the conflict in Sarajevo
3 you mentioned the conflict in Sarajevo
4 were the tactics that the Bosnian Serb army was using inside of Sarajevo
5 A. The Bosnian Serb army was not in Sarajevo. It was surrounding
7 recognition of the status quo that they had achieved. However, the
8 Bosnian Muslims did not accept that and so the Bosnian Muslims --
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: Once again I would ask Ms. Carter to control the
10 witness. The question was very specific, "What were the tactics the
11 Bosnian Serb army was using inside of Sarajevo." And I believe he has
12 answered that question.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
14 MS. CARTER:
15 Q. Sir, can you please tell me what military tactics was the Bosnian
16 Serb army employing with regards to Sarajevo?
17 A. There was -- there were two tactics. One was to reply with
18 overwhelming force using heavy weapons, to respond to any Bosnian Muslim
19 attacks out of Sarajevo
20 what -- and this is my interpretation as a military observer, terrorism
21 by artillery, by indirect fire.
22 Q. Can you please describe what you are talking about, what was
23 going on with the shelling?
24 A. There would be fairly continuous shelling throughout the day and
25 night, sometimes more intensively, sometimes less intensively, but there
1 was not aimed at any particular military objective.
2 Q. How were the civilians being impacted by this tactic?
3 A. It caused uncertainty and nobody knew where the next shells would
4 fall. And often civilians were injured or killed by these shells, so
5 they were under -- in a state of constant fear of where would the next
6 shells fall.
7 Q. Can you give a specific example where the Bosnian Serb army
8 replied with overwhelming force using heavy weapons?
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: First of all, that question is leading. And
10 second of all, it's vague, meaning specific example in terms of date?
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
12 MS. CARTER: With all due respect, Your Honour, the question
13 leads from page 34 starting at line 11 where he describes the two
14 tactics. And one was to reply with overwhelming force using heavy
15 weapons. I'm just trying to follow up on the previous response by the
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Objection overruled.
18 MS. CARTER:
19 Q. Sir, can you give an example of this overwhelming force?
20 A. One example is when in early December 1992 the Muslims -- the
21 Bosnian Muslims attacked out of the Stup area, which is a suburb at the
22 western end of Sarajevo
23 initially by surprise. The initial response from the Bosnian Serbs was
24 to concentrate as much artillery fire as they could. Several days later,
25 they had managed to bring some reinforcements of their very limited
1 regular infantry and armour, armoured vehicles to the area and then
2 counter-attacked, and then recaptured the territory of which the
3 Bosnian Muslims had temporarily captured.
4 And they then, the Bosnian Serbs, then proceeded to shell very
5 heavily the suburbs of Sarajevo
6 taken place.
7 Q. Well, if they were shelling the place where the attacks had taken
8 place, how was that inappropriate or overwhelming force?
9 A. Because they shelled not just the direct location of where the
10 attacks had taken place, but they shelled the suburbs behind there in
11 what I would describe as punishment attacks.
12 Q. How many shells were falling on those suburbs?
13 A. Many hundreds per day.
14 Q. And how long did this attack occur?
15 A. This particular attack around Stup went on -- the initial Muslim
16 attack was around a day, a day and a half, maybe two days long. The
17 Bosnian Serb counterattacks then took another week and then petered out
18 over a further week.
19 Q. You also described the random shelling of Sarajevo which you
20 called, but is not charged in this case, terrorism by artillery or by
21 indirect fire. Can you please give an example of that tactic?
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Objection. Not only relevance, but also with
23 regard to the issue of terrorism, that's a matter that has been discussed
24 on innumerable occasions. It's something that, I believe, the
25 Prosecution has agreed would not be led.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
2 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I'm -- the as I pointed out that is not
3 charged, what I'm trying to determine is what he was referring to in the
4 randomly shelling of Sarajevo
5 response, he gave that answer. I'm merely trying in order not to lead or
6 rephrase the witness's question using his own words.
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: I appreciate what Ms. Carter has said, but with
8 regard to the issue of terror or terrorism, the Prosecution is well aware
9 of the concerns and this is something that we have agreed upon during the
10 pendency of this trial, and I believe we are trying to get into the back
11 door with what we've agreed won't come in through the front door. It's
12 inappropriate to be using that language at this time. Whether or not the
13 witness has used those words, it is inappropriate to lead in that
15 MS. CARTER: Certainly.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: I just asked my fellow Judges to confirm, it does
18 seem as if the Chamber is not aware of this agreement, and I don't know
19 whether -- is this an agreement between the parties from which the
20 Chamber was excluded or is this an agreement that the Chamber is supposed
21 to be privy to?
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well it comes from -- it comes from -- it
23 actually stems from a ruling that was made by the Chamber in May of 2007
24 with regard to the application of the Rule 73(B) amendment of the
25 indictment, I believe it's paragraph 16 of that particular ruling. With
1 regard to the agreement, I think it would be fair to say that it has not
2 been a formal agreement. However, every time this issue has come up, and
3 there has been issues about what particular evidence would be led by
4 specific witnesses and the issue of terror has been raised, it has been
5 agreed that it would not be led.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: But the question -- my question was, is this an
7 agreement between the parties or is it an agreement to which the Chamber
8 is supposed to be privy?
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: I believe that it is a combination of an
10 understanding of the decision that was made by this Chamber with regard
11 to the the Rule 73 amendment of the indictment made in May of --
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you quote the ruling, please.
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sure, the Chamber notes paragraph 16, May 2007.
14 "The Chamber notes that at least 22 witnesses are scheduled to
15 give evidence on terror in Sarajevo
16 scheduled to give evidence on the 'terror count.' As the amended
17 indictment does not include a terror count, the relevance of this type of
18 testimony is not apparent. Although the Prosecution alleges a
19 'protracted campaign of sniping and shelling upon Sarajevo,' there is no
20 indication in the amended indictment that a protracted campaign is being
21 alleged in support of charge of Terror against the accused. Only one
22 indication on terror is given in the pre-trial brief: The Prosecution
23 asserts that written" -- italicised -- "evidence will be presented in
24 support of the assumption that inter alia, the nature or purpose of the
25 aforementioned campaign was to spread terror amongst the Serbian
1 population of Sarajevo
2 of extensive evidence on this aspect of the campaign. Therefore, the
3 Trial Chamber will instruct the Prosecution not to lead evidence on
4 'terror' in relation to the Sarajevo
5 Now, I understand that this is not evidence which is charged in
6 the indictment, however, it seems to be inappropriate to be leading such
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah, I just ask you to quote that for us.
9 Madam Carter, it seems that there is a ruling here by Chamber
10 that evidence on terror shall not be led.
11 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, the evidence that I'm attempting to
12 lead is specifically the random shelling of Sarajevo. That was described
13 as one ever the tactics. I am a just trying to lead evidence about is
14 there a specific example of that tactic.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: That is allowed. You can go ahead.
16 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. Sir, you indicated that the second tactic used by the
18 Bosnian Serb army was to randomly shell Sarajevo. Can you please give a
19 specific example of that tactic?
20 A. There was one event that I can describe which was on the night of
21 Christmas Eve 1992 when on the stroke of midnight every Bosnian Serb gun,
22 artillery piece, mortar, anti-aircraft gun surrounding Sarajevo opened
23 fire into Sarajevo
24 or 20 minutes. There was a 40 millimetre anti-aircraft gun mounted on
25 the hill-side above the Presidency, above the residency in Sarajevo
1 is where General Morillon's headquarters inside Sarajevo was, and which
2 is where I was located at the time of this incident. And this artillery
3 gun is a rapid-fire anti-aircraft gun and fired a cadence of boom-boom
4 boom-boom-boom boom-boom, boom-boom boom-boom-boom boom-boom, for about
5 15 minutes firing into the city.
6 Q. Okay.
7 A. 15 minutes. Not five zero.
8 Q. Sir, unfortunately for the record we won't be able to get the
9 specific boom booms that you gave out. Are you indicating that there was
10 a repeated pattern to the shelling?
11 A. Of that particular gun, yes.
12 Q. Is it possible that that's simply how that gun-fires?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Why?
15 A. Because it's an anti-aircraft gun and it would normally fire a
16 burst which would be four, five, six, maybe ten shells in rapid fire one
17 after the other. The gun has a trigger and the gunner of that particular
18 gun was clearly pressing that trigger specifically in order to fire out
19 that particular pattern, cadence.
20 Q. Now, you described that these tactics caused uncertainty in the
21 civilian population of Sarajevo
22 within the city?
23 A. People were very afraid, people were very anxious, people did not
24 like going outside into the open. And particularly into open areas, they
25 would run across open areas.
1 Q. Sir, what were the living conditions like for the people inside
2 of Sarajevo
3 A. The living conditions inside Sarajevo worsened during the winter
4 and the cold and were appalling. There was no heating. There was
5 virtually no gas coming into Sarajevo
6 electricity coming into Sarajevo
7 were down to minus 10, minus 15 degrees centigrade at times during the
8 winter and every single piece of wood in the city was stripped out and
9 every single tree and the roots were dug out of the ground in order to
11 There was very little water, and sanitation was very difficult,
12 and people were very hungry, and you could see that there were no fat
13 people in Sarajevo
14 Q. Sir, was there any outsiders reporting about the events in
16 A. There were international media present inside Sarajevo
17 particular they tended to stay in, I believe, it was the Holiday Inn
18 which was a predominant hotel in the middle of Sarajevo.
19 Q. Which media outlets were covering the siege of Sarajevo?
20 A. There were a number of independent journalists. There were also
21 journalists who were tied to the BBC
22 and to US newspapers who would come into, at least Sarajevo, for a week,
23 two weeks, and would then seek interviews with General Morillon and
24 others and would then report and then leave, come back six weeks later or
1 Q. Were any local or Balkan media outlets covering the siege of
3 A. Inside Sarajevo
4 Muslim newspaper which continued to print even during -- even throughout
5 the siege.
6 Q. Sir, I'd now like to move your testimony to the east and
7 Srebrenica. Can you please tell me, when did the eastern enclaves first
8 come to your attention in your role as an UNPROFOR officer?
9 A. The eastern enclaves came to my personal attention the first day
10 that we arrived in Bosnia
11 because of international newspaper reporting of attempts under the
12 previous commander of Sector Sarajevo, General MacKenzie, who had tried
13 to get humanitarian aid convoys into Gorazde escorted by Ukrainian, by
14 soldiers from the Ukrainian battalion based in Sarajevo.
15 Q. Why were humanitarian aid convoys necessary in the eastern
17 A. The eastern enclaves had been surrounded and isolated by the
18 initial Bosnian Serb attacks in May, June 1992, and when the Bosnian Serb
19 military had seized the land that I described earlier that General Mladic
20 and Karadzic showed me on the census map, they had seized those and
21 surrounded those areas, as I said, in May or June, but had not done much
22 more than isolate them. They were in quite mountainous terrain which was
23 of little economic interest to the Bosnian Serbs who seemed to just leave
24 them be, but isolate them and --
25 Q. Sir, let me stop you right there. You are using the words
1 "isolation of the eastern enclaves," and the initial question was: Why
2 were the humanitarian aid convoys necessary in the eastern enclaves.
3 What was the ground-level reality for the people inside those enclaves?
4 A. Those enclaves were surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces who
5 prevented food, any kind of supply, getting into those enclaves.
6 Q. Okay. And can you please tell the Court what areas are
7 considered the "eastern enclaves"?
8 A. The eastern enclaves were mainly centred around the town of
9 Gorazde, around the town of Zepa
10 around the village of Cerska
11 Q. Now, you indicated that in May or June these areas were
12 surrounded and that the Ukrainians had tried to provide humanitarian aid
13 at some point. Do you know when specifically the Ukrainian battalion
14 attempted aid to these enclaves?
15 A. The dates before I arrived in Bosnia I do not know other than I
16 can recollect reading newspaper articles. In the time -- from the time
17 that I arrived in Bosnia
18 attempts, and again by -- from memory it would be about three or four
19 attempts to get to Srebrenica and about two attempts to get to Gorazde.
20 The -- they did manage to get a convoy into Srebrenica at the
21 beginning of December 1992, and that was the first humanitarian aid
22 convoy that reached Srebrenica since the beginning of the conflict.
23 Q. What prevented these humanitarian aid convoys from getting into
24 the region?
25 A. The Bosnian Serb forces and authorities put roadblocks on the
1 road and prevented these convoys from proceeding and kept on coming up
2 with different reasons as to why they would not be allowed to proceed
3 from this roadblock further up the road, and eventually six hours later
4 permission would come and then they would go and they would be stopped
5 3 kilometres further, and so on.
6 Q. Did you bring this prevention to the attention of anybody?
7 A. Yes. We -- this was one of the permanent subjects of
8 General Morillon's discussions every time he met with any of the
9 Bosnian Serb military or political people.
10 Q. How often did this subject come up?
11 A. At every meeting. And these meetings were taking place with the
12 Bosnian Serbs almost daily.
13 Q. What excuses were given as to why the convoys could not pass?
14 A. One excuse was that the Bosnian Serbs demanded to search the
15 convoys to make sure that there were no weapons hidden in amongst the --
16 the humanitarian aid, the food and the medicines, et cetera. When they
17 insisted on doing that, it meant that the food was all ripped apart and
18 that the food was spoiled. They also used the excuse that there was
19 fighting on the road up ahead and that they could not guarantee the
20 safety of the convoy and that they were not allowed to pass.
21 Another excuse was that the locals living in the village, town,
22 or whatever had had suffered many losses and were up in arms and were
23 protesting about this convoy being allowed through and were blocking the
24 road and were not allowing the convoy to pass through. Another excuse
25 was to claim that they would allow convoys through to Bosnian Muslim
1 areas only when similar convoys were sent to Bosnian Serb refugee areas
2 as well. And they claimed that there was an imbalance in the amount of
3 aid that was being provided to the refugees of the different ethnic
5 Q. Were these excuses acceptable to UNPROFOR?
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: Relevance.
7 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I can rephrase the question.
8 Q. Sir, when you met with the Bosnian Serb political and military
9 leaders and these excuses were given, how did UNPROFOR react?
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I'm tempted to ask whether or not
11 Ms. Carter believes that the gentleman has a mouse in his pocket. He can
12 testify as to how he reacted and what he said or he can testify as
13 regards to what he heard some other specific individual said, but to ask
14 the question how UNPROFOR reacted is a bit problematic because UNPROFOR,
15 as we learned from this witness, is a relatively large organisation that
16 as I understand it has its headquarters in Zagreb. So I don't know
17 whether or not as the question is presently framed Ms. Carter is
18 suggesting that when there was a conversation between anyone in which
19 Colonel Tucker was present that Zagreb
20 are speaking about specific individuals.
21 I would once again ask as I've asked before that we have some
22 specificity here because among other things we are referring to specific
23 conversations with regard to specific subject matters on specific dates
24 that will ultimately have an impact not only with regard to the
25 cross-examination, but also with regard to the kinds of factual
1 determines that the Chamber is going to have to make. And to ask this
2 kind of a vague question is not helpful.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
4 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I'm indicating that the conversations
5 are the ones that Colonel Tucker was in fact present at. I believe that
6 that is specific. However, I can be even more specific.
7 Q. Sir, when you and General Morillon spoke with Bosnian Serb
8 political and military personnel and you received these excuses, what was
9 your response?
10 A. General Morillon --
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, first of all, that assumes that within
12 each -- that in the context of each of the meetings they received the
13 same excuses. And the reason I'm pressing the point for specificity is,
14 as Ms. Carter appreciates, this is a highly fluid time during the period
15 in which many many things were occurring. So to ask broad-based
16 questions with regard to how specific -- with regard to what specific
17 people said and what was specifically done in regard to what was said is
18 not helpful.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter, are you able to elicit from the
20 witness specific responses to specific excuses that were given. Maybe
21 take them one by one.
22 MS. CARTER:
23 Q. Sir, when is the first time you brought the humanitarian aid
24 convoys to the attention of, we'll start with the Serb military, with
25 General Mladic?
1 A. In order to answer a question like that referring to events
2 15 years ago or more, I would need to refer to specific meetings. What I
3 can say here now is that it was a subject in the first meetings that we
4 had at the end of October, early November, and continued to be a subject
5 of meetings throughout my time in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: I presume we are talking of October, November
7 of 1992?
8 THE WITNESS: That is correct, sir.
9 MS. CARTER:
10 Q. You indicated that it came up at your first meeting. At your
11 first meeting, what was discussed?
12 A. The need to allow humanitarian aid through to all those in need
13 regardless of which ethnic background that they came from. And that --
14 and General Morillon pressed the point that it was the responsibility of
15 all in the region whether they were Serb, Muslim, or Croats, to help the
16 United Nations forces move humanitarian aid to where it was needed.
17 General Morillon also made the point, and there were a number of meetings
18 where Jose Maria Mendiluce from UNHCR was involved. And who --
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: We've now -- once again I would ask Ms. Carter to
20 control her witness. We are talking about the first meeting. We are not
21 talking about anything but the first meeting. If the question is about
22 subsequent meetings, then he can respond to those questions. I really
23 must press the point here, Your Honour, and it will become evident
24 through the fullness of time why this is of importance. The question
25 was --
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Maybe. Okay. Fine. You can cut out that last
2 sentence where the witness is saying that General Morillon also made the
3 point and there were a number of meetings. Can you deal with one meeting
4 at a time, please, Mr. Tucker. You were talking about the first meeting
5 that you had in October, November 1992. Are you able to tell us about
6 that, if you remember?
7 MS. CARTER:
8 Q. Sir, can you first provide a date. What day did you first meet
9 on the subject?
10 A. I believe it was about the 27th or the 28th of October, 1992.
11 Q. Okay. When is the second meeting that you discussed this?
12 A. It would have been in early -- around the 5th of November, 1992
13 Q. Who was present at that meeting?
14 A. The first meeting with General Mladic --
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: You got to make sure, Madam Carter, that you are
16 on a wave length with the witness. You've asked him about the second
17 meeting and you followed up by saying who was present at that meeting,
18 the answer is the first meeting. You were on the second meeting.
19 MS. CARTER: Certainly.
20 Q. Sir, can you please tell me -- well, we'll flesh out what you
21 were just saying. Can you tell me who was present at the first meeting?
22 A. There were a number of people present at the first meeting. The
23 ones who I particularly recall were General Mladic, Dr. Karadzic,
24 Professor Koljevic, General Morillon, myself, and Adjutant Chief Mihailov
25 who was General Morillon's body-guard. There were other people as well
1 but I cannot, here, 15 years later, recall all their names.
2 Q. Okay. And as to the second meeting, who was present there?
3 A. The second meeting was Karadzic, Mladic, I believe Gvero was
4 there, and again General Morillon, myself, and Mihailov. There were
5 others there as well. Typically there were about eight or ten people in
6 total at these meetings.
7 Q. In relation to that second meeting, what did you discuss?
8 A. There were many things that we discussed. One of them was the
9 humanitarian aids to the eastern enclaves, but there was also the issue
10 of the deployment of the Canadian battalion into the Banja Luka area.
11 There was the deployment of the French battalion around Petrovac. There
12 was permission for engineers to go into the no-man's land between --
13 surrounding Sarajevo
15 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, focusing on the humanitarian aid, what was
16 said about why the -- excuse me. From BH command's position, what was
17 your concern at the second meeting?
18 A. We repeated that humanitarian aid was being dispensed equitably,
19 and it was driven by the independently assessed need on the the ground as
20 opposed to a 50/50, and that General Morillon expected that the
21 Bosnian Serb authorities to do everything in their power to ensure that
22 this aid got through.
23 Q. What was the Bosnian Serb response?
24 A. General Morillon -- General Mladic and Karadzic said they would
25 do everything that they could, but that it was not easy because there
1 were strong emotions on the ground and sometimes locals did not do what
2 they were told to do. They also asked for General Morillon to provide a
3 proposed route so that General Mladic's staff could verify its or suggest
4 alternatives so that the convoy would be able to reach its objective.
5 Q. Now, you mentioned that there were "strong emotions on the
6 ground." Are you aware or were you advised what those emotions were?
7 A. I cannot recall if at that specific meeting we were told, but it
8 was always the same, which is that locals had suffered badly in the
9 conflict and were objecting to aid passing through to the other side.
10 Q. Okay. Now, you said that was during the first week of November.
11 When was the third meeting?
12 A. It was later in November. I can't remember the exact dates.
13 Q. At the time of the third meeting, had humanitarian aid gotten
14 through to the enclaves?
15 A. No. There was -- at the third meeting, the convoy was underway
16 and Mladic kept leaving the the room in order to go and speak on the
17 telephone with his people in order to -- or this is what he was telling
18 us, in order to try and make sure that the convoy got through.
19 Q. Between the second and the third meeting, how much time had
21 A. A couple of weeks. This is meetings with General Mladic. There
22 were many other meetings as well.
23 Q. What were the other meetings?
24 A. The other meetings were with the Bosnian Muslims. At that stage,
25 General Morillon did not have any meetings with the the Bosnian Croats.
1 I think he met Colonel Siber for the first time in November.
2 Q. When did the first convoy actually get through, and to which
3 enclave did it reach?
4 A. I believe that a convoy reached Gorazde sometime in
5 October/November, but the first convoy to reach Srebrenica was in -- at
6 the beginning of December.
7 Q. Okay.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Tucker, can we just clarify. I thought you
9 said that the second meeting was around the 5th of November. Now, and I
10 thought you said that by that time of that meeting no convoy had gone
11 through yet?
12 THE WITNESS: No convoy had gone through to Srebrenica. My focus
13 was on Srebrenica. The convoys to Gorazde were being driven by
14 Sector Sarajevo
15 remember whether it was before the 5th of November or after the
16 5th of November that that convoy got through Gorazde.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
18 Yes, Madam Carter.
19 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Q. In regards to the eastern enclaves, and specifically with regards
21 to Srebrenica, are you aware of how many people were inside of the
22 Srebrenica enclave in October of 1992?
23 A. No, we were not. The United Nations did not have any of its own
24 personnel in the enclaves and the only reports that were available were
25 those from international news outlets who occasionally managed to get
1 reporters into those areas. That's the only information that we had at
2 that time.
3 Q. Were you aware that the people in the enclaves were originally
4 from those individual villages, or were they coming from somewhere else?
5 A. I cannot remember whether my initial information was from reading
6 those original news outlets, but what we subsequently, when we got our
7 own people into the enclaves, found out was that there were many refugees
8 in those enclaves who had fled there from other parts of Bosnia and who
9 had been driven out of where they had previously lived by Bosnian Serb
10 military, paramilitary, and police.
11 Q. Okay. When you say they were "driven out," are you aware of what
12 tactics were being used to drive these people out of their villages?
13 A. The reports that these people -- or what these people told our
14 soldiers when they were in the enclaves is that typically soldiers or
15 people in military uniform or police uniform would come banging on their
16 doors and tell them they had five minutes or whatever to assemble in the
17 square or whatever, and that they were then put on to vehicles with
18 whatever they could carry, and were then taken to a frontline, and were
19 then told to get out of the vehicles and then walk in a particular
20 direction. That was one approach.
21 The other approach was that people would hear that this was
22 happening in next village or the next suburb and they would not wait
23 until people came knocking on the door, and they themselves just picked
24 up what they could carry and of their own volition as it were would just
25 leave and try to find safety somewhere.
1 Q. You indicated that these people were reporting to the troops.
2 Did they indicate why they would leave when they would hear about the
3 pushes from the next village?
4 A. Because they believed --
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, I'm going to object to that question.
6 There are a myriad reasons why. This is during a war. The question is
7 absolutely irrelevant.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Objection overruled. Please carry on.
9 MS. CARTER:
10 Q. Sir, I'll repeat my question. You indicated that these people
11 were reporting to the troops that they were leaving because of the pushes
12 from the next village. Did they explain to you why they would do that?
13 A. Because they believed their lives were at risk.
14 Q. From whom?
15 A. From whoever was carrying out the, I'll use the word advisedly,
16 the ethnic cleansing.
17 Q. How long had this ethnic cleansing been going on?
18 A. I can say that it was going on whilst I was in Bosnia. I
19 believe, from reading international media and television that it had been
20 going on in Bosnia
21 April, May 1992.
22 Q. Okay. At any point in time were you able to enter the enclaves,
23 or specifically Srebrenica?
24 A. I entered the Srebrenica enclave twice. In fact, about six or
25 seven times, but the first time was not Srebrenica itself, it was
1 Konjevic Polje which is about 15 or 20 kilometres to the north-west of
2 Srebrenica. And that was on the 5th and 6th of March, 1992. I then,
3 with General Morillon, went into the Srebrenica enclave again about the
4 10th, 11th of March, 1992, and that was into Srebrenica itself. And we
5 were then in Srebrenica for the next two and a half to three weeks,
6 albeit we left Srebrenica, the enclave that is, on a number of occasions
7 to go and negotiate with Bosnian Serb military and authorities and then
8 returned back into the enclave.
9 Q. Sir, you gave the dates in March of 1992, is that accurate?
10 A. Sorry, 1993, my apologies.
11 Q. If you were expressing concern about the humanitarian situation
12 in October and November of 1992, what took so long for you to go to
14 A. The main reason was that we were working to priorities and in
15 October we knew about the enclaves but we had very little information
16 about the circumstances inside the enclaves, and there were other events
17 taking place which seemed more acute and, therefore, we focused on those.
18 The situation in the enclaves started escalating - and by
19 escalating what I mean is that the Bosnian Muslim authorities in Sarajevo
20 started increasingly demanding that United Nations and the international
21 community do more in order to get humanitarian aid into the enclaves.
22 And this started around middle of December 1992. And it then steadily
23 increased in -- or rather, the Bosnian Muslim pressure on
24 United Nations -- on General Morillon steadily increased throughout
25 January, and that led to the setting up of airdrops of humanitarian aid
1 into the enclaves because the United Nations was not succeeding in
2 getting humanitarian -- land-based humanitarian convoys through.
3 And then in February 1993 we heard reports about a lot more
4 fighting going -- starting up again around the enclaves, and the Bosnian
5 Muslim authorities were no longer only asking for humanitarian aid, but
6 were also -- also started asking for aid for injured -- people injured in
7 fighting. In other words, up until December/January, the enclaves were
8 simply surrounded and isolated, whereas in January/February, fighting
9 started building up and escalating around the enclaves.
10 Q. Thank you, sir. Now, you had indicated that there were airdrops
11 and other calls for humanitarian aid in the enclaves at the end of 1992
12 and the beginning of 1993. Who were you and General Morillon speaking
13 with in order to facilitate aid to the Srebrenica enclave?
14 A. Everybody and anybody who General Morillon was able to meet with.
15 What I mean by that is that General Mladic refused to see
16 General Morillon anymore, and the last meeting that he had with
17 General Mladic was, I think, at the end of December, like the
18 26th of December. Then he didn't meet Mladic again for -- I think the
19 next time he met Mladic was in Belgrade
20 March 1993.
21 So in between he was having to meet with Karadzic, with
22 General Gvero, I think he was a colonel at the time. There was a
23 Colonel Zarkovic.
24 . He met several times with General Milovanovic, who is the
25 Chief of Staff, who is General Mladic's Chief of Staff. He also met a
1 number of times with General Galic who was the commander of the Serb
2 force -- Bosnian Serb forces surrounding Sarajevo. And he met in
3 January/February with a number of Bosnian Serb politicians, members of
4 the, I think they called it the assembly or the National Assembly of the
5 Republika Srpska.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: May I just interrupt you before this line
7 disappears from the screen. Mr. Tucker, you said at page 54, starting
8 from line 16 you said:
9 "Then in February 1993 we heard reports about a lot more fighting
10 going on starting up again around the enclaves, and the Bosnian Muslim
11 authorities were no longer only asking for humanitarian aid, but were
12 also started asking for aid for injured people, injured in fighting."
13 In the notion of the United Nations, BH, what is that --
14 THE WITNESS: BH command.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Command. Was help to the injured not seen as
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, it was.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just that I wanted -- thank you so much.
19 Thank you, ma'am.
20 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Sir, you noted in your recitation with regards to Mladic, that at
22 some point in time you met him in Belgrade
23 your only meeting with persons inside of Belgrade?
24 A. No, we met in, as I mentioned earlier this morning, with the
25 Serb -- Serb Army high command in Belgrade in January 1993, and then we
1 met at the end of March 1993 with Milosevic in Belgrade. And the day
2 after or the day after that we met in Belgrade with General Mladic,
3 Gvero, and about ten other military and political people from the
4 Bosnian Serbs.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, and perhaps I'm confused here, I do
6 apologise. With regard to the question that Ms. Carter has asked, it has
7 as a reference point that he met with Mladic at the end of 1993 in
9 region at the end of 1993.
10 THE WITNESS: At the end of March 1993.
11 MR. GUY-SMITH: Okay. So that's clear. Just because as the
12 question reads it says -- because it's dealing with a series of meetings,
13 I have some concern that as the question is presently put there would be
14 the impression left that Colonel Tucker met with General Mladic in
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.
17 MS. CARTER:
18 Q. Sir, just to make sure we don't have our wires crossed in regards
19 to dates, when is the first time you met in Belgrade?
20 A. In January 1993.
21 Q. Okay. Who did you meet?
22 A. General Panic and a number of senior officers from the Serb --
23 Serb Army.
24 Q. What did you discuss?
25 A. We requested -- General Morillon requested their assistance in
1 exercising influence over their Bosnian Serb brethren to restrain
2 themselves and to allow humanitarian aid through and to prevent military
3 excesses from taking place.
4 Q. What was the response?
5 A. The response was that they would, of course, do everything in
6 their power. However, they made the point that the Bosnian Serbs were an
7 independent country and that whilst they could appeal to them, they had
8 no authority over them, and had no -- had no power to direct them to act
9 in any particular way.
10 Q. I am now going to take up the chronology of your entrance into
11 Srebrenica and we'll discuss the later Belgrade meetings in a while.
12 What specifically were the circumstances where you entered
13 Srebrenica or near Srebrenica for the first time?
14 A. The circumstances were that General Morillon had been
15 increasingly urgently requested by the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo
16 go to Srebrenica to see for himself the situation on the ground, and to
17 see for himself how urgent the situation was, and to make sure that
18 humanitarian aid was no longer held up and blocked and would be made to
19 get through to the besieged people in the enclaves.
20 Q. Can you describe your first entrance?
21 A. The first entrance into the Srebrenica pocket was
22 5th, 6th of March, 1993. And after eventually being allowed by the
23 Bosnian Serbs to go into the enclave, we found in Konjevic Polje that
24 there were not as many injured as had been reported to General Morillon
25 by the authorities in Sarajevo
1 wounded in the refugees had passed through Konjevic Polje and had moved
2 on to Srebrenica.
3 The next day, General Morillon went up to the village of Cerska
4 To do so he had to again cross the frontline because the village of
5 Cerska had been captured by the -- by Bosnian Serb forces several days
6 previously. And the refugees that I mentioned a couple of minutes ago,
7 and the injured, were the ones who had come in the last few days from
8 Cerska and who had escaped from Cerska before it was seized by the
9 Bosnian Serbs.
10 Q. That was your first entrance into the Srebrenica pocket. Can you
11 tell me when the second time was?
12 A. The second entrance into the Srebrenica pocket was about five
13 days later, four days later. And because General Morillon having gone
14 into Konjevic Polje and Cerska, went back to Sarajevo to meet with
15 President Izetbegovic to tell him personally what he had seen, and
16 President Izetbegovic then asked him, and Morillon suggested to him that
17 it seemed as if Srebrenica was actually the place where the majority of
18 the refugees were. So General Morillon said, I will now go back to
19 Srebrenica itself. It then took about two or three more days before
20 General Morillon managed to get into Srebrenica.
21 Q. Why did it take two to three days?
22 A. Because he was stopped every 5 kilometres, every 10 kilometres,
23 at roadblocks. And these -- at these roadblocks, you would be told that
24 whoever was Manning the roadblock did not have authority to let
25 General Morillon pass, so then there would be a wait of two, three, four
1 hours. General Morillon would try to get on the telephone with people,
2 and then eventually he would be allowed through and he would be stopped
3 at the next roadblock and he would be accompanied by -- General Morillon
4 would be accompanied by ten vehicles and then part of the permission to
5 go through past the roadblock would that be that he left two vehicles
6 behind, so then it would be eight vehicles and then at the next roadblock
7 it would be six vehicles.
8 We then eventually reached Zvornik and then we were told that the
9 mayor of Zvornik had to approve General Morillon passing and so we then
10 had to meet with the mayor of Zvornik, but he couldn't be found. So then
11 we had to go and stay in the Hotel Yugoslavia which is just over the
12 river in Serbia
13 Zvornik who wanted General Morillon to approve a resupply of chemicals to
14 a, I forget, something like an aluminium plant so that the plant could
15 start working again and if General Morillon would do that, then they
16 would allow General Morillon to ass. General Morillon protested against
17 that linkage.
18 Then a Major Pandurevic turned up and Major Pandurevic is a
19 Bosnian Serb army officer who obviously had a lot of power and authority
20 in that part of Bosnia
21 and that he would give permission. Eventually we left the mayor of
22 Zvornik's office and we were allowed to go to the bridge at Zvornik over
23 the Drina River
24 bridge refused to let General Morillon cross. And so there was another
25 stand-off for hours. Eventually he was given permission to cross over
1 into Serbia
2 Bratunac, but on the Serbian side of the river, not on the Bosnian side
3 of the river.
4 On the other side of the river were two or three UNHCR convoys
5 trying to go the other direction, in other words, cross the bridge from
7 or longer. There was also the Canadian battalion, the 2nd Canadian
8 battalion which was held up there and had been waiting there for three or
9 four weeks just parked at the side of the road waiting for permission to
10 deploy into Bosnia
11 We picked up an armoured personnel carrier from that Canadian
12 battalion and took it with us because we only had jeeps, and one truck of
13 supplies, of humanitarian aid of sugar and medicines, and we then
14 eventually reached Bratunac where we had to meet with the local Bosnian
15 Serb commander in Bratunac.
16 Q. Sir, I don't mean to interrupt you, and you certainly have been
17 responsive to what took so long, but also the answer has taken quite a
18 long time as well and it appear that is that is the time for the break.
19 If the Court would like to break now or we can finish the answer.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: How much more do you have to finish this answer,
21 Mr. Tucker? Do you think you can wrap it up and we can break?
22 THE WITNESS: In two minutes, sir.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Two minutes.
24 MS. CARTER:
25 Q. Sir, so we left this train in Bratunac, what happened once you
1 reached there?
2 A. Just before we got to Bratunac, we were again held up on the road
3 between Zvornik and Bratunac for two or three hours. When we reached
4 Bratunac, we were told that the bridge on the road from Bratunac to
5 Srebrenica had been blown up the previous day and was now impassable, a
6 bridge called the Yellow Bridge
7 a small hill road that went up through the hills and the mountains into
8 Srebrenica and the Serbs said, Oh, we don't know about that. And so we
9 said, Well, we'll try it. And they obviously had no orders to stop us
10 from doing that. And so rather reluctantly lets go up that route and
11 that's how we eventually, taking about eight or ten hours, managed to get
12 into Srebrenica.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. We'll take a break and come
14 back at half past 12.00. Court adjourned.
15 --- Recess taken at 11.59 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.29 p.m.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
18 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. Sir, when we left off just before the break, you were about to
20 enter Srebrenica proper for the first time. Can you please describe what
21 you saw on that first day?
22 A. We arrived in darkness, so it wasn't until a few hours later that
23 we could actually begin to see, and we then walked around Srebrenica in
24 order to see with our own eyes what the situation was. The temperature
25 was well below zero. There was thick snow on the ground. There were
1 thousands of refugees huddled in the streets and around buildings. There
2 was a wasteland next to the PTT building where there were wrecked cars.
3 These wrecked cars didn't have any engines or wheels, but each car had
4 about eight people living in it. A couple in the engine compartment, a
5 couple in the boot, and then four or five or six in the actual passenger
7 We were taken to the school building in Srebrenica which was jam
8 packed with people. You could barely walk anywhere without stepping on
9 people. These people were very hungry, very cold. The smell in the
10 place -- in any place where people were packed closely together in the
11 cold was indescribable. It was a smell of rancid butter. The smell of
12 human bodies who hadn't been washed in many -- in a long time.
13 We were taken to blocks of flats where there were 15, 20 people
14 to a room. The stairwells in these blocks of flats, these apartment
15 buildings, the corridors, every space had people crouched desperately
16 with blankets and coats, and whatever they could around them.
17 People showed us what they were eating. They were eating little
18 cakes made from a yellow flour which could be found on the hills
19 surrounding Sarajevo
20 hungry. Their eyes were dull. These people had no hope. They were
21 listless. Basic hygiene wasn't being attended to. People were not
22 supporting each other. It was an extraordinarily depressing sight, and
23 it is one of the worst things that I have ever seen in my life.
24 Q. Sir, as you were walk around the streets of Srebrenica, did you
25 have an opportunity to speak with anybody?
1 A. I personally did not directly speak with many people other than a
2 couple of members of the Srebrenica war committee who happened to speak
3 English. We had General Morillon's body-guard who was a Macedonian and
4 spoke Serbo-Croat, he was a foreign legion soldier, and whenever we
5 wanted to talk with people, General Morillon would ask through his
6 body-guard, and it's through this body-guard in most cases that we
7 interacted with local people through language.
8 Q. Did you interact with the local people on that day?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. What did you learn?
11 A. The people told us that they came from many areas, but most of
12 them had the people who were either out in the open or in the school or
13 in these apartment blocks had fled to Srebrenica within the last two,
14 three, four weeks. And they had done so, and most of them came from
15 villages which had been within the Srebrenica enclave, but the Bosnian
16 Serbs had apparently started attacking again in early February and they
17 had started shelling villages, and these people had fled from these
19 Q. Sir, when the villages were being shelled, was there any sort of
20 pattern or plan to that?
21 A. The pattern that we observed was that the Bosnian Serbs would
22 start shelling two or three villages, and by shelling what I mean is one
23 shell every 20 minutes, then a pause of an hour, then three more shells.
24 So it wasn't a fierce Second World War style military bombardment, but it
25 was just desultory dropping of shells on a village.
1 When they first started, the villagers described not really
2 knowing what this was about. However, after two or three days, then
3 suddenly in a quick attack say 50 soldiers, 70 soldiers, infantry, a
4 couple of tanks and a couple of armoured personnel carriers would then
5 suddenly in a pincer movement attack a village and capture it. And then
6 a couple of days later it was the next village, then the next village.
7 And the refugees told us that they very quickly spotted the pattern that
8 the shelling was a precursor to the ground attack which would follow in
9 two or three days' time.
10 So after the first few days when the fighting flared up around
11 the Srebrenica enclave, all it took was for the Bosnian Serbs to start
12 firing a few shells into a village for all the villager just to pick up
13 the bags and flee.
14 One of the tragedies was that in these villages in rural and
15 mountainous areas, these villages had stalk piles and stores --
16 Q. Sir, let me stop you right there. So you are indicating these
17 villages were falling in a pattern, but you also said what you observed.
18 Now, were you observing this pattern or were you only hearing it from the
19 villagers themselves?
20 A. We were hearing the pattern reported to us. The first time we
21 came across this was when we were speaking with villagers on that first
22 day in Srebrenica when we were walking around. Secondly, is when we went
23 into Srebrenica, we had with us a number of UNMOs, who were unarmed UN
24 observers. And after we arrived in Srebrenica, these UNMOs went out
25 every day into the enclave with Bosnian Serb guides. And they went and
1 their task was to go and see for themselves what was happening. And they
2 then reported back to General Morillon and myself and confirmed that they
3 were seeing this pattern as well.
4 Q. Who was participating in these shellings?
5 A. Where the shells came from, obviously we did not know, but the
6 soldiers who then attacked on the ground were Bosnian Serb [sic] soldier,
7 so the assumption has to be that the shells were fired by the Bosnian
8 Serb forces.
9 Q. And so just for clarification, at page 65, line 10, you indicated
10 it was Bosnian Serb guides that were taking you around to the village --
11 A. Sorry, Bosnian Muslim guides inside the enclave who were taking
12 the UNMOs to the frontline in order to see what was going on.
13 Q. Now, I stopped you earlier when you started describing the plight
14 of those who were pushed out of some of the smaller villages. Can you
15 please tell us what made their situation unique?
16 A. Their situation was that in their homes they had stores of food,
17 even though not much, they had something. When they fled, they could
18 only flee with what they could carry or what their mule could carry. In
19 other words, they had much less food with them. So these displaced
20 refugees were the ones who were suffering the most from hunger and from
22 Q. You were describing a very packed village in Srebrenica. Did you
23 have an approximation of how many people were present in that a village?
24 A. There were various people who had various estimates. The talk
25 was from different people, by different people. I mean, we had a couple
1 of UNHCR people, we had a couple of WHO people. There were some people
2 from Medicins Sans Frontieres and a estimate varied from 20.000 to 40.000
3 in and around Srebrenica itself.
4 Q. How long did you stay in Srebrenica on that first day or in that
5 first period?
6 A. It was from about the 11th of March, 1993. And I finally left
7 Srebrenica on about the 28th of March.
8 Q. Okay. During your time in Srebrenica, did you only communicate
9 with those inside the village, or did you communicate outside the
12 headquarters in Kiseljak. We also had a US Army team with us who had
13 come with us in order to coordinate airdrops of humanitarian aid. And
14 they had a satellite radio with them called a TacSat which they used to
15 speak with the United States European command in Frankfurt. This same
16 radio was also able to speak with the United States aircraft carrier
17 which was in the Adriatic
18 Q. Okay. Sir, outside of the communications that you had via phone
19 calls and that type of thing with your command, did you have any
20 communication with Serbian or Bosnian Serbian officials in regards to
21 what you saw?
22 A. Yes. We met -- General Morillon had a number of meetings with
23 Bosnian Serbs. Initially with General Milovanovic, several meetings with
24 General Milovanovic which took place at the Yellow Bridge
25 bridge in between Bratunac and Srebrenica, which was over the river. And
1 that river was at the time the front line between the Bosnian Serb and
2 Bosnian Muslim forces in that area.
3 General Morillon also later had meetings with people in Bratunac
4 itself, the mayor of Bratunac, the local Bosnian Serb commander in
5 Bratunac. He had meetings with Major Pandurevic on the outskirts of
6 Zvornik. He also met Pandurevic and another colonel, whose name I can't
7 remember, near the bridge at Bratunac.
8 Q. Let me stop there. When you met with Pandurevic, what did you
10 A. The meeting with Pandurevic was mainly about letting
11 General Morillon pass and letting humanitarian aid convoys through,
12 because it seemed that Pandurevic had a lot of control over what happened
13 in the area. Pandurevic -- General Morillon also requested Pandurevic to
14 do everything he could to stop the UNHCR convoys which were being blocked
15 in Zvornik, to stop them being blocked, and to allow them to go through.
16 Q. Where specifically were you meeting with Pandurevic?
17 A. We met with Pandurevic a number of times. We met with him
18 outside by the bridge -- first time we met Pandurevic was in the mayor of
19 Zvornik's office on the way into Srebrenica. We then met with him near
20 the the bridge at Bratunac. We met with him in what looked like his
21 headquarters on the outskirts of Zvornik. It was a military barracks and
22 we had been blocked and Pandurevic took us to his office in order --
23 Q. Sorry.
24 A. Whilst he was "seeking permission for General Morillon to
1 Q. Can you please describe his offices?
2 A. His office was in a military installation, a barracks. And
3 inside his office on the wall by his desk there were some military maps
4 hanging on the wall, and this map had marked on it the -- was showing the
5 area of the Srebrenica enclave, and this map showed a series of lines,
6 and the biggest line around the outside had the date 7th of February on
7 it. And then the next line, which was smaller, had the date of
8 10th of February, and there were about six or seven further lines, each
9 line more recent with the last line being a couple of days previous.
10 These lines looked as if they were describing the perimeter of
11 the Srebrenica enclave, and they showed a steady progression of
12 diminishing size of the enclave.
13 When Pandurevic led Morillon and myself into this office, he just
14 led us in and told us to sit down and he would get us a cup of coffee and
15 walked out. When he came back in again, he realised that this map was
16 showing on the wall and there was a curtain over it, and he went and
17 pulled the curtain over the map so we couldn't see it anymore.
18 MS. CARTER: May we briefly go into private session.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
20 [Private session]
11 Pages 9147-9148 redacted. Private session.
21 [Open session]
22 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
24 Madam Carter.
25 MS. CARTER: If I can have one brief moment, Your Honour.
1 Q. Sir, when we left off on your testimony, you were describing the
2 steady progression and diminishing size of the Srebrenica enclave as
3 depicted on the map in Pandurevic's wall. Can you please advise the
4 Court, was this map consistent with what you and the other units on the
5 ground were seeing in and around Srebrenica?
6 A. Yes, this map showed in more detail than we had available from
7 our sparse reporting, but where we did have information, this map was
8 consistent. And as a trained military officer, that map seemed to
9 indicate the progression of the Bosnian Serb assault onto the enclave of
11 Q. Okay. Outside of your meetings with Pandurevic, you indicated
12 that you also had meetings with other persons. Once you learned about
13 this plan, who did you speak with?
14 A. The plan -- seeing this map did not tell us anything we didn't
15 already know. We knew that fighting had started around the Srebrenica
16 enclave -- heavy fighting had started towards the end of January, early
17 February, and that the enclave was being steadily made smaller. And we
18 spoke with -- or General Morillon spoke with Bosnian Serb leaders, I've
19 already described meetings with General Milovanovic and others, at which
20 he requested them to stop the attacks on the enclave pointing out that
21 whilst they -- the Bosnian Muslims were very angry about the attacks
22 which the Bosnian Muslims had started carrying out from --
23 Q. Sir, you were actually asked who did you speak -- did you speak
24 to anybody about the plan. Did you have any other meetings either with
25 Bosnian Serb or Serbian officials with regards to this operation in and
1 around Srebrenica?
2 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, I think -- excuse me. I think at this
3 point we are moving a bit far afield. The initial question stems from
4 the following:
5 "Sir, when the villages were being shelled was there any sort of
6 pattern or plan to that?"
7 And the gentleman's response has been with regard to a pattern
8 which has now been elevated by virtue of the questioning asked to a plan.
9 And there is no indication here of a plan, of some kind of created plan.
10 What there is is an indication of a pattern of activity. And from what
11 we understand, evidence of that pattern. But whether that is elevated to
12 a plan of a particular form is not in evidence, and it is inappropriate
13 to be calling this a plan. Unless, of course, he had a conversation with
14 some Bosnian Serb official in which they said, Yes, we have a plan and
15 our plan is whatever it may be.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
17 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, this line of questioning actually
18 spawns from the fact that Colonel Pandurevic had a map on his wall that
19 had a very distinct line, confrontation line, decreasing the village as
20 well as the information the colonel has provided in regards to the
21 shelling of those outlying areas.
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: The difficulty -- the difficulty with what was
23 just said, of course, is the interpretation. It may as well be
24 memorialising that which is going on as anything else.
25 There's an absence of information that is a plan. There is not
1 an absence of information as he has testified to, that he perceived a
2 pattern. And with regard to the issue of pattern, objectively speaking
3 from what he saw, he saw a pattern. But that doesn't elevate itself into
4 a plan, which is what I'm getting at. Because if there's a plan, that
5 means that some individual or individuals got together and created such
6 of which there is no evidence.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter, I will say indeed when you did ask
8 the question about a plan, I almost asked you what plan is this you are
9 talking about. I think the discussion up to that point had been about a
10 pattern. If you could try and stick to that. And if the word "plan" had
11 come from the witness himself for the first time, I would have gone along
12 with you, but you seem to suggest the word. So the objection is upheld.
13 Page 72 at line 14 to 16.
14 MS. CARTER: If I could have just one moment to consult with
16 [Prosecution counsel confer]
17 MS. CARTER:
18 Q. Colonel Tucker, did you discuss with either the Bosnian Serb or
19 the Serbian leadership what you were seeing in and around Srebrenica?
20 A. Yes, it was the main topic of all meetings with the Bosnian Serb
21 authorities who General Morillon met with.
22 Q. At any point in time did you learn anything about these
24 A. The Bosnian Serbs told us that over the Orthodox new year, that
25 Muslims out of the -- in the Srebrenica enclave had attacked Bosnian Serb
1 villages around the enclave and had killed many villagers. Karadzic even
2 said to General Morillon that 1.260 villagers had been killed.
3 Karadzic in an earlier meeting in January had told
4 General Morillon that the supply lines, the roads from Zvornik down
5 towards Pale which had to go through some fairly narrow areas were being
6 regularly attacked by Muslims, Muslim commandos from the Srebrenica
8 Q. Sir, let me stop you there. What I'm asking about, did you learn
9 anything about the Serbian -- Bosnian Serbian operations in and around
11 A. Yes, but it's, as with everything in Bosnia, I am afraid it's a
12 long answer because it connects about three different things together
13 which is what I'm trying to explain.
14 The Serb, Bosnian Serbs said that -- sorry, Karadzic requested
15 Morillon to investigate the disappearance of his nephew who had
16 disappeared having left Zvornik towards Pale but had never arrived.
17 These were given as examples by the Bosnian Serbs as to military
18 activities and war crimes which they declared had been perpetrated by
19 Bosnian Muslims in -- from the enclaves, and that they were attacking the
20 enclave, and that this was deliberate in order to find the war criminals
21 who had carried out these massacres of Bosnian Serb villagers in order to
22 prosecute them.
23 Q. In your time in Srebrenica, were the villagers who were coming in
24 to Srebrenica being held criminally or prosecuted?
25 A. I am afraid I don't understand the question. The villagers were
1 just refugees, just fleeing into Srebrenica.
2 Q. So in regards to this conversation with Karadzic that they were
3 targeting these villages in order to make arrests, was that consistent
4 with what you were seeing coming into Srebrenica?
5 A. Partially. What we were seeing coming into Srebrenica were
6 refugees fleeing from these villages which were being attacked in the way
7 I described earlier. In all the conversation that General Morillon had
8 with Bosnian Serb authorities about trying to get humanitarian aid into
9 the enclaves, what the Bosnian Serb authorities said was that they would
10 allow women, and children, and old-age men free passage out of the the
11 enclaves at any time. However, they demanded the right to interrogate or
12 question all men of combat age in order to satisfy themselves whether or
13 not they had been war criminals and guilty of these attacks on the Serb
15 Q. You mentioned previously in your transcript that you met twice
16 more persons in Belgrade
18 A. The first of those meetings was with Milosevic. The second was
19 with General Mladic.
20 Q. Can you please set the scene for the meeting -- well, first off,
21 when was the first meeting with Milosevic?
22 A. The meeting with Milosevic was around the 25th of March, 1992
23 sorry, 1993.
24 Q. And when you met with Milosevic, was he the one and only person
25 you saw that day?
1 A. When we arrived at the -- at Milosevic's palace in Belgrade
2 there were about 20 military and other senior people present. About half
3 were in uniform, about half were in suits. However, as we walked deeper
4 and deeper into Milosevic's palace, guards guided more and more of these
5 other people away so that in the end we actually sat down in a large
6 dining room with only Milosevic and General Morillon, his body-guard, I
7 think Thornberry was there as well.
8 Q. Were you having conversations as you were being led further and
9 further into the --
10 A. General Morillon was speaking with Milosevic through Mihailov,
11 his body-guard, but I was not privy to what was being said because I was
12 walking behind them.
13 Q. What were the topics of conversation for that meeting?
14 A. The main topic of conversation was to ask Milosevic to exercise
15 constraint on the Bosnian Serbs and to get the Bosnian Serbs to stop
16 their attacks on the Srebrenica enclave, and to stop their search for
17 revenge for the massacres that they claimed to have happened in January,
18 and to allow humanitarian aid through to the injured and to the starving
19 refugees in the enclave.
20 Q. During your time in Srebrenica, what would have led you to
21 believe that Milosevic could assist you in these matters?
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, that assumes that's a fact not in evidence,
23 which is that is a period of time in which he had such a belief. He
24 could have had the belief before or after he ever went to Srebrenica.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
1 MS. CARTER:
2 Q. Sir, why would you pose -- why would General Morillon have
3 proposed these requests to Milosevic?
4 A. General Morillon believed that Milosevic as a fellow Serb would
5 have some influence over the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic made very clear in
6 that meeting that he would do everything that he could, but that he had
7 no authority or control over the Bosnian Serbs.
8 Q. You indicated previously that shortly after that meeting, you
9 also had a meeting with Mladic in Belgrade. Can you please advise the
10 Court how that came about?
11 A. That meeting came about because General Morillon also asked
12 Milosevic to see if he could get Mladic to come to a meeting because
13 General Morillon told Milosevic that he believed that Mladic was the
14 Bosnian Serb with the most influence over what was happening around
16 And General Morillon requested Milosevic's assistance in getting
17 a meeting with General Mladic. This is in the context that I mentioned a
18 couple of hours previously that Mladic had refused or started refusing to
19 meet with General Morillon anymore back in January. So General Morillon
20 had not actually met with Mladic for a number of months.
21 Q. How quickly was Milosevic able to accede to your request?
22 A. Milosevic's assistant told General Morillon later that evening
23 that a meeting was being set up or had been arranged the next day in
25 delegation from Republika Srpska would be attending, and that
1 General Mladic would be there.
2 Q. What did this tell you, if anything, about that relationship?
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.
4 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'm going to object. It calls for speculation in
5 so many different ways. The fact that the meeting is arranged as this --
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
7 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, the witness after having numerous
8 meetings with these individuals, is certainly able to discuss his
9 observations as well as his opinions as to what was occurring. Thus it's
10 not speculation. He is stating the facts as they were known to him at
11 the time during those meetings.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: The fact that a meeting is arranged between two
13 individuals on an expedited basis when there is a perceived crisis is
14 hardly anything that necessarily tells you about the relationship as
15 between those two individuals. I think that the logic behind the offer
16 of proof is lacking.
17 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I can further respond, but in doing so,
18 I believe it may lead the witness, so I would prefer to stay in
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: In that event, then I will uphold the objection.
21 MS. CARTER: Okay. Your Honour, if the witness can be excused.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: In order to? I've just upheld the objection.
23 MS. CARTER: Okay.
24 Q. Sir, how quickly was Milosevic able to summon Mladic,
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: I think that question has been asked and answered,
2 Madam Carter.
3 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I believe he has a more specific
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Wait a minute, wait a minute, Madam Carter.
6 MR. GUY-SMITH: She asked a specific question --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I just talk first, Mr. Guy-Smith.
8 MR. GUY-SMITH: My apologies.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: At page 78, line 24, you asked:
10 "How quickly was Milosevic able to accede to your request?"
11 The witness did not answer that question. He told you how
12 quickly he arranged the meeting. And so we don't know how quickly
13 Milosevic acceded to the request. He probably acceded almost
14 contemporaneously during the meeting; however, he said in his answer that
15 the meeting was arranged for the next day, so that is how quick the
16 meeting was arranged.
17 MS. CARTER: I'll move on to another topic then, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, ma'am.
19 MS. CARTER:
20 Q. Sir, are you aware of the headquarters that Mladic had available
21 to him during your time in Bosnia
22 MR. GUY-SMITH: Again that assumes a fact not in evidence. That
23 he had headquarters available to him. The question also is leading in
24 nature. She can ask a proper question with regard to this issue.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: I thought you said you were going to another
1 topic. You want to talk about headquarters.
2 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Then that's the topic she wants to talk about, and
4 the witness can tell us.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: The issue is headquarters available to him.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: The question says: --
7 MR. GUY-SMITH: Very well, I withdraw.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- "Are you aware of the headquarters that Mladic
9 had available to him during your time in Bosnia?"
10 MR. GUY-SMITH: But that assumes that there were headquarters
11 available to him, and it's leading. She can say, What physical location
12 did he have available to him at that time.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: A physical location is that he had his home
14 available to him, he had his --
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: But I don't know if he did or not. He is a
16 Bosnian Serb operating in the Republika Srpska. We are now in Belgrade
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: But there are any number of physical locations
18 that can be available to him --
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, then --
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- in Belgrade
21 talk about are headquarters, you can say -- yes, you can say that what
22 headquarters did have available to him may be slightly leading, but the
23 question is: Did he have any headquarters in Serbia.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: I misspoke myself. I misspoke myself when I said
1 is aware of, but to lead him to what he is aware of is improper. And for
2 purposes of getting through this, I withdraw the objection.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. Because I was going to rule
4 against it.
5 MS. CARTER:
6 Q. Sir, did you know if Ratko Mladic had headquarters available to
8 A. I cannot say whether or not they were headquarters. What I can
9 say was that he had a facility available to him in Belgrade.
10 Q. Where was this facility in Belgrade?
11 A. I do not know where it was in Belgrade
12 Mihailov when they were speaking in Serbo-Croat and then Mihailov told me
13 and it was -- that's one specific case where this came up. But what kind
14 of building, what kind of facility, where it was, I had no information.
15 Q. So the extent of your knowledge is that there was a facility in
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Okay. Outside of this facility being available to Mladic, are
19 you aware of any other links between Serbia
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: I don't think that that question is appropriate
21 either. What she's doing, she's asking a question with regard to what
22 she is trying to prove, the theoretical basis of what's in her head, but
23 there is no evidence that there's a link between Srebrenica and Serbia
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Any response?
25 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I'm actually not even --
1 MR. GUY-SMITH: As a matter of fact, excuse me, as a matter of
2 fact, au contraire, the witness has specifically testified that in the
3 conversations that were had with Milosevic, Milosevic indicated that he
4 would do what he could to assist, and depending on what language one
5 chooses to use, I believe that the gentleman used a language of seeing
6 whether Milosevic could have individuals in the Bosnian Serb persuasion
7 exercise constraint. So I think the issue was an issue of whether or not
8 he could influence them in some fashion. But with regard to a link, he
9 indicated that he had no direct control or control over them.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Maybe you can give a comprehensive answer now that
11 you have heard the further part. I'm not sure I'm following all this.
12 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, I'm actually not certain if we have a
13 relevance objection, if we have a leading objection. I am not sure what
14 the objection is to be able to respond to it outside of a diatribe.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: The objection was that the question is not
16 appropriate either. I'm not aware of that kind of objection unless you
17 tell us how inappropriate the question is -- can be inappropriate because
18 it is irrelevant, because it's --
19 MR. GUY-SMITH: The question, as presently posed Your Honour,
20 assumes facts not in evidence. As presently posed, it is speculative,
21 and as presently posed it is not relevant.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
23 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, it's impossible for the response to be
24 speculative given that he will only describe what is known to him, and he
25 certainly was in a position to know certain occurrences. And not being
1 relevant, given the fact that the reason we are in trial here today is in
2 relation to Belgrade
3 actives in Republika Srpska, it certainly would be relevant. Thus, I
4 would ask permission to ask the question.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: The only problem, Madam, I don't know whether this
6 is what causes the confusion, is that you are talking about a link
7 between Serbia
8 MS. CARTER: Okay. I will choose a word beyond "link" and
9 hopefully this will get us somewhere further.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: So if you talk about human beings from Bosnia
11 the human beings from Serbia
12 MS. CARTER: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. Sir, outside of this meeting set up with Mladic, are you aware of
14 any other Serbian involvement in the operations at Srebrenica?
15 A. Yes, I am.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. About the 13th or 14th of March, the UN military observers who
18 were inside the Srebrenica enclave, who I described earlier, reported
19 seeing some aircraft, some military aircraft fly from -- over Serbia
20 across the Drina River
21 then fly back over Serbia
22 That event was reported to me by two UNMOs. I then reported that event
23 to my headquarters in Kiseljak, and I believe it was reported further up
24 the UN chain of command.
25 If you want specific details of that, I have them in my diary.
1 The first aircraft was a biplane. The second two or three aircraft were
2 monoplanes. And I can give you the grid references of the names of the
3 villages that they dropped the bombs on.
4 Q. Sir, that amount of detail will not be necessary. Were these
5 bombs dropped within the time-period that the other villages were being
6 shelled around Srebrenica?
7 A. These two particular villages which were bombed were villages on
8 the perimeter of the Srebrenica enclave, and were subsequently captured.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: But the question, Mr. Tucker, was were these
10 villages bombed within the time-frame that the other villages were being
11 also attacked.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
14 MS. CARTER:
15 Q. Sir, is that the only involvement that you were aware of from the
16 Serb side?
17 A. That is the only factual involvement. There were other potential
18 involvements which were reported to me.
19 Q. What was being reported to you?
20 A. We were --
21 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, objection. Hearsay, unless it's sourced.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Carry on, ma'am.
23 MS. CARTER:
24 Q. Sir, what were you learning and who were you learning it from?
25 A. We were being told by Muslim refugees of bridges being laid
1 during the night over the Drina River
2 these bridges and then further into Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 Q. Sir, in visual inspections, your personal visual inspections, did
4 you see anything that would be consistent with this story?
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me, before the gentleman answers that
6 question, the word "consistent" is a dangerous word when dealing with
7 observations. And has really very little relevance because anything can
8 be consistent pretty much when dealing with it along those lines. So I
9 would object at this point to the use of the terminology "consistent."
10 If there's a fact to be established as opposed to a speculative notion
11 with regard to an objective situation, then the question can be asked in
12 that fashion, but the word consistent is a word which is notoriously
13 known to be not particularly helpful when trying to deal with the proof
14 of objective facts.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
16 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, the witness is merely being asked to
17 describe what he personally saw. Again, it is not speculation, but
18 rather his personal observations.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Maybe you might want to phrase the question
20 slightly differently to hone in on what the witness observed.
21 MS. CARTER:
22 Q. Sir, did you see anything that supported these reports?
23 A. I personally saw on the journey from Zvornik to Bratunac on our
24 way into Srebrenica on the left-hand side of the road, in other words,
25 the side of the road away from the Drina River, in a valley between
1 hills, in a flat, open area, markings and tactical signage of which
2 military use in order to line up vehicles and marshal vehicles in
3 preparation for something.
4 In my -- those tactical markings were similar to that which -- in
5 my own army, the British Army, you would have marshalled large numbers of
6 vehicles prior to moving them somewhere.
7 Q. Sir, did this area seem to be of old use or of continual use?
8 A. There were tire marks, wheel marks in the ground, which had been
9 left fairly recently, so it had been used fairly recently. How long
10 previously and to what purpose, I obviously cannot say.
11 Q. Sir, as you are describing the bridges that were going over the
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sorry, I apologise I'm going to object to the
14 question at this point. That's not the testimony that's been adduced,
15 describing the bridges going over the Drina. What you have is you have
16 unsourced reports of something being built. And the fashion in which
17 these questions are being asked assumes that these are now proven facts
18 which they are not.
19 If Ms. Carter wishes to ask the exact same question and discuss
20 it from the standpoint of these are reports that he received, then I have
21 no objection, but the record begins to look from the questioner's
22 standpoint as if these are facts which are proved, and they are not, and
23 its an inappropriate way to ask a question.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter, at page 85, line 24, you have an
25 answer that says:
1 "We were being ..." -- the transcript says "sold," but I suppose
2 it should be "told" -- "... by Muslim refugees of bridges being laid
3 during the night over the Drina River
4 these bridges, and then further into Bosnia-Herzegovina."
5 So I guess the nub of the objection is that that's what he was
6 told? You go to keep saying according to what you were told, not --
7 because it's not a fact; it's what he was told.
8 MS. CARTER: Certainly.
9 Q. Sir, when you were told by Muslim refugees of the bridges being
10 laid during the the night over the Drina River, and of lorries being
11 driven across these bridges and then further into Bosnia-Herzegovina, did
12 you find these Muslim refugees to be reliable reporters?
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, the question as posed is without
14 foundation, and that meaning, just the language on line 4, sorry, starts
15 on line 3:
16 "Did you find these Muslim refugees to be reliable reporters?"
17 There's no basis for that particular question to be answered by
18 this individual at this time, that they are reliable reporters.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Carter.
20 MS. CARTER: Sir, the witness has indicated that this is what was
21 reported to him, I'm merely trying to elicit whether these reports and
22 reporters were believable. This gentleman is the one who was speaking
23 with them and can certainly tell from his experience what did or did not
24 appear to be reliable information to him.
25 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, the question of the reliability of the
1 information is distinct from the question of the reliability of the
2 author of the information which I'm sure Ms. Carter appreciates. That
3 doesn't deal, of course, with the fact that he did not speak to any of
4 these individuals, but rather there was -- any conversation that was had
5 was a conversation that was reported to a third party at best and maybe
6 more since he did not speak to any of these individuals directly and he
7 has so testified.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Which individuals directly?
9 MR. GUY-SMITH: The Muslim refugees, whoever they may be.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: We don't know whether he did or didn't speak to
11 them; that's not what he said.
12 MR. GUY-SMITH: As a matter of fact we do, Your Honour. He said
13 that he did not have direct conversation.
14 MS. CARTER: Your Honour, the witness said that because he does
15 not speak Serbo-Croat, he always used a interpreter, that's how he spoke
16 with the refugee, specifically the body-guard of General Morillon. To
17 say that that is somehow removed, that would be -- required that anybody
18 sitting in the courtroom today listening to a translation could not rely
19 upon that translation.
20 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, we've been in that situation as a matter of
21 fact in this court. A question of reliability -- the question of the
22 reliability of the author of information is a question which requires a
23 fair amount of analysis. But with regard to where we stand right now,
24 there's lack of foundation with regard to the question that's been asked.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: There is a difference, Madam Carter, between
1 whether a statement or a person is reliable, and whether the listener
2 believes the person. Those are two different concepts.
3 MS. CARTER: I will try to narrowly focus this.
4 Q. Sir, how did you learn about the laying of the bridges and the
5 lorries coming over the Drina
6 A. I learned about it through two sources. The first was that some
7 of our UNMOs reported being told that by locals. And secondly was in
8 conversation through Mihailov with some refugees as we were walking
9 around Srebrenica. And Mihailov was asking them what were they seeing,
10 where had they come from, had they had any food, when had they last
11 eaten, et cetera. This came up in, and a particular refugee said that to
12 Mihailov and Mihailov said it to me. So I heard it from two sources.
13 Q. Did you believe this report?
14 MR. GUY-SMITH: Well, objection. Relevance as to whether he
15 believed it or not. It's not relevant whether he believed it, he
16 obtained the information.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Objection overruled.
18 MS. CARTER:
19 Q. Sir, did you believe this information?
20 A. I believed it was plausible.
21 Q. Why?
22 A. Because we in UN BH command believed that the Bosnian Serb army
23 was incapable of carrying on operations without resupply of particularly
24 fuel and spare parts from somewhere. We had intelligence assessments
25 which showed that the Bosnian Serbs had huge amounts of ammunition and
1 were not short of ammunition, but they were very short of fuel and spare
3 We frequently came across Bosnian Serb military vehicles at the
4 side of the road just run out of fuel. And we therefore believed that
5 they had to be getting fuel and spare parts from somewhere and the only
6 logical place where this fuel and spare parts could possibly come from
7 was from Serbia
8 form they had to be getting across the Drina into Bosnia
9 Q. You indicate that the only logical place where the fuel and spare
10 parts could possibly come from was Serbia. Why is this the only
11 plausible place?
12 A. Because they were --
13 MR. GUY-SMITH: Sorry, he didn't say plausible, he said logical.
14 There is a difference. Line 25.
15 MS. CARTER: My sincere apologies the transcript was being
16 corrected at the point that I was trying to read out.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Okay.
18 MS. CARTER:
19 Q. You indicated that the only logical place for the fuel and spare
20 parts could possibly come from was Serbia. What made you believe this?
21 A. Logic. There was a no-fly zone imposed over Serbia, so and we
22 knew that no aircraft were flying into Bosnia. On the -- to the north,
23 to the west, and to the south, the Bosnian Serbs were facing enemy on a
24 front line and there was no -- obviously no resupply of any kind going
25 across those confrontation lines. The only friendly area was to the
1 east, to Serbia
2 And General Mladic and all his colleagues in the Bosnian Serb
3 Army had previously been members of the Yugoslav Army, and were
4 therefore -- had in the -- literally a number of months previously been
5 part of the military organisation of Serbia, and, therefore, it seemed to
6 us highly likely that that is where they were getting resupply,
7 particularly of fuel, but also of spare parts.
8 Q. When speaking -- or, were you aware of any other support from
10 A. Yes. We heard gossip from Serb -- Bosnian Serb officers that
11 senior officers of the Bosnian Serb army continued to be paid from
13 Q. You indicate that this was gossip. Did you maintain the opinion
14 that this was gossip?
15 A. We initially heard this in the margins of the various meetings
16 that we were having. This was when Mihailov was speaking with Bosnian
17 Serb officers and Mihailov told me afterwards that they were waiting for
18 their money from Belgrade
19 1996, when I was subsequently in the UK crisis management headquarters in
20 Northward which was responsible for the provisions of UK military forces
21 to IFOR and to SFOR, I was -- I had intelligence made available to me
22 which showed that this was in fact the case and that the Bosnian Serb
23 senior officers, I can't remember whether it was a rank of major upwards
24 or whether it was a rank of colonel upwards, salaries were being paid
25 from Belgrade
1 Q. Sir, I'm going to move back to your time in Srebrenica. You
2 indicated that the people were starving and listless. Was any more aid
3 brought to these people?
4 A. The first aid that we managed to get into Srebrenica was the
5 beginning of December, as I had described a number of hours previously.
6 The second aid that arrived in the enclaves came from the airdrops which
7 started in February. However, that was fairly haphazard and extremely
8 dangerous. The third time that -- and the airdrops carried on now and
9 then for a number of months.
10 The third specific time that aid arrived in Srebrenica was on a
11 convoy of which General Morillon persuaded the Bosnian Serbs to allow
12 through and which arrived in Srebrenica around the 17th or
13 18th of March, 1993. Then a further convoy arrived around the
14 27th or 28th, and I believe that then a number of further convoys
15 arrived, but I left Srebrenica around the 28th of March, so don't have
16 specific information after that time.
17 Q. I'd like to focus on the convoy in which Morillon led. Can you
18 please describe --
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: How long are you going to be on that?
20 MS. CARTER: Oh goodness. It will take a bit of time,
21 Your Honour. I apologise. I didn't notice.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Would then this be a convenient time?
23 MS. CARTER: Yes, Your Honour.
24 MR. GUY-SMITH: Prior to the adjournment I request that we
25 receive copies of the intelligence that were made available to
1 Colonel Tucker that he testified to at page 92, line 13. Since we don't
2 have that information.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: We will take a break and come back tomorrow at
4 9.00 in the morning. Same courtroom. Court adjourned.
5 May I just say, Mr. Tucker, that while you are still in the
6 witness-stand, you may not discuss the topic with anybody, the case with
7 anybody, not even with your counsel.
8 Okay. Court adjourned.
9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.
10 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 29th day of
11 September, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.