Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 2425

1 Monday, 16 October 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Madam Registrar. Could you kindly

6 call the case, please.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case

8 IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, madam.

10 I just want to make sure that all the accused are receiving

11 interpretation.

12 I see Mr. Sarapa is not here. More or less the rest of the teams

13 are okay, except Mr. Ostojic is also not here.

14 MR. MEEK: Yes, Your Honour. May it please the Trial Chamber.

15 Mr. Ostojic is on business in Belgrade and should be back Wednesday

16 morning.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I thank you.

18 And from the Prosecution there's Mr. McCloskey, okay.

19 So Mr. Thayer, will you be leading the next witness?

20 MR. THAYER: Yes I will, Mr. President.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Are there any preliminaries you would

22 like to raise? I thank you. I hear none.

23 As we intimated to you earlier on two weeks ago before -- when we

24 had the last sitting, the very first thing we will proceed with today is a

25 short proces verbal dealing or illustrating the site visit that the Trial

Page 2426

1 Chamber conducted between the 2nd and the 7th of October.

2 The decision to hold a site visit was originated from the Trial

3 Chamber and was supported by both parties. Preparations were undertaken

4 months ago in order to make it possible, and during the various 65 ter

5 meetings that took place a list of rules of conduct to be observed during

6 the site visit was agreed to by the parties.

7 Basically, the rules of conduct which were agreed to by the

8 parties and which were observed in the course of the entire site visit

9 were the following: First, the parties, particularly since the accused

10 were not going to be present for the site visit, the parties would not

11 seek the admission of evidence through the entire duration of the site

12 visit. I can confirm that none of the parties sought the admission of

13 evidence.

14 It was also agreed that the guide, who was Mr. Philip Berikoff,

15 would only indicate to the Judges and the parties geographic locations

16 without giving any running commentary regarding events which are alleged

17 to have occurred there. However, it was also agreed that this would not

18 exclude specific references to paragraphs of the indictment which refer to

19 these locations. Again, I'd like to thank Mr. Berikoff for having

20 observed this rule of conduct throughout the entire site visit.

21 And as far as the parties themselves were concerned, the terms of

22 reference or the rules of conduct agreed upon were the following: During

23 the site visit, the parties would not give any views or offer advice or

24 express an opinion or make any other comment in relation to the locations

25 visited unless requested to do so by the Judges. The parties could,

Page 2427

1 however, agree amongst themselves to address observations to the Judges

2 when they were relevant to a better understanding of the locations visit.

3 Also, more or less this rule of conduct was observed by all parties.

4 Now, the -- all the Judges of this Trial Chamber, the four of us,

5 took part in this site visit and at all times we were accompanied by two

6 members of the Chamber legal staff, one representative of the Registry.

7 On the Prosecution's side, there was Mr. Peter McCloskey, who was the

8 chief trial attorney in this case, and he was assisted by Kweku Vanderpuye

9 and investigator Tomasz Blasczyk. And the various Defence teams were each

10 represented by one counsel; namely, Mr. Zivanovic for Popovic, Christopher

11 Meek for Beara, Jelena Nikolic for Mr. Nikolic, Miodrag Stojanovic for

12 Borovcanin, Natacha Faveau Ivanovic for Militic, Dragan Krgovic for

13 Mr. Gvero and Georgia Sarapa for accused Pandurevic. As I intimated

14 earlier on, the guide who was agreed upon by both parties was Mr. Phil

15 Berikoff.

16 The purpose of the site visit was of course to view some of the

17 sites which are relevant to the case before us. Some of the sites were

18 selected by the Trial Chamber, others were indicated by the parties.

19 Unfortunately because of time constraints and also weather conditions and

20 terrain conditions there were some proposed sites that we could not visit.

21 These were mainly or almost exclusively exhumation -- exhumation sites,

22 but this -- these sites were not visited upon agreement by all parties.

23 The -- we started the -- visiting places on the 2nd of October.

24 On the 3rd of October, driving from Sarajevo to Gorazde, passing through

25 Trnovo, Foca and Ustikolina and Gorazde, we saw the UNPROFOR -- previous

Page 2428

1 UNPROFOR check-point. And then we passed through Borik, seeing the Borik

2 school and the forward command post of the VRS Rogatica brigade, moved on

3 to Zepa, where we saw the site of the former location of the Ukrainian

4 contingent of UNPROFOR. Crna Rijeka where we saw the former installation

5 of the Crna Rijeka military installation of Crna Rijeka. And that first

6 day ended with a visit to the Han Pijesak where we saw both the Drina

7 Corps Main Staff headquarters, in other words, where they were, and the

8 restaurant where allegedly party to General Zivanovic was held.

9 On the second day, that's on the 4th of October, we went to Milici

10 where we saw the medical centre, to Zeleni Jadar and to secondary burial

11 sites, moved on to Javor where we saw where the 1st Tactical Group 1

12 position allegedly was. Then to Pribicevac, where we saw the observation

13 post of the Drina Corps or of the former Drina Corps forward command post.

14 And we moved to Srebrenica where we walked through the town itself. Saw

15 the location of the municipal courthouse, the PTT building, the Bravo

16 compound location, the gas station which we have seen in one of the

17 videos, and former location of the destroyed mosque, amongst other things.

18 Moved on to Potocari where we saw the location the Zinc Factory Energo

19 building and the "White House," the UN Canadian DutchBat Compound, and

20 observation post Papa, and also the Yellow Bridge at Zuti Most together

21 with a view of Kokarda hill. We moved on to Bratunac where we saw the

22 locations of the brick factory, the hotel Fontana which we saw from the

23 inside, the SDS building, the police station, the old Vuk Karadzic school,

24 the old school also known as the technical school, the soccer field, and

25 the Bratunac Brigade headquarters, military police building locations.

Page 2429

1 We drove on to the Glogova sites where we saw the Glogova primary

2 grave sites that are referred to by the Prosecution. In Kravica, we saw

3 the market, the site of the market, the school. We didn't stop there.

4 And also Kravica warehouse where we stopped and also went in. We stopped

5 at Sandici meadow and saw the school and the gas station at Konjevic Polje

6 and the soccer field and the school in Nova -- Nova Kasaba.

7 On the 5th of October, we went to Pilica where we saw the cultural

8 centre and the Kula school, together with the restaurant that is in front

9 of the cultural centre. Branjevo where we saw the site where the Branjevo

10 Military Farm was situated. Rocevic is alleged to have been situated,

11 Rocevic where we saw the school, Kozluk. We were shown by the Prosecution

12 a site where an alleged execution is -- is -- was mentioned. This alleged

13 execution site is by the Drina River. We saw the site of the Vitinka

14 bottling company factory and the -- also the Drina Corps headquarters. In

15 Petkovic -- Petkovci we saw the school and also the old school said to be

16 the former Zvornik brigade 6th Battalion headquarters. We also went to

17 the Petkovci dam.

18 We moved on to Zvornik where we saw the Zvornik Brigade

19 headquarters, to Orahovac where we saw the Grbavci, Orahovac school and

20 also the alleged Orahovac Rensen execution sites.

21 We moved on to did Delici and to Baljkovica. In Delici we saw the

22 command post of the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade and the forward

23 command post of the Zvornik Brigade. And in Baljkovica we visited an area

24 which was indicated to us by the Defence for Pandurevic.

25 On the 6th of October, which was the last day of the site visit,

Page 2430

1 we went to the Jadar River where we saw a site indicated to us by the

2 Prosecution. Cerska village, we saw an alleged execution and grave site.

3 Nova Kasaba we went there again to see a primary mass grave site indicated

4 to us by the Prosecution. And the last place visited by the Trial Chamber

5 and the rest of the party was at Tiska where we saw the location of the

6 Luka school.

7 Site visit concluded on Friday, 6th December [sic], and the Trial

8 Chamber returned to The Hague on Sunday.

9 Before closing, I -- Trial Chamber, and I'm speaking for the

10 entire Trial Chamber, would like to thank the President of this Tribunal

11 for having authorised this site visit, the Registrar for having made it

12 possible, Mr. Phil Berikoff, acting chief of security, for having

13 organised the entire site visit and for having accepted to serve as guide,

14 the precious ICTY security services members that accompanied the entire

15 delegation. They were -- they did an excellent job. The civilian

16 authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially the security

17 services operating in the areas visited both in Republika Srpska and in

18 the federation -- federation. We will -- the Trial Chamber will be

19 forwarding -- will be sending formal letters of thanks to all the

20 authorities on land there as well as to the representatives of this

21 Tribunal in Sarajevo on in Banja Luka who assisted Mr. Berikoff in

22 preparing the site visit.

23 I have got nothing else to say, just instruct that what I have

24 stated on behalf of the Trial Chamber is entered into the records as a

25 proces verbal.

Page 2431

1 However, before we start with the rest of our business today, I'd

2 like to know if any of the parties, Prosecution and any of the Defence

3 teams, would like to make any comments on the site visit. Same applies to

4 the accused in case you would like any information or you'd like to put

5 any questions.

6 I'll start with you, Mr. McCloskey.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. President and Your

8 Honours.

9 Just two very brief slight corrections to your list. In

10 Han Pijesak is the headquarters of the Main Staff, not the -- not the

11 Drina Corps headquarters. I think that was just a typo in Mr. Berikoff's

12 material. The headquarters of the Drina Corps is actually in Vlasenica.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Mm-hmm.

14 MR. McCLOSKEY: And the -- also the headquarters building next to

15 the Vitinka factory in Kozluk is the headquarters of the Drina Wolves, and

16 otherwise that was just right, and that's all I would have to say.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I thank you so much for those corrections,

18 which I'm sure everyone will agree with.

19 Any remarks, comments from the Defence teams? I see none.

20 Would any of the accused like to put any questions or seek any

21 information? I see none.

22 So I think we can pass on to the rest of our agenda. We know that

23 there are various motions that have been filed. We will be dealing with

24 them one by one, not necessarily in the way they have been filed because

25 some are more urgent than others, and we will let you know exactly what

Page 2432

1 our projected time schedule is later on today or tomorrow.

2 Can we bring the witness in, Mr. Colonel Franken. Is he still in

3 the Dutch army or not?

4 MR. THAYER: No, Mr. President. He is retired.

5 [The witness entered court]


7 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, to you, Colonel.

8 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: And welcome to this Tribunal once more. You know

10 what the procedure is, so I will not be explaining to you.

11 Madam Usher, who is standing to your left, will be handing to you

12 the text of a solemn declaration that our rules require you to make before

13 you start giving evidence. It's legally and morally binding, the same way

14 as an oath is. Please proceed with making the declaration, and that will

15 be your solemn undertaking with us that you will be testifying the truth,

16 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

17 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

18 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, sir. Make yourself comfortable,

20 please.

21 Colonel, I know that you have retired from the Dutch -- Royal

22 Dutch Army. How would you like me to address you here, like us to address

23 you, as Colonel.

24 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I am a civilian now.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: You are a civilian now. All right. So,

Page 2433

1 Mr. Franken, Mr. Thayer will be examining you in chief, at least today and

2 possibly --

3 Do you think you will finish today? You'll try.

4 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I will do my best. I honestly believe

5 we'll go just a little bit into the first session tomorrow morning.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. And in the meantime during either

7 the first or the second break, whoever is coordinating will give us an

8 updated idea on how much time you think the Defence teams will require for

9 cross-examination. All right?

10 Yes, Mr. Thayer.

11 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.

12 Examination by Mr. Thayer:

13 Q. Good morning, sir.

14 A. Good morning.

15 Q. We will be speaking the same language. However, what we say is

16 going to be translated into a couple of languages, so I would just ask

17 that you speak a little bit more slowly than normal, as I will try as

18 well, and I would also ask you to just pause slightly before your answer

19 whether it's me asking the question or my learned colleagues or Their

20 Honours. All right?

21 A. I'll do my best.

22 Q. Thank you. Will you please state and spell your name.

23 A. My name is Robert Franken, and that is

24 Foxtrot-Romeo-Alpha-November-Kilo-Echo-November. Franken.

25 Q. And how old you, sir?

Page 2434

1 A. I am 56 now.

2 Q. And if I may, I would just like to review briefly your military

3 service history with you.

4 You are a former infantry officer of the Royal Netherlands Army,

5 retiring after 33 years of service with the rank of colonel; is that

6 correct?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And among your positions during that time you commanded a combat

9 support company, commanded a mechanised infantry company?

10 A. That's correct, sir.

11 Q. Served as an operations officer in an armoured brigade with

12 responsibility for planning and executing air support?

13 A. That's correct, sir.

14 Q. You served as a tactics instructor at the infantry school --

15 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Thayer, Mr. Franken, it's both of you, actually,

17 if you could kindly slow down a little bit. Just allow a short pause

18 between question and answer. That's all you need to do.

19 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Your Honour. Will do.

20 Q. You served as a logistics and intelligence officer at battalion

21 and brigade level?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And you served as Chief of Staff of northern command in Holland as

24 well?

25 A. That's correct as well, sir.

Page 2435

1 Q. Have I left anything out, sir?

2 A. Not of any importance.

3 Q. Now, when you entered on duty in Bosnia, what was your rank and

4 what was your position at that time?

5 A. I was a major. My -- my position was DCO and S4; that is, the

6 officer responsible for logistics of the battalion.

7 Q. And I'll ask you some questions about that in a moment. When did

8 you actually arrive in Bosnia, sir?

9 A. As far as I recollect, it was the 15th of January in 1995.

10 Q. And where were you physically based?

11 A. At Potocari, headquarters of DutchBat.

12 Q. Just briefly, sir. What did you understand the mission of

13 DutchBat III to be?

14 A. Our mission was to deter any hostile action by being present,

15 showing our presence, showing the flag, as we will called it. We had to

16 facilitate and to assist in -- in humanitarian aid. The mission was as

17 well to demilitarise the -- the enclave, so that's about it.

18 Q. Now, you referred to your position as being the DCO of DutchBat.

19 What does DCO stand for, sir?

20 A. Sorry. It's deputy commanding officer. So popularly said, the

21 second in command.

22 Q. And who was your immediate commander?

23 A. Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans.

24 Q. You mentioned a moment ago that you were the S4 in charge of

25 logistics. Could you just briefly describe what that entailed?

Page 2436

1 A. That means you're responsible for all the supplies and spare parts

2 a battalion needs for -- for being operational in an area like that. So

3 it includes food, fuel, MO, spare parts, et cetera.

4 Q. And in your position as DCO, would you actually stand in for the

5 commander if he were absent for some reason?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. In general, sir, would -- would you describe the division of

8 responsibilities between yourself and Colonel Karremans.

9 A. Yeah, in fact, the colonel was doing all the external contacts, so

10 contacts with higher echelons, and I was doing, yeah, more or less the

11 daily commanding of the battalion, so the normal routine things. I was

12 coordinating the staff and giving the company commanders orders within the

13 guidelines, of course, of Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans.

14 Q. And was there some central entity which assisted you in terms of

15 keeping informed about what was going on throughout the battalion, given

16 your many duties during the day?

17 A. There was an operations room. You could call that the nerve

18 centre of the battalion where all the information came in and the crew of

19 that operations room had all the, what you say, disciplines in it, in the

20 crew. So they analysed the information and gave me their results or their

21 conclusions.

22 Q. And generally would there be a particular officer in the

23 operations room who would be transmitting you the information?

24 A. Yeah. Was the chief operations room duty officer was always a

25 captain, and he is the one that contacted me, and if there was anything

Page 2437

1 of -- of interest that I should know.

2 Q. Now, were there particular VRS and army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

3 officers with whom you had contact in connection with your duties?

4 A. Yes. There was the formal liaison of the Bosnian Serb army was a

5 Colonel Vukovic. I saw him very little. But in fact there was a Major

6 Nikolic of the Bratunac Brigade who actually was our liaison to the

7 Bosnian Serb army.

8 Q. And in terms of the army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, were there any

9 particular officers with whom you had more frequent contact?

10 A. Yeah, well, the contacts to the Bosnian army was through the Chief

11 of Staff of the 28th Division, Ramiz, the man I know as Ramiz. And

12 eventually in the beginning we contact of course with Oric, the local

13 commander.

14 Q. And do you know what this commander Oric's first name was, sir?

15 A. I was, but I can't recollect it right now.

16 Q. Very well. Now, was there within DutchBat a -- an S5 or liaison

17 officer who served as the primary liaison with these individuals?

18 A. There was a team of liaison officers. In fact, there were three

19 in the beginning at least, and they did the contact as well to the Serbs

20 as to the Bosnian authorities.

21 Q. Given that you had those officers available, sir, under what

22 circumstances, generally speaking, would you become involved with these

23 officers of the VRS or army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

24 A. Well, when the S5 couldn't cope with the problem or didn't come

25 any further in the results then I would come in and do the talking and the

Page 2438

1 negotiations with them. And when I did fail, the last trick we had was

2 that the colonel himself came in.

3 Q. Sir, during your service with DutchBat III, did you have an

4 opportunity to observe soldiers of both of the opposing armies in terms of

5 uniforms, equipment, and so forth?

6 A. Yes, I did.

7 Q. And would you start with the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

8 please, and just describe in general terms how they were equipped.

9 A. Well, they -- they didn't wear their weapons because that was

10 forbidden, but we -- from intelligence and information from our

11 predecessors we knew that they had about 4, 4.500 small arms and some

12 mortars, and what you could see of it that they were mostly -- most of the

13 time walking around in, yeah, parts of uniforms, never dressed up

14 completely. That changed somewhere in May. Then we saw suddenly that

15 there were new combat suits worn by the BiH.

16 Q. And did you have an opportunity to observe how that army operated

17 in terms of cohesion and discipline and centralised command?

18 A. Yeah. Well, there was a divisional structure. There was a

19 division command with brigades who had all their own area within the

20 enclave. So it looked like an army, but it proved pretty soon that --

21 that there was no discipline. The brigade commanders had their own

22 policies. They -- they did not obey to what the division commander said

23 or wanted. An example is the brigade commander in the Bandera Triangle

24 who had his own army. And, well, especially in the end phase we had to

25 cope with local commanders with their own policies who did not follow the

Page 2439

1 orders of the Bosnian divisional command. So to say it was more or less a

2 bunch of armed militia partly doing and functioning as a whole but mostly

3 on their own there.

4 Q. I'd like to turn your attention to the VRS. Could you describe

5 your experiences and observations in terms of that army in the same manner

6 you just described the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, please.

7 A. We had to deal with a couple of brigades. With the Skelani

8 brigade and Bratunac Brigade, we had contact in the Milici area never.

9 That looked like an army. Orders were given. It was clearly that

10 officers gave orders and they were done as you usually see in an army.

11 The troops around the enclave were more or less, with exception of the

12 Milici Brigade, militia-like, combinations of uniforms, et cetera, but

13 they had heavy weapons.

14 In the end phase, we were confronted twice with military units

15 looking and acting like absolute military units as we knew them.

16 Q. Now, although you were the DCO and responsible for logistics for

17 DutchBat, would you also participate yourself in patrols?

18 A. Yes. I did about 23 or -- patrols myself.

19 Q. And were patrols around the enclave part of DutchBat's regular

20 activities?

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 Q. And were you able to observe positions of both Serb and Muslim

23 forces personally during the course --

24 A. Mm-hmm.

25 Q. -- of your patrols?

Page 2440

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. And did your observations include trenches?

3 A. Yes. On the Bosnian -- yeah, on both sides there were trenches.

4 On the Serb side there were bunker-like buildings. Trenches on Bosnian

5 side were -- were pretty shallow, not deep, and the positions on the Serb

6 side were, as far as we could see, pretty well dug out and firm.

7 Q. How about fixed artillery positions, sir?

8 A. Yes, we had identified about - in the beginning, at least - 16

9 artillery and mortar positions, especially in the area of the Milici

10 Brigade that is on the west side of the enclave. There were a couple of

11 positions of self-propelled mechanised guns, artillery that is.

12 Q. And to which army did those positions belong, sir?

13 A. Bosnian Serb army.

14 Q. I want to turn your attention to another topic for a few moments,

15 sir.

16 In the months prior to the VRS attack on the enclave in July of

17 1995, was there shelling and shooting into the enclave?

18 A. Yes, there was.

19 Q. Was there also firing at DutchBat patrols or positions?

20 A. Yes. There was an increasing amount of what we call close firing

21 on patrols and on our operation -- sorry, observation points.

22 Q. And we'll get to that in a moment, sir. But while we're on the

23 topic, do you recall approximately when that increase in firing incidents

24 began to happen?

25 A. That was as of April. April, May it started to increase. Well,

Page 2441

1 it increased until the end.

2 Q. And what was the source of those firing incidents, in terms of

3 which army?

4 A. Reported was mostly it was done by the Serb -- out of the Serb

5 positions. There are a couple of reports where the source of the firing

6 was not destined, was not known, but it was majorly from the Bosnian Serb

7 positions.

8 Q. And did you personally come under fire during any of your patrols

9 by fire from the Serb positions?

10 A. Yes, a couple of times.

11 Q. How else would you learn about shelling and shooting incidents?

12 A. Reports by patrols or by the observation posts.

13 Q. And did you ever observe or receive reports about the results of

14 the shelling or shooting incidents on -- on the civilian population?

15 A. Yes, several times they were wounded, the civil population. We

16 used our means, our armoured ambulances, so to say, to bring the people to

17 the hospital in Srebrenica.

18 Q. Sir, did you have freedom of movement in the Serb territory?

19 A. Within the Serb territory, absolutely not.

20 Q. And how about free movement by the Muslim forces within the

21 enclave?

22 A. Yeah, with exception of what we call the Bandera Triangle, an area

23 in the west side of the enclave, we were supposed to have freedom of

24 movement. I say supposed to, because in the end we had lots of trouble

25 moving our APCs to better positions.

Page 2442

1 Q. And so you have some personal experience in terms of restriction

2 on freedom of movement in the Bandera Triangle; is that correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Would you just briefly share with the Court that experience?

5 A. Yeah. There was already non-freedom of movement when we arrived,

6 when we took over from DutchBat II, and we got in January, yes, orders to

7 restore that freedom of movement in that area. And I let the first patrol

8 into the Bandera Triangle, and that -- well, we got some skirmishing

9 and -- and problems with the BiH. I was stopped by about 45 armed men to

10 enter the area. Other patrols were stopped as well, and it ended in a

11 blockade, more or less, during a couple of days where we had to stay in

12 the area. We couldn't return to camp.

13 Q. And I want to turn your attention now to another area, sir,

14 involving your role as the chief logistics officer for the battalion.

15 You've testified that part of your responsibilities was to be

16 aware of the battalion's resupply needs. What were the most important

17 items requiring resupply for DutchBat?

18 A. In fact, ammo and fuel, because we had to raise our energy, any

19 energy, all by ourselves, and the only way to do that was with generators

20 and they ran on diesel.

21 Q. And I take it, sir, that the battalion's logistical needs were

22 passed up the UNPROFOR chain of command?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And how was that done?

25 A. By fax. We made lists and requested supplies, of course food,

Page 2443

1 et cetera, as well, but requested the -- the supplies and it was sent

2 to -- to Sarajevo and then over to Zagreb where there was a major log

3 base, and they were preparing that. There was a log base at Busovaca,

4 there was a Dutch unit as well, and they loaded this stuff we wanted on

5 trucks, at least that was the general idea, and then bring it to us by

6 road.

7 Q. When you say "log base," are you referring to a logistics base?

8 A. Sorry. A logistics base, yes.

9 Q. Now, did the VRS become involved in this process of resupply

10 requests?

11 A. Yes. For every convoy, there had to be admission by the VRS.

12 They had to consent that. Not only the fact that vehicles were driving

13 down to us, but they wanted to know exactly what was in the vehicles and

14 did approve or not approve the contents of the trucks and the amount of

15 trucks.

16 Q. And to your knowledge did the VRS become involved in the actual

17 approval of the lists that were sent over?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- from the UNPROFOR logistics personnel?

20 A. Yes. They had to approve every little item on the list, whether

21 that it was allowed to bring it in or not.

22 Q. Were there items which the VRS categorically denied?

23 A. Yeah. Ammunition anyway. Anything that had to do with weapons

24 systems, spare parts or testing devices. Spare parts for vehicles,

25 et cetera, were denied anyway as well. Coms, communication radios I mean,

Page 2444

1 sorry, that was always denied to bring that in.

2 Q. Now, you've alluded to this already, and this may be an obvious

3 question, but once the list was approved by the VRS, by what means of

4 transport would the supplies eventually be taken to the DutchBat base?

5 A. By trucks, Dutch trucks, through a route to -- towards the

6 enclave. And it came from the area of Tuzla or the area of Sarajevo.

7 That's where they started from anyway.

8 Q. And how would you become aware that a convoy had actually been

9 approved and was scheduled?

10 A. Again by fax from my logistic base. They informed me that. And

11 then a convoy would apply with the exact contents of that convoy.

12 Q. Would you describe for the Trial Chamber, sir, the process by

13 which the convoys physically reached the battalion?

14 A. Yeah. Well, they drove down the road but were -- well, I don't

15 know exactly how many times but checked by Bosnian Serb check-points.

16 They had to step out, identify themselves, and the load of the trucks was

17 checked, and then exactly according to the lists they had to carry. And

18 then after all these check-points they ultimately came into the enclave.

19 The last check was on the very edge, on the confrontation line near our

20 observation post Papa, what we called Yellow Bridge. That was the last

21 Bosnian Serb check-point.

22 Q. And, sir, would you see a final document of some sort which listed

23 what the VRS ultimately permitted on the convoy?

24 A. Yes. That was in fact the list that was sent to me when the

25 convoy was planned, and they informed me that they would come down, and

Page 2445

1 mostly I got a corrected list when the convoy came in ultimately, because

2 quite a lot of things disappeared on the way down to the enclave.

3 Q. And who supplied you with that corrected list, sir?

4 A. Convoy commander.

5 Q. And were you able to compare what --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- UNPROFOR had asked for and what the VRS had approved and

8 arrived?

9 A. And what actually arrived, yes.

10 Q. And, sir, was this procedure and these restrictions you've just

11 described in place when you arrived in Bosnia?

12 A. Yes. That was the procedure as I found it when I arrived.

13 Q. And at some point did the restrictions on the resupply convoys by

14 the VRS intensify?

15 A. Yes, that's correct. For instance, when my last fuel convoy came

16 in in February.

17 Q. Now, sir, part of your mission, as you testified, was to

18 facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid within the enclave. What

19 was the entity which had primary responsibility for the humanitarian aid

20 there?

21 A. There was in fact two NGOs; UNHCR taking care of food and things

22 like that, and MSF, Medecins sans Frontieres, taking care of the medical

23 support of the population.

24 Q. And to your knowledge was the humanitarian aid coming into the

25 enclave subject to the same process as the DutchBat resupply?

Page 2446

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. And I'm sorry to do this but if you would again try to pause

3 after -- after my question. I know it's difficult.

4 And what was DutchBat's actual role with respect to the

5 humanitarian aid convoys?

6 A. In fact, secure the transport as of the confrontation line. So

7 when they came in or appeared at OP Papa, what the entrance was to the

8 enclave, we sent down a platoon-like unit that escorted them to the

9 warehouse in the city of Srebrenica. Their food or whatever was brought

10 into the warehouse by people of the opstina, the local civil -- civil

11 authority.

12 When it was in the warehouse, we would withdraw and that was in

13 fact our job. Distribution and things like that were done by the UNHCR

14 representative in coordination with the opstina people.

15 Q. Now, without divulging any of the NGO staff members' individual

16 identities, did anyone from UNHCR inform you as to whether or not its

17 convoys were being subject to the same types of restrictions that you

18 described earlier?

19 A. In general, we hardly got any information about these UNHCR

20 convoys. Mostly we discovered them appearing at Papa and then had to take

21 action. I know of a convoy that was sent back by UNHCR because they had

22 to give the Bosnian Serb check-point diesel fuel or something, and they

23 refused that and returned. So they had more or less the same problems we

24 had.

25 Q. I want to ask you some questions about the effects that the VRS

Page 2447

1 restrictions had on DutchBat's ability to carry out its mission, and let's

2 focus first, sir, please, on the effects of the fuel shortage. How did

3 that affect DutchBat's operability?

4 A. The battalion needed, in fact, 8 to 9.000 litres fuel a day to do

5 its job. As the supplies diminished we ended, with a daily ration of 250

6 litres, which meant that we were not able to do our full patrolling. We

7 had to do it by foot, which meant, the fuel lack, that we were not able to

8 heat. We had to chop wood. We were not able to have our medical dressing

9 station as it's called, it's some kind of a hospital, to keep that

10 operational. We were not able to purify water because we had to do that

11 with something that needed fuel as well, a device. We didn't have any

12 electricity, and in the end we were hardly able to, as far as food was

13 present, to prepare that because we couldn't cook it.

14 Q. Now, I'd like to turn your attention to the effects of the VRS

15 restriction on resupply on your weapons and weapons systems, sir. You've

16 already testified that in new weapons or ammunition, spare parts,

17 weapons-related testing equipment, for example, were permitted into the

18 enclave. But what was the effect on the systems themselves that you had

19 there?

20 A. For instance, my -- sorry. My anti-tank systems, TOW, well, I

21 won't explain that but that's the name of the machine, needed a periodical

22 test, otherwise you can't use it. That needed test equipment. We

23 couldn't get it.

24 The rockets for my anti-tack systems, TOW and Dragon, et cetera,

25 were ready to use in the OPs, which meant that they were -- they ran back

Page 2448

1 in quality as far as that they were not usable anymore by -- by moist --

2 by, yeah, moisture, et cetera.

3 Q. And --

4 A. The ammunition for my mortars, without getting technical, but a

5 mortar need for a certain distance extra loads. That's some kind of a

6 pocket you do around it. Again, that powder was all moistured. So they

7 couldn't be used anymore.

8 Q. And do you have an estimate of what percentage of the ammunition

9 that you had with respect to the mortars, for example, was usable?

10 A. Yeah. I had about 15 per cent anyway of the mortar ammunition I

11 should have, and of that 15 per cent up to three-quarters was not usable

12 anymore.

13 Q. You mentioned the TOW system. Is that a missile system of some

14 sort?

15 A. Yeah. It's a thread-guided missile system for anti-tank purposes.

16 Reaches about 4 Ks.

17 Q. And did those missiles have a longevity themselves?

18 A. Sorry, longevity?

19 Q. Did they have an expiration date?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. How long did they last typically under normal circumstances?

22 A. Under normal circumstances not being, well, yeah, keeping ready

23 for use, we swap them normally every four weeks. Under these

24 circumstances, it proved that they didn't last longer than about six weeks

25 on an OP, so we had to swap them for storage which we did not have. So

Page 2449

1 the operational readiness of these systems was zero.

2 Q. Now, in terms of, for example, small -- small arm ammunition, do

3 you recall what percentage of required ammunition you had by, say, July of

4 1995?

5 A. Yeah, well, the -- the average supplies ammo was 16 per cent, and

6 I remember that for small arms ammunition we were up to 30 per cent of the

7 supply of the amount we needed.

8 Q. And do you recall exactly how old some of your ammunition was,

9 sir?

10 A. Well, yeah, that was brought in 1994 with the first battalion and

11 never changed later on. And then again, just for your understanding, in

12 normal circumstances when we are operational, ready, we swap even the

13 small calibre ammunition every ten days because it goes back in quality

14 being in -- in the rifles, et cetera.

15 Q. Now, how about with respect to the DutchBat troop rotations, sir?

16 Were there restrictions placed on DutchBat's ability to rotate its

17 soldiers in and out?

18 A. Yeah, well, we could say till the end of March or April that

19 was -- there were problems with those convoys, personnel convoys, but that

20 was more teasing than operational danger, in fact, but as of April it was

21 finished and we had had quite a lot of guys out who couldn't come in

22 anymore.

23 Q. When you arrived in January of 1995, what was the fighting

24 strength, to use I guess that term, of your combat-trained soldiers?

25 A. About 300. To be exact, I believe 318.

Page 2450

1 Q. And after the VRS restrictions kicked in, sir, you mentioned that

2 you had a lot of soldiers who couldn't come in anymore. What were you

3 down to?

4 A. In the end we had 147.

5 Q. And during this -- this time when you were experiencing these

6 restrictions, did you have a term that you used within the battalion for

7 what was going on?

8 A. Yes. We called that convoy terror.

9 Q. I want to turn your attention now, sir, to a new area. You

10 testified a few moments ago about an increase in firing incidents from

11 Serb forces on DutchBat patrols and -- and positions. Did that in

12 combination with other things prompt some discussions with the army of

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding a -- an idea of how to defend the

14 enclave?

15 A. Yes. We had a -- I personally had that discussion with the Chief

16 of Staff of the 28th Division. Problem was, of course, as we were UN

17 troops and as being UN impartial, but it was absolutely impossible to --

18 to give any substance to the deterrence we had to do when only my

19 observation posts should -- in case that there was a Serb attack should

20 try to defend things or to prevent the Serbs coming in. So we had a

21 strange discussion about how that would look like, which went like, well,

22 question of the Chief of Staff 28th was: What will UNPROFOR do as soon as

23 the -- the Serbs will attack the enclave? And under the -- my orders I

24 was only able and authorised to defend my own observation posts.

25 So we came to a -- an understanding that when I defended my

Page 2451

1 observation posts and the Bosnian army, so the Muslims, would defend the

2 area in between, without integrating the observation posts I would be

3 still that UN impartial force, and they would cover the areas between the

4 observation post, and we had some coordinated defence.

5 Q. Was an element of these discussions or was one of your

6 considerations during these discussions the actual security of your own

7 forces in those observation posts should there be an attack, specifically

8 with respect to knowing what the Muslim forces would be up to?

9 A. Sorry. The point is that -- that security of my own troops is not

10 a big issue. The point was that we -- it is impossible when there is an

11 attack and there are two parties and even three parties operating in an

12 area that two parties do not exactly cooperate but have more or less the

13 same aim, which is prevent the other party to come into the enclave. You

14 can't do that without any coordination on the spot. For instance, when

15 there were Muslim forces next to an observation post and they would leave

16 without telling us, I had a major problem because my observation post

17 would be out in the Bosnian Serb area alone and surrounded.

18 I think that answers your question?

19 Q. Was there -- and I think you just alluded to this, but was there

20 something about the very nature of the OPs themselves which required this

21 type of discussion, sir?

22 A. The problem was that giving -- following the order to deter by

23 presence the locations of the observation posts were military seen

24 absolutely ridiculous 6. We're on top of hills. We even had to put

25 lights on them by night to show that we were still there. They were

Page 2452

1 painted white, so we were absolute sitting ducks if anything went wrong.

2 And if you -- to that comes a non-coordinated operations of a third party,

3 being the Bosnian Muslim army, then it's ridiculous to start defending

4 anyway.

5 Q. I want to turn your attention, sir, to the VRS attack on OP Echo.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Do you recall the date that that attack occurred?

8 A. Beginning of June, 3rd of June.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. Would you please just briefly describe for the Trial Chamber what

12 happened.

13 A. We got report through Bravo Company, the company was responsible

14 for that area that there was some movement in front of OP Echo. The

15 movement proved to be Serb infantry. Then the Serb infantry yelled --

16 used a loudspeaker to tell the OP that they had to go, they had to

17 withdraw because the Serbs wanted to come in. B Company asked me

18 permission to do that. I denied that. And then they came under attack

19 and in the end the Serbs took Echo over, and the crew withdrew in the very

20 last moment with my authorisation.

21 Q. And when you mentioned an attack, what did the attack on the OP

22 consist of, sir?

23 A. There was about 40 infantry supported by a tank at Tango five

24 fighters, the main battle tank, and a gun on the edge, ridge at Zeleni

25 Jadar.

Page 2453

1 Q. And were there actually shots fired during the attack, sir?

2 A. Yes, absolutely, yes, yes.

3 Q. And what -- was there damage to the OP?

4 A. Well, the tower was hit. The observation tower was hit by

5 firing -- the firing main battle tank and the area was fired at by the

6 gun; it was an anti-aircraft gun standing up there. But was used to

7 support the Serb attack.

8 Q. Following the attack, did you take any steps to replace in some

9 form OP Echo?

10 A. Yes. I ordered B Company to send two armoured -- two APCs each

11 to -- to block the -- the approach to the city of Srebrenica, which meant

12 in northern direction, and to block the approach in the Swedish Shelter

13 Project. South of the enclave there was a new built village of barracks

14 and there were about 3.000 fugitives in there, and having the area to Echo

15 the access to both areas was open for the Serbs.

16 Q. You just referred to 300 fugitives.

17 A. Sorry. Sorry, it must be 3.000 fugitives.

18 Q. And when you say "fugitives," what are you referring to, sir?

19 A. Well, people that probably in 1993 or something came to that area

20 but were not real locals, so Muslim fugitives from the area around the

21 enclave who came to that area and were -- were housed there.

22 MR. THAYER: I think this would be a good time, Madam Usher, if we

23 could show map 6, or somebody with e-court knowledge. It's number 2111.

24 And if we could shift the image up a little bit, please. Just a little

25 bit more. That's great. Thank you.

Page 2454

1 Q. Sir, do you have an image in front of you?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. And can you just describe just generally what this depicts?

4 A. In fact, you see the surroundings of the -- of the enclave, and

5 the dots with letters to it are our observation posts. Referring to what

6 I said blocking the Serb approach, after the possible Serb approach, after

7 Echo was taken that resulted in the establishment of the observation posts

8 Uniform and Sierra. And Sierra is on the approach to what I call the

9 Swedish Shelter Project. And Uniform was on the higher ground just on the

10 approach in the direction of to the city of Srebrenica.

11 Q. And those OPs, as you've described them, are located to the south,

12 south-east of the enclave as depicted on this map; is that correct, sir?

13 A. That is correct, yes.

14 Q. And they are marked with an E, U and an S moving from right to

15 left, sir?

16 A. Yeah, that is correct. Still the old trait that I call it Sierra

17 and Uniform, sorry.

18 Q. That's right. Now, you've alluded to this somewhat, sir, but why

19 was this a militarily significant location?

20 A. Well, OP Echo was exactly on the road that went east-west. You

21 can see that on the map. The road that goes along what is called here

22 Zeleni Jadar. It's an important connection east-west, and there was just

23 the small edge you see on the map, the small corner. It was within the

24 Bosnian enclave, so they couldn't use that road.

25 There was a significant mining area, but again their connections

Page 2455

1 from east to west was quite impossible there not having that road, and we

2 thought that purpose of the attack was to get control over that road and

3 the possibility to use it to the Serbs.

4 Q. And what, if any, were the concerns that you referred to earlier

5 with respect to that Swedish Shelter Project?

6 A. Well, there were 3.000 civilians over there, refugees, and we

7 saw -- we thought that they could be jeopardised, or there was a

8 substantial danger for them when the Bosnian Serb army could move in that

9 area without any problem, not stopped. That's why I ordered them to go to

10 S and U, as you say it, and block these approaches.

11 Q. Now, did the increase in close firing by the VRS, the attack on

12 OP Echo and your perceived vulnerability of the Swedish Shelter Project,

13 did that prompt a specific communication by Colonel Karremans to higher

14 command that you recall, sir?

15 A. I know that Colonel Karremans then made a -- quite a large

16 commander assessment of the situation and indicating -- well, not

17 indicating, but making very clear that it was a very critical situation.

18 Not only the fact that a part of the enclave was taken by the Serbs but

19 the situation of the battalion and the civilian population as well.

20 Q. And again you've testified to some degree to this and I'm not

21 asking for a lot of detail, but did the elimination of OP Echo prompt

22 internal discussions in DutchBat about what that action might have meant

23 in terms of the VRS's larger intentions with respect to the enclave?

24 A. Well, in the beginning I thought that it was the beginning of a

25 major attack on the enclave, but when they didn't proceed in northern

Page 2456

1 direction and my own troops were able to get that far south as S and U

2 indicate, I -- in the beginning we did not understand what was going on

3 because it's -- obviously it was not major attack, because normally when

4 you do an attack you have success, you keep up the momentum, you keep on

5 rolling, because that keeps your opponent out of equilibrity. Then we

6 concluded that it was a more a less a test case, and the main effort was

7 done just to get control of that road I described before.

8 Q. Now, the Trial Chamber has already heard testimony concerning the

9 VRS attack on the enclave so I won't go through an hour by hour account of

10 what happened, but I would like to take you essentially through a

11 chronological review of some main events and recollections that you have

12 of -- of the events that occurred following the attack.

13 Where were you when the VRS assault on the enclave began on

14 July 6th?

15 A. In the operations room.

16 Q. And can you describe the reports that you were getting with

17 respect to where the main effort of the attack was concentrated?

18 A. Yeah, well, in fact it started around the 6th of July with heavy

19 firing in the area of the observation post Foxtrot, F, if you want. That

20 increased, was direct firing on the observation post, but there was more

21 shelling in the other area as well, but the main effort was obviously in

22 the area of OP Foxtrot, F.

23 Q. And we no longer have map 6 on the screen and I won't ask that it

24 be brought back up at the -- oh, is it still there? Oh, okay, great.

25 Would you just point out, please, where OP Foxtrot is?

Page 2457

1 A. It's the area that I described before, that is at the eastern --

2 south-eastern border of the -- of the enclave. You see the dot with the

3 letter F.

4 In combination with U and S, we had the Serb penetration at least

5 under observation, and the massive or the main effort of the Serb actions

6 were in the -- directly in the area of F, observation post Foxtrot on the

7 south-eastern part of the enclave.

8 Q. And Foxtrot is due north of Echo?

9 A. That's correct.

10 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Madam Usher. We won't need it now.

11 Q. Did you receive reports that the town of Srebrenica was being

12 shelled?

13 A. Yes. B Company reported random shelling of the city, and there

14 was some shelling of -- of the position at the southern edge of the city

15 already.

16 Q. And how about the Charlie Company or the main compound in

17 Potocari?

18 A. Yes. Well, there was firing at the UN base at Potocari and the

19 direct surroundings. But again, it was obvious it was an absolutely

20 massive firing in the area of Foxtrot.

21 Q. Did you begin to receive reports of civilian casualties in

22 Srebrenica town and elsewhere?

23 A. Reports of B Company who saw that civilians were brought into the

24 civil hospital in Srebrenica, yes.

25 Q. And did DutchBat assist in bringing in those wounded?

Page 2458

1 A. Yes. We had our armoured ambulances, I should say, or missed the

2 word, but you know what I mean. When we were around, we brought the

3 people to the hospital.

4 Q. And can you describe what types of fire OP Foxtrot received in?

5 A. All kinds, small calibre machine-gun, tank fire and mortar.

6 Q. Was there a standing order covering what DutchBat soldiers manning

7 the OPs were to do if directly attacked?

8 A. Yeah. The order to the OPs was defend the OP. And the order to

9 the company commanders were that the -- was in fact that they didn't have

10 to ask for withdrawal before the BiH withdrew.

11 Q. Sir, I'm just looking at the transcript and the answer that the

12 transcript indicates is that the order was to defend the OP and the order

13 to the company commanders was the fact they didn't have to ask for

14 withdrawal before the BiH withdrew.

15 Can you just amplify what that means a little bit, sir, please?

16 A. Yes. Well, you can't say an OP commander -- a commander of an

17 observation post that he can destine himself when he is to withdraw from

18 an OP. But seeing the positions -- I must be careful that I won't give

19 here some tactical detail story, but seeing the locations of the

20 observation posts and the easy way that the opponent can get quite close

21 to the observation post, it means that the reaction time to withdraw is

22 very shortly, if you want to. You can't give that to the judgement of the

23 local sergeant, NCO. The company commander must decide it. And there was

24 a guideline that, well, you can ask for it what you want, but as long as

25 the BiH is in position you will not get consent in withdrawing any OP.

Page 2459

1 Q. Okay. So is another way of looking at that that consent would not

2 be granted to withdraw as long as the Muslim forces were there as well?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Okay. Now, your previous answer raises a related question I

5 wanted to ask you. The -- it's fair to say that once the attack began in

6 earnest on July 6th that events started moving very rapidly in terms of

7 decisions that DutchBat had to make. Is that fair to say?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. Now, can you describe just generally how the command

10 decision-making changed, if at all, during the course of the subsequent

11 events?

12 A. To make it clear I'll have to enlighten something, you already --

13 we already discussed the fact that quite a lot of our personnel was still

14 in Zagreb, couldn't return to the enclave. Normally a battalion staff has

15 an S3. That's the operations officer. He in fact is doing the tactical

16 part of commanding the battalion when under fire. But luckily the S3 was

17 in Zagreb as well. In fact, I was the only staff officer rested. So

18 coordination within the battalion staff was easy, which meant that the --

19 the colonel was called to the phone any time by a general from anywhere,

20 and the fact that -- and I was in the operations room so that tactical

21 decisions within the guidelines of the colonel, I did that because you

22 have to be quick. It's all split-second work.

23 Q. I want to take you now to the 8th of July. This is the day that

24 Private Van Renssen was killed. Do you recall OP Foxtrot finally falling

25 that day, sir?

Page 2460

1 A. Yeah, well, already told that there was increased firing at

2 the OP. It was hit several times. The defence wall was blown away by the

3 tank fire, so they asked permission to withdraw. I gave that because the

4 BiH was not inside anymore. They didn't inform us they were gone but they

5 were gone. Then they waited for a pause in firing to withdraw but it was

6 too late. They were run over by Serb forces, but were allowed to withdraw

7 to Srebrenica.

8 About 700 metres away from -- from -- on that route to Srebrenica

9 they were stopped by a Bosnian -- a BiH position, a position of the

10 28th Division. The commander -- they wouldn't let them through, so the

11 commander checked with his company commander, went under armour, as we

12 call it, or had to, and tried to cross that -- that -- that -- what would

13 you call it, that blockade, in fact. They had some stuff on the road.

14 During that, one of the BiH soldiers fired at the APC and hit the gunner

15 who was not under armour yet.

16 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, we may be a couple minutes early, but

17 I think this probably would be a good time to take a break.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll have a 25-minute break starting from now.

19 Thank you.

20 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

21 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Everything seems to be in place and everyone also.

23 Mr. Thayer.

24 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.

25 Q. Before we get going again, sir, I've been implored to continue to

Page 2461

1 speak slowly and to create as much of a pause between my questions and the

2 answers as possible. So we'll keep trying.

3 A. I'll keep on doing my best.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: It's difficult. I acknowledge that. We fall in the

5 same trap ourselves. But your cooperation, of course, is solicited.


7 Q. Sir, we left off with the fall of OP Foxtrot on 8 July. I'd like

8 to take you now to 9 July. Do you recall receiving reports about what was

9 going on with the remaining OPs? And let's focus on OP Mike and then OPs

10 Sierra and Uniform, taking Mike first, please.

11 A. OP Mike is on the northern border of the enclave, and there were

12 reports that Mike was under fire as well, mortar fire and direct firing.

13 Through the commander of C Company, he asked me permission to withdraw a

14 couple of hundred metres to avoid that firing. It was granted, and as far

15 as I recollect he took a position on the edge of the village of Jaglici.

16 Then Sierra, Uniform, well, the Serbs started then what we called

17 Pacmanning the OPs. Pacman, that little game snatching things away. I

18 don't know whether Sierra and Uniform fell on the 9th exactly which one

19 did on what day. Sorry.

20 What was reported in the beginning of the -- out of that area was

21 that there was on the 9th a continuing battle in that area between

22 probably Bosnian BiH forces and the Serb forces, and Uniform was under

23 fire as well.

24 Q. Did you receive information, in fact, that the Swedish shelter

25 refugees had indeed begun to move?

Page 2462

1 A. As I said, I don't recollect whether that was the 9th or 10th, but

2 Sierra fell, was taken over by the VRS, and then I ordered B Company to

3 send in another APC who again tried to block the approach in the direction

4 of the Swedish Shelter Project. That APC had to go through a western

5 approach, and then in the woods he encountered pretty -- many people,

6 civilians, sheltering there, and they concluded that that was the

7 population of Swedish Shelter Project. Part of those civilians was in the

8 direction of the city of Srebrenica, but I don't know whether they all

9 arrived in Srebrenica.

10 Q. Now, on 9 July, do you recall receiving any instructions, orders,

11 or guidelines from UNPROFOR higher command?

12 A. Yes. We were ordered to defend the city of Srebrenica by -- with

13 all our military means.

14 Q. And did you translate that order into a subsequent order to your

15 forces?

16 A. Yes. I wrote an operational order to B Company ordering him to

17 take blocking positions generally on the south edge of the -- of the city

18 of Srebrenica. We reinforced him with a couple of APC, what we call the

19 QRF, Quick Reaction Forces of the other company. So we tried to give him

20 the means to do that.

21 Q. And what was the purpose of those blocking positions, sir?

22 A. Purpose of these positions were literally to defend Srebrenica,

23 which means to prevent the Serbs to enter the city of Srebrenica.

24 Q. Sir, I want to show you with the assistance of Madam Usher a

25 document that we only came across recently. The Defence has been provided

Page 2463

1 a copy with a translation. It doesn't have a 65 ter number or a court

2 number as yet, so I'll just place it on the ELMO if we could. I have

3 copies of this document as well as the English translation for the Court

4 should the Court desire to have a hard copy to look at as Colonel Franken

5 is reading the Dutch original and translating simultaneously.

6 Sir, do you --

7 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Thayer. Let me see if we get

8 agreement on this.

9 What we see on the ELMO is the -- this document in Dutch, which

10 with the exception of the witness himself very few of us would understand.

11 I think what is more important is that we now can follow in -- in English.

12 So if there is a translated copy of it, I suggest we substitute what we

13 have on the ELMO with the English version. The accused will be able to

14 follow when refers -- specific reference is made to parts of this

15 document. In the meantime, the witness may retain the copy in whichever

16 language he prefers. Certainly he should have the Dutch original of the

17 document. Thank you.

18 MR. THAYER: Thank you for that guidance, Your Honour.

19 Q. Sir, do you have the Dutch in front of you?

20 A. I do.

21 Q. And -- and I see that we have the first page of the English

22 translation on the screen. The English translation version, sir, where

23 can you -- can you say who this memo is from and whom it is to?

24 JUDGE AGIUS: How many of these, do you have just one copy? One

25 copy. So what I suggest is -- one moment, Mr. Thayer. I apologise to you

Page 2464

1 for interrupting you.

2 But I what I suggest, Madam Usher, is that you hand this to

3 Mr. Popovic, and he will -- you will go through it very quickly before we

4 proceed with the questions so that you will know what kind of a document

5 we're talking about.

6 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I've handed one to General Gvero. No

7 doubt he can share with Mr. Pandurevic.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. And do any of the Defence team

9 need a copy of the document in B/C/S apart from English? Or do you have

10 both already? Yeah, they have both already.

11 Let's proceed, Mr. Thayer.

12 MR. THAYER: Yes, Mr. President.

13 Q. Sir, you have a copy of a Dutch document in front of you. Do you

14 recognise what that is?

15 A. Yes. That is the order I gave to the commander of B Company,

16 Captain Groen, concerning the defence of the city of Srebrenica.

17 Q. Moving the document up a little bit. Thank you. The first

18 paragraph that is headed "Task," can you just summarise what that -- the

19 bulk of that paragraph is meant to communicate?

20 A. Yeah. In fact, what he has to do where, in what position. It

21 says that he has to prepare and here -- it says here "further organise,"

22 but the Dutch text is in fact "establish a defence in the southern border

23 of Srebrenica." And I'm giving his left and -- or his west and his

24 eastern border which means that within that area you should do your job.

25 And the note is: "This is a seriously meant green order." That

Page 2465

1 means -- in fact, we had a difference between blue operations, meaning

2 operations within the context of the UN, and blue is referring to the

3 colour of our equipment, blue helmets, et cetera. And the green order was

4 specifically given to tell him that he could use immediately all his means

5 without the restrictions of the UN to execute his order. In fact, it

6 meant you have to proceed now as a normal army, not a UN army. That's

7 what I meant and to make very clear to him.

8 Q. Now, moving down one item under "Movements."

9 A. Mm-hmm.

10 Q. Can you describe what you were communicating here?

11 A. In fact, we -- you can then say by means we reinforce him with

12 means with some APCs personnel and anti-tank weapons, and the order to

13 these means was that they had to leave the camp Potocari and such a time

14 that they arrive in Srebrenica was at 0330 hours in the morning.

15 Q. Now, I'd like to direct your attention to the second page of the

16 English translation, and I just note for the record that the Dutch

17 original version is a single-page document, but turning your attention to

18 the second page of the English translation. Can you explain, please, the

19 meaning of the various items under "Coordinating provisions," just

20 briefly, sir, if you would.

21 A. Yes. I hand-picked the commander of the positions, because

22 commander B Company had still the responsibility for all this area, and it

23 was a specific Captain Hageman pointed out by me to be commander of those

24 blocking positions. It says at what time, 0500 hours, all the units have

25 to be in position. And then some remarks about the quality of -- when

Page 2466

1 possible dig yourselves in, et cetera. It's some -- some guidelines,

2 general guidelines but not -- not very important. Unless he had to count

3 on in the English translation the word "Hrm" which means be prepared to.

4 It's a Dutch abbreviation that they took over. He had to be prepared to

5 be supported by close-air support.

6 Q. Okay. I think that will do it with that document.

7 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Madam Usher.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Bourgon. One moment, because -- okay. I

9 think it's clear enough in the transcript. I just wanted to make sure

10 that this "Hrm" is carefully reproduced. Close-air support would be the

11 full version of the CAS that appears on that.

12 Yes, Mr. Bourgon.

13 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President. I would just like to

14 raise the Trial Chamber's attention to the fact that the document

15 presently being used -- that was just used by the Prosecution of course is

16 a new document. This document never appeared on the Prosecution's

17 intended list of exhibits. It does not have a Rule 65 ter number.

18 Normally we would object and basically say that the Prosecution

19 before using such a document must make an application to say why this

20 document was not presented on its list of exhibits according to

21 Rule 65 ter. That being, Mr. President, that this document, even though

22 it was obtained recently by the Prosecution as was mentioned, what we see

23 here is that it appears that this document indeed already has an ERN

24 number, that it was a document in the possession of the Prosecution, but

25 at some point it was decided or simply they missed a document and did not

Page 2467

1 include it on their list.

2 We simply say, Mr. President, that the Prosecution should, when

3 they come across a document like this, first make an application, explain

4 why the document is not on their list, where the document comes from, so

5 that at least we have some time to prepare. In this case, we were given

6 this document yesterday.

7 We decided not to object in order to allow for the testimony of

8 Mr. Franken to continue today, but we want -- we have to raise this to the

9 Trial Chamber's attention.

10 There is a second issue, Mr. President, with respect to this

11 document, and this will again come on a few documents. There are comments

12 put between slashes on these documents, and this appears to have been

13 added, and it appears on many documents, appears to be added by the

14 translation services. For example, we have on this document, we have

15 "QRF" as being Quick Reaction Force. And then we have some of these

16 expansions, it's written expansions unknown.

17 There's a difference between a translation and a guessing work as

18 to what an abbreviation really means. The person who can tell us what the

19 abbreviation means, sorry, is the witness or at least somebody who was

20 aware of the document, but there should not be a guessing game in terms of

21 trying to identify what these expansions or these abbreviations mean.

22 Thank you, Mr. President.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: I think answering your last issue I think it

24 requires very little -- very few remarks. I think that if you have doubts

25 as to the words between backslash, then you can -- that can be raised in

Page 2468

1 cross-examination with -- with the witness. That's the first one.

2 The second -- the first point that you raised, I understood

3 Mr. Thayer to say that the Prosecution had come into possession of this

4 document only recently. Are you contesting that?

5 MR. BOURGON: Well, the fact of the matter, Mr. President, is we

6 received some notes from the Prosecution and I'm not sure exactly when

7 they came across this document, because according to some information that

8 we have this -- what is referred to in a memo that we've received from my

9 colleague is called a green order with an ERN number.

10 Now, in terms of this document, it talks about a Rule 70 waiver,

11 meaning that the Prosecution already had this document but for some reason

12 appears to have elected or chosen not to use it. Now they want to use it

13 and they changed their mind. Now, that's a big difference between you

14 have a document, you choose not to use it, and then suddenly with another

15 witness comes and you say, "Oh, well, yes, I'm going to use it today." I

16 think that's a difference.

17 Maybe that's not the case. Maybe my colleague can explain, but

18 that's the purpose of my intervention. If the Prosecution wants to use a

19 new document, they should make an application and say, "We have a new

20 document. Here's what it is. Here's where it comes from. Here is why we

21 want to use it." And then we can argue and basically the Chamber can

22 decide whether it should be allowed to do so or not.

23 Thank you, Mr. President.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Bourgon.

25 Mr. Thayer, had these issues not been brought up, obviously your

Page 2469

1 explanation that this document had just come to you recently would have

2 provided the explanation why it was not included on the 65 ter list.

3 However, the issue has been raised, and I think I have to call upon you to

4 tender any explanation you may have.

5 MR. THAYER: Certainly, Your Honour. And my learned colleague has

6 a fair point with respect to these two documents, actually, that we will

7 be dealing with in the course of Colonel Franken's testimony.

8 I misspoke with respect to this particular document. This

9 document we have had. It has not been identified before, as far as I

10 know, by anybody as existing. It was attached to the statement of another

11 DutchBat officer. No one, as far as I know, has seen it ever, and that

12 is -- it came into my possession very recently, and I tried to get a hold

13 of Colonel Franken as soon as I could to see if he would waive his Rule 70

14 privilege with respect to it and communicate that as soon as I could.

15 So we have had this in a collection. I don't believe anybody's

16 actually seen this particular document, Your Honour. I came across it

17 through a massive Rule 68 search that we are conducting as a regular part

18 of our ongoing duties and compliance with the rules of the Trial Chamber.

19 With respect to the second document --

20 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Stop there for the time being.

21 That is the explanation that Mr. Thayer has for the Defence. Do

22 you -- can we proceed, or do you wish to comment on it?

23 MR. BOURGON: Indeed, Mr. President. For today with this document

24 we can proceed. But this is a situation that needs to be brought to your

25 attention for future documents so that we have an ongoing procedure. But

Page 2470

1 I don't want to interrupt the testimony of this witness.

2 Thank you, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

4 Next point with the other document.

5 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, with respect to this second document,

6 this document indeed we only came into possession of on Thursday last.

7 These are documents which we undertook efforts to recover at the request

8 of counsel for accused Miletic, documents which were mentioned in the NIOD

9 report which we have placed the Defence on notice of. It's been in

10 existence for some time, but we received a specific request to search or

11 contact NIOD for documents relating to our anticipated live trial

12 witnesses. We have done so. We expect to receive some of those documents

13 shortly. They will be translated as soon as possible and furnished to

14 Defence counsel.

15 One of those documents was translated last week and furnished to

16 Defence counsel today. The document was received Thursday, translated

17 Friday and Saturday, and then disclosed today. This document that I'm

18 referring to that I will use with Colonel Franken actually has not even

19 been translated yet. It is a document I only had an opportunity to

20 discuss with Mr. McCloskey over the weekend. We made the decision that it

21 had some -- some probative and relevant value, and we have undertaken to

22 have it translated in fact as we speak.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I thank you so much, Mr. Thayer.

24 And I take it from you, Mr. Bourgon, speaking on behalf of all of

25 the Defence teams, that we can proceed?

Page 2471

1 MR. BOURGON: I have not discussed this with my colleagues, but I

2 believe that is the case, but I was not speaking on behalf of everybody

3 because I did not check with them first.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: I apologise to you for having misunderstood that.

5 Does any Defence team wish to disassociate itself with the

6 position taken by Mr. Bourgon, both in relation to the first and the

7 second document? In other words, okay, we can proceed.

8 Yes, Mr. Thayer. And I thank the -- you for the explanations and

9 the Defence teams for their cooperation.

10 Mr. Thayer.

11 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.

12 Q. Just one final question, sir, with respect to these blocking

13 positions, and forgive me if you've answered this previously but I just

14 wanted to clarify it. How many blocking positions were there and what

15 names were they assigned?

16 A. There were originally planned four blocking positions. They were

17 called Bravo 1 up to Bravo 4, and there was one planned position for my

18 forward air controllers, which means that is a team that is able to lead

19 planes on -- attacking planes on a target.

20 Q. Now, do you recall approximately when your blocking positions

21 actually were established?

22 A. Because they had problems by taking their positions. It was

23 prevented by a Serb fire. It was at about 0630 that morning.

24 Q. And this would be the morning of 10 July --

25 A. That's correct, yes.

Page 2472

1 Q. Now, let's just take up where you -- where you left off there.

2 What reports did you receive concerning fire received by DutchBat

3 positions and personnel, and let's begin with those blocking positions.

4 A. Well, the commander, Captain Hageman, who had a central position,

5 I recollect it as being Bravo 2, was not able to reach that because he

6 came under fire of a Serb T 55 main battle tank, was shot off the road

7 with his APC, had to withdraw. That position was adjusted. The position

8 on the west side, Bravo 1, had to change his position because he was under

9 fire of Serb tanks and Serb artillery. Bravo 4 in the east had no

10 problems originally, and Bravo 3 had to change because he was under fire

11 by machine -- machine-guns but took reserve positions, which mean it's a

12 position where he can do the same job just on another spot.

13 Q. You mentioned the position of Captain Hageman taking fire and

14 being driven off the road. Did you have to take any steps to try to

15 recover that --

16 A. Yeah, we tried to -- the recovery vehicles were positioned at

17 Potocari and so I sent down one of them who came in the fire right out of

18 the gate of Potocari by the anti-tank gun that was positioned in the area

19 of OP P, Papa. But again when he tried to go to the vehicle of Captain

20 Hageman he came under fire of that came Tango 55 main battle tank and had

21 to withdraw, so we didn't succeed in recovering that vehicle.

22 Q. Did you receive any reports of injuries suffered by DutchBat

23 soldiers or crew members?

24 A. Yes. There were a couple of shrapnel wounds, light injuries, but

25 they could stay in position and could keep on working or doing their job.

Page 2473

1 Q. And were those injuries sustained by blocking position crew

2 members, sir?

3 A. Bravo 1 and the western position, they had three or four wounded

4 by shrapnels, and some of the crew of -- the gunner of Captain Hageman had

5 some injuries.

6 Q. Now I'd like to focus your attention for a moment to Bravo Company

7 and that area.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. What reports were you receiving on 10 July concerning the attack

10 on -- on that area, sir?

11 A. Well, as I told you, my blocking positions were under fire, and

12 there was a massive shelling of the city of Srebrenica, including our

13 compound. There were reports of wounded, but we didn't count them because

14 they were taken to the civil hospital and we had our hands full in doing

15 other things.

16 Q. And did you at some point request a count of the number of

17 detonations or -- or artillery explosions on that day, sir?

18 A. Standard procedure was that when there was shelling that -- that

19 the patrol or the observer reported the amount and the -- if known, the

20 weapon system that was firing. B Company did that on the 10th as well,

21 but I ordered them to stop when they came up to 160 or 200 or something

22 like that. It was no use anymore to report that, just filling paper.

23 Q. And by this time, sir, were you able to identify and count the VRS

24 artillery or firing positions?

25 A. Yes. We already knew of -- of about 16 positions, but then we

Page 2474

1 came to a count of about 32 artillery or mortar positions active. We got

2 reports of about six different main battle tanks operational.

3 Q. Now, at some point on 10 July, do you recall DutchBat receiving an

4 ultimatum from the VRS?

5 A. On the 10th, you say?

6 Q. Yes, on or about the 10th.

7 A. Well, as far as I recollect, UN sent an ultimatum to -- to the --

8 the Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs, and they reacted with an ultimatum to

9 DutchBat, in fact, saying, okay, stop your hostile activity and with an

10 arrangement that we could leave through Papa, the -- in an order with the

11 civil population, leave the enclave, and they demanded that we left our

12 equipment and weapons, et cetera, as far as I recollect it.

13 Q. Okay. I'd like to show you a document.

14 And for the record, this is the second document that I described

15 previously that has just come into our possession. And with the

16 assistance of Madam Usher, I'd just like to place it on the ELMO.

17 Sir, you have a document in Dutch in front of you. I'd just ask

18 you to take a moment and read it. And again, we are in the process of

19 getting this document translated, so for the time being, with the Trial

20 Chamber's permission, I'd just ask you to translate into English directly

21 from this document. And when you do so, sir, it's even more important to

22 pause to do so, because it's particularly important for the accused to be

23 able to understand what you're saying.

24 Now, having seen in document, can you describe what it is?

25 A. In fact, it is a written version of the -- of the radio message we

Page 2475

1 got from the BSA and I tried to describe the details but I see the details

2 here, and it concerns the information of commander B Company, because the

3 other commanders were in the area of the HQ because I -- so I could do

4 that verbally, but Captain Groen was in Srebrenica, so I sent this down to

5 him, and it concerned that ultimatum of what we call the Bosnian Serb

6 army. Text was: "The UN is not disarming the Muslims so we will do that,

7 and as 11th of July, 0600 hours till 48 hours later, civilians, soldiers

8 of the BiH, DutchBat can give -- hand in their weapons and leave the

9 enclave through Yellow Bridge."

10 Yellow Bridge is the Bosnian Serb check-point at the north part of

11 the enclave.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. "UN" --

14 Q. Let me just stop you right there.

15 A. I'm going too fast.

16 Q. No, no, no, you're fine. I just want to clarify something.

17 This particular paragraph, there's a word that precedes the colon

18 on the line that has the BSA on it. It's "betreft." What is that word?

19 A. B-e-t -- sorry.

20 Q. It's -- right next to where it says "ultimatum BSA."

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. There is a word directly to the left of that.

23 A. Oh, "betreft." That's a Dutch word, means concerned. This

24 concerns the ultimatum of the BSA. That's literally translated what

25 the ...

Page 2476

1 Q. Now I'm sorry, I interrupted you.

2 A. No, no.

3 Q. You were about to talk about the last line of that section.

4 A. Yes. "NGOs, UNHCR, et cetera, can leave immediately through

5 Yellow Bridge."

6 Again, Yellow Bridge being the Serb check-point in the north.

7 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I just raise an issue. We have just

8 received the English translation of the document. I can place this on the

9 ELMO and work from here on, or at the Court's pleasure we can continue

10 with the Dutch translation via Colonel Franken.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: So replace that with the English version. More or

12 less it will also give us an opportunity to control what we've just heard.

13 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, we do have extra copies of the English

14 translation which I can distribute.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please.

16 MR. THAYER: To -- oh, thank you, Madam Usher.

17 May I proceed, Your Honour?

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly.


20 Q. Now, sir, feel free to rely on the Dutch version you have in front

21 of you or the English translation. The bottom portion of that memorandum,

22 would you please explain that to the Trial Chamber.

23 A. Yes, but if you allow me, I have a remark about the translation of

24 the first part.

25 Q. All right.

Page 2477

1 A. It says "DutchBat can hand in weapons," as if there was a

2 possibility not to do so. That was absolutely not the case. We had to

3 hand in our weapons when we should have done that.

4 Then the second part, "UN reaction," was that the Bosnian Serb

5 army should withdraw to lines of Morillon, as was the UN border of the

6 enclave because there were three borders. In fact, there was a BiH

7 border, BSA border and the UN border, and that differed significantly.

8 Every "AV," which is the Dutch abbreviation for attack. Every

9 attack should be left behind. Or they should stop their attack it was

10 meant. And the order was to withdraw to those Morillon lines as of 0600

11 on the, what is it, the 11th. That was the reaction of the UN, and this

12 message was to inform commander B Company what was going on on that level.

13 Q. Okay. I think that takes care of that document.

14 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Madam Usher.

15 JUDGE KWON: What does processing mean? Top line.

16 THE WITNESS: Top line, sir.

17 JUDGE KWON: Processed 13th July.

18 THE WITNESS: That is later on a -- a -- they say they filed it or

19 processed it on the 13th, but that is not done by me or something. It is

20 somebody who made this copy or whatever.

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Judge Kwon.

23 Mr. Bourgon.

24 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President. I would just like to

25 clarify something the witness just said about, he made a comment on the

Page 2478

1 translation. I would just like to know if that was a substantive comment

2 or whether the original says something other than "can hand in weapons."

3 JUDGE AGIUS: So I understood it.

4 But Colonel -- Mr. Franken has heard your remark, and I think he

5 can easily answer that.

6 THE WITNESS: It is significant, because in fact it's a mistake in

7 the translation. The original message says, "You have to hand in your

8 weapons," and the translation says, "You can," giving the possibility --

9 the possibility not to do so, but it's not relevant.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

11 You may proceed.

12 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Your Honour. And thank you, Madam Usher.

13 Q. Sir, that brings us now to the 11th of July. By that time were

14 you also receiving reports concerning the fate of the remaining OPs that

15 you had described earlier? I think the term you used for it was a Pacman

16 video game. And what do you mean by that and was that continuing until

17 the 11th?

18 A. What I meant is that the OPs were one by one taken over by the

19 Serbs. After the Foxtrot incident with which I mean the killing of one of

20 my soldiers, we ordered the OPs only to withdraw when they got permission

21 to withdraw, when there was some kind of an agreement with the local

22 Muslim commander, because we were very keen to prevent more soldiers shot

23 by -- by the Muslim army.

24 So what I meant by Pacman, that one by one the Muslims left their

25 positions without telling us and my OPs found themselves absolutely

Page 2479

1 surrounded by the Bosnian Serb army. And during that day, and I don't

2 know exactly which OP when fell, but it ended in that the OP Charlie and

3 OP Alpha were still in position, and Delta was in another position a bit

4 more north and more or less the rest of them were taken over or withdrawn,

5 with the exception of Papa, because Papa we kept that. In the northern

6 entrance, we kept that operation.

7 Q. And what happened to the DutchBat soldiers who had been manning

8 those OPs as they were being overrun, captured or attacked by the VRS

9 forces?

10 A. In most cases they have to hand in their small calibre weapons and

11 were taken with their APC to -- whether Bratunac. Some of them stayed

12 some period in that mining area, that is the area directly south of the

13 enclave, were brought to Milici, but in the end they all ended in

14 Bratunac.

15 Q. And based on the reports that you were receiving, were those

16 soldiers free to leave their positions or free to leave that location in

17 Bratunac or --

18 A. No, no. They were -- they were POWs. They were taken prisoner.

19 Q. At some point on the 11th of July did you decide to issue any

20 orders regarding continuing to defend the town of Srebrenica?

21 A. That's correct. The situation was that we had an attack on

22 the 10th. The evening of the attack we fired upon the Serb army. They

23 withdrew. Then we found out in the morning of the 11th that the 28th

24 Muslim Division had disappear. Nobody was there anymore.

25 And the population, the civilians, were moving into -- massively

Page 2480

1 in the city itself over in our compound of the B Company, and then we

2 tried to lead them in the direction of Potocari. Commander B Company had

3 soldiers on the road who started to walk in the direction of Potocari, and

4 they followed, which meant that defending Srebrenica, the city, an empty

5 city, was of no use, and I gave B Company orders to withdraw at the tail

6 of that column of refugees a northern position, in northern direction.

7 His mission was stay between the Serbs and the civilians and bring them --

8 bring them north. If you come to Potocari, take position in the south on

9 the edge of Potocari, front south, and again start blocking any Serb

10 approach.

11 Another reason for ordering him withdraw Srebrenica was that by

12 that time being the 28th Muslim Division away, I had Serb infantry on the

13 high edges already past my left and right flanks. So we were in the air

14 and in fact, well, moved out of position.

15 Q. You described the movement of the Muslim refugees together with

16 some of your men northwards. Did you receive reports about their

17 experience as they moved in that northerly direction?

18 A. Commander B Company, of course, informed me in detail where his

19 positions were and how far the proceedings or the ongoing of that column

20 was. I got reports of shelling of the column. Wounded we picked up and

21 loaded them on the APCs and brought them to Potocari on that way. That

22 was in fact in general the reports I got, because every detailed report is

23 not relevant now.

24 Q. And do you know what kind of fire the column of refugees was

25 receiving?

Page 2481

1 A. Yes, mostly mortar and artillery.

2 Q. Did you make any logistical preparations for the arrival of these

3 refugees given the information you were receiving, sir?

4 A. Yes. I ordered base commander Major Otter to recce a route into

5 the camp.

6 Q. Let me stop you right there. What does the term "recce" mean?

7 A. To -- what do you call that in normal English? To find out a

8 road, a safe road, route, I should say, into the camp because the road in

9 front of our base was in the direct site of Serb artillery and Serb tanks,

10 and I didn't want those civilian columns moving up that road because I had

11 reason to believe that it was -- they would be fired upon.

12 That's what he did, and then we had a line of guides to guide the

13 people into our camp in Potocari, and I gave my logistics people and my

14 medics orders to prepare the receiving of the people. So make a first aid

15 post, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

16 Q. You described the -- wanting to keep the column of refugees out of

17 the direct sight of the Serb artillery. Can you describe with a little

18 bit more detail where you had identified those pieces being located and

19 what they were, if you know?

20 A. In -- in the area of the OP Papa there was a small ridge and a

21 saddle what we call it, a lower part, and in that position was an

22 anti-tank gun who had been firing all the time at the -- our base.

23 Directly east of it there was a position of a T55, a main battle tank, and

24 further north there were positions of MRS -- what is it? Multiple launch

25 rocket systems.

Page 2482

1 Q. At this time if we could have P01516 displayed on e-court, please.

2 And this is the one we need upside down, please. Actually, if we could

3 zoom out just a bit, please. Just a little bit more. Zoom out. I'm

4 sorry. Perfect. Okay.

5 Sir, do you have an image on your screen?

6 A. I do.

7 Q. I'll just ask you to take a moment and orient yourself and ask you

8 if you can recognise what this is?

9 A. In fact, that's an aerial photograph of -- of the location of our

10 HQ in Potocari and the -- a part of the village of Potocari itself. The

11 way -- the road you see north-south going is the road between Bratunac and

12 Srebrenica.

13 Q. Okay. And I'll ask you some more specific questions about some of

14 the landmarks and features. But basically are you able to make out

15 various landmarks and structures on this document based on your experience

16 there, sir?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. I'm going to ask you to -- with the assistance of Madam

19 Usher to take a stylus and show you how to do it. It's a lesson in time

20 travel.

21 Okay. I'd ask you if you could just write "UN base" to the right

22 of the actual compound if you can identify it there on the -- and just

23 draw an arrow pointing to it, please.

24 A. [Marks].

25 Q. And do you see an area that you knew as the Ekspres bus compound

Page 2483

1 or the bus company?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. And would you please write "bus compound" to the right of it and

4 an arrow, please.

5 A. [Marks].

6 Q. And do you see the general area of the abandoned factories that

7 have been referred to, and if you do, could you just please

8 write "factories" to the left of it and an arrow pointing to that area,

9 please.

10 A. [Marks].

11 Q. Do you -- can you make out a feature that you knew as the

12 "White House" on this overview, sir, and if you --

13 A. Yes, I can.

14 Q. If you can, would you please just write "White House" to the left

15 and an arrow point to go it.

16 A. [Marks].

17 Q. And just for the record, the northern -- northern direction is

18 going up on the page and south down; is that correct?

19 A. [Marks].

20 Q. Thank you, sir. Would you mark as best as you can recall the

21 route that Major Otter had established for the reception of the refugees.

22 A. Yes. And I'm not sure whether that was in between these buildings

23 or the western part of these buildings I'm not sure as well. But in

24 general, we came from the south side and we made a hole in the fence

25 indicated there as a sign where they came in.

Page 2484

1 Q. And where in the UN base were they physically sheltered, sir?

2 A. In a big factory building in the centre.

3 Q. And if you'd just place an X on top of that, please.

4 A. [Marks].

5 Q. And if you could write your initials and date the document,

6 please.

7 A. [Marks].

8 Q. Thank you, sir. I think we're ready to --

9 A. You're welcome.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: And you will tender that at a later stage. Yes,

11 Mr. Thayer.

12 MR. THAYER: I think we are done for the moment with this

13 document. If it's saved, we can cross our fingers and let it go.

14 Thank you, Madam Usher.

15 Q. How did you determine, sir, when the compound was -- was too full

16 for your purposes?

17 A. Having experienced the situation in Srebrenica with our freedom of

18 movement with military means when all these people were around, which was

19 not, I had to guarantee that on the compound, being the last UN area in

20 the enclave, I still was able to move with my military means, my APCs, if

21 necessary. And secondly, I didn't want the refugees to be exposed to the

22 views of the Bosnian Serb army, especially not directly in the line of

23 fire of the artillery and tanks I described to you before. So that's why

24 I decided to use that building. In fact, it's the only one that gave that

25 cover anyway. And when it was full to closed down, yeah.

Page 2485

1 Q. And where were the refugees directed after that, sir?

2 A. Well, they stayed more or less in the area of the bus station, the

3 factories in the area, and on the other side, on the western side of the

4 road.

5 Q. Which you have marked on your --

6 A. Before, yes.

7 Q. -- previous document. Okay.

8 I want to turn your attention, sir, briefly to another event on

9 the afternoon of 11 July. At some point was close-air support finally

10 delivered?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. And did you receive any response from the VRS to that close-air

13 support?

14 A. Yes. Must have been around 1400 hours when the close-air support

15 was a fact. I got through the communication means of one of the -- let's

16 say of my APCs standing in Bratunac, the APCs that came with the OP crews

17 to that POW site, I got an English message read by one of my NCOs, my

18 NCOs, which said that close-air support had to stop immediately or BSA

19 would shell to the ultimate the area of our base, including the locations

20 where the refugees were, and they would kill my soldiers, being POW.

21 Q. Now, let's take the latter portion of that message first, sir.

22 How seriously did you take the threat to your personnel?

23 A. Yeah. Not that serious. The only thing what in my opinion could

24 be done is that they would use them as a shelter or as a cover for --

25 for -- on important locations, a sort of human shield which they did

Page 2486

1 before in other parts of Bosnia. I didn't -- I didn't believe that they

2 would really execute them.

3 Q. How seriously did you take the threat to shell the HQ and the

4 compound with the refugees in it, sir?

5 A. Very serious, because they did that before. And with that I mean

6 firing at the refugees with all means they had.

7 Q. And at some point shortly after receiving this threat was there

8 actually fire received by the base?

9 A. Yes. Probably they -- they would make sure that we believed them,

10 because very shortly after that there was a mortar shelling of the area of

11 the bus station, and later -- shortly after that there was a full round of

12 the MRS, the multiple rocket system in the area of Potocari.

13 Q. And did that fire cause any casualties among the refugees, sir?

14 A. Yeah, there were wounded, but I can't tell you how many because it

15 was a tremendous crowd in panic, of course.

16 Q. I want to turn your attention for a couple of moments to an area

17 which the Trial Chamber has received substantial evidence already so we

18 went go through it in much detail, and I'm referring to the series of

19 Hotel Fontana meetings between the evening of the 11th and the next

20 morning the 12th of July.

21 Just briefly, sir, did Colonel Karremans brief you following the

22 first meeting?

23 A. Yeah, following the first meeting he did, yes.

24 Q. And as result of that first meeting you had to locate a

25 representative from the Muslim population for the second meeting? Is that

Page 2487

1 correct, sir?

2 A. That is correct, yes.

3 Q. And do you remember that person's name?

4 A. Yeah. Mr. Mandic was the first one that took part of that

5 committee, yes.

6 Q. And did you see Mr. Mandic --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- when he returned from that second meeting? And again, I'm

9 sorry, but if you could please leave a pause between --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- between our questions.

12 A. Mr. Mandic came to the meeting, yes.

13 Q. And what was his demeanour when you saw him after that second

14 meeting?

15 A. Yeah, he was very, very nervous and -- and almost panicking

16 because, well, he felt the responsibility he was confronted with. We

17 talked and he had the wish to speak to his government. We tried that on

18 the evening but we couldn't reach anybody. There was a responsible

19 minister obviously in that -- in the BiH government, but he couldn't be

20 disturbed because he was dining. So Mr. Mandic had his problem. I tried

21 to support him.

22 Q. Now, did Colonel Karremans brief you after the second meeting that

23 night?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So it's fair to say that by the evening of the 11th the refugees

Page 2488

1 had already pretty much filled the compound and were crowded into the

2 factory area and the bus area to the south --

3 A. Yes, the mass was already present then in the night of the 11th.

4 On the 12th, there were smaller groups still coming in, but the mass was

5 there, yes.

6 Q. And at that point what measures did you take with respect to their

7 safety and welfare?

8 A. Their safety, we had -- I appointed a commander as a guard

9 commander, and we had a ring of outposts around that area. Order was to

10 prevent Serb forces or any forces to enter that -- that area. And for the

11 welfare we had a first aid -- no, two first aid posts with medics and

12 doctors in the area. We distributed water and some food of which we

13 didn't have ourself very much, but that's what we did.

14 Q. I take it you spent fair amount of time in the operations room

15 during this period; is that correct?

16 A. That is correct, yes.

17 Q. Did you nonetheless make it a point to get out and about?

18 A. Yes. Well, I thought it was important that I got out so that not

19 only hearing the reports but seeing with my own eyes, and I -- at least

20 twice a day I made my round outside.

21 Q. Did you have an opportunity to observe the conditions --

22 A. Yes, I did. Yes.

23 Q. -- of the refugees?

24 A. Yes, I did.

25 Q. And would you just briefly describe how they appeared to you at

Page 2489

1 that time?

2 A. Totally exhausted, bad condition. In fact, lethargic. Lethargic?

3 Yeah, that is a word. They didn't react on anything, just turned into

4 themselves. Not prepared to help each other or whatever. We were there,

5 and more or less they looked as if the world stopped for them.

6 Q. Were you able to estimate approximately how many Muslim men were

7 inside the compound and among the gathering refugees south of the

8 compound?

9 A. Inside the compound we were pretty sure we counted them. We

10 probably come to that; it's the well known list. And the estimations

11 outside were around 600 up until 800 or something like that.

12 Q. And as you said, we'll get to the list later. But for the time

13 being, did you have a general idea of how many Muslim men were inside the

14 compound?

15 A. Yes, we estimated on 300 about.

16 Q. Sir, I'd like you to turn your attention now to the next day,

17 the 12th of July.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. There was an infantry attack that commenced at some point that

20 morning. Could you just briefly describe what you observed with respect

21 to that?

22 A. Yeah. That advance was a demonstration of a basically trained

23 unit, men in line supported by a main battle tank and coming alongside the

24 road from northern direction in the direction of Potocari. So from the

25 area of OP Papa general Bratunac. Well dressed, I mean in proper

Page 2490

1 uniforms. All the same uniforms. There was obviously a communication

2 between the tank crew and the infantry outside. So more or less a demo, a

3 demonstration of a normal army.

4 Q. Where was Colonel Karremans at this time, sir?

5 A. He was on his way or already present at the third meeting with

6 Mladic, and that was in Bratunac in that hotel.

7 Q. So the attack that you witnessed occurred sometime in the early

8 morning of -- of the 12th?

9 A. Quarter past 10.00, half past 10.00, something like that, yes.

10 Q. Not early for a military man?

11 A. No, not.

12 Q. Did you a bit later that morning have direct contact with some of

13 those VRS forces after they entered Potocari?

14 A. Personally, you mean?

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. Yeah, well, later on when Colonel Karremans returned from his

17 meeting with Mladic, and he was trying to debrief me. Later on I had

18 contact to a Colonel Acamovic, who was a G4 officer, he said, from Pale

19 and who was in charge of what we called -- or what one called then the

20 evacuation of the civil population.

21 Q. Okay. Let me just interrupt you right there, sir. I want to go

22 back a little bit before we talk about --

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Before we go back, if he could repeat the name

24 because it doesn't show up in the transcript. I think it's important.

25 Colonel who?

Page 2491

1 THE WITNESS: As far as I recollect, Acamovic, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Mr. Thayer.

3 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Q. Before we discuss the higher level Serb officers whom you

5 encountered, did you encounter a group of other VRS soldiers somewhere in

6 the vicinity of the compound, sir?

7 A. Yes. I got a report that a couple of Serb soldiers wanted to

8 enter the compound not through the main gate but an unused gate they

9 wanted to go in. Major Rutten reported that to me. As for orders, I went

10 over there myself and forbid that. The only thing I -- to prevent a

11 fighting over there quite close to the refugees. I permitted them to come

12 in with two guys and to check whether or not, as they declared, parts of

13 the 28th Division were in our compound. So I escorted them with four or

14 five soldiers -- of my soldiers and they were in the compound for about

15 four minutes and then out again.

16 Q. And do you recall the appearance of these soldiers, sir?

17 A. Yes. Generally they were -- they were wearing all kinds of

18 uniforms. There were a couple of them in dark uniforms, soldiers with

19 dogs, and on my request somebody stepped forward. There was one soldier

20 who spoke English stepped forward and declared himself the commander.

21 Q. Did these soldiers all appear to be from the same unit?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Or did they appear to you to be from different units at that --

24 A. From different units. Yeah, well, at least they didn't wear all

25 the same uniform.

Page 2492

1 Q. Now, let's pick up where you began to answer previously.

2 Did Colonel Karremans return at some point from that meeting in

3 Bratunac?

4 A. Yes, that is correct. If you want a time it would be somewhere

5 shortly after 12.00, I suppose.

6 Q. And did he brief you about what happened at the meeting?

7 A. Yeah. Well, he started briefing, I should say, because he

8 couldn't finish that because him briefing me, I got the report that there

9 were hell of a lot of buses and trucks appearing from the -- from the

10 north. So he stopped his briefing and I started arranging things, at

11 least tried.

12 Q. And was it at that point that you had contact with this VRS

13 officer Acamovic?

14 A. That was later on. It was later on. I suppose it's about 2.00

15 or 3.00 in the afternoon.

16 Q. Why don't we discuss for a moment your encounter with this Colonel

17 Acamovic, sir.

18 A. Mm-hmm.

19 Q. Did just describe who he told you he was, what he did, and what he

20 was doing there?

21 A. It was a very short meeting, I should say. He came forward to me

22 and said he was a colonel in the Bosnian Serb army and he was a G4 officer

23 and responsible for the evacuation of the civilians and asked for support

24 and specifically transport and diesel.

25 Q. And what was your --

Page 2493

1 A. Fuel.

2 Q. And what was your response to that?

3 A. I could hardly stop my laughing because they were very well aware

4 of the fact that I did not have diesel and I refused that support.

5 Q. Did you meet any other higher-level Serb officers that day who

6 appeared to be involved to some degree in this whole process?

7 A. It must be the same day that I met a Colonel Jankovic, and he said

8 to be a colonel from Pale as well, and his mission was to prepare and --

9 and to coordinate the withdrawal of DutchBat out of the enclave.

10 Q. Now, sir, given that --

11 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Thayer. Previously on -- he was

12 asked and he answered the question relating to what kind of uniforms,

13 whether they were wearing the same uniform. I'm referring to the small

14 group that were allowed to enter.

15 Did he notice any insignia?

16 THE WITNESS: No, I did not, sir. There were some badges on these

17 parts of uniforms, but -- but I don't really recollect them. Yeah, they

18 looked like militia. One had camouflage trousers on, the other a jacket,

19 et cetera. It was a complete mix of civil and military parts on their

20 bodies.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.


23 Q. Now, given that as you testified, sir, the buses had already

24 arrived, what did you decide to do?

25 A. Well, it was obvious that we want to have some control over the

Page 2494

1 operation, so I -- the first buses already tried or started to leave, and

2 I sent down, I picked out two officers in my neighbourhood, put them in

3 the jeep and gave them the word to stay with that convoy whatever happens,

4 and then I gave order to one of my officers, Captain Melchers, to organise

5 a convoy escort which meant one jeep with an NCO or officer and a driver

6 in front of that convoy and one at the tail of the convoy. And he started

7 arranging that.

8 Q. Just going back a moment, sir. The first two officers whom you

9 mentioned, do you recall their names?

10 A. Yes. Major Boering, my S5, and Captain Voerman. He was normally

11 my personnel officer. But they happened to be at hand so I ordered them

12 to do that.

13 Q. Did you attempt to stay abreast of the progress of those first

14 convoys, sir?

15 A. Yes, we did. I could not get any communications with my escort

16 team, but I heard afterwards what happened to that convoy that went well I

17 got reports from the Pakistani battalion being in the area of Kladanj,

18 being a UN unit. On my question whether there were people coming in,

19 specifically men and women, they confirmed that. And later on I got

20 reports from my escort teams as long as they were operational.

21 Q. Now, along those lines, sir, did you start receiving reports

22 concerning the DutchBat escorts of subsequent convoys?

23 A. It was the first -- I mean, I believe the second convoy all went

24 well but then there came a massive harassment of my escort teams. They

25 were stopped, sometimes with the argument that the Serb troops that

Page 2495

1 responsible for their security and it was too dangerous to drive on. So

2 they were stopped and not allowed to drive on but the buses went on. And

3 that varied until stopping under the threat of weapons robbed and some of

4 my patrols came back in their underwear walking out of Serb area and every

5 variation in between that happened, which meant I didn't get any reports,

6 so -- so to say. My ears and my eyes were cut off.

7 Q. You described the escorts being robbed. What were they robbed of,

8 sir?

9 A. Well, anything. Their vehicles, their weapons, their flak

10 jackets, ammo, equipment in the jeep, of course. There were variations.

11 There were escort teams who were allowed to stay in place, kept their

12 weapons, nothing wrong, but it went down to two of my patrols coming back

13 literally in their underpants and the rest was stolen.

14 Q. Now, when you learned that the weapons were being stolen, what did

15 you do in response to that, sir?

16 A. I ordered the escort teams to go without weapons.

17 Q. Do you recall approximately how many vehicles were seized during

18 the course of these events?

19 A. Yeah, about 16.

20 Q. Now, you testified about the variation in -- in the treatment

21 received by the DutchBat soldiers from the Serb forces. Based on the

22 reports you were receiving, was there anything consistent or constant

23 about what you were learning was going on with respect to your efforts to

24 escort those convoys?

25 A. Yeah. Well, in fact it started more or less on one moment, so my

Page 2496

1 conclusion was that it was organised. It was ordered, and the reason for

2 that for me was they -- they don't want us to be around these convoys.

3 They don't want us to be witness of whatever happens. They want us out of

4 the way.

5 Q. Let me diverge just for a moment. Other than the DutchBat escort

6 vehicles which you just described, during the course of this attack and

7 the eventual fall, what other vehicles were -- were lost to the VRS?

8 A. Well, quite some APCs, of course, APCs who were positioned on the

9 OPs, and then two or three were damaged by -- by fire and were taken by

10 the Serbs after we withdrew. Two or three jeeps again and quite a lot of

11 small calibre weapons. But including all my POW systems, because they

12 were positioned on the OPs, and some heavy machine-guns.

13 Q. Did you register a complaint with any of the VRS officers whom you

14 encountered, sir?

15 A. Yes, I did. I complained to Colonel Jankovic, and he would -- he

16 said he would take care of that.

17 Q. And to your knowledge, did he take any action?

18 A. No. I don't know whether he took any action, but I couldn't see

19 any result.

20 Q. Did you begin receiving reports at some point that the men were

21 being separated from the refugees?

22 A. Separation of men was from the very beginning, of course. Mladic

23 announced that as well. So from the very start of the evacuation men were

24 more or less separated. The first convoy went away with men, but then

25 probably on the Serb side it was better organised and men were taken out

Page 2497

1 directly after they left the perimeter we secured.

2 Q. And did you become aware of where some of these men were taken,

3 sir?

4 A. They were brought to the "White House" building, about 150 metres

5 out in front of our main gate, and were interrogated there.

6 Q. And is that the "White House" you identified on the document you

7 previously marked, sir?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. And did you personally observe men at the "White House" at

10 about --

11 A. I've seen that they were brought there, yes.

12 Q. And did you observe anything outside that "White House"?

13 A. Yes. But that was not directly in the beginning. The men had to

14 leave their probably personal belongings that were piled, let's say, about

15 30, 40 metres from the "White House" alongside the road.

16 Q. Later on during this process, sir, did you learn about men who had

17 been permitted to pass through but had been later separated?

18 A. Yeah. Well, I never had an actual report of my own men. This is

19 what I heard when I was back in Holland.

20 Q. When you received information about the men at the "White House"

21 did you take any action with respect --

22 A. Yes. We had an UNMO team, military observers of the UN, a

23 [indiscernible] team. They were on the compound, and I sent them down

24 there to monitor what was happening there, and the reports I got in the

25 beginning, well, that they're -- that many men going in, exact same number

Page 2498

1 men coming out, and the report that they were brought by a specific bus, a

2 light blue bus. They were transported in the direction of the Bratunac in

3 the beginning, at the end of every convoy and later on apart. I mean, the

4 bus drove along, not in the convoy.

5 Q. Let's stay on this issue of the -- of the blue buses or the blue

6 bus. Did you personally observe the -- any of the men being placed and

7 transported in the blue bus?

8 A. Yes, I did. Yes.

9 Q. And was this occurring throughout the day on the 12th --

10 A. Yes --

11 Q. -- to your knowledge?

12 A. -- and on the 13th, et cetera.

13 Q. And can you describe in a little bit more detail what measures you

14 took to monitor that blue bus and the success that the monitoring met

15 with?

16 A. Yeah. We gave order to -- one of the convoy jeeps, the escort

17 jeeps to -- to escort specifically that bus, and the measure of success

18 was nil because the escort was whether stopped at Papa and if he tried to

19 drive on he was blocked by a tank or by men, so in always they tried to

20 separate that escort jeep from that blue bus. And if he was held up in

21 the area of Bratunac and he later on came to the tail of the convoy, the

22 blue bus was vanished.

23 Q. Now, let's go back to the men in the "White House" for a little

24 bit, sir.

25 Did you at some point receive reports that they were not being

Page 2499

1 properly treated?

2 A. Yes. The -- in the course of the 12th I got reports that they

3 were badly treated. I sent down patrols of my own men over there in

4 course of the afternoon. They were blocked by -- by far outnumbering Serb

5 forces which did not allow them to go to the "White House."

6 Q. And again did you speak or register a complaint with any of the

7 VRS officers about these --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- reports?

10 A. I again said that to Colonel Jankovic, who said that they were

11 POWs, and if there was a -- too rude action he would take action to

12 prevent that.

13 Q. To your knowledge, did he take any action?

14 A. Again, I don't know whether he took action, but I didn't see a

15 result. And he confirmed in fact that he had nothing to do with that

16 because he was only there for the withdrawal of DutchBat. That was in

17 fact the answer I got always from Colonel Jankovic.

18 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, believe we have -- is it five more

19 minutes until the break?


21 MR. THAYER: Six. I think this would probably be a logical time

22 in terms of the examination in time to take a break, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: We will take a 30-minute break. We need to discuss

24 a few things [Microphone not activated].

25 --- Recess taken at 12.24 p.m.

Page 2500

1 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Mr. Thayer, go ahead.

3 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.

4 Q. Sir, as you've been testifying, you were monitoring the progress

5 of the convoys, the status of the men who were being kept at the "White

6 House" and transported. Did you begin to have concerns about the male

7 refugees?

8 A. Yes, because the reports made clear to me that the treatment of

9 the men was decreasing, was getting worse. There were all kind of

10 rumours, and somewhere around there there was a report of yelling and

11 things like that from the "White House," et cetera. So I tried to figure

12 out a way to protect these men a bit more than we did at the very moment.

13 Q. And you testified you'd already tried to send your own soldiers

14 down there and that met with no --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So what did you decide to do when other measures had failed?

17 A. Well, in fact I tried to imitate a trick what was done before,

18 getting the unknown people, giving them a face and a name. So I

19 registered -- I tried to register all the men within our UN area.

20 Q. And what was your ultimate intention with this registration?

21 A. Yes. Send them to higher echelons, including Holland here, the

22 General Staff here in Holland, and request them to make it public, to

23 mobilise the public by telling them exactly who it was, the names,

24 et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and hoping that it would work better than

25 there was some unknown mass of men nobody had a name with or any identity

Page 2501

1 with.

2 Q. And could you just describe for the Trial Chamber briefly how this

3 registration took place?

4 A. Yes. I spoke about that with the committee I mentioned before,

5 Mr. Mandic, et cetera, and asked them whether they would take care of the

6 registration and explain the purpose I had with that registration, and

7 they started registering the men.

8 Q. Now you've referred a couple of times to a committee.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Was -- was this some kind of formal group or how did this

11 so-called committee come into being?

12 A. Yes. One of the first, and I recollect the first meeting Colonel

13 Karremans had with Mladic he demanded that the leaders of the enclave,

14 military and civilian leaders, would be present at the next meeting.

15 Problem was that the 28th Division, including their commanders and leaders

16 and the opstina, were vanished, were disappeared, so we asked one of our

17 interpreters whether there were in the crowd of refugees some people who

18 could function as the representative of the refugees, and so we claimed

19 two men and a woman who were willing to act as representative of the

20 refugees. And that's what I call the committee. Sorry.

21 Q. Okay. I think you've already testified that one was Mr. Mandic.

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Do you remember the names of the other two?

24 A. Mr. Nuhanovic, Ibrahim Nuhanovic, and a lady which name I do not

25 recollect.

Page 2502

1 Q. Now, the list that you created were you told about whether that

2 included all of the men inside the compound?

3 A. Now, there were about 60 or 70 men who refused to be registered,

4 and the 251 it appears later on, but 239 I thought then were willing to be

5 registered.

6 Q. And did you try to register the men outside the compound?

7 A. Yes, we did that as well. But then the committee, because we were

8 not able to do it ourself, was massively intimidated by the Serb forces to

9 an extent that the lady had a complete nervous breakdown and had to be

10 brought to the hospital. So they didn't have the guts anymore to go out.

11 MR. THAYER: At this time I'd ask that 65 ter number 2057 be

12 displayed on e-court, please. And if we could, please, just -- perfect.

13 Q. Sir, do you have an image on your screen?

14 A. I do have.

15 Q. And I would ask if we could just slowly scroll through the

16 consecutive pages of the document until we reach page 10, which I believe

17 is the last page. And if we could move the document up, please, to the

18 bottom. Perfect. Thank you.

19 Now, sir, having reviewed these pages do you recognise what this

20 document is?

21 A. Yes. That's the list I mentioned, registration of the men within

22 the compound, and I signed it on the right side. Miscounted it but signed

23 it.

24 Q. You've written 239. I believe you just testified it was --

25 A. 251, yes.

Page 2503

1 Q. And this you did at the time, sir; is that correct?

2 A. Yes, I did.

3 Q. Now, you mentioned that you had passed this information up your

4 chain of command to make it public. Did you tell anyone in the VRS about

5 this list?

6 A. Yes. I told Colonel Jankovic that I registered the men and that

7 the names were known not only within the UN but to the Dutch government as

8 well.

9 Q. And did you show him or any other VRS officer the list?

10 A. No, I did not.

11 Q. Why not, sir?

12 A. Was no use of it, and then I didn't want in any way the

13 information on this list to go directly to the Bosnian Serbs.

14 Q. And what, if anything, did you do to ensure that the list would

15 not fall into the VRS's hands?

16 A. Well, I transmitted it on secure communications to Tuzla,

17 Sarajevo, both the UN headquarters, and to The Hague here, Crisis Staff it

18 was called in that days. And the original list I brought on my body when

19 the battalion came out of the enclave and went to Zagreb.

20 Q. You mentioned a moment ago Ibrahim Nuhanovic.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Other than being a member of this informal committee, as you

23 described it, do you know whether he had any relationship to anybody in

24 the -- in the UN compound?

25 A. Yes. It appeared to be he was the father of one of the

Page 2504

1 interpreters of the UNMOs. UNMOs, being the UN military observers.

2 Q. And do you recall having a conversation with him in the evening of

3 12 July?

4 A. Yes, I did.

5 Q. Would you please describe that conversation.

6 A. Yes. Mr. Nuhanovic came to me that he wanted to speak to me about

7 the evacuation, so I let him in and we spoke. He wanted me to stop the

8 evacuation, because he, as I did, feared for the fate of the men. And we

9 had a discussion. I explained him why I could not do that.

10 Q. And what explanation did you give him?

11 A. Yeah. In fact, I told him with detailed arguments that I had to

12 make the choice between as far as I knew about 800 up until a thousand men

13 and 25 up to 30.000 women and children concerning their survival. I told

14 him that I chose for the 25.000, 30.000 women and children.

15 Q. That brings us up to the 13th of July. Did the -- did the

16 transportations resume that day?

17 A. Yes, it did.

18 Q. And were they completed that day as well?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Did you receive any reports, either on the 12th or the 13th, that

21 Serb soldiers had been among the refugees outside the compound during the

22 night of 12 July?

23 A. Yes. No. I think that were not reported to me.

24 Q. Now, based on the number of soldiers you had available to guard

25 those mass of refugees, would that have been possible?

Page 2505

1 A. Yes, it would have been possible.

2 Q. During this same period of time, during the 12th to 13th of July,

3 did you also receive reports of executions?

4 A. Yes. In two cases.

5 Q. Can you describe those reports for the Trial Chamber?

6 A. Yes. First was a report of nine dead bodies in the area of

7 the "White House" found by one of my officers. Obviously they were in a

8 row and all shot in the back, so we concluded that there has been an

9 execution.

10 MS. CONDON: Well, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Condon.

12 MS. CONDON: I object to this witness giving evidence of a

13 forensic -- he's not in a position to give evidence as to the cause of

14 death of those victims.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: What's your response to that?

16 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I'm not attempting to elicit expert

17 information, simply what this officer related to him, what he observed,

18 and any conclusions he drew based on those observations.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE AGIUS: I have absolutely no problem in allowing the

21 question to proceed or the witness to proceed with answering the question.

22 Of course, you will have every opportunity to cross-examine the witness on

23 any issue that you have referred to, if at all necessary.

24 Yes. So I suggest you repeat your question. I can read it,

25 actually. "Can you describe those reports for the Trial Chamber?"

Page 2506

1 And, Mr. Franken, you had said, "Yes. First was a report of nine

2 dead bodies in the area of the 'White House' found by one of my officers.

3 Obviously they were in a row and all shot in the back, so we concluded

4 that there had been an execution."

5 THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Any further matters that you would like to

7 state in answering this question?

8 THE WITNESS: Yeah. Well, I would like to describe the second

9 report I got about execution, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, go ahead.

11 THE WITNESS: Sorry. And I heard through the colonel who reported

12 that one of the soldiers of C Company, being a member of one of the

13 outposts, saw an execution in any distance of one Muslim man was shot by

14 two soldiers, Serb soldiers.


16 Q. And did you receive information concerning the general location of

17 where that second execution occurred?

18 A. Yes. That was directly east of the bus station area, in that

19 area.

20 Q. Now, I want to go back a moment to the first report of executions.

21 You referred to an officer who gave the report. Who was that officer,

22 sir?

23 A. First Lieutenant Koster, sir.

24 MR. THAYER: At this time could we have P01516 placed on e-court,

25 please. And if we could zoom in just a touch, please. Perfect. Thank

Page 2507

1 you.

2 Q. Sir, did Lieutenant Koster describe for you the approximate

3 location where these nine bodies were found?

4 A. Yes, he did. He described it as a piece of a meadow near the

5 water, brook, like situation.

6 Q. And was it close to any particular feature or landmark that you

7 recall?

8 A. Yes. Let's say about 100 metres or 80 metres south, south-west of

9 the "White House."

10 Q. Now, with Madam Usher's assistance, if I could ask you to just

11 take the stylus and just draw a circle around that general area and if you

12 would write "Nine bodies" and initial and date the document, please?

13 A. Okay. As I recollect it, it should have been in this area.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Judge Kwon is suggesting, and I would quite agree,

15 that instead of creating a new document, perhaps he could use the same one

16 he used before on which he put various markings, and that would make

17 things much more practical.

18 MR. THAYER: If there's room, absolutely, Your Honour. We can

19 give that a try.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Bourgon.

21 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President. I'm just wondering why my

22 colleague from the Prosecution is getting into hearsay at this time

23 without having established any basis for the need to do so. The person

24 he's referring to is a witness in this case. We will hear first-hand

25 evidence from that witness. What is the need of this point in time to go

Page 2508

1 through a different witness what a real witness is going to come and say?

2 Thank you, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Thayer.

4 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, Colonel Franken is here. It's relevant

5 evidence. It's corroborative of the testimony that we expect.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Objection rejected. This is normal procedure.

8 Mr. Thayer, please go ahead.

9 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Bourgon.

11 MR. BOURGON: Mr. President, I'd like to, if I -- with all due

12 respect to the Trial Chamber, ask what is the rationale for the Trial

13 Chamber's decision, because this is hearsay. Hearsay is admissible, but

14 we have to establish some kind of a basis for it and I don't understand

15 why we should hear hearsay evidence when we will here the first-hand

16 evidence.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: This is not hearsay. This is an internal

18 conversation that took place between this witness and another person and

19 it becomes imperative to have first-hand information or relation from this

20 witness which later on will put us in a position where we can make an

21 assessment when we hear the future -- future evidence of the other

22 officer.

23 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: So we are actually, as Judge Kwon rightly points out

25 and we are in agreement here, this is not exactly what one would -- would

Page 2509

1 consider hearsay. This is -- he is repeating the conversation that went

2 on between him and this other person. The other person may or may not

3 confirm it at a later stage, that's true, but this is basically what --

4 what -- information that he is telling us based on the conversation he had

5 with this other witness. So it's hearsay in -- only in a very limited --

6 let's proceed.

7 MR. THAYER: If we could have the document on its head, please.

8 Q. And if you could draw a circle or -- yes, please draw a circle in

9 the approximate area where Lieutenant Koster reported to you that the

10 bodies had been located.

11 A. [Marks]

12 Q. And if you would just write "Nine bodies" and an arrow, please.

13 A. [Marks]

14 Q. Thank you. I think we can save the document.

15 Now, sir, again, during this period of time from 12 to 13 July, do

16 you recall receiving any reports from DutchBat soldiers about large

17 numbers of Muslim prisoners being taken outside the enclave?

18 A. That's as far as I recollect later than the 13th when my -- the

19 crew of OP Alpha was in this period still in position, was brought back

20 over a road north of the enclave, and they reported that they saw a big

21 group of men kneeling on a soccer field or something like that alongside

22 the road.

23 Q. And do you recall receiving any specific information about how

24 they were around?

25 A. Yeah. They were in rows and sitting on their knees, hands on

Page 2510

1 their neck.

2 Q. Now, again, through the day on the 12th and on the 13th --

3 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Mr. Meek.

4 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. President. Just for the record, the

5 witness just answered the crew of OP Alpha. Perhaps my colleague from the

6 Prosecution could be more specific on who those members of that crew were

7 that reported this to this witness.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Thayer.


10 Q. Sir, did you understand the question that was posed by my learned

11 colleague?

12 A. Yes. Yes, I'll try to answer it. One of the OPs that was not

13 overtaken or overridden by Serb soldiers in the end phase was the

14 Observation Post A, Alpha. It's on the ultimate west side of the enclave.

15 We were not able to withdraw him with their own means, through -- I mean I

16 remember Jankovic, a Serb officer contacted me, asked for a lorry to bring

17 the -- to pick up the crew of that observation post and bring them back to

18 the location Potocari. Is that an answer?

19 MR. MEEK: No, Your Honour. My question would be the specific

20 names of the individuals from DutchBat Jones, Smith, Brown. I want to

21 know if the witness can give us a name or names of the people who gave him

22 this hearsay information.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Can you, Mr. Franken?

24 THE WITNESS: No, I cannot, no.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Is there a source of information that we could refer

Page 2511

1 to which would have a record of the names of the various officers or

2 members of DutchBat.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes. I think the NIOD report gives these details.

4 But I don't recollect these names after 11 years, sorry.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: It's quite understandable.

6 All right. Mr. Thayer.


8 Q. Now, again during this period of time, the 12th and the 13th, did

9 you observe the living conditions of the refugees changing at all?

10 A. Yeah. Problem is that we did not have -- it was very hot weather.

11 We were not able to -- to purify water because the lack of fuel. We

12 didn't have any food, and the hygienic situation was, well, disastrous.

13 People didn't have the nerve to go out of their location, as far as I

14 speak now, to the compound itself, out of that factory hall, and -- well,

15 used that hall as a toilet, as a sleeping room, et cetera. Even ladies

16 gave birth in that mess.

17 Q. How rapidly, sir, was that humanitarian situation deteriorating?

18 A. Very rapidly because we already had death by dehydration, and I

19 coordinated with my doctors, and they said, "Well, two or three days and

20 the problem will solve itself if we can't get -- at least get to water and

21 improve the hygienic situation significantly."

22 Q. Did you receive any reports of suicides or suicide attempts, sir?

23 A. Yes, I did. I recollect two of them. One of them refugees tried

24 to kill themselves by hitting him with a stone on the head. He was

25 stopped by one of my soldiers. One of my officers reported that somebody

Page 2512

1 hanged himself in one of the factory buildings.

2 Q. Now, I want to it take you from the time period of approximately

3 14 July through the 16th of July.

4 A. Mm-hmm.

5 Q. You had described previously seeing a pile of personal belongings

6 at a certain distance from the "White House." Did you see what became of

7 those belongings, sir?

8 A. Yes. As it was reported to me one of my guards that the pile was

9 on fire. I went down there and looked at it myself, and it was actually

10 burnt, all those possessions.

11 MR. THAYER: I'd ask that 65 ter number 1897 be displayed on

12 e-court, please.

13 Q. Now, you have an image on your screen, sir?

14 A. I do.

15 Q. And is it in fact sort of a split -- a split image with two

16 photographs?

17 A. Yes, that is correct.

18 Q. And I'd ask you when you look at the two photographs whether you

19 recognise what's in one or both of these photographs.

20 A. Yes. They were taken from the area of our main gate. Right in

21 the centre of the building that is the so-called "White House" --

22 Q. And let me just interrupt you for a moment, sir. Which of these

23 images are you referring to?

24 A. The first one, the upper one.

25 Q. Okay.

Page 2513

1 A. And on the left side is the pile of -- of personal belongings

2 burning we spoke about.

3 Q. And can you actually make out the "White House" --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- in this photograph?

6 A. The "White House" in the upper photograph is what you see in the

7 centre of the photograph. There's a tree in front of it. After that you

8 see a flat white-like building, and that's called the "White House."

9 Q. Now, the photograph below it, are you able to recognise anything

10 in that photograph?

11 A. That's the same area, but -- yeah. I conclude that I see

12 the "White House" and that same pile is burning. It's probably done from

13 one of our steady OPs in the base, but as the -- no, it's not as detailed

14 and clear as the northern one. When you see in front must be the "White

15 House," and what you see on the left burning is that pile. I can conclude

16 that out of the surroundings, but ...

17 Q. And is it fair to say that the top photograph corresponds more

18 accurately to what you actually saw --

19 A. That is correct, yes.

20 Q. -- that day? Now, did you receive any instructions about what to

21 do with the DutchBat archives, the computers and sensitive information and

22 so forth?

23 A. Yes. We were ordered by the UN to destroy everything, including

24 our computers.

25 Q. And were you able to do that, sir?

Page 2514

1 A. We did not complete that task.

2 Q. So can you describe for the Trial Chamber who was left on the base

3 after the transportations were completed?

4 A. Mm-hmm. We had people of Medecins sans Frontieres, MSF, with

5 patients and wounded; still one of the representatives of the committee;

6 representative of UNHCR; interpreters; and DutchBat, the rest of DutchBat.

7 Q. And how about the UNMOs? Were they still around, sir?

8 A. Oh, sorry, yes, of course. The UNMOs and their interpreters as

9 well.

10 Q. How about the DutchBat soldiers who you said had been taken

11 prisoner when the OPs fell and had been kept at Bratunac and elsewhere?

12 A. They were still in Bratunac, never came back to the battalion, and

13 were sent home directly from their location in Bratunac.

14 Q. You just mentioned some wounded who remained --

15 A. Mm-hmm.

16 Q. -- in the compound. Were there also wounded located by at that

17 point?

18 A. Yes. There were wounded which we tried to bring out during the

19 evacuation but that transport was stopped and sent back in -- out of the

20 area of Kladanj, and there were wounded of that transport in the hospital

21 of Bratunac.

22 Q. I'm going to turn your attention now to the 17th of July.

23 A. Mm-hmm.

24 Q. In connection with these wounded you just mentioned, did a

25 delegation of VRS and Serb civilian officials arrive at the Potocari

Page 2515

1 compound?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And would you please describe how that came about?

4 A. Yes. I tried to evacuate the wounded in a normal way, but the

5 military means, a Norwegian medevac company being stationed in the area of

6 Tuzla did not succeed in reaching us to pick up the wounded and bring them

7 out. Then I tried through the MSF to contact the ICRC to do the job,

8 because the Bosnian Serbs told me that I could hand over the wounded

9 absolutely to them. They had hospitals as well. But I didn't think that

10 was a pretty good idea. And so I succeeded in ICRC coming down to pick up

11 the wounded. And that meeting was to coordinate details with the Bosnian

12 Serbs and ICRC, details about the evacuation of the wounded out of

13 Potocari and Bratunac.

14 Q. And whom did this delegation consist of?

15 A. The head of delegation was Colonel Jankovic. Present was Major

16 Nikolic with body-guard, Major Nikolic, staff officer of the Bratunac

17 Brigade; a lieutenant-colonel whose name I forgot but said that he was a

18 lawyer, a civilian who appeared to be later on the new mayor or something

19 of Srebrenica; and somebody I only can describe as what I call the Mladic

20 look alike. He didn't say anything. He was just there, so ...

21 Q. Okay. Who took the lead?

22 A. Colonel Jankovic.

23 Q. Was there anyone there from the Muslim community?

24 A. Not in that stage, because it was concerning the wounded.

25 Q. And at some point did one of the Muslim refugees appear, sir?

Page 2516

1 A. Yes, when the arrangement -- I handed over the wounded formally to

2 the ICRC and the mentioned Major Nikolic insisted to inspect the people

3 whether they were still soldiers or -- or what he said criminals between

4 them, so ICRC went down to the hospital together with that Major Nikolic

5 and security squad of DutchBat to do that inspection, and then Colonel

6 Jankovic asked for one of the representatives, Mr. Mandic, to appear

7 because he had a declaration and he would like Mr. Mandic to sign that.

8 Q. Now, you just referred to a declaration. Had you seen this

9 declaration?

10 A. Yes. He just waved with it. I didn't see it -- I couldn't read

11 it when I saw that it was in the Croatian language.

12 Q. So can you describe for the Trial Chamber what you did next.

13 A. Yes. I had my own interpreters translate it into English, because

14 Jankovic asked me to sign as a witness that Mr. Mandic was not forced to

15 sign it, et cetera, et cetera. So I checked the text and made an

16 alteration.

17 Q. Okay. And we'll get to that in a moment. The -- do you generally

18 recall the gist of -- of this declaration?

19 A. In fact, the Serbs wanted -- stated that the evacuation had been

20 performed in a proper, say, a humanitarian way according to all the

21 international law, et cetera, et cetera.

22 MR. THAYER: And if we could, may we have 65 ter 453 displayed on

23 e-court and, in particular, page 3, please. And could we raise it up and

24 zoom in just a bit, please. And lower it a bit, please. Okay. Actually,

25 can we start at the top a little bit. Thank you.

Page 2517

1 Q. Sir, would you take a moment and just look at the document, orient

2 yourself, and when you're ready, we'll also look at the bottom of the

3 document.

4 A. I'm ready.

5 Q. Okay. Do you recognise this as being the field translation that

6 your people did?

7 A. Yes, that is correct, yes. The translation I had made by my

8 interpreters.

9 Q. Now, there are a series of dashes in the centre of the document,

10 one which begins "The civilian population can remain ..."

11 Do you see that there, sir?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. And would you just read that that portion out loud?

14 A. "Given population can remain in the enclave or evacuate, dependent

15 upon the wish of each individual."

16 Q. Now --

17 A. Sorry.

18 Q. Based on your experience and from what you observed and had

19 reported to you at the time, is this a true statement?

20 A. No. It's nonsense, because they didn't have an opportunity to

21 stay, not a realistic opportunity to stay.

22 Q. Now, moving down --

23 A. Or -- or move in any direction. It was ordered that they should

24 go to the Kladanj area.

25 Q. And who ordered that, sir?

Page 2518

1 A. Mladic.

2 Q. Now moving down one bullet or one dash.

3 A. Mm-hmm.

4 Q. If you would just read that portion, please?

5 A. "In the event that we wish to evacuate, it is possible for us to

6 choose the direction of our movement and have decided that the entire

7 population is to evacuate to the territory of the county of Kladanj."

8 Q. And now you've just answered that to an extent, I think, but is

9 this a true statement?

10 A. No. It was not a decision of the committee; it was an order of

11 Mladic to go to the area of Kladanj.

12 Q. And now the third bullet, sir, if you would read that?

13 A. "It has been agreed that the evacuation is to be carried out by

14 the Army and Police of the Republic of Srpska, supervised and escorted by


16 Q. And the next section?

17 A. "After agreement had been reached, I assert that the evacuation

18 was carried out by the Serb side correctly and the clauses of the

19 agreement had been adhered to."

20 Q. Now, are those portions you've just read true statements, sir?

21 A. Well, the agreement that it had to be carried out by the army and

22 police of Republic of Srpska is correct, supervising and escorting in

23 theory, but I already told you what actually happened with my escorts so

24 that is not true.

25 And the last sentence: "Evacuation was carried out by the Serb

Page 2519

1 side correctly and the clause of the agreement had been adhered to," is

2 partially true.

3 Q. And then the final sentence beginning "during," if you would read

4 that, please?

5 A. Yeah. "During the evacuation there were no incidents on either of

6 the sides, and the Serb side has adhered to all the regulations of the

7 Geneva Conventions and the international war law," and I added "as far as

8 convoys actually escorted by UN forces are concerned."

9 Q. Now, why did you add that language there, sir?

10 A. Because I -- as of the first or the second convoy, I didn't have

11 any control about what happened. Reports of the Pakistan battalion gave

12 that only women, children were coming in later on. So the men were

13 actually taken apart. We had that report about that killing, nine bodies

14 found. So I wanted to in fact neutralise the whole statement by this

15 sentence.

16 Q. And what was the reaction of the Serb members of the delegation?

17 A. Two reactions. Colonel Jankovic smiled a bit and the colonel

18 being a lawyer went almost bananas. He went very angry.

19 Q. And in the end, did Colonel Jankovic permit the document to go

20 ahead and be signed with your notation?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And do you in fact see your signature on the document?

23 A. That is correct. Left lower side.

24 Q. Were you present when the two other signatories signed the

25 document?

Page 2520

1 A. Yes, I was there at the same time.

2 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I see that we are right up against the

3 deadline and I estimate that I have maybe 15 minutes of questioning for

4 tomorrow and we will break for today, if we may.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Thayer.

6 So we adjourn today. Tomorrow I think we are meeting in the

7 morning.

8 Mr. McCloskey, do you wish to address? I forgot. Yes.

9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Perhaps we can do that tomorrow. In fact it's

10 probably a better idea. I think both sides were looking for just a little

11 guidance on 92 ter, 89(F) witnesses. We've had some but I think that

12 would be a good issue to address outside the presence of any witness.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, certainly. So we'll deal with that tomorrow

14 morning first thing, first thing before Mr. Franken continues with his

15 testimony. I thank you, and good afternoon.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

17 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 17th day

18 of October, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.