1 Friday, 24 August 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Madam Registrar. Good morning,
7 everybody. Could you kindly call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is the case
9 number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, ma'am. All the accused are here. From
11 the Defence teams I notice the absence of Mr. Haynes and Mr. Bourgon. I
12 think that's about it. The Prosecution, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Thayer. The
13 witness Mr. Joseph is present. I take it there are no preliminaries,
14 therefore we -- Mr. Josse?
15 MR. JOSSE: I'm simply rising to start my cross-examination, Your
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I was just going to ask you to precisely do
19 Mr. Joseph --.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir?
21 JUDGE AGIUS: You're still testifying pursuant to your solemn
22 declaration of yesterday or of Friday [sic]. With some effort, we will
23 ensure that we finish with your testimony today.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
25 WITNESS: EDWARD JOSEPH [Resumed]
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Josse you had about 15 minutes more or something
2 like that?
3 MR. JOSSE: That's correct.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Go ahead.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Josse: [Continued] .
6 Q. Could we begin this morning, Mr. Joseph, by looking at 6D30 which
7 I hope is the agreement that you have made reference to in the course of
8 your evidence.
9 There it is. Might be worth looking at the top briefly to begin
10 with. Agreement on disarmament of the military-able population in the
11 enclave of Zepa. It says that today, 25th of July 1995, the following
12 agreement was reached between Rajko Kusic on one side, Hamdija Kolak
13 [phoen] from the other side, in the presence of Simon Dudnik as UNPROFOR
15 And it goes through the terms of this agreement.
16 In particular, perhaps if we look at a specific part of it, have
17 you ever seen the agreement before?
18 A. I might have seen it in the past, but I honestly, it's -- this is
19 the first time I've seen it, if so, in a very long time, so it's not
20 jumping out at me. I had been seen a draft agreement that David Harland
21 and I had done that was a different draft demilitarisation agreement, but
22 this does not prompt a memory in me immediately.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Can you -- sorry, Mr. Josse, for interrupting you --
24 can you be specific as to Hamdija Kolak is, please?
25 THE WITNESS: It's possible that meant Torlak instead of Kolak.
1 That's all I can presume. Perhaps they meant Torlak and not Kolak.
2 MR. JOSSE: It's not for me to give evidence, Your Honour, but I
3 think that that's a safe assumption to make.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. I asked the question -- yes, Mr. Thayer?
5 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, perhaps my friend could also show the
6 witness page 2, which also has another date on it, and just for the sake
7 of making sure that he's had a chance to view the whole document before
8 answering, it might be --
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I put my question because whoever that
10 Hamdija Kolak, as it appears on the face of this document, is to have
11 signed this, if he signed this, keep in mind -- you have to mind in mind
12 that he is undertaking also on behalf of who was supposed to be the
13 commander of the ABiH troops on the ground at the time.
14 MR. JOSSE: Well, indeed. The Court has already heard evidence as
15 to that particular difficulty from this witness. I think the Court is
16 going to hear more about that from General Smith in due course as well.
17 Certainly the Defence are aware of that particular issue and/or difficult.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: And that's why I asked who this Kolak is. Thank
20 MR. JOSSE:
21 Q. If we do look at the second page, Mr. Joseph, first of all we see
22 that it purports to be signed by Mr. Torlak among others and it also gives
23 a different date, date of the 24th of July. We need to scroll down a bit
24 in the English, please?
25 A. If I might request, is it possible to just have a copy of this so
1 I can read it?
2 Q. You can have mine.
3 A. Okay. Thank you, sir.
4 Q. It's not marked other than the fact I put the number on it. The
5 usher will give it to you.
6 A. Thank you very much.
7 MR. JOSSE: I'm letting the witness read the document, Your
8 Honour, although I in fact only have one supplementary question.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: When you are finished with reading it, Mr. Joseph,
10 let us know, please.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Okay.
12 MR. JOSSE:
13 Q. It follows from what you've already said that this document was
14 not being waved about by anyone presumably on the 26th of July when you
15 returned to the enclave?
16 A. I certainly don't recall it. If I can say a couple there's a
17 couple other things to observe, if I may say so, number 1 being you just
18 have the typed names here without signatures.
19 Q. That's right. I'm not going to comment on that. The Court has
20 heard some other evidence about this from other sources.
21 A. I understand.
22 Q. But dealing with my question, you don't recall people using the
23 same expression, waving it around putting it in front of you?
24 A. No, sir.
25 Q. And in particular, the reference in paragraph 4 to weapons and
1 equipment being returned and UNPROFOR members being unblocked?
2 A. No. No recollection of that, no, sir, and I might add in
3 paragraph 5 it's rather unusual in an UNPROFOR, if UNPROFOR had a role in
4 drafting this, that the weapons would be handed over to the BSA rather
5 than to UNPROFOR. The standard is always weapons are submitted to the UN,
6 not to an adversary or to a warring party.
7 Q. As a matter of curiosity would be able to picture Mr. Dudnik?
8 A. No. I cannot. Don't remember that name.
9 Q. Don't remember the name?
10 A. No, sir.
11 Q. Don't remember the role he played?
12 A. Don't recall. I can't recall. If I had met him, I can't now 12
13 years later, I do not recall the name.
14 Q. I'll be corrected if I'm wrong, I don't know whether it jogs your
15 memory, he was the commander of the Ukrainian battalion?
16 A. Quite possible.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: One question sorry again, Mr. Josse.
18 MR. JOSSE: Of course. Your Honour.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: But this occurred to me when we heard, as you said,
20 other evidence on this document. But at the time the opportunity to put
21 the question had escaped me.
22 If you look at the B/C/S version of this document, which you
23 should have on your screen on your monitor now, paragraph 5, we see VBS
24 there. VBS. Which -- is that a spelling mistake or what, VRS?
25 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I think I can shed some light on this.
1 The B/C/S version is simply I believe an OTP or it may be a CLSS
2 translation of this document. It's not --
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Of which document?
4 MR. THAYER: Of the English agreement that we were looking at a
5 moment ago. So in other words, the B/C/S version is not a version that
6 was created at the time. It is simply a translation of this English
7 document, which we believe was created at the time.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. But my question was related to something
9 somewhat different because the acronym BSA was in use amongst the UNPROFOR
10 people and the other units.
11 MR. THAYER: Yes, Mr. President, but I think that's a spelling
12 mistake as Your Honour noted.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: But the fact that on this English -- on the English
14 version, the acronym BSA is used instead of VRS, is that -- would that be
15 indicative that this was drawn up, that this was drawn up not by the
16 Serbian side, but by UNPROFOR?
17 THE WITNESS: Sir, your question is that because they use BSA
18 instead of --
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Because a document originating from the VRS
20 itself --
21 THE WITNESS: Right.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Wouldn't use the acronym BSA in the first place.
23 THE WITNESS: It's quite possible. It's quite possible that that
24 was the case, sir.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. Again, my apologies to you,
1 Mr. Josse. You may proceed, thank you.
2 MR. JOSSE: No problem, Your Honour.
3 Q. I'm going to move on. Could we have a look at 6D131? It's a
4 completely different subject. Now, this is an article that we have found
5 on the internet which purports to be written by you and was produced in
6 the Washington Post on Sunday the 10th of July 2005 entitled "Bystander to
7 a Massacre." Could I first confirm that you did in fact write an article
8 that appeared in the Washington Post by that name at that time?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. And it was written, wasn't it, in the aftermath of the discovery
11 of the Skorpion video?
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. And you express some background information about the video and
14 about the events in Srebrenica, and initially on the first page, put it
15 into context in relation to more modern day events, particularly in
16 Darfur; is that right?
17 A. Yes. And with a specific reference, not to scale but to the fact
18 that the presence I contrasted it with Darfur when there was then no --
19 probably still is no UN presence, but in Srebrenica there was UN presence.
20 That's -- that was the reference, the contrast.
21 Q. And I am going to have to be for reasons of time constraint,
22 selective, passages I want to ask you about. If you would go to the very
23 bottom of this first page I'm going to read the final paragraph and then
24 it will move over to the second page. "I have thought about these
25 questions more than most. I served as a UN civil affairs officer in
1 Bosnia for much of the three and a half years of war. My colleagues and I
2 received the waves of women and children expelled from Srebrenica before
3 their husbands, fathers, brothers and sons were executed.
4 "About a week later, I found myself in Srebrenica, neighbouring
5 enclave of Zepa, face to face with Mladic, an architect of the massacres.
6 While his forces were finishing the slaughter in Srebrenica, he had turned
7 his sights on Zepa's Muslim men. The Muslim commander, Colonel Avdo
8 Palic, saved his soldiers by hiding them in the forest while he stayed
9 behind to negotiate with Mladic. A colleague and I watched and protested
10 vainly as Palic was seized by Serb troops from our collapsed UN compound
11 and taken away and likely killed.
12 "Because of this experience, and my feelings of responsibility
13 towards Palic, I continue to ask why we let Srebrenica happen and why we
14 don't act to prevent other tragedies. Over time I've come up with three
16 And it's right, isn't it, that you told us yesterday that you feel
17 a sense of responsibility for what happened to Colonel Palic and you have
18 tried to highlight his plight to the international community?
19 A. Yes that would be correct, and to assist his wife in getting the
20 attention of the international community. That's correct.
21 Q. I'm going to pass over the first of your three answers. Basically
22 you say that the United Nations needs staff who are less interested in
23 money and more interested in doing a decent job but that's not of any
24 relevance to this particular case. Second, even the vast majority who are
25 motivated by the desire to do good may still find their principles
1 compromised or confused by organisational loyalty. Many on the staff of
2 the senior UN official in the former Yugoslavia, the Japanese diplomat,
3 Yasushi Akashi, internalised his overarching priority to protect the UN's
4 neutrality and even handedness by avoiding the use of force against the
5 Serbs. Constantly -- beg your pardon, consistently, they rebuffed those
6 who did advocate force like the UN's military commander in Bosnia, General
7 Smith and toned down reports sent to New York to maintain the premise that
8 all sides were equally guilty."
9 Is that an objective approach?
10 A. Yes. I believe so. And if you would like to take the Court's
11 time I would be happy to explain why I believe that's the case. In fact,
12 I would suggest to save time, that if the Court or any of the parties here
13 would refer themselves to the UN's own report on Srebrenica, you will see
14 many of these points admitted to by the UN themselves, submitted by the
15 then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who was earlier the head of DPKL and I
16 think himself feels a good sense of responsibility. So you'll see many of
17 these same points admitted to in a far more official way than my humble
18 opinion piece here in the Washington Post.
19 Q. One other paragraph I'd like to look at. That's scrolling down,
20 "The third and least understood factor in collective passivity toward evil
21 is the prevalent taboo against, 'getting emotional' about death and
22 tragedy. While there is always a risk of rushing to judgement or in
23 allowing particularly graphic evidence to cloud decision-making, the
24 greater risk is for exaggerated clinical detachment. Without a sense of
25 guided outrage, of empathy for victims of abuse, organisation staff, even
1 human rights workers, are prone to 'move on' and accept it when
2 bureaucracies shrug their shoulders."
3 Wasn't that the type of preconception that you had in mind when
4 you went to Zepa on the 20ing of July 1995?
5 A. Precisely. And it applied the same as it did to Serbs in Krajina
6 or anyone else who was a vulnerable minority. So the attitude applies
7 equally to anyone who is vulnerable, the point is that you do not simply
8 shrug your shoulders, oh, let's be detached, let's be detached. And when
9 you get too detached, then you forget that there is a question of human
10 suffering involved. The question is whether you are equally concerned
11 with suffering of Serbs, whether they be in Krajina or in Kosovo or in
12 some other place, as you are with Muslims in this enclave or Croats in
13 another location. That's the issue. Are you equally concerned about the
14 plight of everyone as a human being and as an officer carrying out your
15 duties? And as long as you are, then you're fulfilling your
16 responsibility, but if you maintain a false premise of neutrality which is
17 what the United Nations admitted in its report, a false obsession with
18 neutrality as the overall guiding principle, and non-intervention in
19 peacekeeping which then contorts the situation where you have to struggle
20 in order to maintain your neutrality by suppressing and diminishing the
21 reports that you have on one side and intensifying and exaggerating on the
22 other. And I think that is the situation in Bosnia that was reported in
23 quite some methodical detail by the United Nations in that seminal report
24 on Srebrenica and Zepa.
25 Q. These robust views of yours have clouded your judgement and
1 recollection, I would suggest, of the events that you have described.
2 Isn't that right?
3 A. Of course, that's your opinion, and I do not share that opinion,
4 and I would say, add, to the extent that you imply as you do, that my
5 memory is selective and that this is distorted and especially here as we
6 have the accused listening, I will mention what a Bosnian Serb general
7 told me at a meeting in airport in 1993. And he said to me, "You know,
8 you come in here, it's like a fight, and you don't see when the first guy
9 pushes and then you -- then we come back and hit someone, and then you
10 come in and see and then you just see one side pushing."
11 And what I tried to convey to you there were limits on what I
12 understood and could witness in terms of Zepa. I arrived when arrived. I
13 witnessed what I witnessed. And I reported to this Court what I remember.
14 To the extent that it is -- does not for example, contain elements about
15 attacks by Bosniak Armija on UNPROFOR, it's because I don't recall them,
16 not because I don't wish to convey them. To the extent that they
17 happened, I simply don't recall. I don't recall any Ukrainian officers
18 complaining to me severely about that. In fact don't recall much of a
19 role at all of the Ukrainian company there in this operation. We were
20 doing most of the work and most of the guiding. They did some assistance,
21 but it was our mission and I honestly don't recall that to the extent that
22 that's what you're implying, so no I do not agree with you. And I try to
23 remain true to my oath and report this as I recall it. That's all I can
24 tell you.
25 Q. In conclusion, I'd like to put this to you: Do you agree with
1 this proposition, that to navigate the thick waters of the Bosnian war is
2 not so much an exercise in looking at deliberate dishonesty but of a
3 contrived self deceit? This applies not only to many of the combatants
4 but also to those who came with good intentions to try to make peace. In
5 short, Mr. Joseph, I'm suggesting to you that you are guilty of self
6 deceit. Isn't that right?
7 A. [Interpretation] What can I say? I was there.
8 MR. JOSSE: Thank you. That was translated for me. I've got
9 nothing else.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. I have three other Defence counsel
11 asking to cross-examine. There is Ms. Fauveau requesting one hour,
12 Mr. Ostojic, 45 minutes and Mr. Zivanovic, 20 minutes. Madam Fauveau?
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
14 Cross-examination by Ms. Fauveau:
15 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, my name is Natasa Fauveau Ivanovic and I
16 defend General Miletic. I would first like to ask you a few questions
17 about Tuzla. The day before yesterday you said that the buses that had
18 arrived with refugees to the base in Tuzla were not escorted by UNPROFOR;
19 is that correct?
20 A. As far as I recall, that is -- was the case.
21 Q. Never, when those refugees were arriving from Srebrenica and
22 Potocari, you were not at the dividing line between the Muslim and Serb
23 forces, were you?
24 A. No. That is -- no, I was at the Tuzla air base.
25 Q. Do you know that the refugees were leaving -- were getting off
1 Serb buses at the dividing line and then were getting on other buses that
2 took them to their final destination, but these other buses had nothing to
3 do with Serbs?
4 A. That may be the case and it's possible that I knew that at the
5 time at Kladanj. Kladanj was the normal crossing points so it's -- that
6 part is true. I think perhaps what I -- to clarify what I meant was there
7 was no UNPROFOR escort from Srebrenica or Potocari to Kladanj. The fact
8 that they boarded UNPROFOR buses or some other buses, of course, no Serb
9 driver could cross -- would or could cross that line from Kladanj and
10 drive all the way to Tuzla. Of course, there would have to have been some
11 transfer taking place at Kladanj. If I recall, that was the junction
13 Q. But you were not in Kladanj, and do not know whether UNPROFOR
14 vehicles had arrived with Serb buses to Kladanj or do you?
15 A. No. I was not at Kladanj but as I understood the case, these were
16 not UNPROFOR-assisted evacuation from Srebrenica. That was my
17 understanding, ma'am.
18 Q. So you cannot say here under oath that you saw the buses arrive
19 without Serb escort, in fact you know nothing about that, do you agree?
20 I'm talking about the buses that came to Kladanj.
21 A. I --
22 Q. And I wanted to add, without UN, without a UN escort. That came
23 to Kladanj without a UN escort.
24 A. I was not witness to the arrival at Kladanj. That is correct. I
25 was not witness there. I was under the understanding that I've already
1 conveyed to the Court.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, if you don't mind, Ms. Fauveau. I
3 accept that, as your explanation. However, did you, at any time, make it
4 a point to receive or did you receive in any case reports from the
5 escorts, UNPROFOR escorts or your escorts, as to the completion of the
6 transportation of the civilians?
7 THE WITNESS: Sir, is your question -- did we get a notice that
8 this is the last bus and no more buses are coming or something liking
10 JUDGE AGIUS: No. What I mean to say is this: You obviously had
11 a part to play in assigning escorts to accompany some of the buses.
12 THE WITNESS: Me, personally?
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
14 THE WITNESS: No, sir, no, sir. I was at Tuzla air base assigned
15 to receive -- assist, assist in the reception of these refugees who were
16 coming in waves. We were at Tuzla air base. We were not at Kladanj. We
17 had no role in terms of that movement from Kladanj to Tuzla, sir.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Who was in charge of that?
19 THE WITNESS: I would imagine it would have been a military
20 operation at Tuzla. There was Dutch control, there was a prominent Dutch
21 role there. It was possible it was Dutch. It was also possible it was
22 French because there was a French contingent in that Kladanj area. So
23 it's quite possible it may have been French, sir, I'm sorry, I just don't
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Sir, you have partly answered this question already, but do you
3 know whether the UN or the UNHCR or any other international organisation
4 such as the ICRC ever tried to go to Kladanj and escort the refugees from
5 Kladanj to Tuzla?
6 A. There would have to have been UNPROFOR movement from Kladanj on.
7 When I spoke earlier as I've said I was speaking about the movement from
8 Srebrenica to Kladanj. There would have had to have been UN -- and very
9 likely UNHCR, from Kladanj on. But Kladanj is essentially the same as
10 Tuzla air base. It's already in an area that UN is active and operational
11 in. We were not unfortunately - not because we didn't want to be - we
12 were not permitted to be operational in Republika Srpska during the war.
13 Q. Sir, I don't want an argument with you about this. But speaking
14 about this concrete situation, you were in a position to go to the place
15 where the Serbs forces left those refugees, weren't you?
16 A. Me personally?
17 Q. Not you personally. But UN staff.
18 A. Of course UN staff were in Kladanj. Of course. But this is
19 already across the confrontation line.
20 Q. Yesterday you spoke about an agreement, about the demilitarisation
21 of Zepa that you proposed in the July 1995. That was on page 31 of
22 yesterday's transcript. Isn't it correct that in July 1995, Zepa should
23 have been demilitarised long ago?
24 A. That is correct. The original vision for all the safe areas was
25 that they would be demilitarised. That's my recollection. That was the
1 concept that they had.
2 Q. And UNPROFOR and you personally, did you know in 1995 that Zepa
3 was not demilitarised?
4 A. I may have -- if there were fighting there, it -- again, Zepa was
5 not my preoccupation until I was assigned to it. We may well have known.
6 We may well have known. But it was not the exact number of arms or
7 something like this, I don't know but we may well have known and even
8 assumed that it was not demilitarised.
9 Q. When you say "we," who do you mean?
10 A. I mean UNPROFOR and very likely I knew this, but again this was
11 not the preoccupation of mine until I was moved and assigned, had this
12 assignment, but that's correct. I believe it probably would be widely
13 known in UNPROFOR that it was not demilitarised.
14 Q. I understand that you personally were not preoccupied with that,
15 but speaking generally about UNPROFOR in Bosnia, it was UNPROFOR's
16 obligation to oversee the demilitarisation and to see to it that the
17 demilitarisation is indeed carried out; isn't that correct?
18 A. I think that was correct. I'm drawing now on memory. I don't
19 have the UN resolutions. There were a number beginning in 1993. There
20 was a number of resolutions. I used to be able to quote some of them by
21 heart, but as I recall, they were required demilitarisation and of course,
22 they empowered the UN to call on NATO air strikes in a number of instances
23 to "deter attacks," et cetera as far as I recall.
24 Q. And why was the demilitarisation of Zepa discussed only in July
25 1995 when it should have been demilitarised as early as May 1993?
1 A. That's a very fair and interesting question. I don't have the
2 complete answer, but it would involve obviously some cooperation with the
3 UN by both sides, and you would have to engage with others, perhaps
4 General Smith and others, to find out where that cooperation was missing.
5 As I said, we had very little access to Republika Srpska,
6 including to these isolated enclaves. There was no civil affairs presence
7 in Zepa at all ever, as far as I know. Very limited access to the other
8 enclaves. There was that effort beginning in Srebrenica in 1993 started
9 by General Morillon about demilitarisation and in exchange to have
10 UNPROFOR protection, and others can speak far better than I to the details
11 as to why those demilitarisation efforts came to -- had success or did not
12 the have success and the relative responsibility of the parties much
13 better than I can.
14 Q. Have I understood you well to say that demilitarisation was not
15 carried out or could not carried out because the Serbs didn't let you into
16 those enclaves?
17 A. No [Interpretation] No, you have not understood me well. [In
18 English] No. I'm saying that -- I am not the best witness to tell you
19 exactly why these demilitarisation efforts did not come to pass. I'm
20 suggesting to you that among the complicating factors was that we,
21 UNPROFOR, only had -- we had very limited access in Republika Srpska
22 anywhere, and so there might even be limitations as to even how much we
23 know. But I can tell you surely that I'm not the best witness to explain
24 to you why exactly the relative responsibility of the parties as to why
25 these demilitarisation efforts did not achieve more success.
1 Q. The demilitarisation proposal that you mentioned earlier, did you
2 remember to whom you submitted that proposal in July 1995?
3 A. We submitted as best I can recall, and I believe the documents
4 show this, that we sent it on to our higher headquarters including to
5 Zagreb, and we had informal discussions about it. I know one of the memos
6 shows I discussed this with General Tolimir and quite possibly we might
7 have had informal discussions on the Bosniak side as well about that. But
8 formally, the document as the document was first submitted, up our chain
9 of command in UNPROFOR as you wish.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show Exhibit
11 number 5D413 to the witness.
12 Q. Sir, can you confirm that this is a memorandum from David Harland
13 dated July 21st, 1995?
14 A. That's certainly what it appears to be.
15 Q. I would like to go to page 2, the last paragraph.
16 Sir, is this paragraph really about an informal conversation with
17 General Tolimir during which you spoke to him about the proposals
18 regarding demilitarisation?
19 A. Probably would have -- yeah, this is referring to a meeting where
20 we would have raised this and discussed it and where he indicated his
22 Q. So it follows from this document that General Tolimir did not
23 refuse that proposal?
24 A. That is correct. But I don't know whether we actually showed him
25 a copy and as you've seen from your copy of the document, the central
1 provision of that demilitarisation proposal was that it had a role for
2 NATO in terms of air strikes, and of course, we placed in it quite clearly
3 that if the Bosniaks refused the agreement, or if they refused to comply
4 fully in implementing the agreement, that that would be taken into account
5 in calling NATO for air strikes. In other words that there would be an
6 onus placed on both sides. That was our effort. That was what we were
7 trying to do with this option, that was already there, under UN Security
8 Council resolutions.
9 Q. I would now like to show you document 5D416. This is also a UN
10 document, a memorandum by David -- from David Harland. We see it is dated
11 as 23 July 1995.
12 A. Yes, ma'am.
13 Q. Let us go to the second page of the document. Paragraph 2,
14 please, on the screen. Sir, I'll give you some time to read this
15 paragraph, which starts, "At about 2.00 p.m. this afternoon."
16 A. M'hm. Yes, ma'am.
17 Q. Is it correct that according to this paragraph, you spoke at
18 length with Mr. Bulajic and you spoke to him about that demilitarisation
19 proposal also?
20 A. According to the record, yes, and I believe that to be the case.
21 Q. And this Mr. Bulajic never opposed demilitarisation, at any case
22 he didn't refuse it, or did he?
23 A. According to this memorandum, which I believe to be accurate, he
24 did not. He -- he apparently showed some interest in and I believe that
25 that's -- this is an accurate reflection of the record. That's -- that
1 would be correct.
2 Q. Mr. Bulajic was a representative of the civilian authorities of
3 Republika Srpska, he was not a military person?
4 A. As far as I recall, that is correct.
5 Q. About the situation in Zepa, and these talks, did you know who
6 really ran these talks, who was -- who was -- who -- in charge of these
7 talks? Were they military or civilian authorities, and please answer only
8 if you really know the answer.
9 A. I can't say that -- with total certainty, that I know the answer.
10 If that's the condition for me to answer, then I can't meet your
12 Q. Let us go back to your demilitarisation proposal. It seems based
13 on the two documents that we've just seen, that the Serbs, both those from
14 civilian structures as well as those from military structures, did not
15 really oppose the demilitarisation proposal. Do you know why that
16 proposal eventually was not realised?
17 A. Ma'am, are you speaking about our demilitarisation proposal, the
18 one of --
19 Q. Yes, sir.
20 A. Yes. I'll be happy to answer your question, and here I think I
21 know the answer quite clearly. I can't say with total certainty, but I
22 believe this to be the case. It never went anywhere because it included
23 the express provision of NATO -- use of NATO air power, and I think for
24 that reason, and 90 per cent that reason, it would have not been welcomed
25 in the UN headquarters, and indeed, had it been presented formally to
1 higher authorities in the Serb side in -- with that provision in it, I'm
2 not so sure that the -- that might have been my acceptance. There might
3 well have been interest in demilitarisation, but I'm not so sure that a
4 start provision about calling in NATO air power would have been so
6 Q. You're speaking about the Serbs not accepting that possibly due to
7 the NATO air strikes element but that is a speculation of yours. You
8 never reached the final stage in these talks. So nobody ever clearly
9 refused that?
10 A. That would be correct. You could call it informed speculation.
11 Q. At any rate, UNPROFOR or the United Nations stopped that project
12 regarding the demilitarisation. Do you agree with that statement?
13 A. As far as I know, yes. Again, I would refer you, if you have
14 witnesses who are senior UNPROFOR military, it would probably be better to
15 get the answer from them. It seemed to me very soon that we were beyond
16 that, that there was a military situation that had quickly overtaken the
17 situation that possibility of a demilitarisation agreement. At some point
18 that was clear and that was again the role that we were called on to play
19 which was to effect the evacuation of the enclave.
20 Q. Thank you. Now I would like to show you document 6D133, that you
21 have already seen. It was yesterday. Yesterday, when you saw this
22 document, you told us that it was possible that the person that the
23 document is addressed to or the fighting that it is -- that is referred in
24 this document might have been the fighting that you've already heard
25 about. Is it possible that you told us that, that it was about the
1 fighting that took place on the 20th of July 1995, and it is referred in
2 this document? Is that possible?
3 A. I'm rereading your question to me. I didn't follow it. I'm just
4 rereading here on the thing.
5 Q. I believe that the interpretation did not come out very clear.
6 The fighting that you spoke about yesterday, and that this document refers
7 to, could this have been the fighting that you heard when you were in Zepa
8 on the 20th of July 1995?
9 A. As I believe I stated yesterday, yes. This could have been part
10 of that fighting, could have been, absolutely could have been.
11 Q. This is a document that originated from the Ukrainian force, and
12 yesterday you spoke about some of the details of the document. However,
13 when it comes to this particular document, do you have any doubt as
14 regards the accuracy of the information that is conveyed in this document?
15 A. Could I see the entire document, please? It's simply stating that
16 fighting began. So I can't be -- verify the exact time in there but the
17 fact that fighting began, yes. The -- I can't speak to the -- necessarily
18 as to whether the means used were simply those mentioned in this. This is
19 a very short --
20 JUDGE KWON: It is two pages. You can see the next page.
21 THE WITNESS: Oh, I didn't see the next page, sir. Thank you.
22 Right. There is nothing there. This is -- if your question relates to --
23 does this document represent that there was fighting on that day and could
24 this have been the initiation of what I heard, yes. Does it represent a
25 full picture of what happened or was the fighting limited to the means
1 mentioned, no, I can't speak to that, but it could well be that the
2 fighting began that day and that that's what we heard part of.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Actually this document doesn't say only that the fighting had
5 started. It, between the Republika Srpska army and the BiH army, with the
6 use of certain means. I'm asking you this question because you also told
7 us yesterday, at the beginning of your yesterday's testimony, that the
8 source of fire that you heard was from the Serb positions, and in your
9 testimony you never mentioned the BiH army at all. You only mentioned the
10 Serb forces. Is that the case? Is it true that it is not just the fire
11 coming from the positions of the Republika Srpska army but that it was
12 actually a battle going on between the two sides?
13 A. Ma'am, I would repeat what I said earlier about the conversation
14 way back and what the Serb general said. You only saw part. I can only
15 testify as to those events that I saw and witnessed. I'm sorry if I can't
16 testify as to the activities of the Armija. I cannot. I cannot say that
17 what they were doing or what they weren't doing. I can only tell you the
18 part that I saw. I was only at OP 2. That was Serb-controlled. That's
19 the only part that I can testify to. I think you can find other witnesses
20 who can give far better testimony than I can as to what the Armija was
21 doing. I concede it's quite possible that they were engaged in a
22 fire-fight. I simply, as this witness, cannot testify to that.
23 Q. Sir, when you were there, how could you determine that the source
24 of fire came from the Serb positions?
25 A. In -- it -- the -- it's quite possible even that we saw firing.
1 You're asking me about events that were 12 years ago. But it is quite
2 possible we saw positions, gunnery positions, and it was clear to us that
3 the spot where we were, this high ground, was completely controlled by the
4 Serb military. That to us was clear. There were various weapons and
5 vehicles associated with that. It would be hard for me now 12 years later
6 to identify, but it was quite clear to me that this was under control and
7 that there were significant presence of weapons. And the firing we heard
8 was from this side.
9 It sounded to us from the way we gauge it; although, hearing is
10 notoriously misleading for anyone. Hearing is not a good indicator but
11 for us, it certainly appeared that this was outgoing. And we didn't see
12 any indication from the Serbs of indication of incoming, such as soldiers
13 running for cover or telling us to take shelter or we didn't see that, we
14 didn't see any indication of what one would expect from a disciplined
15 unit, as the Serbs -- Serb army was, of taking incoming fire at the
16 location where we were.
17 Q. Sir, didn't you say that actually at the given moment, the
18 situation became rather tense and that the Serbs actually told you that
19 you were better off leaving the area?
20 A. They didn't tell us we were better off to leave. They told us to
21 leave. Now, if you want to -- it's fair, if you want to say that they did
22 it out of concern for our safety, you can have that inference. I'm
23 telling you I can only testify as to what I observed. At the time there
24 was a quite serious demeanour. I did not see running for shelter. I saw
25 the appearance of military activity. And we were told to leave. That's
1 what I witnessed. That's what I've testified to.
2 Q. I would like to show you Exhibit 6D91. Yesterday you saw the
3 document. I did not intend to show it to you but I will do nevertheless.
4 Does this document originate from the observation point at which you were
6 A. The document itself, one cannot say where the precise location of
7 the document. It isn't necessarily that this was the same specific
8 location. This may well have been. It says targeted the barracks of
9 Ukrainian company. That could have been down and more likely was down in
10 Zepa town, not where we were at the OP 2 in all likelihood, in all
12 Q. According to you, the Bosnian force, the Armija, shelled the city
13 of Zepa, and I suppose that it was inhabited by civilian population, that
14 it was only civilian population that was there when the army shelled it?
15 A. I am -- the paragraph Charlie that I'm reading says three mortar
16 rounds directly targeted the barracks of Ukrainian company, numerous
17 explosions registered, also has been hit with a small arms and heavy
18 machine-gun, origin of fire is Armija of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's
19 correct. That's what they are reporting. This witness cannot testify one
20 way or the other as to this, as -- because this witness wasn't there.
21 Q. I would like to move on to another topic. I would like to show
22 you Exhibit numbers 5D417. Sir, you have already had an opportunity to
23 see this document. You saw it yesterday. And you were asked about it by
24 my learned friend just a while ago. I would like to show you paragraph 3,
25 which is towards the end of this page. Do you remember that you actually
1 saw this document yesterday and that you discussed it with my learned
3 A. I believe that is correct, yes. We looked at this document
5 Q. Do you remember that yesterday you told us that at the time, which
6 means -- yesterday you told us that -- or actually the day before
7 yesterday, you told us that you saw a copy of the document or the document
8 that this document makes reference to?
9 A. I'm not really following you. Are you asking do I recall actually
10 seeing this document at the time? Is that your question?
11 Q. No. Sir, no, I'm not asking you this. I'm simply asking you to
12 confirm whether you remember that you told us yesterday that you believe
13 that you had seen this document before, when I'm talking about the
14 document I'm talking about the agreement.
15 A. If that's what I said yesterday, I stand by that. I don't have a
16 vivid present recollection of this document, if that's your question. I
17 do not. This -- these reports strike me as accurate and plausible and
18 it's indeed quite likely that I saw this document at the time. But it was
19 Viktor who is reported to have called it in, so it's possible that he was
20 actually holding the document or something or, you know, had more closer
21 scrutiny of it than I did at the time. It's possible as well.
22 Q. And if you could look at the last paragraph, under 6, it mentions
23 the agreement and based on that agreement the civilian population of Zepa
24 was supposed to be provided with an opportunity to declare themselves as
25 to where they wished to reside from then on. Is that correct?
1 A. That's certainly what this says, and I have no reason to believe
2 that that was not in the document at the time.
3 Q. When you arrived in Zepa, during the evacuation campaign, you
4 actually started inquiring among the people whether they wanted to leave
5 or, rather, whether they wanted to stay; is that correct? This is a very
6 simple question, sir.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. This agreement was something that provided for the Muslim forces
9 surrendering. This is what is stated under 2 and 4, Muslim forces were
10 supposed to surrender, according to this agreement.
11 A. Among other things, correct.
12 Q. Is it true, maybe you didn't know it at the time, but I believe
13 that you know it now, that the government in Sarajevo did not want to
14 ratify this agreement, that they would not accept it as such?
15 A. That's possible. I'm not sure what I knew about that but that's
16 quite possible.
17 Q. Can we show page 2 of this document to the witness, please? Can
18 we go to the paragraph which begins with the following words, "At 11.40
19 a.m.". According to this document, Minister Muratovic says that he did
20 not know anything about this document, about this?
21 A. Your question is?
22 Q. Can you confirm that according to this paragraph, Minister
23 Muratovic did not know anything about the agreement or at least that is
24 what he said?
25 A. That's clearly what it says. I have no other basis of knowledge.
1 I can't shed any more light on it but that's clearly what it says, and I
2 have no reason to doubt the accuracy of this report.
3 Q. If you look at the last paragraph of this document,
4 Minister Muratovic expressed a certain doubt about the existence of
5 Hamdija Torlak, he doubted whether Hamdija Torlak actually existed?
6 A. That's what it says.
7 Q. But you yourself knew that Hamdija Torlak did exist?
8 A. Yes. I knew that he existed but I didn't know his exact position
9 or function or his competence to effect or not effect agreements. But
10 that is correct, I knew that he existed, that is correct.
11 Q. What we can also see in this document, which is the penultimate
12 paragraph, is that the Bosnian government was not at all contrary to the
13 evacuation of the Muslim population from Zepa. They did not oppose it at
14 all. Actually, what they wanted was for the evacuation to be carried out
15 under certain conditions.
16 A. What is your question, please, ma'am? I'm sorry, I don't
17 understand your question.
18 Q. Sir, is it true that the paragraph starting with at 11.40,"I
19 called minister Muratovic," and so on and so forth, confirms that the
20 government in Sarajevo was not opposed to the evacuation of the population
21 from Bosnia -- from Zepa as long as it was carried out under certain
22 conditions and the conditions were those that the UNPROFOR supervised the
24 A. What my -- I can give you my best judgement on this. I
25 wouldn't -- I wouldn't make a complete inference as to the total position
1 of the Bosnian government from this paragraph. It depends very much on
2 the context, and I'm not here to speak on behalf of the Bosnian government
3 and you should -- those officials are still alive and can speak for
4 themselves and represent what it was -- what their position is. It seems
5 to me the paragraph stands on its face. The minister is expressing
6 concerns with respect to what happened in Srebrenica. Beyond that, how
7 much you want to infer is up to you. It's not really for me to state.
8 Q. In any case, finally, when the evacuation was finished, it was
9 actually carried out in the full presence of the UNPROFOR. The UNPROFOR
10 was there all the time.
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. And it was also carried out before the Muslim forces in Zepa
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Wouldn't it be correct to say that what happened in Zepa, was the
16 evacuation of the Zepa population, was not the success of Mladic but the
17 success of the government in Sarajevo. Actually it was not Mladic who
18 succeeded by evacuating the population from Zepa. It was the government
19 of Sarajevo and the Muslim forces who succeeded because the Muslim force
20 remained armed after the evacuation of the civilian population.
21 A. Ma'am, is it my role here to ratify your judgements and
22 inferences? I just don't understand -- I'm not sure that this is my role
23 here as a witness. I understood that I was called to this Tribunal to
24 testify as to the events, the observations. If you're asking me for
25 opinions, I'm happy to give them about the total context of this. I'm
1 happy to share those. It would be as an expert and not as a fact
2 witness. But I'm not sure that this is really my role.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Ms. Fauveau and Mr. Joseph. You haven't
4 been summoned here as a witness -- as an expert witness. You've been
5 summoned here as a witness to the facts that you are -- that are to-- that
6 you are aware of. So please, we are not interested, and I'm using this
7 language not in any disparaging way, we are not interested in your
8 opinions because you haven't been called here to express opinions. So if
9 you think that by answering Madam Fauveau's question you would be making
10 an assessment, giving an opinion, which you wouldn't like to give, then
11 you only have to ask not to answer the question. One moment.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE AGIUS: That having been say, of course, Madam Fauveau, you
14 can rephrase, reformulate your question, without asking the witness to
15 give an expert opinion. I could also add that the gist of your previous
16 question to him has more of the nature of a submission than anything else,
17 but I don't want to stop you from reformulating your question or putting a
18 different one.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Is it true that Minister Muratovic said that once the evacuation
21 was finished, before the evacuation was completed, the evacuation of the
22 civilian population was complete, the Muslim forces of Zepa would not
23 surrender, they would not surrender their weapons?
24 A. I -- it says what it says. The document says what it says. I'm
25 sorry, I've lot track of the document. I'm not trying to be difficult.
1 There is nothing more I can add to this. The document speaks for itself.
2 I've attested that I believe it to be an accurate record.
3 Q. Sir --
4 A. I don't know how I can better answer the question. Minister
5 Muratovic's position is reflected, I believe to be accurately reflected,
6 in this document and it stands on its own. I don't know that I can shed
7 any more light on this than that.
8 Q. Sir, my question was not related to this document. I wanted to
9 show you another one, but for the time being I'm asking you this. Did you
10 know that Minister Muratovic stated, once the evacuation was completed,
11 that the Muslim forces of Zepa would not surrender? If you don't know,
12 you can simply say, "I don't know about that."
13 A. I may know this if we stop and look at the record but sounds to me
14 a plausible position that you make, as to his position, but I'm not --
15 here I'd have to refer back to some more documents to confirm that but
16 that sounds like a plausible position.
17 Q. I would like to show the witness Exhibit number 5D419.
18 Sir, this is a document dated 27 July. This is a memorandum
19 originating from David Harland.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Please understand me. I'm asking you this because the accused
22 don't have a copy of this document in the language that they understand.
23 That's why some of my questions seem pretty straightforward. This is just
24 to help them understand what the document is about. In the second
25 paragraph of this document, a reference is made to a telephone
1 conversation that you had and during which you said, at -- that at 2.00, a
2 majority of the civilian population had already been evacuated.
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. Can we now show the witness page 2 of the same document?
5 In the penultimate paragraph, we are talking about 5.00 in the
6 afternoon of the same day, Minister Muratovic called and said that the
7 Bosnian military in the pocket would not surrender.
8 A. That's what it says.
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, would it be the
10 convenient time for our first break? And after the break, I will require
11 another ten to 15 minutes approximately.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, certainly. Yes, certainly, Madam Fauveau.
13 Yes, Mr. Thayer?
14 MR. THAYER: Mr. President I don't want to pre-empt Your Honour,
15 but if we could have an estimate from my friends about how much time they
16 have left, you typically do this, but I just wanted to emphasise we
17 have -- our next witness is an investigator who is multi-tasking all the
18 time, and we just want to be able to manage his time as best as possible,
20 JUDGE AGIUS: As I have it for the time being it's another 15
21 minutes from Madam Fauveau. Mr. Ostojic, do you still require 45 minutes?
22 MR. OSTOJIC: Good morning, Mr. President. I'll re-evaluate. I
23 think about a half hour to 45 minutes. It's hard to gauge.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Mr. Zivanovic.
25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: For the time being I stay.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: So we are where we stood before. 45 minutes to be
2 on the safe side, plus 20, that's an hour and five minutes, plus 15, an
3 hour and 20 minutes. Basically we should finish if there is
4 re-examination, we should finish by the end of the next session.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Before you continue, Ms. Fauveau, for
8 the record Judge Stole had to leave us, unfortunately, and we are
9 proceeding with the sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis. Yes.
10 Yes, Madam Fauveau.
11 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. Sir, in your statement, you spoke much about the evacuation from
13 Zepa. Can we say that the role you played in that evacuation, both
14 personally and as a member of an international organisation, was an active
16 A. Yes, ma'am.
17 Q. And, in effect, you and your colleague, Viktor Bezruchenko, as
18 well as local Muslim leaders, organised the -- for the civilian Muslim
19 population to board buses?
20 A. We weren't solely organising. We organised one part of it and
21 coordinated part of it, but it isn't as though we organised ourselves,
22 everything, but you're correct that the Bosniak or Muslim leaders had
23 their role and we had our role and the Serbs had their role.
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Please show the witness Exhibit
25 number 4D111.
1 Q. This is a statement about the telephone conversation which you had
2 in April 2005, with a representative of the OTP. Could we see the third
3 page, please? I'm referring to paragraph 14. Sir, I'm going to read out
4 this -- what this report says. This is a report about the interview with
5 you, and I will ask you whether you adhere to what you said then. "We
6 started to organise the civilians boarding in the vehicles. I, Viktor,
7 and at least one French officer were very active on this as well as some
8 of the Muslim leaders. I can recall seeing also General Smith there
9 observing the evacuation."
10 A. This is not a very accurate rendering of what I said to this
11 reporter. It's not completely accurate. General Smith was not there that
12 I recall, "Observing" the evacuation. I couldn't rule it out
13 categorically. But it isn't -- that part of it seems -- it's not a
14 complete -- completely accurate picture. We were there. We did start to
15 organise, Viktor and I were there. At one point during the evacuation,
16 yes, there was one French officer who -- who we were cooperating with.
17 That's right. But I can't say that this paragraph is a completely
18 accurate rendering either of what I said to him or what I observed at the
20 Q. I would like to focus on what is said about General Smith. You
21 say that you don't remember seeing General Smith observing the evacuation.
22 But you cannot rule that out categorically. Does that mean that today you
23 no longer remember whether General Smith actually observed the evacuation
25 A. What I'm saying is that I don't believe this is either an accurate
1 reflection of what I said, even to this reporter, or accurate as to what I
2 observed at the time. What I recall vividly was being at a meeting with
3 General Smith and Colonel Baxter at the top, at OP 2. I don't recall
4 General Smith observing the evacuation. The fact that I don't recall it
5 doesn't mean categorically that it didn't happen. I might not have seen
6 him at some point. I'm just saying when I made this statement, and now,
7 that that part of it is not right, and I don't believe I even made that
8 statement to the person who reported -- I think the person misunderstood.
9 It was done over the telephone. The person who did it was a non-native
10 English speaker, and it's quite possible there was some misunderstanding.
11 Q. Thank you very much.
12 A. De rien.
13 Q. Sir, you are mentioning a French soldier. I'm no longer referring
14 to the statement. I'm asking you about the events at that time in Zepa.
15 Is it correct that UNPROFOR, during that evacuation, deployed additional
17 A. That is correct, yes, ma'am.
18 Q. And a little while ago, you spoke about these international forces
19 arriving at Zepa without any problems, although you had been saying that
20 reaching the enclave was problem -- was a problem, or I'm going to repeat
21 the question.
22 Recently, you spoke about the difficulties that the international
23 organisations had reaching the enclave generally speaking, in the general
24 sense. But these UNPROFOR forces that had arrived to assist in the
25 evacuation were able to reach Zepa without problems?
1 A. That is correct, yes, absolutely correct.
2 Q. Is it correct that while you were actively involved in that
3 evacuation, and while you were in Zepa, that you received no orders from
4 General Mladic?
5 A. As a member of the United Nations, I cannot receive then -- cannot
6 receive orders from any military or political official who is not in the
7 United Nations so that's an impossibility. Did -- did General Mladic
8 instruct us -- this is when you will go down and then did we comply? And
9 yes we went down, or this is the way we are going to do the things? Yes.
10 But formally speaking, I can't take orders from any general, nor political
11 leader, of any side in a party of that conflict. But instructions as to
12 how to -- the modalities for this, were there -- was direction given?
13 Yes, direction was given.
14 Q. Do you agree that under no circumstances General Mladic could give
15 even instructions to General Smith?
16 A. No. He couldn't instruct, but he could convey his views as to how
17 something would go, the same as any military leader of any faction,
18 Bosniak or Croat, but that is a true statement. General Smith can only be
19 ordered within his chain of command.
20 Q. In any case, General Smith would never have followed any
21 suggestion or instruction from General Mladic that would result in
22 infringements of international humanitarian law?
23 A. I would tell you this: I have the highest --
24 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Thayer?
25 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I think we have reached the limits of
1 this line of questioning with respect to what General Smith would or
2 wouldn't do. He will be here as a fact witness about the events in Zepa.
3 The witness has already testified about whether he could take orders from
4 General Mladic, but I think that's sufficient for this line of
6 JUDGE AGIUS: I stand to be directed by my colleagues, but I think
7 this is a question that should be directed to General Smith and he is
8 best-placed to answer it. Thank you.
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Sir, if General Mladic had given you an instruction that would be
11 contrary to international humanitarian law, you wouldn't have followed
12 that instruction; is that correct?
13 A. Not -- my -- as I told you, we were, for example, told under
14 international humanitarian law you have to determine the volition of the
15 person to depart, and I told you and explained to this Court what happened
16 and how to disregard it. So I can't say strictly we had in our mind the
17 safety and security, as best we could preserve the dignity, but really it
18 was primarily the safety and security of the people who were being
20 Whether that conformed 100 per cent with international
21 humanitarian law, whether that was even in our mind at every point, I
22 can't say. What was in our mind at every point was the safety and
23 security of the evacuation. That is it. And we would weigh of course
24 what General Mladic would or would not say at -- and weigh that. If it
25 would have imperiled the safety and security. If he had directed us to do
1 something that I felt, speaking for myself, would have imperiled these
2 people in some way, within the confines of the peril they were already in,
3 no, I wouldn't have followed that. I don't know if I've answered your
5 Q. You have answered my question completely. And I will go a little
6 further now. Is it correct that in wartime situations, in situations of
7 serious crises, when the -- the conflicting parties are sometimes forced
8 to take certain steps to protect civilian population and these steps being
9 on the verge of a legal standards and provisions?
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Again, if you think that this is a question that you
11 shouldn't answer because it belongs to an expert witness, you're free to
12 ask us not to answer it. Yes, Madam Fauveau?
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I explain, Your Honour? The
14 witness repeatedly stated that he has rather great experience, he even
15 said unique experience, in the context of the conflict in the former
16 Yugoslavia. That's why I asked this question. But if he thinks that this
17 is not an appropriate question, I shall withdraw it, in fact I wanted to
18 say if the Chamber thinks that this question shouldn't be answered.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: I think if you wish to ask such questions, I mean,
20 you need to phrase them in a way such as not to elicit an opinion, but to
21 seek what his own personal position was at the time. Yes.
22 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I misunderstood. I thought I was
23 awaiting for the respected, esteemed attorney, to rephrase the question.
24 I thought that was what you were getting at.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: More or less, yes.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm waiting for your question.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
3 Q. I will continue and perhaps a little later on I will ask a similar
4 question. So what I'm about to ask you now has nothing to do with my
5 previous question. Yesterday, on page 37 of the transcript, you said that
6 Serb soldiers had a full liberty in the area of the other enclave which
7 was in fact under the control of Ukrainian soldiers. Do you remember
8 saying that?
9 A. Yes, ma'am.
10 Q. But Avdo Palic, who was the commander of the Muslim forces in that
11 enclave, also had a full liberty of movement?
12 A. He had full movement in the area of the village. I don't think he
13 had full movement towards the area towards OP 2. Where I saw his --
14 witnessed his movements free and unconstrained were in the village, and
15 then back up toward the hills wherever he was going and wherever the men
16 were hidden.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Sorry, Madam Fauveau, and you are basing
18 this assessment on what you could see at the time that you were there and
19 not on other information.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. Exclusively saying what I could observe
21 with my own eyes was Colonel Palic could move about, as we were moving
22 about, in the village at the time of the evacuation, and in the evenings,
23 some points when he decided during the day he would go up into these hills
24 behind us. I don't recall him walking freely up towards OP 2, towards
25 that initial position where we were, sir.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: What I meant to say is that you couldn't account for
2 his movements or the extent to which he could move around in the area at a
3 time when you were not present.
4 THE WITNESS: That would be correct. I can only relate what I
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
7 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
8 Q. During the evacuation, and the boarding of the population in buses
9 and vehicles, you never saw anybody being forced to board a vehicle or
11 A. No. If you mean physically, with someone pointing a gun, no.
12 I've already related to you, I believe, to this Court, the fact that it
13 was clear that the issue of volition was already well passed and that
14 these people felt themselves under duress. That was their reason for
15 their departure.
16 Q. When you asked the inhabitants whether they wanted to leave,
17 nobody prevented you from asking them that; is that correct?
18 A. Yes, ma'am, that is correct.
19 Q. And you put that question to some 15 or 20 persons, didn't you,
20 and only one person said that he or she wanted to say but was -- stay,
21 sorry, but was afraid?
22 A. Going on my recollection, that is correct. Only one person said
23 that she didn't want to go, and all of them cried. One said no; all of
24 them cried with her. Correct.
25 Q. When that person said to you she was afraid, and when you doubted
1 her will to leave, did you inform your superiors of that?
2 A. No, ma'am. And not that I recall that we even had means but the
3 answer to that is no, did not.
4 Q. Did you inform General Smith about that?
5 A. No, ma'am.
6 Q. Did you inform General Mladic or even General Tolimir?
7 A. No, ma'am.
8 Q. And when you arrived in Zepa or on the next day, you saw that
9 group of people in the centre of Zepa. You didn't expect to see them
10 there, did you?
11 A. No. I was not sure really what to expect, and we were sort of
12 surprised. We anticipated that we would have to go and sort of group the
13 people, correct.
14 Q. And in your statement, you spoke on several times about
15 impressions. When you saw that large group of people in the centre of
16 Zepa, did you have the impression that those people wanted to leave?
17 A. You're asking for my impressions, and I'm happy to share my
18 impressions with you. My impressions were those people, let's see, your
19 question, wanted to leave. My impression is that these people were afraid
20 for their lives. That's my impression. When someone is afraid for their
21 lives, they want to leave. That's my impression.
22 Q. You personally also, with regard to your experience in the war in
23 former Yugoslavia, you went to several places where there were conflicts,
24 and you had seen crises in other parts of the world too. Can we say,
25 speaking about the people in Zepa, that the fear they felt was more caused
1 by the general situation and the general tension between the ethnic groups
2 after the years of war rather than that -- rather than being due to the
3 situation on that day in Zepa itself?
4 A. You asked this based on my experience, and I can relate this to
5 other areas of former Yugoslavia where I was, and I would say the answer
6 is it was -- the fear was related in my view, in my impression, to this
7 specific situation of being overrun, and I can compare it, if you wish,
8 you mentioned my experience, there was an evacuation of Croats that I
9 participated in in January 1993 following a Croatian attack at
10 Maslenica Bridge. Then a number of Serb forces and Serb irregulars,
11 including Arkan and Captain Dragan came into Krajina, and a number of
12 Croat civilians were killed.
13 And these Croats had been living in, as minorities in Krajina,
14 among the Serbs. They had been living. And it was this change to the
15 situation that injected a situation of crisis, that where some of them had
16 been killed in Drnis and other places, some old people had their throats
17 slit. And that created this atmosphere of great fear and panic. So where
18 they had actually been living under Serb control for sometime, all of a
19 sudden they were afraid and wanted to leave. I would compare it to that
20 situation and say that there had been a change. That these people seemed
21 to be terrified by this change in the situation and that that was their
22 immediate desire to leave.
23 Can I exclude the possibility that they had been isolated and
24 deprived for sometime and that some of them might have wanted to go? I
25 cannot exclude that possibility, but to me drawing on my experience,
1 you're asking for my -- based on my impression based, on my experience,
2 I'm sharing that with you, it was the latter. It was the change
3 situation, an immediate crisis in which these people felt immediately in
4 fearful of their lives, that's my impression.
5 Q. In this particular case of Zepa, fear was caused by the entry of
6 the Serbs in Zepa, the taking of Zepa, which was a consequence of the
7 military victory of the Serbian army; isn't that correct?
8 A. That would be correct.
9 Q. And that couldn't be avoided, could it? What I'm -- what I want
10 to say is, if a military operation is -- takes place, and one side wins,
11 then the defeated side is scared. I'm referring to this concrete moment
12 in July 1995. In 1992 it may have been different, but could anything else
13 be done for the people to avoid the people being scared?
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer? Before you answer the question,
16 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I've risen to object initially because
17 the question really was asking, sounded like for speculation, then it got
18 concrete again it seemed. But then it in, my opinion, reverted to again
19 asking a very generalised speculative question. If he feels like he has
20 the -- as Your Honour has made clear before, he has the factual basis --
21 JUDGE AGIUS: I think -- I read the question and again - I stand
22 to be corrected by my colleagues - but I read the question to be
23 Mr. Joseph, having given us an expose on the events in Krajina in 1993 and
24 having lived through the events in Zepa in July 1995, isn't that -- isn't
25 it true that there was a difference in the circumstances? And this is
1 what the question amounts to, and I think he can answer it.
2 Okay. So that's the gist of the question. If it's not the gist
3 of the question, as I understood it to be, then please tell me,
4 Madam Fauveau, but I think it is.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] It is somewhat different. What I'm
6 interested in is the following:
7 Q. At that moment in Zepa, after three or four years of war, was
8 there anything to prevent the people from being scared, after there had
9 been a military victory of one of the warring parties? Could anything be
10 done to prevent the population from -- of the other warring party from
11 being scared? And I said maybe at the beginning of the war, it was
12 possible, that is in 1992, it was possible, maybe, to find a different
14 A. I'm going to wait. Let me try to read your question here
15 specifically on the screen. "Could anything be done to prevent the
16 population from being scared?" Of course, theoretically many things could
17 be done to redress the fear of a population. You might think first among
18 them a deployment of UNPROFOR. Well, their confidence in UNPROFOR I think
19 would have been rather low, if not non-existent at that point, and the
20 ability to deploy an adequate detachment especially coming right after the
21 fall of Srebrenica and the situation of the Dutch troops there, I think
22 that was not a possibility. One can think of other things that could be
23 done. There is a panoply of things that could be done to restore
24 confidence. Some --
25 Q. Sir?
1 A. Or something else, some agreement, a political agreement, a peace
2 agreement. Many, many things that could be done. I'm still struggling my
3 best to answer your question. I'm just not sure, maybe I don't understand
4 the thrust of it.
5 Q. I believe that you have understood my question very well and you
6 have answered it, as a matter of fact. You said that most natural thing
7 was to deploy the United Nations, but there were United Nations forces
8 deployed when the Serbs entered the village; isn't that correct?
9 A. That's exactly correct. And that's the point. They were
10 completely ineffectual and we should also point out that this comes
11 contemporaneous with the fall of Srebrenica which no doubt this population
12 was aware of and quite possibly was aware of some of the events following
13 the fall of Srebrenica. So it's quite possible that this influenced their
14 mental state and their attitude of great fear.
15 Q. You have also mentioned the signing of an agreement, and it seems
16 that there was an agreement that was co-signed by the Ukrainian Battalion
17 of the United Nations protection forces.
18 A. As I point out before, I was shown that agreement. I don't recall
19 seeing that agreement. Mr. Josse kindly showed me that agreement. But as
20 I pointed out then, I don't recall actually seeing signatures to it, so I
21 don't know that it was -- it was possibly a draft. You'll notice that the
22 one David Harland and I had was sort of equal stature. It was an unsigned
23 draft. I can't exclude the possibility that a signed copy exists. The
24 copy I was shown was unsigned. That's the only thing I point out but
25 Mr. Josse did indeed show us that copy and I did see it here.
1 Q. In any case, this was a very particular situation in Zepa, and the
2 evacuation of the civilian population was a situation in which the Serbs
3 showed the willingness to eventually allow people to remain in Zepa, if
4 they so wanted.
5 A. I can't exclude that possibility. I can't exclude that
6 possibility. Perhaps, if someone had wanted to remain, I can't exclude
7 that possibility, that that -- that would be true. I know that the -- our
8 understanding was clear, that our mission was to evacuate, Serbs provided
9 the vehicles, and we assisted and helped coordinate this onward movement.
10 That is correct.
11 Q. Thank you very much. I have no further questions, sir.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Madam Fauveau. Who is going next,
13 Mr. Ostojic or Mr. Zivanovic? Mr. Ostojic.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Ostojic:
15 Q. Good morning, Mr. Joseph. As you know, my name is John Ostojic
16 and I represent Mr. Ljubisa Beara. How are you?
17 A. I'm fine, good morning to you. [Interpretation] I give my regards
18 to everybody present.
19 Q. I'm going to ask you a couple of questions today, and I hope not
20 to be repetitive. I'd like first to have a better understanding of your
21 position as a civil affairs officer. Was your immediate boss and
22 supervisor the senior civil affairs officer, Mr. Harland?
23 A. It was --
24 JUDGE AGIUS: I think he explained yesterday.
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes, sir.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: -- who his superior was.
2 MR. OSTOJIC: Fair enough.
3 Q. Sir we looked at some of these memorandums or situation reports
4 that you outlined for us. In some of them your name appears directly
5 under Mr. Harland's and in others it does not. Can you explain to me why
6 in some of them your name appears on it and in others it doesn't?
7 A. I think on the ones that would appear, David would have been
8 trying to show that this was a collaborative effort probably that's --
9 that would be the reason.
10 Q. As a civil affairs officer, in 1995, were you required to maintain
11 records and notes while negotiations were on going between various warring
12 or political parties?
13 A. No requirement.
14 Q. How would you be able to convey any of the demands of one party,
15 if you met, as you've testified already, with Minister Muratovic, how
16 would you be able to recall and convey that information to your superiors?
17 A. Whoever would be senior in that meeting would convey and normally
18 would be fastidious with a record. Whether there was a written
19 requirement to do that would be something else, but normally would be
20 fastidious with notes but the senior person would convey that information.
21 Q. When were you tasked to go to Zepa in July of 1995, were you given
22 written instructions as to what your task was?
23 A. No, not that I recall.
24 Q. Your task, and I think your job at that point, was to attempt to
25 evacuate the civilians of Zepa, correct?
1 A. That was my understanding of what our role was to do.
2 Q. And just briefly, although I think you can explain it and you may
3 have already, the purpose to evacuate the civilians because there was a
4 war going on and there was fighting and the use of, as you describe
5 before, both small and very heavy machine-guns and mortars and other types
6 of ammunitions, correct? And to get them out of harms way in essence,
7 isn't that true?
8 A. No, sir. That would not be an accurate. It was because of a
9 specific situation where this enclave, like the one before it, Srebrenica,
10 had fallen. That is the -- was the specific triggering event for this
12 Q. Now, you mentioned just briefly on page 44 just moments ago that
13 there was a loss of confidence in UNPROFOR, although you surmised that by
14 the people in Zepa and then you said that it was not possible to deploy a
15 detachment of UNPROFOR. What would a reasonable detachment be to send out
16 to Zepa in July of 1995?
17 A. The reasonable size?
18 Q. M'hm.
19 A. Well, I would refer you more to reports of the UN Security Council
20 which they prepared their own three options light, medium, and heavy. I'm
21 sure it's well known to the Court and others. It's probably more
22 authoritative than what I can tell you.
23 Q. Well, would you consider 150 UNPROFOR troops to be, if that's a
24 figure that I'd use.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
1 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, if we could have some specificity as
2 to when in July of 1995 we are talking about, because that could make a
3 tremendous difference if we are really talking about what options were
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Sir, I think that's a fair comment. At the same
6 time, I think you are also moving a little bit too fast. Please allow a
7 short pause between question and answer. You both speak the same language
8 and it's creating a little bit of difficulties.
9 MR. OSTOJIC: I will, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: I know you will, Mr. Ostojic.
11 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm just drawing your attention because you've been
13 overlapping actually.
14 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you. I don't agree with my learned
15 colleague's objection. I don't know if the witness, if it makes a
16 difference for the witness, but for the sake of going on how about if we
17 just pick the date of the 26th of July of 1995.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Fair enough. And let's stick to that, then.
19 THE WITNESS: If you would be good enough to restate the question,
20 sir, please.
21 Q. Let's take the 26th of July 1995. What would you consider the
22 deployment of 150 UNPROFOR troops coming into the enclave of Zepa
23 [indiscernible], immediate, light or large?
24 A. I'll tell you, the question of the size of that contingent is in
25 my view relevant but secondary to the willingness to use all aspects of
1 the safe area resolution, including NATO air power. That was where the
2 real deterrent lied, especially at that point after the situation in
3 Srebrenica with the overrunning of the Dutch troops.
4 So the actual size, others are far more expert than I in
5 determining precisely the number of troops needed from a ground
6 perspective. From my perspective that was secondary to the willingness
7 and ability to use NATO air power. What would have provided confidence to
8 the people on the ground is -- would be difficult to say how much.
9 Q. Fair enough. As a fact witness, Mr. Joseph, are you aware that in
10 on or about July 25th and 26th, 1995, actually there is a deployment of
11 about 150 UNPROFOR troops to the Zepa enclave?
12 A. That would be correct as a part of the evacuation. Their mission
13 is not to stay, and as I reported as soon as the wounded convoy left, this
14 was -- triggered great panic among the population.
15 Q. So would I be wrong sir to suggest to you that the deployment of
16 those 150 UNPROFOR troops was for the reinforcement of the Ukrainians that
17 were there? Would that be incorrect?
18 A. I would say respectfully that would be incorrect.
19 Q. Okay. Well, let's look at 6D29, as it's coming up, you were
20 telling us a little bit about Lieutenant Colonel Baxter. Would you
21 refresh my recollection how he fits into the hierarchy?
22 A. I think his title was military assistant to General Smith.
23 Q. And this is 6D29 is a sit report, a situation report, captioned
24 memorandum from David Harland with the initials "SCVAO," which is just
25 Senior Civil Affairs Officer, correct?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. Now just quickly Directing your -- and you saw this report
3 yesterday, directing your attention to the last page and the second
4 paragraph of that page. I'll give you a chance to read it, but my first
5 question is this is a report being written by Harland, so it seems as if
6 Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter is giving him this information, correct?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. Okay. Just read the second paragraph, really, the first sentence
9 is what we are discussing now.
10 A. That is -- I read it and yes, sir.
11 Q. Well, in that, doesn't it clearly say that Baxter reported that
12 UNPROFOR had deployed about 150 additional troops into the enclave to
13 reinforce the 79 Ukrainians there?
14 A. It does, it does -- it does. It doesn't say to reinforce them in
15 what mission. It doesn't say. And I would -- my recollection is their
16 mission was not to remain in place and secure as permanent deployment in
17 the safe area. That's my impression, military obviously, General Smith
18 and others can state it far more authoritative than I can.
19 Q. We will ask them, I'm sure.
20 A. Sure.
21 Q. Now, sir, also we discussed briefly, and you saw in the video
22 yesterday, I think, the ICRC truck; do you remember that?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. And now do you remember that on or about July 26th, 1995, there
25 were actually two ICRC teams in the enclave?
1 A. What I recall and what I testified to is that I recall ICRC being
2 there exclusively to deal with the evacuation of the wounded, and it would
3 have been on that day, probably that was the day, yes, sir.
4 Q. Would you remember if there was more than one team?
5 A. That I can't be sure of.
6 Q. Help me understand this: How many people constitute an ICRC team?
7 A. Not for me to say. I have to defer you respectfully to ICRC.
8 Q. Just look at the next sentence in that same Exhibit 6D29. There
9 senior civil affairs officer David Harland seems to say in addition to
10 UNPROFOR civil affairs, a JO team and two ICRC teams were in the pocket.
11 Do you see that?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. And sorry, I'm being told that I'm overlapping with you and I
14 apologise. It's making it difficult for everyone, so I'll try to be more
16 A. [Interpretation] Maybe it would be easier in Serbian.
17 Q. [Interpretation] I don't want to speak Serbian with you because it
18 would make me look bad. [In English] I don't know if that was a correct
19 translation. I think he can verify it but okay. Sir, is there any reason
20 to dispute that which we see on Exhibit 6D29, which is a memorandum from
21 David Harland to John Ryan?
22 A. No, I can't dispute what you see there. If it's the reference to
23 two ICRC teams, no, but whether a team constituted two vehicles or not, I
24 simply can't recall that detail.
25 Q. And I understand that, and we'll have some other people who can
1 perhaps help us out with that. I'd like to ask you a little bit about
2 that which you mentioned on page 48 yesterday, line 12, and that was a
3 book that you seem to have with you while you were in Zepa in 1995 called
4 "The Documents on the Laws of War." Do you remember that, mentioning
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. And who is the author of that book?
8 A. I -- there is -- it's an edited legal treatise. It contains the
9 Geneva Conventions and assorted other things. I don't know what the -- if
10 there is an author or someone who compiled it, I don't know who it is.
11 Q. Who issued the book to you?
12 A. It was my own book.
13 Q. So you brought that from America when you went on your first
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. And did you carry it with you when you went to Africa as well?
17 A. I was not on a conflict mission in Africa, but I had it with me in
18 every conflict place in former Yugoslavia, and I believe I took it to --
19 with me to Iraq in 2004 when I was in Iraq.
20 Q. And do you still have that book?
21 A. I do, sir.
22 Q. And who else other than yourself had that book in the former
23 Yugoslavia in July of 1995?
24 A. Former Yugoslavia is a big country. I don't know who else would
25 have had that book.
1 Q. If you had -- if you know, did David Harland would have it or
2 John Ryan, would they have had a copy of that book as well?
3 A. No, but they might have had copies of the Geneva Conventions and
4 other documents.
5 Q. Yesterday, sir, the honourable Judge Prost asked you a question,
6 and I believe it was on line 12, I mean page 12, lines 9 through 11, and
7 she asked you, and this is while you were still in Tuzla, what kind of
8 information did you have on the status of the Bosnian Muslims at that
9 time. Do you remember generally the question?
10 A. If I remember correctly, if it's a question I'm recalling, the
11 Honourable Judge Prost asked me about the information we had about the men
12 of Srebrenica, if I'm recalling the right question.
13 Q. That is correct. I think you answered, sir, without specifically
14 citing it, that you had talked to or heard from General Smith that he
15 talked to General Mladic, et cetera. Do you remember that?
16 A. Right. I believe I stated that a senior -- I asked a senior
17 UNPROFOR officer what had happened to the men, and I was told I was
18 relayed as I recall, that General Mladic had said --
19 Q. Men were released?
20 A. Men were released, some of them were released and that they are
21 making their way back, they're walking there. That's what I recall being
22 told. Sir, just a point of reference on that -- sorry.
23 Q. Sir, did you try on the 19th of July 1995, while you were in
24 Tuzla, to obtain any information from the ABiH about the Muslim men in
1 A. No, sir. And no, and not that I would believe that they would
2 have any information. We were consumed with dealing with the refugee
3 influx, and getting our own people out. There was an interpreter,
4 civilian, Bosniak interpreter, who we were in telephone contact with in
5 Srebrenica and he, I can remember speaking to him on the line directly, he
6 was terrified because the Dutch were going to pull out and leave him
7 behind, and he was desperate and asked for our assistance, and we provided
8 it. And I got an instruction to the Dutch that said basically you will
9 not leave without getting this guy out.
10 Q. With all due respect, I'm not sure I understand your answer fully,
11 so if you can help me. Why is it that you think the ABiH wouldn't have
12 information about his own military men who were coming through a forest or
13 in a column?
14 A. First, they were not my, as a civil affairs officer, primary
15 interlocutor. At that time, our mission as civil affairs was focused on
16 dealing with this civil influx, the refugee influx. That's first. Second
17 answer, if you want me to give a larger answer, I don't know what kind of
18 means captured military men would have to convey back to their
19 headquarters about their situation. Perhaps I don't know, maybe I'm
20 missing something.
21 Q. I'm not sure how the word "captured" got into the equation. Let
22 me show an exhibit in a moment, but it's our information sir that the
23 United Nations knew, as early as July 19, 1995, that at least 4.000 ABiH
24 men who were coming through this column made it to Tuzla and most of them
25 were soldiers, some of them were civilians. Do you remember seeing any of
1 that influx of men who were soldiers of the ABiH?
2 A. No. I was at Tuzla air base, and I don't recall hearing of this
3 or seeing it. I cannot recall that. At the time that I was at Tuzla air
4 base, nor do I remember hearing of it when I was returned to Sarajevo.
5 Q. Let me show you 2D17.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Thayer?
7 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I just ask my friend to disclose the
8 list of documents they intend to use on cross-examination. We haven't
9 received it yet.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ostojic.
11 MR. OSTOJIC: All the documents are in e-court, and we didn't
12 anticipate using this document until we heard the testimony, and I don't
13 think there is any others -- that's not the right one, actually -- but I
14 can give him a hard copy with some of my notes on it if the Court is
15 willing and counsel to accept that, but I have it down as 2D17 which is
16 previously identified and marked as an exhibit; which is the report, if I
17 can just identify for the record, dated the 19th of July 1995 to Mr. Annan
18 at the United Nations New York from Akashi, UNPF-HQ, Zagreb with the
19 initials following.
20 The report we've seen previously with Mr. Ruez among other
21 witnesses, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Are you satisfied with that explanation, Mr. Thayer?
23 MR. THAYER: I am. If there is no list, there is no list.
24 MR. OSTOJIC: With the Court's indulgence and I apologise I do
25 have some --
1 JUDGE AGIUS: [Microphone not activated] We still don't have the
2 right document on the screen, Mr. Ostojic.
3 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes. And --
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
5 MR. THAYER: We may be able to assist. If we have the ERN, we may
6 be able to call it up I believe on Sanction or go through another document
7 already in e-court.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ostojic.
9 MR. OSTOJIC: It has a number R 0082071. It's a two-page
10 document, the next page would obviously be 72.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Is it -- has it been given already a Defence 2D--
12 MR. OSTOJIC: I thought it did. That's why I gave it. On my
13 records I have it as 2D17 and that's obviously not accurate. Much to my
15 JUDGE AGIUS: If you could check that. Do you have your own copy
16 that you could put on the ELMO? I know that you said there are some
17 personal notes there.
18 MR. OSTOJIC: They are not -- they are just some calculations that
19 I made, but I can do -- yes of course.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Because I think that will speed up matters.
21 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm being assured by our staff that there is nothing
23 in the records with the number that you --
24 MR. OSTOJIC: I'll check that. My apologies to the Court and to
25 counsel. Thank you, Your Honour. I think it might be 2D03, because 3 was
1 the third document. Thank you for your assistance.
2 Q. All I'd like for us to do is if we can scroll down or move the
3 document, so we could see if it's on the ELMO to the latter portion of the
4 document. It's on e-court now, they said? So I could have mine maybe.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: I think you can -- [Microphone not activated]
6 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. I apologise, Mr. Joseph, I know your time is valuable and I'll try
8 to short circuit this. Now, if you look at that last paragraph on that
9 first page which is, I think, paragraph 4 directing your attention to the
10 third sentence there starting with the letters "ABiH." Do you see that?
11 A. Paragraph 4, third sentence, beginning ABiH.
12 Q. ABiH 2nd corps report, do you see that?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. They report what, a further 4.000 DP, which is displaced persons,
15 mostly soldiers including some civilians have entered the Tuzla area,
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Okay. This is an UN report. Do you recognise it at all?
19 A. I don't. I didn't -- I don't recall ever seeing it.
20 Q. Do you know the parties who are either sending or receiving this
21 outgoing cable? Do you recognise them, I take it?
22 A. If you flip back to the top, it was Akashi as I recall sending
23 this to UN headquarters in New York.
24 Q. Now, is there any reason we should doubt that, that it was
25 reported to them at the United Nations or to some United Nations personnel
1 that there were 4.000 Muslim men who arrived, most soldiers, some
2 civilians, in the Tuzla area?
3 JUDGE AGIUS: I think he has already confirmed to you that he has
4 no knowledge of that. So how can you expect him to answer this question.
5 MR. OSTOJIC:
6 Q. How is it possible, Mr. Joseph, with all due respect that you
7 didn't notice 4.000 Muslim men on July 19th, 1995?
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
9 MR. THAYER: It's asked and answered, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: He simply didn't -- doesn't know about it. He never
11 knew about it then and he doesn't know about it now.
12 MR. OSTOJIC:
13 Q. Who, sir, was the person in charge from the United Nations
14 standpoint, UNPROFOR or others, to gather this type of information if it
15 wasn't the civil affairs officer, to determine how many men, how many
16 women may have arrived from Srebrenica?
17 A. It would have been -- with respect to military, you would have had
18 mainly UNPROFOR military, but it might well have been the civil affairs
19 officer there, Ken Biser, who was the guy, and I may well have been
20 already deployed to Sarajevo at the time this message occurred. But I
21 would add that I think one can state fairly that UNPROFOR was not
22 omniscient about the situation in Srebrenica.
23 Q. What About other information, and we're talking about the
24 Honourable Judge Prost's question, you may have had at that time. What
25 else would have been available to the UNPROFOR or the civil affairs
1 officer or officers, military, to obtain information of what was happening
2 to those men from Srebrenica on July 19th, 1995?
3 A. Sorry, what other sources?
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. Of what was happening?
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. Presumably, if the -- up to the point that the Dutch were still
8 there, they -- and were observing, presumably, the Dutch, but I'm not
9 privy, I don't know when the Dutch actually pulled out so -- but
10 presumably that would be the source. There was no civil affairs presence,
11 there never was a civil affairs presence in Srebrenica.
12 Q. Are you aware, sir, that from time to time, there were some
13 conversation that were being purportedly being intercepted between various
14 parties? Do you know anything about that?
15 A. I don't and I wasn't privy to it.
16 Q. Do you know, sir if there were ever any aerial images that were
17 being taken of places by various governmental agencies in or around the
18 Srebrenica or Zepa area in July of 1995?
19 A. Later, I understood that the US had gotten -- had taken these
20 images which apparently showed mass graves, et cetera, but I wasn't aware
21 of that at the time.
22 Q. Okay. Now I want to discuss another topic with you, and this is
23 the topic of screening. You mentioned it a couple times. Are you
24 familiar, sir, with the term "triage"?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And is that the process for screening military-aged men, in
3 A. Triage, I'm familiar with the term in the concept of a dealing
4 with the -- a result of a disaster where you triage the people who can be
5 saved, those who are beyond saving, and then those who can be saved you
6 make some --
7 Q. A priority list?
8 A. Priority, right.
9 Q. You never heard that term from a military standpoint, is that what
10 you're telling me?
11 A. That's the context in which I've heard it.
12 Q. So you've never heard it in a military context, correct?
13 A. Not other than the context I've conveyed to you.
14 Q. You stated on page 45 yesterday in lines 21 through 27 that in
15 general terms, if you have a male of military age, you were perceived to
16 be military by the then-governing perceptions of things. Do you remember
17 basically that comment you made?
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. And who had that perception, sir? All the parties?
20 A. I think that that was -- that was just the generalised perception.
21 If you were military age, a male of military age, was sort of -- would be
22 perceived to be military.
23 Q. If you capture a POW or an enemy combatant and you want to screen
24 him or triage him, to set a priority to see if he has more or less
25 information, how would you go about doing that?
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
2 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I think this is far beyond the scope
3 of any direct or cross-examination that's been undertaken so far.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: What do you have to say to that, Mr. Ostojic?
5 MR. OSTOJIC: I know Mr. Joseph actually is a fact witness, but he
6 raised the issue of screening, and I'm just trying to follow if he has any
7 other knowledge about that. And if he simply doesn't, I can move on. I
8 just don't want any comments that he made in connection with screening to
9 be utilised because he wasn't involved necessarily in that process if it
10 involved prisoners of war and enemy combatants. So I could live with that
11 if that's what Mr. Thayer --
12 JUDGE AGIUS: But there is agreement that he was not involved in
13 that process, what's the point of proceeding further with your question?
14 MR. OSTOJIC: I thank you for the agreement, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Don't qualify my statements. I'm just putting it to
16 you, if there is agreement, I don't think it can be disputed that he
17 himself was not involved in the screening process, what's the point of
18 putting the question.
19 MR. OSTOJIC: Just because he mentioned it several times Your
20 Honour in his two and a half days of testimony, but I'll move on if the
21 court wishes again.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
23 MR. OSTOJIC:
24 Q. Sir directing your attention to your involvement directly in Zepa,
25 can you tell us sir the extent of the involvement that the Bosnian Muslim
1 government in Sarajevo had with respect to both the surrender and
2 evacuation of that enclave?
3 A. I think, especially as I see the record, it shows that they were
4 heavily involved.
5 Q. Is it fair to say that the local Bosnian Muslim leadership in
6 Zepa, when I say local, were not willing to fight on and had been trying
7 to negotiate a surrender or an evacuation for several days but couldn't do
8 so because of the pressure that was put to them by the Bosnian Muslims in
10 A. I honestly can't speak to that one way or the other. I'm not
11 trying to suggest that it wasn't the case. I just simply cannot really
12 speak to that. I don't know that I really can shed any light on that.
13 Q. You were there. You don't remember that? You negotiated with
14 Minister Muratovic. You don't remember that at all, Mr. Joseph?
15 A. I was with Muratovic in Sarajevo prior to returning.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Stop, stop.
17 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, the question was asked and answered and
18 now the questions are getting argumentative.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Agreed. One moment.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Move to your next question because in
22 any case, the witness has answered your question.
23 MR. OSTOJIC: I'd like to show the witness to follow up on that
24 question 6D29, if I may.
25 Q. It's a sit report memorandum dated 26th of July 1995. It's the
1 same one we just looked at, Mr. Joseph, moments ago, with respect to
2 Lieutenant Colonel Baxter. If I can kindly ask that the second page be
3 shown again. Now instead of looking at the second paragraph let's read
4 the first paragraph where Mr. Baxter is informing Mr. Harland as what his
5 feelings were based on his assessment of the situation in Zepa, the same
6 situation that you were involved in for several days negotiating with
7 various parties. Do you see what Mr. Baxter feelings were at that time?
8 A. The assessment at the bottom?
9 Q. No, the first paragraph on the top.
10 A. Oh, yes. Right. That's certainly his assessment and his feeling
11 as is reported there.
12 Q. Okay. Well, is it true, sir, that when you first started
13 negotiating with Minister Muratovic that he actually, during your meeting
14 with him in discussing the Zepa crisis, that he said that there should be
15 an arrangement made to allow for a limited evacuation of those people; the
16 Bosnians would like to withdraw? Do you remember that at all? This would
17 have been on or about July 23rd, 1995?
18 A. My memory of that meeting is really limited to what I see in the
19 record, and it sounds certainly plausible to me and could be the case.
20 I'd have to, you know, look back. I don't have a vivid recollection of
21 that meeting, and I'm trying to work with you here.
22 Q. I appreciate that and I'm just going to direct your attention to
23 5D416 because we haven't discussed it, but it's a document that has been
24 used previously. And as it comes up I'm just going to directs your
25 attention to the first paragraph where it identifies yourself and
1 Mr. Harland as being in a meeting with Minister Muratovic and then the
2 three points that the minister asked you or asked -- yeah, you to convey
3 to the Serbs. It's on the second page, please. If you could just scroll
4 down a little bit for Mr. Joseph and us, and I think it's the second --
5 it's in the middle of the paragraph, the second point, I guess, ii, do you
6 see that?
7 A. Right, right.
8 Q. "There should be an arrangement made to allow for a limited
9 evacuation of those people the Bosnians would like to withdraw?"
10 A. Right.
11 Q. Who are those people that they were referencing during that
12 meeting on or about July 23rd, 1995?
13 A. Honest, genuinely I don't know, I honestly don't know. That's all
14 I can tell you.
15 Q. Okay. Maybe I'll try to refresh your recollection. Do you think
16 Minister Muratovic was trying to evacuate certain civilians or was he more
17 concerned in your view, since you met him, that he was trying to evacuate
18 certain military soldiers that he had in the area?
19 A. It might well have been that he was trying to evacuate civilians,
20 it's possible and to leave the military there. It's quite possible that
21 that was what he had on his mind.
22 Q. But you don't remember as you sit here, correct?
23 A. Honestly, I do not.
24 Q. Do you know that five days later on the 28th of July, 1995, the
25 same sit report, same type of sit report, and I don't have the number but
1 it's R0123906 is the cover page, and on that sit report, sir, it's again
2 from David Harland to John Ryan copying various people, on July 28th 1995
3 is the date. The subject is "Negotiations on Zepa ." On that it
4 talks about the various meetings that you may have attended, et cetera, in
5 the second to the last paragraph, I'll read it for the sake -- I could put
6 it on the screen. If the Court allows.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
8 MR. OSTOJIC: On the ELMO, if you would prefer it, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I think it would be more practical at this point in
11 MR. OSTOJIC: I apologise.
12 Q. My learned friend I'm just going to direct him to that last page
13 and the Court, but if the Court would like to look at the front first
14 pages to show that the date is actually the 28th, I'd be happy to show it,
15 or if Mr. Joseph would like to see it he's welcome to do so?
16 A. What are we looking at.
17 Q. If would you like to look at the front page to see the date?
18 A. Sure, sure.
19 Q. If we can just scroll down, there we go, we're perfect there. I
20 have it a little highlighted there, and I look at the second to the last
21 paragraph which starts, "At about 12 noon." Do you see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You can read it to yourself and we can all read it. At that
24 point, sir, July 28th, the civilians were evacuated, correct?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. And it seems at least at that point that with the involvement of
2 the civil affairs office, yourself and Mr. Harland, that the minister was
3 still holding out for a surrender. Was he not?
4 A. You really have to talk to David Harland about this. Because he
5 was in Sarajevo all through these memoranda, and he was dealing with
6 this. And we were getting just dribs and drabs in Zepa, and I had only
7 that one meeting with Muratovic prior to going back. So we were there
8 dealing with Tolimir and company and Palic, et cetera, and --
9 Q. And that's fair sir, and thank you for that, and we will try to
10 get to Mr. Harland to explain some of this for us. Now, am I correct if I
11 wanted to summarise kind of your involvement, at least in Zepa with all
12 due respect, that the evacuation lasted probably three days or a little
13 over? Would that be right?
14 A. I don't know really whether it was two or three days. I don't --
15 we would have to refer to these memoranda to determine. It might have
16 been two days.
17 Q. And the atmosphere was very tense during the whole time, correct?
18 A. The atmosphere was very stressful, very stressful. That I can
19 tell you. And as I explained, there was spontaneous semi-riot that
20 ensued. There were other examples of nerves being on edge and tension.
21 Q. And you, your team, managed to get all those people who had come
22 to the centre and were willing to go boarding the vehicles, correct?
23 A. That is correct. Those who came were there. We boarded, and got
24 them out. Whether they made it to their destination or not, I don't know.
25 Q. But I'm using the word specifically, sir, "willing to go." You
1 agree with me on that, do you not?
2 A. As I tried to say, most respectfully, the question of volition to
3 me was rather overtaken by the military situation there, and one -- you'd
4 have to have an argument and a discussion and debate, and I'm not sure the
5 Court would want, about the meaning of "willing" is. If someone feels
6 that if they stay at their home, they will be killed. Is that -- and then
7 you come in and say, "get on the buses," is that willing or is that not
8 willing. I mean, don't know if we need to take the time to debate that.
9 [Speakers overlapping]
10 JUDGE AGIUS: I think this issue was thoroughly dealt with,
11 particularly during the cross-examination of Madam Fauveau. So I suggest
12 that if there is anything extra or different that you would like to ask
13 the witness, please by all means do so by all means, but otherwise don't
14 put questions which more or less or not more or less, which the witness
15 has already clearly given his position on.
16 MR. OSTOJIC: Mr. President I was just leading up to my point
18 JUDGE AGIUS: [Speakers overlapping]
19 MR. OSTOJIC: -- on the same page, but it's actually I wanted to
20 ask him a couple of other follow-up questions.
21 Q. Sir, in preparation for your testimony, if I may -- in preparation
22 for your testimony, were you able to review your witness statement and
23 information report?
24 A. Yes, if it's the one I think you're referring to, I had that
25 opportunity, yes.
1 Q. There were two reports, one a witness statement which you gave on
2 the 11th of April 2003 to the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, correct?
3 A. That would be correct. I don't have that in front of me but --
4 and I don't have a photographic memory so -- but, yes, I had an
5 opportunity to review these statements, yes, sir, that's correct.
6 Q. And the information report was done, as you even earlier said,
7 telephonically by an attorney, trial attorney, Salvador Viada, and an
8 investigator, Olli Salo, on or about -- sorry, February 9th, 2005?
9 A. One report was done telephone, another report was done in person
10 and another -- the one -- with Olli Salo, I believe, that was the one by
12 Q. And that's the one we looked. Can we have 4D111 up on the screen
13 please, again?
14 MR. OSTOJIC:
15 Q. If I can have the third page of that document? Which bears the
16 last three ERN numbers 305 on it.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Again, your attention is being drawn by the
18 interpreters that they are finding difficulties in catching up with both
19 of you.
20 MR. OSTOJIC: I do sincerely apologise. I'm trying to go slow and
21 try to keep within the time limits given that the break is approaching but
22 I do apologise, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE KWON: This is not the first time, Mr. Ostojic. It's not
24 the tone of your speech.
25 MR. OSTOJIC: I understand fully.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: As I was told when I was a little boy that the way
2 to have -- the way to heaven is covered with good intentions. So let's
3 try to make the interpreters' life a little bit less difficult. It
4 already is, Mr. Ostojic, believe me.
5 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. Sir, I'm directing your attention to the interview that you gave
7 telephonically to the Office of the Prosecutor, specifically paragraph 17
8 of that interview. Do you see that, where you, sir, discuss with them how
9 long the evacuation lasted?
10 A. Yes, I do sow that.
11 Q. Basically all I did was read that?
12 JUDGE AGIUS: It applies to you as well, Mr. Joseph.
13 THE WITNESS: My apologies.
14 MR. OSTOJIC: May I proceed, Your Honour?
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
16 MR. OSTOJIC:
17 Q. Mr. Joseph I'm almost done, and I apologise if I've interrupted
18 you. I'm directing your attention to paragraph 17 of this Exhibit 4 D111.
19 And there, apparently the investigator, the trial attorney and the
20 investigator who interviewed you telephonically, they wrote down or
21 recorded, as they say on the first page, what your comments were as you
22 remembered them in 2005, and you clearly used the word "willing," correct?
23 A. That is correct. You can see the word "willing" on that report.
24 And may well have used it.
25 Q. And no where, at least in this paragraph or this report, did you
1 discuss the issue of duress or fear of the civilians that you were
2 evacuating; is that correct?
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer.
4 MR. THAYER: Your Honour with that question I would request that
5 the witness be provided an opportunity to review the rest of the report.
6 I think that would be only fair before he answers that question.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ostojic?
8 MR. OSTOJIC: Mr. President, this witness has already stated that
9 he's reviewed the report in preparation for his testimony earlier this
10 week and possibly before. But it's not a question of finding it. It's
11 clearly not in that paragraph. I don't know what the objection is other
12 than that it might be to coach the witness into not answering the
13 question, but I find it inappropriate unless there is a legal basis to
14 make an objection to a question. The witness is sophisticated enough, as
15 we've seen, and intelligent enough, as we've seen, that he doesn't need
16 Mr. Thayer to tell him that he might need the report in order to quantify
17 or qualify his answer.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: My experience tells me that this debate should not
19 be continued in the presence of the witness if it is to be continued in
20 the first place. Yes, Mr. Thayer.
21 MR. THAYER: Your Honour --
22 JUDGE AGIUS: If the witness wishes to -- have the opportunity to
23 look at the document, then of course he's -- he is old enough and
24 experienced enough to ask, and such -- and then we'll decide, but I don't
25 think at this point we should discuss this any further. Mr. Joseph?
1 MR. OSTOJIC:
2 Q. Would you like me to restate the question, Your Honour?
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please.
4 MR. OSTOJIC: Maybe I'll try to avoid so that it doesn't draw
5 another helpful objection.
6 Q. Mr. Joseph, do you remember whether you talked to the investigator
7 and the trial attorney in 2005, that you told them anything about this
8 fear and duress that you spoke about in your testimony here in open court
9 regarding the civilians in Zepa in July of 1995?
10 A. Sitting here today, I can't recall without looking at the whole
11 report there what all I said about duress. I can tell you that even the
12 very paragraph that you are referring to states that the atmosphere was
13 very tense. If you would like me to elaborate as to the source of that
14 tension, I'm happy to do so. It is from the fact that the Serbs had taken
15 the pocket. That was the source of the tension, the very tension that is
16 mentioned in this paragraph, and there may be other references elsewhere
17 in the document there. I genuinely believe that I've addressed this
18 trying honestly to work with you in my testimony and nothing will convince
19 me that there was not great, great fear on the part of those departing,
20 nothing will convince me of that.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't want to interrupt you much, Mr. Ostojic, but
22 I don't know if you wish really to proceed with this line of questions,
23 especially considering what is contained in the last sentence of the next
24 paragraph in the same document. "However, the civilian in Zepa seem to
25 have some information of the events in Srebrenica. And this was a factor
1 which made them be even more concerned of their safety."
2 Yes, Mr. Thayer?
3 MR. THAYER: And with all due respect to my learned friend, Your
4 Honour, he referred specifically to the report. We can look right at this
5 page, as Your Honour has done, and look at paragraph 13. We can just
6 settle the issue right now, right here, while the document is in e-court
7 and avoid wasting further time on redirect examination.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't know if you wish to pursue this line of
9 questions, but I think the perspective of the use of the word "willing to
10 go," words "willing to go" in this section, if you isolate them from the
11 rest of the context of the same document and of his testimony, where does
12 it get you?
13 MR. OSTOJIC: Your Honour I'm not debating with the witness. I
14 just wanted him to clarify that those were his words that he used in his
15 statement, and I think I'm beyond that.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: He's confirmed that.
17 MR. OSTOJIC: Whatever the Court wishes, I will do.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: He has confirmed that.
19 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.
20 Q. Sir, I'd like to just -- another topic just quickly and that's on
21 the involvement of the Bosnian military in the attack that they may have
22 had on the UNPROFOR units in Zepa. Were you familiar before your
23 assignment the extent of their threats or actual attack on those various
24 observation posts or buildings?
25 A. As I believe I testified, we were aware that there were these
1 allegations. I may have even been aware of some of the reports about
2 this. I don't know that I had confirmation of any of this. And I don't
3 recall, and I'm stressing recollection here, I don't recall that aspect
4 being impressed upon me by the Ukrainians when we arrived. I concede that
5 events that I was not witness to might have transpired. I simply can't
6 testify to them.
7 Q. I'm talking about only the events that and the facts that you
8 know, so you didn't know that the UNPROFOR observation posts were overrun
9 on July 19th, 1995, for example?
10 A. Overrun by whom?
11 Q. The Bosnian government forces.
12 A. No.
13 Q. Did you know, sir, that the UNPROFOR observation posts were
14 disarmed, a number of them, in fact, by the Bosnian government forces?
15 A. No. As I've tried to testify, what we observed with my own eyes,
16 which is most -- hopefully most relevant to this Court, these proceedings,
17 is that I saw when I came, I believe it was the 20th, that the
18 Observation Post 2 had been overrun by the Serb army. That's the part
19 that I can testify to. I simply can't testify to the other part, and this
20 witness is not stating that it did or didn't happen. This witness simply
21 can't testify to it.
22 Q. Let me show you this exhibit again with the Court's assistance
23 because it doesn't have an exhibit number, but it's a situation report
24 dated the 19th of July 1995, and I promise you it's the last exhibit, and
25 with ERN or bait stamp number R 0123425, it's a memorandum from Mr. David
1 Harland to John Ryan with I believe Mr. Edward Joseph's name, I believe
2 right under Mr. Harland's. Sir I'm directing your attention while you're
3 looking at that to the very last paragraph of that first page where I was
4 actually reading from?
5 JUDGE AGIUS: What page?
6 MR. OSTOJIC: Page 1.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Usher, page 1.
8 THE WITNESS: Right. I think I stated that we were aware of these
9 threats and allegations, and I believe I stated yesterday that or the day
10 before, I've lost track now, of -- that Silajdzic had denied it and I make
11 no judgement as to Silajdzic veracity or whether or not he was telling the
12 truth. I make no judgement whatsoever. So I don't know what more -- how
13 I can say to you about this. Yes, we were aware of these allegations.
14 Whether in fact what happened, whether these observation posts were in
15 fact overrun, whether there had been heavy machine-gun fire that had been
16 mentioned in another, I don't -- I was not witness to any of that. I
17 don't recall the Ukrainians talking to us about any of that. I also don't
18 recall any hostility showed by the Ukrainians towards Palic in the entire
19 time that I was there and that he was in the compound and had he been
20 directing heavy machine-gun fire at them, and had one might have expected
21 that. I'm -- that is something I can tell you I didn't observe and I was
22 in a position to observe that, and I observed no apparent hostility
23 manifested towards Palic from the Ukrainians. Whether that's conclusive
24 or not, I don't know. I can only tell you what I observed.
25 MR. OSTOJIC:
1 Q. With all due respect, Mr. Joseph, I'm not asking you about the
2 incidents which you just described which was after your return to Zepa
3 during the negotiations of both the surrender and the evacuation. I'm
4 asking you on the first day that you got there, on the 19th of July 1995,
5 or the 20th, as you sometimes thought that it was, on those early days, we
6 are not talking about Silajdzic now and those negotiations where threats
7 were allegedly made. We are talking about your document from -- with your
8 name on it, with the senior civil affairs officer's name on it, describing
9 exactly what happened. Nowhere in that third paragraph does it, sir, say,
10 "someone has alleged that they've overrun the observation posts." Do
12 A. I'm sorry, I've lost the thread of your question. I'm sorry, sir.
13 Q. You're mixing the issues that we've discussed yesterday and today
14 with you with respect to Silajdzic. This has nothing no do with the
15 threat that may or may not have been made on or about July 23 or 25, 1995.
16 This is actually a report, your initial report, setting forth precisely
17 that which you and your senior civil affairs officers understood the
18 situation to be in Zepa on the 19th of July 1995. Correct?
19 A. Correct. I think I've already stated so, that, yes, this reflects
20 that we understood there were these threats, yes, correct. Their full
21 extent, I can't attest to simply because I'm not in -- I thought that was
22 the reason for this further questioning. I'm sorry, I thought you were
23 trying to get me to provide, shed some more light or something on this.
24 That would --
25 Q. I'd like you to shed more light, but how many observation posts
1 did the Bosnian government forces overrun? Do you remember?
2 A. I don't know that they overran any or all. I don't know. I'll
3 say that again. I don't know that they overran any or that they overran
4 all of them.
5 Q. And you don't know how many they disarmed, if any, correct?
6 A. I don't know that they disarmed any or that they disarmed all.
7 Q. And who would know that? Mr. Harland, do you think?
8 A. Mr. Harland might know that. Someone in the military chain would
9 better know that, and I would best direct you, if I can say so
10 respectfully, if you're having General Smith, I can think of no better
11 source than General Smith, or perhaps one of the Ukrainian officers who
12 were present on the scene.
13 Q. And one final question, sir. Where would the civil affairs
14 officers obtain such information? Would that have been from General
16 A. It could have -- waiting. It could have been anywhere in the
17 military chain. It didn't necessarily have to be General Smith. It could
18 have been from some operations officer, it could have been anywhere in the
20 Q. Thank you very much. Mr. Joseph. It was my pleasure.
21 A. You're welcome. Thank you, sir.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Ostojic. Mr. Zivanovic, but I
23 think it's time for the break.
24 You still require 20 minutes?
25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So we'll have a 25-minute break now, and
2 I think you need to regulate yourselves. We'll have 20 minutes for sure
3 after the break, plus if there is going to be re-examination, you would
4 know how long that's going to take. I still have to inquire whether we
5 have questions from here but I doubt it. So make your own assessment,
7 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 1.06 p.m.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?
10 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I just wanted to advise the Court that
11 Mr. McCloskey had to attend to an urgent case-related matter. If he
12 resolves it, he will rejoin us but he had to tear himself away from the
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. And will you be raising the issue
15 that we were informed that you would like to raise a matter, and we told
16 you let's leave it until after -- you will do that.
17 MR. THAYER: Two very brief matters, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Mr. Zivanovic.
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Zivanovic:
20 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Joseph.
21 A. Good afternoon.
22 Q. I'm going to focus all of my questions on the time that you spent
23 at the air base in Tuzla. This was sometime in mid-July 1995. The day
24 before yesterday, on direct, you mentioned a female who was clutching on
25 to the barbed wire fence, and you also told us that you had spoken to her.
1 Do you remember that?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. She told you that she was expecting the arrival of men from
4 Srebrenica, that she had heard that they were around there, and that she
5 was hoping to maybe find her husband or her son among them?
6 A. She had heard a rumour that the men were encamped there on
7 adjacent -- on an adjacent part of the Tuzla air base, which was not true
8 of course.
9 Q. Does this mean that at the time the men from Srebrenica had not
10 arrived there at all?
11 A. Not at the air base. That is for sure.
12 Q. Could you please tell me whether you asked her if she was so eager
13 to see that, why she didn't leave through a gate, why she didn't leave by
14 a normal way to check whether the relatives that she was looking for had
15 indeed arrived?
16 A. Number 1, we were aware of no men. I certainly was not aware of
17 any men who had arrived there, number 1. So I was not aware to suggest
18 any other access point for her to theoretically be relocated with her
19 loved ones, so that's -- that's why I would not have had any useful
20 suggestion for her -- for her.
21 Q. I did not mean that you were to give her any suggestions as to
22 what to do, but why didn't you ask her why she was climbing on to the
23 wire -- barbed wire fence, why she didn't opt to leave through the gate?
24 A. She had heard -- as far as I can remember, she was at one point in
25 the camp where she had heard the men are just on this other side, and
1 there was no gate at that point. There was this barbed wire fence, as far
2 as I can recall, and she was standing there attempting tentatively to try
3 to scale and then step back and scale, and to do her best to try to get
4 over it when I approached her and then that conversation took place, as I
6 Q. Do you remember whether, in front of the base, at the time, there
7 were any displaced persons hanging around, not in the base, within the
8 perimeter, but outside the perimeter of the base?
9 A. No, I don't recall that. We were flooded with displaced persons.
10 I think this memorandum, the -- one of them, I think the one from Akashi
11 used the figure of 25.000. So we had 25.000 displaced persons coming to
12 this location within two days. Is it possible that some of them were
13 placed outside the gate? I suppose it's possible. And I know we were
14 overwhelmed, so indeed it's quite possible that some were outside the
15 gate. I don't recall any male displaced persons at that time. I only
16 recall female displaced persons, aside from perhaps some children.
17 Q. I'm going to show you an exhibit, which is 1D373. Could you
18 please look at the document, because I am going to put some questions to
19 you based on that document.
20 Kindly look at the document, the date is 14th July 1995. Could
21 you please look at the item 1(D) of this document?
22 A. Sir, I'm looking at it.
23 Q. Could you please tell me whether it is indicated here that on that
24 date, in front of the base, there were 9.000 people, some of whom tried to
25 break into the base but the base could not accommodate them. And if they
1 entered the base on their own, they might stray across minefields on the
3 A. Are you asking me to confirm that this is what this documents
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. We can all read it. That's what it says.
7 Q. Thank you. I am asking you whether this might have been the
8 reason for which this woman could not leave the base via a gate, but,
9 rather, opted to climb over the fence.
10 A. All I can tell you is how I remember the events, sir. All I can
11 tell you is how I remember the event. Whether there was a connection --
12 I'm in fact glad that you put this here because it shows just how bad I
13 used the term overwhelmed and that's reflected here in the document, and
14 that's where our attentions were, and I'm telling you this is how I
15 remember this event. I remember it distinctly, and whether it was because
16 these people were grouped outside or for some other reason she for some
17 reason had heard that the men were there, that's how I recall the event.
18 Q. Thank you. During your tour of duty in Tuzla, which lasted for
19 about a week, did you learn about the arrival of the men from Srebrenica?
20 Did you receive any such information?
21 A. Now I tell you I really don't recall hearing about that. Is it
22 possible that there was some mention of some -- I -- my best recollection
23 is I -- I don't remember. I remember that being a question mark. I
24 remember that being a question mark. If that doesn't accord with what
25 actually happened, I can't say, I'm only giving you my recollection that
1 that was the fate of the men was a question mark. That was as I recall
3 Q. Did you collect any data about that from others?
4 A. About the fate of the men or?
5 Q. About the people arriving from Srebrenica, how many arrived from
6 Srebrenica, whether they indeed arrived, when if they did, had anybody
7 been killed on the way there, what their fate was, or similar information?
8 A. That would have been natural, very natural, for UNPROFOR and the
9 UNHCR, to collect all of that data, and it's possible I was even privy to
10 some of it. I'm telling you here, August, 2007, I don't recall terribly
11 much about that, and there -- perhaps we were made aware of maybe some who
12 had arrived or something like that but in my -- my general recollection is
13 that the fate of the men, at least the vast majority, was a giant question
14 mark. That's my recollection today.
15 Q. Could you also tell me, please, whether displaced persons who
16 arrived in Tuzla, were ever registered? Do you remember that?
17 A. That would have been the role of UNHCR. That would have been
18 exactly their mandate. And that was not our mandate but that was their
19 role, and I presumably these people were registered. I would presume that
20 they would do that. We were -- we were there at the air base dealing with
21 this situation that Akashi is saying is bad and rapidly growing worse.
22 That was our primary focus, and working with everyone, throwing ourselves
23 into it, to try to best address that immediate situation. That was our --
24 that was our focus.
25 Q. Did you come by the information that a certain number of people
1 who were not accommodated at the air base were accommodated at the
2 so-called collection centres? Did you come by that information? And did
3 you ever learn the number of the people who might have been accommodated
4 in that way?
5 A. Not that I recall now. I don't remember that. It's possible --
6 let's -- it's possible that UNHCR was taking some of the people to
7 collective centres. We were dealing with this displaced persons influx
8 crisis at the air base, so I was not aware of this other information. I'm
9 sure UNHCR has good records on that.
10 Q. I'm going to ask you to look at another report. This is 1D374.
11 The date is July the 17th, as you may well see. If I'm not mistaken, your
12 name can be found here as the drafter of the document. Could you please
13 explain whether this means that you were the one who drafted or prepared
14 this report?
15 A. [Interpretation] As they say it in French, "bien joue." [In
16 English] Yes, indeed it appears that I was the drafter of this.
17 Q. Could you please try and tell us whether on that same page, under
18 the title, "Main points," if you look at the first sentence, the first
19 bullet point?
20 JUDGE KWON: If -- Mr. Joseph, if you could put it on the ELMO.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please.
22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I have a second copy to put.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes, I know that --
24 JUDGE KWON: It's very strange. Your number is not correct.
25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: My number is correct but it is not in the e-court.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Any way, let's speed this up. It's on the ELMO now.
2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. The first sentence reads, "Men who fled Srebrenica arrive in Tuzla
4 area after week-long ordeal." This is the information that you had at the
5 time. Can you now turn to page 2 of the same report? Does it say here
6 that interviews were carried out with a certain number of persons who had
7 all described the events that they had been through in a similar way, and
8 does it say in the report that some 12.000 to 15.000 of them left
9 Srebrenica between the 10th and 11th of July, that some 5.000 or 6.000 of
10 them crossed over to the territory under the control of the 2nd Corps
11 south of Sapna, and that this happened the night before, and that some
12 3.000 or up to 3.000 people had been killed on the road mostly by land
13 mines and in fighting the Republika Srpska army troops, that an unknown
14 number were captured, that some committed suicide, and that an unknown
15 number of them left for Zepa? Is this the information that you were privy
16 to at the time, the information that you had been given?
17 A. If I drafted that, yes, I would have been privy to that.
18 Q. Thank you. And one more thing. Could you please look at the
19 following page? The subtitle reads, "Collective centres." It says here
20 that there are approximately 17.000 persons housed in collective centres,
21 among eight different communities in the Tuzla-Drina canton. The exact
22 number of people are given as a breakdown of these collective centres.
23 Can you tell me whether this is the information that you had at the time,
24 that you had been given by the authorised personnel who made the lists of
25 those displaced persons?
1 A. Presumably, yes. It doesn't say the source, but I'm sure we had a
2 qualified source and that's why I put it in the memo that apparently I
4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] That is all. Thank you very much.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, Mr. Zivanovic. Is there
6 re-examination, Mr. Thayer?
7 MR. THAYER: There is, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead. How long will it take?
9 MR. THAYER: I will do my very best. I understand the path to
10 heaven is paved with good intentions, but I will do my very best to
11 complete the redirect in time today. I have cut my examination in half.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: I wouldn't like to see Mr. Joseph stay here the
14 MR. THAYER: Nor would I, Mr. President. With Madam Usher's
15 assistance, if we could just put up one document very quickly. And in
16 fact we will have to put up a couple of documents so -- this is -- we've
17 seen this page already. It is the third page of the witness's information
18 report from 2005. 4D111.
19 Re-examination by Mr. Thayer:
20 Q. You were asked where in paragraph 17 of this report did you
21 discuss the issues of duress or fear of the civilians that you were
22 evacuating. I just want to give you an opportunity to look at that page
23 of the report. I turn your attention first to paragraph 11. "Next
24 morning I saw big number of local women, children and some very old men
25 sitting and waiting in the town square. This is a vivid memory for me, as
1 I remember these people being very much afraid and tense, it very much
2 reminded me of the situations with the evacuees from Srebrenica," is that
3 accurate, sir?
4 A. Yes, it is.
5 Q. Paragraph 13, "I knew we could not happy any parties with their
6 ethnic cleansing and therefore I approached the civilians and asked if
7 they wanted to leave Zepa. Several of them replied that they would like
8 to stay where their homes are and but there was no one to protect them and
9 therefore they feel their lives being threatened. I could sense the
10 atmosphere being very nervous, especially when they saw a VRS jeep parking
11 nearby and some VRS soldiers stepping out, the clear message these
12 civilians gave to was that they were terrified if they were left alone
13 with the VRS;" is that correct, sir? Is that what you told the
14 investigators over the phone?
15 A. Yes, particularly the last part I think some licence might have
16 been taken with the English and the phrasing, especially in the first
17 sentence there, but that -- the gist is absolutely correct, and I think
18 I've so testified.
19 Q. Now, sir, I want to turn your attention to the draft
20 militarisation agreement, and again I'm afraid we are going to need -- it
21 will I think just be faster if we put it up on the ELMO. Just page 1.
22 You've been shown this by several of my friends. I just note that if you
23 turn your attention to the first two paragraphs, the -- where it says, "if
24 you can see it, Bosnian Serb forces continue to bombard the safe area of
25 Zepa and its civilian population with heavy weapons and continue to make
1 armed incursions into the safe area." Do you see that, sir?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Second paragraph, "Bosnian Serb forces have also subjected
4 UNPROFOR troops to attacks with small arms and heavy weapons. They have
5 further threatened to intensify these attacks, especially against the
6 peacekeepers in an observation post which is surrounded by Serb mines if
7 NATO launches air attacks." Now, you are the author of this draft
8 agreement; is that correct?
9 A. Co-author, that is correct.
10 Q. Do you recall the source or sources of this information?
11 A. It would have been the same with respect to allegations about what
12 the army was doing. It would have been from UNPROFOR military, probably,
13 that's where we would have gotten the information.
14 Q. Sit-reps or civ-reps?
15 A. In conversations with operations officers and UNPROFOR military.
16 Q. Okay. I'd like to show you another document. And for the record,
17 it is 03279250 through 9252. This has been previously disclosed to the
18 Defence. If we could Madam Usher just turn to the second page first?
19 This is a memo dated 15 July, it's a Sector Sarajevo weekly situation
20 report. The heading is, "Serb assault on Zepa begins, UNPROFOR forces
21 under attack by the Serbs are powerless." You see that, sir?
22 A. Yes, I do.
23 Q. Do you see the second paragraph where it says "the Ukrainians
24 remained in position and shortly after 1500 the Serbs began to bombard
25 them and the Bosnian forces around the perimeter of the enclave?"
1 A. Yes, I see that.
2 Q. Okay. Now, if we could turn to the next page, do you see the top
3 where it says, UNPROFOR's position in the pocket has also been difficult.
4 The 79 Ukrainians in the pocket have been under Serb bombardment since 27
5 June with the tempo increasing this week? Early in the week, the Serbs
6 tried to force the Ukrainians out of OP 9 at the southern end of the
7 pocket. Later in the week OPs 1, 2 and 3 at the south western end of the
8 pocket were also attacked. You see that?
9 A. Yes, yes, sir.
10 Q. And the next paragraph, "The attacks came after an ultimatum from
11 the Serbs delivered on 30 June that UNPROFOR should withdraw from the
12 pocket immediately."
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, but before you answer that question,
14 Madam Fauveau?
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I know that the
16 Prosecutor is in a hurry, but I really do not see the point of reading out
17 this document. Could the witness say whether he remembers anything of the
18 events of the last days in Zepa? I -- the date of 27 June has been
19 mentioned here and the 15th of July too. Does -- is the witness in any
20 way involved and does he have any knowledge of the documents mentioned?
21 MR. THAYER: Mr. President I have one question that I'm about to
22 put to the witness that I hope will wrap all that up.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Let's hear it, then.
24 MR. THAYER:
25 Q. Do you recall receiving any of this information at or about the
1 time this report was written, sir? Do you recall?
2 A. At this point, I can't recall that. That is a factor of memory
3 after 12 years. I simply don't recall it and have the same caution that I
4 mentioned with respect to memory of events concerning allegations about
5 the Armija. I just don't have the recollection now.
6 Q. Okay. I want to show you another document?
7 JUDGE KWON: If you could give us the 65 ter numbers, if you refer
8 to documents, for record.
9 MR. THAYER: Yes. And Judge Kwon, these particular reports do not
10 have 65 ter numbers. These are documents that we are just using in
11 response to some issues that have been raised on cross-examination. But
12 they've all been disclosed long, long ago, in some cases referred to in
13 particular in the witness statements or in the information reports or in
14 the proofing notes.
15 Q. Sir, I'm showing you a document which has been marked ET -- I'm
16 sorry, 04258574. It is a one-page or English translation is a two-page
17 translation of a combat report. If we go to the second page, it's signed
18 by Rajko Kusic. Is that the same Kusic, sir, that you recall meeting?
19 A. Rajko Kusic, that's correct.
20 Q. And it's dated 15 July at 1 in the morning. I just want to turn
21 your attention back to the first page, sir. Under the heading UNPROFOR,
22 where it says "Check-point number 2 Boksanica, where the UNPROFOR
23 commander has been located, has been put under the control of our forces.
24 An agreement was reached with him not to attack with the condition that
25 they should not open fire on our battle formation which he accepted with
1 the request to leave his positions where they are, and he would in return
2 provide information on enemy activity and would not call in NATO air
4 Now first of all, sir, that first sentence referring to OP 2
5 being under Serb control, is that consistent with your observations on the
6 ground at the time that you were there?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. Second, with respect to the information of the Ukrainian commander
9 agreeing to provide information of enemy activity and not to call in NATO
10 air force, have you ever received that information before, sir?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Does that information surprise you, sir?
13 A. We -- I take judgement from the Honourable Judges here. This
14 would -- do you want me to share my impressions, definitive knowledge?
15 What is appropriate for this witness to share with the Court?
16 JUDGE AGIUS: The question is a simple one.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we can move on, Mr. Thayer.
19 MR. THAYER:
20 Q. Do you recall the video clip Mr. Josse showed you yesterday with
21 an ICRC jeep and what appeared to be French APCs? I think that you
22 identified that that location looked to you like it was OP 2. Do you
23 remember that?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. And my friend, I think tentatively assumed that the date was 27
1 July. My question to you is would vehicles waiting to enter into the town
2 of Zepa have to pass through OP 2 first?
3 A. That was -- my understanding was that that was the entry point
4 through to the -- I don't believe that there was another access point.
5 Q. So is it possible that this footage was taken on the 26th or even
6 on the 25th?
7 A. Right. I couldn't be certain as to the date that that footage was
8 taken and that those vehicles were there.
9 Q. And sir you were also shown a document in which Colonel Baxter
10 said that many houses were burning, apparently torched by departing
11 Bosnians, and were you asked about whether you were aware of that as being
12 a policy. You answered that you were not. And that you did not see that.
13 Did you ever see or hear of Bosniaks torching their own homes as they --
14 as they fled their territory?
15 JUDGE AGIUS: At which time frame are you referring the witness
17 MR. THAYER: Mr. President in his time in Bosnia.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: In his time in Bosnia, okay.
19 THE WITNESS: Throughout the time that I was in Bosnia?
20 MR. THAYER:
21 Q. Yes. Did you receive reports of Bosniaks torching their own
23 A. Let me say, if I can, answer this way, in Zepa, I did not observe
24 any Bosniaks torching their own homes. With respect to other locations,
25 I'm not sure. It was not -- here I'm giving a wider view as based on my
1 experience in there. It was not typically the modus operandi for Bosniaks
2 being forcibly expelled to burn their homes. That was not typically their
3 MO. I can't be categorical and say that it never happened. I would not
4 want to be categorical and say it did not happen but that was not the
5 typical MO. There were other examples I can share with the Court of folks
6 who left and burned their homes behind, but it was not a typical Bosniak
7 or Muslim MO that I was aware. But I cannot be categorical and say that
8 it never happened either.
9 Q. Now, finally, sir, your proposed demilitarisation agreement refers
10 to the bombardment of the civilian population. You yourself saw the --
11 what you had described in the report as being a bombardment starting on
12 the 20th. You were asked some questions by my friend, Madam Fauveau,
13 about reducing the fear of the population. Do you think not bombarding
14 the civilian population of Zepa might have helped reduce the fear that you
16 A. Undoubtedly.
17 MR. THAYER: Thank you, sir. I have no further questions.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Thayer? Judge Kwon? Yes, Madam
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I must ask you to
21 allow me to put a very brief question and that would be the direction to
22 the last question asked by my learned friend. The question is: At the
23 moment of evacuation, which was between the 25th and the 27th of July, was
24 there any shelling?
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Can you answer that question, Mr. Joseph,
2 THE WITNESS: Was there any shelling? Doesn't show the transcript
3 here, was -- was there any shelling between?
4 JUDGE AGIUS: 25th and 27th of July.
5 THE WITNESS: When we were there? There was no shelling that on
6 us during that evacuation. I do not recall any shelling. There may have
7 been firing but not any shelling in the town or during that evacuation
8 that I can recall.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. So we don't have any further questions
10 for you, Mr. Joseph. On behalf of my colleagues and the Tribunal, I
11 should like to thank you for having --
12 THE WITNESS: Sorry just one thing for give me it just occurred to
13 me during the break that earlier Mr. Josse's last question I only had an
14 answer in Serbian, and I just would like to say for the record that I do
15 not consider myself self-deceited or however else you want to phrase it.
16 I just wanted to put that in the record. The answer to his question is
17 no. Thank you.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you for having come over to give evidence and
19 on behalf of everyone I wish you a safe journey back home.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Now, either Mr. McCloskey or Mr. Thayer.
21 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, two brief items are we have had
22 discussions among the Defence, and we have agreed pursuant to the request
23 of one of the teams to switch the order of two witnesses next week. So
24 Witness 132 will precede witness 139. I'll send out my usual schedule in
25 e-mail this afternoon to confirm, but I wanted to put everybody on notice
1 if everybody wasn't.
2 The second is in connection with our previous request to take
3 the week of the 1st through the 5th of October off, we would kindly ask
4 the Court, this is after consultation with our friends, who are unanimous
5 in joining this request, that we also take the following Monday off, the
6 8th of October. We have Dean Manning arriving from Australia. We will be
7 on the tail end of another witness who will have been giving extensive
8 testimony and who may not be finished by then. We believe that we will be
9 able to save time if we have that extra day of preparation, it will
10 ultimately result in a more efficient, and we hopeless time consuming,
11 presentation of the evidence if we have that day off.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll discuss that. We've started discussing, and
13 we just want to make sure that if we grant this break, it's because we too
14 believe that you really need it. So we'll come back with our position
15 sometime next week. Thank you. Have a nice weekend, everybody.
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
17 to be reconvened on Monday, the 27th day of August,
18 2007, at 9.00 a.m.