071128ED

Page 18355

1 1995. Are you familiar with that?

2 A. M'hm.

3 Q. Is that a yes?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Just for our transcript we need to have your verbal response?

6 A. All right.

7 Q. But thank you very much. And when did that Bosnian Muslim

8 offensive in the spring or summer of 1995 commence?

9 A. As I recall, when I landed in Sarajevo, on May 15th, 1995, it had

10 started a day or two earlier.

11 Q. And can you share with us the nature and extent of that Bosnian

12 Muslim offensive?

13 A. They were trying to break out of the strangle around Sarajevo.

14 Q. Was it limited to Sarajevo only?

15 A. As far as I recall, when it started, at that time, yes.

16 Q. Okay. Let me show you P2970, if you don't mind. And do you

17 remember, sir, page 3, when you get a chance, I'll put the question to the

18 witness. Do you remember that there was a significant increase in --

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?

20 MR. THAYER: I'm sorry, I don't know what this document is off the

21 top of my head and it's not on any list.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ostojic?

23 MR. OSTOJIC: I have, Your Honour, 65 ter number P2970 as being on

24 the list of documents provided by the Office of the Prosecution for this

25 particular witness. So I can't imagine that they don't know what the

Page 18356

1 document is. It's on their list. I can put this on the ELMO if the Court

2 needs assistance. And it doesn't have a P number, but it says 65 ter 2970

3 and it has the ERN number, it's rather long, R 0 --

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

5 MR. OSTOJIC: R 002-4213 through R 002-4218 in the English

6 version. I can recite the B/C/S.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: But you can't expect the Prosecution to divine what

8 documents you're using unless you announce beforehand what documents you

9 will be using.

10 MR. OSTOJIC: These are their documents that they provided that

11 they were going to use with this witness.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: But do you expect Mr. Thayer or anyone for that

13 matter to know the thousands of documents that have a 65 ter number by

14 heart and be able to distinguish them by number as soon as they appear on

15 the screen? This is the whole point that has been made.

16 MR. OSTOJIC: I see the point. It's actually eight documents that

17 they identify with this witness. I thought that they would have --

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Let's move. Let's move now.

19 MR. OSTOJIC: May I inquire of this document, Mr. President?

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Of course you can.

21 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.

22 Q. Sir, this is a weekly situation report that's dated the 2nd of

23 July 1995 from David Harland, a similar type weekly situation report that

24 you discussed during your direct examination, and I direct your

25 attention - or at least for my next question - on page 3 which was in

Page 18357

1 essence, do you recall that in June of 1995 there was a significant

2 increase in the Bosnian heavy weapons operating from near UNPROFOR

3 facilities?

4 A. Where --

5 Q. Well, do you just remember that, first?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. And how significant was the increase?

8 A. Well, significant in that as far as I recall, and that's still

9 quite early in my tour, they hadn't been doing it before, and heavy

10 weapons we are referring to roadblock probably light mortars.

11 Q. That would be considered heavy weapons, light mortars?

12 A. Well for the purpose of a weapon collection point, no, but

13 compared to everything that he had in their hands, it was I guess the

14 Heaviest at that time.

15 Q. Now, do you remember, sir, when you were there in June and July of

16 1995, whether the Bosnian Muslims were trying to draw UNPROFOR into the

17 conflict against the Serbs?

18 A. We felt that they tried at times.

19 Q. And do you know, sir, whether or not that happened in June of 1995

20 as well as July of 1995?

21 A. Well, we would have to look at the specifics.

22 Q. You have no recollection of that?

23 A. Well, I can't comment generally like that but as I said, it did

24 happen at times, but we can go through the various occasions, if you want.

25 Q. Okay. And we will hopefully. Now, on page 3, there, on the

Page 18358

1 bottom it says, "Location of Bosnian weapons a problem." Do you see that?

2 A. M'hm.

3 Q. This was also a report by David Harland, and I think with his

4 other weekly situation reports, you would have found it was useful

5 reliable and accurate, correct?

6 A. Generally so, yes.

7 Q. Well looking at this did you review this document in preparation

8 for your testimony?

9 A. Yes, I have.

10 Q. Okay. So this isn't a surprise to you, this document, right?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Is there anything in this section in particular that raises any

13 concern that it may be inaccurate to you?

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Judge Kwon is drawing my attention and he's

15 absolutely right, that you're going too fast. Please allow a short break

16 between question -- a short pause between question and answer. Thank you,

17 Judge Kwon.

18 MR. OSTOJIC: Should I repeat the question, Mr. President?

19 JUDGE AGIUS: [Microphone not activated]

20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. So are you in a position to answer the

22 question?

23 THE WITNESS: I was just reading the text, Your Honour and then

24 translation switched to French in my ear.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: I'm sure that that didn't irritate you.

Page 18359

1 THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question, please?

2 MR. OSTOJIC:

3 Q. Sure. Is there anything in this section in particular that has

4 raised any concern to you that it may be inaccurate?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Okay. Now, in the second paragraph under this section, "Location

7 of Bosnian weapons a problem," it identifies that some people in UNPROFOR

8 see this, meaning the significant increase in heavy weapons, as an effort

9 by the Bosnians to draw counterbattery fire on to UNPROFOR, do you see

10 that, sir?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. What do they mean when they say some people in UNPROFOR?

13 A. I guess not everyone agreed with that assessment.

14 Q. Who did, do you know?

15 A. No, I don't.

16 Q. Okay. Did you agree with that assessment?

17 A. Sometimes, yes.

18 Q. Okay. How about in this occasion on July 2nd of 1995?

19 A. I don't recall the specifics on that day.

20 Q. It goes on in that sentence to say that, "It would then be drawn

21 into conflict with the Serbs." That would mean that UNPROFOR would be

22 drawn into a conflict with the Serbs, correct?

23 A. M'hm.

24 Q. And sir just --

25 A. Yes.

Page 18360

1 Q. Thank you. I want to talk also a little bit about propaganda at

2 that time. In July 1992, as you sit here, do you recall any of the

3 propaganda that was going on by the Bosnian government against the Serbs

4 in connection with the war that was ongoing?

5 A. In July 1992?

6 Q. I'm sorry, 1995. Thank you, sir?

7 A. As I mentioned yesterday, there was propaganda, as in any war from

8 all sides, but I can't recall specifics off the top of my head.

9 Q. Well, do you remember, sir, at any point in July of 1995, whether

10 the situation with respect to the propaganda began to deteriorate?

11 A. Can you be more specific?

12 Q. Sure. For example, if the Bosnian Muslims started to increase

13 their political pressure on UNPROFOR by giving out statements against

14 UNPROFOR and saying that they were complicit with the Serbs in various

15 activities in Bosnia?

16 A. I'll read that again. Well, things like that happened, yes.

17 Q. Do you remember it happening in July of 1995 immediately after the

18 Bosnian Muslim offensive?

19 A. I don't remember any specific occasions.

20 Q. Okay. Well let's look at the next page of this document, if you

21 will. It talks about UNPROFOR's relations with the Bosnian government

22 deteriorating. Do you see that section?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. It's highlighted and then there is some paragraphs beneath.

25 And you've read this section as you shared with us in preparation for your

Page 18361

1 testimony here.

2 Do you remember that the Prime Minister was actually criticising

3 the United Nations and saying that they were an accomplice in a genocide

4 against Bosnia on or about June 26th, 1995? It's in the third paragraph.

5 A. M'hm. I'm reading. Yes. I do not recall this particular

6 situation, but as I said things like that happened.

7 Q. What were they referencing when they said this complicit genocide

8 in June of 1995?

9 A. I don't know.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. You'd have to ask them.

12 Q. Do you remember, just going back quickly to this increase --

13 significant increase in heavy weapons, do you know if there was such an

14 increase in heavy weapons also in the Srebrenica enclave on or near July

15 of 1995?

16 A. During the events, Srebrenica, around the 8, 9, 10 of July, there

17 was an increase, yes.

18 Q. Was it a significant increase?

19 A. Well, as far as I recall, the Bosnian military in Srebrenica were

20 defending themselves against an attack by the VRS.

21 Q. But was there a significant increase in the heavy weapons in

22 Srebrenica at that time?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. And do you know what weapons were significantly increased

25 in that enclave in July of 1995?

Page 18362

1 A. I don't know for sure but I would suspect they would be light

2 mortars which we did not control in WCPs like other heavier weapons.

3 Q. And what other heavier weapons did you have within the WCPs?

4 A. In Srebrenica itself, I don't recall because I was not involved in

5 Srebrenica except for those three or four days, but generally they were

6 heavy mortars, artillery, and tanks.

7 Q. Do you, sir, remember that the Bosnian Muslims provoked a

8 situation in Srebrenica by killing a DutchBat soldier?

9 A. What situation did they provoke?

10 Q. The escalation of combat there?

11 A. I'm not sure that they did kill a Dutch soldier. I wouldn't say

12 it provoked an escalation in combat but it complicated the situation for

13 the Dutch.

14 Q. Did the Bosnian Muslims complicate the situation for the Dutch in

15 any other way other than by that, by killing a DutchBat soldier, although

16 you're not sure of it but we will get to that in a second?

17 A. One thing I recall is they were siting some of their weapons near

18 the TACP operated by British soldiers.

19 Q. Okay. And how did that hamper the situation for DutchBat or the

20 civilians there?

21 A. Well, for DutchBat, if they site their weapons near the TACP and

22 fire on the Serbs with those weapons, when the Serbs fire back, they can

23 hit the TACP so it has to move, and when it moves it did cannot do it its

24 job.

25 Q. Would that also hamper the task of controlling of the close air

Page 18363

1 support if any was ordered at that time?

2 A. Well, that's basically what I mean when I say could not do its

3 job.

4 Q. Let's -- if I can direct your attention to Exhibit 6D152, which I

5 think the Prosecutor has which is your November 1997 statement that you

6 gave to them, sir?

7 A. M'hm.

8 Q. I'm going to direct your attention, if I may, to page 17 for the

9 moment. Now, just to clarify in that third paragraph there, although it's

10 the third sentence, it states that "The Bosnians fired and a Dutch soldier

11 was wounded in the head and later died." End quote. Do you see that?

12 Third paragraph, third sentence, I believe?

13 A. M'hm. Yes, I see it.

14 Q. Fourth sentence actually. This is your statement. Is there any

15 doubt in your mind that the Bosnians fired at the Dutch soldiers and

16 wounded this Dutch soldier and ultimately killed him?

17 A. No. That's how it was reported by the Dutch.

18 Q. And then it also says there was damage to a Dutch vehicle by the

19 Bosnian Muslims, correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Okay. And that was -- how was that vehicle damaged, do you know?

22 A. No, I don't recall.

23 Q. Was there any investigation done on that?

24 A. I doubt it because there -- they didn't withdrew under Serb

25 pressure to the compound in Potocari, and I don't think they had much time

Page 18364

1 to start to investigate.

2 Q. Now, it lists these three or four things, the killing of the Dutch

3 soldier, the damage to the Dutch vehicle, the attraction of fire to the

4 TACPs by situating weapons close to it, hampering its risk of controlling

5 the close air support or CAS, then it goes on to say, and I think it's

6 your superior insisted, is that Gobillard, how do you say his name?

7 A. Gobillard.

8 Q. He insisted that the Bosnians be told that the act of their

9 soldiers was tantamount to a murder. Do you see that?

10 A. I do.

11 Q. Was he referencing all four or so of the things listed above?

12 A. The killing of the Dutch soldier.

13 Q. That was the only thing he referenced?

14 A. I believe so.

15 Q. Do you remember, sir, whether General Nicolai had at any time

16 talked to Tolimir in order to secure the Serbian cooperation for the

17 evacuation of the Dutch soldier killed by the Bosnians?

18 A. Yes. I remember he talked to someone on the Serb side, I believe

19 it was Tolimir.

20 Q. We are talking about this provocation, and if you can tell me

21 whether or not there was further provocation other than this instance that

22 we've identified, or these instances that is we've identified on page 17

23 of your witness statement, which occurred on or about July 8th of 1995 and

24 that would have been again, just to briefly refresh your recollection, the

25 killing of the Dutch soldier, the attack on the Dutch vehicle, et cetera.

Page 18365

1 Were there other provocations or instances where the Bosnian Muslims

2 provoked or attacked DutchBat or any members of UNPROFOR?

3 A. Not that I recall, but...

4 Q. Do you remember, sir, whether or not two days after this incident,

5 the Bosnian Muslims were firing at DutchBat who were with drawing from

6 their observation posts?

7 A. Let me read here.

8 Q. I think if you need to read all I'm asking if you remember, if you

9 don't I'll direct your attention to the next page which is page 18 where

10 in your witness statement, in the middle of it, with the caption starting

11 on July 10th, which is two days after this one, it discusses a meeting

12 that was conducted and that there was a surprise at the ABiH reaction that

13 they had fired at withdrawing Dutch forces. And it's the fourth full

14 paragraph, if you see that in the middle of the paragraph?

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Do you see that, sir?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. Okay. Does it help refresh your recollection that in fact there

19 was a surprise by UNPROFOR that the Bosnian Muslims, despite what happened

20 on the 8th of July 1995, two days later they continued and fired at

21 withdrawing DutchBat soldiers, correct?

22 A. I'm not sure they are one and the same events that are being

23 referred to.

24 Q. I know they are not the same events, sir. And that's why my

25 question preceding that was do you know of any others incidents where the

Page 18366

1 Bosnian Muslims provoked or attacked DutchBat other than the instances

2 that we described on July 8th. And so we have also this on July 10th,

3 correct?

4 A. I guess so.

5 Q. Well, it's your witness statement. Do you doubt it?

6 A. No, it's not that I doubt it. It's I can't remember every single

7 word I wrote ten years ago.

8 Q. I'm not suggesting that you should, sir. Also do you remember,

9 sir, as you sit here whether or not the Bosnian Muslims prevented a

10 resupply to the Ukrainians in Zepa in July of 1995?

11 A. Yes. They made it more difficult. I remember then.

12 Q. How so?

13 A. Well, they were blocking the OPs, the Ukrainians OPs.

14 Q. I'm talking about resupply first. So were they in fact preventing

15 resupply and preventing all resupply to the Ukrainians?

16 A. I don't remember the details. As I said, I remember they were

17 blocking. By blocking the OPs you prevent anything going in, including

18 resupply.

19 Q. Well, do you remember whether the Bosnian Muslims not only blocked

20 those OPs but also attacked them?

21 A. In some cases, yes.

22 Q. Okay. Well in what cases do you recall?

23 A. I don't remember the specifics.

24 Q. Well --

25 A. I remember that this happened.

Page 18367

1 Q. Well, how many observation posts were there in Zepa that the

2 Ukrainians were manning?

3 A. I'm not sure how many they had.

4 Q. Well, do you know that the Bosnian Muslims attacked the Ukrainian

5 observation posts at -- observation post 1, 5, 7, and 8?

6 A. And I think I wrote that much, yes.

7 Q. Okay. So let's look at page 20 of your report, if you don't mind.

8 And the actual first full paragraph, after the numeric 3, the

9 second-to-last sentence it says, "In Zepa the Bosnians were preventing all

10 resupply of the Ukrainians." Do you see that?

11 A. M'hm, yes, I do.

12 Q. Now, if you could just -- if this helps refresh your recollection,

13 from whom did you obtain this information?

14 A. From, I believe from the Ukrainians themselves, in the early

15 stages of the incidents at Zepa and throughout, we were in contact with

16 them.

17 Q. And when you say, "preventing all resupply," can you tell me what

18 that entails?

19 A. Well, food, water, fuel.

20 Q. Well, why -- anything else?

21 A. Well, those are the basic commodities that you need on a daily

22 basis.

23 Q. Well did the Ukrainians have any weapons or anything else that

24 they may have needed other than food, water and fuel?

25 A. Well, they had weapons but they were not shooting them, so there

Page 18368

1 is no need to resupply bullets.

2 Q. Do you know why the Bosnian Muslims were preventing all resupply

3 of the Ukrainians in Zepa?

4 A. I don't recall, no.

5 Q. Do you know if that was a practice at all in Srebrenica as well by

6 the Bosnian Muslims?

7 A. I don't recall the specifics, no.

8 Q. Now, down below on that same page 20 of your witness statement

9 from November of 1997, the last paragraph identifies July 14th as the next

10 date.

11 A. Can you scroll down, please?

12 Q. And just so, sir, we are on the same page we talked about the 8th

13 of July. We talked about the 10th of July. And then I believe that the

14 situation where there was a prevention of supplies to the Ukrainians was

15 occurring, at least according to your statement, on or about the 12th of

16 July, and then two days later again there was information that was

17 provided to you, since you identified in your report, that the Bosnians

18 had attacked the Ukrainian observation posts. Do you see that? It's in

19 the middle of the paragraph?

20 A. Yes, I see.

21 Q. Where did you obtain that information?

22 A. Well the -- as it's written there, on July 14 we were informed by

23 the Ukrainian deputy sector commander. It doesn't say that two days after

24 the 12th or July 14th, that they attacked again. It said that we were

25 informed that that had happened.

Page 18369

1 Q. But keep reading, sir, it says also later that evening --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Please make pauses between questions and

3 answers. Thank you.

4 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, sorry.

5 Q. If you keep reading in that paragraph, sir, although I do take

6 your point, and I wish you to take mine, it says "later that same

7 evening." What evening do you think you're talking about --

8 A. The 14th, that's clear.

9 Q. And when -- but he says later that evening on the 14th, which is

10 clear, you were informed that the Bosnians had attacked the Ukrainian

11 observation posts, 1, 5, 7 and 8, right?

12 A. Right.

13 Q. So do you think that the observation posts were attacked by the

14 Bosnian Muslims before July 14th?

15 A. Well, that sentence refers to July 14th, that is how I see it.

16 Q. Well, I saw it that way too, sir. Do you know why it is that the

17 Bosnian Muslims attacked the Ukrainian observation or UNPROFOR observation

18 posts on July 14th 1995?

19 A. I'm not sure why they would do that.

20 Q. Well, did you ever investigate it?

21 A. I didn't personally investigate it and things happening so fast at

22 that time that we don't have time to chase every loose end.

23 Q. And I understand that, sir. Do you know if there were any other

24 provocations or instances where the Bosnian Muslims attacked or hindered

25 the work of UNPROFOR in Zepa in July of 1995?

Page 18370

1 A. I don't remember.

2 Q. Let me ask you, do you remember a meeting with General Smith and

3 President Izetbegovic to discuss UNPROFOR's assistance in the evacuation

4 of the population in Zepa?

5 JUDGE AGIUS: You already yesterday asked him whether General

6 Smith ever met with Izetbegovic and he answered that he doesn't know.

7 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: If this is supposedly another meeting, it would

9 still fall under the previous answer that he gave you. But if he's

10 thought about it and has got fresh information, then he can go ahead.

11 THE WITNESS: I don't, sir.

12 MR. OSTOJIC:

13 Q. Okay let's take a look at page 21 of your witness, if you don't

14 mind, you identify in your witness statement the conversation, and you

15 identified that Smith then went to Izetbegovic, and it's on page 21,

16 second-to-the-last paragraph. Do you see it, sir?

17 A. Yes. And as I said, General Smith may have told people at a

18 meeting that I was present that he did that, but I was not present at the

19 meeting that he had with Izetbegovic or others.

20 Q. How do you draw in your statement sir the following, if you

21 weren't at the meeting, and seemingly may not know anything about it as

22 follows: "Smith then went to Izetbegovic to discuss UNPROFOR assistance in

23 the evacuation of the population."

24 A. Because he told us so.

25 Q. Who told you?

Page 18371

1 A. General Smith.

2 Q. So you knew that he met with Izetbegovic to discuss UNPROFOR's

3 assistance in the evacuation of the population, correct?

4 A. He told us that that had happened, yes.

5 Q. Did he tell you as well?

6 A. But I don't know -- but he told General Gobillard, and I was with

7 Gobillard, but I don't know. I was not at the meeting.

8 Q. I'm not suggesting you were at the meeting but you have

9 information about it. Could you share with us -- I'm just pausing so that

10 I don't go too fast for the translators. Can you share with us why it was

11 that General Smith went to Izetbegovic to discuss what UNPROFOR's

12 assistance would be if any with the evacuation of the population?

13 A. I'm not sure.

14 Q. Well, as you sit here, do you know if Smith was required to obtain

15 Izetbegovic's approval or authorisation for UNPROFOR to assist in the

16 evacuation of the population?

17 A. I don't think he needed his authorisation, but there was a need

18 for example to discuss a global prisoner exchange, and so the Bosnian

19 government was a party in that negotiation. That may have been the --

20 these things had to be sorted out in order for UNPROFOR to go further in

21 its assistance so that may have been what was discussed, but I was not

22 present at that meeting.

23 Q. I understand. You said that and thank you for repeating it for

24 me, but this is an event that is occurring on the 19th of July 1995. It

25 doesn't discuss at all the prisoner of war exchange, it doesn't discuss

Page 18372

1 exchange in a global level, all it does is talk about UNPROFOR's

2 assistance for the evacuation of the population, does it not?

3 A. I know. That's what it says. But these -- these events were

4 happening at the same time. They are not all reported in that paragraph.

5 Q. Do you remember, sir, whether the Bosnian Muslims were seeking a

6 firm guarantee for their safety from UNPROFOR during any of the meetings

7 you may have attended or have been briefed upon?

8 A. Yes. I remember parts of it.

9 Q. Share that with me. What part in July was that, sir?

10 A. Well, during the meeting in Zepa, that I attended, when I was

11 there on July 27th, I believe it was, Mladic was trying to obtain an

12 agreement with the three Bosnian civilian representatives of Zepa, and

13 UNPROFOR had guarantees to offer for that agreement to be valid, and we

14 could not guarantee those.

15 Q. Well, what -- what were those guarantees that Mladic was

16 purportedly seeking for UNPROFOR to offer?

17 A. Ensure the security of the evacuees, I think was one.

18 Q. Okay. What was the other one?

19 A. I don't recall.

20 Q. Well, whose job was it to secure the population and this enclave

21 in July of 1995?

22 A. Well, that's not what I'm -- the evacuees, meaning while they were

23 being transported out, we didn't have the means to move them out and the

24 Serbs did, buses and trucks.

25 Q. Did UNPROFOR provide any fuel for that?

Page 18373

1 A. I think so, yes.

2 Q. So the guarantee that the -- was it the guarantee that Mladic

3 wanted or the Bosnian Muslims wanted, that there be security and that they

4 be provided with security during the evacuation process?

5 A. I'm not sure who wanted it, but it was essential for the

6 agreement, in our view, any way.

7 Q. Do you think there is any doubt that the Bosnian Muslims wanted to

8 have UNPROFOR secure that they have safe passage as they were evacuating

9 from Zepa?

10 A. No.

11 Q. If we can just direct your attention briefly to page 25 of your

12 witness statement, sir, it's the second full paragraph. And was the deal

13 or the offer to provide security to the evacuees based on any other part

14 of an agreement. Or was it as you say just a fact that UNPROFOR didn't

15 have the capacity, if you will to do that?

16 A. I'm not sure.

17 Q. Okay. Look at -- you reviewed this prior to testimony -- in

18 preparation for your testimony, the second full paragraph, and towards the

19 middle of that paragraph it talks about "As for the Bosnian army, then

20 Tolimir suggests or indicated that they were ready to surrender and drop

21 their weapons provided that they could obtain firm guarantees, which is

22 what we talked about, for their safe -- for their safety from UNPROFOR,"

23 which you told us you couldn't give, the very next sentence is what I

24 would like to discuss with you.

25 It seems here that you and your superior did not provide these

Page 18374

1 guarantees because you were more concerned with the global POW exchange

2 agreement. Isn't that true?

3 A. There was part of the whole package.

4 Q. What were some of the other parts, sir, and then we'll go through

5 them?

6 A. Well, the civilians were to be evacuated to Kladanj and the Serbs

7 wanted the males of military age under their custody, and in order for us

8 to have some guarantees that they would be safe in Serb custody we needed

9 a global prisoner exchange agreement so that there was a way for those

10 people to go back to Bosnia.

11 Q. Okay. Well, wasn't one of the things that the Bosnian Serbs were

12 offering was that ICRC could come in and actually register each and every

13 one of those individuals?

14 A. Yes, I remember that.

15 Q. And what was the response of UNPROFOR to that? Inadequate?

16 A. Well, UNPROFOR is not ICRC. We can't decide for them but they

17 have to be involved and I'm not sure, I didn't play any part in

18 discussions with the ICRC.

19 Q. Well, from time to time, you worked with the ICRC, did you not?

20 A. I met some people of the ICRC, sometimes.

21 Q. Well I'm asking you --

22 A. Personally I did not work with the ICRC on a regular basis.

23 Q. Well, I'm asking you, do you find it or did you find it in July of

24 1995 inadequate for the Bosnian Serbs to offer that ICRC can come in under

25 the supervision of UNPROFOR and register all the people that were to be

Page 18375

1 detained as POWs?

2 A. Did I find that inadequate?

3 Q. Correct.

4 A. No.

5 Q. Thank you, Lieutenant-Colonel. Thank you, Mr. President?

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Ostojic. I take it you are next,

7 Mr. Josse?

8 MR. JOSSE: I am, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead. We'll have the break in half an hour's

10 time.

11 Cross-examination by Mr. Josse:

12 Q. Colonel, my name is David Josse, and with the gentlemen who sits

13 to my left, we defend General Gvero. I would like to begin by taking you

14 back to the 28th of July of 1995 and your presence in Zepa. As far as you

15 were concerned, on that day, who was in charge of the VRS?

16 A. General Mladic.

17 Q. Did you see him there that day?

18 A. I believe it was the 28th, yes.

19 Q. And who, as far as you could see, was assisting General Mladic in

20 that regard?

21 A. General Tolimir.

22 Q. I'll come back to that a little later on, if I may.

23 How competent was General Gobillard's English?

24 A. Not very much. That's why I was there.

25 Q. Were you present when he had conversations in English with either

Page 18376

1 General Nicolai or General Smith?

2 A. I would say most of the time I was present.

3 Q. Yes. Sorry. Bad question. I meant on occasions. That's really

4 what I wanted to ascertain. I take it from what you just said, the answer

5 is that, yes you were there on occasions when Gobillard spoke to Smith

6 and/or Nicolai?

7 A. I was there most of the time. I wouldn't say on occasions.

8 Q. Thank you. What language were such conversations conducted in?

9 A. In English.

10 Q. And Gobillard's English was good enough to cope with that type of

11 meeting; is that right?

12 A. He could understand quite a bit, but he had difficulty speaking

13 the language.

14 Q. And when he tried to express himself, what would he do? Use

15 French and you would translate for him?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. Did you ever meet General Janvier?

18 A. A few times, yes.

19 Q. You presumably spoke to him in French. You personally.

20 A. I didn't get to speak to him very much but yes, in French.

21 Q. Were you present when General Janvier had meetings with English

22 speakers or perhaps I should say non-French speakers?

23 A. Well, when he came to Sarajevo and had meetings in Sector Sarajevo

24 headquarters, in those cases General Gobillard would have been present and

25 I would have been present. In other cases, no, I worked for Gobillard and

Page 18377

1 not for General Janvier.

2 Q. And so can you recall ever being present at a meeting between

3 General Janvier, Gobillard, and Smith?

4 A. I think so, but I don't recall any particular meeting.

5 Q. It's not a -- it's not a trick question, and if you don't recall,

6 I don't think you're going to be able to answer my follow-up question

7 which was to do with the language used, and whether you could comment on

8 General Janvier's competence in English. Can you assist on that?

9 A. I don't recall his personal competence, but he also had people

10 like me who could help him out.

11 Q. Were you aware of any of UNPROFOR generals at any stage during

12 your tenure in Bosnia handing small gifts to any of the generals of the

13 warring parties, any of the three warring parties? For example, a

14 regimental plaque, bottle of liquor, something like that?

15 A. I don't recall any such instances.

16 Q. It's certainly not something that happened often as far as you

17 were concerned?

18 A. I don't recall any such event.

19 Q. Thank you. I want to ask you briefly, in your statement, I don't

20 think I need to take you to it in this regard, you mention quite early, I

21 think, in your stay in Bosnia, going to Gorazde and you had a General

22 Walker with you?

23 A. M'hm, yes.

24 Q. Do you remember his Christian name?

25 A. Sorry, I don't.

Page 18378

1 Q. What nationality was he?

2 A. British, I believe.

3 Q. And what was his role in Bosnia, as far as you were concerned?

4 A. He was commander of the allied rapid reaction corps who -- that

5 corps would take up the bulk of responsibility as IFOR eventually, so he

6 was coming for what we call a recce.

7 Q. And --

8 A. Or a recon, if you're American.

9 Q. And in your brief dealing with him, presumably you found him to be

10 a competent officer; is that correct?

11 A. I can hardly judge. Generals tend to talk to other generals.

12 Q. I don't know if you're aware, but he in fact ended up chief of

13 Defence in the United Kingdom, did you know that?

14 A. I didn't, no.

15 Q. I'm now going to take you, if I may, to the conversation that you

16 translated in part between General Gobillard and my client, General Gvero,

17 on the 11th of July of 1995. Before I look at the actual documentation

18 with you, you have already confirmed that this conversation was taking

19 place through some sort of double translation. That's right, isn't it?

20 A. It's correct.

21 Q. As far as you were concerned, where was General Gvero physically

22 at the time General Gobillard was talking to him?

23 A. I have no idea.

24 Q. No idea at all?

25 A. No.

Page 18379

1 Q. You were translating everything for General Gobillard; is that

2 correct? Or was he able to understand a bit of the conversation in

3 English?

4 A. He was able to understand quite a bit. It's replying that was

5 more difficult for him.

6 Q. So -- and this is important, the specifics here, if you can

7 remember. Did you translate everything for him into French or was he able

8 to understand some of what the English interpreter was saying?

9 A. He was able to understand some of what she was saying, but he

10 would often in those cases double check with me to make sure he got it

11 right.

12 Q. In terms of grammar or the such like, do you recall how good was

13 the English of the Serbian English translator?

14 A. As good as yours, sir. She was British.

15 Q. She was British. And you presumably don't know where this woman

16 was situated, correct?

17 A. She was right beside me.

18 Q. She was beside you. And General Gobillard -- I beg your pardon,

19 General Gvero had an interpreter as well; is that correct?

20 A. I wouldn't know about that. The interpretation that I used was

21 the one that was done on our side.

22 Q. What was the name of your interpreter?

23 A. I think her name was Bliss, Captain Bliss.

24 Q. I'm going to ask you about her later on in a different context.

25 But she, as you say, was a British officer, and she was a liaison officer,

Page 18380

1 wasn't she, one of General Smith's liaison officers?

2 A. That's right.

3 Q. So she was beside you throughout this conversation; is that

4 correct?

5 A. As far as I recall, yes.

6 Q. Now, as I say, we will look at the intercept, at the document in a

7 moment, but General Gvero made reference to a Svetlana. Do you remember

8 that? If you don't I'll help you by showing you a document?

9 A. Please do.

10 Q. What we're going to do now is show you the actual -- your note,

11 which is P2968. We're also going to show you another document, P2379 and

12 before they are brought up, Your Honour, what we've done, because this is

13 going to be quite a long and cumbersome exercise, we have produced English

14 copies of both of these for the witness and for the Bench because

15 otherwise this is going to be, as I say, quite a messy exercise. I would

16 respectfully suggest that on e-court the B/C/S versions are put up so that

17 the accused can follow.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Is that okay with you, Mr. Thayer?

19 MR. THAYER: I take it that when we refer to English copies we are

20 referring to the actual report of the conversation that's been marked as

21 2968 on the one hand as well as the English translation that's in e-court

22 of the intercept.

23 MR. JOSSE: Yes. I'm going to explain to the witness what 2379 is

24 so that he's aware.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: For us, I think it will be useful to have the texts

Page 18381

1 that Mr. Josse has just -- and I think it will be useful for the witness

2 to have those as well because otherwise I take Mr. Josse's word that it

3 will become cumbersome.

4 MR. THAYER: And I believe that's intercept 2374, not 2379 if we

5 are talking about the 1610, or are we talking about the subsequent one at

6 1810?

7 MR. JOSSE: Yes, 1810.

8 MR. THAYER: Just wanted to clarify.

9 MR. JOSSE: The one that involves this witness.

10 Q. Now, can I explain to you, Colonel, what 2379 is? Before I do

11 that, one other thing. I don't know whether there is any problem, Your

12 Honour, with 2379 being broadcast. Perhaps Madam Registrar could advise

13 on that. 2379 is an English translation of a purported intercept made by

14 the Muslim security services at the time that your conversation with

15 General Gvero was taking place, or perhaps I should say General

16 Gobillard's conversation with General Gvero.

17 The intercept operator, as is clear from the first paragraph,

18 could only hear General Gvero. He could not hear your end of the

19 conversation at all. And my first question to you is have you been shown

20 this before?

21 A. I have not.

22 Q. Were you aware, prior to this moment, that the conversation had in

23 some way been intercepted by a security force?

24 A. I was advised that an intercept existed but not by whom it was

25 made.

Page 18382

1 Q. And you were advised that during the course of your proofing, were

2 you?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. But you weren't actually shown the documents?

5 A. No.

6 Q. And the other thing I should tell you and it's an obvious point

7 the original of 2379 is of course in the B/C/S language, not in the

8 English language. This is a translation. And dealing with the point that

9 I was just asking you about --

10 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. 2379, I'm informed, is under seal. So

11 no broadcast of it, please. Otherwise, you can proceed.

12 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

14 MR. JOSSE:

15 Q. If we look quite near the top of this conversation, which I'm

16 going to take you to in a moment, we see that Gvero says, "Hello, this is

17 Gvero." Then he says, "Who?" Then he says, "Svetlana".

18 And then if we look at the bottom of that very same page, we see

19 him, Gvero, saying, "Don't let him start talking while I'm talking.

20 Svetlana, could you please translate to General Gobillard?"

21 So what I'm suggesting to you is General Gobillard -- General

22 Gvero had an interpreter there called Svetlana. Does this help you at all

23 in that regard?

24 A. I'm not sure I understand.

25 Q. Well, what I'm suggesting is that Gvero had an interpreter,

Page 18383

1 somewhere at his end, called Svetlana.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. And assuming that to be correct, what I'd like you to try and

4 explain is the interplay between Gvero, Svetlana, Captain Bliss, yourself,

5 and General Gobillard. How did it work?

6 A. I don't remember that part. I don't remember a Svetlana.

7 Q. So you tell us, Colonel, how the conversation worked, physically

8 worked, as far as you're concerned. I don't think the intercept will help

9 you in this regard. We are going to look at it in a few moments' time.

10 A. Well, as far as I recall, the interpreter would talk to General

11 Gvero in Serbo-Croatian. He would reply, she would translate to me in

12 English. I would translate to General Gobillard in French. He would give

13 me his reply in French. I would tell it in English to the interpreter.

14 And she would then translate for the person at the other end.

15 Q. And the interpreter you are referring to is Captain Bliss?

16 A. I'm quite sure it was Captain Bliss.

17 Q. So you've got no idea about a Svetlana?

18 A. I don't.

19 Q. And by the same token, you presumably would have no idea

20 whether -- well, I'll suggest to you, you probably don't know this, that

21 Svetlana was in fact physically in a different location to General Gvero,

22 just to complicate matters. But you don't know that, correct?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Okay. Bearing in mind your role which you've just described,

25 Colonel, how were you able to note the conversation down? Tell us

Page 18384

1 physically how you did that.

2 A. Well, as it was -- in between my interpretation with General

3 Gobillard and then back to the interpreter, when she spoke Serb, I had

4 time to take a few notes, but I did not take very detailed notes. I

5 drafted those up afterwards in consultation with General Gobillard.

6 Q. Well, I was going to ask you that in a moment. How soon after the

7 events did you prepare the note that is now our exhibit?

8 A. I don't remember exactly but I would say the same day.

9 Q. And you discussed it with General Gobillard, did you?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And the note is in English rather than French for what reason?

12 A. Because it was sent to other headquarters and it made it easier.

13 Q. Have you discussed these events with General Gobillard in the last

14 ten years?

15 A. I never seen General Gobillard since.

16 Q. Now going to try and begin this process of analysing and comparing

17 the two documents. If we could begin by looking at the actual intercept,

18 2379, we can see at the very top that what is coming from the Serb end are

19 these words: "General Mladic is in the field and he too is away. I can

20 only put him through to General Gvero if he wants. Please hold on.

21 Hello, this is Gvero."

22 So would I be right in saying that it appears that the person

23 General Gobillard first wanted to speak to was General Mladic, correct?

24 A. That's possible.

25 Q. It also appears to be the position, doesn't it, that General Gvero

Page 18385

1 was not specifically the person to whom General Gobillard wanted to speak

2 and Gobillard was being told that in effect the only person available to

3 field the conversation was Gvero. Would you accept that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. If we could move, please, to the second paragraph in your note,

6 second sentence of that paragraph, you note the following: "If UNPROFOR

7 troops were really targeted, then it was the BiH who fired on to them

8 according to their old scenario."

9 In the intercept, 2379, about ten lines down, General Gvero seems

10 to have said, "If UN members have been shot at, it was not by us. Rather

11 following the familiar scenario, they were shot at by the Muslims who are

12 very close to them and whom you are protecting." Did you have any idea

13 what General Gvero was referring to when he used the expression, "familiar

14 scenario"?

15 A. Well, yes. This came on occasions from our discussions with Serb

16 side. They would accuse the Bosnians of provoking and to try to -- for

17 various reasons.

18 Q. And UNPROFOR were aware of that, weren't they, the truth of that

19 assertion by the Bosnian Serbs?

20 A. We were aware that on occasion, yes, it was true.

21 Q. Perhaps we could look at 6D204 in this regard. This is a daily

22 sit-rep from General Janvier or at least from his office to, among others,

23 New York and Mr. Annan, and I want to look at page 6, please. It's dated

24 the 10th of July. We can see that at the fax heading at the top of that

25 page. If we could scroll down, please, this is in a part of the document

Page 18386

1 which is described as a military assessment of events in Srebrenica.

2 So it's almost completely contemporaneous with your conversation,

3 perhaps a day or so earlier, and it says, "Similar to what happened in

4 Gorazde, spring 1994, the BiH can attempt to draw UNPROFOR, including the

5 RRF, or NATO, into the conflict on BiH side. Sudden abandoning of

6 positions along the confrontation line, the simulation of a collapse of

7 the enclave or alarming reports from Bosnian side on the situation in the

8 enclaves will be indicated for this."

9 Do you know what the author of this report is referring to?

10 A. I don't. Spring 1994 was before I arrived.

11 Q. Yes. All right. But in short, you've already accepted you were

12 aware -- you knew what General Gvero was driving at when he used the word

13 "old scenario" or "familiar scenario"?

14 A. Oh, yeah.

15 Q. The next bit I'd like to look at, please, is still on the first

16 page of your document. Yes, perhaps we could go back to the two documents

17 in B/C/S on e-court. Thank you.

18 But in the hard copy that you've got, on that first page, we see

19 it says, "The BSA were not attacking civilians either. They had fought

20 against the BiH armed terrorists who should have been disarmed according

21 to the agreement concluded by the parties under the auspices of UNPROFOR."

22 If you could look, please, at the actual intercept, halfway down

23 the first page, we see it says, "Next, we didn't shoot at civilians but at

24 armed terrorists who have inflicted losses on our people in the last

25 months and years. They were supposed to be disarmed according to the

Page 18387

1 agreement we signed with them in the presence of the UN, but that was

2 never done."

3 So General Gvero juxtaposes the armed terrorists with people who

4 have inflicted losses on our people, words - and let me emphasise this is

5 not a criticism - but words which were not in your document, correct?

6 A. Yes, correct.

7 Q. What did you understand him to be saying at that point?

8 A. I'm not sure if I knew at that time, but during that period I

9 found out that the Bosnian army, in Zepa, for example, were conducting

10 raids outside the enclave into Serb villages.

11 Q. Precisely. This exercise is going to take a fair bit longer, I'm

12 afraid, Your Honour so perhaps now would be a convenient time?

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. We'll have the break now. 25 minutes. Thank

14 you.

15 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

16 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Josse?

18 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

19 Q. Colonel, bottom of your note, you say, page 1, this is, "UNPROFOR

20 troops were most welcome on the BSA territory where they would be treated

21 comfortably and would be completely safe."

22 JUDGE AGIUS: No broadcast of the two documents, okay? Or at

23 least of 2379.

24 MR. JOSSE:

25 Q. What did you understand General Gvero to be saying at that

Page 18388

1 juncture in the conversation?

2 A. That they would not take us hostage like they had done at the end

3 of May.

4 Q. And did you have any knowledge at that point in time of how the

5 DutchBat troops, who were in Bratunac, had come to get there?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Could we look at 6D22, please? Now, whilst this is got up on the

8 screen, to explain to you, I appreciate this is a document you almost

9 certainly have never seen before because it's a document from Major

10 General Krstic, to the Main Staff of the VRS and to the Drina Corps

11 command, and it's an interim combat report dated the 9th of July of 1995.

12 And it's not quite on the screen yet. We see the B/C/S version on the

13 right there. There is the English.

14 And it's item number 4 that I would like us to examine.

15 It says this: "Conduct of UNPROFOR forces, the UNPROFOR forces at

16 the check-points in Slapovici village and Bucje [phoen] village

17 surrendered fully to our forces with all their weapons and equipment and

18 asked for our protection. Ten UNPROFOR soldiers from the UNPROFOR

19 check-point in Bucje village have been sent to and accommodated in Milici,

20 while five soldiers from the check-point in Slapovici have been

21 accommodated in Bratunac. UNPROFOR forces from the base in Potocari

22 village did not intervene at the check-points or attack our forces."

23 Now, that appears to be the information that has been sent by the

24 Drina Corps, namely General Krstic, to the VRS Main Staff where my client

25 was stationed at that time. That's right, isn't it?

Page 18389

1 A. That's what it looks like.

2 Q. Were you aware, at the time of the conversation with General

3 Gvero, of the information contained in General Krstic's interim combat

4 report?

5 A. I don't think I was, no.

6 Q. All right. Let's move on, if we may, please, to the second page

7 of your notes of the telephone call. And about six or seven lines down in

8 the second paragraph, you write the following: "He" obviously referring

9 to General Gvero, "claimed that a great number of UN vehicles stolen by

10 the BiH and still painted white were used against the BSA. He said he had

11 no absolute knowledge of who the troops in the vehicles belonged to, but

12 drew the general's attention to the BSA reliable information that those

13 were the BiH."

14 What was your state of knowledge, Colonel, at about 6.00 on the

15 11th of July of the assertions that General Gvero was making?

16 A. What we did not have information that the BiH had stolen any of

17 our vehicles. And I believe the Dutch were able to confirm that. But we

18 did know that the VRS still had vehicles taken during the hostage crisis

19 and that were not returned until later. For example, I personally

20 obtained Canadian vehicles, eight armoured vehicles, taken during the

21 hostage crisis by the VRS on December 24th, 1995, when I went to get them

22 in Ilijas.

23 Q. And where, in the hostage crisis of May 1995, were these vehicles

24 taken? Whereabouts, in Bosnia, were they seized?

25 A. Around Sarajevo for the most part, as far as I know.

Page 18390

1 Q. And I'm right, it's May 1995, we're talking about, about six weeks

2 before the events that this case is concentrating upon, correct?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. Could we have a look in relation to what I've just shown you, at

5 6D23, please? This is a similar document to the one that I just showed

6 you. It's another interim combat report, this time of the 10th of July

7 from Krstic to the VRS Main Staff and the Drina Corps command. And it's

8 paragraph 3 that I'd like to look at here, please.

9 It says, "UNPROFOR conduct in the Srebrenica enclave, from

10 observation and surveillance of the situation in the Srebrenica enclave,

11 we concluded the number of UNPROFOR check-points on enemy territory had

12 been taken by the Muslims who are using some of the weapons and other

13 military hardware in operations against our forces."

14 So on the face of this document, Krstic is telling his Main Staff

15 that broadly speaking what General Gvero is asserting to you was, in fact,

16 happening in the field, correct?

17 A. That's what it says.

18 Q. You of course can't comment on the accuracy of General Krstic's

19 document, correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. It's hard to think of any reason why General Krstic would be

22 misleading his Main Staff or falsifying this type of report, isn't it?

23 A. Sounds fair.

24 Q. Back to your report of the conversation, the last paragraph, you

25 say, "General Gvero promised he would do his utmost to keep the situation

Page 18391

1 in the region of Srebrenica under control, which he thought quite possible

2 because of his competent military there."

3 If we could look, please, in this regard at the actual intercept,

4 second page, about ten lines up from the bottom, it says, "We'll do

5 everything to keep the situation under control. We have competent people

6 from our army."

7 So it's fair to say that General Gvero wasn't personally promising

8 to keep the situation under control. He was talking in the first person

9 plural about the VRS in a general sense. Would you agree with that?

10 A. I do.

11 Q. Going back to your document, and following on from where I had

12 left off, you say, "What happened this day only served to complicate the

13 situation in the region of Srebrenica, and would ill effect the situation

14 there. He would have had the full insight into the situation in the

15 Srebrenica area by the next morning." Going back, if we may, to the

16 actual intercept, again a little on from where I had left off, it says,

17 "It would be best to speak with General Gobillard in the morning and to

18 look at the overall situation."

19 In fact, what you have written is, I would suggest, not a

20 completely fair summary because General Gvero was not suggesting that he

21 would have a full insight into the situation in Srebrenica the following

22 morning. He is simply saying that it would be best to speak the following

23 morning, a subtle but significant difference, correct?

24 A. Correct.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Josse, because I think the words or

Page 18392

1 the phrase, "He would have had the full insight" are reflected in the

2 intercept in the part which reads as follows: "It would be best to speak

3 with General Gobillard in the morning and to look at the overall

4 situation," which I mean to look at the overall situation then, at that

5 point in time. Because then in the witness's report, this is followed --

6 "That was why he suggested another contact by phone only next morning."

7 And as you see that is not followed by what is contained in the intercept,

8 which is reflected in the sentence before.

9 MR. JOSSE: Can I just have a moment, please?

10 [Defence counsel confer]

11 MR. JOSSE:

12 Q. You've heard what the learned judge has just said, Colonel. And

13 by all means, look at more of the intercept if it helps, but General Gvero

14 doesn't appear to actually be saying that he would have a full insight

15 into the situation in the Srebrenica area, isn't that fair?

16 A. I don't disagree that it is. From my point of view at the other

17 end, it was not an important nuance at the time, the information that was

18 conveyed was more important than how it was conveyed.

19 Q. And if we look at the very end of the intercept, it's not -- again

20 understandably -- reflected in whole in your summary. General Gvero says,

21 "I would like General Gobillard to continue making reasonable decisions to

22 not call in the air force, to make mistakes, and I want him to conclude

23 his mission as a decent man and a man of peace, neutral, and impartial

24 towards all sides in this conflict. Many thanks and good night."

25 And you've summarised that as inviting Gvero inviting Gobillard to

Page 18393

1 show no bias towards any party, as I've just indicated what in fact he

2 said was rather fuller than that, correct?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. Now, you basically dealt with this in your examination-in-chief

5 with Mr. Thayer, but this conversation took place at about 10 minutes past

6 6.00 on the 11th of July, in the evening. There is no question that the

7 aircraft who were providing the close air support had been withdrawn

8 almost exactly an hour earlier. Do you agree with that? If you don't, I

9 can help you.

10 A. Well, I know they had been withdrawn shortly before.

11 Q. And so, de facto, this conversation had no effect on the decision

12 by UNPROFOR as to whether or not to bomb the VRS. That must be right,

13 mustn't it?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now -- and one thing that I should have asked you at the very

16 start of this conversation, and then I'll move away from it, it's obvious

17 from the start that this was a telephone call that was put in from General

18 Gobillard' office to the Main Staff of the VRS rather than the other way

19 around, correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Now, this conversation took place at the very tail end of the

22 period when General Smith was away on leave. Do you recall that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Would you accept the criticism that during those 11 days, General

25 Gobillard spent too much time in the PTT building and not enough time in

Page 18394

1 the Residency?

2 A. You're saying that General Smith was away for 11 days?

3 Q. He was away from the 1st of July to the 11th of July. I think on

4 the 8th of July he went it Geneva, but he did not return to Sarajevo until

5 the 11th of July.

6 A. And I think that on the 1st and 2nd of July, he was in Split and

7 he retained command at that time, so there would have been no need because

8 he was still in theatre, as we say it, there would have been no need for

9 General Gobillard to be at BH command. But after that, I can't say.

10 Q. You've got no view on the subject?

11 A. I don't recall other than the events we have been going through

12 between the 8th of July and the 12th, I don't recall the specifics before

13 that.

14 Q. Now, Gobillard had assumed control, notwithstanding that Nicolai

15 was Smith's Chief of Staff; that's right, isn't it?

16 A. Right.

17 Q. And it's also right, and I'll tell you this in case you don't

18 recall, that Smith was in daily contact with his military assistant,

19 Colonel Baxter. Do you recall that?

20 A. I don't recall, no, because I wasn't there all the time during

21 that whole period that you mentioned, but that would be fair.

22 Q. And in particular, when Smith went to Geneva on the 8th of July,

23 do you recall any discussion in your circles, either with your general,

24 i.e. Gobillard, or perhaps in the officer's mess at a slightly lower

25 level, as to whether Smith should return bearing in mind he was in Geneva

Page 18395

1 and had effectively left his leave?

2 A. I don't recall such discussion, no.

3 Q. The reason I'm asking you that is it might give some indication as

4 to the extent to which you in UNPROFOR in Sarajevo had some sense of the

5 impending crisis. Does that help at all?

6 A. I still don't recall any such discussions.

7 Q. None at all?

8 A. No, sorry.

9 Q. And are you able to help us at all as to who said what at the

10 point that Smith was recalled from his leave on the 11th of July, who made

11 that decision, whether you were party to any discussions, formal,

12 informal, or otherwise?

13 A. I may have been but I don't recall.

14 Q. In your witness statement, dealing really with this period of

15 time, the time before the 11th of July, you said - and I could show this

16 to you if need be - the difficulty was to get accurate information from

17 Srebrenica and then deciding what to do.

18 A. Right.

19 Q. Why did you say that?

20 A. As I explained yesterday, the situation was confused. We were

21 getting information from the Dutch company through DutchBat and Sector

22 north-east to BH command, from the GCO, British GCO, in Srebrenica

23 directly to BH command, from civil affairs, from the Bosnians, from the

24 Serbs, and of course it was not entirely clear what was happening, who was

25 attacking the Dutch and at what location, and what we could do to prevent

Page 18396

1 any further attacks or advance by the VRS. So all of that were of course

2 from a distance being in Sarajevo and watching over events in Srebrenica.

3 It was difficult to get a clear picture, something that we were sure this

4 is what's happening on the ground.

5 Q. And at page 18 of your statement, talking specifically about the

6 10th of July, you use a very similar expression, "We were very unsure of

7 their situation." Similar point, I assume?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. You've been asked this morning about the death of the Dutch

10 soldier, Renssen, and your recollection of those events. Do you recall

11 what General Gobillard's official reaction to that event was?

12 A. Well, he was not happy about it and wanted a strong protest made

13 to the Bosnians who had killed the Dutch soldier that this amounted to

14 murder.

15 Q. We know that General Janvier wrote to his counterpart, General

16 Delic, were you aware of that?

17 A. I may have been but I don't recall.

18 Q. Who was General Gobillard's counterpart within the ABiH?

19 A. Normally it was Silajdzic.

20 Q. But he was a civilian, wasn't he? He was a Prime Minister, he

21 wasn't a military man at all?

22 A. Perhaps I got the wrong name.

23 Q. If you don't remember?

24 A. Akolov [phoen] Aznadzic at corps level.

25 Q. Sorry give it us the name again?

Page 18397

1 A. I think it's Aznadzic.

2 Q. I'm going to need some help on this. Either way, did General

3 Gobillard express his outrage specifically to his counterpart about the

4 death of Renssen?

5 A. I'm not sure -- well, I say normally it was Aznadzic when we were

6 operating at sector level. When he was acting commander UNPROFOR or BH

7 command during that period, he would have had contacts at a higher level

8 of the BiH army. I can't think of the name right now. Did he express

9 that directly to that contact? I'm not sure if he did. He may have. But

10 also General Nicolai was supposed to draft something so we could complain

11 formally about this.

12 Q. Could it have been a military man called Hajrulahovic, I'm going

13 to spell that H-A-J-R-U-L-A-H-O-V-I-C?

14 A. Yeah. I believe he's the one we used to call Talijan because we

15 couldn't pronounce his name.

16 Q. Absolutely, Talijan. That's the man. Now, going to move on to

17 the 28th of July or 27th, 28th of July, when you went to Zepa. Remind us,

18 who did you go there with, please?

19 A. Colonel Chinouihl was the French engineer commander at Sector

20 Sarajevo.

21 Q. And on the 27th of July, General Smith was there. Your first day,

22 correct?

23 A. Yeah, for a short period, yes.

24 Q. And you describe both in your diary and to some extent in your

25 witness statement of General Smith's departure. Excuse me a moment.

Page 18398

1 Probably is worth having a look at this. Page 24 of the witness

2 statement, which is 6D152. That's exactly the point that I want.

3 We see that it says towards the top that General Smith arrived at

4 1550 and then going on down the page, it says, "General Smith talked to

5 us, the UN people, before he left." And I'm not going to read all this

6 out. You can read it to yourself. B/C/S page 22. In effect he was

7 rallying his troops, for want of a better expression, General Smith, this

8 is, correct?

9 A. Making sure that those present understood what was at stake.

10 Q. Now, did you understand -- have you any idea, did General Smith

11 return to Zepa at any point?

12 A. Not that I'm aware of.

13 Q. Not that you're aware of. Did you get the impression that this

14 was a rallying call before he left for a final time?

15 A. I can't say that I recall precisely, but it would have been not a

16 situation report but a look at the situation as it is now, share the

17 understanding, and then each carries his activities, not as a final -- not

18 as a final rallying call, as you put it.

19 Q. Was Colonel Baxter with him?

20 A. I don't remember.

21 Q. The questions I'm about to ask you are quite detailed, and I will

22 understand if you do not recall but let's try. Do you recall whether he

23 had one of his liaison officers-cum-interpreters with him at this meeting

24 you described on page 24 of the statement?

25 A. I don't recall.

Page 18399

1 Q. You've mentioned Captain Bliss. Do you recall the name of his

2 other liaison officer?

3 A. I don't.

4 Q. If I mentioned name to you Captain Dibb, does that ring any bells?

5 A. Sorry, it doesn't.

6 Q. It doesn't. Was Captain Bliss in Zepa at any point when you were

7 there?

8 A. I don't recall seeing her.

9 Q. Would Smith always, as far as you can recall, have one of his

10 liaison officers with him?

11 A. I think so.

12 Q. Digressing for a moment, how did General Gobillard deal with

13 communication with the warring parties? Did he have a personal

14 interpreter?

15 A. Yes, he did. He had a number of them.

16 Q. And were they military officers?

17 A. Both military and civilians.

18 Q. And do you recall, did -- who accompanied him on the trip to Zepa

19 on the 28th of July?

20 A. It would have to be one of his military. Either Major Beck or

21 Korsek [phoen], I don't recall.

22 Q. Both French officers, correct?

23 A. Legionnaires. They were senior NCOs.

24 Q. Help us -- you've use used this expression "legionnaire" before.

25 What does it mean?

Page 18400

1 A. Well, the French Foreign Legion is a unit of the French army

2 mainly composed of soldiers from foreign countries.

3 Q. Yes. Now, you've made clear, and certainly not disputing this,

4 Smith leaves on the 27th of July and Gobillard arrives on the 28th of

5 July. Would it be a deliberate decision for any one of them to be in Zepa

6 at any given time?

7 A. Meaning their own choice?

8 Q. Well, not so much their own choice but would there be some sort of

9 informal policy decision that one wouldn't send two such senior generals

10 to a place like Zepa on the same day at the same time?

11 A. Not necessarily. They are commanders operating at two different

12 levels. So commander Sector Sarajevo had responsibilities for Zepa and as

13 did commander UNPROFOR who had responsibilities for all of Bosnia.

14 Q. Moving on, you say in the witness statement, it's there in front

15 of us, at the next paragraph, that Smith left Ed Joseph from civil affairs

16 behind. Who else from UNPROFOR did he leave? Can you help us?

17 A. I don't recall.

18 Q. What about Mr. Bezrouchenko? Do you remember him?

19 A. I know that he had been there earlier. I don't know if he was

20 still there or if he left. I don't recall.

21 Q. And as a matter of interest, I take it you haven't had a chance to

22 discuss this with Mr. Bezrouchenko. I say that because he works in this

23 building. Are you able to -- have you spoken to him about it at all?

24 A. No. In fact I've never seen him since.

25 Q. Okay. Were you aware that he worked in this building?

Page 18401

1 A. No.

2 Q. What time did you depart Zepa on the 28th of July? As accurately

3 as you can, please. This is particularly important.

4 A. It's in my diary. After the meeting General Gobillard had with

5 General Tolimir towards the late afternoon, but I don't recall the exact

6 time.

7 Q. Just a moment, please. I think we can remain in open session.

8 The diary simply says that you returned to check-point 2 and met Gobillard

9 at about 1600 hours. "He met Tolimir, and then I left Zepa to return with

10 him to Sarajevo." So the question is how long did the meeting with

11 Tolimir take, between Gobillard and Tolimir?

12 A. I don't recall.

13 Q. At all? This is particularly important, Colonel, actually.

14 A. I can guess but I really don't recall how long it could have

15 taken, but I think I'm more precise in my diary as to when the meeting

16 started.

17 Q. Yes. I think I just said.

18 A. Well, you said --

19 Q. I beg your pardon, you're more precise in your note. I think you

20 say in your note which is the handwritten note which was a Prosecution

21 Exhibit, I think you say 1710. We are just going to find a copy. I

22 haven't got it to hand.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer?

24 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I think we can agree that 2969

25 indicates that this meeting was 28 July at 1720 hours.

Page 18402

1 MR. JOSSE:

2 Q. So your handwritten note says the meeting appears to have started

3 at 1720 as Mr. Thayer has helpfully just said, and you don't recall how

4 long it took?

5 A. No, I don't, but certainly less than an hour.

6 Q. And you and your general then immediately turned around and went

7 back to Sarajevo?

8 A. As far as I recall, yes.

9 Q. At the point that you left, was there any sign of General Smith in

10 Zepa?

11 A. Not that I recall.

12 Q. Have you any idea when, if at all, General Smith next went to

13 Zepa?

14 A. I don't.

15 Q. And, in fact, your diary says that the journey took four hours,

16 the return journey to Sarajevo. That sounds about right?

17 A. Yeah, which is much faster than 20 some hours it took the first

18 time.

19 Q. Yes, that's because you were held up in Rogatica, correct?

20 A. Yes, correct.

21 Q. And the -- any recollection about what you did about food that

22 evening? I only ask to see if it perhaps jogs your memory as to what time

23 you left or where you ate or what time you ate, or anything like that.

24 A. Sorry, I don't -- I don't recall any more specifically.

25 Q. And I take it there was no sign of General Gvero in Zepa on either

Page 18403

1 the 27th or the 28th of July, was there?

2 A. Well, having never met him, I couldn't have recognised him any

3 way.

4 Q. No. And there was no suggestion from any of the VRS troops that

5 there was another general there amongst them, Tolimir in particular?

6 A. No, not that I recall.

7 MR. JOSSE: If I could just have a moment, please.

8 Q. I want to ask you a few things about matters that you mentioned in

9 your evidence-in-chief, and you gave some evidence about fuel and the fact

10 that you had become aware that the Ukrainian Brigade were trading fuel

11 with the Serbs. That's right, isn't it?

12 A. Correct. The Ukrainian company in Zepa.

13 Q. And where had that information come from, please?

14 A. I don't recall the exact source, just something that was discussed

15 at sector headquarters.

16 Q. And there was no intelligence or information that the Bosniak

17 inhabitants were doing the same, namely trading fuel with UNPROFOR?

18 A. That's possible. I don't remember that.

19 Q. When you say it's possible, it's possible it happened, it's

20 possible there was some information, what, please?

21 A. Both actually. Both are possible.

22 Q. You've a low opinion of that company, haven't you?

23 A. Well, the unit, as I described yesterday, in general, was having

24 lots of problems and not behaving very professionally in general.

25 Q. And to be perfectly fair about this, if I can confronted you with

Page 18404

1 suggestions that the local inhabitants were trading in fuel with that

2 Ukrainian company, you've already said it wouldn't come as a surprise to

3 you at all?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Okay. You said this about that company, that there were

6 suspicions that they were pro-Serb. Do you remember saying that?

7 A. M'hm. I also said that this -- these suspicions were expressed by

8 French officers at the headquarters Sector Sarajevo.

9 Q. Did you have a view on the subject?

10 A. Well, generally, it was easier for them to move about in Serb-held

11 territory than for anybody else except perhaps the Russians after the

12 hostage crisis of May 1995. In fact, we could not for a while go into

13 Serb-held territory, the weeks following the hostage crisis, but we had to

14 maintain contact with Indic, for example, in Lukavica, and we would use

15 the Ukrainians to do that.

16 Q. And did you have any information about how the Ukrainians

17 interacted with the population of Zepa, particularly as the crisis was

18 brewing?

19 A. No, no, no details anyway.

20 Q. Let's have a look at 6D122, please. We need page 5 of the

21 English, please, and page 5 of the B/C/S. This, let me tell you, Colonel,

22 to cut matters short, is a document that emanates from February of 1996,

23 and it's a review by a Brigadier General Jasarevic of the army of the

24 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the events surrounding the fall of

25 Srebrenica and Zepa. And in the middle of that page, we see him talking

Page 18405

1 about the Chetniks' attack on Zepa on the 9th of July of 1995. He talks

2 about the local brigade, the 285th Light Brigade, and he talks about the

3 Ukrainians.

4 And then he says, about halfway through that paragraph, "After the

5 commander of this UNPROFOR battalion crossed over to the command of the

6 Chetnik forces, the new Ukrainian Battalion commander handed over all

7 weapons at its disposal to our soldiers. These were immediately used to

8 defend Zepa. According to several displaced persons from Zepa, he even

9 sent false reports to UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo saying that members of

10 the Ukrainian Battalion had been directly attacked and requesting NATO air

11 strikes against the Chetniks."

12 So in short, this is in effect Muslim intelligence, which is being

13 reproduced in a Muslim report. Can you comment on this at all?

14 A. It's the first I hear of this, and frankly it seems a bit

15 far-fetched.

16 Q. Why do you say that?

17 A. Well, based on the information that I had and what I knew of the

18 Ukrainians, as I said, they were not the best of soldiers, but going so

19 far as to lie to their command? I doubt that. That's my personal

20 appraisal.

21 Q. Were you aware that the Bosniaks, around the 15th, 16th of July,

22 asked for air strikes on the VRS because of their offensive against Zepa?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. You remember that?

25 A. Yeah. I'm not sure about the dates you're mentioning, but we had

Page 18406

1 some, let's say, complaints from the Bosnians, requesting that we do

2 something, namely air strikes.

3 Q. Last question on this: These French officers felt, for reasons

4 that you've explained, that the Ukrainians were pro-Serb. If the

5 Ukrainians were pro-Serb, were the rest of UNPROFOR pro-Bosniak?

6 A. Well, I think it would mean that they were more impartial, as the

7 UN would like it.

8 Q. Did you see any part of UNPROFOR, I know it's a large

9 organisation, that you would categorise as pro-Muslim?

10 A. Can't comment about every individuals but organisation, I don't

11 think so, or I haven't been a witness to things like that, no.

12 Q. I'll deal with this vis-a-vis your diary in a moment, but would

13 you categorise General Smith as more pro-Bosniak than your commander,

14 General Gobillard?

15 A. I don't think so, no.

16 Q. Okay. I am going to go through various extracts in your journal.

17 Before we go into private session to do that, bearing in mind you were

18 asked some general questions about it in open session, I think I can ask

19 you this at the moment: The journal, as you made clear, was actually

20 compiled in late 1997, correct?

21 A. It was put together as it is, yes, but as I said, all the meetings

22 that I attended and where I took notes, those notes were typed usually the

23 same day or in a relatively short time, and when I produced the journal

24 they were cut and paste, put all together.

25 Q. And were they private notes or were they notes which formed some

Page 18430

1 my friend and share it with him, though.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: It's your influence, Mr. Ostojic.

3 MR. THAYER: That's right. We have four -- I'm sorry, five new

4 exhibits, 2968 --

5 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment let me follow you.

6 MR. THAYER: And this should track the list of exhibits that we

7 had tendered or that we had distributed in advance of Colonel Fortin's

8 testimony.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we need to have a clear picture of what

10 you're tendering.

11 MR. THAYER: I'll recite them, Mr. President.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Just the 65 ter number, these.

13 MR. THAYER: 2968, 2969, 2970, 2502, and 6D00165. That is the

14 journal. I expect that we may have to have some discussions about once

15 again putting the whole thing in evidence or just putting in the portions

16 that were referred to. My preference would be just put the whole thing in

17 with all the translations that accompany it and whatever sections are

18 needed to be referred to in the future, everybody can do that without

19 having to create three separate documents, which is what we would have to

20 do, one from the original French, one from the English translation, and

21 one from the B/C/S. This way I just think it will be more efficient and a

22 simpler process to offer the whole document.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Any objections? Mr. Ostojic?

24 MR. OSTOJIC: Just for point of clarification I'm not sure in my

25 index what is right off the top, 2502.

Page 18431

1 MR. THAYER: I apologise. We had initially thought that that was

2 not a document that had been used before. It was in fact MFI'd in

3 connection with Mr. Torlak's testimony. So I think we had initially given

4 that the number 2971. We went back and found out that it originally had

5 been assigned 2502. That is the 15 July Harland report that I believe at

6 least one of my friends also used during their cross-examination.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Is that clear enough, Mr. Ostojic?

8 MR. OSTOJIC: It is, Mr. President, thank you.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Any objections from any of the Defence

10 teams? Mr. Josse?

11 MR. JOSSE: Our preference, Your Honour, would be for the selected

12 passages of the diary to be admitted into evidence. I am bound to say

13 that I would have no objection to the whole diary going into evidence if

14 we had some assurance from the Trial Chamber that they would only rely

15 upon those passages that had in some way been alluded to during the course

16 of the case. It's a point I've made before. Basically we submit we need

17 to know partly the evidence that we've got to meet in the trial but more

18 to the point the evidence that is going to be considered when the Trial

19 Chamber comes to deliberate at the end of this trial.

20 Whilst it will be rather cumbersome for the four parties or three

21 parties who have cross-examined on the document, the one party who

22 examined in chief in relation to it, my preference would be that we do

23 produce a separate document with those passages that have been dealt with

24 during the course of the various examinations.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Josse. Mr. Thayer.

Page 18432

1 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, just let me make explicit what I

2 thought was implicit in my submission a few moments ago which is we do

3 trust the Trial Chamber to do exactly that and not roam where the

4 witnesses have not taken us.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Thank you. Let me confer with my colleagues.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Our position -- I think -- is no different from the

8 position that we have taken already in the past on similar instances, and

9 that is that for us it will be much easier if we are to follow, to have

10 the entire document, especially if we are to establish dates and sequence.

11 But the understanding obviously is that we will be relying only

12 for the purposes of our deliberations on the parts that you have made use

13 of during the testimony of this Colonel, and during the testimony of

14 others if it's the case, and nothing beyond that. So again, our

15 preference is to have the full document rather than excerpts from it.

16 MR. JOSSE: Well, of course, it's your decision, but could I say

17 we are quite happy with that.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: And for the -- to make things easier and clearer for

19 both of you, I mean, if you come forward and indicate the parts on which

20 you are relying, it will be even much better for us because we will have a

21 straightforward direction from -- indication from you.

22 All right. Any objections as regards the other documents,

23 Prosecution documents? None. So they are admitted.

24 This diary will go under seal.

25 The diary will go under seal because of the restrictions that we

Page 18433

1 spoke about in an earlier sitting.

2 Yes, Mr. Thayer? I see you standing.

3 MR. THAYER: I just want to advise the Chamber that we have no

4 objections to any of the documents that had been tendered by any of the

5 teams.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: To my knowledge there is only one. Mr. Josse, there

7 is only one document to my knowledge that you wish to tender.

8 MR. JOSSE: Yes, even though it's previously been referred to we

9 had never actually tendered it, as far as our records can see. We would

10 now like to tender it.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: That to confirm is 6D132?

12 MR. JOSSE: That's correct, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: No objection I take it and no objection from any of

14 the other Defence teams? So that document is admitted. No documents,

15 Madam Fauveau?

16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No documents.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: So that concludes the Louis Fortin's testimony. Is

18 the next witness here?

19 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, our next witness is here.

20 Mr. McCloskey had an issue to address with the Court prior that that

21 might -- okay. Well, we'll finish this issue, then. We do have the next

22 witness available. If I might propose something, given that we have

23 Mr. Ostojic's cross-examination still to go, which I think is estimated at

24 a half an hour, and we have additional cross-examination from Madam

25 Fauveau, I would suggest that given the final preliminary, it may not be

Page 18434

1 worth bringing him -- bringing the witness in to get only half of one of

2 those two cross-examinations done and then pick it up on another day.

3 If the Court feels that that's useful, to pick it up and get at

4 least half of one, then okay, but I just note that it may just be easier

5 to keep him as a gap filler for another rainy day and get both

6 cross-examinations done in one fell swoop.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. But that may sound okay when it relates to

8 Mr. Ostojic's cross-examination, even though we don't know whether he will

9 finish it in 20 minutes, but we had an indication from Madam Fauveau

10 earlier on that she could conclude her further cross examination in 20

11 minutes. So if there is no objection, we could do that with

12 Mr. Blaszczyk, provided he can show up without delay. Yes, Madam Fauveau?

13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I just want to

14 inform you that this will be even shorter, I think five minutes will be

15 even plenty.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.

17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to ask whether my

18 colleague from the OTP has a hard copy of the document coming from the

19 Republic of Serbia. For technical reasons we didn't have time to upload

20 it into e-court.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Madam Fauveau. So I take it we can tell

22 General Nicolai to go away, to leave.

23 MR. THAYER: I'm sorry, Mr. President, when you said the next

24 witness, I thought you meant the gap filler.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes.

Page 18435

1 MR. THAYER: Okay. General Nicolai is not here.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. That's why -- I thought he was here and

3 I was telling you to tell him that he can go.

4 MR. THAYER: Lost in some translation.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Yes, Mr. Nicholls?

6 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, just to respond to Ms. Fauveau. I'm

7 sorry, I don't have an extra hard copy of that document. We spoke earlier

8 and maybe she has one now and I offered to provide one and maybe we

9 misunderstood, but she told me she could print one herself she thought.

10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you but I solved the problem.

11 I found hard copies, thank you.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: So let's wait for Mr. Blaszczyk. And Mr. Ostojic,

13 how much time do you think you require for -- to complete your

14 cross-examination?

15 MR. OSTOJIC: I do think about --

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Meek wouldn't tell us last time.

17 MR. OSTOJIC: I think a half hour, Your Honour. I think I

18 indicated last time on the 2nd of November I had about an hour, but

19 looking at it I do really believe I have an hour or so.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: An hour?

21 MR. OSTOJIC: I mean a half hour or so. Not an hour. Thank you.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: In the meantime, since the Prosecution motion to add

23 to their 65 ter list in relation to this witness that I mentioned to you

24 earlier on, may become urgent, sort of, if we get Mr. Blaszczyk back to

25 testify soon. I would like you to respond to it by not later than Monday