1 Thursday, 13 December 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning.
7 Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is the case
9 number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, madam.
11 All the accused are here. From the Prosecution teams, I notice
12 the absence of Mr. Meek -- or from the Defence teams, I notice the absence
13 of Mr. Meek, Mr. Haynes, and Mr. Bourgon. The Prosecution team is
14 Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Thayer.
15 Good morning to you, Colonel.
16 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Nice to see you again.
18 We are doing our utmost to try and finish with your testimony
19 without need for you to return. I don't know how successful we will be;
20 but in the past, the Prosecution and Defence teams have been very
21 cooperative. So let's keep our fingers crossed and give it a try.
22 WITNESS: JOSEPH KINGORI [Resumed]
23 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Good morning. Good morning to you, Your Honours. Good morning
1 Examination by Mr. Thayer: [Continued]
2 Q. Good morning, Colonel.
3 A. Good morning.
4 Q. We left off with you mentioning a Colonel Vukovic, in addition to
5 Major Nikolic, as two VRS commanders with whom you had some meetings prior
6 to July of 1995. Do you recall that?
7 A. Your Honour, I do.
8 Q. Could you describe, roughly, how frequently you would meet with
9 either one of those two men, and where you would meet them?
10 A. Your Honour, I'll start with Major Nikolic, who we could meet as
11 often as possible, in that if there was anything that we required to know
12 or to check or to give information to the BSA side, this was our main
13 contact. This is the guy we always communicated with through our
14 interpreter, and this could be as often as maybe even twice a week, once a
15 week, or something like that.
16 For Colonel Vukovic, it was not that often. I think during my
17 stay there, for meetings, we met about two or three times, not more than
19 Q. And where would these meetings take place, for example, with Major
21 A. With Major Nikolic, we would normally meet at the point that we
22 were calling "Yellow Bridge." This was a point somewhere in between
23 Potocari and Bratunac. So that is where we would meet, and it was sort of
24 a check-point for them. There were soldiers there. So they would come
25 from the BSA side and we come from the Srebrenica side, and we meet there
1 and discuss whatever we wanted to discuss.
2 Also, it's worth noting that at times we would meet in a hotel,
3 Hotel Fontana, inside Bratunac.
4 Q. And would these contacts be initiated solely by yourself or your
5 fellow UNMOs or would Major Nikolic read out to you through Petar as well
6 on occasion?
7 A. In some instances, it would be Major Nikolic, himself, requesting
8 to meet us, due to some issues that maybe he wanted us to discuss; and at
9 other times, it could be ourselves initiating the discussion or even
10 Dutch-Bat. Dutch-Bat could at times request for a meeting with us and
11 Major Nikolic at the Yellow Bridge or whatever.
12 Q. And what types of matters would these meetings cover?
13 A. Your Honour, most of the times these issues that we were
14 discussing would cover areas like the general condition of the enclave;
15 the issues concerning the Muslims themselves; the BSA side; also issues
16 concerning, especially when we are the ones that requested it or the
17 Dutch-Bat, issues concerning the UNHCR convoys; or even during the time
18 that our UNMOs had gone out and there was no replacement, requesting them
19 to see whether they can allow new ones to come in so that they can replace
20 the ones who have already gone. So there were various issues that we
21 would discuss.
22 Q. Did Major Nikolic, or Colonel Vukovic, or any of the Serb military
23 representatives with whom you met ever complain to you about the fact that
24 Muslim forces were attacking, from inside the enclave, outside the
1 A. Your Honour, this is an occurrence that I really don't remember
2 whether it ever happened, because most of the accusations on attacks were
3 coming from the BiH, saying that they had been attacked by the BSA, but
4 normally not the other way around, not the BSA complaining about attacks
5 from the BiH. It was, I think, very rare or never occurred.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: I just want to make sure that -- I take it that you
7 are restricting this information or this answer that you've just given to
8 the reports that you received, personally, or are you including also
9 knowledge of other reports received by others, UNHCR, for example?
10 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I'm mainly restricting myself to what
11 we, as observers, got. If there was any report maybe from Dutch-Bat that
12 maybe never came to our attention, I really do not know. But from the
13 observer side, it's not necessarily me, but also including the other
14 military observers that we had there.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
16 MR. THAYER:
17 Q. Now, Colonel, whatever the reason for a particular meeting with
18 the VRS representatives, was there anything in particular that they
19 repeated to you during the course of those meetings that stands out in
20 your mind?
21 A. I think one thing that was very clear in their minds and in most
22 of the discussions that we had is that they would like the Muslims to
23 leave the enclave. The way in which they would leave the enclave varied
24 from individual to individual, but mainly they had these as the main
25 agenda, that they really want the Muslims to leave the enclave, so that it
1 can be free of Muslims and it can be inhabited by the normal people who
2 are Serbs.
3 To them, they always claimed that that enclave belonged to the
4 Serbs and that they could not have Muslims in their -- in their midst, so
5 they just wanted the Muslims to leave that enclave. At one point, they
6 even alluded to the fact that they would give the Muslims passage to get
7 out, so that they leave the enclave to the Serbs.
8 Q. And was it your understanding, based on what they were telling
9 you, that when you refer to "Muslims," was that referring to only the
10 military of the Muslim population or the civilian and military population
11 together leaving the enclave?
12 A. Your Honour, when they said they wanted the Muslims out, to them
13 it was not just the military element. It meant both the military and the
14 civilian component. So they had no doubts in their minds, in their
15 utterances, in their discussions, that they really wanted all the Muslims
16 away from that enclave so that they can re-occupy the place as Serbs;
17 because to them, it belonged to them.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Is this a conclusion that you arrived at at the time
19 or is it a conclusion that you have arrived at after the events; and in
20 any case, on what do you base it?
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, it is even written in one of -- I think
22 partly in my statement that I gave and also in some of the sitreps that
23 they said they wanted the Muslims to leave the enclave.
24 MR. THAYER: And perhaps I can follow up, Mr. President.
25 Q. Sir, I want to turn your attention to a dinner meeting you had at
1 the Hotel Fontana in June of 1995, at which Colonel Vukovic was present.
2 Do you recall that meeting, and if you do, would you just describe the
3 events that occurred in that meeting for the Trial Chamber?
4 A. Your Honour, this was a meeting that was called by Major Nikolic
5 and his team, and they wanted us to meet in that hotel with some senior
6 BSA officers. They did not tell us the agenda of the meeting. But when
7 we arrived there, there were several senior officers, including Colonel
8 Vukovic. And during the discussion that we had there, Colonel Vukovic was
9 very clear in his own words, saying that, "We should tell -- go and tell
10 the Muslims to pack up and leave Srebrenica. We do not want them there."
11 Then he went on further to say that he could give them safe
12 passage to get out of the enclave; and if not, if they do not want to get
13 out on their own will, he's going to kill them. That was very clear,
14 those were the instructions that he gave, those were his words. And to
15 was, we took it like he was being very clear. He was telling them,
16 actually, "You better leave; and if you don't want to leave willingly, we
17 will clear the enclave of you."
18 Q. Now, sir, in June of 1995, did anything happen that affected the
19 size of your team?
20 A. Your Honour, this is the time that some of the UNMOs who were
21 inside the enclave finished their times of staying there. In fact, if we
22 start slightly before that, we had every month, after working 30 days, a
23 UNMO would be given six days off so that he can go back to Zagreb or
24 whatever he wants, so that he can relax, and come back already refreshed
25 so that he can be used better.
1 During that period, that is, somewhere after April, they started
2 denying the UNMOs, that is, the BSA started denying the UNMOs permission
3 to leave the enclave. So there was a long stay until three observers were
4 due now for rotation, and the BSA said they cannot give clearance for them
5 to get out. So, later on, they allowed them to get out; and upon their
6 exit, they said they cannot allow anybody else to come in to replace them.
7 So, in effect, we were left, just the three of us; me, myself;
8 Major Andre De Haan from Holland; and Major David Tetteh from Ghana.
9 Those were the only observers who were left in the enclave at that time.
10 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Mr. Thayer. Did you leave issue of the
11 meeting at Hotel Fontana with Colonel Vukovic?
12 MR. THAYER: I thought I had, but I sense that we haven't, Your
14 JUDGE KWON: Okay. Please proceed.
15 MR. THAYER:
16 Q. Now, Colonel, out of the three UNMOs who you just described, was
17 any of -- were any of you assigned to be the team leader?
18 A. Your Honour, Mr. Andre De Haan was the UNMO who was appointed as
19 the team leader, and he started functioning the same way as the team
20 leader. Until later on when he got sick and admitted, we were left there,
21 just the two of us, me and David Tetteh.
22 Q. Colonel, I want to turn your attention now to the VRS attack on
23 the Srebrenica enclave. Do you recall where you were when the attack
24 commenced on 6 July?
25 A. Your Honour, on the 6th of July, that is when the final assault on
1 Srebrenica started, and we were sleeping in the PTT building when we heard
2 shelling all over the place. That was around somewhere 3.00, around 3.00
3 or somewhere there, in the early hours of the morning. That is when we
4 heard shells in large quantities, because shelling in Srebrenica sometimes
5 was obviously not -- was actually a norm; but at that time, it was
6 continuous shelling.
7 So we realised something is going on. So we went to the bunker
8 and listened, counted the shells, then came out, started sending reports,
9 and we knew for sure there was something that was actually happening,
10 something that looked like it's a serious business.
11 Q. Now, can you describe the shelling that you're observing and
12 hearing and counting during this first day of the attack on 6 July? Was
13 there any pattern that you began to perceive?
14 A. Your Honour, the pattern was almost definite. It was like they
15 were shelling a few shells -- not a few, you know, you're talking 50 and
16 over shells; then stop for a while; and, after a while, they would come
17 back and shell again. They had formed a system whereby they were starting
18 from the one side of the village, going upwards.
19 So, in that, you know, we were also interpreting that way, because
20 at least we wanted to know what is really happening. And when we caught
21 that pattern, we realised there could be a safe period in between when we
22 could get out of the bunkers, go and see what is really happening on
23 ground -- on the ground itself, analyse the craters. Then maybe if
24 they're sick, we take them to hospital, injured. For those killed, we
25 count and report and all that. We found that to be almost a bit
1 systematic. They had a system, a pattern that they had formed.
2 Q. Now, by this time on July 6th, how many UNMOs do you recall being
3 operational and were actually working in Srebrenica with you?
4 A. Your Honour, the UNMOs who were there were just the two of us, me
5 and Major David Tetteh, just the two of us in the enclave.
6 Q. You referred to bunkers. Where was your bunker located?
7 A. Our bunker, Your Honour, was located below the PTT building, and
8 that is like an underground floor, you know. Below where we were, where
9 we were living, under there was something that was sort of a bunker. That
10 is where we were going to hide ourselves from the shelling, at least to
11 feel that we were a bit safe.
12 Q. Now, were you able to still count the detonations from inside that
13 bunker, sir?
14 A. From there, we could, because the shells, you know, they make a
15 loud bang, and you could count all of them. You can't count all of them.
16 In the whole of Srebrenica itself, I mean the town itself, all the way up
17 to Potocari, you would be able to count, because you could hear and the
18 noise is accurate, definite. I mean, you can hear it from wherever you
20 Q. You described, Colonel, a safe period that you detected in this
21 pattern of shelling. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what you and Major
22 Tetteh did during those safe periods and what you personally observed?
23 A. Your Honour, this, in the first place, this was a very trying
24 moment for both of us. It's the first time we had such a serious
25 situation in the whole AOR, that is, area of responsibility, and now we
1 are left just the two of us. So flexibility got minimised a bit, in that
2 with many you are able to send some out, some would go for patrols, some
3 would do this and that, some would write reports, but now we are just the
4 two of us.
5 How do you do it? How do you go about the business of knowing
6 what is happening outside? And we had a minimum number of observers who
7 could go out; that is, two. So what do you do?
8 We decided that in the absence of additional observers, we had to
9 at least use ourselves and make sure that we get a proper count of what is
10 happening in the enclave. So we decided that one of us would be going out
11 with one of the interpreters.
12 In one vehicle, go out and check what is happening; first of all,
13 know how the shelling is, the effects of the shelling in the enclave; the
14 injured, if there are any; the killed, if there are any; also analyse the
15 craters as much as one could within as short a time as possible; then come
16 back and start making the report.
17 By that time, the other person now can also go out. If the
18 pattern has started again, he can also go out, do the same, and we were
19 rotating like that. So, in essence, what I'm saying is that we wanted to
20 do everything within the shortest time possible and with a minimum number
21 of people that we had; that is, just the two of us. So that is exactly
22 what we did.
23 But in the process, also we managed to inform the people, that is,
24 the inhabitants of the town, that they should not get out. We tried to
25 sensitize them, you know, with as much effort as we could, saying, "The
1 pattern that is coming now, you people will be killed. So please stay off
2 the streets, stay off everywhere else. Just go to your houses and stay
3 there." Of course, it was difficult to achieve this, but at least we
4 tried as much as we could.
5 Q. And, sir, based on your experience in Srebrenica, were you aware
6 of whether or not people did have shelters, bunkers, or safe places to go?
7 A. In fact, there were a few bunkers. In most of the houses, there
8 was some safe areas under, but, of course, they could not be enough for
9 the whole population of that place. So even if we were telling them to do
10 that, most of them would still be in their own houses, normal areas of
11 their dwelling, because there were not enough bunkers. But at least we
12 informed them to try and be safe.
13 Q. Now, would you please describe the casualties, if any, that you
14 personally observed during this first day of shelling?
15 A. Your Honour, during this first day of shelling, the casualties, we
16 had several- just a few, actually - who had shrapnel injuries, that is, to
17 the head, some to the whole body, their legs, and all that; but,
18 surprisingly, the number was not high. It was not high. I cannot
19 remember how many, but there were a few. We took a few to hospital.
20 Actually, it was surprisingly low. Despite the heavy shelling, the number
21 of casualties were very low, in fact.
22 Q. Okay, and we'll talk about that in a few moments.
23 Did you stay in Srebrenica, do you recall, that first day, or did
24 you go anywhere else?
25 A. During that day, I think - I think - I just stayed in Srebrenica.
1 I'm not very sure, but I think I stayed there.
2 Q. And did you manage to report the events of this first day to your
3 UNMO sector headquarters in Tuzla?
4 A. Your Honour, I did. In fact, every event, we were reporting to
5 our headquarters as soon as it happened.
6 MR. THAYER: May we have 65 ter 490 on e-court, please.
7 Q. Okay. Sir, do you see the document in front of you?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 Q. Can you read it okay?
10 A. Yes, I can.
11 Q. Do you recognise what this particular document is?
12 A. Yeah. Your Honour, these are normal sitrep.
13 Q. And would you just explain the "from," "to," and "info" lines that
14 appear towards the top of the document, please?
15 A. "From," here it shows that it's from UNMO headquarters sector BH,
16 that is, Bosnia and Herzegovina Northeast. That is the sector that we
17 had. That was our own sector. And "To," this is to the UNMO headquarter
18 BH Command. The "From" is actually from Tuzla, and the BH Command was in
19 Sarajevo. Then "Info," MIO, that is a military information officer, UNMO
20 headquarters, Zagreb.
21 Q. Just one more definition, sir. At paragraph 2, there's an acronym
22 there, "SMO," "SMO's assessment." What does "SMO" stand for?
23 A. This is the senior military observer; that is, the one in charge
24 of a sector.
25 Q. So he or she would have been based, in this case, in Tuzla;
2 A. Correct, Your Honour.
3 Q. Now, if we look at paragraph 3, do you see the portion that
4 begins: "Team Srebrenica reported a BSA offensive launched and ongoing."
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 Q. There is a reference to at least 250 artillery and mortar
7 rounds "have been recorded so far." Do you recall where that information
8 as to the specific figure of 250 artillery and mortar rounds came from?
9 A. For sure, these -- these came from us. I can't see the "250."
10 Q. I'm sorry. You can or cannot, sir?
11 A. I cannot. Maybe my eyesight is --
12 Q. Okay. If you see in the middle of that big paragraph, and this is
13 both in the English and the B/C/S versions, the middle of paragraph 3,
14 there is a reference to Srebrenica township with some grid references, and
15 then it says: "At least 250 artillery and mortar rounds have been
16 recorded so far."
17 If you like, I have a hard copy.
18 A. I can see. I can see now.
19 Q. Now, again, do you know what the source of that figure of 250
20 mortar rounds was?
21 A. Your Honour, I believe this is -- this should have come from us,
22 as military observers.
23 Q. And as for the other information concerning Dutch-Bat reporting
24 rockets, did that come from you, do you recall, or did that come from
25 Dutch-Bat directly?
1 A. This is a report that we, ourselves, as Team Srebrenica, were
2 given by Dutch-Bat, and we reported the same. So it came from us, but
3 originally from Dutch-Bat themselves.
4 MR. THAYER: Okay. Moving along, sir, may we have 65 ter 491 on
5 e-court, please.
6 Q. Now, can you read this okay, sir? I've got a hard copy again, if
7 that's easier for you?
8 A. Yeah, I can read it.
9 Q. And can you tell the Trial Chamber what this report is, first?
10 A. First of all, this is a situation report, and it is from the
11 sector that is UNPROFOR. It is not by UNMOs; this is the UNPROFOR itself.
12 Q. And do you see the date and time in the upper left-hand corner, "6
13 July, 2100 hours, July 1995"? Do you see that, sir?
14 A. Yes, I do. I can see the time.
15 MR. THAYER: Let's turn to page 2 of both the English and the
17 Q. Turning to paragraph 1, sir, there is a reference to Potocari
18 compound being targeted several times during the day. Do you see that?
19 It's about the middle of the paragraph.
20 A. Yes, I do.
21 Q. The last sentence in this paragraph indicates that: "In
22 Srebrenica enclave, an artillery impact killed a civilian and injured
23 [Realtime transcript read in error "killed"] a boy." Do you see that?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. Now, sir, based on your recollection, do you know if these
1 casualties are the same as those you and Major Tetteh observed and
2 reported or are these being reported separately by Dutch-Bat?
3 A. Your Honour, this was a report separately by Dutch-Bat, but I
4 think this is the same as we had observed ourselves.
5 Q. Now, if we look down to the bottom of the page, this is page 2 of
6 the English and we'll have to go to page 3 of the B/C/S, at paragraph 3 --
7 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. My apologies to you, Mr. Zivanovic.
8 But I was bending down, reading the document, and you just didn't make it
9 further up from the screen, so I never noticed you.
10 Yes, go ahead.
11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: There is a misstatement in the line 15 on the
12 page -- page 15, line 3. It is stated that "killed a boy," but in the
13 original documents, the boy is "injured."
14 MR. THAYER: It actually should be reversed.
15 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It's reversed.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
17 MR. THAYER: I thank my friend. It should be reversed.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes, yes.
19 MR. THAYER:
20 Q. Now, sir, going down to the bottom of the page, and this is page 2
21 of the English and page 3 of the B/C/S, it's paragraph 3(e)(3). There is
22 a reference to the Srebrenica enclave under the heading "Eastern Area."
23 "150 detonations were counted. Due to bunker alarms, an exact figure
24 cannot be given." Do you see that, sir?
25 A. Yes, I see it.
1 Q. Now, is this information that was being reported from you and
2 Major Tetteh or is this information that Dutch-Bat was gathering on its
3 own and reporting to UNPROFOR?
4 A. This -- this was not our report. This is UNPROFOR, and I guess
5 this figure was given by the Dutch-Bat, not us.
6 Q. Okay.
7 MR. THAYER: We're done with that document. Thank you. Let's
8 move to the next day of the attack, 7 July.
9 Q. Can you describe what occurred that day? Did the attack continue;
10 and if so, can you describe the shelling that you observed?
11 A. Your Honour, the shelling just continued. The following day, it
12 was a continuation of the previous one. The number of shells actually
13 were almost the same, and the target seemed to be the same; that is,
14 Srebrenica itself and Potocari. The pattern followed the same way as the
15 previous day, so there was no let-up on the onslaught. It was the same.
16 Q. And were you able to observe what was actually being struck by the
17 shelling, Colonel?
18 A. In fact, we would get out and after -- that is, after we would get
19 the lull, we would get out, go to the town itself, see where the target
20 was. We were surprised to find that the target mainly was the market
21 area, and surprisingly they were also trying to target the hospital; that
22 is, that was our own conclusion, because you could see they were missing
23 it by a -- by a whisker. Also regarding the PTT building, that we could
24 see because the shells were landing just across, across the river; that
25 is, to a hill which was on the other side.
1 And on the marketplace, at least they were getting -- they were
2 getting the market, but luckily there was nobody in that market. So there
3 were no many casualties, as such, but at least they had some targets they
4 were targeting. Regarding also the roads, the roads - maybe I don't know
5 for what particular reason - but at least they were targeting the roads.
6 Q. Now, when you say they were targeting, for example, the market,
7 what are you referring to, sir? What was being struck?
8 A. I'm saying that the -- the shells were landing in the market or
9 just in the vicinity; you know, not necessarily inside, but inside, close
10 by, or somewhere along there. So we could see actually the actual target
11 was that particular -- particular market.
12 And, of course, the market, that is something they all knew its
13 location because it had not changed for a long time. Also, the PTT
14 building was the same for a very long time, and the hospital also.
15 Q. Now, you referred to the hospital and the PTT building, sir. Do
16 you recall whether those were being targeted, from your recollection, that
17 very second day of the shelling or were they targeted later on during the
18 shelling on another day?
19 A. Your Honour, even this time, the PTT was being targeted, at least
20 the shells were landing across the other side, but it was never hit. It
21 was never hit during this period at all. Even the hospital was not hit,
22 but we could see the shells were coming somewhere just around there.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Colonel, well, if I remember well, the hospital is
24 practically opposite the PTT building, isn't it?
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, it was opposite, but you climb a
1 bit to get to it.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: So how would you know, as a military man, how would
3 you know whether a shell is aimed at one or is directed to hit one, rather
4 than the other, if they are in the same direct line of shooting?
5 THE WITNESS: If they're in the same line and they're slightly
6 short of each other, there's some distance in between, you can tell -- if
7 the shell is hitting in between the two buildings, you can tell that maybe
8 it is targeting either. But if it is somewhere maybe of the first
9 building, you can tell that maybe the target was that particular building
10 that is there.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
12 MR. THAYER:
13 Q. Now, on the second day of shelling, Colonel, did you or Major
14 Tetteh leave Srebrenica for any reason?
15 A. On the second day, I cannot remember very well, but I think we
16 were called for a meeting. I cannot remember very well.
17 Q. Okay. Well, on either the first or second days of the shelling,
18 do you recall ever going to Potocari?
19 A. Yeah, yeah. We went to Potocari. We were called to Potocari for
20 a meeting with Dutch-Bat.
21 Q. Okay. And do you recall what that meeting was about?
22 A. That meeting was specifically on the issues that had occurred and
23 also to discuss some information that [indiscernible] had received
24 concerning some ultimatums.
25 MR. THAYER: Okay, and we'll get to those in a little while. Why
1 don't we look at 65 ter number 492, please.
2 Q. Do you see the document in front of you, Colonel?
3 A. Yes, I do.
4 Q. And what is this, sir?
5 A. This is an UNMO report from headquarters, the sector; that is, the
6 Sector BH Northeast to UNMO HQ Command, and also they inform the HQ
8 Q. And this is a daily sitrep for what day, sir?
9 A. This is a daily sitrep for -- it was covering the period 0700
10 hours. "07," that is the date; and around midnight, that is "0001 Bravo."
11 That is the times that we had there, up to the evening of that same day.
12 Q. And that's 2000 hours?
13 A. That is 2000 hours, July 7, 1995.
14 MR. THAYER: Now, let's look down at paragraph 3, if we could, and
15 this will be on both the English and the B/C/S versions.
16 Q. Do you see where it says: "Team Srebrenica reported that the BSA
17 continued their offensive."
18 Do you see that?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. Now There is a reference to: "Dutch-Bat reported heavy shelling
21 around their compound in Potocari; and as a result, three men were injured
22 and brought by the MSF to hospital. UNMOs confirm this." Do you recall
23 you or Major Tetteh confirming those injuries?
24 A. Yes, I do. These were reported to us by Dutch-Bat; and when they
25 were bringing them to hospital, we went there and saw them.
1 Q. Further on in this paragraph, do you see where it refers to "At
2 1500, three shells landed in Srebrenica and injured two men. One was
3 picked up by our patrol and the other one by MSF, but he died on arrival
4 at the hospital."
5 Do you see that, sir?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. Do you recall whether you personally picked up or saw either of
8 these two casualties that day?
9 A. For these ones, I cannot remember very well whether I'm the one
10 who picked them or Major Tetteh. I sometimes did not know every issue,
11 but I know of this issue. This is an issue I very well know. We picked
12 them up ourselves and we took them to hospital, but what I can't remember
13 is whether it was me or Major Tetteh.
14 Q. Now, moving on, there is a reference to "More shells had been
15 landing in the same spot or around and we suspect they're from a tank
16 positioned at Company Hill. A lot of damage on buildings has been caused
17 in that area, despite the low casualty figure."
18 Now, sir, you referred, yourself, a few moments ago to your
19 surprise, that despite the amount of shelling, there were relatively few
20 casualties. Can you account for that or do you have an explanation, based
21 on your observations, for the relatively low casualty figure at that time,
22 given the amount of shelling that you reported?
23 A. First of all, I think I would say it was quite a surprise to us
24 that there was that kind of heavy shelling; and when you go out, the
25 number of injured -- or rather, the casualties were very few. But we can
1 account this to several facts, and one of them is that the -- the weapons
2 used, these are high-trajectory weapons; that is, the artillery shells,
3 they are high trajectory.
4 Most of the time where they are located, they are somewhere that
5 they can be safe, because these are the major weapons, heavy weapons for a
6 fighting unit. So, first of all, it is to ensure their security. So they
7 would be put behind a hill somewhere or behind a place -- in a place where
8 it is difficult for the enemy to see, and that is from where now you're
9 going to shoot to the other side. We call them"high trajectory," in that
10 they don't aim direct. They go up and then fall on the target or on the
11 place where you have targeted.
12 So sometimes because their target this time is also a valley,
13 because Srebrenica village itself, in fact, the whole place there, they
14 are full of several valleys, hills, and all that. So I think it was a bit
15 difficult to get the actual targets due to that particular fact, that the
16 high trajectory and the target is actually some hills, some valleys
17 somewhere. So it could be difficult to get -- to get the target
18 correctly. So that is a major -- one of the major reasons.
19 Another reason could have been the fact that at least, though
20 maybe not to a large extent, at least we sensitized the people to not go
21 out there during the shelling, to make sure they stay in. I'm not saying
22 that were the ones who did that and that was the main factor. But even
23 themselves, at least they had had more battle than we had, because when
24 the war started in that country, at least they were there. So they knew
25 what to do, and also our assistance maybe helped a bit.
1 Q. Any other factors that you can accounts for?
2 A. I can't remember, you know, other factors at the moment.
3 Q. Okay. Let's continue looking in this paragraph. There's a
4 reference to "a lot of damage on buildings has been caused." Did you
5 observe damage to buildings, sir, in Srebrenica town?
6 A. Your Honour, the first thing to remember is that most of the
7 buildings in Srebrenica had been hit, one way or the other, during
8 previous onslaughts. But during this one, at least you could go back
9 there and see some fresh -- fresh signs of attack. At least there was
10 fresh damage, not the old damage that you are used to, not the old damage
11 that you knew.
12 So you can easily tell that these buildings have been -- have been
13 hit. There has been something that was hit here because it's a bit fresh.
14 So we could easily see, Your Honour, that they were really destroyed, and
15 it was fresh, not the old destruction that was there before.
16 Q. Moving on, there's a reference at 1700 hours, "21 detonations were
17 heard by UNMOs in Potocari. We suspect they are from an MRL located" at a
18 grid reference," but NCBU." I just want to ask you a couple of questions
19 about that, sir.
20 These 21 detonations heard by UNMOs in Potocari, do you recall
21 whether or not you or Major Tetteh were in Potocari at this time to
22 personally hear these impacts or view their location, or is this something
23 you heard from Srebrenica?
24 A. Your Honour, this is -- this is information we got from Major
25 De Haan, who was already there in hospital. But at least he could
1 slightly move around, and of course he's -- he as well was working at
2 least. That is not where he had problems. So he heard that and reported
3 to us. He told us and that is what we reported, because it was one of us.
4 Q. And it further states that: "We suspect they are from this
5 multiple rocket-launcher, but NCBU." So what does that qualification
6 there tell us?
7 A. The suspicions of where they could be coming from, even if we can
8 get the general direction and it's a certain area, but if you have not
9 confirmed that it is the actual place, then you cannot say you have
10 confirmed. So that's why we put "NCBU," that is, not confirmed by UNMOs.
11 And, Your Honour, this is a place where we knew, in that general
12 area, not in Sarajevo but in one location, there was a rocket-launcher
13 somewhere, located somewhere there, because even before that we used to
14 see rockets, you know, over-flying from that general direction. So we
15 knew there was an MRL somewhere there, but we were not sure. That's why
16 we could not confirm ourselves.
17 Q. And when you say "before that," you're referring to prior to the
18 attack which began on 6 July, sir?
19 A. Yes, Your Honour.
20 Q. And do you recall approximately how many shells you and Major
21 Tetteh recorded striking Srebrenica town on this second day of shelling,
22 the 7th? Do you recall approximately how many?
23 A. Well, it's difficult to recall, but definitely it was about 200 --
24 actually, more than 200, definitely over 200.
25 MR. THAYER: Okay. Let's move to 65 ter 494 briefly, please.
1 Q. Do you see the document in front of you, Colonel?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. And what is this document?
4 A. This is a situation report which is sent by Headquarters Sector
5 Northeast. That is being sent to Headquarter UNPROFOR.
6 Q. Covering what period, sir?
7 A. The time period here is - maybe we can go down here - 1700 hours,
8 that is on the 6th, to 1700 hours on the 7th of June, 1995.
9 Q. Now, I want to ask you a couple of questions, and we'll find out
10 whether that reference to June 1995 is a typo or not.
11 MR. THAYER: Let's turn to page 2, and this is of both the English
12 and the B B/C/S.
13 Q. Do you see, up at paragraph 1: "General Assessment"?
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. Before we talk about that, do you see a fax transmittal line at
16 the top of the page with a date?
17 MR. THAYER: And we might have to scroll to the right on the
18 English version to catch that, please. It will be up at the very upper
19 right of the corner.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, and the dates are different.
21 MR. THAYER:
22 Q. Okay. And what's the date of the fax transmittal?
23 A. This is 7th of July, 1995, at 2040 hours.
24 Q. Looking at paragraph 1 here, it reports that "a BSA tank fired ten
25 rounds at the electricity plant 200 metres southwest of the Potocari
1 compound." Do you recall receiving this information, sir, or hearing
2 about this attack on the electrical plant?
3 A. Your Honour, I don't. I don't remember hearing about the attack
4 on the electricity plant; in fact, I didn't know there was -- there was
6 Q. Okay. So from your understanding, then, this information is
7 coming from where?
8 A. This information, according to what we saw on the previous page,
9 is coming from the -- from UNPROFOR, not military observers.
10 Q. The next line says: "Due to BSA shelling inside enclave, a total
11 of four civilians killed and 17 wounded."
12 Do you recall the source of this information, first of all?
13 A. This most likely could have come from Dutch-Bat, but not
14 ourselves, not UNMOs.
15 Q. By the second day of the shelling, do you have any recollection of
16 how many civilians had been wounded and killed by the shelling?
17 A. By that time, I am not very sure. The wounded obviously were
18 many, but the killed -- killed could have been maybe around four, four or
19 somewhere there. I'm not very sure.
20 Q. Okay.
21 MR. THAYER: And if we look further down to section 3 (e 3(e), and
22 we'll have to scroll down on both versions.
23 Q. Again, under "Eastern Area," there's a reference to the
24 "Srebrenica enclave, 147 detonations." Was this information coming from
25 you or is this from some other source?
1 A. Your Honour, this is not from us. This must have been from the
2 Dutch-Bat, not us.
3 Q. Now let's move to the 8th of July. Can you describe the attack
4 that day, sir?
5 A. 8th of July, Your Honour, I think, as far as I can remember, was
6 the heaviest, in terms of shelling, and it started very early and the
7 shelling was concentrated in Potocari itself and Srebrenica village. It
8 was -- I think we counted the most number of shells, and also the damage
9 was enormous. It was, really, I think the heaviest, if I can recall.
10 MR. THAYER: Let's move to 65 ter 495, please.
11 Q. What is this document, sir?
12 A. Your Honour, this is an UNMO report from BH Command, Sarajevo, to
13 UNMO headquarter's arrival from UNMO HQ BH Sector Northeast, and it covers
14 the period of July 8, 1995, 1430 hours, July 8, 1995 .
15 Q. And this is described as a "Sit Update." What's that, sir?
16 A. Your Honour, the normal sitreps were being sent every day in the
17 evening to the cover the whole period of the previous day and that
18 particular day. But whenever something happened that you're required to
19 inform the headquarters, you had to send it as an update. Actually, this
20 is an update to the sitrep.
21 Q. Let's look at update number 1: "The shelling started in
22 Srebrenica village this morning at 0800. They seem to be concentrating
23 more on the densely populated areas," two grid references are provided,
24 "and Potocari town."
25 There's a reference to "31 explosions in Potocari and 34 in
1 Srebrenica town, with one landing approximately 20 metres from the UNMO
2 accommodations at 1247."
3 Just reading into that paragraph, sir, do you recall these events?
4 A. Your Honour, I do.
5 Q. When it refers to the PTT building and the shrapnel being hurled
6 over it, were you present, sir, for that?
7 A. Your Honour, I was. This was one of the most scaring periods of
8 my stay there, in that. The -- the explosion actually hurled a lot of
9 shrapnel towards our building. Of course, you don't expect us to have any
10 windows, any glass windows, that is true. But some of them tried to
11 penetrate the hard boards that were put in the form of the windows, and we
12 got very scared because we were inside there. The shelling was
13 continuous. Shrapnels have started getting in, and we had nowhere else to
14 go, other than maybe go to the bunker.
15 These really formed a period from where - because at this time we
16 started feeling, ourselves, to be very, very insecure, very insecure -
17 anything could have happened to us any time from that time.
18 Also the PTT, as I said earlier, had some importance to the BSA,
19 in that it had some communications equipment up there. We sensed that
20 maybe they really want to destroy the whole building, and we are no longer
21 safe in there.
22 Q. Okay. There's a reference here to the BiH Chief of Staff
23 informing the UNMOs that over 100 shells have landed in a general area
24 described, but this is NCBU. Do you see that, sir? It's in the middle of
25 the paragraph.
1 A. Yeah, yeah, I've seen this. I've seen it.
2 Q. Okay. Again, does that indicate just because somebody's reporting
3 something to you, were you able to report it as being confirmed?
4 A. What this meant is that we never ignored any information that we
5 got from, whichever source; and, you know, we had reported, we had
6 reported. But if it is something that ourselves have not confirmed, we
7 always made an effort of writing, "Not confirmed by UNMO," so that we can
8 tell whoever this information is going to, ourselves have not confirmed.
9 But at times - in fact, most of the time - we would go out to try
10 to confirm and then that say we have actually confirmed it. But if the
11 circumstances do not allow, it will remain just not confirmed by UNMOs.
12 Q. Okay. To save some time, I won't ask any more questions about the
13 other portions of this memo, but let me just ask you: As you said, this
14 is a report from your sector headquarters in Tuzla to UNMO BH Command in
15 Sarajevo and Zagreb, but it appears to be an actual copy or verbatim copy
16 of a report from you. It describes "we" and so forth in the text. Can
17 you explain how this -- or how your report is incorporated into these
18 other reports?
19 A. Your Honour, during this, the onslaught on Srebrenica, most of our
20 sitreps and even the updates to the sitreps were being retransmitted the
21 same way we had written, partly because they didn't want to change
22 anything or put any inference by adding or removing anything or trying to
23 report their own way, so that it could have the same impact as we, the
24 originators, could have wanted it to have.
25 Also, maybe due to the time factor, because they wanted this
1 information to reach the upper echelon as soon as possible, and when you
2 try to write it your own way, you waste more time. This was something
3 which was a very serious occurrence, and maybe they wanted the
4 transmission to be very fast.
5 So those were the two main reasons, maybe.
6 Q. Can you just briefly describe the process by which you and Major
7 Tetteh drafted these reports during this attack, just briefly?
8 A. Your Honour, during this onslaught, what we were doing was that
9 when one observer goes out with one interpreter, the other one would be
10 left behind, trying to put the shell, or rather, to form the report.
11 The data that one comes with the one who has gone on patrol,
12 whatever he comes with, it would just be inserted so that it can be as
13 fast as possible; then when that one comes in and tries to insert that,
14 the other one would go out.
15 So these reports were a coordination of what both of us were
16 getting, and it really did not matter who was writing or sending the
17 report, but it was a summary of what both of us were getting at both
18 different moments.
19 Q. Now, Colonel, at some point on the 8th of July, did you make an
20 assessment of the food situation in the enclave, and if so, why?
21 A. The food situation in the enclave was a serious concern to our
22 headquarters, and this is something that we were doing, I think, almost
23 every week. It was a weekly report on the food situation, and it's not --
24 not just in Srebrenica. It was everywhere else.
25 This situation was to account for any discrepancies, any
1 additions, so that you can know, in case there are additions to what you
2 expected to have been there, where has it come from? Is it through the
3 normal mafia style? Is it the UNHCR food that is being sold? Is it, you
4 know, for whatever? You've got to know what is really happening, because
5 you've got to have the information on the enclave at your fingertips.
6 So concerning food, we wanted to know whether they steal
7 sufficient food for their people. What about the prices? How high are
8 the prices? Is it still affordable or not? And, of course, on
9 affordability, the people there, you know, we didn't expect them to
10 afford, but at least how affordable is it? How were the curtails working,
11 if any? So those were the main reasons that we were going to check the
12 prices of food.
13 Q. Okay. You mentioned a couple terms there, "mafia" and "cartels,"
14 and I'll ask you some follow-up questions in a moment.
15 But, first, during your time in Srebrenica, how would you describe
16 the state of the food supply for the population in Srebrenica?
17 A. Your Honour, most of the food in the enclave was coming from
18 UNHCR, the bulk of the food, because those people were dependent on the --
19 on the UN for food supplies. But in addition to that, as in any
20 situation, be it a war situation, be it a disaster, be it whatever, there
21 are always some people who sometimes try to capitalise on a predicament.
22 And, in this situation, there were people who were trying to go
23 out, which is okay. They go out, buy some food, bring it over to the
24 enclave, sell, and, of course, sell at high prices because en route they
25 had to pay for the BSA soldiers to give them a way through. And when they
1 got back, they've got to sell and get -- and get profits. So this used to
2 happen, and that was their situation.
3 Q. And how would you describe the adequacy of the food supply
4 situation in Srebrenica during your time there, Colonel?
5 A. Your Honour, there was never enough food in Srebrenica, never.
6 There's no time that there was enough food in that -- in that enclave, not
7 at all. Even when UNHCR is there, they could just provide just basic --
8 the basically required nutritional ingredients, but not enough food for
9 all the people.
10 But at times, you would find some people would try to save some
11 little food here and there from the one that they have been given by the
12 UNHCR, and you find it in the market the following day or two days later.
13 After they have saved a little, it was old, so, finally, they are able to
14 sell a bit of it to the other people.
15 MR. THAYER: Let's look at 65 ter 493, please.
16 Q. Do you recognise this document, sir; and if you do, what is it?
17 A. This is a food report in Srebrenica, and that is being sent from
18 UNMO headquarter in Sarajevo to UNMO headquarter, Zagreb, and this was
19 done on the 8th at 930 hours, July 1995.
20 Q. And who prepared this report, sir?
21 A. This report would have come from us.
22 Q. Well, do you recall how you went about compiling this report on
23 the 8th of July, during the shelling?
24 A. I do remember very well, in that we went out there and, you know,
25 we had small, small shops that used to sell a bit of food. And also
1 around the market area, some were there, the people who were selling and
2 who could be able to get the prices. You know, it was like sampling. You
3 know, you just go there and get an item. If it is wheat flour, if it is
4 anything, whatever item that you find there, you ask the price of those
5 who were buying and those who were selling, because sometimes there could
6 be some difference. Some could lie that, "We bought it for this much";
7 whereas, actually they were sold at a higher price, or vice versa.
8 So we went out there and got these from the people themselves,
9 those who were selling and those who were buying, and that is what we used
10 to compile this report.
11 Q. You mentioned that the market was one of the areas that appeared
12 to you to be targeted, so why were there still people available for you to
13 even interview?
14 A. Let me tell you, in every situation, there would always be people
15 somewhere there. Even during the tsunami, there were still people selling
16 and buying. So you ask me that, sometimes I cannot even understand
17 myself, but they were there. You find they are there. You told them not
18 to be there, but they would still be somewhere. And we got them and they
19 give us their prices; and also, as I say, there were some shops nearby,
20 small, small shops, which were selling these commodities.
21 Q. Okay.
22 MR. THAYER: Let's move to page 2, please, and this is in both the
23 English and the B/C/S.
24 Q. If we look at paragraph 3, and I won't dwell on this, it speaks
25 for itself, where did you get this information regarding the UNHCR planned
2 A. Now, for UNHCR, this one, normal, normal convoys, and we used to
3 know when they are scheduled to bring in food supplies, fuel supplies, to
4 the enclave, and they were scheduled. We used to know about them. We had
5 to know about them so that we could also arrange for security, their own
6 security, during the transit. In fact, they were relying on us observers
7 to ensure security.
8 Also, there was need, at that particular moment, because they had
9 been denied entry earlier. So there was definitely a shortage of food.
10 So everyone was concerned about this UNHCR convoy, and this was the main
11 lifeline for the whole enclave. So every UNHCR was being greeted with a
12 lot of joy. So this was something we were following throughout.
13 Q. If we look down to paragraph 4 regarding the water supply, was
14 this water supply information new to you, Colonel?
15 A. Your Honour, this is not new. This was not new to us, because
16 this is something that was there throughout. What was being gotten from
17 some springs, this was more hygienic than the main river. Because from
18 the spring, you expect it to come in fresh from the hill. So there were
19 some points where UNHCR had constructed a pipe to gather water from in
20 there, so that people can draw it from outside, and it used to work very
21 well. For people going there, they would line up, and you could see a
22 line of 100 metres of people waiting with their container to go there so
23 that they can draw water. So this was nothing new.
24 Q. Where did you get your water, sir?
25 A. Our water, we had two sources; that is, normal drinking water. We
1 were getting it from that compound. So we had to send a patrol every day
2 to go to Dutch-Bat, draw the water in our drums, small, small drums, small
3 containers, bring it over to the -- to our building. So that is the one
4 that we used to cook with and also to drink.
5 Now, the other water for washing our clothes and the building,
6 that is, the offices and all that, came from those -- those wells or
7 sometimes the rivers themselves. It didn't have to be very clean.
8 MR. THAYER: Now, moving down to paragraph 7, this is on page 2 of
9 the English and on page 3 of the B/C/S.
10 Q. Was this electricity information new to you, sir?
11 A. No, this was not new. This is what these girls were using. They
12 were improvising their own electricity, in that what they were doing is
13 they were diverting from the main river. Let's say, from a small hill up
14 there, they would divert it directly through a certain gradient and all of
15 a sudden increase the gradient so it could drive some turbines down
16 there. That would, in the normal process, generate electricity. Using
17 the normal river flow, it could help generate and transmit electricity.
18 So that was normal.
19 But this kind of electricity, for one, is not safe, and also
20 reliability is not assured, but it was there. They were using that, in
21 fact even for this electricity, they were using for some video shops to
22 show movies and some other small, small activities.
23 Q. And how did you power your equipment, sir?
24 A. We were operating them using a generator, which is diesel-driven.
25 And somehow when there was no diesel or when the supply was low, we had to
1 change the timings, in that like during this period, we were just starting
2 the generators when we have something to do, when we have a report to
3 write, not for anything else. Because the supply was low, none of the
4 convoys were being allowed in, so we had to change our pattern of
6 Q. Okay, sir, let's move to the 9th of July. You described the 8th
7 of July as being the heaviest. How did the 9th progress, in terms of
8 shelling, and does anything stand out in your mind about any decisions you
9 made that day, the 9th?
10 A. The 9th obviously started just like the other days.
11 Unfortunately, I think this is the day that we later noticed a tank had
12 come close-by, and the hit of a tank is normally direct. It's not high
13 trajectory like the artillery. So this one hits direct, and we got very
14 scared. We knew our place now targeted, and they could get us any time
15 they wanted. So I think this was a major, major turning point in our stay
16 in Srebrenica town.
17 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I note that we are about two minutes
18 from the break, but rather than calling a document, if we could take the
19 break a little earlier, I think that will work better.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Certainly, Mr. Thayer.
21 Let's have a 25-minute break now. Thank you.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
1 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, we --
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Where's the witness?
3 MR. THAYER: We asked for just a couple moments for a quick
4 preliminary with Your Honours.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
6 MR. THAYER: First, to give the Chamber an idea of timing with
7 respect to this witness --
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. We are anxious to know.
9 MR. THAYER: I'm sure, and we understand the urgency of time. We
10 share that. I've been trying to cut the direct as much as I can. Things,
11 nevertheless, are moving actually slower than I had expected.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: That's our feeling.
13 MR. THAYER: So I and everybody, I think, shares that and
14 understands that. Unfortunately, that means that I think I should be able
15 to conclude the direct today. I've canvassed my friends to see if, based
16 on my direct, the potential cross might have been cut at all. Sometimes
17 that's the case. If I do a fairly thorough direct, it cuts down on
18 cross-examination questions.
19 My understanding is, given how contested this witness's testimony
20 is, we expected it to be so, and I think it has proven to be so, the cross
21 estimates have not changed. So there is, I think, very little way, under
22 any circumstances, that we are going to be able to finish this witness's
23 testimony before the recess.
24 Prior to him taking the stand, I'd actually inquired about his
25 availability to return, if the Court permitted, in January. His schedule
1 is wide open, so he is available to do that, Your Honours.
2 So we wanted to keep the Court aware of those developments. I
3 think Mr. McCloskey may be prepared later. I don't know now if this is
4 the appropriate time now to update the Court on the Dean Manning issues,
5 in terms of tendering and some agreements which may or may not be
6 finalised. But I wanted to bring those two matters to the Court's
7 attention and give you a realistic idea of where things stand.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: It sounds like an unfinished symphony to me. You
9 finish your direct today, if I understood you well, or you should be in a
10 position to do so?
11 MR. THAYER: I think I should be in a position to do that,
12 Mr. President.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: And then tomorrow?
14 MR. THAYER: Tomorrow, I think some of my friends will be in a
15 position to start. I don't know if they are unified on --
16 JUDGE AGIUS: That's the important thing, yes.
17 MR. THAYER: I don't know if they're unified on a position as to
18 whether beginning cross and then interrupting cross for his return is
19 something they wish to do. That I'm not certain of, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madame Fauveau.
21 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't know whether
22 we're all uniform, but at least five Defence teams believe that it would
23 be more appropriate to start the cross-examination after the break because
24 our cross will be interrupted.
25 Another reason is that we were informed by the Prosecutor, in the
1 proofing note, that the witness is -- has a certain number of documents
2 which he will give the Prosecutor once he comes back his the country. And
3 since these are UNMO reports, we believe it would be more appropriate that
4 we start the cross when we have seen the documents which the witness holds
5 for the time being.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: And which documents does the witness hold for the
7 time being that the Defence haven't seen?
8 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, these are documents that neither of
9 the parties have seen. One is a notebook which he maintained, which he
10 said contains some not detailed notes of events, including the events
11 during the attack, which he took at the time, which he had with him during
12 his 1997 OTP interview, but which was not copied. I inquired whether he
13 had that. He indicated he did, and he would furnish us a copy.
14 The other documents are some copies of Srebrenica team reports
15 that were sent to Tuzla during the time. He had destroyed all of -- as
16 far as he knew, all of the original UNMO -- his original copies of UNMO
17 reports from Srebrenica to Tuzla before the Dutch-Bat withdrawal out of
18 concern for his safety should they be discovered. He realised that a
19 couple copies had come out with him interspersed among his equipment. He
20 has copies of those at home. I asked him if he would provide those to us.
21 I asked him whether there was, to his understanding and
22 recollection, anything in those reports that hasn't already been captured
23 or is actually present in the various attachments to his OTP witness
24 statement, which formed the basis of these reports that are being shown to
25 him now. He said that he did not believe that there was anything knew or
1 different in those reports.
2 As you heard him say, what Tuzla was doing with his reports was
3 simply re-transmitting them to Zagreb or BH Command at Sarajevo. So what
4 we are seeing are, in some cases, verbatim copies of these reports that
5 came from Team Srebrenica, of which he has, he said, a handful of copies
6 at home, but there's nothing knew in those, as far as he knows.
7 So I don't think there's going to be anything new or surprising in
8 either of these documents, but we will have them.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
10 And who are the five Defence teams that are united in preferring
11 to start the cross-examination after the holidays or the recess?
12 Mr. Ostojic.
13 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President and Your Honours. I'm not
14 sure who the five are and I think they can announce it for themselves, but
15 we're one of them. It is only because I think, although my learned friend
16 calls it a notebook, I think the witness identified it as a diary, and he
17 kept two sets of diary, from my understanding. Also, he's writing a book,
18 and we would like and we would ask the Court to get that transcript. I
19 understand that it's almost complete, and it does involve the events
20 relating to Srebrenica in 1995.
21 So we would ask that those documents be presented to us. And if
22 it is a diary, as I understand that it is, it was my understanding he kept
23 it contemporaneous with the events, and it may be relevant for all of us
24 here in this courtroom.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. So you're one of the five. I suppose
1 Madame Fauveau is also amongst that group. I saw Mr. Zivanovic anxiously
2 on his feet. You want to join the five?
3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes. I would join, just to the submission of
4 Madame Fauveau and Mr. Ostojic, that I asked additional documents from the
5 Prosecution, but they need Rule 70 clearance. Mr. Thayer has informed
6 about those.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: We haven't heard about those yet.
8 Madam Nikolic, are you also amongst the five?
9 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I join my
10 colleagues; although, my cross-examination will be far shorter and maybe
11 even reduced to nothing after having heard their questions.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
13 Mr. Lazarevic.
14 MR. LAZAREVIC: Yes, Your Honours, we are among these five
15 Defences who would like to join Madame Fauveau's submission.
16 To be honest, I really cannot know at this point what is the
17 relevance of the documents that are in the possession of the witness. I
18 cannot exclude that it could be relevant, or any other solution. I mean,
19 I just cannot be sure about it, and I really wouldn't be -- wouldn't feel
20 comfortable in starting my cross-examination and then later receive some
21 documents which could lead in a completely different way.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: The witness is coming back in any case, so you can
23 then put fresh questions.
24 Mr. Josse or Mr. Krgovic?
25 MR. JOSSE: Well, we weren't aware that this submission was going
1 to be made, so I can't claim that the Gvero team were part of the five.
2 Frankly, our position is we wish to maintain our position on the
3 indictment. We made it clear to learned friends at an earlier point in
4 the case that that's what we wanted to hitherto. This was some months
5 ago. And whilst I don't, as such, support what's being said; in reality,
6 I suppose I must, because if they're going to get their extra time, then
7 inevitably we will, because we want to go sixth.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
9 And Mr. Sarapa? Mr. Sarapa?
10 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] We join the application. We are
11 agreed that the cross should start in January rather than now.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: And what's the reason for that?
13 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] The reasons stated by Ms. Fauveau.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: So it's not just solidarity?
15 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] No, not just solidarity. We simply
16 believe that we can save some time in not explaining everything that's
17 already been said.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. We need to discuss amongst ourselves,
19 obviously, and take a decision, which we will let you know about later on.
20 Yes, about the documents that require the Rule 70 clearance.
21 MR. THAYER: Yes, Mr. President, if I can clarify a couple of the
22 references that were made.
23 My friend, Mr. Zivanovic, had made a specific request for any of
24 the original Srebrenica-to-Tuzla UNMO reports coming from Team Srebrenica.
25 We did a database search and couldn't find any of those original
1 documents. And in connection with that, I inquired of the witness as to
2 whether he had any. That's when I understood that he had a couple of
3 those originals that he had brought out with him inadvertently.
4 During the course of the review, I located some Sector Northeast,
5 that is, Tuzla, daily sitreps and some other related documents that date
6 back to May through the end of July that were never shown to the witness
7 Kingori. It didn't have his name on it, which I had seen for the first
8 time. Out of an abundance of caution, I asked my friend if he wished to
9 have access to those. He indicated he did.
10 Since we've never sought to use them, we didn't have Rule 70
11 clearance, so we've had to apply for those. Those are the documents that
12 we're referring to there. Again, those aren't original Srebrenica. As
13 far as I know, they cover time periods outside of this immediate 6 through
14 18 July time period. There may be some that are inside in there, but
15 again that's a separate request.
16 This is the first time I am hearing about any book that this
17 witness may be working on. I understand my friends met with the witness
18 over the weekend. I've not heard anything about that. I don't see the
19 relevance of a book. That sounds to me like it's been written after the
20 fact. Unless he's got additional contemporaneous documents, then I don't
21 see the relevance of that.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: But that's something we can discuss --
23 MR. THAYER: Yes, but it's the first I'm hearing about it,
24 Mr. President, as well.
25 With respect to the actual notebook that I referred to, I've never
1 heard it referred to as a diary. In fact, there were two notebooks he
2 kept contemporaneously, the first which he said was much more detailed in
3 terms of the activities he witnessed, the meetings that happened. He
4 destroyed that prior to the Dutch-Bat withdrawal, again out of his concern
5 for his safety. He destroyed the notebook that contained the more
6 detailed, as he described it, incriminatory information of whomever.
7 The second notebook, which is the one he still has, as I said, he
8 described as much less detailed. That included just a record of sometimes
9 firing incidents or brief descriptions of meetings. That he felt safer to
10 be taken out. That's the one we're referring to, but I haven't heard it
11 as a personal diary. That's the first I've heard of that.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey, no offence meant to you, Mr. Thayer,
15 if I am bypassing you, but we also want to make sure that all the time,
16 while you are making these statements, that you are aware of the fact, and
17 that you still remember what we told you earlier on this week, that you
18 have a deadline for resting your case which will not be moved.
19 Mr. McCloskey.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. I am very conscious of that and the Court's
21 position on that, and I can give you a little update on where our
22 discussions with the Defence have been on some ongoing things. I think
23 the Defence would like that I did that as well. It would just take a
24 minute or two.
25 As you know, Alistair Graham is still out there as a witness, and
1 I think we have a stipulation - we especially worked with the Borovcanin
2 team - about a few issues relating to his that his testimony. We don't
3 think any feels it is necessary to call him back, unless you do. So that
4 should be taken care of. We should have that stipulation, if we're lucky,
5 before the break.
6 There's also a videographer of the Scorpion film, and we have a
7 stipulation worked out on that. So that person won't be -- won't have to
8 be called.
9 Now, in regarding Dean Manning's exhibits, we're in the midst of
10 that, but it appears that the Defence is not objecting to many of the
11 reports that he based his earlier work on: The fabric analysis, the shell
12 casing analysis, the soil/pollen analysis. They, as you know, are
13 objecting now to the DNA material which was the subject of his last
14 report; and because of that, as you know, I think I've mentioned before,
15 we will need - unless you think otherwise - need to bring in someone from
16 the ICMP to give a foundation for the methods and procedures upon which
17 this material is based.
18 I hope not to bring in someone to talk about chromosomes and how
19 DNA is matched and that kind of thing; though, I think the witness will
20 have basic knowledge of that. I think we're long past the need for that
21 kind of thing. But as for the methods and procedures and how they take
22 the blood and match the families to the missing, based on the challenge, I
23 think it's appropriate that we bring that in so you can see that.
24 We had not thought we'd have to, frankly, because we got no
25 objection from Helge's -- Helge Brunborg's report that had that
1 significant information in it, and Helge Brunborg described the basic
2 methods and procedures. But now that Mr. Manning has relied on some of
3 that and we have this objection, we're in the process of trying to
4 organise that ICMP witness to come sometime after -- after Mr. Butler.
5 Along with that, we may need to bring in a brief demographics
6 witness, because the date we get from the ICMP is in a raw form that our
7 demographics person applies so that we can make sense of it for Dean
8 Manning and Helge. We may be able to reach a stipulation on that, but
9 that may -- those two witnesses may be some that we have to bring
10 together. As I think you invited me to do, we will file a motion
11 requesting those witnesses.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: This leads me also to another thing.
13 You have filed a confidential motion to add another witness to
14 your list, which would occupy, I think, a good day or two if he is brought
15 over. Is there a position taken by the Defence teams on that motion,
16 because we need to know. I mean, otherwise, we will, tomorrow, we will
17 have to sit. I mean, it's --
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: That should be a very short witness, as the motion
19 says, in terms of the Prosecution's direct.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't know what his testimony is going to be like,
21 so you are in a better position to make an assessment than we are.
22 Yes, Ms. Nikolic.
23 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just wanted to say
24 something concerning the latest motion you've just mentioned.
25 I believe it is too early to express our position, since
1 Mr. Pandurevic's lead counsel is not here, and I wish to meet him first
2 before responding to you.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, but I would imagine Mr. Haynes would have made
4 up his mind by now, and Mr. Sarapa would certainly be privy to that
5 information. That's what the co-counsel is here for, or one of the
7 Mr. Sarapa.
8 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] Concerning the witness that is being
9 proposed, I would kindly ask that we state our position after the break.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: After the next break, that is, after 12.30?
11 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] Yes.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
13 Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Mr. President, as you can tell, we have been
15 in discussions with the Defence about various things. They've asked us,
16 on our position, for an extension of the -- I think they'll be asking you
17 for extensions of a couple of the deadlines that you have set, and we've
18 provided them our viewpoint on that, based on some of the things that they
19 were able to agree with us and save us some time. So I would put that in
20 their hands, as they, I think, know our position, and I can respond as
21 well. But I think everyone wanted to get that out to you so you could see
22 what the parties were feeling before the holidays.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. But I think that was limited only to the
24 time period or the limit fixed by us for the filing of the 65 ter
25 documents, not any other extension. That's how I understood it from
1 Mr. Bourgon.
2 Yes, Mr. Ostojic.
3 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President. You are correct, and what
4 we needed is we saw that we needed additional time for the preparation.
5 The Court did set the date of March 31st, and we wanted to know the
6 position of the Prosecution, if we could move that deadline up to and
7 through April 30th. I believe we have an agreement on that, or at least
8 no objection, and we're just going to inquire of the Court, with your
9 permission, if we could amend that order so that the deadline for the 65
10 ter witness list and documents be presented by April 30th.
11 Another condition to the agreement or non-objection that we have
12 is my learned friend from the OTP requested that we, at the very least,
13 provide to him the military experts only by the 31st of March, as the
14 Court had earlier set as the deadline, and we have agreed to that.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
16 MR. OSTOJIC: Of course, with your permission.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Of course. Thank you, Mr. Ostojic.
18 It seems to me, in my mind, that you're trying to reach a package
19 deal between and amongst yourselves. If that is the case, we also have
20 another point to make; and if necessary, we'll incorporate it in an
21 appropriate order. But we are giving you an advance notice of it, just as
22 we did prior to the Prosecution -- to the opening of the trial and the
23 start of the Prosecution case.
24 We'll be calling upon you, the Defence teams, to submit a list of
25 possible agreed facts and adjudicated facts on which stipulation from the
1 Prosecution could be forthcoming. So this is also an exercise that and
2 which would perhaps justify delaying a little bit the filing date limit
3 for 65 ter purposes.
4 But, anyway, I know, but forgive me, because sometimes the column
5 stands in the way. It seems as if it's moving.
6 Yes, Mr. McCloskey. My apologies to you.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I agree with Mr. Ostojic.
8 Just to clarify, we don't have an objection to a 30-day extension
9 for the witness list and the exhibit list; though, we would like them to
10 stick by your order related to the experts and their reports, so we get
11 all of those, you know, at once upon the deadline you set, otherwise --
12 military experts.
13 The other experts can get the 30 days as well. I think they have
14 demographics and other things which -- which we've agreed that that's all
15 right to give them the 30 days as well.
16 Also, I'm sure you will recall that Mr. Ostojic and I were having
17 discussions about the US aerial imagery issues with the US, and we have
18 reached an agreement on that. That issue is no longer something we need
19 to present to you; though, Mr. Ostojic is still objecting to those images,
20 which of course is fine by us. But we don't feel a need to get the US
21 involved anymore.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
23 So the only pleasure yet to come for today, for the time being, is
24 Mr. Sarapa's announcement after the break. Okay. Thank you.
25 Let's bring the witness in, please -- sorry.
1 Mr. Josse.
2 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, could I just mention this: The Gvero
3 team filed a motion yesterday which I see has not yet reached certainly my
4 system, which may, in some small way, impact on the time issue, and
5 clearly the Chamber and the Prosecution will need to read it.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: We are not aware of it as yet, so If you have a copy
7 that you could let us have as a courtesy copy.
8 MR. JOSSE: There's a reason it's not on the system. There was a
9 bureaucratic problem, but I'm grateful to the Registrar.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: I didn't know there were bureaucratic problems in
11 this Tribunal. It's the first time I've heard of that.
12 MR. JOSSE: I seem to be particularly prone to them, I'm afraid.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Josse.
14 [The witness entered court]
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Thayer.
16 MR. THAYER:
17 Q. Good morning again, Colonel.
18 A. Good morning, sir.
19 Q. Before the break, you were describing the events of the 9th of
20 July and the proximity of a tank to your position in the town of
21 Srebrenica. Can you describe what decisions you made and what caused
22 those decisions that day?
23 A. Your Honour, maybe, maybe one correction. I'm seeing it's been
24 written "Josse," but I'm Joseph.
25 Q. It is a different person.
1 A. It's a different person. Okay.
2 MR. JOSSE: It's me, sir.
3 THE WITNESS: Okay. On the 9th, I think what happened was the
4 proximity of the tank was so threatening to us and so intimidating, we
5 found it unsafe to continue staying there. What I was saying before the
6 break is that the tank fires directly. It is unlike the artillery which
7 is high trajectory. So this would definitely get a direct hit if it
8 strikes. So we were afraid that we would be targeted and hit without --
9 without any heads up, and we felt the best thing to do was for us to leave
10 our place, that is, the PTT building, and go to a place that we felt could
11 have been slightly safer, and that is Potocari, that is, the Dutch-Bat
13 So we talked, we had a meeting. We requested for a meeting from
14 the deputy mayor so that he can give us permission or allow us to leave
15 the -- our PTT building. The reason for this, it may look a bit funny
16 that we were asking for permission, but we felt intimidated by the
17 presence of some armed BiH soldiers out of the building moving around.
18 Also there were lots of civilians, very many civilians, who are around the
19 PTT building, and also the Bravo Company, that is, the big company of the
20 Dutch-Bat that was just around there. We felt it is proper for us to tell
21 these people to ensure that we have a safe exit from that place on the way
22 to the Dutch-Bat compound.
23 Q. Do you recall the name of this -- this person who you recall was
24 the deputy mayor?
25 A. Yeah. I think his name was Osman Suljic or something like that.
1 Q. Can you describe the meeting you had with him?
2 A. We held two meetings, Your Honour, with him. The first one was
3 earlier on, when we requested that we be allowed to leave; and he said, in
4 no uncertain terms, that we cannot leave that place, we cannot leave
5 Srebrenica, because he believed if we leave, that will be the end of the
6 enclave. The BSA will have an open field. They will be able to do
7 whatever they want without fear of being reported by us. So they felt we
8 should carry on staying there until maybe something is done to revise the
10 Then we reported the same to our -- our headquarters, and they
11 told us to continue requesting them. They told us to diplomatically try
12 to persuade them to allow us to leave, and this now we did later in the
13 day. We talked to him, together with his other people, the other people
14 that he had, through persuasion, and also through trying to tell him that,
15 sincerely, even if we stay there and we are hit, surely no one would be
16 reporting about the issues that happen after that.
17 And, in fact, I would like to inform you that he actually broke
18 down into tears and asked us, "Surely, you want to leave us alone like
19 this for the Serbs to do whatever they want to us? Do you really want to
20 go to a safe place and leave us unsafe here?" We told him that sincerely,
21 even when we went to the Dutch-Bat compound, we still continue reporting
22 the same way and trying to tell the headquarters or the UN whatever issues
23 are happening or going on in the enclave.
24 Q. So who went with you from Srebrenica to Potocari, and can you
25 describe your trip there?
1 A. Your Honour, we - it was me and David Tetteh and also one
2 interpreter, that is, Emir, Emir Suljagic - after we were given permission
3 to leave by the deputy mayor, we packed the few items we could manage to
4 get, put them in the Jeep. I personally drove that Jeep all the way to
5 Potocari, and it's worth informing you that it was very scary. It was a
6 very scary trip. In fact, we didn't know that we would survive that trip.
7 It was a short distance, about seven kilometres or so, but it
8 looked like a thousand kilometres, in that there was shelling on our way
9 out and the shells could land on either side of the road near our vehicle;
10 that is, as we were moving, the shells could land sometimes ahead of us,
11 sometimes behind us. But luckily they were hitting softer ground, that
12 is, where there was rice planted and wheat or whatever, and the -- I mean,
13 there were no shrapnels going up to hit us.
14 So we managed, and I was driving at a speed of about 90
15 kilometres, in gear number three, to engage all those corners and also so
16 that I could be able to stop the vehicle in case of any emergency. So it
17 was very, very scary all the way up to Potocari.
18 Q. The other interpreter who you identified as Hasan, do you know
19 where he was when you left Srebrenica?
20 A. Your Honour, Hasan was there with us. He was around there
21 somewhere. He was looking for his -- his people. And when we said that
22 we want to go to Potocari, he said he cannot leave that place until he
23 finds his relatives, who he said were everywhere. He didn't know where
24 they were, and he was scared he might -- they might get killed or
25 whatever. So he said he cannot go with us. We left him in Srebrenica.
1 Q. What did you do when you got to Potocari?
2 A. Immediately, we arrived in the Dutch-Bat compound; in fact, we
3 felt a sigh of relief. We went into an old business of establishing
4 communication with our headquarters. We had to set up our communication;
5 and, immediately, we informed our headquarters that we already now
6 relocated to Dutch-Bat compound in Potocari and that now they can transmit
7 to us without any -- any problems.
8 Then, later on, we thought of how we can be able to know the
9 situation in Srebrenica, and we had to make a decision on how to go about
10 the business of Srebrenica itself, that is, the town, and also the
11 surrounding areas.
12 Q. What decision did you come to, Colonel?
13 A. At this point in time, we really had very few, very few options,
14 very few options, because we felt we might be unable to go back there
15 ourselves, and that driving our jeep up there could have been very unsafe.
16 So we talked. We talked and agreed that we can send one of our observers,
17 that is, the one we had, Emir Suljagic, so he could go up there and maybe
18 monitor the situation for us and tell us what clearly is happening. We
19 felt he might be safer than us at that particular moment because he's a
20 local, and maybe no one may know who he is and he may still be able to
21 communicate with us.
22 Q. Okay, sir. I just notice that in the transcript, it indicates
23 that "We talked and agreed that we can send one of our observers," and you
24 refer to Emir. He was a translator, just to be clear, interpreter;
1 A. Correct. He was a -- I don't know whether we wrote a "observer,"
2 but he's actually not our observer. He was our interpreter, yellow card.
3 Q. And what time of the day did he, in fact, head back to Srebrenica,
4 sir, and do you know how he got there?
5 A. I think he moved out later in the evening under the cover of
6 darkness, and he moved along -- along the river, which was behind the
7 Dutch-Bat compound, all the way up, you know, through concealment, all the
8 way up to Srebrenica town itself.
9 Q. And were you able to then communicate with him, sir; and if so,
11 A. Your Honour, we had given him one of our handsets, so that when he
12 arrives there, he can be able to talk to us, he can be able to communicate
13 with us using the handset.
14 Q. Okay, Colonel. I want to show you a couple of reports that were
15 sent out on the 9th, one before -- a couple before your withdrawal, and
16 then we'll pick up from there.
17 MR. THAYER: May we have 65 ter number 498, please.
18 Q. Sir, can you recognise what this document is?
19 A. Yes, I can. This is a sitrep; in fact, it's is an update from
20 UNMO headquarter, Sector Northeast, to UNMO headquarter, Sarajevo, in
21 Zagreb. But as they are saying here it is actually direct from to our
22 team, and they have put it the way we had written it.
23 Q. And I notice there's an abbreviation "TA" after "UNMO Team
24 Srebrenica." What does that stand for?
25 A. That is Tango Alpha. That is a team. That is a code name for
1 Team Sebrenica. Every team had different code names, like "Tango Sierra"
2 was Team Sebrenik; "Tango Alpha" was Team Sebrenica; and all that.
3 Q. Moving to the document, sir, the second paragraph starts: "The
4 morning started beautifully and we thought all would remain well, but that
5 changed at 800 hours when shelling started in Srebrenica again."
6 It also states that "UNMOs have also counted up to 113 explosions
7 in both Sebrenica and Potocari."
8 Where is that information coming from, sir?
9 A. Your Honours, this information comes from us. We're the ones who
10 were reporting it. And like that of Srebrenica, even from Potocari, we
11 could be able to hear what was happening, the shelling and all that;
12 though, the -- our yellow card is Emir, and he could tell us from
13 Srebrenica itself. But also we could hear maybe the actual place where
14 they hit. We could clarify it was this such-and-such a place, but the
15 counting we could be able to do it ourselves also.
16 Q. Okay. At the time of this report, which is 1440 hours, were you
17 still in Srebrenica, sir?
18 A. This is at 1440, 1440. Yeah, I think 1440 we were still in
19 Srebrenica. I think -- I think we left at -- at 1800 hours or so from
20 Srebrenica to Potocari, so this was from us directly.
21 Q. Well, we'll look at some other documents and clarify that.
22 A. Thank you.
23 Q. Moving on further in that paragraph, sir, there's a reference to
24 on the 8th of July, at 2240 hours. Do you see that?
25 "UNMOs observed many persons entering Srebrenica town from
1 Slapovic, Swedish shelter village, and neighbouring villages. Some are
2 seeking shelter from relatives, while others are staying in the school
4 Did you personally observe this influx, sir?
5 A. No. This was on the 8th, so we actually observed it ourselves.
6 We saw people coming in, streaming in from the Swedish shelter village.
7 This was a village outside Srebrenica where refugees had been sheltered.
8 It was a government, a Swedish government, initiative to build houses for
9 these people, and they started streaming in down to Srebrenica because
10 they felt that was a safer place for them.
11 MR. THAYER: Now, we turn to page 2 of the English, and this will
12 be page 3 of the B/C/S of this document. We'll need to scroll down on the
13 English, and I think we can stay where we are for the B/C/S. Thank you.
14 Q. Sir, this is a difficult document to locate portions in. But if
15 you could look about two-thirds of the way down the document, there's a
16 reference to one of the public officials from Srebrenica requesting
17 security from Dutch-Bat for the local hospital.
18 Do you see that portion, sir? It may be easier if you look up
19 from the bottom: "MSF, however, refused such a security, explaining that
20 any military presence in and around the hospital would attract military
21 confrontation which would be detrimental to the sick."
22 A. Yes, I can see that.
23 Q. Were you present at that discussion, sir?
24 A. Yes, I was in this discussion.
25 Q. And what was the outcome of that discussion?
1 A. The -- the request that Dutch-Bat send soldiers there actually was
2 turned down. Especially they felt, certainly myself felt, that the
3 sending soldiers there would make the hospital a lucrative object for the
4 BSA to attack. So instead of it being a target of the BSA attack, they
5 felt the best thing is to leave it like that, and also because normally
6 the hospitals are not supposed to have soldiers.
7 Internationally, and due to the Geneva Convention, those who are
8 in there are either people wounded or injured, and so no one is supposed
9 to attack a hospital. So you make sure and you just ensure that there are
10 not soldiers around, so that you don't make it a lucrative target for
11 the -- for the other guys.
12 Q. Now, from this period of the 6th of July until the time you
13 withdrew to Potocari, did you have an opportunity to actually enter this
14 hospital; and if so, for what reasons?
15 A. Yeah, I had an opportunity to enter the hospital; although, that
16 was not the first time I entered. But at least at this particular time I
17 entered because we were told that there were people who had been taken
18 there who were injured. I think - I can't recall very well - that there
19 was one who was -- who died or something like that. So I went there to
20 check what was happening at the hospital.
21 Q. And do you recall personally transporting or bringing any wounded
22 to the hospital, yourself?
23 A. Yeah, several, several. I think I made one or two trips to
24 that -- to that hospital. That was almost every day. But on this
25 particular day, I remember taking some to that hospital, wounded ones.
1 Q. Now, based on your observations inside the hospital, was there
2 anything there to indicate that this was being used as a military
4 A. Your Honour, inside that hospital, I don't think there was
5 anywhere that was being used as a -- as a military base or hardware store,
6 military hardware store or something, because I went round. I remember I
7 went round to check the condition of the other guys who were wounded, and
8 really you could not see anywhere where there was evidence of -- of
9 soldiers or arms or even a store for anything that was military. I could
10 not -- I remember not seeing anything to that effect.
11 MR. THAYER: Okay. Let's look at another report from that day, 65
12 ter 499, please.
13 Q. Can you identify what this document is, sir?
14 A. This is a situation update from UNMO headquarter, Sector
15 Northeast, directed to UNMO headquarter, BH Command, and also Zagreb, and
16 this was on the 9th at around 1700 hours.
17 Q. The report indicates that between 1400 hours and 1516 hours, that
18 your team reportedly heard 78 explosions in Srebrenica town alone and that
19 more than 70 per cent of the explosions were in the center of town.
20 You've testified that in the previous days, you'd heard hundreds
21 of detonations and that you had been counting them. Was there anything
22 particular or anything in particular about this shelling that was
24 A. Your Honour, the -- the only peculiar issue here is the
25 concentration of the firepower was a bit too high in one particular grid
1 square; that is, Charlie Papa 6385. These were very scary to us, in that
2 when you find a concentration of firepower in one area, there must be
3 something that really they want to soften. There must be something that
4 they want to get out of that place. That was the only reason why we felt
5 this is a bit different from the others, because the others we could hear
6 from different areas, you know, a wide range of weapons coming, you know,
7 or hitting very many different areas. But now this was a concentration on
8 one area.
9 Q. And do you recall approximately where, in the center of town, this
10 grid location was?
11 A. I really cannot, but I think this was, I think, the market or near
12 the hospital. I'm not very clear in my mind right now.
13 Q. Okay. Moving on in this report, it states that: "They also
14 reported hearing some small-arms fire within their location."
15 Was that small-arms fire incoming or outgoing, sir?
16 A. Your Honour, these are small-arms fire incoming from the BSA side,
17 not from the BiH side; and maybe it's good to know how you identify
18 incoming fire and outgoing fire.
19 It's very easy to know fire which is coming in, in that the origin
20 where the weapon is -- the fire is coming from, the kind of noise that you
21 hear from that direction is not the same as the hit that you hear after
22 the bullet has hit a certain area. It's not the same, and we are able to
23 easily identify that kind of fire. Also, if it does not hit that
24 particular area, you hear a whizzing noising that is going past, and you
25 definitely know towards which the direction it's heading to.
1 So if you can hear the direction it's heading to, definitely you
2 would be able know the direction that it's coming from. So it was very
3 easy to know that it was incoming fire.
4 Q. And the fact that it was incoming fire, sir, was that significant
5 to you in any way?
6 A. Your Honour, this is significant because you find normally, after
7 you have softened the target by using artillery, be it even tanks or even
8 air power, the next thing that you do is to go and mop up the place. That
9 is where normally we tell the army that is where they go after -- after
10 the air power has already softened the target. And in this case, it was
11 artillery and the tank power.
12 So the infantry now, maybe, we thought, now this is the time they
13 are coming in to mop up the place, that is, to clear, in fact to come in
14 to hold. Actually, the right word is to hold the ground. So that is now
15 the last phase, because after they come to hold the ground, they must dig
16 a defensive position so that now they can defend it against any
18 So these to us showed like it's now going toward the final phase
19 of the onslaught.
20 Q. And how, if at all, did that contribute to your decision to
21 withdraw from Srebrenica?
22 A. Your Honour, considering the range of small arms, it's not like
23 the artillery where you can say 2.5 kilometres or even beyond two
24 kilometres and all that. For the small arms, the longest range that you
25 can get, even from an AK-47, I think an AK-47 is about 600 metres. Other
1 rifles can go up to 900 metres or even call it 1.000 metres, that is, one
2 kilometre. So one kilometre is very close, that is very close. And when
3 he's somewhere there, he can scare you, and he definitely will be moving
4 more towards you and he will get you. Small arms, definitely, when
5 someone is in range and you are not harmed, surely he will definitely kill
7 Q. You just mentioned that when you're not armed. As an UNMO, sir, -
8 and I may have asked you this, but forgive me if I didn't - were UNMOs
9 armed during their service, sir?
10 A. Your Honour, UN military observers all over the world, they're
11 never armed. They -- normally, the only arms that they have is a good and
12 working pen and a notebook. Then, obviously, you can have a flak-jacket
13 to protect yourself. But the weapons normally that we have is a pen and a
14 book to write.
15 Q. Now let's look to the 10th of July, sir. Just one quick question.
16 Where did you spend the night of the 9th, physically?
17 A. Your Honour, physically we spent the night in the Dutch-Bat
18 compound. We got ourselves a container that was a bit free. We removed
19 some items, and that is where we slept for the night.
20 MR. THAYER: May we look at 65 ter number 502, please.
21 Q. Do you recognise what this is, sir; and if so, what is it?
22 A. This is an UNMO report being sent from UNMO HQ Zagreb, Sector
23 Northeast, to Zagreb and BH Command. It is a situation update from
25 Q. Now, this is on the 10th of July. Let's just move to point 3 to
1 save a little bit of time. It indicates that: "Reports, via phone from
2 the team, report that the shelling is ongoing in the area of Srebrenica
4 How is that information coming from Srebrenica, given that you're
5 in Potocari?
6 A. Your Honour, the shelling could be heard from any position,
7 especially if you are along that main road leading from Bratunac all the
8 way to Srebrenica. So we were hearing the shelling.
9 Also in our report, our interpreter, Mr. Emir, was also in that
10 place, and he could talk to us and tell us where the shelling is actually
11 going on. But at least even ourselves from Potocari, we could be able to
12 hear and count.
13 Q. Now, focusing on the 10th of July, sir, do you recall, in
14 particular, any other information that Emir was transmitting to you from
15 Srebrenica that day?
16 A. I think for the -- for the shelling, he could tell us the actual
17 hit, the actual place where the shells were hitting; and also concerning
18 the injured, if any, and the dead, if any. Actually, the actual condition
19 or situation in Srebrenica, he could be able to tell us from there.
20 MR. THAYER: Let's look at 65 ter 501, please.
21 Q. Just to move things along, this is dated the 10th of July, 1025
22 hours. At number 1, we can see that it's being retransmitted as received
23 from you through Tuzla to UNMO Command in Zagreb and UNPROFOR -- or UNMO
24 headquarters in Sarajevo; is that correct?
25 A. That's correct, sir.
1 Q. Now, if we look at the entry at 1230 hours, there's a reference to
2 over 100 detonations, and then at 0930, about eight rockets being fired in
3 the direction of Srebrenica. Can you tell the Trial Chamber how these two
4 reports were confirmed?
5 A. Now, for the -- for the 100 detonations, obviously we counted
6 ourselves. Now, for the -- for the rockets, the eight rockets, obviously
7 they were fired from -- the report came from Dutch-Bat, and so we reported
8 the same.
9 Q. And with respect, for example, to the hundred detonations that you
10 said you could count yourself, what confirmation, if any, from Srebrenica
11 did you receive about those detonations?
12 A. Now, the confirmation from Srebrenica was coming from our yellow
13 card, that is, Emir, and also we could be able to count ourselves. We
14 could count, but also he was confirming to us it was exactly hitting
16 Q. You've referred a couple of times to the term "yellow card." What
17 does that mean or refer to, sir?
18 A. "Yellow card" was the identification card that was being given to
19 all interpreters. So we easily refer to them as "yellow cards," and
20 especially when you don't want to come out clear. In military terms, you
21 don't want to come out clear when you're talking on the set. So when you
22 say "yellow card," you know you mean the interpreter, but someone else may
23 not understand. In fact, it is meant to do what exactly what he has done
24 to you, so that you may not understand what it means.
25 Q. There's a reference to a tank, a BSA tank, making the recovery of
1 some UNPROFOR APCs very difficult. What, if anything, did you learn about
2 this event?
3 A. Now, there was, you know, in the enclave we had several
4 observation posts which were manned by -- by Dutch-Bat. I think there
5 were about ten or more observation posts. These are posts which are
6 outside the normal area and where you really want to observe to know what
7 is happening around that place, so that you can also report. And also in
8 case of any rapid requirement of force, those people at the OP can be able
9 to react immediately. So that was, first and foremost, their sense of the
10 OPs. It also helped us observers to go there and observe from there.
11 Now, for this particular location, there was a tank, a BSA tank
12 somewhere, and it was located. It was sighted. The -- the OP that was
13 there, they felt they wanted to withdraw, but they cannot because of the
14 fear of that -- of that tank. It was actually intimidating. To them, it
15 was intimidating, so it was very difficult for them to start that, to
16 start moving, because they feared they could have been hit. It was a lot
17 of fear because you can see it. They can see you. So you don't know the
18 next course of action that you should take.
19 Q. Do you recall whether you received any information about the APC
20 or any other vehicle being fired upon by -- by that tank?
21 A. Your Honour, that I cannot -- I cannot recall.
22 Q. Okay. That's fine, sir. If we look down at the next sitrep
23 update at 1255 hours, it indicates that: "Two heavy shells, probably
24 155-millimetre artillery shells, hit the direct surrounding of the
25 hospital at 1100 hours. All the windows are smashed and shrapnel has
1 showered the walls and rooms of the hospital."
2 Do you recall who reported that?
3 A. This was reported by the -- by Emir, and this is what he sent to
4 us from there.
5 Q. Now, as far as you've stated, Emir is a -- an interpreter. Do you
6 have any knowledge, based on your working with him, what position he was
7 in to assess this as a 155-millimetre artillery shell? You qualify it as
8 "probably" in the report, but why is that even being mentioned as a
9 155-millimetre artillery shell?
10 A. Your Honour, the experience these interpreters had in that place
11 was very high, having been there for around three years or so, and having
12 worked with various observers, and also having been responsible or having
13 been able to assist us to analyse the craters when we were there, and all
14 the other observers, you know, make them have an upper hand. In fact,
15 they could have been more experienced by newer -- more than newer
16 observers in the field of analysing some of these things, in that they
17 were there throughout.
18 And at least with the technicalities, they could be able to tell a
19 shell. They could be able to distinguish sometimes even between a
20 mortar -- a mortar shell and an artillery shell. So the experience that
21 they had and the way we had worked with them, we could know that they can
22 tell us an actual situation, the truth of the matter.
23 Q. Okay. Let's move on.
24 MR. THAYER: May we see 65 ter 503, please.
25 Q. Sir, we're looking at a re-transmission, as it says here, of
1 Srebrenica update at 1346 hours on the 10th. It indicates that Srebrenica
2 township is still undergoing a very heavy shelling. The report states
3 that: "We have recorded figures, 49 shells between 1250 and 1533 hours
4 and nine rockets launched into the town ..."
5 Again, with respect to the shelling, where is that information
6 coming from?
7 A. Now, for the shelling, as I had said earlier, the shelling, we
8 could count the shells landing anywhere between Potocari and Srebrenica.
9 From Potocari, we could be able to count the number of shells, and also
10 now our yellow card there could now be able to confirm that actually this
11 is true. So we could easily tell; that is, for the shells.
12 For the rockets, as I said, most of the rockets were originating
13 from a hill somewhere near Bratunac, to the -- to the west of Bratunac,
14 somewhere there. So those ones we could even see them over-flying
15 Potocari, so it was very easy to count.
16 Q. Just to be clear, when you say "we," you mean yourself, sir; is
17 that correct?
18 A. I mean, we, the military observers, because that is me and David
19 Tetteh. And, already, at this time, Andre De Haan is there with us,
20 though fully not recovered, but he was there. When I say "we," I mean
21 military observers.
22 Q. Just to be clear, sir, do you have a recollection personally of
23 ever seeing rockets over-flying Potocari from that direction you just
24 described towards Srebrenica?
25 A. Your Honour, not once. At least I have, I can remember
2 Q. When you say "not once," sir, what do you mean by that?
3 A. The rockets did not fly -- over-fly Potocari once. There were
4 several times that we noted.
5 Q. Okay.
6 MR. THAYER: May we have 65 ter 505 displayed on e-court, please.
7 If we could go to page 3 of the English and page 6 of the B/C/S, please.
8 If we could focus down on the entry for 1645 hours on the 10th.
9 Q. Sir, here the report refers to the yellow card reporting various
10 information. At the bottom, number 4 refers to: "Latest information
11 received reports of the following villages being burnt by the BSA," and it
12 lists one village.
13 I'm afraid our -- the copy that we managed to obtain stops there.
14 But with respect to that report, do you recall where that information was
15 coming from, sir?
16 A. Your Honour, this information came from the people who were
17 streaming into Srebrenica and also all the way down to -- to Potocari.
18 This is the information that they were bringing, and especially those who
19 were, first of all, arriving in Srebrenica. Our yellow card could be able
20 to tell us what this is what they are saying and this is what, I think,
21 the condition on the ground is. So we were reporting the way -- the way
22 they told us.
23 Q. Okay, sir. I just noticed, if you look at this page, there are a
24 series of situation updates, all dated the 10th of July at various times.
25 MR. THAYER: If we could scroll to the top of the page, please, I
1 just wanted to clarify one matter.
2 Q. It refers, you can see it at the upper right-hand corner, "Annex
3 A, dated 09 July." Is it fair to say that's probably a typo, given all
4 these events occurred on the 10th, sir?
5 A. Your Honour, this is a typo error. As part of these things, they
6 are always there, and so we just put the update and sometimes one may
7 forget to change the date.
8 MR. THAYER: Okay. We're done with that document; thank you.
9 Q. Now, that brings us to the 11th of July. Do you recall attending
10 a meeting, Colonel, in the very, very early morning hours of July 11th;
11 and if so, can you share with the Trial Chamber who was there and what was
13 A. Well, there was a meeting called very early in the morning, and
14 this was by Colonel Karremans, I think, the CO Dutch-Bat, and the BiH. As
15 I recall, I think the essence of the meeting was to convey some messages
16 to -- to the BiH and also to hear from them.
17 Q. Do you remember, in particular, anything that was discussed or any
18 information that was given or transmitted in particular during this
20 A. During this meeting, there was an issue concerning -- mainly,
21 there were two issues, I think. One of them was concerning the -- the
22 BSA, I think, giving -- I think there were two ultimatums being given, and
23 I think the BSA had conveyed a message that they would like the Muslims to
24 leave the enclave. They'll be given a safe passage to get out. Also, I
25 think there was an issue of -- of an air strike. I cannot recall very
1 well, but I think those were the main issues.
2 Also, I think there was one on the Muslim side, because there was
3 one soldier, one Dutch soldier, who had been shot and later on died on the
4 way to hospital, and that issue, I think, was also discussed.
5 Q. Okay. You just referred to the BSA conveying a message that they
6 would like the Muslims to leave the enclave. Do you recall whether you
7 had received this ultimatum or heard this ultimatum yourself prior to this
9 A. Your Honour, I had heard that. I had personally heard that, that
10 message earlier, through, I think, Petar or Major Nikolic, one of them or
11 both. But at least I got that information from them, in that there was
12 some orders. I don't know whether we can call them orders or requests,
13 requesting, of course by the BSA, that the Muslims leave the enclave
14 immediately so that they can be safe or they'll be forced out.
15 Q. And was this reference to the Muslims referring to the civilians
16 and military together, or one or the other, if you can recall?
17 A. Your Honour, this reference to Muslims actually meant all the
18 people, all the Muslims. You're talking about, whether armed or not,
19 civilians, all of them together. What they meant is they really do not
20 want them there and that they should leave immediately.
21 Q. You referred to a discussion of air strikes. What was that about?
22 A. After we had given the UN HQ the situation of the enclave, and
23 also the various positions of the guns, we also requested for -- for air
24 strikes. These also came earlier from the Muslims, who requested, "Why is
25 the UN not doing anything about this situation?"
1 So we requested for air strikes, and so we were being told that
2 the air strikes would definitely come. There will be air strikes in that
4 Q. And the air strikes didn't come right away; is that fair to say,
6 A. Your Honour, surprisingly, and to the frustration of us, as the
7 observers, and also Dutch-Bat, no air strikes occurred that morning, so we
8 were afraid that maybe they failed to take place or whatever.
9 Q. So what did you do, if anything, that morning when you observed
10 that the air strikes were not happening?
11 A. Initially, you know, when you expect air strikes, you also expect
12 the other side to maybe retaliate because also the air strikes would be
13 there. So we expected them maybe to do something. So, in fact, most of
14 our time there in the morning, we were either in the bunker or somewhere
15 close-by, so that in case of anything, we can go in. But I think that's
17 Q. And when you were outside the bunker, sir, what, if anything, did
18 you observe outside the compound?
19 A. I think, outside the compound, what I can remember seeing is some
20 refugees coming in. They started streaming in from Srebrenica. They
21 started coming in. There was an inflow now of refugees to that camp.
22 Q. Now, I don't think it's in dispute that the close air support was,
23 in fact, delivered that afternoon. Do you recall whether the close air
24 support continued?
25 A. Your Honour, the close air support, if we can call it that -
1 because it really wasn't; it was just an air strike - it came in, but
2 came in late, later in the afternoon, and it was not effective. As I can
3 say, it was not effective. By being effective, I mean we had reported to
4 them various positions of guns, of the rocket-launcher, and other military
5 hardware, but surprisingly I think they just managed to hit one tank and
6 one gun or something like that. Having used their six -- six aircraft for
7 that, that was, as far as we were concerned, not effective, because it
8 really did not stop the onslaught on the enclave.
9 Q. Now, you referred to providing various positions of guns. Who
10 actually obtained that information and transmitted it, and what was the
11 information? What are you talking about, Colonel?
12 A. Now, for us, partly as military observers, you know, we had to --
13 we knew or we could be able to get information on where these positions
14 are. Because when they fire, in fact immediately when you fire, you
15 disclose your position. So it's very easy to know that location. We
16 could go to the map and get the grid references and send it over.
17 But also there were some British guys there. They were -- I think
18 they were calling them JCUs or something, joint combat something, I can't
19 remember, but JCUs, very tough officers, very tough, in that they could
20 penetrate anywhere. They could go anywhere without fear, and they had
21 everything. What I'm saying by "everything" is that they had their
22 weapons. They had the -- they were using a Land Rover, but they had all
23 communication equipment. They could set it up within a very short time,
24 and they were very, very accurate. And in all air strikes, they were the
25 ones directing the aircrafts to the targets, all air strikes -- most of
1 the air strikes anywhere. These were the guys directing the air strikes
2 to the actual target.
3 Q. And are you aware, sir, as to any particular reason why the close
4 air support actually stopped that day on the 11th?
5 A. Your Honour, we are -- we are not aware -- I was not aware. I was
6 not aware why they stopped, and it is difficult to say the reasons,
7 because at least we expect them to continue until they hit all their
9 But maybe, on the other hand, if you look at it from the other
10 side, maybe they thought they might end up hitting the refugees. But
11 definitely they should have continued on the -- with the air strikes.
12 That's what I thought.
13 Q. Now, after the air strikes, sir, did you observe any shelling?
14 A. Your Honour, the shelling was, you know, resumed straightly.
15 There was a lull, more a lull. Maybe they thought these guys -- the air
16 strikes would continue, so they waited for a while. And after that, the
17 shelling started again.
18 The -- you know, what they did was like they were just doing what
19 they had told us earlier, that if the air strikes actually take place,
20 they're going to bombard the whole place.
21 Q. When do you recall that statement or position being taken by the
22 VRS that day?
23 A. This happened during a meeting that had been called by the -- by
24 the BSA, and they told us that we should tell the UN not to -- not to
25 execute the air strikes; otherwise, if they do, they'll make sure they
1 wipe out the whole -- the whole enclave.
2 Q. Do you recall whether or not you were present for that meeting,
4 A. I was there. I think I was there in that meeting.
5 Q. Well, do you have any recollection of who was present? You said
6 you think you were there. Do you have any specific recollection of who
7 was present, where this meeting was?
8 A. This meeting occurred in Bratunac, and the people present
9 normally, you know, in all meetings, Major Nikolic would be there, and
10 Colonel Vukovic was there, and I can't remember the other senior officers
11 who were there. But Andre now was -- I think he was also there, I am not
12 very sure, but at least those two, Nikolic and Vukovic, were there.
13 MR. THAYER: Let's look at 65 ter 510, please. And if we could
14 move to -- well, let's look at the first page just for a moment.
15 Q. This is dated the 11th of July, sir, daily sitrep covering the
16 period of one minute after midnight on the 11th to 2000 hours.
17 MR. THAYER: If we could move to page 3 of both the English and
18 the B/C/S, please.
19 Q. If we look at the top of the English, where it says, it's the
20 second paragraph: "Then the BSA had another ultimatum, Dutch-Bat and the
21 NGOs should leave the enclave, turning over their weapons, the population
22 would be given 48 hours' time to leave the enclave as well. They were
23 also free to go."
24 Colonel, is this the ultimatum that you referred to before or is
25 this another ultimatum? You mentioned that there were a couple of
1 ultimatums that were discussed. I'm just trying to find out, with respect
2 to the section I just read, whether your recollection is whether or not
3 this is the ultimatum you testified about a moment ago.
4 A. These -- these ultimatums were there throughout, especially about
5 leaving the enclave. Whenever the BSA were meeting with us or whatever
6 they were communicating to us, these ultimatums were almost similar, these
7 people should leave. But this particular one, I think, was -- this was
8 after. I think it was -- at least this is not the one I talked about, but
9 I think it's -- every time they met us, they were giving us these
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. THAYER: Let's look at page 4 of the English and the B/C/S.
13 We'll skip a couple of sections to try to save a little bit of time.
14 Q. If we look at the entry for 1600 hours, do you see that, sir?
15 A. Yes, I can see it.
16 Q. There's a reference to the stream of refugees being uncountable.
17 Towards the bottom, it says: "The latest ultimatum given by the BSA is
18 that if the air strikes continue, everything inside the enclave will be
19 bombed, including UNPROFOR and the other UN organisations."
20 Now, I just want to test your memory a little bit, Colonel. Do
21 you recall whether this is the ultimatum that you were referring to,
22 having heard in Bratunac, or was there another ultimatum that's being
23 reflected here, if you know?
24 A. As you can see -- as you can see written there, this is the latest
25 ultimatum, meaning there were a series of ultimatums given by the BSA.
1 This one now is after the air strikes had taken place.
2 They said, you know, if the air strikes continue - and it's good
3 to know that this time they were getting bolder and bolder, in fact they
4 were telling the UN, "There is nothing you can do," - so, "Either pack up
5 and go with the Muslims, or we wipe you out, all of you."
6 So they were saying it in no uncertain terms that they don't want
7 anybody to be there. If the air strikes continue, they can do whatever
8 they want in that place.
9 Q. I guess one of the reasons I'm testing your recollection, Colonel,
10 is that you mentioned your recollection is that you heard a similar
11 ultimatum in Bratunac at some point, and you seem to recall that a Djurcic
12 was present and Vukovic. Do you recall whether or not, on the 11th, you
13 were in any position to leave Potocari for Bratunac?
14 A. I think I did. On the 11th, I think I did.
15 Q. Okay. All right. Now let's skip down -- skip a few more
16 questions here, sir.
17 MR. THAYER: If we could go down and focus on the update at 1910
18 hours, and we're now on page 5 of the B/C/S.
19 Q. Under that entry for 1910, sir, at number 3, the report states
20 that: "From 1844 hours until 1900 hours, the BSA fired 22 rockets/shells
21 from Dugo Polje towards Budak and Gradac."
22 In those 16 minutes, sir, during that time do you recall who
23 counted those rockets?
24 A. Your Honours, we're the ones -- sorry for that. We're the ones
25 who counted these rockets.
1 Q. And what effect, if any, did those rockets have on the civilians
2 who were gathering at the compound?
3 A. The sound of -- in the fired weapon, and especially when it's
4 rockets, is very scaring, is very scary for everybody, and especially when
5 they are together in one particular area.
6 You know, the feeling that you are there, your sister is there,
7 your brother, your mother, father, grandmother, and all that, all your
8 relatives are in the same place, and that you can be hit and killed at any
9 moment, really sends a chill down your spine. You feel that anything can
11 So the panic was actually so much in them that that you could not
12 hide. It, you can't easily see it. That happened because we were going
13 out there to check what was happening with them and we could see it. It
14 was written all over their faces.
15 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, I see it's 12.30.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I was going to draw your attention to. That.
17 We'll have a 25-minute break.
18 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Sarapa, are you in a position to give us the
21 information you promised?
22 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]
23 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, because I'm not receiving
24 interpretation. I wish I could understand your language better; but in
25 six years, I haven't managed.
1 MR. SARAPA: [In English] Do you hear me now?
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Can you repeat, please?
3 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] Do you hear the interpretation now?
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Thank you.
5 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 Your Honours, the joint position of the Defence of Mr. Pandurevic,
7 in view of the circumstances and the time when we received the motion, and
8 in view of the fact that the witness, if he should testify, will do so
9 after the recess, then we would like to ask more time until tomorrow for
10 additional consultations.
11 Then, in the course of tomorrow, we would like to give to you our
12 definitive position. So we are asking to have this extra time until
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. You will have that extra time.
15 MR. SARAPA: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll indicate our various decisions at the end of
17 today's sitting, which means that you leave us some time.
18 So try to conclude your direct today. If not, we'll continue
19 tomorrow, of course --
20 MR. THAYER: Thank you, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: -- to be followed by cross-examination.
22 MR. THAYER: Mr. President, will you need five minutes or ten
23 minutes at the end, which is --
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Five will be enough.
25 MR. THAYER: Very well.
1 Q. Good afternoon, Colonel.
2 A. Good afternoon.
3 Q. We left off talking about the panic that you observed as a result
4 of the over-flying rockets. I want to show you another report.
5 MR. THAYER: This is 65 ter 511, please.
6 Q. I'll just note that the first update at 1910 is a continuation of
7 the previous document, 510. So I want to focus your attention on the
8 second update at 2135 hours, sir. Do you see that?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. It refers to"another 45 shells over-flying the Dutch-Bat compound
11 between 1845 and 2051 hours, causing a lot of panic amongst the refugees,
12 but they are deliberately missing the buildings."
13 What was the basis of your conclusion, from your observations,
14 that the VRS was deliberately missing the buildings?
15 A. Our main reason was that these -- we were informed, that is, these
16 shells, we were informed that they were coming from somewhere near the
17 Yellow Bridge towards Bratunac, somewhere there, and they were coming from
18 a tank or tanks. I think there were two tanks or so. So and a tank is
19 very easy to get a direct hit, if you want, and especially in such an area
20 where the ground was tank-able; "tank-able," meaning it was a bit level.
21 It was on the road. So they could easily get a direct hit, if
22 they wanted. We felt at that time that maybe they're firing overhead and
23 not at the people deliberately. Maybe the reasons could have been that
24 now the whole international community knows that the people are centered
25 in one area. So it would have been suicide to actually, on their side, to
1 hit directly where these people were; otherwise, they would attract
2 international condemnation.
3 So that was our own way of reasoning, and that's what we came up
5 Q. You referred to these two tanks. Now, as to the rockets
6 over-flying the compound, were you able personally ever to see the source
7 of that rocket fire; and if so, where was it located?
8 A. We could see and we knew where the rocket-launcher was; and, in
9 fact, even finally, when it got out of that place, it came directly
10 towards Potocari. Actually, we could see it from the same place where we
11 always thought it was. So I personally knew where it was.
12 I knew where it was, and we had given the grid references of the
13 same place. So it was evident that where it was was a definite area;
14 maybe not one place, maybe it was moving about a few metres, then back and
15 all that. But it was the same grid square.
16 Q. When you refer to giving the grid references, sir, just to be
17 clear, you're referring to you provided those grid references in
18 connection with supporting the close air support that you had called for;
19 is that correct?
20 A. Correct, Your Honour. We had given that grid reference so that it
21 could have been marked as one of their targets.
22 Q. So just to be clear, were these 45 shells in addition to the 22
23 rockets that you observed previously or would these include the 22?
24 A. That is one thing right now I cannot -- I cannot recall, whether
25 it was an additional. If they were together, I can't remember very well.
1 Q. That's fine, sir. That brings us to the 12th of July.
2 Do you recall seeing the Serb forces arrive at the Dutch compound
3 that morning; and if so, can you describe how they appeared and where they
5 A. Your Honour, this day, okay, started like any other day. But when
6 we woke up, I personally saw that there was some presence of BSA soldiers
7 passing by, passing on the road leading from Bratunac, through Potocari,
8 towards Srebrenica. These soldiers were slightly different from the
9 normal BSA soldiers that we knew, in that they wore -- they wore black.
10 So they passed Potocari; some went straight towards Srebrenica;
11 others branched, I think, to the right somewhere.
12 Q. And did you see any other soldiers or military forces arrive in
13 Potocari; and if so, what did they do, where did they go?
14 A. Your Honour, immediately, these soldiers in black passed through
15 Potocari. They were followed almost immediately by now the normal BSA
16 soldiers that we knew, with their camouflage. Those ones now came in and
17 took positions in Potocari, that is, along the road. They started even
18 going towards where the IDPs were. They -- they took their positions, and
19 you could see they were scattered everywhere. They were almost -- they
20 had manned the whole -- the whole area.
21 We then -- there were some who had, I think, blue -- I think they
22 all wore blue. Like the blue uniform was for the police, so we saw these
23 ones now follow immediately thereafter.
24 Q. Sir, just for the record, you refer to "IDPs." What is that?
25 A. IDPs, we're talking about internally-displaced people; in fact,
1 that is what we were referring them to.
2 Q. What happened next after these soldiers came in and took up
3 positions along the road and among the refugees?
4 A. Your Honour, this caused a lot of concern for us because we were
5 thinking that maybe they can do whatever they want. Now that they're
6 already inside, maybe the mop-up exercise could start any time, because
7 immediately when infantry gets in, what they do is to wipe up, to mop up
8 the place, that is, clean the place, clear the place of any element of the
9 enemy. So we thought maybe they're going to attempt to do that.
10 So we forced ourselves, you know, because -- I say the word "force
11 ourselves," because we were fearing them in the process because we don't
12 know what intentions they have. But at the same time, we cannot sit back
13 and watch them doing whatever they want.
14 So we went out to investigate, to check what really was happening,
15 and we found that they were -- they were mingling with the locals, not
16 discussing. But they were there with them, and they were everywhere,
17 everywhere. And most of them could not speak English, so we could not
18 communicate with them properly. You try to talk to someone, and he does
19 not understand what you're talking about, and you also cannot get what --
20 what he is saying.
21 Q. And on that note, do you recall where Emir and Hasan were by this
22 time on the 12th?
23 A. By this time, Hasan had not reported. He had not come back yet.
24 And, Emir, I can't remember whether he had come back or not. I'm not very
25 sure about that.
1 Q. Okay. Do you remember investigating any reports of threatening
2 behaviour by the Serb forces towards the refugees early that day?
3 A. Your Honour, that was part of the intentions that we had on going
4 out of the Dutch-Bat compound, because we had received information that
5 the BSA soldiers were threatening the Muslims. They were behaving in a
6 manner like they could shoot them. They could shoot them any time.
7 So we went out there to check what was happening, and somehow we
8 didn't find them posing in such a threatening way. In fact, we didn't see
9 them pointing their guns; though, we had been told that they had at the
10 Muslims. That obviously does not mean that they had not pointed at them.
11 But what we were told and what we saw straightly differed. So we didn't
12 see them pointing the guns.
13 Q. And, in fact, when you went to investigate this report of a
14 threat, what did you actually see the Serb soldiers doing?
15 A. Your Honour, at this stage, I saw them giving out candies in a
16 friendly way, giving out sweets, bonbon, or whatever they were calling
17 it. So they were giving it to them, and, you know, it looked like they
18 are doing it without any -- without any problems. Like it was out of
19 their own hearts that they were giving out. But, later on, we noticed
20 that immediately we turned. You know, we moved from that place, and they
21 were taking them back. So it was like an act, they were acting.
22 Q. Do you recall there being more than one occasion when you saw
23 candy or sweets being distributed by the Serb soldiers to the refugees?
24 A. Your Honour, that was the first time; but, later on, I witnessed
25 one, when General Ratko Mladic came in, and, okay, a lot of activities
1 happened. But the moment I told him that there were some men who were put
2 in one place, they were isolated. They were in a place where the -- the
3 place was not habitable. At that time, he went there and distributed some
4 beers and all that.
5 Also before we went there, in the field where I found him, he was
6 distributing those candies with the soldiers there. And, immediately
7 after, now he turned to another direction to find the candies being taken
8 by the same soldiers, and you wonder why this is happening. But that was
9 happening in front of cameras. That is when they were giving the candies.
10 It was happening in front of the cameras, and my assumption was
11 that maybe they're just acting maybe to show that they are friendly to
12 these people. They don't mean any harm to them. But the reason why they
13 should take back the candies, really, you can't understand why.
14 Q. You referred to encountering General Mladic, and you stated that
15 some things happened. Would you tell the Trial Chamber about your
16 encounters and any discussions you had with General Mladic?
17 A. Your Honour, in the first place, I just bumped into him when I --
18 when I was getting out of the Dutch-Bat compound. I saw a lot of soldiers
19 grouped together somewhere, and I wondered what was going on. So I went
20 there out of curiosity to check what is happening. And from a distance, I
21 could see one similar guy, you know. He is a bit short, and there was
22 some distance between him and the other people. So you could tell he was
23 the main guy there, the main character.
24 So I approached and I looked at the guy, and I saw he's General
25 Mladic. At least I could identify him, because he's someone we had seen
1 on TV and all that. So you could easily identify him. So I knew this is
2 the actual, the real General Ratko Mladic. So I approached him through a
3 series of those soldiers that were there, the bodyguards and the senior
4 officers. And, finally, I managed to get where he was.
5 And upon seeing me, he looked at me and saw my patch, that is,
6 it's Kenyan, and he asked me, "Oh, are you Kenyan," and I told him, "Yes,
7 I am Kenyan." Then we started talking and discussing issues. He talked
8 about athletics in Kenya. We talked about another general who was in
9 another sector that he was operating. We discussed a lot of issues, a lot
10 of outside issues, issues which are not to do with the real situation in
11 that -- in the enclave. So we discussed freely and we finished.
12 I left him a bit, then later on returned after I realised that
13 there was something queer happening, that there was separation of men and
14 women and children, and that the men were being taken to -- to one
15 particular building. They were being taken to a building somewhere there.
16 Then I looked across and saw the building and the people that were being
17 taken there.
18 I came back to the general and I asked him, "Surely, what is
19 happening here? I can see men are being separated from women and children
20 and being taken to that building. The way it looks from the outside
21 really shows that there is a big problem. It's overcrowded. How can you
22 keep people in one overcrowded place like that? There's no air, there's
23 no space, there's nothing." So I asked him those questions and we talked.
24 Then he looked at me and asked me whether -- I mean, he told me that,
25 yeah, as far as he's concerned, the people there are very comfortable.
1 He told me that he'll take me there, himself, because for
2 information I tried to go there earlier and I was stopped by the BSA
3 soldiers. I was told I could not go there. So this time the general told
4 me, "I'll take you there myself."
5 So at that time we started talking; and within a very short time,
6 he said, "Let's go." We went there, and actually we saw the people were
7 there huddled in one particular building, and you could see there's no
8 space in between. It was overcrowded, and they were making noises, you
9 know, shouting - not shouting, as such - but you could see they were
10 murmuring to show that they were dissatisfied and all that.
11 So I told him, "This is not acceptable. This is wrong," and he
12 told me, "No, no, no. It's not, it's not. Look at them, they're okay."
13 At that time, a soldier started distributing beer. The beer soldier
14 started distributing beer, candies, and all that, sodas, soft drinks. You
15 know, he started distributing; and at that time, the fuming was going on.
16 This was meant now to show that the people were comfortable, which
17 was not the actual case, because the situation had not changed. So I told
18 him, "Okay. If they are comfortable, fine, but what do you intend to do?
19 What is the problem here? Why are you separating them?" He told me, "No,
20 no, no. They're okay. Just leave them alone." So I finished with the
21 general at that time.
22 Q. Sir, did you try to get access to those men in that building when
23 you were brought back there by General-- or with General Mladic?
24 A. Your Honour, I requested that I go in to check, physically, but he
25 told me point blank, "You cannot go in there." He refused me entry into
1 that place.
2 Q. And what happened next, to your recollection, sir?
3 A. One thing to note here is that when these men were being taken
4 inside that building, they were being forced to abandon their wear wares,
5 their belongings, on the way somewhere. They were told to drop them there
6 and go in, everything that they had. We're talking about maybe even
7 wallets, their bundle of clothes, or whatever they were carrying, to leave
8 them there, and they're going into the building.
9 So later on, after I was denied permission to get in there, I -- I
10 just went back. I just went back. I can't remember anything else around
11 there, at that time.
12 Q. Sir, you testified a few moments ago that you noticed that the men
13 were being separated. Can you describe, in as much detail as you can,
14 what you actually observed of those separations, how the men were
15 reacting, and what, if anything, you tried to do?
16 A. Your Honour, this separation was actually very bad. I did not
17 enjoy it. I did not like it, in that you could see men were being moved
18 from their families. They were being told, "All the men, come over here."
19 Now, initially, they had indicated that the ones they were looking
20 for, even when Major Nikolic had gone inside the Dutch-Bat compound, had
21 indicated the people they were looking for were those who were in the
22 fighting age. So after they started picking these men and taking them to
23 that building, there was a lot of fear from amongst themselves and also
24 the families they're leaving behind, in that no one could know for sure
25 what their fate would be.
1 So as they got out, they could be given most of the things that
2 the family had. You could see that happening, "Oh, please go with that,
3 go with that." Sometimes they, themselves, could leave whatever they had
4 with the families that they were leaving behind. So it was total
5 confusion, because they didn't know who was safe. Is it the families? Is
6 it the men who were being moved? So who was safe, no one could tell.
7 So sometimes in that confusion, everyone was shedding tears,
8 crying here and there, the families, the soldiers themselves -- the men
9 themselves. And with that confusion, we could see that definitely this is
10 a state that we should not have reached in the first place.
11 So they were separated, kept together, huddled together in that
12 one group. And after that, the aim - I talked to some of the BSA soldiers
13 - was exactly to make sure that they can be able to identify those who
14 are soldiers in the war, and so that they can take them elsewhere. So I
15 think that that maybe will come later; but as for now, that is what I
17 Q. And who was doing the separating, sir?
18 A. Your Honour, this separation was being done by the BSA soldiers
19 who were there, but their senior leaders were also there, because even
20 General Mladic was there. These other Colonels, they were all there,
21 Major Nikolic, Colonel Vukovic, and all those senior officers, they were
22 all there. They were all there when this separation was going on. The
23 actual removal of the people was being done by the soldiers, but they were
24 obviously the ones who were giving the orders.
25 Q. You recall buses arriving at some point on the 12th, sir?
1 A. I do recall that very well, because I was directly involved in a
2 discussion with General Mladic, telling him that a situation has arrived
3 whereby the UN is going to send buses to come and pick the refugees from
4 there. And upon telling him that, he told me, point blank, he does not
5 require the use or the help from the UN.
6 He, himself, has organised his own transport, and he's going to
7 transport those people from there to Tuzla, where their Muslim brothers
8 are located. Those were his words, "We will move the Muslims from here
9 and take them to Tuzla to join their brothers there."
10 So, immediately, somehow it was like in a movie. Almost
11 immediately after, about 20, 30 minutes or so, the buses started arriving,
12 and we saw them come in. They aligned themselves now facing the other
13 direction now towards Bratunac. After they turned, they faced Bratunac.
14 Now in their own lane, they came in, ready to exit after taking the
16 Q. Just a couple of follow-up questions, sir.
17 During all these conversations that you described between yourself
18 and General Mladic and various Serb soldiers, who was doing the
19 interpreting or how were you actually communicating?
20 A. Your Honour, it was very difficult at that time because for sure
21 they could not allow our interpreters to come anywhere near there, and
22 also we did not want to come with them there. So what we were doing, we
23 were trying to identify some of the BSA soldiers who could understand and
24 speak English, and somehow, myself, I managed to get one.
25 Of course, the legal officer I had alluded to earlier was speaking
1 good English; but as a senior officer, he could not be available
2 throughout. So I selected one -- this one guy who could speak a bit of
3 English. He was a bit conspicuous, I think, in that I think he was
4 wearing a blue -- a blue UN jacket. So at least that one could speak a
5 bit of -- a bit of English.
6 He's the one now I was telling so that he could tell these other
7 people. So he was the link. And wherever he moved, you know, I would try
8 and make sure that if there's anything I want to communicate to the BSA,
9 he's there to help us. Otherwise, communication was a big, big problem.
10 Q. And did you observe anyone boarding the buses that had arrived,
12 A. Your Honour, the boarding of the buses was, you know, commenced
13 immediately thereafter, and we were there to see them, to witness that
14 they are going in, and that they are going in there properly. And during
15 this period, the -- there was something that the BSA were doing. They
16 were seeing -- you know, when the women and children were now going to the
17 buses, they could look at them. And if they identify a boy who is
18 slightly above 14, 15, 16, somewhere there, they could turn to him, they
19 could chuck him out, and tell him to go to the building where the men were
21 That was to my amazement, because they had said they don't want
22 the young and the very old. So I asked some of the soldiers, "Why are you
23 picking these very young boys," and due to their problem with their
24 communication, you know, they could not understand. But they were still
25 telling them to go in, so later on I started removing some of the boys. I
1 could ask them their ages, personally I could ask them their ages. I
2 would say, "What is your age," and the boy would say, "Fourteen." I would
3 tell them, "Get out. Fourteen, get out." After they got out, I could
4 show them their way back through these BSA soldiers, and I would tell
5 them, "No, no. These are just boys. Leave them alone."
6 Now, on the way out, after I got out of these, when I turned back,
7 I could still some more being still told to go in. So it was like a
8 vicious circle, but I know at least I managed to save several of them.
9 Several, actually, did not get into those buses, but I could not be there
10 throughout. So some of them, I'm sure still were forced into those buses,
11 and they were young.
12 Q. Now, can you describe the actual process that you observed of
13 the -- let's start with the people other than the men in the house. Did
14 you see them getting on the buses? Can you describe what that process was
16 A. Your Honour, the process was not that honourable, in that they
17 were not being requested to get in. In fact, they were being pushed in.
18 And in the moment you tried to either resist or maybe try to shout at your
19 brother or sister, your relatives, that they come to the same bus, you
20 could be pushed even to the ground by force.
21 Because, you know, I wish you could be able to look at yourself in
22 such a situation, in that you're seeing yourself being forced into a bus
23 and your sister or your brother or any close relative is now entering a
24 different bus, and you want them to join you where you are or you want to
25 go back and join them where they are. The people you're telling that.
1 They are telling you, "No, no, no. Go in. Go in, go in. Go in."
2 The moment you try that, you are forced. You are pushed to the
3 ground. You are pushed until you physically get in. They start crying.
4 They start making a lot of noises, "Why are you doing this do us?" "What
5 is wrong?" "What have we done?" You know, a lot of issues were coming
6 up, and it was to do with, "Why should you people be doing this to us?"
7 We were ourselves now we also hear some of the -- I mean, we could
8 understand some or part of the language because we were there for some
9 time, but not fully. But we could hear the outcry of the Muslims being
10 pushed to go into those buses, and it was not the most comfortable
11 position or situation.
12 Q. Did you, sir, have an occasion to observe any of the men from this
13 house getting on buses or leaving on buses?
14 A. Your Honour, I did. When the men were being taken to the buses,
15 for one, they were not allowed to go back and pick their belongings. So
16 they were being put in the buses without their belongings, without the
17 items that they were forced to leave out there. So they were taken
18 towards the buses one by one, like they are prisoners of war, one by one,
19 one following each other, with no space in between, and soldiers
21 And in between the buses, there are soldiers to ensure that one
22 does not cross. So they were all taken in, and this was one of the
23 saddest moments that I ever had in that area, in that you could see men,
24 real men, crying, asking us, "You, UNPROFOR, why are you letting these
25 people take us? Why are you letting them go with us? Why do you want us
1 to be killed by these people?" And we could ask them, you know, "What do
2 you think they're going to do to you," and they say, "Really, these people
3 are going to kill to us. Why do they, in the first place, separate us
4 from our families? Why are they taking us in buses? Do you know where
5 these buses are going to?" And it's true, we really did not know, other
6 than what we had been told, that they would take the Muslims to Tuzla.
7 So there was -- it was very emotional, in that some of the men,
8 obviously, we were seeing them in the village of Srebrenica, so some of
9 them we could identify, this is so-and-so, this one looks familiar and all
10 that, and all these people are crying, looking at you for assistance,
11 assistance you cannot provide. They're also desperate. There's nothing
12 you can do, and you know for sure these guys are headed to a place where
13 maybe it's not very safe, but there's nothing you can do.
14 MR. THAYER: Your Honour, I see we still have a couple of minutes
15 before the five minutes. My next idea was to go to a document, though,
16 that may take a little bit longer. I'd ask if we could continue tomorrow,
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, of course.
19 MR. THAYER: Thank you.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, Mr. Kingori, we need you back tomorrow.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: So you'll be escorted, and thank you so much.
23 Tomorrow morning at 9.00.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
25 [The witness stands down]
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey, there is this Josse motion that he
2 referred to earlier on, which we have gone through during the break. Will
3 you be in a position to respond to it orally tomorrow?
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Is that the Gvero motion?
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes.
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I think so.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: And the other Defence teams, insofar as considering
8 some of the points made by the Gvero Defence team in their motion, they
9 may be of relevance to some of you?
10 I beg your pardon, Mr. Ostojic.
11 MR. OSTOJIC: I haven't read it yet, Your Honour. We were in
12 court, so I didn't get a copy yet.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. But, anyway, it's an appointment for
14 tomorrow. We will be discussing this orally; and then, if necessary,
15 we'll either hand an oral decision tomorrow or else a written one in the
16 course of the recess.
17 We'll also discuss tomorrow, after hearing your position, if there
18 is anything to be said in relation to the Prosecution motion to add
19 another witness. So we could do that.
20 Who had the intention of going first cross-examining this witness
21 from amongst you? You, Mr. Zivanovic?
22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'm going to be first, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: You still require two hours?
24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: At least two hours.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: At least two hours. I think there will be two hours
1 left. We'll see tomorrow, anyway, we'll see tomorrow.
2 In the meantime, I would suggest that you start preparing. The
3 worst that could happen is that you'll go home and be more ready when you
4 return in January, more ready when you return in January, to start your
6 Anyway, one moment.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Also, we have had an opportunity to discuss, during
9 the break, the joint Defence oral application for an extension of the time
10 limit set in our scheduling order for the filing of the 65 ter documents.
11 We have taken into consideration not only what we consider to be a
12 justified request, but also the fact that the Prosecution does not object
13 to that, rather it's signified its agreement with such need to have the
14 time limit extended, so we have decided to grant it.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE AGIUS: So the 65 ter documents that the written scheduling
17 order refers to, the time limit will be as requested, end of April instead
18 of end of March, with two important caveats. Most important, of course,
19 is that nothing else is going to change. The other dates fixed for the
20 pre-Defence case conference and start of Defence case will stand. The
21 other caveat is that we believe that the point made by the Prosecution, in
22 relation to expert reports, shouldn't fall within the extension --
23 extended time limit, but that those reports should be handed to the
24 Prosecution, be made available to the Prosecution, by the 31st of March,
25 as originally planned.
1 Yes, Mr. Ostojic.
2 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 I think our agreement was limited to just the military expert, so
4 that there's no confusion. We would just like that clarification from
5 Your Honours. We agreed that we were going to tender to them only the
6 military expert by the 31st of March, and all the other experts, if any,
7 we would tender to them by the 30th of April, pursuant to the extension.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: That's -- thank you, Mr. Ostojic. That's how you
9 understood it to be?
10 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, then that's how it will be. I think it's
12 clear enough.
14 MR. OSTOJIC: Just to clarify just one other point a little more.
15 The Court, Your Honour, refers to 65 ter documents. Just so there's no
16 confusion, it was the 65 ter witness list and the documents. So I just
17 want to make sure we're all on the same page.
18 Thank you, Mr. President.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, that's right, whatever the 31st March deadline
20 that we had indicated in our scheduling order refers to, okay, are the
21 filings that we had in mind and which we still have in mind.
22 The other thing is this: We are granting this extension with the
23 understanding that within the same time frame, that is, the end of April,
24 30th of April, you will come forward with a definitive -- both of you, a
25 definitive position in relation to agreed facts and possibly adjudicated
1 facts. In other words, in the interim between our Rule 98 bis decision
2 and the 65 ter filings, you need to engage yourselves into an exchange of
3 correspondence on possible agreed facts and possible adjudicated facts,
4 and have that crystallised by the time the 65 ter filings take place.
5 All right?
6 I think we can adjourn now. Tomorrow, 9.00. Thank you.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
8 to be reconvened on Friday, the 14th day of
9 December, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.