080114ED

Page 19572

1 A. Presently, I am an intelligent research specialist, or as we're

2 now referred to, a criminal research officer, with the Human Rights

3 Violators Unit for the US Department of Immigration and Customs

4 Enforcement, which is an agency of the Department of Homeland Security.

5 Q. Could you give us just a brief description of what that entails,

6 very brief?

7 A. My role as a criminal research officer is to support our field

8 investigators as well as US attorneys offices and our own administration

9 lawyers with respect to identifying, prosecuting, and removing, where

10 applicable, individuals who have committed human rights abuses and who are

11 residing in the United States in contravention to the Immigration and

12 Nationality Act.

13 Q. All right. And does any of that work involve your knowledge that

14 you learned from the job at the United Nations?

15 A. Yes, sir. Certainly, the techniques and tactics that we -- that I

16 learned here with respect to dealing with law enforcement are applicable

17 in the United States, and a number of cases that my agency is currently

18 undertaking are derivatives of information that have come from the Office

19 of the Prosecutor.

20 Q. Shortly, does that in many cases involve false statements that

21 former members of the VRS have made on their immigration applications?

22 A. Yes, sir, and again --

23 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, please.

24 Yes, Mr. Ostojic.

25 MR. OSTOJIC: My mic is not working anymore, Your Honours. I

Page 19573

1 object to the form of the question.

2 Thank you. We object to the form of the question, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Why?

4 MR. OSTOJIC: It presumes there were false statements in those

5 applications, and I don't know that he's made a conclusion as to each of

6 those applications. I think there may be allegations on some of those

7 applications. But Mr. McCloskey is suggesting that each of the applicants

8 who made those applications, that they were indeed false, and that's a

9 finding that, one, would be held over for a criminal federal court to

10 decide. It has been on some of the cases where Mr. Butler has testified,

11 some of which have found that they were not false statements. Secondly,

12 there were some issues that go to the -- specifically the Department of

13 Immigration and Naturalisation.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey, would you like to comment? Why don't

15 you concentrate on what the gentleman is here to testify upon, I mean.

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: I can throw in allegations. That's fine.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Please go ahead, Mr. McCloskey.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY:

19 Q. Let's just put "allegations" into that question, and can you

20 answer it?

21 A. Yes, sir, in part it does revolve around those types of

22 allegations.

23 Q. All right. And how long have you held that job?

24 A. I began my employment with the US Immigration and Customs

25 Enforcement in February of 2004.

Page 19574

1 Q. And what job did you hold before that job and before February

2 2004?

3 A. Prior to that, I was a military analyst with the Office of the

4 Prosecutor of the ICTY.

5 Q. For how many years were you with the ICTY?

6 A. My total service with the ICTY was six and a half years: Roughly,

7 four and a half years while I was a member of the United States Army,

8 seconded to the Tribunal, and the remaining two years as a UN civil

9 servant.

10 Q. Okay. We'll get into a little more detail of that later, but

11 what -- before coming over to the -- being seconded to the ICTY, to the

12 OTP, what was your job?

13 A. I was an all-source intelligent technician with the United States

14 Army.

15 Q. All right. Well, now I'm going to ask you to -- we're going to go

16 way back in time a bit to have you describe your military career a bit for

17 us. Let's start when you graduate from high school or secondary school,

18 about age 18, what did you do?

19 A. At that point in time, I enrolled in a local community college in

20 Miami and spent two and a half years at school there.

21 Q. For what?

22 A. Initially, I was studying marine engineering and marine survey

23 technology.

24 Q. And what happened to that field?

25 A. At a point in time, particularly after spending several months on

Page 19575

1 an ocean-going tugboat, actually living the life, between finances and a

2 few other things, I decided I wanted to stay on dry land for a while and

3 enlisted into the United States Army.

4 Q. And what year did you enlist in the army?

5 A. I enlisted in August of 1981, sir.

6 Q. So about how old were you?

7 A. Twenty, twenty-one, yeah.

8 Q. So did you start out as a private, like everyone else?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. Can you briefly describe your career in the United States Army? I

11 will try to leave pauses, like we know how to do, so bear with me on that,

12 please.

13 A. As an enlisted soldier, from August of 1981, my initial basic

14 entry training, I tracked, go into the military intelligence career field,

15 as part of my enlistment. So after completing basic training, I went to

16 the initial intelligence analysis course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, which

17 is standard.

18 My first operational assignment was starting in January of 1982,

19 where I was assigned to a military intelligence group in Europe. I

20 remained there doing analysis, primarily human intelligence, human-related

21 intelligence, from 1982 to 1985.

22 I left that organisation, being promoted to sergeant, and went to

23 the intelligence company of an armoured regiment in Fort Bliss, Texas,

24 where I spent 15 months as a non-commissioned officer, doing intelligence

25 analysis with that organisation.

Page 19576

1 I then transferred to the United States Central Command, which is

2 a major joint headquarters at McDill Air force Base, Florida. It's

3 responsible for the entire Middle-Eastern region, from a US perspective.

4 I spent two years there doing research on then Soviet Army operations in

5 Afghanistan, so I was looking at their military operations from a tactical

6 and operational level.

7 After the completion of that assignment, I was selected for

8 appointment as a warrant officer, went to warrant officer -- the basic

9 course, and the warrant officer intelligence basic course, and

10 successfully graduated those courses. Then as a warrant officer, back to

11 Europe, where I was assigned to work in the all-source production section

12 of the 3rd Infantry Division, Wuerzburg, Germany.

13 Q. Let me interrupt you just briefly. Can you tell us what, in the

14 United States Army, a warrant officer is, as opposed to a regular officer,

15 lieutenant, captain, major, that we're used to hearing about?

16 A. Within the context of the United States Army, there's long been

17 recognised a need to have officers who can specialise in specific career

18 fields, primarily those technical career fields that the army has a

19 requirement for. Many of those, warrant officers, my counterparts, will

20 be specialised in, for example, the aviation field, where they'll deal

21 strictly with issues related to military aviation. You'll have my

22 counterparts in the ordinance field, where they deal with issues of

23 ammunition, or logistics, or things of that nature.

24 In my particular career field, myself and my counterpart warrant

25 officers deal with the technical issues of intelligence, where we are

Page 19577

1 actually the people who conduct those -- that type of detailed analysis.

2 Regular officers in those same fields are -- obviously they have, you

3 know, they have an education level as well. But as a result of their job

4 functions, they do not get into the same technical details that we, as

5 warrant officers, are trained and expected to do.

6 Conversely, those officers have a much more varied career field

7 that they're expected to adhere to. Those regular army officers, for

8 example, may be directed to spend three years teaching at universities,

9 military education there. They will be directed to do other things not

10 necessarily related to the branch that they specialise, that the army

11 requires them to do as part of their professional education and their

12 professional opportunities.

13 So it is a differential that the army uses for those officers who

14 will remain for their careers doing these technical issues and officers

15 who will be broader generalists, so to speak.

16 Q. Okay. Let's get back to where you left off. You're a -- you're a

17 warrant officer --

18 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, one moment.

19 JUDGE KWON: Just one thing to be clear on my part, Mr. McCloskey.

20 What would be a human intelligence?

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Your Honour. There's a couple of

22 different kinds of intelligence which we're about to get to, but I do

23 appreciate questions, because I have organised this in a manner where I've

24 tried to -- I've left out things that I may have talked about before,

25 because you have heard so much. So as questions come, I appreciate them.

Page 19578

1 So thank you for that and we'll get to that.

2 Q. So, Mr. Butler, you're now a warrant officer, and you've mentioned

3 human intelligence, so it's a good time to talk about. What kind of

4 intelligence were you looking at?

5 A. Human intelligence, within the general parlance of intelligence

6 disciplines, is defined as intelligence and information that is derived

7 from human sources, not technical sources. That would, for example,

8 include an overt debriefing or an interview of somebody who might have

9 information. It would include, obviously, information that was derived

10 from clandestine or covert sources of information.

11 It generally encompasses what's known as open-source information,

12 intelligence or information that might be derived from the media sources.

13 Any form of information that falls under the broader rubric of human

14 contact is known in the intelligence disciplines as "human intelligence."

15 Q. How about if you got a hold of some orders, orders or documents or

16 reports from the enemy, what would that be?

17 A. That falls into a category of document exploitation, which is also

18 under the broader category of human intelligence.

19 Q. How else have -- has your profession divided intelligence? What

20 other kind of intelligence?

21 A. Another major branch of intelligence is what's known as "signals

22 intelligence." It is the intelligence information derived from radios or

23 other forms of emitters. There is communications intelligence, which

24 specifically deals with the intercept of radio traffic. There is what's

25 known as non-communications intelligence, which is intelligence that is

Page 19579

1 derived from other broadcast means that don't involve communications;

2 for example, radar, or, for example, telemetry, or things of that nature.

3 So that is the general, you know, types of intelligence related to signals

4 intelligence.

5 Q. Anything else in particular, especially that may be relevant to

6 this case?

7 A. The next discipline would be imagery intelligence, which is the

8 category of collecting intelligence information from imagery video

9 sources, and it could be from something simple like hand-held photography

10 all the way up to, of course, imagery derived from reconnaissance

11 platforms or satellites.

12 Q. All right. And I don't obviously want to get into the detail of

13 this, but have you had experience, in your long career, of actually

14 dealing with this sort of intelligence in real-life situations?

15 A. Yes, sir, with all three branches. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Okay. Can you describe for us briefly now the kinds of learning

17 and educational experience you had throughout your career so we can get an

18 idea of your training and your education?

19 A. As an enlisted soldier, as I've said, I've attended the basic

20 intelligence analyst course, non-commissioned officers academies related

21 to that advanced education for both my leadership skills as well as my

22 intelligence skills.

23 In 1988, when I was appointed for warrant officer, I attended

24 again not only their warrant officer leadership academy for leadership

25 skills, but also the military intelligence warrant officer basic course,

Page 19580

1 where we were given additional training with respect to dealing with the

2 types of intelligence that I've just discussed.

3 Continuing on my career as a warrant officer, when I achieved a

4 specific rank, in my case Chief Warrant Officer 3, a senior-grade

5 intelligence warrant officer, I was required to go back and complete

6 what's known as the warrant officer advanced course, which is less in that

7 case given information with respect to teaching specific skills.

8 But at that point of our careers, where we're considered to be,

9 you know, significant career professionals, it was more of a forum where

10 other warrant officers were brought in for these various course works and

11 it allowed, in a collaborative environment, for all of us to share the

12 ideas and the information and the techniques that we had learned through

13 the years for the benefit of not only that class but, in many cases, the

14 information would be put out to the services as well.

15 So that's the limit of my military education.

16 Q. Well, how about general university education? Have you received

17 any university degrees?

18 A. Yes, sir, I have. I have a bachelor's degree from the University

19 of Maryland, their European division, in political science.

20 Q. And did you receive that while you were an active service person

21 in the army?

22 A. Yes, sir, I did, a compilation of a lot of years of night school.

23 Q. All right. Did the US pay for that?

24 A. They paid 75 per cent, and I paid 25 per cent.

25 Q. Generous. All right. Now, you have, in your reports, defined

Page 19581

1 three subject areas of military analysis for land warfare. Can you

2 briefly tell us what each of those are and, as you have before, just

3 encapsulate what they are?

4 A. In the three areas of intelligence analysis with respect to land

5 warfare, they parallel, of course, the three levels of land warfare. The

6 first one is what is referred to generally as the tactical level.

7 "Tactics," as the name implies, deals primarily with issues

8 related to close combat, military operations that last from, you know, the

9 immediacy until 24 to 48 hours. This type of combat is generally

10 described as the type of combat that small formations would be involved

11 in, platoons, companies, battalions, even brigades involved in

12 tactic-level operations.

13 The next level of operations, and they'll be some overlap here

14 obviously, is what is known as the operational level of war.

15 Q. Can I interrupt you briefly? I know different armies use

16 different terminologies for their forces. Can you briefly tell us, at the

17 tactical level, where in your -- what sort of units in the VRS context are

18 we talking about?

19 A. As an example, there will be orders with respect to Srebrenica

20 that we will see. Those will be actual attack orders or actual orders

21 where the roles of companies and battalions are outlined. That would be

22 an example of a tactical order, having to deal with the particular

23 movement or issues of a company or a battalion or what it's to be doing

24 within the next 12 to 24 hours. So we'll see that in that particular

25 context.

Page 19582

1 Q. Okay. After tactical was what?

2 A. The operational level of war deals with the higher military

3 formations; and, again, brigades are involved in this to some extent,

4 division-level commands where various military forces will have them, or

5 corps-level commands. This is the warfare and the planning and the

6 process of warfare that deals more specifically, not with those

7 day-to-day-related issues, but with those issues that generally in combat

8 will transpire between the 72-hour to 96-hour to beyond, you know, several

9 days afterwards.

10 In the United States, you know, when you're thinking of the

11 operational level, you're already thinking beyond the current battle and

12 that you're now looking towards the next battle. Maybe to proceed with

13 the question, where we would be looking in this context, for example,

14 would be where the Srebrenica operation is going on, and at the point in

15 time that people start thinking about what happens after Srebrenica,

16 what's the next military operation, in this case Zepa, and that's an

17 example of now delving into the operational art of war. You're already

18 thinking beyond your immediate battle, and you're now thinking what

19 happens in the next phase, the next part of that.

20 Q. Okay. The third part?

21 A. The third part is what's known as the strategic battle, and as the

22 name implies, again, what you're talking here is the overall conflict

23 capacity of an army and how it's tied into a nation.

24 The strategic level of warfare, for example, you know, will

25 encompass not only the actual combat, it will encompass issues related to

Page 19583

1 the development of weapons systems, the development of national strategy

2 or policy on issues. It will encompass issues related to short- and

3 long-term personnel mobilisation: How will the military be financed, how

4 will it be supported, what is its training base, how do you train your

5 current generation of officers, and how do you train your next generation

6 of officers.

7 So that is -- the interrelationships between the three, but, you

8 know, each particular aspect of that, you know, deals with a various

9 component of how a country or nation wages armed conflict.

10 Q. And, again, can you give us a short VRS or RS example of what may

11 fit into that category?

12 A. For example, many of -- some of the documents that I'll talk about

13 in the future relate to what are known as operational directives. Now,

14 while they were in fact named "operational," what those directives do, you

15 know, outlines the strategic concept of how the war is to be fought during

16 various stages of the conflict. It melds the military situation on the

17 ground with the political situation within the Republika Srpska, as well

18 as the other warring parties.

19 It also talks about and wraps in the political and diplomatic

20 issues related to the European Community as they involve the conflict in

21 Bosnia. So those types of directives would be an example of what I would

22 call the strategic conduct of the war.

23 Q. All right. And in your experience as a United States Army warrant

24 officer, have you dealt with all three levels?

25 A. Yes, sir, I have.

Page 19584

1 Q. Now, let's go to your movement over to the OTP of the ICTY. Can

2 you remind us again what year that was?

3 A. That was April of 1997.

4 Q. And as you said, you were seconded from the United States. Can

5 you briefly tell us, what was the understanding between the United States

6 and the OTP at that point? How was it that you ended up being an OTP

7 person but staying in the United States Army?

8 A. To start that off, at the time I was an intelligence warrant

9 officer with what's known as the United States 3rd Army, which is the army

10 component of Central Command, and in that place I was for five years doing

11 strategic and operational intelligence. The United States government had

12 agreed apparently to a request from the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor to

13 second, as the practice used to be back then, individual -- an individual

14 military analyst to the Office of the Prosecutor to assist them in

15 understanding many of the military aspects of the crime bases they were

16 investigating; not only the United States, I understand other countries

17 were involved in this process as well, volunteering military analysts.

18 As a result, primarily because I had spent five years in the

19 United States and it was time for me to rotate back overseas again, my

20 name came up and I accepted the assignment, came to Europe, and was

21 essentially loaned to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY for my

22 duration of military service.

23 Q. And who was paying you?

24 A. As an active-duty army officer, I was salaried by the United

25 States government, I was paid by the United States Army.

Page 19585

1 Q. Okay. Aside from that, did you become a regular worker at the

2 OTP?

3 A. I showed up at 8.00 and left at 7.00 in the evening, like most of

4 the people who were involved in this case. So I was, for all effects, I

5 was a non-paid UN employee.

6 Q. And where did you get assigned when you first arrived?

7 A. The initial office I was assigned and working out of is what's

8 known as the Military Analysts Team, a group of military officers and

9 analysts who assist the Office of the Prosecutor in various

10 investigations, in understanding military activities related to the crimes

11 that they're investigating. My initial two months there were essentially

12 to read up and become familiar with this particular area, since I've not

13 dealt with issues related to Bosnia for about five years before I came to

14 the Tribunal.

15 After several months, the branch chief of MAT at the time, Peter

16 Nicholson, assigned me to support the Srebrenica investigation which at

17 that time did not have a military analyst.

18 Q. So what does that mean?

19 A. Essentially, what that meant was that while I was assigned to the

20 MAT for accountability and other personnel-related activity and I worked

21 in that office, my primary focus was to provide military analysis support

22 to the investigators and the lawyers who at that time were investigating

23 the crime base related to Srebrenica.

24 Q. All right. And you'd mentioned that you had some Bosnia

25 experience prior to that. Can you describe any Bosnia or experience from

Page 19586

1 the former Yugoslavia, just to -- in broad terms, of course?

2 A. After finishing up with my assignment in Southwest Asia with US

3 7th Corps during what is now known, I guess, as the first Gulf War, I

4 reverted back to my original position in 3rd Infantry Division in

5 Wuerzburg, Germany. At that time, it was early 1992; and as part of NATO

6 and part of the Central Army group, there was contingency planning going

7 on with respect to the possibility of NATO forces being deployed to Bosnia

8 in some form or fashion.

9 So from my return in late April of 1992, after leave, being back

10 to the unit in May of 1992, until I rotated out in August of 1992, my

11 focus was catching up and looking at the aspects of the conflict in Bosnia

12 during that short period in order to potentially support a deployment of

13 US military forces, should the decision be made to do that.

14 Q. And, again briefly, what kind of information sources did you look

15 at to study up on the former Yugoslavia?

16 A. Primarily, at that time we were less interested in issues related

17 to the actual combatants, themselves, and more interested in relation to

18 more of the -- more of the boilerplate issues of intelligence, which is

19 identifying various issues related to map holdings, identifying areas

20 which may be potentially suitable for deployment areas, working with the

21 logistics staff a lot to provide them with the information related to

22 existing railroads and things of that nature that might support a

23 potential deployment.

24 We were not engaged in a day-to-day monitoring of the military

25 activities of any of the warring parties, if that's what you're getting

Page 19587

1 at.

2 Q. Any general materials for historical background?

3 A. At that time, it would probably be whatever news and media reports

4 were coming out of Yugoslavia. I guess it's a matter of fact at this

5 point that, certainly, when the civil conflict in Bosnia started, it

6 wasn't a primary focus of the United States.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think it's break time, Mr. President.

8 [Trial Chamber confers].

9 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll have a 30-minute break, starting from now.

10 Thank you.

11 --- Recess taken at 12.00 p.m.

12 --- On resuming at 12.32 p.m.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

15 Q. Okay, Mr. Butler. We left off and you were -- had just been

16 assigned to the Srebrenica team. Can you describe the tasks that you were

17 assigned and what you basically did in those early months and years?

18 A. Yes, sir. I was assigned two specific tasks. The first one was

19 to engage in the study of the military and armed forces apparatus that was

20 believed to be responsible for the crime base, in which case would be the

21 Armed Forces of the Republika Srpska, in order to understand their

22 doctrine, how they would have been engaged in operations, things of that

23 nature, how their command-and-control organisation would have worked, how

24 their -- you know, all those fundamentals of how the military would have

25 worked in the concert of that crime base.

Page 19588

1 The second component was to actually do the analysis necessary to

2 identify and place the various military units on the ground at the time

3 that the investigation had determined that crimes had occurred or

4 potential crimes had occurred, you know, in order to start making it to

5 the next step to determine who the leaders in those units were and whether

6 or not they would have any potential criminal culpability for the acts

7 that were being charged.

8 Q. Okay. Did the first thing you described end up in a particular --

9 with a particular product?

10 A. Yes, sir, and in the context of my first product, it's known as

11 the VRS command responsibility report.

12 Q. And so what kind of materials did you have access to in those

13 early days to help you sort out the procedures, the rules, the basic

14 command doctrines that were necessary to fulfill that task?

15 A. When I first arrived at the OTP, which is 1997, they had already

16 started to compile a library of former manuals, regulations, rules, and

17 doctrinal aids related to the former Yugoslav National Army, and, of

18 course, those were being translated.

19 So we had that type of information to start with in order to lay

20 out the basic doctrinal framework of what the former JNA looked like, how

21 the former JNA operated, how it was organised, and started to receive

22 documents from the warring parties, which, you know, began to lead me in

23 the direction of believing that, in fact, the Army of Republika Srpska was

24 following along in the same doctrinal, organisational, and behavioral

25 lines as the JNA before it.

Page 19589

1 Q. Okay. Well, those are in the early days. Can we just jump

2 forward just a bit, and I don't want to get into a lot of detail here;

3 but, today, what's your conclusion on that point, the relationship between

4 VRS rules, procedures, doctrine, and those of the JNA?

5 A. After not only reviewing the documents that the OTP received as

6 part of search warrants, you know, from various military units of the Army

7 of Republika Srpska, but also sitting in with interviews of senior VRS

8 officers and commanders, they all acknowledged that, you know, in fact the

9 officer corps, the tactics and the doctrine of the VRS, did mirror those

10 of the former JNA.

11 Q. In all senses?

12 A. There were some minor deviations based on the actual conduct of

13 the armed conflict with respect to maybe terminology or with respect to an

14 area -- particular area of operations that were based on municipality --

15 municipal boundaries and things of that nature. But issues related to

16 command and control, logistics support, combat doctrine, all of those

17 things remained the same as these officers were taught during their JNA

18 professional service.

19 Q. And how would you again describe briefly the quality and

20 completeness of the JNA material that you have had access to over the

21 years?

22 A. I can't obviously say I've got a complete listing of everything,

23 because I certainly don't know what I'm missing. I have some ideas. But

24 given the broad variety of material that the OTP has at this juncture, we

25 certainly have a very detailed cross-section of the material that would

Page 19590

1 have represented the reporting, the orders, the doctrine, and the whole

2 characteristic of the type of material that an army produces when it's in

3 the conduct of combat operations. So, I mean, I think we've got a fairly

4 good representation of that.

5 Q. And we'll get into some of that specific material a bit later, but

6 do you -- you lay out the names, the dates, the titles of all the material

7 you had basically in your command study and your narrative?

8 A. Yes, sir, I do. I footnote that extensively.

9 Q. Okay. How about the second task that you talked about, as you

10 described it, following after identified crime scenes and trying to link

11 units, identify leaders and units? What sorts of materials did you do --

12 did you look at in that review?

13 A. For that particular task, the most valuable documents were those

14 documents that actually represented the combat orders or reports of the

15 units of the Drina Corps that the OTP either acquired through seizures or

16 through other sources; for example, the documents from the Zvornik

17 Infantry Brigade that the OTP received, the documents from the Bratunac

18 Brigade, the documents that are referred to as the Drina Corps collection.

19 Those documents give a fair accounting of what those particular

20 units were doing on given days and set the foundation for interviews of

21 officers, or soldiers of those units, which then corroborated what they

22 were doing at those locations at those particular times with respect to

23 military operations.

24 Q. How about Ministry of Interior or MUP materials?

25 A. Yes, sir. In the same way that the military documents laid out

Page 19591

1 that picture, the OTP came into possession of documents from the RS

2 Ministry of the Interior, not only those special police units, but also

3 the public security offices or centres, which formed the exact same

4 picture. They give us the foundation of where these police units were,

5 and that, in large part, has been corroborated by the investigation,

6 interviewing the officers in question.

7 Q. All right. And how about open sources from the former Yugoslavia?

8 A. In the beginning, particularly, open source, you know, played a

9 significant role with respect to understanding the basic foundations of

10 the VRS. There's also what we would call open-source information specific

11 to the crime bases, itself, where various media outlets either associated

12 with the Republika Srpska military or independent media people were

13 videotaping various aspects of the operation.

14 In reviewing those videotapes, you know, you're able to identify

15 key members of the leadership, military equipment, things of that nature,

16 which again tend to flow into the larger picture of what particular

17 military units are on the ground, what their activities that they were

18 engaged in, things of that nature.

19 Q. Did you find any magazines interesting or important?

20 A. Yes, sir. Not only did the Army of the Republika Srpska publish

21 their own military magazine for the consumption of the soldiers, to read

22 about what their army was doing, in this particular case the first -- the

23 Zvornik Brigade, and later the Drina Corps took that over, published their

24 own military magazine as well, which on a monthly basis would discuss

25 issues of interest to the soldiers of the Zvornik Brigade and later the

Page 19592

1 Drina Corps. That magazine is known as "Drinski Magazine."

2 Q. All right. And how about information from the investigation, did

3 you have access to that kind of information?

4 A. Yes, sir. I mean, I had full access to the investigators as well

5 as all of the facets of the investigation that was going on certainly with

6 respect to interviewing military personnel, interviewing police personnel,

7 things of that nature. So I -- I had full access to all of the materials

8 of the investigation during my time here from 1997 through 2003.

9 Q. Did you cite any witness interviews or that kind of information in

10 your narrative?

11 A. As a -- as a general rule, I do not cite or attribute substantive

12 information to witness interviews, primarily because those are individuals

13 who may one day appear before a Trial Chamber and will be cross-examined.

14 I'm not in a position to -- you know, I don't want to rely on their

15 testimony, in the former of statements, as anything that I might rely on.

16 I do, however, in order to set the proper context of some of the

17 crime bases, for example, a place -- you know, the school at Orahovac or

18 the school at Petkovci, where individuals may have arrived and they depart

19 that location, I will rely on some of the statements or prior testimony of

20 those witnesses merely to establish that a crime base was at that location

21 to provide a framework for the remainder of the military documents or

22 other analysis that I do that will, you know, then places

23 the military unit at the location or in proximity.

24 Q. Okay. Over the years, have you drafted different addendums to

25 your report as you were called on to do so?

Page 19593

1 A. Yes, sir. For the requirements of the trial of General Krstic, I

2 had the corps command responsibility report, which was tailored towards

3 his responsibility as a corps commander, and my initial product, which was

4 known as the Srebrenica military narrative, which was the first iteration

5 of my laying out the military units and their association to the crime

6 base.

7 Following that, for the trial of Colonel Blagojevic and Major

8 Jokic, I tailored a product known as the brigade command responsibility

9 report, focusing on their roles and responsibilities with respect to the

10 brigade level of command. And, at the same time, I took that opportunity,

11 based on additional information that the investigation was generating, to

12 revise or, more accurately, update the military narrative that I had

13 authored earlier; and that, of course, was tendered as part of the trial

14 of Colonel Blagojevic and Lieutenant-Colonel Jokic.

15 Also as a part of that, I annexed in a new part of the

16 investigation that was developed, which was military documents related to

17 individuals who were being treated at various medical facilities within

18 the Drina Corps zone and who were subsequently on the missing list, and

19 that was a separate annex to my Srebrenica military narrative, the revised

20 version.

21 Finally, in preparation for this particular set of hearings, I

22 authored what's known as the Main Staff command responsibility report,

23 again dealing with the roles and functions of the Main Staff, in order to

24 set the context for my potential testimonies here as well. However, I did

25 not revise the military narrative that I had at the time. By that

Page 19594

1 juncture, I had already left the OTP and I didn't feel that I was in the

2 position, with respect to my current employment and my time constraints,

3 to significantly revise that document.

4 Q. All right. So the investigation and interviews and things

5 continued without you. Had you kept up to date with that -- all that

6 information, like you would have if you'd been a UN person?

7 A. My -- my current job responsibilities obviously preclude me from,

8 you know, keeping up with the day-to-day activities of the investigation

9 or the proceedings. You know, the US government, from the beginning, you

10 know, of my employment, understood that the Office of the Prosecutor had

11 requested and they had agreed to my continuing to function as an expert on

12 behalf of the Office of the Prosecutor for this case.

13 But certainly I have a day job, and I'm not in the position to

14 spend, you know, so many hours a day reviewing this. I would, of course,

15 go over new materials that were being published on the OT -- on the ICTY

16 website with respect to the trial. I have read a number of witness

17 statements relating to this particular trial from the website of the ICTY,

18 and I have been in contact with members of the Office of the Prosecutor

19 with respect to continuing issues of this investigation in preparation for

20 my testimony.

21 Q. All right. Now, in the process of carrying out your -- the tasks

22 that you've described, did you get involved in field missions, actually

23 going in to the -- into Bosnia or other places with the team?

24 A. Yes, sir, I did.

25 Q. And can you describe the sorts of things that you would go along

Page 19595

1 with?

2 A. Field missions that I would participate in would be those field

3 missions that would have a direct nexus to my military analytical work;

4 for example, I was part of the field missions that were involved in the

5 seizure of documents from the Krajina Corps, from the Zvornik Brigade,

6 from the Bratunac Brigade, as part of that operation.

7 Initially, I was involved in some of the work in trying to locate

8 potential intercept evidence from the Bosnian Muslim Army, at the time

9 2 Corps, until a point in time when we handed off investigatively to some

10 of the other investigators and Ms. Stefanie Frease.

11 When we started getting access to military officers of the VRS to

12 be able to interview them, I started to participate in those interviews in

13 order to assist the investigators and whatever lawyers were there with

14 understanding some of the answers of the accused with respect to the

15 context of the JNA, as well as to pose my own questions to either confirm

16 or deny our working thesis at the time that the rules, the regulations,

17 and the procedures of the JNA were, in fact, followed by the VRS.

18 Q. So did you actually question some witnesses?

19 A. Yes, sir, I did.

20 Q. Do you have -- can you give us a rough number?

21 A. For the OTP, I probably personally participated in maybe 24, 25,

22 two dozen. I mean, I think there were about three separate missions where

23 I participated in direct interviews. And in those missions where I didn't

24 participate in direct interviews because I had other commitments to do, I

25 certainly read the transcripts of the interviews afterwards.

Page 19596

1 Q. All right. Now, I want to go back just briefly. You've talked

2 about some of the material you relied on from open sources and JNA

3 documents and captured material from the VRS, but you've -- you've just

4 mentioned intercepts. Did you work with intercepted radio conversations

5 that were intercepted by the Bosnian Muslim Army of the Serb forces?

6 A. Yes, sir, I did.

7 Q. Can you tell us about -- about that?

8 A. What, as a component of my analysis or some background behind --

9 Q. Let's -- how did you first view that, how did you analyse that

10 material?

11 A. As the material -- or as we became aware that this material

12 existed and that the OTP started gaining possession of it, you know, my

13 view of the material, and I think I've indicated this in other forums

14 before the various Trial Chambers, is I was very skeptical of this

15 information, and certainly --

16 Q. Why is that?

17 A. Well, again, as a military professional, I could certainly hold

18 open the prospect that, you know, we could be baited into some form of a

19 disinformation campaign; and, certainly, within the context of the crime

20 base, those individuals within 2 Corps, many of whom had lost relatives as

21 a result of Srebrenica, you know, would certainly have motive to want to

22 enhance the evidence, so to speak, with respect to various issues of the

23 crime base. I mean, I was aware of that, and so was the investigative

24 team from square one.

25 Q. In your experience as a military intelligence analyst in your

Page 19597

1 prior job, was credibility of intercepts and other documents an issue that

2 you would deal with?

3 A. Not only intercepts, but all intelligence information. A part

4 of -- a part of being an analyst is being able to not only review the

5 information and figure out what it means, but also being able to judge the

6 credibility and the reliability of the information. In doing that,

7 obviously, you know, the implied task is that the analyst had to

8 understand the various methodologies that were used to collect the

9 information.

10 That's the first step in determining whether or not the

11 information that you're receiving is -- whether it's technically feasible

12 to even acquire that information, in the first place, as a role of

13 verifying that the information that you're receiving is at least -- you

14 know, has some form of reliability.

15 Q. Okay. So what, if anything, did you do to review, look into, and

16 test the reliability of these -- this intercepted material?

17 A. The first thing that I did, at a time while Ms. Frease and others

18 with language skills were actually going through the material and

19 translating it into a language I could understand, was, you know, I took

20 that opportunity, you know, through the work of the investigators, to

21 familiarise myself with the technical capabilities and the practice that

22 the BiH 2nd Corps had and maintained during the war with respect to their

23 ability to intercept enemy communications; the enemy, in this case, being

24 the VRS communications of the Drina Corps and, to some extent, the Main

25 Staff.

Page 19598

1 At the same time I was doing this, I had access to the documents

2 of the Zvornik Brigade and Bratunac Brigade searches. What I was able to

3 do is, from their communications documents with respect to how their

4 communications systems operated, the schematics of their networks and

5 their general practices that I could divine from the documents, I came to

6 the conclusion that at least from a technical feasibility standpoint, the

7 Bosnian 2nd Corps understood what the target environment was that they

8 were collecting against and that they had the technical feasibility to do

9 that.

10 So the idea that they could collect this material was -- was

11 within the ballpark now. It wasn't something that was completely out of

12 question.

13 Q. Then what else, if anything, did you do to evaluate, to test the

14 credibility of this material?

15 A. Well, the next step of testing the credibility of the material was

16 to determine whether or not we were in a position to be able to

17 independently verify the context of the intercepts, as we referred to

18 them, against material that arguably, you know, the Bosnian Muslim 2nd

19 Corps people would have no knowledge of, as a way of independently testing

20 that.

21 For example, there are - and I know the Court has heard this, so I

22 won't go into the details, obviously - but there are numbers of documents

23 that were seized from Bosnian Serb Army or VRS headquarters or other

24 locations that refer to times, places, and events that it is unlikely or

25 impossible that the ABiH 2 Corps people could have known about at the

Page 19599

1 time, that these records were being created, unless they'd actually

2 intercepted these communications, pertaining to fuel deliveries,

3 pertaining to various events happening on the ground, things of that

4 nature.

5 So in an intelligence world, having the ability to look at a

6 potential adversary's actual collection of orders and then marry it up

7 with the intelligence that you're collecting in the first place, from an

8 ABiH portion, was definitely a unique -- a unique opportunity to really

9 get an understanding of how good or how bad the ABiH 2 Corps people were

10 in collecting against this particular target environment.

11 Q. And were you able to review interviews of ABiH intercept

12 operators, see their testimony, judge them as individuals?

13 A. Yes, sir, I did, primarily in the context of the trials against

14 General Krstic and Colonel Blagojevic.

15 Q. And how did that factor into your overall view?

16 A. It -- it certainly reinforced my opinion that the people who were

17 collecting the data, you know, understood the target environment that they

18 were collecting against. They knew what they were doing and had the

19 technical means to do that. Certainly the fact that in most cases the VRS

20 communications was not encrypted certainly lended to their ability to do

21 that.

22 So, again, it just reinforced my opinion that what the OTP was

23 looking at, within the context of the intercepts, was in fact an

24 authentic, you know, contemporaneous version of what they were doing in

25 July of 1995.

Page 19600

1 Q. I think you mentioned "disinformation." Has your review of all

2 this material in the investigation shown you any efforts by the VRS to get

3 out disinformation or false information over the airwaves that could have

4 been picked up in these intercepts that you're reviewing?

5 A. Well, within the context of disinformation, the thing to note in

6 the fact of disinformation is disinformation is part of a plan. There is

7 a motive behind attempting to deceive or misinform the enemy. Ideally,

8 what you're trying to do is completely draw him, you know, away from what

9 you really intend to do. So disinformation is not -- it's not random.

10 There's actually a planned campaign which does this on a normal basis.

11 When you look at the contextual body of the ABiH intercepts, there

12 certainly was an awareness by many members of the VRS to include their

13 senior commanders, that the communications that they were talking to were

14 not secure. They knew the ABiH had the potential to intercept them.

15 But I don't see evidence of a disinformation campaign where

16 communications disguised as official communications between correspondents

17 in the VRS were being designed to actually draw the attention of the ABiH

18 intelligence personnel to a different part of the battlefield or to a

19 different avenue of what they were actually doing.

20 I mean, their primary concern was to prevent the leakage of

21 information, not to engage in a more sophisticated effort to direct or

22 steer the analysis towards a different conclusion.

23 Q. All right. You have provided us with a recent copy of your CV.

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's 65 ter 681. We have marked the various

25 narratives and command reports also with numbers, and I will provide Your

Page 19601

1 Honours with that list later, not take the time to go over it now.

2 Q. But did you include in your narrative and your command reports

3 detailed annotations or cites to the materials that you were relying on?

4 A. Yes, sir, I did.

5 Q. And are those materials -- how important are those materials to

6 have at hand when reviewing your reports?

7 A. I find them personally valuable to have them at hand. One of the

8 fundamental components of my analysis is I try to be as conservative as

9 possible with that particular analysis, and as a result I rely heavily on

10 the documents and what the documents say at face value. I try not to read

11 much in to those documents.

12 Q. All right. Now, I just -- I want to go very briefly to an area,

13 and I don't want to have to use documents about it, but can you tell us,

14 who did you learn was in overall command of the Armed Forces of the

15 Republika Srpska?

16 A. During what period?

17 Q. 1992 to 1995.

18 A. Well, during that period, by law and in reality, the commander of

19 the armed forces, the supreme commander, was Radovan Karadzic.

20 Q. And can you describe who or what made up the armed forces, by law?

21 A. Again, by law, the armed forces were made up of two components.

22 One is the Army of the Republika Srpska and the other one is the Ministry

23 of the Interior or the police forces of the Republika Srpska.

24 Q. And was there anything that had to be in place for the police

25 forces to be considered part of the armed forces?

Page 19602

1 A. In the context of post-1993 and going into 1994, the -- a series

2 of laws that were published in the Official Gazette articulated that the

3 police forces would become part of the armed forces when the political

4 decision was made to declare either an imminent state of war or a full

5 state of war existing within the republic.

6 Q. And in the period of July 1995, had an imminent state of war been

7 declared?

8 A. Yes, sir. In fact, an imminent state -- an imminent threat of

9 state of war was declared back in June of 1995.

10 Q. And are the documents and laws supporting this all set out in

11 your -- in your reports?

12 A. Yes, sir, they are.

13 Q. Now, another question. In your command report, did you identify

14 what kind of criminal law, if any, was in effect in the Republika Srpska

15 throughout the wartime period?

16 A. Yes, sir, I did.

17 Q. And what did you find out?

18 A. What I was able to find out, one, as a result by analysis, as well

19 as subsequent interviews of personnel, was that the law of the former

20 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted as the law of

21 Republika Srpska. I think they made it official in December of 1993.

22 Q. All right.

23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 ter 419.

24 Q. Now, we haven't used e-court before. We always had you put things

25 up on the ELMO. So as I mentioned to you, there may be a slight delay.

Page 19603

1 But is this a document you've pointed out for us that supports the

2 conclusion you just made? And, Mr. Butler, you might just open up your

3 binder.

4 A. It would be easier for me to read, yes.

5 Q. As everyone knows, you've got binders that reflect the material in

6 the computer.

7 A. Yes, sir, it is.

8 Q. And what are you citing us to?

9 A. This is a particular law and amendment to the Criminal Code of the

10 SFRY, essentially redesignating it, with minor changes, as the law of

11 Republika Srpska.

12 Q. All right.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Well, let's now go to the next exhibit, 65 ter

14 424.

15 Q. This is Chapter 20 of the Criminal Law that you have identified;

16 and as it comes up, I will just mention, as we leaf through some of the

17 articles, we see military things like failure or refusal to carry out an

18 order, refusal to accept or use arms, those sorts of things.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: What I want to get us to is on page 17 in e-court

20 and page 104 in the B/C/S.

21 Q. It's Article 239, which states, and I'll read it as it's coming

22 up: "A subordinate shall not be punished if he commits a criminal act or

23 by order of a superior officer which relates to official duties, unless

24 the purpose of the order was to commit a war crime or another serious

25 criminal act, or if he knew that the carrying out of the order constituted

Page 19604

1 a criminal offence."

2 Now, this particular crime, do you have any knowledge of whether

3 or not officers trained in the JNA would be aware of -- or been trained on

4 the Criminal Code that was in force in the former Yugoslavia prior to the

5 war?

6 A. Certainly within the context of this article, yes, sir.

7 Q. And what do you base that on?

8 A. As part of the professional development and education of those

9 career JNA officers, there were -- they were required to attend various

10 military academies, military training classes or courses. Interviews with

11 those officers in many respects confirms the fact that the inherent, you

12 know, knowledge relating to their own military laws, as well as, you know,

13 adherence to the broader Geneva Conventions, were topics that were taught

14 at those locations. So as part of their on professional development,

15 these issues were broached.

16 Q. Let's go to the next set of laws.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's Chapter 16. It's 65 ter 411, and it's on

18 page 1 of the e-court, B/C/S page 66.

19 Q. This chapter is entitled: "Criminal Offences Against Humanity and

20 National Law." I just note on that first page, it has the crime of

21 genocide. I won't read it all out, but it includes, as a potential part

22 of genocide, "forcibly deports the population."

23 Then down in Article 42, "War Crimes Against Civilian Population,"

24 it notes an attack on a civilian population as something else, and just

25 another part of it, exposing the population to starvation, confiscation of

Page 19605

1 property.

2 Did these laws have any applicability to the -- your analysis and

3 the crimes you were investigating?

4 A. Yes, sir. They had applicability, in the sense that, one, the

5 laws themselves were applicable to the Republika Srpska and specifically

6 the members of the army or police of the Republika Srpska; and, two, many

7 of the offences that the Office of the Prosecutor was investigating with

8 respect to Srebrenica would have been encompassed within the described

9 actions here in these laws.

10 Q. And, again, would the -- would career officers in the JNA have

11 received training on the Geneva Conventions and the laws as set out in

12 their own laws?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. All right. Now, that's briefly what I'll ask you about on what

15 law you found.

16 Did you find any military guidelines or regulations that actually

17 directed the Armed Forces of the Republika Srpska relating to crimes

18 against international law?

19 A. Yes, sir, I did.

20 Q. All right. And do you remember, in particular, a set of

21 guidelines? Can you describe that briefly, and then I think we can

22 probably go to it.

23 A. There are several. But within the context of the former Yugoslav

24 National Army, one of the most valuable documents is the 1988 regulations

25 pertaining to the application of international law and the laws of war on

Page 19606

1 the army.

2 Q. Okay. And we'll get to those, but was there a document that came

3 out of the Main Staff that talked about the applicability of those regs?

4 A. Yes, sir. In fact, on a number of occasions shortly after the

5 armed conflict began in earnest, both political leadership as well as the

6 military leadership published various aspects of guidance to the various

7 political and military bodies to confirm that, you know, these rules and

8 regulations remained applicable to the VRS, even though they were

9 labelled "SFRY."

10 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Let's go to 65 ter number 28,

11 something that you have cited in your reports and testified about.

12 Q. And, again, as it's coming up, I will help outline it. It's from

13 the Main Staff, the Army of Republika Srpska, dated 6 October 1992,

14 entitled: "Guidelines for Determining Criteria to Criminal Prosecutions."

15 I'd like you to look at what appears to be a cover letter under

16 the name of Commander Ratko Mladic?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Now, what can you tell us about this cover letter? What is this

19 referring to?

20 A. In -- you know, sometime during the summer/early fall of 1992, the

21 military prosecutor office or branch at that time published a 14- to

22 15-page document which laid out the various aspects of SFRY law and how

23 they pertained to the VRS. In many respects, those, you know, pertain to

24 the law of the arm forces regulating military discipline and procedures

25 with respect to conscript call-ups, mobilisation, failure to follow

Page 19607

1 orders, things of that nature.

2 They also outlined the applicability of international law that was

3 found in the SFRY code to the VRS as well. So the military's prosecutor's

4 office drafted the base document, and what we're looking at now is the

5 cover memorandum that was published by the Main Staff that essentially

6 promulgated this.

7 Q. Have you been able to make out anything from these initials at the

8 bottom, "SS/MR," on who may have been involved in this document?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. And what have you come to?

11 A. The initials "SS," to back up a little bit, is part of the scheme,

12 and I believe the Court has heard this before, the initial set of initials

13 is the person who drafts the memorandum, the slash, and then of course the

14 typist. In this particular instance, the initials "SS" stand for "Savo

15 Sikanovic," who was a member of the VRS Main Staff, specifically Morale

16 Legal, and Religious Affairs branch or sector.

17 Q. And why do you conclude that?

18 A. In 1992, at the time this memorandum was published, the military

19 prosecutor's office, the military court system, were under the

20 administration of the VRS. At a later point in the war, those

21 responsibilities were relinquished by the army and, in fact, picked up by

22 the Ministry of Defence.

23 But at the time, the sector under the, you know, direction of

24 Lieutenant-General Gvero was responsible for the administration or setting

25 up the framework of the military prosecutor's office and the military

Page 19608

1 justice system. In that context, the only officer with the initials "SS"

2 would be Colonel Sikanovic.

3 Q. Let's go into the guidelines themselves, briefly.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: That's at 65 ter 28.

5 Q. Again, they begin by talking about various Criminal Code offences,

6 like failure to call up and those sorts of things.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: So I want to skip through that and get to e-court

8 page 7, which is B/C/S page 23 and 25 and 27 as we go through it, but I

9 want to start with paragraph 3, which maybe -- may start on page 25 in the

10 B/C/S. In English, it's page 7 -- oh, 8, okay. Thank you.

11 Q. This is entitled "Criminal Offences Against Humanity and

12 International Law" pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Criminal Code -- sorry,

13 16 of the Criminal Code, which is what we just referred to.

14 And, Mr. Butler, looking down the paragraphs, we see references to

15 genocide, Article 141, and the other crimes that we had just gone over in

16 the previous document -- a couple of documents ago. How does this fit

17 into your analysis?

18 A. Again, it goes to confirm the applicability of that particular

19 section of what is then the SFRY Criminal Code, you know, is being adopted

20 and, you know, will be followed by the VRS as a component of the formation

21 of their new state.

22 Q. All right. And I won't read it out; but the paragraph preceding

23 the mentioning of the different articles, it starts out: "Crimes against

24 humanity and international law ..." I know you've read that many times.

25 Do you have any disagreement with that conclusion, as we all read it?

Page 19609

1 A. No, sir. I mean, I think it's a fair characterisation of how

2 these things can occur.

3 Q. All right.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: And then looking at the paragraph at the bottom of

5 the English page, now I think this goes over to B/C/S page 27, a 27 and

6 then to page 29.

7 Q. It begins by talking about: "In addition to preventing criminal

8 acts which are in violation of the norms of humane conduct and

9 international law, the Armed Forces of the Army of Republika Srpska are

10 required to abide by the instruction on application of the International

11 Laws of War ..."

12 Is this -- are those the instructions that you had just referred

13 to earlier as being followed by the VRS?

14 A. Yes, sir, it is.

15 MR. McCLOSKEY: And I want to look at the top of English page 8

16 and B/C/S page 29 -- English page 9, where it starts -- B/C/S 31, I'm

17 told, from --

18 Q. After the paragraph that states they have to follow the

19 International Laws of War, it states: "From this follows the explicit

20 responsibility of the officer corps of the Army of Republika Srpska as the

21 givers of orders in command of the armed forces, whose members could

22 commit or are committing some of these offences, to take uncompromising

23 action and prevent such conduct.

24 "This responsibility belongs, by its nature, particularly to

25 high-ranking individuals and officials in state, military, or public

Page 19610

1 organisations who are in the concrete circumstances in a position to issue

2 orders."

3 And the next paragraph: "If officers merely find out that units

4 of the armed forces of the Army of Republika Srpska or their members have

5 committed or are committing such acts and take no measures to prevent the

6 consequences or the acts themselves and expose perpetrators to criminal

7 prosecution, this in itself makes them answerable for these criminal

8 offences."

9 Are you aware of either of these two paragraphs, these guidelines,

10 ever being withdrawn in any order or in any policy of the VRS or the RS at

11 any time during the war?

12 A. No, sir.

13 Q. Also, if we go down a few paragraphs, there's a short comment by

14 the author. It says: "It is noteworthy that officers and units on the

15 front line witness such incidents and quite frequently even take part in

16 them, but make no attempt to prevent such conduct by individuals in a

17 unit," referring to criminal conduct.

18 In your analysis of the evidence, did you see this occur, where

19 officers on the ground didn't do anything to stop it and actually took

20 part in it, themselves, based on orders and other things you've read?

21 A. Yes, sir. Well, particularly in the context of where this

22 document was written and the time frame, reflecting a well-known problem

23 at the time that many of these smaller units that were organised as

24 military police units or self-styled paramilitaries, that both the troops

25 in them and their soldiers were engaging more in criminal acts than they

Page 19611

1 were in legitimate acts necessary to further the goals of the military

2 forces.

3 Again, the fact placing the obligation on the officers, you know,

4 if the officers are engaging in that type of conduct, themselves, or are

5 at the very least condoning it, the message that the soldiers are going to

6 hear is that this kind of conduct is, in fact, acceptable.

7 Q. All right.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 ter 416.

9 Q. This is something you've identified as an order or a law under the

10 name of Radovan Karadzic, 13 May 1992, on the application of Rules of

11 International Law of War in the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina. Is this something you found to support your analysis?

13 A. Yes, sir, I have.

14 Q. And do you have any reason to believe this was not a proper

15 enactment of law that was in place at the time of July 1995?

16 A. No, sir. This remained in place.

17 Q. All right. Now, let's go to that particular JNA regulation that

18 you had referred to and was referred to in one of the documents.

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's 65 ter number 409, entitled: "Regulations on

20 the Application of International Laws of War in the Armed Forces of SFRY,"

21 dated 1988. Now we're going back into the JNA regs.

22 Can we take a look at I believe it's page 14 of the document, and

23 it should be 14 in e-court, and it may be page B/C/S -- B/C/S page 16,

24 entitled: "Prevention of Violations of the International Laws of War and

25 Criminal Responsibility for War Crimes."

Page 19612

1 Q. Now, I just want to point out, and I won't take the time to read

2 them, but you have talked about paragraphs 19 and 20, 19 entitled:

3 "Responsibility of Parties to the Conflict for Violations of the Laws of

4 War"; 20 is entitled: "Personal Responsibility for Violations of the Laws

5 of War."

6 I note in paragraph 20 that talks about personal responsibility.

7 A paragraph or two down, it says: "The perpetrators of such criminal acts

8 may also answer before an international court if such court has been

9 established."

10 Was that old JNA policy? Do you know anything about what the RS

11 policy was in July 1992 about recognising any international court?

12 A. Well, you know, obviously the ICTY did not exist at that juncture.

13 Having said that, the VRS and the RS, you know, explicitly indicated that,

14 you know, these regulations would be in force for them as well. So I

15 guess by default, you know, if a future court had been established, it

16 would have put them on notice.

17 Q. Do you know what the -- do you have any knowledge about what the

18 RS view was of the ICTY in July 1995? I don't know if I've asked you that

19 before; but if you know, you can answer.

20 A. Well, I know by -- there is a document floating around, roughly

21 March of 1996, from the Main Staff which reflects that their position is

22 that the ICTY is, of course, illegal and has no authority to do anything

23 there.

24 Q. All right. I won't get into 1996 at this point.

25 All right. Now, the -- do you have any reason to believe that the

Page 19613

1 other paragraphs, paragraphs 21, 22, 23, were rejected or not in existence

2 at the time in 1995 in the VRS?

3 A. No, sir.

4 Q. All right. Now, let's go to a particular section. I won't go

5 through any more detail on that. That's something you talk about in your

6 narrative or in your command report.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 ter 409. It's the same -- it's the

8 same rules, but it's a section on page 60 in the English,

9 entitled: "Prisoners of War."

10 Q. The part I want to ask you a couple of questions about begin on

11 page, I believe, 64/65 in the English. It's actually paragraph 216 in the

12 document.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yeah, 64 in English. I believe it's page 57 in

14 the B/C/S, entitled: "Personal belongings of Prisoners of War."

15 Q. I won't go into it again in the detail, but what does this roughly

16 prohibit, in your view?

17 A. It reiterates the provisions in the Geneva Conventions and the

18 additional protocols about the fact that individual soldiers who are

19 captured as prisoners of war are entitled to keep their personal property

20 or any military gear with respect to -- that's construed as personal

21 property or needed for the protection of those soldiers, which are

22 normally issues such as uniforms. In a chemical environment, it could

23 include letting the soldier keep a protective mask, potentially letting a

24 soldier keep a helmet.

25 It allows him, you know, any food that he has on his person,

Page 19614

1 identity cards, money, things of that nature, that those things are

2 considered not to be the property of the state. In most respects they are

3 considered to be the individual property of the soldier; and, as such, the

4 soldier should be permitted to retain them.

5 Q. All right. Can't you take money off a prisoner?

6 A. Well, at some point, presumably, the detaining power would want to

7 take money off the of the prisoner, but there's also procedures where it's

8 going to be vouchered and properly accounted for. It's not customary

9 procedure to -- for the battlefield soldiers who are capturing this

10 individual to keep the money.

11 Q. All right. Now, have you been able to identify actually some

12 orders or documents that speak to these issues that we have just talked

13 about and communicate them to the officers or troops of the VRS?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. All right. Let's go to the first one that you've talked about.

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's 65 ter 3035. This is on page 1 of the

17 English, and it's from the Command of the Drina Corps, 15 July 1993,

18 entitled "Treatment of Prisoners of War," and the part I'm looking at is

19 the second paragraph down.

20 Q. It says: "From the moment they are captured, enemy soldiers who

21 are put out of action must be treated as prisoners of war in accordance

22 with the Geneva Conventions. Actions contrary to international and

23 domestic law constitute serious criminal offences.

24 "In addition to criminal responsibility, persons acting in this

25 way also incur all other types of responsibility. This responsibility

Page 19615

1 rests not only with the immediate perpetrators of criminal offences and

2 inhumane treatment, but also by their superior officers, because prisoners

3 of war are not the property of individuals or military units, but the

4 responsibility of Republika Srpska" -- "of the VRS," excuse me, "and the

5 Republika Srpska.

6 "Prisoners should be isolated as soon as possible and put in a

7 safe place. Inhumane and unlawful treatment is extremely harmful to the

8 struggle of our people and must be prevented by all legal means. It

9 should also be borne in mind that we can exchange captured enemy soldiers

10 for our soldiers who have been captured and thus return them to their

11 families."

12 Now, this comes out under the name of Deputy Commander Colonel

13 Milutin Skocajic. Who is that?

14 A. At this time, Colonel Skocajic was the Chief of Staff of the

15 Drina Corps. Given the fact that it's the deputy commander and not Chief

16 of Staff, I'm assuming that, for whatever reason, the corps commander at

17 the time, Milenko Zivanovic, was not available to sign this order.

18 Q. Does this, the paragraph and the document itself, reflect the

19 international law on the documents and the applications that we reviewed

20 previously?

21 A. Yes, sir, it does.

22 Q. And would this go on to the commander of the Zvornik Brigade?

23 A. Yes, sir. It's addressed to all -- all commands of all brigades,

24 as well as some of the specialty units.

25 Q. And 15 July 1993, who was the commander of the Zvornik Brigade?

Page 19616

1 A. At that time, it would have been Major Vinko Pandurevic.

2 Q. Okay. And this comment about "bearing in mind that captured enemy

3 soldiers get exchanged," what are they practically pointing out in that

4 situation, in your view?

5 A. Well, the strong inference, particularly when you look at the

6 first paragraph, is that a battlefield practice has been developed;

7 whereas, units who are immediately responsible or who are immediately

8 capturing an enemy combatant are taking it within their own responsibility

9 to kill them.

10 Q. Did you see --

11 A. -- or otherwise mistreat them.

12 Q. And if you mistreat a prisoner and then exchange him, does that

13 have any practical knock-on effect, possibly, to prisoners who are in

14 custody of the enemy force?

15 A. Well, as a matter of practical circumstance, you can assume that

16 if you're mistreating your prisoners and some of those prisoners are

17 ultimately repatriated back to their own foreign -- or their own army, you

18 know, the word's going to get around that their prisoners are being

19 mistreated and you can kind of expect that prisoners from your army, who

20 are being held by them, you know, may very well be subject to the same

21 treatment.

22 Q. All right. Let's go to another practical document.

23 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's 65 ter 3034, dated 17 July 1993. This is a

24 brigade document from the Bratunac Brigade, in the name of Commander

25 Cvjetin Vuksic.

Page 19617

1 Q. In this document you talked about, you said, I believe, in the

2 middle of that second big paragraph, It says: "Our former country, SFRJ,

3 incorporates its rules in its criminal legislation. In the present stage

4 of its establishment as a state, the Republika Srpska has adopted the

5 provisions of the criminal legislation of the former SFRJ and, therefore,

6 the provisions of the international conventions."

7 Okay. So, here we have the Bratunac Brigade, and it talks about,

8 again, instruction on the treatment of prisoners of war. I won't go into

9 all of it, but -- so what is this document?

10 A. Pursuant to the 15 July order from the Drina Corps, what you see

11 here is the brigade commander receiving that order and essentially

12 reiterating the content of that order to their particular subordinate

13 formations. In this case - and it's kind of hard to see on this - but

14 certainly where it has "Command," on the original B/C/S version, it's got

15 a blank line. The customary practice was they would then hand write in

16 this particular document where each version of this document would go to.

17 Q. And where would it go to in a brigade context?

18 A. It would normally go to the battalions as well as the staff

19 organisations of the brigade itself.

20 Q. All right. I'm not going to ask you a lot of detail about that,

21 that structure. I think the Court has heard quite a bit of the various

22 structures of battalions and brigades and corps and Main Staff.

23 Okay.

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to the next document, 65 ter 697, that you

25 found. It's a Zvornik Brigade document, and I've not found a date on it.

Page 19618

1 Q. It's a bit of a different subject; but in the left-hand corner of

2 it, it says: "I approve, Commander Major Vinko Pandurevic," where it is

3 signed and stamped, but it's in the name of Chief of Staff Captain First

4 Class Dragan Obrenovic.

5 As you pointed out before, the first paragraph states that: "On

6 the basis of provisions of the rules of the brigade, items 114-124 and

7 125-149, the ..." and then it talks about the rules of the command.

8 Now, what rules is Mr. Pandurevic and Mr. Obrenovic talking about

9 in this context?

10 A. They are talking about the 1984 rules for JNA brigades, be it

11 infantry brigade, motorised brigade, things of that nature, light infantry

12 brigade. So they are referring to a former regulation of the JNA.

13 Q. All right. So we have now moved away from international law to

14 the rules associated to the functioning of the brigade, and you've already

15 talked briefly about how the army adopted the JNA rules, so I'm not going

16 to ask you about that in general anymore.

17 I want to go in particular to one -- to one of those rules.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's 65 ter 694. It's a JNA rule dated 1984,

19 entitled: "Brigade Rules for Infantry, Motorised, Mountain, Alpine,

20 Marine, and Light Brigades."

21 Q. Here, Mr. Butler, I want you to go to the section on Command,

22 which I have as page 37 in the English.

23 MR. McCLOSKEY: It should be B/C/S 63 and 64.

24 Q. Now, particularly 115 states: "The brigade commander has the

25 exclusive right to command all brigade units and attached units."

Page 19619

1 What does that mean? What has your investigation and your review

2 of the materials of the VRS, the JNA, and general military practices led

3 you to -- can you just tell us what that means, practically?

4 A. It is a -- in practical terms, it is a universal tenet, for the

5 most part, within professional military organisations that within the

6 context of the brigade, the brigade commander is, by law and regulation --

7 he has the exclusive right of command. Individuals from outside that

8 formation, even if they're higher-ranking individuals, do not have the

9 authority to interfere with that particular commander's right to command

10 his own brigades.

11 Q. Okay. It goes on and says: "He bears full responsibility for the

12 work of the brigade, command, and subordinate commands, for the state of

13 morale, for security, combat readiness, for training, and for the proper

14 performance of tasks."

15 Can an outside officer, as you've just said, come in and take over

16 that commander's responsibility for those things?

17 A. No, sir. I mean, just as he has the exclusive right of command,

18 the collateral effect there is he also is the one who ultimately bears

19 responsibility for the actions of his subordinates.

20 Q. So what military process or procedure would have to take place

21 before a brigade commander no longer had command responsibility under

22 these regs?

23 A. He'd have to formally be relieved or relinquish command to the

24 superior next in line that's authorised to either relieve him or accept

25 his relief of command.

Page 19620

1 Q. Okay. It says -- it goes on and says: "The commander takes

2 decisions, assigns tasks to units, monitors their fulfillment, and demands

3 their strict execution regardless of difficulties that arise."

4 Can you go through that, one by one, and tell us practically what

5 that means?

6 A. It -- in a nutshell, what that particular sentence is is a

7 one-line sentence that reflects what later is known as the command and

8 staff process.

9 The commander takes decisions either independently, on his own,

10 or after consulting with his staff and getting their advice. He assigns a

11 task to units, whether he elects to individually assign a task or whether

12 that task is formalised through orders published by his staff. He

13 monitors their fulfillment, and this is a key issue.

14 A commander does not issue orders in the abstract. As part of a

15 function of command, you know, he's required to verify that those orders

16 are, in fact, being carried out, and he has the right to demand

17 compliance. Again, commander is expected to be able to accomplish his

18 role of command, regardless of whatever difficulties might arise.

19 These regulations are published for people who will command

20 military units in wartime. It is anticipated that there will be many

21 times during the course of an individual's command that the compliance of

22 orders and the carrying out of the mission is going to be difficult

23 because, you know, the enemy forces that you will be facing will be taking

24 every step that they can to try and prevent you from carrying out that

25 function.

Page 19621

1 Q. Okay. And this last part, I'm talking about decisions and

2 tasks: "... and demands their strict execution, regardless of

3 difficulties that arise."

4 In your review of the documents and the orders, how serious did

5 VRS officers take orders received from their superiors? I mean, VRS

6 professional former JNA officers?

7 A. The trained professional officers, particularly because they were

8 the most educated and held the most senior positions within the army, were

9 well aware of the seriousness and the gravity of orders that were issued

10 and, you know, what they had to do to undertake -- to follow those orders.

11 Even codified under the armed forces law that they were operating,

12 I mean, the ability to follow the orders to the extent necessary, you

13 know, these are major, significant issues to officers.

14 Q. In the context of Srebrenica, do you see any officers refusing to

15 follow orders?

16 A. In the context of certainly one of the most serious instances,

17 where an officer refuses to follow whether it's an explicit order or

18 whether it's an order given by General Mladic, as we understand it, is on

19 the 16th of July, 1995, when then Lieutenant-Colonel Vinko Pandurevic

20 unilaterally takes a decision effectively authorising a battlefield truce

21 in the area of the Zvornik Brigade to allow the Muslim column to pass

22 through his lines, which was certainly not something that either the Drina

23 Corps or the Main Staff had intended to happen.

24 So that is a major significant instance where Colonel Pandurevic,

25 on his own, with the best interest of his brigade, and based on the

Page 19622

1 decision and his right to command, made.

2 Q. And when you say "best interests of the brigade," what do you

3 mean? Why do you think he made it?

4 A. Within, you know, the context of the events that were occurring on

5 the battlefield at the time, several battalions of the Zvornik Brigade,

6 specifically the 4th Battalion and the 6th Battalion, elements of the 7th

7 Battalion, were decisively engaged and frankly quite outnumbered by the

8 sheer size of the Muslim column that was carving their way through Zvornik

9 Brigade territory.

10 By looking at the orders and the reports that are generated by

11 this battlefield truce that Colonel Pandurevic engaged in, it's clear

12 that, you know, he came to the conclusion that continuing to fight the

13 column would not prevent the column from breaking through to the friendly

14 territory of Muslim lines, as they were trying to do, and would only

15 result in additional casualties for his own military forces.

16 So, again, you know, within his authority as a brigade commander,

17 he took it upon himself to, you know, effect a battlefield truce with the

18 enemy to allow this column to pass.

19 Q. Okay. We may get into that a few days down the road when we get

20 to some more documents, but let me also ask you an example related to

21 General Pandurevic.

22 Do you recall, on 11 July, on the video, General Mladic, in the

23 presence of at that time Colonel Pandurevic, making some kind of statement

24 or order?

25 A. Yes, sir. In the context of the video scene, General Mladic - and

Page 19623

1 not only the video, but, you know, in larger part other officers have

2 confirmed this accounting of events - as the day was ending, General

3 Mladic was giving his brigade commanders, who had accompanied elements of

4 their brigades into Srebrenica, orders on what he wanted to accomplish

5 next on parts of the terrain.

6 You know, obviously that's an order directly from the army

7 commander. But several of the brigade commanders, in a quick council of

8 war, so to speak, went back to General Mladic and told him that, you know,

9 given the light conditions and everything else, the battlefield situations

10 and the fact that they didn't know where some enemy components was, that

11 tactically speaking they did not think that was a wise move and requested

12 that General Mladic reconsider his decision.

13 In fact, you know, from the accounts of the officers who were

14 involved in that, General Mladic did, in fact, reconsider his position and

15 countermanded his original orders to these commanders.

16 Q. Do you recall what Pandurevic was saying on the video in response

17 to Mladic? If you don't, don't worry about it.

18 A. It's been a lot of years since I've seen the video or the

19 transcripts, so I can't recall exactly.

20 MR. HAYNES: I don't mind if you lead him on this.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Your microphone, Mr. Haynes.

22 MR. HAYNES: [Microphone not activated]

23 JUDGE AGIUS: I still can't hear you.

24 MR. HAYNES: I was just saying I don't mind if Mr. McCloskey puts

25 the words to Mr. Butler, if he knows them.

Page 19624

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Haynes.

2 Yes, Mr. McCloskey. You've got about four minutes left.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. Haynes has quized me on that. I think it was

4 something about, We've got to get the Browning up on the ridge, there's

5 Muslims up there. Something like that.

6 THE WITNESS: I think it was in the context that they wanted to --

7 they wanted to put some form of a heavy machine-gun position and other

8 units up on a ridge. The subordinate -- the brigade commanders, and I

9 think Pandurevic specifically was noting the fact that they had in fact

10 lost contact with the 28th Division. They didn't know where it was, and

11 they didn't particularly feel comfortable putting an isolated element up

12 there, that as the sun was coming down, in an unfamiliar position, could

13 potentially be attacked and ambushed later that evening.

14 Again, it was a, you know, a quick council of war and it made

15 eminently sense militarily not to want to expose themselves, given the

16 fact that they did not have a good idea, from their own reconnaissance,

17 where the bulk of the 28th Infantry Division was.

18 MR. McCLOSKEY:

19 Q. Is there evidence that Colonel Pandurevic took on Mladic on his 12

20 July decision to go to Zepa as well?

21 A. Yes, sir, there is.

22 Q. So with this evidence that at the time Colonel Pandurevic was

23 willing to take on Mladic on issues that involved the safety of his

24 troops, do you see any evidence of Colonel Pandurevic taking on General

25 Mladic when it came to the commission of violent war crimes against the

Page 19625

1 Muslim army prisoners or population?

2 A. No, sir, I don't.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think -- is it break time?

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. You have about two to three minutes left.

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: It might be -- well, let me see if I've got one

6 more document.

7 It may not be a two- to three-minute document, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. We will have a break now, as we agreed

9 on earlier this morning. We'll reconvene at 3.00, and then we'll sit

10 right through until 4.30. Thank you.

11 --- Recess taken at 2.00 p.m.

12 --- On resuming at 3.05 p.m.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: What happened to the representative of the US

16 government?

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: As you may recall in the motion, they normally

18 just stay during the parts that have to do with Mr. Butler's background,

19 especially when they were part of the US, and then come back when that

20 section is up for cross-examination. But the -- Ms. Schildge did want me

21 to pass on to you that, of course, they are available at any time should

22 some issue come up.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. No, no. It's just I noticed her absence,

24 that's all.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: All right.

Page 19626

1 Q. Mr. Butler, I just noticed that I needed to go back to this

2 paragraph 115 on the brigade commander. It's in your tab 12. I forgot to

3 ask you about the second -- the second paragraph.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's at 65 ter 694. It should be page 37, in

5 B/C/S page 64. Yeah, I see it.

6 Q. It's that second paragraph: "Through his personal conduct, work,

7 involvement, and the implementation of the SKJ policies, ethical standing,

8 courage, ability, fairness, cool-headedness, consistency, and respect for

9 the personality and opinion of subordinates, the commander vitally

10 influences the entire condition of the brigade, especially the morale of

11 units and command."

12 Can you tell -- can you bring that down to a practical level?

13 What does that mean, this personal conduct with all these things, "vitally

14 influences the entire condition"?

15 A. Perhaps the best I've heard it ever explained is the testimony of

16 General Dannett during the Krstic trial, where he explained that command

17 is a personal thing.

18 Of all of the individuals in a particular unit, from platoon level

19 to the very top, the individual temperament, qualities, moral courage,

20 personality of the commander is a decisive factor in influencing the

21 brigade, and not just the brigade but obviously in any unit; and,

22 certainly, subordinates, when they're ably led like that, will often

23 reflect the character -- the positive characteristics and qualities of

24 their command.

25 The JNA obviously recognised that as a component of their own

Page 19627

1 leadership training.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madame Fauveau.

3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Microphone not activated]

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Microphone. Okay.

6 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'd like to know

7 whether this is a personal conclusion drawn by this expert or is this

8 something that he just conveys, I mean, the conclusions drawn by General

9 Dannett. He's just said the best explanation was the one provided by

10 General Dannett.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: Basically, what Madame Fauveau is asking you is

12 whether you are adopting the same approach.

13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I believe he said it far better than I

14 could. He's hit it right on the button.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Is that clear, Madame Fauveau? Okay. Thank you.

16 Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.

18 Q. Now, we will soon see documents, well, from the highest levels

19 down to the lowest levels, including the brigade levels, where commanders

20 are making reference to the enemy in derogatory terms, such as "Poturice,"

21 "Turks." Does that kind of conduct fit into this second paragraph,

22 "through his personal conduct," et cetera, "influences the entire

23 condition"?

24 MR. HAYNES: I object.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Haynes.

Page 19628

1 MR. HAYNES: I object.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Your microphone --

3 MR. HAYNES: It's not working all day.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: I know there's something wrong, but please be

5 patient. Yes.

6 MR. HAYNES: I object to that. That is not a question of military

7 analysis or expertise, and it's simply Mr. McCloskey making a comment and

8 requiring confirmation from the witness.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

10 MR. McCLOSKEY: I absolutely -- I'm sorry. I've been told to have

11 both these on so people could hear me. But I absolutely disagree with

12 that. This is a fundamental and important principle that has -- and maybe

13 we should have it outside of the conduct of the witness, but I --

14 JUDGE AGIUS: If you want, we can do that. I think it's not

15 difficult for us to decide, but if you wish to --

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: We have -- we have documents I'll refer to. I'm

17 just asking Mr. Butler if those documents that have --

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Why don't you then wait until you make use of these

19 documents.

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Well, this -- because I believe it's an unfounded

21 objection, and this is a principle --

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's discuss it in the absence of the witness,

23 then.

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll soon call you back, Mr. Butler.

Page 19630

1 of one's personal conduct have to do with one's -- things like the example

2 I give.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

4 [Trial Chamber confers]

5 JUDGE AGIUS: At this phase, at this stage, we don't really see

6 the need for this question, Mr. McCloskey. But then when you are, in due

7 course, if at all, you are referring to specific documents and you may

8 wish to -- you wish to ask questions to the witness, we'll consider each

9 question on its own merits at that stage. But for the time being, I think

10 we can safely proceed with your next question.

11 Bring Mr. Butler in again, please.

12 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

13 [The witness entered court]

14 MR. McCLOSKEY:

15 Q. Mr. Butler, can you tell us, in your experience, how important is

16 it for a commander to lead by example, by positive example?

17 A. Within the framework of my own military background, that is

18 probably the key fundamental tenet of command and of leadership is that

19 it's leadership by example.

20 Q. All right. We'll get some actual examples of that a little later

21 on, but right now let's go to another document.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's 65 ter 699.

23 Q. This is another manual that you have identified over the years.

24 It's entitled "Manual for the Work of Commands and Staff," and it's

25 describing under "Command."

Page 19631

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: I want to go to page 15, if we can, in the

2 English, and it's B/C/S page 16.

3 Q. Do you recall this particular manual?

4 A. Yes, sir, I do.

5 Q. And do you remember what it is?

6 A. While the brigade regulations and other JNA regulations talk about

7 and give some details with respect to how the command and staff processes

8 should work in a properly-functioning unit, what this particular manual

9 does is really gets into the minutiae and all of the technical details

10 about all of the various forms of interrelationship between a commander

11 and those officers who are part of a commander's staff, and its rules are

12 applicable from the battalion all the way up into the highest levels of

13 staffs.

14 Q. All right.

15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Well, let's go to page 15 in the English, and I

16 don't -- we see paragraph 13.

17 Q. It says: "Command is a process function of control ..."

18 What does that mean?

19 A. Command -- essentially, command or the action of command is how

20 the individual exercises control over the functions of the unit. There

21 are various ways it can be done, as the remainder of the paragraph points

22 out, either by, you know, direct orders, broader guidance or directive,

23 instructions, and a command act in effect being an order.

24 Q. All right. Then we see, in number 14: "Coordination is a

25 function of command (part of the process) and control coordinating various

Page 19632

1 elements in the execution of the task that has been set.

2 "Coordination ensures harmonious work within and among the

3 commands and staff and other organs of control," and it goes on.

4 What does that mean, in practical terms?

5 A. In practical terms, within a particular staff, it recognises the

6 fact that a staff may be organised in many certain ways, in the context of

7 the former JNA, where you have assistant commanders of morale or political

8 works at the time, assistant command for logistics, assistant for

9 security, you have chiefs of intelligence and other staff bodies.

10 Now, the issue of coordination is the fact that, well, staff

11 officers and staff elements have their own specific responsibilities, that

12 they are to work with an eye towards ensuring that their activities are

13 properly coordinated with the ultimate goal of fulfilling and ensuring the

14 commander's order and intent to make sure that, you know, the operations

15 people, when they're designing a particular operations order or op plan,

16 you have the logistics staff that is part of that entire process. You

17 don't have a situation where different things are being done by different

18 entities without coordination, I guess using the word again.

19 Within a unit, it is also between other units you'll have

20 coordination, where you'll have, for example, coordination between

21 multiple brigades or multiple elements of multiple units for a senior

22 commander. You can also have elements of coordination between the

23 military and other political entities that would support the military;

24 although, that would normally fall more along the lines of collaboration.

25 Q. Okay. And we see "Cooperation," and it appears to define it in, I

Page 19633

1 think, the term we're all familiar with, so I won't ask you about that,

2 but that does get us to "Collaboration," which is the manner of regulating

3 the relations between unit commands which engage in combat and control

4 organs and other things.

5 So how does collaboration differ from coordination and

6 cooperation?

7 A. Collaboration more accurately describes issues that involve

8 elements of the army and non-military, or perhaps a better way to say it

9 is non-army elements. For example, where you have a situation -- I mean,

10 the term of "collaboration" is that the conditions of collaboration are

11 set by superiors and that the units are expected to coordinate with each

12 other within that framework.

13 So when you have a situation, for example, where the army staff

14 and the police staff have dictated, you know, how particular units can be

15 used or under what parameters that they can be used, within the framework

16 of those guidance from the senior commanders on both sides, the lower

17 units are going to be expected to collaborate to ensure that they

18 accomplish that mission.

19 Q. Okay. Now, "Verification." Again, we don't need to read that

20 out. It's pretty clear. How important is verification in the process of

21 exercising command?

22 A. Verification is a key component of exercising command. A

23 commander is ultimately responsible for the activities of his unit; and as

24 part of the chain of command, his subordinates are expected to report back

25 to him. As the commander, he is expected to verify, in case they don't

Page 19634

1 report back, that his orders are being complied with.

2 Q. All right. And these concepts of command, in your view, how well

3 known are they to JNA officers?

4 A. I can't foresee of a situation, particularly within the framework

5 of the former JNA and the extent of its professional military development

6 and education system, that officers who are essentially growing up within

7 that environment are not going to know these issues. All officers are

8 expected, within the various competencies, to know how to operate within

9 this framework.

10 It's a standard framework for the army. Many people who

11 ultimately become commanders are individuals who will also have had

12 extensive experience on staffs in order to be able to get as comprehensive

13 a background of military knowledge as possible.

14 Q. Now, we -- we'll get into some examples later, but just generally,

15 do you see indications of Vinko Pandurevic and Mr. Borovcanin exercising

16 these different concepts as they exercise command through the events that

17 we look at?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Okay. Now, I want to go to one particular area that you've talked

20 about before, and that is the rules of the security organ. The Court has

21 heard a fair amount about that, so I just want to touch on some of the

22 basics.

23 MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to 65 ter 407, this is a manual

24 that's entitled "Rules of Service of Security Organs in the Armed Forces

25 of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in 1984".

Page 19635

1 Q. I think it's a document that has been established before in the

2 trial, so I'm not going to ask you to authenticate it.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: But I want to go to page 10 in the English, B/C/S

4 page 9.

5 Q. I'll ask you to -- and under "Management," ask you to comment on

6 paragraph 16: "The security organ is directly subordinate to the

7 commanding officer of the command unit, institution, or staff of the armed

8 forces in whose strength it is placed," et cetera.

9 Can you just clearly tell us what that means?

10 A. It's a reflection of the earlier doctrine that within the --

11 within the framework of assistant commander for security, or security

12 official, or assistant commander for logistics, or any of that nature,

13 they are ultimately subordinate to the commanding officer of that unit. I

14 mean, they are considered to be direct subordinates of him or her, as the

15 case may be.

16 Q. All right. In comparison to that principle, let's look at 18 that

17 talks about the security organs of the superior command, unit,

18 institution, or staff of the armed forces provide specialist

19 administrative services for security organs in subordinate commands, et

20 cetera.

21 Can you distinguish for us the difference between a security organ

22 being commanded by its commander and a security organ being provided

23 specialist administrative services from the upper or superior security

24 organ?

25 A. Yes, sir. I mean, the -- the concept is that while the commander,

Page 19636

1 of course, is the commander and the security officer or security official

2 is his subordinate, it understands that the -- the reality that security,

3 as well as other branches, are very technical branches and have a myriad

4 of other responsibilities; and that in the conduct of those

5 responsibilities, particularly with respect to security,

6 counter-intelligence, or intelligence, or some things of that nature, that

7 there is going to be guidance and technical support required by

8 professionals in that particular field, senior intelligence and security

9 officials.

10 So there is a -- what is often referred to as a technical or

11 management chain that runs along with but certainly doesn't supersede the

12 command chain. So that particular technical support chain is how these

13 particular officials would get additional guidance on, for example,

14 counter-intelligence procedures and other security procedures that may

15 have to be done, or they would get guidance with respect to threats that

16 may be placed against particular military officers or information that has

17 come through other operative channels that people may be attempting to

18 target that unit for espionage or things of that nature.

19 So the doctrine or, in their case, you know, the regulations, you

20 know, recognise that concept and allow for it.

21 Q. All right. And in any particular unit, be it brigade or corps or

22 otherwise, who commands the military police unit?

23 A. The commander of the larger formation that that unit is

24 subordinate to.

25 Q. All right. And what, generally, is the security officer's role,

Page 19637

1 if any, in dealing with the military police?

2 A. As articulated by the regulations, the role of the security

3 officer, with respect to the military police, is that he -- his role is to

4 advise the commander on the most proper uses of that organisation and even

5 to recommend what their function or what their tasks should be. The

6 security officer recommends that and the detail necessary for the

7 commander, and it is ultimately up to the commander to reject or to accept

8 the recommendations of that officer and to implement them.

9 Q. And what unit is generally responsible for prisoners of war, in

10 dealing with them and securing them?

11 A. Insomuch as a unit echelon or what type of unit? I don't

12 understand the question.

13 Q. In a brigade, who would normally deal with detention issues,

14 prisoner of war issues, as they are captured?

15 A. The front line units, the battalions and companies, generally

16 would be the units to actually capture the prisoner in the first instance.

17 However, according to the JNA regulations and the VRS instructions

18 pertaining to those, the general procedure was that at the very earliest

19 opportunity, these prisoners were to be turned over to the military police

20 to ensure that they could be properly safeguarded and handled through the

21 battlefield to the point where they were turned over to the individuals

22 responsible for their -- for their detention on a longer period of level.

23 Q. All right. And you've already talked a little bit about the

24 relationship between the security officer and the military police, but

25 does this include issues related to prisoners?

Page 19638

1 A. Yes, sir, it does.

2 Q. Okay. Let's --

3 JUDGE KWON: If I may go back to the relation, his role of the

4 security officer, you said, Mr. Butler, that his role is to advise the

5 commander. Does he not have anything to do directly with the police, the

6 military police, himself?

7 THE WITNESS: Once the commander, you know -- as the regulations

8 go, once the commander accepts or modifies that guidance, most often it

9 will be the security officer who will be instructed to implement it. In

10 having his own direct contact with the military police, that security

11 officer will be giving the direction and task to the military police

12 commander as to how to accomplish that.

13 In that particular context, the security officer, in given tasks

14 like that, he's operating under the derived authority of the commander who

15 approved the order.

16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY:

18 Q. Is -- can that be comparable to other assistant commanders that

19 have other tasks, like logistics or other situations?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. Regarding making -- what I'm asking, making proposals and then

22 seeing that those proposals are carried out?

23 A. Yes, sir. Incumbent in the larger command and staff regulations,

24 one of the primary purposes of the staff is to recommend, you know, and to

25 develop courses of action for a commander, to recommend or propose -- to

Page 19639

1 propose these lines of action to the commander.

2 Once the commander makes the decision, it is usually those same

3 staff officers who are going to be responsible for the implementation of

4 it, turning the commander's guidance, direction, and verbal orders into

5 the concrete and specific tasks necessary for the subordinate units.

6 Q. Okay. Let's look to one of the regulations on this that you've

7 talked about in your report.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: It is 65 ter 707. It's called "The Service

9 Regulations of the SFRJ Armed Forces Military Police, 1985."

10 Q. Tell us what this is.

11 A. Coupled with the 19 -- coupled with the regulations we just talked

12 about, these are the specific service regulations of the military police,

13 armed forces military police applicable to the JNA, and referenced in

14 all -- applicable to the VRS military police as well.

15 Q. All right.

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to page 10 in the English and page 9 of

17 the B/C/S that talks a little bit about the issues that we have been

18 talking about.

19 Q. Paragraph 12 very simply means what?

20 A. Specifically notes the officer in charge of the military unit and

21 institution within whose establishment in the military police is placed or

22 to which it is attached, commands and controls the military police. It

23 reiterates the fact that the commander of a unit or installation, in our

24 case let's use a brigade as an example, the brigade commander is the

25 commander of the military police.

Page 19640

1 Q. Okay. And, in paragraph 13, we can see that it says something

2 very similar to what you just said, that the security officer makes --

3 controls the military police and makes suggestions to the officer in

4 charge of the military unit and is responsible for their combat readiness

5 and the performance of their tasks.

6 So that -- I don't think I need to ask any more about that.

7 You've answered that issue.

8 But what I wanted to ask you about is it gets a little more

9 detailed, and it says: "When controlling a military police unit, the

10 officer in charge of the security body from paragraph 1 of this item has

11 the same rights and duties which the officers of arms of service of

12 military units and institutions have in controlling the units of arms and

13 services."

14 Who are we talking about? Are we talking about the commander or

15 the security officer?

16 A. In this passage, we are talking about the -- in this case, the

17 assistant commanders for security in the same way having -- you know,

18 having the same rights and authorities with respect to their function as

19 assistant commanders for logistics or as a chief of intelligence might for

20 their specific responsibilities.

21 Q. All right. And then the next paragraph talks about the traffic

22 service. Does the security officer have any -- what's his responsibility

23 regarding traffic military police issues?

24 A. Not particularly related to, you know, the traffic service; but, I

25 mean, the recognition that under the rubric of the military police, there

Page 19641

1 are a number of -- there are a wider variety of functions, many of them

2 having to do with routine crime prevention and routine, in this case,

3 traffic administration that, you know, are under the expertise of these

4 assistant commanders.

5 They're expected to -- to implement them. I mean, not implement

6 them, but they're expected to be able to give the detailed technical

7 advice and direction to accomplish these missions.

8 Q. All right. Now, the next paragraph, paragraph 14, identifies

9 several examples of how the organisational unit controls the military

10 police, from a specialist viewpoint. I won't go into that.

11 I want to go into -- into some example documents relating to these

12 regulations and ask you about them.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 ter 2741, a document that came out

14 in the Blagojevic case. This is a 24 October 1994 Main Staff instruction,

15 as its entitled, "Command and Control over the Security and Intelligence

16 Organs of the VRS." We can see that a couple of pages down it's under the

17 name of Commander Ratko Mladic.

18 Q. I want to ask you about the first two numbered paragraphs. Number

19 1 seems to divide the work of the security and intelligence organs into

20 two primary areas. Can you just briefly describe what those areas are, as

21 you understand the regulations?

22 A. The military police, of course, have a number of duties and

23 responsibilities that are overseen, and what this particular instruction

24 is indicating is that, you know, as a goal, again situation dependent,

25 what those organs should be doing is spending 80 per cent of their time

Page 19642

1 dealing with the intelligence, counter-intelligence, security rubric type

2 of tasks; and then spend the remaining percentage of time doing all the

3 other remaining tasks that fall under the mantra of the security officer,

4 which would include things such as training, which would include things

5 such as routine crime prevention activities.

6 So, I mean, they're trying to find out that in an ideal situation,

7 where they want to see the bulk of time and resources of this particular

8 branch dedicated to.

9 Q. Okay. And in paragraph 2, it says: "The security and

10 intelligence organs are directly commanded by the commander of the unit or

11 institution of which they form part," which you've talked about at length

12 so far, which I think is clear; and then there's, comma, "but with regard

13 to professional activities, they are controlled centrally by the security

14 and intelligence organs of the superior command."

15 What does this relate to?

16 A. Specifically, it delineates the responsibilities, effectively, you

17 know, acknowledging that that security officer is a subordinate of the

18 commander, but also reiterating the fact that in the conduct of some

19 professional activities, particularly related to the counter-intelligence

20 and security, that the commander does not have a role in either tasking or

21 interfering with the work of the officer in that context.

22 Q. All right. The next line says: "This indicates their full

23 independence in the implementation of intelligence and

24 counter-intelligence tasks and operative combinations, based on the

25 authority set forth in the law."

Page 19643

1 So is that the section you're referring to in your last answer?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. All right. Now, it lays that out in further detail, but do you

4 find that this instruction of 24 October changes the fundamental rules as

5 they were used and set out in the JNA and used in the VRS?

6 A. No, sir, it does not.

7 JUDGE KWON: Just a quick question, Mr. McCloskey.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.

9 JUDGE KWON: Does this rule relating to specialty also apply to

10 another administrative commander -- I'm sorry, assistant commander; for

11 example, logistics? If you could give me an example.

12 THE WITNESS: I think that in this particular case, I mean, this

13 applies directly to the security officers and their branch, in recognition

14 of their unique duties in counter-intelligence, which by definition, you

15 know, have to be accomplished with a great degree of secrecy.

16 One -- one can never say that maybe it's not the commander,

17 himself, who may be the target of an investigation for security; and as a

18 result, this is designed as a framework to ensure that an investigation or

19 whatever investigative activity that needs to be accomplished can be done

20 so without undue inference from the commander.

21 On the other side of the situation, security officers and

22 intelligence officers often run informants or operative agents or things

23 of that nature whose identity must remain unknown for them to be able to

24 do their work; and this ensures, as a mechanism, you know, going back to

25 the laws and regulations on that type of operative work, that their

Page 19644

1 identities can be kept from their commanders, even if they're ordered to

2 be given to them, in order to continue the work.

3 So I think it's unique to the security branch, where in the

4 logistics branch or in the morale branch, you're not going to have those

5 types of problems.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

7 MR. McCLOSKEY:

8 Q. Can you give us another example of where the security branch would

9 have -- would be different from some of the other branches; for example,

10 correspondence?

11 A. Normally -- and, again, there's -- as going into the work of the

12 security branch, there are specifically regulated channels of

13 communications by which information derived from intelligence work or

14 security work or through operative contacts needs to travel to ensure its

15 secrecy and the fact that it's not disseminated outside of established

16 channels.

17 So within that framework, each of the units having means of

18 communication generally by courier in this particular context, where

19 specialised instructions can be couriered from the superiors at the

20 security branch to their subordinates, that won't necessarily come across

21 the desk of the commander or the operations officer.

22 Q. And as an example of that, and I don't want to get into a lot of

23 detail, but do you recall any -- any issue regarding this secrecy of

24 correspondence that occurred between Drago Nikolic and Vinko Pandurevic?

25 A. There was some centre of dispute over whether or not the brigade

Page 19645

1 commander, in this case Colonel Pandurevic, had the authority to make

2 Drago Nikolic, his security officer, reveal operative-related information

3 or security branch-related information.

4 As I understand the testimony of a prior protected witness on this

5 subject, and again from his previous testimony, there was some sense of

6 dispute whether or not this material had to go through the commander or

7 whether it could go separate of him; and my understanding is that a

8 decision was reached, and Colonel Pandurevic was informed that these

9 communications would not go through to him. They could go directly to the

10 security officer.

11 Q. Now, have you seen any examples of the work of the -- security

12 officer's work with the military police as they relate to prisoners that

13 would require this kind of secrecy that's for counter-intelligence work?

14 A. No, sir. In fact, when you look at the documents that lay out the

15 policy and the handling of procedures, those particular documents don't

16 come through security officer channels. They are, in fact -- they come

17 through command channels. The documents are signed not by security

18 officers; they are signed by commanders.

19 Q. Okay. Well, let's go through some examples of some security

20 officer and others on some of these topics and get your viewpoint.

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 ter 3031, involving the -- it's a

22 29 January 1995 communication from the commander of the Drina Corps,

23 General Zivanovic, talking -- entitled "Changes in the Authorisation of

24 VRS Security and Intelligence Support Delivery."

25 Q. Now, I don't want to read this entire document, but can you give

Page 19646

1 us the gist of what Zivanovic is doing here? That should be on your

2 tab --

3 A. I have it, sir.

4 Q. -- 19.

5 A. This one.

6 Q. Yes. And I note specifically of interest paragraph 2, but take a

7 moment to refresh your recollection on it.

8 A. Yes, sir. In this case, depending upon the formation or

9 organisation of a unit, whether it was a regular infantry brigade or

10 whether it was a light infantry brigade, that differential depended on

11 whether you had independent security and intelligence officers or whether

12 you had one officer role to do both -- both details.

13 In this particular order, they're reiterating, now, a prior order

14 from the Main Staff, directing that as part of the unit formation. There

15 would be a separation of functions between the security officers and the

16 intelligence officers, again presumably to allow for each officer to focus

17 more precisely on the tasks that they needed to do.

18 Q. Okay. And in the -- was that necessary in the Zvornik Brigade at

19 the time of -- in July 1995?

20 A. In July of 1995, the Zvornik Brigade was not a light infantry

21 brigade, so they already had separate branches for intelligence and

22 security. So those functions had already been translated -- or had

23 already been separated.

24 Q. All right. And just to remind us, who was who? Who was

25 intelligence and who was security?

Page 19647

1 A. The security officer in this particular case would be Drago

2 Nikolic, and the intelligence officer would be Captain Dusko Vukotic.

3 Q. And who, in this structure, was Captain Vukotic reporting to, his

4 immediate supervisor?

5 A. As the intelligence officer, his immediate supervisor would be It

6 would be the Chief of Staff of the brigade.

7 Q. At the time?

8 A. At the time, it would be Major Obrenovic.

9 Q. And Drago Nikolic reported at the time to who? Who was his

10 superior?

11 A. His superior under the chain of command would have been Colonel

12 Pandurevic. His superior, in terms of technical issues, would have been

13 Colonel Popovic.

14 Q. All right. How about the Bratunac Brigade, which was a light -- I

15 think we heard evidence that it was a light infantry brigade.

16 A. Yes, sir. In fact, pursuant to this, they did separate the

17 functions. What happened in the case of the Bratunac Light Infantry

18 Brigade was that for the month of late June and July of 1995, the officer

19 designated as the intelligence officer was given an additional task to

20 lead a company of Bratunac Brigade soldiers, who were deployed to the turn

21 of a battle front area out of the brigade's area of operations.

22 So while, in theory, you had the two separate functions, the

23 reality was that the only officer left home to do both functions was, in

24 fact, the assistant commander for security, Captain First Class Momir

25 Nikolic.

Page 19648

1 Q. All right. And if you could, we see in paragraph 4

2 here: "Security organs and intelligence organs shall exchange information

3 of importance on a daily basis."

4 Now, the Trial Chamber has heard about some intelligence -- the

5 intelligence side and the security side, but could you give us just the

6 brief -- the brief difference; and if there's a difference, why paragraph

7 4?

8 A. It recognises that there is a commonality of purpose for both

9 specific organs and the fact that information obtained through

10 intelligence channels may have importance to maintaining the overall

11 security posture of the unit and that information obtained through

12 security channels may have intelligence value, particularly with, you

13 know, relationship to, you know, the interrogation of prisoners of war, or

14 line-crossers, or individuals of that nature who may be interviewed or

15 investigated by one organ or another.

16 Q. All right. And in the next paragraphs, it points out that the

17 obligations, in the sense of information, professional administration, and

18 personal affairs, shall remain as pursuant to the Main Staff instruction

19 1820, and then all those numbers, 28 October.

20 Now, I don't need you to compare all the numbers. I notice

21 there's a date between the Mladic October 1994 date and this date; but to

22 your understanding, what is that a reference to?

23 A. I believe it's a reference to the Main Staff order that we just

24 discussed on that issue.

25 Q. All right.

Page 19649

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: And for the record, the -- while the date is

2 different, the order numbers are identical, and it may be a typo. We'll

3 check on that.

4 All right. Now I want to go to a couple of examples of some

5 normal communication of the security branch, the first one being one from

6 Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic, and it's 65 ter 3032.

7 Q. It's dated 7 February 1995. It's to the commands of all these --

8 of all the Drina Corps brigades, and I notice the "5BVP." Can you tell us

9 what "5BVP" is? That should be your tab 20, on the front page.

10 A. I only have the Serbo-Croatian version. I don't have the English

11 one. I'll have to read it off the screen.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. "5BVP" is the standard abbreviation that they use for the 5th

14 Military Police Battalion.

15 Q. And what's that?

16 A. Each corps is a component of its organisational formation. It's

17 supposed to have a military police battalion directly subordinate to the

18 corps commander. In the case of the Drina Corps, the military police

19 unit, while being called a battalion, actually numbered far less in size

20 of personnel. I don't think it ever approached company strength. So, you

21 know, it's called a battalion, but in reality we're talking about a unit

22 of far less personnel.

23 Q. All right. And, again, I don't want to read this whole document

24 out, but we can see that its entitled: "We have received a very urgent

25 telegram from our superior command, obliging us to give short and clear

Page 19650

1 responses with examples to these statements.

2 "And then in the different statements, one is entitled "Command

3 of the Military Police," "Level of Training," "Mobilisation," "Security

4 Tasks for the Military Police," "The Use of the Military Police of the

5 Muslim Army."

6 So we have a security officer of the Drina Corps. What's he doing

7 here and what's this about?

8 A. I'm going to have to scroll -- if I could ask them to scroll down

9 on this particular order. Thanks.

10 This particular order is essentially Colonel Popovic asking the

11 subordinate military police personnel, in the case the commanders not only

12 of the brigade but of other companies, and platoons in some cases, to

13 survey the types of jobs, roles, and functions that they're doing to

14 provide information on what they think they should be doing as a component

15 of their roles and responsibilities, and to provide any information of

16 what their professional counterparts in the enemy forces, ABiH and even

17 Croatian Army, are doing as a way of essentially surveying the general

18 military police community and trying to determine whether or not the tasks

19 that they are engaged in are, in fact, the tasks that, by regulation and

20 doctrine, they should be carrying out.

21 Q. So, can you remind us, why is a security officer involved in this?

22 A. Well, he is again the officer on the Drina Corps staff who, by

23 position, should have the most detailed knowledge about the specific or

24 technical issues that the military police not only are engaged in on a

25 daily basis, but, by doctrine, what the military police's role should be

Page 19651

1 in the armed forces as a matter of their training and as a matter of their

2 functions.

3 Q. Was there a concern that the military police were being used

4 improperly?

5 A. Yes, sir. One of the -- one of the constant factors of the war,

6 from the perspective of the Army of Republika Srpska, was that they did

7 not have the required manpower to, you know, fully bring their own

8 formations up to strength.

9 As a result, one of the unfortunate side effects, from a position

10 of VRS command, was that military police units were very often used as

11 infantry forces to plug a place or a gap in the line or to deploy as a

12 reserve force, because the commands did not have adequate manpower to use

13 other designated infantry units.

14 So instead of doing their police functions, which they of course

15 received specialised training for and equipment, more often than not they

16 were thrown in to performing strictly infantry functions.

17 Q. Well, and briefly did that happen in the Zvornik Brigade area on

18 13/14 July?

19 A. Yes, sir, it did.

20 Q. We'll get into that in more detail when we -- when we get there.

21 All right.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to another document by at that time Major

23 Popovic, and it's 65 ter 196, dated 15 April 1995.

24 Q. This is again to the -- it says "to the command of" and then all

25 the brigades, and as well as the 5th Engineer Battalion, and it says:

Page 19652

1 "Intelligence and security organ heads."

2 Now, can you tell, from the title of this document, whether this

3 is the document that would have gone to the commands or if this may have

4 been one of those more secretive documents? Is that even possible to

5 tell?

6 A. It's not a -- it's not a secret document, in the operative sense

7 of the word. A document like this would have been routinely transmitted

8 through the normal communication channels in most instances. It's not a

9 particularly sensitive document;, but, of course it's directed to the

10 intelligence and security organ heads as the relevant individuals who are

11 in the position to have to execute this technical guidance.

12 Q. Okay. It's entitled "Arrest and Detention of POWs and Other

13 Persons," and then it says "Instruction." Now, first of all, can you tell

14 us what, basically, this instruction is doing and how, if at all, does it

15 fit into this -- the discussion of the rights and responsibilities, the

16 duties and responsibilities of the security organ?

17 A. I believe this particular document is a classic example of the

18 technical guidance and direction that the superior security organ, you

19 know, would be expected to provide to the lower security organs with

20 respect to this issue. It notes the fact that they are receiving

21 information that handling not only prisoners of war but handling

22 individuals who are accused of regular criminal acts among the troops is

23 being done in such a manner that it could potentially compromise the unit

24 security.

25 A good example of that is the notation, I believe, on the second

Page 19653

1 page of the English translation that, you know, there -- some of these

2 people are being segregated after they're captured and being held for a

3 period of time in company or battalion command posts, where they're in a

4 position to potentially overhear or learn about military operations or

5 orders that the unit is carrying out, and, you know, notes the fact that

6 at some point in time these individuals may be traded and that the

7 information that they learn, as part of being captured in where they're

8 held, may ultimately fall into the hands of the enemy.

9 Q. All right. And how does this fit together with your earlier

10 discussion? For example, this says, on page 2, it says: "Instruction."

11 Is that different than "Order"?

12 A. Yes, sir, it is, but, I mean, this again -- it falls into the

13 classic example of the type of technical guidance and direction that a

14 security officer is within his purview to give.

15 Q. Okay. All right. Let's go to another one.

16 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's also by this time Lieutenant-Colonel Vujadin

17 Popovic, dated 20 April 1995. 65 ter 3033. I apologise.

18 Q. Again, it says: "To the commands of the brigades." This time it

19 gets into the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment. What's the 5th Mixed

20 Artillery Regiment?

21 A. Again, as part of its formation background, each course has a

22 mixed artillery regiment or some corps had multiple ones. This is the

23 unit that consolidated the artillery assets of the Drina Corps.

24 Q. All right. And this -- this heading says: "Strictly for the

25 chief of intelligence and security affairs." So what kind of document is

Page 19654

1 this?

2 A. This is a document that, when you read it in the context, would

3 certainly qualify as an operative document that would not go through

4 normal channels. I would presume - I don't know whether it did or not -

5 but I presume that based on the content, it wouldn't go through normal

6 channels.

7 Q. Okay. Can you briefly summarise the content? I don't want to go

8 into the whole thing.

9 A. The content of this particular order outlines operative

10 information that the army has received that their -- you know, after the

11 50th Session of the RCS National Assembly, that there is a plot or

12 contract to assassinate General Mladic and potentially other senior

13 members of the army.

14 Having laid that out, it directs the security officers to take the

15 necessary steps, within the confines of their responsibility, to, one,

16 initiate investigations at all levels within their units to determine if

17 they potentially have any information to add to this investigation, and,

18 two, you know, when or if they become aware that some of these senior

19 officers may be passing through or may be staying at that location, to

20 ensure that they take the necessary steps to ensure the safety and

21 security of the senior officers as they travel through.

22 Q. All right. Let's go to another document.

23 MR. McCLOSKEY: It's 65 ter 3014. It's dated 18 July 1995. We

24 see a command stamp. In the English, it says "15," but I'm not really

25 that concerned about the date. Again -- and I think we have another

Page 19655

1 translation problem. This is not Second-Lieutenant Popovic.

2 Q. This is another document that's entitled: "To the chiefs in the

3 intelligence and security organs," entitled, "Dealing with reporter

4 crews."

5 What does this document basically do and how does it fit into your

6 analysis of a security officer's job?

7 A. The VRS, perhaps like most military institutions, tends to view

8 the media as a potential security threat. This is, again, a classic

9 example of the security officer exercising, you know, the authorities

10 within his competence to -- in order to ensure that the media crews or

11 outlets do not get information which could potentially be viewed as

12 compromising the security of VRS units or operations.

13 Q. Does that fit into the 80 per cent counter-intelligence or the 20

14 per cent military police law enforcement work, or someplace else?

15 A. I think this type of example falls firmly into the 80 per cent

16 counter-intelligence work.

17 Q. All right. Now, that is -- those are my questions related to the

18 security branch. I wanted to move on now to something that you said

19 earlier on when you talked about --

20 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment.

21 Mr. Bourgon.

22 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President.

23 If my colleague is moving on to another topic, I have a

24 clarification I would like to see of something that came out of page 89,

25 lines 33 and 34. I didn't do it before that. That's way back, and I

Page 19656

1 wanted to let him finish that topic.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Page 89?

3 MR. BOURGON: Page 89, lines 33 and 34.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

5 MR. BOURGON: And on this occasion, the response of Mr. Butler was

6 that this was a reference to "earlier doctrine," and I would just like to

7 know what he meant by it. For clarification purposes, it might save a lot

8 of time in cross-examination. Has there been new doctrine since then, or

9 Why did he say "earlier doctrine"?

10 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Mr. Butler, the question was you were

11 being referred to document 65 ter 407, which is a manual entitled: "Rules

12 of Service of Security Organs" in the Armed Forces of the Socialist --

13 SFRY, and particularly to a paragraph thereof or a part thereof which

14 said: "The security organ is directly subordinate to the commanding

15 officer of the command unit, institution, or staff of the armed forces, in

16 whose strength it is placed," et cetera.

17 Then you were asked: "Can you clearly tell us what that means?"

18 Your answer was: "It is a reflection of the earlier doctrine that

19 within the framework of assistant commander for security or security

20 officials, or assistant commander for logistics, or any of that nature,

21 they are ultimately subordinate to the commanding officer of that unit. I

22 mean, they are considered to be direct subordinates of him or her, as the

23 case may be."

24 Mr. Bourgon is asking you to be more specific when you refer

25 to "earlier doctrine" by explaining what you really meant.

Page 19657

1 THE WITNESS: When I refer to the earlier doctrine, I believe

2 the -- what he's looking for is the -- in this particular context that

3 we're talking about, the 19 -- the 1984 JNA brigade rules.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you wish to add further questions?

5 MR. BOURGON: I can take that up on cross-examination, but it's

6 just because when he used the word "earlier," has there been a change? I

7 think my colleague is as much interested as I am in getting an answer to

8 this question, or has there been a change?

9 JUDGE AGIUS: I understand, Mr. Bourgon.

10 Yes, Mr. McCloskey, do you wish to elaborate this further or do

11 you wish to move to the next topic?

12 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think he is means "discussed earlier," but I

13 think it's going to -- if Mr. Butler reads the whole business, I mean, he

14 discussed this earlier-discussed doctrine of --

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Don't try to explain yourself what he meant. If he

16 wishes to add anything coming, he's perfectly capable of doing so.

17 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think it's a very simple explanation, and I

18 think this kind of interruption can be helpful, I agree, but it --

19 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. But on the other hand, Mr. Bourgon

20 waited until you had closed the chapter you were dealing with, so let's

21 not make a mountain out of it.

22 Yes, your next question, then.

23 MR. McCLOSKEY: I better clarify that, if I could, Mr. President.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, of course. Of course, you can.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY:

Page 19658

1 Q. The doctrine, the security doctrine that's set forth in the rule

2 on security, as it was stated, the commander of the unit, commander of the

3 security, is there some earlier security doctrine that was different from

4 the rule that you were talking about? I think that's what Mr. Bourgon is

5 concerned about.

6 A. I think there were earlier security doctrines published by the

7 JNA, but I've not reviewed them, so, I mean, I'm not talking about an

8 earlier doctrine in that context. We reviewed the material from this

9 particular date group because it was the most contemporary JNA doctrine

10 related to these functions before the JNA ceased to exist as part of the

11 war. So I don't mean to make the -- the claim that there is pre-1984 --

12 or pre-doctrine that I haven't talked about that I'm referring to.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Let's move.

14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you.

15 Q. All right. Now I just want to ask you about -- you've earlier

16 testified that the Ministry of Interior units were part of the armed

17 forces in an imminent war or state of war, and I want to direct your

18 attention to 65 ter 422, which is a law, entitled "The Law on the

19 Implementation of the Law Internal Affairs during Imminent Threat of War

20 or State of War."

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's look at, I believe, it's page 9 in the

22 English and page 4 in the B/C/S.

23 Q. It's Article 4 that I'm -- that I believe you've referenced in the

24 past, and can you tell us about this?

25 A. Yes, sir. It just reiterates what I indicated earlier. It's the

Page 19659

1 background source that during a declared state of imminent threat of war

2 or a state of war, that the Ministry of the Interior forces are considered

3 to be a component part of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, under

4 the command of the president as the commander-in-chief.

5 Q. All right. And would that include what the Courts heard regarding

6 the special police?

7 A. Yes, sir. They are a -- they are a component part of the

8 Ministry of the Interior and would be covered under this law.

9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. Let's go to page 12 of the English, of the

10 same law. It's number 4, and it's page 4 in the B/C/S. This is the first

11 article, and then we go on to some of the other articles on page 5 of the

12 B/C/S.

13 Q. It's entitled: "The Use of Police Units in Combat Operations,"

14 and I want to direct your attention in particular to Article 14, which

15 states: "Police units assigned to combat operations by an order of the

16 commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces shall be resubordinated to the

17 commander of the unit in whose zone of responsibility they are performing

18 combat tasks."

19 It goes on to say: "Police units shall be under the direct

20 command of a commander who is a member of the Ministry of the Interior.

21 During the time they are resubordinated to the Army of Republika Srpska,

22 they shall retain their organisation and may not be split up or separated.

23 "Police units resubordinated to the Army of Republika Srpska in a

24 certain zone shall be used only for combat operations established in

25 advance by the commander-in-chief or the Minister of the Interior."

Page 19660

1 Then lastly: "In the zone in which they are carrying out combat

2 operations, the commander to whom a police unit has been resubordinated

3 shall provide logistic support for the police unit in the same way as the

4 other units of the Army of Republika Srpska."

5 Now, can you tell us, what is the significance of this law,

6 actually, do -- to your case - or to your analysis? Excuse me.

7 A. Well, the first thing it indicates is that, you know, when you

8 have a situation where the police are resubordinated to the military for

9 the conduct of military operations, while the army has a great deal of

10 latitude with respect to using the police, and previously in designated

11 combat tasks, they don't have unlimited authority over police forces.

12 For example, the army cannot relieve the police unit commander of

13 command of his own troops, nor can they, now, for whatever expedient

14 reason, essentially disband that unit and take those particular soldiers

15 and move them wholesale into army formations. So it establishes, by law,

16 limits to the issue of command that the military commanders can exercise

17 over the police.

18 Q. It's dated 29 November 1994. Were you aware of any issues or

19 problems that were related to the enactment of this -- of this legislation

20 or law?

21 A. Towards the -- towards the end of 1994, particularly with respect

22 to the situation in the far western portion of the Krajina, specifically

23 the zone of the 2nd Krajina Corps in the Bihac area, the military

24 operations that were being conducted there were of such scope and

25 intensity and the manpower was so poor that the army was having

Page 19661

1 significant problems dealing with that situation.

2 I believe that General Milavonovic [phoen] noted to some degree

3 that one of the things that he had personally asked the president of the

4 republic to implement was an imminent state of war, which would give the

5 military additional powers and additional manpower assets, at least in

6 that particular part of the country, in order to deal with the military

7 threat.

8 So concurrent with, you know, the army asking for these additional

9 powers, there appears to be, from the legislative side of Republika

10 Srpska, an effort to more finely codify what these additional powers and

11 responsibilities meant, not only to the Republika Srpska Ministry of the

12 Interior police, but in this particular Official Gazette, it is entirely

13 comprised of laws for almost every branch of the government on how their

14 activities will be regulated during the same time.

15 So it sounds like somewhere towards the back part of 1994, the

16 government, as it -- you know, the legislative and the executive bodies of

17 the RS government, decided they needed to sit down and codify, under law,

18 just what those differentials meant in each and every circumstance.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Bourgon.

20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Let's go to 65 --

21 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President. I think it's time now to

22 object to these types of questions, Mr. President.

23 The question that's put to the witness as to whether he is aware

24 of any problems or issues, and then the witness goes into an

25 interpretation of a situation that took place in 1994, without quoting any

Page 19662

1 documents, without quoting any specific source, and he talks about his

2 knowledge of what happened in 1994 --

3 JUDGE AGIUS: You can cross-examine him on that. I mean, the

4 purpose of the question was to try and make some sense of the document

5 that the witness is being shown in relation to a particular period in

6 time. So if you have problems or questions to put, put them on

7 cross-examination.

8 MR. BOURGON: Mr. President, the witness is not qualified to talk

9 about what happened in 1994, and he's not qualified to give interpretation

10 of problems of a legislative nature.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: He is being asked why it is, in this particular

12 period in 1994, that this document emerges from the VRS.

13 So let's proceed, please.

14 Yes, Mr. Ostojic.

15 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.

16 We're joining the objection, and also --

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, but the objection has already been decided,

18 Mr. Ostojic. Please sit down.

19 MR. OSTOJIC: I will only add one other thing, if I may.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we better stay by the book, by the rules.

21 If an objection has already been decided, you sit down. It's over. If

22 you have a fresh objection, we will deal with it, but not the same

23 objection.

24 Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 19663

1 Now, let's go to a document that's 65 ter 57. This is a document

2 that is entitled: "Republika Srpska, Ministry of the Interior, Cabinet of

3 the Minister," dated 10 July 1995, to various police commands.

4 Q. In your view, Mr. Butler, does this -- well, first of all, can you

5 just briefly outline what -- and we're going to get into this in more

6 detail now, but I just want to know: Is there, in your view, a

7 relationship between this document and the previous law you just went

8 over?

9 A. Yes, sir. I believe this is a -- this is an excellent example of

10 just how that law was manifested in the practical reality on the ground

11 when it came to these situations.

12 Q. Can you point to a couple of examples in this document to back

13 that up?

14 A. It notices that it was the -- pursuant to the order of the supreme

15 commander of the RS, reiterating President Karadzic's authority as the

16 supreme commander to give ut this order. It reiterates -- you know, it

17 designates a commander for the police units. It regulates the issue with

18 respect to once a unit arrives, it is obliged to make contact with the

19 corps chief of staff, General Krstic.

20 So, in a sense, it regulates -- you know, or it manifests itself

21 on the law and the requirements of the law and how this is done, and

22 further reiterates the fact that once the particular unit or this

23 amalgamations of unit gets to the destination is to put itself at the

24 direction of General Krstic, report to him for further instructions.

25 Q. Well, when it says "obliged to make contact with Corps Chief of

Page 19664

1 Staff General Krstic," does that imply any kind of command relationship

2 between the MUP forces and General Krstic?

3 A. I read it to be as such, yes, sir.

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Okay. One more document on this topic, a short

5 document. Let's go to Exhibit it looks like 4D00087, a 15 July document

6 from the Drina Corps Command to the Main Staff, requesting food provisions

7 for a MUP unit monitoring the Srebrenica and Bratunac area.

8 Q. Can you tell us briefly what this is and whether it fits that law

9 you were talking about?

10 A. Yes, sir. I don't think we went over this component verbally; but

11 as a component of that, when these forces fall under the --

12 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, one moment.

13 Yes, Madame Fauveau.

14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

15 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. We haven't received the interpretation.

16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the Prosecutor repeat the

17 sentence he just read from this document, the whole sentence, please,

18 because half of the sentence may alter the meaning of the sentence.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Do we have time for that today because it's

20 4.30, or shall we adjourn?

21 We adjourn until tomorrow.

22 Thank you, Madame Fauveau.

23 Mr. Butler, we are adjourning today. Before we wind up, I wish to

24 thank you all for having made yourself available this afternoon to

25 recover, recoup some of the time we lost this morning, not due to

Page 19665

1 anybody's fault. In particular, I also wish to thank the interpreters,

2 the technicians, the reporters, and the rest of the staff that have been

3 working hard.

4 Thank you.

5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.30 p.m.,

6 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 15th day of

7 January, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.