1 Wednesday, 23 January 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning.
7 Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
9 IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
11 All the accused are here, and I see a full house amongst the
12 Defence teams. The Prosecution, Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Nicholls.
13 Good morning, Mr. Butler.
14 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Ostojic is soon going to finish his
17 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
18 MR. OSTOJIC: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. Thank
20 Cross-examination by Mr. Ostojic: [Continued]
21 Q. Good morning, Mr. Butler.
22 A. Good morning, sir.
23 Q. Sir, can you tell us, if you know, the whereabouts of my client,
24 Ljubisa Beara, from July 17th through July 31st, 1995?
25 A. Unless otherwise noted in my narrative report, I don't recall that
1 there is a specific intercept that reflects him, from the 17th through
2 about the 22nd, 23rd. I think towards the end of July, there are specific
3 intercepts which reflect his presence in association with Zepa.
4 Q. Right. And we are talking about the period in association with
5 Zepa, and an intercept that we reviewed or that you reviewed with
6 Mr. McCloskey is dated the 1st of August, 1995, and that's why my question
7 to you is specifically: From the 17th of July until the 31st of July,
8 1995, what did your analysis find as to the whereabouts of Mr. Beara?
9 A. I don't believe we have any intercepts or any other information
10 pertaining to his whereabouts during that period.
11 Q. Now, if you were going to be fair and objective in your report,
12 isn't it something that you think you should put in your report, to say,
13 "With respect to Mr. Beara, we do not know the whereabouts of where he was
14 from the period of the 17th of July through the 31st of July, 1995"?
15 Wouldn't that be fair to the man?
16 A. Which report?
17 Q. In any of the five that you wrote.
18 A. Well, sir, with respect to the Srebrenica military narrative and
19 the revised version, given that the focus is on Srebrenica and the
20 Srebrenica crime bases, where he is included, his whereabouts after 18
21 July, with respect to the major crime scenes, his disappearance or his --
22 or a lack of awareness where he is wasn't relevant for me.
23 Q. Okay. Help me with this, sir. Do you agree with me that you
24 cannot and, in fact, were unable to document any significant crimes with
25 respect to Zepa?
1 A. My understanding with respect to the crimes that occurred with
2 Zepa is that they are charged with respect to forcible transfer and a few
3 other legal things that I'm not sure of. We do not have, obviously, a
4 collateral situation like one sees in Srebrenica, where you have the
5 actual execution in large quantities of prisoners.
6 Q. Okay. Well, we'll come back. Specifically, on the 17th of
7 November, 2003, you stated that under oath, sir, on page 4675, lines 4
8 through 5, and I'll read it just so we have it clear:
9 "Given that we don't have any significant crimes with respect to
10 Zepa, to my knowledge," and then you proceed to discuss it.
11 Are you telling us that forcible transfer, in your opinion, is not
12 a significant crime, or, sir, is it in fact true that you believe, as
13 you've testified under oath, that there weren't any significant crimes
14 with respect to Zepa that you, as an analyst, found?
15 A. As an analyst, I believe what I said, which is I don't believe
16 that there are any significant crimes. As for whether or not forcible
17 transfer is a significant crime within the context of the law is a
18 question that, you know, I don't have the expertise to comment on.
19 Q. Now, when, if you can give us or help us with this timeline, when
20 does that process --
21 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, because this needs clarification, once
22 you've raised it.
23 What, in your mind, not having a legal background, do you
24 understand by "significant crimes"?
25 THE WITNESS: Significant crimes with respect to the process of
1 gathering people, moving them, and then the conduct of mass executions. I
2 understand obviously there are legal discriminating factors between
3 genocide or extermination or murder, but those are not within my field of
4 expertise to make opinions on. The reality is it was a mass execution,
5 how it's legally categorized. That's the view that I look at these issues
6 when I say a major crime, "a mass execution."
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
9 MR. OSTOJIC: I'm not sure if that's clear Mr. President, but if I
10 can just follow it up on that --
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Very briefly. I just wanted to do establish when he
12 uses the term "significant crimes," it's what he understands --
13 MR. OSTOJIC: Fair enough, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: -- it to be.
15 MR. OSTOJIC: If I may proceed.
16 Q. Sir, I want to focus a little bit on this Krstic tape that we saw
17 during our trial, which I think has been identified as the "kill them all"
18 tape. Do you remember that? It's an audiotape, actually; correct?
19 A. Yes, sir, I do.
20 Q. And I think that under oath you stated previously that you were
21 not to -- you were not prepared to conclude, based on that comment in
22 isolation, that the intent behind the conversation was criminal in nature,
23 and you held open the possibility that it may very well have nothing to do
24 with the commission of any crimes. Correct?
25 A. Yes, sir, I did.
1 Q. And that's the logic that you used, the military analysis;
3 A. Given when the audiotape was -- well, given when the actual
4 intercept was taken and given my understanding of the military situation
5 on the ground at the time, yes, sir.
6 Q. And these things, when taken in isolation, can certainly have more
7 than two meanings; correct?
8 A. Yes, sir, which is exactly why I do as much of my analysis as I
9 can in context, and not in isolation.
10 Q. And that's the fair and objective and honest way to analyse; isn't
11 that correct, sir?
12 A. The proper way to analyse these things is in context, yes, sir.
13 Q. Now, with respect to Zepa, can you give us the timeline as to the
14 date when the people were being either evacuated or transported from the
16 A. I believe the civilians were being transported from the Zepa
17 enclave starting 26 July, if memory serves.
18 Q. Okay. We won't debate the dates with you, but we have other
19 dates. When did it end, sir?
20 A. I think, within two days, three days, the movement was done.
21 Q. So would that be the 28th, 29th, according to your analysis?
22 A. Yes, sir. I mean, I believe I have the dates in my report, but
23 I'm going off of memory here, so I think that the movement was only a day
24 or two at max. It was not a very large movement process.
25 Q. Well, let's take it at the outside to include it to be two days
1 from the 26th to the 28th. Can you share with us what your analysis found
2 as to where Ljubisa Beara was on July 26th, 27th, or 28th, when we
3 discussed this transportation or evacuation of the civilians?
4 Do you have any information whatsoever to identify his
6 A. No, sir.
7 Q. In fact, am I not correct, sir, that there is no evidence
8 whatsoever with respect to Ljubisa Beara involved in the Zepa operation
9 but for the intercepts that we see purportedly on the 1st and 2nd of
10 August, 1995?
11 A. To my knowledge, that's correct. I'm not aware of any
13 Q. Help me with this also, sir. Is it correct that based on your
14 analysis, there was no evidence that you saw or digested that Ljubisa
15 Beara planned any part of this transportation or evacuation of the
16 population from Zepa?
17 A. Given that I can't comment on where he was and what he was doing,
18 I mean, that is a logical inference to draw, that I can't and that I have
19 no evidence that he was part of that. Whether it was true or not, I have
20 no way of knowing.
21 Q. And the same would go true, sir, for any purported organisation,
22 assistance, supervision, facilitation; correct?
23 A. The same answer: I have no information, so, therefore, you know,
24 on a lack of information, I agree with you.
25 Q. Let's look, if you don't mind, sir, at 65 ter 1378A, and that is
1 the intercept of the 1st of August, 1995.
2 And while that's coming up, I would just like to ask you a couple
3 of preliminary questions, if you don't mind.
4 You talk a lot about legitimate military activities in your report
5 and, in part, in your testimony. You also talk about a legitimate
6 military combat engagement. For our purposes, can you describe for me,
7 what is a legitimate military combat engagement?
8 A. A legitimate military combat engagement, it would be an engagement
9 that falls within the confines of internationally-established Law of War.
10 Now --
11 Q. And where did you study this Law of War, sir?
12 A. To finish the answer, obviously military officers aren't experts
13 on that, and that is why, within the context of the VRS, those laws of war
14 were codified within the service regulations on the Law on the Armed
15 Forces with respect to that. So when I talk about the phrase "legitimate
16 military combat," it is within the context of those SFRY regulations that
17 the VRS adopted.
18 Q. And just so the record is clear, I think it is, when you say or
19 use the contraction "aren't," you mean "are not experts"; correct?
20 A. I would assume, yes, sir, the military officers in question are
21 not experts on international law.
22 Q. Well, I'm asking about you, sir.
23 A. Well, I'm not an expert on international law, sir.
24 Q. Okay. And you're not an expert in criminal law, as we've
25 established; correct?
1 A. I did not go to law school. You can draw your own conclusion on
2 that one, sir.
3 Q. I have. Sir, with respect to that, we've used the word, and
4 obviously somewhat incorrectly. For a legitimate military combat
5 engagement, we've used the word "ambush" from time to time. Do you know
6 what I'm referring to when I use the word "ambush"?
7 A. Yes, sir. In a military sense, I do.
8 Q. Is that what a military combat engagement is?
9 A. That is one form of a tactical-level military operation, yes, sir.
10 Q. Now, let's look at this intercept, if you don't mind, of the
11 1st of August, 1995.
12 MR. OSTOJIC: I think it's at 1002, if I have my notes correct.
13 Q. Now, here it references -- excuse me.
14 MR. OSTOJIC: Actually, it's on the second page, I believe.
15 Q. I'm just looking at the last paragraph in the second page, which
16 would indicate or start with the letter "B." Do you see that, where it
17 says, "Know what, man ..."?
18 A. Yes, sir, I do.
19 Q. Now, with respect to this intercept, we know there are basically
20 two ways to identify a speaker, and one would be compromise, as you
21 discussed, and the other one is voice recognition; correct?
22 A. Yes, sir. That was another method that the intercept operators
24 Q. Help me with this: What, other than those two methods, are there,
25 other than voice recognition and compromise?
1 A. Well, sir, depending on the context of the conversation, and even
2 with respect to the use of call signs and the discussion that they're
3 talking about, it's possible to make a fair inference on who the
4 correspondents are.
5 Q. From a military or purported military analytical perspective or
6 from an intercept operator perspective?
7 A. Both, sir. For example, when -- excuse me. As I've talked
8 before, when we see "Zlatar 01" personally involved in conversations, it's
9 a fair inference to make that the individual in the conversation is, in
10 fact, the Drina Corps commander, based on that compromise of a code name.
11 Q. Well, when we're talking about individuals, we're not talking
12 about where they may have called. But when you have to identify an
13 individual as a participant in a purported intercepted conversation, the
14 two ways in which to identify them would be voice recognition and
15 compromise; isn't that true?
16 A. Yes, sir, when talking about the individual.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: He's already answered that and also told you other
18 factors as well. So let's move.
19 MR. OSTOJIC: I was just trying to clarify.
20 Q. Now, if you look at this last paragraph, sir, it states here that
21 it's alleged to have been purportedly Mr. Beara stating, "When we get it,
22 we'll call the MKCK ..."
23 Do you see that?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. Now, is there anything wrong with calling the International
1 Committee of the Red Cross with respect to potential prisoners of war?
2 A. In the abstract, certainly there's nothing wrong with any
3 discussion with the International Committee of the Red Cross on prisoners
4 of war, I agree.
5 Q. Tell me, sir, what is the standard for how long of a period of
6 time do you have to register POWs?
7 A. I am not sure what --
8 Q. Sorry.
9 A. I'm not sure what international standards require. For the most
10 part, though, the rule is that they're to be registered as quickly as
12 Q. Well, that's kind of vague, but do you know what the United States
13 government position is on that?
14 A. I haven't had to deal with that particular situation for a number
15 of years, so I can't say I know what the current US government position
16 is, no, sir.
17 Q. Okay. Well, let me show you an exhibit that I found of a recent
18 article. And you're familiar with the International Herald Tribune, are
19 you not?
20 A. Yes, I am.
21 Q. It's a reliability newspaper, as far as you can tell; right?
22 A. As much as newspapers are reliable, yes, sir.
23 Q. Now, are you familiar with the Defence Department person by the
24 name of -- I'm sorry, senior Pentagon official called Sandra Hodgkinson?
25 A. No, sir, I'm not.
1 MR. OSTOJIC: And I have this marked as an exhibit, Your Honour,
2 and let me read this. It's from the 7th of January, 2008, The Herald
3 Tribune, and the article is entitled "Troubles at another prison run by
4 the US."
5 Q. I'll give it to you, sir, if the Court wishes, with the assistance
6 of the usher.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: In the meantime, for the record, I forgot to mention
8 that Ms. Schildge from the US Embassy has been present from the beginning
9 of the sitting.
10 MR. OSTOJIC: It is in e-court.
11 THE WITNESS: You're not going to make me read that off the
12 screen, are you?
13 MR. OSTOJIC: No, no.
14 Q. It's on the second portion of that article, sir.
15 And when they discuss this, the senior Pentagon official for
16 detention policy, Sandra Hodgkinson, she refused to comment on the
17 complaint, citing the confidentiality of communications with the Red
18 Cross. She said that the organisations had access to "all Department of
19 Defence detainees in Afghanistan after they are formally registered," and
20 that "the military makes every effort to register detainees as soon as
21 practicable after capture, normally within two weeks."
22 Do you see that?
23 A. Yes, sir, I do.
24 Q. And then she goes on to say something else:
25 "In some cases, due to a variety of logistical and operational
1 circumstances, it may take longer."
2 Do you see that?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Now, do you agree or disagree with that?
5 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Agree, disagree with what?
7 MR. OSTOJIC: With the statement that it takes 14 days --
8 JUDGE AGIUS: How can he agree or disagree with a statement of
9 someone with whom he's no relationship? The statement exists there in the
10 newspaper. Don't ask him whether he agrees or --
11 MR. OSTOJIC: Let me try it this way, Your Honour, if I may.
12 Q. You're employed currently with the --
13 JUDGE AGIUS: I interrupted, Mr. McCloskey. I didn't know what
14 you wanted to say.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: Relevance was my objection.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: But I can see some relevance. That's why I haven't
17 stopped Mr. Ostojic as yet. We'll see as he goes along.
18 MR. OSTOJIC:
19 Q. Sir, you work currently for Homeland Security, do you not?
20 A. Yes, sir, I do.
21 Q. And you've testified a little bit about your background in
22 connection with Homeland Security, and you state that in capturing POWs,
23 it should be as soon as possible. Isn't it correct that the definition
24 that the Pentagon department gives is actually more accurate, given that
25 you work for the same government as Ms. Hodgkinson does, that, in fact,
1 POWs are to be registered within four weeks -- or within two weeks, and
2 sometimes it takes longer? Isn't that fair?
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's move to your next question, Mr. Ostojic. I
4 mean, let us decide. This is so marginal. Let's proceed, please.
5 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you. And just for the record, my co-counsel
6 is saying I didn't identify the exhibit number and I thought I did, but
7 we'll find it for the Court and we'll get back to you. We'll have to get
8 back to the Court with the exact exhibit number. I think we have it.
9 THE REGISTRAR: It's 2D157, for the record.
10 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you very much.
11 Q. Sir, in isolation and in context, when we look at this intercept
12 of August 1st, 1995, 65 ter 1378, there is nothing that's improper as to
13 the contents of it, isn't that correct, from a military analytical
15 A. From the passage that I read, you're correct, there doesn't appear
16 to be anything improper about it.
17 Q. Well, not just from the passage that we've read. I mean, you've
18 analysed this intercept. You've included it in your report. You've
19 discussed it in your direct examination. What about the intercept do you
20 find, if anything, that would constitute anything improper, militarily
22 A. I don't know that I do is what I'm saying. I mean --
23 Q. So --
24 A. That one intercept I don't see in that part; and, again, I didn't
25 read the entire intercept because we just went to page 2. But for the
1 context of what we talked about, I see nothing improper.
2 Q. Well, I thought you read the intercept before, sir, but I'll give
3 you the opportunity, if you'd like, to read the intercept in its entirety.
4 A. If -- yeah, that would be fine, sir, and then I can comment on it.
5 Q. Mr. Butler, is this the first time you've seen this intercept?
6 A. No, sir, but I hope you'll appreciate my position. There has been
7 a whole lot of documents that have been going by, and --
8 Q. And I do, sir. Now, let me ask you this: When, if -- when, to
9 the best of your recollection, given that you left the OTP in November of
10 2004, as you've told us yesterday --
11 A. 2003, sir. If I said "2004," that's a misstatement on my part.
12 Q. And thank you for that clarification. You know, I'd hate to waste
13 the valuable time that was given to me by the Court. If you'd like to
14 read it, I'll give you the opportunity, since you asked to read it. I
15 don't want to be accused of being unfair to you. But I'd like to move on,
16 so it's really your call, sir. If you need to read it --
17 A. No, sir. I mean, you can proceed on, I mean.
18 MR. OSTOJIC: Let's look at the next intercept, 65 ter 1380, and
19 this is an intercept also purportedly capturing Mr. Beara at 2245.
20 Q. Do you see that, sir, at the top?
21 A. Yes, sir, I do.
22 Q. Among others, of course. And then what I'd like to do is focus
23 quickly on the second page of that intercept, where it states that
24 purportedly Mr. Beara is discussing ICRC escorts and for them to be
25 exchanged here. Do you remember that at all? It's about a third from the
2 A. I see it, certainly.
3 Q. Now, is there anything wrong with that, sir, with having an ICRC
4 escort and having the POWs exchanged at some point?
5 A. They're not talking about their POWs. What they're talking about
6 is what the Serbian MUP is doing with the POWs in Serbia, that -- as far
7 as I can tell from this one.
8 Q. Well, keep reading, sir: "We had no plans to kill them ... but to
9 exchange them."
10 Is Mr. Beara with the MUP at this point, according to your
12 A. The context of the conversation, as I understand it, is they're
13 talking about the activities of what the Serbian MUP are doing. That's
14 how I -- that's how I understand the context of this conversation.
15 Q. Okay. Are you familiar, sir, with respect to the intercept
16 operators, if any of them were trained in voice recognition?
17 A. I have -- I don't know that yes or no, I mean.
18 Q. Well, in your analysis and participation and reliance on those
19 intercepts, did you ever ask that question?
20 A. No, sir. I did not ask that question of the intercept operators.
21 Q. Would you be surprised to learn -- would you be surprised if none
22 of them had experience in voice recognition?
23 A. No, sir. It wouldn't surprise me at all.
24 Q. Do you know, sir, if the intercept operators ever had a dossier or
25 a file of various VRS officers or military personnel?
1 A. No, sir. I don't know that, that the operators would have it.
2 Q. Well, certainly, that's something you would have asked; correct?
3 A. Actually, sir, normally speaking, that's not material that the
4 actual operators would routinely get. Their job is to collect the
5 information, not to make judgements with respect to analysis at a higher
6 level based on other forms of information. They're collectors, not
8 Q. So would you agree with me that it would be somewhat strange, if
9 not unbelievable, that intercept operators would have dossiers on VRS
10 officers or military personnel?
11 A. Yeah. If they had full dossiers on these individuals, I would
12 agree that it would be strange, yes, sir.
13 Q. And you've never seen such dossiers from these military
14 operators. They've never given you a copy of that; correct?
15 A. The only product I'm aware of is the general working notes of
16 various operators with respect to frequencies and other technical data,
17 not broader notes as you discuss.
18 Q. And in your several or few meetings, interviews, that you've had
19 with these intercept operators, that issue never came up; correct?
20 A. The issue of dossier or voice recognition?
21 Q. Dossier.
22 A. No, sir, as far as I know.
23 Q. And it never came up in your investigative team with Madam
24 Stefanie Frease or Mr. Ruez; correct?
25 A. Not to my knowledge with respect to dossiers. I know that there
1 was an effort to go out and obtain and clarify the relevant technical data
2 that was incumbent in the intercept notebooks, but not with respect to
3 analytical dossiers.
4 Q. Now, I want to just spend a minute, if we can, on compromise and
5 to make sure that I understand it correctly. And that's for
6 identification, voice identification.
7 When we talk about compromise, there are two ways in order that an
8 identity of a participant in a conversation can be compromised; correct?
9 A. Yes. As we've discussed, it's either a voice compromise, the
10 individual compromises his own identity, or he's compromised by --
11 Q. By the other --
12 A. -- yeah, by the other party. And then leading on to that, he's
13 compromised by the context of his own conversation.
14 Q. Now, let me ask you this: Did you discuss with any of the
15 analysts, when there was no voice compromise, how were they able to deduce
16 whether or not the speaker that they were purportedly intercepting the
17 conversation was, was person A, B, or C?
18 A. I didn't. If it was not clear within the context of the
19 conversation, whether it was a compromise or not, I took that into account
20 in my analysis.
21 Q. And you would give it less weight, if you will?
22 A. Yes, sir. I mean, there are other factors. For example, if the
23 compromise was not done prior to the actual contacts, there's certainly a
24 possibility that as a component of the conversation, they would have
25 recognised the voices of the individuals and used that accordingly. They
1 were the best people who were taking that information at the time to make
2 those judgements.
3 Q. And we'll get to voice recognition in a second. But if we just
4 stay with compromise, it would be fair that, as I said, you would give it
5 less weight and, therefore, it would be less reliable; correct?
6 A. Notwithstanding the reliability of the correspondence we're
7 talking about, I would give it less weight with respect to identity, yes,
9 Q. And now let's turn to voice recognition. How often do you think
10 that a person, such as an intercept operator with the level of experience,
11 education, and certification that these gentlemen had, who are the
12 intercept operators, how many times would they need to hear the voice of
13 an individual participant so that it could be qualified as voice
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you have the expertise to answer that question,
16 Mr. Butler?
17 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure that it requires an expert opinion,
18 Your Honour. I mean, simply put, it's the same level of expertise that we
19 use every day when we recognise people we hear over a telephone. It's not
20 a technical question, sir.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Let's move, Mr. Ostojic, please.
22 MR. OSTOJIC: Okay.
23 Q. Sir, as an analyst, albeit a historical analyst, did you address
24 or analyse the NIOD report with respect to the intercept operators?
25 A. No, sir. I didn't analyse the NIOD report. I'm not even sure how
1 much of it had been translated into English.
2 Q. Okay. I'd like to, if we may, turn to Srebrenica for a few
4 Sir, when we talk about the evacuation and the movement of the
5 population of Srebrenica, can you give me, based on your analysis, what
6 was that timeline? When did it start and when did it end?
7 A. I believe the -- excuse me. I believe the first buses departed
8 the Potocari compound at approximately between 1200 and 1400 hours. The
9 convoys were suspended at darkness on the 12th. I believe they resumed as
10 early as between 800 and 1000 hours on the 13th, and I believe that all of
11 the individuals were evacuated by darkness on the 13th of July.
12 I'm not aware of any information that there were still remaining,
13 on the evening of the 13th of July, civilians that were going to be
14 subsequently evacuated on the 14th.
15 Q. Let's talk about the visibility of Mr. Beara with respect to this
17 Do you know the whereabouts of Mr. Beara from the beginning of
18 July, and you can pick any date, but we can go with July 1st, up to and
19 through July 13th, 1995?
20 A. No, sir. There's no information that I'm aware of with respect to
21 intercepts or sightings that place Mr. Beara on the ground, with the -- I
22 think the only exception that places him on the ground prior to the 13th
23 is the identification of him by one Dutch officer at Nova Kasaba. I'm
24 just unclear whether that identification is on 12 July or on 13 July.
25 Q. And let's talk about or continue to talk about the visibility of
1 Mr. Beara. You have no documentation and you've reviewed no such reports
2 or information that he was ever at Srebrenica during that period of time;
4 A. I'm not aware of any military documents or video footage that put
5 him there. I don't recall if statements by either Mr. Nikolic or
6 Mr. Deronjic or other individuals place him on the ground or place him at
7 Srebrenica. The town of Srebrenica, I just don't recall, but I don't
8 believe that there is either video footage or documents that put him in
9 the town of Srebrenica, no, sir.
10 Q. And the same would be true with respect to Potocari, would it not,
11 that there are no military documents or video footage or information that
12 you've seen or analysed to put Mr. Beara in Potocari on or about that time
13 period; correct?
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, one moment Mr. Butler.
15 Mr. Bourgon.
16 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 I wanted to avoid interrupting my client, but just at page 20,
18 lines 7 and 8, the witness, Mr. Butler, mentioned a name "Nikolic." I'd
19 just like him to confirm that we're not talking about Drago Nikolic.
20 Thank you, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Bourgon.
22 Do you confirm that?
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I can. We're talking about Momir Nikolic.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
25 THE WITNESS: Getting back to your question, sir: I don't believe
1 so, but it's been a few years since I've actually seen the video coverage
2 of Potocari. So I can't say that as an absolute fact, but I don't recall
3 that I've ever seen video footage of him at Potocari or any documents that
4 reflect that.
5 MR. OSTOJIC:
6 Q. And what about the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac? It's true, isn't
7 it, that there's no evidence whatsoever that would place Mr. Beara at the
8 Hotel Fontana at Bratunac for those what we've described as three meetings
9 on the 11th and 12th of July?
10 A. I believe there are some records that place him at the Hotel
11 Fontana, that he has a room there during that relevant period. However,
12 I'm trying -- I don't believe that he is listed as one of the participants
13 in any of the three meetings, no, sir. I think that's correct.
14 Q. We have to break this down a little bit. What room records are
15 you referring to, sir, that you claim Mr. Beara had a room at the Hotel
17 A. Well, I'm -- like I said, there are records that, as part of the
18 Bratunac Brigade collection, that shows that a number of VRS officers,
19 where essentially the Bratunac Brigade was paying for their rooms at the
20 Hotel Fontana during this period. I don't recall whether or not Colonel
21 Beara was one of those listed officers. I mean, we have those records,
22 but I just don't recall at the moment whether he was one of those
23 individuals who had a room or not there.
24 Q. Okay. And we'll take a look at that, sir, and I think your
25 recollection will be refreshed that he was not. But in any event, you say
1 in line 19, that he's not listed as one of the participants in any of the
2 meetings. Aside from the lists, sir, I mean, we have video footage of
3 those meetings, in part, do we not?
4 A. Yes, sir, the OTP has that.
5 Q. So let's not limit it to just a list. But all the documents that
6 you've reviewed, including the video footage, all that which you're trying
7 to put in this historical context for us that you reflect in your report,
8 it's rather clear, is it not, that Mr. Beara was not - and you've
9 concluded this, sir - he was not a visible figure in Bratunac; correct?
10 A. I basically said, as part of my report, if I recall correctly that
11 particular paragraph, that he wasn't one of the listed participants at the
12 meetings. That would be based off of, you know, lists, the material, as
13 well as the video coverage. Whether or not -- I mean, there is testimony
14 and there is other information that he was a participant in and around
15 Bratunac at that time, but, you know, that's witness testimony, that's not
16 documents or video.
17 Q. And so why do you keep referring to it, Mr. Butler? I mean, you
18 yourself said that you don't rely on that, you're not asked to rely on or
19 analyse that witness testimony, you haven't done it. You're simply going
20 to take the documents; and as Mr. McCloskey or my learned friend said,
21 connect the dots or link them up to this historical analysis that you've
22 done, but you seem to insist to want to talk about these interviews.
23 That's not part of what your job is here, is it, to talk about those
25 A. No, sir. But when you ask me a broad question that encompasses
1 that information and want me to agree or disagree with it, I have to take
2 it into account.
3 Q. Well, I'm accepting that you're going to talk about the documents,
4 that you're going to talk about the intercepts, and that you're going to
5 use this analysis that you've come up with to put it in context. In the
6 context of Ljubisa Beara, he was nowhere to be found, from those documents
7 that you've reviewed, the intercepts, and the material that you've
8 examined, in either Srebrenica, Potocari, or Bratunac, including the Hotel
9 Fontana; correct?
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. It appears that there may be an alibi
12 defence coming. I have no information from counsel of any alibi defence;
13 and before any further questioning is going on, I think he should be
14 ordered to follow the Rules of this Tribunal and provide us with alibi
15 information. I have asked it repeatedly and received nothing.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: The question is also limited to the documents that
17 the witness examined.
18 MR. OSTOJIC: Well, I'm not and I don't want to get into a debate
19 in front of this witness with what my learned friend said, but he's wrong
20 to suggest that I'm not following the law, and he's wrong to suggest --
21 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Because if you're going to proceed,
22 then we have to do it in the absence of the witness.
23 The thing is this: I am drawing a distinction between what you
24 said, generally, and in the broader sense of the word, and, in fact, the
25 question itself, which was limited to the documents that the witness
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Objection overruled, Mr. McCloskey. We need to
4 remember that in the indictment, you also have "joint criminal
5 enterprise." So what Mr. Ostojic may have in mind may not be that
6 relevant for the time being, but what's more important is that the
7 question is limited to the documents that the witness has reviewed, that
8 is, intercepts and others, all the material that he has examined, either
9 surveillance of Potocari or Bratunac including the Hotel Fontana. He
10 hasn't answered that question, and he is being asked now to answer it.
11 Q. THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, for the 12th of July, that is correct. On
12 the 13th of July, we start seeing intercepts that refer to the individual,
13 depending on where various phone conversations are attributed to, and I
14 believe there is one that attributes him to "Badem," which is the code
15 name for the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade on that date.
16 I mean, that is an intercept document that potentially places him
17 in Bratunac on that day.
18 MR. OSTOJIC: Is the Court happy with the answer, and if I may
19 proceed, in terms of did he answer the Court's question?
20 JUDGE AGIUS: I suggest that you move ahead, Mr. Ostojic.
21 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.
22 Q. Sir, let me stick, then, with this, so we understand it correctly.
23 And we'll get to that intercept on the 13th that you want to.
24 Am I correct, sir, that Beara is not a visible figure in Bratunac
25 in that period of time? Yes or no?
1 A. For the period of time for the 12th of July, that's correct, from
2 the documents and the intercepts, yes, sir.
3 Q. How about for the period of time after the 12th of July, sir?
4 A. I believe, for the 13th of July, his presence in and around
5 Bratunac, and when I talk about in and around Bratunac, I qualify that as
6 Bratunac Brigade, Nova Kasaba, and up the road, that road area there, I
7 believe the intercepts reflect his presence on the 13th of July.
8 Q. And I want to cover two little points with respect to this, and
9 just so we're clear. So, prior to - although, you said, on the 12th of
10 July, you agree there's no documents to support that he was present in
11 Srebrenica, Potocari, Bratunac and/or the Hotel Fontana - but prior to the
12 12th of July, do you know what his whereabouts are, from the 1st through
13 the 12th, up to and including this intercept of the 13th?
14 A. No, sir. I'm not aware, incorporated in my reports or the
15 material that I have seen, that I have any information about his
16 whereabouts during that period through the 13th, when he becomes visible.
17 Q. Help me understand what you said under oath on the 21st of
18 November, 2003, in the Blagojevic case.
19 MR. OSTOJIC: And it's on page 5073, lines 11 through 13.
20 Q. You go on to say: "And, again, Beara, it may well be; do they
21 know who he is?"
22 Then you go on to say: "He is not a visible figure in Bratunac."
23 Then you go on to describe Momir Nikolic, among others, as being
24 that people should know who they are on sight.
25 I want to focus on the words that you used: "He," meaning Beara,
1 "is not a visible figure in Bratunac."
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: For that to be fair, we need to see the questions
4 before and answers, but taking anything out of trial --
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Fair enough. Do you have them available,
6 Mr. Ostojic?
7 MR. OSTOJIC: I've given the page cite. I only have my copy that
8 the witness is more than happy -- I'm more than happy to give him my copy.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I think, at least if we put that on the ELMO,
10 we can proceed at a faster rate.
11 MR. OSTOJIC: And I do have markings, Mr. President, on that, so I
12 apologise for that.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's see what markings they are. Let's put it on
14 the ELMO. All right. Okay.
15 MR. OSTOJIC: Okay.
16 Q. Do you see it, sir?
17 A. Yes, sir. I understand the context of this comment, and I can
18 explain it.
19 Q. First, is it true that Mr. Beara was not visible, according to
20 your own sworn testimony, a visible figure in Bratunac?
21 A. Yes, sir. I mean, the --
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. -- context of the conversation was whether or not visibility, not
24 in the form of "I see you," but visibility in the form of somebody who is
25 a figure in and around Bratunac and would be recognised by these
1 individuals, and that's why, you know, individuals of the Drina Corps who
2 are more habitually there, you know, would be recognised, such as Momir
3 Nikolic. And individuals such as Ljubisa Beara, who would not be expected
4 to frequent Bratunac, would not be recognised as readily, and that was the
5 context that I made that comment about visibility on.
6 Q. Well, help me with this, and I want to stick to the period of time
7 when the evacuation of the population started. That's the time period I
8 want to start. That means everything that's involved in that that you, as
9 a purported military analyst, knows.
10 Up until the 12th of July, 1995, not only is Mr. Beara not
11 physically visible, there's no documents whatsoever to indicate that he
12 participated at all in any of the events leading up to the July 12th, 1995
13 evacuation of the population; isn't that true?
14 A. Within the context of the 12 July, there are no documents that
15 reflect that, that's an accurate statement, sir.
16 Q. And when you say "documents," you include the intercepts as well;
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. Now, help me with this, because my learned friend seems to be
20 shocked about what he calls an alibi, but do you know of a newspaper
21 reporter called Sredoje Simic?
22 A. No, sir, I don't.
23 Q. Do you know that the Prosecutor had called this person as a
24 witness in their case-in-chief?
25 A. No, sir, I don't.
1 Q. Do you know, sir, that that person, Mr. Simic, interviewed
2 Mr. Beara regarding some of the events involved in Srebrenica?
3 A. No, sir, I don't.
4 Q. Did the Prosecutor, at any time during your tenure here or during
5 your proofing sessions for your testimony, inform you that in that
6 interview, Mr. Beara says that during this time period, up until the 12th
7 of July -- up until the 13th of July, 1995, that he was not at or around
8 Srebrenica, Potocari, or Bratunac, or in that area? Do you know that?
9 A. No, sir, I'm no aware of that.
10 Q. Do you know that in that interview, Mr. Beara said that he was
11 actually at -- in Bihac at that time?
12 A. Again, since I don't know of the interview, I don't know what
13 Mr. Beara said.
14 Q. Well, maybe you could help us with that, sir. Do you know --
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Stop, Mr. Ostojic.
16 Mr. McCloskey.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: If Mr. Ostojic is standing by that interview and
18 the answers, as his duty regarding alibi, I would appreciate that, but
19 that has never happened before. And if that's what he is saying, I think
20 the law requires him to do that.
21 MR. OSTOJIC: Again, I --
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey, I don't want to sound cold-blooded,
23 but we don't have a notice of alibi, in terms of Rule 67.
24 So let's proceed.
25 MR. OSTOJIC:
1 Q. Sir, can you help us understand, from your analysis of the
2 documents, what, if anything, was going on in Bihac in that time period
3 prior to the 13th of July, 1995?
4 A. I can't tell you specifically what was happening in Bihac during
5 that period. That was outside of my -- my area of review, so I don't
6 know. I know in broad terms, but I don't know specifically what you would
7 be referring to.
8 Q. Well, tell me in broad terms, and maybe we could connect it, like
9 we would the --
10 A. In broad terms, the VRS military leadership was concerned about
11 the potential that 5th Corps, as well as the Croatian Army forces, were
12 going to launch a large-scale attack in the western part of the country.
13 In that context, you know, there was a significant military
14 interest in that particular region, the western part of the country. As
15 for the actual details of what they were doing in preparation or to
16 attempt to spoil that or other things, I don't know the answer. That's
17 not an issue that I've looked at.
18 Q. Or analysed; correct?
19 A. I didn't look at it. Obviously, I didn't analyse it.
20 Q. Who was the officer by the name of Manojlo Milovanovic; do you
22 A. Yes, sir. He's the deputy commander of the Main Staff or -- I'm
23 sorry. He is the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff.
24 Q. And he was in that position in July of 1995; correct?
25 A. Yes, sir. General Lieutenant-Colonel Milovanovic was in that
1 position in July of 1995.
2 Q. Help me with this, if you don't mind, from looking at the
3 documents and analysing this case and spending time with the investigative
4 team: Do you have any idea where Manojlo Milovanovic was in the early
5 parts of July 1995?
6 A. It is my understanding that he was in Banja Luka.
7 Q. Do you know if he was ever in Bihac?
8 A. No, sir, I don't, not during July of 1995. I have no idea.
9 Q. I'd like to show you now 65 ter number 480, which is a Prosecution
10 document, and it's the article. I just want to be fair and put it to you,
11 sir, since you've analysed all what you call relevant documents in this
13 MR. OSTOJIC: So 65 ter 480.
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection on whatever that last comment was, but
15 he's not stated that he's analysed every relevant document.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. You are correct.
17 MR. OSTOJIC: Let me, then, ask the question. I thought that's
18 what we got.
19 Q. What relevant documents, sir, did you not analyse for purposes of
20 your historical analysis?
21 A. As I've indicated now for probably the fifth time, it's not a
22 historical analysis; it's a limited analysis with respect to the military
23 intercepts and the military documents and their correlation with the crime
25 This would be an example of a document that probably would not
1 have made the cut, whether it's accurate or not, as relevant, because it
2 has no particular relevance to a crime scene. I mean, I've never seen
3 this before, so, I mean, I'm kind of commenting in the abstract on it.
4 Q. And I can imagine. Do you think that's something that you should
5 have been given, so that you could at least digest it and make the
6 determination as to whether or not --
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's move to your next question, please.
8 MR. OSTOJIC:
9 Q. Sir, we're sticking with the time period up through and including
10 the start of the process for evacuation, and I want to make sure. You've
11 seen not one order, not one military document, not one directive, not one
12 intercept, not one piece of evidence to indicate that Mr. Beara was in any
13 way involved with any of the process with respect to the evacuation or the
14 movement of the people from either Srebrenica or Potocari; correct?
15 A. I'm not delaying. I'm just going down through your checklist.
16 You've asked a lot of questions here.
17 Yes, sir, I believe that that's correct, as long as we're fair
18 that whatever witnesses may or may not potentially say is not what I'm
19 including in your context of one piece of evidence.
20 Q. And we know that.
21 A. I just want to be clear on that. Okay.
22 Q. You've said it several times and we accept that, and thank you for
23 repeating it, but we know that. It's just from your analytical
24 standpoint, from the documents that you've reviewed, and my question was
25 limited, just so you can rest comfortably. Okay? So, I know it's limited
1 to that.
2 A. Then I believe that that's accurate. I'm not aware of any
3 information that with respect to the movement of the people from
4 Srebrenica or Potocari, in the context that we're talking about, the
5 civilian movement.
6 Q. Now, I'd like to turn to the column, if you don't mind.
7 During your -- and, I'm sorry, I thought we had called it
8 yesterday "historical analysis," and I didn't mean to offend you if think
9 it's not --
10 A. No, sir. You've called it that. I've been consistent --
11 Q. With all due --
12 A. -- about what I've called it.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's move, please, Mr. Ostojic.
14 MR. OSTOJIC:
15 Q. With all due respect, sir, you called it that under oath in the
16 Blagojevic case, but we'll look at that record again.
17 With respect to your analysis, did you analyse at any time how
18 many military combat engagements were there with respect to the column of
19 Bosnian Muslims that were leaving Srebrenica and Potocari from Susnjari
20 and the VRS?
21 A. No, sir. I never engaged in a process to do a step-by-step
22 accounting of each particular engagement of the column.
23 Q. Well, let's go a little broader. Did you ever engage in a process
24 to do something more general than this step-by-step accounting that you
25 referred to?
1 A. Yes, sir, I did. In fact, based on the information that I had, I
2 worked to be able to establish the track of the column from where it left,
3 and particularly once it crossed over the road -- excuse me, the
4 Konjevic Polje-Milici road and went through the zone of the Zvornik
5 Brigade, so I could track the broad movement of the column in point of
6 location on the ground and in point in time.
7 Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Butler. I'm really actually referring to the
8 combat engagements. Did you track where, specifically, these military
9 combat engagements occurred?
10 A. No, sir. I didn't track specifically, other than the general
11 references to ambushes at Snagovo, at various terrain features that were
12 listed in the brigade combat reports on the 12th, 13th, and 14th.
13 I did not track specific -- or did not make an effort to track
14 specific combat activity of the column, 12th and 13th, south of the road.
15 Q. So you can't tell us, as you sit here, how many military combat
16 engagements were undertaken during that period of time in July of 1995;
18 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
19 Q. Now, you've called and you've used the word "legitimate military
20 combat engagement," and do you agree with me, sir, that these were,
21 indeed, legitimate military combat engagements?
22 A. As a result of the mixed character of the column, with a mixture
23 of military units and personnel and civilians, I believe I've been fairly
24 consistent by saying that, you know, regardless of the civilian presence,
25 that, you know, at face value, it would qualify as a legitimate military
2 Q. Now, I asked you if you analysed when and where these legitimate,
3 if we can call them now, with your opinion, legitimate military combat
4 engagements occurred. Did anyone else, to your knowledge, any of your
5 other assistants, or associates, or anyone on the investigative team,
6 actually sit down and do a step-by-step process of where these legitimate
7 military combat engagements occurred?
8 A. No, sir, not to my knowledge, or certainly not to the degree that
9 you're talking about. The only ones that was done, to my knowledge, is
10 the ones that I did.
11 Q. Now, in order to give an objective, fair balance, or a
12 conservative approach to any analysis, wouldn't that be something that
13 should be included in a report?
14 A. No, sir. Again, given what the goals of my report were, if I were
15 prepared to concede that the column was a legitimate military target, any
16 casualties related to that particular operation would, by definition, be
18 Given the context of what we were looking at with the crime base,
19 it didn't matter what happened to the column, per se. It only mattered
20 what happened to the individuals after they came into the custody of the
21 VRS after being captured or surrendered.
22 That is why that particular type of analysis that you have looked
23 for was not done.
24 Q. Thank you. And just so I'm clear, so when you say "legitimate" in
25 your report, especially or specifically when you reference "legitimate
1 military combat engagements," you're really saying "lawful military combat
2 engagements," are you not?
3 A. I say "legitimate military combat engagements" because the column
4 represents a military target. I will concede that particularly in this
5 institution, there will be and no doubt will continue to be a debate as to
6 at what point and juncture so many civilians changed the character of not
7 only a column but any other military objective. That's why I took myself
8 out of that process.
9 Q. Well, no, I don't know that you have, but thank you for your
10 analysis of that. But on page 35, line 1, you, in fact, state that -- you
11 mean that "legitimate" means lawful, does it not, in your opinion? Don't
12 worry what everyone else thinks about. You're the one who is under oath
13 here as a witness in this proceeding.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: He's calling for a legal opinion which Mr. Butler
16 has not made, and I don't think it's appropriate. These are not items
17 that are part of the charges of the indictment, either. So where are we
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Ostojic.
20 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
21 Q. Sir - and maybe I can direct a little more attention to where we
22 might be going with it, since my learned friend doesn't know - did you
23 analyse at any time, sir, whether there were minefields on that stretch
24 from Susnjari through to Tuzla?
25 A. Yes, sir. I was, in fact, aware that there were minefields not
1 only around the enclave but that there were minefields particularly
2 between the confrontation lines between the Zvornik Infantry Brigade and
3 the ABiH 2 Corps people close to Tuzla.
4 We had heard that there were potentially uncharted minefields
5 along some of the smuggling routes that some of the units, whether the
6 Zvornik or the Milici or the Bratunac Brigades, might have placed along
7 areas that they thought that the ABiH was smuggling in weapons, but I --
8 I'm not aware whether or not those have actually been located.
9 So, I mean, while I've heard rumours of those types of minefields,
10 I don't know them as a fact.
11 Q. So how many minefields were there, Mr. Butler? Three?
12 A. I couldn't give you a distinct number.
13 Q. Ten?
14 A. The mining records exist. I just never -- I can't give you a
16 Q. Well, how many people -- or strike that.
17 Who, on the investigative team that you were involved in, was in
18 charge of determining how many minefields there were? Who was the person
19 who would be in charge of that, in reviewing these landmine records that
20 you say?
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Why don't you ask Mr. McCloskey, and he will tell
23 MR. OSTOJIC: If you wish.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's move on.
25 MR. OSTOJIC:
1 Q. Sir, did you, as a military expert, in your report analyse how
2 many people died as a result of coming into contact in landmine fields or
4 A. No, sir, I didn't. I didn't analyse ABiH military casualties at
6 Q. And let me restrict it again and confine it, and thank you for
7 that. It's quite clever. Confine it to the column that we're talking
8 about, sir.
9 With respect to the column that left from Susnjari to go towards
10 Kladanj and Tuzla, do you know, sir, or did you ever analyse how many
11 people died as a result of landmines?
12 A. No, sir. I thought I just answered that question. I didn't.
13 Q. Fair enough. Do you know of anyone on the investigative team --
14 sir, do you know of anyone on the investigative team who actually has
15 conducted any sort of analysis whatsoever to determine how many people
16 from the column that left from Susnjari to go towards Tuzla died as a
17 result of landmines?
18 A. I don't know whether or not that was a function of one of the OTP
19 forensics teams that were part of the investigation or not. I mean, I
20 just don't know the answer to that.
21 Q. Okay. My next question with respect to this column, sir, is: Did
22 you personally analyse how many people died as a result of these
23 legitimate combat military engagements?
24 A. I believe I've given the numbers of VRS casualties, but I told you
25 I did not analyse ABiH casualties.
1 Q. Why not?
2 A. It wasn't relevant to my analysis.
3 Q. Is it relevant to determine how many people may have died during
4 the period in Srebrenica in July of 1995, to distinguish whether some of
5 them died from legitimate military combat engagements? Isn't that really
6 what you're saying, that that's not relevant?
7 A. It would only be relevant if the forensics evidence of the mass
8 graves were showing evidence that would reflect that the bodies in those
9 graves reflected combat casualties. The forensics evidence, as I
10 understand it coming out of those mass graves, reflects the opposite, that
11 they're not combat casualties.
12 Q. And that's based on -- I'm sorry?
13 A. I'm sorry. That's it, yeah.
14 Q. And that's based on your recollection of the summary of these
15 forensic pathologists who have reviewed the material; correct?
16 A. Yes, sir. I mean, that was a -- one of the very first -- when we
17 talk about holding analytical options open, when I first started here,
18 that was one of the obvious options that I felt that you do explore,
19 whether or not the bodies that were in the mass graves were not victims of
20 crimes or alleged crimes, but who are, in fact, casualties that would have
21 occurred in combat.
22 So that was an option that I held open, and the forensics teams
23 were able to answer those questions.
24 Q. And when did you have these discussions with the forensic teams,
25 specifically with respect to the issue of whether any of the bodies that
1 were found in the mass graves were or were not as a result of legitimate
2 military combat engagements?
3 A. I don't have specific discussions with the forensics people.
4 However, because I was incorporated into the investigations, as I was
5 continuing to do my analysis, and particularly as they were also working
6 concurrently on the forensics, you know, we were able to conclude,
7 particularly with respect to Zvornik, that the individuals that were
8 coming out of these particular mass graves and the associated secondaries,
9 you know, were not meeting the characteristics of combat casualties, in
10 fact they were meeting the characteristics of victims from crime scenes.
11 Q. We'll revisit some of that. Thank you. What I'm asking you now,
12 sir, is: Do you know, based on the materials that you reviewed, what the
13 number is of these -- strike that.
14 From your review of the materials in the time that you spent with
15 the Office of the Prosecution, do you know, sir, what the number of deaths
16 were there as a result of the legitimate military combat engagements from
17 the side of the Bosnian Muslims?
18 A. No, sir.
19 Q. Okay. Would it surprise you, sir, that the Office of the
20 Prosecution has taken witness statements from witnesses which indicate
21 that in, for example, one particular combat engagement, over a thousand
22 people died as a result of this legitimate military combat engagement?
23 A. It would not surprise me that a witness would say that. I would
24 think that from my knowledge of the situation, that that number would be
25 high for any particular combat engagement.
1 Q. Do you know that there are witnesses that say that there were, in
2 fact, 1.000 to 2.000 people from the column that died as a result of these
3 combat engagements? Are you aware of that?
4 A. As a gross period from 12 to 18 July?
5 Q. Correct.
6 A. I'm not. I'm not aware of the engage -- I'm not aware of the
7 specific number, but that particular number of 1.000 to 2.000 sounds
8 reasonable, given the context of the combat that I'm aware of.
9 Q. And you're saying that, including all of the combat engagements,
10 correct, as opposed to one isolated combat engagement? Would that be
11 fair, if I can understand what you're saying?
12 A. Yes, sir. I mean, I think the 1.000 to 2.000 number would be
13 reasonable with respect to the combat casualties starting, you know, from
14 12 July through the life span of the column, which is effectively 18 July.
15 Q. Did you at any time, sir, consider this sworn testimony from these
16 Bosnian Muslims who survived and were either captured or made it to Tuzla
17 and their description of the number of combat casualties in any of your
19 A. No, sir, I didn't.
20 Q. Now, in speaking or in telling us that one of the options was to
21 consult with these forensic pathologists, do you remember if you told them
22 that, in fact, of the mass graves that they'll uncover, there may be
23 bodies in those mass graves that would include people who were -- who
24 suffered injuries or ultimate death as a result of these combat
1 A. I've heard --
2 Q. That the number -- sorry. Let me throw this in so I don't have
3 to -- we're getting near the break: And that the number can be as high as
4 1.000 to 2.000?
5 A. No, sir. I mean, I didn't give specific guidance to any forensics
6 people. The forensics part of the investigation began well before my
7 tenure at this institution; and, particularly, when I started my own
8 military analysis, I mean, it was clear to the investigative team that I
9 was interested in, you know, having, you know, confirmation, one way or
10 another, that, you know, relevant gravesites that we were looking at were,
11 in fact, the results of criminal activity and not the results of combat.
12 Q. But where are those people and the bodies, the corpses of those
13 people who unfortunately died as a result of the legitimate military
14 combat engagement with the VRS during their trek from Susnjari through to
15 Tuzla? Even if the number, as you suggest, is as low as 1.000 or as high
16 as possibly 2.000, where are those bodies located?
17 A. My understanding, particularly in the early postwar years, was
18 because of the high threat of uncharted minefields and uncharted or
19 unexploded ordinance, that there was no effort made for many years to go
20 in and attempt to recover those surface remains. I think that I recall,
21 somewhere around 2001 and 2002, the Bosnian government felt it was safe
22 enough to start doing that, but I'm not aware of how many remains that
23 they've ever collected or things of that nature.
24 But, I mean, I know that particularly in the early post-war years,
25 there was a deliberate decision not to try and police up those remains
1 because of the ordinance and mine threat.
2 Q. Thank you, sir. Just before the break, I just have a couple of
3 other questions unrelated to this, specifically, but related more to your
4 broad analysis, or generally your analysis, if I can say that.
5 Now, you've in the past, in testifying both in the Krstic and in
6 the Appeals -- with the Appeals Court in Blagojevic, and you've conceded
7 that you, as an analyst, and I think even during your direct, you've
8 conceded, as an analyst, that you have made some misinterpretation of
9 several things; like an intercept, for example.
10 You know what I'm referring to; right?
11 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
12 Q. Now, analysts such as yourself - and we've seen, although we won't
13 use the example of analyst intelligence, analysts who show aerial
14 photographs to the United Nations for weapons of mass destruction that
15 ultimately are not proven. We're not going to ask you that - but you
16 concede, sir, that given, given your limited analysis, as you suggest, and
17 looking at only some of the documents, that there is indeed and could be
18 error in some of your findings; is that correct?
19 A. I certainly will concede up front that there is a possibility of
20 error in my findings, absolutely. And for the record, the Secretary of
21 State is not an analyst. He was the one who showed the photographs.
22 Q. I'm familiar with who Colin Powell is, but, sir, do you think that
23 he actually showed the photographs without consulting with any
24 intelligence analyst before showing them to the United Nations?
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's move, Mr. Ostojic.
1 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.
2 Q. Sir, who else assisted you in the preparation of your reports,
3 both on the brigade, the corps, the Main Staff, your narrative, and then
4 the revised narrative, historical analysis, that you provided to us? Who,
5 if anyone, assisted you in that?
6 A. I believe I indicated yesterday my partner with the analysis was
7 Ms. Amanda Brettell. She is also a MAT analyst. She has a police
8 background and a research background, not necessarily a military one. My
9 research assistant was a Ms. Sally Lattin, and we had a number of
11 JUDGE AGIUS: We had this yesterday.
12 MR. OSTOJIC: All he could have just said was the same people
13 identified yesterday.
14 Q. Who, in particular, assisted you with the analysis on the Main
15 Staff narrative that you wrote?
16 A. Ms. Brettell was responsible in part with I think some of the
17 young interns for helping to assemble material and send it back to me.
18 But in that particular context, I drafted that report myself.
19 MR. OSTOJIC: Your Honour, we're near the break time. I'm moving
20 into another subject when we come back, with your permission.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: How much longer do you have, Mr. Ostojic?
22 MR. OSTOJIC: I believe an hour and a half, Mr. President,
23 although it's difficult to gauge.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's have a 25-minute break.
25 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Ostojic.
3 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
4 Q. We're almost done, Mr. Butler. A few more areas that I'd like to
5 cover with you.
6 Sir, I'd like if we can turn now to the 15th of July, 1995.
7 MR. OSTOJIC: And in particular, with the assistance of the Court,
8 if we could have document 65 ter 2518 on the screen, and it was also
9 identified under the number 2754 as well. So I'm not sure what number
10 they may be using, and it bears the ERN number 0427983. Just so that
11 we're accurate.
12 Okay. Apparently, we don't have the English version.
13 Q. But I can still ask the preliminary question, if you don't mind,
14 Mr. Butler, while they're finding that.
15 This is a report, do you recall, that you discussed with my
16 learned friend during your direct examination?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. Now, do you remember that in this report, there was, at least
19 during your proofing session, there was some handwritten material that was
20 located on the top right-hand corner? Do you remember that?
21 A. Handwritten material, insomuch as -- I mean, there's a notation
22 that says, "Handwritten: Files." Is that what you're referring to?
23 Q. No, actually --
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Why don't you show him straight away.
25 MR. OSTOJIC: I have one copy here. Maybe we could place it on
1 the ELMO.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you for being practical, Mr. Ostojic.
3 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President, for your suggestion.
4 Q. Do you see that, sir?
5 A. Yes, sir. I see the handwritten in -- on that version, yes, sir.
6 Q. Okay. You discussed that handwriting, did you not, during your
7 proofing sessions with Mr. McCloskey, did you not?
8 A. I don't recall. If -- it might help if I -- I don't recall
9 whether I had it translated or not, so, I mean, I don't recall at this
10 juncture whether I did or not.
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. OSTOJIC: Well, just for my learned friend, if he looks at his
13 proofing session notes of Mr. Butler, on page 14, paragraph 7, he
14 discusses that.
15 Q. You discussed it and state that.
16 Quote, in the third paragraph again on page 14, under paragraph 7,
17 discussing this document, it states: "In relation to the handwritten note
18 at the top of the document, Butler stated that the reference," and then it
19 goes on to discuss what the references are. Do you remember that at all?
20 A. I would probably remember it in context to what the reference was,
21 if you could refresh my memory as to what it actually says.
22 Q. Well, it says there: "50 MUP men." Do you see it?
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey?
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Can we get a full reading? There's been quite a
25 few of these notes on various documents, and I don't remember it either.
1 If we could read the whole thing, maybe that will help refresh the
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Ostojic. How much can you help us there?
4 MR. OSTOJIC: Not much, but I can read what's said in the proofing
5 note; and as I think as I cited, it's on page 14 of the proofing note.
6 It says as follows, Mr. Butler, to put it in context, may you can
7 help us --
8 JUDGE AGIUS: But we don't have that, as you know. But go ahead,
9 go ahead.
10 MR. OSTOJIC:
11 Q. On the third paragraph, it says:
12 "In relation to the handwritten note at the top of the document,
13 Butler stated that the reference to '50 MUP men' may be connected with the
14 arrival of a company of military police from the East Bosnia core in the
15 Zvornik area on the 15th July 1995; to a Sekovici unit from Bratunac who
16 also arrived in the Zvornik area on the 15th July 1995, or a group of
17 municipal police from Doboj, whose commander was captured by the Muslims."
18 A. Yes, sir. Now I remember that, that handwritten notation.
19 Q. Now, because we're trying with your evidence, I think, to keep
20 things in context, help us contextually, if you will, when was this
21 commander captured by the Muslims?
22 A. I believe that the MUP commander in question was captured either
23 late night 14th or the 15th of July, 1995.
24 Q. Now, this letter or this exhibit that we're looking at also
25 discusses reinforcements, does it not? I think that was part of your
1 testimony on direct; correct?
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. Now, my question to you is: You said and set out that there's
4 approximately, if not only three, but at least three variations as to who
5 the reference may be to these 50 men. Do you see that?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. And that's a reasonable approach, and I'm sure you'll agree, is it
8 not, to an analyst, to list out all the different options that he thinks
9 they may be referencing to if you're going to interpret or analyse such an
11 A. Yes, sir.
12 Q. And now it talks also in that report, reinforcements related to
13 this commander who was captured, but also reinforcements for other
14 reasons; correct?
15 A. I'm sorry. Repeat the question again.
16 Q. Thank you. I think it was somewhat awkward.
17 When you list out the three options, you identify three particular
18 units; and for the third unit, according to the proofing note we got from
19 Mr. McCloskey, you say that it could be related to a group of municipal
20 police from Doboj whose commander was captured by the Muslims.
21 What my question is, with respect to the other two options: Do
22 they have anything to do with this commander that was captured from Doboj?
23 A. No, sir. The military police from Bijeljina were VRS, so I don't
24 believe they're in context to that particular one. There were -- there
25 was another municipal police unit that came in obviously from the Sekovici
1 one. I don't believe that the military commander was from that one,
2 either. So, I mean, I only -- I only note that because it's my
3 understanding or at least my recollection that it was the commander of
4 that particular unit who was captured.
5 Q. What's the time, if you could look at the time stamp ...
6 MR. OSTOJIC: And maybe help us by just moving the paper a little
8 Q. ... when that document was either created or sent?
9 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, sir, for your assistance.
10 A. It's the -- what appears to be the receipt stamp on it is
11 "15 July," then I see a zero, and it may be another zero or not, but I
12 can't tell. There's one notation that says "15 July," and there's a
13 second one under the -- hold on one second. I can't make out the second
14 one, because it says "16", and I'm not sure, but that looks like either a
15 "08" or "09" or something. So I don't know that I can make sense out of
16 that one.
17 Q. You don't know that it says 8:00 or at any other given time;
19 A. No, sir. I mean, I can't make that out at what time it says. The
20 reproduction is just too blurry.
21 Q. Now, the time stamp there, does that indicate when it was
22 initially sent, or can you help us understand the time stamp just a little
23 bit better?
24 A. My indication of the document that we're talking about on the
25 ELMO, this particular stamp at the bottom is a time stamp that indicates
1 when it was received, not a "sent" stamp.
2 Q. Is there any indication as to when this document was prepared and
4 A. You have a 15 July 1995 date on it, and it may be possible, in the
5 English language version, that from the context of the document, you might
6 be able to further divine at least which times they were talking about
7 something happening prior to.
8 Q. Thank you. And this document, they're talking about
9 reinforcements to be used for three to four days, are they not? Do you
10 see that plainly on the second paragraph of the document? Even though
11 it's B/C/S, I think you can make out "3-4 dana," which is three to four
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 MR. OSTOJIC: Let's turn, if we can, to the 15th of July, 1995,
15 and the purported intercept with Mr. Beara, which has a 65 ter number
17 Q. Now, as you may know, as they're placing this document up, if I
18 can just ask you, if you recall, there are actually more than one
19 purported transcriptions, if you will, of this conversation of the 15th of
20 July, 1995; correct?
21 A. Yes, sir. I believe, on this particular one, there's somewhere
22 between -- on this one with General Zivanovic, there's two. I think
23 there's -- there may even be a partial floating around as well. I don't
24 know that we've incorporated that, but I know there are multiple versions.
25 Q. In looking at this document, can you tell me if the intercept
1 operator used either voice recognition or compromise to identify the
2 participants in the conversation?
3 A. In the context of this, it appears that General Zivanovic has been
4 voice compromised.
5 Can you scroll down, please, to the bottom in English? Thank you.
6 It does not appear that Lieutenant-Colonel Beara has been voice
8 Q. It not only not appears, it's rather clear, is it not, that there
9 was no voice compromise relating to the identity of the person who this
10 purported operator believes is, as he puts, Colonel Ljubo Beara; correct?
11 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
12 Q. Now, if we could turn, sir, to the next intercept of the 15th of
13 July, 1995.
14 MR. OSTOJIC: And for the record, I'm being told, just so that we
15 have a clean copy or a correct version of the record, that what we were
16 looking at was 65 ter 1378 and not 1178. But if there is a confusion on
17 that, I was just given this sheet. I think it's 1178. But with all due
18 respect, I just want to put that on the record, so that we don't have any
19 confusion. But I think we've identified it sufficiently enough as the
20 intercept at 0954 hours on the 15th of July. Thank you.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Butler. I'm sorry for that.
22 MR. OSTOJIC: Turning to the next intercept that we have of the
23 15th July 1995, that would be 65 ter 1179. Thank you.
24 Q. Sir, how many different intercept operators purportedly captured
25 this conversation between allegedly a Colonel Ljubo and Krle?
1 A. I can't tell you intercept operators. My recollection is that
2 there are two versions of this, as well as a partial version.
3 Q. So that would make it three, would it not?
4 A. I believe so. I mean, I don't know -- I mean, I can't put it to a
5 direct operator, but, I mean, I'm telling you how many versions that I
6 know are in existence.
7 Q. And that's all I'm asking you.
8 A. Okay.
9 Q. And we'll have you look at this quickly and then we'll look at the
10 other two, just so you have the complete grouping of these intercepts.
11 MR. OSTOJIC: And the next exhibit, if we can just have, I have it
12 marked as 1179H, as in "Henry."
13 Q. This would be another version of this intercept purportedly
14 captured on the 15th of July, 1995, just a slightly different time period.
15 The first one, and you can take my word for it, I believe, was at 0955.
16 And the second one is at 0957. Correct?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. And then the third one, just so you can take a look at it, is
19 under 65 ter number 1179C, as in "cat." This, sir, has a time of 1000
20 hours. Do you see that, sir?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. Those are the three versions, if we could call them, or the three
23 intercepts that were purportedly captured on the 15th of July, 1995, at or
24 approximately 10.00, between allegedly Mr. Beara and Mr. Krstic; correct?
25 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
1 Q. Now, did you link, given the time scope of this document, this
2 intercept with any potential reinforcements that may be asked for by
3 anyone from the Main Staff, such as the documents that we just saw, 65 ter
4 2518, also using the number 2754? Did you make any link or connect the
5 dots with that?
6 A. No, sir.
7 Q. Did you link this intercept of the 15th of July, 1995, with the
8 document that's on the ELMO, with the handwritten material that we've just
9 discussed moments ago? Did you connect the dots there at all?
10 A. No, sir.
11 Q. Now, in this intercept, and I'm generalising, you claim that
12 Mr. Beara is asking for 30 or so men; correct?
13 A. It's what the intercept says, yes, sir.
14 Q. And in the document that's on the ELMO, there's a reference to 50
15 or so men, is it not?
16 A. Correct, sir.
17 Q. In this intercept of the 15th of July, 1995, at approximately
18 10.00, there's a reference to three days, is there not?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. And in the document that we have in front of you on the ELMO,
21 which we thought, although we'll have to amend it, which is 65 ter 2518,
22 there's a reference to three to four days, is there not?
23 A. That is correct, sir.
24 Q. How do you, sir, as a reasonably prudent person, how do you not
25 include that the men that were being requested were not requested for the
1 same reason as that which you list with respect to this exhibit, 65 ter
2 2518, and the notation that we see on the top right-hand corner on the
3 ELMO of that?
4 A. Well, sir, first of all, in the context of the intercepts, the men
5 that he's been asking for particular men for two or three days. In the
6 context of the reinforcements from the Krajina Corps, there's no
7 information that anyone has been asking for them for two or three days.
8 So I think it's an "apples and oranges" type of argument. Boban Indjic
9 and individuals from Visegrad are not to be confused with people coming in
10 from the 1st Krajina Corps.
11 The other issue is that, while this particular 15 July Main Staff
12 order wasn't available for me when I was doing my analysis with the
13 reports, I did have other information with respect to documents from the
14 Zvornik Brigade and Bratunac Brigade, as well as from the RS police, which
15 laid out those particular units that the reinforcements were coming from.
16 So because I already had that, I was able to exclude that particular
17 avenue of analysis.
18 Q. Let's -- thank you for that. Let's look at the comment that you
19 attribute or that they attribute to Mr. Beara, where he says, "I've been
20 waiting three days."
21 Do you see that?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. Now, is it reasonable to, when you analyse this, to say that Beara
24 has not done anything for those three days prior and he's simply waiting
25 for three days, from the 12th, 13th, and 14th?
1 A. No, sir. I take, within the context of that intercept, that the
2 order was given three days prior for these individuals to arrive and that
3 he is, in fact, still waiting for them.
4 Q. Well, did you find an order to that effect?
5 A. No, sir. There is no written order to that effect.
6 Q. So are you making an assumption here, sir, with respect to this
7 order that we have no documentation of, that you claim in your analysis is
8 as to what occurred?
9 A. No, sir. I'm not making an assumption at all.
10 Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Butler, that it's pure speculation on your
11 part, since you have no corroborating evidence whatsoever, that there was
12 even such an order?
13 A. No, sir, because, in fact, there is corroborating information with
14 respect to another intercept, related to the fact that a vehicle
15 supposedly carrying these individuals from Visegrad had broken down. So
16 in that respect, there is. But, you know, I agree with you also that
17 there is no written order deploying these individuals.
18 Q. Sir, you've connected that intercept or that purported intercept
19 of a few days earlier with this intercept, but you refuse and don't want
20 to connect this intercept, which is temporally, date and time-wise, on all
21 four squares with the material that you have on the ELMO requesting
22 reinforcements, the number of reinforcements, and the number of days.
23 How do you make that illogical conclusion, with all due respect,
25 A. Well, because logically for me the infantry company from the 1st
1 Krajina Corps has absolutely no relationship to a group of men coming from
2 the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, which is a Drina Corps asset.
3 It's apples and oranges. They're discussing two different things.
4 Q. Now, you list, on the data that we have --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Please make breaks between
6 questions and answers. Thank you.
7 THE WITNESS: It might help if I could see the transcripts on my
8 screen. That way, I would know. I didn't know it was something I could
9 do. I'm sorry. Thank you very much. Hopefully, that will help pause us.
10 MR. OSTOJIC:
11 Q. Sir, let me ask you, with respect to the exhibit that's on the
12 ELMO, which has a 65 ter number 2518, and just so the record is clear, it
13 has the handwritten information on the top right-hand corner that we've
14 discussed, why didn't you, during your direct examination, while
15 discussing reinforcements, tell us that you saw a different exhibit with
16 handwriting information on it?
17 A. As I believe, as is evidenced when you started your line of
18 questioning on this, I didn't remember.
19 Q. And, certainly, you didn't incorporate that in any of your
20 analyses because you didn't have a chance to review it but for during the
21 proofing sessions --
22 JUDGE AGIUS: He's answered that already.
23 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Q. Now, sir. I want to ask you a couple more questions in connection
25 with that intercept.
1 Can we see where purportedly Mr. Beara is during this
2 conversation? You're welcome to use any of the three intercepts that we
4 A. It's okay. Just waiting for it. Could you scroll down to the
5 bottom, please. Okay. The next page, English, please, or is that it?
6 Q. While you're looking at that, Mr. Butler.
7 MR. OSTOJIC: If I could just ask the Court to ask the usher to
8 return the document that's on the ELMO. We're done with that.
9 Thank you, Mr. President.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I've read it. I do not believe, in any of
11 this version of the intercept, there is a compromise or any indication
12 that you could attribute a physical location of Colonel Beara at the time.
13 I believe that I make that observation of where he's located from the
14 prior intercept, which gives a "139" phone number.
15 MR. OSTOJIC:
16 Q. Now, just so I understand, sir, you can have compromise both with
17 respect to the identity of the participants and the location; correct?
18 A. Yes, sir. I mean, any amount of -- you can have any number of
19 compromises within context.
20 Q. Now, in your analysis - and I'm trying to just go a little slower
21 as a courtesy - in your analysis and in keeping this in context, are you
22 familiar with how the switchboard operator was able to connect incoming
23 calls from two parties that may be calling that specific operator?
24 A. No, sir. I don't have a detailed knowledge of how the switchboard
1 Q. Who, in the investigative team, would have that purported detailed
2 knowledge as to how the switchboard worked?
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Can we just have a little more definition. Which
6 MR. OSTOJIC: Fair enough.
7 Q. Take any switchboard. Well, let me give you the hypothetical,
8 that you're the switchboard, Mr. Butler, that I call you and that my
9 learned friend Mr. McCloskey calls you to your right. Do you know that
10 they had a capacity to actually put Mr. McCloskey's call to my call, even
11 though we were not either at Mr. McCloskey's place or your place, where
12 the switchboard operator was? Did you know they had that capacity?
13 A. No, sir. I mean, I don't know the capacities of the local
15 Q. Who would in the investigative team that you worked for involving
16 the Srebrenica issues?
17 A. I don't know.
18 Q. So, as an analyst, do you think that that is something that may be
19 lacking in order to determine whether or not someone is at a given place,
20 if you don't have a full and complete understanding of how the switchboard
22 A. Sir, it is a piece of information that I would have liked to have
23 had at the time, but I didn't think that in the context of the other
24 information that I had, that it was a critical piece of information.
25 Q. And if you're saying that someone is at a certain area, whether
1 it's an IKM, for example, and if you make the assumption that as a result
2 of this call, person X is at the IKM in Zvornik, and if you don't know how
3 that switchboard worked, your analysis could be actually deficient and in
4 fact wrong, because that person may have just called in that IKM and was
5 connected with another individual; wouldn't that be accurate?
6 A. I believe your hypothetical is wrong, because I've never said the
7 IKM. My analysis of where the correspondents are talking in this
8 intercept is that General Krstic is at the Drina Corps IKM that was
9 established for Zepa, and that based on the phone number attributed to
10 where Colonel Beara can be reached in the prior intercept, that he is
11 located at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters, not the IKM, because the
12 number is attributed to the phone number of Drago Nikolic.
13 Q. And that's that 139 phone number; correct? "Extension," I should
15 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
16 Q. And in your analysis, did you find whether or not that 139
17 extension is attributed to anyone else other than Drago Nikolic,
19 A. No, sir. My -- my analysis reflects that the 139 number was the
20 number for the security office.
21 Q. I'm sure you'll be asked some questions about that, so I'll move
23 A. I'm sure I will.
24 Q. Thank you, sir.
25 MR. OSTOJIC: Let's go to the intercept that I think the
1 Prosecutor has coined from time to time as the triage intercept, which is
2 dated the 16th of July, 1995, and it has a 65 ter number 1187, I believe.
3 Q. And if you could just be kind enough to take a look at that
4 purported intercept of the 16th of July, so that I can ask you some
5 questions about it.
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. Now, from my reading of this, "triage" is used on four separate
8 occasions, the specific word, is it not?
9 A. Yes, sir. I'll take your word on that one. I guess I don't have
10 to count.
11 Q. Thank you, but you're welcome to do so. And how many times does
12 purportedly Mr. Beara use that word?
13 A. I don't believe that that particular phrase is associated with the
14 correspondent Beara.
15 Q. Where is the individual X?
16 A. Once the X is identified at Cerovic, at that point time, Colonel
17 Cerovic is the duty officer of the Drina Corps. He would be in Vlasenica,
18 at the Drina Corps headquarters.
19 Q. Sir, will you agree with me that the word "triage," as mentioned
20 in this purported intercept, can have multiple meanings?
21 A. It can have multiple meanings, yes, sir. Within the context of
22 this intercept, though, I believe it has only one.
23 Q. Okay. And do you remember, sir, in your testimony under oath in
24 the Krstic case on the 19th of July, 2000, you also said that there's a
25 military meaning of the term which pertains to the separation of wounded
1 on medical grounds?
2 In fairness to you, and I'm sorry, I should give the page number.
3 It's on page 5357, lines 11 through 12.
4 You begin by saying, "In fairness, sir, the military lexicon
5 defines the term in a medical sense."
6 Do you recall that?
7 A. Yes, sir, I do. I recall that conversation.
8 Q. And then you go on, if I can, from lines 11 through 24, again on
9 page 5357, during your testimony in the Krstic case on the 19th of July,
11 "I would hesitate to get very far down the road, speculating what
12 the phrase 'triage' might mean. In various other forms of potentially
13 criminal or non-criminal applications, it is the word that they used. And
14 as I generally note, I try not to put additional or more meaning into
15 their words than is self-evident."
16 Do you remember that sworn testimony, sir?
17 A. Yes, sir, I do.
18 Q. And then the Honourable Judge Riad asked you, because he wasn't
19 sure was meant by "self-evident": "What do you mean by self-evident?"
20 Then you proceed to answer the question as follows:
21 "Sir, they use the phrase 'triage.' One possible explanation, is
22 as Mr. Petrusic forwards, there could be multiple possible explanations.
23 All I'm saying, as part of my analysis, is here's the word that was used
24 as translated, and I would prefer not to try to speculate as to what they
25 really mean behind that individual word, sir."
1 Do you remember that?
2 A. Yes, sir, I do.
3 Q. Now, wouldn't you agree with me, in keeping in mind one of your
4 fundamental components of your analysis, that you're trying to be as
5 conservative as possible, that you cannot infer from the text of the
6 intercept alone that there was any dark connotation, as I think you refer
7 to during the Vasic identification document and the word "killing,"
8 attached to the use of the word "triage"? Wouldn't you agree with me on
10 A. Yes, sir. In the abstract of this intercept, I agree.
11 Q. Now, at that time on the 15th of July, 1995, and I know we -- or
12 16th, I'm sorry, 16th of July, 1995, we discussed the column and some of
13 the -- that's from these legitimate military combat engagements.
14 Are you familiar, sir, that there was statements that the
15 Prosecutor received from Bosnian Muslims, who were in the column, who
16 identified during this time period that there were many hundreds wounded
17 as a result of these legitimate military combat engagements?
18 A. Yes, sir. And particularly seven years ago, during the Krstic
19 trial, I held that possibility open because the investigation had not been
20 able to either confirm or deny or identify the numbers of potentially
21 wounded combatants that might be in the custody of the Zvornik Infantry
23 Seven years down the road now, the investigation has been able to
24 run that particular issue to ground; and because of that and because now I
25 have a better understanding of the context, I'm more willing to exactly
1 give you what I believe the phrase "triage" means in the context of that.
2 Q. I don't want you to speculate, sir, as you've said that that's
3 what it would mean.
4 A. I am not speculating.
5 Q. Sir, do you know, during your proofing session with Mr. McCloskey,
6 whether you discussed if other former VRS officers ever used the word
8 A. No, sir, I don't recall that came up.
9 Q. In your review of the documents and the material in total that you
10 reviewed, did you ever find that some or any officers would use the word
12 A. I know that, as a component of the investigation, that question
13 was asked to a number of individuals in this particular context.
14 Q. Who?
15 A. I believe General Zivanovic was asked that particular question.
16 Q. Who else?
17 A. I'm not sure if Major Golic was asked that question as of conduct
18 of his interviews.
19 Q. How about Mr. Cerovic, was he asked?
20 A. I don't know if the investigation had ever interviewed Colonel
21 Cerovic. I understand he either was interviewed and at some point in time
22 stopped, or didn't consent to be interviewed. I don't know the answer to
24 Q. Well, wait. He's a participant of this supposed July 16, 1995
25 intercept, isn't he?
1 A. Yes, sir, he is.
2 Q. Don't you think it might be reasonably prudent that the Office of
3 the Prosecution would have interviewed another participant in this
4 purported conversation?
5 A. If the Office of the Prosecutor had meaningful subpoena power to
6 be able to do that, I'd say yes; but we don't and we do not have the
7 ability to go to Serbia and demand people show up.
8 Q. What about this, sir, the use of the word "triage"? If we're
9 discussing the column of the 28th Division passing through, do you
10 remember if an officer ever said that, "We do not try to carry out a
11 triage to see who was a civilian and who wasn't"?
12 A. Could you -- do I remember if an officer ever -- could you provide
13 more information on who the officer might be? That's pretty abstract.
14 Q. I will. Let's just take it one step at a time. In that sentence,
15 if it's true, "triage" in that sense is being used to separate civilians
16 from military combatants or soldiers, is it not?
17 A. I suppose that, you know, in that, it could be used in that
18 context. That would be a definition that would make sense, yes, sir.
19 MR. OSTOJIC: Now, Mr. President, I'm just looking for a little
20 guidance, but may we go into private session for a moment?
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Of course. Let's go into private session, please.
22 [Private session]
16 [Open session]
17 JUDGE AGIUS: We are in open session.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's go into private session for a moment, please.
20 [Private session]
11 Pages 20276-20277 redacted. Private session
12 [Open session]
13 MR. OSTOJIC: May I proceed, Your Honour?
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
15 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you. I was just waiting.
16 Q. Sir, given what we've seen now in private session and - I know
17 we're in open. Yes, thank you. Just so it makes sense later - and the
18 fact that you did not have any material from the person who used the word
19 "triage," whether it's X or this C which is attributed to Cerovic on the
20 16th of July, 1995, we can see, if we actually study hard, that there can
21 be multiple reasons or multiple -- strike that, multiple definitions of
22 this military lexicon, as you put it under oath in the Krstic trial, of
23 the word "triage"; isn't that correct?
24 A. Yes, sir. I mean, the word itself has multiple meanings, I agree.
25 Q. Now, I want to put into focus, if we can, if we take words in
1 isolation, we saw that the Dragomir Vasic letter -- or, I mean, I'm sorry,
2 the document, which is dated, and I have it here --
3 MR. OSTOJIC: It's 65 ter 886.
4 Q. You testified - if I may proceed while it's being brought up to
5 the screen - on the 17th of July -- I'm sorry, 17th of January, 2008, the
6 reference to that word "killing," and you said, and you gave your
7 identification about it, that, "It has no dark meaning."
8 Do you remember that, pages 19870, lines 10 through 14?
9 A. Yes, sir. Again, while the word itself has multiple meanings,
10 it's my interpretation of what the word implies within the context that
11 it's being discussed.
12 Q. And, also, I think, in another example of the utilisation perhaps
13 of the word "kill" or "killing" is the Krstic tape, and I think you also
14 at that point came to the same conclusion, that despite that the word
15 "kill" was used, that it didn't have a dark connotation. Is that correct?
16 A. Yes, sir, or it had multiple connotations. At that -- and my
17 analysis at that time, I didn't attribute it a darker or murderous intent,
18 which may be a more accurate way to say it, to that phrase.
19 Q. Now, sir, I want to discuss, if you will, a little bit a different
20 area, and that is internal affairs. Do you generally know what internal
21 affairs is?
22 A. I assume we're referring in a law enforcement perspective,
23 internal affairs or --
24 Q. Let's take it first from a law enforcement perspective, and then
25 we'll move to a military perspective.
1 A. Well, law enforcement perspective, my understanding of "internal
2 affairs" is a group of individuals who investigate the activities of law
3 enforcement officials to ensure that they're functioning in compliance
4 with law and not themselves using their official functions to commit
6 Q. Investigating their own people within their unit or organisation;
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. And what about in a military setting, how would you describe an
10 internal affairs officer or an internal affairs person?
11 A. I can't tell you how it is in a broader military setting. I am
12 sure that the US military's, you know, criminal investigation division may
13 have those; although, I don't know that. So, I mean, I couldn't tell you
14 how that function works within a military.
15 Q. Well, no, no --
16 A. If we're talking about the VRS, in that context, I think I can
17 give you an explanation.
18 Q. We are talking about the VRS, sir.
19 A. Okay. In that context, it would be those investigative activities
20 to ensure that military officials are, again, operating in compliance with
21 law and regulation.
22 Q. And who would they be? Who would really be identified in this
23 term of art "internal affairs" in the VRS military, based on your analysis
24 of the documents?
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey.
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. There's no foundation that this term
2 "internal affairs" has been used in any military context at all, and so
3 the form of the question is incorrect. This is a -- this is a term from
4 American television.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Ostojic has very little opportunity to watch
6 here in The Hague.
7 MR. OSTOJIC: Although, I am rather offended by the comment, I
8 won't go into an argument about it now, but I think the witness answered
9 the question both in terms of law enforcement and military, and so --
10 JUDGE AGIUS: It's understandable why he has answered the
11 question, too. So let's hear what Mr. Bourgon has to say, coming to the
13 Mr. Bourgon.
14 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 The witness has referred to internal affair organs on a number of
16 occasions in his reports. Thank you, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: I know that he has. I know that he has, but is it
18 necessary to dwell on this matter any longer, Mr. Ostojic, or shall we
19 move ahead?
20 MR. OSTOJIC: No, it is necessary, I think, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Very briefly, then, please.
22 MR. OSTOJIC: Okay.
23 Q. Which organ of the VRS would have the function and the duties and
24 responsibilities to that which is equivalent to what you, sir, have
25 identified, whether it's from your personal experience in law enforcement
1 or your experience in the military, taking aside anything you may have
2 gleaned from television, who would be similar to that as an internal
3 affairs person? What organ within the military of the VRS?
4 A. Yes, sir. And given the fact that the security organ also has a
5 crime prevention function, it would be the security organ of the VRS.
6 Q. And, sir, I say this without trying to be humorous to my learned
7 friend. Forget about anything you may have learned from watching American
8 television. But in your experience, sir, in the law enforcement aspect,
9 the internal affairs officers are the ones who are, wouldn't you agree
10 with me, least liked by their fellow employees, because they're worried
11 that they may or may not from time to time be investigated?
12 A. In my experience --
13 Q. Well, you've told us about your experience, Mr. Butler. You
14 couldn't identify in the US military whether or not there was such a
15 department; although, you believe that there is.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Now let's move, Mr. Ostojic.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: He just interrupted the witness.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Stop, Mr. Butler. Please move to your next
20 MR. OSTOJIC:
21 Q. With respect to the VRS, sir, can you find which organ, other than
22 the security organ, was least liked by other people within the military,
23 from your analysis, if you've come up with that at all?
24 A. I --
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: You know, that is such an open question. Least
1 liked by who? I mean, that is such a massively broad question.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: You are right, you are right.
3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Commanders are not very well liked by sometimes
4 their men.
5 MR. OSTOJIC: I don't know if he needs to testify, but my
6 question, with all due respect, says "least liked by whom," and it says
7 "other people within." It's right there on page 72, lines 10 through 12,
8 but we'll move on.
9 Q. I'll just ask this question: Did you ever analyse that,
10 Mr. Butler, the relationship between, specifically, and the personal
11 relationship between various VRS personnel and the security personnel?
12 A. Yes, sir. I am aware of the fact that regardless of
13 personalities, that by position there is going to be a natural
14 organisational tension between the roles and responsibility of the
15 security branch and the roles and responsibilities of other organs and the
16 roles and responsibilities of the commander himself, I mean. So I -- I
17 certainly took that into effect.
18 Q. And now you're talking about tension here, but let's turn to
19 another subject area, and that's the relationship between the VRS and the
20 SDS. Do you know what the SDS is, sir?
21 A. Yes, sir, I do.
22 Q. And in 1995, you knew what it was; correct?
23 A. I knew what it was in 1995 with respect to the analysis. I didn't
24 know --
25 Q. Of course, of course. [B/C/S spoken]
1 Did you analyse or did anyone that you know on the investigative
2 team analyse the relationships, whether there was tension or if it was
3 strained or even hostile, between the VRS and the SDS from 1992 through
4 1995, given that you're giving us, in some part, with all due respect, a
5 historical analysis of what may have occurred at that time?
6 A. Yes, sir, I did, particularly for the period of 1995, because it
7 was relevant to my analysis. So I did, in fact, explore that, yes, sir.
8 Q. And where can I find it in your pieces of work, if you will, such
9 as the narrative, the revision, and the brigade, corps and Main Staff
10 analysis that you've written?
11 A. I believe that you would find references to that. The specific
12 incidence that I draw to is the 4 August 1995 firing of General Mladic as
13 the commander of the Main Staff and moving him to be the personal adviser
14 to President Karadzic, who assumes personal command of the military, and
15 the next day the military generals on the Main Staff subsequently publish
16 a letter basically saying that they're not going to recognise President
17 Karadzic's authority to do that. I believe I encapsulate what you're
18 talking about in that part.
19 Q. What about prior to that, anything prior, leading up to July of
20 1995? Did you ever analyse - I haven't seen it in your report, with all
21 due respect, but I'm sure you'll correct me if I'm wrong - the
22 relationship between the VRS and the SDS in order to determine whether
23 there was tension, whether it was strained, or whether it was hostile at
24 some point?
25 A. I was generally aware, when I was doing my analysis, that it was.
1 However, during the period of the construction of the reports, I did not
2 have documentary evidence that reflected that. Clearly, and I think as
3 part of my testimony, I mean, we have seen documentary evidence where that
4 relationship had deteriorated to a point where, by March of 1995, the army
5 believed that people from the SDS were actually out to assassinate key
6 leadership figures.
7 So while I kept that issue in mind about the strained relationship
8 between the two, in my report, I did not have documentation which I could
9 cite back to it.
10 Q. And just so I'm clear, on page 74, line 13 through 14, you, in
11 answer to my question, state, "I was generally aware, when I was doing my
12 analysis, that it was."
13 And you're saying that you were aware that there was tension and a
14 strained relationship, if not hostile relationship, between the VRS and
15 SDS during the time frame that we're discussing; correct?
16 A. Yes, sir, 1995 and particularly the middle portion of the year,
17 yes, sir.
18 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, just quickly to turn to the relationship
19 between the VRS and the MUP, which we know the acronym stands for Ministry
20 of Interior; correct?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. Now, that relationship, what -- did you analyse at all the
23 relationship between the VRS and the MUP leading up to July of 1995?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. And where is that located in your report?
1 A. I believe - and, again, if it's not in my report, it's because
2 the information wasn't available at the time, but I talked about it as an
3 exhibit certainly in the Blagojevic case. I don't know if we've discussed
4 it in this case - the fact that the relationship between the army and the
5 MUP was acrimonious, because soldiers would frequently desert from their
6 military units and try to sign on with MUP units in part because the MUP
7 was paying their soldiers in cash and not other forms of either credit or
8 script; and that particularly from an army perspective, the MUP was not
9 returning those soldiers back to the military units, and that was having a
10 significant impact on the VRS.
11 Q. When you're discussing that the relationship between the army and
12 the MUP was acrimonious and that it had a significant impact on the VRS,
13 isn't it true that the period of time you're discussing, sir, is the
14 period of March, April, May, June, and July 1995, among other periods?
15 A. Yes, sir. In fact, through July 1995, there are references where
16 particularly General Mladic was not a fan of the MUP.
17 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. Butler.
18 Mr. President, I ask, and I know it's 20 minutes before the break,
19 but if I can just have the break now, I think I'm done, and I think it's
20 within the -- within the time period that I've asked for, and I would like
21 to take the break now so I could just go over a couple of materials. And
22 I promise I won't be more than 15 minutes, if that, when I return. I'd
23 like to consult with my colleague and my client, of course, as well.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. We'll have -- unless Mr. Bourgon objects to
1 MR. BOURGON: No, Mr. President. I'll be ready to go immediately
2 when my colleague sits down.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Thank you of informing of that,
4 Mr. Bourgon.
5 We'll have a 25-minute break now.
6 Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: I've been informed informally by both Mr. Bourgon
8 and Mr. Ostojic that they don't think they'll be into US issues, and so,
9 in that event, I think my colleague will be leaving, if that's all right.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I'm not going to interfere or intervene in
11 that. It's up to you, madam.
12 MS. SCHILDGE: Thank you, Your Honours.
13 I think given the other issues I have at the office, I would take
14 this opportunity to depart, but I will be certainly available should any
15 issues that require my attention arise.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, madam.
17 So we'll have a 25-minute break now. Thank you.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. Very briefly, Mr. President.
23 I did not object during the questioning because of the presence of
24 Mr. Butler, but you recall when Mr. Ostojic was questioning Mr. Butler
25 about Mr. Cerovic and whether or not the OTP had interviewed him.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: In fact, we did interview him in September of
3 2005, and that was, of course, after Mr. Butler left. I just wanted to
4 clarify that, that's all.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Let's bring Mr. Butler in, please.
6 At the end of the sitting, we'll be calling upon you to respond
7 orally to the latest Prosecution motion for the addition of another
8 witness. The Prosecution has filed a motion yesterday, I think, for the
9 addition of another witness.
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Ostojic.
12 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. A few more questions, Mr. Butler, just to tidy up a little bit.
14 We were speaking of the tension or acrimonious relationship between the
15 VRS and the MUP, and your answer, certainly with respect to General
16 Mladic, was that he was not a fan of the MUP.
17 My question specifically, with respect to the relationship, was
18 that: Am I not correct, sir, that the MUP was also or had tension and
19 strained relationships with the army, insofar as that the MUP also were
20 not fans of the VRS. So it would work both ways; isn't that correct?
21 A. I don't know that as a fact. I mean, I am aware of what the
22 army's criticisms of the MUP were. I am not aware of what potential
23 criticisms that the MUP would have had of the army.
24 Q. And just to clarify a couple of other issues, if I may. You spoke
25 of an UN person that I think has placed Mr. Beara purportedly, on or
1 about -- on or about the area of Nova Kasaba.
2 Are you familiar that he places allegedly Mr. Beara at Nova Kasaba
3 at a certain time and date; and if so, do you know what time and date he
4 places him purportedly at Nova Kasaba?
5 A. I know that he places him there at a certain date. I don't
6 recollect when I -- when that date is at present.
7 Q. I don't think it's a dispute between my learned friends, but it
8 was some time, I believe, the 14th of July, 1995. Does that refresh your
9 recollection at all?
10 A. That may well be the case. I just don't remember the exact date.
11 I mean, if it is, in fact, the 14th, then that's fine.
12 Q. Because it was in relation to my questions with respect to
13 Srebrenica and the evacuation, and my time period was clearly up through
14 July 12th, I just didn't want the record to be confused or unclear as to
15 whether or not you believed that this UN person places my client anywhere
16 near any of those areas, including Nova Kasaba, prior to the 14th of July,
17 1995, allegedly.
18 A. Yes, sir. In the context of what we're talking about with the
19 movement of civilians out of Potocari, that would have concluded by 2000
20 hours on the 13th, so you're correct.
21 Q. Just a couple other issues, if I can tidy up.
22 I'd like -- we talked about the minefields and the landmines that
23 were present, and we discussed the number of deaths as a result of the
24 legitimate military combat engagements. Are you familiar with a report
25 from the United Nations, UNPROFOR, actually, protection force, dated the
1 17th of July, 1995, where they discuss a number of Bosnian Muslims who
2 were killed on their way to Tuzla as a result of mines and BSA
4 A. I have -- I have seen a lot of UN reports during that time frame.
5 If you care to show me the document and refresh my memory, I can probably
6 give you a more accurate picture, whether I recall it or not.
7 Q. Fair enough.
8 MR. OSTOJIC: If we can have 1D374 on the screen for Mr. Butler,
9 please, and if I can just direct -- well, we'll show him the first page as
10 well, in all fairness to him.
11 Q. And this is a document, sir, that we, I think, have used a couple
12 of times in this case. It's something that was drafted by a person,
13 Edward Joseph, as you can see in the third box on the right-hand side. It
14 was released by an officer, Ken Biser, do you see that, with a signature
15 accompanying his typewritten name?
16 A. Yes, sir, I do.
17 Q. And have you seen this document before, sir?
18 A. If I could look at the actual context of the document. I couldn't
19 tell you, offhand, just looking at the header data.
20 Q. Of course.
21 A. Could you scroll down, please, on the text?
22 Q. And we'll return, when you let us know you've reviewed it, to the
23 second and third pages of this document.
24 A. Next page, please. Thank you, ma'am.
25 Q. Thank you for letting us know, sir.
1 A. Next, there we go. Next page, please.
2 I cannot say that I've specifically seen this report. I don't
3 recall. However, I do recall seeing, in other UN reports, essentially the
4 same information, so it may have well been that it was incorporated into
5 this report.
6 MR. OSTOJIC: I'd like to focus, if we can quickly, on page 2 of
7 this report, the first paragraph and the third subsection of that
9 Q. And if you could see, sir, the UNMOs and Civil Affairs are
10 reporting to UNPROFOR in that third subsection that, "up to 3.000 were
11 killed on the way, mostly by mines and BSA engagements."
12 Do you see that?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. Can you tell us, contextually speaking, why that isn't included
15 anywhere in any of your reports?
16 A. Why the document and information or why the -- or why the issue of
17 how many were killed on the way isn't in the report? In the document, it
18 looks like a UN Rule 70 document, which is why I wouldn't have included
19 it. As I testified prior, the information, how many people were killed on
20 the way with respect to combat activities, was not relevant for the
21 analysis that I was doing.
22 Q. But is there -- do you have, as you sit here, sir, any doubt as to
23 the veracity of what Mr. Biser and Mr. Joseph have reported, that up to
24 3.000 were killed on the way, mostly by mines and BSA engagements? Did
25 you analyse that to see if it was accurate at all?
1 A. Sir, again, because I did not detail through the combat activities
2 and the casualty rates of the column, I have no way of knowing whether
3 that number is accurate or not.
4 Q. And do you know of anyone while you were here, the investigative
5 team, who conducted this analysis at all, whether it be your commander or
6 anyone else?
7 A. I don't know that anyone looked at specifically trying to
8 determine the number of combat-related casualties from the column,
9 regardless of how they were killed.
10 Q. Now, we talked about the combat engagements. Do you know where
11 these people, who they reference as of the 17th of July, 1995, where they
12 were buried?
13 A. No, sir. I don't know where and under what circumstances these
14 casualties were -- were buried. My understanding of the situation was
15 that because of the danger of mines, that at least in the initial years
16 following the hostilities, that there was no effort to collect these
17 individuals and bury them at all. They were left and are often referred
18 to as surface remains.
19 Q. Okay. We'll discuss that with other people, but let me ask you
20 this, if I may: Not only, as you say, you don't know that anyone looked
21 at it, isn't it a fact that no one looked at this issue at all from the
22 investigative team during the time that you were with the Office of the
23 Prosecution? Correct?
24 A. Correct, sir, my understanding is that.
25 Q. Now, in reading some of your testimony in Blagojevic, there was a
1 point where you were asked about your relationship with the Office of the
2 Prosecution, and I'm summarising just for the sake of time.
3 At one point, it's my recollection that you said that the last two
4 years of your engagement with the Office of the Prosecution, you were
5 hired by them. Prior to that, you were just a liaison, loaned from the
6 United States military. Is there -- am I recalling that correctly, sir?
7 A. No, sir.
8 Q. Your status was always that you were a United States military
9 employee at the service of the OTP; correct?
10 A. My status for the first five years was that I was seconded to the
11 OTP, loaned if you will, for the purpose of assisting in doing analysis.
12 I was never a liaison. I was not a conduit of information going back and
13 forth. My final two years here, I was no longer in the United States Army
14 and I was here under a contract. So I was, I guess for lack of a better
15 word, a UN civil servant.
16 Q. But you were under contract, so that means from the year 2001
17 through 2003; correct?
18 A. September 2001 through September 2003, yes, sir.
19 Q. And you were paid through the Office of the Prosecution, correct,
20 for those two years?
21 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
22 Q. Because I wasn't sure if during the direct testimony, when you
23 gave us the 75 per cent/25 per cent for your education that the US
24 government paid. Prior to 2001, you were paid by the United States
25 military; correct?
1 A. Yes, sir. I received a military salary. That was my
3 Q. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that.
4 One last area that I'm going to ask you about that you touched
5 upon, and that is the whereabouts of a General Mladic on the evening of
6 July 14th and 15th.
7 I think in your testimony - and please correct me if I'm wrong -
8 that you have information that you've gleaned or reviewed that he was, in
9 fact, in Belgrade. Correct?
10 A. Yes, sir. The body of information that's available to me reflects
11 that he is in Belgrade starting the -- or he leaves the Main Staff and
12 then is in Belgrade. He arrives there early evening hours of the 14th and
13 remains there through the 15th, yes, sir.
14 Q. And just so we can be more precise, when does he leave the Main
15 Staff on the 14th, sir?
16 A. I believe that there's an intercept that we attribute General
17 Mladic saying that somewhere around 1500 he's, "going to the field." So I
18 take that as the time that he was anticipating leaving the Main Staff.
19 Q. And what time did he return, if at all, in the evening or late
20 hours of the 15th July 1995?
21 A. I don't believe that I have clear visibility on when General
22 Mladic would have returned from Belgrade and whether or not the Main Staff
23 was his first destination. I don't know.
24 Q. Where is the next time that you have visibility of General Mladic
25 after his visit in Belgrade on the 14th of July, 1995?
1 A. I believe, and, again, I'd like to look back at the documents, but
2 I believe, somewhere around either the 16th or the 17th, there may be a
3 Main Staff document that reflects his name and says "S.R.," and I can't
4 swear to that as a fact right now, because my memory is just not getting
5 around that.
6 I believe, also, that there has been, at least in the form of a
7 statement to the OTP, one Main Staff officer has discussed the fact that
8 he did personally see General Mladic at the Main Staff headquarters on the
9 17th. So, I mean, that's my broad framework of my belief.
10 Q. Did you analyse who was the security detail, if any, that General
11 Mladic took with him on the 14th at approximately 1500 hours, up to and
12 including the 16th or 17th, 1995, in Belgrade?
13 A. No, sir, I did not.
14 Q. Did you investigate who the driver was that took General Mladic,
15 assuming, of course, that he didn't drive himself?
16 A. Sir, to be honest, I don't know that he drove. He may well have
17 gone by helicopter. I just don't know how he got to Belgrade.
18 Q. Did anyone on your investigative team analyse who was with
19 Mr. Mladic or how he got there, how long he stayed, and when he returned,
20 that you're aware of?
21 A. I am aware that the investigative team, and I believe individuals
22 have testified, with respect to General Mladic's presence in Belgrade at
23 various meetings on the 14th and the 15th. I don't believe that there was
24 a component of the investigation with respect to how General Mladic got to
25 Belgrade, and I don't believe investigatively anyone looked at how General
1 Mladic returned from Belgrade and at what time. So I think that -- yeah.
2 Q. How about the other variable to my question? Who else may have
3 been with him during that time period? The investigation, was there one
4 conducted with respect to that?
5 A. No, sir, there was not.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Ostojic.
9 Mr. Bourgon.
10 Yes, Mr. Haynes.
11 MR. HAYNES: Just before Mr. Bourgon starts to cross-examine
12 Mr. Butler, I missed your words immediately after the break about the
13 response you anticipate to the motion which was filed by the Prosecution
14 late yesterday evening.
15 To be honest, I would prefer it if you didn't insist upon a
16 response to that today. We haven't, owing to the lateness of the hour of
17 the receipt of the motion and the state of the evidence in the case and
18 our preparation for cross-examination of this witness, had the opportunity
19 to coordinate our response to it.
20 It is said in the motion to particularly affect my client, and at
21 this point in time I've neither seen the transcript of what this witness
22 said, nor heard the CD of what he said, nor had the opportunity to consult
23 with my client about what response I should offer.
24 If you insist that the matter is so very urgent that we must deal
25 with it today, then I would anticipate you are likely to receive several
1 submissions of length from a number of Defence teams, and it may be wise
2 to send Mr. Butler back to his hotel in about ten minutes' time. But my
3 initial submission is that you don't deal with that today.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: When do you think you would be in a position to come
5 with your response? Tomorrow?
6 MR. HAYNES: Tomorrow.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. All right. So we'll receive submissions
8 tomorrow, at the end of the day. Thank you.
9 Mr. Bourgon.
10 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Bourgon:
12 Q. Good morning or good afternoon, Mr. Butler.
13 A. Good afternoon, sir.
14 Q. My name is Stefan Bourgon, and I represent Drago Nikolic in these
16 Kind of a strange place to meet after all these years, isn't it,
17 Mr. Butler?
18 A. Indeed, sir.
19 Q. I'm sure we'll be fine, and I'll try to keep my cross-examination
20 as short as possible.
21 The first thing I would like to look into is duties and
22 responsibilities of the assistant commander for security, and to focus on
23 your report or what you included in your VRS command responsibility
24 report. You've testified about this report already; and, first, I'd like
25 to look at the sources which you considered to be important in order to
1 understand the functions of the assistant commander for security.
2 So, in your report, at the end - I can't really give you a page
3 number, because at the end it says "a" and "b" - you remember 18 different
4 sources that you consulted to compile your report?
5 A. Yes, sir, I remember that generally.
6 Q. So I'd like to go over some of these just to discuss how you
7 looked at these sources and whether you thought they were important to
8 understand the duties and responsibilities of the assistant commander for
10 The first such reference is called "The Brigade Rules for
11 Infantry, Motorised, Mountain, Alpine, Marine, and Light Brigades," dated
12 18 July 1994.
13 MR. BOURGON: That is 65 ter 694.
14 Q. I believe that you referred to this document as being the brigade
15 rules. Is that correct?
16 A. Yes, sir.
17 Q. Now, in paragraph 1.7 of I'll say "your report" - and at this
18 stage, I refer specifically to your VRS brigade command responsibility
19 report, which was 65 ter 684 - in paragraph 1.7, you state that the
20 primary reference defining JNA regulations on brigade-level operations and
21 responsibilities in peacetime and in wartime is indeed those brigade
22 rules; is that correct?
23 A. Yes, sir. I don't see the document, but I agree with the
25 Q. At any time, if you want to see one of those documents, I'll try,
1 unless it's really necessary, not to show you the document; but if you
2 feel there's a need, do not hesitate.
3 Now, you would agree with me that this document includes the basis
4 for the rules and responsibilities of the brigade commander, the brigade
5 staff, as well as other branches of the brigade?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. And that, of course, this was beyond any doubt an important source
8 for you in analysing the duties of the security organ?
9 A. Yes, sir. This was an important source.
10 Q. The second source that I'd like to refer to is the Rules of
11 Service of Security Organs in the Armed Forces of the SFRY, dated 21 March
12 of 1984.
13 MR. BOURGON: That was referred to as being 65 ter number 407, and
14 we'll use the short title "Rules for Security Organs."
15 Q. This was source 17 in your VRS brigade responsibility report. Do
16 you recall this?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. Now, in paragraph 3.13 of your command responsibility report, you
19 refer to this -- you refer to this manual in a number of -- on a number of
20 issues to highlight the duties and responsibilities of the assistant
21 commander for security; is that correct?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. So you would agree with me that this is also an important source
24 to understand the duties and responsibilities of the security organ?
25 A. Yes, sir, it is.
1 Q. Now, there's another manual I would like to show you, which is
2 called "The Directions on the Methods and Means of Work of JNA Security
3 Organs," which is dated 1 August 1986.
4 MR. BOURGON: If I could have 65 ter number 3D275 in e-court,
6 Q. Mr. Butler, I will use for this manual the title "Methods and
7 Means of Work of Security Organs." My first question is: While this was
8 indicated in number 19 of your sources, but it was never referred to in
9 your brigade command responsibility report; is that correct?
10 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
11 Q. Are you aware of this publication and have you seen it before?
12 A. Yes, sir. I have seen it before.
13 Q. And would you agree that because it is an application of the Rules
14 for Security Organs, that it would have been an important publication to
15 refer to in your report?
16 A. Yes, sir, insomuch that, you know, I referred to it as a document
17 that I had reviewed and referenced. However, given the technical aspects
18 of the material involved for what I was doing the responsibility reports
19 for, there did not appear to be much pertinent information. So, while I'm
20 aware of this and I have reviewed it, that explains why it's not cited by
21 footnote in my brigade reports, or the corps report, for that matter.
22 Q. Of course, we will have the opportunity, as part of our Defence
23 case, to bring a different point of view. I'd just like to confirm what
24 you've just mentioned, that the information contained in this publication
25 was not pertinent for your analysis.
1 A. It was not -- I didn't say it wasn't pertinent for my analysis.
2 Because I read it, it was pertinent for my analysis. What I'm saying is
3 that because it involved mostly technical issues related to how
4 clandestine sources are run, how counter-intelligence plans are made,
5 things of that nature, it wasn't relevant in respect to the broader issue
6 of the rules and responsibilities. These are more like the "how to"
8 Q. And what if I suggest to you that in this manual is the only place
9 where you find any source or any reference to the relationship which may
10 exist between prisoners of war and the assistant commander for security?
11 Would that raise the level or the relevancy of this manual?
12 A. I'm -- I'm not sure that your broader statement is true, but
13 certainly any reference to the responsibilities of the security branch and
14 prisoners of war would be of interest, yes, sir.
15 Q. Yesterday, or the day before, you were asked a question by my
16 colleague representing Mr. Popovic to the fact that you did not find any
17 reference to a relationship which exists between assistant commander for
18 security and prisoners of war. That was, of course, in the Rules on
19 Security, and you confirmed that; is that correct?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. So you would agree with me that if this manual highlights that
22 relationship, it is something that is missing from your report?
23 A. Well, sir, if I recall correctly, the highlighted relationship
24 between the security branch and prisoners of war in this manual has more
25 to do with operative possibilities of taking prisoners of war and creating
1 collection agents out of them, as opposed to the handling of them during a
2 tactical state. That is why, in that particular context, I didn't see it
3 as relevant.
4 Q. Okay. Later on we'll go into the prisoner of war issues in more
5 detail, and we'll go into the specific provisions of this manual.
6 MR. BOURGON: Let's move on to another source, which is called
7 "The Service Regulations of the SFRY Armed Forces Military Police," 24
8 September 1985, 65 ter number 707.
9 Q. I take it you're familiar with this publication?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. The short title we can use for this one is "Military Police
12 Regulations," and this was source 18 in your brigade command
13 responsibility report.
14 Now, you agree, in paragraph 3.15 of your report --
15 MR. BOURGON: I apologise. I will slow down for the transcript.
16 Q. So, in paragraph 3.15 of your brigade command responsibility
17 report, you discuss the relationship between the officer in charge of the
18 security body and the commander of the brigade with respect to military
19 police; is that correct?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. So, in this respect, this -- those service regulations for
22 military police are relevant, and they were used in your report?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 MR. BOURGON: I'd like to have in e-court, please, 3D276.
25 Q. And, Mr. Butler, I'd like you to take a look at this manual, which
1 is called "The Instruction on the Application of Regulations of the SFRY
2 Armed Forces Military Police." We can use, as a short title, "The
3 Instruction on Military Police Regulations."
4 Now, to the best of my recollection, this was not included in the
5 sources to your brigade command responsibility report, nor was it referred
6 to or footnoted in the same report. Would that be a fair statement?
7 A. Yes, sir. I'm not familiar with this document.
8 Q. Well, that was my next question, whether you were aware and
9 whether you had seen this publication, which is only available, to the
10 best of my knowledge, in the B/C/S language.
11 If I tell you, Mr. Butler, that this publication deals
12 specifically with the interaction between military police and prisoners of
13 war, would you agree that this was indeed a source that maybe should have
14 been consulted in drafting your report?
15 A. Under that hypothetical, if I had had access to it, it might very
16 well have, yes, sir.
17 Q. Is that something -- a publication that you looked for,
18 considering the fact that it is the application of the military police
19 rules? Is that -- did you expect or look for such a publication?
20 A. Yes, sir. As part of the investigative process and part of the
21 analytical process that I was undertaking, we actively looked for all such
22 regulations that would relate with respect to command and with respect to
23 security, so that we could identify them and get them translated to
24 determine, you know, where they fit into the broader picture. So that was
25 an effort that we did undertake.
1 Q. But this one, you yourself never found?
2 A. No, sir. I take it -- I take it from the ERN range of 046 that
3 this is a document that would have hit the OTP long after my departure.
4 It has a very late ERN number on it.
5 Q. Would you agree with me, then, that to a certain extent, not
6 having consulted this manual, that your brigade command responsibility
7 report is incomplete?
8 A. In light of the fact that there may be additional information out
9 there, I hold open the prospect that it may very well now be incomplete,
10 yes, sir.
11 Q. Let's move on to another source, which is the Instruction on
12 Command and Control over the Security and Intelligence Organs of the VRS,
13 which is not a publication, but rather instructions, dated 11 November
14 1984 and signed by General Mladic.
15 MR. BOURGON: This is 65 ter 2741.
16 Q. I take it you know what document I'm referring to.
17 A. Not by that date, sir. Are you correct?
18 MR. BOURGON: Well, let's put it on the screen. This is 65 ter
19 2741, if I may have that on e-court, please.
20 Q. I will be referring to this instruction at length during my
21 cross-examination, and I'll be referring to it as being the Main Staff
22 Instruction on Security and Intelligence Organs.
23 A. Yes, sir, that explains it. The date is 24 October.
24 Q. And the date would be -- maybe I misled you with the date. It is
25 being brought to my attention now that the date is, of course, 11 November
1 1994, 1-9-9-4, which is the probably what the problem was why you could
2 not recognise the instruction itself.
3 But you know which instruction I'm talking about?
4 A. I have it up on my screen, sir, yes.
5 Q. Okay. Now, you would agree with me that this -- this is an
6 important document to understand the role of the --
7 MR. BOURGON: 11 November 1994 is the stamp, but the directive is
8 24 October. Another mistake. I apologise. 24 October 1994. The other
9 date, 11 November, is a reception stamp, I believe.
10 Q. Okay. So this, you would agree with me, is an important document
11 to understand the role of the assistant commander for security, if only
12 because it was drafted months before the events in July of 1995?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. And in your examination-in-chief, you were referred to this
15 publication or to this publication or to those instructions, but they were
16 not included in the sources to your brigade command responsibility report?
17 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
18 Q. And they were not footnoted or referred to in the brigade command
19 responsibility report?
20 A. That's correct. As I'm sure you're aware from the Blagojevic
21 testimony, at the time that those reports were drafted, the Office of the
22 Prosecutor had this document but was not able to get it out of a
23 particular collection.
24 I only became aware that we had this document and had it
25 translated, and I did discuss it during the testimony phase of that trial.
1 I believe this was a document that Mr. Karnavas' people found.
2 Q. Indeed. This was a document which you testified about at the
3 Blagojevic trial. But to the extent that it was not used in your brigade
4 command responsibility report, would you agree with me that this is
5 another, I would say, missing part of your report?
6 A. Well, sir, the obvious conclusion is I can't include material that
7 I do not know about.
8 Q. And that affects, of course, the validity of your report as we sit
9 here today; would you agree with me on that?
10 A. The absence of information would potentially impact some of my
11 conclusions, yes, sir.
12 Q. The next source I would like to refer to --
13 MR. BOURGON: I'm being told to slow down. I apologise.
14 Q. The next source I would like to refer you to is the Intelligence
15 Support of the Armed Forces manual under 65 ter number 710.
16 Are you aware of this -- which manual I'm referring to?
17 A. I think I am generally. It's not up on the screen, but yes, sir.
18 MR. BOURGON: Let's put it up on the screen in e-court, please, 65
19 ter number 710. The short title of this document, I think we can use
20 "Intelligence Support Manual."
21 Q. Are you familiar with the manual?
22 A. Yes, sir, I am.
23 Q. Indeed, it was, in fact, referred to in paragraph 3.8 -- 3.18,
24 sorry, of the VRS brigade command responsibility report; however, you did
25 not discuss this publication during your examination-in-chief.
1 So my question is the following, even though it was not brought up
2 earlier: It is, indeed, an important publication if only to understand
3 the distinction between the intelligence and the counter-intelligence
4 functions; would you agree with me on this point?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. Now that we have these seven sources, and whether they were
7 included or not in your report, I'd like you to simply confirm what was in
8 your report concerning the application of the JNA doctrine to VRS in the
9 field of security.
10 Now, all of these sources that we've referred, other than for the
11 Main Staff instruction of October 1994, they were all drafted and adopted
12 years before the events of July 1995, at a time when JNA doctrine and
13 rules were to be applied, of course, by units and members of the JNA; do
14 you agree with that?
15 A. Yes, sir.
16 Q. And you'll agree with me that when these regulations refer, at
17 least today, to concepts such as the League of Communists or other similar
18 concepts, these were not -- no longer being -- or concepts that were in
19 use in July of 1995?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. Now, nonetheless, in your report, you say, for the purposes of the
22 VRS, and more specifically I can say the Drina Corps and its subordinate
23 units, you maintain in your report that for the conduct of their daily
24 activities in 1995, these regulations and doctrine did find application.
25 Is that your conclusion?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. You also stated one of the reasons for this was probably military
3 effectiveness. The professional officers were trained using this doctrine
4 and regulations; and, therefore, it would be normal for them to continue
5 using it in 1995. Is that a summary of your conclusions in your report?
6 A. Yes, sir. In fact, many of the officers that we have talked to
7 over the years have confirmed that, so, you know, that's my conclusion.
8 Q. And another reason could be lack of time and opportunity to
9 develop new doctrine by July of 1995?
10 A. Well, sir, as I expect you well appreciate, rewriting a military
11 doctrine on the fly is not something that most states do. It requires a
12 long educational process within the officer and leadership core of a
13 military, so it's unsurprising that they wouldn't do that.
14 Q. Would I be correct in saying that your opinion in this regard is
15 also based on your analysis of all the documents at your disposal in order
16 to conclude that the JNA doctrine and regulations did apply in 19 -- or
17 was applied in 1995?
18 A. Yes, sir. To the extent that we could when analysing through the
19 broader body of documents, we did look for material either where it would
20 directly relate to that or bodies of documents or orders which would
21 either tend to confirm or deny that procedures in these JNA documents were
22 continuing to be followed. So that was a constant process.
23 Q. And does your conclusion apply to the responsibilities of the
24 brigade assistant commander for security?
25 A. Yes, sir. I mean, with respect to the brigade assistant
1 commanders for security, with the addition of the 1994 -- the October
2 1994 document - and I believe I testified to this fact - I believe
3 that document tends to reinforce the fact that the brigade rules were
4 being applied and that the security rules were being applied as envisioned
5 by the former JNA. I don't take that document to be something different
6 than that.
7 Q. And your conclusion, I take it, also applies to the command
8 relationship between the military police company and the brigade
10 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
11 Q. So, in your view, on the basis of the analysis of all the material
12 at your disposal, would I be right in saying that it is not possible that
13 those issues - I'm talking about the brigade commander to military police
14 command relationship and security organ issues - that they were governed
15 any differently in July of 1995?
16 A. No, sir, I agree. I have not found any substantial or any body of
17 evidence that would suggest that there was some form of another command
18 structure in place. The -- the leadership and command structure, as it
19 was envisioned in the brigade and security rules back in the 1980s,
20 appeared to be in place in July 1995.
21 Q. And as you stated, this Main Staff instruction on security and
22 intelligence of October 1995 did not modify and was in accordance with the
23 application of the JNA doctrine and regulations? The matter of security,
24 I'm talking about.
25 A. Yes, sir. I mean, there may have been some technical issues
1 addressed, but I -- by and large, they did not alter the regulatory
2 relationships and they did not alter the command relationships.
3 Q. Now, you mentioned a little earlier that you spoke to a number of
4 people on this issue, that you conducted some interviews. Were you
5 informed by the Office of the Prosecution that some witnesses in this case
6 may have offered different conclusions on the issues of security or on the
7 issue of the command relationship between commander of the brigade and
8 military police?
9 A. No, sir.
10 Q. Would that change your conclusions, if that was the case?
11 A. Again --
12 JUDGE AGIUS: He would require to know the details. I mean, how
13 can you put the questions so vague and expect him to answer?
14 MR. BOURGON: I'll move on, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
16 MR. BOURGON:
17 Q. I just want to get a confirmation from you as to how firm you are
18 concerning your conclusion of what we just discussed concerning the
19 application of JNA doctrine and regulations in those two fields, namely,
20 security organs affairs and command relationship between the brigade
21 commander and the military police, and whether -- how firm you are on
22 those conclusions in your report.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. That is another hugely broad question
24 that --
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Let's move on, Mr. Bourgon. Let's move on,
1 and then it can become an argument later.
2 MR. BOURGON: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. I move to another topic, Mr. Butler, before we leave each other
4 today. I'd like simply to use your expertise to highlight the difference
5 between security and intelligence organs.
6 First, I take it you will agree with me that, pursuant to these
7 regulations and doctrine we've referred to, that there are significant
8 differences between intelligence and security functions.
9 A. Yes, sir, I agree.
10 Q. For example, the intelligence officer is a member of the brigade
11 Command Staff, and his immediate superior is the brigade Chief of Staff;
12 while on the other hand, the security officer holds the position of
13 assistant commander for security, and his immediate superior is the
14 brigade commander. So that's one of the differences; is that correct?
15 A. Yes, sir. That's specified in the regulations, and I believe
16 within the context of the documents, it was applied as such.
17 Q. Now, of course, if the commander is away and the Chief of Staff
18 exercises command and control over the brigade units, in whatever
19 capacity - I don't want to get into this debate - then the immediate
20 superior of the assistant commander for security becomes the Chief of
21 Staff; is that correct?
22 A. With respect to command responsibility, you're correct.
23 Q. And another difference between the intelligence officer and the
24 assistant commander for security is, indeed, the nature of the work they
25 perform? Would you agree with that?
1 A. Yes, sir.
2 Q. If we look at the essence of the work performed by the
3 intelligence officer, I suggest to you that the essence of his work is the
4 gathering of intelligence, while the main component of the work performed
5 by the assistant commander for security is counter-intelligence. Do you
6 agree with that?
7 A. I believe that's a fair reading of the rules and certainly the
8 intent behind what the VRS was trying to do at that time, yes, sir.
9 Q. And looking specifically at the intelligence function, I take it
10 that you, in your capacity as an intelligence warrant officer within the
11 United States Army for many years, you are aware of the importance of
12 intelligence gathering for the successful conduct of combat operations or
13 combat activities within a brigade.
14 A. Intelligence gathering as well as the successful analysis of that
15 information, yes, sir.
16 Q. And at paragraph 3.17 of your brigade command responsibility
17 report, you describe the responsibilities of the intelligence organ, and
18 you use, for this basis, the brigade rules. I'd like to go over quickly
19 some of these responsibilities.
20 So, for example, the intelligence organ will be responsible for
21 and organises intelligence support for combat actions. Is that one of the
22 things that the intelligence organ does?
23 A. Yes, sir.
24 Q. And the intelligence organ would continuously monitor and assess
25 the enemy, and report on the enemy's condition to everyone concerned in
1 the Command?
2 A. Yes, sir. I mean, the primary customer for the intelligence
3 officer and his information would be the remainder of the operations staff
4 and the commander, yes, sir.
5 Q. And it also controls the reconnaissance activities of all organs
6 and units in the brigade; would you agree with that?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. And I just refer you now to the brigade rules.
9 MR. BOURGON: And if we can have on the e-court 694, I'd like to
10 have -- this is the brigade rules, and I'd like to have English page 61
11 and B/C/S page 99.
12 A. I would simply read something, to see if you agree, that the
13 purpose of intelligence support of combat operations conducted by brigades
14 would be to gather, process, and use intelligence about the enemy, the
15 area of combat operations, and weather conditions in the zone of
16 intelligence responsibility.
17 That's what we find at paragraph 208. Does that summarise the
18 intelligence function with respect to combat activities?
19 It's a bit small to read. Most of the other documents I have--
20 A. I'm doing fine, that's all right sir. Well, I was doing fine.
21 Q. So, again, this is paragraph 208, and I take it you must have read
22 by now the -- at the end of this paragraph, where it says that, "in
23 wartime, the focus is on gathering data relevant for making decisions for
24 the deployment of forces." Is there anything in this paragraph 208 that
25 you disagree with?
1 A. No. As written, I think paragraph 208 is a fair reflection of the
2 issues related to intelligence, particularly in a -- in a battlefield
4 Q. And making reference to your answer just a little earlier, you
5 will agree with me that intelligence is very much, to use our language,
6 talking about military language, an "ops matter." Would you agree with
8 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
9 Q. Now, in paragraph 209, we see that the intelligence organ actually
10 carries out intelligence support tasks, and we also see --
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Bourgon, could you take a look? Is the text what
12 you are referring to?
13 MR. BOURGON: 209, yes, it is, but I need to go to the next page.
14 JUDGE KWON: Take a look at 208, whether it's the correct one.
15 MR. BOURGON: Thank you for pointing that out, because I was
16 looking from afar and I don't think it's the right paragraph.
17 I was looking for the brigade rules.
18 JUDGE AGIUS: Shall we continue this tomorrow, Mr. Bourgon?
19 MR. BOURGON: Indeed. I will just make sure I have the right
20 references and give the right paragraph to the witness.
21 THE WITNESS: I was fine in 208. As I read 208, it was a fair
22 application of the battlefield. But when you started to get to 209, we
23 talk about terrain factors.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's leave it at that for today. Tomorrow, we will
25 be sitting in the afternoon, you know that, not in the morning.
1 MR. BOURGON: Yes, Mr. President. Of course, what I just did, I
2 did it on purpose for the witness.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
4 THE WITNESS: And I appreciate that.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 24th day of
7 January, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.