1 Monday, 28 January 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.20 a.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning.
7 Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is the case
9 number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, ma'am.
11 All the accused are here. The Prosecution, it's Mr. McCloskey
12 alone. From the Defence teams, it's only Mr. Meek who is absent.
13 Mr. Bourgon.
14 MR. BOURGON: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning, Judges.
15 I would like to take this opportunity to introduce a new legal assistant
16 on our team, Ms. [indiscernible] from France. Thank you, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam, bonjour and welcome to you.
18 Mr. Butler, welcome back.
19 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning.
21 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Madame Fauveau is going to cross-examine you today.
23 Madame Fauveau, what's your estimate? And good morning to you.
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, eight hours, but of
25 course I'll do my best to complete my cross-examination earlier.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Let's start. I would suggest so,
2 because the longer this evidence takes, the more counterproductive it can
4 Cross-examination by Ms. Fauveau:
5 Q. Good morning, sir. My name is Natasha Fauveau-Ivanovic. I
6 represent General Miletic.
7 On the 15th of January, you mentioned the humanitarian convoys,
8 and you said that your task was not to provide a comprehensive view on the
9 policy regarding humanitarian convoys. I would like, however, to ask you
10 whether you conducted an analysis concerning the period going from March
11 to July 1995 regarding the number of convoys that were announced and the
12 number of convoys that were refused access.
13 A. No, ma'am, I did not.
14 Q. Throughout the same period, you did not, did you, conduct an
15 analysis about the number of convoys that were authorised access but that,
16 for another reason, never went to the enclave?
17 A. That's correct, ma'am, I did not do that.
18 Q. On the 15th of January, you stated that the policy of the staff of
19 the VRS, in terms of the convoys, was directly linked to directive number
20 7. Did you conduct an analysis of the policy of the Republika Srpska and
21 its army regarding the convoys before the directive was passed; in other
22 words, before March 1995?
23 A. No, ma'am, I did not.
24 Q. In that case, how can you say that the policy of the Army of the
25 Republika Srpska, in relation to the convoys, was linked to directive
1 number 7? How can you state that?
2 A. Well, ma'am, it's pretty self-evident in directive 7 what that
3 policy is, so all I did at that juncture was then look at the convoy
4 documents to determine whether or not there was evidence that such
5 policies were being carried out. Now, with respect to the Dutch Battalion
6 and their effect in January and February and March, prior to that, I
7 believe their testimony doesn't reflect the fact that their soldiers were
8 not being permitted back into the enclaves or that they were not being
9 seriously degraded in their -- the supplies that they were getting until
10 approximately the March 1995 time frame. So, granted, while I did not
11 take into account a statistical analysis of that, I did do it on a more
12 anecdotal basis.
13 Q. Is it correct that you do not know whether the percentage
14 [Realtime transcript read in error, "personage"] of convoys that were
15 refused after the directive was higher than before the directive?
16 "Percentage." I was talking about percentage, and I see in the
17 transcript that the word "personage" has been included.
18 A. Yes, ma'am, you're correct, I cannot give you a statistical
20 Q. Would you agree that the policy of Republika Srpska and the policy
21 of its army was the result of the abuse made of the convoys because
22 weapons had been transported in these convoys, as well as humanitarian aid
23 for the ABiH?
24 A. Yes, ma'am. For the convoys, Bosnia-wide in general, the VRS was
25 aware of situations where weapons and other illicit goods were being
1 smuggled in on US -- UN vehicles, I should say, so certainly that is a
2 consideration that the VRS would have taken into account.
3 Q. Do you know that the procedure regarding to the authorisation for
4 humanitarian aid convoys was different from the procedure regarding
5 UNPROFOR convoys?
6 A. Yes, ma'am, I believe that's correct.
7 Q. Are you aware that orders related to humanitarian aid convoys
8 existed right at the beginning of the war and that the procedure did not
9 change, was not modified, after the directive was passed?
10 A. I don't know that as a fact, so I'm just not familiar with convoy
11 operations in the early war years, so I can't tell you "yes" or "no."
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like Exhibit 5D605 to be shown
13 to the witness.
14 Q. In the meantime, I'll tell you that it's an order from the VRS
15 Main Staff, from the 31st of August, 1994, regarding the movement of
16 humanitarian aid. Please turn to paragraph 1 of this order. At
17 paragraphs 1 and 2, it appears that authorisations were delivered by the
18 coordination organ. Do you agree with this?
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: This appears to be a two-page -- if could can see
20 the whole order before he's asked questions about it.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Fair enough. Yes, yes, I think he can see it on the
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I'm reading it now.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, thank you.
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: My question was: There's a whole another part to
1 this. This may be an order, but the foregoing, you know, he ought to be
2 able to look at as well.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: I think Madam Registrar heard that too.
4 THE WITNESS: Am I on page 1 or -- okay.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Otherwise, we get a hard copy and give it to him.
6 THE WITNESS: Page 2, please. Thank you.
7 Okay, ma'am, if you could ask your question again, please.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we turn back to page 1 in
9 English, please.
10 Q. My question is the following: Would you agree that with respect
11 to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this order, approvals regarding humanitarian
12 convoys were issued by the coordinating body?
13 A. Yes, ma'am, they were the initial approval authority, but as you
14 can tell from the remainder of the body of the order, the fact that they
15 would initially approve a convoy, the Main Staff made it quite clear, in
16 the body of the order, that if it wasn't coordinated through them, it
17 still wasn't going through.
18 Q. But if you turn to paragraph 4 on this first page of the document,
19 we can see that the document says sent by the VRS Main Staff to its
20 subordinate units, was a notification, notification regarding the convoys
21 that had been approved and the convoys that had not been approved?
22 A. What it's saying, at least to my reading, ma'am, is that they're
23 complaining that one of the problems that they have is that even though
24 convoys may have been approved by the coordinating body, they're aware
25 that sometimes they're not getting notified and that these convoys are
1 showing up unannounced at VRS check-points and it's causing a problem.
2 Q. I don't want to argue with you. At paragraph 3 on this same page,
3 mention is made of the control of the VRS on the movement of convoys?
4 A. Yes, ma'am. It specifically states that the army has the
5 obligation to check the teams and convoys passing through the territory.
6 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now turn to page 2 of the
7 same document.
8 Q. At point 1 of this order, convoys that had not been announced were
9 not allowed to go through?
10 A. Yes, ma'am, it's what it's saying, is that unless they receive --
11 unless the subordinate formations receive authorisation in writing from
12 the Main Staff, they're not to permit the convoy to pass.
13 Q. In the remaining parts of this order, we have a list of the
14 controls that subordinated formations or units are supposed to conduct
15 when a convoy appears?
16 A. Yes, ma'am.
17 Q. Would you agree that these measures are precisely the same as the
18 one that existed in 1995, provided of course that you know what measures
19 were to be followed in 1995?
20 A. Well, yes, ma'am, with respect to the technical goods and
21 humanitarian aid issues, it just seems to be the same type of order. The
22 fact that they're not to allow anything more that pass -- that's been
23 authorised to pass, anything else will be confiscated, so in that sense
24 it's correct. This order obviously does not regulate anything with
25 respect to the issue of UN or even international personnel who leave a
1 particular area and what the policy is on allowing them to return, so in
2 that respect it is different.
3 Q. This order indeed only mentions humanitarian convoys.
4 Now I'd like to ask you a question about UNPROFOR convoys. Do you
5 know that the VRS had concluded several agreements regarding UNPROFOR
7 A. Yes, ma'am, I am aware that the VRS did deal with the UN on the
8 issue of their particular convoys. I don't know the technical details of
10 Q. Have you had the opportunity to see the agreements passed between
11 the VRS and UNPROFOR?
12 A. For which particular time frame, ma'am?
13 Q. 1995, and especially after the directive was passed.
14 A. No, ma'am, I don't believe I've seen any agreements or any of the
15 technical agreements with the UN with respect to those convoys for
16 post-March 1995.
17 Q. But before March 1995?
18 A. I believe my association with those documents relates to convoys
19 passing between the VRS positions around Sarajevo. They're not directly
20 related to Srebrenica.
21 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown Exhibit
22 5D725, please. It's not been translated. I hope that the Prosecutor will
23 not ask me to read the entire document. It's an agreement between
24 UNPROFOR and the VRS from 12th July 1995. My questions regarding these --
25 this document are of a technical nature. I don't believe that the
1 substance of the document matters so much.
2 Q. First of all, have you had the document to --
3 A. The document says 12th --
4 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Mr. Butler.
5 THE WITNESS: The document says "12 Feb," sir.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
7 MR. McCLOSKEY: That was my point.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, I'm sure Madame Fauveau will come up with an
9 alternative for it.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, it is 12 February 1995. I
11 might have misspoken. But in any case, it's the 12th of February.
12 Q. Have you had the opportunity to see this document before? It's a
13 document related to the movement of UNPROFOR on the VRS territory.
14 A. Ma'am, if it hasn't been translated, even if I did see it, I
15 wouldn't be able to really process it, so I guess the answer is "no."
16 Q. I'm not asking you to process this document, but this document is
17 related to an agreement between the VRS and the UNPROFOR on the 31st of
18 January, 1995. At paragraph 2, we see the name of Zdravko Tolimir. He's
19 the one who signed the agreement on behalf of the VRS. Would you have any
20 idea about why the VRS decided that Zdravko Tolimir would be the one to
21 sign this agreement related to the movement of UNPROFOR on the territory?
22 A. I know from my previous work in other cases that General Tolimir
23 was frequently one of the individuals who dealt with the UNPROFOR people
24 on a higher level. So it wouldn't surprise me that he would be the person
25 that the VRS had dealing with the UN as a way of concluding this
1 agreement. So, I mean, to me it's not -- it's not remarkable that he is.
2 He has had many prior high-level dealings with the UN in the past, so that
3 doesn't surprise me.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown Exhibit
5 5D727. It's in English. Could we see the signature at the bottom of the
6 document. It's a letter sent by General Ratko Mladic to General Bernard
7 Janvier. If you turn to the text itself of the document, you'll see that
8 reference is made to an agreement passed on the 4th of June, 1995.
9 Q. Have you had the opportunity to see this agreement of 4th of June,
11 A. I do not believe so, ma'am.
12 Q. This document mentions contacts between the liaison officers in
13 the enclaves with the local commanders of UNPROFOR. Have you had access
14 to the material related to these contacts that apparently took place on
15 the 6th of June, 1995, if we are to believe this document?
16 A. No, ma'am. With respect to Srebrenica, and Zepa, for that matter,
17 I am not aware of any meeting notes or things of that nature that -- that
18 would have occurred on 6 June 1995. It certainly may very well have
19 happened, but I don't recall coming across any notes reflecting that.
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like the witness to be shown
21 Exhibit 5D615.
22 Q. And whilst it's being displayed, can you tell me what was the role
23 of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republika Srpska in relation to the
24 movement of convoys?
25 A. I'm not particularly aware that other than issues related to -- I
1 mean, particularly with the UN convoys, the military convoys, I'm not
2 aware that they had any role outside of issues of the check -- you know,
3 the joint manning of check-points and traffic control to ensure that the
4 convoy didn't go off route. I don't know what role they played in the
5 issues related to the other humanitarian convoys, the ICRC, the food
6 convoys and things of that nature. I would have assumed they'd provide
7 the same role, route security and things of that nature. I don't know
8 that they were in the approval process, per se, in the same way that the
9 Main Staff was.
10 Q. This document is dated the 13th of March, 1995, and we can read,
11 right at the beginning of the document, it's a document from the Ministry
12 of the Interior of the Republika Srpska, sent to the Public Security
13 Centre of Bijeljina, Zvornik and Sarajevo. And at the beginning of the
14 document, we can read the following:
15 [In English] "We are hereby informing you that the movement of
16 representative of the ICRC has been approved, so that you can take
17 measures accordingly.
18 "Tuesday, 14 March 1995 - the coordination body for humanitarian
19 aid number 383-ICRC-255."
20 [Interpretation] According to this document, the Ministry for the
21 interior did have to take a number of measures, particularly when
22 reference is made to a convoy and reference is made to the coordination
23 body. Do you agree that in this particular case the coordination body had
24 approved the convoy?
25 A. Well, ma'am, it says it's been approved. I assume it's from the
1 coordination body. But I think as you can also tell from the header
2 information, I mean, it appears that the primary reason for this is the --
3 is to notify the border crossing station that these people would be
4 arriving, as well as part of their route. And certainly the physical
5 control of the international border would have been a MUP responsibility,
6 not an army one in this context.
7 Q. I would then like to show you document P2522. It's a document
8 that you analysed on the 15th of January last. It was signed by the
9 Colonel Miletic at the time, General Miletic.
10 Now, if you look at the bottom of the first page in the English
11 version, this document refers to another document which is dated the 6th
12 of March, 1995 as well and in which the approved convoys are listed. Did
13 you ever see this other document with the approved convoys? Document
15 A. Ma'am, I looked at the entire suite of documents, so it's entirely
16 possible that I did see the approved convoy document, yes, ma'am.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now go on to page 3 of the
18 English version.
19 Q. We can see that on the 6th of March, it was at 2200 hours. Do you
20 see the time and the date on the document?
21 A. Yes, ma'am, I do.
22 Q. Let me now show you the document P5D620. This is the document I
23 just -- well, the previous document just referred to, in other words, the
24 staff document 0618102. This is document 5D620.
25 Can we now look at the last page of this document -- or rather
1 page 3 first. Page 3 in the English version, please. The bottom of the
2 page, please. Lower down, please. I want to take a look at the name.
3 Sir, this document was written, at least from what we see here,
4 the General Milovanovic is apparent here on this document. Now let me
5 show you the last page. I'd like to see the seal.
6 On the seal, what we see is "6th of March, 2030" or "2045." How
7 can you explain that General Milovanovic -- well, that his name is on this
8 document which came out at 2035 and that two hours later Colonel Miletic's
9 name appears on the -- another document?
10 A. I can't explain that. He could either be physically there or it's
11 just that is the way that they -- you know, they either -- they chose to
12 put it that way. I mean, I have no explanation for that.
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we come back to P2522, please.
14 Q. In the meantime, you said, on the 15th of January last, that when
15 General Miletic, who was a colonel at the time, sent out this document, he
16 gave instructions whereby the subordinate units had to -- well, that the
17 subordinate units had to comply with --
18 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter corrects herself.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation].
20 Q. ... And that in the absence of the notification, in any case, the
21 convoys would not have been able to go through?
22 A. I'm sorry, your question must have been mistranslated. Could you
23 repeat it, please?
24 Q. Do you agree that in the absence of such a notification, in any
25 case, no convoy would have been able to go through?
1 A. Yes, ma'am. I mean, the General Staff -- sorry, the Main Staff,
2 you know, had made it clear that unless the units who were manning the
3 check-points at various locations had received a written clearance message
4 that they were not to permit any of the convoys through, so I agree.
5 Q. So this, in itself, doesn't change anything? The fate of the
6 convoys is exactly the same, with or without this document?
7 A. Which document, the one signed by General Milovanovic?
8 Q. No, this one that gives the list of the convoys that are not
10 A. No, ma'am. The list of the -- the document -- the convoys that
11 it's not approved is an additional backstop so that the VRS people at the
12 check-points, if a particular convoy showed up without explanation, there
13 would be some awareness of it and the soldiers would know and the officers
14 there would know specifically to turn it around. The reason behind doing
15 that was to prevent, you know, an individual from essentially talking
16 their way through a check-point by saying that clearance has been granted
17 and that it must be just a paperwork issue or something like that. This
18 way, the VRS people had explicit instructions as to which convoys were
19 permitted to pass and under what circumstance, and they also had the list
20 of which convoys were not permitted to pass under any circumstance.
21 Q. Yes, but you do agree that on the notification -- according to the
22 notification, the convoys could not go through?
23 A. Well, the first part of this document, at least the one I'm
24 looking at here, it talks about "informing you of the convoys that were
25 approved." Now, like I said, at part of these things, they also -- on
1 each of these same orders, they also did list which convoys were not
2 approved, and I think if you scroll down on this one, you'll see the
3 notation to that effect.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May I show the witness my copy.
5 This is the paper copy of the same document, to make things easier, but
6 before looking at this --
7 THE WITNESS: I appreciate that.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Before that: You said, on the 15th of January, last page 19716,
10 that this particular document said the following:
11 [In English] "We at the Main Staff have already decided that these
12 convoys will not pass. We are informing you of our decision. In the
13 event that the convoy shows up at the check-point and is one of these
14 convoys that has already been denied, you are to take the following
16 A. Yes, ma'am. And as you note right here, on page 2 of the English
17 translations, it goes into that exact thing that I've just discussed. It
18 tells you about which convoys were approved, and then it tells you, and
19 just in case, so there's no confusion here, the ones that were not
20 approved and why. So, you know, this particular order does discuss that.
21 It discusses which ones were not approved.
22 Q. My question is slightly different. When you said that this
23 document said "we at the staff have not approved the following convoys,"
24 can you take a look at the document, please? Would you agree to say that
25 the document in no place says either -- either "we" or "the General Staff
1 of the Republika Srpska," all it says is that these convoys are not
3 A. Well, ma'am, it may be a linguistic issue, but the way the first
4 sentence reads in English, it says, you know:
5 "In order to exercise strict control over the movement of convoys
6 and teams which alone have been approved, we hereby provide details of the
7 convoys which have not been approved."
8 So given the fact that the order is from the Main Staff, you know,
9 I take it that -- from that that these are the ones that the Main Staff
10 did not approve. Now, I could stand to be corrected, in that these were
11 not approved at the commission level, but that's not how I read the
12 document. And, again, it may very well be a linguistics issue and not a
13 factual one.
14 Q. In any case, I do not dispute that this document says that the
15 convoys are not approved, but it doesn't spell out who did that. And on
16 the basis of this document alone, one cannot exclude that the coordination
17 body may have not approved that?
18 A. Yes, ma'am, that is a possibility.
19 Q. When you were in the witness box on the 15th of January, you
20 talked about Bratunac and the Bratunac Brigade. It's document P230 we're
21 talking about. This document dealt with the situation in the Bratunac
22 Brigade from the 1st of January to the 30th of June, 1995, and in this
23 document it is written that the check-point was established for the
24 purpose of monitoring entries and exits from and into Srebrenica.
25 What I would like to know is whether you are in agreement with the
1 fact that this check-point referred to was indeed established well before
2 the 1st of January, 1995.
3 A. Yes, ma'am. As far as I'm aware, the yellow bridge check-point,
4 as its referred to, existed from at least late 1993 onwards. It was the
5 primary road in and out. They did not allow convoys to enter through the
6 back way into Srebrenica, which would be the Zeleni Jadar road. So
7 everything went over the yellow bridge, so far as I'm aware.
8 Q. We agree, then, that this check-point was not established as a
9 consequence of directive number 7?
10 A. Correct, ma'am, yes.
11 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you Exhibit 5D321.
12 Q. And whilst the document is being displayed, I would like to say
13 that it's a Zvornik Brigade document that you were shown, and it deals
14 with a number of goods that were confiscated from MSF.
15 Could page 2 in English be shown, point 10 in particular.
16 You've analysed two of the reports from the Zvornik Brigade which
17 stated that sometimes goods would be confiscated from convoys. Did you
18 review the entire collection of the Zvornik Brigade documents dealing with
19 the convoys that went through that territory?
20 A. I don't believe so. I mean, I would have read the reports, but I
21 don't believe I looked at them from the context of -- of the convoy
23 Q. Don't you think that for the period from March and -- between --
24 to July 1995, it would have been relevant to find out how many convoys
25 went through without any problems instead of focusing on just two convoys
1 that had difficulties?
2 A. The goal in this context was -- and again looking at 7-1, and
3 primarily not with respect to the humanitarian good convoys, but for my
4 purpose the key thing was the convoys that were being permitted to leave
5 the enclave with UN personnel and not being permitted to return with those
6 same personnel, again as part of the larger plan of adversely impacting
7 the ability of the UN to perform its mission, which was something within
8 the larger goal of the VRS. It wasn't to do, as I've indicated before, a
9 broad statistical analysis of the convoys back and forth through there and
10 come up with a comprehensive list of materials as to what was permitted to
11 pass and what wasn't. I mean, I agree that it is -- you know, in this
12 case, you know, it is illustrative in nature. It's not meant to be a
13 comprehensive convoy review, and I don't believe I've ever said that it
15 Q. Would you agree that when a convoy showed up at a check-point, it
16 was supposed to have all relevant documents listing the goods transported
17 and the quantity of goods in the convoy?
18 A. Yes, ma'am, that is correct. They were -- the VRS required them
19 to have everything completely manifested.
20 Q. And if the goods confiscated in this convoy was not listed in the
21 documents or if the quantity listed was not the same as the one in the
22 convoy, then the goods should have been confiscated, according to the
23 rules of the VRS?
24 A. Yes, ma'am. As we earlier discussed, and I believe you actually
25 had that particular order up, the units were told by the Main Staff that
1 they were to confiscate anything that was beyond the listed authorised
3 Q. The Zvornik Brigade properly reported to the Drina Corps that the
4 goods had been confiscated; that's what happened?
5 A. Yes, ma'am, they listed as part of their daily combat report the
6 goods that they had confiscated. I did not try and cross-index this to a
7 convoy -- to a particular convoy listing to find out whether or not these
8 goods were above what was manifested or not. I mean, I don't know that we
9 even have that information that would reflect whether or not the goods in
10 this convoy were properly listed or not, so I didn't do that.
11 Q. Do you know whether the Drina Corps reported to the Main Staff
12 that these goods had been confiscated?
13 A. No, ma'am, I don't know that.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have the first page of the
15 document displayed on screen, the first page of this Zvornik Brigade
16 report. It's a report dated April 4th, 1995.
17 Q. I'd like to show you Exhibit 5D722 now. It's a Drina Corps
18 Command report dated the 4th of April, 1995. Unfortunately, this document
19 has not been translated into English. I read out the relevant part in
20 B/C/S. I know -- I think that you are familiar with regular combat
21 reports from this brigade or from the corps. We can see what's the
22 situation on -- in the area of responsibility.
23 "Situation under control. All the planned convoys and UNPROFOR
24 teams have passed through our territory without any delays."
25 Would you agree that under these circumstances, or here in
1 particular, the Drina Corps has not correctly reported the situation to
2 the Main Staff?
3 A. Well, in this context, it's clear that the Drina Corps did not
4 feel that it needed to notify the Main Staff of whatever confiscated
5 material there was. All it noted was that the convoys had passed as
6 scheduled. So I agree with you, there is no accounting of confiscated
8 Q. The goods that were confiscated were confiscated from an MSF
9 convoy. Do you remember that or should I show you the exhibit again?
10 A. No, ma'am, I remember.
11 Q. Do you know that before April 1995, there had been problems with
13 A. Could you be more specific? I mean, that's a pretty broad -- what
14 type of problems are we talking about?
15 Q. Do you know that Medecins Sans Frontieres, MSF, brought an
16 unauthorised goods into the enclave, they abused the trust of the Serb
18 A. I am aware that there were reports of MSF trying to bring in
19 additional medical and other related gear in excess to what was often
20 manifested, so I guess if that's what you mean by "problems," yes, I am
21 aware of that. I just want to make sure we weren't getting into a
22 situation like the UN, where there were allegations of fuel and weapons.
23 I'm not aware of any of those allegations against MSF.
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you Exhibit 5D609.
25 It's a report by Momir Nikolic. It's a report from the intelligence organ
1 of the Bratunac Brigade, dated January 11th, 1995. I'd like you to turn to
2 the penultimate paragraph on the first page in English. In this
3 paragraph, we can read:
4 [In English] "I would also like to inform you that the coordinator
5 of the MSF, Medecins Sans Frontieres organisation, publicly apologized for
6 the abuse of trust of one of his members in Srebrenica and publicly
7 admitted that the Serbian side has behaved perfectly correctly when it
8 confiscated the vehicle and smuggled goods. This delegate, Jean, was
9 removed from the MFS organisation and returned to his country because of
10 abuse of trust and smuggling with Muslims from Srebrenica and Naser Oric."
11 [Interpretation] Have you had the opportunity to read this report
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could he be allowed to read the entire document?
14 Again, we're just getting pieces of it.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: There are two things. Have you seen this document
17 THE WITNESS: I don't believe I've seen this document before, no,
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Then I think you need time to go through it, unless
20 you are going to be very limited in your question.
21 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it was my only question
22 related to this document. The Prosecutor has submitted volumes of
23 documents to the witness whilst only showing fractions of these documents,
24 so I don't mind if the witness is given time to read out this document.
25 But then I will ask for more time for my cross-examination.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: She can count on an objection every time that
3 we're getting piecemeal documents. We've seen the problem with that.
4 These are important matters, and Mr. Butler, as I know the Court knows,
5 needs to see the whole document.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. But what's your question? Your question
7 is whether he's seen this document before or what?
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes. My question was whether the
9 witness had ever heard of this incident and whether he had seen this
10 document. That's all.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. I think you can answer that, Mr. Butler, can
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. No, I'm not aware of the specific
14 incident in question, and like I said, I don't recall. I might have seen
15 this document at some juncture in the past, but it doesn't stand out as
16 something that -- that I'm remembering. So, I mean, I can't say that as a
18 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you know that the policy of Republika Srpska and the Army of
20 Republika Srpska was exactly the same concerning the enclaves in Eastern
21 Bosnia compared to the other ones, such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac?
22 A. For what periods of time, ma'am, because in July -- in late 1995,
23 that's not necessarily the case. I mean, we know, for example, that when
24 we look at what happened in particularly Srebrenica and Zepa, where the UN
25 was completely dependent upon the VRS for access to the enclaves, that in
1 many cases the UN soldiers were not being allowed to return.
2 Q. I think we're talking about two quite different things. I'm
3 talking about humanitarian aid.
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. That was an interruption of Mr. Butler
5 in the middle of an answer, and it was a very broad question and he was
6 attempting to answer it.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Let him answer the question first.
8 Mr. Butler, could you proceed with your answer.
9 THE WITNESS: That was it. I believe that the issue was that with
10 respect to the eastern enclaves, that the policy, particularly after
11 directive 7, was different than it was in enclaves such as Sarajevo, Tuzla
12 and Bihac, primarily because in Srebrenica and Zepa, the UN was -- and the
13 International Community was completely dependent upon the VRS for access.
14 They weren't dependent upon the VRS for access, for example, to get to
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Did you analyse the humanitarian convoys that went to Tuzla, Bihac
18 and Sarajevo to find out -- well, to be able to assert that the policy was
19 not the same as compared with Eastern Bosnia, as between the two?
20 A. No, ma'am, again I didn't analyse that, and certainly, you know,
21 one of the issues that occurred in the middle of that process that
22 completely threw everything out of kilter was in May of 1995, when the
23 NATO air strikes began, and almost all cross-conflict lines movement
24 stopped because of the VRS, you know, apprehending UN soldiers in that
25 regard. So, I mean, it's tough to do a broad statistical analysis as to
1 what all of that meant, given that that particular event occurred in the
2 middle, which skews everything.
3 Q. Do you agree that what happened concerning the NATO strikes and
4 the impact that this had on the convoys had nothing to do with directive
5 number 7?
6 A. No, I agree. I mean, it did not -- it was not a cause-and-effect
7 relationship to directive number 7, that's true.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like now to show you
9 document 5D728. It is a document that is rather lengthy. We received it
10 last Thursday from the -- from the OTP, and hopefully the OTP will not ask
11 us to read it out in full. It is a report on the application of the
12 agreement on the cessation of hostilities, March 1995, and what is of
13 interest to me is on page 4 of this document, point 7, concerning the
14 UNHCR convoy. And we're talking about UNHCR convoys and humanitarian aid.
15 Q. We see in this paragraph that on the 28th of March, 43 of 263
16 UNHCR planned convoys were blocked, and right at the bottom of the same
17 paragraph we can see that 22.800 metric tons of humanitarian aid was
18 intended for the enclave, but in actual fact 18.000 metric tons arrived.
19 And then we see the proportions for each enclave. We see that Bihac
20 received 29 per cent, Sarajevo 71 per cent, Srebrenica 93 per cent, Zepa
21 80 per cent, and Gorazde 83 per cent.
22 Now, when we see that the Srebrenica enclave received 71 per
23 cent -- and I grant you that we're talking about March 1995.
24 THE INTERPRETER: 93 per cent, the interpreter corrects herself.
25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation].
1 Q. Can we really talk about a policy of obstruction?
2 A. Well, ma'am, as you said it yourself, we're talking about March.
3 I mean, directive 7-1 was just being published, and obviously there's
4 going to be a lag between the actual implementation -- or actual directive
5 and then the actual implementation of it. So, you know, I grant it up to
6 March, it appears that 93 per cent of the aid is being delivered. I don't
7 know that that number is valid for April and beyond.
8 Q. Witness, I don't know whether you saw the information for the
9 other months. I haven't seen them, so I can't refer to them. But since
10 you are mentioning this, do you know the data concerning the other months,
11 April, May, June?
12 A. No, ma'am, I don't, and that's why I say, I mean, I don't know
13 that this number is valid, I mean, so there's just -- as far as I know,
14 there is no data with respect to the period April, May, June, until 1 July
15 when everything pretty much stopped at that juncture. So I don't know
16 what the situation is with respect to a number on that.
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we go down and let Mr. Butler read a few
18 more paragraphs down to paragraph 12 perhaps.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Butler.
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, one moment. But can he read until
22 paragraph 12 or is it too small? Yeah, it should be okay now.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I see it, sir.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you. Enough, yeah, okay.
25 Yes, Madame Fauveau.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I don't know whether the OTP would
2 like to take over the cross-examination, but in any case I have no further
3 questions on this particular document.
4 I would like to go on to another document, 5D729.
5 Q. Before we see this document, can you tell us whether you know that
6 in 1995 -- are you aware of a ceasefire that was signed at the end of 1994
7 and was valid until the 30th of April, 1995, concerning all of the
8 territory, not just Srebrenica?
9 A. Yes, ma'am, I am aware that there was a broader ceasefire in
11 Q. Do you agree that during the ceasefire, the Army of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina undertook to arm itself considerably?
13 A. Yes, ma'am, they did, and the VRS was well aware of that fact at
14 the time.
15 Q. The document that you now see, we're talking about a report from
16 Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan concerning the attitude of the Bosnian government
17 to UNPROFOR, dated 1st of March, 1995, I'd like to show you a little down
18 on this page, in the middle of the paragraph, there's a sentence that
20 [In English] "Despite the acceptance of the cessation of hostility
21 agreement on 31st December 1994 and of the accords of several joint
22 commissions held at the various command level, the BiH has obstructed
23 attempts by UNPROFOR to improve liaison, observe confrontation lines, and
24 separate forces by refusing to attend regularly the joint commission
25 process. They have applied significant additional restrictions on
1 UNPROFOR movement, increased the tempo of their own force restructuring,
2 resupply and training, and threatened the lives of the BSA liaison
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Again, could Mr. Butler be allowed to look at the
5 whole document? It's hard to say who, where, what this has to do with.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Is this a long document? How many pages?
7 MS. FAUVEAU: Twenty-five.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. In the meantime, can we know what your
9 question is so that more or less --
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Did the witness know about this policy at the beginning of 1995
12 vis-a-vis the UNPROFOR?
13 A. Yes, ma'am, with respect to where I obtained my knowledge of that
14 is the review of the United Nations report on Srebrenica which
15 incorporates, you know, many of these same documents. So in that respect,
16 you know, I was aware, and as I believe I just said, I mean, the ABiH did
17 in fact use the ceasefire period in order to militarily strengthen their
18 own capabilities, and part of that was denying the UN, particularly their
19 liaison people, access to some of the BiH military units and front lines,
20 as a way of trying to keep that restructuring and retraining and
21 re-equipping secret. So, I mean, that's a known fact and certainly one
22 that I was aware of, and, as I indicated earlier, one that the VRS was
23 aware of as well.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Shall we have the break?
25 Can I suggest that we limit our breaks to 20 minutes instead of 25
1 minutes today so that we will try and recover 10 of the 20 minutes we lost
2 in the beginning because of technical problems. Is it okay? All right,
4 So we'll have a 20-minute break instead of 25.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: What happened? Did we lose all the previous
9 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
11 Yes, Madame Fauveau.
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Before we begin, page 26, line 25,
13 the question was whether the witness knew -- was aware of the policy of
14 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ABiH, but I do believe that the
15 witness's answer was completely clear.
16 I still need 5D729, document 5D729, page 2 of this document. The
17 same document as we had just before the break.
18 Q. You can see paragraph 3 of this document:
19 [In English] "The BiH has improved numerous restrictions on
20 movement ROM on UNPROFOR. The historical trend is that the ROM are levied
21 wherever the BiH is undertaking military activity or attempting to
22 pressure UNPROFOR. Over the past two months, the BiH has applied ROM in
23 Sector North East and South West presumably to screen their military
24 activities and also to force the withdrawal of the BSA liaison officers
25 from Tuzla and Gornji Vakuf."
1 My question is: When this document talks about the North East
2 sector, this is indeed where Srebrenica was located, wasn't it?
3 A. Yes, ma'am. From the UN geographical perspective, Srebrenica
4 would be included in United Nations Sector North East.
5 Q. And then paragraph -- subparagraph (a), at the end of that
6 subparagraph what we see is:
7 [Previous translation continues] [In English] "... In the northern
8 region of the sector as well as UNPROFOR movement in the Zepa town in the
9 west of Srebrenica enclave are the subject of restrictions imposed by the
10 BiH. Concurrently, an unprecedented number of BiH fuel and supply convoys
11 have been seen moving into the northern region of the sector."
12 [Interpretation] What I would like to know: You said, on the 15th
13 of January last, page 19721, that most of the goods that were not
14 authorised to enter into the enclaves, well, these could have been used in
15 one way or another for military needs. Do you think -- do you not think
16 that the policy of the authorities of Republika Srpska concerning
17 humanitarian aid and the convoys could have been different if the enclave
18 was totally demilitarised?
19 A. Yes, ma'am, I -- had the UN completely demilitarised the
20 Srebrenica enclave, and by extension the Zepa enclave, I suspect that the
21 VRS would have factored that into their calculations as to the issue of
22 humanitarian aid. If they were comfortable with the fact that none of the
23 aid that would have been going in could have had a potential military use,
24 you know, it may very well have impacted their decision to allow that aid
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to look at page 4
2 of this same document, right at the bottom of this page.
3 Q. Right at the bottom of page 4, in the last part of this paragraph,
4 what we see is:
5 [In English] "The government actions are designed in part to
6 convince the International Community that the cessation of hostilities
7 agreement is not working, with the aim of discrediting the Bosnian Serbs.
8 In fact, it is the Bosnian government which is proving the more difficult
9 by imposing new restrictions on freedom of movement and refusing to attend
10 joint commission meetings."
11 [Interpretation] Do you agree that the constant behaviour of the
12 authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular in 1995, demonstrate that
13 they intend to compromise any agreement with the Serbs?
14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. That's calling for speculation, and
15 it's massively broad.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Fauveau. Do you wish to proceed with your
17 next question?
18 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you know the route taken by the convoys when they went to
20 Karakaj to go to Srebrenica?
21 A. No, ma'am. My understanding is that most of the convoys that --
22 that were going there went in and out of the international border
23 crossings along the Drina. You know, there may have been a few that went
24 in through Karakaj, but I think the bulk of them went in through the
25 border crossings of the Drina.
1 Q. Do you agree that when convoys entered from Yugoslavia into
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina to go to Srebrenica, they didn't go through Konjevic
4 A. I don't know that. I would assume that convoys entering at
5 Zvornik and taking the road south to Srebrenica would have to, at some
6 juncture, pass through Konjevic Polje. Certainly, the convoys entering at
7 the Loznica -- I'm sorry, not Loznica, but Ljubovo-Bratunac area would
9 Q. You analysed a series of documents from the staff, in particular
10 those relating to convoys. Would you agree to say that the name of
11 General Milovanovic appears on many of these documents right up to the end
12 of May 1995?
13 A. Yes, ma'am, his name does appear on a number of the documents.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show the witness
15 P2891. It is an OTP document that is only in B/C/S.
16 Q. This is an order from the Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska on
17 the 28th of April, 1995. I'm going to read out the first paragraph, item
19 [No interpretation].
20 JUDGE AGIUS: We are not receiving -- madam, we are not receiving
21 the interpretation in English.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] It was my fault.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, yeah. I think you can proceed now again. You
24 have to start again, madame, please.
25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] [No interpretation].
1 THE WITNESS: Still not getting it.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: We still have a problem. We're not getting the
3 interpretation. I would wait for a while, but we never got it. So what's
4 the problem? Shall we try again?
5 Sorry, Madame Fauveau. I mean, it's not your fault at all.
6 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No matter.
7 " ... With a view to combining the activities of the forces
8 engaged according to the Fletcher Plan 95 and a more efficient
9 implementation of the orders issued and the creation of conditions for the
10 realisation of the operation Coordinated Action 1995, I hereby issue the
11 following order: From the Main Staff officers of the VRS, led by the
12 chief of staff, set up the forward command post 1 in Zvornik at the former
13 forward command post of the Drina Corps, and the forward command post 2 in
14 Bijeljina, at the command post of the Eastern Bosnian Corps."
15 For the time being, can you tell me whether these are the
16 operations that were mentioned in directive 7 and 7-1?
17 A. Yes, ma'am, and those have to do with -- you know, in the context
18 of time, what is happening here is less an offensive operation but more
19 the fact that the ABiH 2 Corps has initiated its large offensive against
20 Mount Majevica and that what is happening here is that the VRS is having
21 to react to that with the forces of the northern component of the Drina
22 Corps and of the East Bosnia Corps to defend that particular area.
23 Q. According to this document, the chief of the -- the chief of staff
24 was the one in charge of setting up the post at Zvornik. We're talking
25 about General Milovanovic, aren't we?
1 A. General Milovanovic is, by formation, the chief of staff, yes,
3 Q. And when you drafted your report on the responsibility of members
4 of the staff, did you take into account that at the end of April 1995,
5 General Milovanovic is in charge of setting up forward command post at
7 A. No, ma'am, I did not. I'm not exactly sure how it's particularly
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now show the witness 5D714.
10 What I think is relevant is item 1.
11 Q. We're still here talking about the Spreca 1995 operation, and let
12 me read out to you paragraph 1 and 2(a):
13 "From among the officers of the Main Staff of the Army of
14 Republika Srpska, three teams are to be set up to be engaged in providing
15 assistance, combining combat activities, and ascertaining the state of
16 affairs in the 1st Bratunac Brigade or Birac Brigade. In accordance with
17 the order of the president of Republika Srpska, the composition of the
18 first team, the first team, Lieutenant Colonel General Milovanovic,
19 Manojlo Milovanovic."
20 My question is this: On the 12th of May, 1995, do you know that
21 General Milovanovic went into the field in the Drina Corps area to examine
22 combat activities?
23 A. No, ma'am, I did not specifically know that at this date.
24 Q. Yes, but according to this document, General Milovanovic, as the
25 chief of staff, would go into the field in order to monitor the situation
1 in the field, didn't he?
2 A. Yes, ma'am. While normally the chief of staff is the stay-home
3 person, while the commander or other members of the operation staff do
4 that, you know, the fact that the chief of staff does do it is not
5 remarkable. It's a perfectly normal occurrence.
6 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you Exhibit P2669A,
7 and be reassured that there is a translation -- an English translation of
8 this document, and I believe that you've already seen this document. It's
9 an order from the staff regarding the deployment of UNPROFOR prisoners,
10 and this document is dated 27th of May, 1995.
11 Q. Before going into this document, let me remind you that on the
12 16th of January, at page 19764, you mentioned that order and you stated
13 that item 5 of this order dealt with prisoners -- people taken prisoners
14 at the Echo post. I'd like to show you page 2 of this document in English
15 for you to be able to read item 5. In B/C/S, it's also page 2 of the
17 When you read item 5 of this document, you see that the Command of
18 the SRK has to disarm the remaining blocked UNPROFOR forces. Would you
19 agree that the Command of the SRK here is the Command of the Sarajevo
21 A. Yes, ma'am, Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
22 Q. Then they're supposed to disarm the remaining forces and to deploy
23 them to various installations, pursuant to item 1 of the order.
24 Could we go back to item 1 of the document, please, on page 1 of
25 the document.
1 At point 1, all corps are mentioned, aren't they?
2 A. Yes, ma'am, I take that to mean all the major formations, which
3 were the 6 Corps commands as well as the air-and-air forces.
4 Q. And therefore the first wave of captured UNPROFOR personnel were
5 deployed in the Krajina Corps area, the Eastern Bosnia Corps and the
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina Corps area?
7 A. Yes, ma'am, that's correct.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we go back to page 2 of the
9 document, please.
10 Q. At paragraph 5, mention is made of UNPROFOR forces that have to be
11 disarmed by the Command of the Sarajevo Corps and that they have to be
12 deployed in the Drina Corps area of responsibility. Isn't that what we
13 understand when reading the second page of this paragraph? Sorry, the
14 second sentence of this paragraph.
15 A. No, ma'am. I take it that -- I take it from this paragraph that
16 the Command of the Drina Corps will take any captured UNPROFOR troops or
17 members of the International Community that it takes, not that they're
18 going to await for additional people from the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
19 Q. Yes, but according to you, the second group -- the second wave of
20 people that have to be disarmed by the SRK, where should they be deployed,
21 this second group of people?
22 A. According to the first sentence, it's to deploy them at
23 installations pursuant to paragraph 1.
24 Q. And item 1 refers to all the corps. Why not to the Drina Corps,
1 A. At that time, the Drina Corps did not have any UN individuals
2 under its custody, I presume. And that's why, like I said, when I read
3 the second sentence of paragraph 5, the way I read it is that, you know,
4 once the Drina Corps does get such people into their custody, it will
5 place them in installations within its area of responsibility. I do not
6 take -- because it's two separate sentences, I do not take paragraph 5 as
7 an interpretation that it's the responsibility of the Sarajevo Romanija
8 Corps to take additional UN -- UNPROFOR people and turn them over to the
9 Drina Corps.
10 Q. According to this order, no order is given to the Command of the
11 Drina Corps to capture UNPROFOR personnel, and the Command of the SRK is
12 supposed to disarm these people and to deploy them in the area of
13 responsibility of the 3rd Corps?
14 A. Yes, ma'am, there's no -- there's no -- there's no explicit
15 instruction for the Command of the Drina Corps to actually capture any of
16 these individuals. I take it that that's the inference behind this.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Let me correct page 36, line 1. I
18 did not mention the 3rd Corps. I mentioned the other formations, the
19 other corps.
20 Q. Earlier on, at page 35, line 15 and 16 of the transcript, you
21 stated that at the time the Drina Corps -- or you believe that at the time
22 the Drina Corps did not have any UNPROFOR members in its custody. When
23 you say that you think or you suppose, it means that you're not sure of
24 your fact?
25 A. No, ma'am. As far as I'm aware, at that particular time the Drina
1 Corps had not specifically captured or been able to detain any UN
2 members. So as I noted in my earlier response to the Office of the
3 Prosecutor, or the Prosecutor's question on that, you know, they were also
4 aware that they were going to begin military operations against the UN
5 forces with respect to Observation Post Echo. So I take this is to be
6 that, you know, if UN people should come into their custody as part of
7 that, this is what the Drina Corps is supposed to do, is supposed to
8 deploy them in accordance with the previous instructions in installations
9 around the corps zone.
10 Q. Don't you believe, sir, that you're speculating when you are
11 making that statement, because that's nowhere to be found in this order?
12 A. No, ma'am, I agree. As I told you before, it's not -- it's not
13 explicitly stated that the Command of the Drina Corps will capture
14 those -- will capture individuals. I believe that it is inferred behind
15 the intent here.
16 Q. This order is dated 27th of May, 1995, and the name we find here
17 is that of General Milovanovic. Would you agree that at the end of May
18 1995, and we saw that it was the case also in April and on the 12th of
19 May, 1995, would you agree that General Milovanovic did not only deal with
20 Western Bosnia, he also dealt with affairs pertaining to the Drina Corps
21 and the Sarajevo Corps?
22 A. Ma'am, as evidenced by this particular document, he dealt with the
23 affairs of the entire army. Particularly of note is his listing is not
24 even as chief of staff in this context, it's as deputy commander, implying
25 that General Mladic, for whatever reason, is unavailable to issue this
1 order and it's being issued under the authority of General Milovanovic as
2 his deputy.
3 Q. Would you agree that General Milovanovic, when he was at the
4 forward command post, was acting as the deputy commander of the VRS?
5 A. In times of absence by General Mladic, you know, General
6 Milovanovic would have been, you know, in a de jure role the deputy
7 commander of the VRS, yes, ma'am.
8 Q. Would you agree that General Milovanovic, as the chief of staff,
9 was the deputy commander of General Mladic because of the establishment,
10 he did not need to receive any particular order to fulfill that these --
12 A. Yes, ma'am, I agree. I mean, the inherent authorities that he had
13 as the chief of staff of the Main Staff and as deputy commander meant that
14 he did not need any specific order to function in that role when
16 Q. Would you agree that General Mladic [as interpreted], as chief of
17 operations and training, was not, as such -- because of his position, was
18 not, as such, the deputy commander -- or the deputy chief of staff?
19 A. No, ma'am, I disagree. By -- by position, the chief of operations
20 is the deputy chief of staff and functions as such when the chief of staff
21 is unavailable or, you know, otherwise cannot perform the role. I mean,
22 in the same way that General Milovanovic is the deputy commander under
23 those same circumstances.
24 Q. Let me correct page 38, line 3 of the transcript. I'm talking
25 about General Miletic and not General Mladic?
1 On what basis did you come to that conclusion? I'm talking about
2 the answer you've just given me.
3 A. Ma'am, as the -- looking at the JNA command and staff regulations
4 of 1983, 1984, looking at the corps regulations, looking at the relevant
5 brigade regulations, all of them are consistent with designating that the
6 chief of operations has the responsibility, as the deputy chief of staff
7 of a formation, in the absence of the chief of staff. So, you know, given
8 the fact that the Main Staff is functionally organised along the same
9 criteria, for the most part, that the corps are, my view is that, and I
10 believe others have verified, that the chief of operations of the Main
11 Staff, you know, does in fact assume the position of deputy chief of staff
12 in the absence of the chief of staff.
13 Q. Would you agree that the rules you've analysed are the rules that
14 apply at a lower level, at the brigade level and the corps level, but
15 they -- we're not talking about rules that apply specifically to the
16 staff, the Main Staff?
17 A. That's correct, ma'am.
18 Q. To the Main Staff?
19 A. Yes, that's correct, ma'am. We don't have a set of instructions
20 for how the Main Staff is organised. A main staff is not a body that's
21 formed under regulations, at least not as far as I'm aware, so in that
22 context what it did was -- I had to take the lower-level rules and then to
23 determine whether or not those same rules and practices were applicable to
24 the Main Staff. And one of those was whether or not the chief of
25 operations had a concurrent role as the deputy chief of staff. And again
1 as part of the investigative process, that is one of the questions that
2 we'd asked a number of individuals who were on the Main Staff, as to
3 whether or not that was in effect, and the answer that we got was an
4 affirmative, that, you know, they acknowledge that, you know, their
5 understanding, as members of that body, was that, you know, in the absence
6 of the chief of staff, General Miletic, as the chief of operations,
7 assumed that role.
8 Q. Did you ever come across an official document from the VRS related
9 to the structure of the Main Staff?
10 A. Yes, ma'am, and in that regard I think the most useful document
11 that I came across was the 1992 analysis of the combat operations of the
12 VRS, because inherent in that document, which lays out all of the combat
13 roles and functions of the VRS, the report was authored in part by the
14 Main Staff, and in each particular segment of that report you get an
15 understanding about what the Main Staff's roles and functions were into
16 overseeing those activities. So you can actually do a fairly good job of
17 taking that report and using that to organise the structure of the Main
19 Q. I'll come back to that document later, but now I'd like to show
20 you document 5D431. Have you ever seen this document? It's a portion of
21 the document.
22 Could we zoom in on the part of the document in English, where it
23 says "Establishment number."
24 A. Yes, ma'am, I've seen this document in the last several months. I
25 don't believe that I had this document when I was doing my reports.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we display the third page of
2 this document, page 3, please. Page 2 in B/C/S.
3 Q. You see right at the bottom of this page, fourth line, we can
5 [In English] "Chief of staff, deputy commander."
6 A. Yes, ma'am, I can.
7 Q. [Interpretation] And then afterwards you see:
8 [In English] "Chief." [Interpretation] And here there's no
9 mention that this person is also the deputy chief of staff?
10 A. Yes, ma'am, that's correct, there's no mention of it.
11 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page in
12 English, please.
13 Q. Here we see the "Operations Department." That's part of the
14 Operations and Training Administration. And here again we have the chief,
15 who is at the same time the deputy head of ONP Administration. Would you
16 agree with that?
17 A. Yes, ma'am. When -- it's normally the operations person, in the
18 absence of the chief of operations, it's the head operations person who
19 assumes the role as the deputy.
20 Q. Based on this establishment, based on this formation, could we
21 agree that it's not the head of the ONP Administration who is the chief of
22 staff when the chief of staff is not present?
23 A. Ma'am, as I noted, it doesn't say that. However, the information
24 that I'm aware of reflects the fact that the head of -- that the head of
25 ONP did function as the deputy chief of staff. So, I mean, I understand
1 that particular document doesn't say that. However, I believe that the
2 large body of information, much of it that has come before here reflecting
3 him perform the duties, you know, as essentially the chief of staff, runs
4 counter to that.
5 Q. You've been shown or you've seen a great deal of documents signed
6 by General Miletic, who was first a colonel, with the mention "zastupa" in
7 B/C/S, [B/C/S spoken], and in most cases this was translated by standing
8 in for the chief of staff. Did you notice that in some document,
9 this "zastupa," this mention "zastupa" was translated by chief of staff
10 representative, [In English] "and also on behalf of chief of staff"?
11 A. My understanding is that there are different translations with
12 respect to standing in for the chief of staff or standing in for another
13 officer or a -- there's a lesser abbreviation just known as "za" where the
14 individual is signing for that person. My understanding is that with
15 respect to -- with respect to the formalised title that we're doing is
16 when the person has signed it that way or is titled as standing in for the
17 chief of staff or standing in for a particular individual, that it's a
18 more formalised process than somebody just signing for them.
19 Q. Did you ever ask the translators to explain this difference in the
20 translation in English of this phrase?
21 A. Yes, ma'am, and where it first came up was in the analysis of
22 Zvornik Brigade documents that we saw in August and September of 1995,
23 where we noticed a particular phrase associated with Major Dragan
24 Obrenovic standing in for the commander. And in that context, what I
25 asked the translators to do was to go back to the JNA military lexicon,
1 which gives those definitions, so I could understand what that particular
2 phrase meant in context of command authority, what it entitled the
3 commander or what it entitled an individual to do or to not do. So, I
4 mean, that's -- I was aware, when that particular issue came up, that
5 there was a difference in terminology that I had to explore.
6 Q. But did anybody ever tell you that in B/C/S, "zastupa" can have
7 different meanings and refer to the various levels of standing in for
8 someone or representing someone?
9 A. That's why I went to the JNA military lexicon, because military
10 terminology by and large is designed to be clear so there is absolutely no
11 confusion, on a battlefield environment, as to what it means and what the
12 phrase -- you know, what the phrase implies and what it means in the
13 military sense. So that's why we went to that particular reference
14 source, to be clear.
15 Q. This lexicon dates back to the year 1981, if I'm not mistaken.
16 Are you aware that after the war started, a number of words started
17 meaning something different, started changing, depending on the state or
18 on the territory they were used?
19 A. Well, ma'am, I will assume that that's the case. But having said
20 that, my understanding is, again going back to the JNA military lexicon,
21 and of course, you know, these were questions that we asked VRS officers
22 as we started gaining access to them, to ask them what these particular
23 phrases meant as well, if there was any confusion. So, you know, in my
24 mind there's not any confusion behind it.
25 Q. You mentioned Obrenovic. Isn't it the case that Obrenovic was not
1 standing in for but was the acting commander?
2 A. The -- and, again, it may be a linguistic and terminology issue,
3 but the phrase that we associate with Obrenovic is "the acting commander,"
4 because in a command sense, you know, somebody standing in for the
5 commander does not have inherently the same legal authorities that an
6 individual would do if he were acting as that particular person. My
7 understanding is in the case of Obrenovic, while I know that sometimes the
8 translations go one way or another, the actual term of art we used during
9 that period for him is that he's acting -- he's the acting commander.
10 Q. General Milovanovic was chief of staff of the VRS. He was the
11 direct superior of General Miletic. Would you agree with that?
12 A. Yes, ma'am.
13 Q. On Friday, not last Friday but the Friday before that, at page
14 20009, you said that Obrenovic, who was standing in for the commander
15 whilst [indiscernible] was not there, only had the authority to deal with
16 daily matters, daily affairs. Isn't it the case that General Miletic,
17 when General Milovanovic was not there, could only deal with daily
18 matters, daily affairs?
19 A. Yes, ma'am. I don't believe that, even though General Milovanovic
20 was present at an IKM or in Banja Luka or another location, General
21 Miletic had the authority to essentially perform as General Milovanovic
22 would. General Miletic, you know, in assuming the position as the deputy
23 chief of staff, you know, is going to act within the competence of his
24 position and in light of the guidance that he receives from General
25 Milovanovic and General Mladic in that manner. Again, any authority that
1 he is performing under, you know, has been delegated by General
2 Milovanovic in that respect. It is not an independent authority that he
4 Q. Do you agree that General Miletic never performed the full range
5 of functions of General Milovanovic, the same that the latter performed;
6 would you agree to say that General Milovanovic took part in the meetings
7 with the UNPROFOR?
8 A. I'm -- while I don't have a whole documentary basis to say that,
9 I'm fairly comfortable saying that certainly General Miletic, you know,
10 would not have performed the entire range of functions that General
11 Milovanovic was entitled to perform based on his position.
12 Q. We all saw that General Milovanovic went into the field in May to
13 monitor the situation. From what you know, in 1995, did General Miletic
14 go there? He didn't, did he?
15 A. I don't know whether or not General Miletic at any point left the
16 Main Staff headquarters facility to go out and monitor anything in the
17 field. I have no information one way or another on that, so I don't know
18 that I can answer the question.
19 Q. On the 15th of January, 1995, you talked about an order dated the
20 1st of May, 1993, and the order which was drafted by General Miletic and
21 signed by General Milovanovic. Well, you said that at the time General
22 Miletic was a deputy of Colonel Ilic, who was the chief of the operations
23 for education at the time. What is the source of your information, when
24 you say that on the 1st of May, 1993, General Miletic was the deputy of
25 the -- of Colonel Ilic?
1 A. I am aware that the -- there is a document which lists, in some
2 respect in a similar manner to this, it lists the formations and positions
3 of the individuals assigned to the Main Staff during the course of the
4 war. That particular document, and again I don't know the number of it
5 offhand, has a penciled-in notation on Colonel Miletic showing at what
6 point in time he was -- he was a member of various organs of the Main
7 Staff. It's that particular document which I base my information off of.
8 And, again, while I don't recall what number it would be offhand, I think
9 I have a copy of it among my notes somewhere, and it's something I can
10 produce, if necessary.
11 Q. Do you agree that you do not know what the exact function of
12 General Miletic was in May 1993?
13 A. I'm basing my understanding of the function of then Colonel
14 Miletic off of that particular document. It says what it says.
15 Q. Do you agree that the administrative operations and training of
16 the Main Staff was made up of the -- [Technical difficulties] --
17 Operations department and the department for training and the department
18 premises -- the operations premises? Sorry.
19 MR. McCLOSKEY: Could you repeat that? I don't know that that
20 came well in translation.
21 THE COURT REPORTER: Excuse me, sir. We have a --
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. We will wait and see if we can find a solution
23 to this. If not, then we can have the break now. All right. Let's have
24 a very short break, because we need a break in any case. Five minutes.
25 --- Recess taken at 11.47 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 11.50 a.m.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: It's working. All right.
3 It says when we took the recess, the break. It doesn't say when
4 we started again.
5 It says "Recess taken at 11.47." " On resuming at 11.50." That's
6 perfect. Okay. I think we can proceed.
7 Madame Fauveau.
8 THE WITNESS: Could I ask you to repeat the question again, ma'am,
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
11 Q. So this was my question: Do you agree that the Operations
12 Department -- Operations and Training Department comprises two
13 departments, the Operations Department and the Education, Operations and
14 the Training Room -- Operations Room?
15 A. My understanding is that it's three separate elements. It is the
16 Operations Department, it is the Training Department, and it is the
17 Education Department. So, I mean, those are the three particular
18 functions. Now, an operations room, you know, it may be part of a
19 particular department, but I don't believe it's a separate department, per
21 Q. Well, I won't go into detail about this. It's not really
22 relevant. But you do agree that the chief of the Operations Department is
23 the Deputy Ilic who was the chief of the Operations and Training
25 A. At what time frame? We're talking 1993, ma'am?
1 Q. Yes, 1993. May 1993, to be specific.
2 A. Yes, ma'am, I believe that May 1993, Colonel Ilic was the chief of
3 operations and training.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I show you 5D723? And before
5 that -- well, this is an excerpt from the personal file of General
7 Q. Did you have an occasion to look at General Miletic's personal
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: I think we're talking personnel file, just --
10 because that's not the way it got translated.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: It got translated "personal" file, but ...
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, that is the way it was called.
13 I did mention the personal file. That's how it was presented to us. I
14 agree that the dates are completely mixed up, as least as regards the
15 first line, and that is no doubt General Milovanovic's fault. He wrote
16 this. But what is of interest to me is this: The function of General
17 Miletic, the first is of Training Department, and then, on the 26th of
18 August, 1993, he -- Administration for Operations and Training.
19 Q. Do you agree that General Miletic, as chief of the Education
20 Department, was not the deputy of Colonel Ilic?
21 A. Ma'am, I can only tell you what -- what that other particular
22 document shows. And, again, I'll -- I'll endeavour to produce that
23 document. I think I've seen an English language translation of this. I
24 believe one exists. And I have seen this particular document as well.
25 Q. You said, on the 14th of January, page 19632, and I'm going to
1 read out what you said about the organisation of main staffs:
2 [In English] "In practical terms, within a particular staff, it
3 recognises the fact that the staff may be organised in many certain ways
4 in the context of the former JNA, where you have assistant commanders of
5 morale or political works at the time, assistant commander for logistics,
6 assistant for security, you have chiefs of intelligence and other staff
8 [Interpretation] My question is: In the Republika Srpska Army, do
9 you agree that all these assistants to the commander were not part of the
10 sector of the staff, the staff sector?
11 A. No, I mean, and again the same way when we talk about the brigades
12 or the corps, the assistant commander for morale, legal and religious
13 affairs, the assistant commander for logistics, the assistant commander
14 for intelligence and security, those individuals do not fall under those
15 bodies that are known as the operative staff part of the Main Staff, where
16 you would have, you know, armour forces, where you would have, you know,
17 the staff officer for mechanised, the staff officer for air defence, the
18 staff officer for training, things of that nature, communications. So we
19 do have to parse out within, you know, the larger body of the Main Staff
20 that there's a specific operations-related staff that for the most part
21 deals with the day-to-day operational activity of the army. And it's
22 certainly, you know, within that context people like General Gvero aren't
23 part of that staff, or General Djukic aren't part of that staff.
24 Q. Do you agree that General Milovanovic, what we're talking about,
25 is the chief of the sector of the staff?
1 A. Oh, yes, sir, and again I believe also, as -- as General
2 Milovanovic himself has indicated, you know, as the chief of staff, he is
3 the first among equals with respect to the assistant commanders, because
4 he alone, you know, has the position of deputy commander when necessary.
5 So while, you know, in an administrative sense he is on par with the other
6 assistant commanders, the reality is because of position, he is first
7 among equals and, you know, has authority over them when performing in the
8 deputy commander function.
9 Q. And when General Miletic, in the limited framework that you
10 describe, replaces General Milovanovic, he does this in the framework of
11 the activities of that sector of the staff?
12 A. Yes, ma'am, to a point where -- where he performs as deputy chief
13 of staff that he does. In instances where, as a result of absence or
14 other circumstances, he is called to function as the deputy commander, he
15 would exercise the same inherent authorities as General Milovanovic would
16 as the deputy commander.
17 Q. And are you -- do you agree that in no circumstance could General
18 Miletic replace Milovanovic as deputy commander of the army?
19 A. I've never seen -- I've never seen a document reflecting, at least
20 during the time frame we're talking about in July and beyond of 1995,
21 where General Miletic is ever identified as deputy commander or deputy
22 commander of the army as that would be the case, so I agree in that sense,
23 I mean, I've never seen -- I've never seen his name categorised as such.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Microphone.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Did you have the opportunity to review the testimony of General
3 Skrbic, the testimony he gave here in this Tribunal?
4 A. No, ma'am, I don't believe I've read that testimony.
5 Q. Did you know that General Skrbic -- I believe that you said that
6 he was assistant commander for logistics, but actually he was assistant
7 commander for personnel affairs. Did you know that?
8 A. No, ma'am, I don't believe I've ever identified him as that. I
9 know that -- I know that position is filled by General Djukic, as
10 assistant commander for logistics. I don't believe I've ever referred to
11 him as that, and if I did, it was in error.
12 Q. Do you agree that General Skrbic was the assistant commander for
13 mobilisation and personnel affairs?
14 A. Yes, ma'am, that is my understanding of his position.
15 Q. Do you know that as assistant commander, General Skrbic was higher
16 up in the hierarchy than General Miletic?
17 A. Under normal -- you know, by position, he would be. I mean, he is
18 the -- he is the general officer who is -- who is responsible for the
19 administration of his particular sector. So given that all of the
20 assistant commanders are on somewhat of an equal footing and that, you
21 know, General Miletic is not designated as an assistant commander under
22 his role as chief of operations, that would make sense.
23 Q. Let me now move on to a different topic.
24 On the 15th of January, you mentioned that strategic objectives
25 were discussed at the Republika Srpska Assembly on the 12th of May, 1992.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown Exhibit
2 P25. It's the minutes of this Assembly meeting. I'd like page 13 in
3 B/C/S and page 14 in English, please.
4 Q. Out of these six strategic goals, I'm only interested in the first
5 and the third one, and I'd like to deal with the third one first, the
6 elimination of the Drina as the border. Would you agree that this is
7 indeed a political goal?
8 A. Well, within the context of when it was delivered, at that
9 particular time it was not envisioned that the Republika Srpska would
10 exist as an independent state. My understanding is that the political
11 goal at the time was that the predominantly Serbian territory would in
12 fact be incorporated into the remaining part of the FRY. So it does
13 reflect a political goal, yes, ma'am.
14 Q. When President Karadzic mentioned this third goal, he stated:
15 [In English] "We now see a possibility for some Muslim
16 municipalities to be set up along the Drina as enclaves in order for them
17 to achieve their rights, but it must basically belong to Serbian Bosnia
18 and Herzegovina ..."
19 [Interpretation] When Radovan Karadzic talked about the
20 possibility of setting up Muslim municipalities, then the idea was for the
21 Muslims to stay in the region; that's something envisaged?
22 A. It was envisioned within the context that Muslims who stayed in
23 that territory would have to essentially accept that they would be living
24 under the control of the Bosnian Serb government at the time, yes, ma'am.
25 Q. Yes, but it did not envisage the -- that the population would
1 leave the region?
2 A. Well, the practical problem here is the same as the practical
3 problem in the Krajina region, which was the fact that the areas that they
4 were referring to were areas where the Muslim population was effectively,
5 in some cases, almost a 70 per cent majority population. You can -- in the
6 abstract, you can say certainly the Muslims will be permitted to stay as
7 long as they submit to Serb authority. The flip side, of course, is that,
8 you know, when you're 70 per cent of the population, you're not going to
9 want to do that, presumably. And if you have an ability to resist, you're
10 going to resist. So, I mean, I would also, you know, keep in mind when
11 you read this, there's also, you know, the other documents that are out
12 there with respect to the fact that, you know, which municipalities, you
13 know, have to be depopulated to a point where they become majority Serb
14 population municipality. So, I mean, I can't -- you don't read it in
15 isolation. You have to read it into the practical aspect of what was
16 happening at the time.
17 Q. Do you agree that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the population
18 breakdown and composition was extremely complex, it was a mixed
19 population; most Muslims lived in towns, though, and the Croats and the
20 Serbs lived in the countryside? Please answer if you know, of course.
21 A. I am aware that certainly there are all sorts of ethnic factors
22 involved, and I don't pretend to be an expert on those. My -- my
23 understanding on that, you know, again relates to what the VRS or what the
24 Bosnian Serbs were saying about the situation in 1992 and 1993, not from
25 an understanding of demographics as an independent observer. So my
1 observations of what the situation was in that area is, in large part, a
2 reflection of the VRS and of the Republika Srpska documents that I've read
3 describing that situation, not my own independent observations.
4 Q. I'd like to go back now to the first objective, first goal to the
5 separation of the Serb people from the other people. Let me first put to
6 you the following question: Reading your reports, I can see that you've
7 read a lot of laws from the former Yugoslavia, not only the ones related
8 to the army. For example, you read the Penal Code. But I would like to
9 know whether you ever read the Constitution of the former Yugoslavia.
10 A. No, ma'am, I have not.
11 Q. Did anyone draw your attention to the fact that the preamble of
12 this 1974 Constitution granted the right to the people, not to the
13 republic, to -- granted them the right to self-determination that could go
14 to the point that they would separate from the rest of the country?
15 A. No, ma'am, I don't know that that's in there or not. I'm
16 certainly not a Yugoslav constitutional scholar by any means, so I'll take
17 your word for it.
18 Q. If you take my word for it, isn't the first objective of a Serb
19 people in Bosnia part of the right that was granted to it by the Yugoslav
20 Constitution? Isn't it part and parcel of it?
21 JUDGE AGIUS: You don't need to object, Mr. McCloskey.
22 Move to your next question, please. Thank you.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, I'll move on to something else.
24 Q. Do you know that the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina
25 proclaimed the same objective six months before the Serbs?
1 A. I am aware from a -- from the political context that certainly a
2 number of months before a declaration of independence, there was a great
3 deal of political discussion with respect to whether or not Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina would either choose to become independent or whether they
5 would choose to remain as part of the -- or what was then going to become
6 the FRY. As for the actual details of the discussion and the context
7 behind that, I don't know the answer to that. That's not my area of
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like the witness to be shown
10 Exhibit 5D546. 5D546. It's a joint document from the regional
11 communities of Herzegovina and Travnik.
12 Q. I'll let you read the first paragraph of this document. It's a
13 document dated 12th of November, 1991. What I find relevant here is the
14 last part of this paragraph, where we can read as follows:
15 [In English] "On 12 November 1991, jointly and unanimously decided
16 that the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina finally have to start
17 conducting a decisive and active policy which should bring about the
18 realisation of our eternal dream, a joint Croatian state."
19 [Interpretation] Do you agree that there's no real difference
20 between the goal set out here by the Croatian people and the one that
21 would be proclaimed six months later by the Serbian people?
22 A. I mean, I'm -- I'm generally aware that both the Serb people and
23 the Croatian people in Bosnia were looking, to some degree, to become, you
24 know, more closely aligned with their native ethnic states, but again
25 you're really approaching the outer limits of my not only area of
1 expertise but my basic general background on these types of issues
2 [Technical difficulties]
3 THE COURT REPORTER: Sorry, sir, the computer shut down. Can we
4 have a short break so I can replace it with another computer.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE AGIUS: No, no. I don't think so, Judge Kwon. I don't see
7 at least what I'm saying scrolling. I think the best thing to do would be
8 to take the 20-minute break now instead of in 15 minutes' time and then
9 try and see if we can solve this problem.
10 In the meantime Ms. Fauveau will see how she could shorten her
11 cross-examination further.
12 --- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. For the record, because I didn't notice her
15 absence earlier on, Ms. Nikolic is also not present today.
16 Madame Fauveau, please.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show the witness
18 Exhibit P29. It is directive number 4, dated 19th of November, 1992.
19 Perhaps we could go to page 11 of the B/C/S version and page 5 of the
20 English version. Can we see the bottom of the page of the English
22 Q. On the 15th of January last, you said that the last part of the
23 first sentence concerning the stage -- entrusted to the Drina Corps,
24 defined the character of campaign and the civilian population becomes the
25 objective. Page 19677. When you were a witness, you mentioned on several
1 occasions the doctrine of the JNA. Is it right to say that that doctrine
2 was indeed the doctrine of the People's Defence, the All People's Defence?
4 A. Well, All People's Defence was the primary defence doctrine of the
5 former SFRY. The JNA, just like the TO, had their pieces of that, so, I
6 mean, their -- their military doctrines were a -- were a component part of
7 the larger All People's Defence doctrine.
8 Q. The basis of this concept for the society in former Yugoslavia,
9 which was based on self-management, the basis of the concept of All
10 People's Defence was that everybody should take part, in one way or
11 another, to defence?
12 A. Yes, ma'am. I mean, it's a reflection of the -- one, the past
13 history of the former Yugoslavia under occupation during World War II, and
14 also a reflection of their modern defence strategy, which called for a
15 situation where, if invaded by either the NATO Bloc or the Warsaw Bloc,
16 you know, recognising they didn't have the military force to forestall
17 that invasion, they would adopt a strategy of insurgent warfare within
18 their own country as a way of making a foreign occupation so expensive
19 that an opponent would ultimately leave. So, you know, in that context,
20 that is what All People's Defence revolved around, the fact that not only
21 all individuals but that all sectors of the Yugoslav state would be a part
22 of that defence.
23 Q. Let me now show you Exhibit 5D659, which is indeed the Law on All
24 People's Defence, the Yugoslav law. Strangely, this law -- I was able to
25 find it only in English, so you have a version that you can readily read.
1 Perhaps we could go to page 2, paragraph 3 which begins at the
2 very bottom. In this paragraph, what we see is:
3 [In English] "All People's Defence is a unit system whereby
4 working people and citizens self-management organisations and community
5 sociopolitical and other social organisation and sociopolitical
6 communities organise themselves, prepare for and take active part in
7 deterring and forestalling aggression and other threats to the country in
8 arm struggle and other form of All People's resistance."
9 [No interpretation].
10 [Interpretation] Do you agree that on the basis, and I think
11 you've already said this, that indeed everybody, including all the
12 structures, took part in this, do you agree that on the basis of this
13 article, what we conclude is that any able-bodied men could join or should
14 join the army, and in particular join in combat?
15 A. What it notes is the fact that all sectors of society, you know,
16 need to be prepared to resist foreign occupying power. The reality is
17 that, you know, it was mandatory military service in the JNA, so that for
18 the most part, all military-aged males were inducted into the army for a
19 short period and didn't receive military training, and were expected, in
20 times of conflict, that they would in fact be mobilised and take part in
21 the conflict.
22 Q. Do you know that according to this law, and I'll show the page 10,
23 Article 19, paragraph 2, women aged between 15 and 55 years were compelled
24 to take part in the bodies in charge of civil defence?
25 A. I did not know that within the former SFRY, but I would not find
1 that surprising.
2 Q. Do you agree that under this concept, it is difficult to conceive
3 that the civil population should remain in one place when the army is
4 withdrawing or has withdrawn from the same place?
5 A. I'm -- I'm kind of confused about the context. I mean, what civil
6 population are we talking about? I mean, are we talking about an occupied
7 territory? I mean, I don't understand.
8 Q. We're talking about the population that can only be civilian, in
9 other words, children, elderly people, and the context is the war in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular in the context of directive 4.
11 A. Okay. Well, in the context of directive 4, you know, it would not
12 make sense, I would suspect, that if the Muslim soldiers were forced out
13 of a particular territory, that their families and other male
14 non-combatants, those too old to serve or those infirm would want to be
15 left behind. As a practical matter, you know, their ability to support
16 themselves would potentially be suspect, not to mention the fact that
17 given the context of the conflict to date, they probably wouldn't have a
18 whole lot of confidence that they would be permitted to remain there
19 anyway. So in that regard, it would make sense that if the army were to
20 pull out, that the civilian population that was dependent upon them would
21 want to accompany them, yes, ma'am.
22 Q. Do you think that the sentence in directive 4 that everybody is
23 familiar with, I think, was written more in this particular context, i.e.,
24 the concept whereby the army and politicians of the Serbs were impregnated
25 with the All People's Defence, in other words, that this sentence meant a
1 campaign against the civilian population?
2 My question was perhaps badly formulated, but in any case there's
3 an error in the translation.
4 What I want to know: Do you agree that this sentence in directive
5 4 could be more the expression of that doctrine of the All People's
6 Defence rather than a campaign -- or, rather, the expression of the
7 campaign against the civilian population? The expression of the campaign
8 against the civilian population?
9 A. Certainly, the VRS understood, within the context of that, that
10 the Bosnian Muslims who were fighting with them at the time, you know,
11 were dependent upon, to some degree, their own civilian population for
12 shelter, food, housing, things of that nature. And, you know, as a matter
13 of, you know, technical military expediency, you know, forcing the
14 civilian population out would have a significantly detrimental impact upon
15 the ability of the Muslims to continue to engage successfully in combat
17 Now, having said that, you know, when you look at the directive
18 under 4 and then you look at what actually happened as part of the Cerska
19 1993 operation, it doesn't appear that way. You know, what you -- what it
20 appears that you have is a campaign that is not having any regard for the
21 civilian population whatsoever in an effort to get it to leave that
22 particular area.
23 Q. You're talking about the Cerska 1993 campaign. Is it true to say
24 that what happened in the spring of 1993 was, in fact, in response to the
25 Muslim aggression that had no regard for the Serbian civilians, either?
1 A. The Cerska campaign started in January, so it was a wintertime
2 campaign, and certainly with regards to what the VRS believes the trigger
3 event to be would be the attack on the village of Kravica. You know,
4 their view is that the Bosnian Muslims also fought without regard to the
5 civilian population, so it's not a one-sided affair, I agree.
6 Q. Do you think that indeed this war, on one side and the other, was
7 not directed against the civilian population, as such, but it was simply
8 the nature of the war that made it a war of people against the people, and
9 that is what determined their respective behaviours?
10 A. The problem in making that particular conclusion is that you have
11 to -- to do it, you have to ignore the underlying diplomatic context that
12 was occurring at the time, particularly as we go into 19 -- late 1992,
13 early 1993, where the relevant international peace plan was dependent upon
14 establishing the majority population blocs in certain geographic areas of
15 Bosnia. The Republika Srpska understood at the time that going into early
16 1993, that the Muslims were the majority population bloc in Eastern
17 Bosnia, and they also understood that if the Vance-Owen Plan, as it was
18 coming out, was going to reflect allowing, you know, control over various
19 areas of Bosnia to be determined by the majority population in those
20 areas, they recognised that they would have to cede control over what they
21 understood to be a very important geographic portion of then the Republika
22 Srpska. So you can't ignore -- or you can't view what happened to
23 civilians on both sides without at least, you know, some regard to the
24 over-arching context of what each side was trying to obtain.
25 Q. Well, I appreciate what you have just been saying, but my question
1 may perhaps not be simple, but I do think it needs a rather shorter
2 answer. Do you accept that it is possible to give another explanation to
3 directive 4, particularly the task entrusted to the Drina Corps, i.e.,
4 that it is a campaign partially directed against the civilian population,
5 and this other explanation is that this is phraseology in the doctrine
6 that was -- that prevailed in all the former Yugoslavia entities?
7 A. Well, as I understand the All People's Defence doctrine and why
8 these types of phrases were incorporated into law was so that in
9 circumstances where individuals who might normally be characterised as
10 civilians were caught by an occupying power engaged in military-related
11 acts, that they might be afforded some protections as potentially
12 prisoners of war, as opposed to civilians being unlawfully engaged in
13 combat. So I can't read these particular laws in a way that would somehow
14 be used as a way to justify attacking a civilian population with the idea
15 that, well, they could become militarily relevant at some point, so it's
16 important to do that. I don't think that that's the intent of the laws
17 behind All People's Defence, and therefore I don't read it in that light.
18 Q. Have you studied the concept of All People's Defence once you had
19 finished at the OTP?
20 A. No, and I don't -- I don't pretend to be an expert on the issue of
21 All People's Defence.
22 Q. That was indeed what I was going to ask you. In the Blagojevic
23 case, page 4799, you said that you didn't -- you weren't very familiar
24 with the All People's Defence system.
25 A. No, agreed, and that's why I said, I mean, the context that I
1 understand it is -- is what others who understand the law have noted, not
2 that it somehow -- you know, the concept of All People's Defence, you
3 know, is some form of a legal justification to attack civilians. I mean,
4 I believe that the opposite was -- you know, that I described was in fact
5 true. It's designed as a mechanism to allow their own civilians to seek
6 some protection under the law with respect to their conduct against an
7 occupying power.
8 Q. My proposition is not that it justifies this, but rather that this
9 particular phrase does not mean a particular attack against civilians, but
10 rather the reality of a war situation in this system where the people are
11 fully implicated in the -- in the war, including children and elderly
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Asked and answered.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think so, and I was actually thinking of
15 inviting you to move to something new, Madame Fauveau, something else. I
16 think you have belaboured this point.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we see Exhibit P414, analysis of
18 combat readiness of the VRS in 1992. You've already mentioned this.
19 Perhaps we could take a look at page 161 in the English version, 137 in
20 the B/C/S version.
21 No, that's not it. No, I don't think that's the right page. The
22 next page, please. Is this the new or the former version? I know there
23 are two versions of this document.
24 In the meantime, with the help of my case manager, we'll try and
25 find this page, but I'll read it out to you in English. This was the task
1 entrusted to the Drina Corps, and according to this, the task was:
2 [In English] " ... The Muslim forces in the regions of Srebrenica
3 and Zepa and then regroup forces and orientate them towards Gorazde, plan
4 and prepare the operation in coordination with forces of the SRK and KK,
5 and ensure the linking up of these corps on the southern slopes of Mount
6 Jahorina on the Gorazde-Trnovo line."
7 [Interpretation] This is page 157 in English. It was my mistake.
8 What I'm interested in is the first part of this task.
9 Q. This is a document that dates back to April 1993. This task that
10 was entrusted to the Drina Corps concerns exclusively the Muslim forces,
11 does it not?
12 A. Yes, ma'am, it specifically notes the Muslim forces. I take that
13 to be the Muslim military forces.
14 Q. Nothing in the document demonstrates that the action should be
15 directed against the civil population, civilian population, does it?
16 A. No, ma'am, that's correct, I mean, there's nothing in this
17 document -- in this particular task that notes that.
18 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now go to page 8 of this
19 document, and I think this time this is the right page.
20 Right at the beginning of the second paragraph, we can see how the
21 decisions were taken. In particular, we can read:
22 [In English] "Decisions on the engagement of the forces of the
23 Army of Republika Srpska were taken at meetings of bodies of the Main
24 Staff headed as a rule by the commander, with the presence and active
25 participation of the chief of Main Staff, the assistant commanding
1 officers, the heads of the departments, the heads of the combat arms, and
2 a number of administrative officers."
3 [Interpretation] This is the new version of the document, and we
4 can see here administrative officers are mentioned, whereas previously
5 operational officers were mentioned instead. Do you think there's a
6 reason for the fact that "administrative officers" was in fact translated
7 by "operations officers"?
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, this is a CLSS document, and so I
9 don't understand the thrust of that question. Is it suggesting some ill
10 will on the part of CLSS?
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madame Fauveau. Shall we move to your next
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, of course.
14 Q. Among the people mentioned in that paragraph, commanders,
15 assistants, heads of departments, is there a particular category that
16 covers operations officers?
17 A. I believe the operations officers would fall into the category of
18 the heads of the combat arms, because the combat arms branches were part
19 of the larger Operations Department. So specific operations officers
20 would be included in that particular genre of individuals.
21 Q. Later on, I will show you something else, but I don't think that
22 the head of the army is in the operations. Do you make a distinction --
23 A. I'm not saying the head of the army is operations. What I'm
24 saying is that, you know, the heads of the departments or the heads of the
25 combat arms branches are where you would find the various operations
1 officers who would be supporting that process.
2 Q. But the army corps which they were chiefs of were not part of the
3 Department of Operations and Training, were they?
4 A. No, they would be the -- the heads of combat arms were their own
5 departments, but they did generally have to operate within the context of
6 the operation and -- the guidance of the operations and training people.
7 They were -- they were the technical experts in their particular branch
8 fields who would support the -- you know, support the issuance of orders
9 as well as provide the technical expertise as to what the various branches
10 could contribute or should contribute to various operations. So, I mean,
11 that's why I say that's where I see them as part of that process.
12 Q. Do you agree that the head of the combat arms are not subordinate
13 to the head of the Operations and Training Department but, rather,
14 directly to the head of the staff, to the chief of staff?
15 A. At the Main Staff level, I believe that's true, they would be --
16 they would be directly responsible to the chief of staff.
17 Q. If we look at the next sentence, it refers to the complete method
18 for decision-making, the so-called full method. I'll come back to this,
19 but can you confirm that this full method was used at every level, not
20 just by the staff but also by the corps and the brigades?
21 A. As a rule, where time and resources allowed, the VRS wanted to use
22 the full level in order to develop the best possible plans, using the
23 widest experience and talent pool they had available. There are
24 obviously, particularly when you get to the brigade level and you have a
25 shortage of both time and officers, you're not going to have that as the
1 case. Sometimes it may very well be that the commander is going to have
2 to make that -- you know, that fast-track type of decision because he's
3 out of time to take a longer method. So, I mean, certainly it was
4 preferred, but I can't say as a blanket statement it was always done
5 particularly at the brigade level.
6 Q. Do you agree that when the brigades and corps did use the full
7 method for decision-making, the Main Staff was not involved in planning
8 each particular military action, these military actions that were planned
9 and performed at a tactical level by the brigades?
10 A. Yes, ma'am, that -- that certainly would not have been the
11 function of the Main Staff to get into the necessary detail where -- where
12 they were involved in actually planning tactical-level operations.
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to move on to Exhibit
14 P2749. And whilst the document is being displayed, I'd like to say that
15 it's an order from General Mladic, dated the 22nd of July, 1994, and on
16 the 15th of January you mentioned the Drina Corps order that was based on
17 this particular order I'm going to show you now.
18 Could we show page 2 of this order, please.
19 Q. At the very top of this page, we can see the roads or the road
20 that were used to bring supply to Srebrenica-Zvornik-Drinjaca-Zelinje-
21 Polom-Krasonovici and Bratunac. Is that the way you understood the
22 situation was that the road or the route used to go to Srebrenica -- we
23 mentioned it earlier on.
24 A. Yeah, I don't recall this, but I guess it makes sense that they
25 would go through -- so they're following the left bank of the Drina, so in
1 this particular order they're not being -- they're not being directed
2 along through Konjevic Polje. I think two paragraphs down, it does even
3 reflect that it's specifically designed to prevent movement along that
5 Q. Yes, absolutely. And the paragraph just below that one mentions
6 check-points to be set up to monitor the convoys. Would you agree with
8 A. Yeah. I mean, it talks about that.
9 Q. We cannot say, therefore, that directive 7 changed anything with
10 respect to the convoy policy?
11 A. The -- you know, what directive 7 specifically noted was that it
12 was to create the conditions within the enclaves where the UN and
13 presumably, you know, the civilian population --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Butler, let's move. Madame Fauveau, I don't
15 think the witness needs to repeat what he thinks of directive number 7.
16 He said it already about 20 times.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we move on to page 4 of this
18 document, page 4 in English and 3 in B/C/S.
19 Could you please turn to paragraph 13, paragraph 13 of that order
20 to the Drina Corps, talking about all measures to be taken in respect to
21 the enclaves mentioned in the agreement.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
24 Q. According to what we read in this paragraph, this order is linked
25 to the -- to whether the Muslim forces and UNPROFOR respect the agreement
1 on demilitarisation?
2 A. Yes, ma'am. I mean, it reflects the fact that, you know, because
3 the VRS's position is that the Muslims are not fulfilling the terms of the
4 ceasefire agreement and demilitarisation, that the VRS needs to take
5 actions to reduce the size of the enclaves to what it perceives to be the
6 actual agreed-upon size. I believe I indicated that last time I talked
7 about this document.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we go back to the first page
9 of this document, please.
10 Q. At item 1 of this order, mention is made of an order -- another
11 order dated 18th of April, 1993, which is hereby declared null and void.
12 When talking about General Zivanovic's [Realtime transcript read in error
13 "Jovanovic's"] order that referred to this same order that he's here
14 declared null and void, you stated that according to you, what was
15 declared null and void was the agreement, the ceasefire agreement that had
16 been signed by the Serbs and the Bosnians.
17 At line 3 of the transcript, I'd like to have a correction.
18 It's "General Zivanovic."
19 My question is the following: Isn't it the case that order number
20 03/8-9 is an order from the Main Staff?
21 A. Yeah, I'm curious about your reference to Zivanovic. I hope I
22 didn't say that. I believe that what the order is is there's an order
23 signed by General Mladic to that effect. I hope I didn't say "General
24 Zivanovic," because it is a Main Staff order; it's not a Drina Corps
1 Q. I mentioned General Zivanovic because you were shown the Drina
2 Corps order that was delivered based on the order I have just shown you.
3 Now, with respect to order number 03/8-9, dated 18th of April,
4 1993, my question is whether you've seen that order.
5 A. I think I have, and I may even have referenced it in my
6 narrative. I believe I have seen that order, because it is the
7 implementing order for the ceasefire that was signed. So I think if
8 memory serves me, I have seen that order.
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have Exhibit 5D708.
10 Unfortunately, we only have this exhibit in B/C/S, but you might have seen
11 it in English somewhere else.
12 Q. I'll read out the relevant portion of this document:
13 "Pursuant to the agreed ceasefire, the delegation of the Army of
14 Republika Srpska, the UNPROFOR forces and the Muslim forces, in a view to
15 further regulating further procedures of the army of Republika Srpska
16 around Srebrenica, I hereby order: On the 18th of April, 1993, at 0459
17 hours, the corps commands and other commands subordinated to them, as well
18 as the officers, will ensure a complete and total ceasefire in Srebrenica
19 and its surroundings, and at the same time all the combat activities shall
20 stop. The ceasefire and combat activities imply the following: A ban on
21 opening fire from all types of infantry, artillery and other weapons, as
22 well as the use of mines, explosives and other pieces; an interruption of
23 the movement of forces and equipment around Srebrenica, as well as of the
24 manoeuvre of the forces and equipment, bringing new troops and new
25 equipment to the general sector of Srebrenica. After the aforementioned
1 time, not a single bullet must be fired from any piece or any weapons.
2 Anybody who violates this ceasefire shall be taken to task in disciplinary
3 or criminal terms."
4 Please tell me, would you agree that this order signed by General
5 Milovanovic is in accordance with the agreement signed by the Muslim and
6 the Serb side in April 1993 with respect to Srebrenica?
7 A. Yes, ma'am, it incorporates that. I believe many of those --
8 those exact same measures are incorporated into the broader agreement that
9 General Mladic signed, so I believe this is consistent with that, yes,
11 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you Exhibit 5D748.
12 It's a document from the ABiH. 5D548. It's a document from the ABiH,
13 dated 8th of June, 1993, less than three months before the first agreement
14 was signed and only two months after the signature of the second
15 agreement. At point 1, we can see:
16 [In English] "Organise your own reconnaissance and deploy
17 reconnaissance patrols as deep as possible behind the enemy lines, and
18 based on their reports and your own assessment, take action (operations)
19 against the enemy."
20 [Interpretation] This document, this order, comes from the chief
21 of staff of the Supreme Command of the OS RBiH, Sefer Halilovic. It is
22 addressed to the defence of Srebrenica and to Naser Oric. Would you agree
23 that this paragraph does not fulfill the terms of the agreement signed or
24 entered upon by the Muslims and the Serbs?
25 A. Yes, ma'am. I mean, it reads very much in reality what happens,
1 that the ABiH didn't make any serious effort to demilitarize itself or to
2 stop combat operations out of the enclaves, particularly when they could
3 support operations in other parts of the country.
4 Q. In the second paragraph, we can read:
5 [In English] "Engage guides through the territory by yourself, by
6 hook or by crook, by engaging the local population."
7 [Interpretation] Do you agree --
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey.
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: This has been part of the Prosecution's case and
10 Mr. Butler's narrative for years, and I don't know where this is taking
11 us, especially this kind of detail. There's no disagreement on any of
12 this. Mr. Butler has testified about this about 10 times already.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: And a good part is amongst the adjudicated facts
14 that we listed in our decision of 2006.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, I believe that what was admitted
16 was that they were armed and that they never proceeded to demilitarize the
17 enclave, but that's not the meaning of my cross-examination. That's not
18 what I'm driving at at all.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: It's more than that, it's also that they mounted
20 operations and attacks inside and outside the enclave, so it's more than
22 Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
23 MR. McCLOSKEY: To the degree of relevance that this has at this
24 point, it's her decision to go through this, but there should be a time
25 limit placed on this because this will -- we'll be here forever at this
2 JUDGE AGIUS: What are you trying -- what are you seeking to
3 prove, Madame Fauveau?
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor started his case with
5 the sixth objective of the strategy, and they used all the documents from
6 1992, from the date of the establishment of the army, until the end of the
7 enclaves. They were allowed to submit all these documents. I mentioned
8 it earlier on. They would show parts of these documents, show them in a
9 certain light, and I think I'm entitled to respond to these allegations.
10 Furthermore -- but I don't know if I should continue with the witness here
11 in the courtroom. I'm not bothered, I don't mind.
12 But the case of the Prosecution is that all that happened in
13 Srebrenica and Zepa is a consequence of directive number 7. My case is
14 that it's not the case, and in order to demonstrate that, to prove that, I
15 have to talk about what happened before.
16 And with respect to this particular document, what I find relevant
17 here, and I can tell you and you may decide whether I may ask the question
18 or not, is whether this paragraph 2 of this document shows that the Muslim
19 army was engaging the civilian population, involving the civilian
20 population in military operations.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
22 MR. McCLOSKEY: The Prosecution's case is, of course, much more
23 complicated than that. It involves much of what Mr. Butler has repeatedly
24 testified to, which supports everything that Ms. Fauveau just said, as
25 this document does. But I don't think we need to go over it and over it
1 and over it. I agree with her, the Muslims did lots of things, and we've
2 heard about them and the Court has ruled upon them. We're starting to get
3 into the Croats -- you know, making the Croats look bad here, too.
4 It's just getting so repetitive on items that we agree with that
5 it's just really wasting time, in my view.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: The other thing is where I have doubts is whether
7 you can prove your point with this witness, particularly with these
8 documents. Paragraph 2 deals with guides, as I see it.
9 Anyway, please think about it, Madame Fauveau. I'm not stopping
10 you, but I think what's important is to know exactly what you want, how
11 you can get there, and without causing damage along the way. So it's up
12 to you.
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
14 Q. When the army uses guides from the civilian population, doesn't it
15 mean that these guides are involved in military operations, in particular
16 when dealing with reconnaissance operations?
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Ma'am, I don't think we need a military expert to
18 tell us that. We can draw our own conclusion, combined with other
19 evidence that we have heard.
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In that case, I'll come back to my
21 first question.
22 Q. Isn't it the case that paragraph 2 of this document shows that the
23 Muslim army involved the civilian population in military operations?
24 A. Yes, ma'am. I mean, not only with respect to, you know, engaging
25 local guides, but, you know, by virtue of the fact that, you know, members
1 of -- you know, members of the civilian population who were males were --
2 were instructed that they had to meet a military obligation and become
3 part of the 28th Division. So they did involve the civilian population to
4 that degree.
5 Q. Let me now show you document P5, directive number 7.
6 While we wait for it, do you know this directive -- do you know
7 whether this directive mentioned the Krivaja operation, the Krivaja-95
9 A. I believe when that question came up before, I didn't recall
10 whether Krivaja-95 was specifically an articulated operation. I'd have to
11 re-read the English version to make sure. It might have, but I just don't
12 recall off the top of my head.
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we get to page 12 of this
14 document in the English version. I think this is page 19 in B/C/S. Can
15 we look at the bottom of the page, where you can see that there are tasks
16 entrusted to the Zigovina [phoen] Corps?
17 THE WITNESS: I think it's Krivaja-95 and it's in relation to a
18 Herzegovina Corps operation.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
20 Q. So this operation had nothing to do with the Drina Corps?
21 A. Somewhere along the line, the names obviously got switched, yes,
22 ma'am. But as designed in March, you know, the Nervetna Valley wouldn't
23 have fallen within the Drina Corps area of competence.
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 10 of the English
25 version, page 15 of the B/C/S version. This is the tasks entrusted to the
1 Drina Corps.
2 Q. Do you agree that the separation of the enclaves was a military
3 task that was perfectly well suited to the military context that the
4 Republika Srpska Army was confronted with in March 1995? I'm talking
5 about the tasks without the last sentence; I'm talking about the
6 separation of the enclaves.
7 A. Yes, ma'am, and I believe I've said that before, that, you know,
8 there would be a large military justification to be able to move in and to
9 be able to -- and when I use the phrase "separating the enclaves,"
10 obviously they are geographically separated, but to create the situations
11 where you would be able to interdict the movement of Muslim military
12 forces from Zepa to Srebrenica, from Srebrenica to Zepa. So, yes, there's
13 a large military advantage to be gained by being able to do that.
14 Q. This directive in relation to the separation of enclaves, does
15 this entail restricting the urban area of Srebrenica? Let me repeat my
17 The tasks entrusted to the Drina Corps concerns solely the
18 separation of the enclaves, and no mention is made of reducing the urban
20 A. Yes, I -- in this particular paragraph, it -- it doesn't use the
21 phraseology "reduce Srebrenica to the urban area," that's correct.
22 Q. The last sentence that you commented on, the same thing with
23 directive 4, do you think what we're talking about here is an expression
24 of that doctrine of self-management and All People's Defence rather than a
25 phrase that was directed against the civilian population?
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Can we be specific, what she's talking about?
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madame Fauveau.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'm talking about the last sentence
4 relating to the Drina Corps, the last three lines.
5 THE WITNESS: Ma'am, it says what it says. I don't take that
6 particular last sentence to be something along the lines of All People's
7 Defence. I believe, as I've testified, I take that to mean that they want
8 to create the conditions to force the UN at this juncture to remove the
9 civilian population from the enclaves.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we go on to the next page,
11 please. In fact, I think it's the previous page in the English version.
12 Q. The first paragraph refers to the Jadar operation, which was to be
13 carried out only if the UNPROFOR forces left Srebrenica. Do you agree
14 that this is the case?
15 A. Yes, ma'am. I think what we're referring to in this context is
16 just that. I mean, in the event that the UN, for whatever reason,
17 evacuates their people out of the enclave, that the VRS is supposed to be
18 able to -- or the Drina Corps, specifically, is supposed to be able to
19 immediately undertake an operation to go after the Muslim military forces
21 Q. Nothing in this paragraph is directed against civilian
23 A. No. This particular sentence, it's a one-sentence paragraph,
24 reflects, you know, going after the Muslim military forces.
25 Q. This directive was signed by President -- or the supreme
1 commander, Radovan Karadzic. Do you agree that the directive signed by
2 the supreme commander is a military act that is generated by the overall
3 full method for decision-making?
4 A. Yes, ma'am. I mean, I -- I believe that when you look at the
5 entire body of this particular directive, where it talks about the entire
6 situation in context and that what each various organ will do and will
7 contribute, it does reflect a planning process which is the -- is the full
8 method of decision-making.
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 3 of the
10 directive. Paragraph 2, 2.1, the Croat-Muslim coalition forces are
12 Q. Do you agree that this paragraph, the following one, is part and
13 parcel of the powers of the Intelligence Department?
14 A. I mean, I'd have to read the whole paragraph on 3 and 4, but
15 certainly information with respect to what's happening within the
16 federation forces would be something that the VRS Intelligence Department
17 would be targeted against and collecting against, yes, ma'am.
18 Q. And the structure of the staff, the Intelligence Department, is
19 part of the intelligence and security sector, isn't it?
20 A. Yes, ma'am, and, you know, one of the differences in the Main
21 Staff from the corps is that at the Main Staff level, intelligence doesn't
22 work directly for the chief of staff as it would in a corps. In fact,
23 intelligence and security is its own combined branch under General
25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, can we go on to
1 another document, I think? I was going to go on to another document, so
2 perhaps we could have the break.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. All right. We will continue tomorrow at 9.00
4 in the morning.
5 Thank you, Madame Fauveau. Thank you, Mr. Butler.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 29th day of
8 January, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.