Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 23358

 1                           Monday, 7 July 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning, everybody, and good morning to you,

 7     Madam Registrar.  Could you call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning,

 9     everyone in the courtroom.  This is case number IT-05-88-T, the

10     Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, ma'am.  All the accused are here.  I

12     think we are full -- no, we are not full house.  I don't -- yes, we are

13     full house.  Mr. Sarapa is behind the column.  Prosecution, it's Mr.

14     McCloskey and Mr. Mitchell.

15             The witness is here as well.  Good morning to you, Colonel.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Today we are going, hopefully, to finish with your

18     testimony.

19             Mr. Haynes, you still had a few minutes to go.

20             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good morning.

21                           WITNESS:  PETAR VUGA [Resumed]

22                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Haynes: [Continued]

24        Q.   Mr. Vuga, good morning to you.  I've just got a few more

25     questions to finish off with, and I'm going to start by asking if you

Page 23359

 1     could be shown P707 in e-court; English, page 9; and B/C/S, page 8.

 2             Mr. Vuga, you've seen regulation 7 before, and you might recall

 3     Judge Kwon asking you a few questions about who might be somebody of

 4     equal or higher ranking military rank to the army commander, but let's

 5     just look at that section together:  Military police may not be used to

 6     perform duties outside of their needs and tasks unless authorised by the

 7     army commander or an equal or higher-ranking military officer.

 8             The question I want to ask you is rather different, which is, in

 9     your view would that authority have to have any formality?  In other

10     words, would it have to be in writing, or would it be sufficient that,

11     for example, an acting commander were informed by his security officer

12     that these instructions came from the very top?

13        A.   Mr. Haynes, the acting person who was given authorisation to be

14     able to decide about this matter, that is to say that the military police

15     can be used and deployed outside its regular functions, does not get that

16     authorisation from the security organs but the senior officer down the

17     chain of command starting with the army commander, and this authorisation

18     depending on the circumstances in which it is issued can be orally given

19     if the situation is of an urgent nature, but this kind of authorisation

20     is in principle granted in written form so that it can set up precisely

21     the terms and what it refers to and the duration of the authorisation.

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Vuga.  That's very helpful.

23             Can we now, then, have a look at 1D1078 in e-court, please.  And

24     I'd like you to look at the first page so that you can recall the

25     document, and then we will have a look at the end of it.

Page 23360

 1             Is that clear enough for you, Mr. Vuga?  Can you see that

 2     document on your screen?

 3        A.   Yes, Mr. Haynes.  It is legible.

 4        Q.   And I think Mr. Zivanovic showed you this document sometime last

 5     week.  It's a report from the command of the 5th Military Police

 6     Battalion of the Drina Corps.  You recall that?

 7        A.   Yes, sir, I do recall that.

 8        Q.   And have you seen many other such reports at Drina Corps level

 9     from the command of the Military Police Battalion?

10        A.   Well, "many" is a flexible term, so I can't really answer that.

11     What do you mean by "many"?  How many?

12        Q.   That's a fair comment.  Can we go to the second page?  I just

13     wanted to know whether from your observation it was standard practice in

14     the Drina Corps for reports of the Military Police Battalion to be

15     addressed only to the chief of security and the Chief of Staff, not the

16     commander.

17        A.   Judging by the way in which the military police was under control

18     and command, it was through the security officer that they had to go to

19     the commander.  I have no other information.  The Chief of Staff was

20     informed of the activities because they -- this involves combat action

21     and of course that to the operative part of the staff, they had to take

22     note of it.  Now, as to the Chief of Staff, this is not in contravention

23     to cooperation between the security organs and the Chief of Staff when it

24     comes to this type of report.  However, the commander must necessarily

25     have had a report of this kind as well.

Page 23361

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now move on quickly, please --

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment.  If the commander is not listed as one

 3     of the addressees or one of the recipients, how would he come into

 4     possession of such a report?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He had to have received it from the

 6     security organ.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  Or directly from the

 9     commander of the unit of the military police.  So there are two

10     possibilities for that:  One, that the commander of the military police

11     directly reported to him; or that the report was -- reached him through

12     the security organ.

13             MR. HAYNES:

14        Q.   Are you just guessing as those possibilities, Mr. Vuga?

15        A.   Those are the prescribed ways and duties in which this had to be

16     done.

17        Q.   Well, forgive me, prescribed where?

18        A.   It was regulated and prescribed in the instructions for applying

19     the rules of service within the military police, where deployment is set

20     out, as well, and this also implied this kind of information system and

21     reporting system.

22        Q.   Very well.  I'll leave that there.  I'm coming to my last small

23     topic, and I'd like to have a look, please, at 3D396; B/C/S, page 40; and

24     English, page 48.

25             This is a diagram or schematic that you drew as part of your

Page 23362

 1     report in this case.  I dare say you recall it, Mr. Vuga.

 2        A.   Yes, sir, I do recall it.

 3        Q.   And before we go any further, the Zvornik Brigade was an infantry

 4     brigade, wasn't it?

 5        A.   Yes, Mr. Haynes, an infantry brigade.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And the manner of drawing this diagram is quite

 7     standard.  The solid lines are intended to denote lines of command,

 8     aren't they?

 9        A.   Yes, Mr. Haynes.  They are the lines of command.

10        Q.   And the broken lines are intended to denote lines of functional

11     or specialist control?

12        A.   Yes, Mr. Haynes.  Those lines are called, according to the

13     regulations, the lines of control in the professional sense.

14        Q.   Now, it's your opinion, isn't it, that the military police in an

15     infantry brigade are commanded indirectly by the commander of the brigade

16     through the chief of security?

17        A.   This schematic or diagram shows otherwise.  The commander

18     commands the military police directly.  It is subordinated to him, as is

19     the security organ.  The commander can choose via the security organ to

20     accomplish certain assignments in which there would be space and need for

21     professional management and guidance of the military police and

22     professional supervision over the execution of the tasks assigned to the

23     military police, and once again, based on choice he can directly issue

24     assignments to the commander of a unit of the military police.

25        Q.   Well, this isn't the first time you've given evidence before this

Page 23363

 1     Tribunal, is it?

 2        A.   No, it is not the first time, Mr. Haynes.

 3        Q.   And the schematic I've put up on the screen is not the first

 4     report you've ever written for the purposes of giving evidence before

 5     this Tribunal?

 6        A.   No, it is not the first report, Mr. Haynes.

 7        Q.   I wonder if we could have in e-court, please, 7D952; page 29 in

 8     both English and B/C/S.

 9             You can see the first page there.  This is the previous report

10     you wrote for the Vukovar case, isn't it?

11        A.   Yes, Mr. Haynes.  That is that report.

12        Q.   For those of us who are reading it in English, we will have to

13     read page 29 and then go over to page 30.  So if the English page could

14     be moved forward a little bit now.  And I chose the words from this

15     report to put to you that it was your opinion that in an infantry

16     brigade, the military police is subordinated to the brigade commander

17     indirectly, i.e. via the chief of the security organ.  Do you not still

18     agree with that?

19        A.   Mr. Haynes, what you've just shown us is not an infantry brigade.

20     It is a guards motorised brigade, motorised guards brigade, which is

21     different on all counts from a classical infantry brigade.  So the

22     schematics cannot be compared because the functions were quite different.

23        Q.   Well, let's have a look, then, please, at the same document

24     7D952; page 73 in the B/C/S; 90 in the English.

25             I think the page is wrong in B/C/S, but it doesn't matter.  We'll

Page 23364

 1     just look at it in English, please, if we can turn it the right way

 2     around.

 3             It says in the bottom right-hand corner of this diagram, which

 4     you drew for a report you wrote two years ago, that this is a schematic

 5     of the composition of the infantry brigade.  So it's not a guards

 6     brigade.  This is the composition of an infantry brigade.  And can you

 7     see that in this diagram there is no direct line of command from the

 8     commander to the military police unit, and there is a solid line denoting

 9     command from the security organ to the military police unit.  Do you see

10     that?

11        A.   What we should see here, Mr. Haynes, is what infantry brigade it

12     is here because the solutions were different and decisions were different

13     because the composition of the cadres of the staff within the command of

14     the brigade and communications was defined by the size of the tasks in

15     hand.  So all this corresponds to a specific brigade because the rules

16     governing brigades envisages several types of brigades and caters to

17     several types.

18        Q.   Well, you've already agreed with me, Mr. Vuga, that the Zvornik

19     Brigade was an infantry brigade, and this is your schematic for the

20     structure of an infantry brigade.  So that's answered that question,

21     hasn't it?  I just want to know why you drew this diagram in 2006 and a

22     rather different diagram when you came to write your report for this

23     case.

24        A.   Well, fairly different.  That isn't quite right.  It's different

25     only with regard to the possibilities of command and control over the

Page 23365

 1     military police, and this is in accordance with the regulations.

 2     According to the regulations, you can command and control the military

 3     police directly or through the security organs.  So this "or" isn't

 4     excluded in this version, either, this alternative.  It only depicts a

 5     given situation at a given point in time.  There is an "or" here too, an

 6     alternative.  Without changing the definition, you can include this

 7     possibility because this is a possibility for a commander, and it is also

 8     a commander's right.

 9        Q.   Mr. Vuga, thank you for your time.  I've got no further questions

10     of you.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Mr. McCloskey?

12             Colonel, you're now going to be cross-examined by the

13     Prosecution.

14             MS. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I need the

15     assistance of the usher.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.

17             MS. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18                           Cross-examination by Mr. McCloskey:

19        Q.   Good morning, Colonel.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, Madam Tapuskovic, is that the same

21     dossier the witness had when he was being examined in direct by you or by

22     your colleague?

23             MS. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  These are the

24     same documents that the witness had in the course of his examination or

25     in the course of the examination-in-chief, but if necessary the

Page 23366

 1     Prosecution can check the documents.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  No, I just asked the question.  I knew what the

 3     answer would have been, but I just wanted to put it straight for the

 4     record.

 5             Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President.  Good morning, everyone.  I

 7     had asked the Defence if they could make the colonel's report available

 8     to him so -- if I asked him to look at it.  Thank you very much.

 9        Q.   Colonel, good morning.

10        A.   Good morning, Mr. McCloskey.

11        Q.   And, yes, as you've heard quite a few times over the last week,

12     my name is Peter McCloskey.  I represent the Prosecution.

13             I would like to just, before I get into sort of my more planned

14     cross-examination, ask you about a couple of things that just came out

15     with Mr. Haynes.  You had said in response when Mr. Haynes had 1D1078 up

16     on the board that document that was not addressed to the commander, but

17     you had said that that had had to be received by the commander from the

18     security organ or the commander of the MPs.  Can you explain that

19     concept, why the commander had to have received such information?

20        A.   Mr. McCloskey, it's easy to explain this idea because the chief

21     of the security organ and the MP commander are directly subordinated to

22     the commander, and the Chief of Staff is also subordinated to him, who

23     also receives such a report, so there are three possibilities or, rather,

24     there are three individuals who must have received such a report.

25        Q.   But what is it about the job of commander that means the

Page 23367

 1     commander has to get this information?  Why does the commander have to

 2     get this information?  Why are you so sure when you get up there and say

 3     he had to receive this?  What is it about the nature of command that

 4     makes this --

 5        A.   Mr. McCloskey, there is the principle of unity of command.  A

 6     commander had to receive reports for all those directly subordinated to

 7     him, reports on the work that they had to carry out in accordance with

 8     the law and in accordance with their rights to command.  So this is the

 9     idea of singleness of command.

10        Q.   I understand.  What is it about a military commander?  I don't

11     get all the information from all my subordinates.  What is it about a

12     military commander in his particular responsibility that makes you so

13     sure he has to get this kind of information?  Or why does he need to have

14     this information, if that's a --

15        A.   Mr. McCloskey, a commander takes extremely important decisions,

16     and he quite simply has to have access to all the available information

17     without which it's impossible to assess the situation and without which

18     one cannot take valid decisions.  In such a situation, it wouldn't be

19     possible to assume responsibility for such decisions.  The singleness of

20     command and the idea of subordination were the basic principles upon

21     which the military organisation that I spent 36 years in was based.

22        Q.   Okay.  You also -- just a minute ago, Mr. Haynes was asking you

23     questions about the security officer using the military police and asking

24     you about the commander's role, and in that you said something about that

25     the authority starts with the army commander.  Do you remember that?

Page 23368

 1        A.   Yes, yes, I do remember that, Mr. McCloskey.

 2        Q.   And what did you mean by that?

 3        A.   That means that the army commander would take decisions about

 4     when and in which cases the military police could be engaged, to carry

 5     out tasks that weren't part of its regular tasks and duties.

 6        Q.   Let's say the army commander we are talking about is General

 7     Mladic, and he passes an order down regarding the use of military police

 8     in some operation.  What role of responsibility of any do the subordinate

 9     commanders have, and I want you to consider this to be a brigade -- an

10     order that has to do -- starts with Mladic but ends up in the brigade, so

11     the military police are doing something for the brigade.  Where does the

12     corps and the brigade commander fit into any responsibility for an order

13     that is generated by General Mladic?

14        A.   Mr. McCloskey, we have to distinguish orders from authorisations.

15     An order is something that has to be carried out.  When a commander

16     issues an order, the subordinate has the duty to carry out such an order.

17     Authorisation involves giving subordinate commanders the right to act in

18     certain situations in which it is necessary for the military police to

19     act and to carry out duties other than duties that it usually carries

20     out.

21        Q.   Let's talk about an order, then.  Mladic gives an order that goes

22     down to the military police.  What role, if any, would the commanders in

23     the corps and the brigade have in relation to that order?

24        A.   In such a case, if an order was issued, such as you have

25     described, it's the duty of subordinates to carry out the orders of their

Page 23369

 1     superiors, if we are talking about orders, not about authorisations.

 2        Q.   So would that apply to the Drina Corps commander and the brigade

 3     commander whose orders this went through to get to the military police of

 4     the brigade?

 5        A.   That would fully apply to the corps commander and commanders in

 6     units subordinated to him if they also included military police units.

 7        Q.   All right.  Now, let me go back --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. McCloskey, if I can interrupt here.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Please.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Let's suppose if General Mladic had something to

11     order or a specific assignment to be performed by the military police of

12     Zvornik Brigade, would that order be passed through commanders or the

13     chief of security or intelligence at the Main Staff, through security

14     lines or command lines?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have understood your question,

16     Your Honour.  An order, such an order issued by General Mladic to his

17     subordinate commanders, according to which they should use the military

18     police or any other kinds of orders, such an order would pass through the

19     line of command.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:

22        Q.   On that same subject, let's say for some reason the commander is

23     not found.  Would General Mladic or General Krstic normally be able to

24     trust their security officer to pass on their order to, say, the brigade

25     commander?  If they couldn't speak -- if the commanders couldn't speak or

Page 23370

 1     order each other directly, would a security officer be trusted enough to

 2     pass on General Mladic's order?

 3        A.   Mr. McCloskey, in my experience, as far as I know and given what

 4     the documents state, a commander is always present.  There is always

 5     someone who plays the role of commander, and he has the authority to

 6     perform the duties of commander at all times.

 7        Q.   I agree with you, and I understand that.  I just ask you to look

 8     into a situation where the security officers are talking to each other.

 9     Would there be anything inappropriate about a corps or Main Staff

10     security officer passing on to a brigade security officers the order of

11     General Mladic?

12        A.   Passing down orders through such a line could only concern

13     professional issues in regard of the military police.  Commanding

14     excludes the possibility of interfering with this line of command at any

15     level of the military organisation.  This is particularly the case given

16     the idea of singleness of command.

17        Q.   All right.  Let's go back to where I had intended to start, and I

18     want to go into a little bit of the background, a little bit of your

19     background a little more.  Before the war in Bosnia, did you have any

20     family connections to Bosnia?  We see in the census a number of Vugas

21     around the Gorazde area.

22        A.   Mr. McCloskey, my mother was born in the village of Vrbaska near

23     Banja Luka in 1912; and when she was four years old, her family moved

24     across the Sava to Slavonia.  My only connection, well, is that fact and

25     nothing else.

Page 23371

 1        Q.   Okay.  And during the war in Bosnia, did you have any connections

 2     with the army, either at the time -- we know you retired in September but

 3     either before you retired or after you retired, did you go help out the

 4     VRS, the RSK folks any time during the war with your expertise or

 5     knowledge?

 6        A.   Mr. McCloskey, in the security department I was the assistant of

 7     the chief of the security department for the security organs in National

 8     Defence secretariats throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

 9     The connections I had in that field with Bosnia-Herzegovina were

10     identical to the connections I had to other parts of the former

11     Yugoslavia.  They didn't have a specific character or nature of any kind.

12        Q.   Okay.  How about after you retired?

13        A.   Having retired and after the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

14     after the signing of the Dayton Agreement in the year 2000, I became

15     involved in developing the idea of security for the Army of Republika

16     Srpska.  I was asked to carry out this work, and to the best of my

17     abilities I did this.  So all I did was within those limits.

18        Q.   So from September 1992 to when the war ended near the end of

19     1995, you weren't involved with the VRS in any way?

20        A.   No, Mr. McCloskey.  I had fulfilled my role before retiring.

21        Q.   Now, right before you retired, you were the assistant chief of

22     security.  Who was your boss?  Who was the chief of security?  What was

23     his name?

24        A.   When I made a request to retire, on the 16th of March, 1992, the

25     chief of the security administration of the national Secretariat for

Page 23372

 1     Defence was General Aleksandar Vasiljevic.  And when I retired on the

 2     30th of September, 1992, the chief was Major General Nedeljko Boskovic.

 3        Q.   And who was General Boskovic's boss when you retired?

 4        A.   General Boskovic's boss was the then-Federal Secretary for

 5     National Defence.  I can't remember who his superior was exactly at the

 6     time, but it was the Federal Secretary for National Defence.

 7        Q.   And who was the Federal Secretary for National Defence's boss?

 8        A.   The Federal Secretary for National Defence was a member of the

 9     parliament, and the Prime Minister was his boss.

10        Q.   Okay.  I don't think we need to go into that.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Was a member of the

12     government.

13             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Error in transcript.  It is page 15, line 8.  It

14     was said "parliament."  He said "government."

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, yes.  It was corrected by the interpreter

16     himself already.  Thank you.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:

18        Q.   Now, before you retired in September of 1992, your position as

19     the assistant chief would have given you a very good look at what had

20     been going on from 1991 in Croatia, Vukovar, and what was beginning to

21     happen in Bosnia in March of 1992; is that right?  I don't want to get

22     into all that, but I just want to ask you whether or not you would have

23     had a pretty good look at all that.

24        A.   Well, most of the events that took place -- well, I was

25     responsible for controlling the organs of security in the secretariats of

Page 23373

 1     National Defence, as I have said.  So it's difficult to obtain

 2     information, broad kind of information, in such a position.  As an

 3     officer, what I can say is that I was informed, but as a member of the

 4     organs of security and as a chief -- as assistant chief, I didn't have

 5     sufficient information on other issues in order to be able to provide you

 6     with a satisfactory answer to this question.

 7        Q.   You wouldn't have known the name of the Seselj's paramilitary

 8     unit?

 9        A.   No, sir.  In the Vukovar case when I started with the report or

10     work on the report, I obtained information that I had no previous

11     knowledge of.

12        Q.   Okay.  You've just told us you requested to be retired in March

13     of 1992.  I think you were only 54 years old then.  Is that about right?

14        A.   That's correct.

15        Q.   Did what you had seen happen to the former Yugoslavia play a role

16     in your deciding to request retirement at such a young age?

17        A.   Mr. McCloskey, I was born in Croatia.  Don't hold it against me

18     if I tell you a detail from my biography that has always been of key

19     importance.  In 1943 and 1944, I was imprisoned in an Ustasha camp, and

20     all my subsequent cares and concerns in Croatia bore the trace of this

21     experience until the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was

22     established.  In that country, I became a citizen equal to all other

23     citizens.  This was my main concern in life, and this was my life-time

24     desire.  It was my life-time desire to see such a country in existence,

25     to see the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.  When this

Page 23374

 1     country was broken up and the war in Croatia came to an end, it was my

 2     conviction that my mission within the army had come to an end.

 3        Q.   Did you work with or get to know General Mladic during your time

 4     in the JNA and VJ?

 5        A.   I only met him accidentally on one occasion.  I greeted General

 6     Mladic on one occasion.  He returned the greetings, and that is all.  I

 7     had no other kind of contact with General Mladic.

 8        Q.   How about General Tolimir?  He, as you've already told us, was

 9     the Main Staff head of security and intelligence from very early on.  You

10     gentlemen were coming from a similar background.  What knowledge or

11     contact did you have with him?

12        A.   Mr. McCloskey, as for General Tolimir, the situation is somewhat

13     different.  General Tolimir is ten years my junior, and when I was an

14     officer in the security organs and when I held the positions that I held,

15     General Tolimir did not yet hold positions that would have involved me

16     having close or direct contact with him in the course of performing my

17     duties.  But as a security officer and given all the duties I had to

18     perform within the army, I knew more or less all the officers in the JNA

19     who had security-related tasks to perform.  And as a result, I also had

20     contact with General Tolimir or knew General Tolimir on that basis.

21        Q.   How about Colonel Beara?

22        A.   My recollections of my meeting with Colonel Beara is linked to

23     the period of 28 years ago.  I and Colonel Beara met for the first time

24     in Split when he was on duty there in the navy.  I don't know his

25     position exactly, but it was a very brief encounter because I had come

Page 23375

 1     within the composition of a team which was engaged in professional

 2     supervision of the work of the security organs in the navy command of the

 3     SFRY, the then-SFRY, of course, within the composition of the JNA as a

 4     whole.  And since then, well, that's when I first met Colonel Beara, and

 5     I've known of him since then.  I have known about how he developed

 6     professionally.

 7        Q.   Well, I don't want to get into the time period of 28, 30 years

 8     ago.  I think that was the height of the Cold War, 1960s, early 1970s.

 9     Were you working in counter-intelligence with Colonel Beara?  And I won't

10     ask you about that work.  I know you're probably not even allowed to tell

11     me about it.

12        A.   Well, I wouldn't have anything to tell you because I never worked

13     with him in counter-intelligence.

14        Q.   What kind of security work, then, if it's not

15     counter-intelligence did you work with him?

16        A.   Mr. McCloskey, I never worked on other security affairs within

17     the frameworks of the service except in counter-intelligence.

18        Q.   You also mentioned in your report that - you were talking about

19     interrogations - that coercion could be used, but it had to be approved

20     by someone high up the line in the ministry; is that right?

21        A.   That term in my testimony, the application of force, the approval

22     of force and application of force, to the best of my recollections, I

23     didn't say that.  Now, I'd have to check that, look it up, but if it was

24     wrongly interpreted, that's another matter again.  So "coercion" is not a

25     word I use, and that was absolutely not resorted to in my work or in my

Page 23376

 1     testimony.  That was not a method to be used.  Not only was it

 2     prohibited, it was absolutely not allowed to be used.

 3        Q.   Counter-intelligence work, interviewing opposing spies in the

 4     Cold War, coercion was never used?  Is that what you're saying?  I won't

 5     get into this, but I just want to make it clear that you're saying that.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Zivanovic?

 7             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  It is very ambiguous question about Cold War and

 8     coercion was never used in Cold War.  I don't know that the expert knows

 9     everything about Cold War and coercion.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  I would strike him off as an expert if he didn't

11     know about those subjects, to be honest.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:

13        Q.   Colonel, I was just responding to your comment.  Let me try to

14     help you so you can see what I was referring to because, yeah, we do have

15     translation issues here.  It's your report.  It's -- I believe it's the

16     Popovic report.  It's in section 2.13.  It's -- do you have that in front

17     of you?  I'm sorry, because we better get it out because all I have is

18     the English -- the English version.  It's page 5 of the English, but it

19     is under section 2.13 in the B/C/S, and it's just the first two or three

20     pages of the B/C/S, if -- if that can be pulled up on the screen.  Do you

21     see that section, 2.13, in your report?  And I'll get a 65 ter number, if

22     -- 3D396, thank you.  And I'm reading the part that starts out with

23     "regard to regulating relations in the security domain".

24             JUDGE KWON:  I think that Mr. Vuga has hard copy in front of him.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  He can't --

Page 23377

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I haven't managed to find it.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I've got a copy.

 3             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  It is in first binder of Mr. Vuga.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  It's in the first binder, Colonel.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If you could --

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  But the thing is -- okay.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 8        Q.   Page 5, B/C/S.  It's that paragraph, and it's 2.13.  It's page 5

 9     in the English.  It's the same for the Nikolic report and the Popovic

10     report.  It's under the section, "Security provisions and the law on the

11     defence of the RS."  2.13:  "With regard to regulating relations in the

12     security domain, the Law on the Army of the RS does not contain any

13     provisions or paragraphs regulating the field of security concretely in

14     detail.  In this domain, only the section covering the use of weapons by

15     authorised personnel in the military security service and military police

16     is concretely prescribed."

17             Article 26 of that law states, "Authorised military personnel and

18     the military security service and the military police may use, while

19     performing military security or military police duties, weapons and other

20     means of coercion under conditions prescribed by authorised officials of

21     the Interior."

22             The word -- I can't help you with the actual word, but I think

23     you got the gist of that.  "Coercion under conditions" -- I don't think

24     anyone is saying coercion is necessarily a problem with dealing with

25     these issues, sir, so my question is, what did you mean by that?

Page 23378

 1        A.   Mr. McCloskey, what is missing here, when you were talking about

 2     coercion, under conditions prescribed by law.  That's the missing phrase,

 3     which means that there are specific authorisations which are prescribed,

 4     regulated, for individuals conducting security business, what those

 5     conditions are, and under what conditions the security organs are able to

 6     apply 5 authorisations and 14 authorisations that they have right to

 7     apply, and that is prescribed by law.  So there is no application of

 8     force or coercion outside that, and that does not include interrogation

 9     of spies and uncovering them.  These are different conditions and are

10     beyond the context of this discussion and has nothing in common with

11     either the Cold War or the methods of work of the security organs, but it

12     has to do with authorisations.

13        Q.   Well, Colonel, I just pulled this out of your report, so my

14     question is and is exactly that:  What legal forms of coercion were

15     prescribed that you may have had to get authorisation from the minister?

16        A.   Here, coercion is prescribed by the law governing internal

17     affairs, which was voted on and passed in parliament, and it wasn't the

18     ministry that provided such authorisation.  The law or that law underwent

19     parliamentary procedure, and it provided for the fact that, as regards

20     those who do not -- those people who do not, at the request of the

21     security organs in performing their professional duties, that is to say

22     establishing identity or if they are -- they are protecting someone, they

23     have five authorisations at their disposal for them to be able to conduct

24     that, and among those is the use of weapons in strictly prescribed

25     situations, and among others if they are not able to repel an illegal act

Page 23379

 1     against themselves or an individual under their protection and whose duty

 2     it is, that is the security organ's duty is, to protect that individual,

 3     then they can resort to et cetera.  So this is a point in time when the

 4     security organ is authorised to use weapons as the last resort at their

 5     disposal, and they also have the right before that to use physical force

 6     to overcome an attacker; that comes first, to caution him and warn him

 7     beforehand, and to identify the person or establish his identity.  So

 8     these are the authorisations in the performance of their duty.  Outside

 9     those authorisations, there are no other conditions and situations in

10     which the security organs may avail themselves of the use of force, and I

11     stated this because it was one of the conditions for criteria to be

12     prescribed for admittance into the security organs and service because

13     this is a very important point, an important situation, and they must be

14     -- it must be assessed very well and evaluated.  The situation must be

15     properly evaluated, and that is something not everyone can do.  That also

16     refers to the policemen on the beat in the street when he has the right

17     to use his weapon in situations that prescribe this.  So it's a general

18     provision, a general regulation, providing for authorisation to organs of

19     the Interior, not only the security organs.

20        Q.   All right.  I think we all fully understand a police officer or a

21     military police officers and his rights to use force and deadly force in

22     is various situations.  What got me is the word "coercion."  Can you give

23     me an example of coercion that a security officer would have to seek

24     authority for, coercion?

25        A.   There is no special authorisation.  He's on duty, engaged in an

Page 23380

 1     assignment which provides for the use of force.  So if he is providing

 2     security, for example, for an individual, for a person, or security for

 3     special importance buildings or premises, so in carrying out his duty he

 4     comes across a problem in which he is forced to resort to these sorts of

 5     authorisations, which are given in the order stipulated, and according to

 6     the different levels and degrees, he in the performance of his duties is

 7     authorised - he doesn't need permission - he is authorised to do that.

 8     Now, outside those situations, in talking to people, interviews,

 9     collecting information and in all other situations, which he does in the

10     course of his duty, there is no application of force.

11        Q.   Would a security officer in an interrogation have to seek

12     approval in order to use the technique of keeping a light on 24 hours a

13     day?

14        A.   He cannot receive such authorisation unless it is provided for by

15     law or something that is applied, such as the Law on Internal Affairs.

16     So he cannot seek or be given such approval.

17        Q.   Okay.  Let me ask you -- go back a little bit.  Did you come to

18     know General Gvero during your career?

19        A.   Yes, I did, Mr. McCloskey.  For a very brief period of time, I

20     worked in an organisational unit headed by General Gvero.

21        Q.   What was that?

22        A.   It was the organ for political affairs, for political work, and I

23     was there for a very short period of time, even less than two months, I

24     think.

25        Q.   What year?

Page 23381

 1        A.   1991 -- 1990 or 1991.  It was for just a short period, so I have

 2     not got any specific recollections about it.

 3        Q.   Why were you there so short a period?

 4        A.   I was there for such a short period because it was a period when

 5     I came from another structure where I had been working temporarily and

 6     was going back to the security administration, which was being harmonised

 7     and dovetailed at the time with the newly arisen situation and

 8     requirements.

 9        Q.   So the job of political affairs, 1991, did that have remnants of

10     the eastern bloc Soviet political affairs, commissar, political officer

11     in the unit situation?  Do you understand what I'm asking about?

12        A.   It didn't have that kind of character.  It was a period of time

13     when two important reorganisations in the Yugoslav People's Army were

14     taking place.  The first was that the Yugoslav People's Army should de--

15     become depoliticised, That is to say, to throw politics out of the JNA,

16     and for the JNA to become a non-political or be set on non-political

17     foundations, and that the JNA should be defined in the new situation as

18     non-ideological and extra-party organisation engaged in the defence of

19     the country.  So it was during that periods of time that I for a brief

20     period was where I said I was a moment ago.

21        Q.   And how about General -- now General Miletic?  Did you get to

22     know him or work with him at all?

23        A.   As for General Miletic, I never worked with him.  I didn't know

24     him except for a chance meeting.  I don't know when it took place.  I

25     can't remember, but I do remember having met him briefly once.

Page 23382

 1        Q.   How about Vujadin Popovic?

 2        A.   I don't remember Vujadin Popovic.  However, I was a lecturer in

 3     the education centre for security, and many people passed through that

 4     institution, over 2.000 over a given period of time.  So from what I

 5     heard from Popovic by talking to him, he remembers me as a lecturer from

 6     those days.  Nothing more than that.  So I can't tell you anything more

 7     about or have nothing else to say about that period.

 8        Q.   So you were able to talk to Lieutenant Colonel Popovic in

 9     preparing your report?

10        A.   I had an opportunity of talking to Lieutenant Colonel Popovic

11     before I began preparing my report because I had to establish what my

12     task was, what it was I had to do from the professional point of view,

13     the point of view of my profession.

14        Q.   So did Colonel Popovic tell you what your task was?

15        A.   I told him what my task could be if he accepted that.

16        Q.   What did he tell you?

17        A.   He told me that that task would be acceptable in as far as I

18     explained it to him, and that's how the task appears in my profession.

19        Q.   Did you ever speak to him about the details of your report, the

20     rules, how they were applied in the RS at the time, some of these key

21     days that you've talked about, these key issues that you've talked about?

22        A.   No, Mr. McCloskey.  I analysed the documents, the regulations,

23     and conducted a comparative analysis to see what was in the

24     documentations and regulations in order to identify points in common,

25     common substance and solutions, and to make my own assessment and

Page 23383

 1     evaluation independently on the basis of the facts that I recognised.

 2        Q.   Why didn't you speak to Colonel Popovic on these issues?

 3        A.   I was of the opinion that the circumstances in which Lieutenant

 4     Colonel Popovic found himself were not conducive to, from my point of

 5     view and suited to from my point of view, the formation of a

 6     comprehensive picture, the way I thought that this should be done as an

 7     expert myself.

 8        Q.   Well, for example, you testified --

 9        A.   For example -- for example, because a lot of time had gone by,

10     one loses from sight some very important circumstances that took place at

11     a time when the events took place, and it was no longer possible to view

12     them realistically, from this passage of time and this vantage point, so

13     my picture about everything that I did would or could be incomplete in a

14     way or in certain sections even incorrect.

15        Q.   One of the things you've talked about in your testimony, you said

16     that relating to the separation of military-age men, you said it would be

17     the duty of the security branch to work with the MPs to make sure that

18     that job was done right and done correctly.  And did you speak to Colonel

19     Popovic about that, whether he in fact acted under what you said was his

20     duty?  That would have been a perfect time to ask him what really

21     happened.

22        A.   As to these matters, I did not ask Colonel Popovic about them

23     because that would have been a lesser portion or - let me put it this way

24     - conditionally speaking, a very small part of the work he did.  So I

25     didn't attach that much importance to this, but I mentioned it as one of

Page 23384

 1     the things -- one of the jobs that he could perform under certain

 2     circumstances, of course, in the prescribed manner.  As to the rest, I

 3     thought it would be established on the basis of other sources because the

 4     documents that I had did not contain such information, so other sources

 5     could be used, but as far as my profession is concerned, and my

 6     evaluation and assessment of work based on documents from the aspects of

 7     establishing the correctness of work would not have done that.  So that

 8     is a question that is up to the Court to decide, up to the Trial Chamber

 9     to assess, and that was the reason and substance of that position that I

10     took, my attitude and position.

11        Q.   How about Drago Nikolic?  Did you have a chance to talk with him?

12        A.   My talk with Drago Nikolic was identical to the one conducted

13     with Lieutenant Colonel Popovic with the proviso that before meeting

14     Drago Nikolic and in talking to him -- well, I had no contact with him,

15     nor did I have any fuller information about him, from the aspects of

16     having an insight into his development and his work as a security organ.

17        Q.   Now, your lack of contact with both these men, Drago Nikolic and

18     Vujadin Popovic, are you saying that was specifically your decision based

19     on you alone?

20        A.   My decision was based on experience, experience from my previous

21     work in compiling an expert report, and I thought that the best way of

22     going about it given my position was to offer an expert professional view

23     and assessment and conclusions about the regulations and duties that in

24     conformity with those regulations were to be implemented, and I found

25     them to be most reliable in the documents and material which was not

Page 23385

 1     subject to change, to alteration, which remained the same, remained the

 2     way it was at the time when it was being realised.

 3        Q.   Did you talk with Momir Nikolic and help him in preparing his

 4     case?

 5        A.   I did talk to Momir Nikolic as well.  I talked to him about --

 6     well, I didn't know him, so I needed him to tell me something about

 7     himself, what duty it was that he was performing, because it was the

 8     principal duty in the brigade which I as an expert studied for purposes

 9     of this case, these proceedings.  The situation was the same when I

10     talked to Momir Nikolic, but that work for well-known reasons and based

11     on my testimony were not placed before the Trial Chamber.

12        Q.   Meaning you knew he pled guilty?

13        A.   Yes, I do know that.

14        Q.   And you've had a chance to review his statement of facts that he

15     made pursuant to that guilty plea?

16        A.   I didn't have a chance to see that beforehand.  I had it in my

17     hands when everything was over and when the judgement came into force at

18     the second instance.

19        Q.   Right, but in preparing your reports for these gentlemen, you had

20     Momir Nikolic's statement of facts pursuant to that plea?

21        A.   I had an insight into that.  However, Momir Nikolic, on the 3rd

22     of April when we met told me that I should work in the way I have

23     explained to you, so that on the 27th or after the 27th of April, he

24     pleaded the way he pleaded.  Now, between Momir Nikolic and myself, there

25     is a view of all this, a vision of all this, which does not provide me

Page 23386

 1     with sufficiently reliable grounds for me to be able to conclude on a

 2     reliable basis things that I can use for writing a proper and correct

 3     report.  So that was the reason why I did not take into consideration his

 4     statement of facts.

 5        Q.   And just -- last question because I see it's break time.  You're

 6     also working for and set to testify in the state court for Milorad Trbic,

 7     correct?

 8        A.   Mr. McCloskey, I did not work on that.  There was a discussion

 9     between me and his Defence counsel, which is still ongoing, this

10     exchange, and I did not wish to include that exchange until I completed

11     this particular testimony.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think it's break time, Colonel.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE AGIUS:  We will have a break of 25 minutes starting from

14     now.  Thank you.

15                           --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19        Q.   Colonel, one last -- on this issue before we get into more

20     substantive material, have you been speaking at all to General Tolimir or

21     his people about working for him in his upcoming case?

22        A.   No, Mr. McCloskey.  Such things have never been discussed.  The

23     subject was never broached.

24        Q.   Have you spoken to General Tolimir since his arrest?

25        A.   No, Mr. McCloskey.  All I did was say that General Tolimir should

Page 23387

 1     be informed of my presence here, and it was only at the end of my

 2     testimony that he could meet me or I could meet him, if he was interested

 3     in such a meeting.

 4        Q.   Any interest from him?  Got any plans to see him?

 5        A.   I haven't received any feedback information for the moment.

 6     That's the situation at present.

 7        Q.   What was the last information you received on this topic?

 8        A.   What I have just said.  I haven't received any other information.

 9     I'm waiting.  Perhaps I'll receive information before I leave.  If not,

10     I'll leave.

11        Q.   Who did you pass the information on to to connect with General

12     Tolimir?

13        A.   Through -- I passed this information on through Mr. Erol who

14     welcomed me when I arrived here.

15        Q.   Who is that?

16        A.   He works for the Tribunal in the victim and witnesses unit.  I

17     think that's the term.  I don't know the exact term because I received it

18     in translation, but he works here in the Tribunal.

19        Q.   Okay.  Let me go now -- I want to ask you about one of the rules.

20     I don't want you to have to get into that too much depth because I think

21     you've talked quite a bit about it and explained yourself.  But relating

22     to the rules of the security branch, I think you explained very well the

23     professional relationship that a security officer would have with the

24     military police unit and that it was part of the security officer's job

25     to propose to the commander, the security officer's commander, on the

Page 23388

 1     best uses of the military police.  So what I want to ask you about is

 2     when the security officer makes a proposal about some use of the military

 3     police, and the commander - let's say brigade commander - decides to act

 4     on that proposal and turns it into an order, what then is the security

 5     officer's duty in seeing to it that that order is carried out?  And the

 6     other day on page 23060, line 5 and 6, you said something -- you said

 7     that the security officer can give professional guidance to the military

 8     police on how best to execute what the commander ordered.

 9             Is that -- is that right, in the context of the question?

10        A.   Yes, I understand that.  That is correct.

11        Q.   And I did not see in your report where you explain how this

12     works, so could you explain in a little more detail, given this

13     situation, the -- what would the security officer do in providing

14     guidance to the MPs to get the job done according to the proposal and now

15     order of the commander?

16        A.   I answered the question, but perhaps it wasn't really noted

17     because I went into detail in the course of my testimony.  When

18     testifying in general, you can lose sight of certain important details,

19     so I'll go over it to the extent that this is necessary.  I won't repeat

20     everything.

21             First of all, the security officer is the most qualified

22     individual to assess threatening activities, and on the basis of the

23     information he obtains he can identify tasks that should be assigned to

24     the military police given the duties that MPs have to perform.  He has to

25     command and control and guide the military police together with the

Page 23389

 1     company commander, and so he should be in a position to inform, one, of

 2     what the military police can succeed in doing when carrying out a task.

 3        Q.   I'm sorry to interrupt, but there is I think a fairly significant

 4     error in the transcript that I ought to clear up with you.  It says that

 5     the security officer has to command and control and guide the military

 6     police.  Did you mean to say that the security officer commands the

 7     military police?

 8        A.   No, no, no, no, that's not the right word.  Professional guidance

 9     is what is involved.  It's not command -- a matter of commanding.

10     Commanders command.  It's the command of an MP unit.  Well, you have the

11     organ of security and the commander of a military police units.  They

12     have common information.

13        Q.   We understand that.  The term "rukovodjenje" is being translated

14     sometimes as "command," but it's now supposed to be "control."

15        A.   Rukovodjenje.

16        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  I'm sorry to interrupt.  You can continue.

17        A.   I have understood your intervention.  The commander of an MP unit

18     -- what the commander of an MP unit knows is essential as well as what

19     the security organ knows, and on the basis of that information you have a

20     suggestion that is formulated and forwarded to a commander, and on the

21     basis of that suggestion the commander will then decide on what is

22     important at that point in time and will then assign tasks.  I can

23     provide you with an example, if you like.  For example --

24        Q.   We understand that.  What -- the examples I need you to provide

25     me with is what role, if any, the security officer has in facilitating

Page 23390

 1     the commander's orders or making sure that it happens.  What role does

 2     the security officer play, if any, given that it may have been his

 3     proposal in the first place?

 4        A.   Yes.  I understand.  Well, his role follows a different course in

 5     this case.  He has to monitor the way in which what has been suggested is

 6     being implemented, and given the commander's order, in light of the

 7     commander's order, he has to intervene as a professional, and he has to

 8     ensure that the tasks are carried out in an effective manner, and then he

 9     must inform the commander of the fact of the situation.  He must inform

10     him of the role he played as far as the role he played when he suggested

11     that action be taken.  So first you make the suggestion, and then you

12     have to monitor how the task is being carried out.  You have to intervene

13     to ensure that the commander's order is being respected, that it's being

14     implemented, and then you have to inform about what has been

15     accomplished.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Zivanovic?

17             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Sorry.  I see that a part of the answer of the

18     witness is not translated properly.  It is at page 33, line 1 to 12.  He

19     said that security organ just have to intervene in professional aspect of

20     the carrying out of order, commander's order, but not as professional.

21     It was translated as "professional."

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  So he didn't use the word as a professional?

23             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Yeah.  He used the words, in the professional

24     aspect or [Interpretation] "In the professional aspect."

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Do you confirm that, Colonel?  Let me

Page 23391

 1     read it to you as we have it here.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  His -- yeah, but I want to make sure how it fits in

 4     now because it's still not clear to me.  "He has to monitor the way in

 5     which what has been suggested is being implemented, and given the

 6     commander's orders, in light of the commander's order, he has to

 7     intervene as a professional, and he has to ensure that the tasks are

 8     carried out in an effective manner."

 9             What's wrong in that?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, "professional," that's not

11     very specific.  We are talking about the act for which he is

12     professionally responsibility.  Professional is a bit different, but

13     professional responsibility is a little more specific.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  I just wanted you to clear that up for us, to make

15     sure that what Mr. Zivanovic raised was --

16             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  We have again a wrong translation because the

17     word nadlezan, Serbian word nadlezan was translated, and

18     "responsibility."  It is the proper Serbian word odgovoran.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  What's nadlezan?  How should it be translated,

20     nadlezan?

21             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  It is in competence of security organ.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Okay.  Let's move.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

24        Q.   I don't think much is changed by any of that, Colonel, but I'd

25     like to ask you.  Let's say the security officer sees the military police

Page 23392

 1     doing something not the way it had been envisaged and he has to

 2     intervene.  When he intervenes, can he issue instructions to the military

 3     police that were consistent with the commander's orders and his previous

 4     proposal?

 5        A.   Yes.  And that was an important part of his role as an organ who

 6     had to guide and monitor the situation.  He could issue requests in this

 7     respect.  A request that one act and abide by the commander's order and

 8     to act in the way prescribed so he can make such a request.  He cannot

 9     change a commander's order but within the limits of the order, he can

10     exert his influence to ensure that this task is professionally carried

11     out.

12        Q.   May be translation, but what is a better word for what he can do,

13     "request" or "instruct"?

14        A.   Well, a request, demand, it's like instructions.  Can't be

15     anything else, but it's a demand in the sense that you have to respect

16     the commander's order.  That's the professional part of the task.

17        Q.   So when a security officer comes to the commander of the MP and

18     gives a -- and intervenes and makes an instruction to that commander, the

19     MP, is that commander, the MP, required to follow that instruction?

20        A.   The instructions issued within the limits of a commander's order

21     -- well, they have to be implemented in a professional way, and the

22     commander of a military police unit is obliged to act on these

23     instructions.

24        Q.   Okay.  So whatever we call it, the MP commander is going to do

25     it?

Page 23393

 1        A.   Yes.  It's his duty to do it.

 2        Q.   All right.  Go to another topic for a little while.  In your

 3     report, you spend a fair amount of time talking about the 28th Division

 4     and some of the bad things they were doing from 1992 to 1995, and

 5     sometimes you used the term "sabotage" and "terrorism" together.  I want

 6     to ask you about one -- one comment you made in your report.  It's at

 7     page 3, paragraph 1.17, and I can give you a -- it's 3D396 again.  It's

 8     page 5 in the English, page 4 in the B/C/S.  It's probably easier --

 9     since you haven't been able to find your report, I'll try to just give

10     you the page.

11             And take a look at paragraph 1.17.  You state the following:

12     "Experience has confirmed that the organisers and perpetrators of

13     destructive activities [threats] do not have any moral, legal, or

14     methodological restrictions and that they are comprehensively perfecting

15     their destructive activity."

16             Now, we know that you went on to talk quite a bit about the BiH

17     army and the 28th Division specifically.  Who if anyone are you referring

18     to when you say the organisers and perpetrators of destructive activities

19     have no moral, legal, methodological restrictions?

20        A.   Mr. McCloskey, this part of the report is the general part that

21     focuses on problems that had been identified of a very long period of

22     time, that I spent working within my field, the field that I worked in,

23     and just so happens that I still work in this field.  So this is a

24     position based on investigating and following events, global events and

25     local events as well.  Each event, each specific event, does not have the

Page 23394

 1     characteristics of this general experience.  It's individual.  It has --

 2     or they are individual and they have their own characteristics, but when

 3     you look at this within the context of one's general experience, it does

 4     fall under such a description.  That's why you have this paragraph here.

 5     The entire view of the problem has been defined more specifically in

 6     terms of risks and threats.  The risks and threats that are referred to

 7     here were subsequently analysed and become identifiable on an individual

 8     basis.  So that is the sense of this paragraph.

 9        Q.   Most of us would agree with you in that if you were describing

10     terrorists, but are you suggesting that all the activities of the 28th

11     Division in this time period were acts of terrorism or acts committed by

12     terrorists?

13        A.   No.  Later, one moves on to documents, and these documents were

14     analysed and relate to the 28th Division in particular.  The 28th

15     Division isn't referred to here, but terrorism is and problems that are

16     related to terrorism and its appearance.  The 28th Division is a

17     different matter.  It was analysed individually and on the basis of the

18     documents that I had.  There is nothing here that I did not find in

19     documents and that is not part of the assessment on what was in

20     accordance with the regulations on the application of war law and what

21     amounted to violation of such law.  So it's in this respect that one can

22     analyse what the 28th Division is, but in this general part we can only

23     deal with the part that has something in common with this position.

24        Q.   All right.  Well, I -- I didn't see in your report any real

25     problems or bad conduct carried out by the VRS in this time period.

Page 23395

 1     Would you say you're objective in this review?  But very simply; we don't

 2     need a long answer.

 3        A.   The rules and regulations imposed limits on me, so I could not

 4     deal with the problem of the VRS, and so if I had been assigned a task to

 5     analyse something else, well, then I would have used other rules and

 6     regulations, and I would have analysed something else.  But this wasn't

 7     the task assigned to me, and I can't assess the threats on the Muslim

 8     side.  You should have to analyse the documents from the Muslim side for

 9     this.

10        Q.   Well, let's go over a few documents and see if we can get your

11     take on it, a few VRS documents.  Let's start with 65 ter number 29.

12     It's page 5 in the English and page 11 in the B/C/S, and this is going to

13     come up on the screen, Colonel.  This is a document by General Mladic

14     dated 19 November 1992, called, "Directive Operational number 4."  And it

15     lays out several tasks for the various corps at that time, and I hope

16     they can help you -- I'm sorry that that's such a bad copy.  But I want

17     -- I'll read you the key part of the Drina Corps section, is what we are

18     looking at.  "From its present positions, its main forces shall

19     persistently defend Visegrad [the dam], Zvornik, and the corridor while

20     the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region shall exhaust the

21     enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on him, and force him to

22     leave the Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas, together with the Muslim

23     population."  Now, have you seen this document in the preparation of your

24     testimony or report?

25        A.   I've seen this document, Mr. McCloskey.

Page 23396

 1        Q.   Thank you.  What I wanted to ask you is we see here that Mladic

 2     wants to force the enemy to leave, which I understand, but then it says,

 3     "Together with the Muslim population."  Based on your knowledge, did the

 4     Muslim civilian population present some sort of security threat that

 5     would justify an order like this?

 6        A.   This is the broad view of my expert report.  It would open up a

 7     new security dimension, the appearance of Muslim civilians that

 8     accompanied the armed forces when attacking inhabited settlements in

 9     order to loot and destroy property of the civilian population in the

10     territory where there was a conflict.  And this created a security

11     problem, not only for the armed forces --

12        Q.   Okay, Colonel, I can stop you there because I'm not talking about

13     looters and villains that are with the army in their -- in their raids.

14     What I'm talking about is villagers, people that lived in the villages of

15     Eastern Bosnia, of Kamenica, Cerska, the areas around Birac, Zepa.  I'm

16     talking villagers, farmers, kids, old ladies, men, all the people that

17     are going on their daily lives.  That's what I'm asking you.  Did they --

18     those people living there during the military operations to beat the

19     Muslim army, is there some sort of security reason to justify their

20     removal from the area, the civilians?

21        A.   Mr. McCloskey, as for the security reasons, I have addressed

22     them.  I spoke to you about them precisely, not military looting, if I

23     can put it that way, or unnecessary destruction of targets without any

24     military necessity.  But of all the accompanying sometimes mass presence

25     on -- of non-military forces from among the civilian population who made

Page 23397

 1     up what I said and to what I exclusively attached a security dimension

 2     within the frameworks and in the extent to which they deserved that.

 3     Now, as for this portion of the population that you're referring to here,

 4     on that occasion I did not speak about that as a security problem.

 5        Q.   No, I understand it, but that's the problem with

 6     cross-examination.  Sometimes lawyers ask you new questions.  So can you

 7     -- in thinking about this, is there some sort of security issue in

 8     relating to these old ladies and kids and farmers?

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madam Fauveau?

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] This question has been answered

11     twice.  He spoke about the Muslim civilians on page 39, line 2.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'm going to object, Your Honour.  This is

13     obstruction.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, yes, yes.  It is pure obstruction, Ms.

15     Fauveau.  Let him answer the question, please.

16             Colonel, could you answer the question?  And please answer the

17     question.  Don't try to beat around the bush or go around it.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I did not understand

19     what you meant by beating about the bush or going around it.  I would

20     like to know how you think that I sidestepped this because I'm always

21     ready to provide an answer to the best of my ability, of course.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  You're specifically being asked about a particular

23     part of the population, women, old women, and that, if they ever

24     constituted a security problem.  Please answer that question.  That's

25     part of the question, and then the rest, Mr. McCloskey can deal with.

Page 23398

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As to that part of the question,

 2     the answer given was that they weren't the object of security

 3     considerations and were not a security problem.  So up above is the

 4     answer to the question.  So I was a little taken aback when you said I

 5     hadn't answered it.  They weren't a security aspect.  They weren't a

 6     problem or the subject of my considerations.  So they cannot be taken --

 7     it cannot be taken as a security problem in my response and answer.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Back to you, Mr. McCloskey.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:

10        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  What military justification can you think

11     of, then, if these aren't a security problem, to remove these people from

12     the area of Birac, Zepa, Gorazde?

13        A.   I do not have an insight into the military situation in Republika

14     Srpska for me to be able to provide you with arguments, and I really have

15     no military justification for that.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Ms. Nikolic?

17             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the expert, Mr. Vuga,

18     did not deal with the problem of Gorazde and Zepa and Birac, but he is a

19     military expert in the security field, and that is what he deals with.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.  Do you wish to answer that?

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I absolutely disagree.  His report is rife with

22     issues that happened in this area of Eastern Bosnia, and the activities

23     of Naser Oric are all over Birac, the Birac area, which is a broad area

24     of Eastern Bosnia precisely where we are talking about.  However, he's

25     answered the question.

Page 23399

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Ms. Fauveau?

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I believe that the

 4     question is rather unfair towards the witness.  Indeed, the text referred

 5     to by the Prosecutor --

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Your Honour, continuing with her and that kind of

 7     comment, the witness and I, can we remove the witness if we are going to

 8     go into this kind after dialogue?

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  I don't think it's necessary, but if you insist on

10     it.

11             Colonel, can you please remove your headphones for a short while?

12     And one moment -- can you put them back?  I think we asked him before and

13     he said no.  Do you understand English?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, sir.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Please remove your headphones.

16             I asked him because earlier on I think I heard him speak in

17     English to the usher.  I'm just saying it.  I don't know whether he's

18     understanding or not now, but earlier on I heard him from here speak in

19     English to the usher.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  My particular concern in this --

21                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Something like that.  Yeah.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- conclusions that I'm being unfair to the

24     witness, these kinds of things that, you know, may mount up or -- you

25     know, we don't want to inflame the witness with such comments.  I've got

Page 23400

 1     to spend some time with this.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's hear what she has to say.  So far to me she

 3     hasn't said anything that is irregular or highly irregular.  Let's hear

 4     what she has to say.  If she outsteps, then we'll stop her as we have

 5     before.

 6             Yes, Madam Fauveau?

 7             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, President.  The

 8     Prosecutor referred to a specific text that mentions the civilian

 9     population.  In that text, there is no farmer, no person, no women or

10     older people.  It is the entire civilian population.  Earlier on, the

11     witness said why the civilian population may be a security concern.  Now,

12     if you pick a specific population out of that civilian population, the

13     elderly women, the elderly people, he said that that segment did not

14     cause a security concern, but he said that as such, the civilian

15     population could be a security concern.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  No.  I think I won't comment, of course, but -- and

17     I don't think we need, at least I don't need to hear your comment on

18     that.  I don't know.  Judge Kwon?

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  So we are going to move on.

21             Colonel --

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  He answered the question, so --

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  So, Colonel, all right, we are going to move on.

25     Let him take you back to the question.  The question -- there was an

Page 23401

 1     objection from Ms. Nikolic.  There was an objection from Ms. Nikolic to

 2     which he, Mr. McCloskey, had responded, and then Madam Fauveau

 3     intervened.

 4             Yes, you had put a question which had been answered, so you can

 5     put your next question, Mr. McCloskey.  Your last question was, "Thank

 6     you, Colonel.  What military justification can you think of, then, if

 7     these aren't a security problem to remove these people from the area of

 8     Birac, Zepa and Gorazde?"  And he had answered, "I do not have an insight

 9     into the military situation in Republika Srpska for me to be able to

10     provide you with arguments, and I really have no military justification

11     for that."

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think that's the answer.

13             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:

15        Q.   One last question on this point, Colonel.

16             Along with that population I described of the women and children

17     and non-combatants living in these villages, there were many times

18     mosques.  Did the mosques in these villages where the army and the

19     civilians were inhabiting, did those mosques after the combat was over,

20     the mosques that remained standing after the combat was over and the

21     Muslim military is gone and the civilians are gone, did those mosques

22     represent any kind of a security threat to the VRS or the RS?

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Ms. Nikolic?

24             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think that my

25     colleague has provided both -- has asked the question but provided the

Page 23402

 1     answer, as well, to it.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's proceed.  Colonel, could you answer the

 3     question, please?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Neither the mosques nor the

 5     churches nor any religious sites in general are military targets nor a

 6     security threat on either side or on any side.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 9        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Let's go on to another document.  We are now

10     getting into the period of May 1993 where you talked about in your report

11     and testified about some of the things the 28th Division was doing

12     outside the enclave, and I just want to show you a document, 65 ter

13     number 3499.  And it should come up.  If you're having any trouble

14     reading it, I can also hand you a nice clear copy.  And this is, as I

15     said, from 31 May 1993, to the TG Jazz 1 [phoen] command, attention

16     Colonel Vukota Vukotic or Lieutenant Colonel Milan Urosevic, and it's

17     from the deputy commander of the Drina Corps at the time, Colonel Milutin

18     Skocajic, and it says, "Lieutenant Colonel Urosevic received a verbal

19     order from the commander, Colonel Milenko Zivanovic, to demolish the

20     water-tower and tank in the area of Zeleni Jadar [water supply system for

21     Srebrenica].  Since this has not been done so far, this task is to be

22     executed immediately, by June 1 1993 at the latest, and it is to be

23     presented to the public as if the Muslim forces did it.  During the

24     execution of the task, strictly take care of safety of personnel and our

25     forces in order to prevent any consequences.  Upon the execution of the

Page 23403

 1     task, inform this command in writing."

 2             Was this a document you had a chance to review as you were

 3     looking in this time period?

 4        A.   No, sir.  I didn't have this document in my hands, nor did I

 5     analyse it.

 6        Q.   Did this water tank, in your view, pose some sort of security

 7     threat to the Muslim -- excuse me, to the VRS forces, and I'm sure you

 8     know Zeleni Jadar at the time was within the enclave as the Muslims held.

 9        A.   According to what I analysed, this wasn't a document that I had,

10     so as such, alone, it could not have been the subject of my analysis.  It

11     isn't part of that.

12        Q.   We are going to have a lot that may not have been talked -- you

13     may not have talked about -- well, not a lot.  We are going to have some

14     things that you haven't talked about, but that's what I say.  You talked

15     a lot about the activities of the Muslim units.  Now I'm going to ask you

16     to talk about the activities of some of the VRS units.  That's fair game,

17     Colonel.

18        A.   It seems that my task, the assignment I had, was taken out of

19     context and brought to a completely different set of assignments that I

20     did not have within my own task.  It was my task to analyse the function

21     of the security organs within the Army of Republika Srpska, in the Drina

22     Corps and the Zvornik Brigade, and it was -- and my task was defined to

23     begin with.  Its parameters were defined.  So it was my task to show this

24     objectively, to show how it functioned objectively.  Now, the documents

25     that I selected, which did not throw light on this question, were not

Page 23404

 1     utilised for any conclusions I made or, indeed, for my analysis.  They do

 2     not deny the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and what happened in that war, but

 3     from it this has been separated.  So that's what I dealt with, and that

 4     is why it is objective in that portion.  Now, the fact that it was not

 5     considered cannot be a part of the report.  So that is my position, which

 6     is now being altered.

 7        Q.   Colonel, don't worry about the part that you didn't see this.  I

 8     hadn't seen this for -- until very recently myself.  But could you help

 9     me out here and go over some of these VRS documents?  It's --

10        A.   Mr. McCloskey, as an expert, then, a security expert, I would

11     need a comprehensive analysis, and I cannot make conclusions based on

12     partial functions or how things were jeopardised because in the documents

13     itself from the military aspect it is easily recognisable, and security

14     has no better insight nor any better explanation than what command has.

15     So nothing specific in security -- nothing more can be seen specifically

16     within the realm of security than can be established through command and

17     checked out through command.  So my role is derived from the context of

18     the material I dealt with, so I'm not concerned.  I just don't have any

19     qualified answers to provide.

20        Q.   You can't tell me why they blew up the -- or what security

21     reasons there may have been for blowing up a water tank and blaming it on

22     the Muslims?

23        A.   Especially not that.  I can't say that.  It is outside my

24     knowledge and the possibilities that I have of clarifying the issue.

25        Q.   Okay.  Well, this next document may bring the questions a little

Page 23405

 1     bit more into focus for you.  Let's go to 65 ter 3500, and let me give

 2     you a good copy of that too.  This is another document from the Drina

 3     Corps roughly three weeks later, June 21st, 1993.  This one is actually

 4     from Milenko Zivanovic, the commander that gave the oral order to blow up

 5     the water tank and blame it on the Muslims.

 6             Now, having in mind that that particular order that General

 7     Zivanovic wanted this act to be blamed on the Muslims, let's take a look

 8     at what this says from Zivanovic to TG Pribicevac, to the command,

 9     attention Colonel Vukota Vukotic.  Submit the data on the Muslim TGD that

10     demolished the water supply system in Zeleni Jadar.  What's TDG mean?  Or

11     TDG?  Those -- sorry, the initials.

12        A.   Are you asking me, sir?

13        Q.   Yes.

14        A.   I didn't understand it that way.  That's why I paused.  Sabotage

15     terrorist group.  You quoted that correctly.  Sabotage terrorist schools

16     or diversionary terror -- tactical group.

17        Q.   Okay.  So we see this report and it starts, it says, Since we

18     need to inform highest UNPROFOR bodies about the barbaric act of the

19     Muslim DTG when they demolished the water supply system in Zeleni Jadar

20     and on this occasion directly confronted our forces, inform me about the

21     following.  According to your estimate, how many terrorists took part in

22     this demolition action; briefly describe the sequence of events, in the

23     direct clash with our forces whether you killed, wounded heavily or

24     lightly, or captured any terrorists.  Submit identification data for

25     these persons if you're in possession of any.  Submit the data by June

Page 23406

 1     21st, 1993, at the latest until 2 hours.

 2             Now, three weeks earlier Zivanovic tells Urosevic to demolish

 3     this thing, and it is to be presented to the public as if the Muslim

 4     forces did it.  Now he's asking for documents suggesting -- or asking for

 5     how the Muslim forces did it.  What's all this about in your view?  Think

 6     the Muslim forces got in there and blew it up before the Serbs had a

 7     chance to do that?

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Ms. Nikolic?

 9             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the witness has

10     already answered that when discussing the first document, and now after

11     everything that has gone before, my colleague puts hypotheticals to the

12     witness and documents and material that Mr. Vuga didn't deal with at all,

13     so we are in a situation where we are dealing with hypothetical things

14     and speculation and guess work.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Assuming that these two documents are authentic,

16     and I hear nothing challenging that so far, what Mr. McCloskey is doing

17     is putting two apparently contradictory documents, and he's trying to

18     solicit from the expert an explanation.  So, Colonel, have you understood

19     Mr. McCloskey's question?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have understood the question, but

21     the whole idea of Colonel Milenko Zivanovic, I cannot find anything that

22     would provide an answer to the question I'm being asked.  Colonel

23     Zivanovic knows about this, and that's it.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:

25        Q.   Well, Colonel, I can tell you that has been established that the

Page 23407

 1     water system got blown up in this case, so I think a lot more people than

 2     Colonel Zivanovic know about it, but let me ask you a question.  You have

 3     relied on many --

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, one moment -- yes, okay.  Go ahead, go ahead.

 5     One moment because we have got --

 6             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Well, I'll hear the question out,

 7     Your Honour, and then afterwards I'll get on my feet if I need to.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:

10        Q.   You have relied in your report and in your testimony on many VRS

11     reports of Muslim terrorist actions.  Is that not correct?

12        A.   That is correct.

13        Q.   Now, had you seen this particular report, 65 ter 3500, by itself,

14     you would have assumed that -- as we would have all that read that, that

15     this water tank was blown up by the Muslim forces and that this document

16     was correct and genuine, right?

17        A.   That the document is correct and truthful, I cannot verify that,

18     but I'm relying on what is written down there.

19        Q.   Okay.  My point is, if this is a completely fabricated document

20     based on the orders of General Zivanovic to fabricate who actually blew

21     up the water tank, doesn't that cause you a little concern about the rest

22     of the documents you saw about blaming things on Muslims?

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Ms. Nikolic?  I suggest, anticipating what Ms.

24     Nikolic probably would be saying, that, Colonel, you take off your

25     headphones again, please.  Thank you.  Yes, Ms. Nikolic?

Page 23408

 1             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we don't know whether

 2     this document has been fabricated or not by General Zivanovic, nor do we

 3     know what actually happened for the witness to be able to evaluate the

 4     document in the way in which my colleague put his question.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  This is very simple.  I'm just putting an

 7     inference together from the previous document, nothing complicated nor

 8     unfair about it.  Armies do this to each other all the time.  That's my

 9     point.  I'm just -- you know, and this has to do with security,

10     counter-intelligence.  It's right on point.  Nothing mysterious about

11     this.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  We have understood the question perfectly

14     well, and on the basis of that, we believe that the witness can proceed

15     to answer the question.  That's unless he wants an explanation from Mr.

16     McCloskey.

17             So Mr. -- Colonel, have you understood the question that Mr.

18     McCloskey put to you?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I understood Mr.

20     McCloskey's question.  However, it would seem that what was not

21     understood was what I dealt with, and I dealt with threats to the Army of

22     Republika Srpska and the functions of the Army of Republika Srpska, any

23     threat to that and jeopardy to that.  So when my mission, my task, is

24     placed in another context, in a different context, then it no longer has

25     that same meaning.  So that's the substance of the misunderstanding and

Page 23409

 1     the problem we are now facing.  So, please, I would like to ask that my

 2     task and assignment, as I was given, should be assessed that way.  As far

 3     as I'm concerned, this would be a completely new assignment as an expert.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Mr. McCloskey?

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I don't have the authority to provide him a new

 6     assignment, but I will continue to ask questions.

 7        Q.   Colonel, part of testifying here is answering the questions.  If

 8     the command in this courtroom allows the question to be asked, it's

 9     imperative for you to answer it whether it has to do with your report or

10     not.  You understand that?

11        A.   Yes, I do understand that.  Go ahead, please.

12        Q.   You don't have --

13             JUDGE AGIUS:  If you rephrase the question the way you explained

14     it when he had his headphones off, I think he will be able to answer it

15     better, or he would choose to answer the question, rather.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:

17        Q.   Colonel, the reason I'm asking you about this is because you have

18     made reference to many VRS documents of this time period relating to what

19     was going on in the woods around and in Srebrenica.  Now, if we look at

20     this document, it appears that this is a fake document designed to make

21     the public and even the VRS believe that the Muslims blew up their own

22     water tank, and so my concern is you've been reviewing a lot of

23     documents.  How do you know the difference between a faked document like

24     this one, which as you can see created terrorists out of the blue sky,

25     how do you know your -- the documents you looked at weren't fakes

Page 23410

 1     designed to mislead the public?

 2        A.   Mr. McCloskey, the word "fake" or "fabrication" is one that I did

 3     not utter.  I did not say that the document was not in order, was not

 4     valid.  All I said was that from the aspects of whether it was truthful

 5     or not I couldn't check that out, but I was looking at the contents of

 6     the document.  So that was as far as the authenticity of the document is

 7     concerned, and I said that that is something General Zivanovic could

 8     know, but I am looking at the contents of the document.

 9        Q.   One more time, I'll try.  What I'm fascinated with about this

10     document is that it's sent to the command of Vukota Vukotic and it's

11     talking about providing documents to your own army to provide support for

12     what you know is a fantasy.  Why would you want to fantasise with your

13     own army?

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Ms. Nikolic?

15             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this question goes

16     quite beyond cross-examination and enters a different sphere altogether.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  It doesn't go beyond.  I mean, the witness is being

18     asked, from your experience as a military expert, would there be a reason

19     or is there a reason why a Colonel like Milenko Zivanovic would draft

20     such a document and have it addressed to and sent, communicated to

21     colleague - I forgot his name now - Vukotic or Vukota Vukotic.  That's --

22     and he can answer that.

23             Yes, Colonel, if you could answer the question.  Why would have

24     Milenko Zivanovic drawn up and sent such a letter or communication to

25     Vukota Vukotic?

Page 23411

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The expert for security just like

 2     myself who deals in this area from this document cannot uncover the

 3     motives and reasons for which this, precisely at that time and in this

 4     way, was ordered by Zivanovic.  Obviously, he wanted to achieve something

 5     through documents that were supposed to be given to him to his hand.

 6     Now, his intentions and the goal behind it, that stands behind that, is

 7     something I cannot uncover from this document, but the entire procedure

 8     as it stands in itself speaks of the fact that this is linked up.  There

 9     was linkage between the document, the first document, and this second

10     document.  Now, the security organ cannot uncover the real reasons and go

11     into what Milenko Zivanovic thought in doing so.  So as far as I'm

12     concerned, this procedure is not customary.  It's unusual with respect to

13     the way it was conducted, carried out, and I'm saying this because I

14     can't say what Milenko Zivanovic's motives were in proceeding along these

15     lines.  I would have to have far greater insight into everything

16     surrounding this particular act because this is insufficient for a

17     conclusion to be made, but the procedure itself is unusual.  I did not

18     come across acts of this kind frequently.

19        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  Let's go to another document.  It's one that

20     you've seen briefly by the Defence, 65 ter number 1D1076.  I'm sorry.  My

21     printing on this copy is really small, so maybe we can get a -- the one

22     blown up on the screen to be a bit better.  This is a document from

23     February 11th, 1995, from the Drina Corps command, department of security

24     and intelligence, from Vujadin Popovic.  And I'm not so much interested

25     in the information that was in it, and I think you've talked about that a

Page 23412

 1     -- but I see twice that Vujadin Popovic has made reference to the term

 2     "balija."  It says, we have information that a man called Milorad Radocic

 3     [phoen] from Belgrade is in contact with the balija army."

 4             Then it goes on to say the balijas are trying to establish the

 5     whereabouts of prisoners.

 6             Now, this isn't a bar or the trenches or the back rooms or in

 7     some jeep.  This is a document that goes out to all the security units,

 8     what looks like all the brigades of the Drina Corps.

 9             First of all, what is this term "balija," in your view?

10        A.   As far as I know, the term "balija" represents a word in the

11     vernacular that has a certain dose of -- it has a certain derogatory

12     aspect or making fun of, just as the other side used the term "Chetniks,"

13     and you'll find similar terminology that was used when the parties were

14     confronted, but it refers -- it's not too derogatory.  It's mildly

15     derogatory and appears in the vernacular.  It has derogatory elements for

16     referring to Muslims.

17        Q.   Are you aware of a worse word to Muslims than "balija"?

18        A.   I don't know a lot of terms, generally speaking.  I nor my family

19     were ever in areas where these mocking terms or derogatory terms were

20     used throughout my upbringing and so on.  So I'm not well-versed in the

21     subject, and I was born in Croatia, as I said, and I never heard that

22     used.

23        Q.   You must have grown up in a different world than I did.  What's

24     worse, poturice or balija in your experience?

25        A.   As to context -- the context of these words --

Page 23413

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment.  Yes, Madam Nikolic?

 2             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] I would like my learned friend to

 3     tell us what the object of that question is and what the grounds for

 4     asking it are and where he's heading.  What parts of the

 5     examination-in-chief give rise to this type of question in the

 6     cross-examination, whether we are dealing with credibility or what.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Do you wish to answer that, Mr. McCloskey, in the

 8     presence of the witness?

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  He should probably --

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Colonel, do you mind removing your headphones

11     again, please?  And be patient with us.  Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  This was a document that was brought up in direct

13     examination.  It was portrayed as a reasonable document involving

14     counter-intelligence, is my recollection.  There is -- we are in a case

15     of genocide and persecutions where an ethnic element is part of it.  As

16     you have seen, these documents are laced with these terms, official VRS

17     documents, and it's the position of the Prosecution that when you see

18     documents -- when you see terms like this outside of the bar, outside of

19     the trenches, when you see them in official documents, this has an effect

20     on the troops and the morale of people that hear them.  And it gives an

21     indication of the professionalism and the quality and character of the

22     people that write them.  We are not prosecuting anyone for using rotten

23     language, but I think the language gives us an insight into the ethnic

24     feelings of those that write them and help us understand this case

25     better.

Page 23414

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Let me consult with my colleagues and

 2     we'll -- yes, Ms. Nikolic?

 3             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] I have to speak in my own language

 4     and answer the question.  The witness has his headsets off, but [In

 5     English] I'll try English, but it's not good enough.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  That's the last thing we would do to you, Ms.

 7     Nikolic.

 8             MS. NIKOLIC:  I'll try to express myself in the best way.  I

 9     really don't think, Your Honour, that this witness is a real expert

10     witness for the question like my colleague indeed asked.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.  Yes, let me consult with my

12     colleagues, please.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Simple solution to the problem, if it's

15     a problem.  This document was in the first place used by Mr. Zivanovic

16     during his direct, to start with.  Secondly, we find absolutely nothing

17     extraordinary or out of the ordinary given the parameters of the

18     expertise of this witness for this question to be put and answered.  So

19     I'm asking, Colonel -- page 55, line 4.  One moment.  Especially since

20     the witness himself said that it is mildly derogatory and appears in the

21     vernacular.

22             So I'm going to ask the Colonel to put on his headphones.

23             And yes, Mr. McCloskey.

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:

25        Q.   Colonel, I'm not quite sure where we are.

Page 23415

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Neither am I but --

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I can get to the point.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  He had answered it from lines 8 to 12 -- to 11 of

 4     that page, page 55.  And then you commented, actually.  Your next

 5     question was, You must have grown up in a different world than I did.

 6     What's worse, then ... or balija in your experience, but you were stopped

 7     there.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 9        Q.   I asked you, Colonel, what was worse, poturice or balija, in

10     terms of a Muslim?  How would -- what would be worse from a Muslim

11     perspective?  You grew up in Yugoslavia.  You've got to know the answer

12     to this question.

13        A.   To grow up in Yugoslavia in a microenvironment such as

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina, well, these are two different matters, two different

15     things.  To answer your question precisely, I would have to have

16     communications experience and experience in living in the environments

17     where these terms are used, were these used in their original sense as

18     slang and to know what the emotional connotations are, to know how people

19     reacts to these terms.  I didn't have such experience, so you can't put

20     such a question to me as a Yugoslav.  So this is why there is such a gap

21     here.  From books and other sources, there is much that I have learnt,

22     but this is something that has to do with one's life experience, and I

23     don't have that experience that relates to terms such as Chetniks and

24     balijas and so on and so forth.

25        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to one more document, 65 ter 3497, and let me

Page 23416

 1     show you a copy of that.  I won't spend much time with this one, Colonel.

 2     It's much like the last one.  This is 29 April 1995 document to the

 3     chiefs of the organs for intelligence and security of -- looks like all

 4     the brigades, including the mixed artillery regiment and the Engineering

 5     Battalion, from Lieutenant Colonel Popovic.  And just in looking at this,

 6     I count his use of the term balijas, it's actually in reference to a

 7     human being named Saban Omerovic [phoen], four times.

 8             Is it appropriate for a JNA-trained professional security officer

 9     to use these sorts of terms in their official correspondence with junior

10     security officers who are looking to him as an example?

11        A.   As for how appropriate it is, if you're asking me this question,

12     if you're putting this question to me as a professional, well, I can say

13     that it's not appropriate.

14        Q.   And why not?

15        A.   Well, if I'm a security officer -- well, as I have already told

16     you what my experience is, I won't go into these offices, but if I were

17     such an officer I wouldn't understand all the dimensions and all the

18     meanings or the various meanings of this term.

19        Q.   Okay.  Let's go to another document, 65 ter 2517.  This is really

20     the last one of this group of documents.  And I'll give you a -- so you

21     can look at it.  This is a document from 21 July 1995, personally to

22     General Miletic from assistant commander Major General Zdravko Tolimir.

23     It's entitled, "The Situation In Zepa."  And what I'm mostly concerned

24     about is paragraph 5.  You've already told us who Tolimir is, and I want

25     to get an idea from you why the -- what is it, if anything, about his

Page 23417

 1     position as chief of intel and security that would involve him in the

 2     activities we see suggested in paragraph 5.  He's talking about the

 3     Muslim army here, in the beginning, crashing the enemy's defence as we

 4     see from paragraph 4, and he says, "The most convenient means for their

 5     destruction would be the uses of chemical weapons or aerosol grenades and

 6     bombs.  Using these means would accelerate the surrender of Muslims and

 7     the fall of Zepa."  Now, he's making this proposal to General Miletic.

 8     Is this the kind of getting around the -- how he's suggesting the

 9     destruction of the forces, is -- where in the security branch do we find

10     rules supporting a -- you know, how to destroy the opposing forces?  Is

11     that something that fits into the definitions you've been talking about?

12        A.   I spoke about the definitions of special enemy groups and

13     infiltrated groups.  These forces don't have such a character.  As to the

14     means that were to be used, well, from the point of view of security, it

15     wasn't something that was examined.  It didn't fall within the scope of

16     my work, and in itself this is not the task that falls within the field

17     of that profession.  This is a military task.  I can't imagine what sort

18     of chemical means are in question, but aerosol grenades and bombs, well,

19     these means have not been banned.  So the answer to the question is that

20     I'm not familiar with the security aspect of this question.  This is a

21     military question, destroying enemy forces, special enemy forces that

22     haven't been infiltrated.  They are there.

23        Q.   Can you tell us what aerosol grenades and bombs are, the ones

24     that have not been banned?

25        A.   At this point in time, I can't provide you with a classification

Page 23418

 1     of all the means, but on the basis of the literature I've consulted, I

 2     came across explanations according to which some of these means can be

 3     used, are not banned.  So I can't provide you with a precise answer right

 4     now.  I would have to prepare myself somewhat for such an answer, but I'm

 5     answering your question on the basis of what I have read so far.

 6        Q.   Did you read or hear about what Mr. Butler said about what these

 7     things were?

 8        A.   I'm trying to remember what Mr. Butler said, but I'm not sure

 9     that I have linked up the answer with the question and answer, but I

10     can't be very precise here.

11        Q.   He was I think on the witness stand even longer than you were, so

12     don't worry about that.

13             What kind of chemical weapons were in the arsenal of the JNA or

14     VJ when you were chief assistant or you were the assistant chief of

15     security?

16        A.   I haven't got any experience or knowledge about chemical weapons.

17     I'd been educated for PNKPO, anti-nuclear chemical protection -- defence,

18     so from the point of view of defence.  Not from the point of view of

19     possessing means, but from that point of view we had enough information

20     on protection on the way in which these means could be used to attack.  I

21     never had the occasion of seeing chemical or biological weapons nor did I

22     study about how these weapons were used.

23        Q.   Okay.  Looking at the last part of paragraph 5, we believe that

24     we could force Muslims to surrender sooner if we would destroy groups of

25     Muslim refugees fleeing from the direction of Stublic, Radava, and

Page 23419

 1     Brloska Planina:  To your knowledge as a professional that's talked about

 2     the laws of war, is this legitimate, to try to destroy fleeing groups of

 3     refugees in order to get the army to surrender sooner?

 4        A.   In the order Stupcanica 95, it says that the Muslim population

 5     and UNPROFOR are not the target, and this isn't in accordance with that

 6     order or with any other.

 7        Q.   So this is a very illegal order, isn't it?  But it's not an

 8     order.  Let's get that straight.  This is a very illegal proposal.

 9        A.   The proposal, such as it is -- well, naturally it's not an order

10     because General Tolimir did not have the authority to exercise command.

11        Q.   But it's very illegal, isn't it, this proposal, what he's asking

12     for?

13        A.   We said that that was the case from the point of view of the

14     order and from the point of view of the proposal itself, from the point

15     of view of the order Stupcanica 95.  That's what I had in mind when I

16     referred to an order.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  I think we'll have the break now.  How much

18     longer do you have, Mr. McCloskey?

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  It's taken quite a bit longer than I thought it

20     was going to, but I hope -- I'm still hoping I can finish today, but it's

21     going to be close.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Okay.  So 25 minutes -- do you want to

23     reduce it to 20 minutes?  Yes, Ms. Fauveau?

24             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I could have waited to

25     the end of the cross-examination of the Prosecutor, but I thought that it

Page 23420

 1     would be --

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Do you need the witness in the courtroom or not?

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, no, no, pas du tout.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  And Colonel, you can withdraw.

 5             MS. FAUVEAU:  [In English] No, not at all.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would require 25

 7     minutes if possible.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  We will give you 25 minutes.  Yes, Ms. Fauveau?

 9             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I believe that it would be better

10     to inform the parties and to ask your leave for this.  Following some of

11     the questions put by the Prosecutor, I would seek for your leave to allow

12     me a very short cross-examination, which stems from the document that

13     we've just seen a few moments ago, and also I have some questions with

14     regarding Srebrenica.  If you give me that permission, I will not go over

15     -- I would need 10 to 15 minutes.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  We will communicate our decision on

17     that later when we resume, okay?  Thank you.

18                           --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey?

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President.

22        Q.   Colonel, you had -- I think you were shown some documents and you

23     talked a bit about the security officer's review of recruits or

24     volunteers, I guess, from places outside the former Yugoslavia, in

25     particular, Poland in this particular case.  Remember speaking about

Page 23421

 1     that?

 2        A.   Yes, Mr. McCloskey, I do remember.

 3        Q.   And I think we all understood that vetting foreign volunteers is

 4     a good idea for -- to make sure you're not -- try to make sure you're not

 5     getting some kind of a spy or problematic person.

 6             At that time, should or did -- well, let me put it this way:

 7     Would it have been a good idea for a VRS security officer in looking at a

 8     Polish volunteer to identify what religion he was from?  Would religion

 9     be a significant issue in looking at his security -- potential security

10     threat?

11        A.   This problem could be viewed from the aspects of the

12     comprehensive conditions, not isolated, not religion and faith per se

13     because that in itself, unless there are any other factors and

14     influences, would not be an essential reason or vital reason from the

15     security aspect.  I don't know if I've been clear enough.  From the

16     security aspect, I'm saying.

17        Q.   Shouldn't a -- well, would a VRS security officer be worried

18     about bringing on Polish Catholics?

19        A.   A security officer would be worried, first and foremost, for the

20     fact that there is no answer to the question as to what the real motives

21     were of the arrival of volunteers because wars kill people; people are

22     killed in wars, and so if somebody comes who is from -- comes in who is

23     otherwise a very long way away from the war to take part in that war,

24     then one must find the answer to what the real reason for that person

25     doing that is.  Now, if, along with that, there are some other factors,

Page 23422

 1     some other indexes which do not -- which cannot be incorporated into the

 2     entire context and character of the war, then this would require a

 3     comprehensive overview of the situation.  So that would be an answer.

 4        Q.   Okay.  [Microphone not activated] ... documents now, and I want

 5     to go to a document that you talked a bit about, and I want to give you a

 6     -- another chance to answer a question on it.  It's 65 ter 131, and for

 7     your benefit, let me give you a typed version of it.  I'm sure you'll

 8     recognise it.  It's that document that General Tolimir sent to General

 9     Gvero on the 13th of July, and we see it's handwritten, that it was

10     submitted at 2230 hours on the 13th, so pretty late.  You have given us

11     your analysis of this, and I'm not going to ask you why Tolimir would

12     suggest sending Muslims to take care of a pig farm, but I want you to

13     look at that last line especially.  "It would be best if this is a new

14     group which has not been in contact with the other prisoners of war."

15             Now, I'm going to ask you this question in the context of a

16     hypothetical, which, as I mentioned, is -- should be fair game and part

17     of your job here, and the hypothetical reflects the facts as the

18     Prosecution sees them, and they are this:  The late evening hours of 13

19     July, in the areas around Srebrenica and Bratunac, the morning of 13

20     July, about 16 people were taken by an execution squad in a bus when,

21     buses were in great need, and executed.  At about 1.00 p.m. the same day,

22     on the 13 July, in the area near Konjevic Polje, three buses were taken

23     from this massive transport of civilians and filled with Muslim men of

24     military age and were joined by an APC and an excavator, and these three

25     buses, the APC, and the excavator trundled off down the road to the

Page 23423

 1     Cerska Valley where the men in those buses were tied up, were summarily

 2     executed in the afternoon hours of 13 July, and later on a little bit

 3     later, roughly a thousand men in the warehouse at Kravica were mowed down

 4     by automatic weapon fire as they were huddled inside the warehouse.

 5             So that's what's happened on the 13 July, and at 2230 hours there

 6     is roughly somewhere in the amount of 5.000 to 6.000 Muslims all detained

 7     in schools and vehicles around Bratunac, some are actually in Zvornik, in

 8     the Orahovac school, that night.  They are being beaten, they are being

 9     killed individually at times.

10             So take that into account, that background.  When you look at

11     this document, and you've told us about Tolimir, that he's the man that

12     should be in the know.  And if Tolimir knows that there are hundreds and

13     hundreds of prisoners being detained in separate areas, and he's talking

14     about bringing 800 prisoners of war to this area at the Podrinje Light

15     Infantry Brigade, "It would be best if this new group, which has not been

16     in contact with the other prisoners of war."

17             Now, given this factual scenario I've given you, what is the most

18     reasonable interpretation of what that line means?  Why would Tolimir

19     want his group of 800 separate and apart from the other group?

20        A.   Mr. McCloskey, there are several things here.  The description

21     lasted a long time, so we must clarify them very well, properly.  First

22     of all, where was General Tolimir with respect to the events that we are

23     discussing?  That's the first serious question, for us to be able to see

24     how far he actually was aware and informed of the events which were

25     described or whether anything at all about those events reached General

Page 23424

 1     Tolimir at the place where he was located at the time.  Now --

 2        Q.   Let me add something to make this clear, sorry.  Let's say

 3     General Tolimir knew that those 6.000 men that were being held that were

 4     still alive were marked for death, were going to be summarily executed.

 5     If you throw that into the equation, let's say he knows, doesn't that

 6     give meaning to this last statement?

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's move to your next question, and let us draw

 8     the conclusion if there is evidence to what you're saying, Mr. McCloskey.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10        Q.   All right.  Let's go to an easier area, Colonel, something I want

11     to try to clear up.  65 ter number 107, and this is the Krivaja 95 attack

12     plan that you saw.  I think you said that you were nonplussed with a

13     section in it that made reference to the security branch and the MPs

14     finding locations for prisoners of war, and you talked at length about

15     security branch and prisoners of war and MPs, and I don't want to go

16     through that with you again, but I do want to give you a chance to see

17     the original documents because I think that may help in your evaluation.

18             Okay.  The first one I want to give to you is -- just so it's

19     clear it's ERN 04303386.  It's got an original inked signature from

20     General Zivanovic, and it was found in a -- what we call the Drina Corps

21     archives.  And in it at page 7 is that section that you talked about:

22     "Security organs and military police will indicate the areas for

23     gathering and securing prisoners of war and war booty."

24             Now, to try to save some time, that one doesn't have any markings

25     on it.  It's got an original signature.  I believe there was a suggestion

Page 23425

 1     that perhaps someone had corrected that mistaken view of the security

 2     branch's responsibilities in a later document.  You remember that?

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Ms. Nikolic?

 4             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  If this is

 5     about P107, the ERN number that we have in e-court does not coincide with

 6     the ERN that Mr. McCloskey quoted on page 67, line 5.  So could he please

 7     identify the document for us to be able to follow what it's about, if

 8     it's 507?

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think I've got it right.

11             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] 107.

12             MR. McCLOSKEY:  It's just the original inked copy of the Krivaja

13     95 plan.  There are several of them.  This is just one.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Do you -- yes, Mr. Zivanovic?

15             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Sorry, may we know how many such documents the

16     Prosecution has at its disposal.  What does it mean, several of them?

17     May we see that?

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We have the same number that you have.  This is

20     no big mystery.  I can clear this up with you later, but it's -- this is

21     all been disclosed.  There is a Drina Corps version, and that's what

22     we'll get into.

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Ms. Nikolic?

24             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, according to the list

25     that I have, which the Prosecution provided for the cross-examination,

Page 23426

 1     P107 has a different ERN number from the one mentioned by Mr. McCloskey.

 2     So could we see it -- see whether it's the same document and then move

 3     on?

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  The one in e-court is -- was picked up at the

 6     Zvornik Brigade.  The one the Colonel has came from the Drina Corps

 7     collection.  Somebody want to see it?  They're welcome to see it.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Can we proceed?  I don't understand why we should

 9     have this problem, to be honest with you.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  There is really nothing very mysterious about

11     this, so --

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  So you will show the document or you

13     give the information later to the parties.  In the meantime, please,

14     let's proceed.

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:

16        Q.   All right, Colonel.  So that's the one that's got that --

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Zivanovic?

18             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  I'm aware of two versions of these documents.

19     One of them was corrected, and it was subject of my examination of the

20     witness and the cross-examination of many other witnesses.  And I'd like

21     to know if the Prosecution has the third or fourth or any other version

22     of these documents as well.  I'd like to see that.  And this ERN number

23     is not the same as the ERN number indicated to us through document 107.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Zivanovic.  Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'm into ERN knots all day long, but it's -- I'm

Page 23427

 1     going to get to the document that he's concerned about, and these

 2     documents have all been provided for -- to the Defence in various ways.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's proceed and then you clarify this later with

 4     the parties.  Thank you.

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 6        Q.   So, Colonel, we have got that original, inked version now, and

 7     that should have gone out via teletype or in some other way to various --

 8     the various brigade units, correct?

 9        A.   There is something that doesn't quite tally.  You said it was

10     page 7.  I have page 4 here.  It refers to security.  So we are talking

11     about the same thing?

12        Q.   Yes.  It's that section you testified about.  Thanks for the

13     correction.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Zivanovic?

15             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Sorry, the witness has this document shown to him

16     in a binder, our binder, and it is not necessary to look at this document

17     given right now by the Prosecution.  It is P107, and I do not see any --

18     any problem to see that in the binder.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  If you want to see the document that he has been

20     given, of course you have every right to have a look at it and confront

21     it with what you may have given him, but please, let's proceed.  Do you

22     wish to see the document that he's just been given?

23             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Yes, I would.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Usher, could you please show the document to Mr.

25     Zivanovic?  And in the meantime, you can proceed on the basis of what you

Page 23428

 1     have on the screen in e-court.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:

 3        Q.   Okay.  All right, Colonel.  So let's say we see this original,

 4     inked signature of that document.  That should be valid, though you've

 5     pointed out to a document that Mr. Zivanovic went over with you that had

 6     what you said I think dark line-outs.  So let me show you the original of

 7     that document, and that was 65 ter 1D382.  And here is the original, and

 8     Mr. Zivanovic, if you'd like to see it, you can see the pencil marks on

 9     it.  It's just the original of the photocopy that everybody's had.  Let

10     me give that to you so you can see it.  It's -- as an expert, as you

11     probably agree, it's always good to be able to have original documents

12     when making some kind of analysis.  Just take a look at that, and you'll

13     see those pencil marks that you've seen -- oh, sorry, that's not the

14     pencil-marked one.  It's getting late.  We are -- that's -- sorry, that's

15     the original that you were looking at or that's the inked copy.  This one

16     that has the pencil marks, I'm sure you'll recognise it as the -- an

17     original version of the copy that you were talking about, but there is no

18     inked signature at the bottom.  And the important part of all this time

19     is, I want you to be able to look at, which may not have been clear in

20     the copied version, the last page of the marked-up version that says --

21     stamped, it was a command of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade.

22     Isn't that a receipt stamp, showing that that was received by the

23     Bratunac Brigade on 5 July 1995?

24        A.   Could you please repeat that question?  I was reading the

25     document, so I wasn't quite following.  I apologise.

Page 23429

 1        Q.   So do you see that receipt stamp at the bottom that shows that

 2     this document came it to the Bratunac Brigade on 5 July 1995?

 3        A.   Yes, Mr. McCloskey.  I can see the stamp.

 4        Q.   Okay.  So now, if we take into account that this document was

 5     received by the Bratunac Brigade on the 5th of July, and now we look at

 6     these pencil marks on it, isn't it a fair conclusion that somebody at the

 7     Bratunac Brigade went through the security section and added a few things

 8     and crossed out a few things?

 9        A.   Given the designation of the document, one could come to the

10     conclusion that this was done in the Bratunac Brigade, given the marking.

11        Q.   And we can see, as you've testified to, I think, that in the

12     marked-up version of that document somebody wrote in that Pribicevac as

13     the location where POWs would go?

14        A.   Yes.  This is obvious in the document.  You can see that.

15        Q.   Okay.  And then if we go to P3025, we may not need to get it all

16     up on the board, but if it comes up, fine.  This is what you were shown

17     earlier, and it's the Bratunac Brigade's version of the Krivaja attack

18     plan dated 5 July where they adopted much of the information in the corps

19     plan and made it applicable to their specific needs as a brigade, which I

20     think you've testified about.  And we should see on that that they've

21     actually put in prisoners of war and war booty to be collected in

22     Pribicevac.  So the point of that would be that if we see the original

23     inked signature of Milenko Zivanovic, would that reflect the final work

24     product of the Drina Corps as it went out to the brigades?

25        A.   The question mentions a request for fighting.  It's from -- it's

Page 23430

 1     forwarded to the subordinate units, and that includes the Bratunac

 2     Brigade.  So it's a basis for the commander.  The commander will take a

 3     decision on that basis.

 4        Q.   Right.  And the part that you were nonplussed with or you thought

 5     was inappropriate in terms of the use of security was that portion that

 6     said "security organs and the military police will indicate the areas for

 7     gathering and securing prisoners of war and war booty".  So my question

 8     is now that you understand how that carved-up document came into

 9     existence and that you can see that the original words of General

10     Zivanovic or the people that drafted it for him are not changed, do you

11     still disagree or are you still nonplussed by this comment, "Security

12     organs and military police will indicate the areas for gathering and

13     securing prisoners of war"?

14        A.   I have two documents.  Which one are you referring to right now?

15     I have the original document from General Zivanovic, and I have a

16     document that has been amended, so could you be precise, please?

17        Q.   The original document from General Zivanovic.

18        A.   Very well.  I understand.  The original document, which was

19     drafted and signed by General Zivanovic, well, I examined it in the light

20     of the norms in force at the time, and this has to do with engaging

21     security organs, and in the light of those norms and regulations, well,

22     I'll tell you what it involves if you like, but in the light of those

23     norms and regulations, this document or this part of the document wasn't

24     in accordance with the regulations in force at the time in the Army of

25     Republika Srpska.

Page 23431

 1        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.  And I apologise.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, could we adjourn early now?  I

 3     need to adjourn.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  By all means.  Colonel, we haven't

 5     finished today contrary to our expectations.  We'll continue tomorrow

 6     morning at 9.00.

 7             You can withdraw now with the assistance of our usher.  In the

 8     meantime, before we adjourn, Mr. McCloskey, on something completely

 9     different --

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11                           [The witness stands down]

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Okay.  Thanks.  We stand adjourned

13     until tomorrow morning at 9.00.

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.31 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 8th day of July,

16                           2008, at 9.00 a.m.