090114IT

Page 30076

1 February 1995, and you can see that one of the major tasks of the Skelani

2 Battalion in 1995 was to take part in the closing of the frontline in

3 Srebrenica. On the basis of which element did the command of the Skelani

4 Battalion elaborate its plan for February 1995?

5 A. Every unit of battalion rank and higher up battalion regiments,

6 brigades, corps and the Main Staff of the Army Republika Srpska,

7 according to the valid documents, worked out work-plans, annual

8 work-plans, and based on that monthly work-plans. The Skelani Battalion

9 in the Drina division had as the basis for their work-plan the documents

10 of their superior command and the documents pertaining to the

11 implementation of that plan.

12 Q. Who in the commando unit is in charge of elaborating the

13 work-plan of the command?

14 A. In the battalion commands, the work-plans were elaborated by the

15 deputy commanders. In the commands of regiments, brigades and higher up,

16 it was the chiefs of staff who were responsible for the work-plans, and

17 the assistant of the Chief of Staff for operations and training were in

18 charge of working out those plans.

19 Q. On the basis of which elements were the officers in charge of

20 operation and activities elaborated these plans?

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

22 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President, I just wondered if we

23 could be clear on which level of command we are talking about so that the

24 witness could respond effectively.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, can you deal with that, Ms. Fauveau, please.

Page 30077

1 Yes, thank you.

2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

3 Q. What I'm interested in is the work-plan of the Main Staff. Here

4 we have the work-plan of the battalion of Skelani, on the basis of which

5 element did the officers in charge -- in charge of education and

6 operation, could they make annual work-plans?

7 A. All the work-plans in all the units enumerated were elaborated

8 according to the same methodology, but now I will use only the term the

9 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, it's monthly work-plan was

10 elaborated based on the annual work-plan which had been adopted and

11 verified. Apart from the excerpt from the annual work-plan, all the

12 assistant commanders delivered their proposals for the introduction of

13 new elements into the work-plan. Also the work-plan also included

14 elements obtained from outside and delivered in good time, such as

15 proposals, requests, and so on from the Supreme Command, from the

16 ministry, and in a specific situation, if UNPROFOR delivered some

17 information on time, this would be included in the work-plan for the

18 following month.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

20 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. I just wonder if my

21 colleague could have the witness clarify what he means by "elaborated."

22 The question related to make work-plan and I don't know that elaborated

23 responds to that, whether it means make or complete or develop. I just

24 wonder if we could clarify this so the record is clear.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Fauveau.

Page 30078

1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Could you explain what the Prosecutor has requested, what is

3 meant by plans elaborated on the basis of annual plans? Can you explain

4 what you mean by "elaborate" or "develop"?

5 A. To elaborate a work-plan means based on the complete proposals

6 that had been processed in view of their contents, these had to be put in

7 order according to the structure, the elements of combat readiness. They

8 had to be harmonised with the participants, all the participants had to

9 be familiar with those elements. They had to be harmonised in relation

10 to time, hours, and those responsible for implementing the individual

11 elements of the plan, and all -- and harmonised with all those who were

12 involved in that work-plan.

13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D990,

14 the work-plan of the Drina Corps for February 1995. Would it be possible

15 to see page 2 in B/C/S and page 3 in English.

16 Q. This number 5, we always have this problem about the enclaves,

17 but at item 10 - this is what I'm interested in - we may see that the

18 Drina Corps was to receive documents from the Main Staff and was to

19 create then the combat documents, make the combat documents.

20 What does this specific task refer to, can you explain?

21 A. Bearing in mind that this is a work-plan for February, and also

22 bearing in mind that it says here that the task can be received from the

23 1st to the 28th of February, which means that any day in the month is the

24 day it's expected to arrive, two things can be assumed. The first task

25 which will arrive and which is expected and in the army everybody knows

Page 30079

1 it's always coming, those are the tasks based on the briefing on combat

2 readiness completed in the previous month. And from these tasks and

3 based on the briefing by the supreme commander, other specific tasks may

4 also be expected. In any case, the command here decided that they should

5 be prepared to receive that task and act on it.

6 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] could the witness be shown now

7 5D970. This is an order of the 7th February 1995 of the Drina Corps.

8 Q. Please look at the first part, the preamble, and tell us what

9 it's about, what is this order linked or connected to? What is it about?

10 A. This order issued by the command of the Drina Corps was drafted

11 based on the order by the commander of the Main Staff of the Army of

12 Republika Srpska dated the 5th of February 1995, and it is a consequence

13 of the tasks and obligations mentioned at the briefing of the previous

14 month. After every action, inspection, briefing and so on, all the

15 armies stemming from the former JNA expected orders to take measures in

16 order to remove weaknesses and to improve combat readiness, and you can

17 see that the command of the Drina Corps expected this order from the Main

18 Staff and that within a day or two because on the 5th of February, this

19 was done in the Main Staff, they might have received it on the 6th, and

20 within a day or two they had already prepared their own order to be

21 forwarded to the subordinate units.

22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 2,

23 both for B/C/S and French.

24 Q. Could you please look at item 1.8.

25 Since we have seen a similar task assigned in November 1994 for

Page 30080

1 the Drina Corps, does this task also come from the analysis of the combat

2 readiness done in January 1995?

3 A. The source of the task in point 1.8 under the element command is

4 from 1993, and it's a consequence of the fact that the corps command did

5 not carry out that task. I have hardly seen any documents within the

6 past year or year and a half here similar to this one which does not

7 mention this task. That means that this task was not carried out or was

8 not carried out fully, so it was always reiterated.

9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we briefly -- no, now I

10 would like to see 5D969, an order of the 5 February 1995 of the Main

11 Staff to which this order of the Drina Corps refers.

12 May I give the witness a hard copy so that he can see the whole

13 text of the order.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Ms. Fauveau.

15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I would like to ask you this: Please look at this order of the

17 Main Staff and tell us whether somewhere in this text a task concerning

18 the enclaves is at all mentioned?

19 A. This document, or rather, this order issued by the Main Staff is

20 something I've analysed more than once now and one can see that the

21 enclaves in this order are mentioned only in point 5 [as interpreted]

22 only where the problem of helicopters flying over by night is mentioned

23 bringing in aid without any control which includes weapons and equipment

24 being brought to these two enclaves.

25 According to the order issued by the command of the Drina Corps

Page 30081

1 where sometimes they use the term "separation" and sometimes "closing,"

2 such a task did not exist in this order.

3 Q. The order of the Drina Corps which we've just seen before this

4 one refers to this order of the Main Staff, doesn't it? Is it -- how is

5 it possible that the tasks given to the corps, the Drina Corps, do not

6 exactly correspond to the task which the Main Staff has entrusted to it?

7 A. I wouldn't say that the order of the Drina Corps does not

8 correspond to the task which the Main Staff has entrusted to it.

9 Analysing the order issue by the Drina Corps and analysing the order

10 issued by the Main Staff on the 5th of February, one can conclude that

11 everything that the Main Staff ordered was included by the command of the

12 Drina Corps in its order. It took the opportunity, and this is not

13 against the rules, to include in the order some things it had omitted to

14 do, and felt it was necessary to reiterate in its order to its

15 subordinate tasks, and this includes the order on the separation of the

16 enclaves.

17 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Fauveau, take it that line 18 previous page,

18 page 7, "point 5" should read "point 15"; am I correct?

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Have you found it, Ms. Fauveau?

20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, on page 4, it should be task

22 15. That's correct. I do apologise.

23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes. Could the witness be shown

24 P5.

25 Q. For the moment the only thing I'm interested in is what can be

Page 30082

1 seen in English, it would be page 2, what can be seen at the top of this

2 first page. It says "very urgent." In the military practice, what does

3 this mean?

4 A. In military practice when it says "very urgent," that means that

5 the document, once received, must immediately, as soon as possible, be

6 acted upon, but it was always stressed that certain rules and procedures

7 had to be followed. Very urgent means that whatever has to be done

8 should be done as soon as possible while strictly adhering to certain

9 rules and procedures.

10 Q. One sees on the directive that it bears the date 8th of March,

11 1995, in light of that date and of the other elements you were able to

12 find in other documents, could you make conclusions about this directive

13 that it was forwarded to the president for signature?

14 A. There are a lot of elements leading to the conclusion that it was

15 given to the president for signature, but then it was given in a rather

16 specific way. A specific way of giving documents for signature means

17 that the draft of that directive was made by the staff of the VRS and

18 that it was sent to the president for signing on a CD or any other

19 medium. By the look of it, this is one of the rare directives that had

20 been made on a computer, mainly documents that I had an opportunity to

21 see were typed on electrical typewriters.

22 Q. Well, in fact, my question was about the date at which the

23 document was forwarded. Could you draw a conclusion about the date at

24 which the directive was forwarded to the president for signature?

25 A. Bearing in mind the date on the directive, it could not have been

Page 30083

1 forwarded to the president for signing after the 8th of March. According

2 to the military practice, it could have been forwarded only on the 7th of

3 March at the latest in order to reserve the number. According to the

4 practice it could not have been forwarded either earlier or later.

5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown

6 Exhibit 5D1322. This is the diary of the secretary of the president of

7 the republic, Radovan Karadzic. I would like to have page 29 in B/C/S,

8 and 27 in English, please.

9 Q. On this page you see an entry from 7th of March, 1995. At 1400

10 President Karadzic, according to this diary at any rate, had a meeting

11 with a General Djukic and Minister Nikolic. In light of the fact that

12 the directive is an act which is under state secret -- now, in light of

13 the fact that the directive is a document which falls under state

14 secrecy, General Djukic, the assistant of the commander for logistics,

15 could he have taken the directive to the president of the republic?

16 A. He could have done that. This method of transferring documents

17 of high top secret nature was in place, but it could have been delivered

18 in a different way as well, in accordance with the regulations that

19 classify this document as a state secret.

20 Q. And right at the end of that entry, the 7th of March, in English

21 this is on the following page, throughout the whole page you can see that

22 President Karadzic should have called General Mladic. In light of the

23 type of organisation of the Army of Republika Srpska and of that of the

24 Supreme Command, and in light of the working method about the directive,

25 could the President Karadzic have called General Mladic prior to the

Page 30084

1 directive being signed?

2 A. In normal circumstances when the Main Staff of the VRS had

3 prepared the draft document, and this document needs to be approved and

4 endorsed by the supreme commander, then the draft is reported to the

5 supreme commander by the commander of the army of the VRS. We see here

6 that the word "call" is mentioned, which means called by telephone, so it

7 is highly likely that this directive was sent and that it was said on the

8 phone that it had been sent and that if anything further is needed, then

9 the commander of the VRS was prepared to provide additional explanations.

10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

11 Exhibit 5D975. At 971 rather.

12 Q. This is the letter through which the Main Staff transferred the

13 Directive number 7 to the corps. We know that the directive is dated 8th

14 of March, 1995. How do you explain that it was only transferred on the

15 17th of March in light of the fact that it was a very urgent document?

16 A. Bearing in mind that the directive bears the notice "very urgent"

17 and that the date is the 8th of March, this covering letter with which it

18 was forwarded to the Drina Corps also bear the notice "very urgent," but

19 the date is the 17th of March. The conclusion is that it is very likely

20 that between the 8th and the 17th of March, this directive was being kept

21 by the president or rather the commander in chief of the VRS. It was

22 received either immediately before it was dispatched further, either on

23 the same day or the following day.

24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

25 Exhibit 5D1326.

Page 30085

1 Q. This is in fact a very similar letter that is sent to the

2 Herzegovina Corps. You can see that this document was also forwarded on

3 the 17th of March. And before asking you the question, I'd like for you

4 to see 5D1327, which is practically the same document sent to the

5 Sarajevo Corps.

6 So one can see on all of these documents the date 17th of March,

7 1995. Can you tell us when a document is very urgent, what is the usual

8 time lag for which to be forwarded to the subordinated units once it has

9 been signed?

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

11 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. If my colleague would

12 be so kind as to refer to the specific type of document she's talking

13 about in terms of the time lag when it's an urgent document. A directive

14 is obviously different than an order which is different than an

15 instruction, et cetera.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Fair enough. Yes, Madam Fauveau.

17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Well, a document such as directive, what would be the normal

19 time-frame in which it is to be transferred to the subordinated units

20 after it has been signed?

21 A. There is no dead-line of an hour or a day or two for this type of

22 documents. These kind of documents require to be classified as secret to

23 be copied in several copies, and to delivered in a secure manner to units

24 and to be received in the units in a special way.

25 You can notice here in this covering letter sent to the

Page 30086

1 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that they didn't leave anything to chance and

2 that they responded in a proper and appropriate way.

3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now come back to the diary

4 of the President Karadzic's secretary. This is Exhibit 5D1322. And I'd

5 like to have page 33 in B/C/S and 32 in English, please. No, it's

6 actually rather page 31 in English.

7 Q. Well, the date shown on the entry I'm interested in is 16th of

8 May, 1996. 16th of May, clearly it's a mistake if you look at the

9 exhibit in its entirety. On that day President Karadzic had a meeting

10 with the General Milovanovic, General Tolimir, and General Subotic. And

11 according to this diary, the meeting went from 1105 up until 1505. In

12 other words it lasted four hours. Now, given the date and the duration

13 of that meeting, and in light of the fact that the directive was

14 forwarded to the corps on 17th of March, 1995, were you able to draw some

15 conclusions from that meeting due to the fact that the meeting was held?

16 A. Having carefully analysed all the dates that appear here, and the

17 participants mentioned here, and the order in which they appear, you can

18 arrive at a full picture at how it -- the work was done on Directive

19 number 7. It is known that the idea came up on the 31st of January that

20 probably on the 7th of January it was taken to the supreme commander by a

21 very responsible high ranking officer which supreme commanders

22 appreciate. It is also known that on the 7th of March, a meeting was

23 held with -- and I didn't have this information before but it is known

24 that this meeting took place on the 16th of March which lasted full four

25 hours, and that very important generals attending this meeting.

Page 30087

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

2 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I just don't see how this answer

3 isn't completely speculative in light of the fact that the witness has

4 not commented on any minutes concerning these meetings or anything

5 concerning the content of what occurred or as is recorded in the diary.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, but he starts his answer with having

7 carefully analysed all the dates that appear here and the participants

8 mentioned here and the order in which they appear. In other words, he

9 himself has provided himself a sort of a basis on which he then moves

10 ahead with his conclusion.

11 MR. VANDERPUYE: I understand that, Your Honour, but I think what

12 he's described is a coincidence among the dates and beyond that we don't

13 have anything of substance concerning the content of the discussions.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: I wouldn't go that far as a member of the bench,

15 obviously. Let's leave it and we'll proceed with your next question,

16 please.

17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, I think that it

18 is very important and one can -- may speculate one way or another, you

19 know, this is an expert witness and not an expert of facts and I think

20 that he is entitled to say how he has reached some conclusions.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: We haven't denied you or him that. In fact, you

22 should interpret our conclusive intervention to mean let's proceed, leave

23 things as they are and proceed. We are not saying Mr. Vanderpuye was

24 right. Eventually we will decide ourselves what weight to give to the

25 statement of the accused -- of the witness, sorry.

Page 30088

1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Of course.

2 Q. Well, you have already answered this question, but I should like

3 to go further in the detail of this. Before signing the directive which

4 is a military deed, did -- would President Karadzic have consulted with

5 the members of the Main Staff, particularly if he wanted to bring in

6 modifications?

7 A. This directive is not a military document, it's a state document

8 issued by the Commander-in-Chief addressed to the military or the Army of

9 Republika Srpska. Only when a document is prepared by the Army of

10 Republika Srpska, then it becomes a military document, and from day one I

11 tried to point at a problem that many people here will understand. When

12 it comes to issuing state orders to soldiers and coordinating them with

13 military orders, it was also discussed by General Wesley Clark in his

14 book.

15 So if -- when a Commander-in-Chief issues a document, he has a

16 need and an obligation to talk to the military in order to avoid issuing

17 directions or tasks that are impossible for the military to carry out.

18 And when I was interrupted earlier, I was speaking about jurisdiction and

19 responsibility. I'm not talking about personalities. I am talking about

20 officers and their responsibilities. The people who are involved in this

21 show that all areas necessary for drafting this kind of document were

22 covered.

23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could I now show you Exhibit

24 5D977.

25 Q. This is the document about the forwarding of Directive 7/1. In

Page 30089

1 this document one can see that Directive 7/1 dates from 31st of March,

2 1995, and you see also that this covering letter is also dated 31st of

3 March, 1995.

4 Now, is this a usual way of transferring a document, i.e., that a

5 document be transferred on the same day?

6 A. Yes. The Directive 7/1 generated from the command, it was

7 approved and signed by the commander at the commander headquarters and

8 was forwarded on the same day. If we make a comparison with Directive 7

9 where it generated and where it was delivered, I can say that both these

10 directives satisfy these criteria.

11 Q. About the Directive number 7, we know that this is a directive

12 from the president of the republic. The person who signs a document,

13 could that person bring in modifications to the drafter which is

14 submitted to them for signature?

15 A. Once the document is signed, then the signatory takes

16 responsibility for it. That implies his right either to deviate

17 completely from the proposal, or to accept it 100 percent, or to accept

18 it to the extent that he believes it to be appropriate.

19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May I now show you two exhibits,

20 the draft order and then the order being signed. First I'd like 5D1342.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone, please.

22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] This is the draft order from the

23 president of the republic dated 16th of June, 1995, and I'd like to ask

24 leave to give to the witness the two exhibits, this one and the following

25 one, 5D1341, for him to be able to compare. Now, on the screen I'd like

Page 30090

1 to have page 2, please. Actually, it will be page 3 in English and in

2 B/C/S as well. The end of page 3, the bottom of it. The end of page 3.

3 [In English] It's the same order, just one is signed, the other is not

4 signed. [Interpretation] Now this, I think, is Exhibit 1341. But, you

5 know, I just want to be sure that we have matching numbers, the right

6 numbers.

7 Q. Okay. So here you see this is Exhibit -- make sure that it

8 matches e-court, this is Exhibit 5D1341. And you can see that the

9 document which was signed by the president of the republic. May we have

10 page 1 of this document, please.

11 Throughout this whole page, you see that this is an order number

12 01-1118/95 from 16th of June, 1995.

13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show to the

14 witness Exhibit 5D1342, which is the same order but not signed.

15 And here you see the date 16th of June, 1995, number 01-1118/95.

16 And I'd like to show page 2 of this document.

17 Q. On this page 2, you can see the handwritten changes. Now, if

18 these changes were made by order of President Karadzic, would -- did

19 these modifications have to be incorporated in the final text?

20 A. In any case, that's how it should be. There is a methodology

21 used when drawing up documents as important as this one at all levels of

22 command, and even at all levels of management in civilian life. When the

23 final version of a document which is to be signed is adopted, a version

24 of the text is always also adopted including corrections so that the

25 signatory can check whether all the corrections he asked to be made have

Page 30091

1 actually been made.

2 Q. Now, in the Army of Republika Srpska, could anyone have changed

3 the text of the directive after the president of the republic has signed

4 it?

5 A. I have never come across that level of crime. In a normal

6 situation, it would not occur to anyone to alter anything after a

7 document had been signed. Even if you notice a grammatical error, it

8 must not be changed or corrected.

9 Q. And what were the powers of Colonel Miletic when Directive number

10 7 was forwarded to the Main Staff signed by the president, bearing the

11 president's signature?

12 A. Well, the question is how the directive arrived in the Main

13 Staff. Based on the cover letter sent to the commands of the corps or

14 the accompanying document sent to the commands of the corps signed by the

15 Chief of Staff, whoever compiled this accompanying document, it can

16 probably be concluded that forwarding the directive, entering it into the

17 books, and then forwarding it on is something in which General Miletic

18 was not involved.

19 Q. Now, as a general rule, what could have General Miletic do when

20 he saw the directive if he may have considered that parts of the

21 directive were not compliant with the law of war?

22 A. General Miletic was duty-bound if he saw that to bring it to the

23 attention of his superior officer, and his superior officer, General

24 Milovanovic, was duty-bound to assess whether General Miletic's warning

25 was justified, and then to alert the commander of the Army of Republika

Page 30092

1 Srpska.

2 Q. And who was under the obligation of warning President Karadzic

3 that the directive may have included some elements which could have been

4 qualified as being contrary to the law of war?

5 A. Based on Directive 7 through 1, one can see that the command

6 studied Directive 7 and the command of the Army of Republika Srpska at

7 that point was duty-bound to warn the president of Republika Srpska that

8 the directive contains elements not in compliance with the customs of

9 war.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

11 MR. VANDERPUYE: This is only a minor point, Your Honour, at the

12 beginning of his answer he says -- in the transcript it reads Directive 7

13 through 1, and I believe that, just so if we could clarify that.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, okay. Right. Yes, Ms. Fauveau, I think you

15 can clarify it with the witness. It doesn't make sense as it is.

16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Could you please repeat what directive you were talking about

18 when you said that the command considered Directive 7?

19 A. Well, I tried to be precise, I have the impression whenever I try

20 to be precise that it raises a problem. I said that the command of the

21 Army of Republika Srpska studied Directive number 7. The conclusion that

22 it studied Directive number 7, I don't have the work-plan, is something I

23 made based on the fact that based on Directive number 7 they compiled

24 Directive 7/1. When they studied Directive 7, the commander of Republika

25 Srpska was duty-bound to alert the commander in chief that Directive 7

Page 30093

1 contains elements not in compliance with the customs of war.

2 Q. Now, generally speaking if General Miletic as the head of the

3 body in charge of operations and education received an order to prepare

4 or to forward an order with which he did not agree, what were his powers,

5 or rather, what were the possibilities offered to him? What could he do?

6 A. I am afraid I didn't understand your question properly. Could

7 you repeat it, please, to avoid problems.

8 Q. Now, if -- when General Miletic did not agree as the head of

9 administration in charge of operational affairs and training, so if he

10 did not agree with a given order that he was supposed to forward or carry

11 out, what were the possibilities offered to him? Is there a way that he

12 could do anything about it?

13 A. The procedure to be followed by an officer when he sees that an

14 order or a document is not in compliance with the customs of war is

15 prescribed in detail. It implies, one, that he should immediately inform

16 his superior of this. If he sees that his superior is not taking any

17 action, then, two, he is to inform the highest superior. In the

18 particular case of General Miletic, he was duty-bound to inform General

19 Milovanovic of this. If he saw that General Milovanovic is not willing

20 or interested in alerting his superior, then he was duty-bound to inform

21 the commander. He, furthermore, is not duty-bound to act on the

22 document, which in his view is not in compliance with the customs of war,

23 because doing so would constitute a crime.

24 Q. Very well. But what were his powers if this is not a crime, but

25 if he is just not in agreement with the order? What were his options?

Page 30094

1 A. Quite simply, he can express his disagreement, but nothing more

2 than that.

3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

4 Exhibit 5D1016. This is a document from the Main Staff dated 17th of

5 November, 1994.

6 Q. In this specific case, what was, according to this document, the

7 position of President Miletic [as interpreted] as compared to that of the

8 commander?

9 A. This is a typical example of professionalism. A textbook

10 example. From this document you can see that General Zivanovic, the

11 commander of the Drina Corps, was asking the commander of the Army of

12 Republika Srpska to change his decision in some elements, and this has to

13 do with this reinforcement. And you can see that General Zivanovic asked

14 the same of General Miletic.

15 Although this was not within the purview of General Miletic, he

16 proposed to the commander to inform General Zivanovic, the commander

17 refused. General Miletic, highly professionally, at that time he was a

18 colonel, forwarded the document to the commander of the Drina Corps

19 saying that the commander insisted that the order be carried out in spite

20 of the fact that he is familiar with the standpoint of General Zivanovic

21 and that he advocated that this attitude -- this standpoint be respected.

22 So this is highly professional.

23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown P5 --

24 JUDGE KWON: General Kosovac, was this sent out on -- in the name

25 of Colonel Miletic, in the name of Main Staff? In what capacity did he

Page 30095

1 send this memo, this letter?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Miletic sent this

3 information to the commander of the Army of Republika Srpska saying that

4 he abides by his standpoint, with a copy to General Zivanovic. So

5 Colonel Miletic by this document conveys the standpoint of the army --

6 commander of the Army of Republika Srpska to the commander of the Drina

7 Corps.

8 JUDGE KWON: This is not a personal letter, is it?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This is a notice that a

10 commanding officer is duty-bound to convey.

11 JUDGE KWON: But he added his personal opinion as to the matter?

12 To a certain extent.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Private, no, but personal, yes. So

14 he as the chief for operations and training agreed with the commander.

15 He told the commander of the Drina Corps that he shared that opinion but

16 that his opinion which he had forwarded to his superior had not been

17 adopted.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Ms. Fauveau Ivanovic.

19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

20 Q. Just one question, if I may, to clarify a point about that

21 exhibit. How can you see that this is an official document?

22 A. Private documents are not entered in the protocol log-books,

23 especially a strictly confidential document which has a number which

24 refers to previous correspondence and in which highly important matters

25 are mentioned, that is reinforcements consisting of a certain number of

Page 30096

1 men.

2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown

3 Exhibit P5. This is a Directive number 7. And I'd like to give the text

4 of the directive to the witness in its entirety as I think that it will

5 be easier for him to follow.

6 Q. Yesterday we were talking about the method by which decisions are

7 made. What part of this directive is the decision per se?

8 A. The decision here is contained in point 6.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Point 4.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to all the regulations,

11 it is the fourth element of the document.

12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] So this point 4 is on page 8, but

13 before we refer to point 4, I'd like to focus on point 3 which is on page

14 7 in English and page 11 in B/C/S.

15 Q. Can you please explain the meaning of point 3 in this directive?

16 A. Point 3 represents the task of the Army of Republika Srpska.

17 This task implies the following: Every aim that is to be achieved, the

18 forces, the means, the time, and the place have to be specified. And

19 this is provided for the Army of Republika Srpska in point 3.

20 Q. Who could ascertain or determine point 3 of this directive, the

21 very content of it?

22 A. The task in point 3 is a task emanating from the superior

23 command, and it is defined by the supreme commander. In lieu of the fact

24 that the supreme commander is a civilian, it's logical that when

25 formulating the task, he used a draft and he talked to competent

Page 30097

1 officers.

2 Q. At this point one sees the reference to the order of the Main

3 Staff dated 5th of February, 1995. How do you explain the fact that the

4 directive of the supreme commander refers to this order of the Main

5 Staff? This reference is shown in the first paragraph of point 3.

6 A. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Republika Srpska was

7 present when an analysis of combat readiness was made. He spoke at that

8 analysis meeting, provided guide-lines, and all the conclusions that were

9 made were made in compliance with his standpoints. It can clearly be

10 seen here that this stems from the analysis of combat readiness and that

11 that's where the whole idea came from.

12 Q. Let's now move to point 4 which is on page 8 in the English

13 version and which is on the screen in the B/C/S version.

14 In your report, and here this is paragraph 125 - but I don't

15 think that it's necessary to show it on the screen - you have analysed

16 this decision. According to this decision, what were the main tasks of

17 the Army of Republika Srpska in 1995?

18 A. The tasks of the Army of Republika Srpska, the tasks of the

19 Supreme Command, the decision of the Commander-in-Chief mentioned in

20 point 4 was to be later implemented in the tasks issued to the

21 subordinate units. The decision of the Commander-in-Chief is in line

22 with all the standpoints adopted up to that point, and in spite of the

23 fact that its contained in some 10 or 15 lines, it can be reduced to five

24 points. A decisive defence, resolute defence, persistent defence,

25 strengthening the defence line, inflicting losses on the enemy to the

Page 30098

1 greatest possible extent, preventing further break-throughs, and cutting

2 up the territory. These are the decisions that follow from this text.

3 Q. We can see in this point 4 that one to two operations at

4 strategic level are mentioned, as well as three or four operations at

5 operational level. And for the transcript in the English version of the

6 directive, there is a mistake because the text in English talks about

7 operations at tactical level, when in fact the original in B/C/S talks

8 about operations at operational level.

9 Yesterday we were talking about levels of command. Could you

10 please tell us the differences between operations at strategic level, and

11 that at operational level?

12 A. This difference can be better understood when one analyses the

13 document, which is what I will now proceed to do from that aspect. At

14 the strategic level, a large number of strategic forces have to be

15 involved in a strategic operation. It's led by the staff of the Supreme

16 Command, and at the operative level it's the operative commands that are

17 in charge. So in addition to the level of command, the differences in

18 the aims to be achieved, the forces engaged in those operations, and very

19 often there's a difference in that time in which the operation has to be

20 carried out.

21 Q. Now, in this directive, are the tasks which were entrusted to the

22 Army of Republika Srpska in point 3, were they supposed to be in

23 agreement with the decision?

24 A. Absolutely. Harmony between the decision and the task is a

25 prerequisite for the successful implementation of the task.

Page 30099

1 Q. And in these specific documents, do points 3 and point 4 match?

2 A. In essence, yes.

3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honours, is this an

4 appropriate time?

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam. We'll have a 25-minute break now.

6 Thank you.

7 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

8 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Fauveau.

10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. About

11 the directive, I would like now to speak of the tasks of the units, and

12 this is on page 8 of the English, and page 13 in B/C/S.

13 Q. Who had the power and the authority to determine the tasks

14 entrusted to the units?

15 A. It is the Commander-in-Chief who issued tasks to the units, to

16 the subordinate units, the orders are issued by the commander of the VRS.

17 In this particular instance, the Commander-in-Chief had gone a step

18 forward and issued tasks to subordinate units, which is not contrary to

19 the rules, but it is rather peculiar.

20 Q. During the drafting of this document, Directive 7, did the corps

21 commander have the right to make proposals concerning their respective

22 units?

23 A. As far as I could see in the available documentation, and after

24 reading transcripts of General Milovanovic, the VRS adhered to the

25 standard to involve commanders of the corps as much as possible in the

Page 30100

1 decision-making process whenever the possibilities allowed that.

2 Q. Could you have a look at the task entrusted to the Drina Corps

3 which is described on page 10 in English and 15 in B/C/S. You?

4 The tasks of the Drina Corps as defined in this item number 5,

5 does this tally with the decision made and which is described in item 4.

6 A. This is one of the key elements for the analysis of this

7 document. I mentioned this several times so far, that a decision sets

8 out when, what, how, and why, and the ultimate goal being to achieve and

9 carry out a task. This example shows that the tasks entrusted to the

10 Drina Corps is not consistent with the decision, that is to say that it

11 contains some elements that are not at all mentioned in the decision.

12 Q. Could you tell us what are these elements of the Drina Corps

13 which are not mentioned in the decision?

14 A. The first passage on the tasks of the Drina Corps is consistent

15 with the part of the decision which speaks about the decisive defence.

16 However, the latter part of this paragraph, actually, the last sentence

17 has no connection whatsoever with this task of putting up decisive

18 defence, nor does it stipulate that the Drina Corps has any possibility

19 to carry out the task in this way. As I put it in my report, this is a

20 typical example of a task that the military is incapable of carrying out.

21 Q. Could you explain why you consider that this task cannot be done

22 by the army?

23 A. I would just like to remind you of the year 1995, mid-1995, and

24 the decision taken -- actually, the assessment of the international

25 community that that was the year in which the VRS became inferior in

Page 30101

1 every aspect. That was exactly and precisely the moment that this

2 document speaks about, and that is the moment when the VRS had lost

3 territories in all fronts when offensive battles were being fought with

4 the BH Army, the Croatian Defence Council, and the Croatian army. And if

5 somebody at that point takes a decision for the army to carry out certain

6 operations that would send a message to the civilian population, can only

7 be described as a senseless decision.

8 Q. You also wrote in paragraph 139 that this part of the task was

9 illogical. Could you explain why you consider this task as illogical?

10 Is there anything else than what you have just said now?

11 A. Is it illogical because it is assigned to the army. It is also

12 illogical for the army to do something contrary to its goal. One of the

13 main objectives sets out in January 1995, and which is contained in every

14 single decision of the Main Staff, and I think that you all notice the

15 phrase to "settle down the front," in other words, to not mount

16 operations, to not make any movement, do not create any problems, and why

17 that was left in. This activity that is required to be carried out here

18 is something completely contrary, i.e., to create problems and to solve

19 them in a different manner.

20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 19 in B/C/S,

21 and 14 in English.

22 Q. Item 6 speaks of combat support. What is the role of the

23 administration in charge of operational and educational matters and

24 matters for support in combat?

25 A. There is no role in providing support to operations. In the

Page 30102

1 preparation of this document, its role is to take over parts of this

2 document from other participants and make it a whole. Let me just remind

3 you that the support of combat operation is a very complex task made up

4 of nine elements which each of them constitute a separate entity.

5 Q. And this item, I see that UNPROFOR is mentioned. Did the

6 cooperation with UNPROFOR in general, the relations with UNPROFOR, and

7 the humanitarian organisations, were they within the purview of the organ

8 in charge of operational and educational matters?

9 A. Cooperation with UNPROFOR is a separate activity which is

10 precisely defined in the VRS, and it was under the jurisdiction of the

11 commanders of the Chief of Staff, and if army were to address this issue,

12 it would have done it completely differently. As far as the operations

13 and training administration, had no responsibility and jurisdiction in

14 terms of cooperation with UNPROFOR, and in support of this view, I would

15 like to remind you of the yesterday's conversation between General

16 Nicolai and General Mladic.

17 Q. We know that General Miletic signed a certain number of documents

18 which concerns supplies of the UNPROFOR units. This sort of document,

19 does it enable us to conclude that matters linked with UNPROFOR enters

20 within its purview?

21 A. There is no foundation for such a conclusion. The fact that a

22 large number of documents and information bulletins were assigned by a

23 man at the basic command post that could have been forwarded to everybody

24 else could lead to a wrong conclusion. The fact that he signed certain

25 documents does not imply that he had any rights or powers in that

Page 30103

1 respect.

2 Q. The treatment of war prisoners, was it within the competencies of

3 the administration in charge of operational and educational matters?

4 A. No. Under no circumstances. The staff and the operations and

5 training administration within the staff have no jurisdiction over

6 prisoners of war.

7 Q. Does the treatment of the civilian population as well Serbian

8 civilian population or other nationalities, does that belong to the

9 competencies of the Administration in Charge of Operational and

10 Educational Matters?

11 A. I think that on the first day I have highlighted a crucial

12 difference and now is a good time to repeat it. The VRS, the JNA, and

13 all the other armies that emerged from the ex-JNA, as well as the army of

14 the FRY, had no organs or jurisdictions over the treatment of any segment

15 of the civilian population. And by virtue of that this particularly

16 refers to the operations and training administration.

17 Q. You already said that this directive was sent to the corps and

18 that it was unusual.

19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown

20 5D1167.

21 Q. This is a document from the Main Staff which transmits the order

22 of the president of the republic. I would like you to have a look at

23 item 2 and 3 -- items 2 and 3 of this order. In English this is page 2.

24 What could be the reason for the president of the republic to

25 decide in this way?

Page 30104

1 A. If we can just scroll the document down so that I can see the

2 date, please. All right. I can see it.

3 Q. The date is 20 April, 1994.

4 A. Thank you. This document has presented a kind of obstacle in the

5 preparation of my report because I tried to fathom the reason and the

6 authority for this document to be issued and the consequences of it.

7 When I saw that it does not -- has any particular bearing on the

8 subject of my report, I arrived at the following conclusion: It is

9 obvious that in this period there were some disagreements, personal

10 disagreements between the Commander-in-Chief and the commander of the

11 VRS, and that the Commander-in-Chief had issued an order which was in

12 contrary to his powers because it was well known that the commander of

13 the VRS was appointed by the assembly and nobody can strip him of the

14 rights stemming from the fact that he was the commander.

15 Had the Commander-in-Chief acted properly, he would have probably

16 initiated a procedure for dismissal of the commander of the VRS, and

17 restore order. I was particularly perplexed by the fact that the

18 Commander-in-Chief has sent an order to the corps which means that in a

19 certain way he has ordered them not to carry out orders of their superior

20 officer in certain situations.

21 Based on further analysis, and specifically the analysis of the

22 combat readiness in 1995 or other documents, it seems that either this

23 agreement has been resolved completely, but there are some indications

24 that it persisted in a certain form.

25 Q. When the Main Staff received the Directive 7 signed, what were

Page 30105

1 these tasks? Technically speaking, what did the Main Staff have to do?

2 A. First you will notice an anomaly that at the beginning of

3 Directive 7, there is no mention of it being addressed to the Main Staff

4 because it says that it is addressed to the corps and the centre of

5 military schools. From this specific example, we see that it was after

6 all sent to the Main Staff, although it's not mentioned. The Main Staff

7 initially acted as it had to. It forwarded the directive to the units

8 according to the decision of the commander of -- in chief. And by doing

9 so, that is what he did at the moment, and later on he took some further

10 steps.

11 Q. We know that the Main Staff created Directive 7/1. Did the Main

12 Staff have the obligation to draft this directive?

13 A. In principle if the Commander-in-Chief had prepared Directive 7

14 and forwarded it to a lower ranking unit, and it does not contain any

15 military problems, that is to say, it satisfies all the standards

16 applicable in military documents, then there is no need for the

17 operationalisation of this directive. It is only followed through as if

18 it had been issued by the Main Staff. The best example of that is

19 Directive number 6 which was done in that manner. The fact that we have

20 Directive 7/1 is a direct consequence of the fact that the Directive 7

21 was not clear enough and not useable enough.

22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown

23 document 5D361. This is Directive 7/1. Could page 2 be displayed on the

24 screen, both for B/C/S and English, please. I would also wish to be

25 allowed to give a hard copy of this directive to the witness, please.

Page 30106

1 Q. Please have a look at the text, in particular for task or item 2,

2 tasks for the Army of the Republika Srpska. One can see that there is

3 reference made to Directive 7. Could you tell us whether the task which

4 I indicated in Directive 7/1 do correspond to those which are already

5 indicated in Directive number 7?

6 A. I said that task number 2 stems from the task issued by the

7 superior command, that it's been taken over. And bearing in mind that

8 this is a specific case, one can see that the commander of the VRS has

9 decided to include tasks from Directive 7 in his directive and to

10 elaborate it. This is completely consistent with what had been agreed

11 and done before.

12 Q. Could you look at item 3, paragraph number 3. In this paragraph,

13 do you find the tasks of the Army of the Republika Srpska?

14 A. Item 3 is not a task. The task is listed under item number 2.

15 Q. This item 3, what is its meaning in the directive? Could you

16 tell us what this item 3 actually means here?

17 A. Well, this is what one can see from other directives, practically

18 it describes the developments relating to the cessation of hostilities

19 and the developments in Republika Srpska, and it provides some details

20 for further operationalisation. One can say that neighbours are

21 mentioned under item 3, and one can conditionally say that this is what

22 it refers to.

23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown,

24 you see this in the English text on the next page, and in B/C/S it is at

25 the bottom of the page.

Page 30107

1 Q. In the one-but-last paragraph, there is mention of the fear of

2 the elimination of the enclaves, the fear which the foreign powers have.

3 Militarily speaking, does this part be linked -- can it be linked with

4 the tasks entrusted to the Drina Corps?

5 A. I think that these statements referring to the characteristics

6 of the execution of combat activities, movements of UNPROFOR, and the

7 zones are in harmony with the structure of the directive, that is that

8 they are found in point 3. And everything that relates to the tasks can

9 be pulled out of whatever is necessary.

10 Q. Please look at item 4, which is on page 3. In this item 4 where

11 you have the decision, first of all, could you tell us who determined the

12 content of this item 4? Who was in a position, who had the authority to

13 determine this?

14 A. This is the inviolable competence of the commander, and it is for

15 the commander to make a decision.

16 Q. This decision from Directive 7/1, does it tell you with the

17 decision and Directive 7?

18 A. The decision from Directive 7/1 must be in harmony with the task.

19 And it is in harmony with the task.

20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown the

21 bottom of the page. In English it is page 4.

22 Q. In the last paragraph on this page, you can read that in the

23 execution of the Sadejstvo operation, the other forces of the Army of the

24 Republika Srpska cooperate to the objective, the goal, and this has to

25 conform with Directive number 7 and this concerns the enclaves of

Page 30108

1 Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac. According to your analysis, does

2 this paragraph include to prepare possible conditions for the population?

3 Unbearable conditions?

4 A. I will now use a word that is frequently heard here, this

5 conclusion from the military viewpoint is a matter of speculation. This

6 is very precisely defined here what the Army of Republika Srpska should

7 do with a view to successfully carrying out Operation Sadejstvo 95 and

8 carrying out the task. It's elementary knowledge that when you want to

9 carry out an operation, in one part of a war theatre, you are

10 intensifying combat in all other parts to prevent the enemy from bringing

11 his forces to the place which is the focus of your military activity.

12 This is a typical example of action against enemy units in order to tie

13 them down, and thus make it possible for the task to be carried out.

14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could page 5 be displayed now,

15 page 5 in English.

16 Q. Item 5.3 you can see a task for the Drina Corps, which is

17 described there. Is this task indicated in 5.3 tallies with item 4 of

18 this directive?

19 A. In this case, the task of the Drina Corps is in line with the

20 commander's decision.

21 Q. And this task, does it tally with the tasks entrusted to the

22 Drina Corps in Directive number 7?

23 A. Evidently this task given to the Drina Corps in Directive number

24 7 was the reason or a major reason for Directive 7/1 to be drawn from it

25 and to give this task. This is a task which in comparison with Directive

Page 30109

1 number 7 is in military terms appropriate in terms of what a military

2 unit can do.

3 Q. This task entrusted to the Drina Corps, does it include part of

4 the task given in Directive number 7 concerning the creation of

5 unbearable conditions for the civilian population?

6 A. Absolutely not. You can see that the task is in line with the

7 actual situation and with the decision of the commander.

8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to come back to page 2 of

9 the directive. It's page 2 in English and in B/C/S.

10 Q. In item 2, last paragraph, last sentence of item 2, the Main

11 Staff was to commence immediately plans and prepare for the execution of

12 the Sadejstvo operation. When such a task has been entrusted, what are

13 the organs of the Main Staff who had to take part in these activities,

14 plans, and preparations?

15 A. It's precisely stated here, and that's how it's done, the whole

16 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska is being included, and it

17 begins to plan and carrying out organised preparations for the

18 implementation of the strategical operation. This is a sufficient task

19 for all the organisational units of the Main Staff of the Army of

20 Republika Srpska. From the on the left-hand side of yesterday's diagram,

21 the staff to on the right-hand side the Administration for Planning, so

22 that everyone has to begin preparations for this within their own sphere

23 of competence.

24 Q. What is the role of the Administration in Charge of Operational

25 And Educational Matters in the plans and the preparing of a strategic

Page 30110

1 operation, called the Operation Sadejstvo in this case?

2 A. Based on this directive and this sentence, the Chief of the Main

3 Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska was supposed to make his own

4 decision as to what and how the staff of the Army of Republika Srpska

5 would carry out.

6 Q. I don't know where the problem is, but the question was not

7 properly transcribed so I will repeat it. What was the role of the

8 Administration in Charge of Operational and Educational Matters in the

9 preparation of Operation Sadejstvo?

10 A. First there was the task to act on the orders of the Chief of

11 Staff. The Chief of Staff was supposed to provide the initial elements

12 on the basis of which the Administration for Operations and Training

13 would proceed to work further. It may be assumed that the task issued by

14 the Chief of Staff includes drawing up a plan as to how to carry out the

15 planning of Operation Sadejstvo on the basis of which he would consult

16 the commander, and this would be adopted and it would be binding on the

17 entire Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.

18 Q. Which tasks did the Chief of Staff entrust -- or could he entrust

19 or should he normally have entrusted in the planning of a strategic

20 operation to the Chief of the Administration for Operations and Training?

21 A. The first task entrusted to him would be to draw up a plan for

22 the drawing up of the documents for the strategic operation, but he would

23 also give him a large number of initial documents which are of importance

24 for the plan. These would be the essential elements, when to begin, when

25 to finish, whom to involve, what forces to include, and based on this he

Page 30111

1 would draft the plan, and then based on this draft further work would be

2 carried out.

3 Q. One can see both in the Directive 7 and in this directive that

4 the Spreca operation which should also be at the operational level

5 according to this directive. Does the Main Staff have a role to play in

6 the planning and the preparation of the Spreca operation? Perhaps also

7 could you have a look at page 4, in particular page 4 in B/C/S, and I

8 think it may be page 5 in English. In B/C/S it's completely at the

9 bottom of the page, the East Bosnia Corps.

10 A. From task 5.2 and 5.3, the commander of the Army of Republika

11 Srpska, one can see how he planned for Spreca 95 to be organised and

12 carried out. We can see that he put in charge the commander of the East

13 Bosnia Corps, and we can see that he ordered the commander of the Drina

14 Corps to be included in the operation according to the plans of the

15 commander of the East Bosnian Corps, and this indicates that the command

16 of the East Bosnian Corps was supposed to draw up a draft decision on the

17 map. It was supposed to draft the order and all the necessary documents

18 and deliver this to the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.

19 At that point in time, the task of the Main Staff of the Army of

20 Republika Srpska was for the staff to receive these documents, that is

21 the officer for operations and training to look them over and give them

22 with his comments to the Chief of Staff, and all the other organs of the

23 command were to look at these drafts from the viewpoint of their own

24 competencies and then forward this over to the Chief of Staff, and he

25 would then accept and approve the operation or reject it.

Page 30112

1 I wish to mention here, under normal conditions, or rather, as

2 wartime conditions are not normal, in conditions where there is

3 sufficient time, often there is a possibility for the competent commander

4 in charge of carrying out the operation to report to the commander what

5 his proposal is in the presence of the other members of the staff. So

6 both methods are equally valid.

7 Q. Just to have a clear transcript on this matter, here we have the

8 corps commander who was in charge of the performance of the operation,

9 and in such a situation and when the conditions allow, he reports to the

10 commander. Can you say the commander of which unit?

11 A. The commander who issued the order for the operation; that is,

12 the commander of the Army of Republika Srpska.

13 Q. When Directive 7/1 was transmitted to the Drina Corps, what were

14 the tasks which the Drina Corps had to perform, those of Directive 7 or

15 those of Directive 7/1?

16 A. In the army it is well known with great precision, when you get

17 your last order everything else that preceded it which is contrary to the

18 last order ceases to be valid. Here the commander of the Army of

19 Republika Srpska was very precise. He gave him a precise order where he

20 said that things in Directive 7 were no longer valid and which things in

21 Directive 7 could still be considered valid.

22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown P107.

23 This is an order for the combat activities and the activities of the

24 Drina Corps. The date of the order is 2 July, 1995. And could page 2 in

25 B/C/S and 3 in English be displayed. I would also like to give a hard

Page 30113

1 copy to the witness, if I may.

2 Q. In item 2, the Drina Corps refers to Directive 7 and Directive

3 7/1 of the Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska. Could you

4 look at this item and tell us whether the task indicated in this order

5 tallies or is in agreement with the tasks entrusted to the Drina Corps in

6 the directive?

7 A. This order for active combat activities marked Krivaja 95, this

8 was the name given it by the command of the Drina Corps, is part of the

9 tasks received by the Drina Corps with Directive 7/1, and what remained

10 in force from Directive 7, bearing in mind that this is only part of the

11 tasks and is not reflected in the engagement at Spreca and so on, what

12 has been extracted here are the tasks which are in accordance with

13 Directive 7/1. It refers to all these elements of active combat

14 activities with free forces, tied down those forces in the depth of the

15 area, and part of the tasks separate the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa.

16 This is a task which has been ongoing for two years. It's not based

17 either in Directive 7 or 7/1, but was present in every order issued in

18 the past two years, so in item -- or point 2, it's inappropriate, but it

19 could have been realised in quite a different way.

20 Q. One can see that in this task, the Drina Corps received as an

21 assignment to reduce Zepa and Srebrenica to the urban zone. Could you

22 from a military point of view determine what it is meant by the shrinking

23 or reducing to the urban zone?

24 A. If there is a town somewhere and the boundaries of the town, then

25 that would be a precise task. The fact that Zepa is not a town and that

Page 30114

1 Srebrenica and Zepa do not have such boundaries, this is a very imprecise

2 task.

3 Q. And from a military point of view, was it possible to execute

4 this under this form, in this form?

5 A. Well, when you don't know what the boundaries are, you cannot

6 execute it. But as they knew what the boundaries of the enclaves were,

7 those were the boundaries within which they were able to execute it.

8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the last page of the

9 document be displayed now.

10 Q. According to what is said on this last page, this order should

11 have or would have been transmitted to the Main Staff. According to the

12 documents you had at your disposal and which you perused, did you find

13 any trace or anything which may confirm that this order has been

14 transmitted?

15 A. According to all the rules regulating the behaviour of the

16 commands regulating the combat documents, there was no need to deliver

17 this to the Main Staff, there was no obligation unless they wanted

18 something to be seen. I don't know what, but according to what I saw

19 nowhere did I see that this document was received or analysed or that any

20 action was taken pursuant to it in the Main Staff. I never saw anywhere

21 that the Main Staff, or what was called the basic command post, was

22 apprised of this document.

23 Q. If this document had been transmitted to the Main Staff, would

24 the staff have made his own documents which would then have been

25 transmitted to the Drina Corps?

Page 30115

1 A. Had it been sent to the Main Staff, I believe that the commander

2 of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska would have ordered a

3 better order to be drawn up, and this one to be disregarded.

4 Q. One last question on this particular topic for the time being.

5 Directive number 7, does it have a link with Directive number 4?

6 A. This stems from the very two documents, but I'm afraid that it

7 might be mistranslated. These are documents at different levels, and

8 therefore they are incomparable. Directive number 7 was issued at the

9 national level based on the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, and

10 Directive 4 is a military document issued at the strategic level issued

11 by the commander of the Army of Republika Srpska.

12 However, despite these huge differences, there are -- it contains

13 two general tasks that cannot be compared at all, but if we know what the

14 purpose of the directive is and at what period it was issued and to which

15 they were addressed, even then there can be no comparison. Any such

16 comparison would be artificial and exaggerated.

17 Q. In your report, and this is on page 5 and 6 in B/C/S, 5 and 7 in

18 English, you mention establishment of protected areas. What is the basic

19 fundamental condition from a military standpoint for an area to be

20 considered as a protected area at the time of a war?

21 A. This item is crucial for good understanding of the report, and

22 any serious work must establish at the beginning the subject matter of

23 the analysis. Item 6 is specifically characteristic for this work and

24 for the understanding of the analysis of all the remaining elements that

25 are involved. It is impossible not to say for any conditions relating to

Page 30116

1 a protected area that it is not important. From the military point of

2 view when analysing the fulfillment of all other conditions, this is the

3 primary concern.

4 Q. Could you please just repeat, now, from a military point of view

5 what is the prime or first condition?

6 A. The basic or the initial condition is demilitarisation of the

7 zone.

8 Q. According to the documents which you were able to analyse, was

9 this condition met regarding the Srebrenica and Zepa areas?

10 A. None of the documents that I reviewed except for the report of

11 the Secretariat of the Secretary-General of the UN, which in one part

12 contains the phrase "could be considered demilitarised," although it

13 sounds strange, there is no document that confirms that demilitarisation

14 has been effected. On the contrary, all the documents are saying that in

15 this very small area, there was an inordinately huge armed force, the 8th

16 Operations Group, in that very small area present all the time which was

17 then transformed into the 28th Division in order for it to be able to be

18 engaged in the final operations carried out by the BH Army.

19 Q. From the fact that demilitarisation was not effective, I mean,

20 how was it reflected on the existence of the protected areas from the

21 point of view of the Army of Republika Srpska?

22 A. From the point of view not only of the Army of Republika Srpska,

23 but from the view point of every soldier - and that is the basic thing -

24 the fact that there was no demilitarisation practically means that this

25 was not a protected area. That was a place where enemy forces were

Page 30117

1 deployed carrying out offensive combat operations, tying up and engaging

2 huge troops on the part of the VRS, and which present danger to the army

3 who is responsible for that particular area.

4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you Exhibit

5 5D708. This is the order from the Main Staff dated 18th of April, 1993.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

7 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

8 Q. This order is about the cease-fire and the procedure around

9 Srebrenica. This order was issued immediately after the first agreement

10 was signed about the demilitarisation of Srebrenica. Now, if you refer

11 to this first page of this order, can we show the witness a little

12 further down. Can we scroll down on the page, please.

13 What conclusions can you draw about the intentions of the Army of

14 Republika Srpska about Srebrenica?

15 A. When one analyses carefully this order, it becomes obvious that

16 the VRS had anticipated for this to be a true protected and demilitarised

17 zone. In accordance with that it issued very precise and strict orders

18 and instructions, and I would like specifically to highlight two

19 apparently non-military instructions; and that is to forbid manoeuvres

20 and movement of forces, and the bringing in of fresh troops. So this

21 order is on the path of the creation of a proper protected zone as it

22 should have been.

23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd now like to show you two

24 orders which are quite short from the Main Staff at about the same period

25 of time. The first one is 5D1023 and is dated 23rd April 23rd, 1993.

Page 30118

1 Q. I would only like to did you to look at this order, and then I'll

2 show you the other very similar order.

3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And may I now show you Exhibit

4 5D1024, which is the order from the Main Staff dated 3rd May, 1993.

5 Q. According to these orders, what was the position of the Main

6 Staff, particularly relating to the second order about two weeks after

7 the signature of the first agreement on demilitarisation?

8 A. All three orders represent the commitment of the VRS, that this

9 is essentially a protected area. The first one was issued to their units

10 instructing them how to behave themselves, and this one deals with the

11 approval for the passage of units, aid, and doctors, and also UNPROFOR

12 commander. All that is in compliance with the conditions for a protected

13 zone, and that is to ensure a proper control being carried out by the UN

14 forces.

15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May I now show you Exhibit P2742.

16 This is also an order from the Main Staff from the 1st of May, 1993.

17 This is the order for the liberation of Zepa and Gorazde. What I'm

18 interested in in this order is at page 5 in B/C/S and page 8 in English.

19 Q. Could you please have a look at the paragraph starting, "In the

20 second phase ..." and which talks about disarmament of the Muslim units.

21 This formation talks about the disarmament of Muslim formations, and

22 according to this paragraph, the idea was to make it possible for the

23 civilian population to move to central Bosnia or to remain in town,

24 provided that they recognised the Serbian rule. From a military point of

25 view, does this paragraph include a number of irregularities?

Page 30119

1 A. If we take out of context this, then one can say that there is a

2 certain irregularity and that is the disarming of the civilian

3 population. However, if we put this order back into the context and look

4 at all the forms of the war that was being waged and that very often

5 enemy soldiers dressed as women or wore civilian clothes, then it's

6 obvious that the process of disarming was intended to search everyone and

7 find whether they had any weapons or not. On the other hand, this is a

8 rather frequent sentence that appears because in this region fear was

9 often instilled among the civilian population by the armies.

10 Q. Could you please read the paragraph that I pointed to before,

11 please.

12 A. The whole or just the latter part?

13 Q. The whole paragraph, the one that starts by "in the second

14 phase..."

15 A. "In the second phase which is to last 5 to 6 days, regroup the

16 forces and from the circular axis bring fresh forces and continue fierce

17 attack against Gorazde and take the dominant peaks around Gorazde and

18 encircle it as soon as possible and completely. This way conditions are

19 to be created for the disarming of the remaining Muslim formations, and

20 it will make it possible for the civilian population to move to central

21 Bosnia or to remain in town, provided they recognise the Serbian rule."

22 Q. My question was only about this paragraph. Now, does this

23 paragraph entail a number of irregularities, militarily speaking?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Now, on this same page in the B/C/S version and also in the

Page 30120

1 English version but that is further down on the page, one sees that this

2 operation was supposed to be conducted by the Main Staff. And according

3 to this paragraph, Colonel Ilic was in charge of forces engaged in the

4 liberation of Gorazde, and while Colonel Miletic was in charge of forces

5 engaged in the liberation of Zepa.

6 First of all, I should like to ask you a question about Colonel

7 Ilic. Do you know what the position of Colonel Ilic was in May 1993?

8 A. Head of the Operations and Training Administration with the Main

9 Staff of the VRS.

10 Q. Now, without this order, would Colonel Ilic have had the

11 authorities required and indicated in this order for the operation in

12 Gorazde?

13 A. No, he wouldn't.

14 Q. And what if this order had not existed, what would have been the

15 competencies and authorities of Colonel Ilic in this operation in

16 Gorazde?

17 A. His regular duties and responsibilities as the head of the

18 operations and training administration stationed at the command post.

19 Q. Colonel Ilic who was in charge of the forces in Gorazde, did he

20 have in this specific operation authority over Colonel Miletic who was in

21 charge of forces in Zepa?

22 A. No. One can see clearly here how the Main Staff of the VRS had

23 planned the execution of this operation. The Main Staff of the VRS was

24 in charge of conducting the operation, Colonel Ilic was in charge of one

25 part, that is Gorazde, and Colonel Miletic was in charge of the other

Page 30121

1 part, i.e., Zepa. The two of them had powers according to their tasks

2 and they were absolutely equal in performing their tasks.

3 Q. Now, at the time of military activities around Srebrenica and

4 Zepa in July 1995, did General Miletic have certain powers which he had

5 during this operation in Zepa in 1993?

6 A. Absolutely none. His powers are precisely defined here, and that

7 is to be in charge of these forces. In June and July he was at the

8 command post discharging his duties, and particularly the aspect that I

9 mentioned before relating to the VRS and that was the time when the

10 commander was in the area which automatically reduces the duties of the

11 head of the Operations and Training Administration head.

12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like the witness to be shown

13 Exhibit 5D1201. This is Directive number 5 dated 25th of June, 1993.

14 Q. Could you tell us what were the military reasons for this

15 directive to be drawn up in June 1993?

16 A. This was a period, that is 1993 is particularly characteristic

17 for developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was a time when all the

18 three entities insisted on autonomy at the same time. The Croatian

19 leadership was the loudest in insisting on the autonomy of their entity.

20 That was also a period when these two entities started clashing with each

21 other in a very prominent way.

22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 8 in

23 English and page 4 in B/C/S.

24 Q. This is the task for the Drina Corps. At the very top of the

25 page in English. In this directive, you can see that the Drina Corps had

Page 30122

1 as a task to contain the Muslim forces which remained in Gorazde, Zepa,

2 and Srebrenica during the whole siege and the encircling period. In

3 light of the agreements on demilitarisation which date back to April and

4 May 1993, how do you explain the existence of this task entrusted to the

5 Drina Corps?

6 A. This task given to the Drina Corps was the result of the fact

7 that the VRS had seen for itself and became quite certain that there was

8 no militarisation of Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa. Having realised that

9 at that point there was no other option, it decided to hold and contain

10 firmly the units deployed in the area and to prevent them linking up and

11 engaging in coordinated actions.

12 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... block off the Muslim forces,

13 why is this word "completely," why is this word included in the

14 directive? Sorry, my mistake, I'd like to repeat the question.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Either now or after the break, it's up to you.

16 It's your choice.

17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] We can have a break now, I still

18 have a couple of questions.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll have a 25-minute break now. Thank you.

20 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

24 Q. We were talking about this task entrusted to the Drina Corps

25 which was to block the forces, the Muslim forces, block them completely.

Page 30123

1 Why was it necessary to block completely the Muslim forces, and why is

2 this word "completely" necessary?

3 A. This completeness was the consequence of the stay in the enclave

4 of large military forces which used every possible means to replenish

5 themselves and which represented a latent threat to the Drina Corps and

6 the VRS.

7 Q. About this task entrusted to the Drina Corps, from a military

8 point of view, was this task imply moving the civilian population?

9 A. No, no way. This can be seen from the order issued by the Main

10 Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska where practically all action and

11 all movements were halted and the protected area was accepted as a good

12 thing.

13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 5

14 in B/C/S and page 10 in English.

15 Q. One can see at item 5 -- item 7 that the Main Staff orders or

16 commands in the operation which is mentioned in this directive. Does a

17 similar task -- was a similar task given to the Main Staff in Directive

18 number 7 concerning the activities, the combat activities around

19 Srebrenica?

20 A. Specifically in this document, in this directive, the item 7

21 formulated in this way is redundant. When the Main Staff issues an

22 order, it doesn't forward the order. The only thing that can be

23 concluded is that the Main Staff will be in charge, the directive

24 specifies who is to do what and the planned operations were conducted in

25 line with that.

Page 30124

1 Q. And what was the role of the Main Staff in the actions entrusted

2 to the Drina Corps concerning -- concerning Srebrenica in the case of

3 Directive 7?

4 A. As regards Srebrenica, in the context of Directive number 7,

5 there was only one possible potential task which was established and

6 which could take place, and the operation would be planned and led by the

7 Main Staff, which would be in charge of it. If you analysed the document

8 in detail, you were able to see that Operation Jadar did not have a

9 number, so it was not actually carried out, it was only planned, if

10 that's the one you are referring to.

11 Q. No, not specifically. I asked whether Directive number 7 gave

12 the authority to the Main Staff for this order to command for the combat

13 activities which had to be ordained around Srebrenica?

14 A. No.

15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1203.

16 Q. This is the order of the 7th July, 1995 which is linked to the

17 realisation of the order. It was 1993, 1993.

18 You can see that this document is addressed to the Drina Corps,

19 and one also can see on page -- at the bottom page 1 in English, one can

20 also see that the specific tasks were entrusted to units of the Drina

21 Corps. Why does the commander of the staff determine precisely the tasks

22 of the units of the Drina Corps? The commander of the Main Staff.

23 A. One can see here that the tasks set by the commander very clearly

24 and precisely to the units of the Drina Corps have as their purpose

25 making it possible for the Sarajevo Romanija and the East Bosnian Corps

Page 30125

1 carrying out the tasks and operation they have been assigned. This a

2 textbook example of a commander ordering actions to distract the enemy

3 and make it possible for the other actions to be carried out more

4 efficiently.

5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D963

6 which is Directive number 6. This is a directive from the Supreme

7 Command dated 11 November, 1993. Could page 5 in B/C/S and in English be

8 displayed.

9 Q. One can see on this page what are the tasks of the Drina Corps,

10 and one can see that the task was to besiege the enemy forces to inflict

11 constantly losses to these forces and to interrupt or hinder their

12 communications. Obstruct their communications. Could you explain from a

13 military point of view why this task comprised to inflict to the enemy

14 constantly some losses?

15 A. For this task to be understood, why was it persistently

16 reiterated, it would be a good thing to show the tasks given to the 28th

17 Division from the Main Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 as

18 soon as these enclaves were established. At that time the tasks were as

19 follows: That active combat should constantly be undertaken to inflict

20 losses on the enemy and tie down enemy forces. And this is the order on

21 the other side, to prevent forces from Srebrenica and Zepa spilling over

22 to the 2nd Corps and other forces, and thus preventing them from taking

23 action.

24 Q. Did this task from a military point of view also include

25 irregularities?

Page 30126

1 A. No. It's very precise. It says block enemy forces, inflict

2 constant losses, and prevent communication, so it is very precise in

3 military terms and it refers to enemy forces.

4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 3

5 of this directive, and it's also page 3 for the English text. Just at

6 the bottom of the page.

7 Q. Item 3 defines a task of the Army of the Republika Srpska and one

8 may read, inter alia, that this task speaks about the achievement of

9 objective conditions to reach the strategic objectives of the Army of the

10 Republika Srpska during this war. So here you have two tasks concerning

11 Sarajevo first, and the Neretva river. Would it be possible now to go to

12 page 4 in B/C/S. Then here you have the two other tasks concerning river

13 Una, and widening of the borders in the north-east area.

14 Was one of these tasks about the Drina river? Sorry, did one of

15 these goals have to do with the Drina river?

16 A. It's important that you separated the task from the goal. The

17 task was given previously and the goal was announced, and none of this

18 has anything to do with the Drina river.

19 Q. Could you give an explanation why among these four goals,

20 strategic goals for the army, there is no third strategic goal which we

21 had seen on Monday concerning the valley of the Drina river?

22 A. First of all, we are trying to make a connection between two

23 different documents, the state goals and the military goals. One thing

24 is important, a military goal can never be greater than a state goal. It

25 can never involve more. And every military goal which is within the

Page 30127

1 scope of a state goal is defined in this way. Why do they differ? Well,

2 quite simply probably at that time there was no need for the goal stated

3 here to exist.

4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown

5 document 5D954 [as interpreted]. This is an order modifying the

6 directive. It amends the directive. So I asked for 964.

7 Q. Now, this is an order from President Karadzic, modifying

8 Directive number 6 of the 12th of December, 1993.

9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the bottom of the page 1 be

10 shown in English, and also the case in B/C/S.

11 Q. Here you have the task of the Republika Srpska's army described,

12 and according to the tasks which are indicated here in this item 2, were

13 the goals, the strategic goals as defined in Directive number 6, were

14 they in any way modified, changed?

15 A. The strategic goals included in Directive number 6 are goals and

16 they remain goals. We can establish a link between the task from

17 Directive 6, and this addition to the -- or rather, correction,

18 modification of the decision issued by the Commander-in-Chief. You can

19 see from this that he focused on three tasks which narrow down the

20 activity envisaged in Directive number 6, and make it possible for the

21 tasks to be carried out more efficiently. The military goals from

22 Directive number 6 cannot be linked to these tasks. Goals are goals and

23 until they are transformed into tasks they remain merely goals.

24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown page 3

25 from the same document.

Page 30128

1 Q. The second paragraph in B/C/S and third paragraph in English. In

2 this paragraph the Drina Corps has to be reinforced with a reserve from

3 the Supreme Command. Do you have any idea of what is this reserve of the

4 Supreme Command?

5 A. Well, that's the problem I mentioned. I find it strange that a

6 reconstruction of the organisational plan of both the Army of Republika

7 Srpska and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were drawn up to see what

8 forces were included. According to the documents I saw, it was

9 practically one regiment and one sabotage battalion. I think those were

10 all the reserves that they had under their command.

11 Q. Did the Supreme Command or the President Radovan Karadzic have

12 his own forces as a president?

13 A. The Supreme Command had no forces. The Commander-in-Chief had

14 only the Army of Republika Srpska. Those were the only military forces

15 he had. There were no other military units or institutions.

16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown

17 document 5D1033.

18 Q. This is an order from the Main Staff dated 26 April, 1994. This

19 order speaks about preventing communications between the Muslims on the

20 Kladanj and Zepa axis. I don't want to harp on it, but I'm interested

21 especially in item 1 of this order. Which indicates that the artillery

22 support, the action has to be executed without support from artillery.

23 Without any artillery support. What was the military reason for such an

24 order?

25 A. To give an answer to this, one must be familiar with the

Page 30129

1 situation, but we do have sufficient elements to provide a highly

2 probable reply, and that is that the Main Staff of the VRS evaluated that

3 the task should be carried out and could be carried out in this way in

4 order to save artillery ammunition needed for other activities.

5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1223.

6 Q. This is the plan of the Drina Corps to eliminate and to realise

7 the tasks on the 10th of July, 1994. Does the making of such plans --

8 was it usual, is it usual in an army to make such plans?

9 A. I said when we were speaking about the analysis, after every

10 inspection, every visit, every analysis, every briefing, and one can see

11 here that there has been a briefing, when the commander's report what the

12 essential problems are, and the command underlines what it has observed,

13 a plan always has to be drawn up to remove any weaknesses and

14 shortcomings. This sort of activity is obligatory.

15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 2

16 in B/C/S and 3 in English.

17 Q. Just to avoid any repetition, could you simply tell us whether

18 these plans are made -- the elimination plan is elaborated on the same

19 system as a monthly or annual work plain, or are they elaborated

20 according to another methodology?

21 A. These plans are developed according to the elements of combat

22 readiness. This plan is also defined according to the elements of combat

23 readiness. Analysis of work-plans are done quite differently and

24 corrected quite differently. This was pursuant to a briefing according

25 to the elements of combat readiness and the first such element is command

Page 30130

1 and control.

2 Q. And what is the organ of the command which is in charge of

3 drawing up plans of this nature?

4 A. The Chief of Staff is in charge of this, and it is carried out by

5 the assistant of the Chief of Staff for operations and training, and all

6 those involved in implementing the plan, every organ of the command,

7 makes proposals as to activities, those in charge, and so on and so

8 forth, and the operative then incorporates that into the plan.

9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you page

10 3 in B/C/S, which is page 5 and 6 in the English version.

11 Q. Can you please look at point 5.1. According to this point 1, the

12 regular reports for regular combats must be transferred in time and must

13 have quality content. Can you explain why the quality of the reports

14 matters?

15 A. Analysing the large number of cases of the delivery of combat

16 reports in the JNA, the VRS and other armed forces, this is a typical

17 problem. Combat reports are often a burden on the commander, they have

18 to submit this at a particular time, collect all the elements, and then

19 send this at a defined time. Often units use a cliche, they fail to

20 include important things that happened, and they send an incomplete

21 combat report, and then the command is not well informed. And then as a

22 consequence interim reports are sent, or the actual situation in the unit

23 does not correspond to what is in the report. That's why it's stated

24 here that these reports have to be done on time and that they have to be

25 done well and not just according to the cliche.

Page 30131

1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you P2749.

2 Q. This is the order from the Main Staff dated 22nd of July, 1994.

3 Looking at the preamble of the order, you can see that it follows a

4 briefing, which was held on the 1st of July, 1994, and that it was

5 pursuant to the report from the commander of the Drina Corps to the

6 commander of the Main Staff. According to point number 1 in this order,

7 the order of the Main Staff from 18th of April, 1993, is the order which

8 followed immediately after the disarmament agreement is declared null and

9 void.

10 What were the possible reasons why this order from the 18th of

11 April, 1993 was made null and void? And I would like you to give us a

12 very brief answer to this question.

13 A. First of all, what is characteristic of this document, it is

14 realistic to assume that the commander of the Main Staff of the VRS was

15 with the Drina Corps at the time, and that the briefing of the commander

16 was organised there. Because commanders of regiments and brigades were

17 present there and they indicated and addressed the problems they are

18 facing in their respective zones. We see that Srebrenica, Zepa, and

19 Gorazde enclaves were mentioned. Most probably one can deduce that in

20 view of the huge combat operations launched from these enclaves that both

21 the army and the population were suffering losses. And in order to carry

22 out good control and blockade, this order had to be annulled because if

23 you remember this order banned any movement of the units of the VRS.

24 Q. Can you now please refer to points 2 and 3 of this order. Now,

25 looking at these two points, are they in disagreement with the agreement

Page 30132

1 on demilitarisation?

2 A. They are not contrary to the agreement on demilitarisation but

3 since the demilitarisation was not carried out, this obligation was in

4 place.

5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we move to page 2 in the

6 English version, please, which is also page 2 in B/C/S.

7 Q. Can you please focus on item or point 5 and tell us whether point

8 5 is contrary to the agreement on demilitarisation?

9 A. Absolutely not. It is even in conformity with the agreement

10 because it enables unhindered movement.

11 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now have Exhibit 5D1176.

12 Q. This is an order from the president of the republic dated 1st of

13 August, 1994, which is sent to the Ministry of Interior. As you can see,

14 this order is much shorter, but it more or less addresses the same orders

15 as the Main Staff -- that of the Main Staff, particularly the order of

16 the 22nd of July. Why did the president of the republic give to the

17 Ministry of the Interior practically at the same time the same task as

18 the one that was entrusted to the Drina Corps?

19 A. The Army of Republika Srpska and the police constitute a single

20 armed force. The president of the republic is now giving a task to the

21 forces of the Ministry of the Interior within their purview and in

22 cooperation with the army based on specific plans to resolve this

23 problem. If you analyse the document, which is not what I did when it

24 concerns MUP, one can nevertheless see that all the conditions here are

25 in place for a coordinated action to be taken.

Page 30133

1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I now show you 5D1224. This

2 is an order from the Drina Corps dated 6 of September, 1994.

3 Q. This order refers to the order from the Main Staff from 5th of

4 September, 1994, and as you can see, this is still to prevent

5 communications between the enclaves and between the enclaves at Kladanj

6 and Tuzla. In light of the fact that there was an order from the staff

7 from April 1994, and as we've just seen there was the order from the 22nd

8 of July, 1994, why was it necessary to issue another in order in

9 September 1994?

10 A. Unfulfilled previous order require a new order to be issued in

11 order to correct the situation and for it to be implemented. It is

12 obvious that since this order was issued a couple of days after the

13 previous ones, in the meantime, the Main Staff also issued an order for

14 the 8th Operations Group who at the time was in Srebrenica, was creating

15 huge problems for the VRS and they were looking for every possible way to

16 resolve this problem.

17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I now show you Exhibit 5D1034.

18 This is the report from the Drina Corps which followed the order from the

19 Main Staff from September 5th, 1994.

20 Q. From this type of report, which is not a usual combat report,

21 neither is it an interim report. Was that sort of report a usual one?

22 A. When an order is received, it's usually defines when and what

23 kind of reports are to be submitted, either the regular combat reports or

24 other. Once you receive an order and start implementing it, it is

25 customary for the commander of the unit to brief his superior commander

Page 30134

1 about the implementation of the order. This is done often through

2 communications line or in writing as was the case here. The commander of

3 the Drina Corps is informing him of how the tasks were being carried out

4 in compliance with the order received on the 5th of September.

5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And just before the break, I'd

6 like to show you 5D1040.

7 Q. This again is an order stemming from the Drina Corps about

8 communications between the enclaves. Now, what I'm interested in is

9 right at the top, at the very top of the document, because if you look at

10 the preamble of this document, it is -- it seems that the forces in the

11 Srebrenica enclave, the enemy forces, were preparing for an offensive

12 operation, and were getting prepared for that. You have already said

13 that there were military forces present in the enclaves. How is it

14 possible for these forces to be manned well enough and to have enough

15 strength in order to conduct an offensive?

16 A. First of all, when you say enough strength, it might be

17 misleading. One immediately thinks about a group of soldiers. There was

18 an operations group in Srebrenica which is a formation that exceeds the

19 capacity of the region in all its aspect, and their task was to regroup.

20 All the documents that are available and that I've seen show that these

21 forces were supplied with weapons and ammunition from the air by land and

22 even through humanitarian aid. They were exceptionally supplied with the

23 appropriate ammunition because the focus of the supply was on the

24 infantry ammunition, and it is a decisive factor when it comes to

25 operations carried out in this region.

Page 30135

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think we can stop here for today. Thank you

2 Ms. Fauveau, thank you gentlemen -- yes.

3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, just for the

4 benefit of my colleagues, I think that I will be able to finish during

5 today's session, probably towards the end of the session, but I think

6 I'll be able to finish tomorrow.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Tomorrow.

8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely. Tomorrow, not

9 today.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, more or less those of you who had

11 indicated a significant amount of time for cross-examination - I can

12 recall one instance of at least three hours, for example - will please

13 let us know in the morning or let the Prosecution know if you still are

14 sticking to that amount, so that the Prosecution will know whether they

15 will start tomorrow or next week. We will reconvene tomorrow morning at

16 9.00.

17 Same advisory as before, please do not discuss the subject matter

18 with anyone. Thank you.

19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.

20 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 15th day of

21 January, 2009 at 2.15 p.m.