1 Wednesday, 14 January 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, good morning, Madam Registrar. Could you call
7 the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Morning, Your Honours. This is case IT-05-88-T,
9 The Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, ma'am. All the accused are present.
11 And presentation is exactly like yesterday except that instead of
12 Mr. Thayer we now have the pleasure of the presence of Mr. McCloskey.
13 Good morning to you, general and welcome once more.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: We are going to continue with your testimony.
16 Ms. Fauveau.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
18 WITNESS: SLOBODAN KOSOVAC [Resumed]
19 [Witness answered through interpreter]
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D997.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: While he is being shown these document, there are
22 three very short oral decisions that would like to give, because
23 otherwise, I'll forget. On the 11th of November, the Nikolic Defence
24 team, filed a confidential motion inviting the Trial Chamber to exercise
25 its discretionary powers pursuant to Rule 98 to call a witness. This was
1 joined by the Popovic Defence, and there was a response on behalf of
2 Gvero filed on the 24th of November. And the next -- the following day
3 we had the Prosecution filing a confidential response and corrigendum.
4 On the 2nd December the Nikolic Defence filed a confidential motion
5 seeking leave to reply and also containing a reply to the Prosecution for
6 the responses.
7 Purpose of this intervention this morning on our part is to
8 inform you that the Trial Chamber will not be responding to the
9 invitation of the Nikolic Defence team. On the 9th of December General
10 Miletic filed a motion seeking leave to add a document to the Exhibit
11 list and have it admitted in evidence. And it's response of the 23rd
12 December, the Prosecution did not object. For all intents and purposes
13 at this stage based on the arguments set forth in the motion, the Trial
14 Chamber grants same.
15 Last on the same day, 9th of December, the Popovic Defence team
16 filed a request for guidelines concerning disclosure of documents
17 obtained during the Defence investigations. On the 17th and 18th of
18 December, Gvero Defence team and Prosecution filed their respective
19 responses respectively. Given the hypothetical nature of the motion, the
20 Trial Chamber hereby dismisses it.
21 Yes, Madam Fauveau sorry for that abrupt interruption, let's
22 proceed, thank you.
23 Examination by Ms. Fauveau: [Continued]
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Now, this is a work-plan of the Skelani command work-plan for
1 February 1995, and you can see that one of the major tasks of the Skelani
2 Battalion in 1995 was to take part in the closing of the frontline in
3 Srebrenica. On the basis of which element did the command of the Skelani
4 Battalion elaborate its plan for February 1995?
5 A. Every unit of battalion rank and higher up battalion regiments,
6 brigades, corps and the Main Staff of the Army Republika Srpska,
7 according to the valid documents, worked out work-plans, annual
8 work-plans, and based on that monthly work-plans. The Skelani Battalion
9 in the Drina division had as the basis for their work-plan the documents
10 of their superior command and the documents pertaining to the
11 implementation of that plan.
12 Q. Who in the commando unit is in charge of elaborating the
13 work-plan of the command?
14 A. In the battalion commands, the work-plans were elaborated by the
15 deputy commanders. In the commands of regiments, brigades and higher up,
16 it was the chiefs of staff who were responsible for the work-plans, and
17 the assistant of the Chief of Staff for operations and training were in
18 charge of working out those plans.
19 Q. On the basis of which elements were the officers in charge of
20 operation and activities elaborated these plans?
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
22 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President, I just wondered if we
23 could be clear on which level of command we are talking about so that the
24 witness could respond effectively.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, can you deal with that, Ms. Fauveau, please.
1 Yes, thank you.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
3 Q. What I'm interested in is the work-plan of the Main Staff. Here
4 we have the work-plan of the battalion of Skelani, on the basis of which
5 element did the officers in charge -- in charge of education and
6 operation, could they make annual work-plans?
7 A. All the work-plans in all the units enumerated were elaborated
8 according to the same methodology, but now I will use only the term the
9 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, it's monthly work-plan was
10 elaborated based on the annual work-plan which had been adopted and
11 verified. Apart from the excerpt from the annual work-plan, all the
12 assistant commanders delivered their proposals for the introduction of
13 new elements into the work-plan. Also the work-plan also included
14 elements obtained from outside and delivered in good time, such as
15 proposals, requests, and so on from the Supreme Command, from the
16 ministry, and in a specific situation, if UNPROFOR delivered some
17 information on time, this would be included in the work-plan for the
18 following month.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. I just wonder if my
21 colleague could have the witness clarify what he means by "elaborated."
22 The question related to make work-plan and I don't know that elaborated
23 responds to that, whether it means make or complete or develop. I just
24 wonder if we could clarify this so the record is clear.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Fauveau.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Could you explain what the Prosecutor has requested, what is
3 meant by plans elaborated on the basis of annual plans? Can you explain
4 what you mean by "elaborate" or "develop"?
5 A. To elaborate a work-plan means based on the complete proposals
6 that had been processed in view of their contents, these had to be put in
7 order according to the structure, the elements of combat readiness. They
8 had to be harmonised with the participants, all the participants had to
9 be familiar with those elements. They had to be harmonised in relation
10 to time, hours, and those responsible for implementing the individual
11 elements of the plan, and all -- and harmonised with all those who were
12 involved in that work-plan.
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D990,
14 the work-plan of the Drina Corps for February 1995. Would it be possible
15 to see page 2 in B/C/S and page 3 in English.
16 Q. This number 5, we always have this problem about the enclaves,
17 but at item 10 - this is what I'm interested in - we may see that the
18 Drina Corps was to receive documents from the Main Staff and was to
19 create then the combat documents, make the combat documents.
20 What does this specific task refer to, can you explain?
21 A. Bearing in mind that this is a work-plan for February, and also
22 bearing in mind that it says here that the task can be received from the
23 1st to the 28th of February, which means that any day in the month is the
24 day it's expected to arrive, two things can be assumed. The first task
25 which will arrive and which is expected and in the army everybody knows
1 it's always coming, those are the tasks based on the briefing on combat
2 readiness completed in the previous month. And from these tasks and
3 based on the briefing by the supreme commander, other specific tasks may
4 also be expected. In any case, the command here decided that they should
5 be prepared to receive that task and act on it.
6 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] could the witness be shown now
7 5D970. This is an order of the 7th February 1995 of the Drina Corps.
8 Q. Please look at the first part, the preamble, and tell us what
9 it's about, what is this order linked or connected to? What is it about?
10 A. This order issued by the command of the Drina Corps was drafted
11 based on the order by the commander of the Main Staff of the Army of
12 Republika Srpska dated the 5th of February 1995, and it is a consequence
13 of the tasks and obligations mentioned at the briefing of the previous
14 month. After every action, inspection, briefing and so on, all the
15 armies stemming from the former JNA expected orders to take measures in
16 order to remove weaknesses and to improve combat readiness, and you can
17 see that the command of the Drina Corps expected this order from the Main
18 Staff and that within a day or two because on the 5th of February, this
19 was done in the Main Staff, they might have received it on the 6th, and
20 within a day or two they had already prepared their own order to be
21 forwarded to the subordinate units.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 2,
23 both for B/C/S and French.
24 Q. Could you please look at item 1.8.
25 Since we have seen a similar task assigned in November 1994 for
1 the Drina Corps, does this task also come from the analysis of the combat
2 readiness done in January 1995?
3 A. The source of the task in point 1.8 under the element command is
4 from 1993, and it's a consequence of the fact that the corps command did
5 not carry out that task. I have hardly seen any documents within the
6 past year or year and a half here similar to this one which does not
7 mention this task. That means that this task was not carried out or was
8 not carried out fully, so it was always reiterated.
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we briefly -- no, now I
10 would like to see 5D969, an order of the 5 February 1995 of the Main
11 Staff to which this order of the Drina Corps refers.
12 May I give the witness a hard copy so that he can see the whole
13 text of the order.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Ms. Fauveau.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I would like to ask you this: Please look at this order of the
17 Main Staff and tell us whether somewhere in this text a task concerning
18 the enclaves is at all mentioned?
19 A. This document, or rather, this order issued by the Main Staff is
20 something I've analysed more than once now and one can see that the
21 enclaves in this order are mentioned only in point 5 [as interpreted]
22 only where the problem of helicopters flying over by night is mentioned
23 bringing in aid without any control which includes weapons and equipment
24 being brought to these two enclaves.
25 According to the order issued by the command of the Drina Corps
1 where sometimes they use the term "separation" and sometimes "closing,"
2 such a task did not exist in this order.
3 Q. The order of the Drina Corps which we've just seen before this
4 one refers to this order of the Main Staff, doesn't it? Is it -- how is
5 it possible that the tasks given to the corps, the Drina Corps, do not
6 exactly correspond to the task which the Main Staff has entrusted to it?
7 A. I wouldn't say that the order of the Drina Corps does not
8 correspond to the task which the Main Staff has entrusted to it.
9 Analysing the order issue by the Drina Corps and analysing the order
10 issued by the Main Staff on the 5th of February, one can conclude that
11 everything that the Main Staff ordered was included by the command of the
12 Drina Corps in its order. It took the opportunity, and this is not
13 against the rules, to include in the order some things it had omitted to
14 do, and felt it was necessary to reiterate in its order to its
15 subordinate tasks, and this includes the order on the separation of the
17 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Fauveau, take it that line 18 previous page,
18 page 7, "point 5" should read "point 15"; am I correct?
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Have you found it, Ms. Fauveau?
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, on page 4, it should be task
22 15. That's correct. I do apologise.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes. Could the witness be shown
25 Q. For the moment the only thing I'm interested in is what can be
1 seen in English, it would be page 2, what can be seen at the top of this
2 first page. It says "very urgent." In the military practice, what does
3 this mean?
4 A. In military practice when it says "very urgent," that means that
5 the document, once received, must immediately, as soon as possible, be
6 acted upon, but it was always stressed that certain rules and procedures
7 had to be followed. Very urgent means that whatever has to be done
8 should be done as soon as possible while strictly adhering to certain
9 rules and procedures.
10 Q. One sees on the directive that it bears the date 8th of March,
11 1995, in light of that date and of the other elements you were able to
12 find in other documents, could you make conclusions about this directive
13 that it was forwarded to the president for signature?
14 A. There are a lot of elements leading to the conclusion that it was
15 given to the president for signature, but then it was given in a rather
16 specific way. A specific way of giving documents for signature means
17 that the draft of that directive was made by the staff of the VRS and
18 that it was sent to the president for signing on a CD or any other
19 medium. By the look of it, this is one of the rare directives that had
20 been made on a computer, mainly documents that I had an opportunity to
21 see were typed on electrical typewriters.
22 Q. Well, in fact, my question was about the date at which the
23 document was forwarded. Could you draw a conclusion about the date at
24 which the directive was forwarded to the president for signature?
25 A. Bearing in mind the date on the directive, it could not have been
1 forwarded to the president for signing after the 8th of March. According
2 to the military practice, it could have been forwarded only on the 7th of
3 March at the latest in order to reserve the number. According to the
4 practice it could not have been forwarded either earlier or later.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown
6 Exhibit 5D1322. This is the diary of the secretary of the president of
7 the republic, Radovan Karadzic. I would like to have page 29 in B/C/S,
8 and 27 in English, please.
9 Q. On this page you see an entry from 7th of March, 1995. At 1400
10 President Karadzic, according to this diary at any rate, had a meeting
11 with a General Djukic and Minister Nikolic. In light of the fact that
12 the directive is an act which is under state secret -- now, in light of
13 the fact that the directive is a document which falls under state
14 secrecy, General Djukic, the assistant of the commander for logistics,
15 could he have taken the directive to the president of the republic?
16 A. He could have done that. This method of transferring documents
17 of high top secret nature was in place, but it could have been delivered
18 in a different way as well, in accordance with the regulations that
19 classify this document as a state secret.
20 Q. And right at the end of that entry, the 7th of March, in English
21 this is on the following page, throughout the whole page you can see that
22 President Karadzic should have called General Mladic. In light of the
23 type of organisation of the Army of Republika Srpska and of that of the
24 Supreme Command, and in light of the working method about the directive,
25 could the President Karadzic have called General Mladic prior to the
1 directive being signed?
2 A. In normal circumstances when the Main Staff of the VRS had
3 prepared the draft document, and this document needs to be approved and
4 endorsed by the supreme commander, then the draft is reported to the
5 supreme commander by the commander of the army of the VRS. We see here
6 that the word "call" is mentioned, which means called by telephone, so it
7 is highly likely that this directive was sent and that it was said on the
8 phone that it had been sent and that if anything further is needed, then
9 the commander of the VRS was prepared to provide additional explanations.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
11 Exhibit 5D975. At 971 rather.
12 Q. This is the letter through which the Main Staff transferred the
13 Directive number 7 to the corps. We know that the directive is dated 8th
14 of March, 1995. How do you explain that it was only transferred on the
15 17th of March in light of the fact that it was a very urgent document?
16 A. Bearing in mind that the directive bears the notice "very urgent"
17 and that the date is the 8th of March, this covering letter with which it
18 was forwarded to the Drina Corps also bear the notice "very urgent," but
19 the date is the 17th of March. The conclusion is that it is very likely
20 that between the 8th and the 17th of March, this directive was being kept
21 by the president or rather the commander in chief of the VRS. It was
22 received either immediately before it was dispatched further, either on
23 the same day or the following day.
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
25 Exhibit 5D1326.
1 Q. This is in fact a very similar letter that is sent to the
2 Herzegovina Corps. You can see that this document was also forwarded on
3 the 17th of March. And before asking you the question, I'd like for you
4 to see 5D1327, which is practically the same document sent to the
5 Sarajevo Corps.
6 So one can see on all of these documents the date 17th of March,
7 1995. Can you tell us when a document is very urgent, what is the usual
8 time lag for which to be forwarded to the subordinated units once it has
9 been signed?
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: Thank you, Mr. President. If my colleague would
12 be so kind as to refer to the specific type of document she's talking
13 about in terms of the time lag when it's an urgent document. A directive
14 is obviously different than an order which is different than an
15 instruction, et cetera.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Fair enough. Yes, Madam Fauveau.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Well, a document such as directive, what would be the normal
19 time-frame in which it is to be transferred to the subordinated units
20 after it has been signed?
21 A. There is no dead-line of an hour or a day or two for this type of
22 documents. These kind of documents require to be classified as secret to
23 be copied in several copies, and to delivered in a secure manner to units
24 and to be received in the units in a special way.
25 You can notice here in this covering letter sent to the
1 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that they didn't leave anything to chance and
2 that they responded in a proper and appropriate way.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now come back to the diary
4 of the President Karadzic's secretary. This is Exhibit 5D1322. And I'd
5 like to have page 33 in B/C/S and 32 in English, please. No, it's
6 actually rather page 31 in English.
7 Q. Well, the date shown on the entry I'm interested in is 16th of
8 May, 1996. 16th of May, clearly it's a mistake if you look at the
9 exhibit in its entirety. On that day President Karadzic had a meeting
10 with the General Milovanovic, General Tolimir, and General Subotic. And
11 according to this diary, the meeting went from 1105 up until 1505. In
12 other words it lasted four hours. Now, given the date and the duration
13 of that meeting, and in light of the fact that the directive was
14 forwarded to the corps on 17th of March, 1995, were you able to draw some
15 conclusions from that meeting due to the fact that the meeting was held?
16 A. Having carefully analysed all the dates that appear here, and the
17 participants mentioned here, and the order in which they appear, you can
18 arrive at a full picture at how it -- the work was done on Directive
19 number 7. It is known that the idea came up on the 31st of January that
20 probably on the 7th of January it was taken to the supreme commander by a
21 very responsible high ranking officer which supreme commanders
22 appreciate. It is also known that on the 7th of March, a meeting was
23 held with -- and I didn't have this information before but it is known
24 that this meeting took place on the 16th of March which lasted full four
25 hours, and that very important generals attending this meeting.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
2 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I just don't see how this answer
3 isn't completely speculative in light of the fact that the witness has
4 not commented on any minutes concerning these meetings or anything
5 concerning the content of what occurred or as is recorded in the diary.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, but he starts his answer with having
7 carefully analysed all the dates that appear here and the participants
8 mentioned here and the order in which they appear. In other words, he
9 himself has provided himself a sort of a basis on which he then moves
10 ahead with his conclusion.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: I understand that, Your Honour, but I think what
12 he's described is a coincidence among the dates and beyond that we don't
13 have anything of substance concerning the content of the discussions.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I wouldn't go that far as a member of the bench,
15 obviously. Let's leave it and we'll proceed with your next question,
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, I think that it
18 is very important and one can -- may speculate one way or another, you
19 know, this is an expert witness and not an expert of facts and I think
20 that he is entitled to say how he has reached some conclusions.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: We haven't denied you or him that. In fact, you
22 should interpret our conclusive intervention to mean let's proceed, leave
23 things as they are and proceed. We are not saying Mr. Vanderpuye was
24 right. Eventually we will decide ourselves what weight to give to the
25 statement of the accused -- of the witness, sorry.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Of course.
2 Q. Well, you have already answered this question, but I should like
3 to go further in the detail of this. Before signing the directive which
4 is a military deed, did -- would President Karadzic have consulted with
5 the members of the Main Staff, particularly if he wanted to bring in
7 A. This directive is not a military document, it's a state document
8 issued by the Commander-in-Chief addressed to the military or the Army of
9 Republika Srpska. Only when a document is prepared by the Army of
10 Republika Srpska, then it becomes a military document, and from day one I
11 tried to point at a problem that many people here will understand. When
12 it comes to issuing state orders to soldiers and coordinating them with
13 military orders, it was also discussed by General Wesley Clark in his
15 So if -- when a Commander-in-Chief issues a document, he has a
16 need and an obligation to talk to the military in order to avoid issuing
17 directions or tasks that are impossible for the military to carry out.
18 And when I was interrupted earlier, I was speaking about jurisdiction and
19 responsibility. I'm not talking about personalities. I am talking about
20 officers and their responsibilities. The people who are involved in this
21 show that all areas necessary for drafting this kind of document were
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could I now show you Exhibit
25 Q. This is the document about the forwarding of Directive 7/1. In
1 this document one can see that Directive 7/1 dates from 31st of March,
2 1995, and you see also that this covering letter is also dated 31st of
3 March, 1995.
4 Now, is this a usual way of transferring a document, i.e., that a
5 document be transferred on the same day?
6 A. Yes. The Directive 7/1 generated from the command, it was
7 approved and signed by the commander at the commander headquarters and
8 was forwarded on the same day. If we make a comparison with Directive 7
9 where it generated and where it was delivered, I can say that both these
10 directives satisfy these criteria.
11 Q. About the Directive number 7, we know that this is a directive
12 from the president of the republic. The person who signs a document,
13 could that person bring in modifications to the drafter which is
14 submitted to them for signature?
15 A. Once the document is signed, then the signatory takes
16 responsibility for it. That implies his right either to deviate
17 completely from the proposal, or to accept it 100 percent, or to accept
18 it to the extent that he believes it to be appropriate.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May I now show you two exhibits,
20 the draft order and then the order being signed. First I'd like 5D1342.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone, please.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] This is the draft order from the
23 president of the republic dated 16th of June, 1995, and I'd like to ask
24 leave to give to the witness the two exhibits, this one and the following
25 one, 5D1341, for him to be able to compare. Now, on the screen I'd like
1 to have page 2, please. Actually, it will be page 3 in English and in
2 B/C/S as well. The end of page 3, the bottom of it. The end of page 3.
3 [In English] It's the same order, just one is signed, the other is not
4 signed. [Interpretation] Now this, I think, is Exhibit 1341. But, you
5 know, I just want to be sure that we have matching numbers, the right
7 Q. Okay. So here you see this is Exhibit -- make sure that it
8 matches e-court, this is Exhibit 5D1341. And you can see that the
9 document which was signed by the president of the republic. May we have
10 page 1 of this document, please.
11 Throughout this whole page, you see that this is an order number
12 01-1118/95 from 16th of June, 1995.
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show to the
14 witness Exhibit 5D1342, which is the same order but not signed.
15 And here you see the date 16th of June, 1995, number 01-1118/95.
16 And I'd like to show page 2 of this document.
17 Q. On this page 2, you can see the handwritten changes. Now, if
18 these changes were made by order of President Karadzic, would -- did
19 these modifications have to be incorporated in the final text?
20 A. In any case, that's how it should be. There is a methodology
21 used when drawing up documents as important as this one at all levels of
22 command, and even at all levels of management in civilian life. When the
23 final version of a document which is to be signed is adopted, a version
24 of the text is always also adopted including corrections so that the
25 signatory can check whether all the corrections he asked to be made have
1 actually been made.
2 Q. Now, in the Army of Republika Srpska, could anyone have changed
3 the text of the directive after the president of the republic has signed
5 A. I have never come across that level of crime. In a normal
6 situation, it would not occur to anyone to alter anything after a
7 document had been signed. Even if you notice a grammatical error, it
8 must not be changed or corrected.
9 Q. And what were the powers of Colonel Miletic when Directive number
10 7 was forwarded to the Main Staff signed by the president, bearing the
11 president's signature?
12 A. Well, the question is how the directive arrived in the Main
13 Staff. Based on the cover letter sent to the commands of the corps or
14 the accompanying document sent to the commands of the corps signed by the
15 Chief of Staff, whoever compiled this accompanying document, it can
16 probably be concluded that forwarding the directive, entering it into the
17 books, and then forwarding it on is something in which General Miletic
18 was not involved.
19 Q. Now, as a general rule, what could have General Miletic do when
20 he saw the directive if he may have considered that parts of the
21 directive were not compliant with the law of war?
22 A. General Miletic was duty-bound if he saw that to bring it to the
23 attention of his superior officer, and his superior officer, General
24 Milovanovic, was duty-bound to assess whether General Miletic's warning
25 was justified, and then to alert the commander of the Army of Republika
2 Q. And who was under the obligation of warning President Karadzic
3 that the directive may have included some elements which could have been
4 qualified as being contrary to the law of war?
5 A. Based on Directive 7 through 1, one can see that the command
6 studied Directive 7 and the command of the Army of Republika Srpska at
7 that point was duty-bound to warn the president of Republika Srpska that
8 the directive contains elements not in compliance with the customs of
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
11 MR. VANDERPUYE: This is only a minor point, Your Honour, at the
12 beginning of his answer he says -- in the transcript it reads Directive 7
13 through 1, and I believe that, just so if we could clarify that.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, okay. Right. Yes, Ms. Fauveau, I think you
15 can clarify it with the witness. It doesn't make sense as it is.
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Could you please repeat what directive you were talking about
18 when you said that the command considered Directive 7?
19 A. Well, I tried to be precise, I have the impression whenever I try
20 to be precise that it raises a problem. I said that the command of the
21 Army of Republika Srpska studied Directive number 7. The conclusion that
22 it studied Directive number 7, I don't have the work-plan, is something I
23 made based on the fact that based on Directive number 7 they compiled
24 Directive 7/1. When they studied Directive 7, the commander of Republika
25 Srpska was duty-bound to alert the commander in chief that Directive 7
1 contains elements not in compliance with the customs of war.
2 Q. Now, generally speaking if General Miletic as the head of the
3 body in charge of operations and education received an order to prepare
4 or to forward an order with which he did not agree, what were his powers,
5 or rather, what were the possibilities offered to him? What could he do?
6 A. I am afraid I didn't understand your question properly. Could
7 you repeat it, please, to avoid problems.
8 Q. Now, if -- when General Miletic did not agree as the head of
9 administration in charge of operational affairs and training, so if he
10 did not agree with a given order that he was supposed to forward or carry
11 out, what were the possibilities offered to him? Is there a way that he
12 could do anything about it?
13 A. The procedure to be followed by an officer when he sees that an
14 order or a document is not in compliance with the customs of war is
15 prescribed in detail. It implies, one, that he should immediately inform
16 his superior of this. If he sees that his superior is not taking any
17 action, then, two, he is to inform the highest superior. In the
18 particular case of General Miletic, he was duty-bound to inform General
19 Milovanovic of this. If he saw that General Milovanovic is not willing
20 or interested in alerting his superior, then he was duty-bound to inform
21 the commander. He, furthermore, is not duty-bound to act on the
22 document, which in his view is not in compliance with the customs of war,
23 because doing so would constitute a crime.
24 Q. Very well. But what were his powers if this is not a crime, but
25 if he is just not in agreement with the order? What were his options?
1 A. Quite simply, he can express his disagreement, but nothing more
2 than that.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
4 Exhibit 5D1016. This is a document from the Main Staff dated 17th of
5 November, 1994.
6 Q. In this specific case, what was, according to this document, the
7 position of President Miletic [as interpreted] as compared to that of the
9 A. This is a typical example of professionalism. A textbook
10 example. From this document you can see that General Zivanovic, the
11 commander of the Drina Corps, was asking the commander of the Army of
12 Republika Srpska to change his decision in some elements, and this has to
13 do with this reinforcement. And you can see that General Zivanovic asked
14 the same of General Miletic.
15 Although this was not within the purview of General Miletic, he
16 proposed to the commander to inform General Zivanovic, the commander
17 refused. General Miletic, highly professionally, at that time he was a
18 colonel, forwarded the document to the commander of the Drina Corps
19 saying that the commander insisted that the order be carried out in spite
20 of the fact that he is familiar with the standpoint of General Zivanovic
21 and that he advocated that this attitude -- this standpoint be respected.
22 So this is highly professional.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown P5 --
24 JUDGE KWON: General Kosovac, was this sent out on -- in the name
25 of Colonel Miletic, in the name of Main Staff? In what capacity did he
1 send this memo, this letter?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Miletic sent this
3 information to the commander of the Army of Republika Srpska saying that
4 he abides by his standpoint, with a copy to General Zivanovic. So
5 Colonel Miletic by this document conveys the standpoint of the army --
6 commander of the Army of Republika Srpska to the commander of the Drina
8 JUDGE KWON: This is not a personal letter, is it?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This is a notice that a
10 commanding officer is duty-bound to convey.
11 JUDGE KWON: But he added his personal opinion as to the matter?
12 To a certain extent.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Private, no, but personal, yes. So
14 he as the chief for operations and training agreed with the commander.
15 He told the commander of the Drina Corps that he shared that opinion but
16 that his opinion which he had forwarded to his superior had not been
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Ms. Fauveau Ivanovic.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Q. Just one question, if I may, to clarify a point about that
21 exhibit. How can you see that this is an official document?
22 A. Private documents are not entered in the protocol log-books,
23 especially a strictly confidential document which has a number which
24 refers to previous correspondence and in which highly important matters
25 are mentioned, that is reinforcements consisting of a certain number of
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown
3 Exhibit P5. This is a Directive number 7. And I'd like to give the text
4 of the directive to the witness in its entirety as I think that it will
5 be easier for him to follow.
6 Q. Yesterday we were talking about the method by which decisions are
7 made. What part of this directive is the decision per se?
8 A. The decision here is contained in point 6.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Point 4.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to all the regulations,
11 it is the fourth element of the document.
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] So this point 4 is on page 8, but
13 before we refer to point 4, I'd like to focus on point 3 which is on page
14 7 in English and page 11 in B/C/S.
15 Q. Can you please explain the meaning of point 3 in this directive?
16 A. Point 3 represents the task of the Army of Republika Srpska.
17 This task implies the following: Every aim that is to be achieved, the
18 forces, the means, the time, and the place have to be specified. And
19 this is provided for the Army of Republika Srpska in point 3.
20 Q. Who could ascertain or determine point 3 of this directive, the
21 very content of it?
22 A. The task in point 3 is a task emanating from the superior
23 command, and it is defined by the supreme commander. In lieu of the fact
24 that the supreme commander is a civilian, it's logical that when
25 formulating the task, he used a draft and he talked to competent
2 Q. At this point one sees the reference to the order of the Main
3 Staff dated 5th of February, 1995. How do you explain the fact that the
4 directive of the supreme commander refers to this order of the Main
5 Staff? This reference is shown in the first paragraph of point 3.
6 A. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Republika Srpska was
7 present when an analysis of combat readiness was made. He spoke at that
8 analysis meeting, provided guide-lines, and all the conclusions that were
9 made were made in compliance with his standpoints. It can clearly be
10 seen here that this stems from the analysis of combat readiness and that
11 that's where the whole idea came from.
12 Q. Let's now move to point 4 which is on page 8 in the English
13 version and which is on the screen in the B/C/S version.
14 In your report, and here this is paragraph 125 - but I don't
15 think that it's necessary to show it on the screen - you have analysed
16 this decision. According to this decision, what were the main tasks of
17 the Army of Republika Srpska in 1995?
18 A. The tasks of the Army of Republika Srpska, the tasks of the
19 Supreme Command, the decision of the Commander-in-Chief mentioned in
20 point 4 was to be later implemented in the tasks issued to the
21 subordinate units. The decision of the Commander-in-Chief is in line
22 with all the standpoints adopted up to that point, and in spite of the
23 fact that its contained in some 10 or 15 lines, it can be reduced to five
24 points. A decisive defence, resolute defence, persistent defence,
25 strengthening the defence line, inflicting losses on the enemy to the
1 greatest possible extent, preventing further break-throughs, and cutting
2 up the territory. These are the decisions that follow from this text.
3 Q. We can see in this point 4 that one to two operations at
4 strategic level are mentioned, as well as three or four operations at
5 operational level. And for the transcript in the English version of the
6 directive, there is a mistake because the text in English talks about
7 operations at tactical level, when in fact the original in B/C/S talks
8 about operations at operational level.
9 Yesterday we were talking about levels of command. Could you
10 please tell us the differences between operations at strategic level, and
11 that at operational level?
12 A. This difference can be better understood when one analyses the
13 document, which is what I will now proceed to do from that aspect. At
14 the strategic level, a large number of strategic forces have to be
15 involved in a strategic operation. It's led by the staff of the Supreme
16 Command, and at the operative level it's the operative commands that are
17 in charge. So in addition to the level of command, the differences in
18 the aims to be achieved, the forces engaged in those operations, and very
19 often there's a difference in that time in which the operation has to be
20 carried out.
21 Q. Now, in this directive, are the tasks which were entrusted to the
22 Army of Republika Srpska in point 3, were they supposed to be in
23 agreement with the decision?
24 A. Absolutely. Harmony between the decision and the task is a
25 prerequisite for the successful implementation of the task.
1 Q. And in these specific documents, do points 3 and point 4 match?
2 A. In essence, yes.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honours, is this an
4 appropriate time?
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam. We'll have a 25-minute break now.
6 Thank you.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Fauveau.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. About
11 the directive, I would like now to speak of the tasks of the units, and
12 this is on page 8 of the English, and page 13 in B/C/S.
13 Q. Who had the power and the authority to determine the tasks
14 entrusted to the units?
15 A. It is the Commander-in-Chief who issued tasks to the units, to
16 the subordinate units, the orders are issued by the commander of the VRS.
17 In this particular instance, the Commander-in-Chief had gone a step
18 forward and issued tasks to subordinate units, which is not contrary to
19 the rules, but it is rather peculiar.
20 Q. During the drafting of this document, Directive 7, did the corps
21 commander have the right to make proposals concerning their respective
23 A. As far as I could see in the available documentation, and after
24 reading transcripts of General Milovanovic, the VRS adhered to the
25 standard to involve commanders of the corps as much as possible in the
1 decision-making process whenever the possibilities allowed that.
2 Q. Could you have a look at the task entrusted to the Drina Corps
3 which is described on page 10 in English and 15 in B/C/S. You?
4 The tasks of the Drina Corps as defined in this item number 5,
5 does this tally with the decision made and which is described in item 4.
6 A. This is one of the key elements for the analysis of this
7 document. I mentioned this several times so far, that a decision sets
8 out when, what, how, and why, and the ultimate goal being to achieve and
9 carry out a task. This example shows that the tasks entrusted to the
10 Drina Corps is not consistent with the decision, that is to say that it
11 contains some elements that are not at all mentioned in the decision.
12 Q. Could you tell us what are these elements of the Drina Corps
13 which are not mentioned in the decision?
14 A. The first passage on the tasks of the Drina Corps is consistent
15 with the part of the decision which speaks about the decisive defence.
16 However, the latter part of this paragraph, actually, the last sentence
17 has no connection whatsoever with this task of putting up decisive
18 defence, nor does it stipulate that the Drina Corps has any possibility
19 to carry out the task in this way. As I put it in my report, this is a
20 typical example of a task that the military is incapable of carrying out.
21 Q. Could you explain why you consider that this task cannot be done
22 by the army?
23 A. I would just like to remind you of the year 1995, mid-1995, and
24 the decision taken -- actually, the assessment of the international
25 community that that was the year in which the VRS became inferior in
1 every aspect. That was exactly and precisely the moment that this
2 document speaks about, and that is the moment when the VRS had lost
3 territories in all fronts when offensive battles were being fought with
4 the BH Army, the Croatian Defence Council, and the Croatian army. And if
5 somebody at that point takes a decision for the army to carry out certain
6 operations that would send a message to the civilian population, can only
7 be described as a senseless decision.
8 Q. You also wrote in paragraph 139 that this part of the task was
9 illogical. Could you explain why you consider this task as illogical?
10 Is there anything else than what you have just said now?
11 A. Is it illogical because it is assigned to the army. It is also
12 illogical for the army to do something contrary to its goal. One of the
13 main objectives sets out in January 1995, and which is contained in every
14 single decision of the Main Staff, and I think that you all notice the
15 phrase to "settle down the front," in other words, to not mount
16 operations, to not make any movement, do not create any problems, and why
17 that was left in. This activity that is required to be carried out here
18 is something completely contrary, i.e., to create problems and to solve
19 them in a different manner.
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now see page 19 in B/C/S,
21 and 14 in English.
22 Q. Item 6 speaks of combat support. What is the role of the
23 administration in charge of operational and educational matters and
24 matters for support in combat?
25 A. There is no role in providing support to operations. In the
1 preparation of this document, its role is to take over parts of this
2 document from other participants and make it a whole. Let me just remind
3 you that the support of combat operation is a very complex task made up
4 of nine elements which each of them constitute a separate entity.
5 Q. And this item, I see that UNPROFOR is mentioned. Did the
6 cooperation with UNPROFOR in general, the relations with UNPROFOR, and
7 the humanitarian organisations, were they within the purview of the organ
8 in charge of operational and educational matters?
9 A. Cooperation with UNPROFOR is a separate activity which is
10 precisely defined in the VRS, and it was under the jurisdiction of the
11 commanders of the Chief of Staff, and if army were to address this issue,
12 it would have done it completely differently. As far as the operations
13 and training administration, had no responsibility and jurisdiction in
14 terms of cooperation with UNPROFOR, and in support of this view, I would
15 like to remind you of the yesterday's conversation between General
16 Nicolai and General Mladic.
17 Q. We know that General Miletic signed a certain number of documents
18 which concerns supplies of the UNPROFOR units. This sort of document,
19 does it enable us to conclude that matters linked with UNPROFOR enters
20 within its purview?
21 A. There is no foundation for such a conclusion. The fact that a
22 large number of documents and information bulletins were assigned by a
23 man at the basic command post that could have been forwarded to everybody
24 else could lead to a wrong conclusion. The fact that he signed certain
25 documents does not imply that he had any rights or powers in that
2 Q. The treatment of war prisoners, was it within the competencies of
3 the administration in charge of operational and educational matters?
4 A. No. Under no circumstances. The staff and the operations and
5 training administration within the staff have no jurisdiction over
6 prisoners of war.
7 Q. Does the treatment of the civilian population as well Serbian
8 civilian population or other nationalities, does that belong to the
9 competencies of the Administration in Charge of Operational and
10 Educational Matters?
11 A. I think that on the first day I have highlighted a crucial
12 difference and now is a good time to repeat it. The VRS, the JNA, and
13 all the other armies that emerged from the ex-JNA, as well as the army of
14 the FRY, had no organs or jurisdictions over the treatment of any segment
15 of the civilian population. And by virtue of that this particularly
16 refers to the operations and training administration.
17 Q. You already said that this directive was sent to the corps and
18 that it was unusual.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown
21 Q. This is a document from the Main Staff which transmits the order
22 of the president of the republic. I would like you to have a look at
23 item 2 and 3 -- items 2 and 3 of this order. In English this is page 2.
24 What could be the reason for the president of the republic to
25 decide in this way?
1 A. If we can just scroll the document down so that I can see the
2 date, please. All right. I can see it.
3 Q. The date is 20 April, 1994.
4 A. Thank you. This document has presented a kind of obstacle in the
5 preparation of my report because I tried to fathom the reason and the
6 authority for this document to be issued and the consequences of it.
7 When I saw that it does not -- has any particular bearing on the
8 subject of my report, I arrived at the following conclusion: It is
9 obvious that in this period there were some disagreements, personal
10 disagreements between the Commander-in-Chief and the commander of the
11 VRS, and that the Commander-in-Chief had issued an order which was in
12 contrary to his powers because it was well known that the commander of
13 the VRS was appointed by the assembly and nobody can strip him of the
14 rights stemming from the fact that he was the commander.
15 Had the Commander-in-Chief acted properly, he would have probably
16 initiated a procedure for dismissal of the commander of the VRS, and
17 restore order. I was particularly perplexed by the fact that the
18 Commander-in-Chief has sent an order to the corps which means that in a
19 certain way he has ordered them not to carry out orders of their superior
20 officer in certain situations.
21 Based on further analysis, and specifically the analysis of the
22 combat readiness in 1995 or other documents, it seems that either this
23 agreement has been resolved completely, but there are some indications
24 that it persisted in a certain form.
25 Q. When the Main Staff received the Directive 7 signed, what were
1 these tasks? Technically speaking, what did the Main Staff have to do?
2 A. First you will notice an anomaly that at the beginning of
3 Directive 7, there is no mention of it being addressed to the Main Staff
4 because it says that it is addressed to the corps and the centre of
5 military schools. From this specific example, we see that it was after
6 all sent to the Main Staff, although it's not mentioned. The Main Staff
7 initially acted as it had to. It forwarded the directive to the units
8 according to the decision of the commander of -- in chief. And by doing
9 so, that is what he did at the moment, and later on he took some further
11 Q. We know that the Main Staff created Directive 7/1. Did the Main
12 Staff have the obligation to draft this directive?
13 A. In principle if the Commander-in-Chief had prepared Directive 7
14 and forwarded it to a lower ranking unit, and it does not contain any
15 military problems, that is to say, it satisfies all the standards
16 applicable in military documents, then there is no need for the
17 operationalisation of this directive. It is only followed through as if
18 it had been issued by the Main Staff. The best example of that is
19 Directive number 6 which was done in that manner. The fact that we have
20 Directive 7/1 is a direct consequence of the fact that the Directive 7
21 was not clear enough and not useable enough.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown
23 document 5D361. This is Directive 7/1. Could page 2 be displayed on the
24 screen, both for B/C/S and English, please. I would also wish to be
25 allowed to give a hard copy of this directive to the witness, please.
1 Q. Please have a look at the text, in particular for task or item 2,
2 tasks for the Army of the Republika Srpska. One can see that there is
3 reference made to Directive 7. Could you tell us whether the task which
4 I indicated in Directive 7/1 do correspond to those which are already
5 indicated in Directive number 7?
6 A. I said that task number 2 stems from the task issued by the
7 superior command, that it's been taken over. And bearing in mind that
8 this is a specific case, one can see that the commander of the VRS has
9 decided to include tasks from Directive 7 in his directive and to
10 elaborate it. This is completely consistent with what had been agreed
11 and done before.
12 Q. Could you look at item 3, paragraph number 3. In this paragraph,
13 do you find the tasks of the Army of the Republika Srpska?
14 A. Item 3 is not a task. The task is listed under item number 2.
15 Q. This item 3, what is its meaning in the directive? Could you
16 tell us what this item 3 actually means here?
17 A. Well, this is what one can see from other directives, practically
18 it describes the developments relating to the cessation of hostilities
19 and the developments in Republika Srpska, and it provides some details
20 for further operationalisation. One can say that neighbours are
21 mentioned under item 3, and one can conditionally say that this is what
22 it refers to.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown,
24 you see this in the English text on the next page, and in B/C/S it is at
25 the bottom of the page.
1 Q. In the one-but-last paragraph, there is mention of the fear of
2 the elimination of the enclaves, the fear which the foreign powers have.
3 Militarily speaking, does this part be linked -- can it be linked with
4 the tasks entrusted to the Drina Corps?
5 A. I think that these statements referring to the characteristics
6 of the execution of combat activities, movements of UNPROFOR, and the
7 zones are in harmony with the structure of the directive, that is that
8 they are found in point 3. And everything that relates to the tasks can
9 be pulled out of whatever is necessary.
10 Q. Please look at item 4, which is on page 3. In this item 4 where
11 you have the decision, first of all, could you tell us who determined the
12 content of this item 4? Who was in a position, who had the authority to
13 determine this?
14 A. This is the inviolable competence of the commander, and it is for
15 the commander to make a decision.
16 Q. This decision from Directive 7/1, does it tell you with the
17 decision and Directive 7?
18 A. The decision from Directive 7/1 must be in harmony with the task.
19 And it is in harmony with the task.
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown the
21 bottom of the page. In English it is page 4.
22 Q. In the last paragraph on this page, you can read that in the
23 execution of the Sadejstvo operation, the other forces of the Army of the
24 Republika Srpska cooperate to the objective, the goal, and this has to
25 conform with Directive number 7 and this concerns the enclaves of
1 Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac. According to your analysis, does
2 this paragraph include to prepare possible conditions for the population?
3 Unbearable conditions?
4 A. I will now use a word that is frequently heard here, this
5 conclusion from the military viewpoint is a matter of speculation. This
6 is very precisely defined here what the Army of Republika Srpska should
7 do with a view to successfully carrying out Operation Sadejstvo 95 and
8 carrying out the task. It's elementary knowledge that when you want to
9 carry out an operation, in one part of a war theatre, you are
10 intensifying combat in all other parts to prevent the enemy from bringing
11 his forces to the place which is the focus of your military activity.
12 This is a typical example of action against enemy units in order to tie
13 them down, and thus make it possible for the task to be carried out.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could page 5 be displayed now,
15 page 5 in English.
16 Q. Item 5.3 you can see a task for the Drina Corps, which is
17 described there. Is this task indicated in 5.3 tallies with item 4 of
18 this directive?
19 A. In this case, the task of the Drina Corps is in line with the
20 commander's decision.
21 Q. And this task, does it tally with the tasks entrusted to the
22 Drina Corps in Directive number 7?
23 A. Evidently this task given to the Drina Corps in Directive number
24 7 was the reason or a major reason for Directive 7/1 to be drawn from it
25 and to give this task. This is a task which in comparison with Directive
1 number 7 is in military terms appropriate in terms of what a military
2 unit can do.
3 Q. This task entrusted to the Drina Corps, does it include part of
4 the task given in Directive number 7 concerning the creation of
5 unbearable conditions for the civilian population?
6 A. Absolutely not. You can see that the task is in line with the
7 actual situation and with the decision of the commander.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to come back to page 2 of
9 the directive. It's page 2 in English and in B/C/S.
10 Q. In item 2, last paragraph, last sentence of item 2, the Main
11 Staff was to commence immediately plans and prepare for the execution of
12 the Sadejstvo operation. When such a task has been entrusted, what are
13 the organs of the Main Staff who had to take part in these activities,
14 plans, and preparations?
15 A. It's precisely stated here, and that's how it's done, the whole
16 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska is being included, and it
17 begins to plan and carrying out organised preparations for the
18 implementation of the strategical operation. This is a sufficient task
19 for all the organisational units of the Main Staff of the Army of
20 Republika Srpska. From the on the left-hand side of yesterday's diagram,
21 the staff to on the right-hand side the Administration for Planning, so
22 that everyone has to begin preparations for this within their own sphere
23 of competence.
24 Q. What is the role of the Administration in Charge of Operational
25 And Educational Matters in the plans and the preparing of a strategic
1 operation, called the Operation Sadejstvo in this case?
2 A. Based on this directive and this sentence, the Chief of the Main
3 Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska was supposed to make his own
4 decision as to what and how the staff of the Army of Republika Srpska
5 would carry out.
6 Q. I don't know where the problem is, but the question was not
7 properly transcribed so I will repeat it. What was the role of the
8 Administration in Charge of Operational and Educational Matters in the
9 preparation of Operation Sadejstvo?
10 A. First there was the task to act on the orders of the Chief of
11 Staff. The Chief of Staff was supposed to provide the initial elements
12 on the basis of which the Administration for Operations and Training
13 would proceed to work further. It may be assumed that the task issued by
14 the Chief of Staff includes drawing up a plan as to how to carry out the
15 planning of Operation Sadejstvo on the basis of which he would consult
16 the commander, and this would be adopted and it would be binding on the
17 entire Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.
18 Q. Which tasks did the Chief of Staff entrust -- or could he entrust
19 or should he normally have entrusted in the planning of a strategic
20 operation to the Chief of the Administration for Operations and Training?
21 A. The first task entrusted to him would be to draw up a plan for
22 the drawing up of the documents for the strategic operation, but he would
23 also give him a large number of initial documents which are of importance
24 for the plan. These would be the essential elements, when to begin, when
25 to finish, whom to involve, what forces to include, and based on this he
1 would draft the plan, and then based on this draft further work would be
2 carried out.
3 Q. One can see both in the Directive 7 and in this directive that
4 the Spreca operation which should also be at the operational level
5 according to this directive. Does the Main Staff have a role to play in
6 the planning and the preparation of the Spreca operation? Perhaps also
7 could you have a look at page 4, in particular page 4 in B/C/S, and I
8 think it may be page 5 in English. In B/C/S it's completely at the
9 bottom of the page, the East Bosnia Corps.
10 A. From task 5.2 and 5.3, the commander of the Army of Republika
11 Srpska, one can see how he planned for Spreca 95 to be organised and
12 carried out. We can see that he put in charge the commander of the East
13 Bosnia Corps, and we can see that he ordered the commander of the Drina
14 Corps to be included in the operation according to the plans of the
15 commander of the East Bosnian Corps, and this indicates that the command
16 of the East Bosnian Corps was supposed to draw up a draft decision on the
17 map. It was supposed to draft the order and all the necessary documents
18 and deliver this to the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.
19 At that point in time, the task of the Main Staff of the Army of
20 Republika Srpska was for the staff to receive these documents, that is
21 the officer for operations and training to look them over and give them
22 with his comments to the Chief of Staff, and all the other organs of the
23 command were to look at these drafts from the viewpoint of their own
24 competencies and then forward this over to the Chief of Staff, and he
25 would then accept and approve the operation or reject it.
1 I wish to mention here, under normal conditions, or rather, as
2 wartime conditions are not normal, in conditions where there is
3 sufficient time, often there is a possibility for the competent commander
4 in charge of carrying out the operation to report to the commander what
5 his proposal is in the presence of the other members of the staff. So
6 both methods are equally valid.
7 Q. Just to have a clear transcript on this matter, here we have the
8 corps commander who was in charge of the performance of the operation,
9 and in such a situation and when the conditions allow, he reports to the
10 commander. Can you say the commander of which unit?
11 A. The commander who issued the order for the operation; that is,
12 the commander of the Army of Republika Srpska.
13 Q. When Directive 7/1 was transmitted to the Drina Corps, what were
14 the tasks which the Drina Corps had to perform, those of Directive 7 or
15 those of Directive 7/1?
16 A. In the army it is well known with great precision, when you get
17 your last order everything else that preceded it which is contrary to the
18 last order ceases to be valid. Here the commander of the Army of
19 Republika Srpska was very precise. He gave him a precise order where he
20 said that things in Directive 7 were no longer valid and which things in
21 Directive 7 could still be considered valid.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown P107.
23 This is an order for the combat activities and the activities of the
24 Drina Corps. The date of the order is 2 July, 1995. And could page 2 in
25 B/C/S and 3 in English be displayed. I would also like to give a hard
1 copy to the witness, if I may.
2 Q. In item 2, the Drina Corps refers to Directive 7 and Directive
3 7/1 of the Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska. Could you
4 look at this item and tell us whether the task indicated in this order
5 tallies or is in agreement with the tasks entrusted to the Drina Corps in
6 the directive?
7 A. This order for active combat activities marked Krivaja 95, this
8 was the name given it by the command of the Drina Corps, is part of the
9 tasks received by the Drina Corps with Directive 7/1, and what remained
10 in force from Directive 7, bearing in mind that this is only part of the
11 tasks and is not reflected in the engagement at Spreca and so on, what
12 has been extracted here are the tasks which are in accordance with
13 Directive 7/1. It refers to all these elements of active combat
14 activities with free forces, tied down those forces in the depth of the
15 area, and part of the tasks separate the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa.
16 This is a task which has been ongoing for two years. It's not based
17 either in Directive 7 or 7/1, but was present in every order issued in
18 the past two years, so in item -- or point 2, it's inappropriate, but it
19 could have been realised in quite a different way.
20 Q. One can see that in this task, the Drina Corps received as an
21 assignment to reduce Zepa and Srebrenica to the urban zone. Could you
22 from a military point of view determine what it is meant by the shrinking
23 or reducing to the urban zone?
24 A. If there is a town somewhere and the boundaries of the town, then
25 that would be a precise task. The fact that Zepa is not a town and that
1 Srebrenica and Zepa do not have such boundaries, this is a very imprecise
3 Q. And from a military point of view, was it possible to execute
4 this under this form, in this form?
5 A. Well, when you don't know what the boundaries are, you cannot
6 execute it. But as they knew what the boundaries of the enclaves were,
7 those were the boundaries within which they were able to execute it.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the last page of the
9 document be displayed now.
10 Q. According to what is said on this last page, this order should
11 have or would have been transmitted to the Main Staff. According to the
12 documents you had at your disposal and which you perused, did you find
13 any trace or anything which may confirm that this order has been
15 A. According to all the rules regulating the behaviour of the
16 commands regulating the combat documents, there was no need to deliver
17 this to the Main Staff, there was no obligation unless they wanted
18 something to be seen. I don't know what, but according to what I saw
19 nowhere did I see that this document was received or analysed or that any
20 action was taken pursuant to it in the Main Staff. I never saw anywhere
21 that the Main Staff, or what was called the basic command post, was
22 apprised of this document.
23 Q. If this document had been transmitted to the Main Staff, would
24 the staff have made his own documents which would then have been
25 transmitted to the Drina Corps?
1 A. Had it been sent to the Main Staff, I believe that the commander
2 of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska would have ordered a
3 better order to be drawn up, and this one to be disregarded.
4 Q. One last question on this particular topic for the time being.
5 Directive number 7, does it have a link with Directive number 4?
6 A. This stems from the very two documents, but I'm afraid that it
7 might be mistranslated. These are documents at different levels, and
8 therefore they are incomparable. Directive number 7 was issued at the
9 national level based on the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, and
10 Directive 4 is a military document issued at the strategic level issued
11 by the commander of the Army of Republika Srpska.
12 However, despite these huge differences, there are -- it contains
13 two general tasks that cannot be compared at all, but if we know what the
14 purpose of the directive is and at what period it was issued and to which
15 they were addressed, even then there can be no comparison. Any such
16 comparison would be artificial and exaggerated.
17 Q. In your report, and this is on page 5 and 6 in B/C/S, 5 and 7 in
18 English, you mention establishment of protected areas. What is the basic
19 fundamental condition from a military standpoint for an area to be
20 considered as a protected area at the time of a war?
21 A. This item is crucial for good understanding of the report, and
22 any serious work must establish at the beginning the subject matter of
23 the analysis. Item 6 is specifically characteristic for this work and
24 for the understanding of the analysis of all the remaining elements that
25 are involved. It is impossible not to say for any conditions relating to
1 a protected area that it is not important. From the military point of
2 view when analysing the fulfillment of all other conditions, this is the
3 primary concern.
4 Q. Could you please just repeat, now, from a military point of view
5 what is the prime or first condition?
6 A. The basic or the initial condition is demilitarisation of the
8 Q. According to the documents which you were able to analyse, was
9 this condition met regarding the Srebrenica and Zepa areas?
10 A. None of the documents that I reviewed except for the report of
11 the Secretariat of the Secretary-General of the UN, which in one part
12 contains the phrase "could be considered demilitarised," although it
13 sounds strange, there is no document that confirms that demilitarisation
14 has been effected. On the contrary, all the documents are saying that in
15 this very small area, there was an inordinately huge armed force, the 8th
16 Operations Group, in that very small area present all the time which was
17 then transformed into the 28th Division in order for it to be able to be
18 engaged in the final operations carried out by the BH Army.
19 Q. From the fact that demilitarisation was not effective, I mean,
20 how was it reflected on the existence of the protected areas from the
21 point of view of the Army of Republika Srpska?
22 A. From the point of view not only of the Army of Republika Srpska,
23 but from the view point of every soldier - and that is the basic thing -
24 the fact that there was no demilitarisation practically means that this
25 was not a protected area. That was a place where enemy forces were
1 deployed carrying out offensive combat operations, tying up and engaging
2 huge troops on the part of the VRS, and which present danger to the army
3 who is responsible for that particular area.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you Exhibit
5 5D708. This is the order from the Main Staff dated 18th of April, 1993.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
7 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
8 Q. This order is about the cease-fire and the procedure around
9 Srebrenica. This order was issued immediately after the first agreement
10 was signed about the demilitarisation of Srebrenica. Now, if you refer
11 to this first page of this order, can we show the witness a little
12 further down. Can we scroll down on the page, please.
13 What conclusions can you draw about the intentions of the Army of
14 Republika Srpska about Srebrenica?
15 A. When one analyses carefully this order, it becomes obvious that
16 the VRS had anticipated for this to be a true protected and demilitarised
17 zone. In accordance with that it issued very precise and strict orders
18 and instructions, and I would like specifically to highlight two
19 apparently non-military instructions; and that is to forbid manoeuvres
20 and movement of forces, and the bringing in of fresh troops. So this
21 order is on the path of the creation of a proper protected zone as it
22 should have been.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd now like to show you two
24 orders which are quite short from the Main Staff at about the same period
25 of time. The first one is 5D1023 and is dated 23rd April 23rd, 1993.
1 Q. I would only like to did you to look at this order, and then I'll
2 show you the other very similar order.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And may I now show you Exhibit
4 5D1024, which is the order from the Main Staff dated 3rd May, 1993.
5 Q. According to these orders, what was the position of the Main
6 Staff, particularly relating to the second order about two weeks after
7 the signature of the first agreement on demilitarisation?
8 A. All three orders represent the commitment of the VRS, that this
9 is essentially a protected area. The first one was issued to their units
10 instructing them how to behave themselves, and this one deals with the
11 approval for the passage of units, aid, and doctors, and also UNPROFOR
12 commander. All that is in compliance with the conditions for a protected
13 zone, and that is to ensure a proper control being carried out by the UN
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May I now show you Exhibit P2742.
16 This is also an order from the Main Staff from the 1st of May, 1993.
17 This is the order for the liberation of Zepa and Gorazde. What I'm
18 interested in in this order is at page 5 in B/C/S and page 8 in English.
19 Q. Could you please have a look at the paragraph starting, "In the
20 second phase ..." and which talks about disarmament of the Muslim units.
21 This formation talks about the disarmament of Muslim formations, and
22 according to this paragraph, the idea was to make it possible for the
23 civilian population to move to central Bosnia or to remain in town,
24 provided that they recognised the Serbian rule. From a military point of
25 view, does this paragraph include a number of irregularities?
1 A. If we take out of context this, then one can say that there is a
2 certain irregularity and that is the disarming of the civilian
3 population. However, if we put this order back into the context and look
4 at all the forms of the war that was being waged and that very often
5 enemy soldiers dressed as women or wore civilian clothes, then it's
6 obvious that the process of disarming was intended to search everyone and
7 find whether they had any weapons or not. On the other hand, this is a
8 rather frequent sentence that appears because in this region fear was
9 often instilled among the civilian population by the armies.
10 Q. Could you please read the paragraph that I pointed to before,
12 A. The whole or just the latter part?
13 Q. The whole paragraph, the one that starts by "in the second
15 A. "In the second phase which is to last 5 to 6 days, regroup the
16 forces and from the circular axis bring fresh forces and continue fierce
17 attack against Gorazde and take the dominant peaks around Gorazde and
18 encircle it as soon as possible and completely. This way conditions are
19 to be created for the disarming of the remaining Muslim formations, and
20 it will make it possible for the civilian population to move to central
21 Bosnia or to remain in town, provided they recognise the Serbian rule."
22 Q. My question was only about this paragraph. Now, does this
23 paragraph entail a number of irregularities, militarily speaking?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Now, on this same page in the B/C/S version and also in the
1 English version but that is further down on the page, one sees that this
2 operation was supposed to be conducted by the Main Staff. And according
3 to this paragraph, Colonel Ilic was in charge of forces engaged in the
4 liberation of Gorazde, and while Colonel Miletic was in charge of forces
5 engaged in the liberation of Zepa.
6 First of all, I should like to ask you a question about Colonel
7 Ilic. Do you know what the position of Colonel Ilic was in May 1993?
8 A. Head of the Operations and Training Administration with the Main
9 Staff of the VRS.
10 Q. Now, without this order, would Colonel Ilic have had the
11 authorities required and indicated in this order for the operation in
13 A. No, he wouldn't.
14 Q. And what if this order had not existed, what would have been the
15 competencies and authorities of Colonel Ilic in this operation in
17 A. His regular duties and responsibilities as the head of the
18 operations and training administration stationed at the command post.
19 Q. Colonel Ilic who was in charge of the forces in Gorazde, did he
20 have in this specific operation authority over Colonel Miletic who was in
21 charge of forces in Zepa?
22 A. No. One can see clearly here how the Main Staff of the VRS had
23 planned the execution of this operation. The Main Staff of the VRS was
24 in charge of conducting the operation, Colonel Ilic was in charge of one
25 part, that is Gorazde, and Colonel Miletic was in charge of the other
1 part, i.e., Zepa. The two of them had powers according to their tasks
2 and they were absolutely equal in performing their tasks.
3 Q. Now, at the time of military activities around Srebrenica and
4 Zepa in July 1995, did General Miletic have certain powers which he had
5 during this operation in Zepa in 1993?
6 A. Absolutely none. His powers are precisely defined here, and that
7 is to be in charge of these forces. In June and July he was at the
8 command post discharging his duties, and particularly the aspect that I
9 mentioned before relating to the VRS and that was the time when the
10 commander was in the area which automatically reduces the duties of the
11 head of the Operations and Training Administration head.
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like the witness to be shown
13 Exhibit 5D1201. This is Directive number 5 dated 25th of June, 1993.
14 Q. Could you tell us what were the military reasons for this
15 directive to be drawn up in June 1993?
16 A. This was a period, that is 1993 is particularly characteristic
17 for developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was a time when all the
18 three entities insisted on autonomy at the same time. The Croatian
19 leadership was the loudest in insisting on the autonomy of their entity.
20 That was also a period when these two entities started clashing with each
21 other in a very prominent way.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we please have page 8 in
23 English and page 4 in B/C/S.
24 Q. This is the task for the Drina Corps. At the very top of the
25 page in English. In this directive, you can see that the Drina Corps had
1 as a task to contain the Muslim forces which remained in Gorazde, Zepa,
2 and Srebrenica during the whole siege and the encircling period. In
3 light of the agreements on demilitarisation which date back to April and
4 May 1993, how do you explain the existence of this task entrusted to the
5 Drina Corps?
6 A. This task given to the Drina Corps was the result of the fact
7 that the VRS had seen for itself and became quite certain that there was
8 no militarisation of Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa. Having realised that
9 at that point there was no other option, it decided to hold and contain
10 firmly the units deployed in the area and to prevent them linking up and
11 engaging in coordinated actions.
12 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... block off the Muslim forces,
13 why is this word "completely," why is this word included in the
14 directive? Sorry, my mistake, I'd like to repeat the question.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Either now or after the break, it's up to you.
16 It's your choice.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] We can have a break now, I still
18 have a couple of questions.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: We'll have a 25-minute break now. Thank you.
20 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 12.58 p.m.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Q. We were talking about this task entrusted to the Drina Corps
25 which was to block the forces, the Muslim forces, block them completely.
1 Why was it necessary to block completely the Muslim forces, and why is
2 this word "completely" necessary?
3 A. This completeness was the consequence of the stay in the enclave
4 of large military forces which used every possible means to replenish
5 themselves and which represented a latent threat to the Drina Corps and
6 the VRS.
7 Q. About this task entrusted to the Drina Corps, from a military
8 point of view, was this task imply moving the civilian population?
9 A. No, no way. This can be seen from the order issued by the Main
10 Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska where practically all action and
11 all movements were halted and the protected area was accepted as a good
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 5
14 in B/C/S and page 10 in English.
15 Q. One can see at item 5 -- item 7 that the Main Staff orders or
16 commands in the operation which is mentioned in this directive. Does a
17 similar task -- was a similar task given to the Main Staff in Directive
18 number 7 concerning the activities, the combat activities around
20 A. Specifically in this document, in this directive, the item 7
21 formulated in this way is redundant. When the Main Staff issues an
22 order, it doesn't forward the order. The only thing that can be
23 concluded is that the Main Staff will be in charge, the directive
24 specifies who is to do what and the planned operations were conducted in
25 line with that.
1 Q. And what was the role of the Main Staff in the actions entrusted
2 to the Drina Corps concerning -- concerning Srebrenica in the case of
3 Directive 7?
4 A. As regards Srebrenica, in the context of Directive number 7,
5 there was only one possible potential task which was established and
6 which could take place, and the operation would be planned and led by the
7 Main Staff, which would be in charge of it. If you analysed the document
8 in detail, you were able to see that Operation Jadar did not have a
9 number, so it was not actually carried out, it was only planned, if
10 that's the one you are referring to.
11 Q. No, not specifically. I asked whether Directive number 7 gave
12 the authority to the Main Staff for this order to command for the combat
13 activities which had to be ordained around Srebrenica?
14 A. No.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1203.
16 Q. This is the order of the 7th July, 1995 which is linked to the
17 realisation of the order. It was 1993, 1993.
18 You can see that this document is addressed to the Drina Corps,
19 and one also can see on page -- at the bottom page 1 in English, one can
20 also see that the specific tasks were entrusted to units of the Drina
21 Corps. Why does the commander of the staff determine precisely the tasks
22 of the units of the Drina Corps? The commander of the Main Staff.
23 A. One can see here that the tasks set by the commander very clearly
24 and precisely to the units of the Drina Corps have as their purpose
25 making it possible for the Sarajevo Romanija and the East Bosnian Corps
1 carrying out the tasks and operation they have been assigned. This a
2 textbook example of a commander ordering actions to distract the enemy
3 and make it possible for the other actions to be carried out more
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D963
6 which is Directive number 6. This is a directive from the Supreme
7 Command dated 11 November, 1993. Could page 5 in B/C/S and in English be
9 Q. One can see on this page what are the tasks of the Drina Corps,
10 and one can see that the task was to besiege the enemy forces to inflict
11 constantly losses to these forces and to interrupt or hinder their
12 communications. Obstruct their communications. Could you explain from a
13 military point of view why this task comprised to inflict to the enemy
14 constantly some losses?
15 A. For this task to be understood, why was it persistently
16 reiterated, it would be a good thing to show the tasks given to the 28th
17 Division from the Main Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 as
18 soon as these enclaves were established. At that time the tasks were as
19 follows: That active combat should constantly be undertaken to inflict
20 losses on the enemy and tie down enemy forces. And this is the order on
21 the other side, to prevent forces from Srebrenica and Zepa spilling over
22 to the 2nd Corps and other forces, and thus preventing them from taking
24 Q. Did this task from a military point of view also include
1 A. No. It's very precise. It says block enemy forces, inflict
2 constant losses, and prevent communication, so it is very precise in
3 military terms and it refers to enemy forces.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 3
5 of this directive, and it's also page 3 for the English text. Just at
6 the bottom of the page.
7 Q. Item 3 defines a task of the Army of the Republika Srpska and one
8 may read, inter alia, that this task speaks about the achievement of
9 objective conditions to reach the strategic objectives of the Army of the
10 Republika Srpska during this war. So here you have two tasks concerning
11 Sarajevo first, and the Neretva river. Would it be possible now to go to
12 page 4 in B/C/S. Then here you have the two other tasks concerning river
13 Una, and widening of the borders in the north-east area.
14 Was one of these tasks about the Drina river? Sorry, did one of
15 these goals have to do with the Drina river?
16 A. It's important that you separated the task from the goal. The
17 task was given previously and the goal was announced, and none of this
18 has anything to do with the Drina river.
19 Q. Could you give an explanation why among these four goals,
20 strategic goals for the army, there is no third strategic goal which we
21 had seen on Monday concerning the valley of the Drina river?
22 A. First of all, we are trying to make a connection between two
23 different documents, the state goals and the military goals. One thing
24 is important, a military goal can never be greater than a state goal. It
25 can never involve more. And every military goal which is within the
1 scope of a state goal is defined in this way. Why do they differ? Well,
2 quite simply probably at that time there was no need for the goal stated
3 here to exist.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown
5 document 5D954 [as interpreted]. This is an order modifying the
6 directive. It amends the directive. So I asked for 964.
7 Q. Now, this is an order from President Karadzic, modifying
8 Directive number 6 of the 12th of December, 1993.
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the bottom of the page 1 be
10 shown in English, and also the case in B/C/S.
11 Q. Here you have the task of the Republika Srpska's army described,
12 and according to the tasks which are indicated here in this item 2, were
13 the goals, the strategic goals as defined in Directive number 6, were
14 they in any way modified, changed?
15 A. The strategic goals included in Directive number 6 are goals and
16 they remain goals. We can establish a link between the task from
17 Directive 6, and this addition to the -- or rather, correction,
18 modification of the decision issued by the Commander-in-Chief. You can
19 see from this that he focused on three tasks which narrow down the
20 activity envisaged in Directive number 6, and make it possible for the
21 tasks to be carried out more efficiently. The military goals from
22 Directive number 6 cannot be linked to these tasks. Goals are goals and
23 until they are transformed into tasks they remain merely goals.
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown page 3
25 from the same document.
1 Q. The second paragraph in B/C/S and third paragraph in English. In
2 this paragraph the Drina Corps has to be reinforced with a reserve from
3 the Supreme Command. Do you have any idea of what is this reserve of the
4 Supreme Command?
5 A. Well, that's the problem I mentioned. I find it strange that a
6 reconstruction of the organisational plan of both the Army of Republika
7 Srpska and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were drawn up to see what
8 forces were included. According to the documents I saw, it was
9 practically one regiment and one sabotage battalion. I think those were
10 all the reserves that they had under their command.
11 Q. Did the Supreme Command or the President Radovan Karadzic have
12 his own forces as a president?
13 A. The Supreme Command had no forces. The Commander-in-Chief had
14 only the Army of Republika Srpska. Those were the only military forces
15 he had. There were no other military units or institutions.
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown
17 document 5D1033.
18 Q. This is an order from the Main Staff dated 26 April, 1994. This
19 order speaks about preventing communications between the Muslims on the
20 Kladanj and Zepa axis. I don't want to harp on it, but I'm interested
21 especially in item 1 of this order. Which indicates that the artillery
22 support, the action has to be executed without support from artillery.
23 Without any artillery support. What was the military reason for such an
25 A. To give an answer to this, one must be familiar with the
1 situation, but we do have sufficient elements to provide a highly
2 probable reply, and that is that the Main Staff of the VRS evaluated that
3 the task should be carried out and could be carried out in this way in
4 order to save artillery ammunition needed for other activities.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1223.
6 Q. This is the plan of the Drina Corps to eliminate and to realise
7 the tasks on the 10th of July, 1994. Does the making of such plans --
8 was it usual, is it usual in an army to make such plans?
9 A. I said when we were speaking about the analysis, after every
10 inspection, every visit, every analysis, every briefing, and one can see
11 here that there has been a briefing, when the commander's report what the
12 essential problems are, and the command underlines what it has observed,
13 a plan always has to be drawn up to remove any weaknesses and
14 shortcomings. This sort of activity is obligatory.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 2
16 in B/C/S and 3 in English.
17 Q. Just to avoid any repetition, could you simply tell us whether
18 these plans are made -- the elimination plan is elaborated on the same
19 system as a monthly or annual work plain, or are they elaborated
20 according to another methodology?
21 A. These plans are developed according to the elements of combat
22 readiness. This plan is also defined according to the elements of combat
23 readiness. Analysis of work-plans are done quite differently and
24 corrected quite differently. This was pursuant to a briefing according
25 to the elements of combat readiness and the first such element is command
1 and control.
2 Q. And what is the organ of the command which is in charge of
3 drawing up plans of this nature?
4 A. The Chief of Staff is in charge of this, and it is carried out by
5 the assistant of the Chief of Staff for operations and training, and all
6 those involved in implementing the plan, every organ of the command,
7 makes proposals as to activities, those in charge, and so on and so
8 forth, and the operative then incorporates that into the plan.
9 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you page
10 3 in B/C/S, which is page 5 and 6 in the English version.
11 Q. Can you please look at point 5.1. According to this point 1, the
12 regular reports for regular combats must be transferred in time and must
13 have quality content. Can you explain why the quality of the reports
15 A. Analysing the large number of cases of the delivery of combat
16 reports in the JNA, the VRS and other armed forces, this is a typical
17 problem. Combat reports are often a burden on the commander, they have
18 to submit this at a particular time, collect all the elements, and then
19 send this at a defined time. Often units use a cliche, they fail to
20 include important things that happened, and they send an incomplete
21 combat report, and then the command is not well informed. And then as a
22 consequence interim reports are sent, or the actual situation in the unit
23 does not correspond to what is in the report. That's why it's stated
24 here that these reports have to be done on time and that they have to be
25 done well and not just according to the cliche.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you P2749.
2 Q. This is the order from the Main Staff dated 22nd of July, 1994.
3 Looking at the preamble of the order, you can see that it follows a
4 briefing, which was held on the 1st of July, 1994, and that it was
5 pursuant to the report from the commander of the Drina Corps to the
6 commander of the Main Staff. According to point number 1 in this order,
7 the order of the Main Staff from 18th of April, 1993, is the order which
8 followed immediately after the disarmament agreement is declared null and
10 What were the possible reasons why this order from the 18th of
11 April, 1993 was made null and void? And I would like you to give us a
12 very brief answer to this question.
13 A. First of all, what is characteristic of this document, it is
14 realistic to assume that the commander of the Main Staff of the VRS was
15 with the Drina Corps at the time, and that the briefing of the commander
16 was organised there. Because commanders of regiments and brigades were
17 present there and they indicated and addressed the problems they are
18 facing in their respective zones. We see that Srebrenica, Zepa, and
19 Gorazde enclaves were mentioned. Most probably one can deduce that in
20 view of the huge combat operations launched from these enclaves that both
21 the army and the population were suffering losses. And in order to carry
22 out good control and blockade, this order had to be annulled because if
23 you remember this order banned any movement of the units of the VRS.
24 Q. Can you now please refer to points 2 and 3 of this order. Now,
25 looking at these two points, are they in disagreement with the agreement
1 on demilitarisation?
2 A. They are not contrary to the agreement on demilitarisation but
3 since the demilitarisation was not carried out, this obligation was in
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we move to page 2 in the
6 English version, please, which is also page 2 in B/C/S.
7 Q. Can you please focus on item or point 5 and tell us whether point
8 5 is contrary to the agreement on demilitarisation?
9 A. Absolutely not. It is even in conformity with the agreement
10 because it enables unhindered movement.
11 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now have Exhibit 5D1176.
12 Q. This is an order from the president of the republic dated 1st of
13 August, 1994, which is sent to the Ministry of Interior. As you can see,
14 this order is much shorter, but it more or less addresses the same orders
15 as the Main Staff -- that of the Main Staff, particularly the order of
16 the 22nd of July. Why did the president of the republic give to the
17 Ministry of the Interior practically at the same time the same task as
18 the one that was entrusted to the Drina Corps?
19 A. The Army of Republika Srpska and the police constitute a single
20 armed force. The president of the republic is now giving a task to the
21 forces of the Ministry of the Interior within their purview and in
22 cooperation with the army based on specific plans to resolve this
23 problem. If you analyse the document, which is not what I did when it
24 concerns MUP, one can nevertheless see that all the conditions here are
25 in place for a coordinated action to be taken.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I now show you 5D1224. This
2 is an order from the Drina Corps dated 6 of September, 1994.
3 Q. This order refers to the order from the Main Staff from 5th of
4 September, 1994, and as you can see, this is still to prevent
5 communications between the enclaves and between the enclaves at Kladanj
6 and Tuzla. In light of the fact that there was an order from the staff
7 from April 1994, and as we've just seen there was the order from the 22nd
8 of July, 1994, why was it necessary to issue another in order in
9 September 1994?
10 A. Unfulfilled previous order require a new order to be issued in
11 order to correct the situation and for it to be implemented. It is
12 obvious that since this order was issued a couple of days after the
13 previous ones, in the meantime, the Main Staff also issued an order for
14 the 8th Operations Group who at the time was in Srebrenica, was creating
15 huge problems for the VRS and they were looking for every possible way to
16 resolve this problem.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I now show you Exhibit 5D1034.
18 This is the report from the Drina Corps which followed the order from the
19 Main Staff from September 5th, 1994.
20 Q. From this type of report, which is not a usual combat report,
21 neither is it an interim report. Was that sort of report a usual one?
22 A. When an order is received, it's usually defines when and what
23 kind of reports are to be submitted, either the regular combat reports or
24 other. Once you receive an order and start implementing it, it is
25 customary for the commander of the unit to brief his superior commander
1 about the implementation of the order. This is done often through
2 communications line or in writing as was the case here. The commander of
3 the Drina Corps is informing him of how the tasks were being carried out
4 in compliance with the order received on the 5th of September.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And just before the break, I'd
6 like to show you 5D1040.
7 Q. This again is an order stemming from the Drina Corps about
8 communications between the enclaves. Now, what I'm interested in is
9 right at the top, at the very top of the document, because if you look at
10 the preamble of this document, it is -- it seems that the forces in the
11 Srebrenica enclave, the enemy forces, were preparing for an offensive
12 operation, and were getting prepared for that. You have already said
13 that there were military forces present in the enclaves. How is it
14 possible for these forces to be manned well enough and to have enough
15 strength in order to conduct an offensive?
16 A. First of all, when you say enough strength, it might be
17 misleading. One immediately thinks about a group of soldiers. There was
18 an operations group in Srebrenica which is a formation that exceeds the
19 capacity of the region in all its aspect, and their task was to regroup.
20 All the documents that are available and that I've seen show that these
21 forces were supplied with weapons and ammunition from the air by land and
22 even through humanitarian aid. They were exceptionally supplied with the
23 appropriate ammunition because the focus of the supply was on the
24 infantry ammunition, and it is a decisive factor when it comes to
25 operations carried out in this region.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think we can stop here for today. Thank you
2 Ms. Fauveau, thank you gentlemen -- yes.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, just for the
4 benefit of my colleagues, I think that I will be able to finish during
5 today's session, probably towards the end of the session, but I think
6 I'll be able to finish tomorrow.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Tomorrow.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely. Tomorrow, not
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, more or less those of you who had
11 indicated a significant amount of time for cross-examination - I can
12 recall one instance of at least three hours, for example - will please
13 let us know in the morning or let the Prosecution know if you still are
14 sticking to that amount, so that the Prosecution will know whether they
15 will start tomorrow or next week. We will reconvene tomorrow morning at
17 Same advisory as before, please do not discuss the subject matter
18 with anyone. Thank you.
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.
20 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 15th day of
21 January, 2009 at 2.15 p.m.