Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 30136

 1                           Thursday, 15 January 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning to you, Madam Registrar.  Could you

 7     call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case

 9     IT-05-88-T, The Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Good morning, everybody.  For the

11     record, everyone is here today with the exception of Mr. Nikolic for the

12     Beara Defence team.  Accused are all present.

13             General, good morning to you.  We are going to proceed.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Ms. Fauveau.

16             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

17                           WITNESS:  SLOBODAN KOSOVAC [Resumed]

18                           [Witness answered through interpretation]

19                           Examination by Ms. Fauveau:  [Continued]

20             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have Exhibit 5D1225.  This

21     is an order from the Drina Corps dated 24th of November, 1994.

22        Q.   Now, this is an order for the conduct of activities and ambushes.

23     Could you tell us what in the military terminology "ambushes" mean?

24        A.   According to the definition, it belongs to active combat

25     activities, and it's carried out in the following way:  The units conceal

Page 30137

 1     themselves and sneak up, they wait for the enemy, and this part is

 2     defensive, and then at an appropriate moment they respond very quickly,

 3     and at that point, this becomes an offensive combat activity.

 4        Q.   Could you please now look at point 3 of this order.

 5             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In English, this is on page 2 of

 6     the English version.

 7        Q.   According to this item number 3, the ambushes plan was to be

 8     forwarded to the corps command for certification purposes.  And just

 9     before that, you see that it was the military brigade, which was to draw

10     up the plan as well as the Skelani Battalion.

11             Could you explain what certification mentioned here?

12        A.   From this order, it is easy to conclude that this is a zone of

13     activity which was kept under control with patrols and ambushes.  It was

14     very vulnerable, columns passed through, and the order has been issued

15     for two units to elaborate a plan of ambush activities.  As two units

16     were involved in doing this, it's quite normal that the superior command

17     should review their plans and, if necessary, coordinate and harmonise

18     them.  And if it had anything to add as regards the time, place, forces,

19     and means, it could do so.

20             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to now show you 5D1041.

21     Now, this is a warning from the Drina Corps which is sent to the military

22     brigade dated 3rd of December, 1994.  This warning refers to the order

23     that we just looked at.

24        Q.   In light of this warning, can you say on the basis of the text in

25     this document, did the Milici [Realtime transcript read in error,

Page 30138

 1     "military"] Brigade carry out the tasks which were entrusted to it?

 2        A.   From this document sent by the command of the Drina Corps, it is

 3     evident that the Milici [Realtime transcript read in error, "military"]

 4     Brigade did draw up a plan, but it can also be seen that it did not

 5     comply with the plan.  They listed some reasons as to why they didn't do

 6     so.  The command, however, is insisting that they carry out the plan, and

 7     the three reasons adduced for non-compliance were not adopted.  One can

 8     see here that in military terms the task has not been carried out

 9     properly, and the command is warning the unit about this.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Fauveau, "military brigade" in line 25 and line

11     3 should be "Milici Brigade."

12             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely.  Thank you, Your

13     Honour.  This is the Milici Brigade.  That's how it should be.

14             I would now like to show you Exhibit 5D1042.  Now, this is

15     another order from the Drina Corps dated 13th of December, 1994, which is

16     also about ambushes.  May we have page 2 of this order, please, both in

17     English and in B/C/S.

18        Q.   Can you please have a look at the very top of the page, item

19     number 3.  And according to this item 3, the organisation and the

20     execution of ambushes activity in the area of responsibility of the

21     Milici Brigade and of the Skelani Battalion between the Zepa and

22     Srebrenica enclaves is to be executed by the Drina Corps command.

23             Is this order related to the order we just saw?

24        A.   This order is connected with the previous two documents we have

25     looked at.  In the first order, the order was given that these two units,

Page 30139

 1     the Milici Brigade and the Skelani Battalion, should draw up a plan of

 2     ambush activities and submit it for approval.  One can see that this was

 3     done.

 4             From the second document, we can see that it was approved but not

 5     implemented, and this is the third level.  The corps command saw that

 6     those two units, in spite of the plan they had drawn up and in spite of

 7     the warning they had received, were not carrying it out, and now this is

 8     at the highest level.  They are organising the carrying out of ambush

 9     activities with their units.

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown

11     Exhibit 5D1043.  This is a document from the Main Staff dated 23rd of

12     December, 1994, which forwards the agreement on the cease-fire to the

13     subordinated units.  Could we please have page 2 of this document, the

14     last paragraph on page 2, please.

15        Q.   So here we have the cease-fire agreement which is mentioned, and

16     in the last part of this document you can see that the Main Staff is

17     asking its subordinated units and commands to immediately inform all of

18     the subordinated units to the command of the content of the agreement.

19             Is it usual in an army to send such agreement texts up to the

20     lowest levels of command, lowest levels of command?

21        A.   To understand this decision concerning this agreement, one must

22     understand two points:  First, this is the end of 1994 when the

23     international community is investing enormous efforts into brokering a

24     cease-fire, and the former American President Jimmy Carter was involved

25     in this personally.  Every successful command of units in any army rests

Page 30140

 1     primarily on providing good information.  Every member of the army must

 2     know what his command is aspiring to and what his state, his country, is

 3     aspiring to.

 4             This is a document showing how units are kept well-informed and

 5     how it is required if one is to command to provide good information to

 6     the units.  In this way, every member of the Army of the Republika Srpska

 7     would be familiar with the aims and scope of the agreement.

 8        Q.   I would now like to show you another agreement which dates from

 9     23rd of -- I mean, this one was from 23rd of December.  The one I want to

10     show now is dated 31st of December.  This is 5D1045.  The date of the

11     agreement is 31st of December.

12             This is the Drina Corps command which delivers the full text of

13     the agreement on the full cessation of hostilities, and this document of

14     the Drina Corps is dated 2nd of January, 1995.  Could you please first

15     look at page 2 of this text, item 4.

16             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to come back to

17     B/C/S in page 1.  In English, it will still be page 2.

18        Q.   Could you please read item number 2, which is at the very bottom

19     of the B/C/S text, and could you please do it out loud because I am not

20     sure that the translation in English is precise enough.

21        A.   "As regards the commitments of the VRS from the agreement, issue

22     necessary preparatory orders for the preparation of firing and combat

23     positions for weapons and for the accommodation of men and combat

24     hardware, as well as the preparation of observation posts, the

25     organisation of communications, et cetera."

Page 30141

 1        Q.   Does this order refer to the preparation of combat positions and

 2     firing positions or the preparation for setting up whatever is necessary

 3     for firing purposes?

 4        A.   It's very clear here.  It says that all these positions should be

 5     put in order so that people and equipment can be accommodated there, and

 6     to put in order observation post.  So this means that all this should be

 7     put in order.

 8        Q.   Can you please explain what this "put in order of the facilities

 9     of combat positions" actually means?

10        A.   Well, it's like when you are redecorating your apartment.  When a

11     unit is engaged in combat activities, they have major movements, changes

12     of combat positions.  Some combat positions are taken up very quickly.

13     In the course of combat, elements of the combat disposition can get mixed

14     up.  So now is the time to put in order the place where you are, and this

15     is what we describe as militarising the place.

16             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now have 5D1356.  This is a

17     document from the 8th OG Srebrenica from the Army of Bosnia and

18     Herzegovina which is sent to the Zepa Brigade on the 18th of February,

19     1995.

20        Q.   In what way is the first paragraph of this document part of the

21     agreement on cessation of hostilities that we just looked at?

22        A.   This is an example which is directly opposite to what we saw in

23     the previous document.  The command of the Drina Corps and the units of

24     the VRS issued orders to put in order firing positions, accommodation for

25     men and equipment, and to put in order all the elements that were

Page 30142

 1     missing.  Here, the units are being raised to the highest level of combat

 2     readiness.  This implies that at the simplest and quickest command, the

 3     unit can be ready to enter into combat.  So the unit must be ready to

 4     enter into combat at any moment.

 5             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

 6     document 5D1130, 3-0.  This is the report from the Main Staff which is

 7     sent to the president of the republic and to the corps on 25th of

 8     February, 1995.  And I would like to have page 3 on the screen, please,

 9     both in English and in B/C/S.

10        Q.   This document gives some information on the situation in the

11     Drina Corps.  Now, what I am interested in is to know on the basis of

12     which elements does a superior command - and in this case, the Main Staff

13     - which described in its reports the situation in the subordinated units?

14        A.   One can see that this document contains two points for every

15     unit.  First, A, enemy; and secondly, B or -- well, it's not quite

16     legible, the situation in the corps, the command and units.  So the

17     superior command is collecting information about the situation in the

18     enemy ranks and in the ranks of the unit.  It summarises these data and

19     forwards them to the Commander-in-Chief and all units at that level.  So

20     the Main Staff of Republika Srpska is drawing up this document based on

21     reports received from subordinate units.

22             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

23     Exhibit 5D1054, which is the report from the Drina Corps on that same

24     date, 27th of February, 1995.

25        Q.   This report from the staff, which we've just seen, does it

Page 30143

 1     reflect what is written in this report?

 2        A.   When we analyse this report of the corps command, we can state

 3     that it fully reflects this report.  This report is somewhat more

 4     detailed; whereas, the report of the corps command is somewhat more

 5     general, and that's the normal procedure.

 6        Q.   In this order -- in this report, sorry, of the Drina Corps, one

 7     may see that certain actions are mentioned which have been executed from

 8     the enclave of Srebrenica, and this is the 27th February, 1995, is the

 9     date of the report.

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1055.

11     That is an order from the Main Staff of -- dated 28th February, 1995.

12        Q.   Please have a look at this order and tell us whether it's

13     possible to establish a link between the report of the Drina Corps of the

14     27th of February and this order of the 28th February, 1995.

15        A.   This document is fully in compliance with the former reports and

16     with the situation in the field.

17        Q.   What is the nature of this order?  Is it an offensive order, an

18     order for an offensive?

19        A.   No.  We can see from this report, too, that the Army of Republika

20     Srpska was determined to comply with the cease-fire and that it ordered

21     all its units defensive activities.  However, in spite of all this, it is

22     closely monitoring the activities in the battle-field, but that is of

23     less importance.  What is important is that it is under attack from the

24     enclave, and in order to prevent those attacks it is now just raising the

25     level or the readiness of the units in order to be able to reply or to

Page 30144

 1     react to the attacks in order for the units to be ready to be engaged if

 2     necessary.

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1057.

 4     This is an order of the Drina Corps dated 1st March, 1995.

 5        Q.   This order follows an order of the Main Staff of the 28th

 6     February - you can see the reference which is made to it in this order -

 7     but I'd like to know if this order is essentially different from the

 8     order we saw yesterday and which was dated 1994 concerning the separation

 9     of the enclaves.

10        A.   This order is in keeping with everything that they have

11     undertaken so far; in other words, they -- it does not differ.  This is

12     an order where they are trying to resolve a problem that they have had

13     since 1993, the problem being the separation of these two enclaves.

14        Q.   We mentioned several times the Spreca operation, which was

15     planned on the basis of Directive number 7, and I would like you to look

16     at 5D980.  This document is linked to the Spreca operation.  5D980.

17             This document comes from the Drina Corps.  Its addressed -- sent

18     to the Main Staff, to the Chief of the Staff.  When a document is

19     addressed like that to the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff, who is the

20     person to whom this order is directed?  Who might be this person?

21        A.   There is no dilemma about that.  This was sent personally to

22     Major General Milenko Zivanovic [as interpreted]

23        Q.   This document starts by:

24             "General, sir ..."

25             I would ask you if you can repeat the name of the general to whom

Page 30145

 1     the document is sent because there is a mistake in the transcript, line

 2     22.

 3        A.   This order was sent personally to the Chief of Staff, General

 4     Milovanovic, Manojlo.

 5        Q.   This document starts by:

 6             "Sir, General ..."

 7             Do you have anything to say about the way the document begins?

 8     Does it mean anything specific?

 9        A.   This document that was sent to this person and which was among

10     others filed in the log-book where all other combat documents are filed,

11     we can see from this document -- or in this document some things that are

12     not quite common.  For instance, the commander of this unit speaks of the

13     successes of his unit.  And, in keeping with that, proposes that units

14     that are assigned to the same task and under the command of another

15     corps, that they should take advantage of the attack of our forces and

16     move along their axis.  It is also calling for logistical support.

17             Why is this document somewhat unusual?  Because it is known that

18     the command that is responsible for this operation, Spreca 95, is

19     precisely the command that this document deals with, which is the East

20     Bosnia Corps.

21             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D981.

22     It is also connected to the Spreca operation.  This document is dated 27

23     April 1995, and it's sent by Drina Corps to General Milovanovic.  Could

24     the witness be shown page 2 of the document.  In English, it's the third

25     paragraph.  In B/C/S, it's the first paragraph on that page.

Page 30146

 1        Q.   In this document, the Drina Corps requests from the Main Staff

 2     the designation of an officer who will be charge of coordination of the

 3     forces engaged.  If the staff after this request determines or designates

 4     an officer in charge of coordination, where should he be to be able to

 5     perform this coordination, this officer?

 6        A.   The first thing that we can conclude from this document is that

 7     the entire operation is under the firm command of the Chief of Staff.  We

 8     can also see that the command of the Drina Corps also communicates with

 9     the corps commander personally and asks for some changes in the

10     coordination.  And if this request of the Drina Corps was to be

11     satisfied, the officer who was appointed to coordinate the activities

12     would be at the IBK command post or at the forward command post; in other

13     words, at the command post of the corps which is in charge of the

14     operation.

15        Q.   Would an officer at Crna Rijeka at the main command post of the

16     Main Staff, could such an officer coordinate those activities?

17        A.   Not even in theory could such a person coordinate those

18     activities because in order to be able to coordinate such activities,

19     that person would need to be fully aware of all the details of the

20     activities, to be fully advised of the orders and corrections to the

21     orders of the commander of the operation, and to be fully aware of the

22     ongoing situation in the field.

23             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1059.

24     This is a document from the Drina Corps of the 20th March, 1995, sent to

25     the commander of the UNPROFOR in the enclave Srebrenica.

Page 30147

 1        Q.   You can see in this document that the Drina Corps has problems

 2     with the Muslim formations coming out of the enclave.  Could you explain

 3     the fact that the commander of the Drina Corps has decided to write or

 4     send a message to Srebrenica of the commander of UNPROFOR and didn't take

 5     any other action, more violent action?  How can you explain that?

 6        A.   Well, this is precisely an example of behaviour or conduct that

 7     was -- that was normal or common at the time of this agreement.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be asked to repeat his

 9     answer.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  General, the interpreters had problems following

11     you.  If you could repeat your answer, please, from the beginning.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Should I speak even more slowly?

13     All right.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  I don't think that was the problem.  You know, it's

15     something about interpretation.  It could be something different,

16     catching up.  You know, it could be speed, but I don't think it is speed.

17     So let's proceed.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I understood.

19             This document is a pattern of behaviour of the Army of Republika

20     Srpska which was in place after the cease-fire agreement was signed.

21     This pattern of conduct precisely regulates the manner and response in

22     each case where there is a cease-fire violation.  It is prohibited that

23     any violation of cease-fire should be responded to with any kind of

24     force.

25             In this particular instance, the commander of the Drina Corps in

Page 30148

 1     keeping with all the orders of the command of the Republika Srpska Army,

 2     in addition to registering this and taking action to oppose this attack

 3     and the cease-fire violation, he also warns the person who was supposed

 4     to monitor the cease-fire and also the Srebrenica enclave.

 5             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1349.

 6     This is a document from the commander of the DutchBat sent to the

 7     president -- sent to -- from Srebrenica on 3rd of April, 1995.

 8        Q.   This document mentions a fire which took place just on the border

 9     of the enclave.  Owing to the fact that the area had to be demilitarised,

10     does this letter of the DutchBat commander seem appropriate to you?

11        A.   This letter, in each of its segments, is inappropriate.  For one,

12     on April 3rd the commander of the DutchBat was very well aware that the

13     8th Combat Group was reconfigured as a division, and he knows the reasons

14     for that as well.  Second, the commander of the DutchBat knows that units

15     of the 28th Division would venture out of the enclave to take action.

16     And from this letter, it would appear that he's not concerned by this

17     fact that these units would leave the enclave and engage the -- in action

18     and kill people, but he's concerned if some rounds were fired within the

19     enclave.  Among others things, I would say that this is a formal way of

20     taking action, just a formality, a formal action, but not really

21     addressing the essence of the problem.

22             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1329.

23     This is an order from the president of the republic of the 29th of March,

24     1995, sent to the Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska and to

25     the Ministry of the Interior -- the Minister of the Interior.

Page 30149

 1        Q.   In this order, one can read that according to the information

 2     given by intelligence, 1.500 troops of the Srebrenica Brigade were to be

 3     transferred from Srebrenica to Kladanj.  If this information is accurate,

 4     what were the military reasons to justify this transfer?

 5        A.   It must be well known that at this point the 25th Division of the

 6     land forces, and previously the 8th operations group that was

 7     reconstructed as a division, took action, and this was a huge force that

 8     was not in use, which was a loss for the army of the -- of Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina.  It was clear -- and we saw that the spring offensive for

10     everyone was an occasion to take up as much territory as possible, and it

11     was clear that the BH Army would do anything it can to pull out this unit

12     from Srebrenica or to put this unit in action so that it could link up

13     with other units and create its own territory.

14             The information that was obtained after the restructuring was in

15     place and after increased activities of both these units, it was very

16     likely that they would try to pull out this unit, in this particular

17     case, one whole brigade.

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1064.

19     This is information gathered from intelligence of the Drina Corps on the

20     11th of April, 1995.  What I am interested in is the last paragraph in

21     English, page 1, and the one-but-last paragraph in B/C/S.

22        Q.   In this information, one can read in this paragraph:

23             "[In English] The prevailing mood among inhabitants of Srebrenica

24     is still that they will leave the enclave if a safe corridor is

25     established by the VRS."

Page 30150

 1             The prevailing mood among inhabitants.

 2             [Interpretation] This information, does it have a military

 3     importance?  Why is this information given in this report from the

 4     intelligence service?

 5        A.   When intelligence officers assess and analyse the enemy, the

 6     other side, in addition to assessing them they also have to assess all

 7     other circumstances that may have an effect on combat operations.  Here,

 8     we can see that there is a strong pressure and that the inhabitants of

 9     Srebrenica felt that they were used as -- as a human shield by their own

10     forces, and they wished to leave Srebrenica at any possible moment.

11             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to show you now

12     5D1262.  This is a document from the minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

13     Hasan Muratovic, and sent to the presidency -- the War Presidency of Zepa

14     on the 8th of May, 1995.  This document speaks about the evacuation in

15     the general interest.

16        Q.   Could you have a look at this document, and could you explain

17     what is meant by the "evacuation in General interest" in this context.

18     In particular, explain the title of this document.

19        A.   The subject, "Public Evacuation," that is what the subject is,

20     and the rest of the text really discusses evacuation.  Simply, we can see

21     that there are two contradictions here:  The population has a desire to

22     leave the area under any circumstances, whereas the state and the army

23     want to leave them there.  So any conclusions here -- drawing any

24     conclusions would be unnecessary.

25             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1364.

Page 30151

 1     This document comes from the 28th Division, and it's sent to the

 2     commander of the 2nd Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the

 3     19th of June, 1995.

 4        Q.   Could you have a look at the first part of this document, which

 5     speaks in particular of the problem of departures of members of the Army

 6     of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the civilians' departure from the enclaves.

 7             Could you tell us, what were the military reasons or the possible

 8     reasons for the authorities of Srebrenica to prevent members of the Army

 9     of Bosnia-Herzegovina to leave the enclave?

10        A.   Two problems are evident here:  The first is desertion; that is,

11     members of the army of Republic leaving, and the second problem is the

12     evacuation of civilians.  One can see here what we talked about from the

13     beginning.  They all want to leave the area in the direction of Tuzla,

14     Kladanj, and Serbia, so in all three directions.  Everywhere -- people

15     feel much safer anywhere else than they do in that area, and it's quite

16     clear to everyone that this is a consequence of the creation of a

17     so-called protected area which was in fact militarised.

18        Q.   What were the reasons for the authorities to prevent members of

19     the army to leave the enclave, which, anyway, had to be demilitarised?

20        A.   There are two levels of authority here.  The local authorities,

21     wherever they could, expressed the wish to leave the area because they --

22     they and the population felt insecure; and the state authorities, which

23     wanted both the army and the population to remain in Srebrenica because

24     they knew that in this way they were tying down a large military force.

25     On the other hand, all the members of the army who wanted to leave

Page 30152

 1     realised that they would become a legitimate target if they continued to

 2     behave as they were behaving, and so they realised that it was best for

 3     them to leave.  The population, they used as protection and as a source

 4     of logistical support, and the civilian authorities wanted to retain

 5     their territory in this way.

 6             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1065.

 7        Q.   This is another information coming from the intelligence of the

 8     Drina Corps on the 13th of April, 1995.  Please look at page 2, last

 9     paragraph of the document, which speaks about an offensive, a possible

10     offensive.

11             The connection which this paragraph speaks about, is it a

12     connection with forces coming from the direction of Kladanj, has to do

13     with the forces of Srebrenica?  Did they represent a real danger for the

14     Army of Republika Srpska?

15        A.   In this relatively small zone, the 28th Division being there was

16     a threat to the VRS and the Drina Corps.  A special threat was the fact

17     that it was expected that this unit would try to break through the

18     encirclement.  They were not in a position to engage in a frontal battle.

19     It was estimated that the greatest threat was at the point where the

20     other units of the BH Army were closest, and in this particular instance

21     this would be Kladanj.  This is a realistic assessment of a situation

22     which could arise for the 28th Division to break out of the encirclement,

23     and, on the other side, for the units of the BH Army to take action to

24     reduce the thickness of the separation.

25             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1067.

Page 30153

 1     This is a document from the Drina Corps of the 25th of April, 1995.

 2     Reading this first paragraph, we see that the Drina Corps has received

 3     from security services of the Ministry of the Interior some information

 4     according to which the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was preparing a

 5     general offensive on the positions of the Republika Srpska.

 6        Q.   What was -- what is the natural reaction of an army when it

 7     receives this sort of information?

 8        A.   When such information is received under normal conditions, any

 9     army would take offensive action to prevent the carrying out of this

10     offensive, which was expected from the beginning of the year and was

11     called the Spring Offensive.  Bearing in mind that the cease-fire was

12     still in force, the VRS and the Drina Corps did not take offensive action

13     to prevent this offensive in its beginning, in the initial grouping of

14     forces.  All they did was to strengthen the organising of continuous

15     reconnaissance, observation, and following of all activities in order to

16     prevent any surprise.

17             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 1237.

18     This is an order from the Drina Corps of the 18th of May, 1995,

19     concerning the sealing up of the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa --

20     sealing off.  What I am interested in in this order is the first part of

21     the order itself.

22        Q.   Essentially, is this order different from preceding orders which

23     had the same goal, which you have already seen?

24        A.   The introductory part of this order can also be based on the

25     order of 1993 or of 1994 because these are the same tasks of the Drina

Page 30154

 1     Corps stemming from its obligation, which it received in 1993.

 2             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1238.

 3     This is a document from the Drina Corps sent to the Main Staff on the

 4     20th of May, 1995.

 5        Q.   Have a look at the first paragraph.  According to this text, it

 6     seems that the commander of the Drina Corps has informed the Chief of

 7     Staff of the Main Staff about the combat plan and the fact that the

 8     organisation of this plan has already started as much as possible at a

 9     meeting which took place at the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska on the

10     20th of May, 1995.

11             The Chief of Staff -- the Chief of the Main Staff to whom this

12     document refers, could tell us who may be this person, this Chief of

13     Staff?  Who is it?

14        A.   It is evident in this document that this is the Chief of Staff

15     General Manojlo Milovanovic.

16        Q.   Since the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff was informed about the

17     plan for combats around Srebrenica and Zepa on the 20th of May, 1995, and

18     since he is even told about the beginning of implementation of this plan,

19     what may be concluded about the implication of General Milovanovic in May

20     1995 in the area of the Drina Corps?

21        A.   Based on all the available documents so far, and especially the

22     collection of documents presented today, it can be unambiguously

23     concluded that the situation in the area of responsibility of the Drina

24     Corps and the area of responsibility of the IBK was exceptionally

25     familiar to the Chief of Staff, General Manojlo Milovanovic, and not only

Page 30155

 1     was he very familiar with the situation, but he was personally in charge

 2     of a large number of operations in that area.

 3        Q.   Could you have a look at paragraph 1 of this document -- item 1.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In English, it's on page 2.  In

 5     this item 1, we see that the Drina Corps requests the resubordination of

 6     a unit of the 60th Protection Regiment -- 65th.

 7             And could the witness now be shown a document of the staff which

 8     follows this request, and this is 5D1214.  Essentially, this document

 9     speaks of a unit of the 65th Protection Regiment which was already

10     resubordinated to the Drina Corps.

11        Q.   Could you explain, what is "resubordination"?

12        A.   Resubordination is an activity where the commanding officer for a

13     certain period of time, for certain tasks gives a unit of his to another

14     commander to command.  The other commander during the time in which that

15     unit is resubordinated to him has the right to command the unit, but he

16     does not have the right to make any changes within the unit itself.

17     After the completion of the task, the unit returns to its original

18     commander and reports to him as to how it has carried out its task.

19        Q.   Just to be quite clear, who commands with the unit of the 65th

20     Regiment -- protection regiment when this unit is resubordinated to the

21     Drina Corps?  Who commands it?

22        A.   The commander of the Drina Corps was in command of this

23     resubordinated unit.

24        Q.   Could you have a look at the number of this order, 03/4-973.  Can

25     you tell us what this number actually means?

Page 30156

 1        A.   I did not look at the log-book of the Main Staff of the Army of

 2     Republika Srpska, but I conclude that this number refers to the staff

 3     because it's the one occurring most frequently.

 4        Q.   What does this number indicate?

 5        A.   This number indicates that this document was drawn up in the Main

 6     Staff of the VRS, that it was entered into the log-book under this

 7     number, that it was signed by the officer responsible, and that it

 8     fulfills all the conditions for being sent out.

 9        Q.   If one supposes that this number is given by the Administration

10     in Charge of Operational and Educational Matters, does the chief of the

11     Administration of Operational and Educational Matters, does he have to

12     necessarily see all the documents who bear such a number?

13        A.   No, it's not just -- not necessarily, but he needn't see them at

14     all because this is a document signed by his superior officer.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown document

16     5D1079.  This is a report, interim report, of the Drina Corps of the 27th

17     of May, 1995, informing - you can see in paragraph 1 that the -- that the

18     Drina Corps informs the Main Staff about the fact that five soldiers of

19     the Milici Brigade have been killed in an ambush.

20        Q.   What is the influence of such events on the making of decisions

21     by the command of a unit?

22        A.   It is evident from this report that this was an exceptional

23     incident in the unit.  It was a consequence of lack of discipline, and

24     the consequences were tragic.  Based on this report, one can see that the

25     steps taken by the superior command implied that something like this

Page 30157

 1     might happen; that is, in the unit there was a lot of irresponsibility in

 2     carrying out tasks.  So this tragedy was the lack of -- due to the lack

 3     of responsibility.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown

 5     5D1075.  This is a new order from the Drina Corps.  It concerns the

 6     communication between the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa.  It's dated 4

 7     June 1995, and as this is simply an order which is very brief.

 8        Q.   I have a simple question.  Does this order differ essentially of

 9     other orders we have already seen concerning communication between the

10     enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa?

11        A.   It doesn't differ at all.  This is one of the many different

12     activities to carry out a task received earlier, so this is just an

13     attempt to carry out that order.

14             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown order

15     5D1245.  This is also an order from the Drina Corps dated 19 June 1995.

16        Q.   Could you just have a look at the preamble of this order.

17     According to this order, what were the reasons for this order to be sent?

18     According to what you may read on this order, what are the reasons for

19     giving it?

20        A.   Practically, failure to carry out the order on separating the

21     enclaves, the constant problems that the units of the Drina Corps were

22     experiencing in that area, all this prompted another order to have this

23     regular task carried out.  So this is one of countless orders attempting

24     to have this task carried out.

25        Q.   One may see that this order also refers to a new situation on the

Page 30158

 1     front around Srebrenica and Zepa.

 2             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Please display 5D1092 for the

 3     witness.  This is an order from the Drina Corps on the 15th of June,

 4     1995.

 5        Q.   In paragraph 2 of this order, you may see that in the zone of

 6     responsibility of the Drina Corps, the enemy has executed combat

 7     operations according to Kladanj, Kalesija, Olovo, and between Srebrenica,

 8     Zepa, and around Gorazde.  This order you have just seen, does it have

 9     any connection with this document, the order you saw just before this

10     document, which was dated 19 June.

11        A.   I wish to mention a fact here, which is the following:  The

12     command of the Drina Corps had a very specific position.  It had an

13     outside and inside front line, so to speak; that is, its demarcation line

14     with the 2nd Corps, it held that front where there was contact.  And

15     then, on the other side, it held the borders of the enclaves where the

16     enemy was extremely active and never stopped activities.

17             The external line had its oscillations.  Sometimes there was more

18     activities, sometimes less.  It participated in both defensive and

19     offence actions by the command of the Drina Corps.  The internal borders

20     so to speak were constantly active.  There was never any decrease in

21     activity or, if there was, this was only so that the concentration of the

22     VRS soldiers would fall.  And here, we see that at this point there was

23     intensive activity at both the external and internal borders of the Drina

24     Corps.

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, we'll have a break now of 25 minutes.  How

Page 30159

 1     much more do you think you have?

 2             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I think I will go until the end of

 3     the day.  Perhaps I will finish a little before.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  [Interpretation] Thank you, Madam.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madam.

 8             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 9             I'd like to show the bottom of the page in B/C/S and page 2 in

10     English.  Page 2 in English, and in B/C/S, it's at the very bottom of

11     page 1.

12             You can see under item 1 in this order that this order was given

13     so that all subordinated units to the Drina Corps ensure full combat

14     readiness.

15        Q.   And before asking you the question, I'd like to show you Exhibit

16     5D1088, which is an interim report from the Drina Corps dated 14th of

17     July [as interpreted], 1995, so the eve of the order that we were looking

18     at.

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Just a small correction.  Line 18,

20     page 24, this is the 14th of June.

21        Q.   Could you please consider this interim report and tell us whether

22     there was a connection with the order of full readiness to combat and the

23     situation described in this report.

24        A.   The previous order on raising combat readiness to the maximum was

25     precisely the consequence of these activities that had been undertaken by

Page 30160

 1     the BH Army.

 2             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

 3     Exhibit 5D1249, which is an order from the Drina Corps from 27th of June,

 4     1995.  1249 is the number of the exhibit.

 5             Now, this is another order about the situation around the Zepa

 6     and Srebrenica enclaves.  Now, we looked at a number of reports dating

 7     from June 1995.

 8        Q.   Why was it necessary to issue this new order on the 27th of June,

 9     1995?

10        A.   At every point where there is a new situation or new combat

11     activity one cannot follow the orders that had been issued earlier, it is

12     necessary to issue new orders and correct the previous orders.  We could

13     say here that the entire collection of these orders by the Drina Corps,

14     on the basis of BH Army actions in the area of responsibility of the

15     Drina Corps and a newly developed situation, this is a natural live

16     organism of commanding.

17             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

18     Exhibit 5D1246.  This is an order from the Drina Corps dated 19th of

19     June, 1995.  Could we please have page 2 in English.  For B/C/S, it will

20     be page 1.

21        Q.   You can see in this order that the Main Staff ordered the Krajina

22     and Drina Corps to form a light infantry brigade, each of them, so as to

23     reinforce the Sarajevo Corps.  And this, indeed, is the order of the

24     Drina Corps to set up this brigade.

25             How do you explain that in a situation in which the Drina Corps

Page 30161

 1     possibly had problems in its own area, that they had to send a brigade to

 2     the Sarajevo Corps?

 3        A.   It was probably because the Main Staff of the Army of Republika

 4     Srpska assessed - and based on all the analysis so far I agree with their

 5     assessment - that the Drina command Corps could with their forces resolve

 6     all their problems, especially the problems surrounding the enclaves of

 7     Srebrenica and Zepa, and it assessed that at this point in time the

 8     Sarajevo Romanija Corps had bigger problems and, pursuant to that,

 9     decided to assign a unit for the implementation of the task that they had

10     to implement.

11             This was the method where from the complement of the existing

12     live units you would withdraw one unit and form it to assign it to a

13     particular task, and this is a well-known method of work.  The order is

14     in every way justified, and it has its purpose, and it would in no way

15     interfere with the structure of the Drina Corps.

16             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have Exhibit P107.  This

17     is the order from the Drina Corps about combat -- active combat

18     activities from the 2nd of July, 1995.

19        Q.   Can you please say what active combat activities are?  Can you

20     define them, please?

21        A.   I will try to be as precise and as clear as possible.  Active

22     combat activities are primarily offensive activities that are carried out

23     by the army, and among them we know counter-attack in --

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Would the witness please slowly repeat the

25     types of counter-attack and response in combat.

Page 30162

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  General, again, we have a few problems.  If you

 2     could kindly repeat the types of counter-attack and response in combat

 3     because the interpreters had some problems.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I will repeat it.

 5             Active combat activities are primarily offensive activities;

 6     mainly, they involve attacks.  Among them we know the following:

 7     counter-attack, insurgence, entrapment, diversion, demonstrative

 8     operations.  Based on the forces that conduct these attacks, they are

 9     carried out by tactical units.  The fact that they are carried out by

10     tactical units speak of their scope and the number of people that

11     participate in them.

12             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I just briefly show you now

13     Exhibit P114.  This is the order from the Drina Corps dated 13th of July,

14     1995.  This is the order for the attack to Zepa.

15        Q.   Why in this order it is -- the attack is mentioned, while the

16     other order mentioning the Srebrenica enclave, it mentioned combat

17     activities?

18        A.   This is precisely the substantial difference between these two

19     orders that have been issued.  The attack order, in such an order an

20     attack is a form of combat operations, and this is what would determine

21     the final goal and the forces that would take part in it with a clear --

22     clearly defined beginning and end of an operation.  Active combat

23     operations in their character are subordinated to the attack.

24        Q.   Could you please repeat the very last part of your answer about

25     the comparison between combat activities and the attack, please.

Page 30163

 1        A.   Perhaps I should interpret because I think that the term

 2     "suposirenja" [phoen] was not properly interpreted.  An active attack has

 3     its continuity, whereas the act of operations can fluctuate.  They are

 4     not in continuation.  They can be conducted, and then there can be a

 5     pause in their carrying out, and then they can be on again.

 6        Q.   Now, before talking in greater detail about activities taking

 7     place around Srebrenica in July 1995, I would like to show you Exhibit

 8     P2894, which is an order from the Drina Corps dated 2nd of June, 1995,

 9     and which is about Zeleni Jadar, the communication in Zeleni Jadar.

10             Could you please look at the first page of this order, and I

11     think that this should suffice for you to be able to express your

12     opinion.  And could you please say whether this order is connected to the

13     activities which then took place in July?  Can this action be considered

14     as the beginning of the action which was initiated in July?

15        A.   This action is one of a number of actions and problems that they

16     had in this area, and it is not a beginning of anything.  It is just in

17     continuation of the attempt to resolve a problem.

18        Q.   You can see here that this order is about the establishment of

19     physical control over the buildings and communications in Zeleni Jadar.

20     I would now like to show you Exhibit 5D1227, which is an order from the

21     Drina Corps from 18th of March, 1995.

22             Now, this is what I am interested in.  This is about property in

23     Zeleni Jadar.  The purpose of this order, is it connected to the order we

24     just saw, the order from 2nd of June, 1995?  Is there a connection

25     between the purposes or the goals of these two orders?

Page 30164

 1        A.   In both of these documents, the subject is Zeleni Jadar, and we

 2     can see that this is an area that is outside of the demilitarised zone,

 3     and we can see that the Army of Republika Srpska is seeking to establish

 4     control in keeping with all the authority in its power.

 5             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now come back to Exhibit

 6     P107, i.e., the order from the Drina Corps from 2nd of July, 1995.  Could

 7     we have page 3 in English and 2 in B/C/S, please, and I'd like to focus

 8     on item number 2.

 9        Q.   Looking at the content of the task indicated in item 2, does this

10     in essence defer to the tasks that were given to the Drina Corps

11     previously?  Does it differ?  Is it different from the tasks which were

12     previously entrusted to the Drina Corps?

13        A.   Since 1993, the Drina Corps' task was to ensure the security of

14     the enclaves, of the enclave borders, so that they may function in

15     agreement -- or according to the agreement that had been reached.  And

16     the minute that those borders became porous, especially between the

17     Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, their duty was to split them apart and

18     establish control in the area again.  So that was their task since 1993,

19     and there was really nothing new in this one.

20        Q.   From a military point of view, does point 2 in this order imply

21     that the civilian population be displaced?

22        A.   In no way can that be the conclusion, and it is even very

23     difficult to draw such a conclusion even if we were to speculate.

24        Q.   What about the task defined in this order?  Does it imply that

25     the enclaves be eliminated?

Page 30165

 1        A.   I would like to read it in its entirety, and then I would say

 2     that the last sentence is very precise:  Within the depth of the area, to

 3     split apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, and reduce them to their

 4     urban areas.

 5             So the term used here is "split apart," not "taking over."

 6        Q.   Now, what about the Administration in Charge of Operations and

 7     Training in the Main Staff?  Did it have a role in the planning of this

 8     it order?

 9        A.   The Administration For Operations and Training had no role or

10     authority or any part in the creation and issuance of this order nor any

11     orders that we spoke of today.

12             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

13     Exhibit P33, which is a document from the Main Staff dated 9th of July,

14     1995, which delivers to the Drina Corps the agreement -- agreement of the

15     president of the Republika Srpska for the forces of the Army of Republika

16     Srpska to enter Srebrenica and, also, the order of the president

17     concerning the procedure to be applied with the members of UNPROFOR and

18     the Muslim civilian population.

19        Q.   First of all, can you say how important this document is, from

20     9th of July, 1995, as part of the events which unfolded in July 1995 in

21     Srebrenica?

22        A.   Could we please scroll this down a bit?

23             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could you please scroll down the

24     document.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Looking at the

Page 30166

 1     substance of the document, first I would like to say that this does not

 2     come from the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army.  This was a

 3     document that was only filed there.  This is a decision by the supreme

 4     commander, which was forwarded to the subordinates by the assistant

 5     commander, and it was received and filed in the Main Staff.  So in its

 6     character and by its nature, this is not a decision from the Main Staff.

 7     It is a decision by the supreme commander.  And according to this

 8     document, this decision of the supreme commander refers to taking up --

 9     or taking over Srebrenica and demilitarising the Srebrenica enclave.

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Who or what organ in the Main Staff is normally in charge of

12     forwarding the orders to the subordinated authorities?

13        A.   At this point in time, it was irrelevant.  What was relevant was

14     that the authorised organ of the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army,

15     the assistant commander, was aware of the decision of the supreme

16     commander; and being briefed of it, he relayed it to all the other sides

17     or to all the other bodies, and where it was actually filed is not

18     relevant for this particular document.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

20             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, with respect to the answer that

21     the witness gave, it is non-responsive to the question, and I would ask

22     if he could actually answer the question.

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, that's correct.  Unless you wish to disagree,

24     but I think Mr. Vanderpuye is perfectly right in pointing that out.

25             The question, General, was as follows:

Page 30167

 1             "Who or what organ in the Main Staff, is under normal

 2     circumstances normally in charge of forwarding the orders to the

 3     subordinate authorities?"

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that I may complicate

 5     matters when I answer, but each organ within his sphere or his area of

 6     responsibility.

 7             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I shall make my question more

 8     precisely.

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  Go ahead.  Go ahead, but you still need to clarify

10     this because the question was either "who" as a person or, if there is an

11     organ that is charged with passing on instructions, which organ would

12     that be.  So if you could perhaps -- if you need to consult with your

13     client, by all means.

14             Okay, let's proceed then.  Thank you.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   I'd like you to tell me, what is the organ, theoretically, in the

17     Main Staff which conveys the orders about combat activities to the

18     subordinated units?

19        A.   As a matter of principle, combat documents, or the basic combat

20     documents, are issued from the staff or from the operations and training

21     organ from the operations centre.  But all the other documents would go

22     -- or be issued by their organs.  So this is what I can say to make it

23     more precise.

24        Q.   So why -- or do you know, what are the possible reasons why this

25     specific document did not or was -- did not arise or was not recorded or

Page 30168

 1     signed by an officer from the Administration for Operations and Training

 2     in the Main Staff?

 3        A.   It is evident from this document that the president of Republika

 4     Srpska had been informed of the results, that General Tolimir was there,

 5     that somebody conveyed to them the results, and at that point the supreme

 6     commander ordered the assistant commander to convey his standpoint.  The

 7     assistant commander at that point in time conveyed the standpoint from

 8     the most convenient place available to him.

 9             So this document need not have been logged with the operations

10     and training organ or the staff or anywhere else.  It was entered into

11     the log in the nearest place where the assistant commander could go to

12     have it forwarded.

13        Q.   Is there anything in this document which may indicate that the

14     Administration for Operations and Training has received this document,

15     that it has finally arrived there to the Administration for Operations

16     and Training?

17        A.   Judging by the content of the document and all the activities, it

18     was not sent there, and it was sent to Generals Gvero and Krstic at the

19     forward command post and the command of the Drina Corps and also for

20     information to the president of the republic.  So it's clear from this to

21     whom it was sent.

22        Q.   What was the role of the Administration for Operations and

23     Training in the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska and of General

24     Miletic who was heading it in the conduct of combat activities in

25     Srebrenica in July 1995?  I am asking you this question on the basis of

Page 30169

 1     the documents which you have been able to peruse and about the usual role

 2     of the administration of the staff under such circumstances.

 3        A.   Based on this entire collection of documents presented here, the

 4     role of the Administration for Operations and Training was merely on the

 5     basis of the combat reports coming from the Drina Corps to -- to take

 6     note of these reports, incorporate them into the reports to the Main

 7     Staff, and forward them.  When some reports arrive which are of a special

 8     nature, something that is unusual, then the Administration for Operations

 9     and Training or another administration which is competent for this aspect

10     has to warn the commander of this.  This does not refer to units where

11     the commander is already there because then the administration would know

12     that the commander was already familiar with the situation in the unit.

13        Q.   And just to clarify, in the situation we are interested in, we

14     know that General Mladic is in the area of Srebrenica at least on the

15     11th and the 12th of July.

16             Now, in this period of time did General Miletic, who is in Crna

17     Rijeka if he was there - let's assume that he's there - was he to make

18     some proposals, warnings, or issue warnings about Srebrenica to General

19     Mladic?

20        A.   Assuming that he was there and the person who was deputising for

21     him was not there, if he learned of this report he would have no

22     competence to deal with it because he would see that this was something

23     not falling within the plans in the Main Staff of Republika Srpska and

24     that it represents activities in the Drina Corps and that the commander

25     is in the area and is aware of all this.  And even if the commander was

Page 30170

 1     anywhere else, one of his assistants, the one who drew up this report,

 2     would be aware of the situation.

 3        Q.   In the normal course of circumstances in the Army of Republika

 4     Srpska, did the Administration in Charge of Operations and Training, was

 5     it in charge of supervising the moving or the evacuation of the

 6     population?

 7        A.   As I said yesterday - and I'll be more precise now - the VRS did

 8     not have organs working directly or indirectly with the population.  It

 9     had no -- or, rather, the operations and training administration had no

10     competency whatsoever to deal with the population, and this is the case

11     in all armies.

12        Q.   Is it possible to monitor -- generally speaking, is it possible

13     to monitor or supervise the evacuation taking place in Srebrenica,

14     Potocari, if you're in Crna Rijeka, which is several tens of kilometres

15     away?

16        A.   Such activities which involve a large number of participants and

17     a great frequency of occurrence can only be monitored or controlled on

18     the spot, not at a distance.

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

20     Document P113, which is a report about the evacuation which took place in

21     Srebrenica, dated 13th of July, 1995, and which Colonel Radoslav Jankovic

22     sent to the administration of intelligence of the Main Staff.

23        Q.   Now, we can see on this document that it was sent to the

24     administration of intelligence, intelligence department.  What about the

25     officers who worked in operations and evacuations affairs?  Should these

Page 30171

 1     officers have known about a document which was in fact sent to another

 2     department?

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

 4             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I think it would be useful if my colleague could

 5     repeat the question.  It's not translated correctly in the record.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Ms. Fauveau.

 7             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   This document comes from the sector in charge of security and

 9     intelligence and was sent to the intelligence department in the Drina

10     Corps.  Should the officers in charge of the Administration of

11     Operational Affairs and Training in the Main Staff have been made aware

12     of this document?

13        A.   In every army, it is the practice - and it was the same in the

14     Main Staff of the VRS - that whenever one organisational unit receives a

15     report or an order, as soon as it looks at it, it should see whether

16     there are any elements contained within it of which another

17     organisational unit should know.  If there are such elements present,

18     then it must inform the other organisational unit.  This document was

19     sent to the sector for intelligence and security.  It contains about five

20     paragraphs.  The first three in the nature of things refer mostly to the

21     logistics sector or the sector for the rear, and that sector was then

22     supposed to be informed of this.  The fourth one concerning theft refers

23     to the Administration for Security; it's within their competence.  And

24     the fifth one would be for the information organs or state organs for

25     information.

Page 30172

 1             In other words, there is not a single element of this document

 2     referring to the Operations and Training Administration.  It doesn't fall

 3     within their purview.

 4        Q.   And one last question about Srebrenica.  I'd like to show you

 5     Exhibit 5D1365.  This is a document from the presidency of Srebrenica,

 6     from the president, which was sent to the president of the republic on

 7     the 9th of July, 1995, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Now, what

 8     can you say about the position of the local authorities, the local

 9     Srebrenica authorities, about the evacuation?

10        A.   Looking at this document, we can see two things:  That the

11     civilian authorities do not know what the 28th Division is planning and

12     doing; and secondly, they insisted from day one that a method should be

13     found to evacuate the population from Srebrenica.  Their desire to have

14     this done is constant.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to come back to

16     Exhibit P114.  This is the order about the attack on the Zepa enclave

17     from 13th of July, 1995.

18        Q.   First of all, could you tell us, what was the role of the

19     Administration for Operations and Training in the Main Staff?  What was

20     supposed to be its role in the issuance of such an order?

21        A.   With respect to the order of the command of the Drina Corps to

22     some of its units and for the carrying out of regular tasks, the

23     Administration for Operations and Training had no role at all in the

24     issuance of this order.

25        Q.   Should this order have been sent to the Administration of

Page 30173

 1     Operations and Training of the Main Staff?

 2        A.   No, by no means.  Orders sent to the Main Staff for its approval

 3     are clearly defined what orders they are.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness be shown page 2 of

 5     this order, which is also page 2 in English.  Sorry, in B/C/S this is

 6     still page 1, and actually, also page 1 in English.

 7        Q.   Could you please look at items 2, 3, and 4.  Is there anything,

 8     which -- of course, from a military standpoint, is there anything in

 9     these items which imply activities of displacement of the civilian

10     population or any activities against the civilian population?

11        A.   There is no element leading to such a conclusion.  The command of

12     the Drina Corps based on the decision of the Commander-in-Chief with

13     respect to Srebrenica and based on the results achieved in eliminating

14     the Srebrenica enclaves extended activities in the direction of Zepa, and

15     they knew that they were holding stable the line facing the 2nd Corps.

16     So this is exclusively the planning of military action in relation to the

17     BH Army.

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness be shown 5D1366.

19     This is a document from the presidency -- the War Presidency of the Zepa

20     municipality, which was sent to the president of the Republic of Bosnia

21     and Herzegovina on 19th of July, 1995.

22        Q.   Could you please look at this document, particularly with a focus

23     on items 1 and 2 and the end of this page, which actually is the

24     following page in English, and tell us what conclusion you can draw as to

25     the position of the Zepa authorities about the evacuation.

Page 30174

 1        A.   This document indicates very clearly that there was antagonism

 2     between the local authorities and the authorities of the Republic of

 3     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  There is a sentence here which is quite clear:

 4     I don't know what to say about your plan.  This is the plan that they

 5     should remain in Zepa.  They are insisting on leaving Zepa.  In any case,

 6     it's better for someone to be saved than for someone to stay.

 7             So the local authorities want the people to leave Zepa whereas

 8     the state authorities want them to stay, and we can see that this issue

 9     has already been discussed, and they expect that it has also been

10     discussed at the Security Council of the UN.

11        Q.   What we have in the transcript is not very clear.  Who insists

12     that the population should stay in Zepa, and who insists on the fact that

13     the population should leave Zepa?

14        A.   The state authorities always insisted that the local population

15     should remain in Zepa, and in this way they could achieve their goals,

16     whereas the local authorities always insisted that they leave Zepa.

17        Q.   Now, I'd like to show you Exhibit 5D1350.  This Exhibit is in

18     English, but I'm going to read the relevant part to you.  This is a

19     statement from the president of the Security Council dated 20th of July,

20     1995, about the situation in Zepa, and the paragraph that I am interested

21     in is the one-before-last of this statement, which reads that the

22     Security Council president said the following:

23             [In English] "The Security Council underlines the importance it

24     attaches to the fullest cooperation with UNHCR and other international

25     humanitarian organisations and demands that they be given unhindered

Page 30175

 1     freedom of movement and access to the area.  It further demands that the

 2     Bosnian Serb authorities cooperate with all efforts, including those of

 3     UNPROFOR, to ensure the safety of the civilian population, and in

 4     particular its most vulnerable members, including evacuation as requested

 5     by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in his

 6     letter of 17 July 1995."

 7             [Interpretation] Now, once you've seen this document, could you

 8     say what seems to be the position about all the authorities of Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina about Zepa?

10        A.   This document provides the reply to the previous document.  We

11     can see that whoever submitted the previous document was aware of the

12     fact that the issue had been raised before the Security Council on the

13     17th of July.  He called up on the 19th to see what had been done, that

14     the issue of evacuation would be raised, which was what they wished, and

15     he asked to see what the Security Council would do.

16        Q.   Now, if the authorities of Republika Srpska were aware about this

17     content of the declaration of the president of the Security Council, what

18     could be their conclusions about the willingness of the Muslim people in

19     Zepa about evacuation?

20        A.   The authorities of Republika Srpska were certainly aware of this

21     document, and it was clear to them that it was the will of the population

22     to be evacuated from the enclave, and it's also clear what obligations

23     were imposed upon them by the Security Council in relation to the

24     population and the wounded for their safety.

25        Q.   You can see that in this document the Security Council calls for

Page 30176

 1     a cooperation with the international organisations.

 2             I would like now to show you document 5D1114.  This is a document

 3     from the Drina Corps from 20th of July, 1995, giving the information

 4     about the authorisation granted by the Main Staff of the Army of

 5     Republika Srpska to the Red Cross for the purposes of medical evacuation

 6     of the sick and wounded persons in Zepa.

 7             As we look this document, can you see something which is an

 8     irregularity or a disagreement, something which disagrees with the call

 9     made in the statement of the Security Council -- by the Security Council

10     president?

11        A.   It is evident from this document that the Main Staff of the VRS

12     reacted as required by the document of the Security Council, the portion

13     we've read out, and we can see that they carried out their obligations

14     in-depth very fast from the Main Staff toward the corps, and the corps

15     urgently complied with their obligations in relation to the subordinate

16     units.  So we can see that this document is in line with the previous

17     one.

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown

19     Exhibit 5D1115.  This is a similar document from the Drina Corps dated

20     20th of July, 1995, which is about the authorisation for the members of

21     UNPROFOR -- for a team of UNPROFOR to go to Zepa on 20th of July, 1995.

22        Q.   Does this document conform with what has been asked by the

23     Security Council?

24        A.   This document is a clear example that they were in compliance

25     with the Security Council document and that they promptly moved to

Page 30177

 1     regulate this issue from the Main Staff all the way down to the actual

 2     people who were to implement it.

 3        Q.   We know that the evacuation was not done on the 20th of July,

 4     1995, and I would like to show you two documents of the 25th of July,

 5     1995.  The first one is 5D1117.  This is a document from the Drina Corps

 6     giving -- getting authorisation of the main staff to UNPROFOR to command

 7     the -- before I ask the question, I would like to show you another

 8     document.  First, please have a look at this one.

 9             I would like you to have a look now to 5D1118.  The document is

10     quite similar, on the 25th of July, 1995, giving authorisation for a

11     convoy, a Russian and French convoy, including for the medical transport

12     to go into Zepa on the 25th of July, 1995.

13             What can you tell us about this last document in comparison with

14     the appeal of the president of the Security Council?

15        A.   In view of the fact that this document was produced on the 25th,

16     we can see that there is a continuity in the implementation of the

17     Security Council decisions relating to UNPROFOR, the UNHCR, et cetera,

18     the Red Cross, et cetera.

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] One last document on this matter,

20     5D1120, of the 27th of July, 1995, giving authorisation for the movement

21     of a convoy of UNPROFOR transporting food and water to Zepa.

22        Q.   What is your comment about this document?

23        A.   This document, like all the previous ones, are just a

24     continuation of the approval provided by the Main Staff of the corps

25     command to the -- to those individuals who were to implement them to

Page 30178

 1     follow and imply with all the orders issued by the Security Council

 2     document.

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown

 4     document 5D1381.  This is a document on the police station of Rogatica,

 5     27 July 1995.

 6        Q.   I just have a question concerning the reasons why the police

 7     station of Rogatica informs the Ministry of the Interior on how the

 8     evacuation is taking place.

 9        A.   The normal job of public security was to monitor the situation in

10     the territory, and this is part of their responsibility, to inform the

11     organs on what the situation in the territory is.  And in this particular

12     case, we see that they are dealing with an extraordinary event,

13     evacuation, and their reporting was a natural and normal procedure.

14        Q.   The fact that this -- the fact that Mr. Markovic informs his

15     superiors of the evacuation, which is ongoing and -- an ongoing

16     operation, mean that in any way that he is himself taking part in this

17     evacuation?

18        A.   From this document, I could judge that he knew of the evacuation.

19     Now, who was responsible for implementing or commanding or -- in this

20     operation, it is hard to say, but this gentleman was aware of the

21     operation, he been informed of it, and he was informing that he would

22     follow-up with any changes in the situation in his reports.

23             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown document

24     5D1113.  This is a document from the deputy commander for logistics of

25     the Main Staff dated 19 July 1995.

Page 30179

 1        Q.   Could you have a look at items 1 and 2 of this order in which

 2     transport means and medical team are mentioned as well as medical

 3     equipment and the assistant for logistics gives an order for these

 4     transport means and medical means may be allowed.

 5             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In English, it is item 2.

 6        Q.   So these tasks which are described here in items 1 and 2, are

 7     they within the purview of the logistics sector?

 8        A.   If we analyse these two points in detail, points 1 and 2, we can

 9     see that point 1 deals practically with the traffic service, that part of

10     it relates to the technical service, and in one part of it we are dealing

11     with supplies, in this case, of fuel, which is the natural purview of the

12     rear sector.  The only problem here is the problem of buses because the

13     Republika Srpska Army did not own or have any buses in their hardware, so

14     they must have procured them from somewhere else.

15             As for item 2, it is exclusively in the logistics sector, within

16     the purview of the logistics sector and its chief.

17        Q.   [Previous translation continues]...  look at item 4.  In this

18     item, one had to assure that a unit of the police, through the chief of

19     Administration in Charge of Operational and Training, this police unit

20     was necessary about looking after the war booty.  Which were the

21     competencies of the chief of the administration in charge of operations

22     and training when he received this document?  What was he able to do?

23        A.   Could we please scroll down this document a bit.  Thank you.  The

24     Administration for Operations and Training does not have any competence

25     over military police units.  We can see that this document this officer

Page 30180

 1     sent to the command post, to the basic command post, the competence of

 2     this administration or the basic command post was to advise of the

 3     contents of this information, the sector of intelligence, which had the

 4     military police within its competence.

 5             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D3015.

 6     D3015.  P3015.  3015.  [In English] No, 3015, sorry.  It's my fault.

 7     [Interpretation] Excuse me.  3015.  No, in English it was my fault.

 8        Q.   In this, you can see that General Krstic who at the time was the

 9     commander of the Drina Corps requests engagement of a military police

10     unit in the enclave of Zepa in order to -- which was necessary for

11     organising and collecting the war booty and prevent any looting.  This

12     document is dated 20 July 1995, and the document we just saw before that

13     was the 19th July, 1995.

14             Do you see any connection between the two documents?

15        A.   I can see some similarities and some differences.  The

16     similarities are in the following:  The first document was sent to the

17     forward command post, and this document here was sent to the -- to

18     General Miletic personally and with a request for a military police

19     battalion.  But they both deal with one and the same matter.

20             The military police had never been nor could it be within the

21     competence of the Administration for Operations and Training.  During

22     combat operations and in many situations, a large number of officers,

23     when they need to resolve an issue, then they try to send something to a

24     person.  So if you are to send something to a command post and wish that

25     to be forwarded to another command post, then you would send it

Page 30181

 1     personally to the commander, for instance, Commander Miletic [as

 2     interpreted], and then he would personally send it or forward it to the

 3     Administration of Operations and Training for implementation.  But there

 4     is mention here of a request for a military police unit, but this

 5     document will probably in the end reach the right address where it was

 6     meant for.

 7        Q.   Just a correction concerning the transcript, page 45, line 21.

 8     What did you say for the first document?  Was it sent to the command

 9     post, the main command post or the forward command post?

10        A.   The first document says "command post," "KM."  Then -- when it

11     says "KM," then mainly what they mean is the main command post.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Basic.  Interpreter's correction:  the basic

13     command post.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Madam Fauveau.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] The document is --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Did the witness say Commander Miletic in line 5 of

17     page 46?

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, I don't think so, Judge.

19        Q.   Have you at any time spoken about Commander Miletic?

20        A.   No.  I said KM command post, and at one point I noticed in the

21     transcript that for "KM" there was "Kosovo and Metohija," and then it was

22     deleted.

23        Q.   There is another mistake in the transcript.  Did you say that

24     this document --

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  It still doesn't explain who else he mentioned

Page 30182

 1     instead of Commander Miletic, because from the transcript itself, to me

 2     its obvious that he did mention a name, even though it wasn't Commander

 3     Miletic.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps I can repeat what I've said

 5     from the start:  The only thing that is certain that I never mentioned

 6     Commander Miletic because I never saw or mentioned his name in this

 7     expert report.  The first document that was sent was sent to the KM.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment.  I don't think we need to repeat

 9     everything.  I will just read out to you the relevant part, and then you

10     tell us who did you mention:

11             You said:

12             "So if you are to send something to a command post and wish that

13     it be" -- "wish it to be forwarded to another command post, then you

14     would send it personally to the commander, for instance ..." And then we

15     have "Commander Miletic."

16             Who did you mention:  Commander whoever, "... and then he would

17     personally send it or forward it to the Administration for Operations and

18     Training for implementation."

19             In the example that you gave, who did you mention as being the

20     person forwarding the information?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Miletic [as interpreted].

22     I never said "Commander Miletic."

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Thank you.  So let's proceed.

24             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] There still is a mistake.

25        Q.   To whom did General Miletic transmit this information, in

Page 30183

 1     particular, the information contained in this document?

 2        A.   This document would have to be forwarded to the sector for

 3     security and intelligence.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now see document P186.

 5     This is a document from the Main Staff security and intelligence

 6     department dated 29 July, 1995.

 7        Q.   Please look at paragraph 3 of the document and tell us whether

 8     this paragraph corresponds to the competencies of the organ in charge of

 9     intelligence and security.

10        A.   First of all, I would like to intervene with a small correction.

11     The way it was translated was that this was from the intelligence and

12     security department, but in fact it is from the intelligence and security

13     sector.  Secondly, the third paragraph, when we look at the way it has

14     been written but also based on its substance, we can see that it is not

15     something that is within the purview of the intelligence and security

16     sector.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Organ, interpreter's correction.

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Could you give an explanation, why did General Tolimir have this

20     document done for something which is outside of his own competence?

21        A.   We can see that he forwarded this document to General Krstic

22     personally.  Probably, and this is just my assessment, in order to be

23     more emphatic, he appeared to issue an order in this sentence.  However,

24     from all the other documents that we've seen so far, I don't think that

25     there were any breaches of the chain of command and subordination.

Page 30184

 1        Q.   You can see in this paragraph that indeed the Drina Corps was

 2     supposed to take all possible measures to prevent the Zepa Brigade to

 3     come out of its encircled position.  Did it have -- in military

 4     terminology, is breaking the encircling have any specific meaning?

 5        A.   The term "break through from the encirclement" is not a military

 6     term.  The word -- the military term is "break out on encirclement," so

 7     this is rather unusual the way it's been used here.

 8        Q.   Could you conclude from this document what General Tolimir was

 9     thinking about when he speaks about breaking through the circle?

10        A.   In my military assessment, this is an instruction, a request,

11     sent to the commander to try and do -- and use everything in his power to

12     prevent the break through from the encirclement but, rather, to try and

13     resolve the problem within the encirclement with his own unit.

14             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown

15     document --

16        Q.   Just before this, from a military point of view this paragraph,

17     this precise paragraph, does it concern the civilian population?

18        A.   The entire paragraph refers exclusively to military personnel.

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown

20     P3036.  This is a document from the Podrinje Brigade dated 1st August,

21     1995.

22        Q.   Could you have a look at this text in total?

23             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we go back at the very

24     beginning of the document.

25        Q.   At the beginning of the document, we may see that it's about the

Page 30185

 1     movement of enemy groups from the Zepa enclave, the group of enemies

 2     breaking through the enclave of Zepa.  After that, in the first paragraph

 3     it speaks of Muslim forces, and after that, in the third paragraph the

 4     enemy groups are mentioned.  There are directions indicated which these

 5     groups are following.  And finally, at the end --

 6             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could you show the bottom of the

 7     document in B/C/S, and in English it would be page 3.

 8        Q.   Here, at the end we can see the term "sweeping" [as interpreted]

 9     and "balai" and essentially Muslims.  From a military point of view, does

10     this paragraph have to do anything with the civilian population?

11        A.   Judging by this entire document that was produced by this chief

12     of the intelligence organ of this brigade, there is always mention of BH

13     Army members, but they keep using different terms.  So sometimes it is

14     difficult to put all this in context.  The terms in use are not typically

15     military terms or they are used in error, and it is not clear to me at

16     all why he would send a document like this to anyone other than his

17     immediate superior.

18             So if we were to analyse this document we could conclude that he

19     means members of BH Army throughout the document.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Before we have the break, I noticed that in

21     your question, Ms. Fauveau, you started by saying:

22             "Here, at the end we can see the term 'sweeping' and then

23     'balija.'"

24             I am trying to find the words "sweeping."  It think it's a

25     mistake.

Page 30186

 1             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, no.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  So if you could kindly say which word you had

 3     mentioned apart from balija, which word you had referred to.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I think I didn't say about

 5     sweeping.  Perhaps I used a derogatory term.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  "balai" and not

 7     "balija."

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  That makes it more confusing to me.  I

 9     think I need 25 minutes.

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, I don't think I said anything

11     about sweeping, but maybe I used a derogatory term.  I'm not sure.

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Let's have -- yes, but I don't see

13     another derogatory term in the -- in the document.  Let's have a

14     25-minute break now.  Thank you.

15                           --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madam Fauveau, please.

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In order to clarify things, when I

19     use the word "balije," I used this word which is used in the document

20     which I quoted from the document in the paragraph-before-last.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, yes.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Note from the interpreter:  The term was

23     confused with "balayer," which means "to sweep" in French.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  I understand that.  In fact, I thought about that,

25     and I made two and two together.  You should speak your French a little

Page 30187

 1     bit more slowly, it means.

 2             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we show the top part of this

 3     document to the witness, please.

 4        Q.   Amongst others, this document is addressed to General Miletic.

 5     What were the competencies of the head of Administration for Operations

 6     and Training and of the administration in the tracking of enemy groups

 7     throughout the territory of Republika Srpska?

 8        A.   The Administration for Operations and Training has nothing to do

 9     with intelligence activities.  This was sent by the intelligence organs

10     to his services, and by some sort of inertia, it was also sent to the

11     basic command post.  Surveillance of enemy forces and the conditions in

12     which they are operating is precisely defined as falling within the

13     competence of the intelligence organs headed by the intelligence

14     administration in the sector for intelligence and security.

15        Q.   What is the role for the Administration for Operations and

16     Training during the surrender of soldiers from the enemy forces?

17        A.   It has nothing to do with prisoners either, no competencies and

18     no obligations.  It doesn't fall within its purview.

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

20     Exhibit 5D1373.  This is a document from the security services, from the

21     state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the Gorazde sector.

22        Q.   And I would like you to look at paragraph -- at the last

23     paragraph, which talks about groups of combatants who crossed the border

24     and who entered Yugoslavia.

25             According to this document, which stems from the Muslim

Page 30188

 1     authorities, were civilians involved in the crossing of the border, and

 2     are they concerned here by this last paragraph?

 3        A.   This last paragraph is very precise because it says "some of our

 4     groups of fighters," which implies that this refers exclusively to

 5     soldiers of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, certain groups of our

 6     fighters.  Whether there is any possibilities of finding others in those

 7     groups I don't know, but the telegram is precise.  We registered that

 8     certain of our fighters from Zepa.

 9        Q.   Now, the group of combatants, from a military point of view

10     groups of combatants traveling from Zepa, were they a danger for the Army

11     of Republika Srpska and for the civilian population on the territory of

12     Republika Srpska?

13        A.   Every group of fighters, and this refers primarily to broken-up

14     groups of fighters, are a threat to every army and the entire population

15     because their behaviour, as a rule, is uncontrolled, undirected, and they

16     are armed and have military equipment.

17        Q.   What are the usual actions which an army undertakes when groups

18     of fighters move on the territory over which it has control, a group of

19     enemy fighters, that is?

20        A.   In all such situations, first all the organs on the ground are

21     warned, all the commands of the army units.  Then the MUP and all the MUP

22     units are warned, and the local authorities are warned who can take

23     action, such as, for example, disseminating information.  All the forces

24     on the ground attempt to register such groups and to capture them and

25     disarm them and then hand them over to the competent authorities.  Such

Page 30189

 1     groups are treated with great caution because one never knows what they

 2     will do.

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now move to a different

 4     subject matter.  I would like to show the witness Exhibit 5D903.  The

 5     document in question is an explanation about the authorisation for the

 6     passage of convoys and the carrying out of the weekly plan for

 7     humanitarian aid.

 8        Q.   Now, first of all, could you tell us, what is a notification in

 9     the military terminology?  And just for the transcript, in your report

10     this is 5D759 on page 35 in the B/C/S version, page 42 in the English

11     version in which you have given us a classification for military

12     documents.

13             Could you please, therefore, explain what is the meaning of the

14     word "notification"?

15        A.   I would like to repeat the classification made here as regards

16     combat documents.  For the most part, they are similar in all armed

17     forces all over the world, and these were valid in the VRS.  All combat

18     documents are divided into three groups:  first, command; second,

19     information; and the third are auxiliary documents.  And from this

20     classification, one can see that information has, for its purpose,

21     obtaining all the elements needed to command, whether something has been

22     done, how it has been done, and whether the command needs to take any

23     corrective action.  So this forms into the reporting and information

24     group of documents, the second group.

25        Q.   We know that General Miletic, that some of these notifications

Page 30190

 1     entail the name "General Miletic."  In paragraph 190 - and this is on

 2     page 85 in the English text, page 66 in B/C/S in your report - you stated

 3     that General Miletic was involved in the procedure, the decision-making

 4     procedure about humanitarian aid and the passage of convoys.  Can you

 5     tell us what his participation consist in?

 6        A.   The reply to your question is in paragraph 191 where I stated

 7     that the documents signed by General Miletic are informative documents

 8     not having the character of orders.  When information had to be sent,

 9     when there was no opportunity, as would have been the case in normal

10     conditions, for the Chief of Staff to sign notification documents, then

11     General Miletic signed them and sent them to the unit.

12        Q.   So before our eyes what we have is the approval for a weekly plan

13     for humanitarian aid, and this is the approval concerning authorities of

14     Republika Srpska.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

16     document 1361, which is a document from the Army of Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina from 3rd of April, 1995.  Sorry, it's 5D1361.

18        Q.   So as you can see, this is a similar document which also mentions

19     the approval of a weekly plan conducted by UNPROFOR, UNPROFOR movements,

20     except that in this case we are talking about movements within the area

21     of the 2nd Corps and within the boundaries of that area.

22             As a rule, why do armies deliver special authorisations about the

23     convoys of humanitarian organisations and UNPROFOR?

24        A.   Every army in Bosnia-Herzegovina was responsible for the

25     situation on its own territory, inter alia security for UNPROFOR units

Page 30191

 1     passing through.  To ensure security, they delivered these plans for

 2     their movements thus pre-empting any surprises.

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

 4     Exhibit 5D783.  This is a document from the Drina Corps dated 2nd August,

 5     1993, which conveys to the subordinated units an order from the Main

 6     Staff about the passage of UNPROFOR's convoys.  The only point I am

 7     interested in in this document is on page 2 of the B/C/S version and page

 8     3 in English, and I'm referring to item 13 at the very end.  So in B/C/S

 9     it's the mention that's at the very bottom of the page.

10        Q.   According to the order, all misunderstandings with UNPROFOR had

11     to be solved with UNPROFOR including at the meetings which took place

12     with UNPROFOR.

13             Now, in an army when some officers are in charge and attend some

14     meetings, are these officers in charge of a specific area for the agenda

15     of the meeting?

16        A.   One can see here that the original document on cooperation with

17     UNPROFOR was forwarded to the units.  One can see that all details had

18     been defined with UNPROFOR, and one can see that the people in the joint

19     commissions were authorised to solve all the problems that had arisen,

20     and if they were not able to do so they would send them up to a higher

21     level where they would be dealt with.

22        Q.   In the Main Staff, would that person be in charge -- would an

23     officer be in charge of UNPROFOR, but an officer who would not attend the

24     meetings with UNPROFOR?

25        A.   Well, then there would be no point.  Those working in the

Page 30192

 1     commissions, their main task was to attend meetings, to participate in

 2     reaching decisions, analyse problems, discuss them with their own

 3     command, and then delegate these problems to the meetings that were held.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown

 5     5D1348, please.  This is about a meeting with the command of the various

 6     armies involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a meeting with,

 7     also, UNPROFOR.  You can see on page 3 in English and in the signed

 8     versions that this document was signed by Ratko Mladic for the Republika

 9     Srpska representative.

10             Could I now have page 2 in B/C/S, which is also page 2 in the

11     English version.  You can see that questions pertaining to the freedom of

12     movement and humanitarian questions were discussed in the course of the

13     meeting.  That can be seen under item 1.

14        Q.   Do these questions -- are these questions part of the

15     competencies of the Administration for Operations and Training?

16        A.   Not a single element of this meeting fell within the purview of

17     the Administration for Operations and Training or, in other words, the

18     competencies of the Administration for Operations and Training cannot be

19     included in any agreement of this type because they're exclusively

20     military competencies.

21        Q.   If for one reason or another General Miletic was given

22     competencies about UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations, would he have

23     had to accompany General Mladic to that meeting, to attend that meeting?

24        A.   Had he been given the authority, then that authority would have

25     been clearly defined, and he would have been duty-bound to attend the

Page 30193

 1     meetings.

 2             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May I now show you Exhibit 5D1174.

 3     This is an order from the president of the republic dated 16th of

 4     January, 1994.  In item 3 of this order, you can see that all contentious

 5     issues or controversial issues in relation with representatives of

 6     UNPROFOR must be solved through the corps commands and through the Main

 7     Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska and that any controversial issue in

 8     relation to international humanitarian organisations must be dealt with

 9     through the coordinating body of the government.

10        Q.   Who, according to this order, was in charge of relations with

11     humanitarian organisations, the international humanitarian organisations?

12        A.   In accordance with this order issued by the president of the

13     republic, the problem of military and the problem of humanitarian

14     organisations is clearly defined, and the coordination body of the

15     government is defined in a special document.

16        Q.   And who was in charge of the relations with the international

17     humanitarian organisations according to this order?

18        A.   The coordination body of the government.

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D76 --

20     772.  It is an order from the Drina Corps dated 10 April, 1993,

21     concerning the control or monitoring of convoys.

22        Q.   Did the checking of convoys, of humanitarian convoys, was

23     usual -- is usual in wartime?

24        A.   It's absolutely usual.  In accordance with what I said

25     previously, the VRS was responsible for the movements of these convoys,

Page 30194

 1     for their security, and their coordination.  And it was responsible when

 2     they were moving through its territory for ensuring that this actually

 3     was humanitarian aid and not something else.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1286?

 5     This is an order from the Main Staff.  It concerns humanitarian aid.  In

 6     the first paragraph of this order, one may see that about humanitarian

 7     convoys, military equipment was given to the Muslims.

 8        Q.   Did the carriage or shipping of military milicija, did armies

 9     normally allow transporting of military -- of humanitarian -- of military

10     equipment for humanitarian convoys in the other part of the conflict --

11     to the other part of the conflict?

12        A.   No army in the world, including the Army of Republika Srpska,

13     allows humanitarian aid to be transported together with weapons, military

14     equipment, ammunition, and other things that can be used for military

15     purposes.

16             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now see document 5D801.

17     This is an order from the Drina Corps -- a document from the Drina Corps

18     of 25 November, 1995.

19             THE INTERPRETER:  21st November, 1995, correction.

20             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In this document, one sees that --

21     on the 21st of November, 1993 -- the date is 21 November 1993.  In this

22     document, one may see that the Drina Corps and the Main Staff of the Army

23     of Republika Srpska had the information about a possible transfer of

24     explosives and mines in bags which were supposed to be flour bags.

25        Q.   This sort of information, does it normally have an influence on

Page 30195

 1     the future passage of the humanitarian convoys and on the checking which

 2     may be affected?

 3        A.   This information is the result of prior experience, which means

 4     that such incidents have been noted and that such acts have been done.

 5     And, on the basis of that, all those who manned the check-points were

 6     warned, and in that respect I would point out the one-before-last

 7     paragraph in B/C/S that -- where it is emphasized that the checks should

 8     be made by taking samples and applying methods of inspection that would

 9     prevent such things to happen in the future, which means to take all

10     measures to prevent any surprises.

11             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now see 5D956.  This is an

12     information coming from the intelligence department in sector for

13     security and intelligence of the Main Staff, dated 13 August -- I think

14     1994.

15             In paragraph 2, one may read this:

16             "[In English] We confirmed information that a Turkish UNPROFOR

17     battalion contingent brought in double the combat equipment to the area

18     of Zenica than originally envisaged and gave a specific number of

19     armoured transporters and tanks to the so-called BH Army."

20             [No interpretation]

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, I am not receiving interpretation.

22             MS. FAUVEAU:  [No interpretation]

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  [French spoken]

24             MS. FAUVEAU:  [No interpretation]

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Still the situation is the same.  No, I am not

Page 30196

 1     blaming anyone.  I mean, these things happen.  I am just waiting for it

 2     to be resolved.  No, what I am saying is being transcribed.

 3             All right.  If you could repeat again, please.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU:  [No interpretation]

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Again, we haven't --

 6             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Of course, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  It's solved now.  It's solved now.  Thank you.

 8     Please repeat your question, please.  Thank you.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  It seems that one console is defective in the

10     French booth.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, I understand this had to be technical because

12     interpretation into B/C/S was being received.  So let's proceed.

13             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   How is it that this type of information is -- how can it be

15     reflected on the passage of convoys of UNPROFOR and of humanitarian

16     convoys?

17        A.   This type was information contributed to increased inspections of

18     UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid convoys; for instance, the effect was that

19     the inspection was -- the inspections were more specific about what it is

20     that the units which were moving -- that belonged to the units that were

21     moving through there because up until then, many of those units carried

22     equipment that did not belong to them; secondly, the -- whether the

23     material that was arriving was in fact expended; and third, it pointed to

24     the need for increased inspections of the personnel that were parts of

25     those units.

Page 30197

 1             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now have Exhibit 5D770.

 2     This is an order from the Drina Corps about the movement of UNPROFOR's

 3     convoys and about humanitarian convoys, and I'd like to have page 2 both

 4     in the B/C/S and in the English versions.  And the only point I am

 5     interested in here is point number 9, the fact that radio and video

 6     equipment is forbidden.

 7        Q.   Could you please tell us why video equipment is forbidden?

 8        A.   Radio and video equipment are the most sophisticated means or

 9     devices used in intelligence.  Radio and video equipment allow certain

10     information to be analysed by the best professionals that they had

11     available.

12             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And I would now like to show to the

13     witness Exhibit 5D842.  This is a document from the Main Staff dated 11th

14     of October, 1994, and I would like to have page 2 on the screen.

15        Q.   Under point 5 of this document, you can see that three people

16     from UNHCR were not able to obtain authorisation to visit Zepa because

17     their intention was to take pictures with a camera.

18             Now, the intention to take pictures or to film or record video,

19     is this something which from a military point of view or for armies is

20     sufficient reason to deny access to a given area?

21        A.   Absolutely.  It is well known that filming is strictly prohibited

22     of certain areas, and combat areas are precisely such sites because they

23     are exposed and they are the focus of the intelligence work of the enemy.

24             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

25     Exhibit 5D778.  This is a document from the Drina Corps from 23rd July,

Page 30198

 1     1993, informing the Main Staff about the fact that radio stations and the

 2     satellite antenna was confiscated, taken away from a humanitarian convoy

 3     or, rather, a Red Cross convoy, which carried humanitarian aid to

 4     Srebrenica.

 5        Q.   You have already explained what is the meaning of radio

 6     equipment.  What about the confiscation of this particular equipment

 7     which was part of a humanitarian convoy.  Is this a usual procedure,

 8     again from a military point of view?

 9        A.   It is absolutely common, and this practice is still in place

10     today.  You will see that even delegations that want to visit an area are

11     not allowed to do so, let alone in wartime.  So this is something that is

12     just in order to protect one's self from the actions of the other side or

13     from someone acting for the benefit of the other side.

14             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And I'd like to show you now

15     5D1271.  This is a conversation which is an intercept from 31st August,

16     1994, which comes from the Croat collection.

17        Q.   In this conversation -- I mean, this is a summary of the

18     intercepted conversation between General Brinkman, the head of staff of

19     UNPROFOR, and General Milovanovic.  And as you can see, the convoys

20     carrying fuel to the UN units in Srebrenica and Gorazde were not

21     authorised.

22             Can you tell us the meaning of fuel in a conflict?

23        A.   In a conflict fuel, and the meaning of fuel here is primarily

24     military fuel, for military usage, is very important for maneuvers of the

25     other side.  Without the fuel, the enemy side will have fewer opportunity

Page 30199

 1     for maneuvering and will be able to reach fewer areas.

 2             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would still need

 3     another 15 minutes.  I'm terribly sorry about that.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  You don't need to be sorry, Madam.  Incidentally,

 5     also fuel in the context of combat operations should never fuel combat

 6     operations because the more you fuel it the worse it becomes.

 7             We'll stop here for today.  We'll continue tomorrow morning at

 8     9.00.  After 15 minutes I reckon Ms. Fauveau will be finished with her

 9     examination, so whoever is next please be prepared.

10             Thank you.  General, same advisory as before.  Thank you.

11                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

12                           1.44 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the

13                           16th day of January, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.