1 Thursday, 15 January 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning to you, Madam Registrar. Could you
7 call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-05-88-T, The Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Good morning, everybody. For the
11 record, everyone is here today with the exception of Mr. Nikolic for the
12 Beara Defence team. Accused are all present.
13 General, good morning to you. We are going to proceed.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Fauveau.
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
17 WITNESS: SLOBODAN KOSOVAC [Resumed]
18 [Witness answered through interpretation]
19 Examination by Ms. Fauveau: [Continued]
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have Exhibit 5D1225. This
21 is an order from the Drina Corps dated 24th of November, 1994.
22 Q. Now, this is an order for the conduct of activities and ambushes.
23 Could you tell us what in the military terminology "ambushes" mean?
24 A. According to the definition, it belongs to active combat
25 activities, and it's carried out in the following way: The units conceal
1 themselves and sneak up, they wait for the enemy, and this part is
2 defensive, and then at an appropriate moment they respond very quickly,
3 and at that point, this becomes an offensive combat activity.
4 Q. Could you please now look at point 3 of this order.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In English, this is on page 2 of
6 the English version.
7 Q. According to this item number 3, the ambushes plan was to be
8 forwarded to the corps command for certification purposes. And just
9 before that, you see that it was the military brigade, which was to draw
10 up the plan as well as the Skelani Battalion.
11 Could you explain what certification mentioned here?
12 A. From this order, it is easy to conclude that this is a zone of
13 activity which was kept under control with patrols and ambushes. It was
14 very vulnerable, columns passed through, and the order has been issued
15 for two units to elaborate a plan of ambush activities. As two units
16 were involved in doing this, it's quite normal that the superior command
17 should review their plans and, if necessary, coordinate and harmonise
18 them. And if it had anything to add as regards the time, place, forces,
19 and means, it could do so.
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to now show you 5D1041.
21 Now, this is a warning from the Drina Corps which is sent to the military
22 brigade dated 3rd of December, 1994. This warning refers to the order
23 that we just looked at.
24 Q. In light of this warning, can you say on the basis of the text in
25 this document, did the Milici [Realtime transcript read in error,
1 "military"] Brigade carry out the tasks which were entrusted to it?
2 A. From this document sent by the command of the Drina Corps, it is
3 evident that the Milici [Realtime transcript read in error, "military"]
4 Brigade did draw up a plan, but it can also be seen that it did not
5 comply with the plan. They listed some reasons as to why they didn't do
6 so. The command, however, is insisting that they carry out the plan, and
7 the three reasons adduced for non-compliance were not adopted. One can
8 see here that in military terms the task has not been carried out
9 properly, and the command is warning the unit about this.
10 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Fauveau, "military brigade" in line 25 and line
11 3 should be "Milici Brigade."
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely. Thank you, Your
13 Honour. This is the Milici Brigade. That's how it should be.
14 I would now like to show you Exhibit 5D1042. Now, this is
15 another order from the Drina Corps dated 13th of December, 1994, which is
16 also about ambushes. May we have page 2 of this order, please, both in
17 English and in B/C/S.
18 Q. Can you please have a look at the very top of the page, item
19 number 3. And according to this item 3, the organisation and the
20 execution of ambushes activity in the area of responsibility of the
21 Milici Brigade and of the Skelani Battalion between the Zepa and
22 Srebrenica enclaves is to be executed by the Drina Corps command.
23 Is this order related to the order we just saw?
24 A. This order is connected with the previous two documents we have
25 looked at. In the first order, the order was given that these two units,
1 the Milici Brigade and the Skelani Battalion, should draw up a plan of
2 ambush activities and submit it for approval. One can see that this was
4 From the second document, we can see that it was approved but not
5 implemented, and this is the third level. The corps command saw that
6 those two units, in spite of the plan they had drawn up and in spite of
7 the warning they had received, were not carrying it out, and now this is
8 at the highest level. They are organising the carrying out of ambush
9 activities with their units.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown
11 Exhibit 5D1043. This is a document from the Main Staff dated 23rd of
12 December, 1994, which forwards the agreement on the cease-fire to the
13 subordinated units. Could we please have page 2 of this document, the
14 last paragraph on page 2, please.
15 Q. So here we have the cease-fire agreement which is mentioned, and
16 in the last part of this document you can see that the Main Staff is
17 asking its subordinated units and commands to immediately inform all of
18 the subordinated units to the command of the content of the agreement.
19 Is it usual in an army to send such agreement texts up to the
20 lowest levels of command, lowest levels of command?
21 A. To understand this decision concerning this agreement, one must
22 understand two points: First, this is the end of 1994 when the
23 international community is investing enormous efforts into brokering a
24 cease-fire, and the former American President Jimmy Carter was involved
25 in this personally. Every successful command of units in any army rests
1 primarily on providing good information. Every member of the army must
2 know what his command is aspiring to and what his state, his country, is
3 aspiring to.
4 This is a document showing how units are kept well-informed and
5 how it is required if one is to command to provide good information to
6 the units. In this way, every member of the Army of the Republika Srpska
7 would be familiar with the aims and scope of the agreement.
8 Q. I would now like to show you another agreement which dates from
9 23rd of -- I mean, this one was from 23rd of December. The one I want to
10 show now is dated 31st of December. This is 5D1045. The date of the
11 agreement is 31st of December.
12 This is the Drina Corps command which delivers the full text of
13 the agreement on the full cessation of hostilities, and this document of
14 the Drina Corps is dated 2nd of January, 1995. Could you please first
15 look at page 2 of this text, item 4.
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to come back to
17 B/C/S in page 1. In English, it will still be page 2.
18 Q. Could you please read item number 2, which is at the very bottom
19 of the B/C/S text, and could you please do it out loud because I am not
20 sure that the translation in English is precise enough.
21 A. "As regards the commitments of the VRS from the agreement, issue
22 necessary preparatory orders for the preparation of firing and combat
23 positions for weapons and for the accommodation of men and combat
24 hardware, as well as the preparation of observation posts, the
25 organisation of communications, et cetera."
1 Q. Does this order refer to the preparation of combat positions and
2 firing positions or the preparation for setting up whatever is necessary
3 for firing purposes?
4 A. It's very clear here. It says that all these positions should be
5 put in order so that people and equipment can be accommodated there, and
6 to put in order observation post. So this means that all this should be
7 put in order.
8 Q. Can you please explain what this "put in order of the facilities
9 of combat positions" actually means?
10 A. Well, it's like when you are redecorating your apartment. When a
11 unit is engaged in combat activities, they have major movements, changes
12 of combat positions. Some combat positions are taken up very quickly.
13 In the course of combat, elements of the combat disposition can get mixed
14 up. So now is the time to put in order the place where you are, and this
15 is what we describe as militarising the place.
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now have 5D1356. This is a
17 document from the 8th OG Srebrenica from the Army of Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina which is sent to the Zepa Brigade on the 18th of February,
20 Q. In what way is the first paragraph of this document part of the
21 agreement on cessation of hostilities that we just looked at?
22 A. This is an example which is directly opposite to what we saw in
23 the previous document. The command of the Drina Corps and the units of
24 the VRS issued orders to put in order firing positions, accommodation for
25 men and equipment, and to put in order all the elements that were
1 missing. Here, the units are being raised to the highest level of combat
2 readiness. This implies that at the simplest and quickest command, the
3 unit can be ready to enter into combat. So the unit must be ready to
4 enter into combat at any moment.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
6 document 5D1130, 3-0. This is the report from the Main Staff which is
7 sent to the president of the republic and to the corps on 25th of
8 February, 1995. And I would like to have page 3 on the screen, please,
9 both in English and in B/C/S.
10 Q. This document gives some information on the situation in the
11 Drina Corps. Now, what I am interested in is to know on the basis of
12 which elements does a superior command - and in this case, the Main Staff
13 - which described in its reports the situation in the subordinated units?
14 A. One can see that this document contains two points for every
15 unit. First, A, enemy; and secondly, B or -- well, it's not quite
16 legible, the situation in the corps, the command and units. So the
17 superior command is collecting information about the situation in the
18 enemy ranks and in the ranks of the unit. It summarises these data and
19 forwards them to the Commander-in-Chief and all units at that level. So
20 the Main Staff of Republika Srpska is drawing up this document based on
21 reports received from subordinate units.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
23 Exhibit 5D1054, which is the report from the Drina Corps on that same
24 date, 27th of February, 1995.
25 Q. This report from the staff, which we've just seen, does it
1 reflect what is written in this report?
2 A. When we analyse this report of the corps command, we can state
3 that it fully reflects this report. This report is somewhat more
4 detailed; whereas, the report of the corps command is somewhat more
5 general, and that's the normal procedure.
6 Q. In this order -- in this report, sorry, of the Drina Corps, one
7 may see that certain actions are mentioned which have been executed from
8 the enclave of Srebrenica, and this is the 27th February, 1995, is the
9 date of the report.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1055.
11 That is an order from the Main Staff of -- dated 28th February, 1995.
12 Q. Please have a look at this order and tell us whether it's
13 possible to establish a link between the report of the Drina Corps of the
14 27th of February and this order of the 28th February, 1995.
15 A. This document is fully in compliance with the former reports and
16 with the situation in the field.
17 Q. What is the nature of this order? Is it an offensive order, an
18 order for an offensive?
19 A. No. We can see from this report, too, that the Army of Republika
20 Srpska was determined to comply with the cease-fire and that it ordered
21 all its units defensive activities. However, in spite of all this, it is
22 closely monitoring the activities in the battle-field, but that is of
23 less importance. What is important is that it is under attack from the
24 enclave, and in order to prevent those attacks it is now just raising the
25 level or the readiness of the units in order to be able to reply or to
1 react to the attacks in order for the units to be ready to be engaged if
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1057.
4 This is an order of the Drina Corps dated 1st March, 1995.
5 Q. This order follows an order of the Main Staff of the 28th
6 February - you can see the reference which is made to it in this order -
7 but I'd like to know if this order is essentially different from the
8 order we saw yesterday and which was dated 1994 concerning the separation
9 of the enclaves.
10 A. This order is in keeping with everything that they have
11 undertaken so far; in other words, they -- it does not differ. This is
12 an order where they are trying to resolve a problem that they have had
13 since 1993, the problem being the separation of these two enclaves.
14 Q. We mentioned several times the Spreca operation, which was
15 planned on the basis of Directive number 7, and I would like you to look
16 at 5D980. This document is linked to the Spreca operation. 5D980.
17 This document comes from the Drina Corps. Its addressed -- sent
18 to the Main Staff, to the Chief of the Staff. When a document is
19 addressed like that to the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff, who is the
20 person to whom this order is directed? Who might be this person?
21 A. There is no dilemma about that. This was sent personally to
22 Major General Milenko Zivanovic [as interpreted]
23 Q. This document starts by:
24 "General, sir ..."
25 I would ask you if you can repeat the name of the general to whom
1 the document is sent because there is a mistake in the transcript, line
3 A. This order was sent personally to the Chief of Staff, General
4 Milovanovic, Manojlo.
5 Q. This document starts by:
6 "Sir, General ..."
7 Do you have anything to say about the way the document begins?
8 Does it mean anything specific?
9 A. This document that was sent to this person and which was among
10 others filed in the log-book where all other combat documents are filed,
11 we can see from this document -- or in this document some things that are
12 not quite common. For instance, the commander of this unit speaks of the
13 successes of his unit. And, in keeping with that, proposes that units
14 that are assigned to the same task and under the command of another
15 corps, that they should take advantage of the attack of our forces and
16 move along their axis. It is also calling for logistical support.
17 Why is this document somewhat unusual? Because it is known that
18 the command that is responsible for this operation, Spreca 95, is
19 precisely the command that this document deals with, which is the East
20 Bosnia Corps.
21 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D981.
22 It is also connected to the Spreca operation. This document is dated 27
23 April 1995, and it's sent by Drina Corps to General Milovanovic. Could
24 the witness be shown page 2 of the document. In English, it's the third
25 paragraph. In B/C/S, it's the first paragraph on that page.
1 Q. In this document, the Drina Corps requests from the Main Staff
2 the designation of an officer who will be charge of coordination of the
3 forces engaged. If the staff after this request determines or designates
4 an officer in charge of coordination, where should he be to be able to
5 perform this coordination, this officer?
6 A. The first thing that we can conclude from this document is that
7 the entire operation is under the firm command of the Chief of Staff. We
8 can also see that the command of the Drina Corps also communicates with
9 the corps commander personally and asks for some changes in the
10 coordination. And if this request of the Drina Corps was to be
11 satisfied, the officer who was appointed to coordinate the activities
12 would be at the IBK command post or at the forward command post; in other
13 words, at the command post of the corps which is in charge of the
15 Q. Would an officer at Crna Rijeka at the main command post of the
16 Main Staff, could such an officer coordinate those activities?
17 A. Not even in theory could such a person coordinate those
18 activities because in order to be able to coordinate such activities,
19 that person would need to be fully aware of all the details of the
20 activities, to be fully advised of the orders and corrections to the
21 orders of the commander of the operation, and to be fully aware of the
22 ongoing situation in the field.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1059.
24 This is a document from the Drina Corps of the 20th March, 1995, sent to
25 the commander of the UNPROFOR in the enclave Srebrenica.
1 Q. You can see in this document that the Drina Corps has problems
2 with the Muslim formations coming out of the enclave. Could you explain
3 the fact that the commander of the Drina Corps has decided to write or
4 send a message to Srebrenica of the commander of UNPROFOR and didn't take
5 any other action, more violent action? How can you explain that?
6 A. Well, this is precisely an example of behaviour or conduct that
7 was -- that was normal or common at the time of this agreement.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to repeat his
10 JUDGE AGIUS: General, the interpreters had problems following
11 you. If you could repeat your answer, please, from the beginning.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Should I speak even more slowly?
13 All right.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't think that was the problem. You know, it's
15 something about interpretation. It could be something different,
16 catching up. You know, it could be speed, but I don't think it is speed.
17 So let's proceed.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I understood.
19 This document is a pattern of behaviour of the Army of Republika
20 Srpska which was in place after the cease-fire agreement was signed.
21 This pattern of conduct precisely regulates the manner and response in
22 each case where there is a cease-fire violation. It is prohibited that
23 any violation of cease-fire should be responded to with any kind of
25 In this particular instance, the commander of the Drina Corps in
1 keeping with all the orders of the command of the Republika Srpska Army,
2 in addition to registering this and taking action to oppose this attack
3 and the cease-fire violation, he also warns the person who was supposed
4 to monitor the cease-fire and also the Srebrenica enclave.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1349.
6 This is a document from the commander of the DutchBat sent to the
7 president -- sent to -- from Srebrenica on 3rd of April, 1995.
8 Q. This document mentions a fire which took place just on the border
9 of the enclave. Owing to the fact that the area had to be demilitarised,
10 does this letter of the DutchBat commander seem appropriate to you?
11 A. This letter, in each of its segments, is inappropriate. For one,
12 on April 3rd the commander of the DutchBat was very well aware that the
13 8th Combat Group was reconfigured as a division, and he knows the reasons
14 for that as well. Second, the commander of the DutchBat knows that units
15 of the 28th Division would venture out of the enclave to take action.
16 And from this letter, it would appear that he's not concerned by this
17 fact that these units would leave the enclave and engage the -- in action
18 and kill people, but he's concerned if some rounds were fired within the
19 enclave. Among others things, I would say that this is a formal way of
20 taking action, just a formality, a formal action, but not really
21 addressing the essence of the problem.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1329.
23 This is an order from the president of the republic of the 29th of March,
24 1995, sent to the Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska and to
25 the Ministry of the Interior -- the Minister of the Interior.
1 Q. In this order, one can read that according to the information
2 given by intelligence, 1.500 troops of the Srebrenica Brigade were to be
3 transferred from Srebrenica to Kladanj. If this information is accurate,
4 what were the military reasons to justify this transfer?
5 A. It must be well known that at this point the 25th Division of the
6 land forces, and previously the 8th operations group that was
7 reconstructed as a division, took action, and this was a huge force that
8 was not in use, which was a loss for the army of the -- of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina. It was clear -- and we saw that the spring offensive for
10 everyone was an occasion to take up as much territory as possible, and it
11 was clear that the BH Army would do anything it can to pull out this unit
12 from Srebrenica or to put this unit in action so that it could link up
13 with other units and create its own territory.
14 The information that was obtained after the restructuring was in
15 place and after increased activities of both these units, it was very
16 likely that they would try to pull out this unit, in this particular
17 case, one whole brigade.
18 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1064.
19 This is information gathered from intelligence of the Drina Corps on the
20 11th of April, 1995. What I am interested in is the last paragraph in
21 English, page 1, and the one-but-last paragraph in B/C/S.
22 Q. In this information, one can read in this paragraph:
23 "[In English] The prevailing mood among inhabitants of Srebrenica
24 is still that they will leave the enclave if a safe corridor is
25 established by the VRS."
1 The prevailing mood among inhabitants.
2 [Interpretation] This information, does it have a military
3 importance? Why is this information given in this report from the
4 intelligence service?
5 A. When intelligence officers assess and analyse the enemy, the
6 other side, in addition to assessing them they also have to assess all
7 other circumstances that may have an effect on combat operations. Here,
8 we can see that there is a strong pressure and that the inhabitants of
9 Srebrenica felt that they were used as -- as a human shield by their own
10 forces, and they wished to leave Srebrenica at any possible moment.
11 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to show you now
12 5D1262. This is a document from the minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
13 Hasan Muratovic, and sent to the presidency -- the War Presidency of Zepa
14 on the 8th of May, 1995. This document speaks about the evacuation in
15 the general interest.
16 Q. Could you have a look at this document, and could you explain
17 what is meant by the "evacuation in General interest" in this context.
18 In particular, explain the title of this document.
19 A. The subject, "Public Evacuation," that is what the subject is,
20 and the rest of the text really discusses evacuation. Simply, we can see
21 that there are two contradictions here: The population has a desire to
22 leave the area under any circumstances, whereas the state and the army
23 want to leave them there. So any conclusions here -- drawing any
24 conclusions would be unnecessary.
25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1364.
1 This document comes from the 28th Division, and it's sent to the
2 commander of the 2nd Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the
3 19th of June, 1995.
4 Q. Could you have a look at the first part of this document, which
5 speaks in particular of the problem of departures of members of the Army
6 of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the civilians' departure from the enclaves.
7 Could you tell us, what were the military reasons or the possible
8 reasons for the authorities of Srebrenica to prevent members of the Army
9 of Bosnia-Herzegovina to leave the enclave?
10 A. Two problems are evident here: The first is desertion; that is,
11 members of the army of Republic leaving, and the second problem is the
12 evacuation of civilians. One can see here what we talked about from the
13 beginning. They all want to leave the area in the direction of Tuzla,
14 Kladanj, and Serbia, so in all three directions. Everywhere -- people
15 feel much safer anywhere else than they do in that area, and it's quite
16 clear to everyone that this is a consequence of the creation of a
17 so-called protected area which was in fact militarised.
18 Q. What were the reasons for the authorities to prevent members of
19 the army to leave the enclave, which, anyway, had to be demilitarised?
20 A. There are two levels of authority here. The local authorities,
21 wherever they could, expressed the wish to leave the area because they --
22 they and the population felt insecure; and the state authorities, which
23 wanted both the army and the population to remain in Srebrenica because
24 they knew that in this way they were tying down a large military force.
25 On the other hand, all the members of the army who wanted to leave
1 realised that they would become a legitimate target if they continued to
2 behave as they were behaving, and so they realised that it was best for
3 them to leave. The population, they used as protection and as a source
4 of logistical support, and the civilian authorities wanted to retain
5 their territory in this way.
6 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1065.
7 Q. This is another information coming from the intelligence of the
8 Drina Corps on the 13th of April, 1995. Please look at page 2, last
9 paragraph of the document, which speaks about an offensive, a possible
11 The connection which this paragraph speaks about, is it a
12 connection with forces coming from the direction of Kladanj, has to do
13 with the forces of Srebrenica? Did they represent a real danger for the
14 Army of Republika Srpska?
15 A. In this relatively small zone, the 28th Division being there was
16 a threat to the VRS and the Drina Corps. A special threat was the fact
17 that it was expected that this unit would try to break through the
18 encirclement. They were not in a position to engage in a frontal battle.
19 It was estimated that the greatest threat was at the point where the
20 other units of the BH Army were closest, and in this particular instance
21 this would be Kladanj. This is a realistic assessment of a situation
22 which could arise for the 28th Division to break out of the encirclement,
23 and, on the other side, for the units of the BH Army to take action to
24 reduce the thickness of the separation.
25 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1067.
1 This is a document from the Drina Corps of the 25th of April, 1995.
2 Reading this first paragraph, we see that the Drina Corps has received
3 from security services of the Ministry of the Interior some information
4 according to which the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was preparing a
5 general offensive on the positions of the Republika Srpska.
6 Q. What was -- what is the natural reaction of an army when it
7 receives this sort of information?
8 A. When such information is received under normal conditions, any
9 army would take offensive action to prevent the carrying out of this
10 offensive, which was expected from the beginning of the year and was
11 called the Spring Offensive. Bearing in mind that the cease-fire was
12 still in force, the VRS and the Drina Corps did not take offensive action
13 to prevent this offensive in its beginning, in the initial grouping of
14 forces. All they did was to strengthen the organising of continuous
15 reconnaissance, observation, and following of all activities in order to
16 prevent any surprise.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 1237.
18 This is an order from the Drina Corps of the 18th of May, 1995,
19 concerning the sealing up of the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa --
20 sealing off. What I am interested in in this order is the first part of
21 the order itself.
22 Q. Essentially, is this order different from preceding orders which
23 had the same goal, which you have already seen?
24 A. The introductory part of this order can also be based on the
25 order of 1993 or of 1994 because these are the same tasks of the Drina
1 Corps stemming from its obligation, which it received in 1993.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1238.
3 This is a document from the Drina Corps sent to the Main Staff on the
4 20th of May, 1995.
5 Q. Have a look at the first paragraph. According to this text, it
6 seems that the commander of the Drina Corps has informed the Chief of
7 Staff of the Main Staff about the combat plan and the fact that the
8 organisation of this plan has already started as much as possible at a
9 meeting which took place at the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska on the
10 20th of May, 1995.
11 The Chief of Staff -- the Chief of the Main Staff to whom this
12 document refers, could tell us who may be this person, this Chief of
13 Staff? Who is it?
14 A. It is evident in this document that this is the Chief of Staff
15 General Manojlo Milovanovic.
16 Q. Since the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff was informed about the
17 plan for combats around Srebrenica and Zepa on the 20th of May, 1995, and
18 since he is even told about the beginning of implementation of this plan,
19 what may be concluded about the implication of General Milovanovic in May
20 1995 in the area of the Drina Corps?
21 A. Based on all the available documents so far, and especially the
22 collection of documents presented today, it can be unambiguously
23 concluded that the situation in the area of responsibility of the Drina
24 Corps and the area of responsibility of the IBK was exceptionally
25 familiar to the Chief of Staff, General Manojlo Milovanovic, and not only
1 was he very familiar with the situation, but he was personally in charge
2 of a large number of operations in that area.
3 Q. Could you have a look at paragraph 1 of this document -- item 1.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In English, it's on page 2. In
5 this item 1, we see that the Drina Corps requests the resubordination of
6 a unit of the 60th Protection Regiment -- 65th.
7 And could the witness now be shown a document of the staff which
8 follows this request, and this is 5D1214. Essentially, this document
9 speaks of a unit of the 65th Protection Regiment which was already
10 resubordinated to the Drina Corps.
11 Q. Could you explain, what is "resubordination"?
12 A. Resubordination is an activity where the commanding officer for a
13 certain period of time, for certain tasks gives a unit of his to another
14 commander to command. The other commander during the time in which that
15 unit is resubordinated to him has the right to command the unit, but he
16 does not have the right to make any changes within the unit itself.
17 After the completion of the task, the unit returns to its original
18 commander and reports to him as to how it has carried out its task.
19 Q. Just to be quite clear, who commands with the unit of the 65th
20 Regiment -- protection regiment when this unit is resubordinated to the
21 Drina Corps? Who commands it?
22 A. The commander of the Drina Corps was in command of this
23 resubordinated unit.
24 Q. Could you have a look at the number of this order, 03/4-973. Can
25 you tell us what this number actually means?
1 A. I did not look at the log-book of the Main Staff of the Army of
2 Republika Srpska, but I conclude that this number refers to the staff
3 because it's the one occurring most frequently.
4 Q. What does this number indicate?
5 A. This number indicates that this document was drawn up in the Main
6 Staff of the VRS, that it was entered into the log-book under this
7 number, that it was signed by the officer responsible, and that it
8 fulfills all the conditions for being sent out.
9 Q. If one supposes that this number is given by the Administration
10 in Charge of Operational and Educational Matters, does the chief of the
11 Administration of Operational and Educational Matters, does he have to
12 necessarily see all the documents who bear such a number?
13 A. No, it's not just -- not necessarily, but he needn't see them at
14 all because this is a document signed by his superior officer.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown document
16 5D1079. This is a report, interim report, of the Drina Corps of the 27th
17 of May, 1995, informing - you can see in paragraph 1 that the -- that the
18 Drina Corps informs the Main Staff about the fact that five soldiers of
19 the Milici Brigade have been killed in an ambush.
20 Q. What is the influence of such events on the making of decisions
21 by the command of a unit?
22 A. It is evident from this report that this was an exceptional
23 incident in the unit. It was a consequence of lack of discipline, and
24 the consequences were tragic. Based on this report, one can see that the
25 steps taken by the superior command implied that something like this
1 might happen; that is, in the unit there was a lot of irresponsibility in
2 carrying out tasks. So this tragedy was the lack of -- due to the lack
3 of responsibility.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown
5 5D1075. This is a new order from the Drina Corps. It concerns the
6 communication between the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. It's dated 4
7 June 1995, and as this is simply an order which is very brief.
8 Q. I have a simple question. Does this order differ essentially of
9 other orders we have already seen concerning communication between the
10 enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa?
11 A. It doesn't differ at all. This is one of the many different
12 activities to carry out a task received earlier, so this is just an
13 attempt to carry out that order.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown order
15 5D1245. This is also an order from the Drina Corps dated 19 June 1995.
16 Q. Could you just have a look at the preamble of this order.
17 According to this order, what were the reasons for this order to be sent?
18 According to what you may read on this order, what are the reasons for
19 giving it?
20 A. Practically, failure to carry out the order on separating the
21 enclaves, the constant problems that the units of the Drina Corps were
22 experiencing in that area, all this prompted another order to have this
23 regular task carried out. So this is one of countless orders attempting
24 to have this task carried out.
25 Q. One may see that this order also refers to a new situation on the
1 front around Srebrenica and Zepa.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Please display 5D1092 for the
3 witness. This is an order from the Drina Corps on the 15th of June,
5 Q. In paragraph 2 of this order, you may see that in the zone of
6 responsibility of the Drina Corps, the enemy has executed combat
7 operations according to Kladanj, Kalesija, Olovo, and between Srebrenica,
8 Zepa, and around Gorazde. This order you have just seen, does it have
9 any connection with this document, the order you saw just before this
10 document, which was dated 19 June.
11 A. I wish to mention a fact here, which is the following: The
12 command of the Drina Corps had a very specific position. It had an
13 outside and inside front line, so to speak; that is, its demarcation line
14 with the 2nd Corps, it held that front where there was contact. And
15 then, on the other side, it held the borders of the enclaves where the
16 enemy was extremely active and never stopped activities.
17 The external line had its oscillations. Sometimes there was more
18 activities, sometimes less. It participated in both defensive and
19 offence actions by the command of the Drina Corps. The internal borders
20 so to speak were constantly active. There was never any decrease in
21 activity or, if there was, this was only so that the concentration of the
22 VRS soldiers would fall. And here, we see that at this point there was
23 intensive activity at both the external and internal borders of the Drina
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, we'll have a break now of 25 minutes. How
1 much more do you think you have?
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I think I will go until the end of
3 the day. Perhaps I will finish a little before.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Madam.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam.
8 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
9 I'd like to show the bottom of the page in B/C/S and page 2 in
10 English. Page 2 in English, and in B/C/S, it's at the very bottom of
11 page 1.
12 You can see under item 1 in this order that this order was given
13 so that all subordinated units to the Drina Corps ensure full combat
15 Q. And before asking you the question, I'd like to show you Exhibit
16 5D1088, which is an interim report from the Drina Corps dated 14th of
17 July [as interpreted], 1995, so the eve of the order that we were looking
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Just a small correction. Line 18,
20 page 24, this is the 14th of June.
21 Q. Could you please consider this interim report and tell us whether
22 there was a connection with the order of full readiness to combat and the
23 situation described in this report.
24 A. The previous order on raising combat readiness to the maximum was
25 precisely the consequence of these activities that had been undertaken by
1 the BH Army.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
3 Exhibit 5D1249, which is an order from the Drina Corps from 27th of June,
4 1995. 1249 is the number of the exhibit.
5 Now, this is another order about the situation around the Zepa
6 and Srebrenica enclaves. Now, we looked at a number of reports dating
7 from June 1995.
8 Q. Why was it necessary to issue this new order on the 27th of June,
10 A. At every point where there is a new situation or new combat
11 activity one cannot follow the orders that had been issued earlier, it is
12 necessary to issue new orders and correct the previous orders. We could
13 say here that the entire collection of these orders by the Drina Corps,
14 on the basis of BH Army actions in the area of responsibility of the
15 Drina Corps and a newly developed situation, this is a natural live
16 organism of commanding.
17 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
18 Exhibit 5D1246. This is an order from the Drina Corps dated 19th of
19 June, 1995. Could we please have page 2 in English. For B/C/S, it will
20 be page 1.
21 Q. You can see in this order that the Main Staff ordered the Krajina
22 and Drina Corps to form a light infantry brigade, each of them, so as to
23 reinforce the Sarajevo Corps. And this, indeed, is the order of the
24 Drina Corps to set up this brigade.
25 How do you explain that in a situation in which the Drina Corps
1 possibly had problems in its own area, that they had to send a brigade to
2 the Sarajevo Corps?
3 A. It was probably because the Main Staff of the Army of Republika
4 Srpska assessed - and based on all the analysis so far I agree with their
5 assessment - that the Drina command Corps could with their forces resolve
6 all their problems, especially the problems surrounding the enclaves of
7 Srebrenica and Zepa, and it assessed that at this point in time the
8 Sarajevo Romanija Corps had bigger problems and, pursuant to that,
9 decided to assign a unit for the implementation of the task that they had
10 to implement.
11 This was the method where from the complement of the existing
12 live units you would withdraw one unit and form it to assign it to a
13 particular task, and this is a well-known method of work. The order is
14 in every way justified, and it has its purpose, and it would in no way
15 interfere with the structure of the Drina Corps.
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have Exhibit P107. This
17 is the order from the Drina Corps about combat -- active combat
18 activities from the 2nd of July, 1995.
19 Q. Can you please say what active combat activities are? Can you
20 define them, please?
21 A. I will try to be as precise and as clear as possible. Active
22 combat activities are primarily offensive activities that are carried out
23 by the army, and among them we know counter-attack in --
24 THE INTERPRETER: Would the witness please slowly repeat the
25 types of counter-attack and response in combat.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: General, again, we have a few problems. If you
2 could kindly repeat the types of counter-attack and response in combat
3 because the interpreters had some problems.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I will repeat it.
5 Active combat activities are primarily offensive activities;
6 mainly, they involve attacks. Among them we know the following:
7 counter-attack, insurgence, entrapment, diversion, demonstrative
8 operations. Based on the forces that conduct these attacks, they are
9 carried out by tactical units. The fact that they are carried out by
10 tactical units speak of their scope and the number of people that
11 participate in them.
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I just briefly show you now
13 Exhibit P114. This is the order from the Drina Corps dated 13th of July,
14 1995. This is the order for the attack to Zepa.
15 Q. Why in this order it is -- the attack is mentioned, while the
16 other order mentioning the Srebrenica enclave, it mentioned combat
18 A. This is precisely the substantial difference between these two
19 orders that have been issued. The attack order, in such an order an
20 attack is a form of combat operations, and this is what would determine
21 the final goal and the forces that would take part in it with a clear --
22 clearly defined beginning and end of an operation. Active combat
23 operations in their character are subordinated to the attack.
24 Q. Could you please repeat the very last part of your answer about
25 the comparison between combat activities and the attack, please.
1 A. Perhaps I should interpret because I think that the term
2 "suposirenja" [phoen] was not properly interpreted. An active attack has
3 its continuity, whereas the act of operations can fluctuate. They are
4 not in continuation. They can be conducted, and then there can be a
5 pause in their carrying out, and then they can be on again.
6 Q. Now, before talking in greater detail about activities taking
7 place around Srebrenica in July 1995, I would like to show you Exhibit
8 P2894, which is an order from the Drina Corps dated 2nd of June, 1995,
9 and which is about Zeleni Jadar, the communication in Zeleni Jadar.
10 Could you please look at the first page of this order, and I
11 think that this should suffice for you to be able to express your
12 opinion. And could you please say whether this order is connected to the
13 activities which then took place in July? Can this action be considered
14 as the beginning of the action which was initiated in July?
15 A. This action is one of a number of actions and problems that they
16 had in this area, and it is not a beginning of anything. It is just in
17 continuation of the attempt to resolve a problem.
18 Q. You can see here that this order is about the establishment of
19 physical control over the buildings and communications in Zeleni Jadar.
20 I would now like to show you Exhibit 5D1227, which is an order from the
21 Drina Corps from 18th of March, 1995.
22 Now, this is what I am interested in. This is about property in
23 Zeleni Jadar. The purpose of this order, is it connected to the order we
24 just saw, the order from 2nd of June, 1995? Is there a connection
25 between the purposes or the goals of these two orders?
1 A. In both of these documents, the subject is Zeleni Jadar, and we
2 can see that this is an area that is outside of the demilitarised zone,
3 and we can see that the Army of Republika Srpska is seeking to establish
4 control in keeping with all the authority in its power.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now come back to Exhibit
6 P107, i.e., the order from the Drina Corps from 2nd of July, 1995. Could
7 we have page 3 in English and 2 in B/C/S, please, and I'd like to focus
8 on item number 2.
9 Q. Looking at the content of the task indicated in item 2, does this
10 in essence defer to the tasks that were given to the Drina Corps
11 previously? Does it differ? Is it different from the tasks which were
12 previously entrusted to the Drina Corps?
13 A. Since 1993, the Drina Corps' task was to ensure the security of
14 the enclaves, of the enclave borders, so that they may function in
15 agreement -- or according to the agreement that had been reached. And
16 the minute that those borders became porous, especially between the
17 Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, their duty was to split them apart and
18 establish control in the area again. So that was their task since 1993,
19 and there was really nothing new in this one.
20 Q. From a military point of view, does point 2 in this order imply
21 that the civilian population be displaced?
22 A. In no way can that be the conclusion, and it is even very
23 difficult to draw such a conclusion even if we were to speculate.
24 Q. What about the task defined in this order? Does it imply that
25 the enclaves be eliminated?
1 A. I would like to read it in its entirety, and then I would say
2 that the last sentence is very precise: Within the depth of the area, to
3 split apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, and reduce them to their
4 urban areas.
5 So the term used here is "split apart," not "taking over."
6 Q. Now, what about the Administration in Charge of Operations and
7 Training in the Main Staff? Did it have a role in the planning of this
8 it order?
9 A. The Administration For Operations and Training had no role or
10 authority or any part in the creation and issuance of this order nor any
11 orders that we spoke of today.
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
13 Exhibit P33, which is a document from the Main Staff dated 9th of July,
14 1995, which delivers to the Drina Corps the agreement -- agreement of the
15 president of the Republika Srpska for the forces of the Army of Republika
16 Srpska to enter Srebrenica and, also, the order of the president
17 concerning the procedure to be applied with the members of UNPROFOR and
18 the Muslim civilian population.
19 Q. First of all, can you say how important this document is, from
20 9th of July, 1995, as part of the events which unfolded in July 1995 in
22 A. Could we please scroll this down a bit?
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could you please scroll down the
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. Looking at the
1 substance of the document, first I would like to say that this does not
2 come from the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army. This was a
3 document that was only filed there. This is a decision by the supreme
4 commander, which was forwarded to the subordinates by the assistant
5 commander, and it was received and filed in the Main Staff. So in its
6 character and by its nature, this is not a decision from the Main Staff.
7 It is a decision by the supreme commander. And according to this
8 document, this decision of the supreme commander refers to taking up --
9 or taking over Srebrenica and demilitarising the Srebrenica enclave.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Who or what organ in the Main Staff is normally in charge of
12 forwarding the orders to the subordinated authorities?
13 A. At this point in time, it was irrelevant. What was relevant was
14 that the authorised organ of the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army,
15 the assistant commander, was aware of the decision of the supreme
16 commander; and being briefed of it, he relayed it to all the other sides
17 or to all the other bodies, and where it was actually filed is not
18 relevant for this particular document.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
20 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, with respect to the answer that
21 the witness gave, it is non-responsive to the question, and I would ask
22 if he could actually answer the question.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, that's correct. Unless you wish to disagree,
24 but I think Mr. Vanderpuye is perfectly right in pointing that out.
25 The question, General, was as follows:
1 "Who or what organ in the Main Staff, is under normal
2 circumstances normally in charge of forwarding the orders to the
3 subordinate authorities?"
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that I may complicate
5 matters when I answer, but each organ within his sphere or his area of
7 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I shall make my question more
9 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead. Go ahead, but you still need to clarify
10 this because the question was either "who" as a person or, if there is an
11 organ that is charged with passing on instructions, which organ would
12 that be. So if you could perhaps -- if you need to consult with your
13 client, by all means.
14 Okay, let's proceed then. Thank you.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I'd like you to tell me, what is the organ, theoretically, in the
17 Main Staff which conveys the orders about combat activities to the
18 subordinated units?
19 A. As a matter of principle, combat documents, or the basic combat
20 documents, are issued from the staff or from the operations and training
21 organ from the operations centre. But all the other documents would go
22 -- or be issued by their organs. So this is what I can say to make it
23 more precise.
24 Q. So why -- or do you know, what are the possible reasons why this
25 specific document did not or was -- did not arise or was not recorded or
1 signed by an officer from the Administration for Operations and Training
2 in the Main Staff?
3 A. It is evident from this document that the president of Republika
4 Srpska had been informed of the results, that General Tolimir was there,
5 that somebody conveyed to them the results, and at that point the supreme
6 commander ordered the assistant commander to convey his standpoint. The
7 assistant commander at that point in time conveyed the standpoint from
8 the most convenient place available to him.
9 So this document need not have been logged with the operations
10 and training organ or the staff or anywhere else. It was entered into
11 the log in the nearest place where the assistant commander could go to
12 have it forwarded.
13 Q. Is there anything in this document which may indicate that the
14 Administration for Operations and Training has received this document,
15 that it has finally arrived there to the Administration for Operations
16 and Training?
17 A. Judging by the content of the document and all the activities, it
18 was not sent there, and it was sent to Generals Gvero and Krstic at the
19 forward command post and the command of the Drina Corps and also for
20 information to the president of the republic. So it's clear from this to
21 whom it was sent.
22 Q. What was the role of the Administration for Operations and
23 Training in the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska and of General
24 Miletic who was heading it in the conduct of combat activities in
25 Srebrenica in July 1995? I am asking you this question on the basis of
1 the documents which you have been able to peruse and about the usual role
2 of the administration of the staff under such circumstances.
3 A. Based on this entire collection of documents presented here, the
4 role of the Administration for Operations and Training was merely on the
5 basis of the combat reports coming from the Drina Corps to -- to take
6 note of these reports, incorporate them into the reports to the Main
7 Staff, and forward them. When some reports arrive which are of a special
8 nature, something that is unusual, then the Administration for Operations
9 and Training or another administration which is competent for this aspect
10 has to warn the commander of this. This does not refer to units where
11 the commander is already there because then the administration would know
12 that the commander was already familiar with the situation in the unit.
13 Q. And just to clarify, in the situation we are interested in, we
14 know that General Mladic is in the area of Srebrenica at least on the
15 11th and the 12th of July.
16 Now, in this period of time did General Miletic, who is in Crna
17 Rijeka if he was there - let's assume that he's there - was he to make
18 some proposals, warnings, or issue warnings about Srebrenica to General
20 A. Assuming that he was there and the person who was deputising for
21 him was not there, if he learned of this report he would have no
22 competence to deal with it because he would see that this was something
23 not falling within the plans in the Main Staff of Republika Srpska and
24 that it represents activities in the Drina Corps and that the commander
25 is in the area and is aware of all this. And even if the commander was
1 anywhere else, one of his assistants, the one who drew up this report,
2 would be aware of the situation.
3 Q. In the normal course of circumstances in the Army of Republika
4 Srpska, did the Administration in Charge of Operations and Training, was
5 it in charge of supervising the moving or the evacuation of the
7 A. As I said yesterday - and I'll be more precise now - the VRS did
8 not have organs working directly or indirectly with the population. It
9 had no -- or, rather, the operations and training administration had no
10 competency whatsoever to deal with the population, and this is the case
11 in all armies.
12 Q. Is it possible to monitor -- generally speaking, is it possible
13 to monitor or supervise the evacuation taking place in Srebrenica,
14 Potocari, if you're in Crna Rijeka, which is several tens of kilometres
16 A. Such activities which involve a large number of participants and
17 a great frequency of occurrence can only be monitored or controlled on
18 the spot, not at a distance.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
20 Document P113, which is a report about the evacuation which took place in
21 Srebrenica, dated 13th of July, 1995, and which Colonel Radoslav Jankovic
22 sent to the administration of intelligence of the Main Staff.
23 Q. Now, we can see on this document that it was sent to the
24 administration of intelligence, intelligence department. What about the
25 officers who worked in operations and evacuations affairs? Should these
1 officers have known about a document which was in fact sent to another
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
4 MR. VANDERPUYE: I think it would be useful if my colleague could
5 repeat the question. It's not translated correctly in the record.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Fauveau.
7 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
8 Q. This document comes from the sector in charge of security and
9 intelligence and was sent to the intelligence department in the Drina
10 Corps. Should the officers in charge of the Administration of
11 Operational Affairs and Training in the Main Staff have been made aware
12 of this document?
13 A. In every army, it is the practice - and it was the same in the
14 Main Staff of the VRS - that whenever one organisational unit receives a
15 report or an order, as soon as it looks at it, it should see whether
16 there are any elements contained within it of which another
17 organisational unit should know. If there are such elements present,
18 then it must inform the other organisational unit. This document was
19 sent to the sector for intelligence and security. It contains about five
20 paragraphs. The first three in the nature of things refer mostly to the
21 logistics sector or the sector for the rear, and that sector was then
22 supposed to be informed of this. The fourth one concerning theft refers
23 to the Administration for Security; it's within their competence. And
24 the fifth one would be for the information organs or state organs for
1 In other words, there is not a single element of this document
2 referring to the Operations and Training Administration. It doesn't fall
3 within their purview.
4 Q. And one last question about Srebrenica. I'd like to show you
5 Exhibit 5D1365. This is a document from the presidency of Srebrenica,
6 from the president, which was sent to the president of the republic on
7 the 9th of July, 1995, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, what
8 can you say about the position of the local authorities, the local
9 Srebrenica authorities, about the evacuation?
10 A. Looking at this document, we can see two things: That the
11 civilian authorities do not know what the 28th Division is planning and
12 doing; and secondly, they insisted from day one that a method should be
13 found to evacuate the population from Srebrenica. Their desire to have
14 this done is constant.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to come back to
16 Exhibit P114. This is the order about the attack on the Zepa enclave
17 from 13th of July, 1995.
18 Q. First of all, could you tell us, what was the role of the
19 Administration for Operations and Training in the Main Staff? What was
20 supposed to be its role in the issuance of such an order?
21 A. With respect to the order of the command of the Drina Corps to
22 some of its units and for the carrying out of regular tasks, the
23 Administration for Operations and Training had no role at all in the
24 issuance of this order.
25 Q. Should this order have been sent to the Administration of
1 Operations and Training of the Main Staff?
2 A. No, by no means. Orders sent to the Main Staff for its approval
3 are clearly defined what orders they are.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness be shown page 2 of
5 this order, which is also page 2 in English. Sorry, in B/C/S this is
6 still page 1, and actually, also page 1 in English.
7 Q. Could you please look at items 2, 3, and 4. Is there anything,
8 which -- of course, from a military standpoint, is there anything in
9 these items which imply activities of displacement of the civilian
10 population or any activities against the civilian population?
11 A. There is no element leading to such a conclusion. The command of
12 the Drina Corps based on the decision of the Commander-in-Chief with
13 respect to Srebrenica and based on the results achieved in eliminating
14 the Srebrenica enclaves extended activities in the direction of Zepa, and
15 they knew that they were holding stable the line facing the 2nd Corps.
16 So this is exclusively the planning of military action in relation to the
17 BH Army.
18 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness be shown 5D1366.
19 This is a document from the presidency -- the War Presidency of the Zepa
20 municipality, which was sent to the president of the Republic of Bosnia
21 and Herzegovina on 19th of July, 1995.
22 Q. Could you please look at this document, particularly with a focus
23 on items 1 and 2 and the end of this page, which actually is the
24 following page in English, and tell us what conclusion you can draw as to
25 the position of the Zepa authorities about the evacuation.
1 A. This document indicates very clearly that there was antagonism
2 between the local authorities and the authorities of the Republic of
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is a sentence here which is quite clear:
4 I don't know what to say about your plan. This is the plan that they
5 should remain in Zepa. They are insisting on leaving Zepa. In any case,
6 it's better for someone to be saved than for someone to stay.
7 So the local authorities want the people to leave Zepa whereas
8 the state authorities want them to stay, and we can see that this issue
9 has already been discussed, and they expect that it has also been
10 discussed at the Security Council of the UN.
11 Q. What we have in the transcript is not very clear. Who insists
12 that the population should stay in Zepa, and who insists on the fact that
13 the population should leave Zepa?
14 A. The state authorities always insisted that the local population
15 should remain in Zepa, and in this way they could achieve their goals,
16 whereas the local authorities always insisted that they leave Zepa.
17 Q. Now, I'd like to show you Exhibit 5D1350. This Exhibit is in
18 English, but I'm going to read the relevant part to you. This is a
19 statement from the president of the Security Council dated 20th of July,
20 1995, about the situation in Zepa, and the paragraph that I am interested
21 in is the one-before-last of this statement, which reads that the
22 Security Council president said the following:
23 [In English] "The Security Council underlines the importance it
24 attaches to the fullest cooperation with UNHCR and other international
25 humanitarian organisations and demands that they be given unhindered
1 freedom of movement and access to the area. It further demands that the
2 Bosnian Serb authorities cooperate with all efforts, including those of
3 UNPROFOR, to ensure the safety of the civilian population, and in
4 particular its most vulnerable members, including evacuation as requested
5 by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in his
6 letter of 17 July 1995."
7 [Interpretation] Now, once you've seen this document, could you
8 say what seems to be the position about all the authorities of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina about Zepa?
10 A. This document provides the reply to the previous document. We
11 can see that whoever submitted the previous document was aware of the
12 fact that the issue had been raised before the Security Council on the
13 17th of July. He called up on the 19th to see what had been done, that
14 the issue of evacuation would be raised, which was what they wished, and
15 he asked to see what the Security Council would do.
16 Q. Now, if the authorities of Republika Srpska were aware about this
17 content of the declaration of the president of the Security Council, what
18 could be their conclusions about the willingness of the Muslim people in
19 Zepa about evacuation?
20 A. The authorities of Republika Srpska were certainly aware of this
21 document, and it was clear to them that it was the will of the population
22 to be evacuated from the enclave, and it's also clear what obligations
23 were imposed upon them by the Security Council in relation to the
24 population and the wounded for their safety.
25 Q. You can see that in this document the Security Council calls for
1 a cooperation with the international organisations.
2 I would like now to show you document 5D1114. This is a document
3 from the Drina Corps from 20th of July, 1995, giving the information
4 about the authorisation granted by the Main Staff of the Army of
5 Republika Srpska to the Red Cross for the purposes of medical evacuation
6 of the sick and wounded persons in Zepa.
7 As we look this document, can you see something which is an
8 irregularity or a disagreement, something which disagrees with the call
9 made in the statement of the Security Council -- by the Security Council
11 A. It is evident from this document that the Main Staff of the VRS
12 reacted as required by the document of the Security Council, the portion
13 we've read out, and we can see that they carried out their obligations
14 in-depth very fast from the Main Staff toward the corps, and the corps
15 urgently complied with their obligations in relation to the subordinate
16 units. So we can see that this document is in line with the previous
18 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown
19 Exhibit 5D1115. This is a similar document from the Drina Corps dated
20 20th of July, 1995, which is about the authorisation for the members of
21 UNPROFOR -- for a team of UNPROFOR to go to Zepa on 20th of July, 1995.
22 Q. Does this document conform with what has been asked by the
23 Security Council?
24 A. This document is a clear example that they were in compliance
25 with the Security Council document and that they promptly moved to
1 regulate this issue from the Main Staff all the way down to the actual
2 people who were to implement it.
3 Q. We know that the evacuation was not done on the 20th of July,
4 1995, and I would like to show you two documents of the 25th of July,
5 1995. The first one is 5D1117. This is a document from the Drina Corps
6 giving -- getting authorisation of the main staff to UNPROFOR to command
7 the -- before I ask the question, I would like to show you another
8 document. First, please have a look at this one.
9 I would like you to have a look now to 5D1118. The document is
10 quite similar, on the 25th of July, 1995, giving authorisation for a
11 convoy, a Russian and French convoy, including for the medical transport
12 to go into Zepa on the 25th of July, 1995.
13 What can you tell us about this last document in comparison with
14 the appeal of the president of the Security Council?
15 A. In view of the fact that this document was produced on the 25th,
16 we can see that there is a continuity in the implementation of the
17 Security Council decisions relating to UNPROFOR, the UNHCR, et cetera,
18 the Red Cross, et cetera.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] One last document on this matter,
20 5D1120, of the 27th of July, 1995, giving authorisation for the movement
21 of a convoy of UNPROFOR transporting food and water to Zepa.
22 Q. What is your comment about this document?
23 A. This document, like all the previous ones, are just a
24 continuation of the approval provided by the Main Staff of the corps
25 command to the -- to those individuals who were to implement them to
1 follow and imply with all the orders issued by the Security Council
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown
4 document 5D1381. This is a document on the police station of Rogatica,
5 27 July 1995.
6 Q. I just have a question concerning the reasons why the police
7 station of Rogatica informs the Ministry of the Interior on how the
8 evacuation is taking place.
9 A. The normal job of public security was to monitor the situation in
10 the territory, and this is part of their responsibility, to inform the
11 organs on what the situation in the territory is. And in this particular
12 case, we see that they are dealing with an extraordinary event,
13 evacuation, and their reporting was a natural and normal procedure.
14 Q. The fact that this -- the fact that Mr. Markovic informs his
15 superiors of the evacuation, which is ongoing and -- an ongoing
16 operation, mean that in any way that he is himself taking part in this
18 A. From this document, I could judge that he knew of the evacuation.
19 Now, who was responsible for implementing or commanding or -- in this
20 operation, it is hard to say, but this gentleman was aware of the
21 operation, he been informed of it, and he was informing that he would
22 follow-up with any changes in the situation in his reports.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown document
24 5D1113. This is a document from the deputy commander for logistics of
25 the Main Staff dated 19 July 1995.
1 Q. Could you have a look at items 1 and 2 of this order in which
2 transport means and medical team are mentioned as well as medical
3 equipment and the assistant for logistics gives an order for these
4 transport means and medical means may be allowed.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In English, it is item 2.
6 Q. So these tasks which are described here in items 1 and 2, are
7 they within the purview of the logistics sector?
8 A. If we analyse these two points in detail, points 1 and 2, we can
9 see that point 1 deals practically with the traffic service, that part of
10 it relates to the technical service, and in one part of it we are dealing
11 with supplies, in this case, of fuel, which is the natural purview of the
12 rear sector. The only problem here is the problem of buses because the
13 Republika Srpska Army did not own or have any buses in their hardware, so
14 they must have procured them from somewhere else.
15 As for item 2, it is exclusively in the logistics sector, within
16 the purview of the logistics sector and its chief.
17 Q. [Previous translation continues]... look at item 4. In this
18 item, one had to assure that a unit of the police, through the chief of
19 Administration in Charge of Operational and Training, this police unit
20 was necessary about looking after the war booty. Which were the
21 competencies of the chief of the administration in charge of operations
22 and training when he received this document? What was he able to do?
23 A. Could we please scroll down this document a bit. Thank you. The
24 Administration for Operations and Training does not have any competence
25 over military police units. We can see that this document this officer
1 sent to the command post, to the basic command post, the competence of
2 this administration or the basic command post was to advise of the
3 contents of this information, the sector of intelligence, which had the
4 military police within its competence.
5 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D3015.
6 D3015. P3015. 3015. [In English] No, 3015, sorry. It's my fault.
7 [Interpretation] Excuse me. 3015. No, in English it was my fault.
8 Q. In this, you can see that General Krstic who at the time was the
9 commander of the Drina Corps requests engagement of a military police
10 unit in the enclave of Zepa in order to -- which was necessary for
11 organising and collecting the war booty and prevent any looting. This
12 document is dated 20 July 1995, and the document we just saw before that
13 was the 19th July, 1995.
14 Do you see any connection between the two documents?
15 A. I can see some similarities and some differences. The
16 similarities are in the following: The first document was sent to the
17 forward command post, and this document here was sent to the -- to
18 General Miletic personally and with a request for a military police
19 battalion. But they both deal with one and the same matter.
20 The military police had never been nor could it be within the
21 competence of the Administration for Operations and Training. During
22 combat operations and in many situations, a large number of officers,
23 when they need to resolve an issue, then they try to send something to a
24 person. So if you are to send something to a command post and wish that
25 to be forwarded to another command post, then you would send it
1 personally to the commander, for instance, Commander Miletic [as
2 interpreted], and then he would personally send it or forward it to the
3 Administration of Operations and Training for implementation. But there
4 is mention here of a request for a military police unit, but this
5 document will probably in the end reach the right address where it was
6 meant for.
7 Q. Just a correction concerning the transcript, page 45, line 21.
8 What did you say for the first document? Was it sent to the command
9 post, the main command post or the forward command post?
10 A. The first document says "command post," "KM." Then -- when it
11 says "KM," then mainly what they mean is the main command post.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Basic. Interpreter's correction: the basic
13 command post.
14 JUDGE KWON: Madam Fauveau.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] The document is --
16 JUDGE KWON: Did the witness say Commander Miletic in line 5 of
17 page 46?
18 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, I don't think so, Judge.
19 Q. Have you at any time spoken about Commander Miletic?
20 A. No. I said KM command post, and at one point I noticed in the
21 transcript that for "KM" there was "Kosovo and Metohija," and then it was
23 Q. There is another mistake in the transcript. Did you say that
24 this document --
25 JUDGE AGIUS: It still doesn't explain who else he mentioned
1 instead of Commander Miletic, because from the transcript itself, to me
2 its obvious that he did mention a name, even though it wasn't Commander
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps I can repeat what I've said
5 from the start: The only thing that is certain that I never mentioned
6 Commander Miletic because I never saw or mentioned his name in this
7 expert report. The first document that was sent was sent to the KM.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. I don't think we need to repeat
9 everything. I will just read out to you the relevant part, and then you
10 tell us who did you mention:
11 You said:
12 "So if you are to send something to a command post and wish that
13 it be" -- "wish it to be forwarded to another command post, then you
14 would send it personally to the commander, for instance ..." And then we
15 have "Commander Miletic."
16 Who did you mention: Commander whoever, "... and then he would
17 personally send it or forward it to the Administration for Operations and
18 Training for implementation."
19 In the example that you gave, who did you mention as being the
20 person forwarding the information?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Miletic [as interpreted].
22 I never said "Commander Miletic."
23 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you. So let's proceed.
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] There still is a mistake.
25 Q. To whom did General Miletic transmit this information, in
1 particular, the information contained in this document?
2 A. This document would have to be forwarded to the sector for
3 security and intelligence.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now see document P186.
5 This is a document from the Main Staff security and intelligence
6 department dated 29 July, 1995.
7 Q. Please look at paragraph 3 of the document and tell us whether
8 this paragraph corresponds to the competencies of the organ in charge of
9 intelligence and security.
10 A. First of all, I would like to intervene with a small correction.
11 The way it was translated was that this was from the intelligence and
12 security department, but in fact it is from the intelligence and security
13 sector. Secondly, the third paragraph, when we look at the way it has
14 been written but also based on its substance, we can see that it is not
15 something that is within the purview of the intelligence and security
17 THE INTERPRETER: Organ, interpreter's correction.
18 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Could you give an explanation, why did General Tolimir have this
20 document done for something which is outside of his own competence?
21 A. We can see that he forwarded this document to General Krstic
22 personally. Probably, and this is just my assessment, in order to be
23 more emphatic, he appeared to issue an order in this sentence. However,
24 from all the other documents that we've seen so far, I don't think that
25 there were any breaches of the chain of command and subordination.
1 Q. You can see in this paragraph that indeed the Drina Corps was
2 supposed to take all possible measures to prevent the Zepa Brigade to
3 come out of its encircled position. Did it have -- in military
4 terminology, is breaking the encircling have any specific meaning?
5 A. The term "break through from the encirclement" is not a military
6 term. The word -- the military term is "break out on encirclement," so
7 this is rather unusual the way it's been used here.
8 Q. Could you conclude from this document what General Tolimir was
9 thinking about when he speaks about breaking through the circle?
10 A. In my military assessment, this is an instruction, a request,
11 sent to the commander to try and do -- and use everything in his power to
12 prevent the break through from the encirclement but, rather, to try and
13 resolve the problem within the encirclement with his own unit.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown
15 document --
16 Q. Just before this, from a military point of view this paragraph,
17 this precise paragraph, does it concern the civilian population?
18 A. The entire paragraph refers exclusively to military personnel.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown
20 P3036. This is a document from the Podrinje Brigade dated 1st August,
22 Q. Could you have a look at this text in total?
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we go back at the very
24 beginning of the document.
25 Q. At the beginning of the document, we may see that it's about the
1 movement of enemy groups from the Zepa enclave, the group of enemies
2 breaking through the enclave of Zepa. After that, in the first paragraph
3 it speaks of Muslim forces, and after that, in the third paragraph the
4 enemy groups are mentioned. There are directions indicated which these
5 groups are following. And finally, at the end --
6 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could you show the bottom of the
7 document in B/C/S, and in English it would be page 3.
8 Q. Here, at the end we can see the term "sweeping" [as interpreted]
9 and "balai" and essentially Muslims. From a military point of view, does
10 this paragraph have to do anything with the civilian population?
11 A. Judging by this entire document that was produced by this chief
12 of the intelligence organ of this brigade, there is always mention of BH
13 Army members, but they keep using different terms. So sometimes it is
14 difficult to put all this in context. The terms in use are not typically
15 military terms or they are used in error, and it is not clear to me at
16 all why he would send a document like this to anyone other than his
17 immediate superior.
18 So if we were to analyse this document we could conclude that he
19 means members of BH Army throughout the document.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Before we have the break, I noticed that in
21 your question, Ms. Fauveau, you started by saying:
22 "Here, at the end we can see the term 'sweeping' and then
24 I am trying to find the words "sweeping." It think it's a
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, no.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: So if you could kindly say which word you had
3 mentioned apart from balija, which word you had referred to.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I think I didn't say about
5 sweeping. Perhaps I used a derogatory term.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: "balai" and not
8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. That makes it more confusing to me. I
9 think I need 25 minutes.
10 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, I don't think I said anything
11 about sweeping, but maybe I used a derogatory term. I'm not sure.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Let's have -- yes, but I don't see
13 another derogatory term in the -- in the document. Let's have a
14 25-minute break now. Thank you.
15 --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam Fauveau, please.
18 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In order to clarify things, when I
19 use the word "balije," I used this word which is used in the document
20 which I quoted from the document in the paragraph-before-last.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Note from the interpreter: The term was
23 confused with "balayer," which means "to sweep" in French.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: I understand that. In fact, I thought about that,
25 and I made two and two together. You should speak your French a little
1 bit more slowly, it means.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we show the top part of this
3 document to the witness, please.
4 Q. Amongst others, this document is addressed to General Miletic.
5 What were the competencies of the head of Administration for Operations
6 and Training and of the administration in the tracking of enemy groups
7 throughout the territory of Republika Srpska?
8 A. The Administration for Operations and Training has nothing to do
9 with intelligence activities. This was sent by the intelligence organs
10 to his services, and by some sort of inertia, it was also sent to the
11 basic command post. Surveillance of enemy forces and the conditions in
12 which they are operating is precisely defined as falling within the
13 competence of the intelligence organs headed by the intelligence
14 administration in the sector for intelligence and security.
15 Q. What is the role for the Administration for Operations and
16 Training during the surrender of soldiers from the enemy forces?
17 A. It has nothing to do with prisoners either, no competencies and
18 no obligations. It doesn't fall within its purview.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
20 Exhibit 5D1373. This is a document from the security services, from the
21 state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the Gorazde sector.
22 Q. And I would like you to look at paragraph -- at the last
23 paragraph, which talks about groups of combatants who crossed the border
24 and who entered Yugoslavia.
25 According to this document, which stems from the Muslim
1 authorities, were civilians involved in the crossing of the border, and
2 are they concerned here by this last paragraph?
3 A. This last paragraph is very precise because it says "some of our
4 groups of fighters," which implies that this refers exclusively to
5 soldiers of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, certain groups of our
6 fighters. Whether there is any possibilities of finding others in those
7 groups I don't know, but the telegram is precise. We registered that
8 certain of our fighters from Zepa.
9 Q. Now, the group of combatants, from a military point of view
10 groups of combatants traveling from Zepa, were they a danger for the Army
11 of Republika Srpska and for the civilian population on the territory of
12 Republika Srpska?
13 A. Every group of fighters, and this refers primarily to broken-up
14 groups of fighters, are a threat to every army and the entire population
15 because their behaviour, as a rule, is uncontrolled, undirected, and they
16 are armed and have military equipment.
17 Q. What are the usual actions which an army undertakes when groups
18 of fighters move on the territory over which it has control, a group of
19 enemy fighters, that is?
20 A. In all such situations, first all the organs on the ground are
21 warned, all the commands of the army units. Then the MUP and all the MUP
22 units are warned, and the local authorities are warned who can take
23 action, such as, for example, disseminating information. All the forces
24 on the ground attempt to register such groups and to capture them and
25 disarm them and then hand them over to the competent authorities. Such
1 groups are treated with great caution because one never knows what they
2 will do.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now move to a different
4 subject matter. I would like to show the witness Exhibit 5D903. The
5 document in question is an explanation about the authorisation for the
6 passage of convoys and the carrying out of the weekly plan for
7 humanitarian aid.
8 Q. Now, first of all, could you tell us, what is a notification in
9 the military terminology? And just for the transcript, in your report
10 this is 5D759 on page 35 in the B/C/S version, page 42 in the English
11 version in which you have given us a classification for military
13 Could you please, therefore, explain what is the meaning of the
14 word "notification"?
15 A. I would like to repeat the classification made here as regards
16 combat documents. For the most part, they are similar in all armed
17 forces all over the world, and these were valid in the VRS. All combat
18 documents are divided into three groups: first, command; second,
19 information; and the third are auxiliary documents. And from this
20 classification, one can see that information has, for its purpose,
21 obtaining all the elements needed to command, whether something has been
22 done, how it has been done, and whether the command needs to take any
23 corrective action. So this forms into the reporting and information
24 group of documents, the second group.
25 Q. We know that General Miletic, that some of these notifications
1 entail the name "General Miletic." In paragraph 190 - and this is on
2 page 85 in the English text, page 66 in B/C/S in your report - you stated
3 that General Miletic was involved in the procedure, the decision-making
4 procedure about humanitarian aid and the passage of convoys. Can you
5 tell us what his participation consist in?
6 A. The reply to your question is in paragraph 191 where I stated
7 that the documents signed by General Miletic are informative documents
8 not having the character of orders. When information had to be sent,
9 when there was no opportunity, as would have been the case in normal
10 conditions, for the Chief of Staff to sign notification documents, then
11 General Miletic signed them and sent them to the unit.
12 Q. So before our eyes what we have is the approval for a weekly plan
13 for humanitarian aid, and this is the approval concerning authorities of
14 Republika Srpska.
15 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
16 document 1361, which is a document from the Army of Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina from 3rd of April, 1995. Sorry, it's 5D1361.
18 Q. So as you can see, this is a similar document which also mentions
19 the approval of a weekly plan conducted by UNPROFOR, UNPROFOR movements,
20 except that in this case we are talking about movements within the area
21 of the 2nd Corps and within the boundaries of that area.
22 As a rule, why do armies deliver special authorisations about the
23 convoys of humanitarian organisations and UNPROFOR?
24 A. Every army in Bosnia-Herzegovina was responsible for the
25 situation on its own territory, inter alia security for UNPROFOR units
1 passing through. To ensure security, they delivered these plans for
2 their movements thus pre-empting any surprises.
3 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
4 Exhibit 5D783. This is a document from the Drina Corps dated 2nd August,
5 1993, which conveys to the subordinated units an order from the Main
6 Staff about the passage of UNPROFOR's convoys. The only point I am
7 interested in in this document is on page 2 of the B/C/S version and page
8 3 in English, and I'm referring to item 13 at the very end. So in B/C/S
9 it's the mention that's at the very bottom of the page.
10 Q. According to the order, all misunderstandings with UNPROFOR had
11 to be solved with UNPROFOR including at the meetings which took place
12 with UNPROFOR.
13 Now, in an army when some officers are in charge and attend some
14 meetings, are these officers in charge of a specific area for the agenda
15 of the meeting?
16 A. One can see here that the original document on cooperation with
17 UNPROFOR was forwarded to the units. One can see that all details had
18 been defined with UNPROFOR, and one can see that the people in the joint
19 commissions were authorised to solve all the problems that had arisen,
20 and if they were not able to do so they would send them up to a higher
21 level where they would be dealt with.
22 Q. In the Main Staff, would that person be in charge -- would an
23 officer be in charge of UNPROFOR, but an officer who would not attend the
24 meetings with UNPROFOR?
25 A. Well, then there would be no point. Those working in the
1 commissions, their main task was to attend meetings, to participate in
2 reaching decisions, analyse problems, discuss them with their own
3 command, and then delegate these problems to the meetings that were held.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown
5 5D1348, please. This is about a meeting with the command of the various
6 armies involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a meeting with,
7 also, UNPROFOR. You can see on page 3 in English and in the signed
8 versions that this document was signed by Ratko Mladic for the Republika
9 Srpska representative.
10 Could I now have page 2 in B/C/S, which is also page 2 in the
11 English version. You can see that questions pertaining to the freedom of
12 movement and humanitarian questions were discussed in the course of the
13 meeting. That can be seen under item 1.
14 Q. Do these questions -- are these questions part of the
15 competencies of the Administration for Operations and Training?
16 A. Not a single element of this meeting fell within the purview of
17 the Administration for Operations and Training or, in other words, the
18 competencies of the Administration for Operations and Training cannot be
19 included in any agreement of this type because they're exclusively
20 military competencies.
21 Q. If for one reason or another General Miletic was given
22 competencies about UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations, would he have
23 had to accompany General Mladic to that meeting, to attend that meeting?
24 A. Had he been given the authority, then that authority would have
25 been clearly defined, and he would have been duty-bound to attend the
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May I now show you Exhibit 5D1174.
3 This is an order from the president of the republic dated 16th of
4 January, 1994. In item 3 of this order, you can see that all contentious
5 issues or controversial issues in relation with representatives of
6 UNPROFOR must be solved through the corps commands and through the Main
7 Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska and that any controversial issue in
8 relation to international humanitarian organisations must be dealt with
9 through the coordinating body of the government.
10 Q. Who, according to this order, was in charge of relations with
11 humanitarian organisations, the international humanitarian organisations?
12 A. In accordance with this order issued by the president of the
13 republic, the problem of military and the problem of humanitarian
14 organisations is clearly defined, and the coordination body of the
15 government is defined in a special document.
16 Q. And who was in charge of the relations with the international
17 humanitarian organisations according to this order?
18 A. The coordination body of the government.
19 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D76 --
20 772. It is an order from the Drina Corps dated 10 April, 1993,
21 concerning the control or monitoring of convoys.
22 Q. Did the checking of convoys, of humanitarian convoys, was
23 usual -- is usual in wartime?
24 A. It's absolutely usual. In accordance with what I said
25 previously, the VRS was responsible for the movements of these convoys,
1 for their security, and their coordination. And it was responsible when
2 they were moving through its territory for ensuring that this actually
3 was humanitarian aid and not something else.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1286?
5 This is an order from the Main Staff. It concerns humanitarian aid. In
6 the first paragraph of this order, one may see that about humanitarian
7 convoys, military equipment was given to the Muslims.
8 Q. Did the carriage or shipping of military milicija, did armies
9 normally allow transporting of military -- of humanitarian -- of military
10 equipment for humanitarian convoys in the other part of the conflict --
11 to the other part of the conflict?
12 A. No army in the world, including the Army of Republika Srpska,
13 allows humanitarian aid to be transported together with weapons, military
14 equipment, ammunition, and other things that can be used for military
16 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now see document 5D801.
17 This is an order from the Drina Corps -- a document from the Drina Corps
18 of 25 November, 1995.
19 THE INTERPRETER: 21st November, 1995, correction.
20 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In this document, one sees that --
21 on the 21st of November, 1993 -- the date is 21 November 1993. In this
22 document, one may see that the Drina Corps and the Main Staff of the Army
23 of Republika Srpska had the information about a possible transfer of
24 explosives and mines in bags which were supposed to be flour bags.
25 Q. This sort of information, does it normally have an influence on
1 the future passage of the humanitarian convoys and on the checking which
2 may be affected?
3 A. This information is the result of prior experience, which means
4 that such incidents have been noted and that such acts have been done.
5 And, on the basis of that, all those who manned the check-points were
6 warned, and in that respect I would point out the one-before-last
7 paragraph in B/C/S that -- where it is emphasized that the checks should
8 be made by taking samples and applying methods of inspection that would
9 prevent such things to happen in the future, which means to take all
10 measures to prevent any surprises.
11 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now see 5D956. This is an
12 information coming from the intelligence department in sector for
13 security and intelligence of the Main Staff, dated 13 August -- I think
15 In paragraph 2, one may read this:
16 "[In English] We confirmed information that a Turkish UNPROFOR
17 battalion contingent brought in double the combat equipment to the area
18 of Zenica than originally envisaged and gave a specific number of
19 armoured transporters and tanks to the so-called BH Army."
20 [No interpretation]
21 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, I am not receiving interpretation.
22 MS. FAUVEAU: [No interpretation]
23 JUDGE AGIUS: [French spoken]
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [No interpretation]
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Still the situation is the same. No, I am not
1 blaming anyone. I mean, these things happen. I am just waiting for it
2 to be resolved. No, what I am saying is being transcribed.
3 All right. If you could repeat again, please.
4 MS. FAUVEAU: [No interpretation]
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Again, we haven't --
6 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Of course, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: It's solved now. It's solved now. Thank you.
8 Please repeat your question, please. Thank you.
9 THE INTERPRETER: It seems that one console is defective in the
10 French booth.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I understand this had to be technical because
12 interpretation into B/C/S was being received. So let's proceed.
13 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]
14 Q. How is it that this type of information is -- how can it be
15 reflected on the passage of convoys of UNPROFOR and of humanitarian
17 A. This type was information contributed to increased inspections of
18 UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid convoys; for instance, the effect was that
19 the inspection was -- the inspections were more specific about what it is
20 that the units which were moving -- that belonged to the units that were
21 moving through there because up until then, many of those units carried
22 equipment that did not belong to them; secondly, the -- whether the
23 material that was arriving was in fact expended; and third, it pointed to
24 the need for increased inspections of the personnel that were parts of
25 those units.
1 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now have Exhibit 5D770.
2 This is an order from the Drina Corps about the movement of UNPROFOR's
3 convoys and about humanitarian convoys, and I'd like to have page 2 both
4 in the B/C/S and in the English versions. And the only point I am
5 interested in here is point number 9, the fact that radio and video
6 equipment is forbidden.
7 Q. Could you please tell us why video equipment is forbidden?
8 A. Radio and video equipment are the most sophisticated means or
9 devices used in intelligence. Radio and video equipment allow certain
10 information to be analysed by the best professionals that they had
12 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And I would now like to show to the
13 witness Exhibit 5D842. This is a document from the Main Staff dated 11th
14 of October, 1994, and I would like to have page 2 on the screen.
15 Q. Under point 5 of this document, you can see that three people
16 from UNHCR were not able to obtain authorisation to visit Zepa because
17 their intention was to take pictures with a camera.
18 Now, the intention to take pictures or to film or record video,
19 is this something which from a military point of view or for armies is
20 sufficient reason to deny access to a given area?
21 A. Absolutely. It is well known that filming is strictly prohibited
22 of certain areas, and combat areas are precisely such sites because they
23 are exposed and they are the focus of the intelligence work of the enemy.
24 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you
25 Exhibit 5D778. This is a document from the Drina Corps from 23rd July,
1 1993, informing the Main Staff about the fact that radio stations and the
2 satellite antenna was confiscated, taken away from a humanitarian convoy
3 or, rather, a Red Cross convoy, which carried humanitarian aid to
5 Q. You have already explained what is the meaning of radio
6 equipment. What about the confiscation of this particular equipment
7 which was part of a humanitarian convoy. Is this a usual procedure,
8 again from a military point of view?
9 A. It is absolutely common, and this practice is still in place
10 today. You will see that even delegations that want to visit an area are
11 not allowed to do so, let alone in wartime. So this is something that is
12 just in order to protect one's self from the actions of the other side or
13 from someone acting for the benefit of the other side.
14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And I'd like to show you now
15 5D1271. This is a conversation which is an intercept from 31st August,
16 1994, which comes from the Croat collection.
17 Q. In this conversation -- I mean, this is a summary of the
18 intercepted conversation between General Brinkman, the head of staff of
19 UNPROFOR, and General Milovanovic. And as you can see, the convoys
20 carrying fuel to the UN units in Srebrenica and Gorazde were not
22 Can you tell us the meaning of fuel in a conflict?
23 A. In a conflict fuel, and the meaning of fuel here is primarily
24 military fuel, for military usage, is very important for maneuvers of the
25 other side. Without the fuel, the enemy side will have fewer opportunity
1 for maneuvering and will be able to reach fewer areas.
2 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would still need
3 another 15 minutes. I'm terribly sorry about that.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: You don't need to be sorry, Madam. Incidentally,
5 also fuel in the context of combat operations should never fuel combat
6 operations because the more you fuel it the worse it becomes.
7 We'll stop here for today. We'll continue tomorrow morning at
8 9.00. After 15 minutes I reckon Ms. Fauveau will be finished with her
9 examination, so whoever is next please be prepared.
10 Thank you. General, same advisory as before. Thank you.
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
12 1.44 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the
13 16th day of January, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.