1 Tuesday, 3 February 2009
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.21 p.m.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, this is --
6 MR. HAYNES: If you could call the case, I think I'll raise it as
7 a preliminary.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam Registrar.
9 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Can you call the case, please, and then ...
11 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours, this is the case
12 number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Now, General Miletic is not present
14 today as you said yesterday he has already forwarded his waiver.
15 Composition today, Prosecution is Mr. McCloskey. Defence teams I
16 only notice the absence of Mr. Lazarevic, Mr. Krgovic, and that's it, I
17 think, and Ms. Tapuskovic.
18 Now, Mr. Haynes. We would like to finish the sitting today
19 because of things that have come up that we have to attend to at 6.15 at
20 the latest.
21 Now, under normal circumstances I would have suggested having two
22 sessions with just one break of 30 minutes. However, I know that you
23 asked for shorter sessions of an hour and 20 minutes each.
24 What do you think?
25 MR. HAYNES: I'll fall in with anything you wish to do to
1 maximise the amount of sitting time.
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Right. And shall we say that the accused or the --
3 your client or yourself should you require a break at any time, you will
4 let us know. [French on English channel]
5 I see madam --
6 MR. HAYNES: Yes, we will do that. Can I add one caveat to that?
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
8 MR. HAYNES: Your reaction when you walked into this courtroom
9 did not surprise me at all. I had been in court setting up for about 25
10 or 30 minutes. Several of my colleagues have been in here for not long
11 short of that and the accused himself has been sitting in the chair
12 waiting for you for 10 or 15 minutes, and you will come to realise that
13 the working conditions in this court at the moment are far from ideal. I
14 don't want to be too explicit, but I'm beginning to feel very
15 uncomfortable in here.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: You're not the only one, Mr. Haynes, and I told my
17 colleagues beforehand that if the temperature is as described to us,
18 unfortunately, I have a condition which cannot tolerate it beyond a
19 certain degree, I feel sick. So I'm telling you this straight and plain
20 that there can come a time unless it comes down, I will have to leave the
22 MR. HAYNES: I was invited by Mr. McCloskey to raise joint
23 concerns. I do wonder whether it's worth fit for purpose at the moment,
24 having been here for 25 or 30 minutes, I'm beginning to feel faint, to be
25 perfectly honest.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
2 MR. McCLOSKEY: I agree. It gets hotter the more you sit and
3 given the importance of this sitting, and in what heat does to all of us,
4 I'm sure we could handle it; but I'm not sure that's something that's
6 JUDGE AGIUS: I suggest opening at least two doors, one at
7 different ends of the courtroom so that the air could circulate and
8 switch off the air-conditioning or the heating system for a while.
9 Because if you switch it off and leave the doors closed, it's going to
10 remain the same. There's too much light, and it will keep the same
11 temperature. As I said, I mean I feel faint after a certain while if it
12 continues like this.
13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Josse, the idea would be to open this door and
15 then the door of the -- leading to the terrace for a while. That should
16 extract a good part of the heat, but over here, and I don't dispute with
17 security, it's easier said than done.
18 MR. JOSSE: I was going to say I think there may be a security
19 issue. I'm happy to open this door although it leads nowhere as I have
20 explained on the previous occasion.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: And we try a bit for a while. Can't that door
22 remain open as well.
23 MR. JOSSE: We probably need whoever is in charge of the security
24 today to come in here. That's what I would respectfully suggest,
25 Your Honour.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: It's like being in a sauna here.
2 Was it like this morning as well or what? No.
3 MR. JOSSE: It is much cooler in that corridor.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Haynes, let's start.
5 If you feel uncomfortable, and for that matter, I may feel
6 uncomfortable even before you, then speak up; and we'll see what we will
7 do. But I don't want to keep anyone in this courtroom unduly if the
8 conditions continue to remain like this.
9 MR. HAYNES: Thank you very much. Then we'll make a start.
10 Good afternoon, everybody. Good afternoon, Mr. Pandurevic.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.
12 WITNESS: VINKO PANDUREVIC [Resumed]
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Examination by Mr. Haynes: [Continued]
15 Q. Yesterday afternoon when we finished off we were just looking at
16 a few of the events that were going on in the command of the
17 Zvornik Brigade during the morning and the afternoon of the 16th of July,
18 and I trust you will recall that.
19 A. Yes I do.
20 Q. Now if you don't mind we'll turn our attention to where you were
21 and what you were doing at that time. On the morning of the 16th of
22 July, I think you'd already told us you got up quite early. Why was
24 A. I think I got up before dawn, even before 4.00 in the morning.
25 Q. Why was that?
1 A. Because I knew, based on the information that I had, that it was
2 possible for combat activities to commence early in the morning in that
4 Q. Now, I want to turn our attention, please, to the forces under
5 your command on the morning of the 16th of July. Can you tell us what
6 forces were available to you from the Zvornik Brigade itself?
7 A. I'll try to be as clear as possible to start from the most
8 general and then go to the more specific. As usual, the entire
9 Zvornik Brigade was under my command, meaning all the units that made up
10 that brigade. The deployment was slightly unusual, as well as there was
11 some other units of reinforcement and support that had come from
13 In this map behind my back, topographic signs indicate the total
14 tactical and combat situation prevailing on the morning and afternoon of
15 the 16th. By using the technology available to me at the moment, I may
16 try to show you which specific units I have in mind.
17 If we look at this bold red line, and this red spot, this
18 represents the defence line or rather the front line, and that is to say
19 the deployment in the area where the Zvornik Brigade units were; and that
20 is viewing from north towards south-west, that is to say the
21 1st Battalion, the 5th Battalion, the 2nd Battalion, the 3rd Battalion,
22 the 6th Battalion, the 4th Battalion, and the 7th Battalion. Those were
23 the units entirely deployed on the front line and their level of strength
24 was 100 percent.
25 There were also artillery fire support units and that was
1 actually a mixed artillery division shown by a triangle that you can see
3 There was also a battalion firing squad or rather mortar squad
4 for each battalion in their respective defence area. Each mortar was
5 marked like this, that is to say, everybody battalion had their mortar
6 batteries as their own artillery support.
7 The units that were part of the Zvornik Brigade but whose form of
8 deployment was not in the area of Baljkovica were as follows: The
9 Podrinje detachment of the special forces was in the area west of the
10 command post of the 4th Battalion. They were ready both to act on the
11 front and against the 28th Division.
12 Then there was the company of the military police which was
13 deployed at the command post of the 4th Battalion on the east side.
14 There were also two military police regiments of the East Bosnian Corps
15 where the 4th and the 6th Battalions linked up.
16 In addition to that, there were elements of --
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters would kindly ask the witness
18 to slow down when enumerating all these units, please.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: General, you are enumerating a good number of units
20 and you are going a little bit too fast for the interpreters. If could
21 slow down, especially when you are mentioning names or indicating units,
22 please. Thank you.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, I will do that.
24 I think the last unit on the transcript were two platoons of the
25 East Bosnian Corps deployed where the 4th and the 6th Battalions linked
2 There was the Bratunac Brigade company on the south-west position
3 vis-a-vis the battalion command post, then there was an intervention
4 platoon from the 2nd Infantry Battalion also close nearby.
5 On the 13th and the 14th July, two companies were established by
6 Dragan Obrenovic and these two were in the area of Crni Vrh: One company
7 was commanded by Major Jovanovic and the other one was commanded by
8 Mr. Maric.
9 Also, west of these two companies was a MUP detachment from
10 Doboj. On the Parlog-Baljkovica axis and this is the line that I'm just
11 showing, were joint forces of the MUP commanded by Ljubisa Borovcanin
12 including a detachment of the special police from Sekovici and
13 PJP Company from Zvornik.
14 There was also a tank company of the Zvornik Brigade which, for
15 the most part, was deployed along the road Crni Vrh-Memici and also on
16 the Orahovac-Parlog-Baljkovica axis. Those were the forces that on the
17 16th of July available to me and which I commanded.
18 Q. In terms of manpower, what was the approximate number of men
19 under your command on the morning of the 16th of July?
20 A. If we add to this the entire forces of the Zvornik Brigade in the
21 defence area, the total number of men was over 6.000.
22 Q. And the units you've just described to us and pointed out on the
24 A. On the 16th of July at dawn, all these units were at these
25 locations that I mentioned with the exception of two platoons from the
1 eastern Bosnia Corps who arrived sometime after 10.00 on that same day,
2 that is to say, on the 16th of July.
3 Q. It's probably my fault, Mr. Pandurevic, a bad question. I was
4 asking you how many men were there in the units that you've described and
5 point out on the map behind you?
6 A. This area that I am circling here is an interesting area in terms
7 of the 16th of July and the combat activities carried out there. Around
8 2.000 troops were directly under my command in that area on that day.
9 Q. Now, as to the battalions, how would you describe their positions
10 on the front line facing the 2nd Corps?
11 A. The front line that I showed you which is marked by a bold red
12 line represents the positions of the Zvornik Brigade that for nearly four
13 years had not been shifted either forwards or backwards. Those were the
14 positions that we soldiers usually say excellently fortified, that is to
15 say communicating trenches were there, shelters were there for both the
16 troops and the equipment.
17 In front of these positions, we had prepared minefields and there
18 were occasional wire obstacles. In other words, the front end of the
19 defence of the Zvornik Brigade was remarkably well fortified, and from
20 the [indiscernible] to the north up to Memici and Spreca river to the
21 west, there was a communicating trench dug out which is actually a canal
22 with the depth of 1.20 metres.
23 Q. Now, you told us yesterday about the work you had done during the
24 15th of July deploying units. What was the position of the 28th Division
25 by the morning of the 16th of July and how were your units deployed in
1 relation to it?
2 A. On the evening of the 15th, we knew the deployment area of the
3 28th Division. If you look at the map, what I'm showing you now marked
4 with colour blue and number 28, PD represents the forces of the
5 28th Division. As you can see, the forces under my command were -- had
6 fully blocked the forces of the 28th Division by pushing them forward
7 from the back and from the flanks and keeping them off the front line.
8 Q. In terms of your position as commander, how were you able to
9 command these units?
10 A. I had my own observation post -- excuse me -- at such a position
11 which gave me a full view of the battle-field or rather the area where
12 the combat activities were going on.
13 Secondly, there was another observation post of the mixed
14 artillery division in this area here and also in the sector of Memici,
15 the observers adjacent to me were also able to view the entire
16 battle-field and to update me about all the changes. I also had radio
17 communications and also wire communications with certain battalions.
18 Q. I just want to retrace our steps a little bit to amplify
19 something you said. The mixed artillery division, were its guns, as it
20 were, substantially trained in one direction?
21 A. The mixed artillery division was made up of different kinds of
22 artillery weapons. It was made up of platoons or batteries, one of them
23 was ZIS 76-millimetre guns of Russian make. It also had a
24 122-millimetre howitzer battery, 155-millimetre howitzer platoon; one,
25 152-millimetre howitzer and 120-mortar battery made up of six mortars.
1 Their firing positions and their area of activity was such that all the
2 targets in this area stretching from Memici via Nezuk, Baljkovica, et
3 cetera were within their range and within their zone of operation.
4 Q. Could any or all of that artillery have been targeted upon the
5 forces of the 28th Division on the 16th of July?
6 A. The majority of these weapons were able of firing at the column
7 of the 28th Division and a smaller number of these weapons needed about
8 half an hour in order to adjust their platform at the firing positions in
9 order to be able to fire efficaciously.
10 Q. What was there also available at your disposal, as it were, more
11 mobile artillery within the battalions themselves?
12 A. We had a self-propelled 76-millimetre battery which was also part
13 of the formation division. However, at the time it was deployed in the
14 defence area of the 4th Infantry Battalion, I forgot to mention it
16 We also had tanks that cannot be categorised as artillery weapons
17 but their calibre was large and those were actually four T-55 tanks and
18 T-34 tanks of 75-millimetre calibre.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 A. Not to mention anti-aircraft guns, 20, 30, and 56 millimetres.
21 Q. Now did any combat commence on the morning of the 16th of July?
22 A. Yes, it did.
23 Q. At about what time?
24 A. The combat began at around 4.00 in the morning.
25 Q. And from which direction did it commence?
1 A. The combat started from the direction of Nezuk, that is to say,
2 from the 246 Mountain Brigade of the 2nd Corps which happened when the
3 artillery fire started.
4 Q. Two questions: Firstly, how heavy was the shelling?
5 A. It was heavier than usual. During the war, we managed to repel
6 numerous number of the attacks by the 2nd Corps along that axis. In the
7 past, there were fierce artillery fire when Major Petrovic, the brigade
8 commander was wounded; but on this particular day, I could say that the
9 artillery fire was intense.
10 Q. And how accurate was it?
11 A. Given that the Muslim forces only knew the exact deployment of
12 our forward defence line, that is to say, the units in the trenches, most
13 of their fire originally and initially was concentrated and focused on
14 these positions.
15 Q. Did it hit your positions?
16 A. The fire targeting the forward positions created no consequences
17 for the Zvornik Brigade units because a number of positions were in the
18 woods; and on the other hand, we were well-fortified, we had good
19 shelters and covers; and therefore, they suffered no losses as a result
20 of the artillery fire.
21 Q. Did the artillery fire hit anything else?
22 A. At times, the artillery fire was transferred, as we soldiers say,
23 in-depth targeting the general area of Baljkovica, Motovska Kosa and
24 Planici. A number of shells landed at a couple of hundred metres from my
25 forward command post.
1 Q. Were there any consequences of that for you or anybody else?
2 A. We suffered losses in terms that we had troops wounded and
3 killed. However, I don't know what kind of injuries caused these losses,
4 whether those were caused by artillery fire or rifle fire.
5 At any rate, one can always see and hear and notice artillery
6 fire; and therefore, one has ample time to find cover.
7 Q. Where were the forces of the 28th Division in relation to where
8 the artillery fire was falling in the depth?
9 A. The forces of the 28th Division were deployed as shown in the map
10 closer to Baljkovica, and as a result of the artillery fire from the
11 2nd Corps, they suffered so-called friendly-fire losses.
12 Q. How long did the artillery fire go on for on the morning of the
13 16th of July?
14 A. The first strikes lasted for about 15 to 20 minutes, which is a
15 standard feature, and it provided support to infantry. After that, fire
16 was opened at different time intervals and without any particular
17 systematic order.
18 Q. During that period, what did the forces of the 28th Division do
19 so far as you could see or find out?
20 A. The forces under my command that were holding the 28th Division
21 under blockade informed me about minor movements and commotion among the
22 troops of the 28th Division in anticipation of the forces to break
23 through from the front and to link up with them. But there was no
24 organised attack by them on that morning.
25 Q. Did the forces of the 2nd Division or the 2nd Corps break your
2 A. No, the defence lines of the 4th, 6th and 7th Battalions remained
3 unchanged and all the troops remained in their positions.
4 Q. Did the forces of the 28th Division break out of the blockade?
5 you've described?
6 A. At one point, some elements of the 28th Division, whilst moving
7 along the -- as I am showing you on this map -- managed to push the crews
8 of self-propelled guns that were deployed in the area because the
9 soldiers having seen a large group of enemy soldiers abandoned their
10 positions because they were not infantry, and they were not trained to
11 fight with rifles in their hands. So two or three guns were captured by
12 the 28th Division.
13 Q. How long were they in the possession of the 28th Division?
14 A. Not for long. As soon as we received reports that elements of
15 the 28th Division were there, we targeted this area with our artillery
16 fire and these self-propelled guns stopped firing back. By the way, the
17 position where these guns were deployed had a planned area of operation
18 and this area of operation was actually the Nezuk sector; that is to say,
19 the forces of the 2nd Corps.
20 Since our forces were in Baljkovica in a depression, it was
21 impossible to fire from these guns at a negative angle. Therefore,
22 initially, they fired mainly towards Parlog and towards the southern part
23 from my IKM where the village of Kuce [phoen] was.
24 Q. Well, we might return to that in a little while.
25 Now, you told us yesterday, and we listened to a recording of
1 your conversation with the opposing commander, Semso Muminovic. We'll
2 come on to some conversations you had with him on the 16th of July, but
3 other than him, was there any other contact between your forces and the
4 enemy on the morning of the 16th of July?
5 A. If you are referring to exchange of fire, there were those, but
6 if you are talking about radio contact, at one point, we received reports
7 through surveillance that Semso was trying to get in touch with me.
8 Q. What about personal contact between anybody from within your
9 forces and a member of the opposing forces?
10 A. At one point, I think it was between 9.00 and 10.00,
11 Dragan Obrenovic, who was in the area of the command post of the 4th
12 Battalion reported to me through means of -- through the communication
13 devices that an officer from the 28th Division had surrendered to him,
14 that this man was wounded, and that he told them the exact deployment and
15 positions of the 28th Division, the number of troops, the number of men
16 under arms, the number of men without arms, and he described how grave
17 the situation in the 28th Division was.
18 Q. Do you remember what that man's name was?
19 A. I think his last name was Salihovic, and I can't recall his first
21 Q. And what did Dragan Obrenovic do with him?
22 A. He interviewed him, they gave him first-aid, and acting on my
23 orders, they let him go back to the division to convey to them that I
24 would establish contact in order to negotiate with them and allow the
25 column to pass through.
1 Q. And did you do that?
2 A. When I was explaining my interim combat report of the 15th
3 yesterday, what I had in my mind at the time was a firm decision to open
4 up the front line and let through the forces of the 28th Division. All I
5 had been waiting for was a suitable moment to do that. This seemed to be
6 an excellent moment providing me with a reason to act in this way. I
7 established contact with Semso Muminovic through our radio equipment.
8 Q. About what time of the day was that on the 16th of July?
9 A. I think our talks began at around 10.00 in the morning or a few
10 minutes later.
11 Q. And how quickly did you reach an agreement that morning?
12 A. I think we reached an agreement relatively quickly, but we needed
13 time for the results of our agreement to be conveyed to all the units on
14 the ground. So this all went on until a little after 11.00.
15 Q. How did you receive the history that the man called Salihovic had
16 given to Dragan Obrenovic, in other words how was it told to you?
17 A. I heard this from Dragan Obrenovic in the I have just described.
18 I assumed that the situation in the 20th Division had to be grave, but I
19 had had no idea it was as grave as represented by Mr. Salihovic in his
20 conversation with Obrenovic.
21 Q. Where was Obrenovic when he told you this?
22 A. He was in the immediate vicinity of the command post of the
23 4th Battalion.
24 Q. And what did you tell him to do at that stage?
25 A. I told him when he let that man go back or rather once he had let
1 the man go back, he should organise his own evacuation and the evacuation
2 of part of the men who were with him to the point where the 4th and
3 6th Battalion joined up.
4 Q. Why did you tell him to do that?
5 A. In addition to my decision to enter into negotiations and open up
6 a corridor for the passage of the 28th Division, I knew that they would
7 concentrate around the command post and that, in any case, I had to be
8 prepared for possible artillery fire if something went wrong. And that
9 therefore, I had to evacuate Obrenovic from there in order to establish a
10 so-called safe area for artillery fire.
11 Q. Were the guns of your artillery division repositioned during the
12 morning of the 16th of July?
13 A. Not all of them, only one platoon of 105-millimetre howitzers was
14 transferred or repositioned, that is.
15 Q. Did you use your artillery during the morning of the 16th of
17 A. Yes, my artillery fired on the forces of the 2nd Corps which were
18 attacking from the front line. They were acting -- they were doing
19 so-called barrage fire.
20 Q. Did you use your artillery on the forces of the 28th Division?
21 A. In the early morning hours, the howitzer platoon of the
22 4th Battalion and probably the 6th fired with their mortars, but later on
23 the artillery of the mixed artillery unit did not do that.
24 Q. Why not?
25 A. Quite simply, I did not issue such an order. I wanted to save as
1 many lives as possible.
2 Q. What agreement did you reach with Semso Muminovic?
3 A. The agreement was that soldiers from the 4th Battalion from three
4 trenches should be moved thus opening up a corridor several hundred
5 metres wide. That soldiers from his brigade and my soldiers should be in
6 direct contact, and that the column of the 28th Division was being
7 invited and called upon and directed to pass through that corridor. We
8 knew the name of the feature, it was a small place called Resnik and
9 Zuta Zemlja. They passed along that axis.
10 Let me add that part of the agreement was that some of the
11 soldiers from the 2nd Corps should enter in the direction of Baljkovica
12 and assist in the evacuation of the wounded and the ill who were in the
13 column of the 28th Division.
14 Q. Was there anything you asked for in return as part of this
16 A. At the time the agreement was reached, when we had agreed on
17 every detail, I had no counter-requests to make. Later on, I heard that
18 a soldier named Tesic had been taken prisoner, and I asked him to be sent
19 back, to be exchanged. At the insistence of some members of the MUP, I
20 also asked for an exchange because Mr. Jankovic had been captured
21 previously and was held by Semso Muminovic, so I asked for him.
22 Q. How was the agreement put into effect?
23 A. It was implemented in full at around 1300 or 1400 hours. Parts
24 of the 28th Division were already passing through the corridor and going
25 off in the direction of Nezuk. Their passage continued until nightfall.
1 It was supervised by both sides. We had agreed that if either side
2 violated the agreement one-sidedly, the other side could open fire.
3 Q. What preceded the actual opening of the lines?
4 A. A complete cessation of hostilities, informing all the units on
5 the ground and the beginning of the passage through the corridor. Of
6 course, the soldiers had to be moved from these trenches so that they
7 would be opened up, freed up for the passage of the division.
8 Q. And for about how long was the period of cease-fire before the
9 soldiers of the 28th Division began to pass through the open trenches?
10 A. Between an hour or two hours, certainly, and it was agreed that
11 it should go on for 24 hours; that is the same time on the next day, but
12 it actually lasted longer.
13 MR. HAYNES: Now, I just want to go through a few documents with
14 you relating to the events of that morning.
15 Can we start with P254, please, a daily combat report of the
16 Bratunac Brigade of the 15th of July. And under paragraph 2, we see it
18 "Part of our forces has been sent to the area of the Zvornik
19 Light Infantry Brigade, 80 soldiers and another platoon has been sent to
20 the Romanija Motorised Brigade."
21 Q. Did that unit arrive and place itself under your command?
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. HAYNES: Can we now go to the duty operation officer's
24 notebook P377, and we want page 141 in the English and B/C/S, of course;
25 and Ms. Stewart, thank you very much.
1 Q. Mr. Pandurevic, can you look at page 5759 and the entry ...
2 A. At 1330?
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. It says: "Lazo says that everything is all right where he is --
5 the Bratunac people have arrived and are deployed at Parlog."
6 Q. Is that the same unit we've just been looking at in the combat
7 report of the Bratunac Brigade?
8 A. Yes, it's the same unit.
9 Q. And what is being referred to in the entry of 1230, the call
10 from Zoran Jovanovic relating to 100 men and 130 for Maric?
11 A. At this time, at 12.30, Zoran Jovanovic, that's Major
12 Zoran Jovanovic who was the commander of a company which I said had been
13 established previously and numbered 100 men, he -- and 130 men for Maric,
14 food had to be delivered for them; and they were in the Crni Vrh area.
15 MR. HAYNES: Thank you. Can we have a look please at 7D774.
16 Q. This is an order of the Drina Corps dated the 16th of July of
17 1995 sent to the command of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st
18 Military Light Infantry Brigade and the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry
20 "Because of the very complex situation in the zone of
21 responsibility of the 1st Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade, this brigade
22 must be reinforced so as to prevent enemy forces operating from the
23 direction of Tuzla and enemy forces pulling out of Srebrenica via
24 Kamenica towards Tuzla from linking up.
25 "In order to assist the 1st Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade, I
1 hereby issue the following order: The command of 1st Bratunac Light
2 Infantry Brigade shall detach 100 men fit for active combat operations.
3 "The command of the 1st Military Light Infantry Brigade shall
4 directly contact the commander of the 1st Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade
5 to agree on coordinated action.
6 "The command of the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade shall
7 detach 30 men, and the command of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade shall
8 receive soldiers from these units."
9 Were they forces that on the 16th of July you anticipated
10 arriving and being placed under your command?
11 A. Yes. I was expecting them, and as far as I can remember, the
12 forces from the Bratunac Brigade did arrive and were deployed in the
13 Crni Vrh area along the road together with R Battalion to the best of my
14 recollection also a platoon from the Vlasenica Brigade arrived numbering
15 30 men; and the commander of the Milici Brigade contacted the commander
16 of the Zvornik Brigade but did not arrive in the area of defence of the
17 Zvornik Brigade with his men.
18 Q. I just want to come on quickly and deal with the self-propelled
19 guns you were telling us about. Can we have a look at P1183 D, and it's
20 under seal so it better not be broadcast. If it's an initial, I can't
21 see anything offensive about the English translation.
22 This is a conversation recorded at 7.06 in the morning of the
23 16th of July. You've obviously had the opportunity to read it,
24 Mr. Pandurevic. To the best of your recollection, did you have a
25 conversation like this and who with?
1 A. I remember having a conversation with General Krstic about this
3 Q. And did you tell him about the taking of two self-propelled guns?
4 A. Yes. When asked by him about the situation, I reported to him
5 that there was combat going on and that the Muslim forces had taken those
6 two self-propelled weapons.
7 MR. HAYNES: Now can we have a look at P2231, page 21, and P2232
8 page 19. This is the book of tactical intercepts.
9 Q. There's an entry 238, "1140, Igman said that weapons are to be
10 ready to fire at planned targets."
11 In the book of codes or the list of codes for use on the
12 16th of July, who was Igman 1?
13 A. To the best of my recollection, Igman was the name of the
14 artillery battalion and Igman might have been a subordinate unit of that
15 artillery battalion.
16 Q. And what does it appear has been listened into that Igman 1 has
17 been saying about weapons being ready to fire at planned targets?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Well, what's he talking about?
20 A. As I understand this conversation, I can't see the proper
21 passages, the corresponding passages in the translation, but what this is
22 about is that artillery has taken up its positions, selected its targets,
23 and is ready to open fire.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Haynes, we'll have a break of 20 minutes in
25 five minutes' time or earlier if you so wish.
1 MR. HAYNES: Thank you very much. That's very helpful.
2 Q. Can we go to the bottom of that page. Palma in person; who's
4 A. Palma in person was me, or rather the commander of the
5 Zvornik Brigade.
6 Q. And Lovac 1 in person; who was that?
7 A. Looking at all these documents and analysing them, I think it was
8 Dragan Obrenovic; he was Lovac 1.
9 MR. HAYNES: There may be an element of confusion here because
10 the page in Serbian is not the right page. I think we need to go forward
11 a page so that Mr. Pandurevic and all those who want to read it in that
12 language can follow. Well it's further up the page, but I think it's too
13 faint to read. Yes. Okay.
14 Q. Just one more question on the first entry which presumably is now
15 not on the page in Serbian. It says at 1140:
16 "They seized some elements of our weapons but they did not fire
17 because of the cease-fire."
18 And it's reminded me that there is something I didn't ask you
20 What happened after Obrenovic and his units had evacuated the
21 command of the 4th Battalion?
22 A. Obrenovic then withdrew to the place where the 4th and
23 6th Battalions joined up. I continued negotiations and while the
24 negotiations were going on, fire was not opened from artillery weapons.
25 Q. What happened to the command of the 4th Battalion?
1 A. The command of the 4th Battalion also withdrew in the direction
2 of Parlog where we later established a new command post for them.
3 Q. And what did the forces of the 28th Division do after Obrenovic
4 and the command of the 4th Battalion had withdrawn and whilst you were
6 A. The forces of the 28th Division were already in the Baljkovica
7 area along the road, that is a depression around the command post of the
8 4th Battalion and that was the axis along which they passed.
9 MR. HAYNES: Can we now have a look, please, at P2231, B/C/S page
10 22 and English page 20.
11 Q. This is Palma again to Lovac 1, so from what you tell us that's
12 you talking to Obrenovic. We agreed that their axis is going to be
13 towards the stream so that we liberate Breznik and Govedarice. What are
15 A. That is a conversation in which I am informing Obrenovic what
16 axis had been agreed for the passage of the 28th Division.
17 Q. And it goes on:
18 "We are going to open it there, and once it passes, we are
19 returning to our old positions. It is about the withdrawal of our dead
20 and wounded, and the Chetniks received an order to shoot if someone
21 attempted to go into the depth of the territory. The Chetniks received
22 an order not to open fire while the men were going through."
23 How does that reflect your understanding of the agreement you
24 reached with Semso Muminovic?
25 A. Well that's precisely what we agreed on.
1 Q. Mr. Pandurevic, in military terms, was it necessary to open the
2 corridor at Baljkovica for the forces of the 28th Division to pass to
4 A. It was necessary to open the corridor in order to save human
6 Q. Was it your only military option?
7 A. No, it was not the only military option. From the military
8 viewpoint, the purpose of fighting is to inflict losses on the enemy in
9 terms of manpower, and this was an occasion to do just that.
10 Q. What else could you have done other than open the corridor and
11 let the forces of the 28th Division walk to Nezuk with their arms?
12 A. Well, I could have betrayed the agreement I had made and when the
13 28th Division was concentrated in one place, in my sights, I could have
14 fired on them from my weapons.
15 MR. HAYNES: Thank you. I think we'll take a break there.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: The break will be of 20 minutes' duration starting
17 from now, and there will be another break, short break at 5. I will
18 communicate to you later anyway.
19 --- Recess taken at 3.33 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 3.59 p.m.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Haynes.
22 MR. HAYNES: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Q. Just a couple of questions before we move on. During the making
24 of the agreement on the 16th of July, can you recall now how many radio
25 communications you had with Semso Muminovic?
1 A. After communication line was established, and after we started
2 our conversation and negotiation about cease-fire and opening of
3 corridor, we virtually never stopped our contact. We were in constant
4 communication. This channel was open all the time, we were monitoring
5 the development of the situation, and we reacted whenever necessary.
6 Q. And for how long did that contact continue?
7 A. We were in contact until nightfall, and that is when we talked
8 about what arrangements to make for the night, and how things should go
9 on during the night.
10 Q. And did it go on after the 16th of July and, if so, for how long?
11 A. In the evening, I also talked with his division commander. I
12 think his name was Salih Malkic, he was not, as far as I know, at the
13 forward command post. And from him, I requested additional guarantees
14 that during the night, their side with a would not undertake anything
15 contrary to our agreement, and I was given that guarantee from him.
16 Q. Again, probably my fault for asking a bad question, but what I
17 meant was did you continue to have radio conversations with Muminovic
18 after the 16th of July; and did they continue for a day, two days, what
19 sort of period did you continue talking to him?
20 A. During the 17th of July, we were also in contact. On the 18th,
21 we communicated a few times and after that, we spoke occasionally.
22 Q. And when you spoke on the 18th and after that, what were you
23 talking about?
24 A. I specifically remember an incident which took place on the 18th
25 and which prompted me to contact him. There was a group of teenagers or
1 rather men aged about 18 who were supposed to be escorted safely through
2 our positions to Nezuk and handed over to Semso Muminovic.
3 Q. Well, we may come to that a little later on. Now, on an entirely
4 different topic, during the course of your preparation of your case, have
5 you had occasion to instruct a military expert witness?
6 A. A military expert was present during the visits at the detention
7 unit, and he was also present here during the breaks while he was
8 listening the testimony of a prosecution witness. I discussed with him
9 some general issues, and my overall instruction - if I may call it that -
10 was for the expertise not to dwell on general principles only, but that
11 it must go very much into the core of the problem and all the incidents
12 that took place. I think I said that one should really get their shoes
13 dirty rather than just walk on a pavement.
14 Q. Well I'm really only dealing with one specific issue now which is
15 the map you have behind you. Did you give instructions as to the drawing
16 of that map?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And so when we look at that map and the positioning of the
19 forces, does that come from information that you gave to your military
21 A. Yes, and I believe that I was the only one who had a full insight
22 into the engagement of all the forces at that time and in that place.
23 Q. Thank you. I haven't mentioned it before, but the map that we've
24 all been looking at is 7D1116.
25 And it can be moved now.
1 Now, throughout the course of the morning of the 16th of July,
2 did you take the trouble to get in contact with General Krstic to see if
3 it was okay for you to let the 28th Division go?
4 A. From the moment when I started negotiations about letting the
5 28th Division go through, I did not attempt to establish contact with
6 anyone from the Superior Command. Therefore, during that period, I had
7 no contact of that nature.
8 Q. Why did you not make contact with the Superior Command about what
9 you were doing?
10 A. I wanted, in the spirit of the word that I gave to the other
11 side, to see this agreement through to the end. I knew that I was not at
12 the level of command that could do such a thing from the aspect of the
13 combat rules and combat engagement rules, but I wanted to get this done
14 and over with lest someone should prevent me from doing that.
15 MR. HAYNES: Can we now have a look, please, at the duty
16 officer's notebook, P377. Mr. Pandurevic, you're looking for page 766
17 and the rest of us, page 148. It's the last entry on that page which
18 reads in English:
19 "They called from Zlatar that the commander is to call the Zlatar
20 duty officer or send a report --" I'm sorry, "or send a written report on
21 the situation in the field at 1525 hours."
22 Q. Firstly, what was going on where you were at 1525 hours?
23 A. At 1525, the column of the 28th Division was already passing
24 through the corridor.
25 Q. Were you at about half past 3.00 in the afternoon, or indeed at
1 any time, made aware of this request for a report?
2 A. I knew that there was a request for me to either send a report or
3 to call the duty officer at the corps or to send a written report.
4 MR. HAYNES: Can we now have a look at P1192. The B/C/S is under
5 seal. And the B/C/S is C, the English B. This is an intercept of a
6 radio communication a few minutes after the entry in the duty operations
7 officer's notebook we've just been looking at, if the times are both
8 accurate. And it is recorded as being someone from the Main Staff
9 talking to somebody at Palma, and about halfway down the first page in
10 English, the person from the Main Staff says:
11 "You know what this is about. Have Vinko tell you what
12 happened, and send it right away. Okay. So if there is no other,
13 dictate what has been done and have him send it urgently, right away to
14 the Main Staff, right away. Got it? Hello? Hello?
16 "Did you understand? Have Vinko dictate you -- well you have a
17 wire line to him and send that urgently to us."
18 In much the same vain.
19 Now the entry we saw in the duty operation officer's notebook was
20 from Zlatar, is that the Main Staff or some other organisation?
21 A. If we can go back to the beginning so that I can see who the
22 speakers are. The one who was intercepting this conversation marked by
23 X, someone from the Main Staff and by Y, the duty officer from the
24 Zvornik Brigade. And this conversation was exactly about as you quoted,
25 and it refers the events in Baljkovica in which I was involved.
1 Q. Were you aware that -- well, I perhaps better get an answer to my
2 first question. Zlatar is code for what?
3 A. Zlatar was the code-name for the Drina Corps command.
4 Q. Right. And I think you told us that when you looked at the entry
5 in the duty operation officer's notebook, that you became aware that the
6 Drina Corps wanted an explanation. Did you become aware that the
7 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska wanted an explanation as to
8 what was going on?
9 A. As far as I can remember, the reason for the Drina Corps to
10 request this information was their need to pass it on to the Main Staff.
11 MR. HAYNES: Very well. Can we look now, please, at P1194 --
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey.
13 MR. McCLOSKEY: There's something that may want to be cleared up
14 in the question there's a suggestion that the General actually read this
15 in the duty officer notebook. It's a little unclear whether he's just
16 now read it or read it in the preparation of his case or read it at the
17 time. You may want to clear that up.
18 MR. HAYNES: That might be helpful.
19 Q. Mr. Pandurevic, we're looking at certain, as it were, extraneous
20 documents to what was going on where you were. And we looked, first of
21 all, at an entry in the duty officer's notebook which was timed at 1525.
22 And really the question to you is: If you became aware that the
23 Drina Corps wanted a report from you and, if so, approximately when did
24 you become aware of that?
25 A. Since Zlatar or rather the Drina Corps was requesting a report
1 from the duty officer Palma, he was obliged to pass this request
2 immediately to me, to my command post and instruct me to send a report.
3 Q. And the question, really, is did you know that? Did you know
4 that they were contacting the command of the Zvornik Brigade down in
5 Zvornik while you were up at Delici?
6 A. The duty officer from the command in Zvornik passed Zlatar's
7 request or the Drina Corps' request to me which means that somebody from
8 the Drina Corps spoke to him. Nobody spoke directly to me.
9 Q. Thank you. I think that answers the question. But did you also
10 become aware that the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska were
11 contacting the duty officer at Zvornik directly themselves asking for the
12 same thing?
13 A. I did not know at that moment who the duty operations officer of
14 the Zvornik Brigade was talking to, but I knew what he was talking about
15 because he requested a report from me, and I knew at the time that a
16 report was requested by both the corps and the Main Staff.
17 MR. HAYNES: Can we move on to P1194 A, about half an hour later.
18 The B/C/S is B, and I don't think it's under seal.
19 Q. Here, an intercept of a conversation between Zlatar and Palma at
20 1602: "Give me 01."
21 Who would 01 be at Palma?
22 A. Somebody wants to speak to me personally.
23 Q. And who would Zlatar 01 be?
24 A. That would be the Drina Corps commander.
25 Q. It says that the Palma, presumably duty officer, says they're not
1 able to reach the commander. Can you offer any explanation why
2 General Krstic should be told that?
3 A. The duty officer Palma said that they were unable to get in touch
4 or rather reach the commander, that was me. In any case, they were able
5 to contact me because everybody knew where I was. But at that point, I
6 didn't want to take any call coming from the corps.
7 MR. HAYNES: Thank you. So can we move on, please, to P1195 C,
8 about 10 or 15 minutes after the last call. The passage in B/C/S is at
9 the bottom of the page.
10 Q. At 1615, we recorded a conversation between the duty officer at
11 the Main Staff and General Mladic, and we could not hear. The
12 conversation was as follows:
13 "Good day, General, sir. Well I just sent the telegram to Toso.
14 The President called a short while ago. He said he had been informed by
15 Karisik that Pandurevic has arranged passage for the Muslims over to the
16 territory. Since I have no communication with him, I asked the duty
17 officer urgently to connect me with him to have him send me a telegram
18 with that information and not to do anything without authorisation until
19 he receives our answer. Now I'm waiting for them to call me because
20 Pandurevic hasn't called for the last four ...
21 "Yes, of course. No, but there are both fighters and civilians.
22 "Nobody is playing around. That's just the information we got.
23 I spoke to Krsto down there. He says it's going well ..."
24 And the latter part provisions are irrelevant.
25 Do you know who Karisik is?
1 A. Karisik was, as far as I knew, Milenko Karisik was at the time
2 chief of the public security at the Ministry of the Interior of Republika
3 Srpska. On that day, he was in the Baljkovica sector.
4 Q. Did you become aware on the afternoon of the 16th of July that
5 the president and General Mladic were interested in what was going on at
7 A. No, I didn't learn about that on that day.
8 MR. HAYNES: Very well. Can we go back to the duty officer's
9 notebook, please, P377. For you, Mr. Pandurevic, page 767, and for the
10 rest of us page 149. We'll kill two birds with one stone and look at the
11 entries for both 1620 and 1640. So 5 and 20 minutes after the last
12 intercept respectively.
13 Q. At 1620 hours:
14 "Message from Zlatar that one officer from the command was to go
15 immediately to the commander and send a written report on the current
16 situation. The agreement and arrangements made with the other side
17 immediately sent to Mijatovic."
18 Do you recall whether you saw Mijatovic at any time during the
19 afternoon of the 16th of July?
20 A. This was probably the last effort on the part of the corps
21 command to contact me, and that is why they requested an officer to be
22 sent from the brigade command to establish direct contact with me.
23 Therefore, Mr. Mijatovic was sent out.
24 As far as I recall, he did come to the forward command post.
25 Q. The second message from entry:
1 "Message from Zlatar that Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic must go to
2 Vinko Pandurevic in the field at 1640. The message through the
3 1st Battalion that Popovic must report to the duty officer so he can be
4 sent on a task by Zlatar."
5 Did you see Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic at any stage during the
6 16th of July?
7 A. No, I didn't.
8 MR. HAYNES: Can we go to page 767. And that's page 149 for the
9 rest of us. Yes I'm sorry it's the next entry at 1705:
10 "Thirty soldiers came from Vlasenica and were sent immediately to
11 the IKM at Gnovice [phoen] as ordered. Zlatar was immediately informed,
12 and Zlatar asked again whether the report had come from the commander."
13 What did Mr. Mijatovic do, if you remember, when he came.
14 A. As far as I remember, he told me that I had to send a written
15 report to the corps command about everything that took place that day. I
16 don't think that he stayed long, and then he went back.
17 Q. So that brings us to a little after 5.00. Did you accept that
18 you would have to tell your superior command what you'd done at some
20 A. Yes, I realised that I would have to send this report. I had no
21 option after so many interventions. Probably I would have sent this
22 report at the time that I usually did even if there hadn't been so much
24 Q. And what had you been doing between 11.00 that morning and 5.00
25 in the afternoon when we see the last entry here in the duty officer's
1 notebook that we've looked at?
2 A. By that time, I was supervising the passage of the 28th Division.
3 I maintained contact with Semso Muminovic, and then at around 1700 hours,
4 I dictated a report to Captain Milisav Petrovic.
5 MR. HAYNES: Can we come now, please, to P330, the regular combat
6 report for the 16th of July. And just so we can put this into the
7 careful chronology we've been building, Mr. Pandurevic, can we have a
8 look at page 2 first.
9 Sorry, page 2 in English but not in B/C/S. All we want to do in
10 B/C/S is go to the bottom of the page and look to the record of the
11 sending of the document.
12 Q. Now, there's a number there, Mr. Pandurevic, 1158. What does
13 that denote?
14 A. What I see in front of me is an interim combat report relating to
15 the 16th. As far as I understood you, you made reference to a regular
16 report. The number you are asking me about is the number of the telegram
17 or rather the report under which it was registered at the communications
19 Q. And where is the communications centre?
20 A. The communications centre was at the command in Standard, the
22 Q. Now, just quickly tell us how this report came to be sent by you?
23 What was the processes -- what were the processes involved, as it were,
24 in delivering it to Standard to be sent?
25 A. I think that there were only a few reports that I personally
1 dictated, those were the reports dealing with a very complex situation
2 and this is one of such reports. This interim combat report dated the
3 16th, I personally dictated as I said to Captain Milisav Petrovic, and
4 thereafter this report was carried by a courier who was driven to the
5 communications centre.
6 After encrypting it, the communications centre passed it on to
7 the corps command.
8 Q. And from the stamp at the bottom, and the handwritten additions
9 to the document, what can we tell about the history of the transmission
10 of this document?
11 A. The signalsman, when he received the document in writing, he
12 typed in the contents into the encryption teleprinting machine and tried
13 to send it through the radio relay connection to the corps. Here we see
14 his note saying that due to poor, or rather due to a bad relay line, the
15 telegram was repeated several times.
16 So it was ready to go at 1810, but it was not actually sent
17 before 2000 hours.
18 MR. HAYNES: Thank you. Now I just briefly want to have a look
19 at another document before we come back to this and that is 7D532, the
20 regular combat report for the 16th of July.
21 Again, can we look at the end of the document which I think is
22 page 2 in both versions.
23 Q. Again, this document has a number. What number does this
24 document have?
25 A. This document has the number 1159, so it's the next document
1 after 1158.
2 Q. But what can we glean from the box as to the sequence in which
3 this was sent in relation to the last document in your regular combat
5 A. The signalsman first received the previous telegram which was the
6 interim combat report and entered it under number 1158. Then he received
7 the regular combat report and entered it under the following number, the
8 next number.
9 Q. But the transmission of this report, when was it successfully
10 transmitted, the regular combat report?
11 A. This regular combat report was sent off at 11.20. I don't
12 know --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Or rather 1820, interpreter's correction.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know why, for technical
15 reason, this one did go through at that time and the other one didn't.
16 It's possible that he sent the report thinking that it would be received
17 in the corps but that it wasn't received; and then later on, there was a
18 bad line, and there was several attempts to send the report again.
19 I'm not a signalsman. I'm not a technician by profession, so I
20 really can't offer any other explanation.
21 JUDGE KWON: What I would like, Mr. Pandurevic, to see the bottom
22 right part.
23 MR. HAYNES: I'm trying not to lead.
24 Q. We see RPT
25 the other document. Even though you're not a signalsman, what does that
1 indicate to you?
2 A. I apologise. I didn't see this before. Probably this one also
3 went at 1830. RPT
4 radio teleprinter, but I'm unable to explain the meaning of the
5 abbreviation RPT
6 Q. Very well. But what you can tell us is what you had to do with
7 the writing of the regular combat report of the 16th of July.
8 A. The regular combat report was written by the duty operations
9 officer. He sent off that report before my handwritten signature so you
10 can see just the typed version of my name, and in this regular combat
11 report, there is very little information about what was really going on
12 on the ground.
13 MR. HAYNES: And I will lead if nobody minds.
14 Q. If RPT
15 successfully sent, it looks as if the regular combat report arrived first
16 by about a couple of hours. Would you agree with that?
17 A. Yes, it's evident from what it says here.
18 MR. HAYNES: So can we have a look at paragraph 1 of the regular
19 combat report that was received by the Drina Corps:
20 "The enemy deployed large forces in front of the forward line of
21 our defence, with which from early morning, they launched a very heavy
22 artillery-infantry attack on the area of the 7th, 4th, and 6th Infantry
23 Battalions along the Parlog-Baljkovica-Rijeka-Pandurica axis, in
24 conjunction with the forces which had pulled out from Srebrenica. They
25 are trying to penetrate our defence lines and create conditions to pull
1 out a large number of armed soldiers and civilians from the Kamenica area
2 via Crni Vrh, Cetino Brdo and Baljkovica. Their intention is to link up
3 with the 2nd Corps. Fighting is still going on, and we will send more
4 detailed information in an interim report."
5 Do you know who actually wrote that?
6 A. Based on the initials I have seen at the bottom of the document,
7 according to the rules of office correspondence, the initials are MT; and
8 I think they refer to Milorad Trbic.
9 Q. And as at about 6.00 in the evening of the 16th of July, how
10 accurately did what he told corps command reflect what was going on on
11 the ground?
12 A. It did not reflect the situation accurately because at that time
13 in the evening, there was no combat going on. The column of the
14 28th Division was then passing through without any hindrance.
15 Q. Did you relay information from the forward command post back to
16 the duty officer at the Zvornik Brigade as to what was actually going on?
17 A. No, I did not relay anything to him. He was receiving brief
18 telegrams from the battalion commands as to what had happened in the
19 course of the day and based on that, he compiled this report. Whether he
20 obtained any information in some other way, I don't know. I'm not aware.
21 Q. So you don't know why his report is so inaccurate; is that right?
22 A. I don't know.
23 Q. Well, let's have a look at your report, P330:
24 "As of 0400 hours, the enemy has continued intensive attacks on
25 the brigade area along the entire front line with particular intensity in
1 the defence areas of the 7th, 4th, 6th and 3rd Infantry Battalions."
2 How accurately did that reflect the events of the 16th of July?
3 A. This does not fully reflect the events that took place that
4 morning. The attack began at 0400 hours but did not continue. There was
5 no previous attack. The attack was not along the entire front line, so
6 it was not this whole line that was attacked from the north to the
7 south-west. Rather, it was the areas of the 7th, the 4th and the 6th
8 Battalions, their areas of defence that had been attacked.
9 Q. "Using all their forces, the 24th and 25th Infantry Division and
10 Bosnian Army 2nd Corps Intervention Units fired almost a thousand
11 projectiles of varying calibre."
12 How accurately did that reflect what had happened on the
13 16th of July?
14 A. It's correct that in front of the area of defence of the
15 Zvornik Brigade was the 24th Division, not the entire division. Its
16 command was in Zivinice, and the axis of attack and the width of the
17 front of the attack had the capacity of one brigade not two divisions.
18 So the 25th Division was not engaged in combat activities in the attack
19 on the Zvornik Brigade.
20 Q. "Parts of the Srebrenica 28th Infantry Battalion together with
21 previously-infiltrated groups carried out a synchronised kamikaze attack
22 against the 4th Battalion, our positions, weapons, and other equipment."
23 How accurately does that reflect what happened on the 16th of
25 A. There had not been any previously infiltrated group from the
1 direction of the 2nd Corps, there was only what I previously spoke about
2 when the self-propelled weapons were taken, so this is partly true.
3 Q. Kamikaze attack?
4 A. I think we all know what a kamikaze means. It's a term from
5 World War II. I tried to describe in what way they had taken those
6 self-propelled weapons.
7 Q. "Using their numerical advantage, they surrounded the
8 4th Battalion, counting soldiers and civilians armed and unarmed,
9 altogether about 7.000."
10 How accurate is that?
11 A. First, the 4th Battalion could not have been surrounded because
12 it is -- it was at the front line, that's this part here. And in terms
13 of numbers, this number is more than double the one of the previously
14 day. I wasn't sure how many men there were, but when observing the
15 passage of the column, I thought there were between 4.000 and 5.000 or
16 6.000. It's very hard to estimate.
17 MR. HAYNES: We'll pass over the self-propelled guns.
18 Q. "By continuous pressure from the front, they managed to seize
19 three of our trenches in the Poljana area and link up part of their
20 forces with the others in the wider area of Baljkovica."
21 Was that an accurate reflection of what happened on the 16th of
23 A. No, they didn't manage to take these three trenches as you see in
24 point 2 where it says:
25 "We have managed to repel all the attacks from the front line."
1 Q. Were there any trenches in particular you were referring to in
2 that paragraph of this report?
3 A. I was referring to the forward defence line. We repelled all
4 attacks, and these three trenches are mentioned because these were the
5 trenches that we ourselves freed up in order to enable the passage of the
6 28th Division column.
7 Q. "The brigade's problem is that a part of our forces is
8 surrounded in the Baljkovica area."
9 Was that an accurate reflection of what had happened on the 16th
10 of July?
11 A. With respect to the forces from Baljkovica, we pulled them out of
12 the area of the command post before the 28th Division column arrived
14 Q. Can we go to paragraph 3:
15 "In view of the great pressure on the brigade's area of
16 responsibility, the losses sustained, the inability of the surrounded
17 forces to hold out for long, the abandonment of the Zvornik command to
18 deal as best it could with the Srebrenica Turks and served it right when
19 it was the brigade that forced them out of Srebrenica into its own area,
20 coupled with the absolute determination of the Turks to save at least
21 some lives regardless of loss --"
22 THE INTERPRETER: Slow down, please.
23 MR. HAYNES: I'm very sorry. The last word I see translated is
25 " ... regardless of losses, and in order to prevent losses in our
1 own ranks, I have decided in view of the situation to open a corridor
2 along the line of the three lost trenches, for the civilian population,
3 about 5.000 of them. I have agreed on a method of evacuation with the
4 enemy side and this is now going forward."
5 Q. How does that reflect the agreement you had reached?
6 A. The agreement was that they should all pass through together,
7 armed men, unarmed men, and civilians. So what it says here is not
9 Q. "I have requested the release of a captured policeman and my own
10 missing soldiers. This procedure is in progress, and I think I will
11 succeed. It is likely that a certain number of soldiers got out among
12 the civilians but all who passed, pass through unarmed."
13 How does that reflect the reality of the situation on the ground
14 at the time you were writing this report?
15 A. This does not reflect the reality of the situation on the ground.
16 As I said, they were all passing through. This is my personal attempt to
17 protect myself because of my responsibility for what I had decided to do.
18 Q. Well, you've probably answered this question, but let me put it
19 at the end of that. Why did you portray the combat situation in the way
20 that you did in paragraph 1 of this report to your superior command?
21 A. I described it in such a way that I could represent to the corps
22 command through the report that the situation was more dramatic and more
23 grave than it really was, hoping that they would understand my actions in
24 putting a stop to the fighting and opening up the corridor.
25 Q. Why did you represent the agreement you had reached in the way
1 that you did in paragraph 3 of this report?
2 A. Because it was all contrary to the orders that I had which I had
3 received on the 15th.
4 Q. I have to ask you about two particular sentences, Mr. Pandurevic.
5 The sentence in brackets, four lines into paragraph 3:
6 "And served it right when it was the brigade that forced them out
7 of Srebrenica into its own area:"
8 Why did you dictate that to Milisav Petrovic at the forward
9 command post on the afternoon of the 16th of July?
10 A. This interim combat report could not have been written in this
11 way by anyone except me. I put these words in brackets remembering well
12 the 11th of July and the meeting in the command of the Bratunac Brigade
13 when I was very roughly interrupted when putting forward my proposals as
14 to how to treat the 28th Division.
15 Within the scope of the Krivaja 95 Operation, I had been given
16 the most difficult axis of attack. I had moved the 28th Division from
17 its area of defence and the military action that would most logically
18 follow after all this under the rules would be to pursue the enemy, to
19 get on to the enemy's back, to attack their flanks, to set up ambushes,
20 to set out to destroy the enemy.
21 I felt that the 28th Division had moved from its area of defence
22 under the pressure of Tactical Group 1; and when I said that we ourselves
23 pushed them there, that's what I was referring to because if I hadn't set
24 them in motion, they wouldn't have been there, and I would not have had
25 this problem with them. That's what I was referring to.
1 Q. I wonder if you would just speak the words inside those brackets
2 for us?
3 A. "Well that's what they deserve. They themselves pushed them from
4 Srebrenica to their area." I was referring to the Zvornik Brigade,
5 referring to myself, in fact.
6 Q. Thank you. And lastly, the last sentence of the report.
7 Paragraph 6:
8 "I consider that the Krivaja 95 Operation is not complete as
9 long as a single enemy soldier or civilian remains behind the front
11 A. This is -- I don't know how to find the right word. It's a slap
12 on the wrist for the command because the aim of Krivaja 95 was to
13 separate the enclaves and prevent communication of enemy soldiers behind
14 our front lines. Later on, the aim of the operation was changed.
15 Further operations were undertaken and what did we get? We got
16 large groups of the 28th Division, a great many of them, in the rear of
17 our forces. Among them, a certain number of civilians, and this kind of
18 situation did not suit anyone, either the Muslims or the Serbs. That's
19 why I thought that all this had to be brought to an end in the best
20 possible way.
21 Q. What sort of mood were you in when you sat down to dictate this
22 report to Milisav Petrovic on the 16th of July?
23 A. The work I was doing at that time was very important to me. I
24 made a decision on my own initiative. I opened up the front line. I
25 trusted the enemy. Quite the opposite might have happened. Through that
1 open corridor, they could have pumped in the forces of the 2nd Corps and
2 I could have been faced with total ruin. That's what I was concerned
4 Another reason for my concern was the many requests for me to
5 send a report as soon as possible. I found this irritating, and that's
6 why I compiled it in this way. I thought, Well, if that's what you want,
7 here's your report.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Any time you wish, Mr. Haynes, we will have a
10 MR. HAYNES: That is actually a very good moment, but I obviously
11 misunderstood what you said earlier on. I thought we were doing two
12 longer sessions, but we can break now. That's perfect.
13 JUDGE AGIUS: We don't want to unduly presurise your client.
14 MR. HAYNES: No, no. It's strange because I had a conversation
15 with Ms. Stewart in the last break trying to work out when the next one
16 will be, but now that you've told me when it is, I'm more than happy.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Also I had some problems that I had to look into as
19 JUDGE KWON: Before break, can I ask one question.
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Pandurevic, in your previous answer, I wanted to
22 just clear. In the course of your answer that you said, "Later on, the
23 aim of the operation was changed."
24 Do you remember saying that?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE KWON: Could you explain in detailed terms what you meant?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I meant was the 9th of July
3 when the document reached the IKM of the corps at Pribicevac saying that
4 the president of the republic was satisfied with the progress of the
5 operation, and that he approved the continuation of the operation and the
6 VRS to enter Srebrenica. That is what I meant, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. We'll have a 20-minute break. Thank you.
9 --- Recess taken at 5.00 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 5.25 p.m.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Haynes, with your indulgence, we'll leave
12 approximately five minutes or so before the end so that we hear some
13 submissions on the an urgent motion that has been filed.
14 MR. HAYNES: Lovely.
15 JUDGE AGIUS: About five minutes, I understand, would be
16 sufficient. Or more?
17 MR. McCLOSKEY: I mentioned that I would maybe need five minutes
18 but that was just me and it's not my motion.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, but it's only you that we are going to hear.
20 MR. McCLOSKEY: Fair enough.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. The rest has been put in writing,
23 Mr. Haynes.
24 MR. HAYNES: I'll leave ten to be to the safe side.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Thank you.
1 MR. HAYNES:
2 Q. You were just describing to us the dictation of the irregular
3 combat report of the 16th of July at the IKM, and I know you've already
4 told us, but so far as you can work out, about what time of day did you
5 do that?
6 A. It might have been at around 1700 hours.
7 Q. Had you, by that time of that day, seen Dragan Obrenovic?
8 A. No, I hadn't met him personally by that time on that day.
9 Q. And to your knowledge, what had he been up to since you spoke to
10 him about the soldier Salikovic?
11 A. The whole time, he was engaged in combat operations in the area
12 around the command of the 4th Battalion and then upon cessation of
13 combat, he pulled out at the linking of the 4th and 6th Battalions; he
14 inspected the positions in the area and supervised the activities of the
15 2nd Corps or rather monitored the activities of the 2nd Corps, and the
16 activities of our forces in the area where the 2nd Corps was deployed.
17 Q. And where did he do that from?
18 A. He did that directly from the positions of the 6th Battalion.
19 Q. When did you first see him on the 16th of July?
20 A. At around 1800 hours.
21 Q. Where did you see him?
22 A. I called him to come over to the IKM.
23 Q. Did he come alone or did he come with somebody else?
24 A. I think that Milan Jolovic aka "Legenda" was with him and
25 possibly a soldier courier, but I don't remember his name.
1 Q. Did you speak to him?
2 A. Yes, I did.
3 Q. In the presence of others or on your own?
4 A. First we discussed the situation on the ground, specifically the
5 development that took place by that time. I gave tasks to Jolovic aka
6 "Legenda" to take direct control with his forces over the night of the
7 corridor and the front line. And after that, I had a private
8 conversation with Jolovic.
9 Q. Did you have a private conversation with "Legenda" or Obrenovic?
10 A. While they were both there, we discussed the overall situation of
11 the day, and I issued tasks to "Legenda." He left and Obrenovic stayed
13 Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Pandurevic, I was just trying to correct something
14 in the transcript. The private conversation you had after "Legenda" had
15 left, who was that with?
16 A. With Obrenovic.
17 Q. How did the conversation begin?
18 A. It began with my question about what information he had about
19 POWs in the area of Zvornik relating to the information that I received
20 in the course of the day from Grujic.
21 Q. What did Obrenovic tell you?
22 A. He started telling me his story and informing me about what,
23 according to him, he knew at that point.
24 Q. Did he tell you what schools he knew about?
25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, leading.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.
2 MR. HAYNES: I'll rephrase it, but I'm not sure it is.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Once you mention schools that's ...
4 MR. McCLOSKEY: This is classic. What did he tell you? I mean
5 this is inexcusable in this case.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: I think Mr. Haynes knows it, but anyway, the
7 witness has heard everything in any case now. So ...
8 MR. HAYNES: What did he know?
9 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. That is -- I don't even know what the
10 proper -- that -- how does he know what Obrenovic knows? I mean that
11 calls for speculation.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Exactly. Can't you reconcile yourself with the
13 suggestion made by Mr. McCloskey himself, what did he tell you? I mean
14 it's the simplest and harmless way of approaching the subject,
15 Mr. Haynes.
16 MR. HAYNES: Yes, I'm sure. I'm not sure he even needs the
17 question now.
18 Q. Tell us about the conversation, Mr. Pandurevic.
19 A. Since I told you that Brano Grujic had informed me about
20 prisoners of war being in schools in Petkovci and Pilici, I asked him
21 what he knew about that. He then started telling me his story if I may
22 continue and tell you what he told me.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, please do.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Obrenovic told me that on the
25 evening of the 13th, Drago Nikolic passed on information to him that he
1 had received from the security organ that pursuant to the order of the
2 Main Staff of the VRS, a number of prisoners were to be transferred to
3 the area of Zvornik. And that a triage was going to be carried out, or a
4 screening. Those who were suspected of committing war crimes would be
5 sent to Batkovic and the rest of them would be exchanged.
6 He also told him - I mean Drago Nikolic - that his obligation was
7 to wait for the arrival of these prisoners, that these prisoners would
8 come under escort and with security guards, but that he needed Obrenovic
9 to place at his disposal a number of policemen for any eventuality.
10 Obrenovic, according to his statement, acted accordingly. He
11 placed Jasikovac and another five or six policemen at his disposal. Then
12 he spoke about his being most of the time in the field setting up
13 ambushes for the 28th Division, and that he just went to the command
15 What is particularly interesting is that he told me a story
16 relating to events that took place on the evening of the 14th. He told
17 me that on the evening of the 14th, or, rather, during the night, he sent
18 an interim combat report to the corps command asking for reinforcement
19 given that he had estimated the forces of the 28th Division, the size of
20 them, as that he needed reinforcement.
21 He spoke to Dragan Jokic on that occasion who was duty operations
22 officer and who told him, according to his words, that Colonel Beara had
23 been in the command with some other men unknown to him. That from
24 representatives of the authorities, they had requested certain machinery
25 to bury the people who were shot dead in Orahovac. They also asked --
1 they actually asked the machinery to be provided by companies; but after
2 they had been told that some of the machines were mobilised by the
3 engineer company of the Zvornik Brigade, they took one of the machines
4 from Glinica or the company called Birac Holding, one machine from the
5 Josanica quarry and another machine from the Josanica company. These
6 machines were used to bury the people killed in Orahovac.
7 Jokic told him that he couldn't do anything about that. I asked
8 Obrenovic whether he informed about this or did he pass this information
9 to anyone; but he said that in view of the information that he had
10 received from Drago Nikolic, these men were to arrive pursuant to an
11 order from the Main Staff and that he considered that this should not be
12 passed on to anyone as information.
13 I also asked him if he knew if any member of the Zvornik Brigade
14 took part in these activities in Orahovac. He answered that apart from
15 being contacted by Nikolic, to whom he gave the men in question, he had
16 no information about anyone from the Zvornik Brigade including
17 Drago Nikolic took part in the executions.
18 This is his story relating to Orahovac.
19 Q. Did he only know about Orahovac or did he know about some other
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. Same objection. He can't get into
22 what he knew. That's calling for speculation.
23 MR. HAYNES:
24 Q. Did he tell you only about Orahovac, or did he tell you about
25 some other site?
1 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. What did he tell you? Did he tell
2 you anything else? He cannot put in the answers or part of the answers.
3 He knows that. It's been mercifully quiet over here for the last several
4 days. He knows how to do this.
5 MR. HAYNES: A leading question is one which suggests the answer.
6 That does not suggest an answer. If you ask somebody: Where were you?
7 That is not a leading question. If you ask somebody: Were you here or
8 there? That is not a leading question. If you say to somebody: You
9 were not there, were you? That is a leading question. That is not a
10 leading question.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we are getting into niceties, legal
12 niceties on what is and what is not a leading question --
13 MR. HAYNES: I'll move on.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: -- in the presence of the witness who we have agreed
15 has a right to be present during these discussions. So you either move
16 on or you rephrase the question, please.
17 MR. HAYNES:
18 Q. What else did you tell you about it?
19 A. He also told me that on the 16th, while he was with the 6th
20 Battalion, he met Ostoja Stanisic, the commander of the 6th Battalion,
21 who told him that prisoners had been in the school in Petkovci and that
22 according to his deputy's report, Majo Milosevic or Marko Milosevic,
23 execution of these men was carried out at the Crveni Mulj dam; and that
24 some of them were killed in the vicinity of the school itself. He also
25 told me that Ostoja didn't mention it or rather told him that no member
1 of the 6th Battalion took part in these executions but that some men,
2 some dead men were collected around the school and driven to the dam.
3 Q. How long did this conversation last?
4 A. Perhaps half an hour, 45 minutes. I'm not sure.
5 Q. And what did you do as a result of the conversation?
6 A. Since this had been the topic of conversation for three years,
7 and someone might find it easy to talk about it, at that moment, this
8 information was shocking to me. I simply couldn't believe that something
9 like that could have happened. I asked him if he knew about any similar
10 things. He said he didn't. And I decided to send him that evening to
11 Zvornik to the duty operations officer at the command or to the security
12 organ and try to find out additional information about prisoners in the
13 area of Zvornik.
14 Q. Just so that we clarify this. When you said at the start of your
15 last answer, "Since this has or had been the topic of conversation for
16 three years, someone might find it easy to talk about," which three years
17 did you have in mind?
18 A. I'm referring to the years of the trial.
19 Q. And when you were telling us about your reaction at the time you
20 were talking to Obrenovic, did you say you simply believed that or you
21 simply could not believe that?
22 A. It is very difficult to believe something like that at a time
23 like that. I cooperated with Obrenovic during the war. I had
24 experience, and I thought that he wouldn't tell me such things if they
25 were found groundless.
1 Q. What time did he leave the forward command post?
2 A. Perhaps at around 1900 hours. I'm not sure. He had some other
3 things to see to, then he had to go to the command, then he wanted to go
4 home to spend the night and return to the IKM in the morning.
5 Q. And what arrangement did you make with him?
6 A. I told him to check things and to collect as much information as
7 he could about the POWs, and whether there was any other school or any
8 other location where these men were being kept, and whether they had been
10 Q. Now, can we just take a little time, as it were, tracking the
11 movements of the two of you. And we'll have a look, please, at the duty
12 officer's notebook.
13 Mr. Pandurevic, for you, page 769. For the rest of us, page 151
14 and that's P377.
15 And I want to direct your attention really to three entries on
16 this page. Firstly, the top one:
17 "At 1830, a unit from the 16th Krajina Brigade arrived from
18 Banja Luka. The commander at the IKM and the commander of the unit were
20 Can you tell us what that refers to and whether you can recall
21 that event?
22 A. Yes, this refers to a company that had been sent from the
23 6th Krajina Brigade of the 1st Krajina Corps to assist the
24 Zvornik Brigade. This is the time when it arrived in the general area of
25 Orahovac, and I was informed about that because at the time, I was at the
2 Q. Thank you and who is referred to there by the title "the
3 commander of the unit?
4 A. This probably refers to the man who commanded this unit although
5 I know this is a bit illogical. I know this was a major and operations
6 officer who came as an advanced party from the brigade, and the company
7 was following him so this probably refers to this man.
8 Q. Do you recall what his name was?
9 A. Major Dragicevic. I can't remember his first name.
10 Q. Thank you. Can we go down the page where we see an entry saying:
11 "Men from Bratunac are in Orahovac. Obrenovic asked the
12 commander what to do with them at 1920 hours."
13 Who are the men from Bratunac?
14 A. Probably the men who had been sent in compliance with
15 General Krstic's order on the 16th as additional assistance to the
16 Zvornik Brigade.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Haynes, on the previous page, last line, line
18 25, the -- your client mentions 16th Krajina Brigade, which corps did it
19 form part of?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was part of the
21 1st Krajina Corps, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: That's the one under Momir Talic?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right, Your Honours.
24 MR. HAYNES:
25 Q. Why, at 20 past 7.00 in the evening of the 16th of July was
1 Obrenovic asking what to do with the men from Bratunac?
2 A. When I sent him from the IKM to meet this company coming from
3 Banja Luka, this is where he found the men from Bratunac about whom we
4 had no information that they would arrive. They did arrive actually and
5 that is why he was asking what to do with them.
6 Q. And where was he when he was asking you that question?
7 A. He probably asked this question of the duty operations officer,
8 he probably called him from Orahovac, Orahovac or some other place.
9 Q. Let's move down. At 1940 hours, the men from Krajina went with
10 Chief Obrenovic to search the terrain."
11 We can probably work out who the men from Krajina are, but you
12 tell us.
13 A. These were the men from the company that we have just mentioned,
14 Obrenovic met up with them. He was about to inform them about the
15 terrain, show them the features where they would be carrying out their
16 tasks, and he probably directed them to the next area in order to search
17 the ground.
18 As far as I can remember, it lasted for a short period of time,
19 and then they went back to Orahovac.
20 Q. And where would he have met up with them?
21 A. Probably in Orahovac.
22 MR. HAYNES: Can we have a look, please, at P1202, B in the B/C/S
23 and C in the English.
24 Q. A short transcript of a intercepted radio communication involving
25 Colonel Cerovic and the Palma duty officer, apparently, at 2126 on the
1 16th of July:
2 "Colonel Cerovic was informed that at 2100, 30 men came from
3 Badem; at 1705 hours, 30 men came from Dobos; and at 1725 hours, 100 men
4 came from Banja Luka.
5 General Mladic asked through Colonel Cerovic what had happened to
6 three self-propelled guns, and at 2135 hours, the duty officer informed
7 him that the guns were on the Serbian side."
8 Do you have a recollection of this, as it were, inquiry?
9 A. As far as I understand this, Cerovic was looking for the
10 confirmation of the information that General Krstic's order had been
11 carried out in terms of sending soldiers from Bratunac, i.e., Badem and
12 Vlasenica, i.e., Dobos; and he also took this opportunity to inquire
13 about the self-propelled guns. I don't remember receiving this
15 Q. Very well let's move back to the duty officer's notebook please,
16 page 771 for you, please, Mr. Pandurevic; and for the rest of us
17 page 153.
18 The bottom of the page:
19 "The security centre reported at 2317 hours that enemy groups
20 have been spotted moving from Kusonja to Crni Vrh. Passed on to the
21 commander at the brigade IKM."
22 Did you receive information of that sort at about 2317 on the
23 evening of the 16th of July?
24 A. Yes, I was at the IKM at the time and this information arrived
25 from Zvornik and obviously they deemed important enough to pass it on to
2 Q. Now, what happened at nightfall with the passing of the column?
3 A. The agreement was the passage of the column would be suspended at
4 nightfall, and that everything would remain in place as it was, that
5 nobody would move, and we would continue in the same way the next
7 As I already said, that is why I talked to the commander of the
8 24th Division, Salih Malkic asking him for additional confirmation that
9 they would honour the agreement. The night went by peacefully, and I
10 spent it in a make-shift facility.
11 Q. Where?
12 A. In the village of Delici.
13 Q. I have omitted to ask you this question before, and I'll do so at
14 this moment: Did you see the column passing through the vacated
16 A. Yes, I was observing the column on the 16th and the 17th as it
17 was passing by.
18 Q. And what could you observe?
19 A. I noticed that the -- that there were quite a few people in the
20 column, different people. Some of them were wearing uniforms, some were
21 wearing civilian clothes, some were armed, some were unarmed, some had a
22 rifle, some had walking sticks.
23 Q. Are you able to give us your estimation as to how many people
24 passed through the three trenches?
25 A. I would say at least 5.000 or 6.000 people.
1 Q. And what effect did their passing have on the environment, on the
2 ground they passed over?
3 A. If you think whether they left some traces while passing by, yes,
4 they did, although it was summertime. And the vegetation was lush. The
5 grass was high. The path that the column pass the down was completely
6 devoid the grass. It was totally trodden.
7 Q. I just want to pop to a couple of entries in the small hours in
8 the duty officer's notebook. Can we go to page 773 where you are,
9 Mr. Pandurevic, and page 155 for the rest of us.
10 The entry at 5.10 in the morning:
11 "Milenko Jovanovic to send food and soft drinks to the IKM. The
12 IKM called. Milenko Jovanovic was informed."
13 What was that all about?
14 A. Milenko Jovanovic was the commander of the staff command in the
15 Zvornik Brigade, and this was a message sent at my request that certain
16 foodstuffs and soft drinks should be sent.
17 Q. And lastly, can we go to page 772 in your book, and page 154 for
18 the rest of us.
19 We see there -- well, perhaps you can go back a page to page 771
20 to see if we can get some idea of when these entries were written.
21 What's the last entry on the previous page, in terms of a time?
22 A. I think it's 2330.
23 Q. And if we now go back -- forward to page 772, what's the first,
24 as it were, timed entry we can see on that page?
25 A. It's in the middle of the first part of the text, and it says
2 Q. Thank you. The entry at 4.30 -- I'm sorry:
3 "At 2340 hours, Obrenovic reported that there is a tank up there
4 to be assigned and that Manco is going and with manpower and that
5 armoured equipment is given to the Commander Jovanovic and disband his
6 company and that all of them should report to their units.
7 "At 4.30 to come and pick up Obrenovic at his home; wake him up.
8 Petrovic does not have to come -- "
9 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down.
10 MR. HAYNES: I'm very sorry:
11 "Petrovic does not have to come for Obrenovic."
12 Q. Who is Petrovic?
13 A. In the original, it says at 4.30. He should come to pick up
14 Obrenovic at his home; wake him up. And Petrovic doesn't have to come to
15 pick up Obrenovic. I think this is Milisav Petrovic. As I remember, he
16 was Dragan Obrenovic's kum. And in the brigade, of course, he was the
17 chief of communications.
18 Q. Where did Dragan Obrenovic spend the night of the 16th and
19 17th of July of 1995?
20 A. He spent it at home, at his home.
21 Q. And you?
22 A. At the forward command post.
23 MR. HAYNES: Thank you. I'll stop there for tonight.
24 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Haynes.
25 We will continue with your testimony on Monday.
1 In the meantime, we received today a joint motion of which you
2 are aware. Basically requesting the Trial Chamber to order the
3 Prosecution to proceed with its cross-examination of co-accused
4 Pandurevic before the joint defence, before the defence teams. Are you
5 in a position to reply orally?
6 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President.
7 I apologise, I have -- I heard about this this afternoon when
8 Mr. Bourgon informed me that he would be sending me a motion. I had
9 spoken to Mr. Bourgon and Mr. Ostojic, I think, the day before when they
10 requested this of me and I said, No, I would like to go with the set-up
11 that we've been going on all along. This motion I received at 1.22 this
12 afternoon, and, obviously, I've been in trial with all of us for most of
13 that afternoon.
14 Having said that, in looking over this, there is no law cited for
15 this proposition at all, really, except the -- in the fairness of them to
16 be able to put on their case.
17 You have set out, well years ago, I'm not sure it's three years,
18 but it was a long time ago, perhaps it was three years, the rules by
19 which we would be doing this; and those are the rules we've been relying
20 on, and we've been following, and we don't see any reason to change them
21 at this point.
22 The Defence says in paragraph 10 that:
23 "Moreover, for the other co-accused to be able to assess whether
24 the testimony of co-accused on the stand affects their respective
25 defences, it is necessary that the Prosecution's case against this
1 co-accused be known to them."
2 Well, the Prosecution's case, I believe they're speaking of
3 General Pandurevic, has been made for these last many years in the
4 indictment, in the trial brief, in the opening statements, and all the
5 evidence. I think we have a very good idea from even the testimony as
6 it's come out that the Defence clearly understands what the case is
7 against them.
8 And so I think what they really want to know is what, based on
9 the General's testimony, how will his testimony affect the case against
10 their clients? And they would rather see me cross-examine him first to
11 see what he says on that so they can do it afterward.
12 That's not the way it's been designed. There's no reason for
13 that. And the Prosecution, if we switch this, will be left with a
14 situation where I cross-examine, and then all the accused will have the
15 ability, with leading questions, to take the General through their case
16 as they please.
17 From what it appears thus far, that may be very valuable for them
18 to do that, from what I see from where I see the General coming from.
19 And then I'm left with no ability to cross-examine the General. It
20 shouldn't work that way. They need to make their strategic decision
21 now -- well, after, when the General's testifying. We're only halfway
22 through. There's a lot more to be said. I think it's going to be much
23 clearer. The answers that they want answers to will be much more clear
24 to them once the General is through, the things that they're concerned
25 about, I have no doubt by the detail that we're going through they're
1 going to see some of the answers.
2 So there's no reason to do this. There's no prejudice to them
3 strategically, yes, they'd be better off that way, but this is not what
4 this is about.
5 And frankly, if, during my cross-examination, something new and
6 different and rather exculpatory to one of the accused comes out, I will
7 probably not be objecting to Defence counsel who that is affected by that
8 to be able to put questions to the General on that particular point. I
9 don't want to leave any accused hanging out to dry, so to speak, and
10 having them not be able to respond. But this idea that this is going to
11 save some time is just not correct.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
13 Mr. Haynes, where do we -- how is it going? Where do you stand?
14 How many more hours?
15 MR. HAYNES: Sorry, I've changed headphone sets.
16 To have estimated 30 hours and be on schedule to do it in 30
17 hours, I pat myself on the back for frankly because I think that's pretty
18 much exactly what it's going to be. The amount of material we are
19 getting through we can gauge -- we can project quite accurately now, I
20 think I will take a couple or maybe three days of next week. And that
21 will be eight or nine days which is 30 hours.
22 JUDGE AGIUS: It's been 19 hours. You've been 19 hours so far
23 so --
24 MR. HAYNES: I knew somebody would be timing me.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: So we're talking about another 11, 12 hours. Okay.
1 Let me consult with my colleagues, please.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE AGIUS: We will be thinking about this matter, and we will
4 come down with our decision on Monday orally. In the meantime, I
5 wouldn't suggest that anyone takes risks and assume the decision to go
6 one way or another. So be prepared just in case. Thank you.
7 We will resume on Monday morning. Thank you.
8 MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, can I just ask you one thing. Due
9 to the lateness of this, if there is a particular question you have
10 regarding this motion, I -- if you could ask us to address it because
11 there's a lot of points in here, and I did not want to hold us up.
12 JUDGE AGIUS: No, Mr. McCloskey. If I may say so, this is a
13 matter that we preferred not to discuss amongst ourselves once we were
14 told that you would be responding orally today. So we prefer to wait,
15 hear your submissions, and I think in the few minutes that we have left,
16 it will be not exactly the right thing to do on our part to rush into a
17 decision. We need to discuss. Thank you.
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.15 p.m.,
19 to be reconvened on Monday, the 9th day of
20 February, 2009 at 9.00 a.m.