1 Thursday, 10 June 2010
2 [Open session]
4 --- Upon commencing at 10.06 a.m.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, everybody. I apologise for starting
6 five minutes or six minutes late, but we had a technical fault which we
7 were trying to fix. Unfortunately, we haven't fixed it, but we decided
8 to start nonetheless.
9 Today, we'll be a little bit more formal when it comes to
10 representation. I will be asking you to identify exactly who is and who
11 isn't here.
12 For the record, all the accused are present. I just want to make
13 sure that you are receiving interpretation in your own language or in a
14 language that you understand.
15 Yes, I see all the accused nodding, so let's proceed to
17 Prosecution, Mr. McCloskey.
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,
20 My name is Peter McCloskey, for the Prosecution, and with me
21 today is Nelson Thayer, Kweku Vanderpuye, Janet Stewart, Jelena Plamenac,
22 Chris Mitchell, Caitlin Chittenden, Rupert Elderkin, Lada Soljan, and
23 Julian Nicholls, who for the life of me I couldn't figure out who he was.
24 Thank you.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.
1 Representation for Accused Popovic.
2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning.
4 MR. ZIVANOVIC: For Mr. Popovic, Zoran Zivanovic, lead counsel;
5 Ms. Mira Tapuskovic, co-counsel; Mr. Djordje Kalanj, legal assistant; and
6 Ms. Leanne Andrecik [phoen], legal assistant. Thank you.
7 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
8 Representation for Accused Beara.
9 MR. OSTOJIC: Good morning, Your Honours. My name is
10 John Ostojic here on behalf of Mr. Beara.
11 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
12 Representation for Accused Nikolic.
13 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. My
14 name is Jelena Nikolic, with me, Mr. Stephane Bourgon and
15 Ms. Caroline Bouchard-Lauzon, our legal assistant. Thank you.
16 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
17 Representation for Accused Borovcanin.
18 MR. GOSNELL: Good morning Mr. President, Your Honours. My name
19 is Christopher Gosnell. I'm here on behalf of Mr. Borovcanin, and with
20 me are Tatjana Cmeric and William Byrne.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.
22 Representation for Accused Miletic.
23 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Natacha Fauveau Ivanovic
24 representing General Miletic with Mr. Petrusic, Nenad.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 [In English] Representation for Accused Gvero.
2 MR. KRGOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,
3 everyone. On behalf of General Gvero Defence, Dragan Krgovic, lead
4 counsel; David Josse; Michelle Butler; and Ivan Zogovic.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. And finally representation for
6 Accused Pandurevic.
7 MR. HAYNES: Myself, Peter Haynes, Mr. Simon Davis, and our case
8 manager, Helen Kaker.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. So let's proceed.
10 The Trial Chamber is sitting today to delivery its judgement in
11 the case the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara,
12 Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero, and
13 Vinko Pandurevic.
14 I shall now read a summary of the Trial Chamber's findings in
15 that judgement. However, the authoritative account of those findings is
16 contained in the judgement, which will be made available after this
18 At the outset, the Chamber wishes to express its gratitude to all
19 counsel, past and present, the Registry staff, the interpreters, court
20 reporters, and technicians, the security officers, and staff at the
21 United Nations Detention facility, the Trial Chamber's own staff, and all
22 others whose have contributed to the smooth and efficient conduct of this
24 Trial proceedings in this case commenced on the 21st of August,
25 2006, and concluded on 15th September 2009. In that time, the
1 Trial Chamber has heard or otherwise admitted evidence from
2 315 witnesses. A total of 34.915 transcript pages records what was heard
3 in court. There were 5.383 exhibits before the Trial Chamber, amounting
4 to 87.392 pages.
5 Over the course of a few days in July 1995, following the fall of
6 Srebrenica, thousands of Bosnian Muslim males were detained in deplorable
7 conditions, transported to various remote locations, and summarily
8 executed. In parallel to these mass executions, Bosnian Muslim women,
9 children, and the elderly were transferred out of this part of
10 Eastern Bosnia
11 in the context of human history, these events are arrestive in their
12 scale and brutality.
13 The Trial Chamber wishes to emphasise that while the horrific
14 crimes committed in and around Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995 form the
15 basis for this case, the trial is ultimately about seven men:
16 Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin,
17 Radivoje Miletic, Milan
18 these seven men and their alleged individual criminal responsibility.
19 The Trial Chamber will first list the charges brought against the
20 accused. It will then provide a summary of the factual allegations that
21 underpin the crimes charged. Next, it will examine the specific crimes
22 and the criminal responsibility for each accused. Finally, it will
23 render its verdict. I'll start with the accused.
24 The Prosecution alleges that two joint criminal enterprises
25 existed in Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1995. One was a joint
1 criminal enterprise to murder the able-bodied Bosnian Muslim men from
2 Srebrenica, which I will be referring to as the JCE to murder, and the
3 other was a joint criminal enterprise to forcibly remove the Bosnian
4 Muslim population from Srebrenica and Zepa. I will be referring to this
5 joint criminal enterprise as the JCE to forcibly remove.
6 By virtue of their acts and omissions, five of the accused, that
7 is, Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin,
8 and Vinko Pandurevic, are alleged to be responsible for genocide under
9 Count 1; conspiracy to commit genocide under Count 2; extermination,
10 being a crime against humanity in Count 3; murder, a crime against
11 humanity and a violation of the Laws or Customs of War in Counts 4 and 5
12 respectively; persecution, a crime against humanity in Count 6; inhumane
13 acts consisting of forcible transfer, a crime against humanity in
14 Count 7; and, finally, deportation, a crime against humanity under
15 Count 8.
16 All five accused are alleged to have been members of the JCE to
17 murder and the JCE to forcibly remove, and are charged under every form
18 of individual responsibility set out in Article 7(1) of our Statute. In
19 addition, Ljubomir Borovcanin and Vinko Pandurevic are alleged to be
20 responsible pursuant to superior responsibility under Article 7(3) of the
22 By virtue of their acts and omissions, two of the accused,
23 Radivoje Miletic and Milan Gvero, are alleged to be responsible for
24 murder, a crime against humanity and a violation of the Laws or Customs
25 of War under counts 4 and 5 respectively; persecution, a crime against
1 humanity under Count 6; inhumane acts consisting in forcible transfer, a
2 crime against humanity under Count 7; and deportation, a crime against
3 humanity under Count 8. Radivoje Miletic and Milan Gvero are alleged to
4 have been members of the JCE to forcibly remove and are charged under
5 every form of individual responsibility set out in Article 7(1) of the
7 I now turn to the Trial Chamber's findings in relation to the
8 commission of the alleged crimes by the Bosnian Serb forces.
9 I note at the outset that the judgement sets out the background
10 of the events alleged from 1992. For the purpose of this summary,
11 however, the Trial Chamber will limit itself to events that took place
12 between March and September 1995.
13 In March 1995, Supreme Command Directive 7 was issued by
14 President Karadzic. The directive set out the criminal plan for an
15 attack against protected United Nations safe areas aimed at forcing the
16 civilian populations of Srebrenica and Zepa to leave the enclaves. It
17 tasked the Drina Corps to create "an unbearable situation of total
18 insecurity, with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants
19 of Srebrenica and Zepa." It also detailed that "the planned and
20 unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits" should be undertaken so as
21 to limit the supply of material resources to the population and logistic
22 support of the United Nations Protection Force, which I will be referring
23 to as UNPROFOR.
24 In the implementation of this plan, from at least June of 1995,
25 the aid supply decreased significantly as a result of the Bosnian Serb
1 Army restrictions, creating an increasingly dire humanitarian situation
2 in Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves. Henceforth, I will be referring to this
3 Bosnian Serb Army as the VRS.
4 On 6th July, the VRS started its military attack on the
5 Srebrenica enclave, an operation known as Krivaja 95. Several days of
6 intense shelling followed, which Srebrenica town and the compounds and
7 observation points of the Dutch Battalion of UNPROFOR, which I shall be
8 referring to as DutchBat, being amongst the targets. On 11 July, the
9 enclave, including the town of Srebrenica
10 As a result of the attack, from 10th July, thousands of
11 Bosnian Muslims started fleeing from Srebrenica town to the DutchBat
12 compound in Potocari, desperate for protection. While mostly women,
13 children, and the elderly fled to Potocari, Bosnian Muslim men from
14 Srebrenica gathered in villages in the valleys of the Srebrenica enclave.
15 In the late evening, these men formed a column which set off in the
16 direction of Tuzla
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will be referring to this army as ABiH. In
18 order to reach Tuzla
19 The column consisted of about 10.000 to 15.000 individuals, mostly men,
20 and with both a civilian and a military component.
21 Meanwhile, three meetings took place between representatives from
22 the VRS and DutchBat at the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac over 11th and
23 12th July. So-called unofficial representatives of the Bosnian Muslim
24 population also attended the second and third meetings. The parties
25 discussed the logistics of moving over 10.000 Bosnian Muslims from
1 Potocari and its surroundings, and Mladic told the Bosnian Muslim
3 "You can either survive or disappear. For your survival, I
4 demand that all your armed men surrender their weapons to the VRS."
5 By the morning of 12th July, a decision had been taken to
6 separate the Bosnian Muslim men in Potocari and execute them. On that
7 same day, the VRS dispatched approximately 50 buses to Potocari, where
8 members of the Bosnian Serb forces, that is, VRS forces, Ministry of the
9 Interior in Republika Srpska MUP forces, began separating men aged
10 15 to 65 from the women, children and the elderly, who were boarding the
12 Already on the verge of a humanitarian disaster, a night of utter
13 misery ensued at the DutchBat compound. People were frightened, some
14 died. Members of the Bosnian Serb forces took away men who did not
15 return, and women were heard screaming, Let me go, and, Please don't.
16 The transfer and separations continued throughout the next day.
17 Members of the Bosnian Serb forces confiscated and eventually
18 burnt the separated men's belongings, including passports and identity
19 papers, and detained the men at various houses in Potocari. They were
20 given no food, hardly any water, and sanitary facilities were scarce.
21 Members of the Bosnian Serb forces transported the separated men towards
22 Bratunac. The Bosnian Serb forces thwarted efforts by DutchBat soldiers
23 to escort the convoys and record the men's names.
24 On 13 July, there were several random killings of Bosnian Muslims
25 by members of the Bosnian Serb forces, including at the Luke School
1 in Potocari. By the evening of 13 July, between 20.000 and 30.000
2 Bosnian Muslims had been bussed out to ABiH-held territory, and no
3 Bosnian Muslims remained in Potocari or Srebrenica.
4 The Trial Chamber has found that this constituted forcible
5 transfer, including by majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, with respect to
6 the civilian component of the column.
7 Meanwhile, on 12th and 13th July, the VRS deployed several units
8 along various routes in order to engage militarily and block the column
9 of Bosnian Muslims that was moving from Srebrenica to Tuzla. By this
10 point, the murder plan originally directed at the men in Potocari was
11 extended to Bosnian Muslim men who were captured or surrendered from the
12 column. By 13th July, Bosnian Serb forces had detained approximately
13 6.000 Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the Bratunac area. The prisoners were
14 forced to surrender their property, which included identity cards,
15 wallets, watches, and food. They were kept in cramped conditions and
16 received some water, although hardly any food. Members of the Bosnian
17 Serb forces did not ask or record names. Some of the detained prisoners
18 became victims of opportunistic killings.
19 On 13th July, VRS Commander Ratko Mladic issued a telling order
20 prohibiting filming and photographing of prisoners, and preventing access
21 by "unauthorised" and "uninvited" entities. At the same time, a series
22 of meetings were held over the 13th and 14th July between members of the
23 civilian authorities and VRS members, at which the logistics of the
24 killing and burial operations were the central objects.
25 On 13th July, the murder operation began in earnest. Members of
1 the Bosnian Serb forces shot and killed Bosnian Muslim prisoners on the
2 banks of the Jadar River
3 the Bratunac Brigade headquarters, and Sandici Meadow, and in and around
4 the Vuk Karadzic School in Bratunac town.
5 On the same day, Bosnian Muslim prisoners who were captured or
6 surrendered from the column close to Sandici Meadow were marched or
7 transported to the nearby Kravica warehouse. There, what appears to be a
8 busload of prisoners were initially killed after a prisoner had grabbed a
9 weapon, killing one member of the Bosnian Serb forces and wounding
10 others. What followed this initial killing episode can only be described
11 as a massacre of the prisoners held in the warehouse. Members of the
12 Bosnian Serb forces besieged the prisoners with gun-fire and grenades.
13 The assault upon the prisoners lasted through the night. By the end, at
14 least 1.000 Bosnian Muslim men had been killed. Excavators arrived on
15 14th and 15th of July to remove the bodies.
16 Further mass executions followed in Zvornik shortly after. Over
17 13th to 17th July, the detained Bosnian Muslim men were taken by the
18 Bosnian Serb forces in buses and trucks from Bratunac to various places
19 of detention in Zvornik. The men endured a brief but horrific period of
20 detention in various public buildings, mainly schools. The facilities
21 were woefully inadequate. The men were taunted along ethnic lines and
22 largely denied food and water. An atmosphere of terror was maintained
23 through beatings and sporadic executions. Their spirits broken, the
24 Bosnian Muslim men were taken for execution. Some were blindfolded and
25 their hands were tied, and at one detention site they were given a final
1 glass of water. Then they were transported to nearby locations and shot.
2 This scene played out at a field in Orahovac, a dam at Petkovci, a gravel
3 pit in Kozluk, and a farm in Pilica. In addition, hundreds were killed
4 inside the Pilica Cultural Centre, an execution for which there are no
5 known survivors.
6 Loaders and excavators were either already at the sites at the
7 time of the executions or arrived soon after to bury the dead in mass
8 graves. In the wake of these mass executions, the Bosnian Serb forces
9 ordered a so-called mopping-up operation throughout the enclave, and
10 executions on a smaller scale continued in the Zvornik area between the
11 16th and the 27th of July, 1995.
12 The members of the column who had not surrendered or been
13 captured had continued to move towards ABiH territory. By 15th July, the
14 column had reached the Zvornik Brigade's area of responsibility, and
15 heavy fighting took place. However, on 16th and 17th July, a corridor
16 several hundred metres wide was opened in the defence lines of the
17 Bosnian Serb forces, allowing a significant part of the column to pass to
18 ABiH-held territory. These Bosnian Muslim men escaped the murder
20 During September and October 1995, in an effort to conceal the
21 killings, the VRS, with the assistance of the civilian authorities,
22 carried out a large-scale operation in the areas of Zvornik and the
23 Bratunac Brigades, during which bodies of execution victims were moved
24 from their primary graves to secondary locations.
25 An extensive amount of forensic and demographic evidence was
1 presented in this trial. This evidence is analysed in detail in the
2 judgement. Based on this evidence, the Trial Chamber has found that at
3 least 5.336 identified individuals were killed in the executions
4 following the fall of Srebrenica. However, noting that the evidence
5 before it is not all-encompassing, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that
6 the number of identified individuals will rise. The Trial Chamber,
7 therefore, considers that the number of individuals killed in the
8 executions following the fall of Srebrenica could well be as high as
10 The scale and nature of the murder operation, with the staggering
11 number of killings, the systematic and organised manner in which it was
12 carried out, the targeting and relentless pursuit of the victims, and the
13 plain intention apparent from the evidence to eliminate every Bosnian
14 Muslim man who was captured or surrendered, proves beyond reasonable
15 doubt that this was genocide.
16 As these events played out north of Srebrenica, the VRS also
17 maintained a military focus on the Zepa enclave. The VRS initiated
18 discussions regarding the removal of the population of Zepa before
19 arriving militarily at the enclave. Three rounds of negotiations took
20 place. At each juncture, military force was the means used by the VRS to
21 compel concessions from the Bosnian Muslim population of Zepa. As the
22 attacks continued, they intensified.
23 Further, news about the fate of the Bosnian Muslims from
24 Srebrenica began to circulate, adding to the panic of the population, and
25 loud-speakers broadcasted a message that there was no chance for the
1 Bosnian Muslim population, as the area was controlled by Mladic.
2 Ultimately, in the face of these impossible conditions, the population
3 had no choice but to leave the enclave. As one witness described, the
4 choice was "to leave Zepa under very cruel and humiliating circumstances
5 or to remain and then either be killed or be subjected to suffering."
6 Most of the transportation of the civilians took place on
7 26th July, and by the following day, the 27th, around 4.000 or
8 5.000 Bosnian Muslim women, children, and elderly, and wounded were
9 transported by bus out of Zepa.
10 As of 31st of July, when negotiations as to their fate appear to
11 have stopped, the Bosnian Muslim able-bodied men of Zepa, civilians and
12 military, fled in various directions, including across the Drina River
14 they had no choice but to escape the enclave. While a so-called
15 agreement was signed to give a veneer of legitimacy to the movement of
16 the Bosnian Muslim population of Zepa, the Trial Chamber has found that
17 this constituted forcible transfer, including, by majority, Judge Kwon
18 dissenting, of the able-bodied men who fled to Serbia.
19 I now turn to the legal finding.
20 The Trial Chamber will now summarise its key -- the interpreters
21 on the English channel, I'm now receiving the Serbo-Croat translation.
22 If that could stop, it would help me immensely.
23 The Trial Chamber will now summarise its key legal findings.
24 The Trial Chamber has found that there was a joint criminal
25 enterprise to murder and a joint criminal enterprise to forcibly remove
1 with several participants. The Trial Chamber has found that
2 opportunistic killings were committed in the course of the JCE to murder,
3 and by majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, in the course of the JCE to
4 forcibly remove. Further, it has found that some members of the JCE to
5 murder had genocidal intent and, thus, genocide was committed. It has
6 also found that members of both JCEs had the requisite special intent for
7 the crime of persecution. It has also been established beyond reasonable
8 doubt that there was a widespread and systematic attack against the
9 civilian population. This attack commenced with the issuance of
10 Directive 7 and had various components, including the strangulation of
11 the enclaves through the restriction of humanitarian supplies, the
12 gradual weakening and disabling of UNPROFOR, and a planned military
13 assault on the enclaves, and culminated in the removal of thousands of
14 people from Srebrenica and Zepa.
15 Therefore, applying the legal elements of the crimes charged in
16 the indictment to the facts found to be proven, the Trial Chamber has
17 found that the following crimes were committed by members of the
18 Bosnian Serb forces in various locations alleged in the indictment:
19 Genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; extermination, a crime against
20 humanity; murder, a crime against humanity and a violation of the Laws or
21 Customs of War; murder, cruel and inhumane treatment, terrorising
22 civilians, and forcible transfer as acts of persecution, a crime against
23 humanity; and, finally, forcible transfer as an inhumane act, a crime
24 against humanity. The Trial Chamber finds that the elements of the crime
25 of deportation have not been established.
1 I now turn to individual criminal responsibility of each of the
2 accused, starting with Vujadin Popovic.
3 Vujadin Popovic was the chief of security of the Drina Corps in
4 1995, and he held the rank of lieutenant-colonel. On 12th July, Popovic
5 forecasted the planned separations, transfers, and killings in the
6 enclave when speaking to Momir Nikolic prior to the third Hotel Fontana
7 meeting. He told Momir Nikolic that "All the balijas have to be killed,"
8 and asked him to assist in the operation. Popovic was present with the
9 Bosnian Serb forces in Potocari on 12th July, and the Trial Chamber has
10 found that Popovic was aware of the large number of men among the
11 thousands of Bosnian Muslims gathered at Potocari on this day. The
12 Trial Chamber has found that Popovic had knowledge of the operation to
13 capture men along the Konjevic Polje road on 13th of July. That evening,
14 Popovic phoned Drago Nikolic to inform him that a large number of
15 prisoners would be brought from Bratunac to Zvornik in order to be
16 killed. He asked Drago Nikolic to assist in this operation.
17 On 14 July, Beara, Popovic and Nikolic met at the
18 Standard Barracks, which was the Zvornik Brigade's headquarters in
19 Karakaj, to organise and co-ordinate the killing operation. Following
20 this meeting, Popovic carried out the initial steps required to put the
21 plan in action when he accompanied a convoy of buses carrying
22 Bosnian Muslim prisoners from Bratunac to Grbavci School
23 The Trial Chamber has found that later that day, Popovic was present at
24 the field in Orahovac as the executions took place.
25 On 15th July, Popovic was present at the Rocevic School
1 organising personnel and equipment to facilitate the detentions at the
2 school as well as the executions which occurred later that day at a
3 gravel pit near Kozluk. Also on this day, Popovic gave the
4 Zvornik Brigade duty officers instructions to not record any information
5 concerning the Bosnian Muslim prisoners, nor should he speak about them
6 over the radio.
7 In the following days, that is, 16th of July, Popovic was present
8 at yet another site, where prisoners were detained prior to execution.
9 I'm referring to the Kula School
10 requested the delivery of fuel from the Zvornik Brigade in relation to
11 the execution and burial of prisoners in Pilica. Drazen Erdemovic, saw a
12 so-described lieutenant-colonel at Pilica several times on 16th July,
13 including at the Branjevo Military Farm execution site. The
14 "lieutenant-colonel" was organising personnel to participate in the
16 For the reasons outlined in the judgement, the Trial Chamber is
17 satisfied that this so-called lieutenant-colonel was Popovic.
18 That evening, Popovic asked that a message be conveyed to "the
19 general" that he had "finished the job." And the next day, 17th of July,
20 Popovic again told an unknown interlocutor, whom he referred to as "the
21 boss," that "that all gets an A."
22 For the reasons outlined in the judgement, the Trial Chamber is
23 satisfied that in both of these conversations, Popovic was referring to
24 the killing operation.
25 Later in July 1995, 10 wounded Bosnian Muslim men came to be held
1 at the headquarters of the Zvornik Brigade. Sometime after 23rd of July,
2 these men were placed in Popovic's custody. For the reasons outlined in
3 the judgement, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that Popovic either killed
4 or facilitated the killing of these 10 wounded Bosnian Muslim men.
5 The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
6 during these days, Popovic was fully engaged in the organisation of the
7 killing operation being carried out in the Zvornik area. For the reasons
8 set out in the judgement, the Trial Chamber has found that Popovic was a
9 member of the JCE to murder the Bosnian Muslim males of Srebrenica and
10 that he participated in the joint criminal enterprise with persecutory
11 intent. The Trial Chamber has found that Popovic was not a member of the
12 JCE to forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslim civilian population from the
14 Popovic was not a marginal participant in the JCE to murder. He
15 knew of the plan from the time of its inception and was privy to each
16 development, from the discussions at Bratunac before the operation began,
17 to the capture of the Bosnian Muslim men from the column, to the
18 large-scale killings at Zvornik. Popovic was entrenched in several
19 aspects of the operation, and he participated with resolve. He was
20 ubiquitous in the Zvornik area, present at all but one of the major
21 killing sites. Popovic knew that the intent was not just to kill those
22 who had fallen in the hands of the Bosnian Serb forces, but to kill as
23 many as possible, with the aim of destroying the group. Popovic's
24 ensuing robust participation in all aspects of the plan demonstrates that
25 he not only knew of this intent to destroy, but also shared it.
1 I'll now deal with Accused Beara.
2 In July 1995, Ljubisa Beara was chief of security in the
3 VRS Main Staff, and he held the rank of colonel: He was the superior to
4 Popovic and Nikolic, in the professional sense.
5 On 13 July, Beara was present in Bratunac and was seen at a
6 number of places where Bosnian Muslim men were detained. Intercepted
7 conversations from this day record Beara discussing Bosnian Muslim
8 prisoners. Although the record of one conversation indicates that Beara
9 was looking to simply detain prisoners, the Trial Chamber is nevertheless
10 satisfied, for the reasons set out in the judgement, that the
11 conversation was deliberately misleading as to the fate that awaited
12 these Bosnian Muslim men.
13 Several witnesses testified that Beara was present in Bratunac
14 and took part in informal meetings held at the SDS offices held between
15 13th and 14th of July, 1995. The evidence of these witnesses is analysed
16 in detail in the judgement. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Beara
17 participated in these meetings, the subject matter of which was the
18 logistics of the planned killing operation, including the location for
19 the killings and burial as well as transportation and equipment.
20 Beara's co-ordinating role in the murder operation continued
21 throughout 14th of July. He sourced construction machinery, enlisted the
22 help of civilian authorities to assist with the burials, and inspected
23 possible detention and/or execution sites. Beara was also present at the
24 Grbavci School
25 were detained prior to being executed.
1 On 15th of July, Beara continued to enlist personnel to carry out
2 the killing operation, and intercepted conversations record his thinly
3 veiled attempts to solicit resources. Beara told General Krstic that he
4 had "3.500 parcels" that needed distributing and pressured him to assign
5 troops for that purpose. In another conversation, he discussed the
6 killing operation in terms of conducting a "triage."
7 On 16th of July, Beara was at Kula School in Pilica, where
8 prisoners were being held prior to execution.
9 As the most senior officer in the Security Branch, the
10 Trial Chamber is of the opinion that Beara had the clearest overall
11 picture of the massive scale and scope of the killing operation. From
12 his presence in Bratunac on the night of the 13th to his personal visits
13 to the various detention and execution sites, and the significant
14 logistical charges he faced throughout, Beara had a very personal view of
15 the staggering number of victims destined for execution. Steeped in this
16 knowledge, the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that Beara effectively
17 became a driving force behind the murder enterprise.
18 For the reasons detailed in the judgement, the Trial Chamber has
19 found that Beara was a member of the JCE to murder the Bosnian Muslim
20 males from Srebrenica and that he participated in that JCE with
21 persecutory intent. The Trial Chamber has found that Beara was not a
22 member of the JCE to forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslim civilian
23 population from the enclaves.
24 Beara's vigorous efforts to organise locations and sites, recruit
25 personnel, secure equipment, and oversee executions all evidence his grim
1 determination to kill as many as possible as quickly as possible. His
2 encounters with Miroslav Deronjic, on the night of the 13th of July,
3 provide a chilling illustration of a mind set on destruction. He
4 announced an intent to "kill all" the detained men, and without pause to
5 consider or comment upon the horrific nature of his so-called orders, he
6 launched into a series of heated exchanges about the best location for
7 this reprehensible undertaking.
8 For these reasons, which are outlined in the judgement, the
9 Trial Chamber is satisfied that at this time Beara was a man intent on
10 destroying a group by killing all the members of it within his reach.
11 Beyond all reasonable doubt, he harboured genocidal intent.
12 I'll deal with Drago Nikolic.
13 In July 1995, Drago Nikolic was the chief of security in the
14 Zvornik Brigade and held the rank of second lieutenant in the VRS.
15 On the evening of 13 July, Nikolic was informed by Popovic that
16 the able-bodied Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica were to be brought
17 from Bratunac to Zvornik to be killed. Popovic asked Nikolic to assist
18 in the murder operation, and Nikolic subsequently sought release from the
19 forward command post for this purpose. The evidence shows that from that
20 moment, Nikolic became an active member of the JCE to murder the
21 Bosnian Muslim males from Srebrenica.
22 During the evening of 13 July 1995, Nikolic made preparations for
23 detaining the prisoners at Orahovac and was at Orahovac giving directions
24 to the Zvornik Brigade military police who had been released to him for
25 that purpose. For much of the day on 14th of July, 1995, Nikolic was
1 present at the Grbavci School
2 at the Orahovac execution site.
3 On 14 July, Nikolic ordered the 1st Battalion of the
4 Zvornik Brigade to secure the prisoners at the Kula School
5 awareness that they would be executed. Nikolic was also present with
6 Popovic near Petkovci School
7 whom were killed the next day.
8 On 15th July, Nikolic, working closely with Beara and Popovic,
9 was involved in organising the detention and execution of prisoners at
10 Rocevic School
11 to carry out his assigned tasks in this murderous operation. His
12 contribution to the JCE to murder can properly be described as persistent
13 and determined.
14 However, Nikolic's knowledge of the murder operation is of a
15 different nature from that of Beara and Popovic. Nikolic was first
16 informed of the murder plan on the evening of 13th July. On the evidence
17 before the Trial Chamber, the evidence he was given was sparse, and it
18 came at a time when the murder operation was already well underway.
19 Further, at that point, other than his general understanding that these
20 were prisoners taken as a result of the attack on and the fall of the
21 Srebrenica enclave, there was no evidence that he had information as to
22 the circumstances by which these men had ended up in VRS custody.
23 Thus, the Trial Chamber has found that on 13th July, when he
24 joined the common plan, Nikolic was aware of the plan to murder on a
25 large scale, but not of some of the key features of the operation which
1 would evidence genocidal intent. However, the Trial Chamber has further
2 found that from his interactions with Popovic and Beara, and from his own
3 observations at the school and execution site at Orahovac on 14 July,
4 Nikolic soon became aware that this killing operation was being carried
5 out with genocidal intent.
6 Nonetheless, for the reasons set out in detail in the judgement,
7 including the nature of Nikolic's acts and participation, as well as his
8 personal circumstances and position, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied
9 beyond reasonable doubt that he shared this genocidal intent. In these
10 circumstances, the Trial Chamber has found that Nikolic participated in
11 the JCE to murder with persecutory intent, that he had knowledge of the
12 genocidal intent of others, and that he made a substantial contribution
13 to genocide. The Trial Chamber has found that there is no evidence that
14 Nikolic participated in the JCE to forcibly remove or that he contributed
15 to it.
16 I now turn to Ljubomir Borovcanin.
17 During the time relevant to the indictment, Ljubomir Borovcanin
18 was deputy commander of the Special Police Brigade, which I will refer to
19 as SBP, of the MUP forces. On 10th July 1995, Borovcanin was appointed
20 commander of a joint force of MUP units which was subordinated to the
21 Drina Corps and sent to Bratunac to participate in the Srebrenica
22 operation. Borovcanin was present in Bratunac and Potocari between
23 11th and 13th of July, 1995, when the plan to forcibly remove culminated
24 in the actual forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim women, children,
25 and the elderly.
1 The evidence does not demonstrate that Borovcanin was aware of
2 the plan, nor of its incremental implementation, prior to his arrival in
3 Bratunac. On 12 July, however, with his presence in Potocari and what he
4 witnessed there, the Trial Chamber has found by majority, Judge Kwon
5 dissenting, that Borovcanin came to know that there was a forcible
6 transfer of the civilian population of Srebrenica taking place. The
7 evidence is insufficient, however, to demonstrate that Borovcanin shared
8 the intent to forcibly transfer, himself. The Trial Chamber has found
9 that Borovcanin was not a member of the JCE to forcibly remove.
10 However, on the 12th of July, Borovcanin left the Jahorina
11 recruits in Potocari under his subordinate commanders, Jevic and Mane,
12 with orders for them to participate in the process whereby the Bosnian
13 Muslim population was to be removed from the area and transported to ABiH
14 territory. They continued to do so on 13th of July and were instrumental
15 in executing the physical forcible transfer.
16 While there is no evidence that Borovcanin shared the intent to
17 forcibly transfer or had the intent to discriminate, with his knowledge
18 of the intent of others, as found by the majority, including
19 discriminatory intent, Borovcanin's acts in ordering his men to
20 participate constituted a substantial contribution to the crime of
21 forcible transfer.
22 While Borovcanin was in Potocari, Bratunac, and on the
23 Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road, where the plan to murder the Bosnian Muslim
24 men was developed and put into place, the evidence is insufficient to
25 find that he had any knowledge of this plan or that he shared the intent
1 to contribute to the common purpose of the joint criminal enterprise to
3 On 13th July, Borovcanin arrived at the Kravica warehouse, where
4 over 1.000 Bosnian Muslim men were detained. And outside, in front of
5 the warehouse, he saw a number of dead bodies, what appeared to be a
6 busload. Borovcanin knew that his units were amongst the Bosnian Serb
7 forces with custody and/or control of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners that
8 day, and therefore had a duty to protect the remaining prisoners in the
9 warehouse. The first and only step Borovcanin took after seeing the
10 evidence of prisoner executions was to remove himself and his men from
11 the Kravica warehouse as quickly as he could.
12 Borovcanin had the means to protect the prisoners and knew that
13 it was probable that the prisoners would be killed. Borovcanin's failure
14 to protect the Bosnian Muslim prisoners then still detained substantially
15 contributed to the full-scale execution which later took place at Kravica
17 The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that Borovcanin knew that the
18 prisoners at Kravica warehouse would probably be killed by members of the
19 Bosnian Serb forces there with discriminatory intent.
20 Further, Borovcanin was the superior of the SBP 2nd Sekovici
21 Detachment. Having arrived at the Kravica warehouse shortly after the
22 murder of a busload of prisoners, he had knowledge which was sufficient
23 to put him on notice that his subordinates had committed the crime of
24 murder. For the reasons detailed in the judgement, he failed to take the
25 necessary and reasonable measures required to punish his subordinates for
1 the murders of the busload of Bosnian Muslim prisoners at Kravica
3 I now turn to Radivoje Miletic, who, in 1995, was the chief of
4 administration for operations and training at the VRS Main Staff.
5 A significant amount of time during the trial proceedings was
6 devoted by the Prosecution and the Defence for Miletic to establish the
7 nature and extent of his powers at the time relevant to the indictment.
8 The Trial Chamber is convinced that from at least May to October 1995,
9 Miletic, in addition to his regular responsibilities, took on certain
10 duties from the Chief of Staff, Manojlo Milovanovic. However, the
11 Trial Chamber is not satisfied that Miletic was Deputy Chief of Staff of
12 the VRS Main Staff or was officially "standing in" for the Chief of
13 Staff. Most importantly, though, the Trial Chamber has not assessed
14 Miletic's criminal responsibility on the basis of title or even assigned
15 or undertaken responsibilities, but rather on the basis of the factual
16 evidence of his acts and conduct which has been adduced before it.
17 Miletic drafted Directive 7, and whatever his level of input, in
18 terms of content or wording, he was intimately acquainted with its final
19 text, including the incriminatory parts. As such, from the early stages
20 Miletic had full knowledge of the common criminal plan to force the
21 Bosnian Muslim populations from the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, and he
22 was instrumental in the plan being captured in writing for dissemination.
23 Through his central role in the drafting process of Directive 7 and of
24 Directive 7/1, Miletic contributed to the joint criminal enterprise to
25 forcibly remove.
1 Miletic further played a role in the process for the approval of
2 humanitarian convoys. Through this, Miletic implemented the instructions
3 of Directive 7 to incrementally and unobtrusively deprive the enclaves of
4 humanitarian aid and UNPROFOR of supplies, with the purpose of creating
5 an untenable situation for the population and strangling UNPROFOR. By
6 doing so, Miletic again contributed to the JCE to forcibly remove.
7 Considering the scale and scope of the military attack on and the
8 operations to forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslims from the enclaves,
9 co-ordination from the Main Staff level was essential. Miletic, with his
10 in-depth knowledge of the strategies and goals of the VRS, was at the
11 center of this co-ordination. Through the reports he received from
12 subordinate units and his direct contact with the forces in the field,
13 Miletic was fully attuned to all developments in the field and informed
14 on the progress of the operations. Miletic forwarded the knowledge he
15 gained to Mladic and Karadzic, while at the same time he ensured the flow
16 of information from the Main Staff to subordinate units.
17 Milovanovic, the Chief of Staff and Miletic's direct superior,
18 captured the essence of Miletic's role at the Main Staff when he called
19 him "the soul of the Main Staff of the VRS" and the person "best informed
20 on the situation in various theatres of the war."
21 Miletic skillfully and efficiently used his unique position to
22 inform and advise and thereby enabled the decisions taken to successfully
23 implement the plan, resulting in the forced removal of thousands of
24 Bosnian Muslims from the enclaves. Through these acts, Miletic
25 contributed to the JCE to forcibly remove.
1 Considering all the individual acts and contributions
2 cumulatively, the Trial Chamber concludes that Miletic made a significant
3 contribution to the JCE to forcibly remove. Miletic furthermore shared
4 the common intent of the JCE. In addition, he carried out his acts in
5 furtherance of the plan to remove the Bosnian Muslims, with the specific
6 intent to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds. Based
7 on Miletic's level of involvement and his in-depth knowledge and broad
8 overview of the massive operation to forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslims
9 from Srebrenica, it was foreseeable to him that murder would be committed
10 in Potocari and that these murders would be committed with the specific
11 intent to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds.
12 Judge Kwon dissents on the foreseeability to Miletic of the
13 killings in Potocari.
14 I turn now to Milan Gvero.
15 In 1995, Milan Gvero was the assistant commander for morale,
16 legal and religious affairs of the VRS Main Staff and directly
17 subordinated to Mladic. In this position, and as one of the most senior
18 officers in the VRS Main Staff, Gvero played an important role in VRS
19 operations, and this was no different for the operations in Srebrenica
20 and Zepa. Through his knowledge of key documents from 1992, and his
21 involvement in the drafting of Directive 7, Gvero knew of the plan to
22 forcibly remove the populations from Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves from
23 its very inception and of the VRS's role in this plan.
24 Gvero had to be informed of major developments in the operations
25 so that he would be in a position to act if issues of morale arose or
1 dissemination of information was necessary. Accordingly, key documents
2 were specifically addressed to him, such as: Tolimir's telegram
3 forwarding Karadzic's order to capture Srebrenica; Tolimir and Mladic's
4 instructions regarding prisoners of war; and documents concerning the
5 negotiations in Zepa. The need for Gvero to be fully attuned was
6 enhanced -- the need for Gvero to be fully attuned was enhanced by the
7 fact that on occasion he was the most senior officer present at the
8 Main Staff, in which case other assistant commanders reported to him and
9 he could be called upon to intervene directly in ongoing military action.
10 During the Srebrenica and Zepa operations, Gvero carried out key
11 functions relating to external propaganda and interaction with
12 international organisations, with the aim to support the plan to forcibly
13 transfer the populations from the enclaves.
14 On 10th July 1995
15 assault on the enclave, taken over United Nations observation points, and
16 moved to capture Srebrenica town, Gvero issued a statement to the media
17 concerning the attack on Srebrenica enclave, stating that the VRS
18 activities were directed at neutralising Muslim terrorists and not
19 against any civilians or UNPROFOR. Though not criminal, as such, the
20 purpose of this blatantly false statement was less innocent. Gvero made
21 this statement with the intention to mislead the international
22 authorities concerned with protecting the enclave, with a view to
23 delaying any action that could frustrate the VRS plans.
24 On 11th July, as part of the combined VRS efforts to stop the
25 NATO bombing on the VRS forces approaching Srebrenica town, Gvero adopted
1 the same approach as the day before. He falsely asserted to UNPROFOR's
2 Chief of Staff, General Nicolai, that the VRS was merely responding to
3 attacks, while knowing that the VRS had taken the town and that Bosnian
4 Muslim men had fled to Potocari. Gvero further threatened Nicolai by
5 stating, in essence, that failure to stop the NATO bombing could result
6 in serious consequences for UNPROFOR and the civilians in Potocari.
7 The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Gvero issued this threat with
8 the aim to halt NATO bombings so that the VRS could complete its plan to
9 take over the Srebrenica enclave and forcibly remove its Bosnian Muslim
11 Soon thereafter, Gvero warned the VRS personnel on the treatment
12 of UNPROFOR forces to avoid any action that could provoke a response and
13 interfere with the efforts to end the NATO bombing.
14 With regard to the Zepa operation, though Gvero was clearly
15 knowledgeable as to the illegal purpose of and developments in the Zepa
16 campaign, the Trial Chamber has no evidence to find that Gvero
17 contributed to it.
18 Based on these factors combined, and for the reasons detailed in
19 the judgement, the Trial Chamber has found that Gvero made a significant
20 contribution to the JCE to forcibly remove and shared the common intent.
21 Furthermore, Gvero acted with the specific intent to discriminate on
22 political, racial, or religious grounds. However, considering the nature
23 of Gvero's acts and his level of involvement in the operation to forcibly
24 remove, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that it was foreseeable to him
25 that murder would be committed in Potocari.
1 I now turn to the last of the accused, Vinko Pandurevic, who was
2 commander of the Zvornik Brigade and held the rank of lieutenant-colonel
3 in 1995.
4 As commander of Tactical Group 1, Pandurevic was aware of the
5 criminal objective described in Directive 7 and of the plan to forcibly
6 remove the Bosnian Muslim populations from Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves.
7 Pandurevic and Tactical Group 1 participated in the attack on Srebrenica
8 on 6th July and entered Srebrenica town on 11th July.
9 While the evidence is insufficient to conclude that Pandurevic
10 intended to carry out the common purpose of the JCE to forcibly remove,
11 the Trial Chamber has found that Pandurevic's participation in the
12 military attack and take-over of Srebrenica enclave substantially
13 contributed to the forcible transfer of the civilian population from
14 Srebrenica. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that by participating in
15 the attack on Srebrenica enclave, Pandurevic knew that he was assisting
16 in the commission of persecution.
17 With respect to Zepa, the Trial Chamber has found that Pandurevic
18 did not make a contribution, significant or substantial, to that forcible
19 transfer, nor did he share the intent to forcibly remove.
20 On 15th July, Pandurevic was ordered to return to the Zvornik
21 area of responsibility to block or crush the column and prevent the
22 column from joining up with the forces of the ABiH 2nd Corps. Upon his
23 arrival to the Standard Barracks on 15th July, the Trial Chamber is
24 satisfied that Pandurevic was told by his Chief of Staff that pursuant to
25 Mladic's order, Beara and Popovic had brought a large number of prisoners
1 from Bratunac to Zvornik, where they were executing them, and that there
2 were enormous problems with the guarding, execution, and burial of
4 In the following days, Pandurevic received additional
5 information, including about the detentions and executions and burials in
6 Pilica, Petkovci, Rocevic, Orahovac, and Branjevo Military Farm. By
7 18th July, Pandurevic had information as to the overall scale of the
8 murder operation. However, there is no evidence to establish that
9 Pandurevic shared the intent to commit the crimes that formed part of the
10 JCE to murder. There is also no evidence that Pandurevic, himself,
11 participated or that he ordered, authorised, or otherwise approved the
12 participation of his subordinates in the murder operation.
13 In the period between 13th and 16th July, members of the
14 Zvornik Brigade participated in guarding the detained Bosnian Muslim
15 prisoners and in transporting the prisoners to execution sites in the
16 area of Zvornik. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that members of the
17 Zvornik Brigade provided practical assistance that had a substantial
18 effect on the commission of the executions of the prisoners.
19 Upon his return to Standard Barracks at noon on 15th of July,
20 Pandurevic had reason to know that his subordinates had committed, were
21 committing, or were about to commit crimes in relation to the detention,
22 execution, and burial of the Bosnian Muslim prisoners in the area of
23 Zvornik. As detailed in the judgement, the evidence before the
24 Trial Chamber shows that Pandurevic did not genuinely attempt to take any
25 measures within his material powers in order to prevent any further or
1 continued participation of his subordinates in the murder operation.
2 With respect to his duty to punish, however, in the unique and
3 extraordinary circumstances Pandurevic faced, the Trial Chamber considers
4 that Pandurevic's actions were such that he is not responsible for a
5 failure to punish.
6 On 16th July, Pandurevic opened a corridor to allow passage of
7 the column through Zvornik Brigade territory to the territory held by the
8 ABiH 2nd Corps. This was contrary to the orders he had received from his
9 superiors. Thousands of men passed through this corridor. After the
10 corridor was closed on 18th July, and during the subsequent few days,
11 elements of the Zvornik Brigade participated in searching the terrain for
12 ABiH soldiers.
13 Around 20th of July, 10 wounded Bosnian Muslim prisoners were
14 transferred from Zvornik Hospital
15 On the 23rd of July, Pandurevic requested instructions from the
16 Drina Corps regarding the wounded Bosnian Muslim prisoners in his
17 custody. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Pandurevic was informed
18 that Popovic would come to take the wounded prisoners. The Trial Chamber
19 is further satisfied that the wounded men were placed in Popovic custody
20 on the 23rd of July and that Popovic was responsible for their death.
21 Although the Trial Chamber has found that Pandurevic did not
22 possess the intent to murder the 10 wounded Bosnian Muslim prisoners, the
23 Trial Chamber has found by majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, that
24 Pandurevic knew it was probable that the wounded prisoners would be
25 murdered once they were transferred into Popovic's custody. By failing
1 to intervene, Popovic [sic] failed to discharge his legal duty to protect
2 the wounded prisoners, and therefore substantially contributed to the
3 murder of these 10 men.
4 I now come to the verdict.
5 Will the Accused Vujadin Popovic please rise.
6 [The Accused Popovic stands up]
7 JUDGE AGIUS: For all the reasons I have summarised, the
8 Trial Chamber finds you, Vujadin Popovic, to be guilty pursuant to
9 Article 7(1) of the Statute of the following counts: Count 1, genocide;
10 Count 3, extermination as a crime against humanity; Count 5, murder as a
11 violation of the Laws or Customs of War; Count 6, persecution as a crime
12 against humanity. In relation to the following counts against you, on
13 the basis of the principles relating to cumulative convictions, which we
14 explain in the judgement, the Trial Chamber does not enter a conviction
15 for Count 2, conspiracy to commit genocide, and Count 4, murder as a
16 crime against humanity.
17 You are found not guilty and therefore acquitted of the following
18 counts: Count 7, inhumane acts consisting in forcible transfer, a crime
19 against humanity; and Count 8, deportation, a crime against humanity.
20 In the face of the grave nature of the crimes perpetrated and
21 your significant responsibility for them, the Trial Chamber considers
22 that the only appropriate sentence for you is life imprisonment, to which
23 you are hereby being sentenced. You may sit down.
24 [The Accused Popovic sits down]
25 Will the Accused Ljubisa Beara please rise.
1 [The Accused Beara stands up]
2 JUDGE AGIUS: For all the reasons I have summarised, the
3 Trial Chamber finds you, Ljubisa Beara, guilty pursuant to Article 7(1)
4 of the Statute of the following counts: Count 1, genocide; Count 3,
5 extermination as a crime against humanity; Count 5, murder as a violation
6 of the Laws and Customs of War; Count 6, persecution as a crime against
8 In relation to the following counts against you, on the basis of
9 the principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber does
10 not enter a conviction under Count 2, conspiracy to commit genocide, and
11 Count 4, murder as a crime against humanity.
12 You are found not guilty and, therefore, acquitted of the
13 following counts: Count 7, inhumane acts consisting in forcible
14 transfer, a crime against humanity; and Count 8, deportation, a crime
15 against humanity.
16 In the face of the grave nature of the crimes perpetrated, and
17 your central responsibility for them, the Trial Chamber considers that
18 the only appropriate sentence for you is life imprisonment, to which you
19 are hereby being sentenced.
20 You may sit down.
21 [The Accused Beara sits down]
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Will the Accused Drago Nikolic please rise.
23 [The Accused Nikolic stands up]
24 JUDGE AGIUS: For all the reasons I have summarised, the
25 Trial Chamber finds you, Drago Nikolic, guilty pursuant to Article 7(1)
1 of the Statute, through aiding and abetting of the following count:
2 Count 1, genocide.
3 You are found guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute of
4 the following counts: Count 3, extermination as a crime against
5 humanity; Count 5, murder, as a violation of the Laws or Customs of War;
6 and Count 6, persecution, as a crime against humanity.
7 In relation to the following count against you, on the basis of
8 the principles relating to cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber does
9 not enter a conviction for Count 4, which is murder, as a crime against
11 You are found not guilty and, therefore, acquitted of the
12 following counts: Count 2, conspiracy to commit genocide; Count 7,
13 inhumane acts consisting in forcible transfer, a crime against humanity;
14 and Count 8, deportation, being a crime against humanity.
15 The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a single sentence of
16 35 years imprisonment, with credit for the time you have already served
17 in detention.
18 You may sit down.
19 [The Accused Nikolic sits down]
20 JUDGE AGIUS: Ljubomir Borovcanin, would you please rise.
21 [The Accused Borovcanin stands up]
22 JUDGE AGIUS: For all the reasons I have summarised, the
23 Trial Chamber finds you guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute,
24 through aiding and abetting of the following counts: Count 3,
25 extermination, as a crime against humanity; Count 5, murder, as a
1 violation of the Laws or Customs of War; Count 6, persecution, as a crime
2 against humanity; and Count 7, by majority, Judge Kwon dissenting,
3 inhumane acts, consisting in forcible transfer, being a crime against
5 In relation to the following count against you, on the basis of
6 the principles of cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber does not
7 enter a conviction pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute for Count 4,
8 that is, murder, as a crime against humanity.
9 The Trial Chamber also finds you guilty as a superior pursuant to
10 Article 7(3) of the Statute of the following counts: Count 4, murder, as
11 a crime against humanity; and Count 5, murder, as a violation of the
12 Laws or Customs Of War.
13 You are found not guilty and therefore acquitted of the following
14 counts: Count 1, genocide; Count 2, conspiracy to commit genocide; and
15 Count 8, deportation, a crime against humanity.
16 The crimes for which you stand convicted are of a very grave
17 nature. However, as detailed in the judgement, the Trial Chamber
18 considers that the particular circumstances which you faced in relation
19 to the forcible transfer, and the nature of your criminal responsibility,
20 which with respect to murder and extermination is predicated on aiding
21 and abetting by omission and superior responsibility, diminishes the
22 gravity of your criminal conduct. Having considered all these factors in
23 combination, the Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a single sentence
24 of 17 years imprisonment, with credit for the time you have already
25 served in detention.
1 You may sit down.
2 [The Accused Borovcanin sits down]
3 JUDGE AGIUS: Radivoje Miletic, would you please rise.
4 [The Accused Miletic stands up]
5 JUDGE AGIUS: For all the reasons I have already summarised, the
6 Trial Chamber finds you, Radivoje Miletic, guilty pursuant to
7 Article 7(1) of the Statute of the following counts: Count 4, by
8 majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, murder, as a crime against humanity;
9 Count 6, persecution, as a crime against humanity; Count 7, inhumane acts
10 consisting in forcible transfer, a crime against humanity.
11 You are found not guilty and, therefore, acquitted of the
12 following counts: Count 5, murder, as a violation of the Laws and
13 Customs of War; Count 8, deportation, a crime against humanity.
14 The Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a single sentence of
15 19 years imprisonment, with credit for the time you have already served
16 in detention.
17 You may sit down.
18 [The Accused Miletic sits down]
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Will the Accused Milan Gvero please rise.
20 [The Accused Gvero stands up]
21 JUDGE AGIUS: For all the reasons I have summarised, the
22 Trial Chamber finds you, Milan Gvero, guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of
23 the Statute of the following counts: Count 6, persecution, as a crime
24 against humanity; Count 7, inhumane acts, being forcible transfer, a
25 crime against humanity.
1 You are not found guilty and, therefore, acquitted of the
2 following counts: Count 4, murder, as a crime against humanity; Count 5,
3 murder, as a violation of the Laws or Customs of War; Count 8,
4 deportation, a crime against humanity.
5 The Trial Chamber, having considered the extent and nature of
6 your involvement, and mitigating factors set out at length in the
7 judgement, hereby sentences you to a single sentence of five years
8 imprisonment, with credit for the time you have already served in
10 You may sit down.
11 [The Accused Gvero sits down]
12 JUDGE AGIUS: Will the Accused Vinko Pandurevic please rise.
13 [The Accused Pandurevic stands up]
14 JUDGE AGIUS: For all the reasons I have summarised, the
15 Trial Chamber finds you guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute,
16 through aiding and abetting, of the following counts: Count 4, by
17 majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, murder, as a crime against humanity;
18 Count 5, by majority, Judge Kwon dissenting, murder, as a violation of
19 the Laws or Customs of War; Count 6, persecution, a crime against
20 humanity; and Count 7, inhumane acts, being forcible transfer, a crime
21 against humanity.
22 The Trial Chamber also finds you guilty as a superior, pursuant
23 to Article 7(3) of the Statute, of the following counts: Count 4,
24 murder, as a crime against humanity; and Count 5, murder, as a violation
25 of the Laws or Customs of War.
1 You are found not guilty and, therefore, acquitted of the
2 following counts: Count 1, genocide; Count 2, conspiracy to commit
3 genocide; Count 3, extermination, as a crime against humanity; and
4 Count 8, deportation, a crime against humanity.
5 The crimes for which you stand convicted are of a grave nature.
6 However, as detailed in the judgement, in arriving at an appropriate
7 sentence, the Trial Chamber has considered the limited nature of your
8 involvement in the forcible transfer, the circumstances you faced upon
9 your return to the Zvornik area, and the nature of your criminal
10 responsibility, which for murder is premised on aiding and abetting by
11 omission and superior responsibility.
12 Further, the Trial Chamber considers that there are several
13 mitigating factors to be taken into account in your sentence, most
14 significantly your act of opening the corridor for the passage of the
16 Having considered all of the relevant circumstances, the
17 Trial Chamber hereby sentences you to a single sentence of 13 years
18 imprisonment, with credit for the time you have already served in
20 You may sit down.
21 [The Accused Pandurevic sits down]
22 JUDGE AGIUS: Judge Prost appends a separate opinion to the
23 judgement, and Judge Kwon appends dissenting and separate opinions to the
25 The hearing is now adjourned.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.33 a.m.