1 Monday, 8 May 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.20 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you call
6 the case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. Case number
8 IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Everyone is here
10 from last Friday, so it is not necessary to have the appearances apart
11 from the Prosecution. Mr. Mundis, could you please present your colleague
12 to us.
13 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. We're accompanied today by
14 Mr. Pieter Kruger, one of the trial attorneys on this case.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm having a look at Defence
16 counsel. Everyone was present on Friday. No one new is here. I'd like
17 to greet everyone present in the courtroom; the accused, Defence counsel,
18 as well as the members of the Prosecution. But I believe that Ms. Nozica
19 would like to introduce her co-counsel to us.
20 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Thank you. I
21 would just like to say that we now have Mr. Peter Murphy as co-counsel,
22 which was not the case on Friday. Thank you.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We will be
24 continuing with our work today. We have a new witness. I know that the
25 Prosecution will soon be taking the floor, but before I give the floor to
1 the Prosecution, there two oral decisions I would like to render that
2 concerns the procedure we will be following.
3 The first decision has to do with the disclosure of Defence
4 exhibits in the course of the cross-examination. The Judges have decided
5 that Defence counsel shall disclose to the Prosecution the documents that
6 they intend to tender immediately prior to the beginning of the
7 cross-examination. On the other hand, 24 hours earlier, the Registrar
8 shall be provided with the documents so that they can be registered in
9 accordance with the e-court procedure.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What should be pointed out is
12 that these documents will be disclosed before the beginning of the
13 cross-examination, but also just after the end of the
14 examination-in-chief. That means that if the examination-in-chief is
15 concluded at 1500 hours, at 1500 hours and one second Defence counsel
16 shall disclose the documents. But if the examination-in-chief is
17 concluded at 1900 hours, in that case the Defence shall disclose the
18 documents at 1900 hours and one second. The cross-examination shall then
19 commence on the following day.
20 That is my first -- that is the first decision.
21 Now, the second oral decision that I'd like to inform you of
22 concerns how Defence counsel shall proceed in the course of
23 cross-examination, how they shall proceed with their interrogation.
24 Yesterday --
25 THE INTERPRETER: On Friday, that is, interpreter's correction,
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] -- some members of the Defence
2 didn't have sufficient time to put the questions they wanted to put to the
3 witness. Given that, we realise that if there is no agreement reached by
4 the Defence counsel, each member of the Defence should have one-sixth of
5 the allocated time. Each member of the Defence counsel shall have a sixth
6 of the time allocated to the Prosecution unless members of the Defence
7 counsel have reached an agreement according to which some members will put
8 questions on behalf of the others. But failing such an agreement, each
9 member of the Defence counsel shall have a sixth of the time allocated to
10 the Prosecution. If the Prosecution has two hours for its
11 examination-in-chief, each member of the Defence counsel shall be
12 allocated 20 minutes. If the Prosecution takes three hours for its
13 examination-in-chief, each member of the Defence counsel shall have 30
14 minutes. If the Prosecution takes four hours - and that's how long they
15 believe they will need for today's witness - in that case, each member of
16 the Defence counsel will have 40 minutes for their cross-examination.
17 In addition, on each occasion we will decide on the order of
18 appearances for Defence counsel. On Friday, Mr. Karnavas commenced with
19 the cross-examination. Today, Ms. Nozica will commence, and then everyone
20 will take their turn. The next time we'll start with Mr. Kovacic, and so
21 on. So you will take turns to commence your cross-examination and thus we
22 won't always have the same member of Defence counsel asking the most
23 important questions. So you will take turns to be in front position when
24 cross-examining a witness.
25 This is the procedure that we have decided on. I know that there
1 is something that Mr. Mundis would like to say with regard to next week.
2 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. In order to do that, if we
3 could, we would ask to go into private session for just a moment.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Registrar, could we go
5 into private session, please.
6 [Private session]
11 Page 1478 redacted. Private session.
20 [Open session]
21 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] We are back in open session,
22 Mr. President.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now that we're in open session,
24 I give you the floor, Mr. Kovacic.
25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, very briefly with
1 regard to this decision according to which we are obliged to disclose our
2 documents that we have prepared for our cross-examination immediately
3 after the end of the examination-in-chief. With regard to this decision,
4 could you excuse me if I fail to comply with that decision today, because
5 I wasn't prepared for it? I don't have many assistants. They are
6 involved in other matters today, so I don't think I'm in a position to
7 comply with your decision today. And my assistants are only putting these
8 documents into electronic form, so I don't know whether I'll be in a
9 position to finish with this today. That will be the case before the
10 cross-examination, but I don't know whether I'll be able to comply with
11 your decision today.
12 And then there is another decision of yours which is a lot more
13 important and that concerns allocating a sixth of the Prosecution's time
14 to each member of the Defence counsel. This is a decision I'd like to
15 know something more about. Will we also have a written decision that will
16 be provided to us? I'm asking about this so as I know how to deal with
17 the possibility of an appeal, an interlocutory appeal.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If the oral decision doesn't
19 appear very clear to you, we will also provide you with a written decision
20 if you so wish. I don't think it's necessary because it just concerns the
21 procedure that will be followed, and for an interlocutory appeal it's also
22 necessary for such an appeal to be certified. I'd like to remind you of
23 this fact.
24 Let's avoid wasting time, because if there are six of you who take
25 the floor on each occasion that an issue is raised, we'll have to spend an
1 hour on the matter and we will be losing that time that could have been
2 used for a witness.
3 Mr. Jonjic.
4 MR. JONJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. There is
5 one thing I'm not quite clear about. When we prepare for the
6 cross-examination of a witness, we'll prepare certain documents, and
7 depending on the number of facts we are aware of -- well, our preparation
8 depends on the facts we are aware of. So the documents we have prepared
9 for today are documents we can provide the Prosecution with as of
10 tomorrow. It's too late to do that today. But what happens when, in the
11 course of the examination-in-chief, the witness says something that we
12 hadn't expected? Perhaps we have certain documents, but we can't prepare
13 these documents by the time the cross-examination -- by the time the
14 examination-in-chief has been concluded. So could you please clarify that
15 matter for us. Thank you.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. In -- if a witness raises
17 an issue in the course of the examination-in-chief, an issue that you
18 hadn't expected when compiling your list of documents, well, this is
19 something that can happen, but in such a case you will always have the
20 possibility of presenting a document that isn't on the list. You should,
21 in that case, say that the witness addressed an issue and that as a result
22 it's necessary for you to file a certain document. This is a case that
23 can arise, but it's not something that will happen all the time.
24 If there are no further issues to discuss, we will call the
25 witness into the courtroom.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: I do have one.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Just to be on the record, Your Honour. I
4 understand your rulings of one-sixth. If and when the time comes where I
5 don't believe I can adequately represent my client as a result of this, I
6 will have to withdraw from the case and I will do so immediately. I will
7 not be part of a trial where I cannot properly represent my client because
8 of some rule that's fast and hard with this calculation. The Prosecution
9 took more time than it indicated because they have their case. We took
10 less than we were allotted because it wasn't necessary. I don't think
11 that we can have this rule.
12 I also think that when you look at the indictment, the indictment
13 is in a particular order because the person who is at the top, and the
14 second person and the third person, it's in the order of importance. So
15 you don't have the person at the bottom who is the most responsible. You
16 have a joint criminal enterprise, and the way it's done is in a pyramid
18 So I'm just putting the Court on notice, and I want a very clear
19 record, that if and when the time comes because of a completion strategy
20 that somebody in New York has decided to place on us that I'm unable to
21 properly represent my client, I cannot part of a process where I cannot
22 ethically follow my own code of ethics. And I appreciate and I will abide
23 by the Court's orders, but at the same time I cannot, you know, proceed if
24 I cannot represent my client. He's at the top of the list. There's a
25 period of three or four years. The Prosecution spent eight years on this
1 case, and I don't think it's fair, I do not think it's fair to say to me
2 that you have one-sixth of the time the Prosecution has to do your case
3 when it's virtually impossible to predict. So I just put the Court on
5 I understand you have a difficult task, Your Honours. I truly
6 understand that. But I don't think you should allow political pressure
7 from New York to prevent you from allowing the Defence to take their
8 necessary time. Thank you.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic.
10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise for taking
11 the floor again. I'll try to be as brief as possible, but there is one
12 other thing I have to add. Last week we had two witnesses. Initially,
13 the rules were flexible, but you established certain principles. I
14 believe that those two witnesses that we heard last week demonstrated that
15 Defence counsel abided by the principle established by you. In both
16 cases, we didn't exceed the amount of time allocated to the Prosecution as
17 far as the pace or the speed of proceedings are concerned. And I'm quite
18 aware of the fact that, as the Presiding Judge, you have to take time
19 constraints into consideration, you have to take the completion strategy
20 into consideration. I'm quite aware of all these factors, but that
21 shouldn't be done to the detriment of the rights of the accused.
22 My client isn't one-sixth of the accused. He's an individual.
23 He's the third person accused in this case. He could have been accused
24 individually or with some of the accused or with 19 of them. If Tudjman,
25 Susak, and Bobetko, Boban and others hadn't died - and they are mentioned
1 in the introduction to this indictment - then these deceased would also
2 have been included in the indictment. Would that have meant that we would
3 have been allocated only one-fifteenth of the time allocated to the
4 Prosecution? I don't think so.
5 Your Honours, we are abiding by your guidelines. Let's continue
6 abiding by your guidelines. But not each member of Defence counsel has
7 the same Defence strategy, so we don't have the possibility to reach
8 agreement on how the cross-examination should be conducted. We had a
9 slight problem when last hearing was held, but we all realised that it was
10 because it was Friday, the witness was an elderly man, there was a
11 misunderstanding between Defence counsel and the Chamber. We all wanted
12 the witness to go home on Friday, and as a result, my colleagues were more
13 cooperative than they would have been. It would have been more natural
14 for the witness to stay on for one more day. But that doesn't matter. I
15 don't think any harm was done. But if we insist on the procedure you have
16 mentioned, I don't know how we will manage to proceed.
17 There is one other matter I would like to mention. As you
18 requested, the Prosecution -- or your decision of the 30th of November has
19 not been respected, your decision that would make it clearer to us to know
20 what the subject of someone's testimony will be. So we're still trying to
21 find our way in the Prosecution's announcements.
22 But in this case, in this particular case, in the case of the
23 witness we are supposed to be hearing today, the Prosecution has mentioned
24 a number of -- a significant number of paragraphs. He's referred to 90
25 per cent of the indictment, I would say. However, in the submission dated
1 the 19th of January, the Prosecution also mentioned that that witness was
2 -- was relevant only for my client. So the paragraphs are referred to in
3 the indictment, but only my client is concerned.
4 Why am I mentioning this? This is something that makes it
5 impossible for us to divide the work, to decide who will discuss certain
6 issues, provided that the witness mentions certain issues that are
7 indicated. And now in the paragraphs provided by the Prosecution, the
8 Prosecution refers to paragraphs in the indictment - let's say paragraph
9 17 and paragraph 39 - and in those two paragraphs, 17 and 39, you will
10 find the names of all six accused. The Prosecution says that this witness
11 only relates to my client, though, Your Honours. It's not just that I'm
12 confused now and I don't know how to prepare myself, even if it only
13 concerns me or if this only concerns my client, but if six Defence lawyers
14 sit down, which we did on Sunday afternoon in my office, and analyse these
15 paragraphs and these names, well, believe me, it's not necessary to tell
16 you all of the theories that we could have thought of and all of the
17 matters we could have expected. So we could only agree to disagree. We
18 couldn't reach any agreements. It's not that we -- we didn't fail to
19 reach an agreement because our Defence strategy was different. In this
20 case we couldn't reach an agreement because we couldn't understand what
21 the Prosecution actually wanted to do. We didn't understand the
22 Prosecution's objectives.
23 And let me conclude, Your Honours. In this particular case, we
24 couldn't reach an agreement because your order dated the 30th of November
25 was not abided by. That was the first order issued by the Chamber, and
1 the Prosecution was quite clearly instructed as to how they should present
2 all the documents and witnesses that they were referring to. And the
3 Prosecution has failed to comply with that order to date. I believe that
4 you had to grant them extra time. But until they comply with your order,
5 we'll be in a state of confusion. I think you extended that deadline up
6 until September. But please, don't force us to have only one-sixth of the
7 time, at least not until September if we are not in a position to know
8 whether a given witness will really be testifying only with regard to my
9 client or with regard to all six accused. Are we referring to a joint
10 criminal enterprise or not? I do not know.
11 Thank you, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, in relation to what you
13 just said, I personally fully agree with that, and I have no objections to
14 what you just said. Indeed, what you said now, had this ruling dated the
15 30th of November been complied with, then we would have known in relation
16 to witnesses who testified last week precisely what the Prosecution
17 intends to show through that witness.
18 You'll remember that in that order we asked the Prosecution to
19 tell us clearly what paragraphs of the -- what paragraphs of the
20 indictment pertain to a particular witness. We asked the Prosecution to
21 quote from their pre-trial briefs and the indictment in relation to each
22 individual witness.
23 In addition to that, we also asked that the Prosecution tell us to
24 which of the accused is the testimony of a certain witness going to
25 relate. The Prosecutor told us that they are unable to do that,
1 especially bearing in mind the voluminous of their filings. Then we
2 adopted a new order, asking that the Prosecution provide a document to us
3 in compliance with our November order for each individual witness,
4 starting in September. You told us that you got together in order to
5 discuss this problem. That was a good idea, because it is only through
6 such meetings and discussions that you are able to determine which Defence
7 team is interested in a particular witness.
8 Mr. Karnavas told us that, in view of the hierarchy of
9 responsibility, the first accused is at the top of the list and the last
10 accused is at the bottom of the list. This is Mr. Karnavas's
11 interpretation and yours as well.
12 Depending on that -- or, rather, on the basis of that, you believe
13 you should be allocated more time than other Defence teams. The Trial
14 Chamber told you that you have to agree among yourselves. But, however,
15 if you are unable to agree among yourselves, then we will have to issue
16 some kind of a ruling. So only failing your agreement will this mechanism
17 kick in where everybody will have one-sixth of the time. So the
18 examination may concern such issues as water supply, was there sufficient
19 water supply, was there lack thereof, and so on. These are factual
20 issues. We are not getting into individual criminal responsibility yet.
21 Once we get to such witnesses, however, it is clear that the time would
22 not be allocated in the same way. For example, when we have to establish
23 how was somebody killed, then the situation will be different.
24 For example, if somebody's primarily interested in a certain
25 witness, then that Defence team should lead that cross-examination or use
1 up the majority of the time allotted to Defence, and then the rest of
2 Defence counsel will share among them the remaining time. However, I see
3 that you have not been able to agree among yourselves on this.
4 We saw with the Prosecution that last week we spent a lot of time
5 discussing the issue of water supply. This is mentioned in the following
6 paragraphs of the indictment: 113, and 114. And a lot of time was used
7 up on that. If the Prosecution continues wasting time like this, I will
8 interrupt them. I will point this out to them. So if we once again have
9 a situation where questions that do not seem relevant or useful to us are
10 being put, then we will have to intervene.
11 Had we received this document, as Defence pointed out, the
12 document that we requested, then we would know where things are headed.
13 As it is, it is impossible to know where we are headed. The Judges and
14 Defence wish to know what is the purpose of the examination-in-chief. I'm
15 bringing up this example with water supply as just one of examples.
16 This is our ruling. If you wish to appeal it, then we will issue
17 this ruling in writing as well and, if necessary, the Appeals Chamber will
18 decide on this. However, if you fail to agree among yourselves, it is
19 impossible for us to give you, all of you, the same amount of time as the
20 Prosecution. It is impossible. So at some point we have to make an
21 executive decision on this.
22 That's all I have to tell you on this issue. Your words and your
23 arguments were not useful in the sense that they did not point to a
24 solution to this problem. We have to work on the basis of the indictment
25 and pre-trial briefs. The mistake of the Prosecution is as follows: You
1 do not have in your pre-trial brief any footnotes related to documents
2 that you intend to introduce into evidence. It would have been much
3 easier had we received complete footnotes, because then we would have been
4 able to see where you headed.
5 For example, the issue of water is mentioned in some of the
6 documents but you didn't point that out in footnotes and this is why we
7 find ourselves in this situation, both the Chamber and the Defence.
8 However, I hope that as the time passes, you will be much more efficient
9 so that we will be able to tailor both examination-in-chief and
10 cross-examination to the existing circumstances.
11 The beginning stage of every trial is usually the most difficult
12 one, but as the time passes, things get easier. They improve. So there's
13 always some time needed for warm-up, but we need to conclude this stage.
14 This is the second week of warm-up, and I think it needs to be brought to
15 an end.
16 Yes. Please go ahead, Mr. Kovacic. That's it, Mr. Kovacic.
17 Mr. Scott.
18 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, very briefly to respond to a couple of
19 points that have been made in the last 40 minutes. In terms of the
20 filings and the time estimates and the references to particular accused,
21 what the Prosecution has consistently said in all of our filings is all of
22 this information is, by necessity, based on an ongoing assessment - you
23 can use the word "guesstimate," if you like - which are always subject to
24 change. For example, last week during the second witness, I indicated at
25 the beginning that I added visual references to paragraphs and counts of
1 the indictment. Frankly, there is some substantial amount of subjectivity
2 in listening and reading a particular paragraph and saying, "I think this
3 paragraph and this paragraph are the ones that it most directly relates
4 to," and when the witness comes, when you talk to the witness, you might
5 look at the indictment again and say, I think really, in fairness, it also
6 relates to paragraph so-and-so and paragraph so-and-so.
7 It is in the nature of these filings, and that's why -- one of the
8 reasons why the Prosecution is concerned about these various filings is
9 that they not be taken as written in stone. I can -- I can assure you
10 that if we make predictions as to witnesses that will come from a year
11 from now, I assure you a number of those predictions will be wrong. We
12 will find out there are new exhibits, we will find out there are things
13 they tell us when they come to The Hague that are different. I assure you
14 any filing that we make today or a week from now or a month from now or in
15 September will be subject to ongoing change and revision. That is the
16 nature -- that is simply the nature of the process.
17 As to the hierarchy in listing of the indictment, Your Honour,
18 there is no particular magic in that. It's fair to say that there is some
19 very, very general reference or listing in terms of Mr. Prlic was the
20 president, Mr. Stojic was the minister of defence. There was some -- you
21 had to choose someone. I suppose we could have simply drawn names out of
22 a hat and decided which accused to list first but let's not ascribe too
23 much importance to that. I don't think it should be overstated that the
24 order listed in the indictment is of some particular or significant
25 importance. They are -- all six are charged, all six are accused in the
2 As to the paragraphs, the indictment, Your Honour, again as to
3 water. I'll be very, very brief, but it is part of the Prosecution case
4 that as involving the siege of East Mostar, that one of the things that
5 the HVO did, and it's part of the Prosecution allegation in this case --
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I'm going to object --
7 MR. SCOTT: -- is that --
8 [The witness entered court]
9 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me. We have a witness present and I
10 understand that he may be testifying in relation to some events. I don't
11 think it's proper for Mr. Scott -- I know he's not doing it
12 intentionally --
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, that's quite right.
14 MR. SCOTT: The point is this -- I won't talk about anything
15 specifically, but if there is something in the indictment and that's part
16 of the case and, as we discussed some weeks ago, the Defence don't agree
17 to anything, they dispute everything, that leaves the Prosecution no
18 alternative but to put on proof of every point in the indictment that we
19 think that is charged in the indictment. So I could take the Chamber to a
20 number paragraphs in the indictment, but because the witness is present in
21 the courtroom, I certainly won't do that.
22 Final comment, Your Honour: In terms of the exhibits being listed
23 in the pre-trial brief, I can assure the Chamber that at no time would
24 every exhibit, would all 9.000 exhibits have ever been linked in the
25 pre-trial brief. Probably they will not all be linked in the final trial
1 brief. It's a selective process. The pre-trial brief is to orient the
2 Chamber to the case. You might choose some exhibits but it would never
3 under any scenario have listed every exhibit that the Prosecution
4 contemplates possibly using in the case.
5 Prosecution is doing everything we can to provide the Chamber with
6 as much information and guidance as possible, Your Honour, and we will
7 continue to do so. Thank you.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
9 Yes, sir, could you please rise.
10 Sir, I greet you on behalf of my colleagues, Judges of this
11 Chamber. Before you read out the solemn declaration, would you please
12 tell me your name, your last name, your date of birth, and your
14 THE WITNESS: [Previous translation continues] ... as you like it.
15 My name is Edward Vulliamy, I was born on the 1st of August, 1954, in
16 London, Great Britain.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, and what is your
19 THE WITNESS: [Previous translation continues] ...
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Have you already testified in
21 any cases before the International Tribunal? If so, then in which cases?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have, Your Honour. I've testified a number
23 of times here in cases against -- I endeavour in chronological order:
24 Dusko Tadic, Milan Kovacevic, what I think is General or Colonel-General
25 Blaskic, what I think is known as the Keraterm case against a number of
1 defendants briefly, and latterly, against Milomir Stakic.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. Can you
3 please read out the text of the solemn declaration.
4 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
5 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. You may sit down.
7 WITNESS: EDWARD VULLIAMY
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I will be very brief in my
9 introductory remarks because you are not the first time here before the
10 International Tribunal.
11 First you will be asked -- answering questions put to you by the
12 Prosecution. Then following that you will be examined by the Defence
13 counsel and perhaps even some of the accused if there is a need for that.
14 They might also put some questions to you during cross-examination.
15 I have to remind you that you just swore to tell the truth, which
16 means that you have to tell the truth and not lie.
17 So your testimony is scheduled to proceed in the following way:
18 Your examination-in-chief will take place today and then cross-examination
19 tomorrow. And now I turn the floor to Mr. Mundis who will be putting
20 questions to you on behalf of the Prosecution.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 Examination by Mr. Mundis:
24 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, can you briefly tell the Trial Chamber your
25 professional background.
1 A. Yes. I -- briefly. I became a journalist properly in the late
2 1970s on a programme called World In Action for Granada television, a
3 documentary programme working in all parts of the world, specialising in
4 the conflict in Northern Ireland in my case. I moved to the Guardian in
5 1986, and as of 1989, was working mainly overseas as what I suppose one
6 could call an international reporter, starting off in Eastern Europe,
7 proceeding to work, in theory, from Italy but also across Yugoslavia,
8 former Yugoslavia, and then to the United States, then back in Yugoslavia,
9 and now back in London -- sorry, back to the United States again and now
10 back in London. Forgive me.
11 Q. And, Mr. Vulliamy, just for clarification purpose, the Guardian is
12 a newspaper based in the United Kingdom; is that correct?
13 A. It's a daily paper based in London, yes.
14 Q. Sir, can you tell us what awards, if any, you have won for your
15 reporting and writing.
16 A. 1985, I think, the Royal Television Society award for something in
17 Northern Ireland; 1992/3 I won International Reporter of the Year; and
18 Amnesty International Reporter of the Year; a thing called Granada, What
19 the Papers Say; Reporter of the Year for work on Bosnia. In 1994 I won
20 something called the James Cameron Award, pompously called the "British
21 Pulitzer," for work on Bosnia and on some aspects of Italian violence in
22 Italy. 1997 I won the International Reporter of the Year for work on
23 Bosnia, and latterly I was runner-up for a couple of awards for work on
24 trafficking in young women and Iraq.
25 Q. Sir, in addition to your newspaper writing, have you done any
1 other published writing?
2 A. I wrote a book about the first year or so of the war in Bosnia
3 called "Seasons In Hell." I wrote another book about corruption in
4 British politics, and I've done various bits of television and radio
6 Q. Sir, you alluded to the time that you were in Northern Ireland.
7 Can you tell us about any -- and the former Yugoslavia. Can you tell us
8 about any reporting that you've done from conflict zones.
9 A. Well, Northern Ireland was my speciality as a student. I returned
10 there professionally many times. That was urban warfare, terrorism, urban
11 warfare. Then I went to Lebanon briefly in 1982, to Beirut. I covered
12 the immediate lead-up to and aftermath of the 1991 war in Iraq. I was
13 there for a long time after that. And before the conflict in Bosnia I had
14 been in Slovenia and in Croatia during 1991, and I have been to Iraq twice
15 during the current whatever it is, conflict, and I have also worked in
16 sort of places that one would regard as unsafe if not at war, like Haiti,
17 Central America, and other places of that kind.
18 Q. Let me turn the focus of your attention now, sir, to Bosnia. Can
19 you tell us the first time during the conflict in Bosnia that you went to
20 that country.
21 A. Yes. This would be the -- well, briefly in the spring of 1992,
22 but my first serious work there was in August of 1992 in the Prijedor
23 region and pertaining mostly -- although I was also in Sarajevo around
24 that time, my work pertained mostly to the attempt to expose and get into
25 camps run by the Bosnian Serbs for Muslim and Croat inmates, and we did
1 manage to find a way in to those at Omarska and Trnopolje, and my work
2 also involved, when I arrived in Bosnia, the whole question of enforced
3 deportations from that region of mostly Muslims but a number of Croats
4 into Central Bosnia at gunpoint. I walked with them, followed them on
5 those enforced deportation convoys.
6 Q. And again, Mr. Vulliamy, for purposes of clarification, at this
7 period of time in the middle of 1992 or into the autumn of 1992, who was
8 the perpetrator of the crimes that you were covering that you just
9 mentioned to us?
10 A. In the north-west, the Bosnian Serbs.
11 Q. In how long following these incidents that you've told us about in
12 August of 1992 in Prijedor, after that how long did you remain in Bosnia?
13 A. Well, I was on a rota of reporters assigned to cover the war, so I
14 was there on and off between that period and February, 1994, when, against
15 my wishes, actually, I was transferred, or promoted, to Washington, and I
16 returned at my own request - I demoted myself, I suppose - to go back in
17 the summer of 1995, and I stayed there for the end of the war and then
18 went back during 1996 to do a retrospective series. So on and off, summer
19 1991 -- in the former Yugoslavia, summer 1991 to spring 1996.
20 Q. Let's go back, sir, to the period after late summer, 1992, when
21 you told us about the camps in Prijedor. Can you give us a brief
22 chronology of where your reporting duties in Bosnia took you after the
23 autumn of 1992 or during the autumn of 1992.
24 A. Yes. They took me immediately to Herzegovina. Do you want me to
25 give an overview or to go --
1 Q. Perhaps --
2 A. I'm sorry.
3 Q. -- if you could just give us an overview first and we'll go back
4 and ask some follow-up questions.
5 A. Oh, yes, I'm sorry. I was working across Herzegovina, up in
6 Central Bosnia, in Mostar. That would cover the autumn, the summer into
7 the fall, yes.
8 Q. Let's -- let's focus now on Herzegovina. You told us at line 20,
9 "they took me immediately to Herzegovina." Your travels that took you to
10 Herzegovina, can you tell us approximately when you went there in the
11 autumn of 1992?
12 A. Our exposure of the camps at Omarska and Trnopolje created quite a
13 lot of impact, and a sort of media circus descended on those places. A
14 challenge came from the Serbs that there were camps in which their people
15 were being held on the other side, and I thought it fair enough to, you
16 know, in the interests of, I suppose balance if not pushing the agenda, to
17 investigate those, and Capljina was a name given. I had never heard of
18 the place. So via Hungary and Zagreb, I would have left Belgrade about
19 the 8th or 9th of August, and via Zagreb down to Capljina, would have
20 arrived there sometime -- I wouldn't want to put an exact date on it,
21 probably around the 10th to 11th of August.
22 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, you just told us that the challenge came from the
23 Serbs that there were camps in which their people were being held on the
24 other side. Can you tell us what you mean or what you interpreted that to
25 mean when you were told that they were being held on "the other side"?
1 A. Well, I mean -- what Nikola Koljevic the then deputy head of the
2 Bosnian Serbs meant, I think, was we had just uncovered horrific, horrific
3 places in which Muslims and Croats were being held by the Bosnian Serbs.
4 Their allegation was that we would find similar on the other side. By
5 "the other side," he meant the alliance between the Bosnian army and the
6 HVO, Bosnian Croatian -- Bosnian Croat militia, army.
7 Q. Sir, if you could continue with what you experienced or witnessed
8 when you went down into Capljina approximately the 10th or 11th of August,
10 A. Well, we arrived in Capljina -- we did actually go and see a
11 leading politician before we went to Capljina, but in Capljina itself, we
12 -- and this is me myself and a woman from the Associated Press, and of
13 course a translator, but we went to Capljina to the headquarters of the
14 organisation that we were told ran this particular camp, which was the
15 HOS, a -- not the HVO. The -- the military wing of a party called the
16 Croatian Party of Rights, and we went to their headquarters and met with
17 their commander, in pursuit of permission to go to this camp.
18 Q. Did -- can you tell us who that person was?
19 A. His name was Milan Dedakovic.
20 Q. What, if anything, did Mr. Milan Dedakovic do for you?
21 A. Well, he was a swashbuckling fellow, not ashamed of his own -- I'm
22 not sure "charisma" is quite the word, but he was a confident man, and we
23 talked about a recent apparent execution of one of his -- one of his
24 commanders, HOS commanders, in the area by the HVO, and we talked a lot
25 about the politics of the rivalry between those two militias which
1 pertained to his allegation that the HVO and the president of the Croatian
2 Union of Herceg-Bosna, as it was called, Mate Boban, who we'd seen the
3 previous evening, I think, he accused them of wanting to carve up Bosnia
4 with the Serbs while he and his militia and its party insisted that all of
5 Bosnia was Croatian and that that was the background for the internecine,
6 well, argument, and indeed violent argument between them, and in his
7 words, the execution of his commander.
8 What we wanted from him -- and there was a lot of banter as well.
9 What we wanted from him was permission to go into this camp and inspect
10 it, and that he granted us, I have to say more easily and more readily
11 than I'd expected.
12 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, I'll ask you some follow-up questions about that in
13 just a moment, but I'd like to return to something that you just told us,
14 and that is as reflected on line 22 of the transcript, where you made
15 reference to Mate Boban and you said "who we'd seen the previous evening."
16 Do you recall any of the events that happened when you met with
17 Mr. Mate Boban?
18 A. Yes. I recall -- I recall the meeting well. It was at his office
19 in a town called Grude, a small town and quite a menacing place although
20 there was no actual fighting there. We knew who he was. Each community
21 or people, if you like, in Bosnia had a leading figure, and Karadzic in
22 the case -- Radovan Karadzic in the case of the Bosnian Serbs, the
23 President Alija Izetbegovic in the case of the -- of the Bosnian Muslims,
24 and Mate Boban was very much the name that one associated with the apex of
25 power among the Bosnian Croats. He was not, and I'll say just this at
1 this point unless you want to pursue, he was not actually the president of
2 the main Croatian -- Bosnian Croat party, which was the HDZ and a Bosnian
3 wing of the ruling party in Zagreb of President Franjo Tudjman, but he was
4 the president of something called the Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna or
5 the Croatian - what did they call it? - Croatian Community of
6 Herceg-Bosna. And he talked to us at that meeting about his plans for
7 that entity and how he was going to achieve it.
8 Q. Okay. Before I ask you about the plans, sir, do you recall the
9 approximate date that you had this meeting with Mr. Boban?
10 A. Well, it will have to be approximate, I'm afraid. It's --
11 travelled on the 12th. It's the -- it's -- it's just before the middle of
12 August. If I can guess it, it's 12, 13, 14th of August, something of that
14 Q. Of which year?
15 A. 1992.
16 Q. Can you tell us now about what you recall from this meeting where
17 plans for the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna were discussed with
18 Mr. Boban.
19 A. Yes, he made it clear -- and he was, incidentally, willing and
20 wanting to have this conversation. He made it clear that he did not and
21 could not recognise the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina nor could he
22 recognise Sarajevo as its capital. The reason he gave was that the
23 constitution guaranteed the rights of individuals but not of people, and
24 the word he used for people was "narod" which is an important word because
25 it means people as an ethnicity or it is -- it is -- it doesn't mean
1 people going shopping, it means a people, the "Hrvatski Narod," the
2 Croatian people.
3 He then went on to describe in some detail how he wanted the
4 various "narod" Serbian Muslims and Croatians to be divided within Bosnia
5 by a system of what he called cantons or provinces, which he likened, I
6 think for sort of public relations reasons, to Switzerland and the
7 European Union, and how one group of these cantons or provinces would be
8 specifically Croatian. He talked about how Herceg-Bosna was connected to
9 Croatia, and the words he used were culturally, spiritually, and
10 economically, and he said that it -- that Herceg-Bosna had been separated
11 from Croatia by what he called "unfortunate historical circumstances."
12 And he then talked about the HVO as specifically -- he -- he didn't -- he
13 didn't talk about the HVO in relation to the HDZ, to his party, but he
14 talked about them as the legitimate military force on what he called the
15 free territory, and went on to make some remark that -- of a nature that
16 the Croatian people were ready to arm to defend this freedom, as he put
17 it, which was language which my experience told me was not always
19 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, did you ask Mr. Boban to elaborate upon the
20 unfortunate historical circumstances that he referred to?
21 A. I think we did.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, if I may intervene for a second,
23 Mr. President, and I can understand the difficulties that Mr. Mundis may
24 be having, but it is leading in nature. I can see and I can sense that
25 Mr. Vulliamy is struggling to remember what he wrote in his -- in his
1 statement. I don't object to him having his statement present. If he
2 doesn't recall exactly, he may look at it to refresh his memory if that
3 may assist, but I would object to any leading questions.
4 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, page 28, line 6 and 7, the witness
5 just testified that "Herceg-Bosna had been separated from Croatia by what
6 he called unfortunate historical circumstances." Those are the words that
7 came from the witness. I have simply asked him if he asked Mr. Boban to
8 elaborate upon or explain what he meant by the use of that term. That's
9 not something that I created; it came right from the mouth of the witness.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: I will withdraw the objection. I stand corrected.
11 THE WITNESS: I -- sorry, after all that I don't actually remember
12 the exact nature of the conversation. I think we did the -- I think
13 initially I took it to mean something to do with the Second World War or
14 the end of the Second World War. On reflection, I think it might have had
15 something to do with the fact that Croatia had fought for and secured its
16 independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, whereas Bosnia had come on behind
17 and had secured its independence only in the spring of 1992. But I don't
18 know if that's what he meant, but that was a discussion we had afterwards,
19 trying to infer what he meant by that.
20 Q. Sir, do you recall any of the other issues or specific things that
21 were discussed during this meeting, this initial meeting that you had with
22 Mr. Boban in -- on or about the 13th, 14th of August, 1992?
23 A. Well, it was a long conversation, and the conversation about
24 provinces and cantons went on -- you know, it was a long time. The other
25 thing that was of interest was that there were -- there were reports,
1 although they were in the back of one's mind, of a sort of a deal, a
2 carve-up of Bosnia - and these are not reports that I had written; I had
3 read them - between President Tudjman and President Milosevic of Serbia at
4 a meeting they'd had somewhere in the Vojvodina area. I can't remember
5 the name of the place, I think it began with K. And there had also been
6 reports of a meeting between Mate Boban and Radovan Karadzic in Graz in
7 Austria. We asked him if he'd ever met Radovan Karadzic, and he said no.
8 I don't recall any particular details of that conversation in --
10 Q. Do you recall approximately how long this meeting with Mr. Boban
12 A. I would say between an hour and two.
13 Q. What, sir, were your -- as a professional reporter, what
14 impressions did you leave this meeting with?
15 A. Well, two: One, I was and we were, and we discussed this
16 afterwards in the car, surprised at how the sort of -- that it had all
17 been directed by implication and -- and overtly against the government in
18 Sarajevo and against his allies on the Bosnian government side and indeed
19 the Bosnian government army, by implication, because -- and it was all the
20 stranger because only a matter of weeks beforehand, when I wasn't in the
21 area, I think in late July, the alliance between the armija of BH, the
22 Bosnian army, and the HVO had enjoyed perhaps its greatest moment by
23 successfully pushing the Serbian positions, the Bosnian Serb positions
24 back out of Mostar and uphill into the mountains, and they'd done that
25 together, and that was a famous and much celebrated victory. And it
1 seemed to me odd that Boban -- there didn't seem to be any -- I mean, he
2 didn't seem to be revelling in that as I'd expected him to, nor did he
3 seemed -- he didn't want to talk about it much. He seemed to want to be
4 concerned with carving out this -- this Herceg-Bosna and its -- and its --
5 and establishing its relationship with Croatia. And I was surprised
6 because his -- his remarks were sort of targeted much more at his own
7 side, his ally, if you like, than at the people over whom he and his
8 allies had just won a very major victory.
9 Q. Do you recall, sir, if you had any discussions with Mr. Boban at
10 this point in time concerning the scope of Herceg-Bosna, the geographic
11 scope of Herceg-Bosna?
12 A. I don't think -- I'm afraid I don't recall asking -- I mean, I
13 knew Central Bosnia by then, but I don't recall asking him how far up into
14 Central Bosnia he considered Herceg-Bosna to go, but I mean I took it to
15 mean that the cantons did not just restrict the area he was talking about
16 to Herzegovina itself, but I don't recall asking him for any map or
18 Q. Let me return to something that you said a few moments ago. This
19 is reflected on page 26, lines 13 and 14 of the transcript. You told us
20 that this meeting was "at his office in a town called Grude, a small town
21 and quite a menacing place." Again, that's lines 13 and 14 of page 26 of
22 today's transcript.
23 Can you elaborate, sir, upon what you meant by "a menacing place"?
24 A. Well, I mean, both in -- both in this war and in previous wars I'd
25 got used to places where I didn't feel comfortable. I didn't feel
1 threatened, but let's put it that although there was no fighting, there
2 was the odd rasp of machine-gun fire into the sky. There were some very
3 heavy lads around who weren't giving us very welcoming looks. The -- I
4 didn't particularly like the fact that the portrait of Ante Pavelic, who
5 was the Ustasha dictator in the Second World War, was in the windows of
6 some of the shops, nor did I find it very tasteful that the U - a sort of
7 capped U - of that movement had been painted on some of the walls.
8 I didn't feel that I -- that I was at risk, but it was an
9 uncomfortable place to be, and it was an intimidating place and a heavily
10 militarised one although it was nowhere near any front line.
11 Q. What do you mean by "heavily militarised"?
12 A. Well, there was -- there were -- there were a lot of soldiers, not
13 -- not drilling or anything but sort of hanging around from both -- well,
14 mostly from -- most of the number plates were HVO white number plates but
15 there are a few HV number plates there as well, which are yellow.
16 Q. And can you just tell us how you came to know that HV number
17 plates were yellow.
18 A. Well, I'd spent a lot of time in Croatia, and even before there
19 was such a thing as the HV, but all around the Dalmatian coast, I mean
20 there is -- there are a lot of military -- there's still military movement
21 going on. You -- you drive down from Zagreb or from Sibenik and you see
22 -- you see HV as a yellow number plate. HVO was a white number plate.
23 Q. Do you recall, sir, what types of clothing these people that you
24 told us were in the military were wearing?
25 A. At this point, actually, various sorts of clothing. I mean, the
1 HVO would have a uniform, but there were sort of lots of boys with, say,
2 maybe a black T-shirt and a pair of camouflage trousers. I mean, some
3 were in uniform, others were in semi-uniform. I didn't in Grude actually
4 see any people in a HOS uniform, which is an all black uniform.
5 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I note the time. I'm about to move
6 into a different subject. Perhaps this would be an appropriate time for
7 the first break.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll have a
9 20-minute break now, and we will resume in 20 minutes' time.
10 --- Recess taken at 3.31 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 3.55 p.m.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing will now resume.
13 Mr. Mundis, please take the floor.
14 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, during the break I was asked, as I anticipated that
16 I would be, to ask you to slow down a little bit in your answers for the
17 sake of the court reporter.
18 Let me --
19 A. Yes, I will. My apologies.
20 Q. Let me turn your attention now to something that you spoke about
21 earlier this afternoon and that is when you obtained permission from
22 Mr. Dedakovic to visit a camp in Capljina. Can you tell us a little bit
23 more about what happened.
24 A. Certainly. We left -- he didn't come with us. We left his -- his
25 office, his headquarters, and arrived at a gate of a camp. I don't think
1 word had been sent forward, or I didn't get the impression that it had
2 been sent forward that we were to come because the commander of the camp,
3 whose name was Hrstic, major, I think, was surprised and not that happy
4 that we'd come in, but the order paper was clear. There may have been
5 some telephone communication, I don't know. There was a Bosnian army
6 sentry on the gate, which I could tell from the patch on his arm, but all
7 the other guards were HOS, in the all-black HOS uniform. And we began
8 after, I think, quite a long conversation with Hrstic, which I don't
9 particularly recall details of, a sort of tour of the camp.
10 Q. And again, Mr. Vulliamy, for the record can you tell us the
11 approximate date and time that you arrived at this camp.
12 A. It will have to be approximate. We're talking mid-August; 14, 15,
13 something like that.
14 Q. And, sir, was it before or after the meeting that you had with
15 Mr. Boban?
16 A. I think it was the day after.
17 Q. Do you recall the approximate time of day that you arrived there?
18 A. It would have been I imagine mid -- late morning through midday to
19 early afternoon, that kind of time. No, maybe afternoon, because we did
20 spend quite a long time with Dedakovic.
21 Q. Can you tell us approximately how long you remained in the camp on
22 that day?
23 A. I should think in total two hours, most of which was talking to --
24 I mean a lot of which was talking to Hrstic.
25 Q. Did there ever come a time, sir, when you learned the name of this
1 camp or location that you were at?
2 A. At the time I didn't know the name. With hindsight, I do because
3 I found myself back there at some other time on another -- on another
4 occasion. I didn't know the name of the camp, no. It was listed on the
5 list in Belgrade as Capljina.
6 Q. And, sir, when you later, as you put it, found yourself back
7 there, at that point in time, did you know the name of this camp?
8 A. Yes. I returned there in September 1993, and the name of the camp
9 was Dretelj.
10 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, can you describe for the Trial Chamber what you
11 observed during the time period that you were in this camp in mid-August,
13 A. Yes. There were -- the prisoners were Serbs, and those that we
14 were allowed to talk to in Major Hrstic's presence were all male Serbs of
15 varying ages. There was -- there was a particular -- I mean, we'd just
16 been in Omarska -- or I had just in Omarska and Trnopolje, and with that
17 -- and with them in mind, I would say that the -- the -- what was
18 saddening and distressing about this place was more to do with subjugation
19 and extreme neglect rather than systematic killing or beating. The men
20 were in bad condition, some in very bad condition, but not -- not through
21 signs of beating or anything of that nature. There was a humiliating
22 ritual of "rise," "sit," "thank you, Mr. Commandant," and there were some
23 interviews with people of -- of -- I don't recall any greatly significant
24 interview. What -- I mean in a way it was the high point -- the shock of
25 the visit was as we were about to leave, we walked across a sort of yard
1 or back towards the exit from where we'd conducted the interviews and past
2 a shed on the right where a door was slightly ajar, a sort of sliding
3 metal door. We could see clearly that the -- the -- that shed was full of
4 large numbers of women, and we asked if we could go in there. We were
5 told we couldn't. We were told in a fairly threatening way that we
6 couldn't, elected not to insist, probably wrongly, and had a conversation
7 about this with Major Hrstic afterwards during which I was threatened in a
8 rather sort of bravado kind of way not to write or reveal the presence of
9 these women in the camp. He made some joke about - what is it? - the less
10 you know, the longer you live, or something, and he wasn't going to
11 discuss it, but that was -- that was the thing that disturbed me most
12 about that camp.
13 And later on, back in Zagreb, we were talking about this to the
14 Party of Rights, and there they were unable to enlighten me any further.
15 But it was the presence of these women in the camp that alarmed me then
16 and, with hindsight, alarms me even more.
17 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, at this point in time I'm going to ask you if you
18 can take the narrative a little bit further in terms of what happened
19 after you visited Dretelj. We will return, as you've told us, to the time
20 in September, 1993, later in your testimony, but can you tell us where you
21 went in -- towards the end of August or after you were in this Dretelj
22 camp in August, 1993.
23 A. Yes. I went back up to Travnik, and this was after quite a
24 serious incident on Mt. Vlasic, which is a -- not part of perhaps what's
25 relevant here. So that would have been towards the end of August. And on
1 that visit I was very much sort of a guest of the HVO, because - excuse me
2 - because my translator was a Croatian, a Bosnian Croat. She had friends
3 in Travnik, and we stayed in -- I mean the system was -- it was called the
4 Hotel Orient, and the system was that the hotels were militarised inasmuch
5 as soldiers -- they were using the rooms and they were run by, in this
6 case, the HVO, and the rooms were used by soldiers but, you know, for a
7 few Deutschmarks they would let you stay while the soldier was out on
8 night duty or something.
9 So I got -- got to spend a lot of time on that visit talking to
10 HVO people, and -- and a commander or deputy commander, I can't remember,
11 called Pokrajcic, and we were sitting with him and somebody from the
12 Bosnian army, a Muslim from the Bosnian army, and that was the first time
13 I heard any discussion of problems between the two militias. And this man
14 Pokrajcic, who was an estimable man, said I'm fighting for the victim
15 peoples of this war, as he put it, and he actually even said over my dead
16 body will I -- will I rupture the alliance, and he gave the impression,
17 although I can't remember his exact words, that the pressure he was
18 talking about was coming up from Herzegovina.
19 Q. Do you recall, sir, the identity of the person that you've
20 identified as a Muslim from the Bosnian army? Sorry.
21 MR. KOVACIC: I'm sorry to interrupt. Actually, I hate to
22 interrupt but as we all saw we are here now discussing events in Travnik.
23 Travnik is not one of the locations where any crimes happened charged in
24 this indictment we are dealing with here. So actually I don't see the
25 relevance, but if the Prosecutor is again charging us for something that
1 is not specifically charged, then probably some more charges. I don't
2 know really.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Mundis, is this issue
4 of any relevance, the issue of Travnik that you are discussing?
5 MR. MUNDIS: Well, Mr. President, the witness has spent a
6 significant period of time in Bosnia. It's a chronological story that
7 will allow us to go from one point to the next point. There are
8 references in the indictment and in the maps and material that Your
9 Honours have before you to events in Central Bosnia. Of course, Travnik
10 is part of Central Bosnia.
11 We would contend that this is also relevant to taking us in terms
12 of a logical time line in progression through the events during the time
13 period when this witness was in Bosnia. I'm not going to be dwelling on
14 any significant -- for any significant period of time.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Please continue.
16 MR. KOVACIC: If I may, Your Honour. The locations where crimes
17 happened, and the crimes which are charged by the indictment are
18 specifically defined in paragraphs 43 to 217 of the indictment, and it is
19 not Travnik. It is definitely not Travnik. And by the way, the witness
20 was talking about Omarska and some other places he visited in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina related to those about which he testified in other
22 cases --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic, that's not what
24 Mr. Mundis said. Mr. Mundis said that we have a witness who was in that
25 part of Bosnia during the period referred to in the indictment, and for
1 the sake of historical context, it might be interesting to have a few
2 guidelines. We're not talking about any crimes in this case, we are
3 dealing with context.
4 Please continue.
5 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, this period in August, 1992, how long did you remain
7 in Travnik?
8 A. That visit, I should think three to four days.
9 Q. And where did you go after you left Travnik in August, 1992?
10 A. I think I went back home, which, by the way, was in Italy at the
11 time, and returned a couple of weeks later. I think.
12 Q. When was the next time following this trip to Italy that you were
13 in Bosnia, and what part of Bosnia were you in?
14 A. It would have been September, and again I went up to Central
15 Bosnia, Vitez, Travnik, around that time. I'm just trying to -- sorry,
16 I'm just -- I'm finding the time line. Yes. I think I went up to Central
17 Bosnia again in September.
18 Q. And how long did you remain in Central Bosnia at that point in
20 A. I don't recall, I'm afraid, I'm sorry.
21 Q. Sir, when was the next time you were in Herzegovina?
22 A. I think the next time I was in Herzegovina was probably in
23 October, towards the end of October, to the best of my recollection.
24 Middle to end of October.
25 Q. Can you describe for us the circumstances which took you back to
1 Herzegovina in October, 1992.
2 A. Yes. And that's -- that's a day I can remember, because I got to
3 Split in the middle of October, and somewhere around 19th, 20th, the
4 translator and/or my colleague from Reuters, who is a former Yugoslav
5 himself, was reading in the paper that Mate Boban had been in Travnik, at
6 the time which I already had relationships and quite good contacts in both
7 the two allied armies, and he'd been there and pronounced it part of
8 Herceg-Bosna. And that surprised me because Travnik is a majority --
9 although it had a strong HVO presence and a thriving Croatian community,
10 it's predominantly a Muslim town. And I think we were still in Split, and
11 I wish we'd hit the road immediately because we were still in Split when
12 news came of a shoot-out at a gas station in Novi Travnik or Pucarevo, as
13 it was called at the time, just to the south at a gas station and someone,
14 a Muslim, had been killed. And it seemed that this was now a serious
15 story and needed examining, and I hit the road I think on the 22nd to go
16 to Travnik.
17 Q. And when you heard this news, you were in Split?
18 A. Either in Split or on the way up.
19 Q. Do you recall, sir, the route that you travelled in October, 1992?
20 A. Yes, I do, well, because it was through Kiseljak and up the Lasva
21 Valley, through Busovaca, and then you turn left towards Vitez. And I
22 remember it because there was a fair -- there was a substantial
23 mobilisation going on, a movement of troops north, particularly from
24 Kiseljak, and roadblocks, HVO roadblocks, coming up on -- onto that road
25 both from Kiseljak up to the T-junction, and particularly towards Vitez.
1 I'm talking about trucks and buses and there were other troops moving from
2 the south, south of Kiseljak towards Central Bosnia.
3 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, where during this specific trip in October, 1992,
4 where did you end up on that day? Where did you go?
5 A. We ended up in Vitez, hoping to stay the night. Again, hoping
6 that the same system I described in Travnik at the Hotel Orient would
7 pertain again; i.e., that even though the hotel had been taken over by the
8 HVO, you could still get a room there if you paid them some money. Sorry,
9 that sounds wrong; made a contribution.
10 And the -- but at this time there was a marked difference. At the
11 hotel, there were people there in -- bedding down in the bar area, in the
12 reception area, to sleep. All the rooms were full. There was no deal to
13 be done about staying there. This was now a militarised -- a completely
14 militarised place. But we decided to stay around in Vitez. There was
15 some small-arms fire going on, and I think through the HVO people at the
16 hotel we ended up in a sort of makeshift radio studio listening to a
17 debate in a small block of flats on the west side of the town.
18 Q. And, sir, at that point in time, and that is in October, 1992,
19 were you aware of what party or parties were involved in this conflict
20 whereby you heard small-arms fire?
21 A. Oh, yeah. Yes. I mean, as a follow-up of the news of the
22 shoot-out in Novi Travnik. There was -- it was the HVO and the armija BH,
23 or at least, if it wasn't the HVO and the armija BH, it was Muslims
24 against Croats.
25 Q. And, sir, how long do you remain in Vitez in October, 1992?
1 A. Our plan to remain there -- we wanted to stay but we couldn't
2 because after the radio broadcast I think we tried again at the hotel and
3 again thought not, but the atmosphere was getting quite menacing because
4 during this radio programme being recorded there was quite a lot of
5 fighting around the edge of the Stari Vitez, Old Vitez area, which is the
6 mainly Muslim bit. There was some fire coming out, and the fire going in
7 accelerated during the radio debate because we could see it from the
8 window. By then -- well, I easily knew the sound of an anti-aircraft
9 weapon being fired ground to ground - it's a deeper sound - and that's
10 what was being used.
11 Q. And again, Mr. Vulliamy, how long did you remain in Vitez in
12 mid-October, 1992?
13 A. Well, we left that night, unable to sleep, went to place called
14 Fojnica, and then came back up at -- attempted to come back up to Vitez
15 again the next day but we couldn't because we got stuck in some quite
16 fierce fighting on the edge of Novi Travnik.
17 Q. And, sir, where did you then go after this incident where you were
18 stuck on the edge of Novi Travnik?
19 A. Well, we were stuck there for quite a long time with a group of
20 HVO soldiers in an exchange of fire, and then we did finally get through
21 Vitez to Travnik and went to the hospital in Travnik where the victims of
22 this new embryonic, and I have to say rather shocking, confrontation were,
23 many of them children.
24 Q. And where did you go next, sir?
25 A. Back down to Split to file the story. I should explain: There
1 were no telephones available to us at that point in Central Bosnia, and
2 you had to drive back to Split or a border town - there's one called
3 Imotski - to file stories. There was a story to file, not least the
4 fighting that we'd seen in Vitez and indeed been part of and pinned by
5 quite -- and very frightened by in Novi Travnik.
6 Q. And on this occasion when you travelled to Split to file your
7 story, can you tell us what route you took.
8 A. We went through Konjic that -- that night. Why, I don't know. I
9 wasn't driving. I'd hooked up with someone from the Sunday Times who had
10 a vehicle by then. Why we went through Konjic I don't know, because it
11 was being shelled by the Serbs, but we got back to Split okay. I don't
12 know why we went that way.
13 Q. And again, when did you then leave Split and where did you go
15 A. Well, almost immediately, because either on the way back, on the
16 radio or when we got to Split, or a mixture of both, we heard that there
17 was reason to go to Mostar, that an ultimatum had been made whereby the --
18 well, there were actually -- there were -- there were confused reports.
19 There was one report that the Bosnian army was -- that the HVO no longer
20 recognise the authority of the Bosnian army. There was another report
21 that, quotes, Muslim extremists would no longer be tolerated on the free
22 territory, and then there was a specific ultimatum from Mostar. Now,
23 whether or not it meant within Mostar or from Mostar for the whole
24 territory, I didn't know, but there was an ultimatum from Mostar that the
25 Bosnian army had to either disarm or come under HVO authority. So the
1 next morning we set off for Mostar. That -- that's the 24th or maybe the
3 Q. Of which month and year, please?
4 A. October.
5 Q. 1992?
6 A. Yeah. I think it's the 24th, counting.
7 Q. And did you in fact go to Mostar on that day?
8 A. We did.
9 Q. And can you tell the Trial Chamber what events you witnessed in
10 Mostar on that day?
11 A. It was quite dramatic and impactful. The HVO had indeed put out
12 their ultimatum. They had taken over important buildings in the city.
13 The PTT - that's the telephone building - the court -- courts, the town
14 hall. They put a guard outside the BH army headquarters. I should
15 explain that at that time, because the alliance had been such a close and
16 effective one, the two headquarters of the two armies were, if not next
17 door, they were close neighbours on the west side of the city. And we got
18 there, were told this -- well, you could see a lot of HVO activity on the
19 streets. Went first to see the Bosnian army commander, whose name was
20 Pasalic, and asked him about this ultimatum, and he said something to the
21 effect of how can I disarm? I'm supposed to be fighting a war. That's
22 not a direct quote. And something to the effect - again not a direct
23 quote - that this is plan, that this is coming from the top. This is
24 coming -- I think he did mention Grude specifically. And warned, and this
25 is very early on, with hindsight, that if this plan was seen through to
1 its professed conclusion, it would mean, and he said "war in Mostar."
2 He told us that the HVO had come in and taken his radio system,
3 and it was actually one of his aides who was a Croat from Zagreb, a
4 student fighting in the Bosnian army, who showed us that -- the wires
5 pulled out and everything from their radio communications room. He was
6 very angry, this young Croat, at what had happened.
7 And I think we then had a long conversation with -- with -- I
8 think it must be the deputy commander. His name is Tetak. He was angry,
9 afraid at what was going on. And said, We want to fight with these people
10 together. Tetak said something to that effect: We want to fight for a
11 united country.
12 Q. Did you have any other meetings while you were in Mostar during
13 this period of time on or about the 24th of October, 1992?
14 A. Yes, several meetings that day, the next of which was next door
15 with the commander of the HVO. If he wasn't the commander, that's -- he
16 was the deputy or at least a senior figure. His name was Lasic. I don't
17 know his first -- I mean, I did and somewhere written, probably, his first
18 name, but I can't recall it. And his headquarters was buzzing with
19 troops, weapons. He produced a rather good -- good scotch whisky, and
20 made his -- yes. He outlined what -- to us what was going on in his
21 terms. He called the HVO the civilian military authority in Mostar and
22 gave the impression that so far as representation was concerned in the
23 civilian military, coupling the words together, authorities in the town,
24 no, as he put it, Muslim, I don't think he actually mentioned the army in
25 that point, would be represented.
1 He said that the armija BH should be disarmed and said that he --
2 I think he -- he didn't say he demanded. He said, you know, I'm inviting
3 them, or something, to come off the front line, the front line being to
4 the east of the city at that point. We talked a lot about that remark
5 afterwards because it has extreme military significance. That's all I can
6 remember from that meeting.
7 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, at that point in time do you know what front line
8 was being referred to?
9 A. I presumed, and I think rightly, it meant the front line held by
10 the Bosnian army and the HVO to the east of Mostar against the Serbs, but
11 information talking to the Bosnian soldier -- soldiers later in the day
12 informed us, rightly or wrongly, I have to say this is what we were told,
13 was that the BH lines were further forward than the HVO lines, and by
14 taking them off the front line, the HVO were actually retreating by some
15 -- by some small distance. I mean, retreating the common front line,
16 which militarily doesn't make sense.
17 Q. Do you recall, sir, at this point in time - again 24 October, 1992
18 - what the conditions in Mostar were like for the residents of the city?
19 A. The city had been under Serbian shell-fire ever since they were
20 pushed out in July. We didn't talk much to residents that day but we did
21 talk to refugees. Refugees, Muslim and Croat, from Serbian-held territory
22 to the east and south-east, most of them. And the interesting thing about
23 that, those conversations, was that they were all going to have to
24 re-register with the HVO if they wanted to stay, that their papers,
25 whatever those papers were, were no longer valid, and -- I think they must
1 have been Bosnian government papers of some kind, were no longer valid,
2 and they were all going to have to individually re-register with the HVO
3 and get a newly stamped document to retain their status. I recall that.
4 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, did you notice anything that had changed from the
5 last time you had been in Mostar in 1992?
6 A. Well, a lot more troops on the streets for sure. And let's see.
7 I mean -- well, and -- and the cost of the Serbian shelling which had
8 continued. There were, I think, even when I was there in -- in August
9 there were graveyards in the parks and that sort of thing. I mean, the
10 marks of war. But I did, on my previous visit, go over to the east side
11 just basically because I wanted to see the bridge, and there was
12 marginally more destruction from the shelling but not -- not markedly.
13 What you noticed is the HVO had taken over and that everything that they
14 had been talking about in Vitez was happening in Mostar.
15 Q. Did you have any other meetings on that day in October, 1992?
16 A. Yes, one with a Muslim political figure whose name I can't
17 remember, I'm afraid. He might have been in the SDA. The -- the -- the
18 main Muslim party led by President Izetbegovic. I don't remember much
19 about the conversation, but I remember him being very distressed and
20 worried for the city and for -- and for the next few months.
21 You know, I ought to say that it was still quite a shock despite
22 all the warnings and despite what one perhaps should -- one should have
23 made more of what Mate Boban had said back in August and heeded it as more
24 of a threat to bring this about, but it was still quite a shock after, you
25 know, one's work in the north-west, given what the Bosnian Serbs were
1 meting out to both Serbs and Croats together, and given one's experience
2 of the way in which they were allied elsewhere in the country, it was
3 still quite a shock that this had happened so quickly, so efficiently, and
4 so determinedly.
5 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, how long did you remain in Mostar during this visit
6 on or about the 24th of August?
7 A. No, we left that day, because we went to see Mate Boban. Left at
8 dusk, went straight to Grude.
9 Q. And can you tell us about this meeting that you had with Mr. Boban
10 in Grude on the 24th of October, 1992.
11 A. Yes. He'd moved across the road. He was now in a hotel, Hotel
12 Grude. And we were sent down into the cellar, into the basement, to wait
13 for him. He was having a meeting behind a curtain. It was some sort of
14 dining or -- area that I think they'd turned into his headquarters in this
15 hotel. We were told to wait. It was indicated that he would see us. We
16 waited. This meeting broke up. The meeting was all with uniformed
17 people. He was in a very good mood and welcomed us in and he was in a
18 good mood because he said, I've just been made president of the HDZ. And
19 we congratulated him and he congratulated us on the exclusive first
20 interview with the party's new president in Bosnia.
21 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, when you say, as you just did, that the meeting was
22 all with uniformed people, can you tell us what kind of uniforms --
23 A. HVO.
24 Q. -- these people wore? What can you tell us about your knowledge
25 at this point in time, that is October, 1992, about the HDZ party?
1 A. Well, as I said before, to repeat briefly, the HDZ was the ruling
2 party in Croatia, led by the president, Dr. Franjo Tudjman. It had a wing
3 in Bosnia, which was -- in theory it was semi-autonomous but it was very
4 close to Zagreb. But the quirk was that its leader was a man who I had
5 not at that point met but later met and talked a lot with but of whose
6 existence I knew, called Stjepan Kljuic. Kljuic was the leader of the
7 party I think by necessity because he lived in Sarajevo. And although a
8 very loyal Croat, he was also loyal to the alliance and to the Bosnian
9 government, which he recognised. He thought that the HDZ was the best way
10 to represent Croatian interests within a unified Bosnia, and certainly
11 within the alliance.
12 He -- I don't want to go into -- I don't want to jump the gun
13 chronologically, but he later said that what happened to him that day we
14 met Mate Boban was a putsch, and Mate Boban told us he was now the
15 president. This, in one's mind, was perfectly coherent with all that we
16 had seen and heard over the last couple of days, and so we were very
17 anxious to talk to him and also talk to him about what was going on in
19 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, do you recall any of the specific subjects that were
20 discussed with Mr. Boban in Grude on 24 October, 1992?
21 A. Yes, I do. We returned to this matter of cantons and provinces
22 because I now wanted to know more about them. Again, I'm sorry to jump
23 around chronologically, but we're a couple of months, I can't remember
24 exactly how many, away from the Vance-Owen Plan, the peace plan drawn up
25 by Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance. And it, with hindsight, is
1 extraordinary to look back on that conversation now because what Mate
2 Boban said to us that night in developing his idea of a Herceg-Bosna made
3 up of cantons almost exactly prologued the Vance-Owen Plan. In fact, when
4 the Vance-Owen came around there was a joke it stood for "Hvala
5 Vance-Owen," which means, "Thank you Vance-0wen." So he elaborated on
6 that. He said that HVO was now the only effective army on the free
7 territory, which-- well, might have been true of some parts of it if the
8 free territory is to mean all that not controlled by the Serbs but is not
9 true of other parts of it. But what also was going on at the time was the
10 Geneva peace talks were either in progress or about to happen, I can't
11 remember which, and he made it perfectly clear that he was now going to
12 call the shots on behalf of the Bosnian Croats at Geneva, he used fairly
13 threatening language with regard to anyone who would disagree with him,
14 and I think he -- he said the HVO is now ready to assume supreme military
15 authority in this area. He talked about that when we talked about Mostar
16 and he used similar language when we did asked him specifically about
17 Mostar. He was talking about Mostar and the territory of Herceg-Bosna.
18 He called the army a purely Muslim militia. I remember that. Which
19 actually was not true at that time. It was almost true later on in the
20 war but at that time it was not true.
21 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, let me interrupt you there and put to you a couple
22 of follow-on questions. First, you just told us, page 50, line 6, that
23 Mr. Boban made it perfectly clear that he was now going to call the shots.
24 What -- what do you mean by that?
25 A. Well, I mean I -- yes, I remember what he said. He said what he
1 meant by that. He said something to the effect of no one is going to
2 represent the Bosnian -- the Bosnian Croats at Geneva unless authorised by
3 me or -- or following my policy.
4 Q. You also told us that --
5 A. Yeah. Sorry. And his policy, as we understood it, that -- that
6 -- at that meeting was -- and I think he singled out Karadzic as well. I
7 mean, he said no dealing with Karadzic but he also said no dealing with
8 Izetbegovic, no dealing with the Presidency in Sarajevo. I mean, it was
9 -- it was a declaration of independence and implicitly of war at the same
11 You must, Your Honours, remember that we'd had a lot of these
12 conversations, if you will, from the Serbs in Croatia in 1991, from the
13 Bosnian Serbs in early summer 1992. They invariably led to violence.
14 They were invariably the prologue to violence, this kind of language.
15 Q. Let me ask you, sir: You told us -- again this is lines 8, 9 and
16 10 of page 50, you -- Mr. Boban said "the HVO is now ready to have supreme
17 military authority in this area. He talked about that when he talked
18 about Mostar." Do you recall in any more specifics the discussion on 24
19 October, 1992, with Mr. Boban concerning Mostar?
20 A. He did make some reference that there will be no Muslims in the
21 authority, that the Muslims will not be part of running this city any
22 more. He had always insisted that Mostar was the capital of Herceg-Bosna
23 and gave non-military reasons for that. We have to have a big city, I
24 remember him saying, it's got a university; this kind of argument. On
25 that occasion he did say in some way, and I cannot, I'm afraid, remember
1 the exact words, that the Muslims will not be -- will not be taking part
2 in the running of Mostar militarily or politically. And it is -- it is
3 the capital of Herceg-Bosna.
4 Q. Approximately how long did this meeting on this day with Mr. Boban
6 A. Again, I don't recall. I would say again between an hour and two.
7 Q. And as you left the meeting that evening, do you recall what
8 impression stuck in your mind from this discussion that you'd had with
9 Mr. Boban?
10 A. Yes. My colleague from Reuters and I discussed it on the way back
11 to wherever we were staying that night. I can't remember, I think we did
12 go all the way back to Split, actually. We -- we discussed the speed at
13 which all this had happened, the efficiency with all -- with all this --
14 with which all this had happened, the -- now getting quite worried about
15 what Boban and the HVO meant by such terms as used before, "to defend our
16 freedom," "to become the supreme authority." As I said, you know, I'd had
17 experience, well, in other places too but specifically in former
18 Yugoslavia I'd had experience talking to the Serbs about Eastern Croatia
19 and about -- with the Serbs about the Muslims in north-west Bosnia, and
20 that kind of language tended to be, as I said, prefaced -- tended to
21 preface violence, and there was no reason not to suppose it wouldn't do so
22 again, because this was bellicose talk, and it was -- and it was sad, in a
23 way, because it seemed that the alliance was now ruptured and deliberately
25 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, on lines 9 and 10 of page 52, you're quoted as
1 saying, "We discussed the speed at which all this had happened, the
2 efficiency with all -- with all this -- with which all this had happened."
3 When you make reference to what had happened, what exactly are you
4 referring to?
5 A. Well, I'm referring, I think, to the -- to the HVO and -- and
6 Boban stamping their authority on a territory they -- they were calling
7 Herceg-Bosna, which apparently extended all the way up as far as Travnik
8 and included Travnik, and -- and the -- the overt attempt to subjugate
9 both -- well, they talked about Muslims, but certainly their allies within
10 that territory and to effectively declare at least a degree of
11 independence from -- from the country as -- as was with Sarajevo as a
12 capital, which we had thought they were fighting to -- to -- to maintain,
13 at least. Not any more we didn't, but that was the idea originally.
14 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, can you tell the Trial Chamber where you went in the
15 days immediately after this meeting with Mr. Boban on the 24th of October,
17 A. On the days immediately after, there was a -- there was an outing
18 with the British army from Split when they were trying to work out routes
19 into Sarajevo, aid routes, and they were trying one which went up through
20 Mostar and a place called Tarcin, as I recall, and they were turned back
21 by the HVO, which was surprising, because one might have expected to get
22 turned back by the Serbs further up the line, as often happened, but not
23 by the HVO.
24 I went up into Central Bosnia and on to Vitez and Travnik to do
25 something else connected with the -- with the -- with an attempt to get to
1 Jajce, I think it was, and to cover the attempt to hold Jajce, which was a
2 town north of Travnik held by the Bosnian army and the HVO against a
3 Serbian siege, and then drove down towards Tomislavgrad and Split, I think
4 to file a story on that, and went through the town of Prozor.
5 Q. Now, Mr. Vulliamy, let me ask you, as you were going north from
6 Mostar up to the Central Bosnia area, what route did you take on that
7 occasion, travelling northbound?
8 A. I think we went back -- the British convoy turned round, went
9 back, but I don't recall which route we took up into Central Bosnia, I'm
10 afraid. But when we came back down, back down south, it was through
12 Q. Do you recall approximately what the date was when you went back
13 down south through Prozor?
14 A. It would have been a weekend. I'm afraid I can't give you the
15 date. I would have written it somewhere. It can be worked out from
16 published articles. It was either a Friday evening or a Saturday. A lot
17 of people -- possibly even a Sunday, but I think a Friday evening or a
18 Saturday. A lot of people out on the streets.
19 Q. And can you describe the mood of the people you saw out on the
20 streets on this occasion?
21 A. It was complete -- life was completely normal. In fact, shortly
22 after going through the town we stopped for coffee. People on the
23 streets, a weekend either beginning or about to begin, kids chatting.
24 Prozor was a fair distance from any front lines. It was -- it was -- it
25 was unshelled unless some Serbs had got some shells a very long way, and
1 life was perfectly normal.
2 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, after that occasion, did you ever return to the town
3 of Prozor?
4 A. Indeed. We headed back up into -- filed whatever we were filing
5 on -- from Central Bosnia, went back up, heading for -- to -- I can't
6 remember where we were going. And this would be two, possibly three days
7 later. And a group of us, and were astonished by what we found as we
8 approached let alone arrived in Prozor.
9 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, can you please tell us the approximate date - day,
10 month, and year - when you returned to Prozor on this occasion?
11 A. I'm afraid -- I don't want to give you an exact date. We're
12 talking end October.
13 Q. And the year?
14 A. 1992.
15 Q. And approximately what time did you arrive in Prozor on this day
16 towards the end --
17 A. Late afternoon.
18 Q. Can you tell us what you saw on that occasion.
19 A. Yes. The first thing we saw before we got to the town were a lot
20 of soldiers, and between Prozor and -- between there is a village called
21 Rumboci, and between there and Prozor, and especially on the high ground
22 as you come into Prozor were a lot of artillery and, in English, a lot of
23 graffiti, new graffiti, which read "Cro territory." Going down into the
24 town, saying nothing other than Oh, my God, and things that shouldn't be
25 repeated in a courtroom, let me say that the main street had been gutted,
1 or most had been gutted. Rows of buildings, in some places every other
2 building, in some places every fifth building, had been incinerated and
3 were empty. There were signs of shelling, there were signs of small-arms
4 fire. There were soldiers going through the shops, looting.
5 In the area which I had took, rightly or wrongly, to be the
6 Croatian area, which was fairly untouched, life was seemed to be -- I
7 mean, the children were sort of hanging around on the streets, we stopped
8 and talked only very briefly to one group of soldiers. I can't remember
9 what they said. We were not anxious to hang around. The atmosphere was
10 very frightening indeed, and we proceeded out of town, what I presumed to
11 be the Muslim quarter of town, or at least the concentration of Muslims
12 because they're mostly mixed in, is to the left as you leave the town and
13 climb a hill. A lot of the houses in that area were damaged. There was
14 some incineration although less than on the high street. The minaret was
15 damaged although not blown down, as one had seen so often. I recall a
16 dead horse lying in the road, for what that's worth. Otherwise, very
17 little sign of any life of at all once you left the town until you got to
18 the top of the hill, and there was a sort of mountain chalet or
19 installation of some kind teeming with soldiers, heavy weaponry rivetting
20 in, and the beginning a series of new roadblocks.
21 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, when you tell us that you saw soldiers in Prozor on
22 this day, what type of clothing were these soldiers wearing?
23 A. They were almost all in fatigues of one kind or another, and I
24 noted - and I'm still not quite clear why - that a lot of them had red
25 ribbons on their epaulettes, but they were mostly in military -- military
1 uniform or -- I have actually since seen a picture of somebody in -- which
2 I didn't see on the ground, in a sort of neo-Nazi uniform, but that
3 doesn't really count for much. They were mostly in military uniform.
4 Q. Did you, Mr. Vulliamy, at any point subsequent to this file any
5 type of stories concerning events in Prozor on this day?
6 A. Yes, that night. This was -- this was a shocking new development.
7 I think it's fair to say that we knew by now that this alliance had
8 ruptured because we'd seen what we'd seen in Vitez, and we'd seen what
9 we'd seen in Mostar, and the roadblocks, plus the mobilisations, et
10 cetera. But this was, and I dislike the word but it's in the vocabulary,
11 this was ethnic cleansing. This bore all the hallmarks of that which I'd
12 seen so much of by the Serbs in Eastern Croatia, by the Bosnian Serbs in
13 the north-west of the country. I say all the hallmarks; it didn't look
14 like some of those areas, or as bad as some of those areas I've just
15 mentioned, but it was the same -- it -- it -- it had the same flavour to
16 it. It didn't feel that there had been a battle between militias in
17 Prozor, it felt as though the Muslims had been burned out.
18 We got as far as Travnik that night with some difficulty because
19 there was some fighting, or at least there was some distant shooting in
20 Novi Travnik, and it turned out that the headquarters of the Bosnian army
21 had all that time had a land-line and in this extremity allowed us to use
23 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, were you ever at any point in time involved in
24 making a film production about the events in Prozor in 1992?
25 A. No, I made a film later.
1 Q. When did you make that film?
2 A. I first went to make -- went to Bosnia to make it in January 1993,
3 and stayed there I think it was into February.
4 Q. And what was the -- what was the basis for producing this film?
5 How did you actually go about making the film?
6 A. It was -- it was actually for a -- a religious affairs programme
7 for the BBC, and the idea was -- it was called "Bosnia's Last Testament,"
8 and it was a sort of lament for what I saw at the time as being the end of
9 a way of life in the town of Travnik, the end of a -- well, in a -- sorry,
10 it was two things: It was the potential end of a way of life in Travnik.
11 I mean, we can talk about this a bit more if it's permissible, but you
12 know I felt that this was a country in which people had for so long
13 learned to live together and wanted -- and so many of them still wanted to
14 live together so the film was a sort of an aspiration that that may still
15 happen and a lament for the fact it seemed to be falling apart.
16 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, what was your role in the production of this film?
17 A. I was to write and present it.
18 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, with the assistance of the registry,
19 I'd ask that the video marked as P1784 be shown to the witness by way of
21 [Videotape played]
22 "... state within Bosnia calling itself Herceg-Bosna."
23 "To the south of Travnik one night in October I stopped for
24 coffee in the busy main street. A few days later I returned to find
25 Croatian MUPs roaming through town and 5.000 Muslims driven into the
1 mountains, looking for caves in which to hide. The pillage and killing in
2 Prozor was the start of a new Bosnian war and a bitter betrayal for the
3 Muslims. This is the consolidation of a hard-line Croatian mini state
4 within Bosnia calling itself Herceg-Bosna. This territory flies a
5 Croatian flag, has a Croatian puppet government, uses Croatian money, and
6 even has special Croatian number plates, and it must say its rulers, come
7 under a Croatian army. Bosnian who refuse that authority are dealt with
8 in the time honoured way."
9 MR. MUNDIS:
10 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, the clip that we just have just seen, can you tell
11 us what your role in producing that clip was.
12 A. No. That's a library clip. I recognise it from the film but it
13 was put in by the producer of the programme. I wasn't involved in the
15 Q. And we noticed, sir, on the top of that clip a date in April,
16 1993. Can you explain that?
17 A. I can't, I'm afraid. I have no idea. It could -- it could be the
18 date of the transmission, it could be the date that the BBC recorded it, I
19 don't know. But if that's Prozor, which it looks like, that's not the
21 Q. Now, Mr. Vulliamy, on this day that you've been telling us about,
22 how long did you remain in Prozor on that day?
23 A. Oh, very little time indeed. I mean, apart from a very cursory
24 conversation with some of the soldiers, we drove straight out. It was
1 Q. Sir, I neglected to ask you in terms of that video clip, at the
2 end when you make reference to "the time honoured way," what were you
3 referring to?
4 A. I was referring to that which I'd mentioned earlier on, the time
5 honoured way in which Croats had been expelled from eastern parts of their
6 country in 1991, in which Muslims had been expelled from the Prijedor area
7 in 1992. It was an attempt at a dry -- a dry reference to the -- yes, the
8 time honoured way. It was by then a time honoured way. What I meant was
9 you get them out, you burn them out, you bus them out; get them out.
10 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, can you tell us how that scene we just saw on the
11 videotape compared with the events that you personally witnessed in Prozor
12 at the end of October 1992?
13 A. The streets look the same. The -- the lads look a bit sort of
14 more like ruffians than the ones we saw, and I noticed that they didn't
15 have these red ribbons on their soldiers, which for -- which stayed in my
17 Q. On this day after you left Prozor, can you please tell us where
18 you went.
19 A. We went to Travnik -- oh, we went to Travnik to file the story.
20 Q. And how long did you remain on that occasion in Travnik?
21 A. Oh, one night and left early in the morning to answer the question
22 where -- where are -- where are the Muslims?
23 Q. And, sir, how did that question come to be formulated in your --
24 in your mind?
25 A. The commander of the Bosnian army who -- who offered us the phone
1 line -- I shouldn't. Anyway, he said, "All I know is that he -- is that
2 the --" we were telling him as much as he could tell us. And what he said
3 to us is that 500 -- all I know is that 5000 Muslims are missing from
4 Prozor and we don't know where they are.
5 Q. Where did you go the following day?
6 A. We got up and went down back towards Prozor, but before we got to
7 Prozor, on a junction we saw some women straggling - it was raining - up a
8 road turning off to the left, and stopped to talk to them.
9 Q. Do you recall the approximate time that you arrived at this
10 junction near Prozor?
11 A. I suppose it would have been late morning coming up midday-ish. I
12 mean, it's not -- it's not an easy drive. Some -- something around that
14 Q. And can you please describe for us what happened when you
15 encountered these people that you -- or these women straggling, as you
16 told us and stopped to talk to them. Would you describe for us what
18 A. Yes. We asked them what had happened. One of them, I noticed,
19 was wearing bedroom slippers. They looked frightened, they looked
20 bedraggled, and one of them said that they'd spent the night looking for
21 caves, that soldiers were out killing people and looking for them. And as
22 we were having this conversation, a mini cab pulled up. That sounds
23 strange. He wasn't touting for business. He was a driver whose car
24 happened to -- you know, he was a mini cab driver using his car in this
25 emergency. And he told the women to get into his car, and those that
1 wouldn't fit got into ours, and he told us to follow him, which we did, a
2 little way up this road, and then turning off to the right up a track
3 mountain track, and the track rose up through I think some wooded country
4 and then opened out onto open -- open country, and there was this amazing
5 sight of large numbers of people wandering the fields in groups or
6 standing, looking to get away. Looking for somewhere. I don't know what
7 they were looking for. They were wandering the open country.
8 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, can you give us a rough approximation as to how many
9 people you saw wandering the country on that day?
10 A. It's difficult. I don't -- I hate numbers. Hundreds. Scores if
11 not hundreds.
12 Q. And which direction were these people wandering?
13 A. In the direction of Jablanica, which I knew to be a government
14 army-held town.
15 Q. And approximately how far from the town of Prozor were you at the
16 point in time when you saw these people?
17 A. I'm not really sure. It's -- it's not far. Five to 10 kilometres
19 Q. Did you, sir, at that occasion have the opportunity to speak to
20 any of those people?
21 A. Yes, we did. We spoke to quite a lot of them to try and get a
22 picture of what had happened.
23 Q. Do you recall any of the information that any of these people
24 conveyed to you?
25 A. Yes. I will have written somewhere but cannot recall direct
1 quotes, and I can remember some details.
2 In essence, it seemed that -- that shelling had -- well, one man
3 did say that his Croatian neighbours suddenly left the neighbourhood the
4 day before this happened. It seems that shelling began during the night
5 or towards dawn. At dawn, soldiers moved into the town. It's -- it's a
6 pattern I by this time knew well. It's the latter bit called -- it's
7 called flushing out. Interviewees, I can't remember their names, I'm
8 afraid. One woman told me that she had spent the night hiding in the
9 cellar before escaping along a gutter or some kind of sewage trench. And
10 one of the militarymen, men in military uniform up there, because there
11 were a few ushering them about, said that he had seen bodies towed away on
12 a trailer by a tractor, and others talked about having seen columns of men
13 being marched out of the town. This is what -- what they were saying.
14 The conclusion was that -- or my inference was that the town had
15 been shelled first, that the soldiers had then gone in, and that these
16 people had fled.
17 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, you mentioned men in military uniforms ushering the
18 people about. Approximately how many uniformed men did you see in this
20 A. A few, not that many.
21 Q. What type of --
22 A. But they were there.
23 Q. What type of arms did they have, if any?
24 A. I don't even know if they had any weapons. They might have done.
25 I can't remember. I mean, they might have. I don't recall any rifles.
1 They might have had revolvers. I don't recall any machine-guns or
3 Q. Sir, how long did you remain in this area where these people were
4 straggling, as you put it?
5 A. Couple of hours or so. Oh, three -- three or four hours.
6 Q. Can you describe the weather conditions at the time?
7 A. At first wet and becoming drizzly. I mean difficult.
8 Q. What type of belongings, if any, did these people have with them?
9 A. Hardly anything at all, although I think a few may have had some
10 plastic -- plastic bags full of things. I don't recall that they had much
11 with them.
12 Q. And how were these people dressed?
13 A. Oh, in -- in -- I mean -- I mentioned the bedroom slippers. They
14 were people who had left in a hurry. They hadn't packed.
15 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, at any point in time did you have any discussions
16 with any soldiers concerning Prozor and its significance?
17 A. Yes. I mean, especially afterwards, given what had happened. And
18 these were mostly soldiers from the United Nations, British soldiers from
19 the so-called UNPROFOR. And -- well, actually, soldiers from both of the
20 armies as well, but mostly British soldiers.
21 Q. Can you tell us what these discussions with UNPROFOR soldiers
22 revealed to you?
23 A. Yes. And this is later, and it made absolute sense, and although
24 not a soldier myself, we had, as reporters, understood similar ourselves.
25 Prozor -- the word "Prozor" means window, and the town of Prozor is the
1 window, or perhaps better put, the gateway from Herzegovina into Central
2 Bosnia up a road which, because of the situation regarding the conflict
3 with the Serbs initially, was the lifeline -- one of the two lifelines for
4 the delivery of aid into Central Bosnia, and for periods of time, because
5 of risks to another route into Sarajevo, also the lifeline of aid into
6 Sarajevo through Kiseljak and a Serbian checkpoint called Ilidza. So that
7 was the significance of Prozor in terms of aid. Control Prozor, and you
8 control, as it were, the portal of the aid route into Central Bosnia.
9 When the UNPROFOR arrived, they tried to enhance some pieces of
10 mountain track into proper and usable road in order to facilitate this --
11 this route, skirting properly metalled roads that were exposed to Serbian
12 guns, and they called it Route Diamond. So we can think of Prozor as a
13 kind of pivot on Route Diamond into Central Bosnia. And the other point,
14 as I think we all knew anyway but which the British soldiers were quick to
15 grasp, is that one man's aid route is another man's military supply route,
16 and that Route Diamond was, of course, the HVO's, or one of the HVO's two
17 - the other one through Kiseljak - two main military supply routes up
18 into Central Bosnia. And it also meant that by controlling them, the
19 Bosnian army in Central Bosnia was landlocked and had no access to the --
20 the -- because they used these same supply routes during the alliance, not
21 just for whatever weaponry they could get but for gasoline supplies and so
22 on. So it made absolute sense. If you wanted to start a putsch, a
23 military putsch in Central Bosnia, you begin with Prozor.
24 Civilian-wise, if I'm not wrong, it was one of the southernmost
25 Muslim populations in Central Bosnia.
1 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, line 19 of page 64 you told us the word "Prozor"
2 means window. I would ask you if you know what language the word "Prozor"
3 means window.
4 A. I have to confess I've never looked it up; I was told that.
5 Serbo-Croat, or B/C/S as it's called now.
6 Q. Let me then ask you, sir, again, what steps, if any, you took to
7 file a story following what you'd observed in this valley or this area
8 near Prozor.
9 A. We headed for the nearest telephone, which was in Tomislavgrad.
10 Not a public phone, actually. There was a European Union Monitoring
11 Mission man we knew there who -- and we thought we'd ask if we could use
12 his phone.
13 Q. Can you describe for us who you had meetings with or discussions
14 with in Tomislavgrad on that day, on that evening?
15 A. Yes, briefly with this aforementioned Monitoring Mission man, but
16 the -- the atmosphere in Tomislavgrad was one of jubilation, rasping
17 machine-guns into the air. We'd actually followed a lot of the soldiers
18 back in their trucks along the -- there's a track that runs from Prozor to
19 Tomislavgrad, which may appear on maps as Duvno sometimes. They changed
20 the name.
21 The EU man was very insistent that we meet with a man who was
22 introduced as the HVO commander in Tomislavgrad. Whether he was or not I
23 don't know but he was introduced as such and invited to join us for dinner
24 and we had a long -- tediously long conversation with him.
25 Q. Let me interrupt you there, Mr. Vulliamy. Do you recall the name
1 of this person to whom you were introduced as the HVO commander in
3 A. Shiljeg or Siljeg, and I can't remember his first name.
4 Q. Do you recall any of the details of this tediously long
5 conversation that you had with him?
6 A. I can recall a few details. Well, I can recall one important
7 detail: He said that Prozor was now clean. He made a reference to the --
8 the rather drunken celebrations outside as night games, as boys will sort
9 of way. And then he got out a -- he got out a series of maps of Croatia
10 down the centuries, 1 to 12, as I recall. Arduously went through each map
11 as Croatia expanded and shrunk, and the last one I remember was labelled
12 "Future Croatian Federation," and had Croatia extending all the way to
13 almost to Belgrade, to a place called Zume. And it was the 1941 so-called
14 Banovina Croatia. That was not actually HVO policy at all. It was, if
15 anything, that of its old rival HOS. But it was a long, long lecture
16 about history, as one had got quite used to.
17 Q. Do you recall approximately how long this lecture lasted?
18 A. I don't recall how long, but way beyond exhaustion.
19 Q. And how long did you remain in Tomislavgrad?
20 A. I think we left the next morning.
21 Q. Do you recall again the approximate date that this would be?
22 A. No, but I remember why. Because I think I mentioned the siege of
23 Jajce up in Central Bosnia. Word reached us if not that -- I think word
24 reached us that night that Jajce was about to go, and by the time we woke
25 up we heard that it had fallen.
1 Q. And again, sir, I understand you might not recall the date, but do
2 you recall the month and/or year when you were in Tomislavgrad and learned
3 that Jajce had fallen?
4 A. Unbelievably, I think we're still at the end of October. I think
5 all this is happening at the end of October in rapid succession.
6 Q. And, Mr. Vulliamy, upon hearing that Jajce had fallen, what did
7 you do?
8 A. Headed for Jajce. Jajce, not Vitez.
9 Q. Did you in fact make it to Jajce on that occasion?
10 A. No. We tried to get into Jajce on previous occasions along a
11 narrow corridor that linked Jajce to Travnik. The HVO and the Bosnian
12 army used it to try and service the defence of the town from a heavy
13 Serbian siege, Bosnian Serb siege. We tried to get up it a couple of
14 times, it was terrifyingly dangerous, and abandoned our attempts on
15 various occasions. And so we only got as far as a place called Turbe that
16 night, which is a little bit far up the line from Travnik towards Jajce.
17 Q. And did you spend the night in Turbe?
18 A. No, we didn't. We went back to Travnik. There was some people
19 coming in already, and we figured we'd get some sleep and get to work on
20 this story the following day. We did talk to some of them and did
21 interview a few people coming in, and they all told the same distressing
22 story, that the siege had become unbearable, they'd been living in
23 cellars, they hadn't been able to eat. But we went to sleep before we
24 started doing our serious interviewing.
25 Q. And the following day when you awoke, can you tell us what you
2 A. I say this against myself: We discovered that we'd been wrong to
3 go to sleep, because overnight the entire population of Jajce had arrived
4 in Travnik, and it was an extraordinary sight of people sitting all over
5 every bit of street with their broilers, their animals, their families,
6 maybe a few possessions. So we quickly started up the road towards --
7 that was coming into town against the tide of this procession, this
8 wretched procession, and started doing interviews with the -- with the
9 people. Among them, by the way, were wounded soldiers, non-wounded
10 straggling soldiers, what was left of each of these two armies, and they
11 were coming by cart, on foot, horse-drawn cart if they had them.
12 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, when you say you started doing interviews with the
13 people, did that include these soldiers?
14 A. No. We didn't talk to any military people until later in the day,
15 towards the evening time. We were trying to get a -- as vivid a sense as
16 we could of the conditions under which Jajce had fallen.
17 Q. Can you tell us, please, Mr. Vulliamy, what you learned from any
18 of the soldiers that you spoke to later on that day.
19 A. Well, there was an oddity and a curiosity. The soldiers were told
20 -- I didn't see this happen, but I understood that their orders were to
21 report to the respective headquarters of their armies in Travnik, and
22 there were -- when we went and -- we went to see this, didn't -- didn't
23 talk to many people, but when we got to the Bosnian army headquarters,
24 there were some Croatians there, Bosnian Croats there, and along with some
25 of the other soldiers they were wearing a patch that I hadn't seen before
1 which had the Bosnian lilies in the top left corner and the Grb, the
2 Croatian red and white chequerboard icon symbol in the lower right-hand
3 half. You know, very obviously a symbol of the alliance. These were
4 young soldiers, except one of them's father was there, and they wanted to
5 register with the Bosnian army. They were talking about a sellout, they
6 were talking about a deal, they said that we could have defended the town,
7 and one of them said -- in fact, one actually mentioned Boban by name,
8 said we're not going to fight Mate Boban's war against the Muslims.
9 I should add that conversations with -- with the Bosnian army
10 commander and one of the senior HVO officers in town that night did not
11 bear out what they said. They said simply that Jajce -- that the defence
12 had become untenable.
13 Q. Do you recall, Mr. Vulliamy, the identity of either the Bosnian
14 army commander or the senior HVO officers in town that you spoke to on
15 that occasion?
16 A. The Bosnian army commander was -- was a man who I'd met a few
17 times called Haso Ribo, and the HVO man's name I don't recall. I don't
18 think he was the commander. I think -- no. It wasn't Pokrajcic, it
19 wasn't the man I'd met before, nor was it, I don't think, the commander
20 whom I would come to know later when I went back to Travnik in January.
21 Q. Okay. But just so we're clear, sir, at this occasion how long did
22 you remain in Travnik at the end of October, 1992?
23 A. I think we -- I don't recall, but I think we must have left to
24 file the story on the fall of Jajce. I can't -- that needed getting to
25 London. I can't see that we'd have stayed around more than another night.
1 Q. And to file the story in London, where did you go?
2 A. You had to go down to, if not Split, you had to go to one of the
3 Croatian border towns where the phones worked.
4 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, noting the time, I would suggest this
5 is perhaps the appropriate point for the next recess.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's about 5.20. We'll have a
7 20-minute break and resume in 20 minutes' time.
8 --- Recess taken at 5.18 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 5.43 p.m.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, you have another
11 hour and 20 minutes.
12 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, right before the break we were talking about the
14 events at the end of October, 1992, and you went to file your story on the
15 fall of Jajce. Can you tell us how long you remained in Bosnia after you
16 filed that story at the end of October, 1992?
17 A. I think I left pretty soon afterwards. One of my friends, a
18 Croatian cameraman for the BBC, was killed that night. We had to arrange
19 for his body to come back. I was disinclined to stay around. I didn't
20 come back until January, 1993.
21 Q. And can you tell us, Mr. Vulliamy, when you first came back in
22 January, 1993, where you entered Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 A. In through Split, as usual. This is with the BBC now, to make
24 this film. And we went up -- ah, yes. Well, we had to go through
25 Kiseljak this time because we were told that Route Diamond was effectively
1 shut, and we didn't have guaranteed use of an armoured vehicle.
2 At some point around this time, I think a little later in the
3 year, the -- the British wouldn't actually let you go up Route Diamond
4 unless you had an armoured vehicle, which I didn't, I was just driving a
5 red Citroen, so it was necessary to go through Kiseljak. Then up the
6 Lasva Valley towards what I'll call the Vitez T-junction, and that was a
7 memorable drive.
8 Q. And at this point in time, that is January, 1993, how long did you
9 remain in Central Bosnia?
10 A. I think a couple of weeks.
11 Q. And where did you go next, sir?
12 A. It was all -- the film was about Travnik. It was centred around
13 Travnik. But for some reason, and it must have been accommodation, the --
14 the stay involved a lot of driving, sometimes by night, between Travnik
15 and Kiseljak, and that's -- that's why -- the scene along that road had
16 been transformed and my car took a bullet. There was a lot of shooting.
17 Few cars. Those that were on that road, a lot were being shot at and shot
18 off it. So I was between Travnik and Kiseljak.
19 Q. Following this time period where you were in Travnik and Kiseljak,
20 where did you go next in Bosnia?
21 A. I was out of Bosnia. I was in other parts of former Yugoslavia.
22 I returned in the summer of 1993.
23 Q. And to which part of Bosnia did you return in the summer of 1993?
24 A. Initially Central Bosnia again, but only briefly because there
25 were other pressing matters to see to around Mostar and Eastern
2 Q. Before turning our attention to Mostar, can you briefly tell us
3 what changes, if any, you'd noticed in Central Bosnia in the summer of
4 1993 compared to when you had spent time there in January of 1993 or in
5 the autumn of 1992.
6 A. Compared to the autumn of 1992, the Lasva Valley, for a start, had
7 completely transformed because the road from Kiseljak to the Vitez
8 junction had already by January become a jigsaw of roadblocks, HVO, HVO,
9 BH, HVO again, with each army staking out, as it were, chunks of road,
10 mostly HVO, and then BH as you got towards Travnik and certainly if you
11 turned right towards Zenica. And then a lot of the houses along that road
12 had been burned out in what was by now a sort of tit-for-tat ethnic
13 cleansing by both sides. And in July, the -- I mean the -- the amount of
14 damage was far more extensive to the point at which I think the road was
15 almost, almost uninhabited.
16 Gornji Vakuf had become a battlefield with the front line going
17 right -- the front line was the main road. Again, one couldn't go through
18 unless one had a armoured vehicle, which I didn't. I had to hitch a ride.
19 But the situation in Central Bosnia had deteriorated into -- I mean, apart
20 from -- sorry, the one difference that had happened is that -- while I was
21 away, is that when I was in Travnik in January, I spent a lot of time with
22 the commander of the HVO, Filipovic, who had gone out of his way to stage
23 a sort of public relations exercise on Mt. Vlasic in which he took a risk
24 to himself and us, I may say, and others with the Bosnian army commander,
25 his counterpart, a man called Kulilovic, up to the Serbian guns together
1 to demonstrate their joint plans to take this post, this antenna together.
2 He talked about, again rather like one of his predecessors, about
3 pressures on him. He said he was walking the edge of a knife, he didn't
4 want the alliance to rupture. By the time I came back, he had gone. In
5 fact, I think the HVO had been -- had been seen out of Travnik by then. I
6 think they'd retreated from Travnik.
7 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, I'd like to now turn to Mostar. You indicated a few
8 moments ago in July, 1993, you left Central Bosnia and went to Mostar.
9 Can you tell us, sir, on this occasion approximately how long you remained
10 in Mostar.
11 A. I didn't go to Mostar in July, 1993. I went to Grude to try to
12 get to Mostar in 1993. The -- there had been since May reports of serious
13 fighting within Mostar between the armija BH and the HVO, and by July what
14 became later known as the siege of East Mostar was effectively mounted.
15 I went to Grude to try and get permission or to get some kind of
16 -- find out if there was, you know, a way into East Mostar to what was by
17 then a surrounded pocket effectively under siege by the HVO on three sides
18 and the Serbs to the east, but the permission -- the request was declined.
19 The other reports we heard were about violence and events in Capljina and
20 Stolac, so we asked if we could go to Capljina.
21 Q. Sir, before -- before we discuss this request to go to Capljina,
22 let me ask you, why was it necessary to get permission to go into Mostar
23 in July, 1993?
24 A. I think you still needed permission to go into West Mostar,
25 because there was a war going on there. I don't know about that. Our
1 interest was to try and into East Mostar because, as I say, it was
2 effectively cut off and under siege. Well, you couldn't get anywhere near
3 the place without going through large numbers of HVO checkpoints, and I
4 imagine that papers would be necessary. As it turned out, I don't think
5 anybody had got into East Mostar and wasn't going to for a long time. In
6 fact, I can remember a spokesman for Mr. Boban, who declined to see us on
7 that occasion, if he was informed, but we were told he wouldn't see us,
8 said that -- I think -- yes, I remember him saying no one's going to get
9 there for two months, and he was almost right, as it happened.
10 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, let's return, then, to this instance where you
11 requested permission to go to Capljina. Do you recall the approximate
12 date when you made this request and to whom?
13 A. The request was made to a Canadian spokesman for Mate Boban, whose
14 name was George. I don't have a surname, I'm afraid. He'll just have to
15 be called George the Canadian.
16 Date, this is -- it must be mid-July. Again, I'm sorry about
17 these dates. They're traceable because of what I wrote. And if I -- if I
18 had a date for an article, I could then work out the exact date, but
19 we're, I think, middle to back end of July.
20 Q. Again, 1993?
21 A. 1993 for sure, yes.
22 Q. And George the Canadian, what -- did George the Canadian speak
24 A. Yes, he did, but we spoke to him in English. I mean, he was from
1 Q. And where did you have this discussion with George the Canadian?
2 A. This was at Mate Boban's new headquarters. He'd moved again.
3 Still in Grude but now somewhere on the outskirts in a sort of -- I think
4 it must be an industrial complex. He had a much bigger, bigger premises.
5 Q. Can you relate to us what the conversation was that you had with
6 George the Canadian.
7 A. We wanted to go to Capljina because I heard -- had heard that --
8 there were reports that Muslim men were being taken missing from Capljina
9 and Stolac and that Capljina was the worst and we wanted to get there, and
10 George said no, we couldn't because it's an action zone, a military action
11 zone, I think he even said. And I retorted that that's absurd, it's far
12 away from any kind of front line. And he said you can't go anyway, which
13 made one obviously all the more inclined to go, because that means they've
14 got something to hide, which they had.
15 Q. And how long did this discussion with George the Canadian last on
16 this occasion?
17 A. I think it was fairly long because there was a lot of -- because
18 there was the Mostar -- Mostar request, but he didn't -- he did leave us
19 for a bit, went back. An hour or so perhaps.
20 Q. And following this discussion, what steps, if any, did you take?
21 A. We took steps to try to get to Capljina, and we were turned back,
22 and then we had an idea that the translator -- I was working with a man
23 from the Washington Post. The translator lived nearby so instead of using
24 the Washington Post car, we went and got his beat-up old car and he drove
25 and my journalist colleague and I just sort of lounged around in the back.
1 I remember spitting out of the window, reading a newspaper I didn't
2 understand. I think my colleague put his feet out of the window and we
3 got waved through. The car had Croatian plates.
4 Q. Do you recall approximately where this checkpoint was that you got
5 waved through?
6 A. It was quite close to Capljina because we -- there wasn't -- there
7 wasn't a long drive between the checkpoint and the town.
8 Q. Can you describe for the Trial Chamber what you saw when you
9 arrived in the town of Capljina on that day.
10 A. Yes. It was a different sort of menacing atmosphere. The streets
11 had very few civilians on them, a few soldiers, not many. There was
12 selective damage. What I've described in Prozor was not the case. But we
13 first asked an old man about these reports that the -- that -- what had
14 been going on, and he said his son had been taken away. A woman we spoke
15 to, I can't remember what she said, but she said go to the mosque, so we
16 did. It seemed like a good idea. The mosque, by the way, was standing,
17 and as I recall, unharmed. The imam was there, so we didn't have a Prozor
18 on our hands but we had another -- another very distressing situation.
19 There were women with the imam, and other women joined him and us as we
20 talked, and the pattern was -- well, because of what I'd been doing up in
21 other parts of Bosnia around Prijedor, was spine chilling because the men
22 had been, it seemed, over the past -- let's see, I do remember them saying
23 it started on the 4th of July because that's a date one remembers. So I
24 remember thinking it's about 10 days. So we're probably 12th 13th-ish
25 July, to try and answer your previous question.
1 The men had been apprehended. One woman told us about how her
2 husband or son had been apprehended while practising football, but what
3 astonished me was that another woman said that her husband had actually
4 been taken - or son, I forget which - on the front lines themselves. In
5 this area, there was no effective Bosnian army. The HVO was the only
6 militia that -- or army that would -- would have been fighting against the
7 Serbs on a front towards the east, and the Muslims would have joined that.
8 I'd come to know a lot about the ethos of the front line and the
9 collegiality of the front line by now and the way that soldiers who fight
10 together think and bond and suffer together and laugh together, and to me
11 it was astonishing, this notion that men in the HVO were being arrested by
12 men in the HVO, having fought together. So I thought this is -- this is
13 -- this is a very important story.
14 But the even more important story was where have they gone? And
15 these women said that they'd gone to camps, and they gave us two names and
16 the names were Dretelj and Gabela. And Gabela was actually on a map.
17 It's near the Croatian border. Dretelj I couldn't find on my map. And we
18 left shortly after this conversation.
19 The imam did talk. I don't remember much about what he said. I
20 must have written it somewhere. And we returned as a matter of urgency on
21 hearing about this word -- hearing this word "camps," which sent a shiver
22 up my spine, to Grude.
23 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, let me ask you a couple of follow-on questions to
24 what you've just told us. Do you recall, sir, the name of the imam in
25 Capljina that you met with on at that day?
1 A. Palic, but I don't remember his first name.
2 Q. Do you remember, sir, if prior to this day you had ever heard of
3 Dretelj or Gabela?
4 A. No, I don't -- no, I hadn't. We -- as I testified earlier, I did
5 not know at that point that I had been to the place the name of which I'd
6 just heard. I had not heard of Dretelj. It just so happens -- I found
7 out another time, later, that I had been there but I hadn't heard the
8 name, no.
9 Q. Now, sir, when I interrupted you, you told us you had gone back to
10 Grude upon hearing the word "camps." Can you tell us approximately what
11 time you arrived back in Grude on this day in mid-July, 1993?
12 A. It would have been late afternoon, early evening.
13 Q. Did you have any meetings or discussions with anyone in Grude when
14 you arrived back in late afternoon, early evening?
15 A. Yes, Canadian George again. And we wanted to ask him about
16 Capljina and what had happened there. I omitted some of the other
17 unpleasant things we wanted to talk about. The treatment of women was
18 particularly unpleasant, apparently. A woman tried to hide some valuables
19 inside her underwear and said shamefacedly that they had found it. We
20 wanted to talk about Capljina, but most of all we wanted to ask him where
21 these men had gone, that we'd heard the names Dretelj and Gabela and we
22 wanted to go there, and he said no. But he did know what we were talking
24 Q. And when you --
25 A. He also said you can't have been to Capljina because we didn't
1 give you permission. We said, well, we did.
2 Q. And what was his reaction at that point in time?
3 A. He was visibly, visibly not necessarily angry, but I think
4 unnerved because he knew we weren't supposed to.
5 Q. And how long did you have a discussion with Canadian George on the
6 late afternoon on this day?
7 A. Well, with hindsight, it probably should have been longer, we
8 should have pushed harder on Dretelj, but it can't have been more than 20
9 minutes or so because we ended up, I think, that night at Medjugorje
10 before dark, so it would have been half hour or so.
11 Q. Why did you go to Medjugorje on that day?
12 A. Sorry.
13 Q. On that day why did you go to Medjugorje?
14 A. Because it was place to stay. But there was also a UNHCR mission
15 in Medjugorje, a United Nations High Commission for Refugees. And in my
16 experience although camps and prisoner registration is the business of the
17 International Committee of the Red Cross, the UNHCR was often a more
18 profitable, at least, source to talk to. So we went in pursuit of the
19 UNHCR office where it so happened that two English speaking people worked,
20 American and/or Australian, I can't remember. I may have written their
21 names in an article, but I can't remember them now.
22 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, did you speak to these two English-speaking
23 people --
24 A. Yes --
25 Q. -- that day?
1 A. -- at length.
2 Q. Do you recall or can you recount for us the topics of
4 A. Yes. First of all, the existence of these camps Dretelj and
5 Gabela, which the existence of which they confirmed, they had heard of
6 these places, and they added a third, called Rodoch, or Rodoc, which was
7 some sort of Heliodrom near Mostar. They said that they had tried to get
8 access and been refused, as had the ICRC.
9 We also talked about the man who -- whose name we'd heard in
10 Capljina, the mayor, and who we had attempted to see but who either wasn't
11 there, as we were told, or didn't want to see us. His name was Markovic.
12 And we actually had quite a long conversation about Markovic and his
13 views. He was described as very extreme by the UNHCR. And then we had a
14 third sort of bit of the conversation which was perhaps the most
15 interesting and alarming. The two people whose names I could probably
16 get, and indeed might have written, told us about a meeting that they had
17 had with local Bosnian Croat authorities and the foreign minister of
18 Croatia proper, a man called Granic, Mate Granic, and they had been
19 invited to this meeting to discuss the possibility of mass deportation of
20 some 50.000 people, men, from this area through a transit camp in -- I
21 think it was intended to be in Ljubuski, where I had actually visited,
22 another internment place, to third-party countries. An astonishing but
23 horribly familiar piece of blackmail, because the people like the UNHCR
24 had been put in a similar position in north-western Bosnia by the Bosnian
25 Serbs, namely that you either cooperate in the grotesque process of ethnic
1 cleansing or you don't and the men remain festering in camps. We had come
2 across that before and here -- here they were -- here was the UNHCR
3 talking about this dilemma again. They had said that they would not
4 cooperate. But I think they reported Mr. -- Minister Granic as saying
5 that the government in Croatia was prepared to cooperate.
6 Q. Do you recall, Mr. Vulliamy, any of the specifics that were
7 related to you by the UNHCR people concerning when and where this meeting
8 had taken place?
9 A. I think it was Makarska, on the coast, but I may be wrong. I
10 think it was Makarska.
11 Q. Do you have any recollection of when that meeting had been held?
12 A. I'm afraid I don't, no. But I had been given to understand by the
13 women in Capljina, and I'm thinking -- I'm thinking -- I'm improvising
14 here, the women in Capljina had said that the roundup had begun on July
15 the 4th. I remember the date for obvious reasons. Nothing to do with the
16 war, of course. And so I suppose it must have been fairly recently, but I
17 don't remember them telling us when it was.
18 Q. Now, sir, on page 80, lines 24, 25, and into the first line of
19 page 81, you indicated that the UNHCR people confirmed Dretelj and Gabela?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And told you about a place Rodoc. You said, "They said that they
22 had tried to get access but were refused, as had the ICRC." Do you know
23 which of those three locations they were referring to when they said they
24 had been denied access?
25 A. I don't, I'm afraid, and I'm not sure they specified. If they
1 did, I can't remember.
2 Q. Now, you mentioned a person by the name of Markovic. Can you
3 recall any of the specifics about what you discussed concerning this
5 A. Yes, it was a conversation -- I mean, the tenor of the
6 conversation was almost of sick humour. The man of the two who was
7 American talked about a document that apparently Markovic had issued or
8 that he'd seen but did not have in Capljina. I'm talking about a breeding
9 programme for the Muslims whose womenfolk were to be refused entry into
10 maternity hospitals because they tended to breed -- I can't remember the
11 exact words but something about anti-authoritarian individuals. I mean,
12 vile stuff. But I hasten to say I didn't see the document.
13 Q. During July, 1993, did you remain in Bosnia throughout that entire
15 A. No. No. I left because by this time I was in discussions about
16 having to write a book and to write it fairly quickly. And I did leave to
17 at least begin writing this thing. I have to say pretty dissatisfied with
18 myself that we'd failed to get into Dretelj and failed to get into East
20 Q. When you say, sir, that you were in discussions to write a book,
21 did those discussions come to fruition?
22 A. Yes. They wanted to -- they wanted it before the autumn. That's
23 why I left, to start trying to organise this thing.
24 Q. And when you say you left, to what location did you go?
25 A. Great Britain.
1 Q. How long did you remain in Great Britain?
2 A. Not as long as I'd planned because, well, two things happened
3 during August. The first was that a colleague of mine, Maggie O'Cane,
4 wrote a story for my paper about the first prisoners being released from
5 -- now, I think it was Gabela and Rodoc, but I'm not sure, but that can
6 be checked in the article. The report was that by "release" they meant
7 making men run naked across territory towards Jablanica while they fired
8 guns over their heads. So that was -- you know, I felt that the camp
9 story was about to move and that whatever work I was work -- doing would
10 not be up-to-date unless I went back. But more importantly, or at least I
11 thought at the time, a man from the BBC had finally got into East Mostar,
12 as had the first aid convoys, and this was now a calamitous situation.
13 His report was unforgettable and clearly my work on this book was not
14 going to be up-to-date until I had got into East Mostar and tried again to
15 get into Dretelj, Gabela, or Rodoc.
16 Q. And, sir, what steps, if any, did you take at that point in time
17 to try to get to these locations?
18 A. Well, my intention had been to make East Mostar the priority
19 because it was so much in the news, although I'm not sure many people were
20 getting in yet, many other people. But the plan changed because a letter
21 appeared -- soon after arriving in Split, if not that day or the day
22 after, a letter and an article appeared in a newspaper which I recall as
23 being Slobodna Dalmacija, and it was a letter from President Franjo
24 Tudjman to Mate Boban about the camps, and I forget the -- the actual
25 wording, but it was all about complying with international law, complying
1 with the Geneva Conventions, and I think I should explain that the
2 backdrop to this is that by now there was talk of sanctions against
3 Croatia, particularly from the Americans and the British unless something
4 was done, or at least pressure was put on by Zagreb to ameliorate the
5 situation in the camps and with regard to the siege of East Mostar and
6 other matters. And anyway, in a very unusual move, President Tudjman --
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I hate to object at this point and
8 interrupt. I've been waiting patiently, but all this afternoon we've
9 heard a lot of speculation, a lot of reading into events, and now the
10 gentleman here is about to do the same thing, and I've been waiting
11 patiently. He's very colourful, wonderful usage of the English language,
12 but I don't think this is proper testimony. If he has specific
13 information, he can give it to us. There may be other witnesses that
14 might be able to tell us what exactly President Franjo Tudjman had in mind
15 when he issued this letter, but now we're going to -- way into
16 speculation. Perhaps historians can write about it but I don't think this
17 is proper testimony from this particular witness unless a proper
18 foundation can be laid, and I dare say one has not been laid for this sort
19 of speculation at this point in time. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. The objection stands.
21 This letter from Tudjman, is it a letter that the witness has seen or
22 read? Because we are now entering into pure speculation.
23 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I can explain a little bit about this,
24 either in the presence of the witness or we can ask the witness to leave
25 the courtroom. I believe, however, the witness was about to get to that
1 point at the -- shortly after -- or would have gotten to that point
2 shortly after my learned colleague objected.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: I have no problems with having a conversation, for
4 the record, outside the presence of the witness. I'm not suggesting that
5 he may not be able to have some information, but I haven't heard a
6 foundation at this point in time.
7 There's one thing: The letter. He might have written -- read the
8 letter or read the article, but now we're going into a psychoanalysis as
9 to what exactly was motivating President Tudjman, and so on and so forth.
10 If they want to lay out the foundation and then the Trial Chamber can draw
11 whatever conclusions it wishes, that's fine. But here now he's delving
12 into -- delving into President Tudjman's psyche as to what motivated him
13 at this particular point in time, and he's done this over and over again.
14 I haven't objected, but at this point I think this is a little bit -- way
15 too much.
16 MR. MUNDIS: Again, Mr. President, very, very briefly in the
17 presence of the witness, what we'll say is that he's laying out the
18 context in which this article appeared and when he saw this -- or what he
19 will testify about this material, he's simply putting it into a context of
20 other events that were going on at that time, and that's precisely what
21 the witness was explaining at the point when the objection occurred. And
22 again if you take a look at lines 18 through 24 of page 84, you will see
23 that the witness was explaining the context in which this article
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll take up this question
2 Sir, you mentioned a letter from President Tudjman. My question
3 is a very simple one: If you are familiar with this letter, did you
4 include the contents of the letter in an article drafted by yourself?
5 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the letter was read to me in
6 translation. I've since seen it in English but not at the time it was
7 read to me in translation, and I only mentioned it because it changed our
8 plans and priorities and -- and was a reason to attempt, as soon as
9 possible - in fact at that day - to get access to one of these camps. It
10 had currency.
11 Did I quote it? I certainly referred to it. I probably quoted
12 it, but I'm afraid I can't answer you, Your Honour. It was -- I just
13 don't remember the specific article, but it would certainly have been
14 referred to in the article, yes.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you are saying that someone
16 translated this letter for you, and the translation of the letter is the
17 reason for which you decided that you should go and visit the camps. Is
18 that what you are telling us now?
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, because quite apart from --
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Who translated this letter for
21 you, and how is it that this person came to know about the letter?
22 THE WITNESS: The letter was in a newspaper called Slobodna
23 Dalmacija, which -- which we read almost every day we could. And the
24 person who translated it was a correspondent for a newspaper, The Daily
25 Telegraph, who had lived many years in Belgrade and read and spoke the
1 language fluently.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Which means that given the
3 contents of the letter, you as a journalist decided to examine the issue
4 of the camps. That's correct, is it not?
5 THE WITNESS: To return -- to return to the issue of the camps
6 which had now become almost a diplomatic matter as well as a humanitarian
8 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 Q. Witness Vulliamy, do you recall the substance of the letter that
10 was translated to you by your colleague from The Daily Telegraph?
11 A. In essence, it was a -- an urging from President Tudjman to Mate
12 Boban to ensure that conditions in the camps be brought within
13 international law and -- and within the Geneva Convention.
14 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, you mentioned at page 86, line 23 and 24, "I've
15 since seen it in English." Do you recall when you saw it in English?
16 A. On Sunday.
17 Q. On do you recall the format in which you saw the letter in
19 A. It was in a -- in a press release, as I recall.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. Or attached to a press release.
22 Q. And the document that you saw on Sunday, who showed you that
24 A. One of your colleagues.
25 Q. And did you have an opportunity to read that document?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Did that document, to the best of your recollection, reflect the
3 material that was published in Slobodna Dalmacija in 1993?
4 A. I -- I -- I mean, all -- no reason to suppose that it wasn't the
5 same letter. I mean, it ...
6 Q. And again, what was the contents of that letter that you saw on
8 A. Well, a -- an urging to Mate Boban to ensure that the camps were
9 within the international law and comply with the Geneva Convention.
10 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I'd ask that the witness be shown
11 what's been marked as P9497, and we do have this in e-court.
12 If we could please -- if we could please go, on the English
13 version, to page 5.
14 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, do you see a document in front you on the screen?
15 A. Yes, in Croatian.
16 Q. In Croatian.
17 MR. MUNDIS: Could we have that perhaps, for the benefit of the
18 witness ... If we could please go to page 5 of this document.
19 Mr. President, it appears that page 5 is not --
20 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, do you now see a document before you in English?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And, sir, is this the document that you were shown on Sunday?
23 A. Yes, it is. As -- and the press release is the cover. It's --
24 it's a continuation. It's attached to that, stapled to it.
25 Q. And you had an opportunity to read this document on Sunday?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Vulliamy. I'd like to return now to the events
3 that you were discussing for us. Do you recall approximately the date at
4 which your colleague read this letter that was published in Slobodna
5 Dalmacija to you?
6 A. I think it's the 20th -- where are we? No, I don't. I can't give
7 you an exact date, I'm sorry.
8 Q. Do you recall the month and year?
9 A. It's certainly September, and it's certainly 1993.
10 Q. Did you at that point in time, sir, see the article in Slobodna
12 A. Oh, yes. We had it in Split.
13 Q. Let me ask you, sir, what steps, if any, you took in September,
14 1993, to visit any of the camps that we were discussing a few moments ago;
15 that is, Dretelj, Gabela, or Rodoc.
16 A. We drove straight to Grude to find -- or to try and meet Mate
17 Boban and ask him if we could go. Dretelj was the one that I think we
18 chose. I think the UNHCR had said it was the one they were most worried
19 about, and it was the one we tried last time so why not try again.
20 Q. Did you have any discussions with anyone at Grude concerning entry
21 to this camp?
22 A. Yes. Canadian George again. And we asked to see Mate Boban. I'm
23 not sure he was there when we got there about late morning. We were told
24 to come back that afternoon, and Canadian George then said, "No, you can't
25 go to Dretelj."
1 Q. Do you recall the approximate date or -- and time that you had
2 this discussion with Canadian George?
3 A. The last one was during the afternoon.
4 Q. And the approximate time period in terms of dates; month, year?
5 A. This is September, 1993.
6 Q. And, sir, what --
7 A. I think we're in early -- early-ish September, 1993.
8 Q. What steps did you take after you were told by Canadian George
9 that you can't go to Dretelj?
10 A. We decided that this was pressing matter now and we stayed in
11 Grude and thought that we'd try again the following day.
12 Q. Did you in fact try again the following day?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Where?
15 A. Same place, back to Mr. Boban's office.
16 Q. Who did you encounter on that day?
17 A. Well, we met Canadian George again first. He -- I think maybe he
18 did go to ask Mate Boban if we could go to Dretelj, and we were -- I think
19 he told us no again and we asked him to go and try again. We were sitting
20 in an office attached to this complex, whatever it was, I don't know what
21 it was, on the outskirts of Grude, and then somebody came into the room or
22 passed us whom all three of us recognised although it wasn't me who
23 recognised him first, and it was one of my two colleagues, I think from
24 the BBC. He said, Oh, there's General Praljak, why don't we ask him?
25 Q. And what happened next?
1 A. We did ask him. And I can't remember exactly whether he left us
2 for a while. I think he did and came back but not that long afterwards,
3 and said, I have to say to my surprise, Yes, so far as I'm concerned, you
4 can. Or I paraphrase those words. I wasn't taking notes.
5 Q. And after this discussion with General Praljak, what did you do?
6 A. An order paper, "odobrenje," was drawn up. I honestly don't
7 recall whether General Praljak returned into the room with it or whether
8 it was typed up. I think it was typed up in our presence. It was stamped
9 and signed, and with surprisingly little ado, and I don't think we talked
10 to General Praljak very much after that. We set off to Dretelj.
11 Q. How did you know where to go?
12 A. Our translator guide knew where to go. And it was -- it was
13 towards Capljina. I think by then we'd found it on the map, actually.
14 Q. This document that you were provided with, whose signature
15 appeared on it?
16 A. To the best of my recollection, it was General Praljak.
17 Q. Can you please describe for us what you did after you set off for
19 A. We got there, and -- yes, I think the translator did know where to
20 go. Well, for me it was very strange, because it was -- you know, I'd
21 been there before, and I said to my colleagues, I've been here before. As
22 I said, I didn't know the name of the place. So far as I was concerned,
23 it was called Capljina, for Serbian prisoners. And we presented our paper
24 to a visibly surprised guard who then disappeared to a building behind the
25 gate. The gate remained shut and we were told to wait.
1 Q. What was this guard wearing?
2 A. HVO uniform.
3 Q. How long did you wait?
4 A. I think about 20 minutes to half an hour.
5 Q. And approximately what time of day was it?
6 A. This would be late morning, mid to late morning.
7 Q. Can you tell us what happened after the guard returned?
8 A. I don't remember whether he returned with the commander of the
9 camp or whether he brought us in to a sort of office block where the
10 commander of the camp was - I think it was the latter - but we were
12 He was cordial but, I think, surprised. I didn't get the
13 impression that any forward call had been made from Grude to tell him of
14 our -- that we were coming. And as I say, it was all very sudden.
15 Q. Do you recall the name of this person who was the commander of the
17 A. Shakota or Sakota.
18 Q. Please continue.
19 A. We had initial discussion, which I don't recall very much of. We
20 were anxious to get on because we were now in. And we began a tour of the
21 camp, after he'd outlined various, as it were, rules of operation, rules
22 of engagement for interviews, which were that he would be -- he would have
23 to be -- he wanted to be present at them and that they would be done
24 through the translator and that we weren't supposed to speak to the
25 prisoners out of his earshot.
1 Q. How many of you were with your group?
2 A. It was translator, whose name I'm afraid I don't have, a woman
3 called Cathy Evans from the BBC, Mike Montgomery from The Daily Telegraph,
4 of London, and a man called John Landy from a news organisation in America
5 called Knight Ridder.
6 Q. And who accompanied you as you entered the Dretelj camp?
7 A. As we went from the administrative block for the tour, if that's
8 the right word, Commander Sakota himself -- if it's Sakota. I'm sorry, I
9 can't remember which it was. And a couple of armed guards.
10 Q. Could you please describe for the Trial Chamber what you observed
11 as you went into the camp from the administrative block.
12 A. The first port of call was a medical facility, a small to medium
13 sized building with beds, military-style iron beds, quite tight -- quite
14 closely -- I wouldn't say packed, quite closely organised so that the
15 doctors could only just pass through between them. Two to a bed, dirty
16 blankets, dirty mattresses, very, very hot, and we began -- well, the men
17 -- they were all men, were in varying states. They were skin very, very
18 dry, skin problems, they looked malnourished, vacant stares. It was a
19 distressing sight.
20 Q. Approximately how many men were in this medical facility, if you
22 A. Again, I -- I -- I don't like making these estimates. Perhaps 20,
23 25. Of that order, but it could have been less, it could have been more.
24 Q. Did you have any discussions with any of the persons who were in
25 this medical facility?
1 A. If we did, they were pretty cursory because the men were not
2 really in a -- in a fit condition to talk very much. But we did talk to
3 one or more of the three doctors who were tending to them, and they were,
4 as is always the system in these camps, they were themselves prisoners who
5 happened to be of the medical profession.
6 Q. Can you tell us where you went after the medical facility?
7 A. We went up past -- forgive me if I refer back to the previous
8 visit. Up past a shed on the right where the women had been to a part of
9 the camp, and I now realise that the HOS hadn't showed us -- well, they
10 showed us very little, never mind the women, because we started to go up
11 past an area that I -- we later came back to where some men were eating,
12 to turning right to two hangars, two sort of tunnels like aircraft hangars
13 or bomb shelter-type places dug into two hills opposite, with the
14 entrances opposite each other, two mounds. We headed up there.
15 Q. And as you went along this -- these buildings that you've
16 described for us, did you see any people?
17 A. Well, guards. I don't -- I mean, yes, there was -- well, there
18 was another building to the left where there were prisoners and a sliding
19 door half open or a third open, but we didn't go in there. We went -- we
20 went up to these tunnels.
21 Q. And what did you do when you arrived up by the tunnels?
22 A. Well, it was -- it was quite a shocking thing to find, because the
23 doors were open but the tunnels were -- well, I won't say packed, but
24 there were a lot of men in each one, and -- oh, sorry. Just a second.
25 I've actually left out the -- we did go into the -- to the shed on the
1 right where the women had been in 1992. Forgive me. We did that before
2 we went to the tunnels.
3 Q. Well, what did you see, sir? What did you see in the building
4 where the women had been in in 1992?
5 A. Right. In there were prisoners either sitting -- for the most
6 part sitting or crouching on the floor with not much space between them,
7 with their -- I mean, sufficiently little space between them so that they
8 -- if they had any belongings with them, they hung them in plastic bags
9 from rafters across the top of the shed.
10 Q. Did you speak with any of the people that were in this building?
11 A. Yes, we spoke to a number of those because I don't actually
12 remember where the commander was at this point, but the -- the translator
13 was doing some interviews. Mike spoke the language, Cathy spoke some
14 German, I think, which she used. I found a DJ, a disk jockey who spoke
15 some quite good English. We agreed -- we had whispered out on the tarmac
16 that we would share stuff if we split up and talked privately to people.
17 I found somebody who spoke good English from -- I think he was from
18 Stolac, and he told me that things had been much worse in July, he said.
19 The doors of this thing had been shut. They had been shut in for some 72
20 hours at one point if not repetitively. I was struck by him saying that
21 they had had to get their excretion out of -- throw their excretion out of
22 a window because of the stench and they'd had to drink their own urine to
23 hydrate themselves during those periods that the doors were kept tight
24 shut. I don't remember what he said about feeding during that times,
25 those 72-hour periods, but my inference was that they were not fed.
1 This wasn't recent to our visit, this was back in July.
2 Q. Can you now, sir, go forward to the point in time where you went
3 to the structures you described as the tunnels and tell us what you saw
5 A. Yes. Forgive me, Your Honours, for leaving out that important
7 When we got to the tunnels, this was, you know, the most
8 distressing bit, because these men were -- were in these tunnels. The
9 doors were open but they were still quite dark at the back. And although
10 the doors were open, as I recall, the commander stayed outside as did the
11 guards, and -- although one or two guards might have come in. I went into
12 the first, into the one on my right, which I think makes it the
13 southernmost, I'm not sure of the directions, and started to talk actually
14 through the translator but unsupervised at first and then joined my
15 colleague who spoke Serbo-Croat who was talking to some other people and
16 translated and we began to talk to the prisoners in there.
17 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, what, if anything, can you recall about your
18 discussions that you had with the prisoners who were in the tunnel?
19 A. Well, I recall what they looked like first of all. They were in
20 -- in bad condition. They were pale. They had -- their eyes were
21 watery. There was no sign of beating, I have to say, although someone at
22 some point said someone had been killed with a plank of wood not so long
23 ago, but they showed signs of extreme, extreme neglect in terms of
24 nutrition, hydration, skin and such.
25 They talked again about July. They mentioned one particular
1 episode when the guards had got drunk outside and were singing songs and
2 opened fire through the doors and against this hangar, this tunnel, and
3 they told us that bullets had come through the doors and that people had
4 been killed.
5 To back up that narrative, there were pockmarks on the back wall,
6 and there were also piercings in the doors, in the metal doors with metal
7 gnarled inwards to indicate a shot. They told me that people had died
8 that night.
9 They also talked about conditions. Again, they said that back in
10 July, those -- even those doors had been shut for 72 hours, for 72-hour
11 periods, with so far as I can remember with, this time, no windows through
12 which excretia could be got rid of, and again they repeated that they
13 needed to drink their own urine in order to hydrate. It was an appalling
15 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, did you ask anyone why they had been locked into
16 these rooms for 72 hours?
17 A. No, I didn't. I think one of my colleagues might have done. And
18 -- and -- but this is a conversation I would have had later, that it
19 might have coincided with military events outside, perhaps an advance by
20 the Bosnian army or something. But what we did ask was about what had
21 happened recently since Commander Sakota had arrived, and there was some
22 dispute between the inmates about this.
23 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, I know you've told us several times you dislike
24 numbers, but can you give us a rough approximation as to how many people
25 were in either these two tunnels or in one of those tunnels?
1 A. Three figures apiece, I'd say. Low hundreds. We did actually ask
2 Commander Sakota how many men were in the camp, and he gave us a figure
3 around 1.400. The UNHCR later informed us that the number had been very
4 much higher earlier in the summer.
5 Inside those tunnels, I'd say low hundreds in each. I --
6 Q. And in the shed, the first building that you entered, how many --
7 A. The one on the right, with the plastic bags hanging.
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. More. Again -- again must have been hundreds. And as I say we
10 passed another building on the left that we didn't go into that was less
11 full, actually. Say scores for that one. In the back of my mind there's
12 a figure of 1.400. I had no reason to disbelieve Commander Sakota, but I
13 would say low hundreds, but warily.
14 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, you told us that many of these people appeared to be
15 malnourished. Did you ask anyone about nourishment that they received?
16 A. I don't think we did ask people about nourishment, although back
17 in the medical facility, if that's the right word for it, which it
18 probably isn't, the doctor did say that along with treating broken ribs -
19 I think you can probably work out what that means - he did indicate that
20 some men had died from what he called natural causes, and made a gesture
21 like this and like that which suggested either -- I mean heat and lack of
22 food and/or water.
23 Q. In total, Mr. Vulliamy, how long did you remain in Dretelj on this
25 A. Probably about two hours if not a little more, because we were
1 talking periodically with the commander as we made the tour. And some of
2 these conversations went on quite a long time. I mean, there was an
3 incident when one man actually got up, gave his name and origin and wanted
4 to say that since Commander Sakota arrived, things had got much better.
5 And there was a lot of hissing and booing going on.
6 We also wanted to find out about the ICRC, the Red Cross visit,
7 and there was quite a long conversation about that, both with the
8 commander and with the prisoners.
9 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, during the two hours if not a little more that you
10 were in the camp, what did you observe the detainees doing?
11 A. Well, I mean nothing, and that's the point really. I think one of
12 the things that struck me was that although these doors of the hangars
13 were now open and it was a hot, sunny day, a lot of the prisoners, inmates
14 in the tunnels, just wanted to remain in the tunnels if not sit up against
15 the back wall. They -- they were doing nothing. I presumed, actually,
16 whether the doors were opened regularly or for our benefit I don't -- I
17 don't know, but I presume that there was a daily opening of these doors,
18 but what interested me was that none of them seemed to want to go outside
19 despite the opportunity for -- for some fresh air.
20 I didn't take heart from that. You know, I thought it showed
21 signs of either fear of going out or -- or something. And indeed one
22 prisoner did say, "We're not really allowed out anyway. It's too
23 frightening to go outside."
24 Q. Did you observe any prisoners outside?
25 A. Yes, oh, yes, yes. A few went out to hang about outside the
1 tunnels. And by the time we came back down the very gentle slope from the
2 tunnels, there was a mealtime going on at the top of a sort of track,
3 where some grass is on a corner.
4 Q. Can you describe for us what this mealtime looked like to you.
5 A. Yes, and I'd seen similar in other places. It was a sort of drill
6 of refreshment and humiliation at the same time. You line up in organised
7 groups and, marshalled by men with guns, you jog, in this case, from the
8 shed where the women were before, as I said where the plastic bags were,
9 over for your meal. In this case it was eaten in complete silence as
10 regards us because -- I don't know. They were eating and I didn't want to
11 interrupt them, but there were guards around, anyway, with guns, and they
12 -- and I have reason from previous experience to be wary of -- of this --
13 of the consequences of talking to people in these circumstances, and --
14 but they were sort of -- I don't know whether they were made or wanted to
15 but they were sort of crouching and eating a meal -- a meal of watery stew
16 which had been cooked outside, in fact, and then they would finish and
17 return to their quarters and be replaced by another shift.
18 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, do you remember any of the topics that you discussed
19 with these detainees?
20 A. Well, we asked who they were, and some of them were civilians. A
21 lot of them had been members of the HVO. They'd been fighting. They had
22 been fighting with the -- with the people who -- for the organisation
23 which was incarcerating them.
24 Q. What ethnicity were these people?
25 A. Muslim.
1 Q. Did you ask them what geographic areas they were from?
2 A. Yes. They came from Stolac, Capljina - which answered the
3 question from July, Where have the men gone? - the villages around the
4 area, and a few were from Mostar. One young boy was from Sarajevo, in
6 Q. Did you ask any of the detainees how long they'd been there?
7 A. I didn't, but they all -- or at least I don't recall having done
8 so. Some looked as if they'd come more recently than others, for sure.
9 They were in better condition than others. Yet others were talking about
10 sufferings that they -- that they recalled from July, early to mid-July.
11 So they'd been there -- to look at them I think different lengths of time
12 but some had been there from the early weeks of July.
13 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, you referred on page 101, line 16, to a young boy
14 from Sarajevo. Do you have idea approximately how old this person was?
15 A. When I say "young boy," I don't mean a child. He was a teenager,
16 maybe 14, 15.
17 Q. Did you ask any of the detainees if they had had any visitors?
18 A. Well, we talked about the visit of the International Committee of
19 the Red Cross, and we talked about that with Commander Sakota as well.
20 Q. What was the discussion? What was the subject of the discussion
21 concerning the visit of the International Committee of the Red Cross?
22 A. Well, they were very different. Commander Sakota told us they'd
23 been - I think they'd been the previous day, or the day that we'd first
24 asked to go into the camp, and -- and Commander Sakota, who -- who implied
25 that he did -- in his body language, his language, in fact, he did not
1 actually enjoy this job he had, to be honest, told us that he'd got a
2 phone call from again the Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic sometime
3 previous to the ICRC visit, asking him to ameliorate the conditions in the
4 camp, and he told us that, and -- and he did say something which I wish I
5 could remember, but it was, you know, something to the effect that he
6 would actually quite like all these people just to be able to go home.
7 The discourse with the prisoners about the visit of the ICRC was
8 very different. I have no way of corroborating this, but some of them,
9 two of them in particular back in the tunnels, said that 120 men in -- in
10 the worst condition in the camp had been removed before the ICRC arrived.
11 I don't know whether that's true or not.
12 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, did you meet with an investigator or an analyst of
13 this Tribunal in 1997?
14 A. 1997. Yes.
15 Q. And did you give a statement at that point in time?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Did you attach anything to your statement?
18 A. If this is the statement that I gave during the trial of Colonel,
19 later General, Blaskic, yes, I did.
20 Q. What did you attach --
21 A. Two -- sorry.
22 Q. What did you --
23 A. Two drawings of the -- a very rough recollection of the layout of
25 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I'd ask the witness be shown these two
1 sketches prior to recessing for the evening. The first one has been
2 marked as P8761.
3 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, do you see a document or a sketch in front of you?
4 A. Yep.
5 Q. Can you tell us what that is?
6 A. It's -- it's -- yes, it's my attempt to recreate the layout of the
7 places I went to in Dretelj.
8 Q. And again, do you recall the approximate date that you made this
10 A. It would be, I suppose, 1997 -- springtime, 1997.
11 MR. MUNDIS: I would ask that the witness now be shown 8762,
13 Q. Do you recognise this document, Mr. Vulliamy?
14 A. Yes, I do. This is my attempt, I presume on the same day, to give
15 a sort of elevation of how the two tunnels, as we've called them, were dug
16 into the mounds, into the hills.
17 Q. And towards the bottom on the right-hand side, can you describe
18 for us what you were attempting to draw.
19 A. Yes, that's an attempt to again give a sort of dissection of how
20 the -- the -- the bullet holes, as it says, in the doors, gnarled inwards
21 to support the narrative that there'd been that shooting that night when
22 the men were locked into the camp after the -- after the booze-up.
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Vulliamy.
24 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I note the time. The next thing we'll
25 be doing is showing the witness some photographs and clearly, given the
1 late hour, it would perhaps be best to recess now and resume in the
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] How much time do you need
5 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I believe that at this point we're
6 just under three hours in terms of the direct examination. We had
7 indicated a revised estimate of about four hours for the direct
8 examination. I anticipate about one hour remaining, perhaps a little bit
9 more than that, but I certainly would expect that by the first break
10 tomorrow we would be complete with the direct examination.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I will ask our legal
12 officer to count the exact amount of time. It seems to me that it's been
13 more than three hours, however, we'll verify this. We shall resume
14 tomorrow. It's almost 7.00 p.m. Thank you, everyone, we continue
15 tomorrow at 9.00 a.m.
16 MR. MURPHY: Excuse me, Your Honours. Under the Court's decision
17 of earlier today, Mr. Stojic's Defence team will be the first to
18 cross-examine this witness. In listening to the witness's testimony
19 today, it has become clear that he must have transmitted to the Guardian
20 newspaper material which resulted in a considerable number of published
21 articles during the period between August 19 -- or earlier in 1992 and
22 September, 1993. I am, as Your Honour knows, fairly new in this case, but
23 I checked with colleagues, and I believe that these articles have not been
24 the subject of any disclosure from the Prosecution.
25 Your Honour, it seems to me that -- and Mr. Karnavas also mentions
1 that there may be handwritten notes of some -- some relevance.
2 Your Honour, I can't imagine that it would be difficult to obtain
3 these materials if a phone call were to be placed to London to the
4 Guardian newspaper, and it seems to me that this is material that should
5 be provided to the Defence, and I would ask the Prosecution to make an
6 effort to obtain these documents.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Mundis. Have you
8 disclosed to the Defence all the articles written by the witness, all the
9 articles that you have, or is it, as the Defence has said, that you have
10 only disclosed some of the witness's articles written as a journalist in
11 the field? What can you tell us about this?
12 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President and Your Honours. We have
13 disclosed those articles which are in our possession. The remainder of
14 the articles are, as would be the case with all the articles, are
15 open-source material. We do not go out and search for material for the
16 purpose of disclosing it to the Defence. Those articles during the course
17 of our work we have come across or downloaded or printed out, my
18 understanding is those have been disclosed, but again, everything else
19 which is in the public domain we do not actively search for for the
20 purpose of downloading or researching the material in order to provide it
21 to the Defence.
22 With respect to the notebooks, that's a subject which the witness
23 could be asked about, and we will certainly be doing that tomorrow morning
24 prior to his testimony, but if Your Honours would like, we could very
25 briefly explore that issue with the witness right now so that this issue
1 can be explained to everyone. I believe the witness has testified about
2 this in prior cases and I would believe that the Defence probably know the
3 story about the notebooks, but we can certainly ask the witness about that
4 at this point, if that would be helpful.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Put some very brief
6 questions to the witness with regard to the notebooks.
7 MR. MUNDIS:
8 Q. Mr. Vulliamy, you've heard the discussion that's happened here
9 today. I know you've testified about this in other cases. Would you
10 please tell the Trial Chamber whether you maintained notebooks; and if so,
11 what has happened to those notebooks?
12 A. Yes. Of course I maintained notebooks, and they've been very
13 thoroughly scrutinised and severally photocopied over the years. I don't
14 have them. They were last in -- and I may be -- they may not be now, they
15 were last in possession of the Tribunal.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, the witness has just
17 told us that he would not rule out the possibility that these notebooks
18 might be in the hands of the Prosecution.
19 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, we have undertaken a complete search
20 for these notebooks within the Office of the Prosecution. We have not
21 been able to locate these notebooks. I believe some of the notebooks were
22 delivered to the Registry for photocopying and became in fact exhibits in
23 another case. I'm not sure to what extent those are the notebooks that
24 have apparently gone missing. The -- again, I don't want to testify here,
25 but the attorney that Mr. Vulliamy has dealt with in the past concerning
1 the notebooks is no longer with the Office of the Prosecutor, and we
2 simply do not know where the notebooks have gone to the extent that they
3 were in fact delivered to the Office of the Prosecutor.
4 I need to correct something also, Mr. President. My case manager
5 in the last few moments has informed me that we did not in fact disclose
6 any of the articles that have been written by the witness. That's
7 presumably because we don't necessarily have them. Again, open-source
8 material, our position is open-source material which is available to
9 anyone who conducts due diligence in order to find that material, via the
10 internet or other open sources has the ability to do that. So I need to
11 correct what I said earlier about disclosing articles. It turns out we
12 have not in fact done that.
13 But again, with respect to the notebooks, additional questions can
14 be put to the witness concerning the notebooks, and that was certainly the
15 subject we are going to touch on tomorrow morning at the conclusion of the
16 direct examination.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, with regard to what the
18 Defence has just said, would it be possible for the Guardian to research
19 -- to carry out some research with regard to the articles that you have
20 published and could those articles be provided, perhaps through the
21 internet, and naturally, if necessary, one could pay to have these
22 articles made available, or would you say this is not a possibility?
23 THE WITNESS: It is a possibility in many ways. Noting my watch,
24 Your Honour, what they call the research department of the library shut
25 five minutes ago. The -- but there is a service which I'm sure is --
1 someone will have access to, called Lexis, where you simply tap in key
2 words and if you tap in my name and Bosnia and choose some dates, you get
3 a list of them all. It's quite a long one. They are publicly available
4 to anyone who can get to the internet.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So, sir, you have the entire
6 night to gain access to these documents.
7 MR. MURPHY: Well, Your Honour, let me just make this observation,
8 if I may: It is the obligation of the Prosecutor under Rule 66(B) to make
9 available documents that are in the Prosecutor's custody or control which
10 are material to the preparation of the Defence, and, Your Honour, where
11 these documents are effectively in the custody of a Prosecution witness,
12 it's my submission that they fall under this provision, and it's not
13 enough to -- for the Prosecutor to refer us to Lexis, a service for -- a
14 commercial service, in order to fulfil its obligations under this Article,
15 and I would respectfully invite the Court to require the Prosecution to
16 make these materials available to the Defence.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Murphy, if I have understood
18 what Mr. Mundis said correctly, the notebooks were not found, and they
19 cannot thus be disclosed. As far as the articles are concerned, he
20 disclosed the articles that he had, whereas other articles that are
21 open-source articles are articles that everyone could have access to.
22 This is how I have interpreted Mr. Mundis's submission.
23 Mr. Mundis, is this the Prosecution's approach in relation to Rule
24 66(B) of the Rules of Procedure?
25 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, let me again correct what I said
1 earlier. We did not disclose articles because they are open-source
2 materials. In the event that we have materials or documents which are
3 under our control or are in our custody and which is not open-source
4 material, we will provide that to the Defence. But again, when there is
5 material that is available to anyone exercising due diligence, then we
6 don't believe that it's our obligation to affirmatively go out and obtain
7 information which is publicly available for the purpose of disclosing it
8 to the Defence.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll leave the matter there,
10 but let me inform the Defence that they have had the witness list for a
11 long time, and this witness was included on the list, this journalist was
12 included on the list. And if one is a Defence lawyer, the least one could
13 do is look into the sort of work that the journalist was involved in, look
14 into the articles drafted by the journalist, and for a number of weeks no
15 one has been able to do this.
16 It's now 7.10. We will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00. Thank
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.10 p.m.,
19 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 9th day
20 of May, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.