1 Thursday, 14 September 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The accused Praljak, Coric and Pusic not present]
5 [The witness entered court]
6 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, can you call the
8 case number, please.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Good day, Mr. President. Case number IT-04-74-T,
10 the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would like to greet everyone
12 present, the Ambassador, members of the Prosecution, the Defence, and the
13 three accused. I have been informed that the other three accused are now
14 ill. They'll be represented by their lawyers today, and as a result we
15 can continue with the hearing today.
16 I would like to point something out. It concerns the application
17 of Rule 70. On a number of occasions yesterday there were some problems
18 concerning the questions put. The Prosecution raised some objections.
19 The witness himself objected. So I would like to remind everyone that if
20 the witness believes that he shouldn't answer the question, he can tell
21 us. If the representatives of the US government believe that the question
22 doesn't fall within the scope of the examination, they can inform us of
23 the fact. And similarly, if the Prosecution believes that the question is
24 inappropriate, they should inform us.
25 Unfortunately, the Judges are bound by this rule and the
1 Tribunal's jurisprudence, so it's not just for the Chamber to decide. If
2 the witness doesn't want to answer the question, the witness doesn't have
3 to answer the question and I can't oblige the witness to answer such a
4 question. Sometimes questions might be border-line questions; they might
5 be in a grey area. Sometimes the matter might be very complicated. I do
6 understand the situation we're in; however, I have to bear in mind the
7 relevant Rule and the jurisprudence that has ensued as a result of the
8 application of this Rule.
9 We have until 1.45. I will now give the floor to the Defence.
10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Good day, Your Honours.
11 WITNESS: PETER GALBRAITH [Resumed]
12 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:
13 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Ambassador. My name is Vesna Alaburic,
14 and I am a lawyer from Zagreb, and I represent General Milivoj Petkovic in
15 these proceedings.
16 You've mentioned the good terms you were on and your cooperation
17 with the Croatian government, with representatives of the political
18 opposition. You said that you were at Budisa's -- at the convention of
19 Budisa's liberals. You also mentioned the independent media organisations
20 who were involved in the protection of human rights.
21 As we are familiar with you and your activities in Zagreb, would
22 you agree that the USA was the most active country when it came to dealing
23 with a series of political issues in Croatia, and through their
24 activities, they strove to contribute to the development of democratic
25 social relationships.
1 A. Certainly that would be true from 1993 through the end of my
2 tenure, and I'm not saying that isn't true beyond. I just will confine my
3 remarks to that period of time.
4 Q. Thank you very much. Did you often hear many people assess the
5 situation in Croatia, people from the independent and dependent media, an
6 assessment according to which you attributed to the protection of human
7 rights in the Republic of Croatia, an assessment that without your
8 activities the situation in Croatia would have been far more serious, far
10 A. I appreciate the implication of your question, but I think that is
11 really for others to say and not for me to say. I certainly hope it is
12 true that the United States and I personally did contribute to an
13 improvement in the situation in Croatia, both in terms of peace,
14 development of democracy, and protection of human rights of all the
15 communities without with regard to ethnicity. But I suppose that final
16 verdict should be made by others.
17 Q. Thank you. Over the last few days you told us that you went to
18 Croatia at the invitation of President Tudjman, among other things, and
19 also that representatives of governments from other republics of the
20 former Yugoslavia wanted the USA to become involved in an active way in
21 resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.
22 I'd like to remind you of an interview of yours, an interview you
23 gave to the magazine Globus.
24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Could the registrar show us the
25 interview on the screen. 4D00326 is the number of the interview in
2 Q. There are only two passages from this interview that I'm
3 interested in for the purposes of the question I want to put to you, but
4 if you believe that other parts of the interview are of interest, we can
5 translate them, too. So I've only had these two passages translated and
6 I'll quote what you said.
7 "Besides, we did not simply decide to come here. We were asked
8 to come, we were begged to come. I can't tell you how many times
9 President Tudjman asked for the help of the United States in 1993, 1994,
10 and 1995. He asked us to get involved, to become diplomatically engaged,
11 and to send our soldiers over here. We have heard the same sort of things
12 from leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As far as that is concerned, we
13 received the same requests from President Milosevic."
14 Do you remember this interview, Mr. Ambassador?
15 A. I did many interviews, so I can't say that I specifically remember
16 this one, but now that you show it to me, I -- I mean, I do remember it
17 and I'm a hundred per cent sure that the words that are spoken here are
18 mine. It certainly reflected -- reflects my thinking then and now.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, when I look at the
21 document in B/C/S that I have before me, I can see that a question must
22 have been first put. It's in bold. And then there is the answer. Here
23 you have shown us the Ambassador's answer, but it would be interesting to
24 know what the journalist's question was. Do you have the question? Could
25 you inform us of the question?
1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] If we are referring to the B/C/S
2 version, could we have the next page on the screen, the next page of this
3 interview. That's right. The question starts at the beginning of the
4 first column, and it is as follows:
5 "Would it be correct to say that the Croatian state, because of
6 the decision of the Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina to boycott the
7 elections, has now found itself in the most difficult political and
8 international situation to date and that they are seriously threatened
9 with the imposition of sanctions?"
10 The beginning of the answer is as follows, and I quote:
11 "The friends of Croatia were, in any event, very disappointed by
12 the step that the HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina threatened to take. The
13 USA clearly stated our concern, and the European Union did so, too. I
14 believe that perhaps the leaders in Croatia and Bosnia and the leaders
15 among Bosnian Croats have failed to understand what is at stake, and I
16 must say that this shows a very poor understanding of international
18 And then there is an explanation that concerns the billions of
19 dollars that the USA had spent to secure peace in Bosnia. And then
20 another passage follows --
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's not necessary to continue.
22 The text on the screen is an answer to a question that was posed, and you
23 have now mentioned the question. Please carry on.
24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. According to what you yourself said, as early as 1993, Mr.
1 Tudjman, President Tudjman, desired that the USA become actively involved
2 in resolving the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. So my
3 question is: On the basis of your conversations with the late President
4 Tudjman, could one say that he believed that the American army and
5 administration were effective, or was that not the case?
6 A. Yes, he did think we were effective.
7 Q. Did he sincerely believe that by engaging the USA it would be
8 possible to put an end to hostilities and that it would be possible to
9 secure peace?
10 A. I think he felt that our engagement was the last chance for
11 bringing an end to the war.
12 Q. On the basis of your experience, if someone wants to use military
13 means to obtain a political objective, would it be possible for such a
14 person to request that the USA become militarily involved to deal with the
15 problems in the territory? If President Tudjman wanted to take or conquer
16 part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, would he have asked the American army to
17 come to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina? I can put it in a simple
18 way, too.
19 A. We're talking about two different time periods here. At the time
20 that we sent our troops in, of course, it was following the Dayton Peace
21 Agreements, and there was no thought, as best I can recall, expressed to
22 me by President Tudjman, about the engagement of US troops prior to the
23 peace agreement because he understood, as did everybody else, that that
24 was not going to happen. And so the involvement of American troops really
25 was something that occurred with the Dayton Peace Agreement. He very much
1 wanted them to come to eastern Slavonia as part of the Erdut Agreement,
2 but that was not going to happen with the US administration. So instead
3 we sent an American general to be the head of the UN mission, who is also
4 a diplomat, Jacques Klein.
5 So the issue of US involvement, frankly, was the diplomatic power
6 of the United States, and that was what he was seeking, the active
7 diplomatic engagement. Perhaps it's useful to recall that when the war
8 broke out in the former Yugoslavia in 1991, the approach of the Europeans
9 was that this was a European problem and Europe would handle it, and that
10 the United States didn't need to get involved. And that, of course, was
11 something that very much fit the views of the Bush administration, which
12 had just come out of the Persian Gulf War and was dealing with all the
13 issues related to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then, of course, a
14 presidential election in 1992.
15 I think in 1992 the Croatian government, and certainly the
16 Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did want to see a more active US
17 involvement, but it was an election year and that was not going to
18 happen. And so the hope was in 1993, with the new administration, that it
19 would happen.
20 Q. Thank you, Ambassador. As far as the policies of the EU are
21 concerned --
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a follow-up question. If
23 I have understood you correctly, your country became involved or started
24 to become involved as of the time that you presented your letter of
25 accreditation, or did that happen, in fact, before you actually arrived?
1 THE WITNESS: It certainly began before I arrived. We did have a
2 special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, but I think it's fair to say that
3 through 1993 and then in 199 -- well, through 1993 and continuing in 1994
4 and 1995, our involvement increased very dramatically. Even from the
5 start there was some minimal US involvement, but it wasn't what the
6 parties in the region, at least the Croatian and Bosnian governments,
7 would have liked to have seen.
8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Thank you, Ambassador. We will deal with EU policies and US
10 policies in the second part of my cross-examination, but I'd like to
11 clarify something with regard to the engagement of the US military in the
12 territory of the former Yugoslavia. Would you agree with the statement
13 that there was a discussion in the international community about the
14 authority of the UN forces or the mandate of the UN forces that were to be
15 sent to the territory of the former Yugoslavia? I'm referring to
17 A. Yes, there was always discussion in the international community
18 about the authority or mandate of UNPROFOR.
19 Q. Was the most hotly debated issue the question as to whether these
20 forces would have the right to intervene in armed conflicts? Or would
21 they just have the right to escort humanitarian convoys and monitor the
22 situation with regard to these convoys in the field?
23 A. There were many discussions about what the rules of engagement
24 would be for the UN forces -- UNPROFOR forces.
25 Q. Would you agree that UNPROFOR did not have the right to intervene
1 in armed clashes and to actively try to put an end to such clashes because
2 members of the American army were not part of UNPROFOR and because the
3 American army was not present in the field?
4 A. No, I would not agree with that statement. That was not the
5 reason why UNPROFOR did not have the authority to intervene in armed
6 conflict. There were many militarily capable forces, extremely capable
7 forces, including from France and Great Britain. And the reason they
8 didn't intervene had to do with the mandate of those -- of the UNPROFOR
9 mission as well as the decisions of the troop-contributing countries. I
10 don't think that had anything to do with the absence of US military.
11 Q. Could you confirm that President Tudjman suggested that NATO
12 forces become engaged in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in
13 the territory of Croatia?
14 A. Well, certainly that was true following the Dayton Peace
15 Agreement. NATO took the role in the -- took the lead role in the
16 international force. And prior to that I guess there was discussion on
17 his part of a NATO role.
18 Q. Could you tell us, before NATO became involved and before the USA
19 became involved, how many years prior to that date did President Tudjman
20 first request that NATO become involved in trying to secure peace in the
21 territory of the former Yugoslavia?
22 A. I don't think I could say.
23 Q. Thank you. I'd now like to turn to the subject of the late
24 President Tudjman, because I believe that your opinion of President
25 Tudjman is of great importance for this case.
1 On the first day of your testimony you told us that the late
2 President Tudjman believed that Bosnia and Herzegovina wouldn't and
3 shouldn't survive as a sovereign and independent state, and you said that
4 on numerous occasions he exposed his views on territorial boundaries and
5 on his territorial aspirations with regard to part of Bosnia and
7 My question is: Would it be correct to say that the Government of
8 Republic of Croatia didn't carry out an attack on the neighbouring country
9 of Bosnia and Herzegovina -- or rather, the Army of the Republic of
10 Croatia didn't carry out such an attack?
11 A. Certainly the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was started by
12 Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb allies, but the Army of the Republic of
13 Croatia was in fact involved in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
14 including fighting the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15 Q. I apologise, but that's not an answer to my question. I was
16 talking about the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. Let me help
17 you when it comes to defining the term of "aggression".
18 The Prosecution, in its indictment, hasn't charged the accused
19 with being involved in an aggression, nor do they claim that Croatia
20 carried out an act of aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. I'm
21 talking about aggression in the usual sense of that term.
22 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, Your Honour, but this is getting into legalese
23 and legal terminology. And so there's no misunderstanding and so the
24 Prosecution's position is not misrepresented, it is indeed the Prosecution
25 position that the Government of Croatia was involved in active aggression
1 against the Bosnian government and sent its troops into Bosnia to do just
2 that. So I don't want the Prosecution position or the indictment to be
3 misinterpreted, whatever terminology one wants to use.
4 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] As far as the legal problem is
5 concerned, I don't believe it's just a matter of the legal concept of
6 aggression. The witness has spoken about legal armies, legal governments,
7 et cetera. So I don't believe that my question is a question that the
8 Ambassador can't understand and answer.
9 As far as referring to the contents of the indictment is
10 concerned, I don't think it's necessary to enter into a dispute right now.
11 But there is something that is illogical. One cannot help --
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Rephrase your question clearly
13 so that the Ambassador, who has studied law, can answer it.
14 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. My question was: Could you confirm that the Republic of Croatia
16 was never involved in an aggression against its neighbouring country
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
18 A. Your Honour is correct, of course, that I have a legal degree, but
19 I perhaps should point out that I've never practiced law. And I'm
20 reluctant to get drawn into offering a legal opinion, not because I'm shy
21 about offering my opinions, which I think those who know me know that I am
22 not, but I'm in a courtroom full of very qualified lawyers, and it strikes
23 me that there are other people who are better able to come to these
25 I'm really here to testify as to facts about my experience as a
1 diplomat in Croatia. So if I could -- I'll just try to state the facts as
2 we saw them.
3 The Croatian army -- I hope I can answer this, because the
4 Croatian army was involved in military action against the Government of
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina. We considered that illegal. We, as I have
6 testified, raised this repeatedly with the Government of Croatia, and we
7 ultimately -- not ultimately, but we regularly -- we threatened sanctions
8 on Croatia, including being part of an ultimatum on the 3rd of March,
9 1994, by the President of the Security Council, which gave Croatia two
10 weeks to withdraw its troops from Bosnia. And that was because we thought
11 the activities were illegal.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ambassador, in very simple
13 terms, the question put to you by the Defence has to do with the term
14 "aggression." In diplomatic language, the aggression of country A
15 against country B is what, exactly? Is it a war at a particular point in
16 time, in the course of the life of two countries? What does it mean when
17 one talks about the aggression of one country against another?
18 MR. SCOTT: Sorry -- I'm sorry to interrupt, but, again, there is
19 a specific term of legal art --
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, I don't appreciate
21 your intervention. I put a question to the witness in diplomatic terms.
22 He's a diplomat, and as a diplomat I asked him how he understands the term
23 "aggression". Without referring to Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, I
24 asked the witness how he interpreted the term "aggression," if one is
25 speaking about the aggression of one country against another. He can
1 either answer the question or not. Let him try and answer it. If he
2 doesn't want to answer the question, he won't answer the question.
3 Ambassador, answer the question if you like; and if you don't want
4 to, we'll move on to another subject.
5 THE WITNESS: Avoiding, then, a legal term, but how did we
6 diplomatically understand "aggression" or how would I understand it?
7 First, of course, a military attack on one country on to the territory of
8 another in circumstances where there was no case of self-defense; and
9 second, I would include in that sending in troops from one country on to
10 the territory of another country against the will of the lawfully -- of
11 the internationally recognised government of that country, and I would
12 certainly include in that situation circumstances where the troops of the
13 foreign country were fighting against the forces of the lawfully
14 constituted government of the country.
15 So those would all fit within what I would define as aggression,
16 in a diplomatic sense.
17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you. It would be interesting to see to what extent,
19 according to this definition of aggression, the USA has committed
20 aggression. So please tell me, apart from the wars that are common
21 knowledge, on how many countries has the USA perpetrated aggression, and
22 how many aggressions is it perpetrating right now? If you cannot answer
23 that question, I'll move on.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's beyond the scope. Move
25 on to another subject.
1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. A few words about the attitude of the late President Tudjman
3 towards the international community. To the best of your knowledge, was
4 President Tudjman aware that without the blessing of the international
5 community, the Republic of Croatia would not become an independent and
6 sovereign state?
7 A. Yes, I think that's correct.
8 Q. To the best of your knowledge, was the late President Tudjman
9 aware that without the blessing of the international community no changes
10 in the borders of the countries of the former Yugoslavia would be possible
11 unless all the sides involved agreed otherwise?
12 A. Your question has a kind of -- has a double -- maybe it's not
13 exactly a double negative to it, but it's a little hard for me to answer,
14 the way you've posed it. You ask: Was President Tudjman aware that
15 without the blessing of the international community no changes in the
16 borders of the countries of the former Yugoslavia would be possible?
17 That's really kind -- one question. I mean, do you mean that, even
18 without the blessing of the international community, as long as all sides
19 agreed, it would be possible?
20 Q. I'll put the question in two parts. So the first part of the
21 question is: Was President Tudjman aware that without the permission of
22 the international community there could be no changes in the borders of
23 the countries of the former Yugoslavia?
24 A. I believe he knew that without the acceptance by the international
25 community there would be no internationally recognised changes in the
1 borders of the former Yugoslavia.
2 Q. I will clarify the second part of my question. For example, if
3 the Republic of Croatia, according to a constitutional procedure, decided
4 to cede part of its territory to, let's say, Montenegro, would that be a
5 problem between those two countries?
6 But we'll move on because my time is running out. Tell us,
7 please, to the best of your knowledge, was President Tudjman aware that
8 without the agreement of the international community there could be no
9 changes in the internal order of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
10 A. No, I don't think that statement is correct.
11 Q. Can you explain to us how it would have been possible to change
12 the internal order of Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time without the blessing
13 of the international community?
14 A. Well, for one thing, he sponsored the creation of the Republic of
15 -- so-called Republic of Herceg-Bosna, which the international community
16 did not condone. That republic consisted -- continued long after it was
17 supposed to have been dissolved. Documents continued to refer to it long
18 after it was supposed to have been dissolved. And in spite of demarches
19 by the United States, the European Union, and others, that this was an
20 illegal entity and in violation of treaties, if he kept it going. So I
21 guess the answer to the question -- that's why I say I don't agree with
22 your statement. And that's just one example.
23 I can offer another. The creation of the Republika Srpska was
24 something that was opposed by the international community, and yet it took
25 place in 1992 -- or the -- self-styled at that time.
1 Q. If I may draw this conclusion: Your answer confirms my thesis,
2 because without the blessing of the international community, no changes
3 occurring in the internal order of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be
4 recognised. But let's take it step by step.
5 A. That's not what I said. Your question was: Could there be
6 changes in the internal order of Bosnia-Herzegovina without the
7 recognition of the international community? My answer is: Yes, there
8 could be and there were many changes. Of course, now you modify that to
9 say: Well, there weren't internationally recognised changes. Well,
10 that's, of course, a truism, but there were in fact changes.
11 Q. I'm only concluding that those changes could not have been
12 recognised without the blessing of the international community, which
13 means in fact that the blessing of the international community was a
14 prerequisite for changes of the internal order of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But
16 A. I don't agree with that statement at all because you could have
17 changes that were not recognised, and in fact there were many changes that
18 were not recognised. I also frankly disagree with the use of the word
19 "blessing." Sometimes one has to recognise some things that one does not
20 bless at all, in fact, some things that one finds distasteful but can also
21 be a reality.
22 Q. Let's approach it from a different direction. Would you agree
23 that in late 1992 or early 1993, when the conflict began -- I apologise,
24 not 1993, but at the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the creation
25 of the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was Bosnia-Herzegovina a
1 unitary state?
2 A. I'm going to have to observe that you're asking me questions that
3 really go beyond the scope of what I'm here to testify to, not that I
4 could not answer that question. But, frankly, I wonder why you're asking
5 me. I mean, this is -- this is a -- it really is beyond the scope of what
6 I'm here to deal with. It's a simple question, but I wonder why you're
7 asking me.
8 Q. I'll be very happy, Mr. Ambassador, to explain the reason for my
9 question. The Serbian and Croatian entities and the forms of organisation
10 of the Serbian and Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is something
11 you have labelled as illegitimate and illegal. So the question is: What
12 kind of order would it be in which Republika Srpska was something
14 I want to explain what kind of state Bosnia-Herzegovina was in
15 order to explain how Republika Srpska and Herceg-Bosna were created. I
16 want to discuss the legitimacy of the so-called government in Sarajevo.
17 Therefore, I believe my question is directly connected to your responses
18 over the past two days, because, according to the opinion of many, the
19 essence of the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina was an attempt to
20 reach an agreement about the internal order. The Muslims wanted a unitary
21 state, whereas the Serbs and the Croats, each in their own way, wanted a
22 complex state, consisting of three national entities. That's why I'm
23 putting these questions.
24 So, to the best of your knowledge, at the time of the break-up of
25 the former Yugoslavia, was Bosnia-Herzegovina a unitary state?
1 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour.
2 Excuse me, Ambassador.
3 I'm going to endorse -- the Ambassador may want to answer the
4 question, but I'm going to endorse his earlier objection. I think this is
5 beyond the scope of the Rule 70 permission and outside the scope of his
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Ambassador, the Prosecutor
8 believes the question put by the Defence might fall under Rule 70, but
9 it's for you to decide whether you should answer the question.
10 The question put by Ms. Alaburic is in fact very complicated, but
11 I'll summarise her question. What she wants to know is your opinion, the
12 opinion of a diplomat or a representative of the US government in Croatia,
13 your opinion as an ordinary citizen. She would like to know whether, in
14 your opinion, the creation of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna, which was
15 described as illegal, is in fact illegal, since the Defence is trying to
16 support the thesis according to which Bosnia and Herzegovina was consisted
17 of three entities, the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims.
18 So that is the gist of her question. Answer it or don't answer.
19 If you don't want to answer it, we'll move on to another matter. It's as
20 you wish.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour, for that explanation. And
22 thank you to Defence counsel for the explanation. And I will answer the
23 question within the scope of my testimony -- within the scope of what I'm
24 -- of Rule 70.
25 And so I will take the question to be about how the United States
1 viewed Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time that I was Ambassador, and the
2 answer is that we viewed Bosnia and Herzegovina -- well, let me answer and
3 if you don't like my answer you can follow up, because I think I'll get to
4 the point -- I'll get to the point that you're after.
5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. I apologise, but my question does not refer to the time when you
7 became Ambassador but 1990 and 1991, when the former Yugoslavia broke up.
8 A. Well, let me answer it in this way: In 1993, when I arrived --
9 when I arrived in Zagreb and we examined these questions, we considered
10 the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina that came into being following the
11 referendum in 1992 to be an internationally recognised state with the
12 constitutional -- legal constitutional structure that it had and that the
13 government, headed by President Alija Izetbegovic, was the lawful
14 government of the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that
15 other entities, including the so-called Republika Srpska and the so-called
16 Herceg-Bosna, were not lawful entities. And that was our view as we saw
17 it in 1993 of the events in 1992.
18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have on e-court
19 P08632. This is David Owen's book "Balkan Odyssey." It's page 51 and 52
20 in Croatian; in the English text, pages 41 and 42. Excuse me, we only
21 have the English text, and I'll correct the page number. It's pages 51
22 and 52 of the book. It's pages 41 and 42 in e-court. Pages 51 and 52 of
23 the book and electronic pages 41.
24 Can we zoom in a little bit? Yes, if we could zoom in to page 51,
25 the last paragraph.
1 Q. Mr. Ambassador, could you read the first sentence of the last
2 paragraph, please.
3 A. "In all our conference papers and meetings, however, we were
4 scrupulous in treating Izetbegovic as president and his ministers as
5 members of the government of an independent state, while being aware that
6 they constituted one of the three parties to a dispute which had to have a
7 negotiated solution."
8 Q. Thank you very much.
9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Could we now turn the page, page 52
10 of the book, which is page 42 in e-court.
11 Q. Could you please read the last three sentences of the first
12 paragraph. The last three sentences of the first paragraph. The sentence
13 I'm interested in begins with the words "The collective Presidency as a
14 democratic body ..."
15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Could we scroll up a bit, please?
16 Raise it a little -- scroll up -- or rather, scroll down. I'm sorry,
17 scroll down.
18 Q. The last paragraph which -- the sentence begins with the words,
19 "The collective Presidency ..." Could you read from there until the end
20 of the paragraph?
21 A. "The collective Presidency as a democratic body with meaningful
22 representation from the three constituent nations was, by the autumn of
23 1993, no longer a reality. The real decisions were made elsewhere. We
24 were, in effect, dealing with a Muslim government for a predominantly
25 Muslim population."
1 Q. Do you feel that Mr. David Owen is correct when putting forward
2 these standpoints on who Alija Izetbegovic was representing?
3 A. As far as the United States was concerned, President Alija
4 Izetbegovic was at president of the entire country of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina. He was the head of state of an internationally recognised
6 nation, recognised by the United States, and a member of the United
8 Q. Can you tell us, when you spoke to the representatives of all
9 three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who did you speak to
10 as the representative of the Serbs of the Bosnia-Herzegovina?
11 A. Perhaps I can explain this.
12 Q. Just give us the names, please.
13 A. Well, the answer is: I was Ambassador to Croatia. I didn't speak
14 to any of the representatives of the Bosnian Serbs in the period of time
15 that is the subject of this testimony.
16 Q. Do you know who, as the representative of the Bosnian Serbs,
17 participated in meetings organised by representatives of the international
18 community relating to relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Can you tell us who it was?
21 A. Radovan Karadzic was one of them.
22 Q. Thank you very much. Can you tell us who at these meetings
23 attended as the representatives of the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. I suppose it depends on which one, but sometimes it was Mate
1 Q. Tell us, at these meetings did the Bosnian Muslims have their
3 A. The president of the internationally recognised state of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Alija Izetbegovic, was at many of these
5 meetings. It is incidentally quite normal in circumstances where there is
6 a conflict that the president of the country might also meet with -- as
7 part of peace negotiations, with leaders of armed groups within a
8 country. That does not in any way make him solely the representative of
9 one party. But it is also true that a political leader, a president, is
10 quite often both the president of the entire country and the leader of one
11 party. For example, George Bush is both the President of the United
12 States and the leader of the Republican Party in the United States.
13 Q. Mr. Ambassador, if Alija Izetbegovic represented all three
14 constituent peoples making up the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it follows
15 that the Muslims did not have their representative at these meetings.
16 Would that be correct?
17 A. What I said was that President Alija Izetbegovic was the president
18 of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the -- that covered the entire
19 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I also said that he was the leader
20 of a political party, and so, as is quite normal, he might participate in
21 discussions, basically wearing both hats.
22 Again, if President Bush, as the leader of the Republican Party,
23 is sitting down with Democratic congressional leaders, he's in some sense
24 doing that in both capacities; he's the national -- the elected national
25 leader and he is the leader of his party with a political agenda
1 negotiating with the opposite party.
2 Q. In view of this dual role you are describing, please tell us
3 whether Mr. Izetbegovic, before he spoke, stated whether he was speaking
4 as a representative of the Muslims or whether he was speaking on behalf of
5 the entire state, including the Serbs and Croats? How did you know when
6 he was speaking as a representative of the state and when he was speaking
7 as a representative of the Muslims?
8 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour, could we have some dates and
9 places on this? Which meeting -- which meeting are we talking about? We
10 can't talk about five years of history all in one go.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, are there any
12 specific meetings you have in mind with regard to which the witness could
13 be of use to us? Because right now we don't really see where you're going
14 -- we can't really see where you're going.
15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I am thinking of the meetings in
16 Geneva, New York, Washington, and Dayton, all the places at which there
17 was discussion under the auspices of the international community of the
18 future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 As the witness has stated that he knew who the representatives of
20 the individual nations were at international meetings, the witness himself
21 might tell us what meetings he was referring to. This is a very important
22 question. If a country such as the USA treats one side as the legitimate
23 government representing all three sides, then serious questions arise as
24 to the role of the USA in the events which ensued.
25 But we will clarify this, if it's relevant to clarify at what
1 meetings Mr. Alija Izetbegovic was representing --
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, the problem is
3 that the Judges don't have to deal with the role of the USA. That is not
4 a matter dealt with in the indictment. We don't have deal with this role
5 within the conflict. We have to deal with acts of certain individuals
6 with regard to a criminal enterprise, a joint criminal enterprise, with
7 regard to crimes committed in certain municipalities.
8 And now you want to discuss the role of the USA in this matter.
9 Historically it might be of interest, but with regard to the defence of
10 your client and with regard to the judgement that we, the Judges, have to
11 render, we might be wasting our time. It's a matter of strategy. Put a
12 question to the witness, a direct question. Say: In my opinion, I
13 believe such and such; do you agree with me or not?
14 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I thank you, Your Honour. I
15 thought by -- that by showing David Owen's statement about Alija
16 Izetbegovic being the president of the Muslims, of only one side in the
17 conflict, I believe that we were dealing with the merits.
18 As far as relevance is concerned, I think this question is
19 relevant in order to be able to assess this witness's testimony. So if we
20 can know on what basis he assessed the situation in the former
21 Yugoslavia. That's why I think these questions are important.
22 Q. As far as your testimony is concerned or your statement --
23 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. Could you tell me how
24 much time I have used up, since my colleagues are looking at the clock and
25 wondering how long they have been waiting for?
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Microphone not activated].
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I apologise. The microphone
4 wasn't on.
5 The registrar has just told me that you have used up 42 minutes.
6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] With your leave, I'd like to move
7 on to the subject of the illegal status of the HVO.
8 Q. On a number of occasions yesterday you told us that the army of
9 the Bosnian Herzegovinian Croats, that was called the HVO, was an illegal
10 body. I have a few questions about this, if we can be very brief.
11 Would you agree with me if I said that while the Socialist
12 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was in existence, the JNA was the only
13 legal army in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the territory of the other
14 republics of the former Yugoslavia?
15 A. Well, I think the situation was more complicated because there was
16 both the JNA and there were Territorial Defence forces that were set up
17 pursuant to the constitution of Yugoslavia.
18 Q. But the Territorial Defence forces, if you can remember the
19 constitution, weren't in fact part of the army. There was only one army
20 and that was the JNA.
21 A. Well, the issue really has to do with what are lawful armed
22 forces, whatever you call them. But ...
23 Q. Could you answer my question: Is it true to say that the JNA was
24 the only legal army at the time of the existence of the Socialist
25 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia?
1 A. I will say that the JNA was the army of Yugoslavia.
2 Q. Thank you. I think that there is no doubt about the fact that in
3 April 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina -- in April 1992, Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina was recognised as an independent state; that means that the
5 Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia didn't exist in 1992. Would
6 you agree that at that time and before the JNA openly sided with the
7 Serbs, both in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
8 A. Yes, I agree with that.
9 Q. Would you agree with me that at that time, at the beginning of
10 1992, there was no army in existence in Bosnia and Herzegovina that could
11 have been considered as a legal army, in accordance with your criteria, an
12 army that could have provided security for the population and the property
13 of that territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
14 A. What I would say is that it was for the lawful Government of
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the internationally recognised Government of
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina, to establish whatever type of armed forces it
17 wished to have, and that armed forces would be the lawful armed force or
18 armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 Q. On the basis of your answer, I can come to the conclusion that the
20 Sarajevo government didn't act in this way. My following question, then,
21 is, if we may make a digression, my question is: At the time of the
22 French Revolution in 1789, which army was in fact the legal army?
23 A. I don't share -- I do not accept that you can come to the
24 conclusion that the -- from my answer that the Sarajevo government did not
25 act -- did or did not act in any way. That is not a fair or legitimate
1 inference from what I said. And second, I will absolutely say that the
2 French Revolution is beyond the scope of Rule 70 and I will refuse to
3 answer that question.
4 Q. Very well. Would you agree with me if I said that at the time of
5 a revolution, when a state is breaking up, when new states are being
6 established, the concept of what is legal and what is not legal, what is
7 illegal -- well, these aren't concepts that are easy to define. What is
8 legal -- well, what is legitimate is something that hasn't been covered by
9 any provisions, by any rules, up until that point in time, in fact.
10 JUDGE PRANDLER: [Microphone not activated].
11 Let me repeat, then. Madam Alaburic, I believe that your
12 questions, although they are partly based on historical facts and legal
13 considerations, we are really rather far from the present issue, that is
14 why Ambassador came here to be listened to. And that's why I believe it
15 would be better if you would ask questions from him which are related to
16 the case before us and which are under Rule 70. I would appreciate if you
17 would be so kind to follow this. Thank you.
18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Q. I said that I would just make a brief historical digression and
20 then return to Bosnia-Herzegovina to say that at the beginning of 1992
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina didn't have an army that would defend the
22 inhabitants from attacks launched by the Bosnian Serbs. So the question,
23 then, is: Does each people, does the population given territory, have the
24 right to self-defense? Do they have the natural right to organise
25 themselves, to defend their homes, to defend their property from attacks
1 that they are subjected to?
2 A. Well, there certainly is a right that people have of self-defense
3 in some circumstances.
4 Q. Are you aware of the fact that under the leadership and command of
5 the HVO, Mostar was in fact liberated from Bosnian Serb forces? And not
6 just Mostar, in fact, as the accused have added, this was not only the
7 case in Mostar but in many other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, could you be more
9 specific? Which exact date do you have in mind?
10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] In June 1992, the liberation of
11 Mostar under the command of the HVO, Muslim units under the command of the
12 HVO participated in the liberation of Mostar as well as many Muslims who
13 were among the HVO forces.
14 Q. Would you regard such an act as an illegal act?
15 A. No, not necessarily.
16 Q. When implementing the Washington Agreement, did Generals Rasim
17 Delic, on behalf of the ABiH, and Ante Roso, on behalf of the HVO,
18 participate on a totally equal basis when it came to resolving military
20 A. I believe that is correct.
21 Q. Can you confirm that these two generals signed a document on
22 accepting principles for the structuring of a federal army of Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina and that ABiH and the HVO became parts of that federal army,
24 fully equal parts or fully equal components of that army?
25 A. Yes, I believe that is correct, and of course that would be
1 pursuant to, you know, the decision of the lawful government of
3 Q. I now have to put another question to you. When concluding these
4 agreements, did representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian Croats
5 participate, Mr. Zubak, and Mr. Alija Izetbegovic on behalf of the
6 Muslims; and there were certain other officials from the Sarajevo
7 government who were involved in other agreements. Did they participate on
8 a fully equal basis?
9 A. Basically that's right, yes.
10 Q. Thank you. Unfortunately I have many other questions, but maybe I
11 could just refer to them for the sake of the transcript. I wanted to ask
12 the witness about his statement that President Tudjman was the
13 spokesperson for the Herzegovina Croats -- Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats in a
14 certain way. I wanted to analyse the acts of the embassies of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina who promoted Muslim interests alone. Then I wanted to
16 ask questions about the possibility of exerting influence by Tudjman,
17 Susak, and Granic on the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats. I wanted to
18 analyse the concept of Croatian territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
19 doesn't mean the territory of the Republic of Croatia, it means the
20 territory of the Croats who lived in that area. And then I wanted to show
21 that it wasn't only Tudjman who was interested in maps; everyone was
22 interested in maps. All those who participated in discussions on the
23 future of Bosnia and Herzegovina were interested in maps.
24 I also wanted to discuss how Mr. Tudjman presented his views on
25 the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina to everyone that he spoke to, and it
1 wasn't necessary to have a secret service or a special source of
2 information to find out what his opinions were. I think this is very
3 important when it comes to trying to establish criminal enterprise.
4 I wanted to analyse the witness's statements about Muslim state,
5 the fact that it was Tudjman's desire to have a Muslim state. David
6 Owen's book, "Balkan Odyssey," contradicts this, as well as the
7 Izetbegovic-Krajisnik agreement, according to which, after two years, it
8 would be possible to organise a referendum on separating from Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina. All of this took place in September 1993.
10 I wanted to prove that the Muslims were in favour of war. This
11 was established by a British delegation when they visited the field. I
12 wanted to prove that there were no plans for evacuation, and that in a
13 communication of the witness he spoke about the information that he
14 received from BritBat, according to which Croats had been organised to
15 leave parts of Bugojno, whereas the Muslims wanted to present this as an
16 evacuation alone. And I wanted to analyse the relationship between the US
17 policies and the policies of the EU.
18 And finally -- I apologise. And finally, I wanted to show how
19 people who participated on behalf of the USA in establishing and
20 implementing the Washington Agreement and the Dayton Agreement believed
21 that US policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina were very questionable. I
22 wanted to prove that Republika Srpska is now facing a referendum or is
23 about to have a referendum on independence today, and the same discussions
24 are being held about the internal organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
25 And I wanted to conclude with the words of Lord Owen, who said
1 that the USA, when it changed its policies after Bill Clinton came to
2 power, if the USA hadn't got involved in that way in 1993, in February
3 1993, the Vance-Owen Plan would have been accepted and peace would have
4 been obtained in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 Thank you very much.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Perhaps some of the other
7 lawyers will put some of the questions that you didn't have the time to
8 put to the witness and your desires will be fulfilled.
9 We have ten minutes before the break. It would perhaps be best to
10 have a 20-minute break now and then resume.
11 Mr. Karnavas.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, just an intervention because I'm not next. I
13 want to know, if Ms. Alaburic took one hour and 20 minutes and I'm making
14 -- I'm being very firm about this one, because I've been attacked in the
15 past of using everybody else's time. I think when we have a gentleman on
16 the witness stand, or a lady on the witness stand, who absolutely must
17 leave on a particular date, on the last day of their testimony, we need to
18 respect each other's time. And I don't think we can take -- we have to
19 recalculate the hours, because now if you are coming in last, you end up
20 with no time.
21 At the same time, I want to voice my concerns that the time
22 constraints, unfortunately, place many of the Defence lawyers in a
23 position where they cannot adequately defend the positions or their
24 clients. Ms. Alaburic made her record on that.
25 So while I support her efforts, at the same time I'm not here to
1 condone some other Defence team taking my time in defending my client,
2 because I'm not part of a joint criminal enterprise. I'm here
3 representing one client and one client only.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We have ten minutes
5 before the break. It would be best to have the break now and resume
6 afterwards. We'll resume in 20 minutes, about 10.40.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.21 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 10.42 a.m.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll resume.
10 Yes, Ms. Alaburic, what would you like to say?
11 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I just have one
12 request, since my colleague Karnavas has complained because I have used up
13 more time granted to me and this is prejudicial to him, I'd be grateful if
14 the registrar can inform us of the exact amount of time I have taken.
15 Thank you.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
17 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated].
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the registrar.
19 THE REGISTRAR: I apologise. 57 minutes, Ms. Alaburic.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stojic now has 45 minutes,
21 Mr. Prlic 45 minutes, and Mr. Coric 25 minutes.
22 I'll now give the floor to the first Defence team.
23 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. Coric's
24 Defence has no questions for this witness. Thank you very much.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
1 So now it's either Mr. Stojic's Defence team or Mr. Prlic's
2 Defence team. It's as you wish.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, I believe it was -- I was going to
4 go first and then Mr. Murphy was going to follow me.
5 I guess I don't want to pass up the point that I was trying to
6 make earlier. On the last day of a witness, I think we need to
7 re-calibrate our accounting system, because intervention -- unless we're
8 going to have the witness fly back from the United States if we run out of
9 time, and I don't think that's going to be the case or should it -- or is
10 it fair to the witness.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Go ahead.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well.
13 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas:
14 Q. Good morning, sir.
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. As you can see, it's not easy being a Defence lawyer around here.
17 First, let me begin by saying that I was somewhat pre-empted by --
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, I have to react to
19 what you said. When you said that it's not easy to be a Defence lawyer
20 here, you're putting the Tribunal into question, and this is not
21 permissible. This is not something that a Defence lawyer may be allowed
22 to do. You can say that you're working under very difficult conditions,
23 that there are time restrictions, but we are all aware of the fact. But
24 you cannot attack the Tribunal by saying that it is not easy to work as a
25 Defence lawyer here.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: I wasn't attacking the Tribunal, I meant even among
2 ourselves, as colleagues, times are -- at times we are at conflict with
3 each other. That's what I meant, Your Honour. No offence towards the
5 Q. Let me say that I was somewhat pre-empted by Mr. Scott yesterday
6 when he asked you whether you were here to help the Prosecution. I wanted
7 to, first of all, publicly extend an apology on that. I thought I
8 overstated the position. I thought you were trying to be helpful, and I
9 certainly want to apologise if I -- by making that remark.
10 But having said that, it would appear, at least from listening to
11 your testimony, that you are quite proud of your achievements and in fact
12 you are somewhat of an advocate of the Clinton administration's policies
13 towards Tudjman and your involvement in Croatia as an Ambassador on behalf
14 of the United States. Would that be correct?
15 A. My job as an Ambassador was to be an advocate of the United States
16 and of the president whom I represented. And I think, looking back, the
17 United States did accomplish a lot. I think we played a very important
18 role in bringing an end to the Muslim-Croat war, to alleviating the
19 suffering, and to bringing an end to the war in Bosnia, and to bringing a
20 final peace agreement with the Erdut Agreement in 1995.
21 Q. All right. But you would agree with me, even as you stand here
22 today, you're advocating those positions as being correct positions?
23 A. I'm here telling you the truth as I see it.
24 Q. All right. Now, I want to step back a little bit prior to your
25 arrival. Looking at your resume and your career, I think it's safe to say
1 that you are for your entire -- I mean from the time that you finished
2 university, you spent your career in foreign affairs, international
3 affairs, call it what you will, but in that field basically. Would that
4 be correct?
5 A. That is correct.
6 Q. Now, when you -- but you -- prior to your appointment as
7 Ambassador to Croatia, you were not part of the diplomatic corps in the
8 sense of being -- rising through the ranks of the State Department?
9 A. That's right. I was on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations
11 Q. Right. And so that would mean you being appointed Ambassador to
12 Croatia, that would be a political appointment?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Okay. Not that the other appointments aren't, but there's a
15 slight difference between someone rising through the State Department and
16 someone who is a political appointee.
17 Now, in light of your previous experience, it would appear that
18 you either had what I would call a rabbi, somebody pushing you in order to
19 make -- get Clinton to -- President Clinton to put your name to the
20 senate, or you raised a bunch of money for him - and I don't think that's
21 the case - or perhaps you even were in the wings assisting the Clinton
22 campaign during the campaign period with perhaps position papers on
23 foreign policy issues. Am I correct in any of the three?
24 A. I think the term "political appointee" implies somebody who either
25 raised money or, you know, was a former elected official. And I was a --
1 I had spent my career as a government employee. I certainly was not
2 chosen because I raised any money, because I didn't raise any money, and I
3 was not chosen because I wrote position papers for the campaign, because I
4 was not involved in a significant way in the campaign. Certainly there
5 were people, both inside the administration and, not surprisingly, in the
6 US Senate, who knew me and thought that I had some skills and could make a
7 contribution to the administration.
8 But I guess the answer is that almost immediately after the
9 election, I was called by the transition team perhaps before any --
10 anybody would have intervened and asked if I was interested in joining the
12 Q. Okay. Was it at that time, sir -- I have to remind myself to
13 speak slower. But was it at that time when you were contacted that you
14 were told that Croatia was the possibility or the former Yugoslavia was
15 the possibility, in light of your prior experience with the region?
16 A. No, not at that time. In fact, a number of positions were
17 discussed with me.
18 Q. Okay. And you did say that you did not -- you were not involved
19 in a significant way. So I guess the question might be: Well, to what
20 extent were you involved? If not significant, to what extent were you
21 involved in the campaign process as far as helping Clinton on foreign
22 policy issues as the campaign was waging?
23 A. Well, of course I knew the people -- many of the people who were
24 advising the campaign, so from time to time I would talk to them. But, as
25 I said to you, I think there was no -- I mean, I can't really remember any
1 particular involvement except for some conversations. It's possible I
2 might have written somebody a note. In 1992 I was travelling a very large
3 amount. I think I made 12 different international trips in that year
5 Q. Okay. Now, there's a reason why I'm asking these questions and it
6 might become obvious at some point. But, as I understand it, your primary
7 focus dealt with the Kurdish issue in Iraq. I mean, not that you were not
8 involved in other issues. But at least both on a professional and on a
9 personal level, it would appear that if you do have one real, real
10 specialty, it's in that area.
11 A. Actually, if you would have asked people in 1992, probably they
12 would have said that my specialty was South Asia, India and Pakistan. But
13 I certainly achieved a fair amount of recognition for the work I had done
14 on Iraq, and on Kurdistan in particular, in the period 1987 to 1993.
15 Q. All right. And at that point in time, as today - and I don't
16 think your views varied that much - it would appear that your solution for
17 Iraq sort of to have it split up to three different nations - the Kurds,
18 the Sunnis and the Shiites - I'm oversimplifying it, of course, but for
19 all intents and purposes, that's sort of your position. Would that be
21 A. To be precise, my position is that Iraq has already split up into
22 an independent Kurdistan and an evolving Shiite entity in the south, a
23 Sunni region in the centre, and that the United States and the
24 international community should not engage in what would be a very costly
25 and probably futile effort to put it back together again.
1 Q. All right. I would call it social engineering. You would agree
2 with me that at least - and I don't want to get too involved into this
3 discussion - that the Sunni and the Shiite are not constituent nations as
4 you would have, for instance, in Bosnia, where you had Serbs, Muslims and
5 Croats; correct?
6 A. Of course the Kurds are a nation. But I write in my book, "The
7 End of Iraq," that the Shiites -- there is an element of the Iraqi Shiites
8 that is -- of course it is a religion.
9 Q. Exactly.
10 A. Just as the Bosnian -- as the Muslims in Bosnia were as a
11 religion. But it is a religion that has elements of a national identity.
12 It's evolving. And so, in fact, there are some parallels, and I write
13 about this, between this Shiite identity and the Bosnian Muslim identity.
14 Q. Okay. All right. Now, by the time that you got appointed and hit
15 the ground in Zagreb, you were sort of -- you arrived sort of in the
16 middle of the third act of a four-act play. I mean, if you look at the
17 dissolution of Yugoslavia as act one; you know, act two is the war with
18 Slovenia, Croatia, and their independence; act three, the situation in
19 Bosnia up until the Washington Agreement; act four, Washington to Dayton.
20 I'm simplifying it, but basically, for all intents and purposes, you
21 arrived in the middle. Would that be correct?
22 A. I suppose it depends on how many acts you think there are in this
23 play, since Montenegro just became independent a few months ago. But I
24 arrived as Ambassador after the break-up of -- after the independence of
25 Croatia and Slovenia and after the independence of Bosnia and the start of
1 the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2 Q. All right. Now, during the campaign, the 1992 campaign,
3 presidential campaign, of the United States, this issue, as I recall, was
4 sort of hotly debated, or at least debated, between the Bush folks and the
5 Clinton folks, with Clinton saying that if he got elected he would be much
6 more active and much more engaging and perhaps even advocating, maybe not
7 directly but indirectly, the possibility of the use of troops there to
8 solve the situation. Would that be correct?
9 A. He advocated -- he certainly advocated a more active American
10 role. He advocated the use of air-strike -- air power against the forces
11 that were attacking Sarajevo. He advocated lifting the arms embargo. I
12 do not think he advocated sending American troops into Bosnia.
13 Q. All right. He wasn't advocating it outrightly, but basically the
14 tone was that they wanted a much more robust - I think that's the term
15 that is used in diplomacy often - a much more robust approach to this
17 A. He felt that we should not allow the indiscriminate shelling of
18 civilians in Sarajevo or the death camps. But I don't want to leave you
19 with the impression that the sending of American ground troops into Bosnia
20 was in any way contemplated, either directly or indirectly, because it was
22 Q. Okay. But the use of force was?
23 A. Air power, yes.
24 Q. Yeah, okay. And air power can be just as deadly, if not more
25 deadly, than, say, use of troops. I think we saw that later on.
1 A. The use of air power in Bosnia, when it finally took place, was
2 very significant, yes.
3 Q. Okay. And I take it that, if we look at the flip side of the
4 coin, the criticism during the campaign of the Bush folks was that they
5 were -- that they were not doing enough in this conflict, because, as you
6 put it, it was viewed at that point in time as a European problem, not an
7 American problem. Let the Europeans deal with it; they could handle it,
8 and so on and so forth. And I'm, again, oversimplifying it, but that was
9 the message, was it not?
10 A. There were multiple reasons. It wasn't that the Bush
11 administration's attitude was: Let the Europeans handle it. It was that
12 the Europeans said: We can handle it. 1992 is the year of Europe. And
13 the Bush administration, which, to be fair, had its hands full with the
14 break-up of the Soviet Union, the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War,
15 and with an election which was turning on dissatisfaction -- on the sense
16 that the president had not done much on domestic issues and was too
17 engaged in foreign affairs, the last thing it wanted to undertake was this
18 new problem in the former Yugoslavia.
19 And I might also add that some of the top advisors to the first
20 President Bush, notably Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger,
21 and National Security Advisor, Fred Scrowcroft, had been involved in
22 Yugoslavia diplomatically and so they had a certain bias on the situation.
23 Q. Okay. Now, you say bias. Well, Eagleburger, as I understand it,
24 at one point in time had been the Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. And so he would be, as one might say, sort of an old hand -- an
2 old Balkan hand. And if I'm not mistaken, Zimmerman worked under him at
3 the time.
4 A. I mean, he worked under him when he was Deputy Secretary of
5 State. I don't recall whether Zimmerman was a political officer in
6 Belgrade when Eagleburger was Ambassador, but that might be right.
7 Q. But nonetheless, Eagleburger was fairly familiar with Yugoslavia.
8 A. That's true.
9 Q. Okay. Now, the Clinton administration takes over in January 1992;
10 correct? 1992.
11 A. No, January 20th, 1993.
12 Q. That's correct, 1993. Now, by this point in time, you had this
13 ongoing process, negotiating process, that had started with the Europeans
14 in trying to find a solution to the break-up of Yugoslavia; correct?
15 A. Yes, that's true.
16 Q. All right. Now, you told us yesterday that before coming over
17 here, coming over to the region and taking up your post, that you had been
18 briefed. And as I recall your testimony yesterday, you said by the time
19 you even arrived, you had sort of your marching orders - and I'm using
20 that term, you didn't, but basically that's what it was - that you had
21 your marching orders to do a couple of things. One was to inform Tudjman
22 that he had to change his policies towards Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
23 number two, he had to get rid of two people in particular - one was
24 General Praljak and the other was Mate Boban. Would that be correct?
25 A. No.
1 Q. Okay. All right.
2 A. Just to make clear, I did say that I had been briefed and talked
3 to many people in preparation for taking up my assignment as Ambassador to
4 Croatia; that, of course, is normal. I also had the experience of having
5 made four trips from 1991, 1992, to the former Yugoslavia as it was
6 breaking up and having met all the leaders, almost all of them. The
7 instructions that I had certainly involved raising the humanitarian
8 issues, access for convoys, the things I testified to yesterday. But it
9 was my conclusion, after a period of time of being there on the ground,
10 that Boban and Praljak --
11 Q. Had to go.
12 A. -- had to go, and that was a decision that was supported by my
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. And I might add that much of the focus was on Boban, since he was
16 the top leader.
17 Q. All right. So just to make sure that I'm absolutely clear, before
18 you came to Croatia, you had not formed an opinion as to whether Boban and
19 Praljak should go.
20 A. That is correct. I had not, no.
21 Q. Okay. Did you have any information about those two individuals?
22 Or was it when you arrived and you began to, you know, make the rounds, as
23 it were, and formulate your opinion, you know, which of the two?
24 A. Well, it is, of course, hard --
25 Q. I understand.
1 A. -- 13 years later, to remember what information I got and when.
2 The kinds of briefings that are prepared are very extensive and the
3 conversations I had were very extensive. But I think it's -- I think it's
4 fair to say that Boban and Praljak had come up in the course of the
5 briefings before I went out, but it -- you know, it would be hard for me
6 to pin-point a day or a place because it's a long time ago.
7 Q. All right. Now, what about with respect to President Tudjman and
8 his policy towards BiH with respect to, you know, what you've testified
9 to, the use of HV soldiers in Croatia or humanitarian aid? Was that
10 something that you had been briefed on in Washington and there had been a
11 fixed position, you know, with you, you know, upon arrival to give a stern
12 lecture, message, to Tudjman as to what you knew and what you expected of
14 A. I think there's an impression that instructions are kind of a
15 written piece of paper that you follow, and that isn't -- that isn't the
16 way the process works. But what it was that the leaders of the Clinton
17 administration wanted me to do was to bring pressure to bear on to
18 President Tudjman to respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina, to end the atrocities that were being committed by Bosnian
20 Croat forces, to end the Muslim-Croat war, to play a constructive role in
21 the --
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. -- Bosnia peace process.
24 Q. All right. But from your answer, I think I can work backwards and
25 draw the conclusion that at least the Clinton administration, whoever they
1 were and whoever was briefing you or instructing you - I suspect it might
2 have been the Balkan Desk in the State Department - but by that point in
3 time, at least the Clinton administration had a fixed opinion that Tudjman
4 was doing all these things in Bosnia and Herzegovina, hence, you know,
5 your mission or part of your mission. Correct?
6 In other words, what I'm trying to say is: You didn't arrive, see
7 what was happening, and say: Oh, by the way, troops are going there;
8 humanitarian aid is being blocked; atrocities are occurring. You were
9 being told this before you arrived and you had somewhat of a fixed opinion
10 based on the information that you had before you arrived?
11 A. Let's leave out the notion of a fixed opinion --
12 Q. All right.
13 A. -- but to stay with the notion that we knew about these things
14 before I arrived. Yes. We had an embassy in Zagreb. There was a lot of
15 reporting about this. There was reporting in the press, yes.
16 Q. All right. Now, when the Clinton -- if I can go back a little bit
17 further -- and incidentally, have you read David Owen's book? It was
18 mentioned before by my colleague. I suspect you have an interest in the
19 area. Have you read it?
20 A. I've read parts of it.
21 Q. Okay. And I take it you probably flipped to the back to see where
22 your name is mentioned and gone in to see where you were mentioned
23 anywhere? Well, you can answer the question without looking at the
24 Prosecutor. I mean, that is a normal reaction.
25 A. It is possible that I looked in the index to see if I was
1 mentioned, yes.
2 Q. It might not fit within Rule 70. Okay.
3 Now, in this book -- and I think you would agree with me that Lord
4 Owen is a serious individual.
5 A. I would agree that he is a serious individual.
6 Q. And by the time that he took up his post, if we are to take him at
7 his word, he had been an MP for about 24 years, and during that career
8 period, he was also Foreign Minister for Britain or the United Kingdom;
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. And in his capacity during that period, he was not there as an
12 individual or representing the British government, but rather he was there
13 on behalf of the EU. Correct?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. And along with him, his counterpart, his sidekick, as it were, was
16 Cyrus Vance, who, as you well know, was one of the wise men of Washington?
17 A. I think it would be inaccurate to character Cyrus Vance as David
18 Owen's sidekick. In fact, in that partnership Cyrus Vance was the senior
19 figure, and, as I understand it, from having talked to Vance, it was Vance
20 who helped get Owen appointed as the EU representative, because Vance had
21 known Owen from the time when Vance was Secretary of State and Owen,
22 Foreign Secretary.
23 Q. And Mr. Vance was there on behalf of the United Nations?
24 A. That is right.
25 Q. Not on behalf of the State Department?
1 A. Absolutely not. He was the UN representative.
2 Q. But as some of us know, he had served as the Secretary of State on
3 the Carter administration; right?
4 A. Yes, until he resigned --
5 Q. As a result of what happened in Iran --
6 A. That's right.
7 Q. -- and disputes with Brizinski, as I understand it. But before
8 that, before the Carter administration, he had served in some capacity, I
9 can't remember whether it was the Johnson administration or maybe even
11 A. He had served in the Johnson administration, maybe the Kennedy
13 Q. All right. If you would look at David Owen's book, it would
14 appear that the Clinton administration, when it got elected and when it
15 took over in January, almost from the very outset, it was dead against the
16 Vance-Owen Peace Plan?
17 A. That is David Owen's view. Frankly, I don't think it is accurate.
18 Q. Okay. And Mr. Owen, for instance, characterised a meeting in
19 January of 1993 where he and Vance - and there was a reason I called him
20 sidekick and you absolutely were correct in correcting me, because I
21 wanted that admission that he was actually the point man - and here is Mr.
22 Vance with Mr. Owen and they're meeting your boss, which would have been
23 Christopher, Warren Christopher, the then Secretary of State, where
24 they're trying to brief him on the Vance-Owen Plan. And it would appear,
25 at least if we are to take Mr. Owen at his word - and we may have him here
1 to testify - that Mr. Christopher was totally uninformed. This is in
2 January. And the -- you're --
3 A. I suggest that the question about what Mr. Christopher knew or
4 didn't know might be directed to Mr. Christopher. I can't speak to what
5 Mr. Christopher knew or didn't know.
6 Q. All right. And also Mr. Owen points out where -- after that
7 meeting, where it was rather obvious to them that Mr. Christopher was not
8 -- not only was he uninformed but also didn't seem to give -- pay much
9 attention to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, slightly thereafter they're
10 passing some cameras and then later on they're watching on CNN where
11 Christopher is giving a news conference, a briefing, where he is, in
12 essence, disrepresenting the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. Are you aware of
14 A. I do not recall reading that -- I do not recall that part of the
15 book, but --
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. -- as I said, I read parts of the book.
18 Q. All right.
19 A. So --
20 Q. And then there are other parts of the book, and we'll introduce it
21 at some other point. I don't have enough time. But I'm just giving you
22 the big picture here, where Mr. Owen - and this was brought up by my
23 colleague a little bit - paints a picture where, at least in the early
24 stages of the Clinton administration, January, February, March - the
25 Clinton administration is doing everything it possibly can to kill the
1 Vance-Owen Peace Plan because, in their terms - and this is widely
2 publicised in the media - that it is promoting ethnic cleansing. Do you
3 know anything about that?
4 A. This is an extremely complicated matter.
5 Q. Stick with me on just the press. Was it coming out in the press?
6 Was the Clinton administration using its relations, it's public relation
7 resources -- and, you know, we know how articles can be planted; people
8 can write -- that happens. The Bush administration has taken it to the
10 But, I mean, do you recall following the press during that period,
11 as you're getting ready to take up your post, where the Clinton
12 administration is outright coming out and saying, through the press, that
13 the Vance-Owen Peace Plan is actually promoting ethnic cleansing?
14 And the reason I'm mentioning this is that one of the parties, the
15 Muslims, are going to have to sign on to this. And if the Clinton
16 administration is making these -- these statements publicly, obviously the
17 Muslims are not going to go along.
18 So do you recall this being -- happening in the press? Yes, no,
19 maybe, or I can't recall?
20 A. No, I do not recall that.
21 Q. All right. And I don't want to press you on this, but if you --
22 if it's in David Owen's book, and assuming that he gives us references,
23 would you have any reason to disbelieve him?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Owen also states in his book that the Vance --
1 that throughout this peace process --
2 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Karnavas.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm sorry.
4 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Karnavas, I would like to tell you that the
5 French booth cannot follow you. Please kindly slow down. Thank you.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: I apologise.
7 Q. Now, would you agree or disagree or would you take exception to
8 Mr. Owen's characterisation in his book where he says that, in his
9 capacity as EU representative, along with Mr. Vance, who was -- the two of
10 them were the architects of this peace plan, members of the European
11 community, such as France, Germany, Denmark, and others, were fully behind
12 the peace plan that they were promoting at the time. And so they weren't
13 -- he and Vance were not acting as individuals, but rather they were
14 collectively getting assurances from the representative countries that the
15 plan itself, what they were promoting or what they had -- and pushing at
16 the negotiating table, was a plan that was acceptable to the Europeans?
17 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour, I'm very sensitive to the
18 issue of time. I know Mr. Karnavas has limited time, but I still feel
19 that I must indicate here, I think we have to get some specifics as to
20 passages of the book, that the book can be put in front of the witness. I
21 just cannot honestly say -- I don't know if we're talking about Mr. Owen's
22 characterisation of his book or Mr. Karnavas's characterisation of his
23 book. And these are -- as the Ambassador said, these are very, very
24 specific items. We don't know the context of particular passages, and I
25 think particular passages should be put before the witness.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, I would be delighted to do that. I
2 simply do not have the time. I am -- and one would have to take me at my
3 word, because at some point we are going to be introducing the book. And
4 if I'm mischaracterising the evidence, then obviously not only do you
5 disregard what I say, but also -- and incidentally, it is -- it's a
6 Prosecution exhibit, it's P08632. So it's not as if I'm quoting from a
7 document that is unbeknownst to the Prosecution. It's their document.
8 I'm using their evidence. And I suspect Mr. Scott has read the book
9 himself. If not Mr. Scott, Mr. Mundis for sure.
10 MR. SCOTT: I don't dispute, Your Honour, that the Prosecution has
11 the book. That's not the issue. The issue is putting the passages in
12 front of this witness so this witness can make fair response.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll rephrase the question, Your Honour. I'll
14 rephrase the question
15 Q. Were you aware, or did you know --
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As a rule, the Judges trust the
17 lawyers who are making such references, because, according to the Rules,
18 the lawyers shouldn't misrepresent matters. If Mr. Karnavas is referring
19 to something, it means he has read it -- it should mean he has read it.
20 Unless the Prosecution immediately says that the Defence is saying
21 something different, it shouldn't be a problem.
22 Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. And if I am misquoting,
24 then I can be sanctioned as well. But I appreciate the Court's --
25 MR. SCOTT: I don't know, Your Honour, if he's misquoting because
1 I have no passage in front of me. We're talking about a long book, so how
2 do I know whether Mr. Karnavas is taking something out of context or
3 mischaracterising it or not? We have no passage in front of us.
4 MR. KARNAVAS: Let me rephrase the question.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, if I was in your
6 place, I'd have the book in front of me, and when Mr. Karnavas intervenes
7 I'd follow. You're contesting what he says but on what basis?
8 MR. SCOTT: Well, number one --
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's fine, but you're accusing
10 him of misrepresenting the truth. This is a Prosecution exhibit. He has
11 given you the number. You can just check.
12 MR. SCOTT: I don't know what passage he is talking about. Which
13 page and paragraph number would you like me to turn to?
14 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll rephrase the question, Your Honour, just to
15 save time.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, to the extent that
17 it's possible, refer to the page or paragraph, if you can.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, this is the problem. I don't want to spend
19 the time, but there is a whole chapter, it's chapter 3, "Vance-Owen Peace
20 Plan." I don't know what part of this chapter the Prosecution has not
21 read, but it covers it in great detail.
22 Q. Now, let me just ask you, sir: Did you read that chapter of the
23 book by any chance? Yes, no, maybe, or I don't remember?
24 A. I can't remember.
25 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Do you recall whether -- do you know whether
1 the European countries that were involved in this process, whether they
2 had signed on to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, whether they were in agreement
3 of this plan?
4 A. I believe they were generally supportive, but I couldn't speak to
5 it in any detail.
6 Q. Okay. Now, would it surprise you, sir, that during this period,
7 during this negotiating period, that every side pulled out maps?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Okay. And I take it one thing that you might recall from reading
10 the book, that Mr. Owen was of a fixed opinion - and you made some
11 references to this - that he was of a fixed opinion that borders were not
12 sacrosanct, that maybe there was room to negotiate with respect to the
13 borders of the various republics?
14 A. Let me be clear about that so that there's no conclusion. The
15 Vance-Owen Plan did not involve changes in the international borders of
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina --
17 Q. That wasn't my question --
18 A. No, because I want to -- one thing follows another --
19 Q. No, I want to go step by step. I will be very fair with you, sir.
20 A. But I have already said that David Owen did favour changes in the
21 international borders, but that that was his view and it was not shared by
22 the United States government.
23 Q. I understand, and I think we're in total agreement, okay? But
24 what I am suggesting to you is, before you come on the scene with the US
25 plan, there are these discussions with individuals such as Lord Owen and
1 his interlocutors, such as Tudjman, where he is advancing ideas, maybe not
2 ideas that the US likes and will have to deal with later on, but
3 nonetheless he's already talk -- they're talking about changing of borders
4 even at the international level. I'm not suggesting that this is being
5 promoted, but there are discussions.
6 A. This is not part of the Vance-Owen Plan.
7 Q. I understand --
8 A. Okay.
9 Q. That wasn't my question.
10 A. I understand.
11 Q. You're a lawyer and you've testified in front of the Senate. I'm
12 just a Defence lawyer. You're highly experienced. Surely I'm no match
13 for you. But you know my question. Could you answer it? You don't need
14 to re-read the question.
15 A. I'm sorry that I --
16 Q. You were having these discussions -- Owen was discussing changing
17 international borders with the folks, such as Tudjman, wasn't he?
18 A. I've testified that he discussed some limited changes, such as a
19 corridor in which territory north of the Sava, north of Brcko, would be
20 ceded to --
21 Q. But my question is --
22 A. -- ceded to Bosnia.
23 Q. Sir, my question is more precise, because this is what I'm trying
24 to get at: You've come here and told us that Tudjman - and I agree with
25 you on this - that Tudjman would pull out these maps, and whoever he saw,
1 especially the new person in the room, he would try to promote his vision
2 of where the Croatian borders should be. Would that be correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And he was almost the incorrigible child who wanted the extra
5 scoop of ice-cream and the parents would say: No, I'm sorry, you've had
6 it, that's it. There are the borders, that's it. But even after signing
7 the agreements, there was Tudjman who was, as you've noted, a historian,
8 first and foremost, who had his particular vision of where the Croatian
9 borders should be; right?
10 A. He had his particular vision, yes.
11 Q. But also what I'm trying to get you to admit, because you
12 partially admitted, that you also have David Owen who is representing the
13 EU, who is openly talking with interlocutors, such as Tudjman, that it's
14 okay to look at these international borders and maybe some changes can be
16 A. Well, let me take that, and this is why I've been careful to make
17 the points that I have.
18 First, what David Owen -- the border changes that David Owen
19 proposed were very minor ones and they bore no resemblance to the border
20 changes that Tudjman was suggesting.
21 Q. I understand that.
22 A. Second, when David Owen was proposing border changes, any of
23 these, he was not representing the EU, and that is why I made the point
24 that these countries supported the Vance-Owen Plan. But David Owen went
25 off on his own, in my view, in proposing these things. I did not feel
1 that that was appropriate. We disagreed with him, and I believe that he
2 set back the peace process by so doing.
3 Q. All right. Now, that's your position and thank you for stating
4 it, but let's be -- let's be -- let's put it into context. David Owen was
5 on the scene well before you got there; right?
6 A. Well, I first went there in December of 1991, so I'm not sure
7 that's true.
8 Q. Well, you went there on a mission, on a fact-finding mission;
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You went there in 1991 and then you made three trips in 1992. So
12 let's talk about this fact-finding mission. Could you tell us what was
13 the state of the Government of BiH in at the time?
14 A. Which trip?
15 Q. At the end of 1992. You've been there 1991 and three times in
16 1992. Could you tell us in what state it was? Was it a failed state?
17 Was it a state that was fully functioning? Was it a state that could
18 provide services, such as protection for its citizens, paid salaries for
19 teachers, paid salaries for the army, paid salaries for -- have a central
20 bank that's functioning? Could you tell us?
21 A. When I last was there in November of 1992, it was a country that
22 was the victim of brutal aggression. The capital was surrounded by
23 Bosnian Serb army -- soldiers. Snipers were shooting into the capital at
24 innocent people. A large number of mortars were landing. Of course it
25 was extremely difficult for the government to function under those
1 circumstances. That is what happens when countries are victims of
2 aggression. Frankly, the same thing happened in the European countries
3 when the Nazis took over.
4 Q. All right. Now, at that point in time, did you have an
5 opportunity to travel around Bosnia and see what the situation was between
6 the Croats and the Muslims during those four trips?
7 A. Yes. In fact, I went to Mostar on one of the trips --
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. -- and through some other parts of Herzegovina.
10 Q. And in your report that you submitted, what was your analysis or
11 what was your conclusion with respect to what was happening in Central
12 Bosnia or in Herzegovina?
13 A. There was only a report that was submitted from one of the trips,
14 and that dealt with the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia-Herzegovina in August
15 of 1992.
16 Q. And the focus of that report on ethnic cleansing, that had to do
17 with the Serbs ethnically cleansing Croats and Muslims; correct?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. All right. So the focal point of your trip was not to examine the
20 relationship between the Muslims and the Croats and the Serbs, from a
21 political standpoint, but rather -- you're shaking your head. Let me
22 finish my question first. But rather it seems that your trip, at least
23 the first time, was on ethnic cleansing.
24 A. Let me try to set this straight.
25 Q. Okay.
1 A. The first trip, --
2 Q. Yeah.
3 A. -- which was in December 1991, looked at the overall situation in
4 the former Yugoslavia as the Croatian war was underway, as Slovenia's
5 independence, Croatia independence. The second trip -- and we went to --
6 in that first trip we went to all the republics and as well as Kosovo.
7 The second trip, which was in August of 1992, was focussed on the
8 Serb-run concentration camps --
9 Q. Okay. Let's get to the third one.
10 A. -- and ethnic cleansing.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. The third one was, again, to all the countries that had emerged --
13 that was in October 1992, that had emerged from the former Yugoslavia, and
14 it dealt with the political situation, broader policy issues.
15 And the fourth trip was with Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and
16 it was to Croatia, to Sarajevo, and to Herzegovina, to Mostar, as well as
18 Q. All right. Now, during those trips, did you examine the political
19 structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, tracing it from its independence onwards,
20 in order for you to have a picture of how Bosnia and Herzegovina is
21 functioning on a political level? Yes, no, maybe, or I don't recall?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Okay. So by this -- and was this part of your report?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Okay. Now, you keep mentioning that Tudjman -- I mean that
1 Izetbegovic was the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Would it
2 surprise you to learn that he was the president of the Presidency and not
3 the president of the country? Would that surprise you? And I'll stand on
4 this statement, and I can be corrected later on by the Prosecutor or the
5 Court if I'm misrepresenting the truth.
6 A. No, it would not surprise me.
7 Q. Okay. Did you know how the Presidency functioned? Did you have
8 any idea of how it functioned? Yes, no, maybe, I don't recall?
9 A. Any idea of how it functioned?
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Okay. Well, I'm not going to ask you specifically to tell us,
13 because that might take some time, but let me just put to you: Do you
14 know whether Izetbegovic had more power than the others, being the
15 president of the Presidency? Yes, no, maybe, I don't recall, I don't
16 know? That's the universe of choices.
17 A. Yes, he did.
18 Q. Okay. Well, what if I were to tell you, you are wrong again.
19 A. Wrong again? When have I been wrong before?
20 Q. Okay. Well, you're wrong on this one.
21 A. Okay.
22 Q. He had no more powers than the others --
23 A. I understand, but perhaps you would like me to explain.
24 Q. No. I'm going to go through --
25 A. Because you asked if he had more power and I understand fully the
1 legal arrangements, but de facto he had considerably more power than the
2 other members of the Presidency.
3 Q. Okay. And we're going to get to that --
4 A. I answered your question accurately and you said I was wrong, and
5 now you agree I'm right, just to be clear.
6 Q. We're talking about de jure.
7 A. You didn't ask that.
8 Q. Okay. I stand corrected. So de facto, even though de jure he's
9 supposed to be the first among equals, de facto the Croats, who were 17.5
10 per cent of the population, are seeing this Muslim, who is supposed to be
11 first among equals, and saying, No, no, no, I'm on top, it's my
12 government, I'm number one. And in fact the US government is treating him
13 as if, either de jure or de facto, he is the representative of all the
14 people of the entire country. Isn't that what we're talking about?
15 A. This is completely standard diplomatic practice that the president
16 -- there is one individual who is the head of state, by whatever title he
17 is - president, president of the Presidency Council, what have you - he is
18 the head of state and he's treated that way by the -- by the international
19 community, and it is of the entire country.
20 Q. All right. And so let me ask you: In your analysis in these four
21 trips, did you ever prepare a report that would at least set out what
22 functions this government and what functions Izetbegovic, as the president
23 of this country, was able to provide at the local level, at the municipal
25 A. No.
1 Q. Okay. Would it not be understandable - and maybe this is a
2 question that's -- that you can't field - but would it not be
3 understandable that the folks at the local level, at the municipal level,
4 should self-organise themselves in order for schools to function, in
5 order, you know, to make sure that salaries are paid, to maybe have some
6 sort of a standing, you know, army, whatever it is, for self-protection?
7 Do you think that's unnatural?
8 A. Well, you asked whether it was understandable --
9 Q. Well --
10 A. -- and the answer is yes.
11 Q. Okay. And did you by any chance, being a lawyer - I understand
12 you did not practice law, but you did go to Georgetown, which has an
13 excellent curriculum on international courses - did you ever look at the
14 constitution of the former Yugoslavia or of BiH to see whether, to see
15 whether, in the constitution itself it provided for municipalities to
16 self-organise in case of a disaster or in case of an emergency?
17 A. Well, I think I'm going to decline --
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. -- to answer a question that is premised on my speaking here as a
21 Q. Well, you did have -- I'm going to slow down. I'm just about
22 ready to -- we have two fine lawyers back there, the "L Department", as I
23 understand that's what the Legal Department is called in the State
24 Department, the "L's". Did you have an "L" in the Croatian embassy -- the
25 American embassy in Croatia?
1 A. No.
2 Q. You didn't have it. But you had access to lawyers from the State
3 Department. If you wanted some sort of a legal analysis, surely the
4 United States government had enough funds to allow you to make a request
5 to have some lawyer in the State Department, especially at the Balkan
6 Desk, to prepare some sort of an analysis? I mean, assuming that you
7 wanted one. And I'm trying to be fair to the United States government.
8 A. The United States government is well-resourced in its diplomacy
9 but perhaps not as well-resourced as it should be.
10 Q. Okay. But did you ever ask for a legal opinion to find out what
11 is going on, what sort of structure is being negotiated at the Vance-Owen
12 Peace Plan and thereafter, the Owen-Stoltenberg? So at least you would
13 have some sort of a measuring stick to see -- or was that not part of your
14 mandate and interest since you were in Croatia with instructions towards
15 Tudjman and not concerned about what was happening in Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina from a political standpoint?
17 A. I was very interested in what was going on in Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina, and I collected information from all sorts of sources. And,
19 incidentally, these kinds of issues didn't necessarily need a legal
20 analysis from the State Department. There was a very good analysis by the
21 extremely capable legal and constitutional communities in Croatia and in
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
23 Q. All right. Now, did you by any chance, while you were giving
24 these messages, these demarches to Tudjman, did you ever try to figure out
25 how Herceg-Bosna was set up from, you know, a political -- how it was
1 structured, who was where, how it operated, what competencies it had? Did
2 you ever look at the legislation, either individually or have somebody
3 look at it and give you an analysis?
4 A. I certainly looked at the structure of Herceg-Bosna.
5 Q. All right. And it was your conclusion that Mate Boban was at the
6 top; right?
7 A. That was my conclusion, yes.
8 Q. Okay. Now, below him, did you check and see how -- where the
9 responsibilities lie; you know, who was responsible for the military, who
10 was responsible for the civilian government, who was doing what?
11 A. I would have looked at that at the time.
12 Q. Okay. And I take it at this point in time you're not in a
13 position - you know, passage of time and what have you - to tell us if I
14 were to ask you concretely to describe it. And I don't think it would be
15 -- I don't want to put you on the spot. But after 13 years, I suspect
16 that you can't answer that question.
17 A. I think I certainly knew more 13 years ago than I do now.
18 Q. Do you know whether the central bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
19 functioning; and if so, was it able to circulate currency throughout
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina to the various municipalities, be they Serb, Croat,
21 Muslim-held, or mixed? Yes, no, maybe, I don't know, or I don't
23 A. Actually, in this case none of your four choices apply --
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. -- because -- for a very important reason, which is that the
1 Bosnian Serbs used their own currency and the Bosnian Croats used the
2 currency of Croatia. That was the Croatian central bank that functioned
3 there --
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you
5 calculate the time that Mr. Karnavas has used so far.
6 Please continue.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well.
8 Q. Was there a currency for Bosnia and Herzegovina? And was the
9 central bank functioning? Yes, no, maybe? Because -- and I'm asking you
10 the question -- I'll give you a clue here: If it's not functioning, if
11 there's no central bank and there's no currency, then obviously somebody's
12 going to have to do something to get something for buying purposes, paying
13 salaries, and so on and so forth. So my question is very concrete: Was
14 there a central bank? Was it functioning? Was there currency that was
15 widely circulated? Yes, no, maybe, I don't know, or I don't remember?
16 A. One answer or answers to each of those questions?
17 Q. It's a multiple choice.
18 A. Okay. I don't remember whether -- at what point the central bank
19 was set up, but certainly because of the aggression it was very hard for
20 it to function. As I recall, certainly in the early period, the effective
21 currency in Bosnia in the government-controlled parts of Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina was the German mark.
23 Q. All right. Okay. I understand your answer.
24 Now, I'm going to touch on a few issues, just because I don't have
25 much time. You mentioned in your direct examination that even though it
1 was 17 per cent population, at some point it dropped to 10 per cent
2 because of the issue of allowing citizenship in Croatia. Do you recall
3 that remark?
4 A. Yes, and I said that this was something that Susak and others -- a
5 point Susak and others had made to me.
6 Q. All right. Now, the United States government has changed its laws
7 - I have a couple of very talented lawyers here and they'll correct me if
8 I'm wrong - where US citizens can hold a second passport. I'm not talking
9 about a second US passport, because you can't do that. But they can hold
10 -- have a second citizenship and hold a second passport. Is that not a
11 fact? If you don't know --
12 A. I do know. Yes, there are circumstances in which you can be a
13 dual citizen.
14 Q. Okay. Now, the issue of Tudjman allowing Croats in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina to become citizens of Croatia and to hold passports, is
16 it not a fact, sir - and if you don't know, let us know - but is it not a
17 fact that that was offered to every single Croatian no matter where he
18 lived; be he in Cleveland, Ohio, where I come from, or Herceg-Bosna, or
19 Brazil, or whatever. That was an open invitation, because for the first
20 time in modern history, Croatia -- there was an independent, fully
21 independent, Croatian nation.
22 A. The answer is: Yes, and it was highly unusual.
23 Q. Okay. Well, it may be highly unusual for us Americans, but
24 maybe --
25 A. I said "unusual" meaning that virtually no other country did it
1 that way.
2 Q. Okay. But the policy wasn't of extending passports in order to
3 draw, you know, and to deplete the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina --
4 A. I didn't say that --
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. I said that this was an unintended consequence and was one of the
7 problems that the Bosnian -- that Croatia and the Bosnian Croats had was
8 the departure of the population --
9 Q. Right.
10 A. -- to Croatia because Croatia was safer and much more prosperous,
11 given the conditions of war in Bosnia.
12 Q. Well, the unintended consequence is also if you're being shelled
13 at and shot at, you're going to get out of the way if you can.
14 A. I think I said that.
15 Q. Okay. That was one of the unintended consequences. I just wanted
16 to be. That has been an issue, I'm not saying that you're raising, but
17 that has been an issue.
18 Now, you talked about the refugees, so I don't want to go into
19 that. I do want to talk a little bit about foreign fighters. Were you
20 aware at the time that there were foreign fighters in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
21 Yes, no, maybe, I don't know, I don't recall?
22 A. Yes, I've testified at length about the presence of the Croatian
23 army in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 Q. Okay. What about foreign fighters from Islamic countries?
25 A. There were some of those, too.
1 Q. Okay. And, in fact, some of those, and we're going to hear
2 probably from an expert in this court, some of those who came from Islamic
3 countries and were part of the Mujahedin, stayed around and were part of
4 the al-Qaeda. Were you area of that?
5 MR. SCOTT: I object beyond the scope of the direct examination
6 and beyond the scope of Rule 70. There was no permission from the United
7 States government to talk about this.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll move on. I'll move on. We'll get their
9 expert from the Delic case, Your Honour. I'll move on.
10 Q. Now, did you ever give a demarche to Izetbegovic, you or through
11 the American Ambassador who was in Vienna, apparently, when he should have
12 been in Sarajevo but couldn't because of the Sarajevo government not
13 functioning, but did you ever -- did the US State Department ever send a
14 demarche to Izetbegovic saying: Don't bring in these Mujahedin because
15 they're bad news?
16 A. The American Ambassador was in Vienna because the aggression
17 against Sarajevo made it unsafe for him to be in Sarajevo. It was an
18 extremely dangerous situation. And he did make trips there regularly, at
19 considerable risk, as did other internationals who went there, some of
20 whom lost their lives. So I resent the implication of your question about
21 my colleague.
22 Q. Did he deliver any demarches, yes or no?
23 A. Well, I think you ought to address the question to him but --
24 Q. You would know. You're talking to him. He's a fellow
25 Ambassador. You're there giving instructions to Tudjman. You're claiming
1 to know what's happening in Central Bosnia. And I'm asking you: Did the
2 State Department that you worked for and you're getting information from
3 as well, did they issue any demarches to Izetbegovic? Yes, no, maybe, I
4 don't know?
5 MR. SCOTT: Again, Your Honour, I'm going to object, beyond the
6 scope of Rule 70.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: It's well within the scope, Your Honour.
8 MR. SCOTT: There's no place within the parameters as set by the
9 United States government as attached to the protective measures that
10 allowed examination on this topic.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: The whole point I'm trying to make is the gentleman
12 here has testified that he knows and knew at the time what was happening
13 in Central Bosnia. He's talking about atrocities, he's talking about all
14 these generalities, and I'm asking him concretely if he knew what was
15 happening on the ground over there.
16 THE WITNESS: You've asked about the knowledge we had about
17 foreign fighters. I think I answered that.
18 MR. KARNAVAS:
19 Q. Right.
20 A. You now go on to a different matter. I think I could say very
21 clearly, because it's in the Dayton peace treaty, there was obvious US
22 government awareness of the presence of foreign fighters, and one of the
23 provisions of the Dayton peace treaty which we insisted on was the
24 departure of all foreign fighters, and that definitely included the
1 Q. I understand, but Dayton doesn't come in until 1995, my friend.
2 And, by the way, even after that period, the Mujahedin stayed around, and
3 Holbrooke talks about it in his book. But that's not the point. You're
4 on the scene in 1993. You obviously are aware that the Mujahedin are
5 there. Do either you or your colleague issue a demarche to get those
6 foreign fighters out of there?
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, I've been told
8 that you've already used 57 minutes. It would have been a lot more subtle
9 by asking the witness whether he was aware of any atrocities being
10 committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He would have then said, Yes, and
11 then you could have asked him: In your opinion, who committed the
12 atrocities? And he would have said: X and Y did. And then you could
13 have proceeded.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: You're absolutely right, Mr. President, because due
15 to time constraints I'm jumping some steps. But you're absolutely right.
16 Q. So perhaps you could answer Judge Antonetti's questions. Were you
17 aware of atrocities being committed against the Croats by the Muslims?
18 And if so, where, and by whom?
19 A. There were atrocities committed by -- by the Bosniaks, by the --
20 by government forces, and by foreign fighters, the so-called Mujahedin.
21 Q. And do you know whether you, your colleague, the State Department,
22 Madam Albright, who was at the UN at the time making speeches, talking
23 about the use of force in the region, was there any demarches to
24 Izetbegovic to get those foreign fighters out of there? And, by the way,
25 we have testimony, or we will have testify, that even the local Muslims
1 were afraid of them and wanted them out of there.
2 MR. SCOTT: Again, I'm going to object. Beyond the scope of Rule
3 70, Your Honour.
4 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. Very well.
5 MR. SCOTT: This is clearly beyond the scope.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, in fact that's right.
7 MR. KARNAVAS:
8 Q. Now, you talked about -- you touched upon a little bit about the
9 arms shipment during this period of time. And first, I guess I want to go
10 step by step on this, do you recall when the arms embargo was put into
11 place for that region of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
12 A. UN Security Council 713, September 1991.
13 Q. Okay. And I take it -- did the US abstain from voting or did they
14 vote for it?
15 A. The Bush administration voted for it.
16 Q. All right. Now, I know you told us that you're not a lawyer, but
17 you were serving in the diplomatic corps. Do you know whether that
18 resolution was in fact binding law that nations that belonged to the UN
19 had to abide by?
20 A. Yes, it was --
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. -- a binding law.
23 Q. Okay. Now, it would appear that here -- and I take it, even
24 though the Bush administration voted for it, it was still binding on the
25 Clinton administration as well, was it not?
1 A. It was binding on the United States, yes.
2 Q. Okay. And it was binding at the time that you were the Ambassador
3 for the United States to Croatia; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now, it would appear - it would appear - from Holbrooke's book,
6 who was your colleague and is also a fellow democrat, and mentions you in
7 his book in a quite favourable way, by the way, which I'm sure you know -
8 that the arms embargo was being broken basically and the US was aware of
9 it as early as two years before 1994. So it would have been as of 1992
10 arms were being shipped to Bosnia-Herzegovina with both administrations,
11 the Bush and the Clinton administration, knowing about it. Am I correct
12 or is Mr. Holbrooke correct?
13 It's in footnote 51, by the way, if there's any need.
14 A. Arms were being shipped to Croatia and to Bosnia, and yes, the
15 United States knew about it. Maybe not all the details, but they knew
16 that at least some arms were going in.
17 Q. All right. And would it be fair to say -- and in one instance, in
18 fact, President Tudjman comes to you and asks you what should he do since
19 Iran wants to ship weapons through Croatia into Bosnia, to the Muslims in
20 Bosnia, and basically there was wilful blindness - a term of art that we
21 use here sometimes - on the part of the United States and its
22 representative, you, that is, the Ambassador of the United States in
24 A. It is correct that President Tudjman asked my view on a request --
25 or asked the view of the United States on a request that was made by the
1 Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Government of Croatia that
2 arms transit Croatia and go to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And in
3 response to that question, I told him that I had no instructions.
4 Q. Okay. Well, that's basically -- a wink is as good as a nod, as
5 they say.
6 A. I said in response to that question, I told him I had no
7 instructions. You can draw what inference you wish.
8 Q. Well, it's not for me, it's for the Trial Chamber to -- but even
9 before that, you were aware that arms were going to Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina, and even though your country, your government, as you put it,
11 had voted for that resolution, you nonetheless did not -- or your
12 government, I should say, because you're not in the position, but your
13 government, did not take a position to stop those arms from going in
15 A. Well, let us be clear because there's an implication in what
16 you're saying.
17 Q. Yes, there is.
18 A. The United States did not in any way and at any time, to the best
19 of my knowledge - and I think my knowledge is pretty good - violate the
20 arms embargo. The United States had no obligation to enforce the arms
21 embargo on other countries. Now, that was not a legal obligation as a
22 member of the Security Council. There was also what we considered to be
23 an anomalous situation, that is to say, there were more resolutions that
24 related to the former Yugoslavia than probably any other international
25 problem. And it seemed rather wrong that the only one to be enforced was
1 the arms embargo which imposed -- which enabled the Serbs, who had all the
2 arms, to engage in aggression against Croatia and against Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina, countries that were essentially defenceless.
4 Q. All right. And I'll accept that answer, but I posed it because
5 yesterday in a rather, if I might add, regrettably cavalier fashion, you
6 sort of wanted to remind us that Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina who were
7 living in Croatia at the time should not be going back to their homes to
8 protect their own villages because it was a violation of the law. And so
9 it seems that there is this double standard here. The US can essentially
10 allow weapons to go to the Muslims, but at the same time, here you are as
11 -- telling us that it was wrong for the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina
12 living in -- in the diaspora, which Croatia would have been the diaspora
13 at the time, to go back to protect their own villages, their homes, their
14 loved ones.
15 A. You're mischaracterising what I said.
16 Q. Very well.
17 A. What I said was that Croatia had an obligation to prevent its
18 citizens from going to a neighbouring country to fight as part of a
19 militia against the lawful against of that country. And I don't think I
20 was cavalier about it either.
21 Q. All right. All right. But you don't object -- and then I take it
22 you don't object to individuals who are citizens of both countries,
23 incidentally, from leaving Croatia and going to Bosnia and Herzegovina to
24 fight there? You don't have a problem with that.
25 A. We had -- we had a problem --
1 Q. Oh, no, you personally. Based on your interpretation of the law,
2 would that be a lawful situation in your book?
3 A. The United States had a problem with forces that were fighting
4 against the lawful government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5 Q. Okay. And yesterday, at times you characterised the other forces
6 as - and I'm trying to remember the phrase that you used - irregulars.
7 Who were the irregulars? That's what I'm trying to figure out. Who were
8 the irregulars, based on the United States government, which you were
9 representing and you were obviously promoting their position, who did they
10 consider the irregulars? Was it the HVO? Was it these renegade soldiers
11 that you had, as in any war, or individuals behaving in unlawful manners?
12 Who were the irregulars? And I'll limit it. Are you referring to the
13 HVO? Yes, no, maybe, I don't know, perhaps?
14 A. Well, let me put it this way: It was for the lawful authorities
15 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is to say, the government in --
16 internationally recognised government in Sarajevo, to determine what were
17 the lawful armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And to the extent that
18 the HVO was engaged in war against the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
19 against the lawful authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was operating in
20 an unlawful way and behaving, if you will, as if it were irregulars.
21 Q. Okay. Now, let me stop you right here and I have one question on
22 that one, and that is: Is it your position that the Army of BiH always
23 acted lawfully against the HVO or against Croats?
24 A. I'm not saying that.
25 Q. Okay. Well, let's deconstruct that a little bit. If, for
1 instance, units of the ABiH are attacking -- unlawfully are being the
2 aggressors, by your definition, against Croats, is that lawful and is the
3 HVO unlawfully, then, engaging the ABiH, which is being the aggressor, in
4 those instances? Yes, no, maybe, I don't know, too complicated?
5 A. I suppose your question is if a lawful armed force is engaged in
6 unlawful activity, do the citizens of a country have the right to engage
7 in [Realtime transcript read in error "re assistance"] resistance?
8 Q. Yeah, I guess that's one way of putting it, although the HVO was
9 also their citizens, but it was -- by the way, it was - we have testimony
10 here - it was a lawful force.
11 A. And just to be clear on the transcript, it's "resistance".
12 Q. For the sake of time.
13 A. And the answer, I think, is -- it's a very good question and I
14 hope you will direct it to someone more learned in these matters than I
16 Q. All right. Very well. I just want to -- I don't know when we
17 take our break, but I just want to cover one matter before I sit down and
18 I failed to do so earlier.
19 With respect to the shipment of arms, this issue --
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, the Judges would
21 like to inform you of the fact that you have run out of time. You have
22 used up far more time than you were granted. We still have Mr. Murphy and
23 perhaps re-examination from the Prosecution.
24 MR. MURPHY: Mr. President, I think the Coric Defence had 20
25 minutes remaining, which they have kindly given to our Defence. And with
1 that time, I'm confident that after the break I can conclude my
2 cross-examination, at the latest, by 1.45, possibly before then. So on
3 the basis that we will now take the break and Mr. Karnavas finishes, I
4 don't anticipate any difficulty.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're saying that Mr. Coric's
6 Defence team gave their 20 minutes to you or to Mr. Karnavas or to no
7 one? I thought it was to no one.
8 MR. MURPHY: [Interpretation] Mrs. Tomasegovic Tomic gave me 20.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. She gave them to
10 you, then.
11 Mr. Scott, would you have any other questions, any additional
12 questions for the witness afterwards? We have to calculate the time we
14 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, under normal circumstances I
15 would. There are a few things, I think in fairness, the Ambassador should
16 have a chance to clarify further. But I'm also very sensitive to the fact
17 that we have to complete this witness by 1.45, and I do not want to hold
18 him over. So, under the circumstances, we are likely to give up our time
19 but I wish we did have time.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: I just have a couple of minutes, Your Honour. And,
21 incidentally, for the record, Mr. Murphy had passed me a note so I was
22 acting with instructions.
23 Q. Now, the issue of the arms coming in from Iran was quite a
24 controversial issue. In fact, the republicans, as you know, tried to get
25 some political mileage out of it, if I can put it that way. Would that be
2 A. You are correct in saying that the republicans tried to get some
3 mileage out of it.
4 Q. But nonetheless it was -- as you testified, it was the reality.
5 And I just want to show you a document, and maybe you could just verify
6 whether this document was shown to you and whether you -- when you
7 testified I believe in a previous case. The number is --
8 MR. KARNAVAS: I apologise for not having it in the e-court. I
9 have a court number. 1C0 -- IC000034. If we could just put it on the
11 Q. If you could just look at the first page and see whether -- it
12 does have an exhibit number from a previous case. It looks like it's from
13 the Milosevic case. And so I just want to verify whether you are familiar
14 with the document, whether it was shown to you. Is this the document that
15 was presented to you when you testified in the Milosevic case?
16 A. I can't remember unless I went back and looked at the transcript.
17 Q. But that document itself, does it not talk about -- I mean, just
18 by -- if you glean it, if you want to look at -- flip through it, but does
19 it not talk about, in essence, the issue of the shipment of arms from Iran
20 to Bosnia-Herzegovina during your tenure?
21 A. In the absence of --
22 Q. If you want to hold it and look at it, I mean --
23 A. Well, I'm happy to read it, but it will take me a while to --
24 Q. No, just glance through it. Does it in general talk about the
25 issues that we have been talking about, shipments of weapons from Iran to
1 Bosnia during your tenure? I think if you flip through it you'll see the
3 A. Well --
4 Q. I --
5 A. I, frankly --
6 Q. If you want to look at it during the break and then tell us
7 whether you recognise it or not.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: But, in any event, I'll be tendering this document
9 into evidence, Your Honour, and I'll verify that, in just glancing through
10 it, it does talk about the shipments from Iran. It is from the Republican
11 Party, so you can give it --
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have the break now because
13 it's ten past 12.00. We'll have a 20-minute break and we'll resume at
14 half past 12.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.29 p.m.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There was a document that was
18 shown to the witness before the break. The witness had the opportunity or
19 has had the opportunity of having a look at the document during the break.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. I just have one question.
21 Q. Do you recognise that document? Have you seen it before?
22 A. Well, if you say it was shown to me in the Milosevic case, then
23 I've seen it before.
24 Q. All right. Well, it does have an exhibit number, so -- but the
25 contents of the document basically relate to -- and I'm not saying -- I'm
1 not asking you to vouch for the truthfulness of what is contained in the
2 document. But the document itself relates to the issue of shipment of
3 arms from Iran to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Clinton
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Okay.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: One last matter, Your Honour. I need to give this
8 a number. It's 1D00917. And with that, that concludes my
10 Thank you very, very much, sir. I appreciate you coming here, and
11 I hope again you will accept my apology when I misspoke and said that you
12 were here to assist the Prosecution.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very briefly.
15 Mr. Scott, the Defence is requesting that this document be
16 admitted into evidence. Apparently it's a document that was already used,
17 produced, in the Milosevic case. Do you object to having this document
18 admitted into evidence?
19 MR. SCOTT: I haven't seen it yet, Your Honour. If I could have a
20 chance to look at it. I thought that the Chamber's ruling was that all
21 the cross-examination material would be provided to the Prosecution, but
22 when we have a chance to look at it, I will come back to the Chamber.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
24 Mr. Murphy.
25 MR. MURPHY: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Murphy:
2 Q. Hi. Good afternoon, Ambassador.
3 A. Good afternoon.
4 Q. My name is Peter Murphy, and together with my colleague Senka
5 Nozica, we represent Mr. Bruno Stojic.
6 A. Okay.
7 Q. Now, you testified that you had many meetings with President
9 A. Yes, I did.
10 Q. You probably got to know him quite well.
11 A. Yes, I think that's fair.
12 Q. I think we could summarise what you said about him by saying that,
13 in a sense, he was a Croatian nationalist.
14 A. He certainly was.
15 Q. When you testified in the Milosevic case - and I can give you the
16 references and show you the transcript if you need it - do you remember
17 that you described him also, though, as being an effective leader?
18 A. Yes. I have described him as an effective leader, and I think
19 you're correct that that came up in the Milosevic case.
20 Q. And also, at the same time, you said that he had surrounded
21 himself with some competent advisors.
22 A. Yes, I have said that.
23 Q. And in that context, you mention Mr. Granic and Mr. Susak.
24 A. Yes, that is my view, that they were both very competent
1 Q. If Mr. Tudjman had the motivation of creating a Greater Croatia,
2 it does not necessarily follow that all his advisors had the same
3 motivation, does it?
4 A. No, and I don't think they did.
5 Q. And it doesn't necessarily follow that everyone in -- that all the
6 Bosnian Croats involved with Herceg-Bosna had any such motivation.
7 A. Oh -- no, no, I don't think that -- I think you're right.
8 Q. I'd like to ask you a few questions about the Croatian Community
9 of Herceg-Bosna. I understand from your testimony that you consider that
10 to have been an illegal entity.
11 A. We considered Herceg-Bosna as a republic to be not a legal entity.
12 Q. All right. Well, before that, you are aware, are you not, that
13 when Herceg-Bosna was created, it was originally called not the Republic
14 but the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?
15 A. Yes, I am aware.
16 Q. Can you tell us when the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was
17 formally created?
18 A. I don't think I could give you a precise date at this point in
20 Q. Would you accept it from me - and I'll be corrected if I'm wrong -
21 that its formal creation was on the 18th of November, 1991?
22 A. I would think that sounds right.
23 Q. I'd like to just go back and draw on your experience, if I can,
24 Ambassador, to recreate a little of what was going on at around that
25 time. By July of 1991, there was war between the -- we can say, the JNA
1 or the Bosnian Serbs on the one hand and Croatia on the other. Is that
3 A. July of 1991?
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. I don't -- I don't think the Bosnian Serbs were involved in it at
6 that time. It was the JNA and the Krajina Serbs.
7 Q. Quite right. All right. There was a war in which the JNA was
8 involved against Croatia?
9 A. Absolutely.
10 Q. And in September of 1991, the United Nations imposed the arms
11 embargo on the whole of the former Yugoslavia, did it not?
12 A. It did.
13 Q. I don't want to go over your testimony again on that. You very
14 fairly agreed, I think, that that was an embargo effectively against
15 everybody except the Serbs.
16 A. It was.
17 Q. Do you know when the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
18 recognised by the United States?
19 A. I could not give the precise date, but it was around -- it was
20 April or May of 1992.
21 Q. Would you agree, about the 6th, 7th of April?
22 A. I think that sounds right, the same day as the recognition of
23 Croatia and Slovenia.
24 Q. Well, actually, wasn't Croatia recognised a little earlier than
1 A. Might have been --
2 Q. In January --
3 A. -- a couple days before. Not by the United States.
4 Q. By the European Union, then?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. So you would agree with me that, accepting that the Community of
7 Herceg-Bosna was created in November 1991, that was before the recognition
8 of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
9 A. Yes, that's true.
10 Q. Now, you were asked in examination-in-chief - and we can look at
11 the documents if you wish; I don't think it's necessary - but about a
12 meeting that you attended with President Tudjman in October 1993 where he
13 had misquoted the French and German Ambassadors as saying that there was a
14 general belief that Bosnia and Herzegovina could not survive. Do you
15 remember -- do you remember that?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Would you not agree with me that in the summer of 1991, going back
18 now some two years before that, the question of whether Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina could survive was a very real question?
20 A. The summer of 1991?
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. Well, insofar as a war followed, the answer to that is yes. But
23 at that time, the focus of the international community was primarily on
24 Slovenia and Croatia and the war that was brewing in Croatia.
25 Q. But that war was being conducted, at least in part, using the
1 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a springboard from which to attack
2 Croatia. Isn't that true?
3 A. Yes, that's true. But I think it's important to remember, at one
4 point the headquarters for the UN operation for Croatia was going to be
5 put in Sarajevo on the grounds that it was safer.
6 Q. Right.
7 A. So, obviously --
8 Q. And it turned out not to be quite true.
9 A. The international community ought to have recognised that the
10 survival of Bosnia was at risk, but it didn't. And I think we could -- I
11 could cite a lot of evidence that -- of where they -- where there were
13 Q. I'm just pausing for the French translation, Ambassador.
14 Certainly by the beginning of 1992, the survival of Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina was clearly a question in the mind of the international
16 community, wasn't it?
17 A. By the -- well, I think it was a matter of growing concern.
18 Obviously by April it was page 1 news.
19 Q. Yes. Would you not agree with me that between November of 1991
20 and really up to the signing of the Dayton Peace Treaty. There was not
21 really a time when the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
22 effectively in control of its entire territory?
23 A. Yes, I would agree with that statement.
24 Q. And I think you agreed today in questioning by one of my
25 colleagues that the -- the very operation of the Government of Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina throughout that period was extremely difficult because of the
2 wartime conditions?
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. And in November 1991, if one thinks of it from the position of the
5 Bosnian Croats, let's say those in Herzegovina, would you not agree, sir,
6 that there was every reason for them to be afraid for their political and
7 social future?
8 A. Yes, there was.
9 Q. And indeed, you've already told us that you wrote a report in
10 August of 1992 detailing the ethnic cleansing by the Serbs. Isn't that
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. You testified in the Milosevic case - and again, I can give you
14 the reference - that it was your opinion that Milosevic was trying to
15 create a Greater Serbia in alliance with the Bosnian Serbs?
16 A. Yes, that is correct.
17 Q. I think you testified that his territorial ambitions included, if
18 not the whole, certainly a very great part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
19 also some of Croatia?
20 A. Yes, I so testified in that trial.
21 Q. You also testified, did you not, that, even when it became clear
22 in 1993 that the goal of Greater Serbia was really effectively impossible,
23 Milosevic still, nonetheless, harboured some very extensive territorial
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Again, at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. You also testified I think in that same trial that during 1992
4 the -- the JNA, which later became the VRS, and also Serb paramilitaries
5 were more or less operating at will in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
6 A. Yes, that's true.
7 Q. And today you said that -- I don't want to go back; we had an
8 extensive discussion. But I think you agreed that for various reasons
9 including the 1992 presidential election, perhaps the United States did
10 not take the most effective action that could have been taken to prevent
12 A. That certainly is my view.
13 Q. Now, again if I could draw your experience and knowledge for one
14 other matter relating to the Community of Herceg-Bosna. In the spring of
15 1991, so this is now some time before Herceg-Bosna, the Serb political
16 party, the SDS, began to form communities of municipalities, didn't they?
17 A. I think that's right.
18 Q. One such community was established in the Bosnian Krajina, wasn't
20 A. I think that's correct.
21 Q. And by the fall of 1991, those communities had been transformed
22 into what became known as the Serbian Autonomous Districts or SAOs?
23 A. I think that's right.
24 Q. Is it also true that in October 1991 the -- the Bosnian Serbs
25 established their own independent assembly, round about that time?
1 A. You have the dates, but I think that's correct, yes.
2 Q. I'll be corrected if I'm wrong.
3 A. Yeah.
4 Q. So if you would accept that.
5 And -- and then one other date on the same basis, if we could,
6 that the SDS also in November of 1991, on the 9th and 10th, held a
7 plebiscite as to whether they wished to remain in Yugoslavia?
8 A. Yes, I think that's correct.
9 Q. And so, I know I've painted for you a -- tried to paint something
10 of a picture of what was going on at that time, but we can assume that
11 when the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was established in November of
12 1991, it was established against that general political background?
13 A. Yes, that is correct.
14 Q. As far as the issue of the legality of entities goes, do you make
15 any distinction between the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna and the
16 later Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna?
17 A. I think it might be easier and quicker if I explain what it was
18 that we considered to be illegal. We considered to be -- or not legal.
19 We considered the to be not legal to have an entity exercising, or seeking
20 to exercise, sovereign governmental functions with its own armed forces
21 engaged again in armed conflict against the internationally recognised
22 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And therefore, to the extent that
23 the Croat community of Herceg-Bosna evolved into such an entity, it then
24 met the threshold conditions that -- that led to my characterisation of it
25 as being not legal. And certainly also, to add, that it continued after
1 there was an agreement to dissolve it was also, of course, a sense that it
2 was not legal.
3 Q. So then if I'm understanding then correctly, Ambassador, your
4 characterisation of it as being illegal is much more concerned with
5 military activities against the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
6 rather than simply its existence?
7 A. Certainly its -- as I said, its exercise of sovereign governmental
8 powers, including most importantly military powers not under the control
9 of the sovereign government and, indeed even worse, against the control of
10 the internationally recognised government.
11 Q. And in rendering that opinion, again you've taken into account,
12 have you, the fact that the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna was in fact
13 established before the recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, you testified at length during examination-in-chief- and I
17 don't want to go through it all, so let me summarise and then you can tell
18 me if I summarise inaccurately. It was your view that the Republic of
19 Croatia was supporting, sponsoring, and directing the HVO of Herceg-Bosna.
20 Is that correct?
21 A. Substantially correct, yes.
22 Q. Well, did you not testify in so many words that President Tudjman
23 was the de facto president and commander-in-chief of the HVO?
24 A. I did so testify, and that was my view.
25 Q. And that Mr. Susak was the de facto minister of defence of the HVO
1 as well as the minister of defence of Croatia?
2 A. I did testify to that, and that is my view.
3 Q. And that whenever the -- you as the United States Ambassador
4 wanted, as you put it, action, you would go always to Zagreb to get the
5 action that you required?
6 A. The address that produced results from the HVO was the leadership
7 in Zagreb, yes.
8 Q. Does it not follow then from your testimony, Ambassador, that to
9 the extent there were people, Bosnian Croats, purporting to hold
10 administrative or governmental offices in the Croatian community of
11 Herceg-Bosna, that these people in your view were simply puppets of the
12 Republic of Croatia?
13 A. Well, I think I'll stay away from the characterisation of puppets,
14 but stick with my testimony, which is that the Government of Croatia
15 exercised substantial control over the HVO and the governmental
16 authorities of the Bosnian Croat community in Herzegovina.
17 Q. Well, now you're saying "substantial control" or I heard the
18 French translation, "controle essentiel"; that is now your
19 characterisation of the relationship?
20 A. You used the word "puppet" which I don't think is a word I used.
21 I think as I presented it in the examination-in-chief is how I meant it,
22 and the simplest way to do it is to say that in my view President Tudjman
23 was the de facto president of Herceg-Bosna and Gojko Susak was the de
24 facto defence minister, with all that that implies.
25 Q. You said in response to Mr. Karnavas that at the time you were, to
1 some extent, familiar with the various legislative acts of the Croatian
2 community of Herceg-Bosna, the legislation that they passed?
3 A. Well, what I said was that I was familiar with some of the -- some
4 of the structure, organisational structure, and I suppose some of the
5 legislation of Herceg-Bosna.
6 Q. Have you ever met William Tomljanovich? He's a research officer
7 employed by the Office of the Prosecutor.
8 A. Possibly, but I don't remember now.
9 Q. Well, have you -- did you meet with him for the purpose of
10 discussing this case or your testimony in this case?
11 A. I met with the researchers of the OTP, yes, of course.
12 Q. Well, I'm just asking you whether Mr. Tomljanovich was one of the
13 people that you met with.
14 A. Possibly.
15 Q. Do you remember when it was you would have met with him?
16 A. I've met with the OTP so many times on these cases that it's
17 frankly a little hard for me to be precise, and I apologise to the Court.
18 I mean, the fact is that I've been doing many other things in the years
19 since I've left Croatia. I think the first meetings were back in 1999.
20 Q. I quite understand, Ambassador. You -- but I think the last time
21 you testified here was in Milosevic, that would have been in 2003, is
22 it --
23 A. No, it was in Martic in April of 2006.
24 Q. Okay. But in relation to this case, which a case involving
25 Bosnian Croats as opposed to Serbs, you don't remember specifically, just
1 in a rough time-frame, when you've met with the --
2 A. Well, I've met with them at different times. I've met with them
3 in the State Department in the 1990s. I've met a number of times with
4 them -- well, let's see, I met in -- when, I think, I was here for the
5 Martic case I met with them. I met with them in December of 2005 when I
6 came to testify in a -- in The Hague in a Dutch war crimes case relating
7 to Iraq. I met with them at the time of the Milosevic case. I mean, I've
8 had -- and the -- I think there have been other encounters. So --
9 Q. That's fine. That's fine. Not within the last month or so
11 A. Beg your pardon.
12 Q. Not within the last month or so anyway?
13 A. Well, of course I met with the OTP within the last month, but --
14 Q. All right. You've not had the opportunity to read a report that
15 Mr. Tomljanovich prepared for the purposes of this case, have you, dealing
16 with the governmental structure of the Community of Herceg-Bosna?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Did you take any steps before coming to give evidence in this case
19 to refresh your memory about the general organisation or structure of the
20 Community of Herceg-Bosna?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Okay. Well, then, just let me ask you in general terms then: Are
23 you aware that the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna set up a -- what we
24 could call an administrative structure?
25 A. Yes, I believe that is correct.
1 Q. That they took steps to deal with social and political matters
2 such as crime prevention?
3 A. Yes, I believe that is correct.
4 Q. That they set up a commission, more than one commission, to
5 investigate war crimes?
6 A. I can't say that I remember that specifically, but the parties to
7 the conflict did have commissions to investigate war crimes which
8 invariably meant crimes committed by the other side and not by their own
10 Q. And that they established a system of courts and adopted a
11 criminal code?
12 A. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. That they made provisions to deal with issues affecting refugees?
14 A. Yes, that is correct.
15 Q. And for the exchange of prisoners?
16 A. I'm sure they made provisions for the exchange of prisoners, yes.
17 Q. Ambassador, do you -- by the way, I meant to ask you, do you speak
18 or read Croatian?
19 A. No, at least in a very, very primitive level.
20 Q. Were you aware ever of the publication by the Community of
21 Herceg-Bosna the Official Gazette, the Narodni List?
22 A. I think I was aware of that.
23 Q. In view of everything that we have discussed, would you
24 acknowledge the possibility that the creation of the Croatian Community of
25 Herceg-Bosna had at least something to do with defensive measures against
1 the Serbian threat, as opposed to some territorial ambition in the mind of
2 President Tudjman?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Would you acknowledge the possibility that there were other
5 driving forces behind the administration of the Croatian Community of
6 Herceg-Bosna other than President Tudjman's obsession with the borders of
8 A. Of course. As you have described, the Herceg-Bosna formed --
9 performed many governmental functions and so it was not just about
10 President Tudjman's territorial ambitions.
11 Q. All right. Ambassador, with the assistance of the usher, could we
12 please see on e-court a Prosecution exhibit that you were shown previously
13 during examination-in-chief, the number is P09504.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Murphy, that is a document
15 under seal. We shall have to go into private session unless the
16 question --
17 MR. MURPHY: [Previous translation continues] ... no, no.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right.
19 MR. MURPHY:
20 Q. Do you have that document in front of you?
21 A. I do.
22 Q. This is a cable sent from the Zagreb embassy in October 1993, is
23 it not?
24 A. That is correct -- sorry, would you say that again?
25 Q. This is a cable sent from the embassy in Zagreb during -- during
1 August 1993?
2 A. Yes, that is correct, yes.
3 Q. And in fact, in this cable you were reporting on a visit by
4 officers of the embassy at your direction to the Heliodrom. Is that
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. If we could focus at the top of the page thereon, the paragraph
8 headed "summary."
9 Mr. Scott directed your attention to certain passages of this. I
10 don't want to go back over them all, but probably due to lack of time he
11 didn't read all of them. I'd just like to refer to one or two others.
12 About four lines down there in that paragraph does it -- do you report
13 back: "But the officers were allowed unrestricted access to buildings
14 throughout the facility"? Is that correct?
15 A. Just to have the record clear, the full sentence is: "The camp
16 officials prohibited private conversations with prisoners, but the
17 officers were allowed unrestricted access to buildings throughout the
19 Q. I understand, I was avoiding repeating -- Mr. Scott, I think for a
20 lack of time, probably omitted the second part of that sentence. I just
21 wanted to bring it out.
22 Would you also read the next sentence aloud for us, please.
23 A. "In general, the prisoners looked okay, were being fed, and had
24 access to medical care."
25 Q. Now, I'd like to, if we could -- I'm not sure quite what page this
1 would be on e-court. Do I give you an R number for that? What's the most
2 helpful way to do it? I want to go to the paragraph called "food and
3 medical care." It should be about two pages further on in the English
4 version. Yes, thank you. The paragraph -- if we could bring that up.
5 Thank you very much.
6 Do you see there, Ambassador, the paragraph headed "food and
7 medical care"?
8 A. Yes, I do.
9 Q. And five lines up from the end of that paragraph let me read it to
11 "The embassy team visited a well-stocked medical clinic and were
12 told by the doctor on duty that he cared for not only prisoners but also
13 for civilians who were no longer able to get to Mostar because of the
15 Again, that was something else that was reported to you by the
16 officers that you sent to inspect?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And then finally, if we could go to the next page under the
19 heading "overall assessment." Thank you. If we could bring that
20 paragraph into focus.
21 And again, omitting passages that were read to you before, five
22 lines down you see a sentence beginning: "The number of 1400
23 prisoners ..."?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And it continues: "The number of 1400 prisoners given by the
1 commander was consistent with what the officers saw, although an exact
2 figure requires a formal census."
3 And then the next sentence reads: "Conditions appeared to be
4 generally acceptable with no overt signs of maltreatment or
6 Is that right?
7 A. Yes, that is correct.
8 Q. Now, I bear in mind all of the other passages in that report that
9 Mr. Scott read to you. But the passages that I have read to you were --
10 they reflect accurately the report that you were given by the officers
11 that you sent to make the inspection?
12 A. Yes, we tried to be as objective as possible.
13 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, if I may have a moment to confer with
14 Ms. Nozica.
15 [Defence counsel confer].
16 MR. MURPHY: I've concluded my cross-examination, Mr. President.
17 Thank you.
18 Q. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
19 A. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Murphy.
21 Mr. Scott, we have some time left if you have any re-examination.
22 A little earlier on you were complaining about perhaps not having the
23 possibility of putting additional questions to the witness.
24 MR. SCOTT: I have to say, Your Honour, in all candour, I did not
25 expect to have time and certainly not this much time, but I appreciate
1 Mr. Murphy's efficiency.
2 Re-examination by Mr. Scott:
3 Q. Let me ask you a few questions, Ambassador. We've talked a number
4 of things, and would you agree that when we were talking about events in
5 the former Yugoslavia, it's quite important on most occasions to talk
6 about specific dates and specific places?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Can you confirm to the Judges, if you know, is it true that there
9 were between 1991 and 1995, until Dayton, that there were many times and
10 many places in Bosnia and Herzegovina where both the Croats and Muslims
11 fought together against the Serbs?
12 A. Indeed there were.
13 Q. Any come to mind?
14 A. Well, they fought together in 1992. They fought together in the
15 defence of Sarajevo. In fact, they fought together in some of the events
16 that have been discussed today, including the liberation of Mostar. It
17 has to be recalled, actually, that Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims were a
18 significant component of the HVO until the Muslim-Croat war started. And
19 then after the Washington Agreement, there came again an effective
20 military alliance between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian government.
21 And just to be completely clear, because I think there may having some
22 ambiguity, it was at that time, after the Muslim-Croat war was over, that
23 I had the conversation that I discussed with Mr. Prlic's counsel about --
24 and which I said to President Tudjman that we had no -- we had no -- I had
25 no instructions on the matter of weapons that were going into Bosnia. But
1 anyhow, subsequent to that there was close cooperation.
2 And then in 1995 - and I think this is very important - the
3 Bosnian government requested the assistance of the Croatian army in a
4 military offensive that -- it went up the Livno Valley. This was after
5 the fall of Srebrenica, at a meeting in Split between Presidents Tudjman
6 and Izetbegovic. In fact, I was at that meeting. They made -- the
7 Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina made a lawful request and the -- for
8 military assistance, and the Government of Croatia accepted, and the end
9 result was a military campaign that changed the balance and created
10 conditions that led us directly to Dayton just a few months later.
11 Q. There has been evidence in the case, and in fact your testimony, I
12 believe, on the first day, that the Croat population of Bosnia-Herzegovina
13 at some time is estimated around 17, 17 and a half per cent, and in your
14 view possibly quite smaller than that?
15 A. It was 17 per cent in the 1991 census. But what -- it wasn't my
16 personal view, it was the view of the Croatian officials who were most
17 knowledgeable about Bosnia, notably Defence Minister Susak, that the
18 population had fallen to 12 to 10 per cent.
19 Q. Given that situation, Ambassador, can you tell the Judges, did the
20 Croats, the Croats in Croatia or the Croats in Bosnia, could they have any
21 hope of defeating or overcoming or evicting the Serbs without Muslim
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Objection. Objection on the grounds that there
24 is -- first of all, it goes beyond the scope, but even if it is within
25 the scope of cross-examination, there needs to be a foundation laid if the
1 gentleman is capable of answering that particular question. So if he
2 wishes, if it is within the scope, I would ask that some foundation be
3 laid for the gentleman to answer that question.
4 MR. SCOTT: I think we just have, Your Honour. We talked about
5 the demographics and the amount of the population, and therefore the
6 manpower that these various forces had to draw on.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, again, let me remind my colleague here
8 that the Ambassador at the time never visited Central Bosnia, nor has he
9 testified that he was familiar with the various capabilities of the
10 various units in Central Bosnia. So unless we can have some sort of a
11 foundation, I think now we're going into areas where perhaps we don't have
12 sufficient knowledge that this gentleman has the knowledge and
13 capabilities of answering that question without speculating.
14 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, during the Defence questioning apparently
15 everyone thought that Mr. Galbraith had sufficient knowledge and basis to
16 talk about everything and repeatedly put questions to him about a wide
17 range of subjects in dealing -- including military matters. It was the
18 Ambassador himself who said -- raised this issue of population and has
19 talked many times, as he just did a few moments ago, about Serb -- about
20 the Muslim-Croat cooperation in various respects. This question follows
21 directly from that.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: And here's why I object to this particular --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before we make a decision.
24 Mr. Scott, rephrase your question so that we can clearly see its
25 relevance and direct link to the cross-examination. What is the exact
1 question that you would like to pose?
2 MR. SCOTT:
3 Q. The question is: Could the Croats have had any hope of defeating
4 the Serbs without the participation of the Muslims?
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, where, in what place are we talking about --
6 MR. SCOTT: In Bosnia between 1992 --
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Bosnia is a big country and there was war
8 between -- Muslim against Muslim, Serbs against Croats, Serbs against
9 Muslim, Croats -- I mean, where are we talking about? What area? The
10 Posavina? Central Bosnia? Herzegovina?
11 MR. SCOTT: We're talking about the war in Bosnia, as we have been
12 all day today.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: And why is this relevant, Your Honour? And again,
14 I stress it's beyond the scope and also there's no foundation.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, what is the relevance
16 of the question you want to ask? How does it relate to the indictment and
17 what is it that you would like to demonstrate by the answer that the
18 witness might give? Because the question you have asked concerns
19 hypothetical events -- or rather, it's a hypothetical question and
20 concerns a period before he assumed his position as Ambassador. If he
21 answers your question, it's because he had certain prior knowledge about
22 the matter.
23 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, you've asked me several questions.
24 The relevance of the question is -- I believe that there's -- the
25 suggestion might be -- I submit to you, the suggestion may be in the
1 future there was something inconsistent with the fact that arms and
2 military equipment were sometimes being sent through Croatia to the Muslim
3 forces. Now, an explanation -- one of the explanations for that is
4 because indeed the Muslims were fighting together against the Serbs.
5 That's one point of relevance. It also may be represented and suggested
6 at times what Mr. Tudjman's -- President Tudjman's ambitions or thoughts
7 were on this matter. And I want to give the Ambassador the chance to
8 respond that it was a very complex situation in which Tudjman had to
9 calculate a number of different factors, including the fact that sending
10 arms into Bosnia was necessary to defeat the Serbs.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Judges have decided that you
12 may ask the question, having considered the objection.
13 Ambassador, could you answer Mr. Scott's question, please?
14 THE WITNESS: The question is -- I need to take the question in
15 parts. By themselves and supported by Croatia financially and with arms,
16 the Bosnian Croats had no chance of defeating the Serbs. So it was
17 essential to have an alliance with the Bosnian Muslims. Croatia itself
18 deploying the army that it had in 1995 might have been able to defeat
19 the -- obviously it did defeat the Croatian Serbs easily and it might have
20 been able to defeat the Bosnian Serbs on its own. But it was certainly --
21 I mean, we can't tell that. And certainly it was very much a joint
22 effort. I think there's another factor here, though, that's very
23 important. One talks about the fact that the United States and,
24 incidentally, not just the United States, Germany, France, Britain, all
25 the major countries knew that arms were going both to Croatia and to
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina and -- and all chose to look the other way, to
2 turn, if you will, a blind eye. The only difference between the United
3 States and those other countries is that the United States was asked by
4 the president of Croatia and declined to answer. I said I had no
6 Now, I say this because had there -- the Muslim-Croat war not
7 ended, it is very likely, indeed close to certain, that there would have
8 been sanctions on Croatia that would have effectively cut off the much,
9 much larger flow of arms to Croatia and, in turn then, Croatia could not
10 have recovered its own territory or helped change the military balance in
11 Bosnia. So the -- Croatia had itself very strong reasons related to the
12 territorial integrity of Croatia itself to end the Muslim war --
13 Muslim-Croat war and to support a military alliance with the Bosnian
15 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I just -- I appreciate -- I appreciate
16 the statements from the Ambassador and I just want to remind the Trial
17 Chamber that we're not in front of some senate subcommittee hearing, you
18 know, where we need to repeat the mantra of the day. I think we've
19 established that there was a joint criminal enterprise to violate the
20 embargo; we've just verified it. But beyond that, I would ask that the
21 answers be restricted to the questions posed. I appreciate all the other
22 commentary. We've heard it. We appreciate the Ambassador's position,
23 which was the United States position at the time. But I think that once
24 too many we're at that point.
25 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, this commentary of Mr. Karnavas is
1 completely inappropriate. It is nothing more than his just getting up and
2 making a speech, as so often happens.
3 Q. Let me ask you this question, Ambassador. You were quite direct
4 in pointing out that in various respects the Republic of Croatia had, for
5 instance, assisted the refugees in the former Yugoslavia to a great degree
6 and had done certain things, let's put it, supporting refugees, supporting
7 humanitarian aid at various times. And you pointed this out in your
8 cross-examination I think mostly yesterday. I want to give you the
9 opportunity - and I think the case that should be put to you because the
10 suggestion may be made at some time in the future after you have left -
11 the Defence case would be that because of what you have said that is
12 inconsistent with President Tudjman, Susak, and others having this Greater
13 Croatia objective. So I'd like to give you the opportunity to explain to
14 the Judges how you reconcile or to explain both of those things.
15 A. I see no inconsistency at all. First, I think there was a genuine
16 humanitarian impulse on the part of the Croatian leaders. Mate Ganic, I
17 believe, cared personally and deeply about refugees. I think the people
18 of Croatia represent a liberal and humanitarian society. There was
19 enormous public sympathy in Croatia for the people of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina. I remember during one of my visits in the main square in
21 Zagreb, there was a flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and people went there
22 to light candles. So frankly Croatia's humanitarian role reflected the
23 goodness of Croatian society. And frankly -- and I also have testified,
24 but I will repeat, the ambitions for Greater Croatia was held by a limited
25 number of people. Frankly, most Croatians weren't all that fond of the
1 Herzegovinians and they were not looking to annex this particular
2 territory, but there was a small group, certainly including Tudjman and
3 certainly including Susak, that did desire a Greater Croatia.
4 Incidentally, I think both Tudjman and Susak were supportive of
5 humanitarian measures. So that they had these ambitions doesn't mean that
6 everything they did was wrong.
7 And beyond that, there was of course a very practical
8 consideration. Croatia needed the support of the West, and one of its
9 biggest political cards, probably its biggest political card, both with
10 Europe and the United States, was its role in taking care of refugees and
11 in making possible humanitarian assistance. And that, in fact, was a very
12 important reason why we were -- why we were reluctant to impose sanctions
13 on Croatia, why it was a difficult decision. Not because we expected
14 Croatia to retaliate against the refugees, but because it would make life
15 for Croatia more difficult and limit its ability to carry out this
16 important humanitarian mission.
17 MR. SCOTT: Yes.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One of the Judges has a
20 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, you have testified about
21 crimes and violations of human rights in the territory of Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina during the period that we are interested in. And when
23 Mr. Murphy showed you P09504, we saw that your telegram made reference to
24 detainees who had been treated correctly, they had been provided with
25 adequate medical care, et cetera. My question is: What is your personal
1 conclusion with regard to the detention of these individuals? We're
2 talking about October 1993. What is your conclusion with regard to the
3 detention of individuals at the Heliodrom? And in general, what
4 conclusion do you draw with regard to the detention of the individuals in
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole?
6 THE WITNESS: Well, in general, individuals were held in appalling
7 conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of course the worst offenders were
8 the Bosnian Serbs. The HVO-run camps, I think, varied at -- depending on
9 the camp and depending on the time. And of course we got access at a time
10 when, because of our pressure, conditions had improved and also where the
11 commanders knew that the American embassy was coming to visit. So they --
12 you know, they had some opportunity to clean things up, and they also did
13 not allow interviews with the prisoners. But the short answer is that in
14 some cases the conditions were appalling with some beatings, summary
15 execution, lack of sanitary conditions, rapes. In some cases they were
16 better, but I would note that even in the Heliodrom one of the issues was
17 the -- was forced labour on the front lines, exposing prisoners to the
18 danger of being killed.
19 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
20 MR. SCOTT:
21 Q. In reviewing my notes, Mr. Ambassador, I have no further questions
22 for you. And I thank you once again for your testimony and assistance.
23 A. Thank you.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a question that relates
25 to the question put to you by my colleague.
1 Questioned by the Court:
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As an ambassador in Zagreb, I
3 assume that you have a press service, television, radios, you have sources
4 of information while you were in that position. In the second part of
5 1993, in particular, did you receive via the media information about what
6 was going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Was there a flow of information,
7 as is now the case in Iraq and elsewhere, the CNN coverage, there's a lot
8 of information one receives in real time, in particular the case with
9 regard to the events in Beirut. At the time that you were there, did you
10 have information as being evidence according to which journalists were in
11 the field, there were reports for sure. Did you obtain information
12 through the media, and I'm not referring to your tradition sources of
13 information, but did you gain information through the media that allowed
14 you to gain a picture of events that were actually unfolding there?
15 A. Your Honour, of course we had all sources of information. I have
16 to tell you that in fact the media is some of the most important sources
17 of information. I think for those who are not in government, there's the
18 impression that -- that secret sources must be extremely valuable. But
19 the truth is that probably the most important information comes from
20 public sources and in -- and the media was hugely important. There was,
21 of course, the local media, and if you watched the television of different
22 parties and listened to the radio you got some different pictures. But
23 the international press did absolutely heroic work in Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina. They brought this war home, not just to me who was living in
25 the region and therefore living with it, but to the policy-makers in
1 Europe and America. And every day they, in their offices and at
2 dinnertime, they were reminded of what was happening in Sarajevo, Mostar,
3 and in Omarska, and so on. And so it was a hugely important source of
4 information and it did provide the big picture.
5 The other advantage that I had personally was that most
6 journalists would pass through Zagreb on their way in and out of Bosnia,
7 and they would come by to see me. So not only did I have the benefit of
8 what they wrote or what they showed on television, but I also had the
9 benefit of talking to them.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But on the basis of the
11 information you obtained from the media, on the basis of what you could
12 see on television, on the basis of what you could learn from journalists,
13 were you able to contact President Tudjman and to draw his attention to
14 the events that the international community could witness through the --
15 through the media? Was it possible for you to tell him that it was
16 perhaps necessary to act on that basis?
17 A. In -- the answer is yes, and in two ways. First, I could -- I
18 could and did take to him reports that appeared in the international
19 media. But secondly, I sent messages to him through the -- my interviews
20 with Croatian newspapers, magazines, and on Croatian television. And
21 frankly, everything that I have described -- or almost everything that I
22 have described here in the -- in the demarches that I made to Tudjman
23 personally are also messages that I delivered publicly to the Croatian
24 media. I said very clearly that -- for example, that we held Croatia
25 responsible for the conduct of the HVO and that if that conduct did not
1 improve there would be sanctions on Croatia. I warned publicly about the
2 presence of the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3 So it was -- it was a very -- the media was a very important part
4 of our diplomacy and a way to send messages and, frankly, to build support
5 among the Croatian people, most of whom, as I've testified, in my view did
6 not support the policies of Tudjman with regard to Bosnia.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, this concludes your
9 examination, your testimony. On behalf of the Judges, I would like to
10 thank you for having come to The Hague. This isn't the first time you
11 have come here, but I hope that it will be the last time because you can't
12 spend your life testifying before Judges. I would like to thank you, and
13 I would also like to thank the representatives of the US Government who
14 have been present during the testimony. I wish you a safe return home,
15 and I will now ask the usher to escort you and the representatives of the
16 US Government out of the court-room.
17 [The witness withdrew]
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have a few more minutes.
19 I'll give the floor to both parties so that we can have the exhibit
20 numbers. We'll be able to make good use of the time in this way.
21 Mr. Scott.
22 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you. The Prosecution tenders
23 as through this witness -- through this witness Exhibits P05047, P06251.
24 P09502. P09503, P09504, P09505, P09506, P09507, P05104, P09508, P09498,
25 P09499, P03240, P05090, P06412, P09501, P09500, P09697, P03673, P05047,
1 P07789, P09510, and P07475.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 And I now turn to Defence counsel in the order you wish to follow.
4 Perhaps we'll start with Mr. Karnavas.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. Mr. President, I just had that one
6 document, which I believe it's 1D00917, and I understand the Prosecution
7 wanted to at least double-check and make sure that that was a document
8 from the Milosevic case, but -- it has an exhibit from that case. But in
9 any event that's the only document that we showed and tendered in this
10 case -- in this -- for this witness.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Murphy.
12 MR. MURPHY: Thank you, Your Honour. The Stojic Defence has no
13 documents to tender through this witness.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Mr. Kovacic.
16 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have prepared the
17 documents we used, but I must add a reservation; I can correct myself
18 later on. We also used some documents that have already been admitted,
19 but I have not marked these. I think that can easily be amended
20 afterwards. We wish to tender document 3D00141, 3D00320, 3D00375,
21 3D00376, 3D00377, 3D00186, 3D00299, 3D00378, that's the document that was
22 on the ELMO and in the meantime it has been assigned a number and put into
24 Of the Prosecutor's exhibits, I wish to tender - and I have no
25 objection to their having a P number - is P9601, P6251, and P3112. These
1 are the documents used by myself and General Praljak. Thank you.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.
3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we have only one
4 document to tender. This is Ambassador Galbraith's interview published in
5 Globus 4D00326. Thank you.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We will render our
7 decision, having checked the numbers of all these documents.
8 We have two minutes remaining. My attention has been drawn to the
9 application of Rule 89(F) that concerns witnesses because I have been
10 informed that the Prosecution also intends to tender documents into
11 evidence. As there will be no examination-in-chief, it would be good,
12 Mr. Scott, if one showed these documents to the witness by the e-court
13 system. You can then say: I'm showing you such and such a document, 1,
14 2, 3, 4, et cetera, do you recognise them? And then the witness will say:
15 Yes, I recognise them, I have seen them already. Is that what you
16 intended to do? Is that how you intended to proceed?
17 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. I appreciate the Court's
18 clarification. I think there's been some misunderstanding about that.
19 With many of these witnesses, the Rule 89(F) procedure will be that -- of
20 course, the witness will be brought into the court-room, they will be
21 given a chance to look at their prior statement to confirm that that
22 indeed would be their testimony. It may be that the Prosecution might ask
23 them a few questions to clarify or highlight a particular part of their
24 testimony and that any documents to be tendered through the witness would
25 be examined with the witness. So I think it was a bit of a
1 misunderstanding. It could happen in some cases or a simplification to
2 think that there would be nothing more than simply a standing up and
3 tendering the written statement. The written statement will be the vast
4 majority of the testimony of the witnesses, supplemented by -- primarily
5 in connection with documents. So, yes, we do intend to take the witness
6 through any exhibits.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll deal with that
8 as things unfold.
9 Ms. Alaburic.
10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just one request. On
11 the 7th of September we received in French a decision on adjudicated
12 facts. As, unfortunately, we are not so conversant with French, to see
13 whether there are any grounds for appeal, we wish to ask for your leave to
14 discuss this decision on receipt of the English text and then perhaps
15 lodge an appeal.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. That's not a
17 problem. You may always make a request for an appeal, but it's the
18 Chamber that shall decide.
19 It's quarter to 2.00. I wish you a good weekend. Those who are
20 now ill, well, I hope they will soon be in good health again so that they
21 can all be here on Monday. I'll see you next Monday then.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Monday, the 18th day of
24 September, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.