1 Monday, 2 April 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you call
6 the case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 Today, Monday, the 2nd of April, I'd like to greet everyone present to the
11 courtroom, the Prosecution, Defence counsel, the accused, and all those
12 assisting us in our work.
13 First of all, there are three oral decisions I would like to
14 render. These concern the admission of documents into evidence.
15 The first document concerns evidence presented when the witness
16 Ferida Likic testified on the 22nd of March, 2007.
17 The Chamber hereby decides to admit into evidence the following
18 documents through the IC 00508 list, given that they have a certain
19 probative value and a certain relevance. The Chamber would like to point
20 out that documents P 06314, P 08382, P 08652, P 08660, P 08662, and P
21 08663 have already been admitted. They were admitted on the 29th of
22 March, 2007.
23 And now for the second oral decision that concerns evidence
24 presented during the testimony of Witness DG, who appeared on the 20th of
25 March, 2007. The Chamber hereby decides to admit the following documents
1 presented by the Prosecution through the IC 00502 list, given that they
2 have a certain probative value and a certain relevance.
3 The third oral decision that concerns documents presented in the
4 course of Mr. Mustafa Hadrovic's testimony, who appeared on the 21st and
5 22nd of February, 2007. Hadrovic, H-a-d-r-o-v-i-c. The Chamber hereby
6 admits into evidence the following documents presented by the Prosecution
7 through the IC 00445 list, and documents presented by the Defence through
8 the IC 00446 list, given that they have a certain probative value.
9 I would also like to remind the Prosecution that on the 8th of
10 March, 2007, I requested that they file a list -- or, rather, a definitive
11 witness list. I'm still waiting for this list to be submitted. It's
12 necessary for us to have such a list in order to see which witnesses the
13 Chamber might call if the Prosecution doesn't put these witnesses on their
15 I would also like to remind the Defence that they should respond
16 to the motion for protective measures pursuant to Rule 70, and this
17 concerns the witness BH.
18 I would first like two IC numbers to be provided by the registrar
19 and then we will go into private session for a few minutes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you very much, Your Honour. Several parties
21 have submitted lists of documents to be tendered through Witness Nelson
22 Draper. The list submitted by the OTP shall be given Exhibit number IC
23 517, while the list submitted by 3D shall be given Exhibit number IC 518.
24 Thank you very much.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Registrar, let's
1 go into private session for a few minutes.
2 [Private session]
11 Pages 16643-16645 redacted. Private session
25 [Open session]
1 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Just a minute. We'll move
3 back into private session.
4 THE ACCUSED PRLIC: [Interpretation] No, it's not a problem; we can
5 remain in open session. Last time you said the accused would have the
6 right to address certain matters, the mentioned -- the meeting on the 22nd
7 of March, and I think that I would like to express my position with regard
8 to this matter, and on Thursday one of the accused already did so.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. We were thinking about
10 having a special hearing on Thursday morning so that you can express your
11 position. Rest reassured -- rest assured we haven't forgotten about this.
12 On Thursday morning there'll be a hearing because at 8.30 there's a
13 Pre-Trial Conference, but it should be over by 10.00. So we could start
14 the hearing at 10.00 and give you the floor, and if the need arises we
15 could then continue with the witness. So rest assured we haven't
16 forgotten about this.
17 We'll now have the witness called into the courtroom.
18 [The witness entered court]
19 WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good day, sir. I would first
21 like to make sure you are receiving the interpretation of what I'm
22 saying. If so, please say so.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I am. I hear you well.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You have been called
25 here as a witness by the Prosecution. Could you please tell me your first
1 and last name and date of birth, please.
2 THE WITNESS: My name is Herbert Okun. My date of birth is 27
3 November 1930.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Do you currently have a
5 profession or do you hold a position of any kind?
6 THE WITNESS: At present I am a professorial lecturer of
7 international relations, international institutions, and international law
8 at the School of Advanced International Studies, SAIS, of Johns Hopkins
9 University in Washington, DC.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, have you already testified
11 before this Tribunal or is this the first time?
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Which case did you testify in?
14 THE WITNESS: I've testified in three cases. The first the
15 Milosevic case, then the Krajisnik case, and the third was the Mrksic
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Could you please
18 read out the solemn declaration.
19 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth,
20 [Interpretation] The whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, you may sit down.
22 THE WITNESS: I'd first like to provide you with some information
23 about the procedure we will be following here. As you have already
24 testified here on three occasions, you are familiar with the rules.
25 You'll first have to answer the questions that the Prosecution will put to
1 you. You have certainly met the Prosecution already. You must have met
2 them this weekend, and once this stage has been completed the Defence
3 counsel who are to your left may also put questions to you in the course
4 of their cross-examination, and the accused themselves might put questions
5 to you since they have the right to do so if they would like to address
6 certain technical problems. The Judges, the four Judges sitting before
7 you may in accordance with the Rules may intervene at any time to put
8 their own questions to you but, as has so far been the case, we prefer to
9 wait for both parties to complete their examination before we put our
10 questions which we put to witnesses in order to clarify some of the --
11 your answers or in order to fill in any gaps that we may have noticed.
12 Any gaps we may have noticed in your answers.
13 Try and answer the questions concisely since as the procedure we
14 are following is an oral procedure it's what is said in the course of the
15 hearing that is important. The Prosecution, and the Defence, too, will
16 show documents to you and ask you to comment on them.
17 If at any point in time you don't feel well, don't hesitate to ask
18 for a break. As a general rule we have a break every one and a half hour,
19 and we have 20-minute breaks to allow the witness to rest, and also for
20 technical reasons. But if you feel it necessary to have a longer break or
21 if you feel to have -- if you feel the need to have more frequent breaks,
22 don't hesitate to ask us to adjourn. So this depends on your wishes.
23 And finally, if a question is not clear to you don't hesitate to
24 ask the party putting the question to you to rephrase it. If you would
25 like to address the Chamber at any point in time, don't hesitate to do so.
1 This is the information I wanted to provide you to make sure that
2 your testimony is given in the best possible conditions, and having said
3 that I will now give the floor to the Prosecution for their
5 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.
6 Examination by Mr. Scott:
7 Q. Good afternoon, Ambassador?
8 A. Good afternoon.
9 Q. Sir, you've told us you are Herbert Okun born on the 27th of
10 November, 1930; is that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Could you tell us please about your educational background, what
13 you -- completion after high school, please.
14 A. Yes. I studied at Stanford University, where I received a
15 bachelor's degree in mediaeval history in 1951. I then studied at
16 Syracuse University in history, then at Princeton University in history,
17 and that ended in 1952. I studied and received a master's of public
18 administration from Harvard University in 1959, and I studied at the
19 naval -- the US [Realtime transcript read in error "UN"] Naval War College
20 and received a degree, a masters in naval warfare, in 1969.
21 Q. Thank you, sir. Is it correct that from approximately 1955 until
22 1991 you served more or less continuously as an officer in the United
23 States foreign service?
24 A. Yes, continuously. There was no break in my service.
25 Q. Can you tell us briefly, sir -- I just want to touch on some of
1 the postings and involvements that you had prior to taking up your
2 responsibilities in connection with Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Can
3 you tell the Judges briefly, did you have any role to play in your foreign
4 service career in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis?
5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] May I -- I'm very sorry but there
6 seems to be a mistake in the transcript. I suppose it is not a UN naval
7 War College that you attended but a US naval ...
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour, I said US.
9 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Judge Trechsel.
10 Q. Ambassador, could you tell us briefly about your involvement in
11 the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962?
12 A. Yes, I was then second secretary at the American embassy in Moscow
13 where I served from 1961 to '63. In October 1962, I was asked by the
14 Ambassador to be at the ready to translate all the communications between
15 Chairman Kruschev and President Kennedy that concerned the Cuban crisis.
16 I had learned Russian at Stanford University and it was a language I spoke
17 well and read comfortably. So I was asked to translate the letters
18 between Kennedy and Kruschev, which I did.
19 Q. And following that, can you tell us -- did you serve for a time as
20 the deputy chair of the United States delegation at the Strategic Arms
21 Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, often more commonly known as SALT
23 A. Yes, sir, I did, from 1978 and '79.
24 Q. And what was your -- very briefly your role in those proceedings?
25 A. Well, I was the deputy chairman of the American delegation, and my
1 role principally was to draft the treaty.
2 Q. All right. And is it correct, sir, that in 1973, 1974, you were a
3 political advisor or were political advisor to the NATO commander-in-chief
4 in the Mediterranean based in Naples with the specific responsibility --
5 well, first of all, did you have that position?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And in the course of performing your duties in that position, did
8 you have some responsibilities in connection with what was then
10 A. Yes. My principal purpose for being there was to be the Yugoslav
11 specialist on the staff.
12 Q. Can you tell the Judges whether that was the first time officially
13 that you had duties, foreign service duties, specifically in connection
14 with Yugoslavia?
15 A. Not really, because I dealt marginally but officially with
16 Yugoslavia in my capacity, which was constant in my service dealing with
17 the Soviet Union and with Germany. Yugoslavia was always in the arc of
19 Q. All right. Can you tell us please about your posting to the
20 German Democratic Republic between 1980 and 1983?
21 A. I was American Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic in
22 those years, '80 to '83, residing in what was then East Berlin, and I had
23 the normal duties that any ambassador has.
24 Q. And could you tell us what post you held during the time 1985 to
1 A. From 1985 to 1989 I was the deputy permanent representative and
2 ambassador of the United States to the United Nations in New York.
3 Q. And can you tell us, please, what positions or functions you
4 fulfilled or carried out during the period 1991 to 1997?
5 A. From 1991 to 1997 I was involved principally, almost exclusively,
6 with matters concerning the former Yugoslavia. From 1991 to 1993, I was
7 the deputy personal envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for the
8 former Yugoslavia, first concerned principally with the conflict in
9 Croatia and then principally concerned with the conflict in Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina. From May 1993 to 1996, in the same capacity, I was
11 principally occupied with mediating and resolving the Greek-Macedonian
12 dispute over the name of the country.
13 Q. Can you tell us as we've moved more closely to the time that we
14 will talk about in the course of your testimony, what position you held
15 during the period September 1992 until approximately May 1993?
16 A. From September 1992 until May 1993, in addition to the regular and
17 other tasks, I was the deputy co-chairman of the International Conference
18 on the Former Yugoslavia. This was the conference that was established at
19 the London conference of August 1992 to bring together the efforts of the
20 then EC and the United Nations, and the conference -- the two efforts were
21 joined. The co-chairmen of the conference were, for the UN, the former
22 American Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and for the EC, the former
23 British Foreign Secretary, David Lord Owen.
24 Q. And then following that term as you told us a moment ago, then you
25 moved to your responsibilities in connection with mediating a dispute
1 between Greece and the -- what was then the Yugoslav Republic of
2 Macedonia; is that correct?
3 A. The official title at the United Nations was the former Yugoslav
4 Republic of Macedonia, usually known by the initials FYROM.
5 Q. And before we move on, just for purposes of the record, and it may
6 come up at some time or another, when you've told us that between 1991 and
7 1997 you were a special advisor and deputy to the personal envoy -- as a
8 personal envoy of the United - UN, excuse me - the UN Secretary-General,
9 who was the UN Secretary-General during that time period?
10 A. At the beginning in 1991 the Secretary-General was Javier Perez de
11 Cuellar, a very distinguished Peruvian diplomat. His term ended in 1991,
12 and from January 1st, 1992, the Secretary-General was Boutros
13 Boutros-Ghali, an equally distinguished Egyptian diplomat.
14 Q. And before turning further to your specific involvement in
15 connection with Yugoslavia in 19 -- in the 1991 and 1993 time period, can
16 you tell us again, just by way of your background, briefly your teaching
17 positions other than the one you just mentioned a moment ago at Johns
19 A. Yes, before teaching at Johns Hopkins I taught for a number of
20 years at the Yale Law School.
21 Q. On what topic or subject?
22 A. I lectured on international law and international negotiations.
23 Q. Now, sir, moving back specifically or forward specifically to your
24 roles in connection with the former Yugoslavia, can you tell the Judges
25 how you first became involved with Secretary Vance in connection with the
1 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia?
2 A. In early October 1991, Secretary Vance and I were contacted
3 separately and together by the Secretary-General and asked if we could
4 proceed immediately to Yugoslavia in the capacity which I've mentioned.
5 First on a fact-finding mission, and then to recommend courses of action
6 that the United Nations and the Security Council and the Secretary-General
7 might follow with regards to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which
8 at that time was limited to the Republic of Croatia.
9 Q. And following that period which focused more specifically on the
10 Republic of Croatia, did you subsequently become involved in work that
11 focused more specifically on Bosnia and Herzegovina?
12 A. Yes. Secretary Vance succeeded in ending the hostilities in
13 Croatia with an accord signed on January 2, 1992, between the government
14 of Croatia and the JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army. The cessation of
15 hostilities was effective, and, based on that accord, the United Nations
16 surround voted in February of 1992 to establish a peacekeeping operation
17 in Croatia. This was, I might add, the first peacekeeping operation in
18 Europe in the history of the United Nations. But even during the Croatian
19 period, from October 1991, Mr. Vance and I were heavily involved in the
20 Bosnian situation because it was widely known, it was common knowledge
21 that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was an explosive one.
22 Q. And can you tell us then more specifically how you and Secretary
23 Vance turned your attention or were given these additional specific duties
24 in connection with Bosnia and Herzegovina?
25 A. As I said, we maintained a watching brief on Bosnia, including
1 visits to Sarajevo and frequent discussions with Bosnian leaders. I
2 should mention that at that time, that is the first half of 1992, the
3 diplomatic negotiating effort, the overall negotiating effort was totally
4 in the hands of the EC. In the summer of 1991, the EC established, for
5 example, a conference, a multi-lateral peace conference called the
6 Conference on Yugoslavia headed by Lord Carrington, the former British
7 secretary for foreign affairs, in order to achieve a peace, comprehensive
8 peace for all of Yugoslavia if possible. The conference did not succeed,
9 but the EC effort continued, along with Mr. Vance and me and our team of
10 two or three other people, which was the only UN effort at the time. But
11 in August 1992, the British government, who then held the Presidency of
12 the EC, convened a large conference of foreign ministers in London, and at
13 that conference it was decided to establish the International Conference
14 on the Former Yugoslavia, that is to say, as I mentioned, joining the EC
15 effort with Secretary Vance and myself.
16 Q. On behalf of the UN.
17 A. Yes, acting on behalf of the UN.
18 Q. Sir, before we continue on now more specifically with your work on
19 various peace plans or in particular what became known as the Vance-Owen
20 Peace Plan, let me ask you about certain diaries that you kept during this
21 time which may come up in the course of your testimony or which you may
22 refer to or others may ask you about in the course of your testimony.
23 Were you keeping diaries during this time, 1991, 1992, 1993?
24 A. Yes. From the first day of our involvement in the former
25 Yugoslavia I maintained, for myself and for Secretary Vance, a record of
1 what was said to us, whom we met, when we met them, and it was of course
2 useful. I should say I am not a stenographer and do not -- could not and
3 did not take verbatim notes, but the diaries were quite complete. As a
4 professional diplomat, one is very used to this sort of work. Accuracy is
5 important, so I maintained these diaries.
6 Q. Let me just pick up on what you just said. In connection with
7 your work in the former Yugoslavia, was that the first time in your
8 foreign service career that you had kept diaries or had that been an
9 established practice with you for some time?
10 A. Oh, it's an established practice.
11 Q. And were these diaries -- how did you actually make the entries in
12 your diaries? Were these collected and you put these thoughts down some
13 days later or were they contemporaneous or how do you prepare these
15 A. They were all contemporaneous. At the negotiating table I had my
16 notebook in front of me. I could be seen writing and taking notes. When
17 I myself was alone with an interlocutor, I sometimes had my diary with me.
18 Very often I didn't because it would not be polite to be writing when
19 you're talking directly to somebody. And when that was the case, I would
20 write it immediately after the meeting, as soon as the meeting ended. So
21 they were done on the spot so to speak.
22 Q. All right. You just mentioned and let me come back to it briefly
23 before going forward, you said that you could be seen taking notes. The
24 persons that were involved in these meetings, I take it you're indicate --
25 it was not a secret that you were making notes?
1 A. No, not at all.
2 Q. And did you use these notes in part to prepare reports on behalf
3 of Secretary Vance and yourself to the Secretary-General of the United
4 Nations during this time?
5 A. Yes. They formed the basis for Secretary Vance's reports, along,
6 of course, with his own impressions and opinions and views, but they were
7 the only record we kept.
8 Q. Let me turn our attention to some of the events taking place in
9 Yugoslavia around this time itself. Can you remind the Judges, please,
10 when did the actual fighting between the Serbs and other non-Serb forces
11 or persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina begin?
12 A. Except for very small-scale, random, and occasional acts of
13 violence, the fighting began in March 1992, immediately after the
14 referendum in Bosnia ended. It expanded significantly in April 1992 with
15 the shelling by the Bosnian Serb army of Sarajevo, and continued until
16 1995 with occasional cessation -- cease-fires on various -- in various
17 parts of the front. The heaviest fighting, I should add, was in 1992 and
19 Q. You mentioned a moment ago that this fighting took place or
20 erupted on a large scale at least immediately after the referendum in
21 Bosnia. Just so the record is clear, was that the referendum on the
22 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was held on the -- February of
23 the -- excuse me, the 29th of February and March 1, 1992?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And did the Serbs participate in that referendum to your
1 knowledge, the Serb citizens of Bosnia?
2 A. No. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum, and it was voted
3 then on only by the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats. The Serbs
4 chose not to participate.
5 Q. And is it correct then to understand based on what you've just
6 told us in the last few minutes that the major outbreak of fighting then,
7 the large-scale war gave was partly in reaction to or following the
8 referendum results?
9 A. Yes. The Bosnian Serbs had let it be known that they would resist
10 the results of any referendum. Indeed, the Bosnian Serbs had already
11 declared the existence, the self-declared existence of their self-declared
12 state, the Republika Srpska, on January 15th, 1992.
13 Q. In that regard, let me ask you, in your role as an international
14 representative during this time, what was the knowledge of the
15 international community and persons like yourself in connection with one
16 meeting between Tudjman and Milosevic in Karadjordjevo in March 1991 and
17 then a meeting between Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban in Graz in May --
18 sorry, if I misspoke. March 1991 was Karadjordjevo and Graz in May 1992?
19 A. I would not say these meetings were widely reported or known to
20 the general public, but those who had reason to follow events in
21 Yugoslavia knew of these meetings and knew quite well of the meetings and
22 knew what the subject matter of these meetings was.
23 Q. And what was the subject matter of those meetings?
24 A. The subject matter was the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
25 the principal subject -- sub-subject, ancillary subject, was the partition
1 of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbs and Croats.
2 Q. In carrying out your diplomatic missions during this time,
3 Ambassador, can you tell us what you understood, what information you
4 gained around that time of what this partition between -- of Bosnia by the
5 Serbs and the Croats, what that might look like, what you had heard about
6 any discussions at these meetings?
7 A. Yes. It was known at the time that the basic form of any
8 partition, if there was to be one by Serbs and Croats, would generally
9 follow the outline of the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement, the Sporazum, as it
10 was called.
11 Q. What was the approximate date of the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement?
12 A. The date of the agreement, the Sporazum, is August 1939.
13 Q. And could you tell us a bit more about what the -- how that
14 agreement came about, briefly, and what was the result in terms of maps or
15 territory resulting from that agreement?
16 A. Yes. When Yugoslavia came into being at the end of the First
17 World War, it was not called Yugoslavia. The name of the country was the
18 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and the Serbian royal family
19 became the King of the country. You see by that immediately the national
20 emphasis of the people of the former Yugoslavia.
21 Relations were not good in the 1920's between the principal
22 nationalities, the Croats and the Serbs. Indeed the leading Serb [sic]
23 politician of the time was murdered by a Serb in the parliament in the
24 late 1920's. So in late 1929, King Aleksandar changed the name from of
25 the country from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to Yugoslavia
1 in order to de-emphasise the national aspect, and at the same time he
2 abolished the traditional provincial borders of the country. And instead
3 of the borders he created what were called "banovina," "banovine" or
4 "banovinas" in English, we would say. There were nine of these
5 Banovinas, all named after rivers of the former Yugoslavia, and again that
6 was done in order to de-emphasise the national aspect, so that when we
7 talk about the banovinas, the Croatian Banovina in the Cvetkovic-Macek
8 Agreement, that is what people are talking about, and indeed there was a
9 map. Cvetkovic and Macek created a map of what the -- what their border,
10 what their common border would look like.
11 Q. All right. Before we continue on, sir, I may have misheard or you
12 may have misspoke or, in fact, it may be absolutely correct. You said --
13 a few moments ago, you said, "Indeed the leading Serb politician at the
14 time was murdered by a Serb in the parliament"?
15 A. No, the leading Croat politician. I excuse me, I'm sorry. The
16 leading Croat -- Croatian politician was murdered by a Serb.
17 Q. Can you tell us --
18 THE WITNESS: I would ask the record to be corrected on that, Your
20 MR. SCOTT: It has been, Ambassador, thank you.
21 Q. Now, this topic could be discussed I suppose at any number of
22 places during the course of your testimony, I suppose now is as good a
23 time as any. In connection with the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement of 1939,
24 was that agreement put into effect and remind us what happened soon after
1 A. As I said it was signed in August 1939. Less than a month later
2 Germany invaded Poland and World War II began. So its implementation was
3 naturally slowed and never completed. As we will all know, Nazi Germany
4 invaded and conquered Yugoslavia in 1941. So the Cvetkovic-Macek
5 Agreement fell completely into disuse after April 1941 because Yugoslavia
6 was an occupied country.
7 Q. And what were the borders or political composition of Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina and Croatia during World War II?
9 A. During the Second World War, the Nazi German government created a
10 so-called Independent State of Croatia with its capital in Zagreb. The
11 state was headed by the Poglavnik, that is to say the fuehrer, the leader,
12 of the Ustasha extreme political party, and it existed under German
13 protection. The Germans gave all of Bosnia-Herzegovina to this state so
14 that from 1941 to 1945 the puppet State of Croatia occupied and was
15 responsible for the activities in what is today Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16 Q. Did the borders of the Independent State of Croatia include or
17 encompass all of what became -- later became Bosnia and Herzegovina?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now, going back with that additional background to the Graz
20 meeting in May 1992, how did you learn or what did you know of the time
21 about how that concept, the Banovina, related to the discussions between
22 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban at that time?
23 A. Well, press reports, and we relied in the main on press reports,
24 spoke of the Banovina. We all knew about it. Anybody connected in any
25 degree with the former Yugoslavia knows about the Sporazum, the agreement,
1 because it's a datum, a fact, so that the assumption was that if the Serbs
2 and the Croatians were talking about partitioning Bosnia, it would likely
3 be along the lines of the agreement of 1939.
4 MR. SCOTT: Can I ask the witness to now please be provided with
5 the bundle of exhibits, and as that's happening and I'll ask the witness
6 or for the Judges' information, I will ask you to look at Exhibit P 00187.
7 And if I could ask -- if I could direct the courtroom's attention
8 to page 4 of that set of papers. Page 4. And if that page 4 could
9 perhaps also be put on e-court.
10 Q. Sir, I'd like you in particular to look -- direct your attention
11 to items 1 and 2. You can certainly scan the entire document, but if I
12 can ask you to please look at 1 and 2. Is what's written here consistent
13 with what you and Secretary Vance and others understood at the time of the
14 discussions between Mr. Boban and Mr. Karadzic?
15 A. Yes, it is consistent. May I add, sir, that as, I read item 2, I
16 note that the Hrvatska banovina, the Croatian Banovina, is specifically
17 referred to.
18 Q. And is that the same concept or was that the -- again the banovina
19 that you're referring to a few moments ago as resulting from the
20 Cvetkovic-Macek agreement from 1939?
21 A. Yes, because the only time banovinas existed was in that period,
22 because after Yugoslavia was liberated in 1945 the Communist Tito
23 government created new republics and new borders.
24 Q. And in reference to the Graz Agreement of May 1992, what was your
25 understanding, and the understanding of the international community, so
1 far as you knew, of where this agreement left the Muslim people in Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina?
3 A. Well, it -- it left them really nowhere.
4 Q. And can you tell the Judges in scanning through this agreement is
5 there anyplace on the face of this document where any discussion is made
6 about a Muslim territory or what part that Muslims would be left with?
7 A. No. There's no mention of the Muslim community.
8 Q. What was the reaction of the people in your profession, the
9 diplomatic corps and the international community to learning of this Graz
11 A. Well, as you mentioned, the meeting occurred in May 1992. By that
12 time, there was very heavy fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
13 Bosnian Serb army already occupied more than two-thirds of the country,
14 and the agreement was noted, but I would not say that a great deal of
15 attention was paid to it. Those who knew the situation were not surprised
16 to see it, but the primary activity at the time, and again I stress this,
17 the activity of the European Community which was leading the international
18 negotiations at the time in May 1992, the primary activity was to try and
19 stop the Serb aggression.
20 Q. Can you tell the Judges whether -- was there further -- was there
21 a further carrying out of this plan or a further public statements taken
22 by either the Serb side or the Croat side as to what this meant for Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina at the time?
24 A. Oh, I would say constantly. It was an undercurrent of Croat and
25 Croatian activity, and we were always aware of that. Numerous examples
1 could be cited. Probably the most dramatic public example occurred as
2 late as 1995 when President Tudjman was in London, and he was at a dinner,
3 seated next to Paddy Ashdown, Lord Ashdown --
4 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, I'm going to object. This covers a
5 piece of evidence that the Court has ruled to be irrelevant. It was the
6 subject and motion by the Prosecution to admit, and in response to a
7 Defence position the Court ruled it out on the grounds that it was
9 MR. SCOTT: I would say this was tendered as part of the
10 transcript of Mr. Paddy Ashdown, which was in fact received, I must say,
11 in contrast to the Chamber's ruling, was in fact received in the Blaskic
12 case, the Kordic case, and the Tuta-Stela case all as relevant evidence on
13 the very same point, and this is simply a part of this witness's account
14 of what he knew at the time and the sort of things that were openly known
15 by the international community.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: The gentleman wasn't present, and according to
17 Mr. Ashdown there was a lot of drinking going on. Mr. Ashdown is a known
18 alcoholic, or at least that's what is perceived in the press. If we're
19 going to be relying on press. And so we can bring Mr. Ashdown in here and
20 he can be cross-examined and he can tell us what he said, but we also have
21 to put it into context and I think if this gentleman, if he wasn't there,
22 he cannot give us that context.
23 MR. MURPHY: Your Honour, leaving that aside, the -- the issue
24 that we brought to the Court's attention was that all that had happened in
25 this conversation was that the there was speculation as to what the status
1 of Bosnia and Herzegovina might be in ten years' time. The dinner took
2 place in 1995, and therefore the evidence was really dealing with a
3 speculation on a social occasion as to what might be the condition of
4 Bosnia in 2005, and for that reason the Court held it to be irrelevant.
5 And whatever another Trial Chamber may have thought, that's the ruling in
6 this case.
7 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, just --
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber will confer and
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as this dinner is
12 concerned and everything that might relate to the dinner, it's our opinion
13 that this should be taken as an anecdote. So it would be best for the
14 Prosecution to move on.
15 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. I would just simply note in
16 moving on that it would have been better, in our respectful submission,
17 rather than have counsel speculate about the nature of this testimony, for
18 the Chamber to have heard Mr. Ashdown's testimony, which he gives a very
19 detailed account of the map drawn by President Tudjman, partitioning
20 Bosnia, but be that as it may.
21 Q. Sir, let me ask you this: In the statement that you gave a few
22 weeks ago, you said that following Graz -- in connection with Graz and
23 Karadjordjevo, both sides made solemn protestations for the benefit of the
24 broader public about the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can you tell us
25 what you mean by that and how that enters into what the international
1 community was doing at that time in reacting to this situation?
2 A. Yes. Both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, primarily the
3 Bosnian Croats in this case, would issue statements concerning the
4 integrity, the sovereignty, the territorial integrity of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina, and they would solemnly affirm their adherence to these
6 concepts. The Bosnian Serbs did that occasionally but a little less so,
7 but that was not true. Their actions belied these public statements, and
8 the international negotiators were always aware of this two-track policy.
9 That is to say the one track in public, declaring loyalty and fielty to
10 the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the other track
11 working to undermine that state and establish their own political entities
12 on the territory of the state.
13 Q. Let me just stay on that one moment longer, sir, since you are
14 very senior diplomat with years of experience in this area. How -- is
15 that unique in your experience as a diplomat, sir, or how could it be that
16 a party on the one hand?
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Objection.
18 MR. SCOTT:
19 Q. Could take a public position and at the same time to your
20 knowledge be taken a different have a different agenda?
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Objection. It calls for speculation, and what
22 others are doing in other parts of the world is irrelevant.
23 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'm asking for his -- based on his
24 experience as a diplomat, as a senior diplomat.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: It's still irrelevant.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, according to the
2 transcript, the question was about knowledge, not about speculation,
3 because line 9 mentions his experience as a diplomat. So he is not being
4 asked to speculate. The witness is being asked to say what he thinks
5 about the matter in the light of his diplomatic knowledge.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: It would still be irrelevant even if it's not
7 speculation. How did -- how the Russians acted during the SALT
8 agreement --
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] The objection has been overruled.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm still entitled to make my record.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] Well, speak.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, that was -- I was making my record,
14 Your Honour. It's still irrelevant. How the Russians, for instance,
15 might have negotiated during the SALT agreement or how the Greeks might
16 have negotiated with FYROM or Macedonia or whatever you want to call or
17 other parts of the world is irrelevant, and I just think that -- I don't
18 see how this is relevant to this testimony. Now, perhaps you may wish to
19 ask the Prosecutor how it -- how he thinks this is relevant information
20 for you to consider.
21 MR. SCOTT: Well, Mr. Karnavas has made his record, Your Honour.
22 Excuse me. Mr. Karnavas has made his record. The Court has ruled.
23 Q. Ambassador, could you go forward and give us your answer in terms
24 of your professional observations and based on your more than 50 years --
25 50 years of diplomatic experience on this kind of situation.
1 A. It is not uncommon to follow this kind of two-track policy.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Does that go for the United States as well? I
3 mean, that's -- that's -- because this is a relevant follow-up question.
4 Was the US also pursuing a two-track policy during this period of time?
5 MR. SCOTT: If Mr. Karnavas wants to ask that during
6 cross-examination, he may do so, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. That's exactly what I was
8 going to say. This is a question for cross-examination.
9 Mr. Scott, please continue.
10 MR. SCOTT:
11 Q. All right. We'll move on, Ambassador, and perhaps you may find as
12 we continue on other opportunities to address that situation further.
13 Now, you told us earlier this afternoon that in August of 1992
14 there was a conference in London which then, if I understand correctly,
15 resulted in the formation of the International Conference on the Former
16 Yugoslavia, sometime referred to as the ICFY or ICFY for short; is that
18 A. Yes, that's correct.
19 Q. And when did ICFY then begin its work?
20 A. It began its work in Geneva immediately after the conclusion of
21 the London conference. That means it began its work at the beginning of
22 September 1992.
23 Q. And were you and Secretary Vance and Lord Owen located in Geneva
24 during that time?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Can you tell the Judges, please, how the conference was organised
2 and how it conducted its business?
3 A. The conference took up its work from where the EC had left off, so
4 the acquis was part of our work.
5 Q. Can you explain to those in the courtroom who may not be familiar
6 with the word or conference, what you mean by that?
7 A. It's French and it's the pass participle -- in English we would
8 say that which has been acquired. That is to say all of the previous
9 official material is utilised.
10 Q. All right.
11 A. There was the -- the chair and co-chairmen's, Secretary Vance,
12 Lord Owen and myself, and Ambassador Peter Hall, a British ambassador. We
13 had five working groups working on various aspects of the problem. One on
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. The purpose was directly to seek to negotiate
15 a peace accord among the parties. We had a working group on humanitarian
16 affairs, a working group on minorities specially, a working group on
17 economic affairs, and, hmm, there was a fifth working group.
18 Q. A working group on military affairs?
19 A. Yes. Excuse me. Of course. A working group on military affairs.
20 Those were the five working groups.
21 Q. And can you tell us how the meetings, how the actual meetings with
22 various of the parties to the conflict were conducted during this time
24 A. Yes. We met continuously, nonstop, with the parties individually
25 or bilaterally, both in Geneva and in the former Yugoslavia. You can
1 understand naturally that much travel to Yugoslavia, the former
2 Yugoslavia, was involved in this kind of negotiating effort while the
3 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina raged.
4 Between September and December, most -- the bulk of the meetings
5 of the chairman and the co-chairman were with the individual parties.
6 There were bilateral meetings on the whole. The reason for that was that
7 the Bosnian Muslims would not sit down, as they said, at the same table
8 with the Bosnian Serbs. So that naturally led to a certain course of
10 After January, the broader groups met with the co-chairman and the
11 conference took on a more even intense form after January 1992 -- excuse
12 me, January 1993.
13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] Might I put a very, very small
14 follow-up question?
15 You have said, Ambassador, that you often met in former
16 Yugoslavia. Could you tell it us the venues? Where was that within the
17 former Yugoslavia?
18 THE WITNESS: In this period it was primarily Zagreb, Sarajevo,
19 and Belgrade.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. SCOTT:
22 Q. Sir, I'm next going to ask you if you can name the principal
23 participants or representatives of the three principal parties. I'm start
24 with the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Who represented -- who
25 participated in these proceedings, conferences, meetings, on behalf of the
1 Bosnian government?
2 A. On behalf of the Bosnian government the principal participants
3 were President Izetbegovic, Foreign Minister Silajdzic, Ejub Ganic,
4 General Halilovic, and Mr. Trnka.
5 Q. And what position did Mr. Ganic hold during that time, if any?
6 A. His positions varied. He called himself sometimes vice-president.
7 He -- he had different denominations.
8 Q. And was Mr. -- General Halilovic, was he there sort of the senior
9 military representative for the Bosnian Muslim -- the government side?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And can you tell us, please, then, who appeared or who were the
12 principal representatives on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs in these
14 A. The principal representatives for the Bosnian Serbs were Radovan
15 Karadzic, who was the self-proclaimed president of the self-proclaimed
16 Republika Srpska; Momcilo Krajisnik, who was vice-president; Nikola
17 Koljevic, and General Ratko Mladic.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I don't mean to interrupt, but the
19 previous question to that was with respect to Halilovic, whether he was
20 with the -- starts with "military representative of the Bosnian Muslim,"
21 and then there is the government side. Now, it's either a compound
22 question or Mr. Scott meant to correct himself, but I would like to know
23 to this gentleman's mind: Was he there on behalf of the Muslims or was he
24 there on behalf of the government, meaning a government that would
25 represent everybody in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not just one side?
1 MR. SCOTT: Well, I would ask for a clarify questioning, but once
2 again I would ask that counsel, and for the Court's guidance, save these
3 matters for cross-examination, which they will have every opportunity to
5 Q. Sir, but which party to these proceedings -- which party to these
6 proceedings did General Halilovic represent or participate with?
7 A. He was in the dual capacity as a member of the government
8 delegation and the Muslim leader, army leader.
9 Q. And when you say "the Muslim army leader," you're referring
10 primarily, do I take it, to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ABiH?
11 A. Yes, the ABiH.
12 Q. All right. And can you please then tell the Judges who were the
13 principal representatives or participants for the Bosnian Croat party?
14 A. For the Bosnian Croats there was President Tudjman himself of the
15 Republic of Croatia in Zagreb; Mate Boban, the leader of the Bosnian
16 Croats. Mate Boban. Who else? Numerous other gentlemen. Could I
17 consult my statement for that?
18 Q. Perhaps I can assist you. Did Mile Akmadzic play any role in
20 A. Ah, yes. Dr. Akmadzic played an important role that needs
21 explaining, if I may.
22 Q. Please.
23 A. Dr. Akmadzic was formally and officially the Prime Minister of the
24 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, he acted and indeed said
25 directly to us that he was there as a representative of the Bosnian Croat
1 side, and this was evidenced not just confidentially to the negotiators
2 but to the world at large, because at the meetings of the International
3 Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, most of which were held in open
4 conference rooms at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Dr. Akmadzic sat
5 physically with Mate Boban and the Bosnian Croat side. So there was no
6 doubt who he represented. It was open. It was direct. It was honest.
7 But there was an anomaly since formally he was Prime Minister of the
9 Q. And you've mentioned in connection with the -- a military
10 participant on behalf of each party Mr. Halilovic, Mr. Ratko Mladic, and
11 can you tell us who was the military representative, if you will, on
12 behalf of the Bosnian Croats?
13 A. It slipped my mind. Could you refresh my memory?
14 Q. We'll come back to it, if we need to, in a few minutes perhaps.
15 MR. KARNAVAS: He can refresh the memory of the ambassador.
16 There's no reason not to.
17 MR. SCOTT:
18 Q. If there's anything that you would like to refer to, if it would
19 assist you, Ambassador, or perhaps in the interest of time I don't think
20 there would be any serious dispute. I think it's a matter of public
21 record, essentially. Was the military representative Mr. Milivoj
23 A. Yes, he was.
24 Q. Now, you mentioned a moment ago that the head of the Bosnian Croat
25 delegation was President Franjo Tudjman, the president of the Republic of
1 Croatia. Can you explain to the Judges, if you can, how it was that the
2 president of the Republic of Croatia headed the delegation of Bosnian
4 A. Well, I should state at the outset that most of our dealings were
5 with Mate Boban, but President Tudjman took a very active interest in the
6 affairs of the conference and the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
7 made it plain to Mr. Vance and me that he, A, was in charge; B, wished to
8 be kept informed, and; C, would be happy to deal with us on these issues.
9 And also in conversation, everyday conversation, Mate Boban might say to
10 me, "Yes, Mr. Ambassador, I think that's possible, but I'd have to check
11 with President Tudjman."
12 Q. Moving --
13 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'm about to change topics. I'm looking
14 at the clock and I'm wondering if now might be the time to take the first
16 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, before we have the break,
17 I'd like to go back to the Prosecution's question. When Mr. Mate Boban
18 said that he had referred to President Tudjman, is that because
19 Mr. Tudjman was the head of the delegation, as one says in diplomatic
20 language, or because he was an observer on the Croatian side?
21 THE WITNESS: He was not formally the head of delegation, but he
22 was de facto the head.
23 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll now have our 20-minute
25 break. It's almost 20 to 4.00, and we will resume at 4.00 p.m.
1 --- Recess taken at 3.39 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 4.01 p.m.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will continue, but first I'm
4 going to give the floor to the registrar for an IC number.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you very much, President. 4D has submitted
6 a list documents they wish to be tendered through witness Nelson Draper.
7 This list for the list shall be given Exhibit number IC 519. Thank you
8 very much.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mr. Scott, you have
10 the floor.
11 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. Sir, I'd like, before we continue on with the work of the
13 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to ask you about when
14 did the international community or you and your particular group
15 Lord Owen, Secretary Vance, yourself, when do you recall first becoming
16 aware of, apart from the conflict going on with the Serbs, that there was
17 a conflict either brewing or happening between the Croats and Muslims in
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
19 A. That a conflict was brewing was known early on. I would say from
20 the outset of the war in March 1992, and even somewhat earlier because of
21 the spill-over from the Serb aggression against Croatia, which had
22 understandably manifestations in Bosnia. Probably the events of Prozor in
23 1992 with the -- was close to the first major indication.
24 Q. At around the time that you heard about the events in Prozor, did
25 you hear anything about related events perhaps in the area of Novi
2 A. Yes. The Novi Travnik area was very sensitive because of the
3 large armaments factory located there, and this was brought to our
4 attention and to the attention of many others as well. There was no
5 secret about the fighting there, and the parties would talk about it
6 directly to us. That is to say the government side would complain. Mate
7 Boban for the Croats would complain. So we were aware of the situation.
8 Q. In that very regard, sir, if I could ask you to look at in your
9 are bundle of documents Exhibit P 00660. Can you look at that briefly,
10 sir, and can you tell us do you recall having seen that document back in
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. And this is a letter from Mr. -- from President Izetbegovic to
14 Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen. Did this come about -- this is dated the
15 27th of October, 1992. Does that remind you of the approximate time
16 period of events related to Prozor and Novi Travnik?
17 A. Yes. To the best of my recollection it's contemporaneous with
18 those events.
19 Q. Continuing on that same topic, could I ask you next to please
20 look -- go to Exhibit P 01462. This is a report, the -- yeah, they should
21 be all tabbed by numbers there. 1462.
22 Apparently it's in the second binder I've just been told. My
23 apology to the usher. There it is.
24 Sir, if you look at that for a moment, and just -- it's a rather
25 long document but there are some specific parts I'll direct your attention
1 to in a moment.
2 A. Mm-hmm.
3 Q. Can you remind the Judges who -- this is a report by the Special
4 Rapporteur, Mr. Mazowiecki. Who was Mr. Mazowiecki at this time, and what
5 was his role in connection with -- or how did he come to be involved as
6 the Special Rapporteur to the UN on the former Yugoslavia?
7 A. Tadeusz Mazowiecki was the distinguished former Prime Minister of
8 Poland. When he left that office, he continued his international
9 activities, and when the United Nations decided to establish the role of a
10 Special Rapporteur for human rights in the former Yugoslavia and
11 specifically Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Secretary-General asked
12 Prime Minister Mazowiecki if he would be the rapporteur, and he accepted.
13 Q. All right. In looking at this document, let me go, if you will,
14 to the end and then work backwards to some extent. Can you please turn --
15 it would be -- the pages are numbered in the upper-left corner, and if I
16 can please ask you to go all the way to page 76, which is Annex number
18 A. Yes, sir.
19 Q. This makes reference to the London international conference,
20 programme of humanitarian issues agreed between the co-chairmen to the
21 conference and the parties to the conflict. Do you see that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Can you tell the Judges whether that is reference to the
24 conference involving Secretary Vance and Lord Owen?
25 A. Yes. This is the London conference of August 1992 that I referred
1 to earlier.
2 Q. Just as a couple of particular examples, if I could please direct
3 your attention to item number 2(d), as in "dog." Can you tell the Judges
4 one of the issues that emerged at this time was the problem of the
5 detention of civilians?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Can I ask you -- excuse me. In connection with that document, was
8 there a signature on this programme, in fact if you go to page 78 can you
9 tell us whether that document bears the signatures of Mr. Izetbegovic,
10 Mr. Karadzic, and Mr. Mate Boban?
11 A. I see their names, yes.
12 Q. It says, "Identical copies of this document were signed in London
13 on 27 August 1992 ..." Do you see that?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. That was the conference in London that was held immediately
16 preceding the formation of the then ongoing group in Geneva; is that
18 A. Exactly so.
19 Q. Just a number of references to be followed by a couple of
20 questions. Can I ask you to go to page 7, paragraph 16. Page 7,
21 paragraph 16.
22 Can you tell the Judges in reference to that entry what knowledge
23 were you -- what knowledge and information were you, Secretary Vance, Lord
24 Owen, and others receiving around this time in connection with so-called
25 ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
1 A. Well, it was a constant subject, a constant object of attention.
2 It was being carried out very heavily by the Bosnian Serbs, particularly
3 along the Drina and in Western Bosnia, Prijedor and that region. And the
4 Bosnian Croats were active in ethnic cleansing around Mostar and other
5 areas in South Herzegovina and in Central Bosnia, which is where Novi
6 Travnik is, for example.
7 Q. Can I please ask you to direct your attention to page number 9,
8 paragraph 30. I won't take everyone's time to read the entire paragraph,
9 but the first sentence is: "There are accounts of ethnic cleansing being
10 carried out by Croat forces in the area of Prozor toward the end of 1992."
11 It goes on to make reference a couple of lines down to October 1992.
12 Can you look at that paragraph, please, and my question to you:
13 Is that information here consistent with what you told us about a few
14 moments ago, the information that you were hearing and receiving around
15 this time as to the outbreak of a more large-scale conflict between the
16 Muslims and Croats?
17 A. Yes. This is consistent with what we understood, what we knew at
18 the time.
19 Q. Can I please direct your attention to paragraph 53 on page 13.
20 You mentioned a few moments ago that one of the issues that had -- was
21 already becoming known around this time was the detention of various
22 ethnic persons and civilians, and this makes reference to the holding of
23 prisoners or detainees by various groups, including approximately 894
24 known detainees held by Croat forces.
25 Let me ask you to look at -- before I put a question to you, if
1 you go on that same topic page 16, paragraph 71. "Croat forces are
2 detaining 537 persons in four known places of detention even though their
3 leaders had stated that they held no further detainees. They are: Livno,
4 Mostar, Rodoc, Orasje, and Rascani." Is that correct?
5 A. Yes. I might add here --
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. -- that there was no attempt to hide this detention activity. The
8 three warring parties, the -- the three warring parties met with the ICRC,
9 the International Committee of the Red Cross, and declared their detention
10 centres in order for the ICRC representatives to visit the camps or to try
11 to visit the camps. They couldn't always visit. They weren't always
12 allowed to do so. But as I say, the parties did openly declare that they
13 held these people most -- almost all of whom were civilians, in fact.
14 Q. Going to another topic besides the detention of civilians, can I
15 ask you please to look at page 23, the end of paragraph 105.
16 "For example, Serb houses were reportedly burnt in the village of
17 Gradina by government/Croat forces in July 1992 as were Muslim houses in
18 Prozor by Croat forces in October 1992."
19 Again, sir, can you tell the Judges, is that information
20 consistent with information you and Secretary Vance and Lord Owen were
21 receiving around that time?
22 A. Yes, the reports of the ECMM, that is to say the European
23 Community Monitoring Mission, and by UNPROFOR, the United Nations
24 Protective Force, were consistent with this information.
25 Q. Now, moving forward, sir, and back to the particular work of the
1 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, in the course of
2 carrying out your mission, did you make any efforts -- I suppose it's an
3 obvious question, but can you tell us what you and Secretary Vance and
4 Lord Owen and your delegation did to learn about the positions or aims, if
5 you will, about the various principal parties to these negotiations? What
6 were their objectives as they became known to you in the course of these
8 A. In the first instance we discussed it directly with them very
9 thoroughly. This was necessary because the principal task of the
10 conference was to develop a settlement, a peaceful settlement of the
11 conflict, and it goes without saying that one of the first things you
12 would do in that situation is learn the objectives, seek to learn the
13 objectives of the contending parties. So this was a steady subject of
14 discussion. And then there were public documents. The Bosnian Serb
15 so-called parliament would issue statements. They did issue a very
16 important one in May 1992. The same thing went for Mate Boban and the
17 Herceg-Bosna people, and of course the government did.
18 Q. All right. Now, just for the record, when you're carrying out
19 diplomatic work such as this, are you relying then only on what the
20 parties themselves tell you and about their public positions, or what
21 other information do you gather and draw conclusions from?
22 A. Oh, one gets them from a whole host of sources. Journalists
23 may -- who have interviews with one of the other leaders of the parties,
24 or one of the people in the field may tell you things that they learn.
25 The non-governmental organisations, the NGOs, deal directly with the
1 organisations. Madam Ogata and the United Nations -- the United Nations
2 High Commissioner for Refugees, which was the lead agency for the entire
3 UN effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina had her own sources, and she, by the way,
4 was the chair of the working group on humanitarian affairs. So we were in
5 steady contact with Mrs. Ogata and with her people. So there were many
6 sources of information.
7 Q. All right. With that background in mind, can you briefly describe
8 for the Judges then, and we will go through all three of the major parties
9 but we'll start with the Bosnian government, can you tell us what the
10 position of President Izetbegovic and the Bosnian government were as these
11 objectives or aims became known to you?
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Before he answers that question, Your Honour, I
13 notice that they keep referring to this "government." Now, is it the
14 government representing all of the people by the people, or is it the
15 Muslims? Because I think we need some clarification. He says three
16 parties. I think it's misleading to refer to the Muslims as "the
18 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, again perhaps Mr. Karnavas would
19 like to talk inquire about that --
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you please clarify.
21 MR. SCOTT: -- to him on cross-examination, but let me just ask.
22 Q. Sir, during this time was an internationally recognised government
23 of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was based in Sarajevo?
24 A. Yes, there was. Its independence had been recognised. It was a
25 member of the United Nations. So there was an internally --
1 internationally recognised government.
2 Q. And what were the positions or aims, if you will, as you learned
3 then of this government?
4 A. The principal aim of the Muslim-dominated government was to
5 create, to develop, to have a highly centralised unitary state within
6 secure, recognised boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They hoped, or at
7 least some members of this government wanted it to be non-ethnically
8 based, so to speak a government of all its citizens. Others inside the
9 government saw it more from the Muslim angle, and that was also known.
10 And it was to be, as I say, highly centralised, and so the constituent
11 units of the country - after all, all countries with constituent units
12 whether they're called states or provinces or regions, whatever - they
13 wanted these constituent units to be largely administrative and the
14 government to be centralised with the decision-making power in Sarajevo.
15 Q. One of the words you used a moment ago in describing this position
16 was a unitary state or a unitary government. You said "unitary state" on
17 line 24 at page 44.
18 A. Mm-hmm.
19 Q. What do you mean when you say "unitary" in this context?
20 A. By "unitary" I mean that there was to be one state called Bosnia
21 and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with no sub-units on
22 the territory. And the reason they were insistent on that was that the
23 Bosnian Serbs, as I mentioned earlier, had already declared the existence
24 in their minds of a state called Republika Srpska, and the Bosnian Croats
25 had already declared and let it be known about the community of
1 Herceg-Bosna, so that the government wanted a unitary statement without
2 the existence of these sub-states.
3 Q. Can you then tell the Judges, please, what the aims or objectives
4 as you came to know them, you and Secretary Vance and Lord Owen - when I
5 say "you," I'm speaking of the group of you working together, not just
6 yourself personally - that you came to know about the positions and aims
7 of the Bosnian Serbs.
8 A. Yes. The Bosnian Serbs had many aims. The first was the creation
9 of the Republika Srpska, the Serbian republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
10 second was that this state should have a continuous territory, not be
11 chopped up into patches. The third aim was that the Republika Srpska be
12 contiguous with Serbia so that in the fourth aim it could either join or
13 associate or have some special relationship with Serbia. And the fifth
14 aim was to divide Sarajevo between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian
15 Muslims. And the sixth and last aim was to hold a veto power over any
16 serious actions that would be taken or contemplated by the central
17 government in Bosnia, because they knew there would be a Central Bosnian
18 government since the state had existed. It was already a member of the UN
19 and was recognised internationally.
20 So those were the six war aims of the Bosnian Serbs.
21 Q. When you talk about the territory and the recognised entity, what
22 became known either then or later as the Republika Srpska, was there any
23 aspect or dimension of the Bosnian Serb objectives or aims having to deal
24 with ethnicity or the demographic make-up of the citizenship, if you will,
25 or the members, the persons who would live in this territory?
1 A. Yes. They made it clear, abundantly clear, that their goal was a
2 homogeneous state, a state of Serbs and for Serbs. And one also observed
3 that because we were aware of the ethnic cleansing that was going on.
4 Q. And you're saying now that not only did you come to know that as
5 an objective, but you actually saw conduct -- are you telling us you saw
6 conduct consistent with or evidencing that objective?
7 A. Oh, yes. It was probably the most attention-getting activity of
8 the Bosnian Serbs was their ethnic cleansing activities.
9 Q. Now, let me turn then next to the objectives or aims that you came
10 to know held by the Bosnian Croat party to these proceedings.
11 A. The Bosnian Croats made clear to us that they also wished to have
12 their own entity in -- in and on the territory of the Republic of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was what they called Herceg-Bosna. They had
14 created a -- a unit. It can be called a community, later a republic.
15 They said, "We speak on behalf of Herceg-Bosna." They were quite clear
16 about that, and they also wanted a special relationship with Croatia or
17 the possibility to join Croatia formally at some later date.
18 Q. Did you learn anything about their aims or objectives in terms of
19 geography or territory?
20 A. Yes. The principal areas of interest to Mate Boban and the
21 Bosnian Croats were, as you might expect, the areas where Bosnian Croats
22 live, and this was primarily the -- in Herzegovina along the Dinaric
23 mountains, the border between the Dalmatian coast and Bosnia. And the
24 other major region was the Posavina, the area south of the Sava River in
25 Bosnia but directly adjacent to Croatia. And then they had very strong
1 interests in Central Bosnia, areas like Travnik, Jajce, Vares.
2 President Tudjman was particularly interested in Vares. He would raise
3 that subject with me frequently. And so Central Bosnia was also an area
4 of interest. The three areas were Herzegovina, Central Bosnia, and the
6 Q. And in connection with the territory, did you and Secretary Vance
7 and Lord Owen come to recognise or identify that territory, the desired
8 territory, with any concepts or maps that you had been familiar with
10 A. Well, we knew of this Macek-Cvetkovic Agreement, and that was one
11 aspect. And we also learned directly from the parties. We were, after
12 all, negotiating with them about the future of this area, and they made
13 clear what they wanted. Indeed they gave us their own maps. Each of the
14 three parties would periodically bring us map about where they thought the
15 boundaries, if there were to be boundaries - I repeat, if there were to be
16 boundaries - where they were to be set. So we had a direct knowledge from
17 Karadzic, Boban, Izetbegovic, you know, of the areas that were of
18 particular interest to them.
19 Q. For --
20 A. I should -- may I add something?
21 Q. Please.
22 A. Just to give an example for Your Honours, it was known, and this
23 was a problem between the Muslims, that the Cazinska Krajina, what came to
24 be called during the war the Bihac pocket, but Cazinska Krajina was an
25 area of deep concern to the government because in the Cazinska Krajina was
1 an alternate Bosnian Muslim leader who was no friend of the administration
2 in Sarajevo, and they were no friend of his, a gentleman named Fikret
3 Abdic. And President Tudjman was also keep concerned about the fate of
4 the Cazinska Krajina, the so-called Bihac pocket, not because there were
5 Croats living there, there were very few, but it's the point of Bosnia
6 that juts into Croatia. So it's of direct interest to the Croatian
7 government. And then we must bear in mind that President Tudjman was,
8 after all, a military man and very aware of transport. And as he would
9 say to me more than once, the transportation from -- the roads, the
10 railroads, roads from Zagreb, from Karlovac down to the Dalmatian coast
11 went through the Cazinska Krajina. That is to say, went through Western
13 So these were the constant concerns, and one did not need to infer
14 the importance of areas to the warring parties because they made clear to
15 us what their concerns were.
16 Q. Before we -- we will look at, in fact, one of the maps at the
17 moment, but can we -- before we go on to the map, in describing the aims
18 or objectives of the Bosnian Serb party, which you did a few minutes ago,
19 and the Bosnian Croat party, which you've just done, can you tell us
20 whether to your knowledge and in your experience were the objectives of
21 those two parties more similar or different?
22 A. Excuse me, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs?
23 Q. Yes, in terms of their objectives as they became known to you.
24 A. Yes. There were similarities. There were congruities with
25 respect to the creation of their own separate state; and second, the
1 possibility of joining the mother state, for the Bosnian Serbs Serbia, for
2 the Bosnian Croats, Croatia, and then for the desire that their states be
3 as ethnically homogeneous as possible. So there were overlaps as between
4 the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat war aims in that respect.
5 MR. SCOTT: Can I ask that the witness be provided the Exhibit P
6 09276, which is the book of maps, and if it's more simple, I can -- the
7 Prosecution can provide that, and specifically map -- I'll ask you to look
8 at map 4, which is page 5 of the actual -- in e-court, I think it's page 5
9 because of the cover page.
10 Perhaps we could centre the one -- one of the maps more clearly on
11 the page and as much as possible in e-court. Maybe zoom out a bit, just a
12 little bit, if we can. Thank you very much.
13 Q. Sir, several times already this afternoon you have made reference
14 to the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement or the Hrvatska Banovina. Can you tell
15 the Judges whether the territory you associate with those -- with that
16 agreement and that area, is that shown on the map that is currently
17 displayed, you have in front of you as map 4 to Prosecution Exhibit P
19 A. Yes, that is the map of the Banovina.
20 Q. And can you tell us, when you referred to earlier -- you said
21 there were several territorial aims. There were the area of Herzegovina,
22 Central Bosnia, and an area called the Posavina. Let's start with the
23 last area. If you have a pointer there, if you could point somewhere to
24 the area when you call -- when you say the Posavina, what area are you
25 talking about?
1 A. The Posavina is -- constitutes the border, the extreme eastern,
2 northern border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it's this
4 Q. All right.
5 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I just noticed myself I was in e-court,
6 but in order to see what the witness is doing I'm looking at the ELMO,
7 now, view.
8 Q. I'm sorry, Witness. I think most of us in the court were looking
9 at a different video image than the one you were pointing at. Could you
10 point again at the area called the Posavina.
11 A. [Indicates]
12 Q. All right.
13 A. May I add --
14 Q. Yes.
15 A. -- that it was an area of vital concern also to the Bosnian Serbs
16 because it was the centre of the so-called corridor connecting Belgrade
17 and Banja Luka, that is to say connecting the capital of Serbia with the
18 putative capital of the Republika Srpska. There was much suggestion,
19 heavy, heavy discussion about this area during the entire period of the
20 negotiations. Indeed, it is not resolved to this day the status of parts
21 of the Posavina.
22 Q. If I can just have a moment. I've given you my book of maps, sir,
23 and I'm looking in e-court for another page of that same booklet. If
24 you'll give me one moment, please.
25 MR. SCOTT: If -- perhaps if I could have the booklet for a moment
1 it might be quicker. Thanks very much.
2 Q. If I can direct your attention to what's been admitted as map 6 of
3 that Exhibit P 09276.
4 Now, on this particular map do you see that the Banovina map, has
5 been overlaid on the territories claimed by the Croatian community of
6 Posavina, and the Croatian community of and the Croatian Community of
8 A. Is there a question?
9 Q. Yes. Do you see that?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And did you come to know -- did you and Secretary Vance and Lord
12 Owen come to know of this relationship between the territories, the
13 territorial aims of the Bosnian Croat party during the period of your
14 negotiations with them?
15 A. Yes, indeed. As I previously mentioned, Vares, which is over here
16 north of Sarajevo, was a constant subject raised with me by President
17 Tudjman. Jajce, which I already mentioned, is and was very important.
18 There's a waterfall and a lot of waterpower around Jajce. And from the
19 economic point of view, it's very important both for Bosnia and for
20 Croatia, because much of the electric power in Croatia comes from power
21 plants around the area of Jajce. It also has, of course, for all
22 Yugoslavs of a certain age an importance because it was in Jajce in
23 November 1943, during World War II, that Tito declared the existence of
24 the AVNOJ republic, that is to say the Partisan republic. And that day
25 became the national day of Yugoslavia and was the national day from 1945
1 till 1991. For all I know, it may still be the national day in Belgrade.
2 But these are very sensitive areas, and so this was well-known.
3 And looking up north, Orasje and Odzak and Bosanski Samac, this
4 area was also very sensitive to Mate Boban and to President Tudjman.
5 Q. Now, in reference to President Tudjman, can you tell us, and think
6 we're done with the maps unless the Judges have questions about the maps
7 before I have the usher return to her seat. Thank you, Your Honours.
8 Sir, you just mentioned that these -- some of these areas, Vares,
9 the Posavina, were of particular concern to President Tudjman. Did you
10 have various conversations and meetings directly with President Tudjman on
11 these topics, these and other parts of the work you were trying to carry
12 out at the time?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And did he make known to you his views and the relationship
15 between his views and those of the Bosnian Croat party?
16 A. They were identical.
17 Q. And how did that manifest itself, or how did you know that?
18 A. He said so.
19 Q. In your travels -- well, during the time you were carrying out
20 this mission, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia or
21 ICFY, did you have occasion to travel about the various parts of the
22 former Yugoslavia at that time?
23 A. Yes. We visited all the capitals, of course. I would say we
24 travelled more, certainly I did, more in Croatia than in any other area,
25 and that's because the fighting in Croatia was very severe. It preceded
1 Bosnia, so we were there earlier, and then we had created the four
2 UN-protected areas in Croatia which I visited regularly. And that was not
3 hard to do. They were all adjacent to Bosnia. And in Bosnia we were --
4 largely visited Sarajevo and other areas as well, "Jablanica, Vares,
5 Kresevo, Visoko." Jablanica, Vares, Kresevo, Visoko, several areas.
6 Q. Let me ask you this before moving on to another topic. In your
7 travels in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did you see anything, did you observe
8 yourself during your travels anything that manifested itself as showing an
9 orientation or an allegiance to Croatia at any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina
10 where you travelled?
11 A. Yes. That was self-evident. On one occasion we travelled by road
12 from Split to Sarajevo because the airport was closed due to heavy Serb
13 shelling, and there were never many flights into Sarajevo, which of course
14 was being besieged by the Serbs. We flew in on UN flights, but in this
15 case we couldn't do even that. So we flew from, I believe, Zagreb. But
16 in any case, we drove from Split to Sarajevo and on the main roads, and we
17 were greeted at the border between Bosnia and Croatia by Mate Boban. And
18 there was a lovely table spread with very good Croatian wine, and we all
19 had a drink and then continued on. And we observed the Croatian flag was
20 flying, the red checker flag, which we were quite used to seeing. And
21 anyway, we proceeded north. We saw some Mujahedin at one point, Muslims
22 from the Arab world with their green headbands and yellow printing in the
23 Arabic alphabet, firing guns into the area, driving by on trucks. One
24 always had the impression that they fired more into the air than against
25 the enemy, but that's a separate subject. And we were able to observe --
1 in fact, we commented to each other, Secretary Vance and I, at the time
2 that the one felt as though one was in Croatia. It wasn't until we were
3 physically on the outskirts of Sarajevo that you didn't know you were in
5 Q. And how so? I mean, what --
6 A. Well, the attitude. All the people who were with us, the people
7 on the side of the road, the flags that were flying were Croatian. If you
8 stopped to buy a Coke Cola you paid in, kuna, the Croatian currency, not
9 the Bosnian dinar.
10 Q. Let me ask you about -- let me now ask you if you could go to the
11 first instance to one of your are diaries, Exhibit P 00534. Let me ask
12 you some questions about some entries in your diary, please. And if I
13 can -- if you go to tab -- your tab P 00534, and in particular I'm going
14 to be making references, Ambassador, to the -- what we call the ERN
15 numbers as page numbers, and you will see on each page - and sometimes
16 they're easier to find than others - there's a stamp. These begin with --
17 all these series of numbers begin with an R, and if I can please ask you
18 to go, in particular, to -- I'll wait for a moment until you catch up.
19 Also a date. The date may help since, of course, the material is in
20 chronological order. So I'm going to be referring you to the 11th of
21 October, 1992. The entry for that date 11th of October begins on page,
22 and again I'm referring to the R number, R0164042. If you'd find that.
23 And then specifically my question to you is on the following page,
24 R0164043, and on the right side of that page, on the right side of your
25 notebook, essentially, at the top of that page starts with the
1 word "Karadzic." Do you see that?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now, before I ask you particular questions about your entries, can
4 you remind or tell the Judges, please, what particular meetings or
5 conversations you were having on the 11th of October, 1992, just to put
6 this in context?
7 A. Well, as you can see, we were in Geneva. It was Sunday, and
8 Secretary Vance and I and the head of our working group met with Karadzic.
9 We did so frequently, and this was one of those meetings.
10 Q. The entry that I just particularly directed your attention to on
11 the page that starts under the heading "Karadzic," says "Kara." Is
12 K-a-r-a an abbreviation?
13 A. That's Karadzic.
14 Q. And it says "Main problem, Tito's borders. But if Serbs and
15 Croats are clever, exchange borders voluntarily, this exchange would
16 help." Can you tell us please what was being discussed in that regard?
17 A. Well, yes. He was -- he was essentially describing the Graz
18 Agreement to us. And being a Bosnian Serb, he had no love for Marsal Tito
19 who was half Slovenian and half Croat. So he says that the main problem
20 is Tito's borders. You see, the Bosnian Serbs felt they had been done
21 dirt to by Tito in 1945. In any case, that's what he means, that if the
22 Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats are clever, those -- they can cooperate
23 with each other, they can basically have what -- what they talked about at
24 Graz, namely to partition Bosnia between them.
25 Q. Immediately under the entry that I just directed your attention
1 to, it says: "(Draws map by hand)" Is that a reference to something you
3 A. No, he did. You can see it's under the entry of Karadzic. Yes,
4 Karadzic drew a map what the -- of Bosnia by hand, what Bosnia would look
5 like when it was partitioned between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats.
6 Q. And do you have any recollection generally of what that map looked
8 A. Certainly, it was basically the same one that President Tudjman
9 drew in 1995.
10 MR. STEWART: Excuse me, Your Honours. I wonder if we could just
11 be clear where the asterisks come from. We do see asterisks at various
12 points throughout this document and, in particular, on this page.
13 MR. SCOTT: I will be happy to inquire.
14 Q. Ambassador, you just heard the comment by counsel. Can you
15 tell -- can you tell the Judges what the various asterisk markings on this
16 and other pages of your diaries indicate?
17 A. Yes, it's quite simple. They indicate points of particular
19 Q. And when did you put thee asterisks on your diary?
20 A. At the time they were said or as I looked at the document right
21 after the meeting. So they were identically -- really contemporaneous.
22 And if you look at the asterisks, you can see the points being made there
23 are important points.
24 Q. Let me then go back to -- we'll be looking at other entries in
25 your diaries as we continue through your testimony, but let me go back --
1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry if I'm -- interrupt -- we were talking
2 about maps.
3 MR. SCOTT: Yes.
4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: And the witness gave a somewhat cryptic answer in
5 that he referred to a comparison map that Tudjman drew in 1995, and which
6 I do not think is presently before the Chamber. So perhaps the witness
7 could - could - show, on one of the maps we have, what it was.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour. Your Honour, I believe the gentleman
9 is trying to bring in the so-called map that was on the napkin when Paddy
10 Ashdown, who was heavily drinking at the time and having a conversation
11 with Tudjman, who doesn't speak English, that's the conversation the
12 gentleman is speaking about. And as I understand it, the -- this
13 gentleman was not present at the time. So you do need some foundation.
14 One, did he actually see the map, did he actually see the map, and where
15 is this map? But I -- as far as I know, there's already a decision by the
16 Trial Chamber that this is speculative in nature. The question was what
17 it would look like ten years from now, and so on and so forth. So based
18 on that, Your Honour, I think this is one way of trying to sneak in the
19 work of the Prosecution. Basically, I would imagine, because he has been
20 proofed heavily by the Prosecution because for the first time we're
21 hearing things --
22 MR. SCOTT: Objection.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: -- that are not in his statement.
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas, my thoughts went in the same
25 direction but with a quite different idea. I think that, Mr. Okun, you
1 were there and you saw that map being drawn by Karadzic, and I would like
2 you to look at one of the maps we have here and draw what you have seen
3 yourself at that moment but not reproduced in your diary without any
4 reference to any possible later map drawn by anyone at any occasion. I am
5 fully -- I was very, very careful exactly to avoid what you warn us
6 against, Mr. Karnavas.
7 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, before he does that, and I think
8 that he should -- and I think he should do that and I'm sure that the
9 Ambassador's quite capable of doing that, but I want to make a record; Mr.
10 Karnavas is always talking about making a record. Your Honour, it is
11 inappropriate for counsel -- he wants to exclude the testimony, exclude
12 the evidence of this but yet engages in character assassination against a
13 person who is not in the courtroom about heavily drink, about who was
14 doing what and saying what. And, you know, it's ironic that we have this
15 speculation by counsel when, in fact, we have Mr. Ashdown's testimony
16 available to us, and this whole question, this whole -- excuse me. This
17 whole question about drinking and all that was discussed in open court in
18 the other cases. Judge Jorda had all of that in front him. Judge Jorda
19 accepted all this testimony -- testimony was accepted in the Blaskic case,
20 in the Kordic case, in the Tuta Stela case. It is odd -- I have to
21 observe again, it is odd that it was relevant in all those cases but not
22 relevant in this case. But in any event, my point is, Mr. Karnavas should
23 not get up every time on his feet and then attack the witness -- a person
24 who is not here and at the same time say, "Well, we shouldn't look at the
25 actual evidence itself."
1 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. Ashdown by his own admission said that the wine
2 was flowing. That's what -- that's a quote.
3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If I may. Let's not perhaps transfer the -- the
4 theatre of war to a place where my questions definitely did not want to
5 put it. And, Mr. Scott, this reaction of Mr. Karnavas was to a question
6 of mine rather than -- than to you raising a point.
7 So could the witness be shown a map and then tentatively,
8 according to his memory, demonstrate what he remembers Mr. Karadzic at --
9 on the 11th of -- what was it? On the 11th of October, 1992, a Sunday,
10 drew in his presence.
11 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour, but I will have to obtain a clean
12 map to do that. I have nothing available to me at the moment without
13 making a copy first.
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I think the -- this witness has a level of
15 faculty of abstraction that any map you take where you have the area on it
16 he will be able to abstract from what he sees there and -- and just from
17 his memory draw that borderline which he recalls, and I see that he's
18 nodding to this --
19 MR. SCOTT: Do you want him to draw just on a blank piece of paper
20 of Bosnia and the lines? Is that what you're saying?
21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I thought you could show him any of the maps we
22 have here which has not too much -- let me just --
23 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I don't have a clean -- I don't have an
24 extra copy of the map in the courtroom. That's my problem.
25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: And you have no --
1 MR. SCOTT: If you want me to stop and have a copy made and bring
2 it into the courtroom I'll be happy to do that.
3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That might be a solution had unless anybody has a
4 map which --
5 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I have a map in my briefcase.
6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Why don't you use it.
7 THE WITNESS: It's a simple -- a simple map of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute, Ambassador.
9 There are two other individuals who would like to take the floor.
10 Mr. Praljak is on his feet and Ms. Alaburic, too.
11 Mr. Praljak, what is it that you wanted to say? And it should
12 concern you.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the accused, please.
14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] What does a conversation in
15 1995 have to do with anything when all international agreements --
16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Not an issue, Mr. Praljak. This is not a
17 necessary intervention. Please, you are disturbing the course of the
18 trial. We are not talking about 1995.
19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] But we're talking about a
20 plan that President Tudjman apparently had with Ashdown. That was in
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. It is entirely wrong. We are talking
23 about a map on which Mr. Karadzic on the 11th of October, 1992, drew a
24 line and that is all, and I have said so quite clearly, I think. If you
25 had been attentive, you would have been aware of this.
1 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] That's correct,
2 Judge Trechsel, but at the same time the question is whether that map
3 corresponds to the map from 1995 when --
4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: No, Mr. Praljak. That is not the question. You
5 may -- you may have this question, but it's not the one that is on the
6 table before the Chamber at this moment.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, to conclude.
8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Perhaps I
9 could contribute to this discussion.
10 In my opinion, Mr. Karadzic's words transcribed here, and they
11 concern the borders of all the republics of the former Yugoslavia. And if
12 we are discussing Tito's borders, we are discussing the borders of all the
13 republics of the former Yugoslavia. If we have a look at the way the
14 territory has been divided amongst the Croats and the Serbs, and if we are
15 aware of the contexts in which they were discussions about Yugoslavia at
16 the time, we know that we're referring to parts of Croatia and Serbia or
17 Montenegro that were intended to be exchanged. Baranja or Prevlaka and
18 towards the border with Montenegro. If we continue to have a look at what
19 Mr. Karadzic was discussing, we can see that he referred to Kosovo, to
20 Montenegro, et cetera. So I think that it's a matter of redrawing the
21 borders in the territory of Yugoslavia as a whole. Thank you very much.
22 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I have obtained a -- have here an extra
23 copy of a map that we have prepared, which is numbered for the record 0 --
24 P 09841, and since I have an extra copy I don't mind if the witness marks
25 on that and then we can have it made an IC number.
1 Q. So, Witness, if you can --
2 MR. SCOTT: Could the map first be put directly in front of the
3 witness so the witness can first orient himself and make any markings, and
4 then we can put it on the ELMO.
5 THE WITNESS: May I make two remarks very brief. First the
6 Security Council, right when Karadzic talked about Tito's borders, he was
7 talking loosely. That's the way Karadzic always spoke, speaking very
8 broadly, about all of Yugoslavia. The map he drew by hand in front of us
9 was of Bosnia alone.
10 A second point, President Tito [sic], in contradistinction to what
11 the learned counsel says about his English, speaks good English. I had
12 numerous conversations with him, sitting more closely to the president
13 than I am --
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Are you talking about Marsal Tito?
15 THE WITNESS: No, President Tudjman.
16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you, because there was a mistake in the
18 THE WITNESS: President Tudjman did not speak fluent English but
19 he spoke good English, and I had occasion to discuss many matters with him
20 directly in English.
21 MR. SCOTT:
22 Q. Sir, with that in mind --
23 A. And on the map -- yes, on the map.
24 Q. Could I just -- no one's going to see it right now, but I first
25 want you to do is take a marker -- first look at the map. Make sure that
1 you've oriented yourself to the map?
2 A. I'm very familiar with this map.
3 Q. I know you are. But what I would like you to do is make -- what
4 the Judges have asked us to do is make markings, so draw the line --
5 recreate the map as best you can recall. That's what Judge Trechsel has
6 asked you to do. So you're going to be provided a marker.
7 A. Yes. Starting in the south it would go along the border of the
8 Neretva, then east to cover the entire Drina valley through Semberija, up
9 to the Posavina, and then across to something like this, and then down
10 along the Una River, so it would be roughly like that. Think of a
11 horseshoe, the best way to describe it. Indeed, the word that Bosnians
12 and others used it. The Bosnian Serbs talked about their horseshoe. So
13 that was the area.
14 Q. On the line that you've drawn and we --
15 A. Excuse me. I should have gone this way with this. Sorry. It
16 included all -- everything that's blue on this map. It included
17 everything that's blue and quite a lot of green. The green is the -- are
18 the Muslim areas, and you'll notice in particular, if I may just for a
19 moment point out the area around the Drina. This was the area of heaviest
20 ethnic cleansing by the Bosnian Serbs.
21 Q. All right. Now, sir, you've drawn -- what you've drawn on the map
22 just so we can now ask some questions about it, the -- I'll use your
23 terminology and say kind of an upside down horseshoe with the top of the
24 horseshoe as a number 5 in the area and the open end of the horseshoe of
25 what would be considered the border, the south-west border of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, if you will; is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The area outside the horseshoe -- if we talk about the area inside
4 the horseshoe and outside the horseshoe, who -- according to Karadzic and
5 your understanding of the Serb position at the time, who would have the
6 territory outside the horseshoe?
7 A. You mean the non-Serb occupied territory?
8 Q. Well, you've drawn a horseshoe?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. The area --
11 A. Which they call Republika Srpska.
12 Q. Who would have the territory outside the horseshoe.
13 A. That is not inside. Yes. That would be Croatian with a -- with a
14 small Muslim area. As I mentioned earlier, one of their war aims was to
15 divide Sarajevo so there would be a portion of Sarajevo and surrounding
16 areas that would be Muslim, and basically the Muslim area, as the Bosnian
17 Serbs envisaged it, would run from Sarajevo on the south to Tuzla which
18 you see in the north-east right next to 4 and 5 you see a green spot.
19 That's Tuzla. So you would go from Sarajevo to Tuzla across to Zenica and
20 then back to Sarajevo. So there would be a very small Diamond-shaped area
21 that the Bosnian Serbs would have accorded to the Bosnian Muslims and the
22 rest of the area outside the horseshoe would be for the Bosnian Croats.
23 Q. All right. I'm not sure that we're -- again that's the problem --
24 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I think I see what's happening,
25 actually. I think that Prosecution counsel, when he's talking about the
1 horseshoe, he's talking about the line but the witness is understanding
2 the area outside the line. So they're talking about different horseshoes,
3 which is the reason Mr. Scott is looking a bit exasperated because Mr.
4 Okun's answers are not quite matching his questions. They're all to do
5 with horseshoes.
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. Stewart.
7 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. Stewart; I do appreciate that.
8 Q. Sir, what -- I think counsel's right and that's the problem of
9 sometimes withdrawing maps in the courtroom like this. If I -- if you
10 look -- when I call the inside of the horseshoe the area number 10, I'm
11 saying the area -- see the number 10?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. I'm calling that area inside the horseshoe.
14 A. Yes, so am I.
15 Q. The area outside the horseshoe is the area that has most of number
16 2, most of number 4. That's outside the horseshoe?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. The area outside the horseshoe, 2, 3, 4, 6 going around the
20 A. Yeah, mm-hmm.
21 Q. Would that be -- who would that territory --
22 A. That would be Republika Srpska.
23 Q. And the area inside the area -- the horseshoe, 10, 9, 7, 5, who
24 would have that territory?
25 A. That would be the area for the Bosnian Croats except for the small
1 diamond that I just described, the area roughly from Sarajevo to Tuzla to
2 notes back to Sarajevo would be a Muslim reservation.
3 Q. All right. As long as we've engaged in this exercise to this
4 point, perhaps we might as well have you mark this area that you say would
5 be the Muslim area or enclave. So I'm going to ask you now to take the
6 manager and do that as best you can.
7 A. That triangle, in Dr. Karadzic's mind, would be Muslim. The rest
8 of the country would be divided between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian
9 Serbs. That was Dr. Karadzic's point.
10 Q. Now, I'm moving away from the map so we're --
11 MR. SCOTT: Judge Trechsel, do you have any additional questions
12 about the map?
13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you very much. And I hope this wasn't too
15 MR. SCOTT: Thank you.
16 Q. Now, if we can go back to the work of the --
17 MR. SCOTT: We need an IC number, Your Honour, before we proceed.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could we have an
19 IC number, please. Can we have the map signed, please.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it will become Exhibit IC 520.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ambassador, could you please put
22 today's date, 2nd April 2007, and also could you please sign the document
23 for us. 2nd April.
24 Mr. Scott, please continue.
25 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. All right. Sir, moving back to the process of the International
2 Conference on the Former Yugoslavia itself, just to bring us back to where
3 we were, we talked about the formation of the conference, the working
4 groups of the conference, who the principal representatives of the three
5 parties were to the conference, and as the work of the conference
6 continued into the fall of 1992, can you tell the Chamber whether
7 something called constitutional principles or constitutional framework was
8 developed in negotiations or discussions with the parties?
9 A. Yes. That was an important milestone when the conference
10 developed and put on the table the constitutional framework or
11 constitutional principles, as we usually referred to them. That occurred
12 on 27 October 1992. And these were, as you can understand, framework
13 principles to be the guiding rules, the overall guide for the future of
15 Q. Can you tell us kind of in a shorthand way, and we will look at
16 some of these principles as they later evolved in the course of your
17 testimony later, but what were the types of concepts that were involved in
18 these principles?
19 A. Well, Bosnia was to retain its sovereignty within its
20 internationally recognised borders. The state was to be democratic,
21 highly democratic, decentralised. The ethnic principle de-emphasised,
22 that is to say multi-ethnic state, democratically decentralised, and also
23 progressively demilitarised. And the formation on the ground, so to
24 speak, the structure, had 10 provinces, including one for Sarajevo with a
25 special status, and the provinces had a good deal of responsibility in
1 this plan. They did not, however, have the right -- according to the
2 constitutional framework, they did not have the right to establish
3 relations, form relations with any foreign country, nor did they have the
4 right to form relations with any international organisation.
5 Q. Now, in addition to the constitutional principals, just to put the
6 various components of the negotiations, the principal parts, if you will,
7 of the negotiations on the table, so to speak, was the -- we've just spent
8 a few -- some minutes talking about a map. Was the "map" part of the
9 ongoing negotiations, the map of Bosnia-Herzegovina --
10 A. Oh, yes, indeed. The discussions of the map were continuous and
12 Q. And was a third significant component of these ongoing
13 negotiations something called the military arrangements?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. What did that involve?
16 A. Well, that involved the -- as I said, the progressive
17 demilitarisation of the country, complete cease-fire, of course, to start
18 with, the removal and secure cantonment of heavy weapons, military roads,
19 civilian roads. It was a lengthy exercise the development of the military
21 Q. Can I ask you, sir, just then as -- again as a matter of the
22 process, can you look at Exhibit P 00752. And I believe I can see from
23 where I am that you have that document. Can you tell us what that is?
24 A. Well, it's a Resolution of the United Nations Security Council,
25 number 787, adopted on the 16th of November, 1992, and deals with the --
1 the situation in the former Yugoslavia.
2 Q. Let me ask you to look at page 5, paragraph 20 of the document,
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Were the co-chairmen Secretary Vance and Lord Owen making reports
6 to the Security Council throughout this period?
7 A. Yes. You'll notice that paragraph 20 says, and I quote, the
8 Security Council: "Expresses its appreciation for the report presented to
9 the council by the co-chairmen of the steering committee of the
10 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia -" that's Owen and
11 Vance "- and requests the Secretary-General to keep the council regularly
12 informed of developments and of the work of the conference," and of course
13 we did so.
14 Q. Can I now ask you to go back to -- or go to Exhibit P 00829, again
15 one of your diaries. And in particular, in referring to the numbers that
16 have been stamped on the various pages, if you could please find -- and
17 I'll refer to the last four numbers just for simplicity's section. 4173,
18 which appears to be a discussion or a meeting on the 28th of November,
19 1992. Do you see that?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can you first of all set the scene for us as to where and what was
22 this meeting about? Who was the meeting with?
23 A. Yes. President Tudjman Secretary Vance and his wife, Lord Owen
24 and his wife, me and my wife, and some -- a few senior members of the
25 Croatian government, Gojko Susak, for example, to enjoy ourselves on
1 Brioni and have -- in a nice beautiful Mediterranean setting to discuss
2 the conflict.
3 Q. Now, throughout -- perhaps throughout your diaries generally to
4 assist the Judges in reading these documents, and in this entry in
5 particular, there are various entries on the page where you have used the
6 initial -- the capital letters or initials FT. Who is FT?
7 A. FT is the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman.
8 Q. You've also used the capital letters GS. Who was GS?
9 A. He's Gojko Susak.
10 Q. And who was Mr. Susak?
11 A. Susak was President Tudjman's closest advisor and the defence
13 Q. Of the Republic of Croatia?
14 A. Of the Republic of Croatia, yes.
15 Q. Now, on the -- looking at the document, and again we've got
16 essentially on all these items we've got essentially two pages of your
17 diary side by side copied on one A4 sheet. Looking at the right -- the --
18 excuse me. Looking at the page on the left, at the bottom of that page,
19 do you see:
20 "FT- Muslims want jihad.
21 "GS- must go getting billions from Arabs."
22 Do you see that?
23 A. No, I don't.
24 Q. Okay. On page 4173, on the left -- bottom left side of the page.
25 A. Ah, the bottom left.
1 Q. My apologies if I misdirected you.
2 A. Sorry. Yes, I see that.
3 Q. Going to the top of the -- right side of the page, "Croats/Serb
5 A. Mm-hmm.
6 Q. Is it correct it says: "All agree they are key to solving ex-Yugo
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. "FT says he supports this idea - for more than a decade; even
10 wrote about it." Do you see that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Can you tell the Judges what was being discussed in this context
13 and what was the subject of Croat/Serb relations?
14 A. Two aspects here were being discussed. First of all, the
15 situation in Bosnia. Since that's where the war was, that was the main
16 object of this part of this discussion. And then Tudjman who spoke in
17 broad historical terms made allusion to the history of the former
18 Yugoslavia with respect, of course, to the situation as between the Croat
19 people and the Serb people, because they are two -- overwhelmingly the two
20 majority peoples in the former Yugoslavia.
21 Q. When it's attributed to President Tudjman, you said, "for more
22 than a decade, even wrote about it," what he's talking about?
23 A. He's talking about Bosnia, because he had written about
24 partitioning Bosnia as between the Croats and the Serbs.
25 Q. And then below that entry you have the initials again GS, and
1 that's again Mr. Susak, the defence minister?
2 A. Yes, mm-hmm.
3 Q. "Problem is we can't do it. Looks like collusion and future
4 partition of BiH."
5 A. Yes, one sees how frank everybody was in discussion because Gojko
6 Susak says the problem is, you know, it won't look good to do it too
7 openly or even too soon. Saying that's what he means. He says it
8 directly. It would look like collusion --
9 Q. Collusion between --
10 A. Of course, it wouldn't just look like collusion, it would be
12 Q. Collusion between who?
13 A. The Croats and the Serbs.
14 Q. Further down the page GS talks again. It says, "GS stresses need
15 for quiet, serious, contacts with Serbs." What was that about?
16 A. Well, Gojko Susak was a very sophisticated man. He's dead now.
17 He was born in Grude in Herzegovina, so he took a direct strong interest,
18 to put it mildly, a strong interest in the Bosnian Croat cause. He was a
19 Bosnian Croat. He later emigrated to Canada and became a Canadian
20 citizen. He was a very sophisticated man. And so he says here that the
21 way to go about the business of partitioning Bosnia with the Serbs is to
22 do it in a quiet fashion.
23 Q. Can I ask you please to then go on to the next page --
24 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, Your Honour, where does it say that?
25 That they're going to partition -- I fail to see that.
1 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, may I answer that directly in order to
2 save time?
3 MR. KARNAVAS: I want to --
4 THE WITNESS: May I draw your attention to President Tudjman
5 saying he supports the idea. Everybody understood he was talking about
6 partition because the very next person to speak, Gojko Susak, says, "The
7 problem is we can't do it," and that's very clear. He's not talking about
8 NASA and a trip to the moon --
9 MR. KARNAVAS: May I remind the gentleman that it begins with the
10 lifting of the embargo of arms. You know, that's -- if you look at the
11 continuity of the discussion.
12 THE WITNESS: No, I beg your pardon.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, I beg your pardon, too, sir Could I ask --
14 MR. SCOTT: Well, perhaps this is better for cross-examination.
15 THE WITNESS: I was there when this happened.
16 MR. SCOTT: Exactly.
17 THE WITNESS: I wrote it as it happened. I put triple asterisks,
18 for Mr. Stewart's benefit. You notice triple asterisks and underlining
19 this phrase.
20 MR. SCOTT:
21 Q. Ambassador, let me ask the obvious question: Why did you put
22 three or four asterisks on both sides of the page on this part of your
24 A. Because the Bosnian Croat, or I should say Croat Serbian including
25 Bosnian Croat, Bosnian Serbian desire to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina was
1 well-known and very important.
2 Q. Let me direct your attention to the next page of the document,
3 the -- when I say the next page, it's 4174. The next -- essentially the
4 next two pages of your diary, still dated the 28th of November, 1992. On
5 the left side of the page, please, can I direct your attention to this
6 part, in the section that begins headed on the left side of the page FT.
7 Do you see the part it says, "I discussed BiH with Milo and Izzie."
8 A. That's Milosevic and Izetbegovic.
9 Q. "Before the current war and said there are two possibilities."
10 Why don't you just tell us instead of me reading it. They're your
11 words. It's your writing. What were the two possibilities?
12 A. The two possibilities were what President Tudjman called a
13 confederal Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say the State of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina would exist but there would be -- it would be a deeply
15 divided state with three regions, so to speak. The other one would be
16 more formal where you would divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into three parts.
17 Basically the Serb part -- the Bosnian Serb part joining Serbia and the
18 Croatian -- Croat -- Bosnian Croat side joining Croatia, and then as he
19 says, this would leave a Muslim patch - his word, patch - in the middle.
20 And if Your Honours will recall the map I drew a few moments ago, I
21 sketched out for you the line Sarajevo-Tuzla-Zenica-Sarajevo, that
22 triangle in the middle that's what President Tudjman meant.
23 Q. And --
24 A. And if I may say, you notice a few sentences earlier right in the
25 middle, the first thing he talked about, President Tudjman, the first
1 thing that he mentioned was the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement. You see the
2 sentence, if I may quote: "Croatia is smaller today than when it entered
3 Yugoslavia in 1919 and smaller than in 1939, the Macek agreement." That's
4 the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement. Macek was the Croat so it's understandable
5 that Tudjman would quote his name and not the Serb.
6 Q. When going down below that it says, then, after the patch, the
7 Muslim patch it says, "but now after war that's academic." So what was
8 being said in that aspect, if you recall?
9 A. Well, what he meant there was that there was going to be difficult
10 to achieve because of the -- of the conflict and because of all the
11 assistance the Bosnian Muslims were getting in order to maintain
12 themselves. But it remained a goal. And he goes right on to say -- the
13 very next line says: "The only good solution," this is President Tudjman
14 talking. "The only good solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina was the 1939
15 agreement. It came after 20 years of failure to deal with
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then Tito disastrously made ABiH and made the Muslims
17 a nation." By that President Tudjman means and of course everybody at the
18 table knew exactly what he meant, that the Muslims in the 1970s were
19 declared to be a constituent people of Yugoslavia because the constituent
20 peoples had specific rights in Yugoslavia. They had group rights, for
21 example. They did not need or ever claim minority rights, that certain
22 rights inhered to the "sastavni ne lod [phoen]," their word for
23 "constituent people." And so elevating the Muslims to the status of a
24 constituent people which Tito's government did in, I believe, 1974 was a
25 serious step, and it empowered the Muslims to a certain point, which
1 President Tudjman objected to, as you see here.
2 Q. If I can ask you then going to -- in -- again using the same
3 numbers, 4176, which appears to be -- you can confirm, please, if it's
4 correct. This is still -- we're still continuing on the 28th of November,
6 A. On the left-hand side, the 28th, yes.
7 Q. I'm sorry, yes, on the left-hand side. And again we have FT:
8 "Until two months ago Izzie and Muslims, plus Muslims wanted unitary
9 Muslim state (GS: Still do secretly)." Is that Franjo Tudjman and Susak
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. What was being -- what -- what furthermore -- what further can you
13 tell us the page and tell us as much as -- I don't need to ask you the
14 questions about what's being said here.
15 A. Well, as I mentioned earlier in answer to one of your questions,
16 the goal of the Bosnian Muslim government was indeed a unitary state, sort
17 of one person, one vote. And the reason for that was that by 1991, 1992,
18 the Muslim population already in Bosnia was a plurality of 44 per cent of
19 the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to the '81 census, '91 was
20 almost identical, was Muslim, was roughly 31 per cent Bosnian Serbs, and
21 about 18 per cent are Bosnian Croats. So the Muslims had the expectation
22 that they would become a majority and President Tudjman and Susak feared
23 very deeply what would happen if and when the Bosnian Muslims ever
24 achieved a majority in a unitary state. That is, as I said, a highly
25 centralised state. And Susak says they still want this. And then
1 President Tudjman goes on to say the Muslims are saying, and I quote him
2 here, "We weren't ready for the Serbs, but we will be for the Croats."
3 And he then went on to say that Tudjman, who was the -- excuse me. Sorry.
4 That Izetbegovic, who was the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but his
5 formal title was president of the Presidency, because they had a rotating
6 Presidency, and since it rotated it was due to rotate actually in January
7 to the Bosnian Croat on the Presidency, and Izetbegovic and Silajdzic and
8 Ganic said that we're at war now. It's a very serious situation. Because
9 of wartime, you know, I should -- I will retain the Presidency. And this
10 displeased President Tudjman, but he goes on to say, "The Muslims decided
11 that Izetbegovic should continue. We don't care. I recommended," quote
12 unquote, "to Boban that he agree and he did. And the reason I put
13 recommended in quotes, because the president smiled at that point, and
14 when he used the word "recommended," of course he knew that he was saying
15 I told Boban or I ordered Boban. So recommended was a politesse, and --
16 and that indeed continued. Izetbegovic remained the titular president of
17 Bosnia for years thereafter.
18 Q. Just so it's clear, Ambassador, if you can, when you
19 say "recommended," and again in quotes, quote, "recommended to Boban that
20 he agree and he did," that Boban agree to what?
21 A. Agree to allowing Izetbegovic to continue in the titular
22 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the -- as the president of the
24 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I look at the time, and that may be the
25 time to take the next break.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have a 20-minute break
3 --- Recess taken at 5.35 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 5.55 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you have the floor.
6 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. Mr. Ambassador, before we -- I'm going to go way back, I'm sorry,
8 to the beginning very, very briefly just to deal with something. Before I
9 forget, we might as well do it now. In your bundle, if you go back to the
10 very first exhibit, we were talking about the Graz agreement. Exhibit P
11 00187, because I'm not sure we'll have anyone else here who can identify a
12 couple of items on the document. So I forgot to ask you before. I
14 On the very -- if you look at the second page of that document,
15 it's in the -- I need the assistance of the usher, please. It's in the
16 other binder.
17 A. I have it in front of me.
18 Q. The second page of the document there is -- it's handwritten. It
19 says, "Dear Colm," C-o-l-m. Do you see that? Sir, if you look at the
20 second page.
21 A. I don't see it.
22 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, sorry. Apparently the wrong -- my
23 apologies, Your Honour. I'll try to come back to it tomorrow. Some pages
24 are missing. I apologise for that. My apologies to the usher for the
1 Q. Sir, then going to the P 00829. We're still on the same diary we
2 were looking at before the break, I believe, and if we go to the entry for
3 the 17th of December, 1992, page 4240.
4 A. 4240 did you say?
5 Q. Yes, sir. All right. On the top of the right side of the page
6 you have -- it looks like Tudjman/Izzie/something us. I guess us. Do you
7 see that?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And let me just make sure -- because I have -- I think I may have
10 misspoken when I said the 17th. Is this -- is the date in your
11 handwriting is that the 17th or the 27th of --
12 A. It's 27.
13 Q. Thank you. Thank you very much. All right. Continuing down and
14 going back to the left side of the page then. It says CRV. Who is CRV?
15 A. Vance. If I might go through all of the names. I can do it very
16 quickly for the Court.
17 Q. Please.
18 A. CRV is Vance. DLO is Lord Owen. HSO is me. PH is Ambassador
19 Hall. Martti is the head of our working group. Martti Ahtisaari. PGR is
20 Perti Ramturan [phoen] from the United Nations Secretariat. Then we have
21 President Tudjman, Vudi Radic [phoen]. Mate Boban, Gojko Susak, Neven
22 Madry, and Professor Janko was interpreting. That was the Croatian
23 delegation, and the Bosnian was Izetbegovic, Silajdzic, Trnka, their
24 lawyer, Somun --
25 Q. Slow, slow, slow down a little bit, please, for the purposes of
1 the translation?
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. Yes.
3 Ambassador, could you slow down and Mr. Scott could you slow down too
4 since the interpreters are having a little difficult following.
5 THE WITNESS: Excuse me. I apologise to the Court. Starting with
6 Tudjman President Tudjman; his Chef de Cabinet, Jure Radic; Mate Boban,
7 Herceg-Bosna. You'll notice I do not say BiH next to Mate Boban because
8 he described himself as from Herceg-Bosna. So that's what I wrote.
9 Defence Minister Gojko Susak. Charge Neven Madry. That is to say the
10 Croatian charge d'affair in Geneva; and the interpreter Professor Janko.
11 From the Bosnian delegation was President Izetbegovic; Haris
12 Silajdzic, his foreign minister; Mr. Trnka, their legal advisor; Mr.
13 Somun, another advisor, and Sabrina who interpreted for the delegation
14 when interpretation was necessary, and she is also President Izetbegovic's
16 MR. SCOTT:
17 Q. Thank you for that. And underneath that there is then the entry
18 marked CRV, Secretary Vance. "Welcome, where do we stand after December
19 17th." Do you see that?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And just looking at this document, sir, can you just look at your
22 notes and tell us then what was discussed at this meeting as -- looking at
23 the notes and whatever additional recollection that you have that you can
24 share with us.
25 A. Yes. Well, we had brought the two parties together, that is to
1 say the Croatian side and the Bosnian side in order to work with them and
2 see the way forward and find out what was going on and what was on their
3 minds. This is normal practice in a negotiation, particularly at the
4 highest level. And Secretary Vance welcomed them and the first response
5 was Izetbegovic who said, "there is no complete agreement on the map but
6 we're making progress," getting there means making progress. We have
7 problems with Travnik and Mostar, which meant that there was a direct
8 problem between the Croats and the Muslims, and he gave us a new map.
9 He goes on to say that his new map retains the old opstina
10 boundaries, but he says, "we are willing to change them." Owen says,
11 "That's a good thing; they're not sacrosanct." And Boban comes in and
12 says, our commission, that is the Bosnian Croat side met for days but I
13 quoted him here and underlined it, "We could not agree on basic
14 principles." And he went on to make the case for Herceg-Bosna, as you see
15 he said for example you cannot cut off Herceg-Bosna. It is the heartland
16 of the church and of our people. That was Mate Boban. And he goes on to
17 say, "If we are honest, we will recognise this." And he gives the
18 percentages of Bosnian Croats and Muslims living in Herceg Nova, for
20 So this was a profound discussion, an open discussion, and it was
21 no secret for us negotiators to hear this from Mate Boban in Geneva
22 because we heard it from him regularly, and Ahtisaari then asks --
23 Q. Who is Ahtisaari for the record?
24 A. That is Martti Ahtisaari. He worked for us. He was the chair of
25 the working group of the international conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina so
1 he had an important job.
2 Q. Can you perhaps remind the Chamber of anything Mr. Ahtisaari is
3 involved in at the current time?
4 A. Yes, after the conference he went back as an official of the
5 United Nations and then returned to Finland, his native country, where
6 some years ago not too long ago he ran for president and was elected
7 president of Finland. And after he retired from the Presidency of Finland
8 he's involved himself actively in good works in international
9 negotiations. Most recently and currently he is the Secretary-General's
10 lead negotiator on the status of Kosovo.
11 Q. But in December of 1993 he was part of your team?
12 A. Yes. He was -- as I mentioned to you, he was chairman of our
13 working group on Bosnia-Herzegovina. And a very good chairman he was.
14 Q. Continuing on -- oh, go ahead --
15 A. So that's Martti Ahtisaari, MA in the middle of the page, asks
16 about the status for the map for Bosnia. Is it and joint map? And Boban
17 responds, no, it has not been agreed upon. And Trnka, the Muslim
18 lawyer -- excuse me -- yes, sorry, yes, President Izetbegovic's lawyer,
19 interjects and says, "It's our compromise proposal." And then I sum up
20 and therefore you'll note parentheses. Mr. Stewart, you will see
21 parentheses down the rest of the page, and that means that I'm not quoting
22 them directly. That is to say I'm not writing as I normally do the direct
23 interchange, but I'm at the table summarising what they're saying as I
24 hear it at the moment, and I write, and this is me writing for myself and
25 Vance: "Inconclusive discussion of Travnik/Kupres area with Martti
1 Ahtisaari pressing and others ducking," that means -- ducking is slang for
2 not responding. And I note this is 11.45 a.m. "Ahtisaari, Martti keeps
3 pressing across the entire of difference. The BiH side appearing quite
4 bored with the proceeding answers every query the same way: It makes
5 economic sense, therefore nearby," et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. They
6 kept talking about the things making economic sense. They -- just to say
7 things that favoured the Bosnian Muslim position. And I note then for
8 myself and I write at the time in capital letters what the BiH map shows
9 is gerrymandering. And if the Court wishes I can explain gerrymandering
10 what it means, otherwise, if it is understood, I will stop here.
11 Q. Let me ask you, sir, just -- you can explain what gerrymandering--
12 what you -- when you say gerrymandering write -- excuse me, wrote in your
13 knows gerrymandering, explain that concept or terminology.
14 A. I can do it briefly. It's an electoral trick where one side to an
15 election dispute or area moves the area, borders around to favour its own
17 Q. If you -- sorry go ahead.
18 A. And the origin of the phrase comes from the American revolutionary
19 period in the 18th century when a Massachusetts lawyer named Gerry shifted
20 the borders of Massachusetts so that his party could easily be elected,
21 and it's referred to always as gerrymandering. Again meaning moving the
22 borders to favour your side.
23 Q. And continuing on to the next page in the continuation of this you
24 say Haris?
25 A. Haris is Silajdzic.
1 Q. All right. Can you just take us through -- down to the end -- if
2 we -- just tell you -- please, if you can just take us down to where
3 you -- then it changes to 1.05 p.m., just to finish up this section?
4 A. Okay. Silajdzic entered the conversation. He was the Foreign
5 Minister of Bosnia, spoke perfect English. He had studied in the United
6 States. His English was as good and mine. He spoke often quite
7 passionately. He was deeply concerned, and he was a secularist. He was a
8 very strong secular voice inside the Bosnian Muslim government.
9 Izetbegovic was much more of a religious person. So he comes in
10 aggressive, scornful, scowling. That's the way I described his facial
11 behaviour. And he asks-- well, he queries Ahtisaari, claiming that
12 ethnicity should have no place enjoin of the provincial boundaries. And
13 Tudjman immediately rebutted Silajdzic as regards ethnicity, because
14 President Tudjman did believe that the ethnic factor was important.
15 And then Silajdzic and Susak clash over the facts of history of
16 Bosnia. This goes on for a while. And I note, again parenthetically, a
17 remark of myself to myself and Mr. Vance, "Bad blood here." Boban comes
18 in to say that Mostar and Travnik must be together, that is to say in the
19 same province. Silajdzic, Haris, says everything is wrong -- "Everything
20 is wrong with that." And President Tudjman, laughing, again rebuts
22 Q. Can you recall anything more particular about what either Boban,
23 Haris, or Tudjman said --
24 A. At that --
25 Q. -- at that --
1 A. At that meeting?
2 Q. Yes. What was -- when you say, "Tudjman, laughing," why did you
3 note that?
4 A. Well, Boban has just said Mostar and Travnik must be together.
5 Silajdzic is saying ethnicity should play no role in the physical,
6 geographical, administrative subdivisions,. And President Tudjman laughs
7 because he knows that of course it will play a role.
8 Q. Moving forward then, this is the 27th of December, 1992. We're
9 leading up to the 2nd of January, 1993, and perhaps you can just introduce
10 that to us in terms of what then happened on the 2nd of January.
11 A. On the 2nd of January the co-chairmen, Secretary Vance and Lord
12 Owen, laid down, tabled for all of the parties, for the three parties, a
13 comprehensive peace plan, a settlement. The plan consisted of the basic
14 framework, the constitutional framework, the map and the third part. The
15 third part of the plan were the military arrangements. That was to
17 Q. In that regard then, please, if I can ask you to find in one of
18 the binders that you have in front of you P 01038, which is the next
19 instalment of your diary. I am told it's in binder 1.
20 A. Yes, I have it.
21 Q. And if you can find that and particularly the page 4253, which I
22 believe should be the beginning of the entry I hope for --
23 A. 4253 you said?
24 Q. Yes, please. It looks like we may have the wrong --
25 A. Excuse me, I have a page, but I'm afraid I can't read the number.
1 429 or is it 5? Can somebody help me?
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. What date but referring to?
4 Q. We're trying to find the 2nd of January, but that's not the right
5 page. So give me a moment, please.
6 MR. STEWART: [Microphone not activated].
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
8 MR. SCOTT:
9 Q. If you could go to -- just give me a moment, please. Sorry. 4253
10 does seem to work if you can find it. If you can find your entries
11 wherever it begins on January 2nd, 1993. That might be the easiest way to
12 deal with it.
13 A. Yes, I -- yes, I have it.
14 Q. All right. Thanks very much. I'm sorry for the confusion.
15 On the right side of that page: "11.10 a.m. to 12.30, pentagonal
16 meeting, BiH meeting of 5 dels," which I assume that's "delegations."
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And we won't go through all of them unless the Chamber wants us
19 to, but do you then list again the members of each delegation?
20 A. Yes. I listed them and capitalised the chairman of each of the
21 five delegations.
22 Q. Now, I'm just going to mention the Bosnian Croat group because
23 earlier this afternoon you did acknowledge that you were having trouble
24 for a moment remembering some of the names. Do you see listed here, under
25 "Boban," Mr. Akmadzic and Mr. Petkovic?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. All right. Below the names it says: "CRV," Cyrus Vance, "11.25,
3 reads text of statement." Can you tell us what that was about?
4 A. Yes, the text of the statement was the statement that he planned
5 to issue to the press after this meeting.
6 Q. All right. And with that in mind -- hold on one moment, please.
7 Did the meeting start -- by the way looking at the page, perhaps you can
8 just assist, this is anecdotally, did meeting start at 11.10 or at 11.40?
9 A. 11.10, as I noted in my diary.
10 Q. What happened between 11.10 and 11.40 when Mr. Vance -- or
11 11.25 when Mr. Vance --
12 A. Well, reading the text of the statement, that he went on to read
13 in its entirety the constitution framework, the nine points, and that took
14 some time. He doesn't speak rapidly. He speaks much more slowly and
15 clearly than I do.
16 Q. All right.
17 A. And then Mate Boban spoke, you know, at some length - I mean not
18 just 30 seconds - about the principles and the map a little bit, but
19 nothing significant because I would have noted it if he said anything
21 Q. All right. Can I next ask you to look at P 01047. 1047.
22 A. What date is that, sir?
23 Q. 2nd of -- not in your diary, a separate document. Entirely
24 separate . The tab -- if you find the tab for the document.
25 A. Sorry. Excuse me.
1 Q. That's all right. It does get confusing at times.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. 1047?
4 A. Mm-hmm. Yes.
5 Q. Can you look at that and then tell us what that document is?
6 A. Yes. That is the statement that I refer to of Cyrus Vance at the
7 opening of the pentagonal conference. The only thing it don't include is
8 his reading out of the principles, and that wasn't necessary because
9 everybody had the text of the principles. So as you see, that statement
10 is three and a half pages in length, and they are single spaced. So it
11 took some time to read that out.
12 And if I may, for the benefit of the Court --
13 Q. Yes.
14 A. -- and yourselves, point out that -- Mr. Vance's remarks at the
15 opening of the second paragraph. I quote: "The process we are starting
16 today." Now one might ask: The conference has been working since early
17 September. Why is Secretary Vance saying -- talking of "the process we
18 are starting today"? He meant the process that began with the formal
19 presentation of the peace plan.
20 Q. All right. Looking down the page, please, after -- in the
21 paragraph that starts, "We expect that the outcome," and then below that
22 you have some bullet items. In the first bullet item, if you will, it
23 says: "You agreed to the principles of the international conference
24 adopted on August 26."
25 Can you briefly comment on that, what those principles were?
1 A. Well, those are the constitutional principles that we've talked
3 Q. All right. Next bullet item: "You agreed in London on a number
4 of things, including full and permanent cessation of hostilities,
5 recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the former Yugoslavia republics,
6 respect for the integrity of present frontiers unless changed by mutual
7 agreement." Is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And have --
10 A. Excuse me, counsel, may I revert to the first point, the
11 principles. You'll note the date August 26. The Court will recall that I
12 said the constitutional framework was introduced on October 27. Both are
13 correct. The rough outline of the principles were agreed upon at the
14 London conference on August 26, 1992. The formalised statement of the
15 principles which were in the plan were the ones of October 27. That
16 explains the discrepancy in dates.
17 Q. Let me before leaving this document if you go to the second page
18 and if we continue on the so-called bullet items, it will be overall the
19 fourth bullet item that the second bullet item on page 2 saying: "The
20 three Bosnia-Herzegovina sides also agreed to the unconditional and
21 unilateral release, under international supervision, of all civilians
22 detained, and the closure of detention camps without delay."
23 Do you recall that?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And does that relate back to -- much earlier this afternoon you
1 were talking about -- one of the issues that was known at the time was the
2 detention of civilians?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Can I ask you, please, to turn to the bundle or the -- excuse me,
5 the exhibit which is marked P -- well, it's marked 1116. For the record,
6 Exhibit P --
7 A. I have it.
8 Q. All right. Now, if you look on that page, because this is a UN
9 publication, on that page begins -- on the right side of the page, do you
10 see document S/25100?
11 A. I see it.
12 Q. And it may be helpful to just briefly say what that nomenclature
13 terminology means or what numbering system that is. S/25100?
14 A. S stands for secretariat, and 25100 is their numbering. The UN,
15 not surprisingly, numbers their documents.
16 Q. All right. When you look at that entire report it then starts
17 there and continues over the next several pages including ending with --
18 on a -- page 40 of the document, numbers of pages on the document itself
19 would be page 40, appendix 3. Do you see that?
20 A. Yes, I do.
21 Q. And is that all a report in connection with the meetings in early
22 January 1993?
23 A. Yes. This is in fact the text of what came to be called the
24 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and you will notice that appendix 1 are the
25 constitutional principles with 10 points and the -- it -- the appendix 3.
1 Well, it continues along the road of outlining -- outlining the Vance-Owen
3 Q. Before we come back further and talk about the positions of the
4 various parties in response to this plan, if we look at appendix 1, the
5 second principle is: "The provinces shall not have any international
6 legal personality and may not enter into agreements with foreign states or
7 with international organisations." Can you tell us the significance --
8 why was that considered to be one of the top 10 principles at issue here?
9 A. It was a vital issue because both the Bosnian Serbs and the
10 Bosnian Croats had made no secret of their desire to have their own states
11 inside Bosnia-Herzegovina and to unite formally or informally with the
12 mother countries, respectively Serbia and Croatia. And the co-chairmen
13 wanted strongly to assure that this did not happen.
14 Q. In that regard, please, can I ask you and everyone in the
15 courtroom please to go back to page 39, to the text of the report itself.
16 And on page 39 there is a section, Roman numeral -- I believe Roman
17 numeral II, resumption of the peace talks. Do you see that?
18 A. Yes, I see it.
19 Q. Can I please direct your attention to paragraph 9 in that column
20 at the bottom. I know the print is small, and I apologise for that. Can
21 you read what paragraph 9 says?
22 A. Yes. Should I read it?
23 Q. Please.
24 A. "With regard to principle number 1, the co-chairmen commented that
25 they did not see any real difference between what they had proposed and
1 what Mr. Karadzic had offered. The differences appeared to be mainly
2 semantic. Both co-chairmen and Mr. Ahtisaari made it clear, however, that
3 the concept of a 'state within a state' would not be permit the under
4 principle number 1. In response to a comment by Mr. Silajdzic, the
5 co-chairmen reaffirmed that Bosnia and Herzegovina was to remain an
6 independent sovereign state within its internationally recognised
8 Q. Would you then go on to paragraph number 10 at the top of the next
10 A. Paragraph 10 reads: "With regard to principle number 2, which was
11 omitted from Mr. Karadzic's list, Mr. Ahtisaari explained that it was not
12 intended to restrict the role of the provinces on matters within their
13 competence. In this regard, he read the following statement which he
14 stated would form part of the records of the conference explaining
15 principle number 2."
16 Q. And just in the interest of time and everyone has the entire
17 document in front of them, can you just refer to the first two sentences
18 of that next section?
19 A. Yes. The first two sentences read as follows: "Only Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina is to have an international legal personality. Provinces
21 cannot conclude formal international treaties."
22 Q. All right. Directing your attention, please, back to Appendix 1
23 on page 40. And if I can just ask you briefly to look at principle number
24 8. Can you just read that and make any additional comment that you can
25 about principle 8?
1 A. Principle number 8 reads always follows: "Bosnia and Herzegovina
2 is to be progressively demilitarised under United Nations/European
3 Community supervision."
4 I should say it speaks for itself, but I would add that in January
5 1993, it's important never to forget that the conflict was still
6 continuing. There was heavy fighting in January 1993.
7 Q. While we have that text in front of us and before going on to
8 something else, can you tell the Judges, looking at that language, and
9 then I'll ask you more generally, was there anything about the Vance-Owen
10 proposals as they existed on the 2nd of January, 1993, which talked about
11 the withdrawal or subordination of any particular military units in any
12 particular territories?
13 A. Well, there was a very large section on military arrangements, and
14 I mentioned withdrawal was discussed, but there is nothing in -- in that
15 document, in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, that spoke about subordination of
16 units with respect to withdrawal. The most detail in the agreement
17 concerned the removal and cantonment of heavy weaponry.
18 Q. All right. Now, let me -- without having looked at the documents,
19 and everyone now has the entire Vance-Owen record -- agreement as it
20 existed as of the 2nd of January in front of them, what was the reaction
21 of the three principal parties, the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Muslims,
22 and the Bosnian Serbs, to this proposal?
23 A. The Bosnian Croat side accepted the entire proposal. The Bosnian
24 Muslim side accepted the principles, accepted but did not sign the
25 military arrangements. So that was a conditional acceptance. And
1 rejected the map. The Bosnian Serb side rejected the Vance-Owen proposal,
2 all three principle sections. They rejected in its entirety.
3 Q. And what was the -- what happened after, then, this important
4 meeting on the 2nd of January?
5 A. Well, we returned -- we kept negotiating. I mean, the goal was to
6 reach agreement of all three parties, so the conference went back to the
7 negotiating table.
8 Q. Can you -- you talked earlier this afternoon about -- that some of
9 the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb interests were similar, or "congruent"
10 I think was the word you used at one point. Was there an interplay here
11 in the positioning of the -- the positioning and posturing of the various
12 parties in relationship to each other and, in particular, between the
13 Croats and the Serbs?
14 A. Yes, I would say there was.
15 Q. How so?
16 A. Well, both sides would publicly express deep concern about the
17 conflict, their regret that it occurred, their desire to end the
18 conflicts, their hope to live in peace and eternal harmony forever and
19 ever, and at the same time they were carrying out on the ground a very
20 different policy and that was this two-track policy. There was the
21 difference that -- the attention, I would say, of the broad public was
22 largely focused - and correctly - on the Serb activities inside Bosnia,
23 because it was the Serbs, for example, who had besieged, were besieging
24 Sarajevo and firing many shells into the city on a daily basis. The UN,
25 if I may parenthetically add, kept an accurate account of the number of
1 shells fired by General Mladic and his troops into Sarajevo, and it
2 averaged 5.000 a day. So that was the main attention, and it was widely
3 known there Karadzic who said publicly that they would reject the
4 Vance-Owen Plan. That was -- that was known.
5 Q. How did the Serb rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan in its entirety
6 impact the negotiating positions of either the --
7 A. Well, it gave both the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats,
8 particularly the Bosnian Croats, a free ride, because they could accept
9 the Vance-Owen Plan in the secure knowledge that it would not go anywhere
10 because of Bosnian Serb rejection.
11 Q. In your negotiations and discussions with the three parties, and
12 in this particular instance the Bosnian Croat delegation, did you have any
13 understanding of the reasons or motivations as expressed or as observed by
14 you as to their agreement to the parts of the Vance-Owen Plan in January?
15 A. Yes. We knew that they were not just formally happy with the
16 proposed map. In reality, they were quite pleased with the map.
17 Vance-Owen took strong account of the needs of the Bosnian Croat people.
18 So the map was fine with Mate Boban.
19 The military arrangements they didn't talk much about, and we knew
20 that reason. And again, they knew that the focus on the military, as I
21 mentioned earlier, was going to be on the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and
22 that meant Serb gunners bombing, shelling Sarajevo and other cities. So
23 that one was easy for them to accept. And they did not like the
24 principles but went along with them because they knew, again, that there
25 would have to be, or they thought there would have to be, some adjustment
1 in the principles if the co-chairmen were to gain Serb acceptance.
2 Q. All right. Well, when you say just now they didn't -- they did
3 not like the principles but went along with them, and then, as you further
4 said, in what ways did they not like the principles. How did that show
5 that --
6 A. Well, above all they did not like the point 2 about not having an
7 international personality and not having any -- "may not enter into
8 agreements with foreign states or with international organisations," and
9 that directly had a very harmful impact on their desire, which we've
10 discussed earlier, to either join Croatia at a later date or have a
11 special relationship with Croatia.
12 Q. It may be -- excuse me. All right. I asked you earlier, then,
13 did negotiations continue on in light of the various positions that you've
14 just explained? And let me ask you to look in particular, please, at --
15 again, Exhibit P 01038, which is again part of your -- one of the parts of
16 your diary.
17 A. Yes, I have it.
18 Q. And if I can ask you to please find page 4266.
19 A. What date is that, please?
20 Q. Yes. The 4th of January, 1993.
21 A. January 4th. Yes, I have January 4th. What -- 4266. Yes, I have
22 it, sir.
23 Q. Let me catch up with you for a moment. You're ahead of me in this
24 instance. Thank you very much.
25 Okay. You have that. This is an additional meeting on the 4th of
1 January, 1993, and you've again listed the various persons who
2 participated; is that correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. On the right -- excuse me. On the left side of the page you have
5 a reference -- an entry for Izzie.
6 A. That's President Izetbegovic.
7 Q. And what does he say there, and can you explain that to us?
8 A. I quote what I wrote: "President Izetbegovic asks for an
9 additional principle that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sovereign independent
10 recognised country."
11 It was. Everybody knew it. The -- the chairmen, the co-chairmen,
12 felt it was self-evident that Bosnia was an independent country. It was a
13 member of the UN, that it did not need saying, but Izetbegovic was clearly
14 nervous about that and asked that it be included.
15 Q. On page 4267, the next page, please.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. There's a reference to something said by Mr. Vance. CRV with two
18 of your asterisks next to it. "Reads prepared texts. Puts two
19 inextricably linked documents on table: A, cessation of hostilities; and
20 B, constitution and map."
21 A. Well, that's very easy to explain. The three parts of the
22 Vance-Owen Peace Plan that we've mentioned, the constitutional principles,
23 the map, the military arrangements, were to be accepted as a package, that
24 is to say all three. So we needed nine signatures. Three parties, three
25 principals, nine signatures. And we had three. The Bosnian Croats had
1 accepted. But -- and then we had this semi-conditional acceptance by
2 Izetbegovic. So Mr. Vance wanted to make clear to all parties, but
3 particularly to the Muslims and Serbs, that they one not be allowed to
4 pick and choose which of the parts of the peace plan they liked.
5 Q. On the right side of the page there's a number of entries, and
6 again everyone has the entire page and can read everything. The middle of
7 the page, Boban, basic thing is "justice. We have no right not to create
8 peace," I think it says. All three parties, "We accept this package."
9 And it's attributed to Izetbegovic, "Izzie, we are ready to sign without
10 map." Is that right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. So is it fair to say that even by the 4th of January, 1993, there
13 was still no agreement between the three parties?
14 A. Yes, there was no agreement between the two [sic] parties.
15 Q. If you can go -- I believe it's in the same part of your diary,
16 but if you can find page -- I'm going to make sure. 4280.
17 A. Yes. Dated January 10.
18 Q. Yes. "Meeting of the five parties, second round." Do you see
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, in that set of minutes and notes -- sorry. Forgive me. I'm
22 looking for the entry. Sorry. It's on page 4287. If you can go forward
23 in the same -- again, still on the 10th, but the notes go on for some
24 period of time. I'm sorry. At the end of the 10th of January meeting,
25 the next day goes on to the 11th of January, on page 4287. Is Boban -- is
1 it correct that your notes indicate Boban: "I believe they don't want a
2 map at all. We must insist on constitutional text that Muslims accept
4 A. I'm sorry, but I don't see that.
5 Q. Okay. I apologise for the confusion but if you find --
6 A. My pages are not numbered, counsel, so I'm having difficulty
7 following you.
8 Q. On the --
9 A. I have 4286.
10 Q. If you go to the next page hopefully --
11 A. Well, it does not say so but I assume it is.
12 Q. Well, I apologise if that's not clear. On that next page on the
13 left-hand side, if you go down, do you see an entry next to Boban?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. All right.
16 A. Is that the one that says, I quote, "We had the feeling that
17 Silajdzic wanted to break up the talks"? Is that what you're referring
19 Q. Above -- well, I don't know. I'm looking at 4287. Perhaps the
20 usher can assist us.
21 MR. STEWART: The witness was looking at the right hand page of
22 the previous page. He's looking at the little right-hand page.
23 MR. SCOTT:
24 Q. Turn the entire A4.
25 A. I see. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Stewart.
1 Boban, yes, I see that. I have that page. I apologise to the
3 Q. Since it's been a couple of moments now, can you just read the --
4 the note that you've attributed to Mr. Boban on that page?
5 A. Yes, if we back up a little bit you see that Mate says, "the
6 Muslims want to end the talks. They forget the principles -- they forget
7 that the principles and the map are one unit." And he's quite right.
8 That's what Mr. Vance said when they are inextricably linked. And then
9 Mate continues by saying at the top of the next page: "Even with the
10 war," and I write "et cetera" meaning the war and the fighting and the
11 killing just the usual words, "we must take into account legitimate Serb
13 Q. Mm-hmm.
14 A. And that again is telling us that some of the Bosnian Serb claims
15 are legitimate, and he means -- and he knows we know that he means the
16 Serb claims to their own state and to their own territory, because they
17 were identical to his aims.
18 Q. Well, that was my next question to you. Why would Mr. -- why
19 would Mr. Boban be claiming the legitimacy of Serb claims?
20 A. I think I've just answered the question.
21 Q. Can you say it again, please?
22 A. In Mate's mind, Mate Boban, that is, the "legitimate Serb claims"
23 were those that were congruent or identical with the Bosnian Croat claims,
24 specifically the desire to have a separate state within the territory of
25 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1 Q. And then below that the next -- there's -- not the next one but
2 the -- do you see the entry "Boban: I believe."
3 A. Yes, I see it.
4 Q. Could you read that to us, please.
5 A. Well, Secretary Vance had said, "What about the Bosnian team and
6 the map?" And Mate Boban responded, and I quote: "I believe they don't
7 want a map at all. We must insist in the constitutional text that the
8 Muslims accept the map. They won't accept Sarajevo province, but will
9 accept a tripartite Sarajevo city."
10 By that he meant that province number 10, it was called number 10
11 on the Vance-Owen map, was to be the area of Sarajevo and the surrounding
12 provinces, and it was to have a separate status to be under strict
13 tripartite rule, that is to say Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, Bosnian
14 Serb. And that's what he meant when he said, "they will not accept
16 Q. Did the concept -- because this may relate to something that may
17 come up tomorrow, was there always a different concept as to how the area
18 around Sarajevo would be organised or governed under the plan?
19 A. There were differing opinions. You might call them concepts
20 although that's a rather elevated term for the way the parties felt. The
21 Muslims took the strong view that Sarajevo was theirs, it was their
22 capital, and that nobody else should really have a look in on the rule of
23 Sarajevo. This concerned primarily the Bosnian Serbs, because the Bosnian
24 Serbs had a heavy presence, a large population, in Sarajevo. It was of
25 much less concern to the Bosnian Croat side because very few Bosnian
1 Croats lived in Sarajevo compared to the other two nationalities.
2 An additional difficulty was that the mountains around Sarajevo
3 were largely Bosnian Serb populated. Ilidza, for example, and some
4 others. And Pale, for example, which is where the Bosnian Serbs installed
5 their pseudo-government. So they had an interest in both the city of
6 Sarajevo and the bowl, I -- if I may describe it, the rim around the city,
7 which was occupied by Serbs.
8 And then there was the fact on the Bosnian Serb side that their
9 number-two man, Momcilo Krajisnik, was himself from Sarajevo and had a
10 real feeling towards the city. Karadzic, for example, did not. He's a
11 Montenegrin by origin, and to him Sarajevo was just another city. But
12 Krajisnik, who played an important role in the Bosnian Serb affairs was,
13 very strong on Serbs retaining an important role in Sarajevo.
14 You'll recall, Your Honours, that I mentioned as one of the
15 Bosnian Serb war aims the partition, the division of Sarajevo. So it was
16 an important issue.
17 Q. Can I ask you next, please, to go to the next page. It should be
18 the next -- very, very next page in your diary, starting on the 12th of
20 A. Excuse me, I have January 20th as the next page.
21 Q. I'm sorry, sir. I don't know why we seem to be having so much
23 A. Are you talking about 4307?
24 Q. No I'm talking about 4297.
25 A. Excuse me. I'm sorry, I don't have it in this book.
1 Q. It may be in the next binder?
2 A. Ne je sais pas.
3 Q. It may be in the next binder, please. I don't know.
4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Scott, it's the same here.
5 THE WITNESS: Is this it?
6 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I apologise for the difficulties, and
7 it's five to 7.00. Maybe the best thing to do is to end now and see if we
8 can hopefully make this clear overnight. I apologise for the confusion.
9 Mr. President, that would be my suggestion.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
11 Ambassador, we are finished for today. As you know, you will be
12 testified over the next four days, until Thursday. Since we will be
13 sitting in the afternoon, tomorrow I kindly ask you to come back at the
14 session starting at 2.15.
15 I am inviting everybody else to come back tomorrow for our
16 afternoon session starting at 2.15. Thank you.
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.54 p.m.,
18 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 3rd day
19 of April, 2007, at 2.15 p.m.