1 Tuesday, 22 May 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, your honour. Good morning,
8 everyone. This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et
9 al. Thank you.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Today is Tuesday,
11 the 22nd of May. Good morning to the witness. Good morning to the OTP,
12 to the Defence counsel, and to all the accused, as well to everyone
13 assisting the Trial Chamber.
14 The examination-in-chief will continue. The registrar has
15 informed me that the Prosecution still has one hour and 50 minutes.
16 Mr. Kruger, you have the floor.
17 MR. KRUGER: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. President, good morning
18 Your Honours, everybody else in the courtroom.
19 WITNESS: PHILIP ROGER WATKINS [Resumed]
20 Examination by Mr. Kruger: [Continued]
21 Q. Good morning, sir. If we may start by just briefly referring back
22 to something we touched upon yesterday, and that was when General Roso
23 replaced General Praljak in November. Was there any discussion or any
24 views within the international community or the ECMM as to the reason why
25 this had happened? Did you form any opinions?
1 A. We had general discussions as to whether perhaps Mr. Praljak had
2 not delivered what he was expected to deliver during his period of
3 command. The other stories that we heard were of illness. We were unable
4 to draw any specific conclusions.
5 Q. If you say that he did not deliver, what do you mean by that?
6 A. Well, yesterday I referred to an expectation that there may be
7 some military activity launched from the area of the Makljen ridge, an
8 offensive action. We didn't witness that offensive action or, if it was,
9 it was no more than regular skirmishing, and perhaps one could surmise
10 that there was an anticipated attack which never materialised and that
11 Mr. Praljak was, as a result of that failure, removed, but that is just my
13 Q. Now, sir, if we can return to where we left off yesterday, and if
14 I can briefly refer you to document or Exhibit 07342. 07342. Do you have
15 the document?
16 A. I have the document.
17 Q. Now, sir, this is a daily summary by CC Mostar dated 26 December
18 1993. Do you recognise this document?
19 A. Yes. It's a document that I wrote, although it's not signed by
21 Q. Okay. Now, if we can look under Political, paragraph 1, and this
22 is where M1 met Zaim Bakovic in Konjic, and then halfway that paragraph,
23 the discussion is kind of summarised, but halfway down it says, "With
24 regard to the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, Bakovic acknowledged that
25 there was a part of BiH Herceg-Bosna that was 99 per cent Croat and would
1 never belong to BiH again." Could you comment on that?
2 A. I believe Mr. Bakovic is referring to the area of Herceg-Bosna
3 around Mostar and to the north. That was, by the time this was written,
4 almost exclusively populated by Bosnian Croats, and it seems to me an
5 acknowledgement that he thinks that neither militarily or politically will
6 that be a part of BiH again.
7 Q. The use of "again" at the end, does that signify anything?
8 A. Well, of course it was part of BiH and indeed still is so his
9 conclusion wasn't correct, but what he was saying is there appeared to be
10 a break away, and of course the establishment of the Croatian Republic of
11 Herceg-Bosna was the establishment of a state that signalled a break from
12 the internationally recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina.
13 Q. Thank you. Now, if we can look a bit further down under Military,
14 the section for Military, the second paragraph. Yesterday, you mentioned
15 that there were always rumours of presence of HV units or elements in
16 Herceg-Bosna or in the area, and you only saw these units personally in
17 January 1994, but if we look at this paragraph, Fazlic claimed the
18 presence of two HV brigades in the area of Vrdi, but if we can look at
19 your comment specifically. "These allegations are repeated so frequently
20 that they have become fact to many commentators. Only circumstantial
21 evidence of their existence has been -- has ever been presented," and the
22 comment ends. Could you comment on that?
23 A. Yes, I think probably shows a little bit of frustration on my
24 part. It was something that everybody was interested in, as I referred to
25 yesterday, and it had become a fact, established fact when we as observers
1 on the ground hadn't actually seen it. There-- the repetition continually
2 and the stated claim had become, I think, in international circles an
3 established fact and what I'm saying here is, I've been in the territory
4 for some time. I've heard these. I've looked. I cannot verify them, and
5 until they are, they remain accusations. As far as I was concerned.
6 Q. Now, sir, if we can turn to a different area now. Could you tell
7 the Court about the economic situation within the Croatian Republic of
8 Herceg-Bosna for the inhabitants, and with specific reference then to
9 Muslim and then Croat inhabitants.
10 A. The picture was very different depending on whether you were a
11 Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Muslim. The economic situation, and by that I
12 mean sort of access to normal, everyday things that we need to live, food
13 and transport and travel, that was as a Bosnian Croat quite possible. You
14 were able to move freely within the area of Herzegovina up to the front
15 line, so that would be up as far as Prozor, and also across the border
16 into Croatia, and there was economic activity between the two states.
17 However, the moment you crossed the front line and went -- went to East
18 Mostar, the situation was completely different. The contrast was stark,
19 and the situation for those living in East Mostar was very bad. There was
20 a dependency on international community for supplies. Not a total
21 dependency. There were supplies coming out of Central Bosnia and down to
22 Mostar and various deals being done, as unlikely as it seems, between the
23 Muslims and the Serb forces, but we had a concentration of civilian
24 population in East Mostar that was short of food and very little
25 electricity supply, if any, and water dependency by the time that I was
1 there was from the Neretva itself, and I saw situations, circumstances
2 there which were worse than anywhere else I observed in Bosnia.
3 Q. We'll come back to that in due course again. If we can step onto
4 the HVO military at this stage. Now, sir, you mentioned earlier that you
5 had testified in the Blaskic case in the appeals case, and not course of
6 your evidence there you expressed that Colonel Blaskic may have had some
7 problems with regard to command and control in Central Bosnia. Could you
8 perhaps just explain to the Court briefly.
9 A. The situation in Central Bosnia for the Croats contrasted strongly
10 with that of the Croats in Herzegovina in terms of the military situation
11 and command. You had a commander, General -- or Colonel Blaskic, command
12 of operational zone middle Bosna, who was actually only able to move
13 freely within the pocket that -- which -- that he was in, which was Vitez,
14 and to a lesser extent he could -- he could get down to -- to Kiseljak.
15 So he was commanding troops ostensibly on paper as far as Vares and Zepce
16 and Zavidovici, but he couldn't physically get there and communications
17 were difficult, so he had a fragmented command, control, and
18 communications structure. That would contrast with the structure that
19 would exist within the territory in -- north of Mostar and up to Prozor,
20 where normal lines of communication, command, and control could exist. So
21 commanders from Mostar could visit the front line, whereas Tihomir Blaskic
22 in Central Bosnia wasn't able to go to Zepce, for instance.
23 Q. The HVO military -- the military wing thereof was a relatively
24 young military organisation, as you would be aware at that time when you
25 were there. Could you comment, and this probably falls back on your
1 military training, on how that may have affected the command and control
2 of that force by the Main Staff?
3 A. Yes. It certainly changed during the period that I was there, but
4 when I was in Central Bosnia it was very clear that the HVO -- HVO units,
5 as indeed was the case with the armija, were not equipped in the way one
6 would expect, i.e., there was a mixture of uniform, there was a mixture of
7 weapons, you may have a soldier with a combat top but wearing jeans, and
8 so one had a feeling of a militia rather than an established army. Over
9 time that did change but in Herzegovina you got the impression of a -- of
10 a military structure. There was common uniform, common arms, and so you
11 got -- you had the impression of formed military rather than militia.
12 Q. Could you comment on the HVO's ability to achieve its objectives
13 in -- with reference to the manpower that it possessed?
14 A. The received wisdom was that the HVO was better equipped in terms
15 of equipment. In other words, it had access to larger calibre weapons,
16 some artillery and tanks but in terms of manpower the advantage was seen
17 to be with the armija forces. More lightly armed but more soldiers on the
18 front line.
19 The other aspect of the HVO is that we observed that perhaps the
20 ambitions of its military capability in terms of action had not been
21 realised in Central Bosnia. We'd actually seen HVO forces losing
22 territory in Central Bosnia. So there was by the time of, I would say the
23 summer of 1993, most of the front lines had stabilised. There were some
24 specific shifts and alterations, but essentially they had stabilised.
25 Q. The -- you say that the HVO had -- had heavier equipment or access
1 to heavier equipment. I'd like to refer you in this regard to Exhibit
2 03771. Do you have the document?
3 A. I have the document.
4 Q. On its face it's a daily infosum of 28 July 1993, and it's
5 directed to the various regional centres and various teams and various
6 coordination centres, and do you know of this document or can you comment
7 on the origin?
8 A. Yes, this is from Eclo Kiseljak, and Eclo was the EC liaison
9 officer. This was an ECMM officer who sat in the headquarters of the
10 UNPROFOR military headquarters and exchanged information. So he would
11 pass the reports that we were writing to the military structure and
12 likewise would see the military information summaries and give us a
13 briefing, and this is one of his briefings.
14 Q. If we can turn to the third page of this document in the Beese
15 version this would be on page 5, and it's paragraph F, titled Prozor, on
16 that page. Do you have that?
17 A. I have that.
18 Q. Now, in the middle of that paragraph it reports that at -- and the
19 time code is given on the 27th of July, "Three coaches, 10 to 15 cars, two
20 ambulances were noticed moving on route Triangle. These were clearly
21 identified as HVO [as read] troops and were probably part of the return
22 rotation of HV troops which began on 26 July."
23 And if we then just look at the comment, it says that it's
24 believed that at least two T-55 are on the Podovi feature, and then at the
25 very end of that section it says, "the Rama Brigade is not credited with
1 such assets." Could you comment on this paragraph?
2 A. Yes. Just looking at the screen and without being pedantic, I
3 think there's one place you've motioned HVO and I think you meant HV.
4 Q. My apologies.
5 A. But the thrust of the question is very clear. The -- this was --
6 as I had mentioned earlier, would have been witnessed by UNPROFOR rather
7 than ECMM. It is a detailed statement of the equipment, and it includes
8 tanks, the T55. It includes multi-barrel rocket launchers and a statement
9 of three coaches, presumably with -- with troops on board. This is a
10 formed military unit and there's credibility here that this is equipment
11 that belongs to the HV. Whether it's actually being staffed or manned by
12 the HV is different, but it's a very strong indication that it is.
13 Q. The conclusion, which says "the Rama Brigade is not credited with
14 such assets," can you comment on that?
15 A. Well, I think that the Rama Brigade in Prozor may well have had
16 access to some heavier weaponry. It might -- they may have had, you know,
17 one tank and a couple of artillery pieces, but here we're seeing on a
18 scale which one would not have attributed to a -- an HVO unit. But it is
19 not impossible that if that was the point of effort in July that a
20 collection of HVO equipment was heading that way, but again it seems more
21 likely this is a formed military unit with a range of weaponry,
22 particularly the multi-barrel rocket launcher, which was coming from
24 Q. If we can turn the page and look at paragraph 6, and this is the,
25 I take it, SpaBat sector. Under Mostar the second paragraph it says, "Up
1 to 15 military vehicles without -- without vehicle registration numbers
2 were observed parked in Ljubuski," and the comment, "the removal of
3 licence place has often been used by the HVO to disguise the presence of
4 HV troops in Bosnia." Can you comment on that? Had you come across that?
5 A. Yes. Certainly some of the vehicles that I observed in January
6 had licence plates removed, but at that time there seemed to be little
7 pretense because there was an indication on the side of the cabs that it
8 was HV forces. But, yes, the removal of licence plates was, I think,
9 probably a rather superficial attempt to cover what was there, but it
10 wasn't unheard-of. I came across and heard of this practice.
11 Q. Just before stepping off paragraph 4 on that same page, under the
12 same section it says, "A SpaBat platoon observed 15 truckloads of
13 civilians, mainly women and children and old people travelling from
14 Ljubuski to Grude." Did you have any knowledge of such movements of
16 A. Yes. We regularly heard of movements of civilian population both
17 out, as I referred to yesterday, out of Central Bosnia, but this, because
18 it's SpaBat and SpaBat's based in Mostar, it's difficult to draw any
19 conclusions. This could simply be the movement of displaced persons who
20 had come in. It could be relocation. But, yes, movement of civilians in
21 large numbers on trucks and buses was something that I witnessed.
22 Q. And then just for the record, if you look at paragraph 1 under
23 that same section, we just note that there's reference to heavy shelling
24 of Muslims in areas of the city, and that is in Mostar, I take it. Were
25 you aware of any shelling in Mostar at that stage, even if it wasn't your
1 area of responsibility?
2 A. Yes, I was, and experienced it myself later.
3 Q. If we can look at Exhibit 06448. Do you have the document?
4 A. I have the document.
5 Q. It's titled CC Mostar, 5 November 1993. Do you recognise this
7 A. Yes, I believe I wrote this document, although my name isn't at
8 the end. As a matter of interest, I always put my name at the end but I
9 don't know why they're being cut off here.
10 MR. KRUGER: And just for the information of the Court that these
11 documents were provided -- when they were provided by the provider certain
12 actions were made within them, and that could explain for that.
13 Sir, if we can look at the section, Military, on the first page,
14 and if we can look at the second paragraph thereof. M1 which is changed
15 to M4 by somebody, "reported sighting six buses from Osijek carrying
16 soldiers with HVO and HV markings. UNPROFOR report 15 buses with the
17 same passengers on route Triangle heading for Prozor." Do you have any
18 comments on this?
19 A. Not sure who made the amendments although obviously after
20 "transmission," it says, "corrected by HCC." That's not so important.
21 What we are clearly stating is that a team observed buses from Osijek,
22 which of course is in Croatia, carrying soldiers with HVO and HV markings.
23 So they are also noting that they're heading up route Triangle. So from
24 Herzegovina up to the front line of Prozor.
25 Q. Let's step off this document. Now, yesterday you described to the
1 Chamber how you came across an HV unit on route Triangle during January,
2 and if we can look at Exhibit 07625. 07625. Do you have the document?
3 A. I have the document.
4 Q. This is a weekly summary for the week 14 to 20 January 1994,
5 issued by headquarters in Zagreb. Could you perhaps just comment on the
6 origins or the status of this kind of report?
7 A. Yes, the headquarters of ECMM based in Zagreb was required to
8 produce a weekly information sheet which was sent to the contributing
9 countries. This is being produced by the info and analysis cell, so there
10 would be monitors compiling this report from sources in the field,
11 including those from regional centre Zenica, and of course regional centre
12 Zenica would have been fed with its reports by the coordination centre.
13 Q. Okay. Sir, if you can turn to page 4 of this document, and I want
14 you to have a look at specifically paragraphs 14 to 16. And this
15 describes while travelling on route Triangle HRC Zenica and HCC Mostar
16 witnessed the move of approximately 30 vehicles. Is this the report of
17 your sighting which you had referred to yesterday?
18 A. It is the report, yes.
19 Q. Did you have any views at that time regarding the presence of HV
20 troops in this area in relation to the proximity of peace talks that were
22 A. We -- well, this for me was the moment at which I suspended any
23 disbelief, although I had seen those reports and we just referred to one
24 way back in July where we have UNPROFOR stating it. This is the first
25 time I saw it myself and had no doubt that I was seeing a formed military
1 unit that was not from HVO forces. Moving up -- I was coming from Central
2 Bosnia with the head of the regional centre, so I was travelling
3 south-west. This convoy we had to get on the side of the road for it to
4 pass. It was heading up to the front line at Prozor. When you look at
5 what we observed, multi-barrel rocket launchers, both vehicle and towed,
6 and 422-millimetre mortars, towed artillery, one could only assume that
7 this was a unit that had firepower and potential offensive capability.
8 There had been speculation for some time, as I said earlier, of there
9 being some sort of thrust by HVO up into -- into middle Bosnia. Although
10 our assessment was that was very unlikely unless there were other forces
11 introduced that altered the equation that had led to the stability of the
12 front lines, and this could be it. It was either to achieve that military
13 aim or to send signals to politicians at a moment where there were
14 discussions going on, and of course we're talking here now about the time
15 of the Washington Agreement, and it was either to send signals of power
16 and capability or, in the event of perhaps failed negotiations, to
17 actually go for seizing land and gaining as much as could be gained
18 through military force.
19 Q. Thank you. Now, you mentioned that during a meeting with General
20 Praljak he had indicated to you that the presence of HV troops in
21 Herceg-Bosna was only due to people volunteering, and therefore these
22 weren't people who were sent down there. Can you comment on that
23 explanation of his in light of this unit that you saw on route Triangle
24 during January 1994?
25 A. Well, his explanation had a ring of credibility about it in terms
1 of it was very likely that soldiers return from HV to fight with HVO, but
2 this was different. This was a formed HV military unit and would not have
3 been purely manned by Bosnian Croats returning from HV army. This was an
4 HV Croatian army unit.
5 Q. Sir, let's turn to document or Exhibit 07 --
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could we go back to the previous
7 document. Could -- could we look at document 15, please -- sorry,
8 paragraph 15. It states that, "someone from the UNPROFOR, 5th Brigade, on
9 the side of a vehicle." What do you think about that?
10 THE WITNESS: Well, I've made -- I've made the comment that it
11 could be referencing 5 HV Guards Brigade, and then I go on to state where
12 that brigade is normally stationed, garrisoned in Vinkovci, which is in --
13 was in Sector East. In Croatia but in UN territory designated Sector
14 East. We saw the writing, "5 Brigade." It was my interpretation that
15 this could be 5 HV Guards Brigade. I was in little doubt, sir, as I
16 mentioned earlier that this was a -- this was an HV unit.
17 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. Sir, it's -- if we turn to Exhibit -- just the next document,
19 Exhibit 07652. 07652. Do you have the document?
20 A. I have the document.
21 Q. Now, this is stated to be a weekly summary for the period 16 to 22
22 January, 1994. Could you comment on this document, the origins?
23 A. Yes. This has come out of headquarters in Zagreb and would again
24 be a compilation and some analysis of the situation over that week, as
25 extracted from the reports sent by the various teams in the field.
1 Q. If we can turn to page 3, paragraph 11. It says, "more HVO troops
2 than necessary," and then the second sentence, "there is also increased
3 evidence of Croatian HV involvement in the vicinity. Certainly groups of
4 officers with HV insignia and a convoy of vehicles have been sighted." Is
5 this a reference to the same sighting you had made or could it be a
6 different unit?
7 A. It is probably the one that I referred to, but I couldn't be --
8 it's formed within that timeframe but it could equally be another unit.
9 Q. For interest, paragraph 13 and the same page, and here we see a
10 significant development in Mostar was the replacement of Mate Boban by
11 Akmadzic. Could you comment on this?
12 A. Well, previously we'd been speculating about the future of Mate
13 Boban, and we had believed that it was a condition being placed by the
14 international community on Croatia, for the delivery of any peace
15 settlement required Mate Boban's departure. When I went to the Presidency
16 meeting on the 29th of December, there had been discussion there by Ivo
17 Lozancic. He mentions that the uncertainty about the leadership was
18 causing issues and by this date it appears that Mate Boban has gone and
19 Mr. Mile Akmadzic had -- had taken over, and Mile Akmadzic had been at the
20 time of the 29th of December the international relations minister and had
21 been representing the Bosnian Croat perspective at those talks.
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Kruger, would you allow me a technical point?
23 MR. KRUGER: Certainly, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Watkins, we have now had two weekly reports.
25 One covers the week from 14 January to 20 January, and the other covers 16
1 January to 22nd January. They're both from HQ ECMM Zagreb, and they
2 largely overlap. Could you explain this? It's a bit striking.
3 THE WITNESS: It does, Your Honour, appear a little unusual, and,
4 as any person in the field will say, headquarters always do operate in a
5 slightly unusual way. I would -- I think, sir, to answer your question
6 fully, could I go back to the other document and just see, because there
7 were various elements within the headquarters. One previously was from
8 the -- I think it was a milinfo summary, and this may well have come out
9 of another element. It may be a more political focus than a military
10 focus, but if I can just go back to the other one I might be able to bring
11 a bit more clarification to that.
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes, please.
13 THE WITNESS: Someone is going to have to remind me what the
14 number was of the previous one. Was it this one before? Yeah, okay.
15 I don't think I can give you a satisfactory explanation, sir, for
16 it, I'm sorry.
17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
18 MR. KOVACIC: Perhaps, Your Honour Judge Trechsel, you ask about
19 14 January to 20 January. I think that we ought to add into the
20 transcript that it is 1994 --
21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes. They both are the same year, of course,
23 MR. KOVACIC: -- for confusion later on in analysis.
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
25 MR. KRUGER:
1 Q. Sir, if we may turn to Exhibit 07614.
2 A. Sir, if I might just offer one perhaps small insight. It could be
3 that if we look at the distribution, the distribution may give us a clue.
4 The distribution of the first team -- sorry, the first report, that is
5 7625, is actually to the other regional centres and not, as I stated
6 earlier, going off to the member countries, and it could be that this was
7 the first one that was pushed out to those regional centres and the second
8 one may have a different distribution, a different audience, and may have
9 been slightly refined. That's a -- just a possible explanation, sir.
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. That makes sense.
11 MR. KRUGER:
12 Q. So, sir, Exhibit 07614. This document says it is a daily
13 monitoring activity report of 17 January 1994. Could you just comment on
14 the origins of this report.
15 A. The headquarters in addition to producing that weekly summary,
16 which involved a little bit more analysis, did a daily report, and this
17 is -- this is one of those -- an example of that report.
18 Q. I'd like to refer you to two things in this report. On page 2,
19 paragraph 10. And this was Mr. Humo, deputy commander of the BiH brigade,
20 "told ECMM that HVO was concentrating forces in Mostar west with both
21 Bosnian Croat HVO and Croatian HV soldiers. He said that if the Geneva
22 talks failed, the Muslims would be expecting a major attack." Can you
23 comment on this?
24 A. Yes, I think this was broadly in line with what I said earlier.
25 There was a show of force, and how that force was to be used was twofold.
1 It was either to send political signals of capability or actually to take
2 territory in the event of a failure of political discussions, and Mr. Humo
3 was repeating something which General Budakovic, the commander of 4th
4 Corps based in Mostar, had been telling us for some while including when
5 we took the -- Ambassador de Baenst to meet him. He was very specific
6 about HV units there are location so what we're seeing here is reinforcing
7 of that but with an explanation as to why and linking it definitively to
8 the talks in Geneva.
9 Q. If we'd quickly look at the next paragraph. We needn't spend much
10 time on this. This is just a report that ECMM team Siroki Brijeg, "their
11 car was targeted by 6 or 7 rounds of heavy machine-gun fire while crossing
12 the bridge to get into Mostar east," and then, what's interesting, "the
13 targeting without doubt HVO was deliberate." Could you comment on this,
14 and did this kind of thing happen on other occasions, too, that you know
16 A. Yes. We were sniped at in our armoured vehicles as we travelled
17 from West Mostar into East Mostar on a not irregular basis. What was
18 important about this was, this is heavy calibre. This is 12.7
19 machine-gun. A -- AK47 rifle round will bounce off the car and just make
20 a little clang. A 12.7 will go straight through. So the fact that one of
21 my vehicles had been targeted by this heavy calibre weapon, and there were
22 two ex-military members on board, meant that I had credibility in their
23 explanation as to where the rounds had come, and as a result of this I
24 made direct complaints to the HVO military forces.
25 Q. Can you remember to whom you made these complaints?
1 A. I believe it was to Bozo Raguz, who was a liaison officer in
2 operational zone Mostar headquarters in West Mostar.
3 Q. Do you recall what his reaction was?
4 A. Well, I made the complaint because it was important to make the
5 complaint, but I never anticipated that it would bring any major changes.
6 It was the same with freedom of movement and, again, not just with Bosnian
7 Croats. Whenever we had our operations interrupted, we made a point of
8 bringing it to the attention of the authorities of whoever had caused us
9 problems but it sometimes resulted, if it was freedom of movement, in
10 temporary lifting of those restrictions, but one knew that an event like
11 this could well be repeated and as a result we slightly changed our
12 operational activity. I didn't allow any single vehicles to go into East
13 Mostar after this. We always sent two.
14 Q. Now, sir, if we can turn to Mostar itself. Can you tell the
15 Court, during your period as HCC or head of the CC Mostar, what was the
16 status of the conflict? How would you describe the status of the conflict
17 you found there as either defensive or offensive with regard to the
18 various sides?
19 A. Well, the front line really from Prozor down through Jablanica and
20 down through East Mostar was static but active. I mean, there were
21 continual and constant skirmishing, was firing of artillery, but the
22 firing of artillery was massively one way. There were and we observed
23 some occasional mortar rounds coming out of East Mostar to West Mostar,
24 but consistently daily, and witnessed by myself, we had shellings by HVO
25 forces into East Mostar. They would be regular and daily occurrences. It
1 wasn't a continual bombardment. It would be three or four rounds dropping
2 without any warning, of course, and then, you know, a period when there
3 wasn't any, and then again later. So it was persistent, demoralising, and
4 caused casualties. And as an addition to the explanation I gave earlier
5 about the circumstances in East Mostar, wounded could only be treated in
6 the hospital in East Mostar, and again that would contrast with anyone who
7 was wounded in West Mostar. They would have been able to be evacuated and
8 ultimately go to hospital facilities in -- in Croatia or elsewhere. In
9 East Mostar you stayed in East Mostar. You went to the hospital in East
10 Mostar, and if you're lucky you came out of East Mostar hospital alive. I
11 went to that hospital and I saw the conditions, and they were awful.
12 Q. Did you ever stay over in East Mostar?
13 A. Yes, I did.
14 Q. Overnight?
15 A. It wasn't normal for monitoring activity to take place after dark,
16 which of course meant many limitations because movement after dark would
17 not be observed by us. However, we -- I did myself stay in East Mostar on
18 a number of occasions overnight.
19 Q. And can you tell the Court what your experience or your general
20 experience was when you did this?
21 A. Well, it's a -- we lived -- lived, I stayed in damaged houses with
22 no water, with no electricity, and with the anxiety of and actually
23 hearing detonations ongoing. Not continuous, but just sporadic.
24 Q. Now, sir, do you know what kind of weaponry the shelling of East
25 Mostar was being conducted by or with?
1 A. Primarily it was with mortar rounds and also with some tank
3 Q. As a former artillery officer, could you perhaps provide the Court
4 with a few insights as to the effect of shelling into a built-up area with
5 mortars and with tanks?
6 A. Artillery is an indirect and what's called an area weapon. It is
7 not a particularly precise weapon, whereas a tank is a precise shell that
8 is fired and in a direct mode. So -- without lapsing into too much
9 military-speak, artillery fire and mortar fire is done indirectly. In
10 other words, the people firing the weapon don't necessarily have to see
11 the target. It is either just fired into a general area or it is observed
12 by someone separate from the firing unit who will then adjust the
13 artillery to have the effect, but it is not a weapon that is used to, for
14 instance, take out a single building. It would be used to hit an area.
15 So it was -- it's indiscriminate. And the nature of an artillery round or
16 a mortar round is one of detonation and fragmentation to create as much
17 shrapnel as possible and as much damage as possible. And that is distinct
18 from a round fired from a tank where the target is observed by those
19 firing the weapon and the nature of the ammunition is one of penetration,
20 largely, rather than detonation and fragmentation, although there are some
21 rounds fired from a tank to achieve that. But it's -- it's indiscriminate
22 and 120-millimetre is a serious thing that you don't want to get on the
23 wrong end of.
24 Q. Thank you for that, sir.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You've mentioned tank fire, and
1 you said that the goal was penetration, and prior to that you said that
2 usually there is an observer. Well, I have a technical question. When a
3 tank fires, in order for this fire to be precise, is there another weapon
4 that would shoot first so that the tank be able to adjust the precision of
5 the fire? A light weapon, for example? Would there be this mechanism
6 with the tracing bullet which would hit the target which would enable the
7 spotter in the tank to see what is happening? Is that a technique that's
8 used when tanks fire?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, although my speciality isn't tanks. That is a
10 technique which is used on tanks and also on some anti-tank weapons used
11 by the infantry, that there is a ranging round fired by a low calibre
12 weapon and once the target is marked on that, the calibration on the main
13 weapon will -- will match that and there will be a hit. That system now
14 is largely redundant and been replaced by lasers, which will give you the
15 same accurate information without actually firing a round. But it is also
16 employed in some shoulder launched anti-tank weapons. Certainly the
17 British Army has those, where the first round that the soldier will fire
18 will be to ensure that he has the correct range and site setting, and when
19 he's confident that he has, he will fire the main armament.
20 If I could just add one clarification. When I was talking about
21 the observer, that is primarily in connection with mortars and with
22 artillery. It is the observer that is guiding the gun that is firing.
23 You -- you don't very often have an observer associated with tank fire.
24 It is the commander in the tank and the gunner in the tank who are doing
25 the observing, and they're seeing the target and they're firing directly
1 at the target. The advantage of the artillery firing indirectly is that
2 it can be a long way away, over hills, hidden, and doesn't have to
3 disclose itself to the target, whereas a tank firing directly at a target,
4 even with concealment, is going to be in view of that target. It has to
5 see that target, and therefore it is a target itself if the capability
6 exists to hit that tank.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have stood up to ask for the
8 floor for a technical question, Mr. Praljak.
9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't think
10 the witness understood your question with respect to when a tank opens
11 fire. I think that you asked that whether before the first tank shell was
12 fired at any time or any place, whether from the tank or anti-aircraft
13 gun, and this was referred to by a witness, whether the target was fired
14 at and whether that would be a way in which a tank could be more precise
15 in the firing. I don't think that exists anywhere at all, but I'll let
16 the witness answer. The tank is an autonomous device, so you can tell us
17 with sights, 12.7 millimetres or 20 millimetres, a smaller calibre, can
18 you target a target with a tank shell?
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. That was the purpose of my
20 question. It seems to me that you did answer the question, but could you
21 perhaps answer the question that was just put forward by Mr. Praljak,
23 THE WITNESS: Yes. I believe that Mr. Praljak's question,
24 Your Honour, is the same as yours, and I do repeat that it is a known
25 technique for tanks to have two calibre weapons, a small calibre that
1 might be 12.7, .50, 7.62, alongside, and in it's -- attached to the tank
2 as well as its main armour, and that the smaller round can be fired as a
3 range finder before firing the main tank. That wouldn't always be the
4 case, and tank battles tend to be fast, but that is a technique used by
5 tank units. They would fire from their own tank a small calibre weapon
6 that would then give them the range and sureness that when they fired the
7 large-calibre weapon it would hit the target. An older rather than a
8 modern technique but it definitely happens.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One of the other generals would
10 like to speak. Perhaps it would be preferable to wait until the -- wait
11 until later.
12 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I should like
13 to present the following position, and that is that this witness is not
14 telling us correctly how the tanks operate. It can have a 12.7
15 machine-gun or 7.62, but it is for close -- fighting close, close up.
16 Now, what about if you have a bullet that is 7.62 calibre, how can you
17 determine the distance if you use this type of calibre bullet? A tank is
18 very powerful. It has the possibility for autonomous viewing. And I'd
19 like to ask the witness that if you have an attack of 20 tanks or 50 tanks
20 in one area how you determine a target. So what I wanted to say is that
21 the witness is not well-versed in the subject matter of tanks and how they
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, I think we must continue
24 because it's becoming extremely technological from a military point of
25 view and there will be other witnesses as well.
1 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour. Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. Witness, if we may turn to the second last document in the binder,
3 Exhibit 09997. 09997. And this is another daily report or a daily sitrep
4 dated the 20th of December, 1993. Could you just comment once again
5 briefly on the origins or status of this?
6 A. Yes. This is a report coming from the EC liaison officer based in
7 Kiseljak in the UNPROFOR headquarters.
8 Q. If you look at page 2 of the document, the fourth paragraph,
9 entitled Southern BH Command. Do you have that?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. It says, "A Mostar -- an active day in Mostar. SpaBat patrols
12 reported 26 incoming and five outgoing mortar rounds in East Mostar. SA
13 fire and HMG exchange continued throughout the day." Could you perhaps
14 just briefly comment on this?
15 A. Yes. SA is small-arms fire. HMG is heavy machine-gun exchanges.
16 That is an indication that the rounds weren't all going one way but it
17 gives a good example of the sort of relative weight. There are 26
18 incoming, and SpaBat was based in Mostar, so that is coming in from HVO,,
19 and the five outgoing are armija rounds being fired into West Mostar. In
20 terms of the numbers and the weight, this would be in my estimation at the
21 higher end of a day's activity. There were counts, and I think if one
22 referred to all the SpaBat reports you'd be able to get a very clear
23 picture of the amount, but if helps the Court my impression would be that
24 we would be seeing and hearing probably half that number. Let's say
25 between somewhere between about 10 rounds a day would be an average day in
2 Q. Would that be during the period that you were CC Mostar?
3 A. That's the period that I can personally vouch to.
4 Q. Sir, just very briefly. On the next page, right at the bottom, D,
5 and if we recall that release from detainees from HVO detention centres
6 was going on, it seems that here we still have a further report on such
7 releases, and with SpaBat involvement.
8 A. I'm sorry. Could you just point me more specifically to ...
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. The next page?
11 Q. The next page, D.
12 A. I have it.
13 Q. Do you have any comments on that paragraph? That you had written
14 15 detainees released and SpaBat involvement and ICRC from Rodoc?
15 A. Yes, checking the date 20th of December so we're very much into,
16 in fact towards the end, I think, of the release of prisoners by HVO
17 unilateral as declared by Mate Boban and as delivered in terms of activity
18 by Mr. Pusic.
19 Q. Now, sir, we've -- you've described the conditions that you
20 encountered in East Mostar. Were there any attempts by the international
21 community to establish the actual population in East Mostar during the
22 period that you were head of CC Mostar?
23 A. Yes. This would have been largely -- well, it was of interest to
24 us all but particularly to UNHCR who would be providing humanitarian aid
25 and would need to have as much detail as they could on numbers. The
1 numbers, however, were always notoriously inaccurate. I mean, clearly
2 because we're in war conditions, there was difficulty in any civilian
3 administration, and in those conditions having an accurate record, but
4 there were various figures that were mooted and used, if you like as -- in
5 order to steer the amount of humanitarian aid that went to an area. In
6 the case of East Mostar, the figures ranged dramatically. I think the
7 highest figures I heard were -- were probably in the 50.000 range I think
8 more likely it was somewhere between 30 and 40, but that's -- that's a
9 guess on my part.
10 Q. Thank you. Sir, if we can look at Exhibit 0995 -- 09995. Sorry,
11 Triple 9, 5. That's my mistake. 09995. Do you have the document?
12 A. I have the document.
13 Q. It's another daily sitrep dated the 23rd of December, 1993. Would
14 you have also known or contributed to this sitrep?
15 A. Most of the information for this sitrep would actually be coming
16 from the UN forces. It's the liaison officer sitting in UNPROFOR who is
17 looking at their reports and extracting information from their reports to
18 inform us, rather than our reports being -- forming the content.
19 Q. What I would like to direct your attention to is the third page of
20 this document, and it's the fourth page in the B/C/S version. There's a
21 paragraph dated -- numbered number 4, southern BH command right at the
22 bottom of the page, and towards the end of that little paragraph there's
23 report of snipe activity, but then there's reference to the "planned
24 escort of BritFor trucks transporting the field hospital into East Mostar
25 on 23 December," which is cancelled. Do you have any knowledge or
1 recollection of this?
2 A. Yes. This was a field hospital donated by, I believe, one of the
3 Nordic countries, and it was destined initially for, I believe, Konjic.
4 It was held in Ploce for a long time, and the movement of this field
5 hospital to Konjic didn't happen, and then at some stage I think the
6 decision was made that it would go to East Mostar. Getting this field
7 hospital into the area of need proved to be very, very difficult and over
8 a fairly prolonged period there were attempts to -- to deploy it, and I
9 don't actually remember that ever being successful, though it is possible
10 that it -- that it was after the period I left as HCC Mostar.
11 Q. Okay. Sir, we're going to turn now to a number of documents just
12 recording the release of detainees from the HVO detention centres.
13 Looking at the same document you have, page 11 thereof, and actually if
14 you look in the top right-hand corner it would be the one numbered
15 R0213946, 3946. In the B/C/S version it would be page 10.
16 Now, sir, there's a paragraph numbered 8, Humanitarian Activity,
17 and just the first part of that detainees released -- the release
18 operation. "Today SpaBat and ICRC again successfully evacuated 160
19 detainees from Rodoc." Do you have anything to add to that or any
21 A. It's the continuation of the releases that we referred to earlier,
22 and Rodoc is also sometimes referred to as the Heliodrom.
23 Q. Exhibit 06590. Do you have the document?
24 A. I have the document.
25 Q. It's a report, daily report, by CC -- from CC Mostar dated 11
1 November 1993. Is this your report?
2 A. This is my report. I wrote this.
3 Q. Okay. Now, it mentions, if we turn to paragraph 5 on the second
4 page, Humanitarian, and if we look at paragraph 3 of that, in the B/C/S
5 version it's page 2, in the middle, "M1 met Semir Boskailo in Konjic
6 hospital. He said he had been taken prisoner in Dretelj before release in
7 October 1993. He claimed that prisoners were hidden from ICRC when they
8 visited camps so a complete register could not be made." Could you
9 comment on this?
10 A. I'm not sure I could add anything significantly to that. I think
11 it was always difficult, certainly for us as a monitors and from the ICRC
12 to get a complete picture. You're going into a controlled environment,
13 and you don't necessarily have access to all buildings, and so this is
14 possible, and I think historically we will have seen it in other areas,
15 and -- and -- but I can't add any more than that.
16 Q. Okay. Sir, if we turn to the first page of that document, under
17 Political, "HCC," that's you, "met with Smail Klaric," who is described as
18 the president of the War Presidency Mostar, and in the middle of that
19 paragraph it states, there's reference of, "Mostar county had recently
20 formed on 7 November in Mostar and had authority over the municipalities
21 of Stolac, Capljina, Mostar, Jablanica." Could you perhaps briefly
22 comment on what this relates to or what this is?
23 A. Yes. ECMM was dealing in many issues and issues but perhaps where
24 it had a unique lead was on political structures, hence my interest in the
25 formation of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. But equally we were
1 discovering and encountering commentary from armija, that they were
2 re-organising their civilian structures along a county basis, and we did
3 see a number of personalities begin to -- to change, and they were telling
4 us that they were part of the new structure. So when I first went to East
5 Mostar as head of the coordination centre, I was meeting another person
6 whose name I'm sorry I can't remember, but Smail Klaric soon became the
7 main interlocutor, along with Ibrahim Kaluda.
8 Q. Very briefly, I don't know whether you would have any comment on
9 that, but Stolac and Capljina were areas included within the Croatian
10 Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Could you comment on the fact that they are
11 also then included in this Mostar county for the Muslims?
12 A. Well, that simply is because the Muslims did not recognise the
13 boundaries as identified by CRHB and were simply -- whether they actually
14 physically held the territory was not so important -- well, it was
15 important to them but their political boundaries would go over the
16 military front lines.
17 Q. Okay. Before stepping on to the next document, if I may just
18 briefly refer back to the mobile hospital?
19 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may, Your Honour, one point of clarification.
20 The gentleman indicated that the army -- that the armija, that is the army
21 of ABiH, was restructuring their civilian structures. I wonder if the
22 gentleman misspoke. But here we have the military restructuring the
23 civilian structures. Is that what the gentleman indicated? It's on page
24 28. I don't have the exact line. It might have just gone off the page.
25 It's on line 23, 24 of page 28. "Armija was restructuring the civilian
1 structure," and is that what the gentleman wanted to indicate?
2 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I think you're right to draw attention to a
3 probably rather clumsy speak there. I have throughout the -- given --
4 giving my evidence sometimes referred to Bosnian Muslims, sometimes
5 referred to armija, sometimes referred to BiH. I did not mean in this
6 case mean to suggest that it was the military re-organising the civilian.
7 It was a civilian structure which was being developed. Its origin was
8 coming out of the Sarajevo government and indeed Ibrahim Kaluda was the
9 coordination for Mostar, but actually I believe he was, if you like, an
10 emissary from Sarajevo. So it was a political development and not one by
11 the armija forces.
12 MR. KRUGER:
13 Q. Thank you. Sir, just briefly back to the mobile hospital which
14 was then scheduled to go into East Mostar, what were -- what were the
15 actual difficulties or the problems involved in get it in? What prevented
16 the hospital going into East Mostar?
17 A. Well, it's most obvious point it was freedom of movement. There
18 would be a -- a physical restriction. The vehicles carrying these
19 containers - and I think there was something like 30 or 40 containers -
20 were not physically allowed to move but of course the -- it's, why were
21 the barriers there in the first place? That would have been a political
22 decision, and it would have been a decision not made in isolation from
23 other humanitarian activity, other activity generally. There were always
24 linked issues. One could never seemingly deal with a specific issue. It
25 always had to be related to another. There was always an attempt for some
1 sort of -- of balance, and therefore that is why, for instance, when we
2 were referring earlier to the attempt to evacuate hospitals, it was
3 happening in Nova Bila, a Croatian -- a Bosnian Croat hospital at the same
4 time as the East Mostar hospital, so there was always linkages.
5 Q. Do you know who from the Bosnian Croat side would have been
6 involved in moving these -- this hospital or preventing it from moving?
7 A. Well, the Bosnian Croat forces wouldn't have been involved in its
8 actual movement but it's -- it's prevention of movement could only have
9 come from the highest level. This would not have been a local command
10 decision and it would either be the highest level militarily or
11 politically. So in terms of names this would require Mate Boban, senior
12 members of the government, or senior members of the HVO. I -- I couldn't
13 state specifically where that specific decision sat, but it would either
14 be with, at this time, November, General Praljak, Ante Roso, we're at a
15 changeover point here. It could have involved Jadranko Prlic. It would
16 certainly have involved Mate Boban. And if I had to make an estimate or a
17 judgement, it would be Mate Boban's decision.
18 Q. Thank you. Now, sir, if we can look at Exhibit 04431. 04431. Do
19 you have it?
20 A. Yes, I do.
21 Q. It's described as an ECMM report number 34 for 22 to 29 August
22 1993. Could you tell the Court first of all, what does it mean, "ECMM
23 humanitarian activity report"?
24 A. The -- during its various evolutions and iterations, the ECMM had
25 slightly different structures of team activity on the ground, and at one
1 stage it had teams that were specifically dealing and only dealing with
2 humanitarian issues, and we had another unit that was dealing with
3 airfield monitoring, and then we had the general teams. By the time we
4 get to August 1993, in fact, the functions are really being carried out
5 which the generalist teams. So we don't see a specific humanitarian team.
6 But the importance of the humanitarian activity was recognised, and so a
7 cell was formed in the headquarters whose job it was to comb through every
8 report from whatever source and extract anything which had a humanitarian
9 connection, and they would write a -- a report, and this is one of those
10 reports coming out of the headquarters at Zagreb of the humanitarian cell.
11 Q. Would you have also seen this report?
12 A. Yes. It had a wide distribution. I -- I can't say that I
13 specifically saw this one unless we go through it a little bit more and
14 something leaps out, but we had those reports coming out of the
15 headquarters, and I did read them.
16 Q. I'd like to refer you to paragraph 29 of the report. And this is
17 the section entitled Prisoners and Detainees.
18 A. I have that.
19 Q. Now, if you look at the second paragraph of that -- sorry, no.
20 Paragraph 29. "On 29 August, team 3, Medjugorje, reported that ICR assume
21 the conditions in the detention camps Dretelj and Gabela to be much worse
22 than in Rodoc camps they visited. Access to the two camps can't be
23 achieved before ICRC have visited the Muslims camps on the east bank of
24 Mostar." Can you comment on what is reported here?
25 A. Yes, it's recognising that ICRC had the lead in terms of visiting
1 detention camps, and we're reporting what they're telling us. So it's
2 not -- it's not an ECMM experience but what it's saying here is, it's
3 pointing out, again, as I mentioned earlier, a linkage that it appears
4 they are reporting they are prevented from gaining access to Dretelj and
5 Gabela at that time until they have demonstrated to the HVO that there is
6 equal access to their HVO forces that were held by armija in East Mostar.
7 So it's that linkage issue again.
8 Q. Can we turn to paragraph 33. "On 26 August, team V2 Gornji Vakuf
9 observed in Trnovaca 25 prisoners of war civilian internees digging
10 trenches close to the front line." Did you ever come across any instances
11 of labour by detainees?
12 A. Yes. It was something which happened and was observed both armija
13 forces making HVO dig -- or captives dig trenches, but I personally saw
14 and witnessed a Muslim being required to dig trenches by HVO, but this was
15 in Central Bosnia.
16 Q. Did you ever come across this mentioned as an issue when you
17 eventually became head of Mostar CC?
18 A. Yes. We had allegations made again from both sides that civilians
19 were used as human shields. They were used to carry out dangerous front
20 line activity, and so it was an issue that was -- we discussed with --
21 with both parties.
22 Q. Paragraph 34. The same team on 26 August met the mayor of
23 Capljina, and he also said, "the municipality has released a number of
24 Muslim men from a camp, but the rest would be kept for later prisoner of
25 war exchanges." Do you know what that was about? Do you recall such an
2 A. Well, this predates the Mate Boban initiative, but it was a
3 constant theme throughout the period that I was in Bosnia to try and --
4 and release prisoners, so it appears here that we do have an initiative at
5 some level that has been successful, but clearly it isn't a complete
6 evacuation of that camp but a statement that some are being held for, if
7 you like, bargaining, again something both sides did.
8 Q. Could you comment on the fact that the mayor of Capljina in this
9 instance appears to have a hand in the release of detainees from -- from a
10 camp? And my comment -- I'd like you to comment from the point of view of
11 how can this be in light of other existing structures which may be in
12 place for such matters.
13 A. Well, there would have to be -- this couldn't be an initiative
14 with the mayor of Capljina carried out in -- of his own volition.
15 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: Your Honour. [Interpretation] Thank you,
16 Mr. President. If the mayor of Capljina says that the municipal
17 structures took part in that, then we must believe him. Now, what my
18 learned colleague is putting to the witness, I think, is entering the
19 realm of speculation.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Also, there's the lack of foundation. If you look
21 at the beginning of the answer, "this could not be an initiative with the
22 mayor." So it begs the question, at whose initiative was this? Does he
23 know for a fact keeping in mine the date and place the gentleman was at
24 that point in time, in country, that is. So unless there is a foundation
25 it calls for speculation.
1 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, if I may respond. I think that the
2 question is -- is justified in the sense of the witness was in the area at
3 the time. He had gained experience of the personalities involved, the
4 people in various positions, and therefore he is qualified to comment on
6 MR. KARNAVAS: We're talking about a specific incident,
7 Your Honour, not in general. He's asking him about a specific incident.
8 So he must lay a foundation.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As regards what was just
10 described about the mayor, you said that the mayor of Capljina -- you
11 mentioned the mayor of Capljina. Did you actually see him and speak to
12 the mayor?
13 THE WITNESS: No, sir. At the time of this report, which is the
14 26th of August, I was in Central Bosnia. I can answer more generally if
15 it helps about structures, and that was where I was lead to go in my
16 answer, but I don't know whether I'm allowed to do that.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: On this -- on this instance, Your Honour, I suggest
18 that he not be answering the question unless a proper foundation can be
19 laid. Based on the answer the gentleman has no personal knowledge.
20 Whether in general something happened or not, that's irrelevant. The
21 Prosecution is -- is pointing to a specific incident.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You stated that the mayor of
23 Capljina -- in fact, you didn't see him because you were elsewhere but you
24 added that you could talk about the structure of the municipality. Have
25 you studied those structures? Why is it that you affirm that you can talk
1 about that?
2 THE WITNESS: Sir, I believe I do have an understanding of the
3 civil and military structures, and what is important is, is how those
4 contrasted between what was happening in Herzegovina and what was
5 happening in Central Bosnia. I was going to say that in Central Bosnia,
6 because of the isolated nature of pockets of minority groups, it was quite
7 possible for an individual to actually -- and often a mayor, and I could
8 give you an example of Zepce or Vares, where a mayor would have authority
9 and would be able to carry out independent actions. My comment would
10 simply be that in Herzegovina that independence of initiative at a
11 political level was not achievable because there was a control structure
12 there. In other words, they may be given some latitude to do some local
13 arrangements, but if that was to extend beyond what was politically
14 acceptable there was a means of -- of checking that individual authority.
15 Up in Central Bosnia there was no means of checking that individual
16 authority. So all I was going to say with reference to Capljina, Capljina
17 fell within Herzegovina. Herzegovina, there was a contiguous land area
18 controlled by the Bosnian Croat forces, and the mayor of Capljina would
19 not have been able to act completely independently of the political
20 structures in Mostar. He would have some latitude but not complete
21 independence. The mayor of Zepce would have a lot more independence, if
22 that helps I sir.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, Your Honour, there's a lack of foundation.
24 There hasn't been -- and I can cover this on cross-examination with
25 additional time, but what the gentleman hasn't answered is how has he
1 studied the structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina. How does he know exactly
2 what is happening at this particular time and the actual powers of this
3 particular mayor. That's -- so anecdotally, he can say, in general, yes,
4 this might be the case, but, specifically, how does he know? And that's
5 the point. He's trying to make a difference between what's happening in
6 Central Bosnia, in Herzegovina, and he's trying to show somehow in
7 Herzegovina you have a parastate in existence where the municipality's
8 under total control. Now, he needs to lay a foundation. Has he studied?
9 Has he looked at the legislation in order to see --
10 MR. KRUGER: [Overlapping speakers] Your Honour, this is for
12 MR. KARNAVAS: -- to see what powers exactly the mayor has
13 vis-a-vis the other structures.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Witness, sir, you have
15 distinguished between Herzegovina and Central Bosnia, and everyone can
16 read the transcript to that effect, but that distinction, that is, as
17 regards the relationship between the municipal structures and their scope
18 of action and responsibility and their position vis-a-vis the military
19 forces, what exactly enables you draw those conclusions? Have you made
20 personal observations? Did colleagues report to you? What is it that
21 enables you to draw those conclusions?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Experience on the ground,
23 Your Honour, in terms of what was possible achieve as a monitor and how
24 one achieved that. We operated in a different way in Central Bosnia. We
25 may well have had a command structure, be it armija or military -- sorry,
1 be it armija or HVO, but one didn't necessarily in Central Bosnia solve a
2 situation by going to the person who appeared to be the senior commander.
3 So in my previous evidence when I've been to the Tribunal, I have noted
4 that one would possibly resolve in some areas in Central Bosnia an issue
5 by reference to the authority, the power, where the power lay in that
6 particular locality and not necessarily by having to go to the senior
7 military or political leader in Central Bosnia. My experience in
8 Herzegovina was different. My experience in Herzegovina was that an issue
9 in, let's say, Tomislavgrad or Siroki Brijeg are a major issue, could
10 equally be dealt with at a senior level in Mostar, because those people in
11 Mostar had a connection and had an ability to influence the activities of
12 military and civil structures in Herzegovina that they didn't have over
13 Central Bosnia or that in Central Bosnia commanders had over all of the
14 pockets in isolation.
15 I have met many of the mayors myself. First of all, when I was a
16 monitor in Tomislavgrad, I would have seen the mayor of Tomislavgrad,
17 Jablanica, Gornji Vakuf, and so on, and by the time I came in as HCC of
18 Mostar, and you will have seen by my references to documents yesterday I
19 met many political leaders as well as military leaders, and so over time I
20 built up an impression of what sort of authority and what sort of
21 structures were in existence and was able to contrast them with my
22 experience in Central Bosnia, but I'm not a legal lawyer, and I anticipate
23 that when we get to cross-examining we'll be dealing with that, some of
24 those issues.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's now 10.30. We're going to
1 have a 20-minute break, and we shall resume with the examination after the
3 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The hearing is
6 resume. The registrar has informed me that the Prosecution still has 40
7 to 45 minutes. Mr. Kruger, therefore, you have three-quarters of an hour
8 to round up your examination-in-chief.
9 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour. I think that should be
10 sufficient time. Thank you.
11 Q. Witness, if we may turn to Exhibit 05959. Exhibit 05959. Do you
12 have the document?
13 A. I have the document.
14 Q. This is an ECMM or CC daily summary -- CC Mostar daily summary of
15 19 October, 1993. Do you recognise this?
16 A. Yes. I believe I had just arrived in Mostar. It was either the
17 17th or 19th, I forget exactly. I don't believe this is one that I wrote
19 Q. If we turn to the second page, at the very top, and in the B/C/S
20 version, that is page 2, the paragraph marked C, I think. Now, it says
21 HCC designate, that would be you; is that correct?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. And it says you attended a joint commission formed to discuss
24 humanitarian issues, and then it goes on to describe what happened at this
25 meeting where the media apparently appeared. Do you recall this meeting?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. In whose meeting was this office -- in whose office was this
4 A. I can't actually remember which office it was in.
5 Q. Can you remember with whom it was specifically?
6 A. Well, it was supposed to be a joint commission, but there were no
7 BiH representatives there, so it would have been Mr. Bozic, and actually I
8 would have expected that it was -- that Mr. Pusic might have been there,
9 but only Mr. Bozic is mentioned at the moment, and Slobodan Bozic was the
10 deputy minister of defence and also dealing with international relations.
11 Q. And what happened at this meeting?
12 A. Croatian television came in to -- to film what was going on, and
13 what was going on, of course, were a number of international organisations
14 including the ECMM in discussions with members of the Bosnian Croat
15 commission about humanitarian issues.
16 Q. Now, your assessment on the fact that the BiH representatives were
17 not present, did you have any views on that at the time?
18 A. Well, as it was a joint commission, certainly those joint
19 commissions that have been established in Gornji Vakuf and Busovaca
20 reflected or had membership from both Muslim and Croat authorities here.
21 The joint commission didn't have any representatives from the BiH, and the
22 interpretation which we can see later on is that the message -- the
23 presence of the television there was going to be signalling to the
24 audience watching that television of H -- of Bosnian Croat forces working
25 with and cooperating with the international community, and this was
1 something which was regularly raised by military and political leaders,
2 that they felt - the Bosnian Croat political leaders - that they didn't
3 get good international coverage, that the coverage is always biased,
4 one-sided, that it always saw the Muslims as the victims and not the
5 Croats as the victims. It underplayed atrocities where the victims were
6 Croats. For instance, Uzdol. It emphasised things like Stupni Do
7 massacre but didn't seem -- sorry, Uzdol was actually a massacre of
8 Bosnian Croats, and they felt, for instance - that was one example given
9 to me that - that didn't receive the same coverage that Stupni Do had. So
10 there was this continual concern, and I felt that this was probably a
11 message about, you know, cooperation with the international community.
12 Q. Sir, if we can turn to the next page of this document at the very
13 top, and in the B/C/S version this would be page 4 under paragraph 6, and
14 it says HCC and HCC designate. That would once again be you?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. And Jesus Amatriain; is that correct?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. And it says that this morning you were visiting the HVO
19 headquarters in Citluk, requesting -- requested by HRC and CC Herceg Novi
20 in order to get a letter of guarantee for a cease-fire. And then you say
21 the letter had already been done. And then in the comment, "Due to the
22 fact that General Petkovic was not in Citluk we were talking to Colonel
23 Akrap." Could you perhaps just elaborate on this, give the Court some
24 insight into this?
25 A. Could I just take a moment to read that whole paragraph?
1 Q. Certainly.
2 A. I can't throw a lot of light on this. I can say that I didn't
3 write this. This does not have my use of language here. What I can say
4 is that this clearly was an issue that we were trying to resolve, and it
5 required an agreement at a level beyond that that could be achieved at CC
6 Mostar, hence the involvement of the regional centre and also the team --
7 and there was one ECMM team based in Montenegro, and the issue here is
8 about power -- power supply, and it required obviously coordination
9 between the various -- that would be Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs.
10 I -- I don't recall any more detail. The comment is, as I say, not my
11 comment, but it's just noting here that we didn't see General Petkovic.
12 We saw his -- his assistant, Colonel Akrap, and I don't believe that I saw
13 General Petkovic at all in this -- in this period.
14 Q. Thank you. Now, sir, just a few final things or one final thing
15 on the issue of release of detainees. You have mentioned a few times
16 already that Mate Boban made or issued a unilateral instruction for the
17 release of detainees from HVO detention centres. My question to you is
18 had you had any prior indication that something like this was going to
20 A. I remember -- not specifically a unilateral. Certainly and almost
21 continually there was an attempt by ICRC to broker large-scale release
22 of -- coordinated release of prisoners of war or -- by both sides at the
23 same time. That had, as we've seen before, had some small and local
24 successes but not done at a large level.
25 What Mate Boban's statement was, was a very clear statement and a
1 good move in terms of sending the right signals to the international
2 community that regardless of cooperation and linkages, he was going to
3 release prisoners from -- from the detention centres. So those releases,
4 the international community still hoped, would encourage the armija forces
5 to reciprocate, and when they didn't, of course, that gave the Bosnian
6 Croats even more kudos in terms of we're doing it, they're not.
7 Q. Let's have a look at Exhibit 07280. 7280. You have the document?
8 A. I have the document.
9 Q. Now, this is a report from CC -- daily report from CC Mostar dated
10 20 December 1993. Is this a report by you?
11 A. Yes, I wrote this report.
12 Q. If we can look at paragraph 7, the assessment, right at the end of
13 the document and there says the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna image
14 offensive is continuing on the international arena with Mate Boban
15 announcing his expectation of reciprocal prisoner of war release. We've
16 just touched upon this. Do you have anything to add to this comment or
18 A. No. I think I've covered it in my previous response.
19 Q. Of course just for the record if we look under Humanitarian, in
20 the first paragraph and the second paragraph I see you're still recording
21 the release of detainees from the various detention centres?
22 A. That's correct. It's part of this Mate Boban programme. It
23 wasn't clearly, as we've established in the last couple of days, a single
24 event. It was a scheduled release with anticipated numbers being given to
25 us at times.
1 Q. If we can look at the very next document in the binder, that is
2 Exhibit 07286. 07286. Do you have the document in front of you?
3 A. I do.
4 Q. And this is once again CC Mostar daily summary, dated 21 December
5 1993, so just the next day from the previous one. Is this your document
6 as well?
7 A. I -- I wrote this report.
8 Q. Sir, once again if we can turn to the assessment. And your
9 assessment once again focuses on the image war, and you say, "it continues
10 with BiH losing and CRHB are expected to maintain the momentum." And then
11 you go further, one method would be to release the BiH helicopters without
12 maintaining the Croatian Defence Council prisoners of war link, and then,
13 specifically, "it is ironic that in the current climate the CRHB would [as
14 read] present such actions as yet more evidence of their unilateral
15 goodwill." Could you comment on this?
16 A. "CRHB could present such action as yet more evidence." Yeah, my
17 impression was at the time that the Bosnian Croats were beginning to turn
18 around their image. They were not only making gestures, they were
19 actually releasing prisoners, and this was -- this was going down well,
20 and the BiH were not reciprocating, so my comments that CRHB are -- are
21 beginning to win this -- this public relations element. But what was
22 surprising and -- was this continued detaining of the two helicopters,
23 because this had become an issue almost out of all proportion. I mean, it
24 was raised at every level and just about every possible occasion with the
25 right authorities about why it hadn't -- why they hadn't been released why
1 they were still being held, when they were going to be released, and it
2 seemed here I'm making the comment that, you know, a simple gesture of
3 their release would be yet more evidence of the Bosnian Croats actually
4 responding to what the international community was -- was asking and
5 gesturing, but they didn't, or they didn't then.
6 Q. Do you have any idea the -- these two helicopters, what kind of --
7 how much of the armija or ABiH's airpower did this represent, or air
9 A. The airfield monitors that I mentioned earlier had given us some
10 impression of -- of forces, and it was our understanding that the armija
11 had four helicopters. So seizing two was instantly holding or
12 neutralising 50 per cent of the air force capability of the armija.
13 Q. Sir, if we can look in the same document. On the first page,
14 under the section Political and the third paragraph thereof, and once
15 again there's reference to John Bryan, and this deals with HVO prisoners
16 being held in Mostar east or the -- and he says, "Armija argue Muslim
17 released so far have been civilians and not soldiers." Can you comment on
19 A. Well, this was their stated position and the reason why they would
20 not release the HVO prisoners that they were holding in -- in East Mostar.
21 They said that it should be an exchange of male men -- or men of fighting
22 age, i.e., soldiers, and they hadn't seen soldiers released from Gabela
23 and Ljubuski and Heliodrom and so on. They said that they were saying
24 civilians. And they were only going to hand over soldiers when they saw
25 soldiers being handed over. What I can't comment on is what was the age
1 and gender of those that were released by the HVO to state clearly whether
2 HVO were releasing males of military age.
3 Q. If we can turn to the next document, which is 7290. And this is
4 again a daily summary from CC Mostar, also the 21st of December, 1993. Is
5 this also your document?
6 A. Yes, it's my document. The reason I hesitate is you pointed out
7 it was the same day, and did we not already send one on that day?
8 Q. If you look at the previous document, which was 7286, I see that
9 that's also the 21st of December, 1993. Could you perhaps comment on two
10 daily summaries on the same day?
11 A. Well, it would be very unusual. I'm just looking at some of the
12 transmission times to see if that's going to give us any clues, and it
13 would appear that if one looks under the UTC time, the document 7286 was
14 transmitted at half past 8.00 on the 22nd of the 12th, 1993. And if we
15 look at the UTC time on document 7290, this was sent at almost 9.00 on the
16 21st. So what I'm concluding from this is, I got the date wrong on
17 document 7286, and that should in fact be the 22nd of December.
18 Q. Thank you. So turning then to 7290. If we can look at the second
19 page, and this is under the section, Humanitarian. On -- in the second
20 paragraph of that section it says, "M9 and M2 monitored the delivery of
21 Muslim prisoners of war to East Mostar." And then further down once
22 again, "Armija and Mostar maintain those released are civilians and not
23 soldiers." Would you like to add anything or comment on this?
24 A. No. It's the same explanation from the armija. What isn't in
25 here and what I can't remember is -- I mean, we monitored them, but I
1 honestly cannot remember what the gender and age profile was. Had I seen
2 that contradicting, I probably would have said that, but I don't remember.
3 Q. If we can turn to Exhibit 07606. 07606. Do you have the
5 A. I do.
6 Q. This is once again a weekly humanitarian activity report for 9 to
7 15 January, 1994. Can you comment on the origins of this document or who
8 produced it?
9 A. Yes. It would have come out of the humanitarian cell in Zagreb,
10 distributed widely, and because it was humanitarian activity report, it
11 would also have been sent outside of the ECMM structures. So it would
12 have gone to ICRC, UNHCR, and because it came out of the headquarters it
13 probably would have gone direct to their headquarters, so Geneva and so
15 Q. Now, if we can turn to paragraph 28 of this document. Paragraph
16 28. It's a few pages on.
17 A. I have that.
18 Q. It says, "the ECMM was informed on 10 January that the release of
19 prisoners as announced by Mate Boban was completed," and then certain
20 statistics are provided. Can you comment on this?
21 A. Well, it proved to be inaccurate because there were releases --
22 oh, no, sorry. 10th of the 1st. Well, it -- I don't remember exactly
23 when it came to an end, but here we have a summary of statistics and a
24 claim that it all was complete, that the camps were empty on the 10th of
25 the 1st.
1 Q. In the middle of that paragraph it refers to remaining prisoners
2 of war in Heliodrom and in Ljubuski. Can you comment on that in the
3 context of releases being completed?
4 A. Well, it seems to be contradictory. I don't know whether it goes
5 on to explain what the contradiction might be, but in the first sentence
6 it's saying, look, it's all completed and here are the figures, and then
7 in the second sentence it's saying "remaining POWs." So there's a
8 contradiction in there that I can't explain, but I imagine that the
9 conclusion one should draw is that it wasn't completed.
10 Q. Sir, if we can now turn to the issue of Stupni Do. The Court has
11 already heard evidence of what occurred on the 23rd of October, 1993. I
12 I'd like to refer you to Exhibit 06211. This is a CC Mostar daily
13 summary, dated 28 October 1993. Do you have the document?
14 A. I have the document.
15 Q. Is it your document?
16 A. Yes, I wrote this document.
17 Q. Sir, under paragraph -- the paragraph dealing with Political, the
18 second paragraph -- no, sorry. Yes. "M4 and -- met Ilija Krezo,
19 municipality -- president of municipality of Livno and Mijo Tokic and
20 asked them to comment on the Stupni Do massacre," and then it says, "they
21 were embarrassed and used the excuse of conflicting reports to avoid
22 comment." Could you comment on this?
23 A. Yes, the initial reports coming out of the incident the master at
24 Stupni Do were conflicting and the United Nations and ECMM established, as
25 I referred to yesterday, that the action and killings were committed by
1 HVO forces working under Ivica Rajic from Kiseljak, who had gone through
2 Serb-held territory into the Vares pocket. There were conflicting and
3 confusing reports. It's precisely back to the point that I was making
4 earlier about the connection with those isolated pockets and getting
5 information quickly. Now, the international community had a better
6 communication with those isolated pockets so we very quickly established
7 what had happened. And over a period of probably two, three weeks we very
8 quickly found that our version was accepted pretty broadly by Bosnian
9 Croats. Obviously there were some exceptions, but I do remember raising
10 this with Vladislav Pogarcic and with Jadranko Prlic, and there were, I
11 think, an early acknowledgement that this was HVO forces had committed
12 this even if they'd acted independently and not been instructed to.
13 Q. Can I refer you to the assessment, paragraph 7 on the next page.
14 "The desire of Croatia to establish their international image as victims
15 has suffered the setback of Stupni Do and the blocked Muslim medevac from
16 East Mostar." Could you comment on this perhaps?
17 A. Yes, it's this consistent theme that Bosnian Croats felt that
18 their predicament, the situation of Bosnian Croats, was not articulated to
19 the international community. The ECMM were blamed, journalists were
20 blamed, UN were blamed, but references were made to specific incidents
21 where they felt there had been an under-representation. What I'm say here
22 is that, if you're actually trying to change that image, and I do believe
23 there was a genuine attempt to change that image, obviously Stupni Do, and
24 a very clear indication and establishing that it was -- in fact, HVO
25 forces sets this back, and also we had at this period the failed medevac
1 from East Mostar although the medevac had been successfully concluded from
2 Nova Bila. So there were actions on the ground and things happening which
3 made it very difficult for a policy or a strategy of promoting a new image
4 for the Bosnian Croats to gain credibility when these things were
6 Q. Just before stepping off this document, if you can go back to the
7 first page, the Political section, the very first paragraph referring to
8 the -- the helicopters, it says it was confirmed -- "UNPROFOR confirmed
9 that these helicopters had flown the published and approved flight path."
10 Was this indeed correct to your knowledge.
11 A. To my knowledge it was correct. It was part of a coordinated,
12 multi-international agency event, and the clearance of the helicopters
13 would have been required by UNPROFOR because they had the no-fly policy.
14 So they -- if they were going to be in the air, it needed UN's authority
15 for this to happen, and this is confirmation from UNPROFOR that they had.
16 Q. Sir, if we turn or return to the issue of the meetings on the 31st
17 of October 1993 with Mate Boban and then with Jadranko Prlic. And if I
18 can refer you in this regard to document 06303. 06303. Do you have the
20 A. I have the document.
21 Q. It's --
22 A. It's my document.
23 Q. It's your document, CC Mostar daily summary for 31 October 1993;
25 A. That's correct.
1 Q. Now if we look at the very first paragraph under Political, and if
2 we look about two-thirds of the way down the first paragraph, it says,
3 "Boban stated that his information on Stupni Do indicated only armija
4 soldiers had been killed." Can you comment on this?
5 A. Yes. I think Mate Boban was one of the last to acknowledge, if he
6 ever did, the reality on the ground, and here is he stating to our head of
7 mission, this is Ambassador de Baenst, with the unusual spelling of the
8 surname, the head of the regional centre is Martin Garrod and HCC is
9 myself and a political advisor who had come down. I forget the name of
10 that political advisor who accompanied the head of mission. So Mate Boban
11 on the 31st is still saying not HVO forces but armija soldiers who
12 committed the murders.
13 Q. If we look at --
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry.
15 I'm sorry, Witness, is that what you wanted to say? Because it
16 reads different. It says it reads only ABiH soldiers were killed. It
17 refers to the victims, I think. It's not quite the same.
18 THE WITNESS: You are right. He is -- I've written here that he
19 stated it was only armija soldiers that had been killed, not that the
20 armija had committed it. You're absolutely right, sir.
21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
22 MR. KRUGER:
23 Q. If we turn to the next paragraph or look at the next paragraph
24 halfway down, this is the paragraph dealing with the meeting with Jadranko
25 Prlic, and when Stupni Do was discussed with him had he said that General
1 Petkovic had removed all local commanders and an investigation was under
2 way. Can you comment on this?
3 A. Well, I can only state that that is what he said and that is what
4 I report, and it is a political leader stating that the senior military
5 commander is carrying out an investigation. It's not an admittance that
6 it was HVO forces but it is I guess at its very least it is an acknowledge
7 that it looks likely and we're taking action to investigate. And more
8 than that, we've removed local commanders.
9 Q. Okay. The local commanders being referred to here, do you have
10 any idea who that referred to or --
11 A. Well, it could refer to the commanders actually in the Vares
12 pocket, or it could indeed refer to the commanders who went to the Vares
13 pocket, Ivica Rajic. I forget the name of the military commanders that
14 were in Zepce at the time. Sorry, in Vares at the time, actually, in that
15 brigade. It may come to me later.
16 Q. Before looking at something else here, during your second tour of
17 duty during 1994, did you ever come across Ivica Rajic or his name in any
19 A. I didn't come across him. I had met him in 1993. In 1994 we may
20 well have come across his name in that we knew by then that he was linked
21 with the mass -- with the massacre. So, yes, I may well have come across
22 his name there, but I certainly didn't meet him in 1994.
23 Q. Okay. Did you discuss him or did he come up during discussions
24 with Tihomir Blaskic during 1994 when Blaskic was chief of the Main Staff?
25 A. I certainly met by then General Blaskic in Posusje, and I may well
1 have raised it, but I would -- I would need to be referred to some
2 documents. I can't bring it straight from my mind.
3 Q. I would have liked to deal with some other aspects of this
4 document, but I think we dealt sufficiently with them yesterday. If we
5 can turn to a final issue that I would like to raise with you, and that is
6 the destruction of the Stari Most bridge --
7 A. Could I -- could I just make one point, and it's just to clarify
8 something. Yesterday, I was uncertain when we did the visit to East
9 Mostar whether it was General Pasalic or General Budakovic who we met, and
10 I see in this report it's confirming it was still Arif Pasalic in command
11 of 4th Corps at that stage.
12 Q. Thank you. Now, sir, how did you come to learn of the destruction
13 of the Old Bridge?
14 A. I learnt it directly from a Danish monitor and a German monitor
15 it. That would be Henrik Villardsen and Helmut Schlecht, who had been in
16 East Mostar meeting with Mr. Smail Klaric at the moment -- on the morning
17 of which the bridge was destroyed. At the time, I was actually in
18 Jablanica to the north.
19 Q. And what did you do after you had learned of this destruction?
20 A. Henrik Villardsen described the impact of the news on the people
21 who were at the -- that he was meeting, which was devastating. He
22 described something which I witnessed myself later. It really emotionally
23 effected, in particular, Mr. Klaric, but others as well. But he also
24 indicated that it had been caught on video and that he had seen the video,
25 and I said we need a copy of that video, and we obtained one in the coming
2 Q. When you obtained the copy, what did you do with that copy of the
4 A. After watching it, I processed it up through our logistics chain
5 to headquarters at ECMM. I had contemplated going directly to the BBC
6 with it, but I felt that there was an important document and the best way
7 to put this into the hands of the international community that would be
8 interested in it would be just to observe the obvious chain. So I sent it
9 up to Zagreb.
10 Q. And did you -- do you know what happen to the video or whether it
11 was wide -- distributed further from thereon?
12 A. Well, I certainly signalled to the headquarters the importance of
13 this video that was arriving. I don't know who they distributed it to, to
14 whom they distributed it, but I did myself see it broadcast on BBC at a
15 later stage. I mean, not in the immediate months. I forget, maybe three
16 or four months later, but it got onto international television.
17 Q. Now, sir, at this stage I would like to show you a clip, and this
18 is from Exhibit 01040, and this exhibit was dealt with, with a previous
20 Now, sir, I'd like to ask you if you look at this clip and
21 obviously it is an edited version from something wider, whether you
22 recognise the images -- not the images, whether you recognise the video
23 itself perhaps.
24 [Videotape played]
25 THE WITNESS: I do recognise it, but it is actually -- it does --
1 it's slightly different to the one that I had in that mine was colour and
2 you're right to point out that this was an edited version because in the
3 one I had I actually saw the destruction of the bridge, and the date on
4 that was the 8th it, and the bridge came down on the 9th. So this has to
5 be an edited version, but it does seem to be taken from the same
6 perspective, i.e., the same observer position.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. Yes. Sorry, the other thing that I -- that I notice is that the
9 film that I have has a wider pan. We very much just saw the bridge, and I
10 think that there are wider angle shots.
11 Q. Okay. I won't belabour this or go further into this. I would
12 like to refer you to document 6559, Exhibit 06559. Do you have the
14 A. I do.
15 Q. It's CC Mostar, daily summary for 9 November 1993. Is this your
17 A. It is my report.
18 Q. Now, sir, if we can look at the first paragraph, the first
19 paragraph, "M2 met Smail Klaric." Is this the meeting you that told us
20 previously just before we entered -- looked at the video?
21 A. Yes, it is.
22 Q. And there we also see the reference to the video of the
24 A. Yes, we do.
25 Q. If I can refer you to paragraph 3 on that page dealing with
1 military, and it says: "Mostar. The artillery attacks on the city, but
2 there are no reports of accompanying infantry activity it." And then the
3 comment is interesting: "The Old Bridge provided a physical means --"
4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request that the
5 speakers slow down when reading. Thank you.
6 MR. KRUGER: My apologies to the interpreters.
7 Q. The comment is interesting: "The Old Bridge provided a physical
8 means of east-bank Muslims supplying those holding precariously on to west
9 bank territory. An HVO follow-up assault on these streets would be -
10 would be consistent with action against the bridge. Comment ends."
11 Can you comment on this?
12 A. Yes. Could I begin by drawing attention to the general situation,
13 the opening sentence, and again proving I'm human, there would appear to
14 be a date error there where I say that tank fire began on the 9th of
15 November and continued today, whereas this is the 9th of November. I do
16 know we were notified by Budakovic on the 8th that the bridge was being
17 targeted. It was something I subsequently raised with HVO forces. But
18 returning, sir, directly to your question, the comment. This bridge was
19 used as a supply route to armija forces that were holding on to territory
20 on the west bank, a very small sliver of land, and at this stage this
21 quick assessment is suggesting if you're trying to interpret that action
22 of the destruction of the bridge from a military perspective, you might
23 well want to destroy the bridge and therefore prevent resupply, and if you
24 were then going to take military action to take the territory from the
25 armija that were on the west bank you would -- could anticipate that you
1 may see some infantry follow-up. We didn't, and I don't think that
2 later -- main in this report, in the assessment at the end. It didn't
3 seem to be so much a military as a more political act, the destruction of
4 this bridge.
5 Q. Could you -- looking at the assessment, could you comment on
6 your -- on the statement there that the Old Bridge could be linked to
7 events in Vares and explained as bloody-minded revenge?
8 A. No. I don't think at that stands particularly good interrogation,
9 that assessment. I can't really now think what the link I was possibly
10 making there. But I go on to say that the consequences of the destruction
11 should not underestimated, and that is something I would most definitely
12 stand by. It had a major impact on the morale of those in East Mostar.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Just a point of clarification. Perhaps the
14 gentleman would be assisted. When he says "bloody-minded," when it was
15 translated it means -- you know, it was translated as "blood," where I
16 know that the British sometimes use the term "bloody" to mean something
17 else. So perhaps he could elucidate for a little bit.
18 THE WITNESS: Well, just to provide clarification on that term,
19 yes, it is a term in the British language just to explain an action out of
20 spite rather than connected with physical spilling of blood.
21 MR. KRUGER:
22 Q. Could we quickly look at document 6511. Exhibit 06511. Do you
23 have the document?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. This is CC weekly report from HCC Mostar for the week 7 to 13
1 November, 1993. Is this your report?
2 A. Yes. I wrote this report.
3 Q. You mentioned earlier that you had been notified the day or
4 previously of this, and is this what is reported under
5 Military, "Artillery, mortar tank has been directed against the city with
6 the Old Bridge reported having received several hits"?
7 A. It's describing the same activity it, but I actually think there
8 is somewhere else a reference to us being very specifically told by
9 Budakovic, and I believe that I read that somewhere during the proofing.
10 Q. Did you do anything as a result of being informed of this?
11 A. Yes. I raised the issue with Bozo Raguz, a liaison officer at --
12 in Mostar. I'm pretty sure he was the liaison officer of the operational
13 zone Mostar. I don't remember clearly whether I raised it before or after
14 the event.
15 Q. Sir, if we can step on quickly to Exhibit 6646. Exhibit 6646. Do
16 you have it?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. This is CC weekly report from HCC Mostar for the week 7 to 13
19 November 1993. Is this your report?
20 A. Yes, I wrote this report.
21 Q. If we can look on the -- under the general situation, the second
22 paragraph under that. It says -- it reports the increased artillery and
23 tank fire in Mostar, and it led to the destruction of the Old Bridge.
24 "Motive was more symbolic than strategic."
25 A. Sorry, could you orientate me to the document again? I'm just
1 missing that.
2 Q. It's on page 1?
3 A. Right.
4 Q. And just about where your finger is now, I see.
5 A. Got it, yep.
6 Q. And what is interesting in this is, "the devastation of the bridge
7 was matched by that of emotions with senior civil leaders reduced to
8 tears." Could you perhaps comment on that.
9 A. It's restating my earlier comments that this had a significant and
10 deep emotional -- it elicited a deep emotional reaction from many people,
11 not just the civil leaders, who we met in East Mostar. That bridge meant
12 a lot to them culturally, symbolly -- symbolically, and it had been
14 Q. Sir, would have -- what would your reaction be to the notion that
15 the Muslims could have destroyed the bridge themselves?
16 MR. KARNAVAS: Objection. Calls for speculation unless a
17 foundation can be laid that the gentleman was there at the time.
18 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, the -- the witness was talking to these
19 leaders. He saw their reaction to the destruction of the bridge, and I'm
20 asking for his comment in the line of that.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: We're not suggesting that the people who he spoke
22 with and who had the emotional attachment and what -- obviously felt
23 emotionally disturbed were the ones that actually destroyed it. So that's
24 not the question. The question is whether he has sufficient knowledge to
25 answer that, the question that's being posed. So if the gentleman was
1 there and was able to observe the shelling at that particular the time on
2 the 8th and the 9th, then perhaps he may be willing to -- may be able to
3 answer the question. So I think it calls -- you know, he -- it calls for
4 a fact not in evidence at this point. So he needs to lay a foundation,
5 otherwise he's speculating.
6 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, I won't belabour this point. I'm sure
7 it will come up in cross-examination.
8 Q. Sir, if we can turn to Exhibit -- that one we've done.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We need -- Mr. Kruger, we've
10 used up five hours. I think we need to finish.
11 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour. If you will grant me just a
12 moment to check which of the remaining documents -- Your Honour, if you
13 would allow me just very briefly deal with two documents, I think I can do
14 it in about six minutes.
15 Q. Sir, the final aspect I would like to touch upon relates to your
16 time in Prozor, or I'd like to refer you to Exhibit 09994. 09994. This
17 is an ECMM CC Travnik report, a daily summary for the 1st of September,
18 1993. Do you recognise this document?
19 A. I wrote this report.
20 Q. Sir, all that I would like to refer you to is on page 2 under the
21 point, Humanitarian, point 4, the first paragraph relates to a meeting
22 with Colonel Siljeg, and there is a confirmed report that 2.000 Muslims
23 from Prozor had been moved to Jablanica, Konjic area. "Siljeg stated this
24 had been done on a voluntary basis."
25 Could you comment on -- on this fact of Muslims moving from Prozor
1 and the numbers perhaps?
2 A. Well, I do go on in the next paragraph to comment by saying, "It
3 seems very unlikely that the Muslims all suddenly decided the time was
4 right to move from Prozor, and coercion is assessed as having played a
5 part; however, the question remains of whether the Muslim authorities in
6 Jablanica were cooperating and ready to receive them."
7 Q. Sir, on this same topic if we can just look at finally Exhibit
8 09996. 09996.
9 A. I have the document.
10 Q. This is CC Mostar daily report for the 10th of September, 1993,
11 and I'd like to refer you to point 5, Humanitarian, and in this paragraph
12 there's a meeting with Ms. Mara Jurkovic social affairs officer in
13 Capljina and it's concerning refugees in the area, "about 6.000 refugees
14 from Kiseljak and may be from Vares," et cetera. Do you have any comments
15 on this?
16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It I'm sorry, Mr. Kruger. Are you sure you have
17 9 September? That's what's in the record and what you said but on my
18 document it says November.
19 MR. KRUGER: My apologies. It is November, indeed, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
21 MR. KRUGER: Yes.
22 Q. Could you provide any comment on the mention of 6.000 refugees
23 from Kiseljak who may be from Vares?
24 A. Sorry for the hesitation; I was going to make the same point.
25 Yes. "Movement of large-scale numbers through Serb-held territory."
1 Again of interest to us because it was indication of cooperation, and on a
2 scale here would obviously have humanitarian impact as well.
3 Q. Thank you. Thank you very much, sir.
4 MR. KRUGER: That concludes the examination-in-chief, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kruger who would
6 like to begin for the Defence.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning,
8 Your Honours. I would be the first one to go. I would note that I'm
9 going to need approximately two minutes or three minutes to set up here,
10 only because I was going through -- keeping track of the documents that we
11 went through, so we could take an early break, and we would have an hour
12 and 40 minutes, or I could just take the two or three minutes to set up.
13 However you wish. I'm in your hands.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Indeed, we could have the break
15 now and then we would continue nonstop.
16 It is now quarter to 12.00. We will resume at five past 12.00.
17 --- Recess taken at 11.47 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 12.07 p.m.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, good morning, Mr. President. Good morning,
20 Your Honours.
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas:
22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Watkins. I'm Michael Karnavas, with me is Ms.
23 Suzana Tomanovic and together we represent Dr. Jadranko Prlic.
24 A. Good morning, sir.
25 Q. I hope that I didn't alarm you with all my interventions thus far.
1 Sometimes I object for the group, so don't read too much into that.
2 A. I'm not easily alarmed.
3 Q. I am sure. We're going to start with the general and then we're
4 going to the specific. So, first of all, a little bit about your
5 background. We do know you have an undergraduate degree and master's
6 degree in economics, I think, and political affairs, spent eight years in
7 the military, and spent a considerable amount of time in country; is that
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. Now, let's talk about what you are not. It might help us a little
11 bit. You're not a lawyer?
12 A. I'm not a lawyer.
13 Q. Okay. And I take it when you were in country and I mean by that
14 in -- or in theatre, as they would say, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you did not
15 have access to all the legislation, did you?
16 A. No, I did not.
17 Q. Did you have access to any legislation translated in your language
18 so you could look at, read, analyse, perhaps even consult with one of the
19 other ECMM monitors who, by your own admission, had a legal background?
20 A. There were other monitors that had a legal background, and one
21 tended when we were dealing with legal issues just to sort of point them
22 in that direction. I don't remember having -- we certainly did not have a
23 large-scale body of evidence translated, but there may well have been some
24 documents that were translated for us to give us a steer, but not
25 in-depth, constitutional stuff.
1 Q. Okay. Now, by the time that you got to the Mostar area, that
2 would have been in October, middle of October, I believe, 1993; correct?
3 A. I believe it was 17th, 18th of October. Yes, 1993.
4 Q. At that point in time -- and we need to slow down. I need to slow
5 down. You're doing okay. But at that time, the Croatian Republic of
6 Herceg-Bosna had not come into existence; correct?
7 A. Not correct. I believe it had been formed and announced in August
8 of 1993. But what is true, and we've had reference to earlier, on is the
9 structures were fluid and forming.
10 Q. All right. Suffice it to say that when you got there, the
11 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna either was dying off or being
12 transformed into the Croatian republic or had already, when you got there,
13 that you had the Croatian republic; correct?
14 A. I believe that the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna was formed
15 and in the ascendance and there was no reference during my period except
16 historically to the Croatian Community.
17 Q. Okay. Now, before going to Mostar or even before going to
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, did you have access to any literature, and I'm
19 speaking, in particular, Official Gazettes that would have the legislation
20 that established the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?
21 A. No, I did not.
22 Q. Did you have any legal analyses available that someone would have,
23 in other words, taken the legislation, taken the Official Gazettes and had
24 perhaps analysed them, maybe even done a schematic to enable you as a
25 newcomer to have an understanding of at least the political structure?
1 A. We had an introductory brief on arrival in Zagreb where we were
2 introduced to, and I mean in big broad terms here, the various elements in
3 former Yugoslavia, the issues surrounding communities that were living in
4 the immediate country surrounding, and part of that, my particular
5 interest because I was being sent to Bosnia, was to understand the Bosnian
6 position, but I have to say it was from a low threshold, but I would have
7 been introduced and was introduced to the Croatian Community of
9 Q. In a very broad sense?
10 A. In a very broad political sense, and I do not know whether those
11 that informed me had got their knowledge through direct extraction from
12 legal documents. I think it's unlikely. It's more of a political than a
13 legal analysis.
14 Q. Okay. And also you don't know whether the information that you
15 had received - no disrespect to your colleagues - was accurate?
16 A. I think we were always testing information and received wisdoms,
17 but no, there could well have been errors. I'm sure there were.
18 Q. And going back to my earlier question, a schematic was not
19 presented to you so you would have the breakup -- breakdown of where the
20 powers lay, the different departments, who had what?
21 A. No, not at that level.
22 Q. Okay. What about at the state level concerning what was happening
23 in Sarajevo? Did you ever get a breakdown of how the Sarajevo government
24 was structured?
25 A. Not -- no, not ministry by ministry.
1 Q. All right. Did you have access to or did you get a briefing on
2 the various peace negotiations that had taken place prior to your arrival?
3 A. Yes, but it was always of some concern that we on the ground were
4 passing a lot of information up, which we believe was useful to the
5 negotiations, but often were unaware of the detail and how things were
6 forming at a high level. So passages of communication tended to be more
7 up than down the chain to us.
8 Q. Right. But I guess my -- and here's what I'm going to focus on a
9 little bit: By the time you get there, get to Bosnia that is, events --
10 certain events have already unfolded; correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And, in fact, before the breakout of the war or the break-up of
13 Yugoslavia you have things unfolding; correct?
14 A. Yes. For instance, the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna being
15 formed after the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state.
16 Q. Right. But I'm going --
17 A. Not before the fighting.
18 Q. But I'm going even before that. On the break-up of Yugoslavia.
19 You're shaking your head. We have to make sure we have a record. So on
20 that, as Yugoslavia is breaking up and as you have various peace
21 negotiations and talks, did you get a briefing book or some sort of
22 briefing that you would at least be able, hitting the ground, to
23 understand what had transpired prior to your arrival and prior to the
24 establishment of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?
25 A. Not a manual, just in broad terms, yes.
1 Q. Okay. And had you received any briefing, any specific briefing,
2 any -- well, let me just -- let me alter the question slightly. Had you
3 received any concrete and detailed briefing as to what had led -- what
4 were the causes leading up to the situation in Bosnia as it existed at the
5 time that you arrived?
6 A. Well, we could have a debate about a -- detailed. I was certainly
7 aware of some of the larger dynamics, issues such as the establishment of
8 the Croatian state or the Bosnian state and what had led to those. So in
9 broad terms it, yes, but detailed knowledge, no.
10 Q. How the function -- how the Sarajevo government functioned, for
11 instance. Did you get a briefing to -- or what existed as far as
12 political structure, you know, and how it operated, and who was -- I mean,
13 we all know Izetbegovic. We've heard of him. Some refer to him always
14 the president, where in fact he was the president of the Presidency, but
15 other than that did you get any detailed briefing on how the Sarajevo
16 government was laid out so at least you could have something concrete to
17 look at perhaps when you're out in the field gathering mention to see
18 whether the information you received is accurate?
19 A. No, not in the form you're describing. I mean, we were aware of,
20 for instance, municipality elections across the whole of Bosnia. I was
21 aware that he was president of the Presidency but, no, I did not have a
22 schematic diagram and I wouldn't be testing my experiences against that
23 particular diagram. I would be testing my experiences against what I had
24 been told before and then what monitors told me. It was very much
25 heuristic learning, learning as you go along.
1 Q. Right. Right. And as I understand someplace you said it took you
2 nearly six months to figure out what was happening?
3 A. Not six months. I believe, and it was certainly my policy in
4 positions of leadership to just ask monitors to watch and observe and
5 actually shut up for a first few weeks. They needed to absorb, and I
6 actually think it took probably two months before you could begin to
7 understand the complexity, and I think by three or four months you had a
8 real contribution to make. By six months you had achieved a lot. When I
9 say achieved a lot, you would have learned a lot.
10 Q. You would have a perspective on strategic aims, for instance?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I'm going by what you indicated at one point.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You indicated that one of the things that you did when you got to
15 the Mostar area was, you went -- you met with various people in high
16 positions, and it seems to me from reading -- and I've just about read
17 everything that you've said or you made reference to or you wrote. It's
18 obvious to me that you were seeking information at all times; correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. And you're trying to figure out what exactly is happening.
21 A. I was, and -- yes, that's true, I was.
22 Q. Yeah. And it's -- often is the case you would go to more than one
23 source, and I believe you used the word "triangulate," in order to figure
24 out what you had heard had any real substance; correct?
25 A. That's correct. Verification of information. Not relying on one
1 source but looking for multiple sources, and then some analysis to make
2 sense of what was emerging.
3 Q. All right. Now, while you were doing that, and we're going to get
4 to -- we're going to talk more specifically about that, but I take it
5 while you were in Mostar and even prior to going to Mostar you didn't do
6 the same thing as far as what was happening in Sarajevo or the Muslim
8 A. I think what tended to happen is, we -- we had this broad
9 introduction and then as a team member you actually really become involved
10 and quite parochial around your area of responsibility. As you became
11 head of CC, so your geographical and political horizons expanded a little,
12 and by the time I became the head of the regional centre, I was looking at
13 a pan-BiH with also more understanding of what was happening outside of
14 BH. So, yeah, at various times, at various levels, specific references.
15 Where I would point to one thing where we were encouraged in the early
16 days was to think more globally was when we were trying to implement the
17 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, which was -- yes, it had a very local and specific
18 relevance but was seated in a framework of international negotiations.
19 Q. Okay. We're going to get to that as well. But this pan-BiH
20 outlook, that might require you to also keep track of what is happening on
21 the international stage as far as negotiations; correct?
22 A. As best we could, yeah.
23 Q. Okay. Now, when we say -- when you use the word "we," is that the
24 imperial we or the we as in the ECMM?
25 A. The imperial. Well, I'm referring really to us as an
1 organisation, but clearly we were a component with a very European
2 perspective, and the UN brought a wider perspective.
3 Q. Right.
4 A. So I would have been looking at and reading reports not just from
5 ECMM, indeed not just from ECMM in Bosnia. For instance, as the head of
6 the regional centre it I would have been receiving reports from Bulgaria
7 and --
8 Q. Okay. But let me stop you here. As far as what was happening --
9 you mentioned the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. Did you have any concrete
10 briefings on that, what was happening in Geneva or what the parties were
11 doing or who was doing what, who was signing what, what the positions
13 A. Again, broad. For instance, the ambassador -- sorry, not
14 ambassador. Well, he called him ambassador, actually, Jean-Pierre
15 Thebault who was the head of the regional centre briefed us as head of CC,
16 and I passed down the chain what was going on, yeah.
17 Q. Well, he's briefing you, but did you have any access to documents
18 so that you would have concretely -- you would be aware of what is being
19 proposed, what is being talked about, what are the two sides, the three
20 sides, what their positions are, their respective positions. Did you have
21 that? I'm not talking about the verbal that you're getting.
22 A. We did have very specifically documents stating what had been
23 agreed. So once there was the partial agreement, we did receive documents
24 saying, here are the province boundaries. Here's what to be set up here's
25 how to do it here's who's governing, but with regards to the political
1 discussions that led to that.
2 Q. Right.
3 A. Only in broad terms in that we got indications of which parties
4 saw a -- which parties were signing and which weren't.
5 Q. Right okay?
6 A. For instance --
7 Q. So when we're talking about, and I'm going to get ahead of myself
8 a little bit, this concept of confederation that has come up, do you know
9 who context that was being discussed at the international level?
10 A. This was in late 1993.
11 Q. Late 1993. I'm getting ahead of myself --
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. -- because there's a point to that.
14 A. We didn't have details of what was going on. We were being asked
15 to do things if you remember me saying specifically about what would
16 the -- how would the idea be received of -- of an EU administration in
18 Q. Right?
19 A. We had these issues about access to the sea.
20 Q. Exactly, now let me stop you right there. Access to the sea.
21 That was something that the Bosniaks, the Muslims, wanted; correct? It's
22 a yes or no. We can move along quicker that way. They wanted access to
23 the sea; correct?
24 A. I believe that the international community thought that if there
25 was to be a settlement, then they would need access to the sea, in fact.
1 Q. Hold on. Hold on. I'm going to stop you here because, you see,
2 you were very accurate when you were answering questions for the
3 Prosecution. I'm not asking what the international community wanted or
4 didn't want. I could care less about them at this point. My question is
5 what the Muslims wanted.
6 A. Okay.
7 Q. So when we're talking about confederation and I'm asking you, did
8 the Muslims want access to the sea, irrelevant respective of the
9 international thought it might be useful for them to have a deep water
10 port or some place where they could go swimming in the summertime?
11 A. Well, to give you a full answer, the Muslims did not want access
12 to the sea because at that time they did not want the break-up of the
13 internationally recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina. So that was often the
14 stated case, why should we look at access to the sea? However, if the
15 international community was looking as a particular way forward then
16 access to the sea became an issue.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly slow down and pause
18 between question and answer. Thank you.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: That was something that was -- so access to the see
20 was something that the internationals were more interested in than the
21 Muslims. I just want to get a -- make sure I understand you.
22 A. The Muslims -- if there was to be any settlement based on a
23 confederation it would require the Muslims to have access to the sea, but
24 their initial positions were they didn't want to see the break-up. Why
25 should they see the break-up of a --
1 Q. Okay?
2 A. -- internationally recognised country.
3 Q. Okay?
4 A. But if that was to be the case they would need access and so it
5 was a big issue.
6 Q. Okay. Well, since we -- we got ahead of ourselves a little bit,
7 there is one document maybe we should share with the Judges. 7290. It's
8 a Prosecutor's binder. If we could the Prosecutor's binder back with the
9 gentleman. You have it there. And in fact this document might have even
10 been shown to you. Yeah. So we can get this point out of the way real
12 Incidentally, this confederation, while you are looking for the
13 document, do you know whether any special agreements were reached between
14 BiH and -- and Croatia? Or the Federation, I should say, and Croatia,
15 with respect to confederation?
16 A. Yes. Part of the Washington Agreement, which formed the
17 federation between the Croats and Muslims, was also insisting on a
18 confederation with Croatia.
19 Q. Right. And do we see that also in the -- in the Dayton Accords as
20 well? If you look at --
21 A. Don't remember.
22 Q. Okay. All right. If we have time we'll get to that as well. If
23 you look at -- on the first page where it says Political, second
24 paragraph, you say -- it says here -- and by the way, did you generate
25 this document? We don't have the -- or you would know from reading --
1 reading the text.
2 A. Yes, I believe this is one of my documents, yeah.
3 Q. All right. It says: "M9 and M2 met Safet? Armija staff officer,
4 4th Corps, who stated that Muslims were not ready for peace until they had
5 access to the sea. He hoped this would be achieved by political means but
6 ventured that armija would take it by force if necessary. Comment. It is
7 assessed armija do not have the capability for offensive action in the
8 area beyond raids. Comment ends." And the date of this is 21 December
9 1993. You wrote that, did you not?
10 A. Yes, I did.
11 Q. Okay. And it appear -- at least this particular gentleman seemed
12 to indicate that there was -- there was a -- at some level an indication
13 that they wanted access to the sea and, if necessary, to take it by force.
14 A. Yes, that's --
15 Q. Okay. All right. Now, going back to where we -- where we were a
16 little bit -- we're still on the background area, when you got to the
17 Croatian -- when you got to the Mostar area, you had already been in
18 country for several months and that was in Central Bosnian; correct?
19 A. Not entirely. When I began I was in Tomislavgrad, and dealing
20 with Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Jablanica and Bugojno, and I reported to the CC
21 that was based in Grude and then moved to Siroki Brijeg. So my
22 introduction, in fact, to Bosnia was in Herzegovina but very quickly, as I
23 said earlier, began to concentrate in Vrbas valley and then I gravitated
24 north up to the Lasva Valley area.
25 Q. Right. And you testified in two previous cases. The Kordic case,
1 that was the first case; short?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. And during your testimony in that case that the Defence in Blaskic
4 had heard that you had not only been testifying but also had given a
5 statement, and then you were called to testify in the Blaskic case as
6 well; correct?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. In Blaskic you testified for the Defence?
9 A. Yes, in appeal.
10 Q. And it would appear, if we were to read your testimony, that you
11 were of the opinion, that at least with the relationship between Blaskic
12 and Kordic, Kordic being the -- the civilian, the head of the civilian
13 structure there, had the upper hand in a sense, that he -- he controlled
14 or he could over -- would overrule sometimes Blaskic. I'm simplifying it,
15 but in essence that's what you were testifying to; right?
16 A. Yes, in essence I was, yeah.
17 Q. All right. And you've indicated to us today that the situation
18 there was different than the situation you found in Herzegovina. Right?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Okay. You had plenty it of opportunities to meet with Kordic, by
21 the way?
22 A. I met him on a number of occasions, yes.
23 Q. Okay. You never heard Kordic by the way say --
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly observe pauses between
25 questions and answers. Thank you.
1 MR. KARNAVAS:
2 Q. I take it you heard that comment.
3 A. I heard it. I'm just trying to find a way of reminding myself.
4 Q. Well, we need to look at the monitor. I'm a recidivist and
5 incorrigible but we'll try.
6 All right. You never heard Kordic, for instance, say I got to get
7 instructions or I'm getting instructions or I have been instructed by
8 Prlic in Mostar to do X, Y, and Z?
9 A. No, we never had that specific conversation.
10 Q. Okay. Well, it's not matter of having that conversation. When
11 you would approach Kordic, he never gave you an inkling that Jadranko
12 Prlic was above him, directed him, ordered him, and as a consequence he
13 had to comply with whatever, he being Kordic, whatever he was being
14 directed to by Prlic; correct?
15 A. That's correct. My impression was always that his connection was
16 through to Mate Boban.
17 Q. Now, one other thing since we're in that area. From your
18 testimony it becomes obvious that at some point the Croatian
19 communities -- there are four pockets, as I understand you put it. Four
20 isolated Croatian pockets?
21 A. Yes. I'm just rapidly going through my mind as to whether there's
22 four. There were isolated Croat pockets of various sizes, but there were
23 four substantial ones, Vitez, Vares, Zepce, and Kiseljak.
24 Q. All right. And just for the record, this could be found in the --
25 in the Kordic case where the gentleman testified in open session on pages
1 13099, but it actually starts as early as, I believe, 13096. And you
2 indicated in fact that they were squeezed into four pockets, Vitez,
3 Busovaca, Zepce, Kiseljak, and Vares. You're shaking your head. Does
4 that mean yes?
5 A. It means yes.
6 Q. And it appeared that the Croats there were not only isolated but
7 there was -- they had some hardships; correct?
8 A. Yes, that's true, they did.
9 Q. All right. Now, there was an issue that came up at some point,
10 and again I'm getting ahead of myself a little bit, about Croats having to
11 leave this it area and going into the Serb area in order to make it down;
12 is that correct?
13 A. Yes. There were movements of population from Central Bosnia down
14 into Herzegovina.
15 Q. Okay. Now, when you say "movements of populations," these folks,
16 these Croats that were living in these pockets were isolated; right?
17 A. Well, they -- they were isolated, but they were also different in
18 character. For instance, the pocket in Vares had a common border with
19 Bosnian Serb territory. The pocket around Vitez did not. So they were
20 isolated but with different characteristics.
21 Q. Right. And since they had that common border with the Serbs they
22 could go out that way as opposed to trying to make it, you know, through
23 Muslim-held territory.
24 A. Yes, that's correct.
25 Q. All right. Okay. Now getting back to the Croatian Republic of
1 Herceg-Bosna. Did you actually see any legislation, any decisions, any
2 conclusions, you mentioned a constitution, did you see anything that could
3 be considered legislative instruments that would give you an
4 understanding, at least on paper, at least on paper, how the Croatian
5 republic was formed or being formed?
6 A. The Croatian republic or the Croatian Community?
7 Q. The Croatian republic. I'm not asking for what you had heard.
8 I'm asking whether you had seen, like Official Gazettes or documents that
9 were translated to you so that you could look at, study them, and then
10 say, okay, now I understand the structure.
11 A. No, but what was interesting in my inquiries was that the
12 structure was obviously very fluid, and I'm not sure whether that detail
13 was that you're suggesting was there in existence. If it was, then it was
14 only known by a few because what was clear is there were many
15 contradictions in who was filling certain roles and posts.
16 Q. Okay. Well, you speak of contradictions, and I would agree with
17 you that at least from listening to your testimony that you were getting
18 mixed messages at times, but those were oral messages from personalities;
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. Now, you had a language assistant?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. Several.
25 Q. Several of them. And -- and I take it they were from the area?
1 A. Yes, in Mostar they were from the area.
2 Q. All right. Now, did you ever ask your language assistants to try
3 to get a hold of for you any documents that were being generated showing
4 the establishment and the functioning of the Croatian Republic of
5 Herceg-Bosna? It's a yes or no.
6 A. I'm just pausing for the interpreters. I'm remembering this time.
7 Q. Do that. Do that. Pause.
8 A. Just one clarification, actually. I remember that one of the
9 interpreters actually came from Croatia itself, but from Split. Now, to
10 specifically answer your question, I would dearly have loved to have got
11 those documents --
12 Q. Is the answer no?
13 A. I believe that we tried to get those documents but I'm not sure
14 they were in existence.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. So the answer is, I did not have any Gazettes or legislative
17 papers to refer to.
18 Q. Okay now, you say they were not in existence. Now, again, let's
19 fast forward a little bit with Jadranko Prlic. I've sat here and I've
20 listened to you, and I've also read some of the documents that were
21 generated, and you've indicated quite readily that you had a good working
22 relationship with him.
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. That he -- you said, "easy accession and open discussions." That
25 was a quote, I think.
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. And in fact, he was the type of individual that readily
3 accessible, especially to meet with internationals.
4 A. Absolutely, yes.
5 Q. And you knew that -- you're shaking your head. That means yes?
6 A. Yes, I did know that.
7 Q. And in fact that's why when there would be some VIPs, you knew at
8 least Jadranko Prlic would be one of the -- the officials in Mostar that
9 they could have access to; correct?
10 A. Yes, and that it was worth them seeing him because of his position
11 in the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.
12 Q. All right. And, of course, when you asked him questions he
13 answered them?
14 A. Yes, usually straightforwardly. Not always.
15 Q. Okay. Well, I don't see in the documents and maybe there are some
16 in the ECMM archive, wherever that might be I'd like to spend some time
17 but I only have what limited documents the Prosecution has given us, but I
18 don't see anywhere you concretely having asked Jadranko Prlic a specific
19 question and then in your comment you say he was evasive, he refused to
20 answer, he gave you bogus information. There's nothing there that at
21 least I have been able to it find in the documents that the ECMM provided
22 to the Prosecution for your testimony and for the Judges.
23 A. I think you should be spared having to read all the ECMM reports,
24 but I do believe that in there, there will be times when we asked
25 questions, and indeed I remember one when we were asking Mr. Prlic about
1 movement of -- exchange of prisoners and movement of humanitarian aid when
2 he was evasive, but diplomatically pointing me to Mr. Pusic who should
3 answer those questions. So we didn't always get the information we want
4 but we were dealing with someone who was willing to discuss more broadly.
5 Q. Okay. That's why I asked you. That's why I asked you earlier if
6 you had seen the schematic and if you had seen any legislation to actually
7 have an understanding as to who had what authority, and who had what
8 responsibility, and who was able to do what with whom and under what
9 circumstances; that's why I asked you that question. And the answer was,
10 I believe, you hadn't looked at and -- or you said that you didn't have
11 access to any of those documents.
12 A. That is correct. I did not have access to those documents. What
13 I was doing was actually trying to create that structure through the
14 analysis and the questions I was asking.
15 Q. Right. Now, had you had access to the documents and I'm not
16 suggesting that you did not, but had you -- if you had those documents, if
17 you knew -- especially for the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna you
18 would have been able -- those were available, but also we'll suggest and
19 show that others were available. Do you think you might have been able
20 to -- from those documents with your education and background, if they had
21 been properly translated, would they have been able to assist you in
22 knowing who had what power and what responsibility and what authority?
23 A. Yes. Clearly they would have helped. I do remember that we did
24 get some information about the structure of the HDZ and who was going to
25 hold particular positions, with Pero Markovic identified as the senior.
1 So we'd got -- and that was in the --
2 Q. But, sir?
3 A. -- in --
4 Q. I don't mean to cut you off because I'm really under a tremendous
5 amount of stress with the time, but HDZ is a party; right?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Okay. We're talking about a political process. All right? So if
8 I ask you, for instance, how does the political process in the UK
9 functions, you're not going to talk to me about the labour party or the
10 conservatives. You're going to describe to me, you know, how it
11 functions, right? How the parliament works and so on and so forth;
13 A. Yes, but if it was a single party state it would be pointless to
14 describe that constitution to you without also taking reference to the
15 other -- the fact that there was only one party, and I believe I gave a
16 statement yesterday where part of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna,
17 certainly information that I got was that HDZ was to be the party and that
18 other small ones --
19 Q. Okay.
20 A. -- were not recognised.
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. So HDZ was very important to understand in the structure of the
24 Q. All right. Now, was -- now, does that mean that also Jadranko
25 Prlic was a member of the HDZ. It's a yes, it's a no, it's a maybe, it's
1 an I don't know. Those are the four choices and we can move on.
2 A. It's a pause for the interpreters and then I can't remember.
3 Q. Well, I -- okay. You can't remember. But if we were to take your
4 previous answer, one would automatically conclude that if you had to be a
5 player and there was only one player, then you had to be a member of this
6 party; correct? So at least based on your assumptions, and I underscore
7 the word "assumptions," that's what you're -- that's what you're trying to
8 tell us?
9 A. Yeah, I'd go along with that.
10 Q. Okay. Now, also from listening to you, it was my understanding,
11 and correct me if I'm wrong, that it was your understanding that the
12 process was somewhat flawed because you would have expected members of
13 parliament or members of the government to come from the members of the
14 parliament. Do I have that wrong or is that what you --
15 A. I did think the process was deeply flawed but for a number of
16 reasons and --
17 Q. That was one of them?
18 A. You've picked out one there, yeah.
19 Q. Okay. Now, I take it in the UK, and I follow politics a little
20 bit in the UK, fascinating, one does have to be elected in order to be a
21 member of the government.
22 A. Not strictly true. You can be a member the of the government and
23 sit in the House of Lords, the second Chamber, and -- but the House of
24 Lords is not an elected body. One of the lovely quirks of the British
1 Q. And that allows you to have a seat on the government?
2 A. Yes, it can. I can give you a high profile example.
3 Q. I don't need one. I just want to -- I'm just using this as an
4 example. Would it surprise you, sir, if I were to tell you that under the
5 process that existed there in -- in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, and if
6 I'm not mistaken, it still exists, that you cannot be a member of the
7 parliament and at the same time -- which is a legislative body, and at the
8 same time be a member of the executive it? Would it surprise you to learn
9 that you can't be in both? You have to be either in one or the other.
10 A. No, I can understand that.
11 Q. Okay. Now, did you -- did you -- did you ask Jadranko Prlic to
12 explain to you exactly how the Croatian republic was structured from a
13 political sense?
14 A. Yes, I did.
15 Q. Okay. And I take it he sat down -- did he ever do a schematic for
16 you so you could understand it?
17 A. No, I don't remember doing any schematics.
18 Q. He did, however, invite you when they had that opening congress,
19 if we want to call it that?
20 A. Yes, very generous and helped me with my understanding.
21 Q. It's the Assembly session. We have to be correct. My colleague
22 here is reprimanding me.
23 All right. And it was a rather transparent process?
24 A. It was surprisingly so to me, yes.
25 Q. Especially you standing there. You had your white uniform
1 sticking out. And so Mr. Jadranko Prlic at the time had nothing to hide
2 and -- right?
3 A. I think he might have wanted me to see things.
4 Q. Okay. Well, he wanted you to learn some things as well.
5 A. Absolutely.
6 Q. And -- so there was nothing -- nothing secretive about what was
7 happening, what was said, and everything that was happening and being said
8 was available for you not only to see and hear but to pass on?
9 A. At that particular session, yes.
10 Q. Okay. Did you ask him to sit on any other sessions?
11 A. No, I didn't.
12 Q. Okay. Suffice it to say any time you wanted to see him he was
13 available for you?
14 A. Yes, good access to Jadranko Prlic.
15 Q. Okay. Now, very quickly if we could go through some documents.
16 And I guess I want to -- at first I want to start with a couple of
17 housekeeping matters. If we could go to document 6303, and it's in the
18 Prosecutor's binder. You might recall the passage that was shown to you
19 earlier, and I want to clarify a couple of points because this document
20 will indeed be introduced by the Prosecution, and on the very first page
21 we see that it's October 31, 1993. Have you found it?
22 A. I have the paper. This is a report which I wrote.
23 Q. On the political section and if you go to the second paragraph,
24 and it says here -- I mean, you're being -- earlier you talked about
25 Stupni Do a little bit, but then it says, "Prlic stated that
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina would never exit as a state but all other options were
3 Now, my question is: Do you allow for the possibility, sir, that
4 perhaps you're missing one particular word, and that word may
5 be "unitary"? Would never exist as a unitary state?
6 A. Yes. That is the way I would interpret what he said to me, as
7 that it would not remain as a unitary state with its authority all vested
8 in Sarajevo but would be some other configuration, and most likely a
9 three-republic configuration.
10 Q. All right. But he never called for the eradication [Realtime
11 transcript read in error "ratification"] of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
13 A. No, but one could conclude that by setting up a self-styled
14 republic within the existing state you could be sending some pretty strong
15 signals about the break-up of Bosnia, but certainly he was talking at that
16 time about within the existing international borders.
17 Q. The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, didn't that call for something like
18 republics in a state? Now, surely you're not suggesting that Lord Owen
19 and Stoltenberg had -- were planning on breaking up Bosnia-Herzegovina
20 because they were suggesting that one way to resolve this issue where you
21 have three constituent peoples would be to have three republics within a
22 state? Surely you're not suggesting that?
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me, Mr. Karnavas.
24 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.
25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: On line 40 -- 14 on page 86 it says something
1 which I do not think you wanted to say I think you spoke about eradication
2 and here it says ratification. So it turns the meaning around I think.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, perhaps -- one of the disadvantages with
4 this -- this podium, but I see it.
5 Q. Yeah, I'm not saying ratification. Erad -- I mean, they're trying
6 to --
7 MR. KARNAVAS: And thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. -- right?
9 A. Own and Stoltenberg were not calling for the eradication of the
10 state. They did seem to be seeking some solution; that would be a three
11 republic within the borders, yes.
12 Q. And do you think -- do you know whether there might have been some
13 sort of earlier plan going back as early as 1992 that might have had
14 something like that in mind?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Even prior to the Vance-Owen Plan?
17 A. Yes, I was aware.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. I believe that Lord Carrington might have been involved in that
20 and --
21 Q. There you go?
22 A. -- That was the reference I was going to give you earlier about an
23 English Lord having a governmental position.
24 Q. Right. Okay. I met the gentleman. He's a -- has had an
25 incredible career. All right. So now that we've clarified that, if we
1 could go further down on the issue of helicopters, because you indicated
2 yesterday that you might have raised it -- you might have raised this
3 issue with Mr. Prlic, and here concretely you said: "Prlic said that he
4 did not agree with the civilian demonstration (resulting in the seizure of
5 the helicopters) as a means of exerting pressure and as a result had
6 refused to be drawn into internal negotiations on the issue."
7 So it would appear that Dr. Jadranko Prlic had in fact stated his
8 position with respect to the helicopters; correct?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. And it would seem to me from reading all sorts of other documents
11 that have been presented here, your initiative was with Boban to try to
12 get him to -- to release these two helicopters.
13 A. That is correct. We very much saw that this was Mate Boban's
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. And if I might just add briefly, and I know you're up against
18 Q. Go ahead?
19 A. Hence this continual interest of ours about the relationship
20 between the forming government and the Presidency.
21 Q. Right. And do you think that it might have helped you a little
22 bit in hindsight, of course, and I understand this was a war and I'm not
23 picking on you but -- but do you think, in hindsight, it might have been
24 helpful for you to have actually seen what existed of the legislation that
25 made it possible for the existence of the Croatian Community and how that
1 community evolved into the Croatian republic so then you might be able to
2 understand at least as of 31st October 1993 de jure, legally speaking,
3 where the powers lay?
4 A. Yes. In retrospect it would have been. You're right to draw the
5 attention to the fact there was a war going on and a number of other
6 issues we were dealing with.
7 Q. Okay. Now -- okay. I think that was -- that was that. With --
8 and then we talked about Stupni Do already, and I believe yesterday you
9 indicated that Mr. -- there was a document shown to you where it said that
10 Mr. Prlic had condemned the -- the atrocity; correct?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. And in this particular document we also see that he is -- he is
13 stating a position or opinion that those responsible were removed and some
14 action is -- is under way.
15 A. Yes, I'd have to just quickly look at the document.
16 Q. Go ahead, look at it.
17 A. Is it in the same --
18 Q. Yeah, it's in the same paragraph.
19 A. Yes, that's correct.
20 Q. And one of the things that I gleaned from reading the material and
21 listening to you as well was that when you were meeting with Dr. Jadranko
22 Prlic, and others as well, they seem -- he in particular seemed to be
23 wanting information from you, the international, as to what was happening
24 in other parts of Herceg-Bosna or Central Bosnia, because he had limited
25 or no access to that information or what was happening over there;
2 A. This is what made meeting with Mr. Prlic always so interesting
3 because it was much more discussions and, yes, he was particularly
4 interested soon after my arrival to get a clearer understanding of the
5 situation in Central Bosnia. What I wouldn't necessarily agree with is
6 that he -- and certainly wouldn't agree with it, that he would have had no
8 Q. Okay. Maybe that was an overstatement, but certainly he's asking
9 you what is happening because you were in a better position to know what
10 happening than he was.
11 A. I'd come fresh from territory that he hadn't been able to visit
12 for over a year, and he was also -- just to give you the complete answer
13 with regards to the EU, yes, he was -- he was interested in what the
14 international community thought. There were many dimensions to the
15 discussion. Often you would have a discussion with somebody and it would
16 be question asked and restricted question response. We had a broad
17 engagement with Mr. Prlic.
18 Q. Right. And Mr. Prlic, as I understand that -- from listening to
19 you, his -- his primary concerns or his preoccupation was with setting up
20 the political structure.
21 A. Yes. I do remember him saying that he'd written constitutions
22 before and he would be writing another one now.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. So although his background I believe was economics --
25 Q. Right. Would it surprise you, sir, if I were to tell you that no
1 constitution was ever drafted?
2 A. It wouldn't surprise me. It would perhaps account for the some of
3 the confusion as to exactly what it was, but no constitution being drafted
4 doesn't stop a functioning government.
5 Q. Right.
6 A. I would point you to the United Kingdom that doesn't have a
7 written constitution.
8 Q. Okay. A fine example. Now -- now, do you know exactly about his
9 particular position? Do you know what -- how it functioned, where -- what
10 his actual powers and responsibilities and authorities were, aside from
11 what you might have heard by others and what you might have thought,
12 because he is a rather charismatic individual, comes across fairly well,
13 speaks good English. So did you actually know for a fact?
14 A. Well, I knew for a fact that his title was the president of the
15 government. First of all president of the Croatian Community of
16 Herceg-Bosna, and as you'll see, it seemed that from what he was telling
17 us and what subsequently emerged that he was going to be the president or,
18 if you like, the Prime Minister of the government. So did I know that?
19 Well, I heard it from him. It was correlated by other information, and I
20 never heard him suggest anything other than that was his title.
21 Q. Okay. But -- all right. Now, before we get to the documents,
22 because I'm told that we need to get to documents, you say that he was the
23 president of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. If he was that, what
24 was Mate Boban?
25 A. Well, Mate Boban was the president, yes. Maybe I should have said
1 the president of the government of Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.
2 Q. All right. Very well. All right. Let's go through some
3 documents very quickly because that's what we need to do. If we could
4 look at P 04611.
5 A. Oh, sorry, are we still --
6 Q. No, we're on my documents right now.
7 A. What --
8 Q. The blue binders.
9 A. The blue binder?
10 Q. Yes. P 04611.
11 A. I may be being dim here, sorry. Yeah, got it. Got it.
12 Q. All right. Otherwise, we can help you out here.
13 A. No, I've got it.
14 Q. It is -- now, if we look at the second page, we'll see that there
15 is a date to it, 28 August 1993. The first page is -- is the preamble,
16 and if we could -- I take it you've seen this document?
17 A. No, I don't recognise this document.
18 Q. I don't know if you have the version in Croatian, but -- all
19 right. And we could see from the very first page it's published in
20 Official Gazette of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, October 1993,
21 so that would have been about the time that you were in and around the
22 Mostar area; correct?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. And You would agree that an Official Gazette si something -- or
25 maybe you don't know. I'm assuming a fact at this point, but perhaps you
1 could help us whether the Official Gazette is something that is widely
2 circulated and available to the public so they know what's in it? Do you
3 know if that's the case or not?
4 A. I have no idea.
5 Q. Okay. Fair enough.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: For the Court's benefit, it's paragraph 3, the last
7 part of that paragraph may be of some interest. I don't want to spend too
8 much time reading it, but I'm talking about where it says, "future
9 federation of republics and by agreeing to participate in joint
10 institutions and services of mutual interest in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
11 That's the portion I wish to draw to the Court's attention.
12 Q. By the way, at this point in time do you know whether there is
13 discussion in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Muslims and the Serbs of also
14 having joint institutions, also having -- forming their own republics?
15 A. Could you -- sorry, could you orient me just so I don't get lost
16 on the track of -- I could not find what you were referring to there.
17 Q. This is the first paragraph on the very first page, the
18 preamble: "Having found that the existing political and state system does
19 not ensure does not ensure them their rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina --
20 A. Got it.
21 Q. -- and their rights -- okay -- and their rights to
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croat -- the Croatian people are determined to
23 defend these rights by, among other things, changing their status and
24 establishing their own state community in a part of the territory of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina by transferring a part of their constitutive rights to
1 the future federation of republics and by agreeing to participate in
2 certain joint institutions," and so on. That's the part I wanted to point
4 Obviously, you would not -- since you haven't seen this, you
5 wouldn't be aware of this, but if I could draw your attention to the
6 following page. Following page, we see that this is a basic decision on
7 establishing and proclaiming the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. What
8 we read was the preamble. If we go to article 3 very quickly, we see that
9 it says: "The republics shall be the integral and indivisible democratic
10 state of the Croatian people in," in, I underscore that for the
11 Judges, "in Bosnia-Herzegovina founded on human rights and liberties, the
12 rule of law and social justice."
13 Now, from this it would appear that -- at least this basic
14 decision, we're talking about being inside Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
15 A. That is correct and --
16 Q. Okay. Okay. I'm just going to go on. Okay. If we go to Article
17 6 we talk about a state: "The state authority shall be organised on the
18 principles of parliamentary democracy." And then it talks about the
19 legislative authority, the executive authority, and the judicial
20 authority. So from here it appears that had you or your staff had
21 available this Official Gazette, you would at least on paper understand
22 how this republic was being formed; correct?
23 A. Yes, but I do believe that our own inquiries are reaching similar
25 Q. I understand that, but I'm just saying --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. I'm just pointing this out, okay?
3 A. It would have been helpful I agree.
4 Q. Yes. And since we're losing time, I point to the Court also to
5 Article 7 and Article 11. That's all for this document.
6 If we go to the next document, and that would be P 04589.
7 A. I've got it.
8 Q. Now, from the top of the page we see Mostar, 11 October, 1993.
9 This is Official Gazette of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, and
10 this is a decision on constituting the house of representatives of the
11 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, and if we look at the next page we see
12 that the date of 28 August 1993. So again based on this we see that there
13 was legislation available in and around Mostar at that point in time, and
14 we -- also Article 2 might be important to the Judges.
15 I take it you were not availed of this. You were not aware of
17 A. I did not have this or whatever. I would love to ask Mr. Prlic
18 why he didn't give me a copy. It would have helped.
19 Q. Well, perhaps you should have asked. Now -- because -- and I
20 don't mean this in a very flippant way, but surely a gentleman such as Dr.
21 Jadranko Prlic who would actually take you there in your white uniform,
22 probably to the dismay of some of the others that were there, because it
23 appeared from your testimony that you were more or less his -- his invited
24 guest but others weren't welcoming your presence, he wasn't the kind of
25 person that would hide this sort of information from you.
1 A. That's correct. We shouldn't chastise him for this omission.
2 Q. Very well. P 05517.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: And this is a summary, Your Honours, I bring to
4 your attention, at the very top. It appears that this summary was
5 provided by the office of the Prosecution, and this is from the Official
6 Gazette again, October 1, 1993. If we flip -- go to the second page, Your
7 Honours, you will see that it says there: "Law on government of the
8 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna." And then Article 4 says: "The House
9 of Representatives of the HR HB --"
10 JUDGE PRANDLER: Excuse me, Mr. Karnavas.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.
12 JUDGE PRANDLER: Sorry to interrupt you. It is only a technical,
13 I would say, correction. You mentioned here that the Official Gazette,
14 October 1, 1993, but I believe it is October 7th. On the second page we
15 will find the date, which is correct, the 7th or probably even later on.
16 It was number 1, but October, something like --
17 MR. KARNAVAS: You're right.
18 JUDGE PRANDLER: That kind of date.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: You're right, Your Honour. I saw the 1 and the
20 comma and I assumed -- you're absolutely right. But it was October 1993,
21 and thank you for bringing that to our attention.
22 Q. On Article 4 on the second page we see: "The House of
23 Representatives of the HR HB at the proposal of president of HR HB
24 appoints and releases president and members of government." So there we
25 see at least the functions, so one of the functions of the house of
1 representatives. And then of course Article 7 talks about a no-confidence
3 Again, you did not have that available to you?
4 A. No, I did not have this.
5 Q. Okay. And if we go to the last page we see it's 30 September
6 1993, Mostar. So that's one minor detail, but nonetheless it's there.
7 Now if we could go to P 06583.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: And I want to point out that I'm being told, Your
9 Honours, that there should be a correction in the translation of this
10 document. This is a statement. If we go to the second page, we see that
11 it's dated 10 November 1993, office of the president of the Croatian
12 Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Then if we go to the first page, we see that it
13 says in the very first paragraph that Mate Boban has appointed Jadranko
14 Prlic Prime Minister, and then it goes on: "At the Prime Minister's
15 suggestion the following people were appointed." I'm told this should
16 be "nominated." Perhaps the translators could verify that if the document
17 is on B/C/S on the e-court, but it says nominated members of the
18 government as opposed to appointed.
19 Q. I take it you were not aware of this statement?
20 A. Actually, this an example of the sort of thing that we did get, a
21 single sheet, but I can't be sure I saw that. Interesting, but we'd have
22 to look back at my dates as to when I identified particular positions.
23 Q. All right okay?
24 A. But this is the sort, just like that one I referred to, HDZ, we
25 did see. So not the detail behind it but the announcement, yes.
1 Q. All right if we go to P 06772.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Again it says at the top Your Honours that that is
3 a summary. This is something provided to us by the Office of the
4 Prosecution and I'm told again there should be some corrections. Where it
5 says "decision," it should be on the election of the president, deputy
6 president, and members of government as opposed to what it says now which
7 says, "on the election of the Prime Minister, deputy Prime Minister and
8 cabinet members."
9 Also, I'm told that it should say rather than, "the Chamber of
10 Deputies," it should say the house of representatives, "elected the
11 following," and then you see who is elected. And then at the very end
12 it's signed by the vice-president of the House of Representatives and not
13 the deputy speaker of the Chamber of Deputies.
14 Were you aware of this decision, sir?
15 A. Not this decision, but it --
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. Could I just add one little thing?
18 Q. Go ahead.
19 A. There are just occasionally name changes against the titles. I
20 would draw your attention to the health minister, Dr. Ivan Bagaric changes
21 to Ivan Saric, and I think this is indicative of the sorts of fluidity I
22 was discussing earlier.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. There may be another example. I --
25 Q. All right. The next document is P 07424, and you briefly touched
1 upon this yesterday and I thought this might be interesting for the Trial
2 Chamber. This is a decision on the establishment of the presidential
3 council of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna, and if we flip to the second page
4 we see that the date is 10 December 1993, and since we're on this page, if
5 we look at paragraph number 4, it says, "The presidential council shall
6 deal with strategic, political, and defence matters and shall coordinate
7 the activities of the executive bodies of the republic." Do you see that?
8 So this tells us a little bit what this presidential council is supposed
9 to do.
10 I take it -- you're shaking your head, but I take it you were not
11 aware of this particular document?
12 A. No, I wasn't.
13 Q. Okay. Now, if we -- if we go to the very first page, we have a
14 list of those who are to serve on the presidential council, and would you
15 agree with me that of the eight people that are listed, Jadranko Prlic is
16 not one of them?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Now, we do see Kresimir Zubak. Did you know Mr. Zubak?
19 A. Yes, I met Mr. Zubak.
20 Q. Okay. In fact, at some point he replaces Mate Boban, does he not,
21 in that title -- in that position?
22 A. I'm not sure. He becomes the president of the Federation, but
23 that is after the Washington Agreement.
24 Q. Okay. But you don't know what he became -- what he was before
1 A. No, I don't know that.
2 Q. Okay. Fair enough and of course there are other names that you
3 recognise here, like, number 2, we see Akmadzic?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Number 1, Markovic.
6 A. Perica Jukic. Ante Roso.
7 Q. Perica Jukic.
8 A. Ivo Lozancic, I recognise those, yes.
9 Q. Okay. But it would appear that Jadranko Prlic at this point in
10 time is not a member of the presidential council of the Croatian Republic
11 of Herceg-Bosna.
12 A. This document would suggest that, yes.
13 Q. Okay. And this is signed by the President Mate Boban?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. And the date is 10 December 1993, while at least at that point in
16 time from your testimony rumours still seem to be circulating as to
17 whether Mate Boban would be in or out, go up or down.
18 A. That's correct, but it was also clear that on that date he was
19 still the president, and indeed he was presented as such at the Assembly
20 meeting that I went to on the 31st.
21 Q. Right. If we go to the next document P 07883. I'm told we need
22 to make two corrections. It should not state "fundamental decision" but,
23 rather, it should be "basic decision of the modification on the amendments
24 of the basic decision on the creation and proclamation of the Croatian
25 Republic of Herceg-Bosna." We see this document was generated on 17
1 February 1994. Were you aware of this particular document which, in a
2 sense, when we see it, we see from Article 8 this legalises essentially
3 the creation and establishment of a presidential council for the Croatian
5 A. I wasn't aware of this document. I was end of mission and back in
6 England as of this date.
7 Q. Okay. Finally I want to share with you one document. It's a
8 rather peculiar document in one way but rather telling in another. It's
9 1D 01533. And if we flip to the second page we can see it's the official
10 letterhead, or at least it would appear to be the official letterhead of
11 the United Nations Protection Force. It's in B/C/S. At the bottom we see
12 that it is signed by Al Ramsay, Brigadier General. Did you know Mr.
14 A. No, I didn't.
15 Q. Did you know of him?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. Okay of the and do you know whether Mr. Ramsay would have been
18 occupying a position with the United Nations Protection Force at or about
19 20 November 1993?
20 A. Can't be sure, but don't have any reason to doubt it.
21 Q. Okay. And -- now, the content of the letter is not so important.
22 What is important is to whom it is addressed: Union of the republics ever
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, Croatian Defence
24 Council, and then municipality of Fojnica. Something like that. But here
25 we see the United Nations is addressing its concerns to the union of
1 republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and my question I guess would be, and
2 perhaps I'm asking you to speculate - if I am, you tell me so - it would
3 appear that at this point in time the United Nations Protection Force,
4 because of their involvement and perhaps inside information concerning the
5 negotiations, the ongoing negotiations, they are of the opinion that there
6 is a union of the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, something that we also
7 see in the preambula or the other documents that refer to or that the
8 Croats are referring to in establishing the Croatian Republic of
10 A. Yes. Date of the letter of is a month or so after we see the
11 first establishment. I agree that the headquarters is writing and giving
12 sort of acknowledgement of the Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna. It hadn't
13 been internationally recognised, and yet I guess you're establishing that
14 this letter from UNPROFOR gives it that credibility.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. I don't know how Mr. Ramsay got on, if he was questioned by his
17 political masters, but I agree with what you're saying.
18 Q. Okay. When you say "internationally recognised," every time you
19 say that, you know, my heart stops a little bit, because it kind of gives
20 the impression that they're trying to create a state that needs
21 international recognition with the flag in New York flying, when in fact
22 we've already agreed that what is being proposed by the Owen-Stoltenberg
23 are republics within a state; correct?
24 A. Yes. It might be helpful to contrast it with the Bosnian Serb
25 Republic that was set up, again self-styled and not receiving recognition
1 until after the Federation.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. So I would see that as the equivalence rather than what you
4 described, a separate little state looking for a flag.
5 Q. Okay. But, you see, in order for us to have this discussion,
6 which is why I started in the beginning, you would have had to know what
7 really transpired in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, you know, as -- when you
8 had the winds of war blowing in a southerly direction and where we had
9 this whole discussion in the past year over here, but we'll skip that,
10 because I'm talking about genesis for the creation of the Croatian
11 Community. So since we're -- we've -- you weren't around at that point in
12 time there's no sense in belabouring it but let's go on to some other
13 documents because I think it might be good at this point this time to look
14 at some documents with respect to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,,
15 and I'm going to start with 1D 01281. 1D 01281. And this is a decision
16 to accept the documents of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And at the top we see Saturday, 15 May 1993.
18 If we look at Article 1, it says: "The Republic of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina hereby accepts in full and shall ensure implementation
20 of the documents of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
21 which was signed on behalf of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
22 the president of the Presidency of the RBH as follows," and then it talks
23 about an agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina signed in Geneva 30 January 1993.
24 Sir, were you aware of this particular decision?
25 A. Yes, I was.
1 Q. And I take it you were also -- you were also aware of the
2 particular agreement?
3 A. Yes, and had some understanding about who was enthusiastic in the
4 Vance-Owen Plan and who wasn't.
5 Q. Right.
6 A. And the HDZ -- the Bosnian Croats were enthusiastic.
7 Q. Right. But also if I -- if I understood your testimony correctly
8 yesterday, and I have it here, I can dig it up someplace, it's here,
9 actually, but -- you did indicate that you, on behalf of ECMM, who were in
10 the process of implementing in some ways the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. You're shaking your head.
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. Okay. Thank you. That's terribly important that we have this
15 record. That's something that the Judges are tired of hearing me talk
16 about, but it's important.
17 Okay. Now, by the way, were you given instructions on how exactly
18 you were to implement the Vance-Owen Peace Plan? I mean, what concretely
19 you were supposed to do, or was it sort of, you know, self-managing in a
20 sense? Okay, here's a team. Figure it out, come up with a plan, let us
22 A. It was probably more structured than any other that came from the
23 headquarters, but it did leave us discretion on how we supported the
24 development, though clearly, as I said before, we had the framework
25 showing the boundaries and showing the make-up of -- of the cantons and
1 who was to be the president of the cantons. So we busied ourselves trying
2 to organise ECMM to best help deliver the Vance-Owen Plan and part of that
3 was meeting some of the designated members.
4 Q. Okay of the and could you tell me about when you started with the
6 A. It would have been when I was HCC Travnik. So that would have
7 been somewhere in about early June, somewhere around there.
8 Q. Okay. Now we're going to move very quickly to the next document.
9 1D 01338.
10 A. Got it.
11 Q. 1D 01338. So you just focus on the last three numbers.
12 A. Yep.
13 Q. 1338. This is a conclusion. We see again it's dated 15 of May,
14 1993. He says, and it's a conclusion, "on the implementation of the
15 documents of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina."
16 Now, we don't have to spend too much time on -- on "I," just the
17 very first sentence. It says "The Assembly of the republic of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina." We don't need to read that. But if we just go to
19 III on the next -- on the next page, it says: "The Assembly of the
20 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina entrusts the Presidency of the Republic
21 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the government of the Republic of Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina, and other state organs in the republic in accordance with
23 their rights and obligations with taking immediate," I underscore
24 that, "immediate action in adopting necessary measures to implement the
25 documents of the Vance-Owen Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina." And then it
1 goes on but we don't have time to read it. But we see at the bottom
2 there's a date, 11 May 1993.
3 Were you aware of this particular document, sir?
4 A. I can't be sure but we got -- as I say, we did receive
5 instructions and it probably did include this agreement, yeah.
6 Q. Okay. Now if we could go to another document. 1D 01535. 1535.
7 A. I've got that document.
8 Q. Okay. This is a joint declaration. We see from the very top,
9 "the president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman." Did you
10 ever meet Dr. Tudjman?
11 A. No, I didn't.
12 Q. Okay. And the president of the Presidency of the Republic of
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic. What about that? Had you ever
14 met Mr. Izetbegovic?
15 A. Yes, on several occasions.
16 Q. Okay. All right. And did you by any chance talk to him about
17 what his plans were about Bosnia-Herzegovina?
18 A. Yes, broadly, we did.
19 Q. Okay. We again. Is that the imperial we or is that ECMM?
20 A. It's the imperial -- no, by imperial I'm referring rather to ECMM.
21 It was the ECMM I took the head of mission to see Mr. Izetbegovic and
22 occasionally we transported him around in our armoured vehicles for
24 Q. All right. You know what I'm talking about when I say the
25 "imperial we"?
1 A. Perhaps we ought to clarify so there's no --
2 Q. Well, I mean when the Queen speaks she usually says "we," meaning
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. All right. Now, over here it says: "Accepting the principles of
6 the London Conference ..." Did you know what those principles were, sir?
7 Yes, no, I've forgotten?
8 A. I've forgotten.
9 Q. Now if we go to the second page, number, it's important. "One of
10 the joint declarations is to form a working group for matters related for
11 the territorial delimitations between the two republics in the envisaged
12 union of Bosnia-Herzegovina including access to the sea as a matter of
13 common developmental interest."
14 Right around this time I get punchy because I've been up a while.
15 Now, were you aware of this particular joint declaration to form a
16 working group? And here we see, "access to the sea, delimitation between
17 the two republics in the envisaged union." So we're talking about two
18 republics in the union not two states, Bosnia and Croatia, but we're
19 talking about the two republics in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
20 A. This is the early foundations of what transpired as the
22 Q. Okay. And of course if we go -- and then before we get to the
23 date, if we look at paragraph III.
24 MR. KARNAVAS: We see on the second paragraph, Your Honours, that
25 Dr. Franjo Tudjman appoints Dr. Mate Granic, who is the vice-president and
1 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia as his trustee.
2 Q. Surely you knew or would have known or knew of Dr. Mate Granic;
4 A. Yes I do but could you point me to that in the documents.
5 Q. III, Okay? Second paragraph, "Dr. -- President Dr. Franjo Tudjman
6 has appointed as his trustee." The same document. It's on the second
7 page, III.
8 A. Don't see it. Must be looking at the wrong bit. Let's just go
9 back and confirm the document.
10 Q. The document is 1D 01535.
11 A. That explains it; I'm looking at 34. I have the wrong document.
12 Q. You have it?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Go to II, on the second page?
15 A. Got it.
16 Q. And you see Dr. Haris Silajdzic is appointed as
17 President Izetbegovic's trustee, and then if we look at the second page,
18 the third page, I'm sorry, we see it's 14 September 1993, and I believe --
20 MR. KARNAVAS: If we go to the third page in the -- in the B/C/S
21 version, Your Honours, you see signatures over there. And we also have
22 another joint declaration. I'm also reminded that if you go back to I,
23 number 2, paragraph number 2, it says, "provide for the bilateral and
24 unconditional disbanding of all detainee camps and for the release of
25 detainees under control of the army -- of the army of Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina and HVO immediately by no later than 21 December 1993 -- 21
2 September 1993, at 1200 hours, and bilaterally assume the responsibility
3 for their protection and care."
4 So this is part of the joint declaration.
5 Q. And I take it you must have been aware of this?
6 A. Not this specific document, but the process broadly, yes.
7 Q. Okay. Now, two documents that are of -- that are rather
8 interesting, and we're going to look at them together, but first we'll
9 look at 1D 01436. 1D 01436.
10 A. I have the document.
11 Q. This document was generated as a result of a session that was held
12 on 28 September 1993, and it reads: "Constitutional Law Constituting the
13 Republic of Bosnia." So we're talking about the Republic of Bosnia, not
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15 A. Yeah.
16 Q. Okay. And this seems to be a proposal, and we're going to discuss
17 this just very briefly. I'm not suggesting that this was passed, but we
18 have to look at the next document to sort of figure out what exactly they
19 did, but interestingly enough, on -- in Sarajevo, they're proposing for a
20 "Republic of Bosnia that is sovereign and independent state of equal
21 citizens, the Muslim Bosniak nation and member of other nations living
22 in -- living in it based on human rights and civic freedoms, rule of law
23 and social justice."
24 And then you get to Article 2 and it talks about: "The Republic
25 of Bosnia is here by constituted an as a constituent republic of the union
1 of republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
2 We go to Article 5. We see that the language -- that the language
3 is, is going to be Bosnian. Article 3, I'm afraid I skipped over this.
4 "Citizens (the Muslim Bosniak nation and members of other nations living
5 in the Republic of Bosnia) --" that's interesting language. "Members of
6 other nations living." And I take it they mean constituent peoples.
7 "... exercise their sovereign rights in the Republic of Bosnia except as
8 otherwise provided in the Constitutional Agreement on the Union of the
9 Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Union of the republics. Now going
10 back to what we had from -- Ramsay was the fellow?
11 A. Al.
12 Q. Now, were you aware of what was -- were you aware of this
13 particular proposal? Were you aware of this?
14 A. No, but it doesn't surprise or shock me in any way.
15 Q. Now, if we go to Article 6, it talks about -- we see the second
16 sentence. "The borders of the Republic of Bosnia are laid down in the
17 constitutional agreement of the union of republics of Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina. And of course Article 10 may be of some importance but we're
19 not going to discuss it because I need to go to the next document. But
20 just very briefly, were you told at all by your sources and I take it ECMM
21 was also -- was also operating in Sarajevo. Were they informing you of
22 what was happening there?
23 A. We would get those situation reports but UNPROFOR was operating
24 from Kiseljak so our liaison officer was with the UNPROFOR headquarters,
25 not that -- at this time, actually, in Sarajevo.
1 Q. Okay. Now, if we look at the next document it's 1D 01532. And so
2 you have to look at both of these together but first we have to look at
3 them separately.
4 A. Okay.
5 Q. Here we say-- here we see that this is a joint session of the
6 Assembly held on 28 and 29 September 1993.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: The previous one was generated on the 28th
8 September, Your Honours. This is the one that comings because there's
9 apparently proposal.
10 Q. Now we look at the conclusions on the draft agreement of Bosnia
11 and Herzegovina, and interestingly -- so if we look at the first -- if we
12 look at the first -- I guess it would be the preambula or -- we see here
13 that this was held on the 27th and 28th of August, 1993. Well, I should
14 read the whole thing I guess. "The Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina, taking into consideration the positions of the Bosniak
16 Assembly, of the political parties and movements, associations of
17 citizens, as well as the opinions of the representatives, have established
18 at the joint Assembly session that the requirements defined at the
19 previous session of the Assembly of RBiH, held on 27 and 28 August 1993,
20 have not been entirely fulfilled. As regards signing of the proposed
21 agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, neither have been fulfilled the
22 decisions of the London Conference and the United Nations Resolution on
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina."
24 And in any event, it would appear that at least the proposal, this
25 is in part as a result of the proposal that was presented the previous
1 day, but were you aware of these discussions?
2 A. No, but they're very interesting. I'd love to know who was at
3 that Assembly from Bosnian Croat side, and also interested in the dates,
4 the 28th of August, which I note is the date on which the CRHB was formed.
5 Q. You know, you read my mind. P 04611. I was going to point you to
6 that, but you led us right to it. Exactly. It seems by serendipity or by
7 design, and I would expect that it's by design, that both sides as result
8 of the ongoing negotiation process and, in an effort to find some sort of
9 a solution, are moving in somewhat of the same direction, in part,
10 although we see at the end the Muslim Bosniak Assembly takes a different
11 position on the 29th of September, 1993, but nonetheless we can see that,
12 at least if we look on paper, and if we look at this that the Croats are
13 not acting independently. They're not trying to get some sort of
14 international recognition in order to carve up, break up Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina, but rather this is an ongoing process, and perhaps one is
16 getting a little ahead of itself over the other, but nonetheless it is a
17 process that both have agreed to participate in. Would that be a correct
18 assessment? Help me out here, and I only have like a minute or so?
19 A. Yes, I believe that's a good assessment. It shows the fluidity,
20 the various initiatives and helps explain why it was quite a complex
21 picture, which I was trying to gather down in Mostar. We were at a
22 position where various options were being discussed.
23 Q. All right.
24 A. But the idea of there being three republics was being explored, as
25 I've said previously.
1 Q. Thank you very much, sir. And we're going to pick up tomorrow
2 where we left off today.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is time to finish. We shall
4 resume tomorrow morning at 9.00. Thank you very much.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 23rd day
7 of May, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.