1 Wednesday, 23 May 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
8 everyone. This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et
9 al. Thank you.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
11 I would like to greet everyone here in this courtroom on this 23rd
12 of May. Good morning to Mr. Kruger, to the Defence counsel, to the
13 accused, and to everyone else in this courtroom.
14 I'd like to ask the registrar for us to move into private session
15 for a few minutes.
16 [Private session]
25 [Open session]
1 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in -- we are back in open session,
2 Your Honours.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll have the
4 witness brought in.
5 As for time now. I've been told that Mr. Karnavas has been
6 granted some time by other Defence counsel.
7 Is that the case, Mr. Karnavas?
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Good morning, Mr. President; good morning, Your
9 Honours; good morning everyone else.
10 Yes. I am told that I have approximately 30 minutes left from my
11 own time. In addition to that, I've been given 20 minutes from the Coric
12 team, 15 minutes from the Petkovic team, and 10 or 15 minutes from the
13 Pusic team, and I think that may be sufficient for me to -- to cover all
14 the things I need to cover. We will be much more efficient today,
16 [The witness entered court]
17 WITNESS: PHILIP ROGER WATKINS [Resumed]
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine.
19 Good morning, Witness.
20 THE WITNESS: Good morning, sir.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As you know, we are now going to
22 proceed with the cross-examination. I am now giving the floor to Mr.
24 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Your Honours.
25 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas: [Continued]
1 Q. Good morning, sir.
2 A. Good morning.
3 Q. Okay. We're going to pick up where we left off yesterday, and if
4 we could look at 1D 01530.
5 Could we provide the documents to the witness. Thank you. This
6 is 1D 01530, 1530. This is still on that chapter we were talking about
7 yesterday with respect to --
8 A. I have the document.
9 Q. Okay. Good. Now, as we could see from the top, there's a date,
10 April 6, 1994. In reference -- if we go to Article 1, we can see the date
11 of 18 of March, 1994, and in essence for the title of it, it says, "Law on
12 Ratification of The Preliminary Agreement on Establishing of Confederation
13 Between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia."
15 First question: Did you have an opportunity to see -- to come
16 across this document when you were in country?
17 A. During this period I was between missions, and I came back after
18 the federation had been formed.
19 Q. Okay. So -- so the question -- the answer to my question, did you
20 get a chance to look at this document at some point when you were in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, "yes," "no," "I don't recall."
22 A. I did not see this document.
23 Q. Okay. By the -- by the time -- when you got back did you get a
24 full briefing on what exactly had been agreed upon in Washington, or what
25 was the Washington Agreement about?
1 A. Yes, again in broad terms, and I would just remind you that I --
2 when I went back the second time I began my service in Tapusko in Croatia,
3 so my initial weeks were spent dealing with different issues.
4 Q. Okay. Thank you for reminding me that. Now, if we look at
5 Article 1 under Preliminary Agreement, it's on the first page, so this
6 would be towards the bottom of the page -- or before that in the
7 preamble - yesterday I kept calling it "preambula," because my colleague,
8 Suzana Tomanovic, calls it that in her language. It says, "the Federation
9 of Bosnia-Herzegovina," in further text, "Federation," and, and "the
10 Republic of Croatia," in further text "Croatia," "have agreed as follows."
11 So from here it would stand that the Federation as opposed to
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina is making an agreement with Croatia; correct?
13 A. That's correct. That was part of the Washington Agreement.
14 Q. Okay.
15 MR. KARNAVAS: And in fact, if we were just for the benefit of the
16 Trial Chamber if we were to -- to look on page 6 there's Annex 2. We see
17 that there is attached an agreement between the federation of
19 Q. Okay. Now, we need not discuss this too much but it would seem at
20 least that this whole notion of a confederation that had been talked about
21 and that the Croats, at least in Bosnia that were talking about, we see
22 some sort of realisation through this document?
23 A. Yes, it was a very important component. I think if they were not
24 together, an Croat independent republic on its own, then, as a part of the
25 of the federation forming with the Muslims, it was extremely important to
1 hang on to the component of connection with Croatia.
2 Q. Well, it was also important for the --
3 A. International community.
4 Q. Yes. But it was also important for the Muslims, and I keep -- I
5 have to go back to this, to get a port, as opposed to being land-locked,
6 because they needed access to the sea, and this was one way of ensuring
8 A. Well --
9 Q. And if you look at page 4.
10 A. Yeah, Okay.
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: If you look at page 4, we will see, Your Honours,
13 there's annex 1, "Agreement ensuring for the Federation of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina access to the Adriatic through the territory of the
15 Republic of Croatia."
16 Q. So at least from this agreement we see that access to the sea was
17 an important component.
18 A. Yes, it was. The Muslims had access to the sea before and they
19 were going to maintain it here.
20 Q. Okay. Hold on. Are we talking about Neum?
21 A. If one classes that as a port, it was access to the sea, yes; and
22 the Neretva.
23 Q. Okay. And let me ask you this: Is that a deep water port "yes,"
24 "no," "I don't know"?
25 A. No it's not a keep water port.
1 Q. Okay. Thank you very much. Now, let's turn to the next document.
2 1D 01539, 1539. And this is just an excerpt from the Balkan Odyssey by
3 David Owen. I believe it's sir David Owen or is it Lord Owen?
4 A. Lord Owen.
5 Q. So that's even bigger; right?
6 A. Yes, I suppose.
7 Q. Okay. All right. We dispensed with those notions in 1776, I
8 believe, we being the Americans.
9 A. Yes, your loss, I believe.
10 Q. So -- okay. Now, to your understanding and belief, is Lord Owen a
11 serious individual?
12 A. Just before we -- I answer that question, I haven't got the
13 document or I can't find the document.
14 Q. Okay. 15 -- 15 --
15 A. 39.
16 Q. 39. And if you don't we have an extra copy --
17 A. It does not appear to be in one of these.
18 Q. Okay. This was something that was added on.
19 A. Lord Owen, yes, a serious international figure.
20 Q. And like Lord Carrington, I believe was at one time --
21 A. [Overlapping speakers] He was also the British Foreign Minister.
22 Q. [Overlapping speakers] Foreign Minister or Defence Minister?
23 A. [Overlapping speakers] British Foreign Minister at the time of the
24 Falklands war in 1982.
25 Q. [Overlapping speakers] Okay.
1 A. [Overlapping speakers] He resigned.
2 Q. All right. Now --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Would counsel make breaks.
4 MR. KARNAVAS: I was just about to do that. Thank you for that
6 Q. I must caution you that we need to slow down.
7 Now, in your capacity at that period of time, did you have access
8 to Lord Owen?
9 A. Lord Owen sat at the top of the ECMM reporting chain. I didn't
10 personally have access directly to him.
11 Q. Okay. So I take it you never discussed with him what at all he
12 was doing when he was with Mr. Vance or later on with Stoltenberg?
13 A. No, I didn't personally.
14 Q. Okay. Now, can I assume or can we assume that the ECMM was
15 getting briefed by whatever it was that Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg were
16 doing at the time?
17 A. Again, in broad terms, and I would also comment that probably on
18 the ground we would have liked to have had more information but for
19 instance we knew about the study which he commissioned at Neum.
20 Q. Okay. Study on Neum. That would have been to see whether that --
21 A. To see whether it was a deep sea port or not.
22 Q. There you go. And the studied turned out to be what?
23 A. Well, it was a technical study and, as we said, we established
24 that it was not a deep sea port.
25 Q. Okay. And so if you want cargo ships coming in with cargo to
1 Bosnia, that's not the place.
2 A. No, that's what that report concluded.
3 Q. Okay, there you go. Now, did you by any chance have an
4 opportunity to read Lord Owen's book? It was published afterwards --
5 A. No, I don't believe I have read that one.
6 Q. Okay. And sir if I were to -- if I were to -- the very first
7 page, there is this quote from Misha Glenny have you heard of him?
8 A. Yes we've all read Misha Glenny's books prior to deployment.
9 Q. And he starts with, "henceforth nobody can talk authoritatively
10 about the course of this war without engaging this text in detail." Now,
11 obviously you haven't read the text but if Misha Glenny says it, is that
12 something that you would at least consider?
13 A. Yes, it's rather an absolute statement but I would consider that
14 it would be worthwhile we now reading this book.
15 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, if we turn to the next page and in the
16 book it's --
17 MR. KARNAVAS: At least in this edition, it's page 226,
18 Your Honours. There's a rather lengthy passage, and unfortunately I will
19 have to read it. I believe we did provide copies to the interpreters. I
21 Q. But I want to read this and then get your understanding because I
22 think yesterday we established, sir, that you -- you did not have all the
23 information at the time from all sides, including the internationals;
25 A. That is correct, and I don't think anybody had all the information
1 from all of the sides.
2 Q. Right. And, as you put it, and I think this is a truism, "the
3 political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be seen in isolation
4 from the international peace talks"?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. Okay. I mean, that's what you said, and I think it's -- it stands
7 to reason that if the internationals are involved, obviously one must look
8 at the international peace talks that are going on as well as what is
9 happening on the ground.
10 Now -- so let's look at what Lord Owen has to say, and I'm going
11 to go to the bottom of the page. And the title of this chapter is, "A
12 Union of Three Republics." We see that on the following page.
13 Now, it says here: "In Geneva on 20 August I briefed EC missions
14 and circulated the documents for a Bosnian settlement to which the leaders
15 of the three parties had agreed in principle. The leaders were going to
16 consult their 'parliaments' and give their final response to the
17 co-chairmen at the meeting in Geneva on 31 August."
18 Notice the quotes, parliaments. I hope that --
19 A. Yes, I noticed. We may draw a different opinion as to why it's in
20 parentheses [sic].
21 Q. I'm just noting it's there and you would suspect that Lord Owen
22 is, is rather precise in language.
23 A. I'm suggesting that he's meaning parliaments, as in perhaps
24 self-styled parliaments, without giving them that particular authority, is
25 the way I would interpret it.
1 Q. Very well. And that, sir -- and that, sir, since you want to
2 volunteer that information, would also go to the parliament,
3 quote-unquote, that exists in Sarajevo.
4 A. Well, that had a legitimacy at that stage.
5 Q. Okay. Well, we'll have other witnesses talk about the legitimacy
6 and see how many Croats and how many Serbs were functioning and making --
7 in that particular parliament but we're not here for that. But let's
9 "As co-chairmen, we had warned against trying to make further
10 significant changes to the agreements. We believe that except for Eastern
11 Bosnia, the outcome met all the criteria set by the EC foreign affairs
12 council in June. Including their part of Sarajevo which accounted for two
13 per cent, the Muslims would get 30 per cent of the total territory of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. All the constitutional principles of the Vance-Owen
15 Plan, for what they were now worth, were some additional points, such as
16 commitments against armies simply being turned into police forces, had
17 been built in the agreements in the form of a complete constitutional
18 instrument. Muslim access to the Sava and Adriatic was guaranteed."
19 Now, see I'm raising my voice, and I'm underscoring it because I
20 want to make sure that we are on the same page, that at least Lord Owen
21 knows and is highlighting that it's the Muslims that want access to the
22 sea, and not something that is being imposed on the Muslims by the
24 A. I'm not sure I would quite interpret it the same way --
25 Q. Okay. Very well.
1 A. -- as I discussed yesterday.
2 Q. Very well. "Mostar was to be placed under EC administrative for
3 up to two years along the same lines as UN administration of Sarajevo.
4 Tudjman had been implacably opposed to UN control of Mostar, so I
5 suggested that the EC should take it on, and Tudjman had accepted this
6 across the negotiating table. Fortunately, the EC later backed me. It
7 was agreed that part of the city would operate as the capital of the Croat
8 majority republic."
9 Let me read that again: "It was agreed that part of the city
10 would operate as the capital of the Croat majority republic. On Eastern
11 Bosnia, we were disappointed that we could not negotiate a territorial
12 link between the Muslim areas of the Zepa and Gorazde but this the Serbs
13 fiercely resisted. The best we could achieve was a road link to be
14 maintained and policed by the Muslims.
15 "Central Bosnia was the most difficult part of the negotiations.
16 Here, Boban was finally persuaded to give up Croatian claims of 1 per cent
17 of territory which then went to the Muslims. The tension -- the tension
18 in the area remained high, however, and we feared that further fierce
19 fighting could erupt, particularly around Gornji Vakuf."
20 And I take it -- let me stop here -- let me pause. I take it,
21 giving up that 1 per cent of the territory, which at least the Croats in
22 that area thought should be under Croatian control might have upset the
24 A. It might. I think the paragraph that you've just read brings out
25 some interesting points and sort of explains some of the local colour I
1 was painting yesterday, the issue here of the EC control of Mostar. How
2 did the Croats on the ground feel about that? And that was one of the
3 times when we were instructed to -- to give feedback.
4 Q. Right. Okay.
5 A. And the other element if I just might say would also be the
6 anticipated further fierce fighting which could erupt particularly around
7 Gornji Vakuf, which again would explain my particular interest in what was
8 happening on the Makljen ridge, the movement of the HV forces.
9 Q. Right. All right. And could also further explain why some of the
10 Croats over there felt that they had been abandoned and were actually
11 being forced to leave because at the negotiating table Boban is having to
12 give up 1 per cent of the territory?
13 A. Absolutely. At the meeting on the 31st, the Assembly meeting I
14 went to, this was expressed as I said by with some concern, which those
15 further away from Mostar that they well may be sacrificed in any - I
16 should be careful - negotiated away their position.
17 Q. Negotiated away. And we're not talking about ethnic cleansing or
18 reverse ethnic cleansing. We're talking about trying to find a negotiated
19 settlement where you have three republics within one state; correct?
20 A. That's correct and.
21 Q. And at no time, sir, at no time at least to your understanding,
22 did anyone -- was anyone at the international scene proposing that there
23 be population exchanges once you formed these republics?
24 A. The international community certainly wasn't proposing that.
25 However, I do believe that as part of providing security for ethnic and
1 constituent groups, there was, certainly in the case of the Bosnian Serbs
2 and I do also believe in the case of the Bosnian Croats, a desire to
3 collect people into the area of which they would have territorial
4 integrity of their three republics.
5 Q. Having a desire and negotiating -- having a desire and negotiating
6 at the table for three republics are two different things. And I'm
7 reminded here on the transcript you say HV forces. You mean to say -- at
8 the Makljen ridge, the movement of HV forces. Are you talking about HVO
9 forces or HV forces there?
10 A. HV forces.
11 Q. Okay. Let me continue. "Overall I warned the EC that the final
12 outcome was still on a knife's edge. We thought Izetbegovic would give a
13 fair wind to the agreement and other members of the Bosnian Presidency had
14 reacted fairly positively when we briefed them."
15 Who are the other members of the Bosnian Presidency, if you know
16 at the time -- if you know?
17 A. I would imagine he's talking here about Ejup Ganic, Haris
18 Silajdzic. I wouldn't be able to name any of the Croats or Serbs
19 involved. Those are the names I would assume he means.
20 Q. Do you know whether there were any Serbs or Croats serving on the
21 Bosnian Presidency at that time?
22 A. If they were, it would have been a very sparse representation.
23 Q. Okay. I'm asking --
24 A. I don't know for sure.
25 Q. There's no sense in being cute because, you know, I can be very
1 rude in cutting you off. I'm just asking a direct question. Do you know,
2 yes or no?
3 A. I do not know.
4 Q. Okay. Did you ever make any efforts top find out who was on the
5 Presidency, yes, no?
6 A. I did not make efforts to find out who was on the Presidency.
7 Q. Okay. So: "The areas from which the Serbs were to withdraw on
8 the proposed map amounted to 16.7 per cent of the whole country and 23.9
9 per cent of the Serb-held territory, significantly less than the VOPP."
10 Then we go on: "The -- the package then faced the same US
11 prevarication which had accompanied the VOPP."
12 Now, do you know what they're talking about the "US
14 A. No, I do not.
15 Q. Do you have an inkling of what that means?
16 A. Well, there were always differentials in approach between EU and
17 the US on what should happen in Bosnia. The US had a much more
18 interventionist approach. There were issues being discussed about whether
19 various groups or organisations or, in particular, the government itself
20 should have been reinforced. EU had a slightly different perspective to
21 the US.
22 Q. Now, prevarication, what does that mean? I mean, do you know the
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. Okay. And what does that mean?
1 A. Well, for a dictionary definition --
2 Q. You can be kind. You can go -- go soft on that?
3 A. Not a determined and set course of action but one of delay and --
4 Q. Obfuscating?
5 A. Obfuscating.
6 Q. Less than candid?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Less than truthful?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Dishonest?
11 A. I think your thesaurus is better than mine. Yes, all those would
13 Q. "Now, their special envoy, Redman, who knew all the twists and
14 turns of the negotiations and seemed personally sympathetic, was working
15 within a remit which appeared to consist of never being wrong-footed into
16 ending up in opposition of the Bosnian Herzegovinian government. The US
17 were adamant that although they were not prepared to pronounce on the
18 details, they would say to the Bosnian -- to the Bosnia-Herzegovina
19 government that the package warranted very serious consideration and that
20 it was the best chance for the moment. The non-aligned movement had a
21 UNSCR at an advance stage before the Security Council which threatened to
22 establish new principles for a settlement. So it became necessary so --
23 for Stoltenberg to travel to New York and to put the case -- and put the
24 case for the package, which was we had to stress yet again not an
25 Owen-Stoltenberg package but one agreed by the parties negotiated over a
1 tense and difficult month in Geneva."
2 Now, were you aware of this by the way?
3 A. Yes, the Geneva talks.
4 Q. Okay.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Would Mr. Karnavas have a set of documents for
6 the French booth. Thank you.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: We apologise to the French booth. An oversight,
8 not a sleight.
9 Q. Now, if we go on, I want to save some time over this, if we
10 could -- we might be able to skip. Let's go to the paragraph where it
11 says: "After 36 hours in which the Serbs and Muslims seemed to be vying
12 with one another to avoid being the first to come out totally in favour or
13 totally against the package, the Bosnian Serbs in their Assembly voted 55
14 to 14 in favour. The Muslim majority Bosnian parliament, however, voted
15 unanimously only in favour of continuing the negotiations. Izetbegovic
16 said his main problem was the map. He wanted Foca, Bratunac, Visegrad,
17 Prijedor, Kozarac, and Sanski Most, all Muslim towns before the war and
18 all in provinces likely to elect Muslim majority under the VOPP. He also
19 wanted access to the sea at Neum. The Bosnian Croat parliament approved
20 the package with only one vote against."
21 Now, were you aware of this, this drama that was being played out
22 as retold by -- as retold by Lord Owen in his book?
23 A. This is not a surprise to me.
24 Q. See, I didn't ask you whether it was a surprise. Had I asked you,
25 are you surprised. I'm asking, were you aware.
1 A. We were aware of the Geneva talks, but for instance --
2 Q. Were you aware of this? I'm speaking concretely about what I just
3 read. I'm not asking for some global picture and I'm not asking for the
4 "we"; I'm asking you, because we -- I don't have the EC as an
5 organisation here, the ECMM. So, were you aware of it? Because you were
6 the one, sir, and this is why I'm pressing you, and I'm not being
7 disrespectful, but I'm pressing because you were making reports. You were
8 drawing conclusions. Others were relying on it, and my whole point to the
9 judges are that, albeit you were very objective in the way you were trying
10 to conduct your business, you were labouring under circumstances that do
11 did not allow you to have access to all the information that perhaps the
12 Judges may need in order to draw the proper conclusion.
13 So my question is: Were you aware, you specifically, aware of
14 what I just read to you, "yes," "no," "maybe," "I don't recall"?
15 A. It's never such a simple world as that. What I'm saying is, yes,
16 I was aware of Geneva talks and we were broadly aware of what was being
17 discussed but, for instance, I did not know, and you have listed many
18 towns or Lord Owen has here, of the detail. So you're right, we did not
19 have all the details, but I knew of the talks and I knew broadly of what
20 was trying to be achieved at that stage.
21 Q. Okay. But did you know the positions that were being taken by the
22 various parties? Yes or no? I mean, it's a very concrete --
23 A. Not in -- not exactly, no.
24 Q. Okay. And it's rather clear, sir, and believe me, I think that
25 when I read all of this, it's very clear. I think neighbour who reads
1 your reports sees a very serious individual who is trying to be somebody I
2 have. I give you that. But I'm trying to point out that perhaps he
3 didn't have all the facts at the time, and you agree with me on that;
5 A. Yes, but I would say that was a statement of the obvious.
6 Q. Okay.
7 A. Of course I didn't have all the details.
8 Q. Okay. Did you know that -- did you know about parliamentary
9 sessions being held in Sarajevo?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Okay. Now, let's move on to the next area and just have some
12 quick documents. I want to focus on P 05709. This was generated by
13 Martin Garrod, and I believe he's a sir. It's Sir Martin Garrod; right?
14 A. That's correct, and I have the document.
15 Q. Okay. And did you -- did you know him or know of him?
16 A. Yes, I knew him. I knew him well. When he first deployed, he
17 came into my team.
18 Q. Okay. And, as I understand, he's an extremely serious individual?
19 A. Yes, he was a British monitor.
20 Q. Well, what does that mean? My question was that he's a serious
21 individual. Being a British monitor doesn't mean anything to me. He is
22 serious or non-serious, yes or no?
23 A. As I said, yes.
24 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, he writes at the bottom of the -- at the
25 bottom of the second paragraph, and this is about a conversation that he's
1 having with, I believe, Mr. Hadzihasanovic -- did you know who
2 Mr. Hadzihasanovic was, Mr. Enver Hadzihasanovic commander of the 3rd BiH
4 A. Yes, I knew Mr. Hadzihasanovic well.
5 Q. Okay, you met him?
6 A. I met him on several occasions.
7 Q. Okay now here he's talking - I don't want to go into the whole
8 part of this because the Judges will have it and can read it at their
9 leisure, and will point out relevant passages - but at the very bottom, he
10 says, Hadzihasanovic is saying, that he added that there was something
11 that Europe had not noticed: "He gave the Croats and Serbs who lived in
12 Bosnia -- he says "who gave" - who gave - "the Croats and Serbs who lived
13 in Bosnia to call themselves Croats and Serbs? They are merely Roman
14 Catholic Bosnians or Orthodox Bosnians."
15 Now, were you aware that he is subscribed to such notions that
16 there weren't Serbs or Croats in Bosnia who were indigenous as a
17 constituent peoples, but, rather, they were all Bosnian of a different
19 A. Yes. It was often articulated.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. And I knew that he had these views.
22 Q. And at that point in time, at least at some other point in time,
23 he was a pretty high-level officer, was he not?
24 A. Yes, he was a corps commander and is of interest to this Court, I
1 Q. All right. Now, if we just look very briefly on -- on paragraph
2 4. This is something again slightly different. Here, Sir Martin Garrod
3 says, and I'm just read part of the paragraph, he says: "It was
4 difficult, for example, to persuade people that they should provide access
5 and freedom of movement when they see little practical results from our
6 efforts." This is what Hadzihasanovic is saying. "In addition, instances
7 of smuggling and 'criminal activity' (by international agencies)," that's
8 in parentheses, "led to the roadblocks."
9 Now, yesterday or Monday I believe you did in fact indicate that
10 the Muslims were also blocking the roads at times; correct?
11 A. Yes, that's correct.
12 Q. Now, do you know what he's talking about, the international
13 agencies smuggling and being involved in criminal activity what is exactly
14 he talking about? Because I would assume that ECMM being one of the
15 international agencies, that accusation in part may have -- may be being
16 lodged against yourselves as well. Any idea?
17 A. Yes. This was a regular allegation, not just from the Muslims but
18 it was, for instance, claims and I do believe on occasions established
19 facts that some aid convoys were carrying more than just aid.
20 Q. This was an established fact. When you say, "carrying more than
21 aid," you mean like carrying weapons?
22 A. There were, I believe, times when, yes, carrying arms and
24 Q. All right and that accusation was also being lodged that the
25 Muslims were doing that in their aid convoys?
1 A. No, that the international community had been carrying more than
2 humanitarian aid.
3 Q. Okay.
4 A. And allegations were made by both Muslims against the
5 international community, Croats against the international community, and
6 Serbs, that that was happening.
7 Q. And was that in fact happening, to your knowledge?
8 A. I do believe that there were a couple of times when it was
9 established but it was -- it was rare but I do believe it was established
10 a couple of times.
11 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, if we go to paragraph 10, just very
12 quickly, I'm just go to look at part of it, it says here that, "He made
13 clear that elements of the BiH at least have the will and capacity to
14 continue the fight until they achieve their goals. He also implied that
15 money was not a problem," in quotes -- I mean, in parentheses, "(with
16 donations coming from abroad)," end of parentheses, "and if he is
17 expressing Izetbegovic's views, peace is a long way off."
18 Now, were you aware that Sir Martin Garrod was commenting about
19 the views being held by Hadzihasanovic at this period of time in such a
20 fashion? That -- we're talking about 7 October 1993. That would have
21 been a time when you were going into Mostar?
22 A. 7th of October. No, I was still actually up as head of CC
24 Q. And you were about -- I think it was the middle of October that
25 you made it to Mostar?
1 A. Two weeks after that, so --
2 Q. Okay, were you aware -- did you ever access to this particular
4 A. Yes, I would have been in the same headquarters as him --
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. -- at the time.
7 Q. When he's talking about "their goals," do you know exactly what he
8 means by "their goals?" Would access to the sea be one of them?
9 A. Primarily the goals articulated to us was the maintenance of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the internationally recognised state.
11 Q. Okay. As a unitary state?
12 A. As a unitary state.
13 Q. Where it's one person, one vote, and then the Catholic -- the
14 Catholics and the Orthodox would be one peoples?
15 A. Well, it was the -- maintenance of the state which had been
16 accepted and ratified by the UN, which was --
17 Q. Very well. I think we got the point. If we go to the next
18 document, there are two documents that I want to talk about in particular.
19 Yesterday, you were shown one document where we talked about -- and this
20 was the document that I shared with you was 2790. 2790, and I made
21 reference -- 7290, and that's where I made reference to a Safet, the an
22 armija staff officer of the 4th Corps who stated that Muslims were not
23 ready for peace until they had access to the sea and so on. And I asked
24 you who Safet was and you weren't quite sure. Could that be Safet Cibo,
1 A. It could be. I haven't actually found the document, but I do
2 remember what you're saying, so it could be.
3 Q. Okay. Have you ever met Mr. Safet Cibo?
4 A. The name certainly rings a bell, but I -- I --
5 Q. Okay. Well, the document that I want to go to is -- that was by
6 way of reference. Now, the document is 6511. 6511. And if we look under
7 political and this is dated 5 November 1993 this would have been at the
8 time you were in the Mostar area. Do you have the document, sir?
9 A. Not if it's from your file.
10 Q. 65 --
11 A. [Overlapping speakers] Yes I --
12 Q. It would have been -- I apologise. And this was something that
13 was shown to you incidentally by the Prosecutor as the previous one,
14 although they omitted to point out those references.
15 A. I have the document.
16 Q. Okay. And if we look at the section under Political, and I think
17 this is something that is rather curious and perhaps even telling. It
18 says, "M1 met Safet Cibo, president of the War Presidency who had recently
19 returned from Sarajevo." And then there is some parentheses some letters
20 and numbers. "Cibo said he was pleased with the new government led by
21 Silajdzic as it represented the first real Bosnian government. He
22 anticipated more changes shortly."
23 Now, who is M1?
24 A. This is the team that reported to me, and it was based in
1 Q. Okay. Now, having read that, do you recall meeting Mr. Cibo now,
2 the president of the War Presidency?
3 A. I don't. Mike 1 isn't me, but I may well have met him.
4 Q. Okay.
5 A. But it is a very interesting paragraph, I agree.
6 Q. Okay. Since these were your team members, and obviously the
7 information is coming to you, do you know whether at the time, reading
8 this, you asked M1 to explain what exactly Mr. Cibo meant when he said
9 "real," "first real Bosnian government"? What did he meant by that? And
10 if you don't have the answer, we can move on.
11 A. I don't have the answer, and given hindsight I would probably have
12 pursued that bit more vigorously. It is very interesting.
13 Q. Yes. Okay. Now, let me just go -- share with you one other
14 document that were being -- that was circulated at the time and it's 1D
15 01434. This was being circulated, I am told, in Central Bosnia during the
16 war in 1993, and --
17 A. I have the document.
18 Q. Okay. It reads -- it starts with: "In the name of Allah, the
19 most gracious. Muslim brethren the time has finally come to liberate our
20 homeland. Like 500 years ago, the Muslim Corps will rule over its
21 historic areas.
22 "We have had enough of injustice both from the kris/cross
23 Orthodox use and from the kriz/cross Catholic use. Our holy mission is to
24 liberate Mostar and Stolac, Sarajevo, Zvornik, Gorazde, Banja Luka, Doboj,
25 Foca, Nevesinje, Trebinje, and other towns throughout our proud Bosnia
1 will once again embark upon the path of Islam.
2 "Let everyone be aware that Muslims die with the name of Allah on
3 their lips and for the glory of their faith.
4 "We were never stronger. Muslims of the world are with us.
5 "We will take our part of the Adriatic coast. Ploce will be the
6 first Bosnian port and Neum will be the new Constantinople.
7 "This will be our Bosnia and Herzegovina."
8 Incidently, where is Ploce?
9 A. Ploce is a port in Croatia.
10 Q. Okay. Had you come --
11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, Mr. Karnavas, could you be so kind as
12 to enlighten the Chamber about the origins of this paper, which has no
13 date, no signature, and may be a leaflet distributed by any fanatic
15 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, that's the whole point. Thank you for that
16 question, and I anticipated you raising it.
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Karnavas.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you for that question, and I anticipated you
19 raising it. This was a leaflet that was being circulated. Whether it was
20 by fanatics, whether this was sanctioned by the government, I don't know.
21 We do know that Mujahedin were running around. But this is something that
22 my colleague, Ms. Suzana Tomanovic, gave me, who was in Doboj throughout
23 the war, and this is where this document came from. So I'm not saying
24 that this was being circulated by the Sarajevo government, but
25 nonetheless, this is the sort of rhetoric that's going around.
1 Q. And my question to you, sir, is, were you aware that pamphlets,
2 such as this one, were being circulated at the time?
3 A. Yes, I was aware. I met some of the extremists, including
4 external Mujahedin and the involvement of external elements, finance
5 coming from overseas was something which was of interest particularly
6 during my second tour and under the French Presidency. And I wrote a
7 special report at the time on the influence of Mujahedin in Central
8 Bosnia. And if it helps the Court in a perspective, there certainly were
9 Mujahedin there, and there were certainly very highly motivated indigenous
10 brigades, such as 17 Muslim Brigade, where you had more extreme elements
11 being articulated such as this. It wasn't mainstream at all.
12 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now we're going to move on very quickly to
13 another -- other sets of documents, and before I do so the term "okruzi"?
14 Okruzi, I think I'm pronouncing it right, did that ever come -- did you
15 ever hear of that term, "okruzi"? You have a phenomenal memory but I
16 wouldn't expect you to remember, but --
17 A. I do not recall that.
18 Q. Okay. All right. If we could look at 6590. 6590. And this is a
19 document date -- this is in the Prosecution's binder. I'm sorry. The
20 next few documents are from the Prosecutor's binder.
21 A. I have the document.
22 Q. Okay. And perhaps you can elucidate a little bit on some of this.
23 I'm still trying to figure it out.
24 Dated 11 November 1993, under the section, Political, it says:
25 "HCC met Smail Karalic, president of the War Presidency Mostar, Ibrahim
1 Kaluda (BiH minister for co-ord Mostar), and Rusmir Cisic (president of
2 the county of Mostar)," and then it goes on to say, "after discussions
3 concerning the delivery of aid (in which EC was accused of -- of
4 implementing a food as well as an arms embargo) HCC addressed the," quote,
5 "county government," unquote, "structure and its aims. Cisic said Mostar
6 county had recently formed (7 November 1993) in Mostar and had authority
7 over the municipalities of Stolac, Capljina, Mostar, Jablanica, Konjic."
8 Question: What is he talking about when he says "Mostar county"?
9 Do you know?
10 A. Well, you can see that we were very interested to understand what
11 new structures were emerging. We'd first come across the county structure
12 in Central Bosnia, and my interest was obviously taken with me to Mostar
13 and here you can see I am trying to find out what this county government
14 means, and again I've used parentheses in the same way we described
16 Q. Right.
17 A. And he's explaining a new civilian structure.
18 Q. All right. Well, he's talking about a structure, but then if you
19 go to the assessment, because there's precious little information that I
20 suspect you were able to drag out of them in order to come up with your
21 assessment, it says here --
22 MR. KARNAVAS: On paragraph number 7, Your Honours.
23 Q. And, sir, "The meeting in Mostar with the civil authorities
24 provided more important information about the Muslim county level of
25 government. It confirms the primary area -- the primary aim is to develop
1 the humanitarian links and the infrastructure." Then it goes on.
2 "Despite Ciric's statement that Mostar has nothing to trade with the
3 county has one major asset, namely hydroelectric power."
4 Now, I'm trying to figure this out. When you go back, Mostar
5 county incorporates various municipalities; correct?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. And do you know whether there was any legislation that was set up?
8 And I'm talking about legal -- legally, that would be, that would set --
9 that would allow for the formation of a county or a region or a canton?
10 Because when we look at the size of these municipalities and the
11 geographical area that they would compass, we're talking about a fairly
12 significant chunk of the territory; right?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. So question: Did you by any chance ask for or did they ever share
15 with you any documentation that would allow the formation of counties in a
16 constitutional -- within a constitutional framework?
17 A. They did not provide me with any paperwork. You could see I'm
18 probing for as much information as I can get about them.
19 Q. Okay. All right. And -- one second.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If I may -- if I may just -- if I may profit from
21 the interval.
22 Witness, you speak in the last paragraph in the Assessment of
23 someone spelled Ciric, whereas on the first page you speak repeatedly of
24 someone called Cisic. Do we have a misprint on the last page?
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I believe we do. I don't remember there
1 being another individual.
2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
3 MR. KARNAVAS:
4 Q. Thank you. Now, for -- I have other documents on this, but since
5 we have that information, we can go to the very last document in this
6 chapter of my cross, which would be 1D 01531, 1531. And that would be in
7 my documents. When it's a D number, you're almost certain to find it in
8 my documents. When it's a P, which means Prosecutor, it will be in their
9 documents. I apologise for not making that clear.
10 A. I have the document.
11 Q. Okay. Now, here we see something that is dated -- at the top we
12 see 6 April 1994, and we see this has been generated as of -- as a result
13 of a session that was held on 30 March 1994. It's a decision to relieve
14 of duties and elect the president of the War Presidency of the
15 municipality of Mostar and the election of the president of Presidency of
16 the Mostar district.
17 Now, if we go to III, we see that, "Smail Klaric is hereby elected
18 as president of the Presidency of the Mostar district."
19 Now, if we go back -- if we look at the original language, we see
20 Okruga [phoen] Mostar. Now we're talking about a district whether it's a
21 county district. Do you know -- have you ever seen this document before?
22 A. I just need a little bit more help on orientation of the document
23 because although I have --
24 Q. 1531.
25 A. I have that document.
1 Q. And if you go to -- here we see that "I," "Smail Klaric is hereby
2 relieved of his duties as president --"
3 A. I have the document, yeah.
4 Q. Okay. He's relieved of his duties as president of the War
5 Presidency of the municipality of Mostar. He's replaced, and then we see
6 now he's being elected to the president to the Presidency of the Mostar
7 district. And at the -- and this is -- and -- and of course is this --
8 does this pre-date or post-date the Washington Agreement?
9 A. It post-dates, I believe.
10 Q. So here we already have a Washington Agreement. In here, we see
11 that Izetbegovic as the president of the presidency is appointed someone
12 as part of the Mostar district. Okay? Now, was there a Mostar district
13 at that point in time? If you know; if you don't know, that's fine.
14 We'll save it for another witness.
15 A. I don't know that.
16 Q. Okay. Thank you very much. Now, a couple of housekeeping matters
17 and then I think we're just about done.
18 If we could go to -- I want to -- yesterday you were shown a
19 document by the Prosecutor, and the document that you were shown, and this
20 would be in their binder but this was 7372, but the essence of it is, the
21 essence of it is that -- that you had put down that Boban had stated that,
22 "If the Muslims and Serbs did not accept the union of republics then CRHB
23 would join Croatia." Remember you saying that, that he was up there on
24 his feet making an impassioned plea, this is -- the document is dated 29
25 December 1993. Do you recall that?
1 A. Yes, I do. I have the document in front of me.
2 Q. Okay. Now, first of all, I -- I haven't come across any document
3 where Dr. Jadranko Prlic ever made any statements of that sort.
4 A. No, I have not.
5 Q. And I take it since I haven't come across any documents, it's
6 because he never made any such statements.
7 A. No, he did once make a statement which I wasn't able to draw a
8 clear conclusion of, but he said some -- if they failed, then we are clear
9 about what we are going to do.
10 Q. Okay. Now, I want to share with you the following day, 30th
11 December 1993, and this is 7405. This is a document that was again show
12 to you, and I take it my good friend on the other side simply was in a
13 rush to get through his -- his case and failed to bring this out but in
14 fairness, in context, I think we should. If we look at the it second
15 paragraph under the Political section on page 1.
16 A. I have the document.
17 Q. Okay. And this is -- again, this is an ECMM document; correct?
18 A. That's correct. I wrote it.
19 Q. You wrote it. Okay. Now, here in the middle of the paragraph you
20 say: "With reference to the CRHB Assembly of yesterday, Markovic said the
21 prospect of CRHB joining Croatia in the event of Serbs or Muslims not
22 accepting a union of republics was not a policy decision of the Assembly."
23 "Was not a policy decision of the Assembly." So here you have a
24 different position taken by Mr. Markovic; correct?
25 A. You do. It would suggest that the decision would not be with the
1 Assembly; it would be elsewhere.
2 Q. Well, that's one way of looking at it. The other way of looking
3 at it is, Boban was merely speaking.
4 A. That would be an alternative perspective.
5 Q. Okay. That's what I'm looking at for fairness, objectively. So
6 also give me the alternative plausible explanation that I'm due, as
7 opposed to giving me one version which, with all due respect, is just one
8 version, one side of the coin. There's another side to that coin, but,
9 very well, we can move on to the next issue.
10 A. I would hope that you would see from the two reports that I do
11 give both those perspectives.
12 Q. I understand that but that wasn't drawn out yesterday. That's why
13 I'm bringing it to everyone's attention and to Their Honours, because I
14 suspect that there was a reason why the Prosecution highlighted Boban and
15 omitted Markovic. Of course, that may be for closing argument. Who
17 Okay. If we go on to the next section, and this deals with
18 refugees. I want to focus your attention just very briefly to one
19 document, and it's a Prosecution document. It's P 05960. 5960. And
20 hopefully you can find it with ease.
21 In this particular document, we see --
22 A. No. For some reason I don't have 60.
23 Q. Perhaps it will be in mine. If not -- it's in my binder, even
24 though -- see, I -- apparently this was a document that was -- been
25 introduced through other witnesses. I apologise --
1 A. I have the document.
2 Q. Okay. I'm not trying to confuse you. It says here at the very
3 first -- this was generated on 26 October 1993, if we look at the third
4 page. And if we go back to the first page, it's a report from the trip to
5 Istria in connection to the escort and accommodation of the Croats from
6 Central Bosnia, Kakanj, and Zenica.
7 Now, it says here: "On 20 October 1993 there arrived in Stolac an
8 organised convoy transporting about 6.000 displaced Croats from Kakanj and
9 Zenica who had been temporarily accommodated in Vares." Were you aware of
10 that sir, more or less?
11 A. More or less, yes.
12 Q. We're going to skip and I want to go to the next paragraph, but I
13 wanted to ask you, do you know -- did you know at the time what the
14 military age was?
15 A. The military age?
16 Q. Yeah, for people to serve. You know, the --
17 A. No, I would be guessing it would be 17, but that is a guess.
18 Q. Until what age?
19 A. Until I don't know.
20 Q. Okay. Would it surprise you that it would have been 60 or 65?
21 A. I was going to say late 50s but, again, it would have been a
23 Q. It could have been as young as 16, depending on where you were,
24 but we're talking the range. That was the range. And were you also aware
25 at the time that everybody was mobilised on all three sides, Serbs,
1 Croats, Muslims?
2 A. Yes, I was.
3 Q. Okay. And so that might account for somebody who's being of
4 military age, a male of military age why perhaps those individuals
5 might -- might be of specific significance.
6 A. Yes, they certainly were.
7 Q. Okay. Because obviously if you're in the middle of a war, you
8 want your military-aged men to be fighting or engaged in civil protection
9 matters; correct?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. And, of course, were you also aware that this was compulsory? In
12 other words, you couldn't just pass? There were no conscientious
13 objectives, you know, in the sense that, you know, you'll pass out this
15 A. Yeah, I was aware that there wasn't much individual discretion
17 Q. Okay.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Now, if we go to the next paragraph, Your Honours.
19 "After the men liable for military service were removed from the vehicles
20 and the vehicles were filled with fuel in Celjevo, and after lists of
21 1.500 displaced persons were created at the border crossing Doljani and
22 Metkovic, we headed as part of the convoy towards Ploce ... two ships
23 (Istra and Liburnija)," I guess I'm killing the name, but, "were waiting
24 to be boarded."
25 Q. Now, couple of questions. Here we can see that at least the men
1 of military age, albeit they are being -- they are being displaced from
2 another part, are being separated presumably so they can continue to serve
3 their military duties; correct?
4 A. Yes, you could draw that conclusion.
5 Q. All right. Can we also draw this conclusion, and this may be
6 helpful to our Trial Bench, that those displaced persons now, the
7 remaining displaced persons, are being taken to Croatia and not being
8 repopulated in areas in Herzegovina because they wanted -- this was some
9 sort of a population engineering process, if I could put it in those
11 A. That's the indication from this particular destination of the
12 displaced persons separated, but I visited camps in --
13 Q. [Overlapping speakers] I understand that you visited camps --
14 A. [Overlapping speakers] -- to try --
15 Q. [Overlapping speakers] But I --
16 A. [Overlapping speakers] Yeah, you're right in this case.
17 Q. And I'm also right, am I not, that the picture is rather
19 JUDGE PRANDLER: I really cannot stand any more. Please slow
20 down. Don't torture the interpreters.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Sorry, Your Honour.
22 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Give me time. Give me a lever and I'll move the
24 world, as Archimedes said, but without that time, without that lever ...
25 Q. Okay. Now, and if we go very briefly to the third page, just very
1 briefly, in the middle of the page there's the second paragraph. It talks
2 about the 25th October 1993, and we see some figures there. It says, "We
3 return from, I dare say, a job very well done. This part of the
4 evacuation, reception, and accommodation of the displaced Croats from
5 Kakanj and Zenica was conducted on a high level. We agreed with the most
6 responsible people from the RH government on the dynamism and location of
7 the new 3.000 displaced Croats from the Central Bosnia while the first
8 group of 600 displaced Croats from Kakanj will be received and
9 accommodated in the Klana barracks near Rijeka which was renovated by the
10 Italian government."
11 Were you aware of that, sir?
12 A. No, I wasn't aware of that.
13 Q. Okay f we go to the next document, and this is a P document, so
14 that would be in your Prosecution binder, and this is 7286, but the point
15 that I was trying -- while you're looking for that --
16 MR. KARNAVAS: The point for Their Honours is that here we have
17 proof that Croats were being displace the are being taken to Croatia.
18 Q. Now, yesterday you were shown this document 7286, and you were
19 focused on one part on the front page in the Political section, and when
20 came to one sentence which I thought you might even want to go in and
21 comment on, because I -- I knew that my friend probably had no interest in
22 it, you didn't, so I'm having to spend some time on this.
23 Third paragraph, last sentence. It says: "The difficulties for
24 BiH are magnified due to many Muslim POWs choosing to go abroad rather
25 than return to BiH territory."
1 Okay? So this whole paragraph talks about the exchange problems
2 and the difficulties between civilians and soldiers, but here we have
3 somebody commenting, I don't know if you wrote this, 21 December 1993.
4 A. I wrote the report.
5 Q. Okay?
6 A. This is Mike 3, so it wasn't me who met them.
7 Q. Do you know what he means by that?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Or what he meant by that?
10 A. You're referring to the third paragraph. Sorry, I just wanted to
11 be clear.
12 Q. [Microphone not activated]
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
14 MR. KARNAVAS:
15 Q. I'm referring to the third paragraph and I'm referring to the last
16 sentence, the sentence which was not read with the rest of the paragraph
17 yesterday when this was pointed out to you and which I think might be of
18 interest. Could you explain to us what you meant when you wrote: "The
19 difficulties for BiH are magnified due to many Muslim POWs choosing to go
20 abroad rather than return to BiH territory," keeping in mind my earlier
21 question having to do with military-age men, compulsory service, and so on
22 and so forth. I think you get my drift?
23 A. I do, and I'm quite clear what I mean here. It was an issue that
24 when there were releases of prisoners, the Muslims very much wanted the
25 prisoners coming out of the camps to come into BiH territory. I think it
1 sent -- for them they told us that it sent very bad signals when people
2 released didn't want to come back and defend and fight for them but wanted
3 to go elsewhere, and that's what I meant by this.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
5 MR. KARNAVAS:
6 Q. My very last topic, sir, has to do with your comments with respect
7 to Anto Valenta. First and foremost, let's get this out of the way, you
8 never heard my client talk about population exchanges?
9 A. No, I did not.
10 Q. Okay and you never heard my client, and I didn't see anywhere in
11 the documents that you or anyone generated, that Dr. Jadranko Prlic ever
12 said that he subscribed to anything that might have been expressed or
13 written by Mr. Valenta?
14 A. No. Mr. Valenta --
15 Q. Okay?
16 A. -- was his deputy at one stage.
17 Q. I understand that, but here we're going to go into -- I just
18 wanted to get that out of the way first and you did not hear Dr. Jadranko
19 Prlic ever say that this was a policy, Anto Valenta's thoughts,
20 philosophy, be it whatever they were, was a policy that had been set in
22 A. No, I did not. As I said yesterday, Dr. Prlic was a -- very
23 practical, pragmatic, and not an ideologue. I never heard him discussing
24 those terms.
25 Q. Okay all right now very quickly and I think this is important for
1 Their Honours, we're going to have the whole book translated, we're going
2 to ask for it to be translated, but, first, let me ask you some
3 preparatory questions did you ever read the book "yes," "no," "I don't
4 recall." The answer is no?
5 A. Which took sorry.
6 Q. His book Anto Valenta's book?
7 A. No, I did not read that book.
8 Q. Okay did you ever have anybody read it to you?
9 A. Good grief, no.
10 Q. Okay I see now before we go into that some -- you know, have you
11 ever heard of the Islamic Declaration that was written by Mr. Izetbegovic?
12 A. I have heard it -- of it, but I have not read it.
13 Q. Okay. Now, some would say that Mr. Izetbegovic was trying to
14 create sort of an Afghanistan a la Taliban in Europe based on what he
15 wrote. Now, setting aside what his political philosophies were, do you
16 think it would be helpful for -- one, for a person drawing a conclusion
17 what if anything Mr. Izetbegovic was promoting in his book, do you think
18 it might have been helpful for them to at least read it first? "Yes,"
19 "no," "I don't know". As an intellectual.
20 A. I wouldn't describe myself as intellectual. Yeah, it would be
21 helpful, I think.
22 Q. Okay all right and, of course, you've heard the old adage, you
23 can't judge a book by its cover; right?
24 A. I have.
25 Q. Okay. Now, if you could look at 1D 01538.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: This is a part that we translated, and we're going
2 to go through this, because I think and I hope that the Trial Chamber will
3 pay close scrutiny and attention to what I'm about to say, because I think
4 there is -- even though this was not a policy, no one was subscribing to
5 it, think we at least owe it to Mr. Valenta to be fair and objective about
6 what it is that he had written.
7 Q. First of all, were you aware that the book was written in 1991
8 before the war? Yes or no?
9 A. I knew it was written before the war. I didn't know 1991.
10 Q. All right. Now, on the very first page, which wasn't translated,
11 at the very bottom it says: "On the basis of the decision of the Ministry
12 of Education, Science, Culture and Physical Culture ..." The very first
13 page of our version, 1D 01538. There is no need to be turning pages. It
14 should be on the very first page, sir. Here, I have an extra copy.
15 Madam Usher. I'm running out of time, that's why.
16 A. I don't think I need an extra copy. I just need to be orientated
17 to --
18 Q. Just look at the first stage.
19 A. I just need --
20 Q. First page, bottom, we're going to go through the Prosecution's as
21 well, but this wasn't translated. "On the basis of the decision of the
22 Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Physical Culture - Sarajevo,
23 number 02-413-150, dated 22 August 1991, exempt from paying the sales
25 Question: Were you aware, sir, that there was a law in Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina at the time, that certain texts that were purported to be of a
2 scientific nature or for educational purposes were exempt from taxes, and
3 this book indeed was, at least, exempted from taxes based on a decision
4 made by the Ministry of Education of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Were you aware
5 of that, "yes," "no," "I don't know"?
6 A. I was not aware.
7 Q. Okay. Now, if we -- if I could go to the last -- when -- you were
8 shown photo -- or some maps by the Prosecutor, and you were shown one
9 particular map with all these arrows going from here to there. Did you by
10 any chance look at all the other maps that were in the book to see where
11 they came from and who might have generated those particular maps?
12 A. No, I did not.
13 Q. Okay. Did you by any chance look at the book, in the back of the
14 book, to see where the footnotes -- the references to the footnotes, to
15 see who, if anyone, Mr. Valenta was quoting or was referencing his
16 comments to?
17 A. No. I was given a brief by Mr. Valenta who said he'd written a
18 book. I didn't make reference to the book. I listened to the brief and
19 saw the maps that he was illustrating his discussion with.
20 Q. Right. Now, in the book, if you read parts of it, and we don't
21 have time, and I want to save time for my colleagues, it is very clear
22 that the book was written at a time prior to the war and as a proposal as
23 one way of preventing a civil war. Were you aware of that?
24 A. No, I was not.
25 Q. Okay. Now, I just want to direct your attention -- you can look
1 at the Prosecution's version which is P 00021, and I just want to read one
2 excerpt, which is why I began questioning you about not judging a book by
3 its cover, and which is why I made the comments about Mr. Izetbegovic, and
4 I wasn't subscribing to those views that others may hold about whether he
5 was in his -- a fanatic trying to establish an Afghanistan of a Taliban
6 nature in Bosnia. I was just merely making the point.
7 A. I have the document.
8 Q. If you look at page 20. At the very top it says page 60. But at
9 the bottom it says page 20 and it has the other numbers 00311591?
10 A. Yes, I have that.
11 Q. And it says here, "I know after the book is published these
12 speculations will be manipulated in a certain way because the theme is
13 unpopular." The theme of the book that is. "The loudest ones will be
14 those who do not read the whole book. I did not want to withhold the idea
15 from a well-intentioned reader that, if necessary, human and civilised
16 resettlement is possible and of mutual interest."
17 Now, two points. In history, we've had legalised resettlements,
18 have we not?
19 A. We certainly have.
20 Q. And the Treaty of Lausanne, where Greeks were driven from their
21 homes in Asia minor and Turks from Greece went to Turkey, right?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. Okay.
24 A. India and Pakistan --
25 Q. India and Pakistan, and you can go on. So there is this concept.
1 But going to the first part, do you think that -- do you allow the
2 possibility that perhaps you might come to a different conclusion about
3 Mr. Valenta and what Mr. Valenta was promoting in his book as an
4 alternative plausible solution to it a civil war which ultimately
5 occurred, do you think at least you owed it to him to first read the book
6 before outright dismissing him as a quack.
7 A. I haven't used those terms it.
8 Q. I know you haven't.
9 A. What I would like to do, sir, i to just give you the context in
10 which I heard this lecture.
11 Q. No, no, no, I'm not -- I'm not asking you about the lecture. I
12 want you to answer my question, and my question is: Did you read the
13 book? And the answer was no. If --
14 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, if I can object.
15 MR. KARNAVAS: If I can finish my question.
16 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, I would like to object first because the
17 way in which the question is being formulated is improper.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: [Microphone not activated]
19 MR. KRUGER: [Overlapping speakers] The witness does not use words
20 like Mr. Valenta is a quack.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll reformulate. I'll reformulate.
22 Q. You said he went into one of his exposes says?
23 A. Yes, in a building --
24 Q. [Overlapping speakers] No, no --
25 A. [Overlapping speakers] -- at a time when I am witnessing some
1 extremely interesting and --
2 Q. Sir.
3 A. [Overlapping speakers] -- very challenging times for --
4 Q. Yeah.
5 A. [Overlapping speakers] -- members of the Croat community --
6 Q. Very well.
7 A. And that's the context in which I form my opinion of a person
8 articulating these views at a time when I am seeing and witnessing
9 movements of people. So --
10 Q. Sir.
11 A. -- it isn't the cold, quiet reading of a book in a library. It
12 is the context in which I judge Mr. Valenta is important to understand the
13 conclusions I draw.
14 Q. Okay. Anything else about that? You've said that.
15 A. Not at this --
16 Q. [Overlapping speakers] Okay. Now --
17 A. [Overlapping speakers] -- stage.
18 Q. -- if you could answer my questions, because I showed you
19 documents there, and we already talked about pockets of isolated Croats
20 who are threatened and have -- in the middle of a war. Some have to
21 leave. Some go to Croatia; correct?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. Okay. Now, I'm going -- the reason I'm going to this particular
24 book is because this book was introduced by that gentleman, not me, and my
25 question is, when they pointed to a map to you, they didn't point to the
1 other maps, and you haven't bothered to read the whole book, do you think
2 that perhaps before formulating an opinion on what is in the book you
3 should have at least first read it or have it read to you? Do you think
4 that as a very minimum? Yes or no?
5 A. I formulated my opinion on a lecture --
6 Q. [Overlapping speakers] No, no, I'm asking you about --
7 A. [Overlapping speakers] -- of which the book was one of the
8 documents proposed. I have not read the book. I've answered that
9 clearly. My opinion was formed by the lecture which Mr. Anto Valenta gave
10 me --
11 Q. [Overlapping speakers] Sir, I don't want to --
12 A. [Overlapping speakers] -- in which he showed me those maps.
13 Q. Okay, now, could you answer my question? That's why I asked you
14 if you ad anything else to supplement. See, I'm fair to you. I want you
15 to be fair to the Judges, because we have precious time. Do you think you
16 should have read the book before commenting on the book that was shown to
17 you, because that's what you did when you were commenting to that
18 gentleman's question as he was pointing that out to you?
19 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, I object.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Kruger.
21 MR. KRUGER: The Prosecution never requested the witness to
22 comment on the contents of the book. Simply, the maps were shown or the
23 maps on page 43 and page 66 were shown to the witness, and with a
24 question, were these the maps or were these of the maps that you were
25 shown. That was all. He was not requested to comment on the contents of
1 the book. Thank you, Your Honour.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, obviously the witness doesn't wish to
3 cooperate here and so therefore there is no need --
4 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, I'm going to object at this point
5 too, because this is ridiculous. Mr. Karnavas has completely
6 mischaracterised the witness's testimony on this point.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: [Overlapping speakers]
8 MR. SCOTT: [Overlapping speakers] What he's saying is, it's
9 not --
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas Mr. Karnavas.
11 MR. SCOTT: I would like to finish my objection. The witness is
12 not being treated fairly on this. The witness's testimony quite clearly
13 was that he had a meeting with Mr. Valenta. During the meeting with Mr.
14 Valenta, Mr. Valenta stated certain views and talked to-- had a
15 conversation with the witness, which the witness has related to us. The
16 witness never purported at any time, either on direct examination or on
17 examination, cross-examination, that he had read the book; never said
18 that, in fact, plainly to the contrary. In the course of the discussion
19 and meeting with Mr. Valenta, the witness said he had seen -- that
20 Mr. Valenta had shown him certain maps as -- simply as a vehicle to ask
21 the witness if the kind of maps in the back of his book were the kind of
22 maps that were shown to him during this meeting. The witness confirmed
23 those were the sort of maps, with arrows and big movements, that were
24 shown to him.
25 Now, that's the full scope of the witness's testimony on his
1 meeting with Mr. Valenta. He didn't express a view on Mr. Valenta or
2 Mr. Valenta's book. So all this character -- mischaracterisation and
3 misstatement of the record by Mr. Karnavas is completely improper and not
4 fair to the witness.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, we have to finish,
9 because it's time.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, if I may with one question.
11 Q. You were shown a map that was on page 43. It was map 17. Do you
12 recall being shown that map by Mr. Kruger?
13 A. Yes, I have that map in front of me.
14 Q. Now, do you know who generated that map or where that map came
16 A. No, I do not.
17 Q. Would it surprise you to -- to find out that everything that is in
18 the books, all -- with the exception of the maps that Mr. Valenta draws
19 himself, the other maps, come from open sources and this particular map
20 comes from a Muslim source? Would that surprise you?
21 A. I didn't know that and, yes, it is a little bit surprising.
22 Q. Well, it's surprising that you didn't read the book before forming
23 an opinion. Thank you.
24 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm told that I need to go to footnote 59.
25 Q. Look at 1D 01538. This is the footnote that is accompanying the
1 text right after -- right before we see the map. This is the source.
2 It's -- did you ever hear of this text, Bosanski Pogledi?
3 A. I don't see that but I don't recognise it on the screen either.
4 Q. Do you see the date? It's on footnote 59, sir. If you look at my
5 text, what I copied, 1D 01538.
6 A. I'm looking at that document now.
7 Q. If you look at the back, you'll see we've listed, we had it typed
8 out or printed out, and this is a publication, a periodical, that's
9 published, I'm told, by Zulfikarpasic, who is a renowned Bosnian
10 intellectual who is currently living in Sarajevo. And also look at
11 footnote 35. Were you aware of these publications, sir?
12 A. No, I was not aware of these publications.
13 Q. Okay. Because if you look at -- if you look at source 35, for
14 instance, maps of 15, 16, and 17, these were the maps that were -- some
15 that were in the book, they come from this particular source, and if you
16 look at the table of contents you will see where the sources -- what
17 sources Mr. Valenta is relying on.
18 A. I see that.
19 Q. Okay. I have no further questions. Thank you very much, sir.
20 A. Thank you very much.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are going to have a 20-minute
22 break we will reconvene in 20 minutes.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. During the break I have
1 been informed of the time used and left. The Petkovic Defence has one
2 hour and 50 minutes left. The Coric Defence has 20 minutes left. The
3 Pusic Defence has 25 minutes. The Praljak Defence one hour and a half,
4 and the Stojic Defence 40 minutes.
5 Who is going to start for the Defence?
6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.
7 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:
8 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Watkins, good day.
9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] And good day to my learned friends
10 and everyone in the courtroom.
11 Your Honours, I wish to say at the outset that the time that you
12 have given to General Petkovic is more than sufficient for us, and
13 according to my plan, we will give some of our time to the Defence of
14 General Praljak. I hope that I will be able to clarify certain points
15 with Mr. -- with the witness in about half an hour.
16 Q. Mr. Watkins, I would like us to clarify part of a Prosecution
17 document that you commented on. That is P 06303 in the Prosecutor's set
18 of documents. That is daily summary for the 31st of October, where there
19 is reference to a meeting with Mr. Prlic, and his words concerning Stupni
20 Do are conveyed, that General Petkovic, the Chief of Staff of the HVO,
21 stated that he had removed all the local commanders and that an
22 investigation had been started.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The year was 1993.
24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. That is all I have to say about the document. Let us now try to
1 analyse this statement by Mr. Jadranko Prlic -- or, rather, the part of
2 the document quoting his words.
3 First of all, let us see whether in October 1993 General Petkovic
4 was actually the Chief of Staff of the HVO as mentioned in this document.
5 Mr. Watkins, you told us that you had spoken to General Praljak in
6 August 1993, and that he had told you that he, Praljak, was the commander
7 of the HVO. Is this correct?
8 A. This is correct. He said he was the Supreme Commander of the HVO,
9 and added that General Petkovic was the Chief of Staff.
10 Q. You also told us, Mr. Watkins, that in November there was a change
11 at the head of the HVO and that General Praljak was replaced by
12 General Roso. Is that correct?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. Would it be correct to conclude from this that at the end of
15 October 1993, General Petkovic was not at the head of the HVO but that,
16 rather, it was General Praljak who was at the head of the HVO at that
18 A. This was our understanding. You'll remember on Monday we were
19 discussing trying to find out who was in command and when, but that is my
20 understanding, yes.
21 Q. Very well. In my set of documents, which is before you on the
22 desk, could you please look at P 06091.
23 A. I have the document.
24 Q. The date is the 25th of October, 1993, the Srednja Bosna military
25 district in Vares. It is delivered by Brigadier Zarko Tole, as one can
1 see at the bottom of the document, and he is said to be the chief of the
2 Main Staff of Herceg-Bosna. So on the basis of this, we can conclude that
3 the chief of the Main Staff was Brigadier Zarko Tole. Can we agree on
4 this fact?
5 A. I do recall a document on Monday where I went to Citluk to the
6 headquarters and I met Brigadier Tole, and certainly in my mind there
7 was -- it was unclear as to the exact order of command. From what you're
8 saying here in terms of this document, it would suggest that
9 Brigadier Tole on the 25th of October was the Chief of Staff, but it
10 appears that General -- sorry, Jadranko Prlic told me that it was Petkovic
11 who was dealing with the issue of Stupni Do.
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Ms. Alaburic, could you perhaps explain to us
13 what the letters OZ and GS which are -- figure before the word "Main
14 Staff" signify?
15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. These are
16 abbreviations for Main Staff of the armed forces of the Croatian Republic
17 of Herceg-Bosna. The army of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina bore this
18 official title, armed forces, and this is pursuant to the decree
19 establishing this body, but many documents use the abbreviation HVO to
20 refer to the same body.
21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] You're very welcome.
23 Q. I would now like us to see whether anyone in the Main Staff,
24 whether the Chief of Staff or the commander, had the authority to replace
25 or dismiss any commander, and this has to do with what you quote as
1 Mr. Prlic's words that General Petkovic said he had removed all the local
2 commanders. So could you look at 4D 00521, which is a decree on the armed
3 forces of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, the consolidated text
4 from November 1993, and please look at Article 34. The Chamber is
5 familiar with this article, so while you are serving for it, I will say
6 that according to this decree commanders in the armed forces were
7 appointed or dismissed or relieved first by the president of the Croatian
8 Community of Herceg-Bosna, referring to brigade commanders and
9 higher-ranking officers, while other officers, lower at -- lower-level
10 officers, non-commissioned officers, and others, were appointed and
11 relieved by the head of the defence department.
12 Mr. Watkins, were you familiar with the rules and regulations
13 governing appointments in the armed forces of Herceg-Bosna?
14 A. No, I wasn't aware of these articles.
15 Q. Could we conclude -- based on this article, and no other article
16 of this decree refers to appointing and relieving commanders, so could we
17 conclude that nobody in the Main Staff was able to appoint or relieve
19 MR. SCOTT: Back to speculation, Your Honour, and I'm just
20 concerned that we're going down a road where we're going to have just a
21 series of reading documents to the witness, and we're back to, did I read
22 the document correctly. So unless there is some foundation for how this
23 witness can express a view on these matters, I think -- I think we're
24 wasting -- we'll be wasting a lot of time. But beyond -- my initial
25 objection is, this is purely speculative and goes beyond the face of the
1 document to ask this witness whether anyone else on the Main Staff could
2 take any sort of action, to expect any sort of discipline in the HVO.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I do not share your view on that
4 point, Mr. Scott. Here we have a document produced by the witness stating
5 that Mr. Prlic told him that General Petkovic had removed a number of
6 officers. The Defence, using Article 4 -- 34, on the basis of Article 34
7 states that the head of the Main Staff did not have the power to remove
8 anyone. It's the heart of the matter, really.
9 If I was conducting the proceedings, I would have put the question
10 in a different way. So what really matters here is the way the question
11 has been put. You should ask the witness whether what he wrote is not in
12 contradiction with the applicable law, and then you should move on to
13 something else.
14 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you for this suggestion,
15 Your Honour. I fully accept it.
16 Q. Could the witness then ask the question is asked by His Honour
17 Judge Antonetti as if I had put it. In other words, from this article
18 that you have just read in this decree, does it follow that what Mr.
19 Jadranko Prlic is said to have said here does not correspond to the
20 legislation then in force?
21 A. I believe, reading this quickly, that it would correspond, and if
22 I could just note that the second sentence of Article 34 says:
23 "Commanders of brigades and high-ranking officers shall be appointed or
24 replaced by the head of the Defence Department or by commanders appointed
25 by him."
1 I understand that the individuals involved in Vares was Ivica
2 Rajic, who was a brigade commander. I would suggest that from this second
3 sentence that the commander appointed by the defence department could
4 remove a brigade-level commander.
5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, for the third time now
6 when analysing this article, we have a problem with the way it has been
7 edited. Without going into an in-depth analysis, I wish to point out that
8 the president of the HZ HB appoints commanders of brigades and
9 high-ranking officers, while all lower-level officers are appointed by the
10 defence department or by commanders appointed by him. So the problem is
11 in the way this article has been edited.
12 Q. Witness, in any case does it follow from this article that the
13 Main Staff would be authorised to appoint or relieve any military
15 A. My interpretation of the text in front of me here is that, yes,
16 and commander appointed by the head of the defence department could remove
17 a brigade-level commander. That's all I can see. My interpretation is,
18 yes, that they could, and that would be standard -- well, it wouldn't be
19 inconsistent with other military structures that I'm aware of.
20 Q. Witness, does this article give the Main Staff any kind of
22 A. Yes, it does.
23 Q. Tell me, where is the Main Staff mentioned here? We are referring
24 to the Main Staff of the armed forces of the Croatian Community of
25 Herceg-Bosna. So tell me, where is the Main Staff mentioned here?
1 A. The commanders of the staff are not mentioned here. It is the
2 commanders of the brigades, and the ability of a commander of the brigade
3 to be appointed by another commander who has been appointed by the head of
4 the defence department. I can only interpret what I'm reading here, and
5 I've not seen this before, as I've said.
6 To me, this document would allow General Petkovic or Tole or
7 Praljak to remove a brigade commander.
8 Q. Witness, I don't have time to go into a detailed analysis with you
9 now, but please tell me, in spite of the fact that you are erroneously
10 applying to the head of the defence department, these authorities, would
11 the Main Staff solely on the basis of this decree, without receiving any
12 authorisation from the defence department be able to do this?
13 A. My interpretation is, yes, they would.
14 Q. Without the authority of the head of the defence department?
15 A. There may be something lost in translation. I'm reading an
16 English version, and all I can say is that the second sentence to me reads
17 very clearly, that, "a commander of a brigade and high-ranking officers
18 shall be appointed or replaced by the head of the Defence Department ..."
19 The question you're asking is for me to stop reading at that point. If I
20 didn't read the next few words, I would agree with you. But the next few
21 words say: " ... or by commanders appointed by him." So he has delegated
22 that authority to commanders appointed by him, is the way that I would
23 interpret this. I can offer nothing else.
24 Q. Witness, it really is a mistranslation, so I will not dwell on
25 this. We will clarify certain points using other documents.
1 Please look at document P 00280. This is an order issued by Mate
2 Boban, dated the 27th of July --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Of June, interpreter's correction.
4 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Colonel Tihomir Blaskic. This is a commander, whom you referred
6 to as the commander of the Central Bosna area. Is that correct? The year
7 is 1992?
8 A. Yes, he was commander of operative zone middle Bosna, above a
9 brigade level.
10 Q. You explained that communication in Central Bosnia was very
11 difficult because there were certain pockets controlled by the HVO, and
12 communication between those pockets as well as communication with the Main
13 Staff and the Supreme Commander was very difficult. Is this correct?
14 A. Yes, that is correct.
15 Q. Mr. Watkins, did you know that precisely for this reason
16 Mr. Tihomir Blaskic had far greater powers compared to commanders of other
17 operative zones?
18 A. No, I was not aware that he had any extra or additional powers.
19 Q. Please look at the document we have just opened, P 00280, and look
20 at paragraph 2, which says: "The main commander appoints the commander of
21 the sector of HVO Central Bosnia, and is fully responsible for full
23 Did you know that Mr. Tihomir Blaskic was authorised to appoint
24 and relieve all commanders of military units in the Central Bosna area?
25 A. I wasn't aware of that in legal terms, but it wouldn't surprise me
1 that he had that capability.
2 Q. Let's now look for the sake of illustration documents P 00765 --
3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I just probe a bit into this?
4 Mr. Witness, the decree which we had seen before, could you give
5 us the date of that decree? It was 00521, 4D 00521.
6 THE WITNESS: Sir, at the top of the document it says 17 October
8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. And when -- what's the date of the
9 order we are looking at now, 00280?
10 THE WITNESS: That order, sir, is the 27th of June, 1992.
11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: And do you know what kind of a degree, with what
12 rules applied at that time to the nomination or dismissal of commanders?
13 THE WITNESS: No, sir, I do not.
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I may, just a brief
16 point of clarification. The decree I showed, which was published in
17 October 1992, is the consolidated text, which means that there was a piece
18 of legislation that had been enacted earlier. It was modified in the
19 meantime, and then the modifications have been entered into the text,
20 which then becomes the consolidated text. I didn't want to put to the
21 witness this whole sequence of documents, but the decree was actually
22 enacted in June 1992, so that between this order issued by Mr. Boban and
23 the structure of Herceg-Bosna, there is no inconsistency.
24 Q. Witness, we are now dealing with document P 00765, from which it
25 can be seen that it is an order issued by Tihomir Blaskic as the commander
1 of the Central Bosnia operative zone, and he's appointing the commander of
2 the Bobovac Brigade, and he is appointing Mr. Emil Harah. This documents
3 shows that Mr. Tihomir Blaskic was in fact authorised to appoint brigade
4 commanders in his area and that he actually did so. Is this correct,
6 A. Yes. The document would suggest that.
7 Q. Very well. Let's see whether this was the case later on when this
8 conversation with Mr. Prlic took place. Let's look at document P 06000.
9 This is an appointment dated the 22nd of October, 1993. Colonel Tihomir
10 Blaskic is appointing the brigade commander of the Ban Josip Jelacic
11 Brigade in Kiseljak, and the person appointed is Mario Bradara.
12 Can we agree, Mr. Watkins, that Mr. Tihomir Blaskic was equally
13 authorised in October to appoint and relieve the commanders of military
14 units in the Central Bosnia area?
15 A. I hesitate for just one reason. It -- I just want to be clear on
16 the date of this document. It's the -- yeah. Sorry. Yes, this would
17 appear to suggest that.
18 I -- could I just make a point, sir? I'm little concerned or
19 unsure and it refers to an earlier document. I'm not sure I'm able to do
20 this under document 280 to which I was earlier referred, it says that --
21 am I allowed to -- can I carry on? 280. We have a document dated,
22 "Grude, 27th of June, 1992." And yet the name at the bottom is General
23 Anto Roso, and I was unaware of his presence in 1992. I just don't
24 understand that. That's the only thing I mention about that document.
25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Witness, were you in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992?
2 A. No, I wasn't.
3 Q. So you have no reason to doubt that Mr. Roso was there in
5 A. I simply don't know. I was just trying to understand.
6 Q. Very well. Let's look at P 06000. In the left lower part one can
7 see that Colonel Tihomir Blaskic only delivered this document as
8 information to the Main Staff of the armed forces of the Croatian
9 Community of Herceg-Bosna; is that correct?
10 A. That appears to be correct, yes.
11 Q. Let's look at the introductory part, which is the same as the one
12 in the order of 1992. Does Tihomir Blaskic refer to the decree on the
13 armed forces and the authority of the Supreme Commander? And the date
14 he refers to is the 27th of June, 1992. We can look at this document,
15 and you will see that this is document number 396/93 of the 27th of
16 June, 1992, which is the document we have just seen, P 00280. Is this
18 A. Yes, that reference is made.
19 Q. Tell us, Witness, did you ever have any knowledge, did you ever
20 see any document authorising someone, or a document in which somebody else
21 apart from Tihomir Blaskic appointed or relieved any commander of any
22 military units in the Central Bosnia area from June 1992 until the
23 Washington Accords when Mr. -- or, rather, during the period when
24 Mr. Tihomir Blaskic was the commander there?
25 A. I did not see any documents.
1 Q. Thank you. Thank you. The third part of Mr. Jadranko Prlic's
2 statement, if it is correctly conveyed here, says that an investigation
3 had been instituted as regards the events in Stupni Do. So let's look at
4 a few documents together. 4D 00500. This is a document issued by the
5 deputy military prosecutor of the -- it's dated the 28th of June, 1993.
6 That is five days after Stupni Do, and it asks the HVO Bobovac Brigade for
7 certain information as to whether any crimes had been committed in the
8 municipalities of Vares and Kakanj.
9 Mr. Watkins, did you have any knowledge about the role of the
10 military prosecutor's office as regards the gathering of information
11 relative for criminal proceedings and the instituting charges against
12 persons accused of war crimes and other crimes?
13 A. No, I was not. I was merely reporting that an investigation was
14 under way.
15 Q. Let us look at all the dimensions of that investigation and
16 attempts made by the organs of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna to
17 have something done about it. Look at document P 06842 next, please.
18 It's a letter by the head of the president's office, Mr. Vladislav
19 Pogarcic to the Ministry of Defence and Mr. Perica Jukic.
20 Mr. Watkins, if I understood you correctly in your testimony, you
21 knew both Vladislav Pogarcic and Minister Perica Jukic; is that right?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. From this letter we can see that the -- that President Boban's
24 office is asking the minister of defence to supply a detailed report about
25 the events in Stupni Do, and in the passages to follow they say what
1 information they want, the names, surnames, the suspects, the fact that
2 the Geneva Conventions might have been violated, et cetera, et cetera. So
3 from this letter, would it emerge from that the presidential office and
4 the ministry of defence were included in the attempts made to establish
5 the truth about the events in Stupni Do and to unleash proceedings to find
6 the perpetrators of these crimes?
7 A. Yes, that's correct. Both the Presidency and the Ministry of
9 Q. Let us now look at another document. 4D 00506 is the number. And
10 the Trial Chamber has already seen this document, but I think it would be
11 a good idea to hear your opinion and to hear whether you knew of attempts
12 made by Perica Jukic, the Defence Minister, with the assistance of
13 UNPROFOR, to all the information supplied about individuals who were
14 suspects, who were suspected of having perpetrated the crime in Stupni Do.
15 And you can see the names here which are listed, Ilijasevic, Ljoljo,
16 Rajic, Bakula, et cetera. Now, did you know the attempts made by the top
17 organs of Herceg Bosna to receive information from international
18 organisations and their assistance of uncovering the perpetrators of these
19 unlawful acts or crimes?
20 A. Yes, I was aware.
21 Q. Thank you. One more document about that, please, and it is 4D
22 00499. It is a document from the commander for SIS of the Ban Josip
23 Jelacic Brigade to the district military prosecutor in Travnik. Tell us,
24 please, Mr. Watkins, do you know what SIS stands for? The abbreviation
25 SIS, do you know which service that was? It is the security and
1 information service, in fact. You know what I'm referring to?
2 A. Yes. You answered before you gave me the chance to say the same.
3 It's the intelligence service.
4 Q. Tell me, please, were you aware of the role and tasks of that same
5 service in gathering information relevant to legal proceedings or criminal
6 proceedings to be initiated?
7 A. No, I did not.
8 Q. Very well. They had this task, as does the regular police force
9 with respect to criminal proceedings before civil courts.
10 From this document we can see that the SIS of the Ban Josip
11 Jelacic Brigade is sending to the military prosecutor's office, district
12 military prosecutor's office, people who were suspects up until then of
13 having committed the crime in Stupni Do, and other documents that they
14 considered to be relevant. Now, since you did not know the place and role
15 of the SIS in criminal proceedings before the military prosecutor's
16 office, I'm not going to ask you any special questions with regard to that
17 document --
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just one question from me. I'm
19 having a look at this document, and I can see that there is an attachment
20 to the letter sent to the military prosecutor, the written statement of
21 Marinko Ljoljo and Marinko Jurisic are attached. These may be of
22 interest, and these have not been attached to your document.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, counsel, please. Microphone,
25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have prepared these
1 statements, as well as a document which is the third document mentioned in
2 the first section of this letter; however, I did not expect this witness
3 to know about the details of the investigation conducted so that I did not
4 prepare those documents within my set of documents, because I hadn't
5 intended to present them to this witness, but I'm sure there will be an
6 occasion to do so in due course and we shall be doing that in the
7 proceedings that follow.
8 Q. Tell me, Mr. Watkins, on the basis of these documents, would it be
9 right to conclude, and we've already said this in part, that the president
10 of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, the Ministry of Defence, the
11 military prosecutor's office, the security and information service or
12 intelligence service, were actively included in the gathering of relevant
13 information and in launching criminal proceedings against the perpetrators
14 of these crimes in due course in Stupni Do? Or let me put it this way:
15 Can we take it that that is the investigation you talked about?
16 A. The investigation I talked about was simply referring to the fact
17 that Jadranko Prlic told me General Petkovic was instigating a report.
18 The documents that you've presented to me today show the full panoply and
19 range of people involved with that. All I can say is that Jadranko Prlic
20 told me that General Petkovic was instigating it.
21 Q. May I just draw your attention, at least that is what the B/C/S
22 text says, Mr. Prlic did not tell you that Petkovic had instigated the
23 investigation, but it just says that an investigation was instigated
24 without specifying who. P 0633 -- 03 is the document we're talking about.
25 It doesn't emerge that Petkovic actually instigated the investigation.
1 It's neutral. It doesn't say who. It says it was instigated, and that
2 was not within his remit to do so.
3 A. That is -- that is true. It says that Stupni -- sorry, with
4 regard to Stupni Do, he, and that is Jadranko Prlic, stated that General
5 Petkovic, Chief of Staff, had removed all local commanders, and an
6 investigation was under way. I agree that the -- an investigation could
7 be neutral. It could be other people. But what's clear is
8 General Petkovic removed the commanders. The other bit, I agree, is
9 neutral in the way it's presented.
10 Q. Tell me, please, Mr. Watkins, if General Praljak was the commander
11 of the armed forces, and if Mr. Tole was the chief of the Main Staff, what
12 post did General Milivoj Petkovic occupy then?
13 A. Depending exactly on the timings, this is where we were unsure so
14 I'm just reporting obviously at this moment Jadranko Prlic considers that
15 General Petkovic is making the dismissals, and I was unsure, as I've said
16 before, exactly who was in ascendance at any one point. But the fact that
17 I've included after his name General Petkovic Chief of Staff, my
18 understanding on the date that I wrote that report was that that was his
19 key role. As of 31st of October. So General Praljak -- in my mind, on
20 the 31st of October, the order of command was General Praljak, General
22 Q. I see, Mr. Watkins. Thank you for your answers. And now I'd like
23 us to move on to another topic, to talk about Central Bosnia and the war
24 events in Central Bosnia.
25 Now, to start off, let us take a look at a Prosecution documents
1 which is in my set of documents, in my binder. It is P 02750, and it is a
2 document from UNPROFOR in which they assess and analyse the events that
3 took place on the territory of Central Bosnia in mid-June 1993, which is
4 to say the time of your arrival in the area of Travnik, and I assume this
5 will be something you know about.
6 We have read the document extensively in this courtroom, and now
7 I'd like to avoid any repetition and ask you to focus on the addendum, the
8 attachment, which in the English text is on page 10, page 10 of the
9 English. And in the B/C/S it is on page 12. And let us look at the
10 heading: "Military consequences," that passage. And "UNPROFOR assesses
11 that the Muslim community was isolated and it cannot survive on its own,
12 that its energy sources and economic sources have been exhausted, that
13 this has no open routes for passage generally and for the bringing in and
14 taking out of resources and fuel." And I skip a sentence it. It says:
15 "The BH army must seek a solution of its own." And now an important
16 sentence we come to and I'm going to quote that. "It will try and clean
17 up all the communities of Ilidza in the central triangle, Travnik, Vares,
18 and Kiseljak, that triangle." Now I'd like to skip over points 1, 2, and
19 3 or you can read them quickly to yourself, and it goes on to say: "The
20 Muslims have realised that control if routes is a key to solving their
21 problem. They will probably attempt to push south to Prozor from Travnik.
22 They have also realised that control of Jablanica and Konjic is critical."
23 Tell me, please, Mr. Watkins, whether this assessment you consider
24 to be a realistic one, or is your assessment of the events that took place
25 in Central Bosnia in mid-June 1993 different?
1 A. I wouldn't have written it like this. I think I would have a
2 slightly different perspective. There are elements in there I wouldn't
3 disagree with, but just quickly, and you'll appreciate this is the first
4 time I've looked at the document, the Croats in Southern Bosnia and
5 South-central Bosnia will probably become even more hostile towards future
6 Muslim convoys attempting to reach the coast -- I'm sorry, the little bit
7 that you referred to me about pushing south from the pocket, I'm just
8 trying to find that now. If I can refer to your text.
9 "They will continue to push south from Prozor to and from Prozor
10 to Travnik, Jablanica, and central ..." Could you refer where you state
11 that on line 7? Could you point to that in the document for me? It will
12 help me.
13 Q. I apologise. I didn't mention line 7 of the document, and I
14 wasn't able to follow the transcript at the same time so I'm not sure what
15 you're referring to. I didn't mention any line 7. I didn't refer to line
16 7 in those terms. But on page 10 -- Mr. Watkins, can you tell me again
17 what you're actually asking me?
18 A. Yes. On the monitor that I have in front of me, we have your
19 questions and my answers, and on line 7 you are referring to what HVO
20 forces might do, and I'm just saying, could you refer to me in a document
21 where that is.
22 Q. Mr. Watkins, it's not the intentions of the HVO forces but the
23 intentions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army, and on page 10, point 2 of the
24 section titled Military Consequences, A, we read out the introduction, the
25 introductory paragraph.
1 A. [Microphone not activated] I found all the elements that I need.
2 My assessment of what was happening in Central Bosnia with regards
3 to the Muslims wanting to clear out the pockets, I wouldn't agree with
4 that. What they certainly wanted to do was open new routes and we saw
5 evidence of that. They wanted to connect Zenica to Travnik, and we saw
6 them in open conflict with HVO in Travnik where the armija forces were
7 successful. But having pushed them into the pockets, it would have taken
8 an enormous military capability to have beaten the HVO in the Vitez
9 pocket, and equally the HVO in the Vitez pocket, as referred to in this
10 document suggesting that they might push south to Prozor, is a completely
11 unrealistic statement of the capability of the HO -- HVO forces. As I
12 said previously, they had no offensive capability, and what we actually
13 saw in Vitez was them in protective pockets and able to sustain a
14 defensive ring which was being probed all the time, but they didn't have
15 an offensive capability to break out of those pockets and move south. Any
16 connection between Central Bosnian forces and other forces in Herzegovina
17 would have had to come from Herzegovina, and, as indicated before, would
18 need some additional resources beyond that and capability beyond that that
19 we'd seen with the HVO. So I don't think that the HVO assessment is quite
20 right and I don't think that the armija assessment is quite right, but I
21 do understand why they might have written it. That's all I -- yep.
22 Q. I apologise, but I want to draw your attention to the fact that
23 this breakthrough towards the south was assessed as being a BH army plan,
24 but I don't want to dwell on that any more because I don't have enough
25 time, but I have prepared a number of maps to show you, and they give us a
1 visual overview of the situation in Central Bosnia and the south sections
2 to Jablanica and Konjic. So would you now please look at document 4D
3 00561, and it shows the situation in Central Bosnia for March and April
4 1993. And, in April, you were in the Gornji Vakuf area and the
5 surrounding parts. So perhaps you will be familiar with the situation.
6 But tell me this: Did you know that at that time the axis of --
7 attacked by the BH army is was as is indicated on the map and the places
8 of conflict was the areas between Jablanica and -- and Gornji Vakuf and
9 Zenica? I assume being find your way on this map and that I don't need to
10 explain it in any detail. I'd just like to ask you whether that was what
11 the situation was like, to the best of your knowledge, or was it
13 A. This broadly reflects the situation.
14 Q. Let us now take a look at the next document. 4D 00562 is the
15 number. And it shows the situation in June, June 1993. And tell me once
16 again whether this reflects the situation as to the BH army axes and the
17 areas in which the conflict took place, and does it correspond to what you
18 knew about the situation on the ground?
19 A. No. This is not a very good map.
20 Q. What is not good on it, in your opinion?
21 A. It states that in June 1993 there were HVO control up through as
22 far as Bugojno. In fact, it wasn't much beyond Prozor. And if you look
23 at Travnik, we'd had major fighting in Travnik, and a the HVO forces were
24 no longer in Travnik, and so the pocket is very different there. But the
25 arrow which you see coming from Zenica towards Travnik is that very thrust
1 I mentioned earlier, an attempt to connect Zenica to Travnik. So by this
2 time we actually have armija forces controlling Travnik.
3 Q. Tell it us, please, and we're referring to June 1993, whether it
4 is true and correct that it was precisely in that month that the HVO lost
5 control of the area or, rather, that the BH army took control of Bugojno,
6 Travnik, Kakanj.
7 A. Yes, it's true to say that the situation completely changed
8 between the beginning of June and the end of June, and that -- if this
9 date on here was 1 June, I would be less critical of it. If it's 3-0
10 June, it's very inaccurate.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Petkovic.
12 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your
13 permission, I would like to ask the witness something linked to this map.
14 Cross-examination by the Accused Petkovic:
15 Witness, do you know that your superior, Mr. Thebault, on the 10th
16 of June, attended a meeting where I myself and Mr. Delic were?
17 A. I don't know of that meeting, no.
18 Q. Well, I'm surprised, because he was one of the signatories of our
20 Now, do you know that the BH army, up until the 15th of June,
21 completely took control of the Travnik area?
22 A. Yes. That's why I'm saying that this is not a very good map.
23 Q. Witness, here we see the intent. The next map will show you that
24 Travnik was not under HVO control, so this shows, and my counsel showed
25 you, the intentions of the BH army in June, and you confirmed that because
1 it -- the thrust of the attack was from Zenica towards Travnik, and you
2 confirmed that.
3 Now, let me go on to ask you this: If we're looking at June as a
4 whole, then you can't claim that the HVO did not have -- or did not exist
5 in Bugojno. Would that be correct or not? Or, rather, do you know that
6 in June the HVO was still in Bugojno?
7 A. Yes, I do. I met the commanders in there, and I was actually
8 there when the headquarters of the HVO Brigade was evacuated under the
9 fighting and they moved south. I forget the exact dates, but I was
10 actually in the HVO headquarters in Bugojno when it was evacuated. I,
11 with references to other documents, could give you an exact date of that,
12 but ...
13 Q. Witness, you're talking about Bugojno, but I think you've got it
14 wrong by one month, and I'll show you that later. So what you're -- what
15 you're talking about Bugojno is correct, but it happened in July.
16 A. I did say I needed to look at the dates. I was in Travnik when we
17 set up the communication -- the coordination centre in Travnik, and also
18 we were evacuated there. Now, that was certainly in the period of this
19 map, and so the large blue area indicated by HVO would be correct at the
20 beginning of June. It would be wrong at the end of June, and I can't
21 state what this -- when this map -- whether it refers to the beginning or
22 the end. It was a very fluid period as you know, General Petkovic.
23 Q. Yes, indeed, Witness. I think we've dealt with that
24 misunderstanding, and this shows the situation up until the 15th of
25 June, when the BH army took full control of Travnik by an attack from
1 Zenica, as you said, and I'm going to let my counsel continue now. Thank
3 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic: [Continued]
4 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Watkins, this map is designed to show what
5 battles took place in June, and I think we've dealt with that.
6 Let's look at the next document now 4D 005673 is the number and it
7 shows the situation in July 1993. So can we see on the basis of this map
8 that Bugojno, Travnik, Novi Travnik is in the green area, which means
9 that the BH army had taken control of these towns and the surrounding
11 A. Yes. This is a -- yes. This map is accurate.
12 Q. Yes. It's the map after the war operations in June. We saw what
13 happened in June earlier on.
14 Now let's look at the it next document, 4D 00564, and we are
15 now -- we've now come to September 1993. To the best of your knowledge,
16 does this map reflect the places where the conflict took place during that
18 A. I think this is accurate. Zepce, I would want to refresh my mind,
19 but concentrating on the Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak pockets and around
20 Gornji Vakuf; I would say this is accurate. I went to Zepce on the 4th of
21 September, and that's why I question these particular front lines. I
22 can't remember exactly what it was like.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.
24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] On this map there's a
25 mistake. Kakanj is the mistake. At that time in June of that year,
1 Kakanj no longer existed.
2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, but Kakanj is in the
3 green area. Kakanj is shown here in the green area.
4 Q. Let's move on to the next month, and the document is 4D 00565, and
5 it shows us the situation for October 1993, that is to say the month when
6 you left and went to Mostar in mid-October, but perhaps you know about the
7 war events in that month of October, and is this map accurate? Does it
8 correspond to your recollections?
9 A. Yes, it does, and we see that the Kakanj pocket's gone. My
10 inclination is with General Praljak, that in the previous one that might
11 have been one error.
12 Q. Well, yes. It's not deep into the green area, but it is there in
13 June. Now I'm not going to ask you about the events of November 1993, but
14 we could take a look together at another map which shows us the situation
15 in November 1993, and it shows all the places which came under the control
16 of the BH army during the months that you were there. So let us now take
17 a look at document 4D 00567. It is a document which we included into our
18 binder subsequently today. It is to your left, Mr. Watkins, the one
19 document on its own.
20 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] We added it -- that on later on,
21 and we apologise to the Judges because we did not include it yesterday.
22 Q. Anyway, this shows the situation in November 1993, and we can see
23 there that for the period we're discussing that the BH army took control
24 of the following places, Bugojno, Novi Travnik, Travnik, Fojnica, Kakanj,
25 Vares came later, and the area around Zenica. Tell us now, please,
1 Witness, to the best of your recollections, is this map accurate? Does it
2 reflect what actually happened on the ground?
3 A. Yes, I think so, but you did make reference to Vares happening
4 later, so we -- you would suggest there was an inaccuracy there
6 Q. In November -- in November 1993. I was referring to a period
7 after the period you were there.
8 Mr. Watkins, there are some numbers mentioned here next to each of
9 those places. Could you tell us what these numbers might mean? Would
10 those be Croats from those towns who, because the HVO lost control of the
11 area, left for some other areas?
12 A. Just before I answer that question, what I haven't clearly got in
13 my mind is the origin of the maps and who is issuing them. That would
14 then help me to explain what those numbers might be.
15 Q. There are numerous sources of maps, but these maps have been
16 prepared by the Defence of Generals Petkovic and Praljak, the two Defence
17 teams together.
18 A. I would agree that this is probably relating to number of Croats
19 that were either in the pockets or affected by the pockets. So, for
20 instance, the figure of 9.000, which appears to be linked to Vares, we
21 know and referred to earlier documents of, I think, 5 or 6.000 people
22 coming out of Vares. So I would say it is probably an indication of -- of
23 Croats in those areas.
24 Q. And one further question, Mr. Watkins. If I remember correctly,
25 you tried to explain to us that the authorities of the Croatian Republic
1 of Herceg-Bosna in Mostar were dissatisfied with the military situation in
2 Central Bosnia. Did I understand you correctly?
3 A. Yes. I think -- yes, that's correct.
4 Q. Thank you very much.
5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have completed my
7 Q. Thank you, Witness.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, I just have one question, a
9 follow-up question, actually. I followed with great interest those maps
10 which are very eloquent, because we can see the evolution on the ground as
11 of the month of June up until October. I notice, while BiH was gaining
12 terrain, I notice that there is an existence of a pocket of Travnik,
13 Vitez, and Busovaca. You were on the ground. You had access to military
14 data. How do you explain the fact that the HVO was able to maintain
15 itself in that area while it is -- or while they were completely circled
16 by the ABiH? Is there a military reason? Did they have a lot of weapons?
17 Is it because of bunkers? Is it because of the configuration of the
18 terrain? Is there a reason that can explain this, while the BiH is taking
19 more and more ground, there is that access Travnik-Vitez-Busovaca that is
20 maintained. It could also apply to Kiseljak that we can call a pocket as
21 well, but is there a reason, or how can you explain this? Or is this a
22 question that I should ask another witness, for instance?
23 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I could give you my attempts if that
24 helps. We -- broadly speaking it would correspond with where there were
25 large population settlements of Croats. So you have particularly in the
1 Lasva Valley, which is the area running from Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, and
2 through down to Kiseljak. And as the BiH had military successes, the
3 forces that were, for instance, in Bugojno would have moved south. Those
4 that were in Travnik would have gone into Vitez. So what you're actually
5 having is a concentration of Croat population living there anyway, and
6 that concentration being reinforced by defeat. So in fact you're getting
7 a redistribution of HVO forces, and a moment has come where the front
8 lines settle, where there is enough military capability in that pocket
9 to - sorry, Your Honour, I'm going to fast - where there is enough
10 military capability to defend those borders -- that front line, rather.
11 So an initial concentration and then -- of population, and then as
12 forces are defeated in other areas, they begin to concentrate in those
13 pockets. So you get to a state where the armija may have wanted to have
14 taken more territory, but there was enough capability to -- to defend
15 those particular lines.
16 They didn't have any particular extra weapon capability there, and
17 the majority of the equipment that we saw would be small arms and mortars.
18 I don't ever recall seeing a tank, a T-54 or T-55 in, for instance, the
19 Vitez pocket, but did see them up in the Zepce pocket. So they had
20 slightly different arrangements there. In fact, what was interesting
21 about the one I saw in Zepce is it had Cyrillic markings on it, and this
22 was a deal that had been done with the Serb forces. So the pockets of
23 Zepce that had a connection with the Serb front line had a different
24 weapon capability, and we would also see that in Kiseljak where I
25 personally witnessed a cooperation between the Croat forces and the Serb
1 forces in movement. But broadly speaking, we are talking about a not
2 particularly well-equipped HVO broadly relying on a concentration of
3 population and the forces all being -- all the population being mobilised
4 to defend that area.
5 I hope that helps, sir.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We may have the
7 opportunity to get back to this in the future.
8 Who will continue now?
9 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
10 I wish to inform the Chamber that the Defence of Mr. Coric has no
11 questions to put to this witness, so we have given the 20 minutes -- 20
12 minutes of our time to Mr. Prlic's Defence and 20 to Mr. Praljak's
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 Mr. Ibrisimovic.
16 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. We do
17 not have many questions for this witness, only a few, just in order to
18 clarify some points made by the witness yesterday.
19 Cross-examination by Mr. Ibrisimovic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Watkins.
21 A. Good day, sir.
22 Q. Yesterday, when questioned by my learned friend about a document
23 drawn up by you, if you recall it's the special report on the Croatian
24 Republic of Herceg-Bosna, dated the 8th of November, 1993. It's P 06381.
25 I don't know whether you have the document before you?
1 A. I have the document in front of me.
2 Q. It's a report compiled by you, and you explained to us how you
3 came by the information included in it. Is this correct?
4 A. That's correct, sir.
5 Q. And it is assessed as an excellent report, which we can see from
6 the preamble of the document. We have the preamble here. You provide
7 some details concerning the structure of the Croatian Republic of
8 Herceg-Bosna, the various organs of government. You mention some names.
9 You didn't who the minister would be. You explained all this yesterday,
10 but let's go back to point 7, which we discussed yesterday.
11 As it says here, it refers to the recently established instruments
12 of government of the HZ HB including four decrees and republican
13 institutions --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Or, rather, not decrees, interpreter's
15 correction, but offices.
16 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Four offices are mentioned here, office of legal affairs, office
18 of international cooperation, and immigration office of refugees and
19 displaced persons, and office of information, and you said that Mr. Pusic
20 was probably to be at the head of the office of the refugees and displaced
21 persons, but then you corrected yourself and said that you were probably
23 A. Yes. I have not in this report put Mr. Pusic's name against any
24 appointment. There were several candidates. Another one would have been
25 Martin Raguz, but I'm speculating now and I didn't speculate at the time
1 when I wrote this report. I reason I mention those two names, if it
2 helps, is whenever we were dealing with humanitarian issues or movement of
3 people or prisoner of war exchanges, either Mr. Pusic or Mr. Martin Raguz
4 were involved.
5 Q. Yes. But when you look at point 7, you see that the title or the
6 name of the organ that Mr. Pusic was at the head of is the service for the
7 exchange of --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel repeat the number of the document,
10 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. So the structure that you mention is not present here. This is
12 not mentioned among these various offices and an institutions; is that
14 A. That is correct. Mr. Pusic's function at the time and when I was
15 dealing with him is not mentioned in this document.
16 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] For the sake of the record,
17 Your Honour, I was referring to Prosecution document P 03191, the decision
18 on establishing the service for the exchange of prisoners and other
19 persons headed by Mr. Pusic.
20 Q. In order to avoid speculation, could you please take a look at
21 this document, which is also before you, and that's number P 07005.
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Ibrisimovic, you have said that you had been
23 looking at document P 03191. Was to not, rather, document P 06381.
24 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] You're quite, Your Honour. It
25 was only for the sake of the record that I said that P 03191 is the
1 government decree -- or the decision of the government of Herceg-Bosna
2 appointing Mr. Pusic at the head of the service for the exchange of
3 prisoners and other persons. I did not, however, wish to put this
4 document to the witness.
5 Q. So you need not look for the document, Witness. Would you please,
6 rather, look at the document before you, P 07005, in order to avoid
7 speculating who was at the head of the office for refugees and displaced
9 A. [Microphone not activated]
10 Q. This is more or less the time when you arrived in Mostar. I think
11 you arrived on the 17th of October, 1993. Would that being correct? And
12 Mr. Raguz who until then had been the deputy head of the office was now
13 appointed head of the office of displaced and refugees.
14 A. That's what this document states, as of 1st of December. When I
15 was dealing with Mr. Pusic first of all that would have been end of
16 October and his title then was -- I forget the exact first title but it
17 was prisoner of war exchange. I can't remember. It was officer of -- it
18 wasn't a minister. It was an appointment, but here as of the 1st of
19 December it does clearly state that Martin Raguz is dealing with the
20 office of the expelled, displaced, and refugees.
21 Q. And from the same document we can see that Mr. Darinko Tadic
22 preceded him in that post. I don't know whether you had occasion to meet
23 Mr. Tadic. And Mr. Raguz had previously been his deputy?
24 A. No, I did not meet Mr. Tadic, I don't believe.
25 Q. You have another document before you, P 00846. It is the decision
1 on the establishment of the office for expelled persons, refugees, and
2 displaced persons. It was published in the Official Gazette.
3 A. I do not have that document in front of me.
4 Q. Well, then I apologise and I will not ask you any questions about
5 it. If you don't have the document, I will not put any questions about
6 this, but I will ask you: The office that Mr. Martin Raguz was in, his
7 task was to deal with all matters concerning refugees and displaced
9 A. Yes, as I said, there were the two people that we needed to talk
10 to, Mr. Raguz, and if it was prisoner of war exchanges, it was Mr. Pusic
11 we saw. The exact relationship between Mr. Pusic and Mr. Raguz and the
12 exact delineation of those issues, I don't know; but if I wanted to talk
13 about prisoner of war exchanges or movements of population from Central
14 Bosnia, it was Mr. Pusic I went to see.
15 Q. Well, movements of the population, internally displaced
16 persons and refugees, those movements were dealt with by the office headed
17 by Mr. Raguz. We were shown a document a little while ago, 05960. You
18 saw this document referring to the arrival of refugees from Vares, how
19 they were received in Stolac by Mr. Herceg, the secretary of the office.
20 Therefore, this office had the task of dealing with displaced persons and
21 refugees, whereas Mr. Pusic dealt primarily with the exchange of
23 A. Yes. I don't think I would disagree with that. I've said
24 Mr. Pusic, prisoners. But the difference is that he also appeared to
25 certainly be knowledgeable and giving us information about those
1 movements, numbers that were coming out of Central Bosnia, and when. So I
2 don't -- all I can say is he was knowledgeable and he passed that
3 information to us. So that's why we saw him. I did never -- what I can
4 also say if that helps I didn't deal with Mr. Raguz on prisoner of war
6 Q. Thank you. And one more question: Mr. Alikadic's name was
7 mentioned. You recalled it later on. Can you say something more about
9 A. Mile Alikadic, I think we're referring to, and he at -- certainly
10 by the end -- okay.
11 Q. Alikadic participated in some negotiations and he was on the east
12 side representing the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You recalled his
13 name. You mentioned it after the break.
14 A. Yes. Sorry, I'm getting Alikadic and Akmadzic mixed up. My
16 I don't have a great recollection of Mr. Alikadic. If you could
17 point me to a document then it may refresh my mind, but I just can't pull
18 his face or my dealings with him. I can't recall it.
19 Q. That's the person who participated in negotiations at the local
20 level concerning exchanges of prisoners, and we saw some documents
21 yesterday showing that both he and Mr. Pusic were present at various
23 A. I do remember that reference. It would help -- if you think we
24 need to pursue this a little bit more, could you refer me to that document
25 just so I can quickly refresh my mind. I now know who we're talking about
1 broadly but I want to remember the context. Certainly when we were
2 dealing with exchanges of prisoners with the armija, Dzumo [sic] was one
3 of the key players and Mr. Alikadic, but it would be helpful if it you
4 would point me to that document and then it would help me.
5 Q. Mr. Dziho. For the transcript, Mr. Dziho and Mr. Alikadic,
6 persons who participated in negotiations concerning the exchange of
7 prisoners of war at the local level.
8 A. Those are the two names on the - on the Muslim side that I dealt
9 with, yes.
10 Q. Thank you. I just wish to clarify that.
11 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] And I have no further questions,
12 Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Praljak, and then
14 we'll take the break.
15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I just wish to
16 clarify the time. You said that the Defence had seven hours, as far as I
17 can remember. Mr. Karnavas had two. The Defence of Mr. Petkovic and my
18 Defence had an hour and a half, and the rest 40 minutes each. As I have
19 been given 20 minutes by Mr. Coric's Defence and 20 minutes by Mr. Pusic's
20 Defence and some time from Mr. Petkovic's Defence, could we please ask the
21 registry to calculate precisely how much time I have so that I can
22 distribute my time accordingly?
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We will add those
24 times up. But, in fact, you have an hour and a half, plus 20 minutes that
25 was given to you by Mr. Coric, plus the 20 minutes that were allocated to
1 you, so in total an hour and 70 minutes, plus Mr. Petkovic's time. So I
2 believe that you have approximately two hours, but we shall make the
3 calculations. We will check this during the break. So after the break it
4 is going to be Ms. Nozica's turn. She has 40 minutes. She will start at
5 that point.
6 Would you like to add something, Mr. Praljak? No? Very well. So
7 let's take a 20-minute break and we'll resume in 20 minutes' time from
9 --- Recess taken at 12.23 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. During
12 the break the registry -- the registrar has used his computers to -- that
13 allows me to tell Mr. Praljak that he has two hours and 20 minutes. We
14 still have one hour today, 40 minutes for Ms. Nozica, and therefore we'll
15 be able to conclude the day with the cross-examination of Ms. Nozica.
16 You have the floor.
17 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:
19 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Watkins. And I'd like to ask
20 the usher's assistance to hand round the binders that I'm going to start
21 off. One binder for the witness and a binder for the Prosecution. I
22 think Their Honours already have a set. As you can see there are quite a
23 few documents there, but unfortunately in the short space of time of 40
24 minutes I'm not going to go able to get through them all, but I'll do my
25 best to focus on what I consider to be important or -- and we'll see how
1 far we get.
2 I'd like to take you back to a topic that was raised on several
3 occasions in the examination-in-chief and in the cross-examination, that
4 is the establishment of the government of the Croatian Republic of
5 Herceg-Bosna. And to start off with, let me take you back to a
6 Prosecution document, which you'll find in the Prosecution binder. And
7 I'm going to use quite a few of the Prosecution documents, so you'll have
8 to look through them. The number is P 06382.
9 A. I have the document.
10 Q. Thank you. Now, it's a document dated the 3rd of November, 1993,
11 and my colleague a moment ago showed it to you, but what I'm interested in
12 is this: The assessments and evaluations you made in your response to a
13 question from the Prosecution with respect to the position of the minister
14 of defence, but before we go into that, let us just take a look at a
15 remark under M1. So after the section dealing with the parliament. It
16 says, "M1": "M1 visited Enver Zebic." Do you see that paragraph?
17 A. Yes, but your colleague referred me to a different document. Just
18 for the record, previously we were looking at 6381.
19 Q. Yes. That's right. You're quite right. And it said that: M1
20 visit the Emin Zebic in Jablanica who stated that the investigation on
21 vandalism to the ECMM mission had still not been completed and that the
22 Mujahedin were suspected as having been the perpetrators of that act.
23 Do you remember that particular incident? There is a document
24 about it. It is 3505976, dated the 20th of October, which talks about the
25 incident. You don't have to look for the document but just tell me if you
1 remember the incident.
2 A. Yes, I do remember the incident, and I have the document.
3 Q. Under point 6. For everybody in the courtroom, P 05976 is the
4 document number. Can you tell us what you know about this and what
5 happened, what the incident was about?
6 A. The vehicle was an armoured Mercedes and it was being driven by
7 the team Mike 1. I know that one of the monitors was a Slovakian called
8 Simovcek [phoen], and essentially what happened is the vehicle was stopped
9 and the ECMM monitors were ordered out of the vehicle. I remember the --
10 that they were asked to stand by the side of the road, and weapons were
11 cocked behind them. I believe they were discharged. Not at the -- the
12 monitors, but after the discharging of the weapons, obviously to
13 intimidate them, the vehicle was stolen. We didn't recover the vehicle
14 then, but it was an ongoing issue which I was addressing as late at the
15 middle of 1994 with the command of 3rd Corps armija. So that is -- this
16 is the incident and that's the vehicle. And it was Mujahedin. Based in
17 Konjic, we later found. That's all I have.
18 Q. Did you have any information by which later on in some of their
19 operations they used this vehicle of yours, precisely in order to cover up
20 the identity and source of who they were on the ground? Did you have any
21 knowledge to that effect?
22 A. We actually discovered the location of the vehicle as it was being
23 held in Konjic, and by this time it was painted in military camouflage
24 colours. They didn't actually hide the fact that they had it, and on one
25 occasion had the audacity to drive to our headquarters in Zenica and pull
1 the car into the car park, blow the horn to draw attention, and then drive
3 Q. Yes. One could say that they -- this was a display of might, a
4 show of force. Would you say that? And to show that they were
5 invincible, that nobody could do anything to them, not even your mission.
6 Would that be right?
7 A. Yes. There were suggestions that military action might be
8 specifically taken against those owners of the vehicle, and those were
9 discussed by -- with us. We, however, felt that that just might provoke
10 the seizure of another vehicle. So I did in fact ask the corps commander,
11 and, forgive me, his name has just temporarily gone, but it was in fact
12 not Enver Hadzihasanovic, it was his successor. He said to me, "Your
13 vehicle was stolen. That is a police matter. You must refer it to the
15 Q. Mr. Watkins, at key moments when the fighting was going on in
16 Central Bosnia and for Central Bosnia, and when there was this great
17 expulsion of the Croatian population, when part of the Croatian
18 population, as you yourself said, fled from the pockets where there were
19 Croatian soldiers. Since you were there during these important times, and
20 we have had very few a witnesses who were as high ranking and as well
21 informed as you were, could you please briefly tell us how objective it
22 this presence of the Mujahedin in Central Bosnia was, in your assessment,
23 and how far did it present a problem with respect to realistic fear and
24 the instilling of an abstract fear in the hearts and minds of the Croatian
25 population and also the Serb population? In fact, for anybody who wasn't
1 a Muslim at that point in time.
2 A. The -- there was a lot of confusion about numbers and also
3 definitions as to what and who were Mujahedin, and I think I alluded
4 earlier to our belief and our certain knowledge that there were Mujahedin
5 who had come from outside of Bosnia, from a variety of countries, and they
6 formed a relatively small core, and they were operating from a number of
7 places, the area south of Zenica, and Konjic I can be specific about, and
8 I personally had an interesting afternoon with the Mujahedin, detained by
9 them at the village of Opera. We needn't discuss that in too much detail,
10 but the additional element as opposed to those that we physically saw and
11 in actually the case I saw, I'm talking about maybe five or six foreign
12 nationals, one of African origin who spoke French, another who was wearing
13 what I would call an Afghan headdress, I'm not sure, it's a cap, it's
14 commonly seen there, a variety of nationals. However, there were others
15 who were called Mujahedin and they formed brigades one was 17 Muslim
16 brigade and I forget the other designation, and they were not from outside
17 Bosnia. They were motivated and I would say religiously motivated, and
18 those brigades were often used as the vanguard for attacks.
19 Now, to come specifically to your question as to how that affected
20 the mentality of the Bosnian Croats specifically, I can comment on that
21 rather than the Serbs. It was significant, and the concern and fear of
22 what would happen to an individual or to a community that was attacked by
23 Mujahedin had a force multiplying effect. In other words, it was greater
24 than the capability of the Mujahedin who were armed with small arms, but
25 it had a significant impact, and on various occasions we either responded
1 to references to where massacres had happened by the Mujahedin, and we
2 followed those up, and in the process of doing that I did gain access
3 with Mr. Junhov, Torbjorn Junhov who I referred to yesterday, at the
4 period of handover as I took over the CC Travnik. There had been
5 fighting in the villages between Zenica and Travnik, and in particular
6 places like Guca Gora on a road there, and there had been a number of
7 indications of Mujahedin activity, which we followed up. We were unable
8 to establish specifically any graves resulting from a massacre, but I have
9 no doubt that they were involved in those forces, and the effect on the
10 population, military and civilian, that were in the Vitez pockets was
12 Q. Thank you. Now I'd just like to focus on two things. The crime
13 happened in Guca Gora; right? When you were there. I just need
14 confirmation. Against the Croats, that is; right?
15 A. Guca Gora was attacked. I didn't use the word "crime." I went to
16 Guca Gora, and I was involved in the evacuation of the population that had
17 taken refuge in the church there. This would be a good example of where
18 we had anticipated perhaps finding significant Mujahedin activity, and we
19 didn't. What we did actually find were a number of people that had been
20 killed, but the evidence seemed to suggest that they were military HVO and
21 they had fought, but there were also some wounded who we -- who we treated
22 who were civilians. I didn't see the Mujahedin there, but again my
23 estimation would have been, yes, they would have been involved in the
24 fighting around there but I didn't see a subsequent atrocity.
25 With regards as to whether it's a crime, well, as I say, that's
1 a -- I saw no criminal acts. I saw military forces fighting.
2 Q. Well, a crime can be perpetrated also against members of the army,
3 but let's not go into that. We'll leave that to the jurists to decide.
4 The second point that I found interesting is this: Without a
5 doubt, a group of Mujahedin did arrive and fought with the BH army, on the
6 side of the BH army, but that they had members of the BH army -- that the
7 BH army had members that adopted their religion and -- so this gave rise
8 to greater fear. Not only the Mujahedin -- because of the Mujahedin, but
9 also the BH army members who adopted their method of fighting, their
10 religion, and so on, their ways. Would that be right?
11 A. I think one of -- one of the characteristics of -- of the fighting
12 in Bosnia was that people sought solace in their culture, in their
13 religion, in their flag, and we saw extremism elements emerging. And,
14 yes, I think it is true that the Mujahedin did have an effect, but I
15 would also state that it was, I think, vastly exaggerated. But it was
17 Q. Let us go back to the establishment of the government of the
18 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna now, and may we take a look at the
19 document again. It is P 06382.
20 A. I have the document.
21 Q. I'd just like to remind you that underneath the names of the
22 officials a portion refers to Mr. Perica Jukic. Now, you said during the
23 examination-in-chief that at that time it was calculated that Mr. Perica
24 Jukic, in the government of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, would
25 be the defence minister in that government. Can you confirm that already
1 at that period of time, we're talking about the 3rd of November, that you
2 had information to that effect already at that time?
3 A. I can confirm -- the exact dates, I don't know. What I can
4 confirm is that we understood Mr. Jukic was holding two posts. One was
5 the president of the Assembly and the other was the defence minister, and
6 that one would be relinquished. I think probably that -- that -- I don't
7 know exactly when that happened, but certainly by the 31st of December at
8 the Assembly meeting, and maybe just before that, if we could refer to
9 those other documents, Mr. Jukic had become the minister of defence. I'm
10 pretty sure I got that right.
11 Q. Thank you. Yes. We'll get to that shortly. Now, would you take
12 a look at the document dated the 8th of November, 1993, and it is P 06381.
13 It is a document shown to you by my learned friend.
14 A. I have the document.
15 Q. On page 2 you have an assessment of which people could take up
16 what posts within the government. Would that be right?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Yes. Thank you. And under A we see Mr. Stojic's name, Mr. Bruno
19 Stojic, and I am Defence counsel for Mr. Bruno Stojic. I omitted to
20 introduce myself at the beginning. But later on he wasn't elected defence
21 minister. That's a fact too; right? And as far as I understand you to
22 say, when this report was compiled, the situation was that Mr. -- it would
23 be Perica Jukic or -- in the house of deputies, that he would occupy one
24 of those two posts. Is that right?
25 A. Yes. And this is why I was hesitant on -- on dates, because
1 actually here we are still at the end of the December and I'm putting
2 Stojic there. But we did know that there were some changes in there, but
3 exactly the date it took place, I don't know.
4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me, Ms. Nozica. You placed -- you placed
5 this document on the 8th of November. On my copies in both languages it
6 says 3rd November. Probably I'm wrong, but you will perhaps help me to
7 dissipate the doubts.
8 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if we look at the
9 document -- P 06381, 6381, that's the document I moved on to, 81 being the
10 last digits. 6381. It is a document dated the 8th of November, 1993. Am
11 I right? Do you have that document?
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I have it, but I was looking at -- at 6382,
13 actually. That would be the 3rd.
14 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes. That was the previous document,
15 indeed, and I've moved on to this other one.
16 Q. I moved on to this other document to show -- and we're looking at
17 the 8th of November. Well, this is a piece of information. We can see
18 who compiled the report and information about these individuals. And if
19 we can just note that the person under A, B, C, D, were not elected and
20 did not -- were not elected to the government. Branko Stojic or Bruno
21 Stojic, Branko Kresic, Zoran Buntic, and Mr. Neventoni. I think there's a
22 mistake in the name, because Neventoni didn't exist.
23 Let's go back to page 1, and under point 3 you said the Croatian
24 Republic of Herceg-Bosna has three political institutions, the Presidency,
25 the government, and the house of representatives. That's what you note.
1 Is that right, that those are the bodies that the Croatian Republic of
2 Herceg-Bosna will have?
3 Now, my learned friend Mr. Karnavas showed you a document
4 yesterday when the government was appointed. It's P 06583. It is the
5 third from the bottom in my binder. The number is P 06583.
6 A. I have the document.
7 Q. Yes, in the pink binder. Right. You have it.
8 Now, there we see that the government has been named, and I am
9 interested in the post of defence minister, Perica Jukic, on the 10th of
10 November. Can we take note that this was two days after that report of
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you agree?
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. And your prognosis about the fact that it could be him, well, he
16 was actually appointed.
17 Now, I'd just like to read out the number of the document, but
18 we're not actually going to go back to it, but it was shown to you by
19 Mr. Karnavas, and for the record I'm going to give the document number.
20 It was P 06772, and it was an excerpt from the Official Gazette, national
21 gazette, on the election of the president, the vice-president, and
22 government members, and the decision was enacted on the 20th of November,
23 which means 10 days later, after the government was appointed, was named.
24 Now, between this naming of these people and before it was
25 ratified that there was a meeting, a government meeting, I asked you
1 whether you knew that there was this meeting. If not, it does not
3 A. We did have a statement, and it was drawn out on the first day of
4 there being an anticipated meeting when the nominations would be made, and
5 I do remember that the first date that we mentioned slipped and it hadn't
6 happened, but I -- so that's all I have to say on that.
7 Q. Yes. Thank you. So we can now confirm, and this is fairly
8 important as far as I'm concerned, that on the 10th of November the
9 government of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna was elected. This
10 would follow on from the documents. And -- or, rather, appointed, and
11 that coincides with what you said, and that Perica Jukic was appointed the
12 defence minister.
13 A. I'm not sure on those dates because I'm -- I'm reading the
14 documents and seeing the dates in front of you. My understanding was that
15 the date on which the proposed ministerial positions were going to be
16 adopted was delayed, and I seem to remember that it was not until into
17 December that we had the actual ratification, if that helps.
18 Q. Yes. I was interested in the knowledge you had. These are
19 documents, Prosecution documents, that haven't been challenged by anyone,
20 so they are completely reliable, and I just wanted to see what you knew
21 about them.
22 And I'd like to move and now to another area, a very important
23 area that you mentioned, and it was the structure of the authorities in
24 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna and later on the Croatian Republic
25 of Herceg-Bosna [as interpreted]. May I take a look at P 04431, please.
1 It is a Prosecution document, P 0 -- just tell me when you've found it.
2 A. I have the document.
3 Q. Right. Now, your documents are very inspiritive, they inspire,
4 and under point 29, for example, we had the situation with respect to
5 prisoners, exchanged persons from Heliodrom. Paragraph 30 is a very
6 important paragraph because of the situation in Bugojno, the visit to the
7 prisoner camp. For the record I'm saying this.
8 Paragraph 41 is significant, too, and I'd like to dwell on that
9 for just a moment. Let's look at it together, and it talks with about
10 your observation about Serbs and Croats in Vares, and here it says that on
11 the 23rd of August it was reported that only 500 Croats left Vares via
12 Serb-controlled territory and that 3.000 are still waiting for departure,
13 and not a single able-bodied man was able to leave. I don't know what you
14 think but it demonstrates that the Serbs showed goodwill where civilians
15 were concerned, but quite obviously not when it referred to HVO members.
16 Isn't that right?
17 A. First, could I point out that this report was not written by me.
18 This has come from the headquarters of Zagreb. It's humanitarian
19 activity, but it will draw on reports written by my teams.
20 Now, specifically on that point, I -- all sorts of deals were
21 done. I do not know specifically whether the Serbs were preventing the
22 movement of people of male -- of males of fighting age through there or
23 whether in fact it was the authorities within Vares that wouldn't let them
24 go, because of course that would have weakened their own ability to
1 Q. But, Mr. Watkins, I believe the source of this report, where it
2 says the Serbs did not allow them to do that, but not to dwell on that.
3 Now, I wanted to ask you about cooperation between the Muslim side and the
4 Serbs, but we'll go into that with someone else in due course.
5 But I'd just like to focus on paragraph 34 and the Prosecutor
6 asked you about that. It is the decision to release a certain number of
7 Muslims from the camp, and what I'd actually like to see is what your
8 knowledge and information was about the position of, let's say, a mayor,
9 because you said yesterday during in-chief that people had different
10 positions, that the heads of the civilian or civic authorities had a
11 different position in Central Bosnia from what they did in the south and
12 in Herzegovina.
13 And now I'd like to ask you: Do you know that the presidents of
14 the municipalities on the territory of the Croatian Community of
15 Herceg-Bosna were simultaneously members of the Presidency of the Croatian
16 Community of Herceg-Bosna, that is to say the top-most body, the top-most
17 authority in Herceg-Bosna? Did you know that?
18 A. No. I understood that most of them took positions or would be
19 taking positions in the new emerging Assembly.
20 Q. We're talking about the period before the establishment of the
21 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna and after the formation of the Croatian
22 Community of Herceg-Bosna. Now, in order to see the realistic it power
23 they had, let us take a look at the next document, which is P 00079 in my
24 binder. It's the first document in that binder.
25 A. Could I just refer -- before I go back to that last question
1 because I think I may have gone off on a slightly different -- I was aware
2 that mayors had a constitutional role in the internationally recognised
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you'll remember that on Monday I made reference to
4 that as part of bringing legitimacy to the later formed Croatian Republic
5 of Herceg-Bosna that was referred to.
6 Q. I apologise for interrupting you. We're not talking about
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina or the constitutional position, because it's quite
8 clear to the Trial Chamber that neither the Croatian Republic of
9 Herceg-Bosna or Community of Herceg-Bosna had a constitution. They
10 regulated their relationships with acts, which are not the same as a
11 constitution, and these acts show that they were part of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and not an independent or autonomous state. But with
13 respect to the positions of the Presidency or, rather, the mayor, I'd like
14 to ask you something about that, and this is an important question, and
15 you gave rise to it by saying that their position depended on -- upon
16 somebody in Mostar. So it's a complex question to understand, that the
17 president of a municipality is in the bodies of the authorities somewhere
18 towards the bottom, subordinated to the government, but at the same time
19 that mayor is a member of the Presidency. So let's take a look at this
20 document. And you don't have to know about this, but I'd just like us to
21 understand what the position is and why the presidents of the
22 municipalities had far greater authority than one would assume, if one
23 didn't know about this.
24 A. Okay. I have your -- I have the document.
25 Q. This is the decision on the establishment of the Croatian
1 Community of Herceg-Bosna. I don't know whether you've ever had this
2 document in your hands because it's very significant, you know, to
3 understand the aspirations, reasons, goals, motives. Have you ever seen
4 it before? It's the 18th of November, 1991. Have you ever seen it
6 A. No, I haven't seen this document before.
7 Q. Please let's just look at point 7 together -- or, rather, Article
8 7, which says that, "the top leadership of the community shall consist of
9 the Presidency which shall consist of representatives of the Croatian
10 people in the municipal government and the senior members or presidents of
11 the municipal boards of the Croatian Democratic Union.
12 "The Presidency shall elect a president, two vice-presidents, and
13 a secretary."
14 "The Presidency shall elect ..."
15 They were the ones who elected Mr. Mate Boban, so you can see how
16 important they are.
17 This document has the signatories, and to see who these are, let's
18 look at P 00081. It's the identical document. In the Croatian version
19 you have the same decision, and in the English version you have the
21 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Mr. President. I just wanted to note an
22 objection, with all respect to my learned friend. Is seems like we've
23 gone back to simply reading documents to the witness. Last series of
24 questions now for some minutes and I've been following the transcript
25 quite closely, counsel has just read a number of documents and there has
1 been no question or no affirmation or no evidentiary value added by the
2 witness. We're simply reading documents and then going on to the next
3 document, and you can see that on the page we just left. Point out a
4 document and let's go to the next document. There's no questions. It's
5 simply reading documents.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Ms. Nozica. You are
7 introducing documents, but you have to ask a question of the witness.
8 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, by Mr. Scott's leave, I
9 will, but the witness must first see all the documents in order for me to
10 be able to put a question. I explained quite clearly to the Court why I
11 was doing this. I'm doing it because of what the witness said yesterday
12 as to position of the president of the municipality. If you allow me to
13 show the document that completes this series, I'll put a question.
14 Q. So, Witness, have you found P 00081? It's the second one in the
16 A. I have the document.
17 Q. On page 2, if you'll just turn the page, you will find the
18 signatures of the mayors who supported -- or, rather, enacted this
19 decision is. For example, 27, Capljina, the mayor we referred to when
20 talking about release from prison, Mr. Pero Markovic. I'm almost sure
21 it's his signature. I can't be absolutely sure, but it looks like his,
22 and there's no doubt he was there.
23 Could we please look at one more document before we establish what
24 the actual position of mayors was so that we can say what kind of powers
25 they had. It's P 0596, the third document in the binder.
1 A. I have that document.
2 Q. Thank you. I won't delve into it very deeply. Let's just look at
3 Article 33 together. That's page 6 in English. It's the rule of
4 procedure of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna of the 17th of
5 October, 1992 and published in the Official Gazette of November 1992.
6 In Article 33, let's see what the powers of the Presidency are.
7 Although you're not a lawyer, I'll just briefly refer you to Article 33
8 too, and it says that, "appointments, nominations, excuse of -- or,
9 rather, implementation of acts and other documents --"
10 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel slow down in reading, please.
11 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]
12 Q. And the last paragraph --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
14 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]
15 Q. "Through its conclusion the Presidency of the HZ HB will determine
16 viewpoints and opinions on matters discussed to determine the main
17 guidelines for the work and tasks of the HVO ..."
18 So they are the ones establishing or determining the guidelines
19 for the work of the government not covered by this, these rules of
21 And let's look at Article 40. That's page 7 in English. Can you
22 please look at the powers? It says: "There the Presidency of the HZ HB
23 evaluates that regulation or piece of legislation issued by the HV HZ HB
24 is contrary to one issued by the Presidency, it will require it to be
25 harmonised or brought into line or for other measures to be instituted
1 within a given time limit.
2 "If the HVO HZ HB should not act in accordance with the previous
3 paragraph, the Presidency of HZ HB shall annul such acts and order that a
4 new one be introduced."
5 Sir, I have two other documents here, one referring to the mayors
6 after the establishment of Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, which you
7 spoke about. I know you have not seen these documents before, but had you
8 known that these were the powers of the mayors or presidents of
9 municipalities, first of all, would you agree that in the period up to the
10 establishment of the republic they had legislative powers? We see that
11 the Presidency issues acts, can annul acts, so that formally in the
12 hierarchy it's above the HZ HB government. Would you agree with me, at
13 least on the basis of what we have just read? If you doubt what I have
14 just read, please say so. I know you are not a lawyer, but simply you are
15 the one who ascribed to them certain -- a certain position saying that
16 they were under the influence of the authorities in Mostar, but what I'm
17 trying to show you is that they were in fact the highest authority. So
18 would you agree that this is what follows from these documents and did you
19 have any knowledge of this?
20 A. I wasn't aware of these documents, and as you've taken me through,
21 I can see the -- the importance. I have never doubted the importance of
22 the -- the mayors. I spent a lot of time meeting them to understand what
23 was going on. But by the time I arrived there, this document, for
24 instance, 00596, this does relate to the constitution of the Croatian
25 Community of Herceg-Bosna, and what I was exploring was the change, the
1 period of fluidity, what their new responsibilities would be, and I'm sure
2 as their -- the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna was formed of course
3 reference would have been made to what had been there before. It would be
4 very strange if it wasn't, and it would be very strange if this document
5 had an influence. But in the period I arrive, the Croatian Community of
6 Herceg-Bosna doesn't exist. A new structure is being formed, and in that
7 I am trying to understand what the particular powers are.
8 My point yesterday about the ability of a mayor to act
9 independently was really to contrast what -- what the situation was like
10 in Central Bosnia where there wasn't such a reach of government and an
11 ability to, if you like, impose any sanction on anyone whose powers went
12 beyond that established in the constitution, and my reference to the
13 importance of the mayors in the Hercegovina territory was simply by
14 contrast, that I felt it very unlikely that they could do -- be too
15 independent of what the key leaders in government - and by that I would
16 refer to Mate Boban and Jadranko Prlic and so on - they would not have
17 major discretion. There would be -- if they were doing things that didn't
18 fit with what was happening in a war period, then there would have been
19 means by which pressure or influence could be brought to bear on them by
20 contrast to Central Bosnia.
21 Q. Mr. Watkins, certainly the situation in Central Bosnia differed if
22 for no other reason than for that of communication, but doesn't the
23 opposite follow from the documents I showed you, that they were able to
24 exert pressure on the government rather than vice versa? However, if you
25 know nothing about this, there are documents to show this, and there will
1 be other witnesses to testify about it.
2 However, I would now like to move on to another area very
3 briefly. My time, however, seems to have run out. If Mr. Praljak would
4 like to continue -- thank you. Thank you.
5 We will now move on to a different question. Today my colleague
6 Mr. Karnavas showed you a document, but you probably don't have the binder
7 before you. It's P 05709. Just listen, please, and you will remember
8 very easily what this is about. It's a report by Mr. Martin Garrod.
9 You'll probably remember what it's about. And in that document -- well,
10 now you will have it on your screen. P 05 -- yes. Thank you. You are
11 the fastest witness we've had so far in finding documents.
12 So this is a document dated the 7th of October, 1993. At that
13 time, as regards the political options of the -- let's call it government
14 in Sarajevo or Muslim government, you said that the political option was a
15 unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, but does it follow from this document that
16 there was another political option, possibly the establishment of a
17 separate Muslim entity or state, and that there was a split between what
18 the army wanted and what the political leadership wanted at that point in
19 time? Was that your impression in October and November in your contacts
20 with military and political representatives of the Muslim side?
21 A. We certainly came across those differences of opinion as to
22 whether the battle, the fighting, was about maintaining the whole of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina and its existing boundaries, or whether these options
24 of there being smaller republics as an issue to be explored, and there
25 definitely were differences between military commanders who we had
1 discussions with and some of the political leadership. And just on that
2 point, on military commanders, a name I couldn't remember earlier with
3 reference to the Mujahedin it was Sakib Mahmuljin. It's just come to me.
4 So yes, there were differences of opinion.
5 Q. Can we clarify this a little bit? Was the army more in favour of
6 taking everything by military means and having control over all of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the politicians were a little more pragmatic and
8 accepted other options also? I'm having a problem with interpretation.
9 They may have misheard me.
10 Was it your impression that the army aspired or tried to persuade
11 everyone that they could take the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
12 military means, while politicians were a little more pragmatic and
13 considered options that might lead to the establishment of an entity of
14 the Muslim people?
15 A. I think we have dealt in generalisms earlier and I think I've been
16 guilty myself of using them but I think that is broad. One thing I could
17 say about the armija commanders is there was a pretty shrewd and realistic
18 assessment of their military capability. And I don't think if you were in
19 3rd Corps headquarters or 2nd Corps headquarters you really believed that
20 you would be able to take large amounts of territory. Certainly some to
21 gain tactical advantage, and we saw that, but not to reclaim all of the
22 territory by military force and I think the reality of their ability to do
23 that. They were well equipped in numbers of people, but they were lightly
24 equipped in weapons and heavy weapons. So it would have been a very
25 unrealistic assessment, and most the corps commanders had JNA background
1 and I think they would have realised that whatever intent that they might
2 have personally, that it would not be achievable in the way that you
3 described. Some -- some certainly would have had that, but I think there
4 was a shrewd assessment that it couldn't be achieved.
5 Q. Yes. I don't want to go into military matters because that's not
6 my area of expertise, and Mr. Praljak will be putting more questions about
7 that, but there's something that seems significant to me here. You dealt
8 with what weapons the HVO had, and you've just said that the army of BH
9 compensated for the lack of weapons by large numbers of men. So could we
10 say that the armija had far more men than the HVO had?
11 A. It was the received which is come that, the one advantage, or two
12 advantages, that the armija had, one was that it had an advantage in
13 manpower. The other one was always related to their morale being high.
14 Q. Well, when you mention "morale," I'd like to go back to the
15 Mujahedin, but I won't go into that. Let's go back to my original
17 Please look at P 06693. It's in the Prosecutor's binder. P
18 06693. P 06693.
19 A. Not so fast at finding the documents without the assistance of the
20 Court. I've found it now.
21 Q. I was too quick in praising you. Let's look at English page 2.
22 For the sake of the record, it's a special report, Geneva 6 -- 16th,
23 November 1993, and on page 2 in the English version we have under
24 B, "Muslim goals." As for the goals of the Muslim politicians and army, I
25 put questions to you about that because they are mentioned in this report.
1 You can see it before you, but I'll refer only to a part. As Kordic
2 properly pointed out, "One might say that the Muslim leadership itself has
3 not decided what its final and ultimate goal is. Do they want ethnic
4 separation along ethnic lines, and if so, within what territory?"
5 Have you found this?
6 A. Yes, I have. I think that's a correct assessment, and I think
7 that could be applied to others involved in the negotiations.
8 Q. Excuse me. Just let me finish. So the option is either an ethnic
9 entity or a unitary state covering all of BH, but in the next paragraph it
10 says: "However, if the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Silajdzic, who
11 is thought capable of persuading his fellow politicians were to become
12 Prime Minister, this might mean that the current balance between the two
13 options could weigh on the side of ethnic separation along ethnic lines."
14 Mr. Silajdzic was actually appointed Prime Minister. Would we
15 agree on that? But let's just look at what the standpoint of the army
16 was. Two passages lower down, it says: "Of course we also heard
17 dissenting opinions on this matter, more specifically from the commander
18 of the 3rd BH army corps and his aide, who do not believe in the partition
19 solution, but who declare that they will obey and carry out the orders
20 issued by the politicians."
21 Mr. Watkins, we can see from this that on the 16th of November, a
22 political assessment had been made where the Muslim side, and I don't have
23 time to explain now why I say the Muslim side, but you refer to it in the
24 same way, the Muslim side had two options. The whole of Bosnia, if we can
25 get it; a separate republic, if we can't, whereas the army said, "We don't
1 agree, but we will comply with the political decisions." Is that what
2 follows from this document?
3 A. Broadly speaking I would accept that characterisation, yeah.
4 Q. Yes. Thank you. And I will show you one more document on the
5 same topic, and that will be the last one. That's P 03771. It's also a
6 Prosecution document, and you have already been shown it by the
8 A. Could I -- just before going on to that document, and I'm sorry,
9 it's -- when I said, "broadly speaking," I do broadly accept what was
10 said, but it may just be helpful. You said very specifically that "the
11 whole of Bosnia, if we can get it," and what I would agree to in that
12 statement is maintenance of the integrity of the borders with a central
13 government operating out of Sarajevo. I would not draw, and I'm not
14 saying you were asking me to draw the conclusion, that it would be a state
15 entirely controlled by the Muslims. I just want to make that clear.
16 Q. Sir, at the point in time we are talking about, more than half of
17 that state was in the hands of the Serbs. Republika Srpska was in
18 existence. We are referring to the 16th of November. Was it possible to
19 take control over the entire territory in any other way? Let's take the
20 Serbs as an example. I am referring now to November, because the NATO
21 strikes pushed them a little back later. I was a little confused. But if
22 the Serbs are holding 70 per cent of the territory at that point how could
23 the central authorities in Sarajevo have control over the entire territory
24 unless they defeated the Serbs by military means? I will not discuss with
25 you the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what the central government
1 represented, because that is a topic we would need a lot of time for, and
2 who at that point in time was part of the central government? Who
3 represented the Serbs and the Croats? Were there only Muslims there? Was
4 their Presidency elected legitimately or not? There are many issues that
5 arise here, but all I'm asking you is to tell me whether, if the political
6 leaders from Sarajevo at that time wanted control over all of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, did that mean military conquest, or liberation, if you
8 want to call it that, of at least the territory held by the Serbs at that
10 There's another interesting document on this topic. My time is
11 really running out.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Did you not answer, sir?
13 THE WITNESS: I did not answer yet. I was just re-reading,
14 because I don't know whether it is just something that I'm not clear on
15 the question. All I was doing by going back to the question that you --
16 you placed to me, and I broadly agreed, was that we have been discussing
17 today about the territorial ambitions of Muslim forces, and I'm simply
18 saying that I agree with you that the options that were being discussed
19 were either a -- a control over an area of Bosnia-Herzegovina in which
20 they would have military control or a complete Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I'm
21 just clarifying that by agreeing with you on those two points that I'm not
22 suggesting that there was a military ambition to control the whole of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Clearly they could not have defeated the Serbs.
24 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation].
25 Q. Yes. Thank you for your answer. Now let's finally look at a
1 document referring to some political thinking of the leaders in Sarajevo.
2 P 03771. Just tell me when you have found it and we'll deal with it very
4 A. I have the document.
5 Q. Point 4, BritBat sector, A Vitez, B, Novi Travnik. Just tell me
6 when you've found that.
7 A. [Microphone not activated]
8 Q. Here we have a conversation with Mr. Alagic. You'll know who
9 Mr. Alagic is. Can you tell Their Honours? It was in your territory.
10 The document is dated the 28th of July, 1993.
11 A. 28th of July. The -- he was either still in 3rd Corps or 7th
12 Corps had been established and he became the commander of 7th corps. I
13 forget the exact dates, but I knew him well.
14 Q. So we can say General Alagic, he was a general at the time?
15 A. I'm pretty sure at this time he would have been the general in
16 command of 7th Corps.
17 Q. I'll just refer you to the second sentence where it says: "In
18 further conversations, Alagic expressed little faith in the political
19 leadership and said that Bosnia-Herzegovina should continue -- would
20 continue to fight for a Bosnia and was critical of Izetbegovic's
21 identification of the struggle for a Muslim state."
22 It follows from this that Mr. Alagic, a general in the army of
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina, as early as in July 1993 spoke about
24 Mr. Izetbegovic's aspiration to create a Muslim state. This document
25 confirms it. Mr. Alagic disagreed with it.
1 A. I had similar conversations with myself with Mr. Alagic over
2 whisky, which wasn't traditionally something which you would expect an
3 extremist Muslim to be sharing with me. He had his own issues with the
4 involvement of Mujahedin in the area, and he disagreed with quite a few
5 people and quite a few politicians, but what I wouldn't agree was at this
6 stage Mr. Izetbegovic was trying to pursue a Muslim state. That's my
7 personal impression.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please finish.
9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, just my last sentence.
10 Q. Sir, I didn't expect you to agree with that. All I wanted to do
11 was to show you what Mr. Alagic felt about it. I thank you for your
13 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I thank the Judges for allowing me
14 to finish my cross-examination.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One minute and 40 seconds we
16 went over our time.
17 Thank you very much, and I would like to remind all of you that we
18 will resume this hearing tomorrow at 9.00.
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,
20 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 24th day
21 of May, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.