1 Wednesday, 6 June 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning to
9 everyone in the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor
10 versus Prlic et al. Thank you.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
12 Mr. Registrar.
13 I'd greet Mr. Scott, the Defence counsel, the accused, as well as
14 everyone in this courtroom, and I'd like to greet our witness as well.
15 As you know, sir, the examination-in-chief will now proceed. The
16 Trial Chamber has decided to grant an additional 30 minutes to Mr. Scott,
17 and of course the Defence will be granted 30 additional minutes as well
18 for the purposes of the cross-examination. Since we have time on our
19 hands because the cross-examination will continue tomorrow, we'll see as
20 we proceed if we need to increase the time.
21 Mr. Scott, you have the floor.
22 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. Good morning, Mr. President,
23 Your Honours, and to everyone in the courtroom.
24 WITNESS: BO PELLNAS [Resumed]
25 Examination by Mr. Scott: [Continued]
1 Q. And also to you, General. Good morning.
2 A. Good morning.
3 Q. General, you've just heard that I'm in the final phase of my
4 questions to you on behalf of the Prosecution and we're still continuing
5 on the subject from yesterday afternoon or evening of issues or concerns
6 about the presence of elements of the Croatian army in Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina, and we were looking at some UN documents toward the end of
8 the day. I would like to now show you, if you have -- I think you have
9 the binder there. If you could please go to Exhibit 752.
10 A. Yep.
11 Q. And, sir, my question to you and for the record this is a copy of
12 Security Council Resolution 787, dated the 16th of November, 1992.
13 Yesterday we briefly discussed some similar UN documents from earlier in
14 1992. Now we've arrived in November, and if I can just ask you to look
15 briefly at paragraph numbered 5 on the third page of the document. And
16 actually, if I can -- if I can -- let me modify my question to you. If I
17 can first ask -- look to paragraph number 2 on the previous page. My
18 apology, but if I can ask you first of all to go back to the previous
19 page, number 2. It says "reaffirms that any taking of territory by force
20 or any practice of ethnic cleansing is unlawful and unacceptable and will
21 not be permitted to affect the outcome of the negotiations on
22 constitutional arrangements ..." et cetera.
23 General Pellnas, during the time of your association with the UN
24 in this regard in the capacities as you've discussed yesterday, did you
25 always understand it to be the position of the -- of the United Nations
1 and indeed the international community, if you know, that the existing
2 international -- internationally-recognised borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina
3 were to be respected?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And did you and other UNMOs and UNPROFOR always consider to be at
6 least a part of your overall mandate to -- to monitor as part of your
7 monitoring to ensure and to observe that those borders were in fact being
9 A. Well, at least it was not an obligation to report any breach what
10 we could happen to detect.
11 Q. All right. Now, in terms of going back to paragraph number 5 on
12 the next -- on the next page, and in particular it makes reference to its
13 earlier Resolution 752, and at the end of that paragraph calls on in
14 particular, including the "... requirement that all forces, in particular
15 elements of the Croatian army, be withdrawn or be subject to the authority
16 of the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or be
17 disbanded or disarmed."
18 Can you confirm, General, by this and other documents that this
19 continued to be an issue or concern throughout all of 1992 and into 1993?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Could I ask you then to go to Exhibit 7789.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please. So as
23 not to waste any time, I'm going to put my question now.
24 General, you have paragraph 5 in front of you. If we think of the
25 previous resolution, the resolution we had a look at yesterday, number
1 752, dated 15th of May, whereas this particular resolution is resolution
2 number 787, dated 16th of May, 1992. It was passed several months later.
3 I notice that between paragraph 3 of Resolution 752 and paragraph 5 of
4 Resolution 787, I note a slight variation that could be of interest. It
5 is the fact that at paragraph 5 mention is made of the infiltration of
6 units -- of irregular units and personnel, irregular units and personnel.
7 This was not mentioned at paragraph 3 of Resolution 752. What does it
8 mean according to you? Because in Resolution 752, the impression we got
9 was that it was about the regular army of Croatia that was in theatre,
10 whereas here we -- we mention irregular units. Do you have an idea about
11 this particular point? Because as for me, I was quite struck when reading
12 these two paragraphs in parallel.
13 THE WITNESS: No, I'm not quite sure because it could easily be
14 reference to Serb units working in the north-east part of -- of Bosnia.
15 So I'm not sure to which the irregular units really refer.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Thank you very much.
17 Mr. Scott, please proceed.
18 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. If I could then ask you to go to 7789. And -- which is a
20 statement by the president of the Security Council, dated the 3rd of
21 February, 1994, and just briefly indicating and setting the context for
22 some follow-up questions I will ask you about some more specific reports
23 that were received following this -- this statement.
24 Can you confirm, General Pellnas, that by this further statement
25 by the Security Council in February 1994 that even by this time or by this
1 time the same concern about the Croatian army's involvement in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina continued to be concern, in fact, may have become even
3 a heightened concern by that time?
4 A. Yes, obviously.
5 Q. How was the -- how was that particular issue, if you will,
6 impacting or influencing the international community's dealings or
7 relationships with Croatia during this time in general, late 1993, early
9 A. I don't think I want to comment on that because it's too
10 complicated actually.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, also if I may go back to the previous
12 answer that the gentleman said. He said "obviously." Was this looking at
13 the document or "obviously" from his own knowledge? We can all read the
14 document and draw our own conclusions but the question should be as to
15 what he knows.
16 MR. SCOTT:
17 Q. Sir, given the issues that you were involved in during this time,
18 I'm simply asking based on your experiences in dealing with various issues
19 on the ground during this time is what is reflected in Exhibit 7789,
20 concern -- disconcern about the Croatian army. Was that consistent with
21 the issues that you were dealing with in general?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, you said the issue was too complicated. I'm going to have to
24 press you - General, my apologies - a bit because based again on your
25 experience you can tell us presumably, hopefully if I can say following on
1 your words a simplified version that this particular matter that is the
2 concern about the presence of Croatian troops in Bosnia was affecting the
3 international politics and dealings at this time. Was there -- had
4 sanctions been threatened against Croatia at any time; do you recall that?
5 MR. KARNAVAS: I would object to leading. He's asked the question
6 and now he's giving answers to the witness. Let the witness answer the
7 question or rephrase the question. Let's do it step-by-step, but let's
8 not ask a question then feed an answer and then ask for a verification of
9 the answer.
10 THE WITNESS: My hesitance is -- pardon.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, as far as possible,
12 please try not to lead the witness. Do as I do myself. Put a general
13 question first.
14 MR. SCOTT: I did, Your Honour, and I was trying to follow up on
15 the witness's obvious reluctance when he said it's a very complicated
16 issue and I was trying to encourage him forward but I think the witness is
17 prepared to answer the best as he can.
18 THE WITNESS: I'm very hesitant to answer it because it will lead
19 me into discussions about the great powers politics on the Balkans.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. That's exactly what we need to hear
21 because this is what we're talking about.
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Is this comment called for now Mr. Karnavas?
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, it is.
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: No, I don't think so.
25 THE WITNESS: But I haven't finished. I haven't finished though.
1 It became obvious much later on that there was -- I mean, the united
2 States versus Croatia is complicated during this time. On the one hand
3 they really want the Federation to take shape and there be success and
4 have the united Bosnia. On the other hand, they are training Croatian
5 officers for the war against the Serbs in Krajina. So what the
6 international community really thought and did about Croatia is a very
7 complicated thing. It depends on what part of international community we
8 discuss and then what context we discuss it. So that explains my
9 hesitance to give a simple answer to this question.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Based on that, Your Honour, I ask that we explore
11 this area completely because of the nature and the breadth of the
12 indictment because Croatia is being attacked, is being involved in a joint
13 criminal enterprise by way of its leader, then President Tudjman. I think
14 now for the first time we have someone who is going to unfold the story a
15 little bit. We're going to unpeel the onion as it were. So I suggest we
16 go into this full throttle.
17 MR. SCOTT: Well, again, Your Honour, if Mr. Karnavas wants to use
18 his cross-examination to do that, he can seek to do that. I think it
19 would be -- many parts of what he's just said would be completely
20 irrelevant. But if he wants to spend his cross-examination doing that
21 then he may do so.
22 Q. General, no one ever suggested, at least, lest of all me, that
23 this was necessarily a simple issue. I just asked if you could confirm
24 that part of the mix, if you will, of this complicated factor the
25 involvement of Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of the -- what was
1 on the international table at the time; is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Can I ask you please to go to Exhibit P -- well, excuse me, 7889?
4 A. Yep.
5 Q. And just to follow up in terms of -- this is a letter from the
6 Secretary-General at the time of Boutros Boutros-Ghali reporting again
7 various information that had been gathered by UNPROFOR troops -- excuse
8 me, the presence of the Croatian army in Bosnia during this time, and, for
9 instance, mentioned several times --
10 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do apologise, but as
11 far as I can see this is document 7889 and as far as I can see that
12 document is not on our chart, and I notice that the other Defence teams
13 don't seem to have it, and yesterday the Prosecutor also showed a document
14 that we didn't have on our chart, but we didn't react to that, but I must
15 say that we can't follow unless we have received the documents. Thank
17 MR. SCOTT: Well, let me just check our records, Your Honour. I'm
18 not sure why that might be the case, but if it is -- if there's been an
19 error, there's been an error.
20 Q. While we're looking at that document, then, sir, and it was
21 primarily to provide in fact the further context of the next document.
22 Can I ask you to look then at Exhibit 7915. If you can go to 7915 and if
23 we can solve the matter of the previous document we'll come back to it.
24 Sir, this document and the next couple of exhibits I'm going to
25 show you if you will are all part of a single package that essentially
1 revolve around or link to Exhibit 7915. This is a report dated the 20th
2 of February, 1994, from UN military observers on the withdrawal of HV
3 forces from Bosnia.
4 In the first paragraph of the document under "Discussion" it
5 says, "UNMO BH south did so and observed some equipment withdrawing from
6 the Buna area." Now this is the same UNMO BH south that we've been
7 talking about previously in your testimony as far as you know?
8 A. I don't know. This is -- I had left, and I don't know who were
9 actually serving at the BH south.
10 Q. Do you know --
11 A. But it is the same organisation of course.
12 Q. Well, that was my question to you. Do you know of any other UNMO
13 organisation that was operating in that region at that time?
14 A. No.
15 Q. All right. And in the next paragraph it says, "On the 18th of
16 February, UNMOs were denied access to sections of the HVO area of
17 responsibility between Buna and Stolac."
18 Again, is that again continuing on from where we left off
19 yesterday in terms of throughout 1993 one of the recurring issues with the
20 UN military observers and UNPROFOR was freedom of movement and access to
21 the territory?
22 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, the gentleman just indicated that he
23 had left. So I don't see how he can comment on this document or on the
24 events over there. I just point this out. So maybe with some foundation
25 he might be able to comment, but based on this document he just indicated.
1 So I don't mean to be obstreperous or maybe you know it seems that way but
2 I don't mean to.
3 THE WITNESS: I think the document stands by itself, actually.
4 It's a very clear report. And freedom of movement was denied by all
5 parties in all places all during the mission.
6 MR. SCOTT:
7 Q. Very well. And when it says, for example, in the end of the --
8 excuse me just a moment. I lost my place, to be honest.
9 In the first paragraph just in terms of UNMO and UNPROFOR
10 procedure, it says this -- the letter is attached. I'm going to come back
11 to that in a moment, but this letter was faxed to UNMO headquarters BH
12 command and to UNMO sector BH south. UNMO headquarters BH command
13 confirmed that headquarter BH command issued a tasking to SpaBat to pick
14 at the main Buna-Metkovic road arteries, I think, and I agree that the
15 document's -- during this -- during the scheduled withdrawal period, UNMO
16 BH south.
17 Is that -- is that the procedure that will be followed in terms of
18 the chain of command from UNMO -- through the UNMO command structure?
19 A. I can't find the text.
20 Q. In the first paragraph, sir. 7915.
21 A. 7915.
22 Q. First paragraph. Halfway through the first paragraph it talks
23 about putting --
24 A. Okay. Just -- let me read it.
25 Q. Okay.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, if they really want to know what the
2 procedure is they can ask the gentleman what the procedure is. If this a
3 way of getting the document in, again, I stand by my earlier objection to
4 which I did not receive a ruling from the Bench.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Karnavas, you're
6 absolutely right.
7 Mr. Scott, the witness was not aware of this document because he
8 told us that at the time he'd already left. He'd already left this post.
9 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I believe --
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] However -- however, there might
11 be a number of control and observation procedures outlined in this
12 document. What do you want to set out in this document? Is it the tenor
13 of this document? But that could be commented upon by other people. Or
14 do you want to point out what the procedures were?
15 MR. SCOTT: Both, Your Honour, and let me say that this man is in
16 a perfectly good condition to explain. He knows the issue generally.
17 He's talked about it yesterday and today, that he's familiar with the
18 issue of the concern, the continuing concern from 1992 to 1994 about the
19 presence of the Croatian army in Bosnia. He has talked about his
20 responsibilities. By this time he was continuing as the military advisor
21 to Stoltenberg. He was the principal military advisor to the conference
22 on the former Yugoslavia, and still involved in these issues and very
23 knowledgeable of UNMO and UNPROFOR procedure. I think that puts him in a
24 completely suitable position to explain to us aspects of the documents.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I've been observing the witness. He's
1 studying the document as if he's about to give oral examinations. And
2 there's nothing wrong with that but it would appear to me that the
3 gentleman has never seen the document. Therefore, I don't know how he's
4 able to comment about the contents of the document itself.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I'm going to put the
6 question myself. We don't want to be wasting any time.
7 General, Mr. Scott has just said that you were the military
8 advisors of -- to Lord Owen. That fact given to us by Mr. Scott. And as
9 military advisors, you certainly had a general knowledge of the military
10 matters in Bosnia. Therefore, I'd like to put to you the following
11 important question: Were the negotiators aware of the presence of
12 elements of the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Was it an observation that had
15 been transmitted or conveyed to the observers? You say yes, but can you
16 please expand on your answer?
17 THE WITNESS: In my work at the international conference we also
18 received the daily reports from -- situation reports from UNPROFOR, as
19 well as the UNMO situation report, and we followed up on them every
20 morning. So whatever was reported by UNMOs and UNPROFOR, we knew of it
21 even if we did not perhaps follow it in such a detail as one did in
22 UNPROFOR because we had a lot of other things to do.
23 MR. SCOTT:
24 Q. Sir, if you can then just assist us in various parts of this
25 report then and based on your knowledge. The first -- going back to the
1 first paragraph with this background in mind, it says: "On the 15th of
2 February, 1994, UNMO Dubrovnik received a letter from southern sector CA
4 Now, could I ask you to look at 10011, which in fact appears to be
5 a letter to -- in the upper-left corner you will see "UNMO Dubrovnik."
6 Indeed the 15th of February, 1994, from a Croatian army general,
7 apparently Marinovic.
8 I need to point out a couple of documents to you before I can then
9 put my final couple of questions to you about this. Keeping that document
10 in mind, if you go back to Exhibit 7915, to the second paragraph, please,
11 the one that begins the 18th of February -- "On 18 February." In that
12 paragraph you'll see a reference to "See UNMO report attached (IN.327)."
13 Do you see that?
14 A. Yep.
15 Q. And can you confirm to the Judges that UNMO reports were numbered
16 in such a fashion?
17 A. No.
18 Q. No?
19 A. No. I don't remember how they were numbered.
20 Q. You don't remember. All right. Can I ask you to look at Exhibit
22 A. Yep.
23 Q. If I can ask you to look, please, to the up -- far upper-left
24 corner of Exhibit 10013. Do you see the number --
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. -- "IN.327"?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Can I ask you to go to the next paragraph of 7915, the report,
4 which says: "On the 18th of February, another letter was received from
5 southern sector CA headquarters." And can I ask you, please, to look at
6 Exhibit 10012. And do you see that that is in fact a letter to UNMO
7 Dubrovnik, indeed dated 18 February 1994, from a Croatian army officer,
8 apparently Mihocevic.
9 A. Yep.
10 Q. And finally, if you look at the next paragraph of the report, it
11 says: "On 19 February, UNMOs conducted more patrols into the HVO AOR.
12 See UNMO report attached (IN.356)." And if I can ask you to look, please,
13 at Exhibit 7913. If you have that, sir, can I again ask you to look in
14 the upper left corner of that document and is that UNMO report -- does
15 that UNMO report in fact bear the number IN.356?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. In the second of the two letters from the Croatian army officer,
18 the one that is Exhibit 10012, the officer Mihocevic appears to be
19 complaining that to their -- to the Croatian army's disappointment, no one
20 was there to see them when they withdrew. Do you see that?
21 A. Yep.
22 Q. Can you tell again based on what we've covered this morning and
23 the reason for asking you these questions what was the situation generally
24 as you recall at the time if you can give us some assistance. Why would
25 the Croatian -- why would the Croatian army wanted to have been seen
1 withdrawing from Bosnia and Herzegovina by the international community at
2 this time?
3 A. I suppose that this was a time when the federation was born. So I
4 suppose Zagreb had every reason to appear to cooperate. That's my only
5 explanation why they were eager to -- to make sure that it was well-known
6 that they withdraw.
7 Q. General Pellnas, that concludes my questions. I want to thank you
8 very much for coming to The Hague and giving your testimony.
9 A. Thank you.
10 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honours, for the additional time.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [No interpretation] Who is
12 going to start Mr. Ibrisimovic? I'm turning to the Defence. Who would
13 like to start?
14 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] [Previous translation
15 continues] ... for this witness and we give our time to the other Defence
16 teams. Thank you.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. For Mr. Coric.
18 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your
19 Honours. Good morning to everyone in the courtroom. Could I please ask
20 the usher to come and collect our binders, please.
21 Cross-examination by Ms. Tomasegovic Tomic:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General. Whilst we're waiting for
23 the binders to be distributed, I will have a couple of questions by way of
24 an introduction. And I will be dealing solely with joint police patrols
25 you mentioned yesterday, and I believe we will be finished quite soon.
1 Yesterday, you told us in your testimony at pages 39, 41, and 42
2 of the record, of the transcript, that joint police patrols operated on a
3 24-hour basis, and that discussions on the patrols started on the 20th of
4 April in Mostar, and that on the 21st of April, 1993, you visited the
5 location where the joint patrol was stationed at. You told us that you
6 came across soldiers there and not policemen. You also told us that this
7 was one of the things that disappointed you.
8 The first question I should like to put to you is the following:
9 When you say -- or when you refer to joint police patrols, did you mean
10 joint police patrols of the military police or joint police patrols of the
11 civilian police? What -- what was it that you expected to find there?
12 A. I expected to find normal police, civilian police. The
13 word "military police" was never mentioned or discussed.
14 Q. Very well. I should like to move on to the documents now. Before
15 you you have a binder of documents. Their Honours also have hard copies,
16 and we have also distributed them to the interpreters' booths so that we
17 don't have to wait for them to show up on e-court.
18 Let us first look at document 5D 02052.
19 A. Say again, please.
20 Q. 5D 02052. That's the last document in your binder.
21 This document is dated the 21st of April, 1993. This is the
22 report on the work of the mixed group of the BH army and HVO. I will read
23 out only the first sentence on page 1 and the last line at page 1 in the
24 English version, as well as page 2. And these passages are the same in
25 the Croatian version as well.
1 The first sentence of the document reads as follows: "On the 21st
2 of April, 1993, the mixed patrol of the ABiH and HVO that had the task to
3 maintain public law and order in the city of Mostar, and which was located
4 in the building of Vodoprivreda of the HZ HB hereby submits the following
6 I will move on to that other sentence, which is in the last line
7 on that page. "At 0710 hours on the 21st of April, 1993, General Pellnas
8 arrived again, and he was informed of all the events that had taken place
9 during the night. He finds the action successful, and thinks, believes,
10 that his -- that this kind of work should continue until -- until a more
11 stable solution is found. The main conclusion of the joint patrol is that
12 tasks and powers for the tasks should be given immediately in a written
13 form so that it could work efficiently."
14 Signed on behalf of the HVO by Zarko Juric and on behalf of the
15 ABiH Esad Humo and Goran Jelavic.
16 Tell me, sir, is this document referring to that visit of yours
17 that you described for us when you went to that location and met with
18 members of the joint patrol?
19 A. It's the first time I see the document, but obviously it refers to
20 my visit to the -- what I called the joint police.
21 Q. Thank you. Let us please look at another document, which is 2D
22 00313, and that's the penultimate document in your binder.
23 A. Yep.
24 Q. This is a joint public announcement which was drafted by the
25 commander of the forced corps -- the 4th Corps of the ABiH army, Arif
1 Pasalic, and the chief of operation zone south-east Herzegovina, Petar
2 Zelenika. The public announcements states at the very beginning: "Today
3 on the 21st of April, 1993," and so on and so forth. And let us look at
4 Item 4, please, which reads: "Joint teams of the military police will be
5 formed and will perform their duties once the conclusion contained in item
6 1 is implemented," and I will not read it now but it refers -- it refers
7 to the withdrawal of the armies into their respective barracks.
8 Please tell me, did you see this release, press release, at the
9 time you were in Mostar?
10 A. Not that I remember.
11 Q. But you are familiar with Mr. Pasalic and Mr. Zelenika. You know
12 who they were?
13 A. Certainly.
14 Q. Please let us look at document P 02030 now. This is the first
15 document in your binder.
16 This is an order by the commander of the operations zone of East
17 Herzegovina, brigadier Miljenko Lasic, dated the 22nd of April, 1993. The
18 operation zone of South-east Herzegovina.
19 Let us look at item 8 which is on page 2 in the English version,
20 which reads: "Joint HVO military police and BH army teams shall be
21 established to carry out around-the-clock patrols of all parts of the city
22 and to control the situation."
23 Tell me, did you see this document while you were in Mostar? And
24 were you aware of this order?
25 A. I was aware of part of it, but I think I only got it in verbal
1 version. For example, "That all members should be forbidden to wear black
2 uniform," which was a reaction of myself coming and complaining about the
3 special unit at Hotel Ero. And I found it a bit ridiculous, and at the
4 time when they said that all units should not -- be forbidden to wear
5 black uniforms, because I never believed it was an HVO unit anyway.
6 I have seen another document, I believe, but not this one.
7 There -- there was a document, and it may well be here.
8 Q. No, it is not here. Let me tell you why I'm asking you all of
9 this. Let me tell you one thing, and I'm saying this for the sake of the
10 Trial Chamber and everyone else in the courtroom, that on the 13th of
11 February, 2007, Witness A was examined here. He was a member of the
12 military police of the ABiH, and he told us that once the agreement was
13 reached joint military police patrols were formed. He was a member of one
14 such patrol as a member of the military police of the BH army. He told us
15 that the patrols were operational until the 7th or the 8th of May, 1993.
16 He said that the part of the patrol that consisted of members of the BH
17 army was housed in the SDK building. He indicated that they went about
18 performing their duties in -- as per normal, that they had to take off all
19 of their military insignia, and that they were distinguished from
20 others -- from other soldiers merely by wearing white belts.
21 The question I have for you now is the following: When you
22 visited the building where these joint patrols were located, you actually
23 saw members of the military police there and not just ordinary soldiers,
24 didn't you?
25 A. At the time I could see no difference or did not observe any
1 difference, which is -- I saw them as military personnel, or what I saw
2 them as, but my first and most important impression was that they were not
3 there to do any job at all. And during the days I spent in Mostar, no
4 patrolling took place. If that was the case afterwards, I cannot comment
6 Q. You told us that the patrols were operational for 24 hours only.
7 I paraphrased a statement by a witness, a member of the BH army, who was a
8 member of these patrols and who stated before the Trial Chamber that they
9 performed their duties until the 7th or 8th of May, 1993.
10 Let us look at the last document you have in the binder there,
11 which is document number P 02192. And can we move into closed session
12 whilst we're dealing with this document, because this is a SpaBat
13 document, which is under seal, I believe.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The document is under seal. We
15 therefore need to move into private session.
16 [Private session]
18 [Open session]
19 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Who is next? Mr. Karnavas?
21 MR. Karnavas: I will be next, Mr. President. I'll need a couple
22 of minutes to -- well, a minute to set up, and the usher can get the
24 May I begin? Once again good morning, Mr. President, good
25 morning, Your Honours.
1 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas:
2 Q. Good morning, General. My name is Michael Karnavas. With me is
3 Ms. Suzana Tomanovic, and we represent Jadranko Prlic.
4 I have four or five areas that I want to cover, but first I
5 thought we would go through some housekeeping matters.
6 In looking at your statements, you gave four statements, two of
7 which are related more or less to this case. Would that be correct? One
8 being on the -- the 19th to 22nd of June, 1999, and the second one
9 being -- I believe it was in 4 to 5 December 2001.
10 A. If you say so, yes. I don't remember the dates, and I don't have
11 the papers.
12 Q. All right. Were you given an opportunity to review your
13 statements, by the way, and when you arrived here at The Hague?
14 A. I have reviewed them, yes.
15 Q. Okay. And you also published a book, I guess in -- in Swedish.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. "Utan Slut", is that --
18 A. "Without End," yes.
19 Q. Okay. And I just want to cover a couple of points real quickly
20 first of all, because my client's name, Dr. Jadranko Prlic, comes up. May
21 I ask first and foremost how much time, actual time did you spend with him
22 discussing any matters?
23 A. Very will time. We had lunch together on one occasion as I
24 remember, but I don't remember when. It was probably before the events in
25 Mostar, which are described in my book.
1 Q. Okay.
2 A. Then I met him on a meeting at the hospital, and then I just had
3 this very short encounter in hotel Ana Marija when he said hello.
4 Q. All right. Is it fair to say in April 1993 when you went into
5 Mostar you did not have any in-depth conversations with him?
6 A. No.
7 Q. And aside from seeing him on that one particular day when you
8 arrived at -- I guess it was the hospital, the Mostar hospital, you did
9 not have any further contact with him the following days that you were in
11 A. No.
12 Q. And if we could fast forward, when you did run into him, and I
13 believe those were your terms on one of your statements, you said you ran
14 into him in Medjugorje, that would have been, I believe, in February
15 1990 --
16 A. 4.
17 Q. He wasn't -- he didn't attend a meeting there?
18 A. He was in company with some individuals at the hotel.
19 Q. Right. He wasn't accompanied, but my question was that he did not
20 attend the meeting. He was not there as part of any meeting?
21 A. I don't know in what capacity he was there but certainly not a
22 meeting with me.
23 Q. Exactly. And you didn't have any discussions with him other than
24 him coming up to you?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And it was him that made the initiation to come up to you and to
2 greet with you -- to greet you?
3 A. I don't remember how we met, if he was going out or if he just
4 came up. I can't tell.
5 Q. And -- and now you say, because I don't see this anywhere else in
6 your -- in your statements or your book, that you believe you might have
7 had lunch with him prior to, I suspect, April 1993.
8 A. Yeah. I might have.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. Have I a vague recollection, but --
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. -- I won't comment on it. We had lunch on one occasion, yes.
13 Q. Okay. But I take it the lunch was rather -- well, for lack of a
14 better term, was not terribly memorable?
15 A. Oh, it was. I remember him well from the time -- from the lunch.
16 Q. Okay. But I mean -- okay. All right.
17 A. It was a social event.
18 Q. It was a social event, okay. The reason I mention this is because
19 you describe him as the self-proclaimed Prime Minister, and this would
20 have been back in April 1993. Did you actually know what his title was?
21 You say he was a self-Prime Minister of Herceg-Bosna. I mean, if you
22 don't know that's fine.
23 A. I must admit I haven't seen any formal documents describing his
24 title. He was referred to as the Prime Minister.
25 Q. Okay. Now when you say he was referred to, referred to by whom?
1 A. By almost everybody --
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. -- around.
4 Q. All right. And I take it when you say "everybody", those who were
5 speaking a language which you understood.
6 A. Some of them, yes.
7 Q. And -- and it was on that one occasion, the first occasion in
8 April you describe where the meeting was interrupted. Yesterday, you said
9 after Mr. Stojic left that -- I believe you used the word Mr. Prlic
10 excused --
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. -- although I believe somewhere in your book you say that he stood
13 up and apologised.
14 A. Yeah, apologised. I meant that when I say excused.
15 Q. Now, during that meeting he was polite?
16 A. Absolutely.
17 Q. And he wasn't sarcastic or scornful in any way?
18 A. No.
19 Q. All right. Now, you say you ran into him in Medjugorje and here's
20 where I have -- you know, I must say I have some -- some reservations
21 about some of your characterisations. You say that he was -- were some
22 folks that were wearing black jackets, but then at one point you describe
23 him as sort of -- I believe it was in your second statement, the perfect
24 style Mafia man, and then later on --
25 A. No. No.
1 Q. -- you're referring to the men in black.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. I see. Okay. Would it be fair to say that a lot of people in the
4 former Yugoslavia wear black jackets?
5 A. Yeah. That is true.
6 Q. Okay.
7 A. But just let me then clarify that it was my very definite
8 impression that the person he was sitting with were criminals and from
9 that I was back to my other experience and I still believe they were
11 Q. Okay. You didn't know them?
12 A. No.
13 Q. You didn't speak to them?
14 A. No.
15 Q. You didn't have them investigated?
16 A. No.
17 Q. But this was an impression that you formed?
18 A. I got the strong impression that --
19 Q. You got a strong impression?
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. That was based on what they were wearing?
22 A. It was based on how they looked and how they were dressed and how
23 they behaved and what I know from previous occasions and other people and
24 other corners on the Balkans so that created the impression.
25 Q. The impression.
1 A. Yep.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. And it is just an impression.
4 Q. All right. Okay. And one might say that as far as you were
5 concerned they were also in bad taste, stylistic taste?
6 A. Absolutely.
7 Q. Okay. All right. One other matter I just wanted to bring up
8 before we go into other areas. You indicated in your book that you met
9 Mate Boban on two occasions, at least, the first time was in Zagreb and
10 that would have been I believe on the 17th of April, correct, 1993?
11 A. Yep.
12 Q. And it was a short meeting. I believe it was at the
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And at that point I believe you described him as sort of being
16 like the perfect hotel manager type, cordial, convivial?
17 A. Yeah, he looked very amicable, yep.
18 Q. All right. And then I noticed that when you describe him again
19 the second time that you meet him, and this would have been a few days
20 later, which is when you say that at that point in time at that second
21 meeting, I believe it was the 22nd or the 23rd of April, that you finally
22 understood what he was trying to convey to you back in Zagreb, at that
23 point you sort of described him as being or looking like a godfather with
24 bodyguards that were -- and you described them as gorillas. That kind of
25 struck me because again it seems that you're rather harsh with your
1 characterisations, your impressions, your first impressions. Could you
2 expand on that a little bit?
3 A. First of all, when you write books you have a freedom to phrase
4 yourself a little bit.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. Secondly, it was hard not to find this phrase, because if you see
7 a man coming up with two 700 BMWs wearing a silk suit and having four
8 enormously impressive bodyguards jumping out in front you it was very
9 close to see what I described.
10 Q. All right.
11 A. It's a definition of what I saw.
12 Q. Is it fair to say however, because I worked in Bosnia and I used
13 to work under an ambassador, that they normally go around with what they
14 called CPUs, close protection unit and some of those folks look pretty
15 big, no?
16 A. That he true.
17 Q. The whole purpose is if you are going to be a bodyguard, you have
18 to look rather impressive, no? Sort of like me, would not make a big
19 impression on anybody.
20 A. Okay. But if you take a timid man in Intercont and the man coming
21 out in a silk suit out of 2 BMWs 700 with four very big bodyguards it gets
22 another impression and that's what I have written about.
23 Q. All right. May I ask you, was that impression formed at that
24 moment or was it formed, you know, did it cogitate in your mind and as you
25 were sitting there in France writing the book you know, searching for ways
1 to describe the -- the scene?
2 A. No. I think it -- the impression was born at that moment.
3 Q. Okay. And the reason I'm asking is because if you see somebody
4 who purportedly is there on behalf of, you know, as the -- as the
5 president and you have this impression, might that have coloured your
6 opinion of anything that he might have been trying to convey?
7 A. I would put it the other way.
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. I think I stood by my first impression writing the book because of
10 what I later learnt --
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. -- about the area and the role of Mr. Boban.
13 Q. All right.
14 A. I think it verified and sort of gave me the right to write this
16 Q. All right. Now, on both occasions, we're going to get a little
17 ahead of ourselves, but on both occasions, I want to cover what Mr. Boban
18 was trying to convey to you. As I understand, it was -- what he was
19 trying to say that the way he envisaged the situation between the Croats
20 and the Muslim armies, that is, that they could co-exist and fight against
21 the common enemy, which would have been the Serbs, would have been north
22 of a particular area. The -- the Croats would be subordinated to the
23 Muslim army and south of that line and vice versa. Would that being
25 A. That is a possible interpretation of what Mr. Boban said.
1 Q. Okay.
2 A. But I did not believe in them and the events following when they
3 actually did not fight the Serbs but the Muslim gave me some vindification
4 for my idea to see what he actually proposed.
5 Q. Okay. Well, we're going to take it one step at a time because you
6 say that your impression -- at least in your book you say that your
7 impression was that he was proposing a division of Bosnia but then later
8 on you say he asked you to work out an appropriate solution to make a
9 proposal to Lord Owen.
10 A. Yep.
11 Q. Okay. So the context in which he was telling you these things was
12 for you as a military man, him being a politician, and let's face it,
13 sometimes politician may have ideas but military folks have to implement
14 those ideas in the field and the military men are the most capable of
15 determining what is and is not feasible, he was then asking you to then go
16 to Lord Owen, another politician, if it -- or --
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. -- political individual --
19 A. Yep, yep.
20 Q. -- or civilian to make a proposal to Lord Owen, who at the time,
21 and correct me if I'm wrong, at the time was engaged in the Vance-Owen
22 peace process; correct?
23 A. He was, yes.
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. But I didn't take it seriously because I had no connection
1 whatsoever with David Owen at that time.
2 Q. All right. Well, when you say -- now, I agree with you on that
3 one. Did you communicate that to Mr. Boban and say, you know, thank you
4 very much, but I don't -- I don't have a brief with Mr. Owen?
5 A. I think Mr. Boban knew exactly what low rank I had for the moment
6 in my position and that I had no connection with the Vance-Owen group.
7 Q. Okay. You say --
8 A. So I found it completely unnecessary to define my role.
9 Q. Okay. Well, you say low rank. First of all, you were a general.
10 Second of all, you were a foreigner. Third, you were with the UN. And
11 fourth, you were in Zagreb. And you did have a rather high position
12 within the UN. Would you not say that?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. Okay. So you weren't such a low individual?
15 A. Well, comparatively, yes.
16 Q. Comparatively. Well, if I may say so, I've been observing you.
17 You don't -- you don't carry yourself like you're low profile?
18 A. It's because I'm old.
19 Q. Well, I don't think so. I think from reading what you went --
20 when you went down to Mostar, you're a man of action?
21 A. Unfortunately.
22 Q. Okay. So perhaps he may have come to you because he thought that
23 you might have been able to assist. Did that -- did that ever cross your
25 A. No, it didn't.
1 Q. Okay. All right. Now, you indicated to us that you were not
2 involved in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. May I ask, may I ask were you at
3 the time keeping up with what was happening with those negotiations in any
5 A. Not really, no.
6 Q. Okay.
7 A. Not really. I had the general viewpoint but not in detail.
8 Q. And I take it Vance-Owen, or Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen, did not in
9 any way brief -- brief your department as far as what they were doing or
10 what they were trying to achieve?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Would it be fair to say that part of the Vance-Owen peace process,
13 it wasn't just trying to find a political solution for Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina but also how the militaries could work together? There was
15 all sorts of different components to that.
16 A. Obviously, yes.
17 Q. All right.
18 A. And I say obviously because I was pulled in in Zagreb on a meeting
19 when they were there to present some sort of military.
20 Q. Exactly. Now I think you said it was in one of your statements
21 you said it was April 30th?
22 A. 30th, yes.
23 Q. But could it have been April 24th? Could you be mistaken on that
24 particular day?
25 A. I could be mistaken.
1 Q. Okay. And that was the first time as I understand it, and correct
2 me if I'm wrong, that was the first time when you were pulled in that you
3 were either engaged in, a participant of, or an observer of the process
4 one of the three?
5 A. Yes, correct.
6 Q. Okay. Did they actually, at that particular time, ask you to --
7 to engage yourself at that moment or at some other -- or was it at some
8 other point?
9 A. No, it was -- I don't know if it was the day before or in the
10 morning it was Brigadier John Wilson who called me and asked me to
11 come and --
12 Q. Okay.
13 A. -- tried to help to present some sort of formula for the military
15 Q. Okay. Now, them asking you that, that was based on your limited
16 knowledge of what was happening in the field. Would that be correct?
17 A. If you wanted to mention -- name it, limit it.
18 Q. Okay.
19 A. Go on.
20 Q. Well, I don't want to put words in your mouth, but you term -- in
21 your book you talk about what lessons you could draw from your excursion.
22 That was the word that you used and I actually went up and I looked at the
23 word excursion on the dictionary to make sure, and you seem to be a man
24 who chooses his words rather well, but that in essence was your entire, up
25 until that point, involvement in working between the Croats and the
1 Muslims in trying to find a solution among themselves; correct?
2 A. Well, I came down in late October to the area, and I took up
3 office on -- in November, early November. So I had been in the States for
4 a couple of months before this happened, almost half a year.
5 Q. Right. But you were in Zagreb?
6 A. I was not very much time in Zagreb. I was most of the time in
7 Bosnia, actually.
8 Q. And were you in -- in the Mostar area dealing with Croat-Muslim
10 A. Not before then.
11 Q. Okay not before then. So when I'm saying -- when you refer to
12 your excursion, the -- the universe, if you want to put it that way, of
13 your experience, hands on experience, in dealing with Croat-Muslim
14 problems, was that period when you went in April 1993; correct?
15 A. Yeah, correct.
16 Q. And as I understand from reading your statements, when Mr. Ganic
17 showed up you did not expect him.
18 A. No.
19 Q. And he introduce -- he was introduced to you, I believe, by
20 General --
21 A. Wahlgren.
22 Q. -- Wahlgren?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. As a vice-president of Bosnia?
25 A. Yep, yep.
1 Q. Would it surprise you, sir, if I were to tell you that at that
2 point in time such a position did not exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
3 A. No, it wouldn't surprise me a bit.
4 Q. Okay. He was a member of the Presidency. You had heard of the
5 Presidency; correct?
6 A. Yep.
7 Q. And you're shaking your head. We need to make a record.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And as I understand it, later on when you went to Mostar, you also
10 met a gentleman, although we don't see it anywhere in your report perhaps
11 because he didn't make much of an impression, Mr. Franjo Boras. Do you
12 recall him?
13 A. I don't remember him from the meeting. It is a possibility that I
14 actually had lunch with him, but I don't remember the name. If -- if you
15 will present me with a photograph of him, I will -- I can possibly
16 identify him.
17 Q. I think he's a short wiry type of fellow who is probably older
18 than you at the time.
19 A. Yes. In that case he still is if he's still alive.
20 Q. Okay. And -- and he was a member of the Presidency, by the way.
21 A. Yep.
22 Q. And he also had equal rank, if you will, with -- with Mr. Ganic.
23 Okay. Were you aware of that at the time?
24 A. No.
25 Q. All right. Did Mr. Ganic introduce to you and say here is my
1 colleague from the Presidency --
2 A. No.
3 Q. Okay. Were you aware that he had come up from Sarajevo? Mr.
4 Boras, that is.
5 A. No, I wasn't aware.
6 Q. Okay. Now, as I understand it, before we get to your impressions
7 of Mr. Ganic, at some point, be it as it may, based on the conversations
8 that were being held at the time, you were asked to go -- to go down into
9 the Mostar area because meetings were taking place; correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And as I understand it, you did not have any particular mission,
12 as it were. And I use the word "mission" because I think military folks
13 like to work with missions. You know, they want to know what the term --
14 the terms of engagement are and what have you. So you didn't have a brief
15 in a sense; right?
16 A. No, it was not a very well-formulated task.
17 Q. Right. But you being a general, being in the military, being a
18 sort of action man, you went down there and sort of seized the situation,
19 as it were, and tried to take some action, what you believed to be
20 appropriate under the circumstances.
21 A. Well, of course I went with the general understanding that there
22 was maybe a conflict coming, and our task was to do whatever we could to
23 avoid that conflict, to go into reality, so.
24 Q. Okay. Had you been told by the way from Mr. Ganic and others that
25 there had already been an ongoing process in theatre, if you want to call
1 it that, whereby the European Monitors, the ECMM, were at the time engaged
2 with both parties in trying to figure out ways that would implement the
3 Vance-Owen peace process?
4 A. I was extremely poorly briefed about the ECMM undertakings in the
6 Q. Do you think, and I'm asking you now to speculate. I might be
7 drawing an objection, but do you think Mr. Ganic would have known what was
8 happening in the field before he set out to meet with you to ask you, the
9 UN that is, to come down and sort things out?
10 A. Well, he anyway said that he had had consultations with Mr. Boban.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. And they were in agreeance on the necessity to create good
14 Q. All right. Okay. And I don't want to go into the meetings too
15 much because others may cover it, but if we could go through some -- some
16 of the documents, but before we do that, you described -- you spent some
17 time with Mr. Ganic on a one-on-one; correct?
18 A. Yep.
19 Q. Much more time than you did, for instance, with Mr. Prlic?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Okay. You were able to sort of glean the type of person he was?
22 A. I had described at least his outer behaviours and looks.
23 Q. Okay. He spoke English?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Had been trained in America or educated in America or worked in
2 A. I don't know that.
3 Q. But he spoke enough English for you to communicate in that same
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And you said that he wasn't very talkative but rarely explicit.
7 That's one way you've put it.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Okay. And then you said that --
10 A. He made very -- if I use the word nervous, it's a bit like that.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. Unsteady.
13 Q. Unsteady.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You also say he was volatile, incoherent, unrealistic. You gave
16 us a description of what Misa Glenny -- how he characterised him as
17 suffering from --
18 A. I think that was deeply unjustified.
19 Q. All right. But you also said he was characterised as a fanatical
20 Muslim and an extremist?
21 A. Some people claim that he was. I found no verification of that.
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. Just about the record. Suffering
23 from something you were saying, but it is not in the record.
24 MR. KARNAVAS: Incipient senility.
25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Senility. It was just awkward to have nothing in
1 the transcript and then a comment on that by General --
2 MR. KARNAVAS:
3 Q. Yes. And of course you -- you're not a psychologist or
4 psychiatrist, you didn't psycho-analyse that these were some of the
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Did you ever, by the way, read Lord Owen's book on Mr. Ganic?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Were you aware and perhaps we could just go through this very
10 quickly. I don't want to spend too much time on it but I think it might
11 be important on a global text -- for global reasons. 1D 01547. This is
12 an excerpt. I have three short excerpts from David Owen's book, and on
13 page 89 of that book, and I'll read from the middle of the page, he
14 said -- well, he characterises him first as being the most complex person
15 in the Bosnian government. But later on he says: "He was one -- he has
16 one central policy objective, namely to involve the US army as a combatant
17 in the Bosnian fight to defeat the Serbs, as he sees it, to achieve this
18 aim of which he makes no secret. He's entitled to use whatever means are
19 necessary. To him the ends justify those means. He orchestrates Bosnian
20 government propaganda operating at every level in the US, at the white
21 house or capitol hill and on the television screens in American homes."
22 Then later on - I'll skip one sentence - he goes on to
23 say: "There is a doggedness about his character that shows itself in his
24 readiness to spend much time in Sarajevo and take the risks of its
25 citizens, but the focus of his attention and his travel is on the US. He
1 knows that you have to spend money to be heard in America and is ready,
2 therefore, to employ media consultants and use all the modern techniques
3 of communications."
4 And then it goes on. I don't want to spend too much more time,
5 but did you -- were you aware of these qualities of Mr. Ganic?
6 A. Well, anyway, I saw him very often on American television.
7 Q. And I take it he was promoting his --
8 A. Yep.
9 Q. -- point of view.
10 A. Yep.
11 Q. Okay. Now if we could turn to another section of Mr. -- Mr.
12 Owen's book. And this I'm referring to now is 1D 01548.
13 A. 1548.
14 Q. Yeah, 1548.
15 A. Yep. I now realise I have read -- I have read the "Balkan
17 Q. Yes. It's hard to --
18 A. It's a thick book.
19 Q. You got to know Mr. Owen, did you not?
20 A. Yes, rather well.
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. Rather well.
23 Q. Would you say he was a serious individual?
24 A. We are talking about the former Foreign Minister of United
25 Kingdom, Great Britain. So he is serious.
1 Q. Okay. All right. We have two fellas from the UK so they are
2 happy to hear these words. I hear the chuckling.
3 If we could just probably to save time just go to -- flip the page
4 and go to 220 in the middle of the passage, because this is a lengthy
5 letter that was sent by Mr. Owen, and in the middle of it he says: "My
6 biggest fear is not how the Serbs are reacting but that such talk will
7 encourage Ganic and others who want to continue with the war that the
8 Americans are about to intervene. Ganic certainly is attempting to derail
9 the negotiations and is hoping for airstrikes. He may even now be
10 seeing -- we may even be seeing a slowing in the tempo of the negotiations
11 because of the NAC meetings -- meeting. Izetbegovic is talking openly
12 about needing four to five days more for negotiations. Silajdzic and
13 others here have been most unhelpful and have not been trying to -- and
14 have been trying to undermine Izetbegovic's negotiating position, but so
15 far to no avail."
16 Now -- and this is the autumn of 1993 in the book.
17 Were you aware that Mr. Ganic was sort of engaged in this sort of
18 a -- these sorts of tactics? I know you talked about it yesterday. At
19 some point the Muslims for sure did not want to end the war because they
20 were gaining ground, but were you aware that this was happening?
21 A. I think there was a constant effort from the Izetbegovic side and
22 people around him to bring in an active participation, at least to have
23 arms, and working on the media and public opinion in the United States,
24 and I think they were very skilful at it.
25 Q. All right. And did you notice by any chance when you were in the
1 field, in theatre, that at some point there was a shift in -- from the
2 Vance-Owen Peace Plan to sort of an American approach in trying to find a
4 A. Yeah. I would say when the Contact Group really came in the
5 international conference of the former Yugoslavia was more or less brushed
6 aside during the summer of 1994. That's --
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. -- that's why I had the opportunity to write the book, because we
9 went out of work for a while.
10 Q. Okay. But because you were out of work you're not now somehow
11 tailoring your answers. In other words, your observations were based on
12 what was happening as opposed to maybe harbouring some animosity towards
13 the Americans for ending your mission?
14 A. No, I have no animosity. I just state the fact that the Contact
15 Group suddenly came in with a big effort and made a real impact and they
16 brushed us aside.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. We became politically unimportant during this period.
19 Q. All right. If we could look at just one last document on this
20 issue and that's 1D 01549. Again, from Mr. Owen's book. And this would
21 be on page 236. We see the date above it is 30th September. This is
22 towards the third paragraph on the page, and I'm just going to read sort
23 of in the middle of that paragraph. It says: "Our own reporting showed
24 that Izetbegovic had appeared to be in the pro-peace camp but had never
25 championed it. His performance was low-key and detached at all times.
1 Ganic's position was very hardline. It had been strikingly noticeable
2 that he continued to talk about the need for land on the sea and was not
3 satisfied with a proposed solution of Ploce and a port on the Neretva."
4 We can go on further down. He says -- we pick up where it he
5 says: "Silajdzic was apparently trying to reach a deal with the Croats
6 having spent two weeks in Zagreb talking with Foreign Minister Mate Granic
7 to get a proposed Muslim-Croat working group off the ground, being aware
8 that at one stage the SDA leaders had come very close to declaring a
9 Muslim state."
10 Were you aware that this was -- that this was an ongoing process
11 while you were trying to find a solution, you and others, that you had
12 Mr. Ganic, who appeared nervously to you, or was nervous when he came up,
13 perhaps maybe that was part of his tatoi, you know, part of his shtick as
14 we say, to appear nervous and timid?
15 A. Nervous is not the correct translation of what I mean in Swedish.
16 Q. Okay.
17 A. If you mean nervous, anxious I don't mean that.
18 Q. Were you aware that this was Mr. Ganic's --
19 A. I'm becoming very inconvenient with what you're asking me now.
20 You had the great objections that I should comment upon UN resolutions.
21 Now you ask me to comment upon "Balkan Odyssey" by Lord Owen.
22 Q. I'm asking you to comment about an individual that you spend time
23 with --
24 A. Yeah.
25 Q. -- and you characterise him in various fashions and I'm asking you
1 whether you were --
2 A. I think Lord Owen can speak for himself and the text is there.
3 Q. Okay. But were you aware that this was happening behind your back
4 at least, that this was an agenda?
5 A. The whole world was happening behind my back of course.
6 Q. Okay.
7 A. There was an enormous amount of polititians, military men and
8 states involved in the Balkan drama. And if you believed that you knew
9 what was going on -- nobody knew actually what was going on, not even the
10 big players I guess.
11 Q. Okay. And I mention all this because we're going to get into some
12 other areas, but in your own book, you talk about being politically naive.
13 This is from your lessons that you learned apparently from your excursion.
14 A. Yeah. And I meant that we -- I at least completely underestimated
15 the width of the contradictions in the Mostar area. It was far deeper
16 than I thought when I went down.
17 Q. Okay. All right. Because you say we were far too ignorant or at
18 leave I was of the political game that was being played.
19 A. Yep.
20 Q. It should have been much better prepared.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Would it be correct to say that one way of getting better prepared
23 would have been, for instance, to have become more familiar with what was
24 happening in the Vance-Owen peace process, so at least you would have
25 known what the two parties were being asked to do and what the two parties
1 were doing with the peace negotiators? Would that have been helpful? In
2 hindsight, of course?
3 A. Yes, of course, the more you know about what is going politically
4 the better you will act as a military man also in the field.
5 Q. Okay.
6 A. On the other hand, one solution I gave to Wahlgren afterwards was
7 that UNPROFOR should have established a territorial system with
8 experienced officers. In that case you would have had a brigadier general
9 in the Mostar area --
10 Q. Right.
11 A. -- working with the parties.
12 Q. Okay.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours, I'm about to start a new chapter.
14 Perhaps we could take a break at this point.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to have a 20-minute
17 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. I'm told that I used up
21 36, was it? Thirty-eight, 38 minutes. I was told that I was getting 15
22 minutes from one of the teams. I think it was the Pusic team. So that
23 would give me 45 by your calculation. I would be asking Your Honours to
24 allow me to do -- to have a full hour, you know, starting from now. But
25 if that's not the case, then I would like some guidance as to how much
1 time the Trial Chamber's willing to give me.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You want one hour starting from
3 now? Well, please proceed then.
4 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Very well.
5 Q. We'll move rather quickly, General, and hopefully we won't use up
6 the whole hour. I want to -- I have a couple of documents going --
7 referring to April 1993. If we could go to document 1D 01546, 1546.
8 A. Yep.
9 Q. If you could look at that. You will see that it says at the top
10 that this is a weekly summary report, 28 of March to 3 April 1993. It
11 appears to be generated from HQ ECMM. Do you see that, sir?
12 A. Yep.
13 Q. Okay. And of course you're familiar with the fact that this --
14 the -- the headquarters of the ECMM would have been in Zenica -- or the
15 regional centre was in Zenica; correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Just two brief matters. If we just look at sort of the last
18 paragraph, it says: "The Muslim authorities have, however, continued
19 their negotiations with Bosnian Croats in order to reach a common
20 agreement on a joint military command." And I merely point this out
21 because it would appear at least as early as this particular week there
22 were discussions ongoing between the Croats and the Muslims to try to
23 reach some accommodation for joint command structure; correct?
24 A. I have no comment on this.
25 Q. Okay. Very well. Well, was this brought to your attention by the
2 A. No. I -- I only knew about the contacts through what Ganic said
3 about his contacts with Mate Boban.
4 Q. Okay. Now Just very briefly, when you did arrive in Mostar on the
5 18th, I believe, you indicated that the hearing -- or the meeting had
6 already started, and it was Mr. -- or Ambassador Thebault; is that
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. He was the head of the ECMM?
10 A. In the Zenica regional centre, I guess.
11 Q. Now, due to the circumstances because a lot of things were
12 happening at the time, I realise that you were very busy, did you have an
13 opportunity to actually discuss with Mr. Thebault what the ECMM might have
14 been doing prior to your arrival in facilitating the process between the
15 two parties?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Okay. All right. If we could flip to the next page very briefly,
18 because it says here: "The Mostar authorities are also developing an
19 overall negotiations offer concerning the future organisation of the
20 republic. HCC Grude has so been approached at the level of Mr. Prlic,
21 president of HVO, who overhands a proposal made some days before by
22 Mr. Maric to propose to ECMM to play a mediation role in negotiations
23 which could be led not only with the Muslim community but also with the
24 Bosnian Serb government. HRC should meet Mr. Prlic and members of its
25 government next Thursday after their weekly meeting in order to make its
1 proposal more precise."
2 Were you aware of this -- this process, sir?
3 A. As I say before, only through what I learnt from Mr. Ganic. I
4 also understood that there had been discussions between Tudjman and
6 Q. Right. Okay. But as far as Mr. -- I notice that in your book you
7 make a -- you describe an ECMM monitor from the UK, someone who was
8 handsome but also had a knack for aggravating or infuriating folks, be
9 they Croat, Serb or Muslim.
10 A. Yes. It was a nasty comment on my part.
11 Q. Okay. But I mean, some people would say the same thing about me,
12 that I have a way of infuriating folks. Whether it's true or not I'll
13 plead guilty to it anyway. But that -- were you referring to by any
14 chance to Mr. Beese?
15 A. I don't remember his name.
16 Q. Okay. But were you aware, and again I don't want to press you too
17 much, but were you aware that -- that there had been meetings in early
18 April, prior to your arrival, with Dr. Jadranko Prlic, between him and the
19 ECMM, to resolve certain issues? And this was part of the process. In
20 other words, you walked into this process. Were you aware of that?
21 A. I was not aware of it.
22 Q. Okay. Finally, if we can go to -- okay. I'm told -- okay. We're
23 going to go to the next --
24 A. Well, let me phrase it like this: I do not remember that I was
25 aware of it. It was 14 years ago.
1 Q. Right. Very well. I'll skip one document. It's already in. We
2 won't comment on it. I'm trying to be as judicious with my time as
4 Okay. The next topic deals with Mostar in general and the various
5 issues. First of all, we touched upon a little bit the Vance-Owen Peace
6 Plan, and if we could look at 1D 00892, and this is -- you will see that
7 this is from a particular text. The first -- the second page shows that
8 this is the Vance-Owen Plan, and it's on page 249?
9 A. Hang on.
10 Q. But if we were to go all the way to the second to last page, and
11 that would be on -- on 273, because if we were to flip through this you'll
12 see that the Vance-Owen Peace Plan had various appendices to it and
13 annexes, but at the -- on page 273 of this particular document, document
14 1D 00892, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, we see where it says: "Province 8."
15 I draw to everyone's attention and to your's, sir, where it
16 says: "Province capital, Mostar," and then it says, "Governor nominated
17 by party A. Vice governor nominated by party B." And then further down
18 we see that there is something there for party C. And if we were to flip
19 to page 2711, we see that party A refers to the Croats, party B to the
20 Muslims and party C to the Serbs.
21 Were you aware, sir -- this is my question, were you aware that at
22 this part of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the way it had been envisaged,
23 that Mostar would be the capital, the province capital, if you were, of
24 province number 8? Were you aware of that?
25 A. I understand this was the Vance idea of a cantonal solution of
2 Q. Right. But were you aware of that?
3 A. I was aware of the cantonal plan, yes.
4 Q. But my question was rather more specific: Not so much whether you
5 were aware that it was a cantonal plan but whether you were aware that
6 Mostar would be the capital?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Okay. And I'm not suggesting that you should have been aware but
9 I'm just going through that.
10 If we go to P 02913. This is a letter. P 02913. P stands for
12 A. I know. Mm-hmm. Is this in your document as well?
13 Q. Yes, it's in my documents. It will be in the Prosecution. We
14 have it all there. It's sort of user-friendly, but I have an extra copy.
15 Mr. Usher, can we get your assistance?
16 A. No, I've got them here. Number again, please.
17 Q. P 02913.
18 A. I got it.
19 Q. Okay. We're both electronic and manual here. Now if we look at
20 it this is a letter dated 22 June 1993, and just -- if we just focus on
21 the very first paragraph it shows that this is a letter to Lord Owen, and
22 if we flip to the end we see that it's signed by Mate Boban, but we see as
23 early as 22 June 1993, that Mate Boban is noting that the -- that it is
24 impossible for the Muslims to be given Mostar, but they're talking -- the
25 talk of this paper is about the union of republics. In other words, the
1 discussions have already begun that within the greater Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina there would be a union of republics. Were you aware of that,
3 sir? As early as June 22nd.
4 A. Probably not in June 1993. I would guess I would not be in the
6 Q. Very well. If we go to 1D 01539. We're going back to Lord Owen.
7 I won't be asking you to comment on personalities, but --
8 A. Number again, please.
9 Q. 1539. 1539.
10 A. Yep.
11 Q. And again, we're on page 226. If you go to the last paragraph, we
12 note that he's talking about in Geneva on 20th of August, he says, "I
13 brief EC missions and circulated the documents for a Bosnia settlement to
14 which the leaders of the three parties had agreed in principle."
15 A. I haven't found that.
16 Q. Okay. This is --
17 A. Oh, yes. The last --
18 Q. The last paragraph.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And I underscored that they agreed in principle. I think that's
21 important so I don't want to mislead anybody that there was anything more
22 than an agreement in principle. And it talks about the parties or the
23 leaders having to consult with their parliaments. But if he would go to
24 the next page, that is 227, which is on -- on the right side of -- of this
25 page that you're looking at, sort of in the middle of that -- the first
1 paragraph it says: "Mostar was to be placed under an EC administrator for
2 up to two years along with -- along the same lines as UN administration of
3 Sarajevo. Tudjman had been implacably opposed to UN control of Mostar, so
4 I had suggested that the EC should take it on and Tudjman had accepted
5 this across the negotiating table. Fortunately, the EC later backed me,"
6 and then it goes on.
7 This is what I guess I'm trying to highlight. "It was agreed that
8 part of the city would operate as the capital of the Croat majority
9 republic." I underscore the word, it was agreed. Were you aware of that,
10 sir? And this was as early as 20th of August, 1993. If you're not,
11 that's fine and I understand you were not engaged in those negotiations.
12 A. There were so many negotiations going on and the American
13 negotiators were coming on stage and you had all sorts of information
14 about solutions and I cannot state what I knew or did not know in the late
15 summer 1993.
16 Q. Right. A bit like that old saying, too many cooks in the kitchen?
17 A. In a way, yes.
18 Q. Okay.
19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas, I'm also a bit worried about the
20 hearsay character of this. If there was an agreement, would there not be
21 any document that would document this? This is just one person telling
23 MR. KARNAVAS: We're getting there.
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Good.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Remember, Your Honours, that this is a very long
1 trial, but we're going to get there, and hopefully I will not disappoint.
2 I try not to at least.
3 Q. If we go to the next document 1D 01557. And I just want -- this
4 again is in his book. If we're fortunate we might cajole Lord Owen to
5 grace us with his testimony here. But if we look at this, 1D 01557, you
6 will see that on page 234 and page 235, it's on the same page --
7 A. There's 1557.
8 Q. 1557. That's correct.
9 A. I have to follow it here.
10 Q. You see that we have two maps.
11 A. I look at on the --
12 Q. Sir -- okay. You'll look at it on the screen.
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. Very well. If you look at it -- the reason I'm pointing this out
15 is we have two different maps, and we see that this is under the map 9,
16 union of three republics, August 1993. If we look on the map and we see
17 Mostar, we can see where it's located. And the same thing if we look at
18 map 10. And it would appear at least -- it would give us an indication
19 that Mostar at least by virtue of these maps was envisaged to be within
20 the Croat-controlled area, if we want to put it that way, or within the
21 Croat republic.
22 A. There's a strange ring around Mostar.
23 Q. There is a strange ring and that may be because of the two years
24 that the -- the EU, or the EC at the time --
25 A. Yep.
1 Q. -- administration. But were you aware of these maps?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Okay. So I'm not telling you anything that's new, and certainly
4 I'm not stretching the facts as they were at the time you knew them?
5 A. Yep.
6 Q. Okay.
7 MR. SCOTT: Sorry to interrupt but just so the record is clear on
8 this point, on map number 9, on the left side of the page, the legend or
9 key to the map specifically does in fact indicate both Sarajevo and Mostar
10 as being under EU administration under these plans. If you look at the
11 key, the fourth box down from the top. Thank you.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: And I think that Sarajevo would have been under the
13 UN, but in any event I think the point is made and we thank --
14 THE WITNESS: I have a map in my book which is the map made by the
15 Contact Group.
16 MR. SCOTT:
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. Which is another group and depicts Sarajevo in a completely
19 different situation.
20 Q. Okay.
21 A. So there are a number of maps. You will always find one that
22 suits your purpose.
23 Q. All right. Very well. Thank you for bringing that to our
24 attention. So this sounds like reasonable doubt as far as when it comes
25 to maps and lines.
1 A. Absolutely.
2 Q. Okay. I point that to the Court's attention.
3 1D 00526. This document, sir, 1D 00526. If you don't have it,
4 we'll provide it for you. This is the Stoltenberg-Owen plan, and -- have
5 you found it sir?
6 A. No. I may have it. Hang on. Hang on for a moment. 526.
7 Q. 526.
8 A. Yes, yes.
9 Q. Usually they're numbered in sort of a sequential order. All
10 right. Now, if we look at the second page, which would -- which on the
11 top left hand it says 276, we see again where Mostar is. This is a map of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, union of republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this is
13 in the Stoltenberg-Owen plan.
14 Then if we could -- if we could go to 3 -- 303. Incidentally, on
15 that one page, that one map I showed you was very similar to what we saw
16 earlier as to where Mostar is; correct? We see the ring around it. And
17 again it would appear to be within the Croat-controlled republic.
18 A. Page 303?
19 Q. Yes, if we go to 303. Now, this is my next question. Number 65,
20 appendix II, it talks about the agreed arrangements concerning the
21 constitutional agreement of the union of republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 First question is, were you aware of the Stoltenberg-Owen plan?
23 A. Yes, in principle.
24 Q. Okay.
25 A. If not in detail.
1 Q. Were you aware of this particular agreement or this agreed
2 arrangement that appears to be part and parcel of the Stoltenberg-Owen
3 plan, that is appendix II?
4 A. Which agreement are you referring to? There was no agreement
5 about it.
6 Q. Okay. Well, this is the -- this is a plan that is being put
7 forward, and it talks about agreed arrangements --
8 A. Yes, okay.
9 Q. -- concerning the constitutional agreement.
10 A. Okay.
11 Q. And I mention that because this was an ongoing process. And if we
12 go to page 306, 306. We're taking the step-by-step process. That's why
13 it's taking us a little bit longer, but hopefully part of the agreed
14 arrangement -- if we look under B, Mostar City Opstina, and we see under 1
15 that there is an interim period. Number 2, that the European Community
16 participation in the governance of the Mostar city opstina is planned for
17 two years. We already talked about that. And then if we go to 3, and I
18 want to highlight this for the Trial Chamber and maybe perhaps you can
19 elucidate a little bit on it, "Mostar City Opstina which shall have within
20 it the buildings of the capital of the Croat majority republic shall have
21 the government function -- the governmental function and powers specified
22 for constituent republics in the constitutional agreement."
23 Were you aware that this was envisaged, that Mostar, Mostar city
24 opstina, would be the capital or part of it would be the capital for the
25 Croat majority republic?
1 A. As part of this plan, yes, but what is the date of this paper?
2 Q. That's a good -- 30th of September I'm told. But you were aware
3 that this was an ongoing negotiating process?
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. And that the negotiators themselves, starting with the -- with
6 Vance -- with Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen -- or Lord Owen, had envisaged that
7 Mostar would be a capital city for the Croats in one way or another;
9 A. No. The first paper you showed me was the canton.
10 Q. For number 8?
11 A. For number 8.
12 Q. Okay. But then --
13 A. Which is not the Croat republic. It was of a completely different
14 solution for Bosnia.
15 Q. Exactly. Exactly. And I'm glad that you pointed that out. I'm
16 happy. I'm delighted that you pointed that out, because we submit to the
17 Trial Chamber at some point arguments will be made that when the
18 community, the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna moves to the Croatian
19 Republic of Herceg-Bosna is as a direct result of the ongoing peace
20 process in anticipation that you would have a Bosnia-Herzegovina with
21 three republics contained therein with Mostar being the capital of the
22 Croatian republic. But thank you for drawing that to our attention.
23 Now if we could go --
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas, would you be so kind to explain to
25 us the expression Mostar opstina, Mostar city opstina because I don't
1 think we have come across it before.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Delayed gratification, Your Honour. We're going to
3 get there with my next section.
4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Okay, but I think it's better to explain a new
5 term when it comes up and not refer to later when it is in another
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Right now.
8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It would have been step-by-step. It would have
9 been first to explain the term and then use it.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. I apologise, Your Honour. I apologise. And
11 you're right. As a technician, I should have -- I should have covered
12 that. But let's go to page 308 of the document where we are talking
13 about -- we see at the bottom there are attachments under B. "The outer
14 boundary of the Mostar City Opstina." And then I'm going to hopefully
15 describe it to you, Your Honour, in sort of pictorial terms.
16 Q. It says here -- Mr. Usher, can we get your assistance here? "It
17 has been suggested," it says over here in this document, "that the Mostar
18 city opstina be defined as including the six," and here's where my
19 pronunciation is rather poor, "mjesna zajednica" and then it lists "Aleksa
20 Santic, Carina, Cernica, Brankovac, Donja Mahala, and Luka."
21 And now if we look at the map, if we look at it, hopefully you
22 will be able to see it, and if you have to move it -- you will have to
23 move it, sir, a little bit further up and then over. There you go. There
24 you go. Hold it.
25 Now, it then goes on in the text: "This needs, however, to be
1 determined by consultation in Mostar with all interested parties." And it
2 goes on and so on.
3 Were you aware that this was envisaged as the part of -- of what
4 would be the Mostar city opstina?
5 A. No. If I had been aware, I think it would have facilitated my
6 endeavours to delineate the area for the EU administration.
7 Q. Okay. Thank you. Could we get an IC number for this document?
8 And if we could go on --
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this document will become Exhibit IC
11 MR. KARNAVAS:
12 Q. Now, if we could go very quickly to 1D 01551. Again we're going
13 back to the "Balkan Odyssey" by David Owen. Now we're on page 252. And
14 on the top of the page we see on 9 December he talks about having visited
15 with Stoltenberg, Belgrade, and had a meeting with Milosevic, followed by
16 a private meeting with -- with Karadzic and his team and Sarinic,
17 President Tudjman, and so on.
18 Further down it says: "At that meeting, we had made real progress
19 on the map with the Croats being ready to accept the Neretva River as far
20 south as Tasovici as the dividing line between the Muslim and
21 Croat-majority republics and with Mostar still to be administered by the
22 EU. But Silajdzic sent a depressing message which arrived during the
23 meeting saying that the Muslims wanted Neum and were longer interested in
24 having an outlet to the sea at Prevlaka as put forward by the Croats.
25 Also, Izetbegovic could no longer come to the proposed meeting ..." And
1 it goes on and on.
2 And I think basically we want to go further down where we
3 see: "We later invited them all to go on from Geneva to Brussels so that
4 the parties could again meet with the foreign ministers in the hope that
5 this would engender a better mood. We had by this time given up on being
6 able to negotiate over Sarajevo and were resigned to having -- to having
7 to have UN administration and in postponing this most difficult of all
9 Now, I skipped one portion which said earlier, the text says: "We
10 therefore cancelled that meeting," meaning the meeting with
11 Izetbegovic, "in favour of the one at Geneva on the morning of 21
12 December; but it was a bad sign and we look it to mean that the Bosnian
13 Muslims wanted to go on fighting the Bosnian Croats and as yet felt under
14 pressure to negotiate -- felt under no pressure to negotiate."
15 Let me ask you because you've been asked by the Prosecution to
16 talk about your impressions and the moods at the time. Would it be
17 correct to say that at that time in history in theatre, because of what
18 was happening on the ground with the Muslims gaining ground that they
19 seemed to be obstructing or dragging their feet in trying to find any
20 reasonable solution in ending the war between themselves and the Croats?
21 A. You make a lot of propositions, and you want me to answer yes or
22 no. I can't do that on that one.
23 Q. All right.
24 A. I was aware of that when the luck of war shifted it immediately
25 influenced the will of the parties to negotiate, because if you are on the
1 winning side you want to delay decisions as long as possible to have a
2 better hand. So I think it is correct what David Owen writes here. There
3 was far less inclination for Muslims in December to come to the
4 negotiating table than it was in April, and that explains also the
5 situation in Mostar in April 1993, that they were far more willing to seek
6 a solution at that time.
7 Q. Right. And would it be fair to say that one of the reasons was
8 because, as we say in America, possession is nine tenths of the law. In
9 other words --
10 A. It is extremely hard to negotiate another solution when the armies
11 are standing on the ground when you make a cease-fire.
12 Q. So the more land you can capture, the more land you control, the
13 better bargaining position you're in?
14 A. Yes, yes of course.
15 Q. And just very briefly if we flip the page to 255, just flip it,
16 you'll see that there is a map there. The EU Action Plan December
17 1993 - February 1994. And again if we take a look at where Mostar is
18 placed on the EU -- or this is probably better -- I don't know if the EU
19 existed at the time, but the EU action plan. Were you aware of this map,
20 the EU action plan map?
21 A. No.
22 Q. All right. If we can move on to -- just one second. If we could
23 go to P 0 -- yes?
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm still puzzled on this map, Mr. Karnavas.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Which map is that, sir?
1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: The one you have just referred to on page 255.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Right. The action plan map.
3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes. I'm probably mistaken, but what I see is a
4 legend, and it -- this legend first says it's the action plan comprising
5 that on the territory -- Muslim majority, and we have one area, which is
6 area 2, and that has -- here it is indicated 65.49 per cent Muslim
7 majority, and Mostar would be placed in that area. That seems to be not
8 quite in line with what we have seen on other maps. So probably you
9 could -- you could clarify or let the witness clarify this.
10 THE WITNESS: As I see the map -- if I may?
11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes.
12 THE WITNESS: It only depicts the area that should be under Muslim
13 governance, and it does not take up the -- how to divide between Serb and
14 Croats. But I'm also very skeptic about the origin of this map and what
15 makes an EU action plan and what importance it has. Is it a Dutch map in
16 EU, or what is it? It seems to me to be out of context as I know the
17 negotiations at the time.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Does that answer Your Honour's question?
19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes. I think it's probably a Serb/non-Serb map
20 rather than a map which is similar to the ones we have seen before.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, at the time -- at the time they were
22 searching for a solution in order to -- based on percentages, and if you
23 look on page 254, we're looking at -- you see the figure of 33.3 for the
24 Muslim republic, and so -- because as the case progresses we'll see that
25 during the negotiations the actual percentage of land became very
1 important to all sides, but that was what was envisaged.
2 THE WITNESS: If I may --
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Certainly.
4 THE WITNESS: -- I can tell the Court that I was heavily involved
5 in drawing maps for David Owen and about percentages and the census from
6 March 1991, I think, of the old opstinas. So there was a lot of
7 percentage talk among the parties.
8 MR. KARNAVAS:
9 Q. Right. And if we fast forward to, I believe, Dayton there they
10 had some sort of fancy apparatus where they were able to redraw the lines
11 and calculate with exactitude so that all parties were -- were happy at
12 the end of the day. You might recall that. To 49, 51; is that correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Okay. Now, if we go to the -- the next document very quickly,
15 P 07866. And the significance, basically, just very quickly, I just want
16 to point out if we go to what -- to page 4, this is a report of the
17 co-chairman of the steering committee on the activities of the
18 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. And as we can see from
19 the very first page it's 14 February 1994. But if we go to page 4, "Talks
20 in Geneva 10 to 12 February." And then we just -- if we just flip the
21 next page, under paragraphs 15, 16, and 17 -- perhaps we could skip 15 and
22 16 and just go straight to 17. "With regard to the definition of the
23 Mostar city area to be placed under the administration of the European
24 Union, the Bosnian Presidency and the Bosnian Croats agreed to a working
25 group which had been established in Brussels on 23 December to look into
1 this issue should meet on 16 February in Medjugorje at the headquarters of
2 the Spanish Battalion."
3 Now, you were part -- were you part of that process, the working
4 group process?
5 A. If this is what the -- my meetings in Medjugorje were a part of,
7 Q. Okay. So this was all part of the -- the ongoing negotiating
8 process to find a solution between the Croats and the Muslims --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- particularly with respect to the issue of Mostar.
11 A. Yep.
12 Q. All right. Now, very quickly since the Court has been kind enough
13 to extend me some time I can get to my last chapter rather quickly.
14 You were shown -- at the beginning of today, the Prosecution
15 showed you document 752, which was Resolution 787. If you don't have it,
16 we have it here.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. Usher, quickly. I don't mean to order you, but
18 we're running out of the time. Thank you.
19 Q. If we look at the very last paragraph, it says here: "Noting --"
20 on the first -- the very first page.
21 A. Okay.
22 Q. "Noting the progress made so far within the framework of the
23 international conference, including the joint declaration signed at Geneva
24 on 30 September 1992," and it goes on, but if I just focus you to number
25 3: "The joint communique issued on 1 November 1992 at Zagreb by the
1 presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina." And then it talks about, number 4, the establishment
3 of a Mixed Military Working Group in the Republic of Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina and the production of a draft outline constitution for the
5 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 Now, were you aware, sir, of this joint communique that they're
7 speaking about in this document of 1 November 1992?
8 A. I don't remember.
9 Q. Okay. If we could go to the next document, 1D 01543. 1543. This
10 is -- it's titled -- it's titled, if you look at the second page of this
11 document it says: "Annex, Joint Communique issued on 1 November 1992" and
12 talks between the president of the Republic of Croatia and the president
13 of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And of
14 course on the first page we see the date is 2nd of November, 1992 and
15 makes reference to this joint communique. Would it be fair to say that
16 this is the same communique that is being referenced in Resolution 787,
17 which was shown to you by the Prosecution this morning?
18 A. It seems obvious.
19 Q. Okay. Now, if we look at the very first page, which is actually
20 page 2, but the annex, it says in the second paragraph that they reviewed,
21 they being Tudjman and Izetbegovic: "They reviewed the implementation of
22 the friendship and cooperation agreement between the two countries and
23 discussed a number of topical issues ..."
24 And -- so I just want to make sure I highlight that point,
25 Friendship and Cooperation Agreement.
1 Were you aware that there had been an agreement between the two
2 countries, the two republics at that time? The Friendship and Cooperation
3 Agreement, were you aware of that?
4 A. Yeah. I --
5 Q. Don't --
6 A. I don't recollect exactly this joint communique, but because I
7 knew about the talks in a way.
8 Q. Okay.
9 A. This came just as I came to the theatre.
10 Q. Okay. Now if we can go to the fourth paragraph, I want to point
11 out one thing --
12 A. Let me just point out that there was no lack of good documents and
13 peaceful talk during this period from any of the parties.
14 Q. I agree. Now, if we go to the fourth paragraph, at the very last
15 line it talks about that -- I'll read the last two sentences: "Joint
16 unbiased commissions will be set up to determine individual
17 responsibility." Then it goes on it state: "Similar occurrences will be
18 avoided in the future through proper actions including urgent formation of
19 a Joint Command of armed forces of BH army and HVO."
20 So here we can see that as early as 2 November 1992 they're
21 talking about a -- a joint command of the two forces.
22 A. And nothing of it took place.
23 Q. I understand that but --
24 A. Which is the essence, I think, with what we are to deal with here.
25 Q. All right. Very well. We'll move on to the next document then,
1 because I think it's important to look at what this agreement's all about,
2 the agreement on Friendship and Cooperation. So if you could please turn
3 to P 00339. P 00339. It's the Prosecution document. It's dated July 21,
4 1992. And regrettably we don't have too much time to -- to -- if we could
5 go through to paragraph number 6. [Microphone not activated]
6 Number 6 it says: "The armed component of the Croatian Defence
7 Council (Hrvatsko Vijece Obrane) is an integral part of the united armed
8 forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian Defence
9 Council will have its representatives in the Joint Command of the armed
10 forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
11 Question: Were you aware, sir, were you aware that the HVO was an
12 integral part?
13 A. Now, I think we need to make this completely clear what was going
14 on in the beginning of 1992 when the Croatian and the Muslim side joined
15 forces and fought the Serbs, for example, in Mostar.
16 Q. Right.
17 A. Evicted the Serbs, ruined a number of Serb villages together, and
18 they had every idea of going together at that time. Once that problem was
19 solved, we come into the realities where I come into the picture, which
20 happens a year later. So referring to the good intentions spelled out in
21 early 1992, I think, has very little bearing on what happened in April
23 Q. Can you produce me a document, sir, that at any point in time this
24 agreement on Friendship and Cooperation was renounced?
25 A. Can you produce me any documents about any agreements being
1 denounced on the Balkans?
2 Q. Sir, I'm asking the questions here.
3 A. No.
4 Q. So the -- so the answer is no. During that period of time while
5 you were there and before you arrived, is it not a fact that the Republic
6 of Croatia was assisting in the arming of the -- of the ABiH?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Okay. Is that not one form of -- of the friendship agreement?
9 Yes or no?
10 A. It might well be, but it can also be that your enemy is my friend.
11 Q. Very well. But -- you know, usually you don't arm your enemy at
12 the same time while your enemy is attacking you; right? I mean, it's an
13 unusual circumstance?
14 A. Even that happened at time on the Balkans.
15 Q. Okay. All right. Now, if we get to paragraph number 8, and I
16 think that we're just going to cover -- I'll just read it: "In
17 consideration of the continuing aggression of Serbian Montenegrin military
18 forces against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also largely
19 against the Republic of Croatia from the contiguous areas of the Republic
20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the president of the Presidency of the Republic
21 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the president of the Republic of Croatia
22 call upon the international community and in particular the United
23 Nations, the European Community, and the United States of America, to take
24 real and efficient steps to vigorously stop the aggression against their
25 States, to prevent further loss of human life, persecution and expulsion
1 of their citizens and the destruction of property."
2 Question: At that point in time in history, was the parts of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina used as a staging ground for a foreign army to be
4 attacking the Republic of Croatia? Yes, no, I don't know?
5 A. What date are we talking about here?
6 Q. Well, this was signed 20 -- 21st July 1992.
7 A. The answer is probably yes.
8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: But, Mr. Karnavas, isn't this outside the time
9 when the witness was engaged in Bosnia-Herzegovina? I think you strongly
10 opposed --
11 MR. KARNAVAS: I did.
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: -- when later, and I think we have to --
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Absolutely.
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: -- have cautious approach to the answer then.
15 MR. KARNAVAS: I understand that, but then the Trial Chamber
16 allowed the gentleman to answer the questions of the Prosecution. Now, I
17 can ask a couple of preparatory questions.
18 Q. Sir, before going into theatre, did -- to work for the UN, that
19 is, especially given your high-ranking position within the UN, and in
20 keeping with the answer that you gave us just earlier where you were able
21 to recall prior to your arrival what the Muslims and Croats were doing, is
22 it fair to say that you knew exactly what had been going on in and about
23 the various republics of the former Yugoslavia?
24 A. No.
25 Q. No? Okay. So earlier when you were saying -- what about Bosnia?
1 A. Are you talking about what I knew before I came to theatre?
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. Of course I did not fully knew what was going on in Bosnia.
4 Q. Did you know what was happening in Bosnia?
5 A. Of course I didn't. It doesn't -- I had friends serving in
6 Mostar. One of my best friends was serving in Mostar during this period
7 when the fighting was going on.
8 Q. While you were in theatre, did you learn what had happened or were
9 you merely speculating earlier when you were saying that the Croats and
10 the Muslims gathered -- got together to repel the Serbs at a point in time
11 when you were not there? Were you?
12 A. I think I have.
13 Q. Were you taking a wild guess?
14 A. I think I have valid information about what took place in Mostar
15 during the fighting because a colleague from my own regiment was the UN
16 observer in Mostar and played a substantial role in bringing out women and
17 children during that fighting.
18 Q. All right.
19 A. So I have some ideas what was going on.
20 Q. And you must have known what the JNA was doing?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And you must have known what the JNA was doing to the republic of
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And where it was operating from.
1 A. At the time, I don't think I knew that.
2 Q. Okay.
3 A. In July --
4 Q. Later on did you find out?
5 A. Later on --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Please kindly avoid overlapping.
7 THE WITNESS: Oh, yes. When I came on stage there was very little
8 fighting going on in Croatia between the two parties. It had settled
10 MR. KARNAVAS:
11 Q. Okay. Was their land occupied?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Who was occupying it?
14 A. The so-called self-proclaimed state of Krajina.
15 Q. And who was supporting them?
16 A. Serbia.
17 Q. Did that still pose a threat to the Zagreb government?
18 A. Yes, of course.
19 Q. Okay. Now, if we could go on with this document, because the
20 Friendship Agreement goes on to state: "With this objective in mind, both
21 states will sustain their past successful cooperation and continuous
22 cooperation -- coordination of the defensive activities in the contiguous
23 zones of the two states."
24 Was that ever brought to your attention?
25 A. This specific paragraph, no.
1 Q. Okay. That they were coordinating the defensive activities.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Okay. So while you were there -- granted you showed up -- I
4 believe it was November 1992, all the way until November 1993 when you
5 were with UNMO, this was not brought to your attention? I mean -- I'm not
6 suggesting that it should have been, but I'm just wondering whether you
7 were aware of it.
8 A. This specific document I don't think I read at the time. I don't
9 recollect having read it, anyway. I think my image starting around
10 Christmas 1993 was not one of intimate cooperation between the Croats and
11 the Muslims.
12 Q. Okay. All right. And if we just go on to the last
13 paragraph. "Aware of the fact that both states are threatened, unless
14 aggression against them is urgently stopped by further destruction and
15 annihilation of their --"
16 JUDGE PRANDLER: Excuse me. Mr. Karnavas, I'm sorry to interrupt
17 you. The General said just a minute ago that I think my image starting
18 around Christmas 1993 was not one of intimate cooperation between the
19 Croats and the Muslims. And I wonder, General, if you meant 1993 or 1992?
20 THE WITNESS: 1992.
21 JUDGE PRANDLER: 1992. Thank you.
22 MR. KARNAVAS:
23 Q. Now, when you say Croats, you're talking about Croats in
25 A. Yep.
1 Q. Okay. Was there still contact between Mr. Izetbegovic and
2 Mr. Tudjman?
3 A. I think there was.
4 Q. Okay. Was Croatia still continuing at that point in time to
5 receive refugees --
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. -- from Bosnia-Herzegovina?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Many of those refugees were Muslim?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Okay. Now, if we go on, it says here: "Aware of the fact that
12 both states are threatened, unless aggression against them is urgently
13 stopped, by further destruction and annihilation of their state entity and
14 integrity, the two states will, should the efforts of the international
15 community remain ineffective, take all necessary steps in order to
16 establish broader cooperation in the military sphere and coordinate
17 military operations in order to definitely repel the danger threatening
19 Now, were you aware of that, that this is what was envisaged by
20 these two gentlemen, at least back in July 21, 1992?
21 A. I have no difficulty imagining that because the Serb offensive, I
22 would say, was ongoing, and all -- as you indicated, even during
23 Christmastime in 1992 there were a lot of refugees coming out, especially
24 from the Banja Luka area into Croatia.
25 Q. Okay.
1 A. So we were under a period of Serb aggression at that time when
2 they were gaining hand.
3 Q. Right. Now, if we could just go back to document 752. This was
4 Resolution 787 that we -- that we looked at when we began.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, just one question
6 I'd like to put to you. This document 00339, I believe that this document
7 has already been tendered. This friendship and cooperation agreement
8 between the two republics, we can see that this document was signed in the
9 B/C/S version is -- as far as you know, was this document published in the
10 Official Gazette of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in the Official Gazette of
11 Croatia, and do you know whether this document was forwarded to the
12 Secretary-General of the United Nations since this document refers to all
13 the resolution that were taken since the 15th of July, 1992, and among
14 others, Resolution 752?
15 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, the answer to your first -- to the
16 first part of your question was I believe no, it wasn't published in the
17 Official Gazette. And with respect to the latter part of your question, I
18 believe I might be able to answer that in due course. I know it may not
19 be satisfactory, but that's the best I can do under the circumstances.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I have acknowledged
21 what you have said. There is -- this is not an urgent matter, but another
22 question. Under the laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what governed
23 international treaties? We can consider that this agreement would be part
24 or come under the heading of international treaties. How does this work?
25 Is there a ratification procedure? President Tudjman and President
1 Izetbegovic, did they not have to submit this document in parliament or
2 discuss it in parliament? You don't answer any of this.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Well, I'm not it at this point in time, but
4 Mr. Izetbegovic was there on behalf of the Presidency and we have touched
5 on it a little bit. While he is being referred to as the president of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he was never that. He was president of the
7 Presidency, and he was -- and at the time the Presidency was responsible
8 due to the conditions of making all major decisions at the state level.
9 And of course I can't speak for Mr. Tudjman, but again I take your
10 question on board and in due course we will answer that because we do
11 think that is an important issue to clarify for the Trial Chamber.
12 I just have one final question or two with -- related -- related
13 back to Resolution 787.
14 Q. Sir, do you have that document with you?
15 A. Yeah.
16 Q. Very well. If we could go to paragraph number 5. That would be
17 on page 3. And I just want to point this out where it says -- we see here
18 that it "demands that all forms of interference from outside the Republic
19 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including infiltration," you touched on this a
20 little bit, "into the country of irregular units and personnel, cease
21 immediately and reaffirms its determination to take measures against all
22 parties and others concerned which fail to fulfil the requirements of
23 Resolution 752 and its other relevant resolutions, including the
24 requirement that all forces, in particular elements of the Croatian army,
25 be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the government of the
1 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded or disarmed."
2 Now, if we go back to what we were talking about earlier with --
3 in the friendship agreement where it noted that the Croatian -- that the
4 HVO was an integral part of the united armed forces of the Republic of
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina, would it not follow, then, that elements of the
6 Croatian army could be subordinated to the HVO and would fulfil the
7 requirement of paragraph 5 of Resolution 787, because after all the HVO at
8 that point in time, given the friendship agreement, was considered part
9 and partial of the legitimate armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
10 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me.
11 THE WITNESS: Are you suggesting --
12 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, General, before you answer.
13 Your Honour, a couple of things. One I'm not sure that this
14 witness can answer in any event; but secondly, I really wonder if the time
15 comes when -- are now conceding that there were Croatian army elements in
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, which is the only possible foundation for
17 Mr. Karnavas's question, or is this mere speculation? If it's the second
18 then there is no value in it, but I think the time has to come when either
19 the Croatian army is in Bosnia and Herzegovina subject to certain
20 agreements or it's not in Bosnia and Herzegovina but we can't have it both
21 ways at the same time.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may respond very briefly. We've heard
23 testimony that you had Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina who were living
24 in Croatia, who might have been in the Croatian army, who came back to
25 their homeland, to their villages, to their areas to serve in the HVO.
1 And it would appear that given the friendship agreement, that it would
2 have been perfectly legitimate for those individuals to come and serve,
3 and it would have been perfectly proper and within paragraph 5 of
4 Resolution 787. We're talking about soldiers. So when I say elements,
5 well, a soldier might be an element.
6 Now, Judge Trechsel, I mean, I'm going at the lowest form of an
8 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, can I respond, please? The clear --
9 what -- the clear thrust of the examination for the last few minutes is
10 indicating that it was Tudjman on behalf of the Croatian government that
11 apparently entered into a partnership or a friendship agreement. These
12 weren't individual -- individual soldiers that had grown up in Siroki
13 Brijeg and decided to go back. This was the president of the Republic of
14 Croatia, and the elements -- Resolution 752 and the other documents we've
15 looked at in addition to talking in some instances about individuals talk
16 about the Croatian army, the regular Croatian army. And I come back to my
17 original -- to my previous point. The time has come either the Croatian
18 army was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if Mr. Karnavas wants to say it was
19 pursuant to a friendship agreement so be it, but they were there, or they
20 were not there but we can't have it both ways. The Croatian army was
21 not -- there in Bosnia and not in Bosnia at the same time.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, it -- first of all, I bear --
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas.
24 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, would you ask your
1 questions, because in paragraph 5 it speaks of irregular units and also
2 there is the word "personnel." So I might think that beyond regular
3 units, legal units, there might also have been some personal behaviours of
4 individuals. Very well. So please ask directly the question to the
5 general. Your question is very complicated. I think he's capable of
6 answering it.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. Let me go step-by-step.
8 You had heard my original question and I think that you wanted to answer
9 or you were about to answer, but do you feel confident that --
10 A. Will you've rephrased that question, because you have had long
11 argument and I'm a senile man so I almost forgot it now, please.
12 Q. From your answers one would not call you senile, but very well.
13 At least -- we looked at the friendship agreement, and in the friendship
14 agreement it's quite clear that the HVO, not the HV but HVO, was an
15 integral part of the -- of the forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. An
16 integral part of the united armed forces. So that would mean, at least
17 from the friendship agreement, that Izetbegovic recognises the HVO to be
18 part and partial of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 Now we go to paragraph 5 of Resolution 787, and the portion that
20 I'm most interested in where it talks about: "Including the requirement
21 of all forces, in particular elements of the Croatian army, be withdrawn
22 or be subject to the authority of the government of the Republic of Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina, or be disbanded or disarmed."
24 Now, Judge Trechsel was taken aback when I said even soldiers
25 could be considered an element, but under this -- this paragraph, would it
1 not stand to follow that you could have a unit of the Croatian army that
2 placed itself under the HVO and would be in compliance of paragraph 5 of
3 this particular resolution, keeping in mind the friendship agreement
4 wherein Izetbegovic recognises the HVO as part and parcel of the
5 legitimate armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
6 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, my objection is the same.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me.
8 MR. SCOTT: My objection is the same.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Please don't overlap.
10 MR. SCOTT: Again, Your Honour, just to be consistent with the
11 point that I've been trying to make for the last 15 minutes or so. Again,
12 it's either -- is there any evidence that actually ever happened, and in
13 which case, then the Croatian army was in Bosnia and Herzegovina; or is
14 this mere speculation of something that never happened? And if it is the
15 latter, there is no value in putting the question to the witness.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, my question doesn't deal with facts;
17 it deals with whether the gentleman, in light of his education,
18 background, experience, is able to draw a conclusion. Now, if he's not
19 able and if that is what the Prosecution's objection is, that is, that he
20 is not competent to answer the question because he lacks either personal
21 knowledge or lacks the ability to -- lacks the ability to put two and two
22 together as I'm doing, then fine.
23 I understand that the gentleman is not a lawyer, but I'm not
24 asking him to venture so far out into legal land where he has to divine
25 what might be in this particular resolution, because after all it was the
1 Prosecutor that was showing him resolution after resolution and the
2 gentleman had no problem in answering the question. So if he's not able
3 to answer the question, then I withdraw the question; I'll sit down.
4 MR. SCOTT: I have no problem with showing the witness
5 resolutions, as indeed the Prosecution did. I have no objection to the
6 witness answering reasonable questions at all. My objection is whether --
7 let me rephrase it. Not my objection, but then based on what Mr. Karnavas
8 has said, the question to the witness is: Would it have been possible,
9 would it have been possible, for an HV unit to subordinate itself to the
10 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Whether it ever happened or not,
11 the question, then, is it possible it could have happened that an HV unit
12 could have subordinated itself to the government of Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina. If that's the question, then I think certainly the witness
14 can answer it.
15 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, that's not the question, and Mr. Scott can
16 ask that question on redirect. In fact, if he does ask it on redirect, I
17 promise not to object. But my question is rather more precise, and my
18 question is, in light of the friendship agreement, in light of what is
19 happening in the situation, keeping in mind that you have Croats who are
20 living in -- across from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who are living in
21 Croatia, who might have been serving in the Croatian army who now may wish
22 to go back and fight in their homelands, assuming that you had a unit of
23 the Croatian army - I'm not saying that was the case; I'm just saying
24 assuming - if that unit were to subordinate itself, as is demanded under
25 paragraph 5 to the HVO, keeping in mind that the HVO is recognised by
1 Mr. Izetbegovic as being an integral part, one of the armed forces of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, would that not be in compliance of this particular
4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas, I'm sorry.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes. Okay.
6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Not only is your question terribly complicated,
7 but also it hangs sort of in the air. You start from an agreement
8 purportedly between two states, or at least two "head of states."
9 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Then you talk about a unit submitting itself to
11 another army. That would not be an act of one of the states or the
12 president of the states. It's different if the president decides,
13 pursuant to an agreement, to dispatch part of his army to serve abroad.
14 But a -- and then your patriotic spontaneous fighters, how can they be
15 withdrawn? The Security Council cannot have had those in mind at all.
16 So it would be helpful if you could sort of put short questions
17 step by step instead of speaking for half a page and then nobody knows
18 what any answer would actually mean.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Well --
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm trying to help. I hope you noticed.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: I noticed that, Your Honour, but again, we're not
22 talking about one army subordinating itself under another army. It says
23 here "particular elements." What is a particular element of the Croatian
24 army? In my definition, a particular element could be a single soldier
25 who wants to go back to his village which is under threat. That could be
1 an element. And it seems to me that the UN over here - and maybe this is
2 something for closing argument - but it seems to me what the UN is saying
3 here, as long as that element places itself, subordinates itself within
4 the lawful army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, everything is copacetic. And if
5 the HVO is part and parcel of the armed forces, the legitimate armed
6 forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would stand to reason that soldiers who
7 might have left, you know, Croatia and joined the HVO would have been
8 perfectly fine. There's no nefariousness to that.
9 Now, that's the nature of my question. If it's too complicated,
10 then the gentleman can certainly tell me it's too complicated and he can't
11 answer it.
12 THE WITNESS: First, a comment. It does not say particular
13 elements of a Croatian army. It says "in particular, elements of a
14 Croatian army," which is quite another thing, actually.
15 MR. KARNAVAS:
16 Q. Yes, in particular elements. But what is an element? It doesn't
17 specify what elements are. Would you agree with me on that, sir?
18 A. Yes. It doesn't speculate if it is a brigade or a battalion or a
20 Q. Or a couple of soldiers?
21 A. Or a couple of soldiers.
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. But they are elements of a Croatian army. They are wearing the
24 uniforms of a Croatian army. They are subordinates of a Croatian army.
25 And your interpretation must imply, as far as I understand, that this
1 agreement of Mr. Tudjman and Izetbegovic should overrule a UN resolution.
2 Q. Well, I'm not asserting anything of the kind. I'm just merely
3 asking you one --
4 A. It's the only way to make it legal.
5 Q. Okay. Very well.
6 MR. KARNAVAS: I believe I've exhausted this area, Mr. President.
7 I want to thank the Judges for allowing me the extra time to go into this,
8 and hopefully we'll clarify it with others.
9 Sir, I want to thank you very much for coming here to give your
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: I trust that I wasn't too combative with you.
13 You're a general. I'm just a mere Defence lawyer. I'm sure you can
14 handle yourself. Thank you again.
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation].
17 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
18 I'd like to inform you that I have one hour accorded me by the
19 Trial Chamber, and I have been given 15 minutes from the Pusic Defence and
20 15 minutes from the Coric Defence. So according to my calculations, that
21 would mean that I have until the end of the working day today. But I'll
22 do my best to go through the basic topics and complete them as quickly as
23 possible. However, if I don't manage to get through everything that I've
24 planned, then I'll go on tomorrow morning and would like to ask the Trial
25 Chamber to give me an extra 20 minutes to Mr. Murphy in order to deal with
1 some questions which step outside the framework of my cross-examination.
2 So I just wanted to inform you about that in advance, and the Trial
3 Chamber can think about it and give a ruling tomorrow.
4 I think you've all received copies of my documents. The witness
5 has, too.
6 Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:
7 Q. So let me say: Good afternoon to you, sir. I'm going to try and
8 speak slower to help our interpreters, and we have provided them with
9 copies of our documents, but let me introduce you. My name is Senka
10 Nozica, and Mr. Peter Murphy and I are the Defence counsel for Mr. Bruno
11 Stojic. And for that reason I'm going to take you back to some other
12 topics, the topics of the meeting held on the 18th of April about which
13 you have spoken at length.
14 Now, during the examination-in-chief, you said that the meeting of
15 the 18th of April, 1993, began before your arrival and Mr. Ganic's arrival
16 in Mostar; is that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. After that, you went on to say that you left the meeting with
19 Mr. Petkovic so that you could talk to him about his insistence upon
20 having Mr. Halilovic attend the discussions and the agreement to be
21 reached; is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Upon your return to the conference hall, you met Mr. Stojic there,
24 who said that the Muslims had undertaken some attacks in Central Bosnia
25 and addressed Mr. Ganic and said that he wouldn't leave Mostar alive; is
1 that right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Sir, before that had you ever met Mr. Stojic?
4 A. No.
5 Q. No. Right. Do you know, sir, how this debate started?
6 A. Which debate?
7 Q. I'm referring to what Mr. Stojic started off by saying and the
8 response to him by someone else with respect to the arguments he put
10 A. I didn't hear any response to his arguments for the moment when he
11 was in the room.
12 Q. Do you know whether Mr. Stojic said specifically what information
13 he had received about the events in the territory where the offensive by
14 the BH army began?
15 A. I think he was specific, but I do not remember which areas he
16 mentioned. But he was specific about points.
17 Q. Do you perhaps happen to know what Mr. Ganic said to him in
18 response to his allegations?
19 A. No, I don't remember that Ganic said anything. He might have done
20 it, but I have no recollection of that.
21 Q. Is it possible that Mr. Ganic might have said something before
22 your arrival in the conference hall? Because as far as I understood you,
23 you entered the hall while the discussion was already under way.
24 A. Yes, it is possible.
25 Q. And I'd like to ask you, to the best of your recollections,
1 whether that meeting was in fact interrupted, because you said that it was
2 interrupted and cut short by Mr. Stojic, or was it put off and delayed for
3 some reason?
4 A. Well, my recollection is that after Mr. Stojic went out, we, so to
5 say, went out of this meeting and it was finished. I don't remember the
6 exact words that Ambassador Thebault used to finish the meeting, but it
7 was finished in a way. And it was Prlic who stood up first and excused --
8 or apologised for the words that had been uttered. And then I think we
9 just closed the meeting.
10 Q. Thank you. Now, do you remember that at the meeting some
11 agreement was reached? I'm asking you all this because you yourself said
12 that you didn't attend part of the meeting. Now, do you know whether any
13 agreements were reached?
14 A. Not to my knowledge, no.
15 Q. You also said during the examination-in-chief that the following
16 day, that is to say, on the 19th of April, 1993, you were called by
17 Mr. Stojic and apologised.
18 A. I'm not sure about the dates. I think I went to see General
19 Petkovic first on that day, and -- so I have to see the statements to be
20 exactly clear whether I saw Stojic on the 19th or the 20th. But I went to
21 see him anyway one of these days, when I was called in a meeting that he
22 wanted to see me.
23 Q. Yes. That's what you've said in your statement. Yesterday, it
24 would appear that it was on the following day, but that's not essential.
25 It was either on the 19th or the 20th anyway. That's quite certain,
1 during those two days while you were in Mostar.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. You said that on that occasion Mr. Stojic said that you shouldn't
4 believe and trust the Muslims.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You also said that Mr. Stojic on that same occasion during that
7 conversation mentioned certain places in the north, specific ones, and I'm
8 talking about the second conversation which was -- should be in the focus
9 of attention and interest before Mostar, and that that was the first time
10 that you heard that insistence was made on some other localities outside
11 Mostar. Would that be correct?
12 A. No. I think that probably General Petkovic touched on these
13 things when we talked in this morning meeting. So I think this was a
14 repetition but perhaps more forcefully put forward.
15 Q. Yes. And I found that in the report for that day, that is to say
16 the 18th, that you said that Mr. Petkovic mentioned the Jablanica region
17 and Konjic. Yes, and Konjic too. And that is why I am insisting upon
18 this. But if you say that Mr. Stojic insisted upon it again, that means
19 that those were places and localities which for the Croatian side became
20 highly significant. Would you agree with that?
21 A. Yes. But at the time I'm -- I don't, I think, fully understood
22 that. I thought it was a trick to get attention away from Mostar more or
24 Q. Yes, but -- yes, precisely, but you understood this as drawing
25 your attention away from Mostar, but you also said that at the 19th of
1 April, 1993, meeting an agreement was reached whereby Mostar, Jablanica,
2 Konjic, and Sovici should be toured. I think this you said that during
3 the examination-in-chief yesterday.
4 Now, for that reason, would it emerge that that information
5 provided sufficient grounds for placing Jablanica and Konjic as the focal
7 A. Yes, it did. Both parties agreed on these areas later on with
8 Pasalic and Lasic. There was complete agreeance between the parties on
9 what points were of essential interest, actually. And the Konjic and
10 Jablanica were among them.
11 Q. So can we now say that this endeavour, these efforts on the part
12 of Mr. Stojic and Mr. Petkovic, to focus on these other places as well was
13 not drawing your attention away from Mostar but, rather, the demand that
14 this be placed on a par with them, on the same level, because according to
15 their information, an offensive by the Muslim army had already started up
16 there. So could we say that those places deserved equal attention within
17 the frameworks of your mission, just like Mostar did?
18 A. Yes, but not more.
19 Q. Yes. Well, we'll come back to that to see whether they were more
20 or less, whether those adjectives could be applied, but -- I'd like to
21 know when we're going to take the break, because I have two more questions
22 before the break to ask within this area.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]
24 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.
25 Q. So nothing happened to Mr. Ganic despite the threats; is that
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. Nobody attacked him?
4 A. Well, he was in a UN vehicle when we least Mostar, so it would
5 have been astonishing if anybody had attacked him. I don't think he was
6 in danger that day, actually. I never took it really seriously.
7 Q. I see, yes. That's important for me. You said you never took it
8 really seriously. Well, you told Mr. Lasic if he didn't carry out his
9 promise about the cease-fire that probably this would follow him to hell.
10 Now, you spent a lot of time in the south, I'm not going to say in the
11 Balkans, but in the south, the area that I live in, the territory I live
12 in, sophisticated threats of that nature are not used. What is used is
13 quite blatant threats, but they have the same idea as what you said, that
14 you would pursue him to the gates of hell or --
15 A. No. I didn't carry a sidearm on my side, and I made it through an
16 interpreter. It was quite another situation, and I -- so if you threaten
17 to kill a member of the Presidency and you wear a sidearm at the same time
18 you do that, it is another threat situation, actually. So don't try to
19 compare it. I didn't scare Lasic a bit, but Ganic was extremely scared,
20 and he has explained to me later that I saved his life that day. End of
22 Q. Sir, I'm sure you'll agree with me when I say that from what you
23 yourself said, Mr. Stojic did not threaten Mr. Ganic that he would kill
24 him, but the threat was uttered in a very general manner.
25 Now, when you say that Mr. Ganic told you that you'd saved his
1 life, where in fact did he go, and when did he leave the Mostar area, in
3 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me wait a minute, Your Honour. Let's have --
4 instead of having just a statement and then no question, let's have the
5 witness respond to counsel's assertion. Counsel has just asserted there
6 was no threat against Mr. Ganic by Mr. Stojic, but then she states that as
7 an assertion and then goes to the next question. Let's have the witness
8 give the answer whether there was a threat against Mr. Ganic or not.
9 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Well, the witness gave his answer.
10 The witness did answer. I heard it, but I can't see that it's in the
11 record. The witness did give an answer to my question when I asked him
12 whether Mr. Stojic issued threats or whether he made an observation that
13 he wouldn't leave Mostar alive, the witness said yes. But that wasn't
15 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me I'm sorry for interrupting. I don't see
16 anything of an answer on -- on line -- page 88 anywhere around line 14,
17 15, or 16. I don't see any answer to that.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ask the question again.
19 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes.
20 Q. It's difficult for me to interpret this. I merely observed that
21 Mr. Stojic did not threaten that he would kill Mr. Ganic, but he just made
22 the assertion. Do you agree with me there?
23 A. He said that Mr. Ganic would never leave Mostar alive. And if a
24 man with a gun on his hip says those words, I would be rather offended if
25 I had been Mr. Ganic. So he threatened him, all right. Then how serious
1 it was one can discuss, and I at the moment didn't take it so serious, but
2 obviously Mr. Ganic did. That was my point.
3 Q. Yes, but -- yes. Yes. Yes. That's precisely what you said. "I
4 didn't take it seriously, but Mr. Ganic obviously did."
5 Now, after that I asked you when and where did Mr. Ganic go to
6 linked to this threat?
7 A. As far as I remember, we took him in the Spanish armoured carrier
8 and took him to the Spanish headquarter, and he later joined General
9 Morillon and Ambassador Thebault and went to Zenica.
10 Q. When was that? Can you remember the date perhaps? When was that
11 in relation to the meeting of the 18th of April?
12 A. I suppose they might have left in the morning of the 20th if
13 Morillon -- no. No. Well, let me put it this way: He stayed in
14 Medjugorje until Morillon arrived, and he -- as far as I remember, he did
15 not come with us into Mostar that night when we went down with Petkovic
16 and Halilovic to meet the -- their subordinates. And if he was still in
17 Medjugorje then, he should have left with Morillon next morning. So then
18 we are probably on the 20th at least. But he has -- he has left my
20 Q. Sir, before the break let me just try and jog your memory. Can
21 you -- do you remember that the next day, that is to say on the 19th of
22 April, the day after the meeting, Ganic and Mr. Halilovic arrived at the
23 meeting in the Ministry of Defence? Can you remember that, that that's
24 what happened, that's how the events developed? And the day after, he
25 went off with Mr. Morillon to Zenica.
1 A. I don't remember that he came with us to Mostar. I don't remember
3 Q. Very well. Now, tell me this, please: Do you know that Mr.
4 Ganic, and this was something Mr. Karnavas asked you, at that time was a
5 member of the Presidency of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as such occupying
6 that post by the same token a member of the Supreme Command of
8 A. Yes, I learnt today that he was not vice-president but member of
9 the Presidency. Yes, he was.
10 Q. Did he introduce himself to you as the vice-president?
11 A. I believe so.
12 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. You said
13 five minutes. I'm going on to discuss the documents so this would be a
14 good time to break.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will now be breaking for 20
17 --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 12.57 p.m.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Nozica.
20 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Sir, can we discuss now matters which may have led to the
22 conclusions taken at the meeting of the 18th of April and the reasons why
23 some of these conclusions were made and look at some of the UNMO reports?
24 I believe you have P 01965. That's the number of the document in the
25 binder before you. This is the report by Mr. Ole Brix Andersen dated the
1 19th of April, 1993. Let us look at page 2 in the English version, in the
2 middle of the page; which is page 2 of the Croatian version, and the
3 beginning of that page.
4 The Prosecutor had some questions for you concerning this
5 document, but he skipped the part which said: "After lengthy, difficult,
6 and sometimes tense discussions, three main issues were secured, three
7 main conclusions were made," and the conclusions are explained here and it
8 is said that all -- "each side, at a political level, accepted the
9 absolute and immediate necessity of a cease-fire." It goes on to read
10 that "on proposal of the chairman agreed by the UN military observers,
11 UNPROFOR and every side, a separate meeting among the high level military
12 representatives had to take place in order to agree on a concrete
13 procedure for immediate and general cease-fire."
14 "Brigadier Petkovic required the presence of BH army commander
15 Mr. Halilovic at these talks, and the UNPROFOR commander promised that if
16 possible Mr. Halilovic would be lifted to Mostar tomorrow by UN. Anyway,
17 technical discussions could immediately begin."
18 Mr. Ganic and Mr. Boras are mentioned here. They proposed that
19 the investigation commissions at a high level comprised 6 members, two
20 from each side and one from European Monitor's mission and this is
21 something that transpires from the text. I will refer to the part shown
22 you by the Prosecutor where Mr. Stojic is said to have appeared and is
23 said to have indicated that a large scale offensive had been launched in
24 Central Bosnia, especially in the areas of Vitez, Busovaca, Visoko, and
25 Travnik. I don't believe that this part concerning Busovaca is true, but
1 he says that in anticipation of further information the meeting was put
2 off for the following day, if possible.
3 They go on to talk about the objective of the meeting and about
4 what had been achieved at the meeting.
5 Can you recall, since you were there, that the agreement was that
6 more information should be gathered about what was going on in the field
7 and that the meeting should be put off for the following day?
8 A. No, I can't recall that because my memory from this meeting is the
9 talks I had with General Petkovic, which was the most important thing for
10 me, and then the impression made by Mr. Stojic is what has stayed in my
11 memory. I don't remember how this meeting ended, and I do not remember
12 that these agreements were made, but I don't dispute it in any way.
13 Q. Yes, that's important. I would like to show you another document
14 from this binder, which is document P 01981, and it's the sixth document
15 from the top. This is another report by Mr. Ole Brix Andersen, dated the
16 20th of April, 1993. Let us look at page 5 of the English text, last
17 sentence of that page, and then the text goes on to page 6.
18 It is said that the first meeting that was held between the
19 warring parties in Mostar was cut short by the HVO minister of defence who
20 claimed that a large offensive had been launched by the BH army in Central
21 Bosnia and the meeting was put off. It goes on to say, regardless of
22 this, the main result was that -- was the establishment of two joint
23 operation commissions consisting of ECMM, UNMO, HVO, and BiH in Mostar and
24 Zenica. Therefore, this report speaks to the same event, does it not,
25 that the meeting was in fact postponed?
1 A. Yes. But I am not completely sure that the key result about the
2 joint operation commission actually was formulated during that meeting. I
3 doubt that a bit, but I will not dispute that. It is possible.
4 Q. But this is stated in the reports. You said you fully accepted
5 what the reports contain since you did not attend the whole meeting. You
6 did not attend it from the beginning to end.
7 Let us look at another document, which is P 01980. It's also
8 contained in my binder, which is the ECMM weekly resume, or weekly
9 summary. If you've found it, let us look at page 4.
10 A. No, I did not. Number again, please.
11 Q. 1980. This is in the Prosecutor's binder. Do you have the
12 Prosecutor's binder before you? You used it yesterday. I didn't have
13 time to move all these documents into my binder. 1980. It was also shown
14 to you by the Prosecutor.
15 Very well. Page 4 in English. The monitors of the European
16 Community in all of their reports, including this one, on page 4 in
17 English, indicate that the meeting had been put off in order to verify
18 information about an offensive in Central Bosnia. They say, and I'm
19 reading item 12. All the same, the key success achieved was the formation
20 of the commission consisting of representatives of the ECMM," and so on
21 and so forth, and a meeting of that commission was fixed for the 18th of
22 April. Or, rather, it's first meeting is manned for the 18th of April.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 19th of April.
24 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And I suppose that this is the way things transpired. Am I right?
1 A. This is a document created by ECMM and probably written out of
2 interest of ECMM. The fact I think I'm ready to acknowledge that this
3 decision was taken. How it was taken and when it was taken, I am not
4 willing to verify upon, but let's -- let's leave it by that. This
5 decision obviously was taken during this day.
6 Q. Thank you. Very well. Thank you. You said that in fact you
7 didn't know why Mr. Stojic showed up at the meeting on the 18th of April,
8 1993. Did you have information about what was going on in the areas of
9 Central Bosnia on the 17th, as you set out from Zagreb, and on the 18th as
10 you arrived in Mostar? Did you obtain any information about the
12 A. I can't answer that question. I don't know. I might have. I
13 might not have.
14 Q. In that case, let us look at -- or, rather, let me ask you first
15 whether you remember that Mr. Bruno Stojic had possibly brought along the
16 document or something of that sort on the basis of which he presented his
17 allegations about the start of an offensive in Central Bosnia. Can he --
18 you recall anything to that effect?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Please look at my document, 2D -- which is in my binder, 2D 00474,
21 which is the third document from the bottom. This is the report dated the
22 17th of April, 1993. We see that it says at 1700 hours the report is sent
23 by the Croatian Defence Council, operational zone Central Bosnia, command
24 Vitez, and the subject is special report on terrorist attack and genocide
25 against the Croatian people in Zenica (1700 hours).
1 When we look at the document in the original, we can see that it's
2 been written upon, and for the sake of the record I have to say that we
3 received the document from the Prosecution. It contains an ERN number.
4 Let us look at the text of the document. "From the terrorist act
5 a few days ago when an HVO brigadier was kidnapped, Muslim extremists
6 joined by other members of Muslim forces under the command by the 3rd
7 Corps continue terrorising members of the HVO and the Croatian
9 Let us stop here. Do you know that HVO members had been kidnapped
10 and that the escorts of the brigadier were killed? Were you aware of this
11 event which occurred -- the report only says a few days ago?
12 A. Not at that moment, no.
13 Q. Very well. "The full effect of terrorist actions occurred today,"
14 this is what the report says, on the 17th of April -- or rather, the 18th
15 of April. "Muslim forces took control over all the important positions
16 and they are killing civilians and HVO members by snipers and artillery.
17 They are arresting and abusing Croats on a mass scale. The Mujahedins
18 from Kozarac headed out towards Grm and Zmajevac, towards the HVO."
19 Let us pay specific attention to Zmajevac because it will prove
20 quite interesting later on. "The situation on the other -- in the other
21 parts of Bosnia is unknown. Attacks at Cajdras was attempted from the
22 direction of Lapac, but it was repelled. A T-55 tank is moving about the
23 city, and another one went in the direction of Raspotovje and Drivusa.
24 The 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade had taken -- had seized the Travnik street
25 from where snipers are operating. The Muslim forces drove Croats out from
1 the areas of Gornja Zenica, Luka, and they are also abandoning the village
2 of Bilivode. "My estimation is the situation is going to deteriorate
3 further and that many Croats will suffer during these actual and classical
4 terrorist acts which are committed under the command by the highest --
5 under the command of the highest military level of the army of BH."
6 Sir, do you recall from that meeting, where Mr. Bruno Stojic
7 appeared, some mention was made of some of the events contained in this
8 record or, rather, that he substantiated his statement concerning the BH
9 army offensive partly by referring to what we have just read out in this
10 report and that this happened at the time when you were present at the
12 A. No, I don't remember. Is this a verified document from that day,
13 and is it the report from a military man?
14 Q. Yes, sir. You have his signature there. It says the chief of
15 VOS, Operation Zone Central Bosnia, and it was sent to Mr. Dario Kordic,
16 Mr. Tihomir Blaskic. We know where the document was obtained from,
17 because in the original it says at the top, and we were given the document
18 by the Prosecution. I cannot testify, but this is precisely the document
19 that arrived on that critical date shortly before the meeting started. It
20 was received by Mr. Stojic, and this was the immediate cause of his
21 arrival at that meeting, and I'm wondering --
22 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. That's exactly --
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You have overlapped, Mr. Scott.
24 MR. SCOTT: My apology for overlapping. Your Honour, counsel has
25 just said she's not testifying but she just did. She's explained this
1 document, stated her argument that Mr. Stojic had received exactly this
2 document before bursting into the room and that's counsel. There is no
3 evidence of this. Now, put a question to the witness and -- if they want
4 to put that on in their own case they can try it. There is no evidence to
5 support that. Please.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Ms. Nozica. Please take
7 Mr. Scott's comment into account.
8 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. I will take it into
9 account. I was merely responding to the witness. I would not have
10 discussed this had the witness not asked me where the document came from
11 and whether it was verified. I was merely answering the witness's
13 Q. Let us move on and look at what happened in Konjic, Jablanica and
14 Zenica shortly before your arrival in Mostar and during your stay in
15 Mostar. Perhaps ultimately we would be able to account for Mr. Stojic's
16 arrival and his behaviour.
17 Let's look at document P 1964, which is the document from my
18 binder, the third document from the top. It is dated the -- I believe the
19 document is under seal, and I would like us to go into private session.
20 It was dated the 14th of April, 1993.
21 [Private session]
21 [Open session]
22 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honour.
23 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Q. Sir, this is a document dated the 16th of April, 1993. You met
25 with Mr. Ganic on the 17th of April, 1993. You were appointed to -- or,
1 rather, you were tasked with going to Mostar together with him in order to
2 calm down the tensions between Muslims and Croats. You said that you --
3 you didn't know that Mr. Ganic was a member of the Supreme Command.
4 This is a document issued by the Supreme Command which was -- and
5 was sent to the 4th Corps command and signed by head Fikret Muslimovic, or
6 chief Fikret Muslimovic. The first paragraph is not relevant to our case
7 at all. The second paragraph reads: "The central sphere of your work in
8 these conditions has to be the protection of units and headquarters from
9 the intelligence and other subversive activities which are being conducted
10 based on the tasks given by the political centres from the territories of
11 Herzegovina and Croatia, with a view to breaking up the sovereignty
12 and --" now, look at this: "It is very important to gather data on all
13 political, military, police and other activities which are carried out
14 against the BH army. This because it is realistic to expect a further
15 deterioration of relations and even a general military confrontation
16 between the BH army and the HVO. It is very important for such a
17 situation to make Muslims within the HVO as passive as possible and to
18 influence their transfer from the HVO to the BH army."
19 Sir, were you aware at the time that the HVO comprised large
20 numbers of Muslims?
21 A. If you say large numbers, no.
22 Q. Well, let us specify. Were you aware of the fact that in Mostar
23 itself there were Muslims in the HVO at the time? I will not give out any
24 figures, but were you aware of the fact that in the month of April there
25 were Muslims in the HVO in Mostar?
1 A. It is -- if there were 2 or 200 has some importance, but I was not
2 aware of it.
3 Q. But you knew that they were members of the HVO?
4 A. But your question is useless unless there was a number which is
5 politically significant. If there were two Muslims in the HVO in Mostar,
6 then of course I didn't know about it. If there was 200, then it's
7 interesting to know that I did not know about it.
8 Q. Well, I will only conclude that it is quite interesting, the fact
9 that you didn't know of them, because there was significantly more than
10 two. Had there been more than two, Mr. Fikret Muslimovic or the Supreme
11 Command Staff would not have issued such assignments as they did.
12 Wouldn't you agree with me?
13 A. I agree with you on that point.
14 Q. Did you know that at a later stage, let's say on the 30th of June,
15 an attack took place launched by the BH army against the northern camp of
16 Mostar and that it was carried out precisely in such a way that the Muslim
17 members of the HVO from inside the army, the HVO, together with the BH
18 army launched this attack, seized the barracks as well as Vrapcici and the
19 western part of Mostar? Did you come by this information through the
20 reports that you received later on?
21 A. Not that I know of.
22 Q. Let us look at the BH army activities in that period, which can be
23 found in document P 01929. That's the first document in my binder.
24 This document is signed by Mr. Arif Pasalic. The document is
25 dated the 17th of April, 1993. This is an order sent to all the units of
1 the 4th Corps. Were you aware of the fact that at the time the 4th Corps
2 went all the way to Konjic, Jablanica? And I mean from Mostar all the way
3 to those towns. Were you aware of that?
4 A. Yep.
5 Q. In point 1 it says: "Units in contact with the HVO and HV forces
6 are obliged to continue their defence actions and all measures should be
7 taken with that end in mind."
8 And it says: "The centre of activity or focus of activity shall
9 be on facilities and acts that endanger you most."
10 Now, let's see how this order is interpreted. It says: "Initial
11 successes should be maximally exploited and dominant features should be
12 occupied from which you will be able to -- unless you have already
13 occupied them from which you will be able to control larger territories
14 and wider areas. Carry out mutual linking and coordination."
15 So on the 17th of April, 1993, is the day before you met with
16 Mr. Arif Pasalic, but at any rate, it was the day on which you met
17 Mr. Ganic. And Mr. Arif Pasalic is issuing this order, from which we can
18 see that the 4th Corps, even before this date, had carried out offensive
19 action because underneath point 1 it says: "Take control of all dominant
20 features unless you have already taken control of them," which means that
21 they were supposed to have occupied them before this day, the 17th of
22 April, 1993.
23 Now, I assume you knew nothing about this when you arrived in
24 Mostar. Do you agree with me there?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Can we now take a look at the next document, which is in my
2 binder. It is 2D 00473. It is the 5th document from the back. It is an
3 order once again. 2D 00473 is its number. Tell me when you've found it,
5 A. I got it.
6 Q. This is a Prosecution document once again, and it doesn't have an
7 official date, but we do see that certain dates are mentioned in the
8 document. It says to the commander RB 2/7 Motorised Brigade, and it is an
9 order for attack. And I'll just look at several points which I'd like to
10 refer you it. Number 2, for example, it says: "The 2/7th mountain
11 brigade is to attack in the direction of Gradisce elevation 474 Zmajevac,
12 and I'd like to mention Zmajevac in particular, because we have already
13 had occasion to see that it was a point of interest to the 3rd and 4th
14 Corps. Now once again in point 3 it goes on to say I have decided that
15 the main access of attack is to be Gradisce elevation, et cetera,
16 Zmajevac, the Zmajevac establishment, and then it says that readiness for
17 the attack must be at 0500 hours on the 18th of April, 1993. And it says
18 the focus of moral and political support must be to prepare the troops for
19 executing the task and also to explain the intentions of the so-called
20 Herceg-Bosna in compliance with an order issued by the command of the 3rd
21 Corps dated the 17th of April, 1993, et cetera.
22 And finally at the end it says in point 10 the commander of the
23 brigade shall be held responsible support the execution of this order, the
24 commander of the 2/7th Muslim Mountain Brigade. I assume you have heard
25 of the 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade or perhaps not?
1 A. Perhaps not.
2 Q. I'll nevertheless like to continue, although I don't see -- I can
3 see that you don't know much of this, but let's get to the end to see what
4 actually happened in the area, first of all with respect to the actions
5 undertaken by the BH army. Now let us just take a look at document 2D
6 00472 briefly now. It is to be found in my binder, the sixth document
7 from the back, and it is an elaboration of the previous document or
8 details. It is an order for an attack dated the 17th of April, 1993, once
9 again, and it says what the first guerrilla group should undertake, the
10 second guerrilla group, and so on and so forth.
11 Now, you have drawn your attention to the mention of Zmajevac in
12 these documents precisely because in the document that I showed you
13 previously, which was dated the 17th of April, 1993, an information report
14 which was sent to Mr. Stojic, it precisely mentions that the Mujahedin
15 from Kozarac have started out towards Grm and Zmajevac, and these orders
16 by the BH army confirm what the details of this order of attack can --
18 Now, if we look at these orders, can we conclude from them, from
19 the orders that we have looked at and the report that some of them were
20 carried out, can we conclude that the BH army was indeed engaged in
21 offensive action in Central Bosnia precisely on the day or one or two days
22 before your arrival in Mostar? Is that something that becomes evident if
23 you look at these orders?
24 A. It was evident, because on some occasions the Croat -- the Croats
25 in Mostar were extremely eager to re-establish communications with one of
1 their units. So I suppose that they had been under attack and were
2 isolated. So this is not nothing new to me. But please let me tell the
3 Court that as a UN officer, you do not have intelligence resources at your
4 disposal, nor do you do intelligence. And if you have it, you are very
5 careful not to share it, because we could be used by the other party.
6 So I think on the whole we had very little information about the
7 formations, their numbers, and so on, and we didn't much care about it.
8 So this is one reason why I may seem rather ignorant about the Mountain
9 Brigade and so on. We really stayed out of that business. You may have
10 go to the Brits or the Americans to get better information.
11 Q. Sir, the aim of my examination was not to see whether you knew
12 about some units. Some units were certainly important and had
13 high-sounding names and are mentioned. However, I have shown you the
14 documents because I wanted to show you what happened, what was going on at
15 that point in time in that area and to link that up with the requests and
16 demands made and to see whether they were justified or not, that in your
17 mission you take into account all the events up there, and as you said at
18 the beginning put them on a par, on the same level.
19 Now, let's see the manner in which the BH army was behaving at the
20 time when negotiations were undertaken with you and your offers
22 Now, for purposes of continuity, let us look at 3D 00559. To --
23 it is the last document in my binder. 00559 is the document number. 3D.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. You can take a look at the English translation. It is on page 2
1 it, but it is the agreement on the 18th of April, 1993, signed by Alija
2 Izetbegovic and Mate Boban. So that is the day of your arrival and of
3 your meetings, and we'll read it through briefly. "All disagreements,"
4 point 1, "regarding the relation between the Croat and Muslim people of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina must be solved through political means.
6 "2. There is no reason for hostilities between the BH army and
7 the Croatian Defence Council.
8 "3. We order all units to cease hostilities immediately, release
9 prisoners and through negotiation at all levels to remove the causes of
11 "4. Immediately establish responsibility in the aims of units and
12 individuals for the beginning of the hostilities."
13 Now, I assume you haven't seen this document before, but am I
14 right in reading out what it says here?
15 A. I might well have seen this document since it is this Security
16 Council -- from the Secretary-General would most certainly have been
17 circulated within UNPROFOR. So I -- I should have seen it, actually.
18 Q. So, sir, the day -- the date of the document is the 18th of April,
19 and on the 19th of April you and Mr. Ganic were in Mostar. You discussed
20 the situation. I know that there were other persons present, too, but I
21 am highlighting Mr. Ganic here, and you were negotiating about a cessation
22 to the hostilities in Mostar and for that reason and upon Mr. Ganic's
23 insistence that is the reason you came to Mostar in the first place.
24 But now let's take a look at another document which at that time
25 was compiled in Mostar. It is document P 01970. And in my binder it is
1 the fifth document from the top.
2 We have seen this document several times in court, but let's look
3 at -- look at it together now in a different light, from a different angle
4 this time.
5 Tell me when you've found it, please.
6 A. I got it.
7 Q. Yes. This document was issued by the command of the 41st
8 Motorised Brigade. You don't have to know that, but please believe me
9 when I say that it was located in the town of Mostar. The document is
10 dated the 19th of April, 1993, and it is an order. It says: "An order
11 for defence," up at the top, and then it says: "I hereby order," and I'd
12 just like to remind you of the most important point. "All units of the
13 41st Motorised Brigade" it says, as well as elements of units from the
14 composition of the 4th Corps should take up positions for decisive defence
15 with the task of defending allocated regions as follows. So without doubt
16 and I'm sure you can confirm this, that on that date, the 19th of April,
17 you did have contacts with Mr. Arif Pasalic who was the commander of the
18 4th Corps; isn't that right?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. And we can also conclude that Mr. Ganic, who was a member of the
21 Supreme Command of the BH army at that point in time was in Mostar on a
22 peace mission to establish a truce between the Croats and the Muslims with
23 special emphasis on Mostar where you were highly involved; am I right?
24 A. Yeah, he seems to have every reason to be there. It looks to me
25 he had every reason to be there when I read this document.
1 Q. Yes. I think our conclusions are the same. And once we have seen
2 the document I'm sure our positions will be identical.
3 Now, I'm going to skip certain portions and look at point 1.3 of
4 this order, 1.3 where it says the following: "The 3rd Battalion has the
5 task of taking up defence positions in their area of responsibility
6 closing down the axis from Vrapcici towards Mostar in the region of Sutina
7 and preventing the crossing over of the hydroelectric power plant of
8 Mostar, the dam, as well as totally blocking and capturing the North Camp
10 This is the barracks that I asked you about earlier on about the
11 events of the 30th of June, and you couldn't remember. However, it is a
12 very significant order, because it is linked up with the events of the
13 order of Mr. Muslimovic of the 16th of April where people are mentioned,
14 Muslims mentioned in HVO units, and here once again we have an order to
15 attack North Camp, and it was indeed attacked on the 30th of June as the
16 documents bear out. It says: "Part of the troops with weaponry should be
17 transferred to the right bank and placed under the command of the 2nd
18 Battalion commander. Dispatch the complete crew for RBR Osa crew and
19 containers as well as the crew for the RPG, rocket grenade launcher's
20 crew. They should be trained in the use of the weapons they have."
21 Now I'd like to draw your attention to point 1.8. 1.8. I'm sure
22 you will remember something linked to this particular portion. It
23 says: "The MUP of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has the task of
24 taking up positions and defending the Old Bridge and the newly-built
25 bridge on Musala. With elements of the forces, launch an attack on the
1 MUP premises and the Mostar police station, capture them and defend them
2 fiercely. Aim to keep the Hirurgija surgery building in our zone. The
3 troops to be used in the attack on the MUP building and the Mostar police
4 station are to be on standby in the Mostar Hotel."
5 So this order, sir, is dated the 19th of April, 1993, and
6 yesterday you said that with respect to moving members of the BH army from
7 the Mostar Hotel, that you had members with the -- problems with the
8 members of the BH army and that Mr. Arif Pasalic was very reluctant to
9 carry it out.
10 Now, is the situation clearer to you now? It was precisely when
11 you were engaged in those activities that Mr. Hujdur, the commander of the
12 41st Motorised Brigade, together with Mr. Arif Pasalic, issued an order,
13 an offensive order, for this unit to go into operation, the unit that was
14 at the Mostar Hotel.
15 Now, does it seem to you be logical? Do you see the logics of why
16 they resisted leaving the building so much? Do you see the reason for
17 that now?
18 A. No. I don't see the reason, because Arif Pasalic agreed to take
19 them out, and he went with me and we took them out. So I -- I would say
20 that if this order was in -- actually issued on the 19th, it is highly
21 strange that the commanding officer of the 4th Corps would go with me and
22 bring out the soldiers from the Mostar -- Hotel Mostar, which he actually
23 did. So I don't see it at all, actually.
24 And there's one other question. This order is issued on the 19th,
25 and you say we attacked on the barracks occurred on the 30th of June. So
1 I fail to see the connection with it as well. If there is a connection,
2 it took them a hell of a long time to launch that attack.
3 Q. Sir, the first point is this: You said yesterday, or you told us
4 the circumstances under which the members of the unit from Mostar moved
5 out, and you said that the reason was because the Croatian side insisted
6 upon it. Is that right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. You said that you told Mr. Arif Pasalic that you were ready to
9 carry out the operation, and you invited him to do so.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You said that the number of members of the BH army in the hotel
12 increased constantly, although the initial assessment of Mr. Pasalic, what
13 he told you was that there were only 30 to 35 soldiers there; is that
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, you said yesterday during the examination-in-chief that
17 Mr. Arif Pasalic did not show any enthusiasm on that score, and that you
18 had to almost push those soldiers out of the Mostar Hotel.
19 A. I got the impression that he was more scared of his soldier than I
20 was. He -- he was very weak commanding at that time. I think he was only
21 too happy that we did the work for him.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Nozica, we have to finish.
23 It's a quarter to. There's a new trial coming, and those who follow us
24 are not pleased if there is any delay. So tomorrow we will continue, we
25 will resume tomorrow.
1 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] As far as I know, there is no other
2 hearing in this courtroom this afternoon. Might I just be allowed to
3 finish this document and then we can move on to the next document
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. So if you tell me
6 there is no other hearing, all right, then you can continue and finish.
7 No, there is another hearing, and Judge Mindua has also another
8 hearing. So we will --
9 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Well, it was my information that the
10 Srebrenica trial was not ongoing this week, but I won't insist. Thank
11 you. I'll continue tomorrow.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So, General, you
13 will come back to the next hearing, tomorrow at 9.00, and that will be
14 your last day. Thank you very much.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 7th day
17 of June, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.