1 Tuesday, 26 June 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the

6 case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon to everyone in the courtroom. This

8 is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al. Thank you

9 very much.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,

11 Mr. Registrar. Today is Tuesday, the 26th of June, 2007. My greetings to

12 the Prosecution, to the Defence counsel, and to the accused, as well as to

13 all the people in and around the courtroom.

14 First of all there is a problem with our timetable. There was a

15 request by Mr. Karnavas yesterday regarding the 15th of August. We

16 discussed the matter this morning, and we believe that it would be

17 possible to have the three days of hearing as scheduled as of the 16th of

18 August in the morning. We could have the 16th in the afternoon, and the

19 Friday, 17th of August or the afternoon if need be.

20 So there it is. It will make it possible for everybody to come

21 back peacefully and to be able to start after the recess on the 16th of

22 August.

23 Secondly, we're going to issue a decision. It is, rather, a

24 reminder by the Trial Chamber regarding the way guideline 6 should be

25 interpreted. It deals with the admission of documents not adduced in

1 court.

2 At its hearing of the 25th of June, 2007 -- at the hearing, sorry,

3 Mr. Karnavas and Ms. Alaburic raised a problem as to the way to interpret

4 guideline number 6 as stated in the decision of the 13th of July, 2006,

5 regarding the admission of evidence. Mr. Karnavas asked the Chamber to

6 reconsider whether it would be possible for the Defence to seek admission

7 of evidence under the said guideline, among other reasons because there

8 are, as alleged, time constraints during the hearing. Ms. Alaburic also

9 argued at the hearing of the 6th of November, 2006, that I amended the

10 said guideline by allowing the Defence, as it is allowed to the

11 Prosecution, to seek admission by way of written motion meeting the

12 criteria of the guideline.

13 The Trial Chamber recalls, first of all, that guideline 6 of the

14 decision of the 13th of July, 2006, provides that the -- only the

15 Prosecution can seize the Trial Chamber of a written motion for the

16 admission of evidence which were not put before the witness in court.

17 Then after saying that it was willing to somewhat loosen up the conditions

18 stated out in guideline 6, the Trial Chamber heard the submissions of

19 parties at the hearing of 6 November 2006, including their proposal to

20 amend the guideline in order to allow not only the Prosecution but also

21 the Defence to file written motions for admission of evidence not put to a

22 witness in court.

23 Following the submissions the Trial Chamber issued, on the 29th of

24 November, 2006, a decision amending the decision of the 13th of July,

25 2006. In its decision of the 29th of November, 2006, the Trial Chamber

1 very clearly stated that: "At the state of the trial, namely during the

2 Prosecution case, the possibility to file written motions before the

3 Chamber under guideline 6 is only opened to the Prosecution."

4 Finally, by way of a confidential decision of the 24th of May,

5 2007, on the request by the Praljak Defence for admission of two documents

6 as evidence, the Trial Chamber once again reminded the parties that

7 guideline 6 could only be used by the Prosecution. With regard to the

8 intervention of the Presiding Judge during the hearing of the 6th of

9 November, 2006, it had to be seen within the context of submissions by the

10 parties following a proposal by the Trial Chamber to loosen the conditions

11 stated in the guideline.

12 At any rate, this intervention was made prior to the decision of

13 the 29th of November, 2006, and can therefore in no way be interpreted as

14 challenging or questioning the written decision of the 29th of November,

15 2006.

16 In conclusion, the Trial Chamber maintains its position, namely

17 that at the state of the trial it is not for the Defence to request by way

18 of written motion for the Chamber to admit evidence which was not put

19 before a witness in court. The Defence will be able and allowed, if need

20 be, when it comes to the Defence case to seize the Chamber of such motions

21 in similar conditions to the conditions applying to the Prosecution.

22 So in a nutshell, the Trial Chamber only allows the Prosecution to

23 file written motions regarding documents that were not submitted to a

24 witness, and the Defence equally will be put in a similar situation and

25 will be given the same possibility when we start with the Defence case.

1 The Prosecution then will not be allowed to request by way of written

2 motion for documents to be admitted.

3 This being said, regarding the Defence motion for reconsideration

4 by the Trial Chamber of the time period allotted to the Defence for the

5 cross-examination of the present witness, the Trial Chamber maintains its

6 position. The Defence will be given six hours. Should there be new

7 elements transpiring on cross-examination that justify more flexibility,

8 the Trial Chamber might possibly, depending on the time remaining, grant

9 an extension of this time, but only so if it's deemed relevant depending

10 on the questions dealt with.

11 Finally, I'd like to tell the parties that the Trial Chamber filed

12 a written decision today regarding the proceedings under Rule 65 [as

13 interpreted] ter. I do invite you to read the decision, and there is also

14 an individual opinion by myself.

15 Let us have the witness brought in, the examination-in-chief to be

16 continued.

17 Mr. Kruger, you have 1 hour and 120 seconds.

18 [The witness entered court]

19 WITNESS: KLAUS JOHANN NISSEN [Resumed]

20 [Witness answered through interpreter]

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just one minor correction. On

22 line 13, page 4, do not read 65 but 92.

23 Good afternoon, sir. We are going to resume with the examination

24 if chief.

25 And, Mr. Kruger, you may proceed.

1 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour. Good afternoon, Your

2 Honours. Good afternoon to everybody in and around the courtroom.

3 Examination by Mr. Kruger: [Continued]

4 Q. Good afternoon, Colonel.

5 A. [In English] I have no German translation.

6 Q. Can you hear us now in German?

7 A. [Interpretation] Yes.

8 Q. Good afternoon, Colonel. Colonel, yesterday evening we concluded

9 with looking at Exhibit -- you don't need to turn to it now, Exhibit

10 03470.

11 MR. KRUGER: If I could perhaps have the assistance of the usher

12 to provide the exhibit binder to the witness.

13 Q. Now, sir, in that document the very last thing we looked at

14 yesterday was a passage which stated that HV troops, special forces from

15 the 41st HV Brigade from Split are carrying a counter-attack in Buna,

16 Bacevici and this was written on the 15th of July, 1993. Would I like to

17 move on from this point and look at the next document related to what --

18 to the previous document, and this is Exhibit 3494. Exhibit 3494. Do you

19 have that, sir?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, this is an ECMM report. Sorry. No, it's not an ECMM report.

22 It comes from the European Community Liaison Officer in Kiseljak, and it's

23 the daily information summary for 16 July 1993. Once again, would you

24 have seen or received this report.

25 A. Yes, we got them as a matter of principle.

1 Q. Now, sir, if we can once again turn to paragraph 6 of this report

2 entitled "SpaBat sector." Do you have that?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, if we look at paragraph (A), which deals with Mostar, we see

5 under the first bullet: "Fighting between the HVO and BiH continued to

6 the south of Mostar in the Buna Bacevic areas." And then it goes on:

7 "After the HVO and HVO troops launched a counter-attack on the morning of

8 15 July."

9 And if we go to the fourth bullet, paragraph 4 on that page:

10 "Fresh Croat soldiers have been seen in Mostar ..." And two lines

11 down: "Significantly, these soldiers appear to be unfamiliar with the

12 names of the surrounding villages."

13 Can you comment on these two portions, add anything to what's

14 already stated here?

15 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I don't wish to -- I didn't object

16 yesterday, but now we're going a gentleman to comment about a passage

17 without laying a foundation, and think I we need to lay a foundation

18 before -- you know, was this his observation, and if he says yes then he

19 can comment, but here someone is giving a value judgement such as it

20 appears that they didn't know, they were unfamiliar with the surroundings.

21 So I just think that, first, was he aware, keeping in mind where he was

22 located at the time. Thank you.

23 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour. I'll rephrase that.

24 Q. Sir, the issues mentioned in this paragraph, first of all the

25 question of HV troops being present at this period in time in the region

1 of Mostar, was that something which the ECMM had also been aware of or was

2 discussing looking at at that stage?

3 A. We discussed this together amongst ourselves again and again

4 within ECMM. My CC had no concrete indications of HV troops. We didn't

5 see any personally, and there were certain cases of suspicion, but we

6 didn't see any.

7 Q. Now, sir, can you tell the Court in what way were -- was the ECMM

8 able to investigate or look for the presence of HV troops? And at what

9 times during the day?

10 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me again, Your Honour. I hate being a pest

11 but I am going to be critical at this point. First, it assumes that there

12 was an investigation. I think the question should be, you know, what, if

13 anything, did he do. We know that he doesn't know anything personally.

14 He didn't see anything. So now the question is if he wants to go about it

15 in a roundabout way, was there an investigation, yes, and it may be based

16 on an investigation he might be able to comment, even though he doesn't

17 have firsthand knowledge, but I think it assumes a fact that's not in

18 evidence yet, and it may never be in evidence.

19 MR. KRUGER: I'll rephrase that one as well.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kruger, please let us try to

21 avoid interventions by Mr. Karnavas. It might be time-consuming, but he

22 wants to comply with the proceedings. So try to comply yourself by

23 putting questions that are such that there is no such objection. It's not

24 of interest to me because I'm interested in what there is in the document.

25 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. Sir, a recurring theme in the documents that we have seen up to

2 now, and it will also appear from a few of the documents which we will

3 still look at, are reports that, especially from the ECMM side, there are

4 allegations of the presentation of HV troops, but you have not seen any

5 evidence of that personally or your ECMM monitors. Could you comment or

6 tell the Court how the Court should view this information as -- does this

7 mean that there were no HV troops as far as you're concerned or not?

8 A. In this report, this did not come from ECMM but from the other

9 side. There was a general mandate from the EC Mostar to monitor border to

10 Croatia, to see if HV troops had crossed the border. And then round about

11 the 13th of June, after these events had happened, there was a special

12 order to repeat this and to intensify our efforts, so that for some days a

13 team checked the border with Croatia several times, but during the day.

14 This could only be visual inspection, travelling up and down, and

15 sometimes an attempt was made to see if there were any tracks in the area.

16 It was a mountainous area, and so it was difficult to see traces.

17 And during these checks we did not find any indications of any HV

18 troops. The only time where we had suspicion, but I cannot confirm this

19 that it was a case of HV troops, in Siroki Brijeg one morning, very early

20 we were in our premises and there were artillery shots, and we saw two

21 artillery stations close to Siroki Brijeg. We assumed that these shots

22 were aimed around the area of Breznice Vjadi [phoen], but it was an

23 assumption. That's all I can say.

24 These -- there were two other posts in other areas. These could

25 have been the same ones, but I'm not sure.

1 Q. Sir, just for clarity, you mentioned that -- sorry, I'm looking

2 for it in the transcript. Ah. And then you said and then around the 13th

3 of June, after these events had happened. Is that correct, the 13th of

4 June, or are you referring to July?

5 A. No. I'm sorry. It was -- perhaps I made a mistake. It was July

6 when these events to the north of Mostar and the south took place. 30th

7 of July, it was afterwards.

8 Q. Thank you. Sir, if we can move to another exhibit, and this is

9 Exhibit 3511. Exhibit 3511. You have it?

10 A. I have it. Yes.

11 Q. Sir, this is once again a report or a daily information summary

12 from the European Community Liaison Officer for the 17th of July, 1993.

13 Would you have had, received this document as well?

14 A. Yes. I assume I did, because we got all of them.

15 Q. If we can turn once again to the sixth paragraph of the document.

16 Do you have that, paragraph 6, "SpaBat sector."

17 A. Yes, I have. Yes.

18 Q. Paragraph (A) is once again "Mostar" and if we look at the end of

19 the bullets or after the bullets, "Comment", in the first bullet under

20 "Comment": "There have been further confirmed reports of HV troops in

21 the area."

22 Were you -- did you receive any further information since the

23 previous report regarding this?

24 A. No. We had no personal knowledge over the events that I have

25 already indicated.

1 Q. Sir, the third bullet, the very last line on that page: "Movement

2 of UNPROFOR vehicles in the area of Mostar, Capljina is still being

3 prevented by the HVO."

4 What was the situation with regard to the ECMM in these areas?

5 A. Capljina, yes. Of course, we were still of course prevented from

6 go into Mostar, not Capljina. And as I said yesterday, in the area of

7 Capljina, Medjugorje, Ceduk [as interpreted], only one time, it was one

8 day or two, I don't know exactly, there was a street barrier. We were

9 prevented from crossing certain crossroads and we were diverted into

10 another direction. Otherwise, for us in Capljina there was no particular

11 restriction, and no one of my team had reported any such restrictions

12 either.

13 Q. Thank you. Sir, just for the record, you mentioned on page 10,

14 line 8, a place called Ceduk. Is that correct? You mentioned three

15 places, Capljina, Medjugorje, and in the -- and in the record, it came out

16 the third place as Ceduk. I'm just checking whether that's --

17 A. I think -- I'm sorry. I think I was only describing the area in

18 general, that is, Capljina, Citluk, because it all belongs together, and

19 of course there are other areas I could mention to the south. But this

20 was the entire area we covered.

21 Q. Thank you, sir. That's cleared it up. If we can move to the next

22 exhibit in the binder. That's Exhibit 3554. Exhibit 3554. Do you have

23 it?

24 A. Yes, I also have is this one.

25 Q. Now, sir, this is a report, a daily report for 20 July, and it's

1 an ECMM report from Brad and Peter. Are you aware of this report? Did

2 you know about it?

3 A. Yes, I know this report.

4 Q. Now, in the section which says "Political situation," -- so, no,

5 the next paragraph, "Military situation": "Restrictions to movement

6 continue. We were stopped by a police patrol on the north side of

7 Citluk."

8 My first question is: The reference to a police patrol, do you

9 know which police this refers to?

10 A. No, I can't remember.

11 Q. After this, it's reported in the same paragraph that the police

12 told the monitors that they should follow the agreement made with

13 UNPROFOR, and then there's a comment. "Neither we nor UNPROFOR know

14 anything about an agreement. End comment."

15 Can you tell the Court about that? Was there such an agreement

16 that you knew of or not?

17 A. Well, that would have been an agreement against our own

18 possibilities of movement, and this is an agreement that I think can be

19 excluded. This report presumably refers to what I said. Citluk is not

20 far from Medjugorje, and this was this crossroads that I mentioned before,

21 the one that the team refers to in this report.

22 Q. Let's look at paragraph 4 of -- of this report. "Humanitarian

23 situation." "At the coordination meeting UNHCR described urgent problem

24 involving the movement of Muslim detainees and refugees. Last Saturday

25 they were asked by the HVO government to establish a transit camp in

1 Ljubuski for up to 10.000 persons..." And then two lines further: "UNHCR

2 refused this as it would be aiding ethnic cleansing."

3 Were you aware of this incident or what's reported in this

4 paragraph and, if so, can you comment on it?

5 A. Well, we were not involved in this, so to that extent I cannot

6 comment on it. However, I had heard - I cannot confirm this - that the

7 wagon camp in Ljubuski -- not Ljubuski, in Capljina, possibly was kind of

8 transit camp and had been used as such, but I don't know that precisely.

9 Q. Following on on this, perhaps if we can just look at the final

10 paragraph, paragraph -- penultimate paragraph, paragraph 8, the

11 assessment. "The international community is being pressured into aiding

12 in ethnic cleansing. If they do not help, they are accused of letting

13 people starve. Pressure must be brought to bear on those responsible for

14 the mass relocations."

15 Can you comment on this assessment, what it implies or what it

16 means?

17 A. Well, in particular, as I said yesterday, the International

18 Committee of the Red Cross was always in a cleft stick. They wanted to

19 help and had to help on one hand. On the other hand they were faced with

20 the criticism if they did help, then they would help with expulsion or

21 ethnic cleansing of the refugees. And this was the permanent atmosphere,

22 and it was a constant concern of the Red Cross.

23 Q. Thank you, sir. Let's look at the next exhibit, 3611. Exhibit

24 3611. Do you have the exhibit?

25 A. Yes, I also have this one.

1 Q. Now, sir, this is an ECMM daily summary report for 21 July 1993,

2 and it's -- at the end, it's signed, "Regards, Jacques Witgen, senior

3 ops-officer." Do you know of this report? Did you see it?

4 A. Yes. I presume that I received it. In fact, I'm sure I received

5 it.

6 Q. Jacques Witgen, who was he, just for the record?

7 A. I didn't get to know him as far as I'm aware, because from Zenica

8 we were very far removed. You have to imagine the mountains involved, an

9 eight-hour journey. So they were very rarely in Zenica.

10 Q. Let's look at section 2 or paragraph 2 of this document on the

11 first page: "CC Mostar area of responsibility."

12 And if we look at the second paragraph under that section, it

13 says: "A meeting was arranged today with Mr. Petkovic to try to arrange

14 for the problem of exchange of prisoners ..." Two lines down: "But he

15 didn't come and had HCC was told by phone that the responsibility of those

16 matters was now in the hands of the deputy chief of police, Mr. Pusic."

17 Can you tell the Court about that incident or about this?

18 A. Yes, in fact this did not take place, and we were not in a

19 position because of a lack of --

20 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] [Previous translation

21 continues] ... President. Your Honours, I want to raise an objection. My

22 learned friend is now obviously stating something that is not even in the

23 indictment or in the pre-trial brief. It was never alleged that Mr. Pusic

24 was the deputy chief of police. It's not in the indictment. It's not in

25 the pre-trial brief. If you look at the date, the 21st of July, 1993, if

1 you look at paragraph 13 of the pre-trial brief, it is obvious, at least

2 based on what the Prosecutor says, Mr. Pusic was in a different position

3 as of the 5th of July that year, entirely different.

4 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, if I may respond. The -- the --

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, please. Please do.

6 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour. The Prosecution is simply

7 putting the document to the witness and is restating exactly what is

8 stated in the document for the witness's comment, and one of the aspects

9 which we could touch upon, if the witness knows, is the title accorded to

10 Mr. Pusic.

11 If I may continue?

12 Q. Sir, can you comment --

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Ibrisimovic.

14 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] If I may, Mr. President. The

15 same sort of question was asked yesterday of this witness and the witness

16 said he didn't understand at all what Mr. Pusic's job was exactly.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] He might tell us that he doesn't

18 know exactly.

19 Please put the question to him.

20 MR. KRUGER:

21 Q. Colonel, you have heard the discussion. In the last line of the

22 quoted section there's reference to the "deputy chief of police,

23 Mr. Pusic." Now, you had met Mr. Pusic. Did you know exactly what his

24 title was, or position?

25 A. I was under the impression, and this was confirmed in 1994 when I

1 heard the name again, that the area of responsibility of Mr. Pusic was not

2 clearly defined from -- I myself didn't quite understand the definition.

3 So he was responsible for displaced persons, then refugees. That's what I

4 heard as well, I seem to remember. And in 1994 he said he was also

5 responsible for prisoners of war. Hence it was never quite clear to me.

6 That's what I stated yesterday about wording here, on the one hand

7 I assume of course that this was said by the mayor of Siroki Brijeg.

8 Otherwise, it wouldn't say so here. I don't think because of the unclear

9 definition of his area of responsibility that I've just described a

10 completely new term is being used. That is not probable. That would

11 really not be good work. That would not really be careful -- careful

12 work.

13 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Are you able to provide the Court with

14 further insight as to why the meeting with Mr. Petkovic was cancelled?

15 Can you recall any reasons being given?

16 A. No, I cannot remember. I don't know that any more.

17 Q. Did or was contact taken up with Mr. Pusic regarding the matters

18 for the exchange -- or the problem of exchange of prisoners in this case,

19 to your recollection?

20 A. It was very difficult to establish communications, and it didn't

21 work out. I think that the attempt was made. Our major line of

22 communication was the -- the secretary of Mr. Stojic, and I can remember

23 the name of Franceska, but this was the only acceptable link of

24 communication that we still had.

25 Q. Now that you mentioned her, can you tell the Court who was

1 Franceska?

2 A. That was the office of Minister Stojic via which we also tried to

3 establish other contacts. But as I said, the links of communication were

4 quite difficult because of technical possibilities.

5 Q. And who was Franceska specifically?

6 A. She was his -- she was the secretary that the -- the lady in the

7 secretariat. She was responsible for the secretariat.

8 Q. Sir, if we can look at -- under -- on this the document paragraph

9 2, "CC Mostar." The first paragraph under that section. It says: "HCC

10 met today ..." First question, does that refer to you, still, as HCC?

11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry if I linguistically intervene,

12 Mr. Kruger. The translation says she was the secretary, but vorzimmerdame

13 is not really secretary. It would rather be the lady at the reception

14 desk. Would you agree with that, Witness?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] She was not the lady in the

16 reception. She was the secretary who was in -- who was responsible and

17 who also turned us away, to say it quite clearly, that was also manning

18 her area of responsibility. So she was not the lady in reception. I

19 think it's nuances. She was really in charge for Mr. Stojic.

20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Microphone not activated] Thank you for the

21 clarification.

22 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 Q. Perhaps it's worthwhile just lingering on this point for a while

24 longer. You say she was responsible, "who also turned us away, to say it

25 quite clearly." Can you tell the Court what you mean by that?

1 A. I'm going to illustrate this by using an example. We have made

2 lots of attempts to get to the minister, to the minister of defence and

3 his deputy, and then every day we were told, for example, "Today he is

4 absent. He is not here. He will only be here at 5.00." But then we

5 tried at 5.00 and he wasn't there. "You can try tomorrow." She told us,

6 "Yes, I saw him, but he's gone away again." So the quite obvious

7 behaviour that we know from such places, from secretariats. But it could

8 be like that but it could have been different on that occasion.

9 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Let's turn then to that paragraph, the first

10 page of the document, section 2, "CC Mostar." Do you have that? And then

11 the first paragraph of that section. "HCC met today..." My question was,

12 HCC, was that still you at this stage?

13 A. Yes, it was still me, because the transfer to my successor, the

14 hand-over hadn't happened.

15 Q. It says then: You "met today the mayor of Siroki Brijeg, who told

16 that they were evacuating Muslims to Croatia, 'Because there was no other

17 solution.'" Can you comment on that or tell the Court what this was

18 about?

19 A. In Siroki Brijeg there were only very few Muslim refugees, and he

20 said it in general terms, and he was also referring to other areas, to

21 other cities, because he basically knew about this activity. He -- he

22 might have talked about it possibly as well in order to make it clear that

23 we were talk -- in his view it was an evacuation, a peaceful movement of

24 population and nothing else. So that might have been the intention behind

25 this. He didn't specify that either. He didn't give any figures. Of

1 course the question was asked again, and then things were not quite clear.

2 Q. The very next line it says: "Nevertheless, most of about 7.000

3 displaced persons in the town are Croats who stay there."

4 Can you comment on this in light of what was just said about the

5 Muslims being evacuated, if you recall?

6 A. This number of Croat refugees in Siroki Brijeg I heard about

7 occasionally. They were mainly Croats who had been accepted in guest

8 families. So they came from the East Herzegovina but also from Jajce

9 where in winter the march started of refugees from Jajce. There were

10 probably also temporary -- there was also a temporary accommodation, but

11 the main share had been -- were staying with guest families, with host

12 families.

13 Q. Colonel, if we turn the page, just one last thing on this

14 document. Just before the third section, the paragraph above, the last

15 sentence reads: "The team around for a meeting with the HVO Brigade

16 commander in Domanovici. If it succeeds, it will be the first time since

17 long that ECMM goes so close to Mostar."

18 To your recollection, did -- was this successful that the ECMM

19 could then -- or that team could then go to Mostar or close to Mostar?

20 A. I seem to remember in my time there were only a few days left that

21 it was -- that it didn't happen, but I would really have to check it in

22 another document and read up on it again, but I don't think so.

23 Q. Sir, if we can turn two documents further, Exhibit 3674.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, let's stay with this

25 particular exhibit, and I'd like us to go back to item two, paragraph 2.

1 Here when reading this text the way it was drafted, we get the impression

2 that there was a meeting organised on that particular day with

3 Mr. Petkovic in order to try to arrange the problem of exchange of

4 prisoners and, in particular, the situation of the Tuzla delegation.

5 Let's proceed with -- when we read the rest of the text, we see that

6 apparently Petkovic never showed up, and then he we read: "HCC," that is

7 to say you, "heard on the phone that the responsibility of those matters

8 was now in the hands of the deputy chief of police, Mr. Pusic."

9 So apparently Mr. Petkovic did not show up, so you called someone

10 on the phone, and that someone told to you that these matters fell under

11 the competence of Mr. Pusic, but do you remember that particular point or

12 not?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot recollect how it

14 technically happened. The most probable is that on the return to CC I got

15 on the phone, or one of my monitors phoned, and that it happened after the

16 mayor of the Siroki Brijeg had left, but I don't remember.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's proceed.

18 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

19 Q. Sir, if we can turn to Exhibit 3674. Exhibit 3674. You have the

20 document before you?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, sir, this document is dated the -- it's the weekly summary

23 for 23 July, and it says at the end: "Best regards, HCC Mostar." Was

24 this a report drafted by you or written by you?

25 A. Yes, I assume that it's from me. It might also have been

1 Sir Martin Garrod who worded it, but then in conjunctions we cooperated.

2 It was a document from me.

3 Q. Sir, if we can look under (A), the "Weekly assessment," the very

4 first part. "Because our current inability to observe and report on key

5 parts of our area first-hand, our assessment has to be our best

6 interpretation of current events." Can you tell the Court what that

7 means?

8 A. I need to read that passage again. That's Sir Martin Garrod's

9 English. I recognised it.

10 Yes. What it means is that we got immediate information about

11 what happened. We were very remote of that. We were cut off.

12 Q. What were the sources of your information?

13 A. These were the observer officers of the United Nations, the

14 Spanish Battalion, and contacts of the UNHCR or International Red Cross,

15 and also the man in the street, but less so or not at all a real insight

16 into the area of contacts with officers -- with officials, or contacts who

17 were close to the front line. We did have the contact with the mayor.

18 Q. If we look at Section (B), the "Weekly projection" toward the end,

19 the first line says: "We will be pursuing the freedom of movement

20 question this week ..."

21 With whom would that have been pursued?

22 A. That was supposed to be made clear with our joint visit of my

23 successor and myself in Zenica so that at the higher level than ours we

24 could look into that matter again. In the meantime, we had an incident

25 that a Mercedes had been stolen, and internally that also created, too, a

1 restriction of movement. We could not operate so easily.

2 Q. So if I understand correctly, if you say, "We will be pursuing the

3 freedom of movement question this week," does that mean that you would be

4 taking it up with the office RC Zenica or did I misunderstand?

5 A. I think I'm correct as far as the dates are concerned. I think

6 afterwards I went with Sir Martin Garrod to Zenica, also to organise the

7 hand-over, and the paragraph under (B) alludes to that and makes it clear

8 that we're going to go to Zenica and with that question.

9 Q. Sir, if we can look two paragraphs above that. This is the

10 paragraph which reads: "There are increasing signs." Do you have that

11 paragraph?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. The second sentence, that's the last word of the third line: "They

14 also seem to be appreciating that the world press is heavily critical of

15 their treatment to date of their major displaced persons problem, and we

16 would see a more moderate and humane line developing, an indication being

17 the statement of Mr. Pogarcic yesterday, the journalists and the United

18 States military attache had been permitted to visit the Heliodrom."

19 Do you recall this or do you know what this relates to?

20 A. There was also a visit with Sir Martin Garrod and myself to

21 Mr. Pogarcic in the days prior to that date. And I think in that context

22 I seem to remember he also talked about the visit of the Heliodrom. So we

23 included this in the report. But what happened in the end, what was the

24 outcome, I cannot tell you. I'm not quite sure.

25 Q. Sir, a final aspect on this -- on this document, and we may

1 actually have dealt with this aspect about 15 minutes ago, but if we look

2 at just the paragraph above the one we were dealing with now, it says:

3 "Although there can be no doubt that there are elements of HV troops in

4 Herzegovina, we ourselves have observed very little in the way of formed

5 bodies ...," et cetera. My only question here is that first part,

6 "Although there can be no doubt." Can you tell the Court on what basis

7 that was written?

8 A. This was taken from the frequent reports from Kiseljak in order to

9 shortly summarise it in a form and transmit it to RC Zenica. And the fact

10 that we ourselves observed very little really -- we have observed nothing,

11 I would like to stick to that even though it might sound differently when

12 you read this here. This was our interpretation after seeing the guns in

13 Siroki Brijeg.

14 Q. Sir, let's turn to Exhibit 3710. Exhibit 3710. Do you have the

15 document before you?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Sir, this is a document with your name at the top, Klaus Nissen,

18 HCC Mostar, and then July 26, 1993, although at the right of the page

19 there's a date 30 July 1993. First of all, do you recognise or know of

20 this particular document?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What is this document?

23 A. This is a personal report to the German head of delegation in

24 Mostar, and at the same time a manuscript or -- which was written

25 subsequent to a presentation in Zagreb. It was a kind of debriefing

1 document.

2 Q. Now, sir, this document relates, of course, to the involvement of

3 HV troops in Southern Bosnia. And if we look at the first paragraph,

4 about halfway down, there's a portion which says: "The value of such an

5 assessment may be limited, because we were not allowed to work in the

6 darkness, but we did not observe any traces in the terrain, which we as

7 soldiers should have been able to interpret."

8 Is this what you were referring to earlier this afternoon when we

9 spoke about this matter of observing HV troops?

10 A. Yes. I referred to this in this particular document, which is

11 dated later, the end of July. Again, I summarised what seemed to me to be

12 important to report to the ECMM of Chief of Operations in Zagreb.

13 Q. Sir, if we can look at Exhibit --

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, one clarification.

15 This document, 3710, is addressed to the head of the German delegation you

16 said in Mostar. Yesterday, I also realised on examining Exhibit 3807,

17 that you also sent a report to the German delegation in Zagreb regarding

18 the issue of the three interpreters that had been captured. The three

19 interpreters and a driver had been captured by the HVO; what is this

20 German delegation?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In Zagreb, Your Honour, there was a

22 sort of ambassador who was in Zagreb representing the German national side

23 at the ECMM. He looked after the monitors, the reports. He wrote his own

24 comments for the Foreign Ministry, and for Federal Minister Kinkel. And

25 it was not desired to use national channels, but I must say that each

1 nation did have to its own national delegations, now and again when it

2 seemed necessary.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. Sir, one final document on HV presence if we can turn to Exhibit

6 2643. Exhibit 2643. Do you have that in front of you?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. Sir, this is a document from Brad or signed by Brad. It's dated

9 the 5th of June, 1993, and it's an ECMM team report, and this is the

10 report which at the -- in paragraph 8 refers to a search of the Bosnian

11 navy, and nothing was found. Do you recall this document or had you seen

12 it?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. We note in paragraph 8 once again this was just an early report

15 of: "Some evidence has been seen suggesting possible HV presence in the

16 area ..." I won't ask you further on this, but perhaps just three lines --

17 or two lines below that. "Team patrol the southern extremes of Bosnia in

18 search of the Bosnian navy. Nothing was found." Can you perhaps just

19 tell the Court what that was or what that means.

20 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I -- I apologise to the Prosecutor.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Ms. Nozica.

22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I think it would be proper, if the

23 Prosecution is showing the document like this, and we'll deal with it

24 during the cross-examination of course, but it would be proper for him to

25 read out everything, the one or two sentences in between. That would be

1 the right thing to do. And it says: "The possible presence -- suggesting

2 possible HV presence in the area," and it says, "Confirmation still not

3 required. Team will continue to pursue the matter." So the correct way

4 of going about this would be to read all the sentences in between as well.

5 Thank you.

6 MR. KRUGER: Thank you for that, Your Honour. I will try and

7 assist in that matter.

8 Q. For this document, though, I think we've dealt with these matters

9 sufficiently at this stage, and I would just like to ask still about the

10 navy and what that meant or what that was about.

11 A. Of course this is a joke, but where is the joke? There was a

12 certain frustration in the teams to be asked again and again about the HV

13 troops and to be unable to come up with an answer, the result being that

14 they said, "Then ask us about the navy." It was roughly like this. Which

15 we couldn't find either.

16 Q. Okay. Now, sir, a final question on the access to Mostar

17 question -- or matter. Did you personally try to gain access via

18 alternative routes during your time with CC Mostar?

19 A. Can I ask you a question? Do you mean the entire time I was there

20 when we didn't have access, in June, for example, or July? Over the

21 entire period of time, not only the last period?

22 Q. Well, perhaps only the last period when access was restricted, and

23 if you have a specific example. That's what I was referring to.

24 A. Yes. At the end of June I made a large detour with the French

25 driver without an interpreter not to endanger the interpreter, and we

1 didn't have an armoured vehicle, we made a great detour coming from the

2 south towards Mostar. This was in June. And to our great surprise,

3 because we had assumed that we came to a check-point and we would be

4 turned away as usual, this -- we wanted to see was there a check-point

5 there and where are we going to land.

6 In fact there was no check-point at all. We just continued the

7 journey and found ourselves at the south entry to Mostar, below the

8 heights of Donja Mahala, fairly far in, not too far away from the

9 Old Bridge. And there suddenly fire was opened and I must say that first

10 of all these were warning shots, quite a few, but they were warning shots

11 because the car could easily have been hit. And I don't know from what

12 side it came. It was not -- we couldn't decide. We stopped immediately,

13 we turned around and we drove away. And we were so occupied with

14 ourselves that we didn't care about the positions, and vehicles, and

15 buildings, and soldiers at their posts. We were too busy looking after

16 ourselves.

17 Q. Sir, on this day in what kind of vehicle were you travelling?

18 A. This was a non-armoured vehicle. What's it called? I can't

19 remember the name.

20 Q. And what did the vehicle -- how --

21 A. The English vehicle --

22 Q. Was that a Land Rover, sir?

23 A. Land Rover. Yes. I'm sorry. Yes. I couldn't remember the name.

24 Land Rover. It was an unarmed Land Rover. And I'm saying it was

25 unarmed in particular because in this area we did have an armoured Land

1 Rover, but this was unarmoured.

2 Q. How was this Land Rover painted?

3 A. It was painted white, and it had the ECMM insignia on top on the

4 hood and on the side. It was clearly recognisable as an ECMM vehicle.

5 And the flag as well.

6 Q. Sir, if we can turn to Exhibit 2619. Exhibit 2619.

7 A. Yes, I have it.

8 Q. This is a document, an ECMM report, to RC Zenica, and it is dated

9 the 3rd of June, 1993. First of all, this report, would you have seen

10 such a report or this report?

11 A. Yes. I'm sure that I had seen it.

12 Q. Under paragraph 7 we see: "People met," and the very first one

13 relates to Colonel -- the "HVO 1 Brigade commander - Colonel Obradovic."

14 Is this the same Colonel Obradovic we were referring to or talking about

15 yesterday?

16 A. Yes, this same person.

17 Q. Now, is sir, if we can look on the second page of this document.

18 The second line from the top, it says: "1st Brigade is involved in only a

19 limited way in the conflict in Mostar." And then the comment is:

20 "Information from Colonel Obradovic suggests strongly a tie between the

21 HVO and the Serbs in this conflict."

22 Were you aware of any such contacts?

23 A. In fact, we hadn't been told anything concrete about such

24 contacts. It was at a time -- no. That was something else. I'm sorry.

25 I was thinking of something else. No. We were not informed further about

1 such contacts. I don't know anything more about them.

2 Q. Sir, the next paragraph down from that: "Colonel Obradovic comes

3 across as a strong advocate of military force." And: "He does not

4 believe that the negotiations will solve the conflict in Mostar."

5 Can you add anything to that or do you have any specific knowledge

6 on Colonel Obradovic in this regard?

7 A. Well, I don't know anything in particular about his person, but

8 the -- I received the entry. I didn't meet him myself, and I know he was

9 a very -- very military man, and this is how he spoke, and he dealt

10 accordingly.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, if the -- in my learned colleague

12 could just either read the rest of the paragraph or walk the witness

13 through the rest of the paragraph, because cherry-picking, as it were, is

14 not appropriate in this instance, because if you read the rest of the

15 paragraph it gives context, and I think the context is something that the

16 Prosecution at times, perhaps because they have lack of time, you know,

17 they seem to omit.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kruger.

19 MR. KRUGER: Yes, Your Honour.

20 Q. Sir, further on in this paragraph, it does say that

21 Colonel Obradovic, referring to Colonel Obradovic: "He does not feel that

22 the Vance-Owen Plan will be implemented in the area either as the opposing

23 armies will not be able to work together." Do you have any knowledge of

24 that or can you comment on that? Whether it's accurate or not?

25 A. At this point in time, this was the beginning of June, the

1 Vance-Owen Plan, in spite of negotiations at a very high level, or the

2 beginning of June, persons had been proposed for the VOP, basically it was

3 common knowledge that this would not have any success. The resistance we

4 noted was strong, but they were strong in -- particularly from the armija,

5 less so on the Croatian side. Obviously, province 10 could have lived

6 with that, among other things.

7 Q. Sir, the next part: "When the subject of detainees and prisoners

8 of war was discussed --"

9 MR. KARNAVAS: The rest -- the rest of the paragraph. Don't skip

10 over the vital part.

11 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, with respect, I think that the witness

12 has responded to this, and it's clear what the extent of his knowledge is

13 on this paragraph. I can ask the last sentence, but this is something

14 that may be something which can be appropriately be dealt with in

15 cross-examination.

16 Q. The final part that I did want to ask, sir, is just: "M3 will be

17 given access to the Capljina camp tomorrow. This is for prisoners of

18 war." My simple question is do you know whether, after this date of this

19 document, which is the 3rd of June, 1993, whether access was gained to the

20 Capljina camp?

21 A. There was no access to the camp in Capljina. And if you allow me,

22 I'd like to make a brief comment, because this came up in other contexts.

23 In principle, in terms of the working meeting of the international

24 team of Zagreb, we had instructions not in a particular way, and I

25 emphasise this, to concern ourselves with prisons because this was a

1 matter to be dealt with by the International Red Cross. So when we came

2 up against anything or saw anything which we knew to be worthy of report,

3 we informed the Red Cross, but we didn't make any conscious efforts to

4 enter any of these premises. That was not our job. It was -- the

5 International Red Cross was particularly protected here, and we were not,

6 in spite of the diplomatic passes we had.

7 Q. Sir, can we turn very quickly to Exhibit 3640. Exhibit 3640.

8 A. Yes, I have it.

9 Q. Sir, this is, on the face of it, an ECMM report, daily report for

10 21 July 1993, and at the end the names of Brad and Peter. This document,

11 would you have seen it or know of it?

12 A. Yes, I know it.

13 Q. Now, sir, there's only one aspect in this document that I wish to

14 refer to you -- refer you to, and it's in paragraph 3, "Military

15 activity." And the second paragraph dealing with Colonel Obradovic:

16 " ... Confirmed the details of the last attack."

17 If we can just very briefly turn to the third paragraph, and this

18 ties in with what you had said, that Colonel Obradovic was a military man.

19 "Currently the confrontation line is back to the original

20 position." Do you have that? The third paragraph of that section.

21 A. Yes. Yes, I can see it in front of me.

22 Q. "The HVO claim to be prepared for an all-out attack on Mostar

23 including tanks and artillery. They do not have the authorisation for the

24 attack yet ..."

25 My simple question is you as a military man, can you comment on

1 what this means or implies from the point of view of Colonel Obradovic

2 then?

3 A. That is very complex and shows different aspects. The wording

4 which says that they're also prepared against attacks of artillery and

5 tanks is very difficult to find out where they were supposed to come from.

6 They didn't -- weren't there. Maybe from the Serbian side. But whether

7 that was possible, I really want to doubt, put into question.

8 The other thing, authorisation for counter-attack did not exist,

9 and if there was such a counter-attack, there would be civilian victims,

10 civilian casualties. That might mean that with a counter-attack you might

11 not only use handguns but also other weapons, artillery or mortar that

12 would mainly affect the civilian population, not by handguns.

13 Q. Sir, we can step off --

14 A. I can't say anything else. If you want me to, then please ask

15 further questions.

16 Q. Sir, our time is nearly up, and I wish to deal with only one

17 further aspect, and that is, sir, did you at any stage talk to anybody

18 from a German government organisation called THW?

19 A. Yes. Yes, I have talked to members of the THW, also in Medjugorje

20 where they had their base. Also in Mostar, but in Mostar it was only

21 brief. I talked to them in both places, yes.

22 Q. And what was the THW?

23 A. The THW is a German organisation, a help organisation, also to

24 give support in terms of water supplies, electricity. Not to install

25 electricity but to install lines, and also to help with evacuation, et

1 cetera. In Mostar, they had the task to get the water supplies from West

2 Mostar to East Mostar because the pipes, the water pipes, were destroyed

3 during the war, and there was a shortage of water in East Mostar.

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I? [Interpretation] Colonel, could you tell

5 us what the abbreviation THW, what it means?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's the German abbreviation for

7 Technisches Hilfswerk.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. Sir, now you say they had the task to get the water supplies from

11 West Mostar to East Mostar because the pipes were destroyed. Can you tell

12 us your discussion? Did it at all deal with whether this -- this activity

13 was successful or not?

14 A. They had to interrupt their work because they didn't deem it could

15 be safe enough. I'm almost certain, because the situation in Mostar

16 escalated in June and July, that no water supplies were -- were carried

17 out by the THW.

18 To go back in June 1994, when Hans Koschnik took over in Mostar,

19 then the water supplies did exist for East Mostar.

20 Q. Sir, can you recall who you talked to, who the person was from THW

21 that you talked to?

22 A. There were several people, but I can remember a Mr. Bosse.

23 Q. Were any particular details of why it was unsafe mentioned?

24 A. The overall situation was a risk for them in Mostar because the

25 water supplies were to be carried out at the southern bridge, which in

1 1992, when there was a conflict with the Serbian side, this bridge had

2 been destroyed, and originally the pipes were situated there, the old

3 pipes, and then the new pipes were supposed to be installed there, too,

4 and it was deemed to be not safe enough also because there was shooting.

5 Q. Thank you. Sir, my final question to you is during your time as a

6 monitor during -- or from the period of April to the end of July 1993, did

7 you at any time meet with Mr. Valentin Coric or Mr. Slobodan Praljak?

8 A. No, I have not met these two gentlemen.

9 Q. Thank you, sir.

10 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour. No further questions.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. Kruger.

12 You've complied with the four hours granted to you, because you've used

13 up exactly four hours.

14 We're going to have a 20-minute break, resume at 5 past 4.00.

15 --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 4.07 p.m.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, we're going to

18 move into private session just for a matter after few seconds.

19 [Private session]

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 [Open session]

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to bring the witness

5 in. I seem to understand that this is the Stojic Defence who is going to

6 start for one hour and 50 [as interpreted] minutes, unless they've been

7 given time, extra time, by other teams. We have six documents, is that

8 right?

9 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I said one hour and 15 minutes,

11 not one and 50.

12 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. I was

13 just looking at the transcript myself, and I noted that the time was

14 wrong. Yes, we shall be using one hour, 15 minutes. We have prepared for

15 the cross-examination. We've prepared for it yesterday. Your binder has

16 six documents, but I think I'll only be using three of those documents

17 during my cross-examination. Thank you.

18 Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:

19 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. My name is Senka Nozica,

20 and together with Mr. Peter Murphy I represent Mr. Bruno Stojic.

21 Yesterday during your testimony you said that you didn't have

22 access to Mostar from the 30th of June, 1993, until the end of your stay

23 on the 24th of July, 1993. Is that right?

24 A. Yes, but not on the west side, on the east side.

25 Q. You also said that on the 3rd of July, 1993, precisely because of

1 this possibility of approaching East Mostar or not, you sent a letter of

2 protest to Mr. Bruno Stojic.

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. If you still have the Prosecution binder in front of you, take a

5 look at that, please. If not, may you be provided with that binder

6 because I want us to look at the letter of protest once again. And the

7 number of document, I'm referring to the Prosecution binder, the number of

8 the document is P 03162.

9 A. 3162. Yes, I have it here.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, in that letter you suggest to Mr. Bruno Stojic,

11 and that is to be found round about the second paragraph, I believe, that

12 if he thinks that your safety and security is jeopardised that he should

13 take the necessary measures and meet you in a safe place. Is that right?

14 Is that what you wrote?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So you met Mr. Stojic in Siroki Brijeg, did you not?

17 A. Yes, at a later point in time. I think this was the 5th of July.

18 Q. Yes. Yes. Now, in this letter you also say that you know that

19 the BH army attacked the HVO on the 30th of June, 1993, and that you would

20 like information about that. Is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And you said that the meeting was convened and held two days

23 later, which would make it the 5th of July, 1993. Would you now take a

24 look -- yes. Thank you. Yes.

25 Would you now take a look at this document again. P 03196 is the

1 number.

2 A. Yes, I have it.

3 Q. Yesterday in response to a question from my learned colleague of

4 the Prosecution you explained the first part of the document under number

5 2, the political situation or political activity, and you told us what you

6 discussed with Mr. Stojic. Now, I would like us to take a look at section

7 number 3, which relates to military activities. And in that passage you

8 take note of the fact that Mr. Bruno Stojic gave comments with respect to

9 the military situation. And first of all, he said that the BH army had

10 taken control of the barracks in North Mostar, and then he said that

11 during the combat activities in Bijelo Polje many people were murdered and

12 taken prisoner.

13 Now, did you have information that on that same occasion the BH

14 army took control of the broader area in the northern part of Mostar in

15 addition to the place mentioned, which was Bijelo Polje, and the Potok

16 and Rastani settlements, and that the Croatian population, which was the

17 majority population in these places, were either taken prisoner or

18 expelled to West Mostar.

19 A. The extent of the area we didn't know so precisely. We could only

20 say in general terms. As far as the Croatic population is concerned, we

21 didn't know that either by the nature of things, but sometime later I

22 talked to a mother and a daughter. I conducted an interview in

23 Siroki Brijeg, who had come on the way from this camp to Siroki Brijeg,

24 and I heard the details from them what happened, that is, from the point

25 of view of this mother and daughter.

1 Q. Did I understand you correctly to say that the mother and daughter

2 came from the area that we're discussing, that is to say, west of Mostar,

3 from that area? That's where they came from; is that right?

4 A. Well, possibly this is a misunderstanding. I mean the area to the

5 east of the Neretva. I'm not sure about the names of the places, but east

6 of the Neretva at the north of Mostar. Rastani is one place, but as I

7 say, I'm not sure of the names of places. I would have to look at a map.

8 Q. Yes. Thank you. That's precisely what I asked you.

9 Now, following on this report you say that Mr. Stojic told you

10 that the BH army wished to attack the entire area of Bugojno, Jablanica,

11 in order to reach the Adriatic coast after that. So I'm talking about --

12 well, you said Bugojno, Prozor, Jablanica, Mostar, with a view to emerging

13 on the Adriatic coast.

14 Now, do you know that later on while you were still in the area

15 some of these military activities did actually place?

16 A. Well, in fact the essential activities in -- well, in Jablanica,

17 Konjic, and the lake and north of that towards Breznice, at that time they

18 were over, so this would have been new attacks.

19 May I add something to that? These towns in the north would

20 indicate that it has nothing to do with the Adriatic coast, but what we

21 mean is that if there was an attack to the south then considerable forces

22 would have to be brought in from the north. Otherwise, this would not be

23 possible. This is how it is meant to be understood.

24 Q. Very well. We'll come to that later on, the Bugojno situation,

25 because Bugojno and the attack by the BH army on Bugojno was something

1 that was mentioned several times in your reports, especially the reports

2 that were shown to you over the past two days by the Prosecutor.

3 Now, what I want to ask you is this: Do you know whether

4 Mr. Stojic -- well, Mr. Stojic went on to tell you that over the next

5 three days the BH army would attack Mostar from three directions. And

6 then what is mentioned here is Rastani, the centre of town, and from the

7 direction of Buna.

8 Now, do you know whether the BH army did indeed attack the HVO

9 from those axes at that time?

10 A. No, we didn't know that, because at the time we had no access

11 more, at least to East Mostar. And basically this was one of the reasons

12 to check this or not; we wanted to know what was happening with the

13 military forces.

14 Q. Yes. In your reports there is some information about this, and

15 we'll go on to clarify that a little later on. But let us now take a look

16 at your assessments. You make your assessments at the end of the report.

17 You said that the report was compiled together with your colleague, and

18 I'd like to read through this passage very slowly, and then I'd like to

19 ask you for some comments.

20 In the second paragraph, you say: "In this complicated situation

21 in which the Croats are fighting the Muslims, and sometimes also still

22 with the Serbs ..."

23 I'd like to stop there for a moment. And tell me on that 5th of

24 July what information you had in order to be able to say that the Croats

25 were still engaged in warfare against the Serbs, that they were still

1 fighting the Serbs.

2 A. As far as I recall, these were individual statements by HVO

3 soldiers that again and again there were artillery attacks from the

4 Serbian side but fewer conflicts with infantry weapons.

5 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, you go on to say that it was a

6 conflict in which the BH army had gained some military successes and

7 during which there was mobilisation, and there was certain restrictions

8 being implemented in civilian life, and within the frameworks of the HVO

9 there were conflicts and arguments going on, and there was the problem of

10 Croatian and Muslim refugees and a mutiny of the Muslim soldiers.

11 And on the other hand, their arrests, the enormous inflation rate

12 that had to be contended with, combined with economic difficulties, and

13 then you say: "The Croatian leadership may feel that the difficulties

14 arise from within the population, which it is difficult for them to

15 control. So this went very far. And we cannot think that the Croats just

16 exaggerated and that they were playing a game with international agencies.

17 The question, however, remains is how credible they are."

18 So this is an assessment made on your part. I won't go into the

19 details, but I'd just like to know whether this was your assessment on the

20 basis of your experience gained in the area from your arrival there until

21 the 5th of September when this report was compiled.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction, the 5th of July.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, basically, these are my own

24 experiences and those of the other monitors, and these resulted from

25 discussions with the former leaders of the HCC in Zenica, but these were

1 accessible to me.

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Perhaps, Ms. Nozica, you will wish to correct the

3 transcript where on page 39, it is spoken of September rather than July.

4 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I was just looking

5 at that. Thank you. Perhaps I misspoke. If I did, it was a slip of the

6 tongue. Thank you.

7 Q. I'd like to move on to the period before this meeting, because in

8 the statement you gave on the 18th and 19th of February to the OTP, 1998,

9 you provided a lot of information about what was going on in April 1993,

10 in the broader area around Jablanica, Konjic, and the area north of Mostar

11 in general. I'd just like to remind you of some of the events that you

12 referred to in your statement, and you have direct knowledge of those, of

13 course.

14 You stayed in your statement that the first major conflict between

15 the HVO and the BH army started on the 8th of April, 1993, in the area of

16 Klis in the village of Seonica. You went there. You saw what was going

17 on. You saw the school in which the HVO was located and it was targeted

18 with a number of artillery pieces. So I'd just like to ask you briefly to

19 tell us what you remember from that visit or of the event itself.

20 A. In our accommodation in Siroki Brijeg, early in the morning we

21 were called by the office of the minister of defence. From the office,

22 not from him personally. In Seonica there were conflicts as you

23 described, and we should look into it.

24 Then a monitor and myself and an interpreter went to Seonica and

25 the following happened: We went into the town, the left-hand side. We

1 saw the school building you mentioned. There were two HVO soldiers,

2 platoon commanders about this rank, and Rabenstein was one name that I

3 remember, and they showed us the inside of the school, the outside of the

4 school, the school -- the windows were broken. There were many impacts in

5 the walls by infantry munition, and in the school, through the windows we

6 saw that the furniture was all over the place. You could see impacts all

7 over the school building. There were very many of them. More than a

8 hundred perhaps, but a great deal.

9 It wasn't artillery, as you said, but according to the indications

10 and we could assume from what we saw that these had -- were the result of

11 machine-gun fire. There was a position indicated about a hundred metres

12 away from the school. Then we continued in the village about a hundred,

13 200 metres, approximately, and we came into the Muslim part of the

14 village. The previous part was the part of the Croatian population. And

15 then we met with local leaders. We came across local leaders, and we said

16 to them, "What is happening?" And it's been alleged that people have shot

17 in the school. And they didn't contest this, but they took us to the

18 mosque, and they said that mortar grenade -- a shell had been fired at the

19 mosque and here are the remnants of the mortar shell.

20 Let me add, I remember this so well because shortly after my

21 return I used this terrible episode in my presentations to give an

22 impression, after I got back to Germany. Otherwise, I wouldn't remember

23 these details.

24 Then we looked at the mortar shells. They were old mortar shells.

25 There were signs of rust. It was certainly not the mortar shells that

1 had made the hole in the mosque, which was in fact there. At the top, on

2 the top of the roof there was a hole.

3 Then we went to about the middle of the village. There was a

4 small square. We were there with interpreters and met with both sides,

5 and we had a lengthy conversation with both sides and called upon them to

6 establish order and peace, and this was said to take several days. How

7 long it took, we don't know. And then we continued our journey.

8 Q. Thank you. I was waiting for the interpretation to finish. Yes.

9 That's precisely what you said in very precise terms in your statement,

10 what you noticed, that next to the mosque you were shown this mortar, but

11 that you observed that the mortar was an old one and that it couldn't have

12 been used in that particular conflict.

13 Now, in June you visited the village of Vucjak. Were you told

14 what happened in that village on the 14th of April, 1993?

15 A. Vucjak. Yes, I understand.

16 Q. There's Vucjak, but it is Buscak, with a B, B-u-s.

17 A. To say it again, it's a place above the command post of the armija

18 corps of the brigade. So it's one of the main roads going to Klis. I

19 can't recall the name. It's above 10 kilometres. Is it Pazavic? Does it

20 exist? Pazaric, or something like that? So above this place.

21 Q. Yes, yes.

22 A. After this incident on the 8th of April, a few days later we were

23 called again by the ministry of Mr. Stojic in Mostar, and then we talked

24 with the deputy Prime Minister there. We, I meant the other monitor,

25 Kiki Salamanca. And Mr. Bozic told us of several places where some

1 attacks were made against the Croat population. And then at a later point

2 in time, I can't remember exactly -- the exact date, I went again there

3 again, and then I heard the following from several people, and several of

4 them spoke German because several worked as guest workers near Stuttgart,

5 not all with interpretation. And I think they said on the 14th of June,

6 at night, masked men penetrated buildings which were inhabited by Croats,

7 and in one or two buildings they shot dead one of the husbands and her

8 brother. We talked to the woman. And in the other building a neighbour.

9 But I think this visit took place in Buscak in the middle of June. The

10 woman also showed us the room which was in a bad state. You could see

11 impacts on the floor. Obviously, fighting had been going on.

12 Then some other people confirmed this, that they had been robbed.

13 Money was taken. Cars had been stolen. They also said that some Croats

14 had moved from the area or had migrated elsewhere, if I can put like that,

15 but she stayed behind, she said, with her children because she didn't know

16 what else to do. And at night, so she said, she also -- she always spent

17 the night with a Muslim neighbour in order to feel safe.

18 So despite what you heard from other places, the -- the

19 neighbourhood between Croats and Muslims did work out fine.

20 So this was the result of our visit. Again, we made a report to

21 the International Red Cross and to the other international groups.

22 Q. If I may, sir, you spoke about the 14th of June. If I may just

23 remind you, I assume that when you made your statement on the 18th and the

24 19th of February, 1998, you remembered all these things more clearly than

25 now. If you could please set me right about some dates.

1 Here you say, "In June, I visited the village of Buscak in the

2 surroundings of Klis where a Croat lady told me that on the evening of the

3 14th of April, in her home, three of their own men had been killed. There

4 are official reports to show that this indeed occurred on the 14th of

5 April."

6 So if I could please ask you to try to think back and remember as

7 best you can, because this is something that you mentioned in your answer

8 as having occurred in June.

9 A. I think it must have been a misunderstanding, because my visit was

10 in June. It was two months later. Indeed, the woman did say clearly --

11 whether it was on the 14th I can't quite tell, but the date was clearly in

12 the middle of April. I think it was the 14th of April.

13 Q. Thank you. Thank you. I have very little time for this cross,

14 and I will be dropping some of the events in April which you have already

15 described, but there is something that you said that I wish to point out

16 to you now to see whether you can confirm that.

17 In your statement you say, "In late April, little by little we got

18 the impression that the Muslims were trying to expel the Croats from the

19 southern part of Central Bosnia."

20 Do you remember saying this, sir, and could you still confirm this

21 statement, this assertion as it is today? We are talking about what, sir,

22 went on in April.

23 A. Yes, I can confirm this. This was also confirmed by other

24 organisations. I can also confirm it using an example, that is Konjic,

25 the expulsion of the priests there. I don't know how long they actually

1 stayed there. They were threatened, at any rate.

2 Q. Thank you. Indeed we have been mentioning Konjic quite often,

3 haven't we, but what I had in mind was the entire region, and that's why

4 your statement applies.

5 I asked you earlier today, in connection with your conversation

6 with Mr. Stojic on the 5th of July, 1993, whether you knew about these

7 events that later took place in Bugojno. If you could please use the

8 binder provided by the Prosecution, please, the document number is

9 P 03611.

10 A. I have got the document in front of me.

11 Q. Thank you. The document is dated the 21st of July, 1993. On page

12 1 we have this. This is in relation to the fighting in Bugojno. It says

13 the expected cease-fire has not taken effect in Bugojno because the BH

14 side refused to accept it.

15 Let me ask you first. Can you remember that on or around the 18th

16 of July, 1993, an attack by the BH army in Bugojno commenced, which for

17 the most part had been completed by the end of your own mandate? Do you

18 remember this, sir?

19 A. I cannot remember that because Bugojno is well outside of our area

20 of responsibility, and I only know Bugojno from driving through, that's

21 all. But I was surprised when, at the end of July, I went to Zenica with

22 Sir Martin Garrod, as I already mentioned. Then we went through Bugojno,

23 and I was surprised about the level of destruction of the houses. And

24 also when we talked to people, they said that parts of the church had been

25 destroyed as well. But I was surprised about the level of destruction.

1 But then I don't know the place personally, and again I'm -- everything

2 was being referred to that had been reports that had been compiled by

3 other people.

4 Q. What you say about mid-July, are you talking about Zenica or about

5 Bugojno? I'm not sure I understand, sir.

6 A. I meant Bugojno, because when I went to Zenica, I went through

7 Bugojno for the first time, because otherwise I'd never been there. On

8 the way to Zenica, and then I saw the level of destruction in the area.

9 Q. Indeed. Back to the report that we're looking at. I assume that

10 you have seen it before, because the -- you answered a number of questions

11 from the OTP in relation to this document.

12 Can you please just try to remember paragraph 6 of this report and

13 the assessment mentioned therein? It should be the last page of the

14 document. The assessment concerning the situation in Bugojno reads: "It

15 appears that the BH army will win this battle over the near term. The

16 estimate is over the next 48 hours, and will continue to press on towards

17 Gornji Vakuf and perhaps even as far as Prozor."

18 Do you remember this comment, and do you remember this particular

19 assessment, sir?

20 A. Basically, I cannot remember that assessment because I didn't have

21 any personal impressions of Bugojno. When we went through Bugojno, then

22 there was no fighting going on any more. Otherwise, we wouldn't have been

23 able to go through. Possibly, but I can't sure -- say for sure whether

24 this -- this had already finished.

25 Q. Speaking of this other area which you discussed at your meeting

1 with Mr. Stojic, which is the southern part, rather, the possibility of a

2 BH army attack coming from the south, could we please now go to a

3 different document, which is another OTP document, 03563. The report is

4 dated the 19th of July, 1993.

5 A. I've got it.

6 Q. Can you please go to paragraph 5. It says: "Southern Bosnia."

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Let me just ask you whether you're familiar with these events.

9 Number one reads: "On the 13th of July the BH started its own offensive

10 from the south of down the direction of Blagaj and towards Buna and

11 Gubavica. At the same time as this offensive, fighting broke out in many

12 of the villages to the south of Mostar in the Capljina-Stolac area. The

13 BH made initial gains, but the HV and HVO launched a counter-offensive."

14 Sir, do you remember these events and do you remember these

15 reports? Can you confirm that you received this report at the time and

16 that they were indeed aware of all these activities?

17 A. I only knew about these activities because of the reports, because

18 we didn't have our personal impressions, although at that moment in time

19 the team M3 that used to work there, although they -- they had a report on

20 this, they heard about further fighting going on, but they were not close

21 to it either. They were relatively far away. But they heard about

22 fighting activities. That's all I can say about this. Everything else

23 has been based on reports.

24 Q. Thank you. Thank you. This is the analysis of these events, and

25 everything I've been asking you about was in one way or the other

1 mentioned at your meeting with Mr. Bruno Stojic. At the very end of this

2 analysis let me ask you this: The purpose of your meeting with Mr. Stojic

3 on the 5th of July, 1993, was to obtain permission for your team to drive

4 into Mostar. Therefore, could you please go to my binder and look for

5 P 3362. This is the pink binder which the usher has probably provided for

6 your benefit. Please go to document 3362.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Have you found it? Fine. The date is the 3rd -- sorry.

9 A. [In English] The first document.

10 Q. The number -- yes, yes. You're quite right. That's the first one

11 in your binder, because your binder contains only those documents that I'm

12 going to use. In the Judges' binder it's a different document.

13 This report is dated the 10th of July, 1993. Is that right, sir?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. It's a report of the PMEZ, I see that you have it. It says

16 coordination centre, Mostar coordination centre. That is under 2; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Could we please have a look at this area of responsibility of the

19 Mostar coordination centre. That's page 1 of the report. Number 2, it

20 reads: "According to SpaBat, Mr. Boban said that UNPROFOR, UNMO, and ECMM

21 would not be able to enter Mostar for at least another month. Team M2

22 tried to enter the city today but was denied access."

23 The latter part is not entirely unsubstantial, but it is for the

24 present question. Can you remember being told about this on or about the

25 10th of July, 1993, sir?

1 A. I do think that the M2 team had tried again to get into Mostar at

2 this time. Normally the check-point 20 kilometres east of Siroki Brijeg,

3 because this was the daily practice, to try again and again. They might

4 succeed.

5 Q. My question was this, sir: Did you know or do you remember being

6 told by SpaBat about what Mr. Boban had stated, namely that UNPROFOR, the

7 UN military observers and the ECMM would not be allowed access to Mostar

8 before a month's time. You tried to gain access yourself, and that's why

9 I would like to know whether at any point you found out about this

10 conversation with Mr. Boban, and did he indeed impose this veto or specify

11 how long the veto would apply for?

12 A. Well, I wouldn't have remembered something like that, such a

13 detail. I didn't hear this directly. If I heard, it was through a SpaBat

14 report, but about this I really don't know any more.

15 Q. Were you aware of the fact that Mr. Boban was at the time the

16 president of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?

17 A. Yes, I did know that, but I didn't meet him personally, although I

18 was in Grude with Mr. Pogarcic.

19 Q. Now that you brought it up, can you tell me what Mr. Pogarcic's

20 position was at the time? I mean at the time you met him.

21 A. I think he -- at the first meeting he said of himself that he

22 was -- consulted Mr. Mate Boban in foreign policy matters, and he said

23 why, because he spoke excellent English, because he obviously had spent

24 many years in the North American area, could be Canada or the United

25 States.

1 Q. Were you aware of the fact that at this critical time that we are

2 talking about was also the chief commander of the HVO, the military

3 component, the HVO?

4 A. Well, if you mean that he had taken over the functions of

5 Mr. Prlic or Mr. Soljic, then I don't know. That's something new to me.

6 Q. I asked you a very explicit question, but if you're not familiar

7 with the set-up, then we'd best just leave that aside. I asked you very

8 explicitly did you know that Mr. Boban was the chief commander of the HVO.

9 If you didn't know anything about the set-up, I'd guess we'd best just

10 leave that aside is then.

11 A. Of course I know that Mr. Mate Boban was the person who created

12 Herceg-Bosna and automatically he was the supreme authority of the HVO.

13 So what I -- whether he had taken over command or not, that would be

14 something new to me. But I would say in rough terms that he had the say.

15 I was aware of that.

16 Q. Thank you. Fine. That's precisely the answer I wanted to

17 receive.

18 Were you back in the area in 1994, sir? You also said that until

19 the very end of your term there your own monitors, the monitors that were

20 part of your mission, never gained access to East Mostar. Later on when

21 you came back, did you ask any questions about when they eventually gained

22 access, how, and who took the final decision? Did you want to know about

23 that, and did you eventually learn anything about that, sir?

24 A. You mean looking back to -- starting in 1994 and looking

25 backwards, if I've understood you correctly, whether I was again in this

1 area. The question, I must say, is something which I can't answer in such

2 detail. I talked with the German monitor in great detail who was in

3 Mostar in the winter as a monitor from Siroki Brijeg. But the question

4 whether they could -- when they could go back in again, I can't remember.

5 I don't remember whether we spoke about that. We talked about other

6 things. For example, that they had been sending supplies in by aircraft

7 and dropping them, because he had been a parachutist. So -- but this

8 resumption of the access, this is something that I can't remember.

9 Q. I will do my best to refresh your memory, sir. If you can

10 remember, fine. If not, let's just move on. Please have a look at

11 Document P 05091, which is also the last document in my binder, the third

12 document. 05091.

13 Please tell me as soon as you've found it, sir.

14 A. It's the Security Council.

15 Q. Indeed. My German is that good, I must say. Can you please go to

16 page 2 of that document, which reads "Annex." In the Croat version this

17 is page 3. This appears to be a letter by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki to the

18 Secretary-General dated the 6th of September, 1993. Would you please just

19 go briefly through page 3, which is the very next page in both Croatian

20 and English. If you could look at number 2, please, item 2. I'll just

21 read it briefly. "On the 18th of August, 1993, the Special Rapporteur

22 expressed his concern on account of the situation, the situation described

23 in Mostar and East Mostar. In his letter to Mr. Mate Boban, president of

24 Bosnia's Croats, at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,

25 he exerted pressure on him to allow direct and unhindered access."

1 I think you have it on your screen now. "... For humanitarian

2 agencies and also his own human rights field officers. He later received

3 a reply from Mr. Boban and access for the field staff was granted."

4 Since this is a Security Council document, for that reason, among

5 others, I wanted to ask you whether you've seen this document, or perhaps

6 you were told by someone at some point that eventually the monitors and

7 humanitarian agencies were allowed access, specifically allowed access by

8 Mr. Boban. Do you remember that? If not, please let's not dwell on this

9 any longer.

10 A. I know of this report really nothing. I don't know about this

11 special matter as far as Mostar is concerned, but I do know that from the

12 preparatory time of the visit of Mr. Mazowiecki, and from my visits in the

13 Jablanica area.

14 Q. Thank you. Could we please go back to 3410. It's an OTP document

15 and it's in the OTP binder. P 03410.

16 A. Yes, I have it.

17 Q. Just two matters, sir, quite substantial ones. As you were being

18 examined by the OTP, you said that this was a meeting that Mr. Bruno

19 Stojic attended as well. If you could please go back to this document, in

20 particular the section under the word "Subject." Could you go through the

21 whole document perhaps, please, swiftly, in order to remember whether

22 Mr. Bozic was the only one who attended that meeting and not Mr. Stojic,

23 in fact. There is not a single reference in this document to Mr. Stojic

24 as attending the meeting.

25 A. Well, now that you've pointed that out to me again, I believe that

1 it was as follows: On the 5th of July, there was my meeting with

2 Mr. Stojic, and we agreed on the 10th of the 11th to have other meetings.

3 And then I think on the 10th no meeting took place. On the 11th then with

4 those people from Zagreb. Discussion with Mr. Bozic in Siroki Brijeg.

5 Mr. Stojic was not there now that you point that out to me. But I'm a

6 little unsure. But the report was written at the time. I must say that.

7 If the report was written at the time, then of course the report is more

8 telling than my memory, because I could have forgotten something in the

9 meantime.

10 Q. Could we perhaps simplify this. You're uncertain today whether

11 Mr. Stojic attended the meeting or not. Can we decide that the report

12 must be accurate in that case and that Mr. Bozic was the only person that

13 attended?

14 A. Well, yes. I think that must have been the case. It couldn't

15 have been otherwise. I wrote this in the evening. If the report is

16 written by Mr. Martin Garrod, we wouldn't have written down anything

17 wrong. If Mr. Stojic had been there, we would have seen that. But from

18 my memory, it was no longer possible to say accurately.

19 Q. Thank you. Do you remember at all while you were in Mostar, and

20 you were in touch a lot with Mr. Bozic, that in addition to being the

21 deputy chief of the defence department he also played a role in

22 communication with international agencies, including yourself? Do you

23 remember anything about that, sir?

24 A. Well, this second function, according to my memory, no expression

25 was made of this expressis verbis but this only came to my attention from

1 papers I read. I experienced this later. I don't recall that this was an

2 actual subject.

3 Q. Thank you. I'd like now finally to go back to a question about

4 the participation of the Croatian army and documents about the existence

5 or non-existence of the Croatian army on the territory in which you had

6 occasion to meet them or not meet them. So in order to do that, let's

7 look at P 03710. It's a Prosecution document, and it's at the end of the

8 Prosecution binder. The Prosecutor showed it to you today. We've already

9 looked at that document.

10 A. That is the document of the 30th of July.

11 Q. Yes. That's right. Now, the Prosecutor showed you some passages,

12 but let's just confirm what your position is, because I assume that this

13 is your definitive opinion about what you had an opportunity of seeing.

14 So you compiled this report at the end of your mission there; is that

15 right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I'm going to read out some portions. Under number 1 you say:

18 "During my time as CC Mostar from the 1st of April to now, our teams had

19 a permanent task to observe/monitor the HV involvement in BiH. It was

20 obvious and confirmed that in past months the HVO used individual HVO

21 soldiers, cars, and some weapons. It was not observed that any organised

22 HVO troops, units from the platoon level upwards, and men, weapons, cars,

23 symbols, leaders, had been moving around fighting, resting, or whatever

24 else, engaged in any other activity."

25 Now, you go on to say that you weren't allowed to work at night,

1 but you go on to say that you did not notice any traces on the ground

2 which we as soldiers would have been able to interpret. And I can't say

3 how many HV soldiers there were in my area, but they were scattered

4 around, and the team was not able to move around freely at times.

5 And that would be my final question to you, sir. If I understand

6 this correctly, what you're saying is this: You said that you saw

7 individual soldiers here and there, but nowhere did you see nor could you

8 notice that there were any units from platoon level upwards. You didn't

9 notice any of that. You didn't notice any weapons, any cars or symbols or

10 leaders. Am I right in making that conclusion from what I read in this

11 report of yours?

12 A. That's correct. My monitors and myself saw it as it was.

13 Q. Thank you very much. That concludes my cross-examination. I'll

14 now cede the floor to my colleagues.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Ms. Nozica.

16 Next Defence counsel.

17 MR. KARNAVAS: Good afternoon, Mr. President. Good afternoon,

18 Your Honours. I'll be the next one to cross-examine the gentleman. If we

19 could have our break. I need about five minutes to set up, and I think it

20 would be appropriate, and then we could just finish off for the rest of

21 the session, if that's okay.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll have a

23 20-minute break. We'll resume at half past 5.00.

24 --- Recess taken at 5.10 p.m.

25 --- On resuming at 5.29 p.m.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you have the

2 floor.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President.

4 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas:

5 Q. Good afternoon, sir. My name is Michael Karnavas, and with me is

6 Suzana Tomanovic, and we represent Dr. Jadranko Prlic.

7 Now -- can you hear me, sir? Okay. Good.

8 A. I can hear you.

9 Q. I'm going to move rather quickly because I have a lot of documents

10 to go through. I don't mean to be rude but I'm going to be going at a

11 rather fast pace.

12 I just want to make sure before we start: You arrived somewhere

13 in January 1993; is that correct?

14 A. I started in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 1st of April, 1993.

15 Q. Okay. All right. And you were there --

16 A. I was there until the 27th of July, with an interruption on leave

17 between the 6th of May until the 26th of May.

18 Q. All right. And so you were rather new in August -- I mean in

19 April; correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Before -- before coming into the area you had an orientation?

22 A. No. I was not -- I did not get a briefing about the country, if I

23 can summarise it like that.

24 Q. Did you get a briefing about who was who?

25 A. I received this briefing in Siroki Brijeg through the CC Mostar at

1 the time, so slowly.

2 Q. All right. Did you get a briefing on the structure of the

3 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?

4 A. That was -- I partially read up on it, and then also by asking

5 questions, so yes.

6 Q. All right. Now, I take it that you were able to look at the

7 legislation that set up the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna to see

8 exactly the structure, how it was organised, who was responsible for what?

9 Did you do that, sir?

10 A. I couldn't have a look at the legislation. I don't have the laws,

11 and I wouldn't have had the time, but the structures, yes.

12 Q. Well, how could you know about the structure without looking at

13 the legislation that set it up?

14 A. I cannot give a reply to this question.

15 Q. All right.

16 A. I had a look at the outlines that I was given and looked at that.

17 Q. Okay. Could you tell me what the Presidency did? What were their

18 functions? I'm not talking about the president but the Presidency and how

19 it was composed. Do you know that?

20 A. The Presidency, if -- just to make terms clear, from -- compared

21 to the German structure was responsible for the guidelines and policy for

22 all military matters, political matters, et cetera. And Mr. Prlic was at

23 the top of this government, and Mr. Zubak, if I remember rightly, was the

24 vice-president. And there was a defence minister, deputy defence

25 minister, et cetera.

1 Q. All right. So if I understand you correctly, Mr. Prlic was in

2 the -- was in the Presidency, and he being the president had all these

3 functions based on what you were told or what you understood; is that

4 correct?

5 A. I think we're getting close to the terminology. Mr. Prlic, let me

6 say is like this, he was the prime minister, the chancellor, the boss of

7 the government of HVO.

8 Q. Okay. And what was Mate Boban then?

9 A. For me, Mate Boban was like an overarching figure who understood

10 everything and who was really responsible for the policy. And the others

11 were the executor of his basic ideas.

12 Q. Well, did he have -- I mean -- okay. Germany has a president and

13 it has a chancellor; right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. I take it that if I were to go to Germany and look at the

16 legislation, the constitution, I would be able to figure out who does

17 what; right?

18 A. I would rather compare it to the French model. The elected

19 President Sarkozy is Mate Boban and the government with the ministers is

20 the government of Mr. Prlic.

21 Q. Okay. And it's your understanding, that based on that particular

22 structure, the Prime Minister is in charge of the military? You know,

23 somewhat like, say, for instance, the Italian model as opposed to the

24 French model.

25 A. I'm going back to the German model. In wartimes, the chancellor

1 is also responsible for the armed forces, and this is, as is the case of

2 war, the prime minister is also responsible for the armed forces, and his

3 ministers support him in that task. But it doesn't have to be like that,

4 but this was how I imagined it to be.

5 Q. All right. Well, you mentioned the French when I mentioned the

6 German. I mentioned the Italian, you went back to the German. So let's

7 stick with one country. Is the president of Germany the supreme

8 commander, especially in wartime? Is he the one that commands the

9 military? Yes, no, I don't know?

10 A. No, he is not the supreme commander.

11 Q. It's the Chancellor.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Okay. All right. Now, you said that in April you were new and

14 around April 18th is when you attended this meeting; correct?

15 A. On the 18th of April, the meeting, among other things, in

16 West Mostar, but not as a participant but rather more as an observer. I

17 was not in the conference room at Mostar.

18 Q. Would it be fair to say, and I don't mean to be disrespectful, but

19 given that you had no orientation, you had just arrived, that for all

20 intents and purposes you knew little to nothing about what was happening

21 there in Mostar?

22 A. It's not dismissing any respect. When I arrived in the country, I

23 felt quite lost, but slowly I tried to understand matters.

24 Q. All right. Now, we had a witness here. His name was Watkins.

25 Did you ever meet him, by any chance? Philip --

1 A. Yes, I have met Philip Watkins.

2 Q. And he indicated that when he testified, he indicated that it took

3 him several months to figure out what was happening. Would that be the

4 case with you as well?

5 MR. KARNAVAS: And I'm referring to, for the Court's convenience,

6 page -- that exchange would be on pages 18908, all the way to 18910.

7 Q. But that's not in your documents, sir. That's just for the Court.

8 Just answer my question. Would that be with you as well?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Yes. I must confirm this. In order really to get a basic

12 understanding it would probably take longer than -- the duration of any

13 mission.

14 Q. All right. Now, I'm going to get ahead of myself a little bit. I

15 take it you spent a lot of time with Mr. Prlic.

16 A. No, I didn't -- no, I didn't spend a lot of time with him, no.

17 Q. You had a lot of meetings with him then?

18 A. There were not so many that I can recollect. I can remember the

19 first meeting quite well. There was also a further meeting that I can

20 remember quite well. But otherwise, there were not that many.

21 Q. All right. And I mention this that because in looking at all the

22 documents that the Prosecution gave us, I don't see anything where you had

23 a meeting with Mr. Prlic, you as a representative of the European

24 Community Monitoring Mission. I see nothing, not one single solitary

25 report that you had a meeting and that an exchange took place. Nothing.

1 Could it be, sir, that you didn't have any meetings with Mr. Prlic? And

2 you're confused over the years?

3 A. No, I don't mix up anything. I personally never met Mr. Prlic,

4 unlike with Mr. Stojic and also Mr. Bozic.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. There was no personal interview or conversation.

7 Q. With Mr. Prlic.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. To make sure, you never had any meetings with Mr. Prlic?

10 That was a question. To make sure --

11 A. I apologise. Sorry. I thought it was a -- I considered it a

12 statement for the minutes or whatever, for the record.

13 Q. All right. The inflection wasn't there perhaps. The interpreters

14 haven't got used to my English.

15 So I take it that you never had a meeting with Mr. Prlic?

16 A. A meeting or an encounter with other participants, yes, but not a

17 personal encounter in the shape of a conversation, and I was not really

18 encouraged to do that when I think back to the 18th of May.

19 Q. Okay. The 18th of May or the 18th of April?

20 A. I apologise. 18th of April.

21 Q. Okay?

22 A. So this meeting in Mostar on the 18th of April.

23 Q. Again, I'm going to get a little ahead of myself. I'm just going

24 to touch on this, on this meeting, and then we'll get back to it in more

25 detail, but were you aware, sir, that there were two meetings actually on

1 that particular day, one where General Halilovic was not present, and

2 later on in the evening when General Halilovic was present, because he had

3 been brought over by General Morillon, and in that second meeting which

4 you talked about, Mr. Prlic was not present. And I mention this because

5 you said you don't get things mixed up. So could you by chance be mixing

6 meetings, and is it possible that you're mistaken?

7 A. That there were several meetings, as I already said yesterday, and

8 that there was also a change in positions geographically I already said

9 yesterday, and I cannot -- I really didn't understand the content of the

10 conferences nor the participants. Also, that I talked to Mr. Prlic in

11 front of one of the conference rooms, I only learned about that in

12 hindsight. I didn't get the name quite straight away at the time.

13 Q. Okay. Somebody told you that the person you'd been talking to,

14 and Mr. Prlic, who everybody has indicated is rather urbane and rather

15 serious and rather polite, he didn't introduce himself?

16 A. As I've already stated, he possibly introduced himself and I

17 myself, too, but I slowly learned how to pronounce names and to remember

18 names.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. That was a slow process.

21 Q. All right. Let's move on a little bit. The Vance-Owen Peace

22 Plan, were you aware of the details of the plan?

23 A. As far as the details are concerned, I'm quite prudent, but I knew

24 about various provinces, 10, 8, 9, and had some documentation, who was the

25 leading power, so to speak, yes.

1 Q. Right. And on province 8, then you must have known that the

2 Vance-Owen Peace Plan called for -- for province 8 for Mostar to be its

3 capital.

4 A. Yes. Yes.

5 Q. All right. Okay. Now we're going to go through a series of very

6 quick documents. 1D 01281. So that would be in the binder, in the blue

7 binder. Yes. 1D 01281. This is a decision, and we can see it's dated 11

8 May, 1993. And in Article 1, it says: "The Republic of Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina hereby accepts in full and shall ensure implementation of the

10 documents of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina."

11 Were you aware of this decision, sir? And I'm asking the question

12 because later on we'll see that ECMM was asked to play a role, but were

13 you aware of this decision, that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

14 had accepted in full for the implementation of the documents connected to

15 the Vance-Owen Peace Plan? It's a yes or no.

16 A. Yes, I had knowledge of that.

17 Q. Okay. We'll go to the next document. 1D 01338. Here's a

18 conclusion. Again it's 11 May 1993, and we can see from the title:

19 "Conclusions on the implementation of the documents of the Vance-Owen

20 Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina." I take it you would have been

21 aware of this as well. We don't need to go through it in any detail?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. All right. Now we go to 1D 01594. Now, this is a document that

24 predates those two. It's April 2, 1993, and you will see at the very

25 bottom it's signed by Dr. Jadranko Prlic. It's addressed to Mr. Thebault.

1 I take it you knew this gentleman; right? He was your -- your boss, for

2 all intents and purposes.

3 A. Yes, yes, he was my boss.

4 Q. Yes. And in this document we can see and I believe we might have

5 seen this earlier in this courtroom, we see here in the very first line:

6 "In accordance with your suggestions and expressed will to be directly

7 engaged in the realisation of the agreement accepted by Alija Izetbegovic,

8 a representative of the Muslim nation, and Mate Boban, a representative of

9 the Croatian nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we were informed in our

10 discussion on April 1, 1993, in Mostar by Mr. Christopher Beese and

11 Mr. Enrique Salamanca de Garay, please be informed ... " And it goes on

12 and so forth.

13 Were you aware that Dr. Prlic had sent this letter in order to

14 arrange a meeting and had in fact proposed various issues for discussion?

15 Were you aware of that?

16 A. I cannot remember that letter.

17 Q. Okay. All right. Suffice it to say on the April the 18th meeting

18 that you attended or witnesses, you -- you were not involved in arranging

19 that meeting in any fashion. You were just new and you just went along as

20 an observer more or less; correct?

21 A. In that case I wasn't involved at the beginning of this period.

22 Q. All right. Now, the next document, 1D 01595. And this is about

23 minutes from a meeting in Medjugorje in May 18, 1993, and this is between

24 the delegation of the Republic of Croatia, and it lists all the other

25 individuals that were involved in the meeting. I don't want to waste too

1 much time on that, but if we go to paragraph number 3, it's numbered, it

2 says: "The president of the Transitional Government of the RBiH, the

3 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, shall be Jadranko Prlic. In agreement

4 with the Muslim side, he shall recommend a balanced government of eight

5 ministerial portfolios of which three will remain without appointment. In

6 case an agreement is impossible to reach he shall consult with the

7 co-chairmen of the peace conference." It goes on to say: "Dr. Haris

8 Silajdzic shall remain as Minister of Foreign Affairs and the deputy

9 Minister of Foreign Affairs shall be a Croatian with equal rights as

10 Minister Silajdzic."

11 And then at the very bottom it talks about the -- we have the

12 organisation for province Mostar, province Travnik, and the next page

13 province Zenica.

14 Sir, were you aware in light of your position, your location, the

15 information that you were receiving, were you aware that Dr. Jadranko

16 Prlic was proposed as the president of the transitional government of RBiH

17 pursuant to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and the implementation documents

18 that we've just seen? Were you aware of that? It's a yes or no.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Good. Now, incidentally, do you know whether you or others in

21 your mission consulted with Dr. Prlic in relation to his new position to

22 see how he would go about in implementing or carrying out his task as

23 president of the transitional government? Do you recall?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Okay. Now, we go to the next document, 1D 01596.

1 And incidentally, for the German interpreters who have just joined

2 us, in case I'm going too fast, feel free to slow me down.

3 May 21, 1993. This is a letter, again by Dr. Jadranko Prlic. We

4 can see it's addressed to Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegovic. I'll just

5 read a couple of things. The first paragraph it states: "Pursuant to the

6 agreement reached in Medjugorje on May 18, 1993, regarding the

7 implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I write

8 to you in my capacity as the president of the transitional government of

9 RBiH and request that as representatives of the Croatian and Muslim

10 people, you partake in the consultation for the election of a transitional

11 government."

12 And then you can see from the very next sentence it talks about

13 each side indicating who they wish to appoint to various positions.

14 Now, were you -- and there's a deadline on the 3rd, or he wishes

15 an a response by May 24th.

16 Were you aware of Mr. Prlic's efforts with Mate Boban and

17 Alija Izetbegovic to begin the implementation process? Were you aware of

18 this?

19 A. I don't know this letter from a different perspective, I know that

20 the Muslim side was hesitating the give the names to complete the list.

21 Q. Right. And we're going to get there. I'm glad you mentioned

22 that, because as I understand your testimony when my colleague Ms. Nozica

23 was questioning you, you had indicated -- or it might have been the

24 Prosecutor, that the Muslims were hesitant in the implementation of the

25 Vance-Owen Peace Plan. In English, we would say they were dragging their

1 feet. One might even say that they really had no intention of carrying --

2 carrying on in good faith; would that be correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Okay. If we look at the next document, 1D 01597. 1597. Again

5 here we see May 23, 1993. If we look at the second page, you can see that

6 it's by Dr. Jadranko Prlic as president of the government, and here this

7 is a letter to the co-chairmen of the conference on former Yugoslavia,

8 Mr. Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg. "Report on the undertaken activities of the

9 president of the Transitional Central Government." And here we can see

10 that he's giving them notice that he has begun the process.

11 Were you aware of this? This basically --

12 A. I have not learned about the various -- the individual steps

13 taken.

14 Q. Okay. Now, the next document is 1D 01598. 1598, dated again,

15 May, 23, 1993, signed by Dr. Jadranko Prlic as president of the

16 government, addressed to the government of RBiH. In its earlier

17 composition, we see. That's how it's been translated. And the subject:

18 "Handing over the mandate to the new government." And here, if we go

19 through the middle of the first paragraph it says: "That it has been

20 decided that I shall be the president of the government and shall commence

21 with preparing its composition that shall be verified by the coordinating

22 body. Since the time frames for these activities are very short, I think

23 would serve the purpose if you were to commence with the preparation of

24 the necessary documentation for the hand-over."

25 And then further down, and again, I'm just going to skip over some

1 of the language, it says: "Bearing in mind that a large number of

2 employees will, in this new situation, find themselves without employment,

3 I would request that you undertake all measures to assist these people

4 having in mind their professional level, social and other aspects of their

5 situation."

6 So were you aware again that here was Dr. Jadranko Prlic writing

7 to the Sarajevo government pursuant to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, of his

8 intentions to go forward as was expected of him; were you aware of that?

9 A. No.

10 Q. We turn to the next document 1D 01599. 1599. Again dated May 23,

11 1993. You see at the bottom signed by Dr. Jadranko Prlic, president of

12 the government. This time it's addressed to the Ministry of Foreign

13 Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, attention Dr. Haris

14 Silajdzic. And here from the very first paragraph, in the middle of it

15 says: "In accordance with this agreement, Dr. Jadranko Prlic is elected

16 as president of the government, and you as the Minister of Foreign

17 Affairs. In accordance with that, it would necessary that you inform --

18 that you inform of these facts the government, i.e., the ministries of

19 foreign affairs of all the states in which the Republic of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina has established diplomatic relations."

21 And then we see that Dr. Jadranko Prlic presents a short

22 curriculum vitae, and at the very end we see the last sentence which

23 says -- or last paragraph which says: "The government of the United

24 States of America, Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community

25 should also be informed that the ambassadors of Croatian nationality will

1 be appointed soon."

2 Were you aware of this, sir, you being with the UN mission at the

3 time, were you aware of this?

4 A. I don't know anything about such a letter, but I know that I'd

5 seen in overviews what nationalities the relative ambassadors should have.

6 Q. Okay. We can go to the next document, P 0 -- P 02509. This is a

7 Prosecution document, but what is absent, Your Honours, if you look at the

8 second page of this document which is in B/C/S there is some sort of

9 title, and I'm told it says "Announcement for public," and I don't want to

10 take a chance in reading it because my language skills are challenging but

11 that's what I'm told. It's sort of a public announcement, and we can see

12 here again, at the very top, it says: "On 25th of May, 1993, the

13 Presidency of the HDZ BiH rep held a meeting presided by Mate Boban.

14 Actual events were taken into consideration, especially the obligations on

15 the basis of the common statement signed by Mr. Boban and Mr. Izetbegovic

16 on the 25th of April in Zagreb, including concrete implementation of

17 Vance-Owen Plan concluded on 18th of May, 1993, in Medjugorje."

18 And then we see that appointments are being made and suggested.

19 Were you aware of this since this was a public announcement,

20 albeit it is in the Croatian language? Would this have come to your

21 attention by any chance?

22 A. Whether this was a public notice or not I don't know, but I do

23 know this document. I remember it.

24 Q. Okay.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: And if we go, Your Honours, at the very end of the

1 document you will note that the public announcement states: "With this

2 nomination, the Croat side have carried out their duties and after

3 nomination of representatives from the Muslim population in the provinces

4 8, 9 and 10 can begin peaceful life, life of protected human rights and

5 stronger defence from the aggressor." And we see at the bottom it's --

6 it's the 25th of May.

7 Q. And I point this out because of the earlier statement that you

8 made that apparently, at least from what you were able to glean and

9 understand and appreciate at the time, the Muslims were less than

10 cooperative or less than willing to carry out their duties, and that is to

11 nominate their representatives to fill the positions in provinces 8, 9,

12 and 10 so that the implementation process would begin; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. If we look at the next document, 1D 01600, 1600. This is dated

15 May 27th, 1993. And here we see at the bottom it's president of the

16 Presidency of RBiH, and it's Alija Izetbegovic. It's addressed to

17 Dr. Jadranko Prlic. Subject, consultation for establishment of the

18 transitional government. I just wish to point out a couple of things.

19 And it might be -- it will become relevant with the next document.

20 Here under paragraph number 1 there's an acknowledgement that yes,

21 indeed, "We have agreed in Medjugorje that you are a candidate for the

22 first prime minister of the government of RBiH."

23 Then if we go on to the second one, paragraph number 2: "In order

24 to propose to you the candidates, it is necessary for me to know for which

25 portfolios it would be good that you propose their distribution. We are,

1 among other things, of course, interested in the ministry for refugees

2 (because of large number of Muslim refugees)."

3 And this is dated the 27th of May, 1993. Were you aware of -- of

4 President Izetbegovic's communication back to Mr. Jadranko Prlic --

5 Dr. Jadranko Prlic concerning his earlier letter to him? Were you aware

6 of this?

7 A. No, I didn't know about this, but I imagine that I had read some

8 sort of summary of this later, but not at that particular time.

9 Q. All right. The next document is very quick. 1D 01601, again

10 signed by Dr. Jadranko Prlic as president of the government, dated June 1,

11 1993, in Mostar, and here he is giving his greetings. "The president of

12 the transitional central government of the RBiH, Dr. Jadranko Prlic, has

13 on the occasion of the Muslim religious holiday Kurban Bajram expressed

14 his best wishes to all the clerical dignitaries and the Islam

15 congregation ... " and it goes on giving his particular greetings.

16 Were you aware of this gesture by Dr. Jadranko Prlic, back in June

17 1, 1993, in his capacity as president of the government, of the interim

18 government?

19 A. Do you mean not the Vance-Owen Plan but in the government of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... He's with -- I'm just --

24 A. Can I ask a question whether we have the same document. This is

25 the 7th Muslim Brigade or do I have the wrong document?

1 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... It's 1D 01601. 1601. If you

2 don't have it, I can give you my copy. Do you have it?

3 A. 1601.

4 Q. That's it. If you don't have it, we can assist you. It might be

5 easier to just hand you the copy so we can move on because I'm under

6 tremendous time constraints.

7 A. Yes, I think I have it. 1601.

8 Q. Okay. Thank you. And again I just read it out. It's dated June

9 1, 1993. These are greetings from Dr. Jadranko Prlic as president of the

10 government, if we look at the signature down there. Were you aware of

11 this?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Okay. Now if we look at the next document 1D 01602, 1602. And

14 here again at the bottom, Dr. Jadranko Prlic, president of the government,

15 if we look at the top, it says 5 May, but the May has been crossed out,

16 Your Honours, and then it says June, handwritten, 1993. Hence the order.

17 Do you see that? Do you have this document in front of you?

18 A. Yes, I think so.

19 Q. Okay. Yeah. And this is addressed to Alija Izetbegovic and

20 Mate Boban, and I wish to point out here, consistent to the earlier

21 document where Mr. -- President Izetbegovic expressed in particular that

22 he wished the Ministry of Refugees to go to the Muslim nation, and of

23 course, we know by virtue of the arrangement that the Ministry of Foreign

24 Affairs would remain with the Muslims. We see in the second paragraph, it

25 says, "In accordance with expressed interest, a need for appointment of

1 balanced government, it is my opinion that the division of portfolios

2 should be as follows: Muslims, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry for

3 Refugee Issues, and Ministry of Communication and Transport."

4 And then we see for the Croats, president of the government which

5 Dr. Jadranko Prlic holds, then Ministry of Reconstruction and Ministry of

6 International Trade. And then, of course, they also allow three different

7 ministries to the Serbs to be filled at some later point.

8 So were you aware of this, that Dr. Jadranko Prlic, consistent

9 with or in accordance with President Izetbegovic's wishes, went ahead and

10 made this proposal?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Now, just to -- just to hammer the point home, at the very bottom,

13 if we look at the second to last, second-to-last paragraph, you see that

14 Dr. Jadranko Prlic saying, "I'm asking you for your agreement with these

15 proposals," and then he goes on to say, "I expect that you will propose

16 more candidates for each existing position no later than Tuesday, June 10,

17 1993, since I have the obligation to form the government within three

18 days, and the meeting with the co-presidents of the peace conference on

19 former Yugoslavia of June 3." So you see that.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. And would it not be, I mean, you could draw an educated

22 conclusion from all this that Dr. Jadranko Prlic is moving, with all

23 deliberate speed, to form the government as was expected to him, in order

24 to put in process a peace plan that would at least -- well, that they were

25 hoping would stop the fighting at least between the Bosnian Croats and the

1 Bosnian Muslims. Would that be fair?

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I intervene?

3 [Interpretation] Witness, if you look at this, Mr. Prlic says that

4 he wants to have proposals by the 10th of June, because until the 3rd

5 of -- three days before the 3rd he has to propose a government. Is that

6 something you can understand? Can you explain to me what that meant in

7 practical terms?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, can I say first of all,

9 Your Honour, that I don't know all of these documents because these were

10 far above the level I was at the time, and I only know things of a more

11 verbal nature about the events of the time, except for the files with

12 names in them. But these are procedures would have been instigated very

13 shortly after this letter. But the 18th of May was considerably before

14 this date.

15 MR. KARNAVAS:

16 Q. If I may -- if I may, the -- I'm told that the translation is a

17 little awkward, and so -- it says, "Since I took" - as opposed to "I

18 have" - "I took the obligation to form the government within three days at

19 the meeting with the co-presidents of the peace conference of the former

20 Yugoslavia on June 3." So in other words the meeting took place on June

21 3, and that's when he took that obligation on. And we can certainly have

22 the document retranslated, Your Honours, to clarify that point.

23 The last document, at least in this -- for this chapter is

24 P 02490. 2490. This is a Prosecution document. It's dated 22 May, 1993,

25 and it's -- it's generated by the EC Monitor Mission, Danish delegation,

1 Greater Serbia, and if we go to the -- at the end, I believe it's at the

2 end. No, I'm sorry. On the very first page we can see that -- that this

3 was sent off by Ole Brix Andersen and of course you knew Mr. Andersen, did

4 you not? On the very first page --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Have you seen this document before? It's a Prosecution document.

7 A. Yes. It seems very familiar.

8 Q. Okay. And just very briefly because I just want to point this

9 out, it would appear if we look at the first page, flip the -- I'm sorry,

10 page number 1, which would be the second page, we see this is a proposal

11 for ECMM participation in the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan,

12 and -- now, were you by any chance, given that you were located in an area

13 where you might be put in a position to implement the Vance-Owen Peace

14 Plan, were you aware of this proposal, that's number one, and number two,

15 did you have anything to do with the drafting of this proposal? In other

16 words, did they solicit your input and guidance and wisdom in drafting a

17 proposal?

18 A. Well, not in the drafting a proposal, but in the implementation.

19 And the practical matters for us, we were further down the rung of the

20 ladder, was, for example, that we spoke to Muslim leaders and asked them

21 why they hadn't done anything yet. And I recall that at some phase, I

22 can't define the date, Mr. Cibo was one of the people I spoke to about it.

23 And I had heard, in general, that he was appointed by Mr. Izetbegovic as

24 a sort of commissioner, so to speak.

25 Q. Right. And one would think, would they not - I mean, logic would

1 follow, at least mine does - that if he was appointed by President

2 Izetbegovic that Mr. Cibo would follow Mr. Izetbegovic's instructions.

3 A. Yes. That's what one should assume.

4 Q. And if Mr. Cibo was dragging his feet, being uncooperative, being

5 non-responsive, being unwilling to go ahead and participate in the

6 implementation of the plan, one might further conclude that perhaps that's

7 exactly why he was placed there by Mr. Izetbegovic, for that very same

8 purpose. Unless of course Mr. Izetbegovic was totally unaware of what

9 Mr. Cibo was up to?

10 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, I would object to that question. I

11 think that calls for speculation.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: The gentleman certainly can answer the question,

13 especially based in part on his previous answer, but if the -- if the

14 Judges think that the question is argumentative in the form, which it may

15 be, then I can certainly move on.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, before the objection

17 was raised you said that you met with Mr. Cibo. When you discussed with

18 him about the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan on the Muslim side,

19 did he convey the impression that he was enthusiastic or rather reserved,

20 that he was overwhelmed? What kind of impression did he make on you as to

21 his position, his stance with regard to the implementation? We've just

22 seen, through numerous documents, that on the Croat side they were moving

23 ahead very rapidly. So what did Mr. Cibo say to you exactly, without any

24 sort of hypothesis?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I met Mr. Cibo on the

1 5th of May, and we talked together for several hours on the Spanish

2 transport vehicle. We talked about various things including the

3 Vance-Owen Plan. I don't remember the exact wording. The situation was a

4 situation on the terrain, so to speak, but I do remember that he was

5 reserved, and he did not show any enthusiasm. One could put it that way.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President.

7 Q. Now, if we look at this document just very quickly, just a couple

8 of points, on the very -- on that page number one we see under item number

9 4 or paragraph that is numbered 4, we say -- we see here that at the

10 meeting it was agreed that the Vance-Owen Plan should be -- should be

11 implemented to the extent possible considering the character of the

12 provinces, and then it mentions provisions, and present circumstances

13 within the three regions, Mostar, Travnik, Zenica. So I take it your

14 understanding was those were the regions where the Vance-Owen Peace Plan

15 was going to be implemented; correct?

16 A. Yes, that's what I understood.

17 Q. And then we see that at least the ECMM is saying that "The

18 international community needs to take rapid and positive action with

19 concrete results demonstrated in order to convince the parties that the

20 agreement reached is viable." Okay? So I take it you also understood

21 that you, along with others, for all intents and purposes, the

22 international community, had to assist in this implementation process,

23 hence why you were meeting with people such as Mr. Cibo to cajole him into

24 getting himself into action; correct?

25 A. The meeting resulted from different circumstances, but the

1 opportunity was there to talk to him about it.

2 Q. And the reason why you were talking to him about it was because

3 you had an obligation. At least -- at least somebody who was above you,

4 Ole Brix Andersen, is making this proposal. He certainly seems to think

5 that ECMM and others in the international community must take action;

6 right? And that's what you were doing.

7 A. Well, I must think of the time frame. When I was together with

8 Mr. Cibo for a long time, things hadn't developed so far, as far as I

9 recall, but things were moving. And again I met Mr. Cibo once more. I

10 don't remember the exact time, but it was when the implementation process

11 started, and this was one of the subjects, especially because I knew him

12 from the beginning of April, and it was something I was very much aware

13 of.

14 Q. Okay. And if we again look at page number 2, we just see at the

15 very bottom it says "Tasks in the two agreements," and we see under

16 paragraph that is numbered 13, "Agreement on interim arrangements". I

17 don't want to go through -- through any of that, but it seems at least -

18 and there is a purpose I did it in this fashion - that here we are in May

19 and I showed you documents before that that were back in -- in June, so as

20 early as May, the ECMM was gearing up for the implementation, and then we

21 see June. We see Dr. Jadranko Prlic moving pursuant to what was expected

22 of him; correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. Thank you. We can now off on to another -- another area,

25 and that has to do with the convoys. Yesterday you were asked a few

1 questions about convoy, and I just wanted to clarify a few points.

2 Now, there was a Makarska Agreement that was on 10 July 1993, and

3 if I am correct, the ECMM was not present at that meeting.

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Okay. All right. Now, briefly I just want to go through a

6 chronology before we go through some documents, and to the best of your

7 recollection, if you could tell me whether my chronology is consistent

8 with your memory. If not, we'll deal with it through some other means,

9 perhaps with you, perhaps with others, but I've indicated, number one,

10 that on 10 July 1993 there was the Makarska Agreement. And incidentally,

11 that agreement dealt with convoys, and we've seen it here before in

12 P 03346 just to let the Court know. It's not there. It's not in your

13 bundle. I'm just letting the Court know.

14 So that agreement dealt with convoys; correct? With the issue of

15 humanitarian relief. If you recall. You're shaking are head. We need to

16 make a record.

17 A. Yes. I'm sorry. I'm terribly sorry. I was trying to

18 concentrate.

19 Q. Okay. All right. Then on 13 July 1993, the ABiH attacked in the

20 area of Dubrava plateau region, Stolac, Capljina, Buna. And again we saw

21 that in another document and that would be P 03427, Your Honours, earlier.

22 But do you recall that three days later, 13 July, the ABiH carried out

23 an attack? Do you recall that? If you don't recall, that's okay.

24 A. No, not particularly Stolac, but the 3rd of July, this was after

25 the 30th of July -- June where the fighting was continued.

1 Q. No, no. But what I'm asking is -- what I'm saying is this: 10th

2 July you have Makarska Agreement. 13th July, three days later, the army

3 of BiH attacks in the area of Dubrava plateau, the region of Stolac,

4 Capljina, Buna. Were you aware of that? Do you recall that?

5 A. Could I ask you whether you're talking about the document or the

6 fact? Are you talking about a paper, because I don't remember a paper.

7 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Okay.

8 A. So a period of time is in the area where there were uprisings of

9 the armija and there was fighting, but then it quietened down somewhat.

10 Q. All right. And then on 14th of July, 1993, were you aware that an

11 UNHCR convoy was cancelled? And again that can be found on P 03453

12 [Realtime transcript read in error "P 05453"] for the Court but were you

13 aware that on 14 July 1993, an UNHCR convoy was cancelled? It's a yes or

14 no --

15 A. No, I can't remember.

16 Q. Okay. Nobody's expecting you by the way. It's a long period of

17 time. That's why we have some documents, hopefully might clarify the

18 point and on 14 July 1993, Dr. Jadranko Prlic sent a letter to the UNHCR,

19 and that's going to be found on 1D 01336 which we'll get to, but were you

20 aware of that, that Dr. Jadranko Prlic sent a letter? And there's a

21 purpose for all of this by the way. We'll get to it.

22 A. No.

23 Q. And then on 15 July there was still heavy fighting in the Buna

24 area south of Mostar. Were you aware of that?

25 A. I assume that the fighting continued, and as I said before, we

1 didn't have findings of our own on this, but we heard signs of heavy

2 fighting.

3 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, I'm truly -- I apologise for

4 interrupting here, but just for the record at line 12, the reference to

5 P 05453, I think that is incorrect. It should be P 3453.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: That's correct. That's correct.

7 MR. KRUGER: Sorry for the interruption.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Either I'm tired, which is probably the case, or I

9 was misheard.

10 Q. In any event -- okay. Now, we have the Makarska Agreement.

11 There's another -- there is an agreement. We can find that on 3346,

12 P 03346. I think we looked at it yesterday very briefly. I don't know if

13 you have it in your packet. But it's in the Prosecution binder. The

14 Prosecution's. That's the very thick one. And I just want to point

15 something out very quickly. 3346.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. If we see -- we see it sort in the middle it talks about recalling

18 the Medjugorje agreement concluded on 18 May 1993. Were you aware what

19 that agreement was all about?

20 A. I didn't know the agreement, but I can put it into the context of

21 the question -- in the context of the question raised yesterday.

22 Q. Okay. And that is that it was -- the agreement was basically --

23 again dealt with convoys and what-have-you; right? In that context.

24 Okay.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And then if we go to the very last page or the second-to-last

2 page, we see who is nominated and we see there representative of the

3 Croatian Defence Council, we see Dr. Jadranko Prlic, president of HVO

4 Croatian Community Herceg-Bosna, and then we see Zubak and other names as

5 well. And then we see other names.

6 Okay. Now, if we could just move on, real quickly, to the next

7 document. Again, this is a Prosecution document. 3427, 3427. This is a

8 document that was shown to you, I believe, yesterday. It's dated 13 July

9 1993, and I just want to point out something, couple of things actually,

10 and at the very end it says, "Best Regards, CC Mostar". So you would be

11 familiar with this document.

12 Here we see that there's a meeting with a Mr. Zubak. Do you have

13 it? Do you have the document, sir? Okay.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And then we see sort of in the middle of that first paragraph, it

16 says, "He agreed that the current fighting could again interrupt the

17 possibilities for convoys, as already Mr. Tadic had said, he stressed that

18 BiH has not announced the responsible person for the convoys."

19 And so now, were you aware that Mr. Zubak was raising this issue?

20 In other words, that the fighting is preventing the convoys to go through,

21 and that as Mr. Tadic is saying, that the Muslim side had not announced

22 the responsible person for the convoys.

23 A. Well, the last thing was something I heard from Mr. Tadic himself

24 in addition.

25 Q. But you were present at this, were you not?

1 A. Sorry?

2 Q. This document was generated by you, I believe, and I believe that

3 you were present at the time and having a conversation with Mr. Zubak. So

4 you would have heard Zubak saying that he agreed that the current fighting

5 could again interrupt the possibilities for convoys. So he's stating the

6 reasons why perhaps convoys may not come through; right?

7 A. That is the case, yes.

8 Q. And if we go to the second --

9 A. Sorry.

10 Q. No, go ahead. I don't mean to cut you off. I thought you were

11 finished.

12 A. That was also because of the fighting. We talked about the

13 fighting already at the north of Jablanica towards Prozor, and when they

14 were talking about fighting, it was a matter of course that there were no

15 convoys, and military convoys themselves couldn't get through.

16 Q. Okay. All right. And that -- and that incidentally might be one

17 of the reasons why convoys of humanitarian aid are unable to get through,

18 if there's fighting, especially if one of the two sides is activating the

19 fighting. I mean, that makes sense; right?

20 A. Well, I can't really go into the subject of who was the initiator

21 in this context.

22 Q. I'm not asking you who the initiator is. All I'm saying is if

23 there's fighting -- I mean, it's one thing to say the government or the --

24 or the person who's responsible is not allowing convoys to go through.

25 It's another thing to say that the passage is blocked because of fighting

1 going on; right? There are two different issues; right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. Now, if we go to the second page, under military matters,

4 paragraph -- it's number 3, "Military activity", we see there, "There are

5 gun positions now one kilometre north of Siroki Brijeg firing this morning

6 and in the middle of the day. There have been army attacks in the area of

7 Dubrava plateau, what is the region of Stolac-Capljina-Buna."

8 So it would seem that at least you are aware that three days after

9 there is an agreement signed here is the armija carrying out an offensive.

10 And I say offensive because they're -- it would appear that they're the

11 ones initiating the fighting; correct? You wrote this, so ...

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. All right. Now we go to the next document -- sorry, did you want

14 to say something?

15 A. Yes, figure 3, the first sentence refers of course to the

16 positions of the HVO. The second sentence has to do with indications from

17 UNPROFOR and the UNMO officers and what our team itself had heard in terms

18 of sounds of fighting. So this is how this passage emerged.

19 Q. Right. Okay. And you wrote it.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. All right. And in fact at the bottom of the page where it says

22 "Assessment", you even note that Mr. Zubak has made an offer for you to

23 meet with Mr. Prlic; correct? The very last sentence under "Assessment".

24 "The offer to meet Mr. Prlic is an additional indicator for that." I

25 should say, actually, you've mentioned that earlier and this is part of

1 your assessment.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. All right. Now, if we go to the next document, 3453.

4 3453. This is dated July 14. And if we go to the second page under (D),

5 Southern BH Command, it says here, "(1) Mostar, all UNPROFOR vehicle

6 movement towards Mostar continued to be forbidden. Both sides -- both

7 sides' sources state that combat are taking place in the Buna area and

8 south of Mostar. SA fire and explosions have been recorded in Capljina

9 surroundings. The access has been denied to UNPROFOR vehicles. HVO

10 continues gathering personnel and material for a further offensive, and an

11 UNHCR convoy that was going to deliver humanitarian aid to Muslim refugees

12 in the Heliodrom in Mostar has been cancelled by UNHCR due to the combat

13 and the incidents that have taken place in Capljina. The population is

14 blaming UNPROFOR for not having prevented the recent events."

15 Now, would it be fair to say, based on this passage, that that

16 convoy that was headed towards the Heliodrom was prevented from going

17 there as a result of the fighting, the activity that was going on?

18 A. Because of the fighting and also the factor that the access was

19 prevented so that -- that the Spanish Battalion was escorting.

20 Q. Okay. When you say access prevented, do you think it would have

21 been wise to -- in the middle of a war zone where there's fighting going

22 on and you told us how on one mission, you just turned around and left as

23 soon as there was some shooting going on, do you think it would have been

24 wise to drive a convoy of humanitarian aid through the middle of fighting

25 where both sides are waging war? Or would the safer course be cancel and

1 wait for another day?

2 A. Well, it would be right to cancel it, but in June, for example,

3 I'd like to point out that sniping activities were there in East Mostar,

4 and still the Spanish were able to enter East Mostar in spite of

5 admittedly small-scale fighting.

6 Q. Okay. We'll move on. 1D 01336. This is a letter signed by

7 Jadranko Prlic, president of the HVO. It's 1 -- it's the other -- the

8 blue binder. There you go. 1D 01336. It's dated 14 July 1993. So this

9 would have been the following day. Remember I indicated that there was a

10 letter sent by Jadranko Prlic, and here if we look in the middle of the --

11 the second paragraph it says: "However, the attack of the Muslim forces

12 on the large area of Mostar and Capljina, including the main road

13 Capljina-Mostar (the section belonging to the only corridor from Ploce to

14 Bosnia) is a flagrant proof of their unwillingness to respect the

15 agreement."

16 Do you see that?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So let me put it to you this way: If one side wanted to prevent

19 that convoy from through, one way would be to engage in military

20 activities to block the corridor; right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. All right. Next document is Prosecution P 03470. It's --

23 yeah, that's that one. 3470. And this is dated 15 July 1993. This was

24 not shown to you, but it's a Prosecution document. I'm told that -- I'm

25 told that it was shown to you. And if we just look at very briefly under

1 number 3, "Military activity". You say: "As M2 could hear from

2 Siroki Brijeg last night, heavy weapon fire -- heavy weapons fire from the

3 direction of Buna, fighting continues south of Mostar. They also could

4 see smoke today in the direction of the area of Buna. The military police

5 in the CP of Varda told M2 that the armija is at present shelling with

6 mortars the road from Siroki Brijeg to Mostar, although they did not say

7 in which place."

8 "M3 reported that all the Muslim soldiers in Tomislavgrad were

9 disarmed and sent back to their homes yesterday (about 400-500)."

10 Were you aware of this military activity as was reported in this

11 document? And this is 15 of July, five days after the agreement that was

12 signed to allow the convoys to go through. Were you aware of that?

13 A. This was a report that my deputy prepared at a time when I was not

14 there. I read it afterwards and talked to him about it.

15 Q. Do you know whether your deputy made any efforts to find out why

16 the Muslim side were carrying out these activities only five days or three

17 days after they had signed an agreement that would bring vital

18 humanitarian aid to the Muslim population, why they were waging attacks

19 blocking a corridor? Do you know whether your deputy or whoever was

20 working there made any efforts to get to the bottom of this?

21 A. Well, his attempts were especially geared towards creating access

22 to Mostar. He didn't manage that. And then he didn't have access to --

23 from the south either.

24 Q. All right. So are you saying to me that -- that ECMM did not have

25 access at all to the Muslim side to find out -- I mean, you had access to

1 Cibo, so I take it you're saying that there was no way to find out, if not

2 maybe in the Mostar Muslim authority, but perhaps go through Izetbegovic,

3 and find out why after such an agreement is signed to allow vital

4 humanitarian aid to go through, why his military wing, representing his

5 party and his people is waging war? I mean, you told us how he was

6 dragging his feet with the implementation of Vance-Owen.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Could this be one of those examples?

9 A. That could be, but once more if -- well, convoys are stopped for

10 minor reasons. If you think of a check-point, a small check-point with

11 two people with guns and it stops a convoy, you don't need combat

12 activity. If the convoys -- if the check-points are there, they can stop

13 everything.

14 Q. I'm fully aware of that, but that wasn't -- that wasn't the answer

15 to a question that I had posed, but never mind. We'll go on to the next

16 document.

17 We're going to switch topics a little bit, and we're going to

18 document 3361. I believe this was shown to you yesterday. And I also

19 have the transcript where it was -- where you made reference to it. But

20 what was posed to you or a question that was posed to you was whether you

21 would have of been aware of documents or documents of this sort as a

22 matter of routine, and you indicated, yes, we received these reports and

23 used them.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. And if we go to -- under the third page under 4 where it

1 says BritBat sector, there is a section there. We can skip over that a

2 little bit because we don't have time. But we go under C, Travnik. It

3 says: "The BiH OG command, Alagic, said to the ICRC that he had given

4 orders that no prisoners were to be taken by his troops." And then

5 there's a comment. But my question is did you react to that? You being a

6 military man, you coming in possession of these documents and, as you

7 said, you used them albeit it's not in your direct vicinity, were you --

8 did you react in any way? I mean, how could a military commander advise

9 his troops not to take any prisoners?

10 A. Well, I didn't react to that. It was far beyond my area of

11 responsibility, and there were enough people there to do something. There

12 were -- if I had tried to do anything, I would have been intervening in

13 their work and interrupted their work, and I wouldn't have been able to do

14 so.

15 Q. Well --

16 A. Because to read such a document, of course, it takes a certain

17 time.

18 Q. You could have said, "Listen, I think something has to be done."

19 I mean, there are Geneva Conventions; right? So -- but be that as it may,

20 I only bring this out because it was repeatedly brought out by my learned

21 friend on the Prosecution side how you would get these documents and how

22 you would use them. But now let's look at two documents I think that

23 might be helpful, and this goes to another issue that may not directly

24 involve you, but it involves a section of the indictment. It's 1D 01605.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment before you move on.

1 You have already used one hour and 15 minutes. Who has given you

2 additional time to continue?

3 MR. KARNAVAS: No one. No one, Your Honour. I can stop at this

4 point, but there are just two documents that I wish to show the gentleman

5 directly related to my previous question, and I think that that would

6 be -- I could end at that.

7 If we could look at --

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Well, proceed until 7.00.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you very much, Mr. President and

10 Your Honours.

11 Q. 1D 01605. This is a -- dated 20 June 1993. It's an order. It

12 says, "On the basis of the order issued by the commander of the 3rd ABiH

13 Corps, I am issuing the following order." And we'll skip through it a

14 little bit so we can save some time. Under point 1.1, it says -- at the

15 very -- at the beginning, it says: "On 24 June 1993, ABiH units, 319th

16 Mountain Brigade --" Mr. Usher, I believe --

17 A. Well, I don't have the document at the moment.

18 Q. We're -- we're going to help you out here.

19 A. [In English] Thank you.

20 Q. I'm looking at paragraph 1.1 and it says, sort of at the end of

21 the paragraph: "Along -- along the attack line, burn down everything that

22 belongs to Ustasha, take the women and children to the camp in Vitlaci and

23 kill the men."

24 All right? And this is an issue that we've talked about. There's

25 an issue about reverse ethnic cleansing, and I just want to -- that's why

1 we're going through these documents, and you indicated that you would have

2 been aware of what was going on, having read all those documents.

3 We go on. On paragraph 1.2, it says at the very bottom -- this

4 is -- it gives instructions to the forces of the 305 Jajce Brigade, and at

5 the very end, it says: " ... Shall immediately start executing the Ustasha

6 command and HDZ leaders."

7 So now we're not only targeting military, but we want to make sure

8 that we exterminate the HDZ leaders as well.

9 Now we go to 1.3. "The forces in town, by using the religious

10 holiday and the gathering of people in the church until 8.00 a.m. on 24

11 June 1993, shall occupy the reinforced buildings according to the

12 previously made plan, kill everything that moves. With the use of

13 snipers, neutralise all prominent members of the Ustasha command, and take

14 over control of the town. Upon entry of our forces, start cleansing the

15 town; women and children shall be taken to the secondary school Zepce, and

16 to the primary school Zepce - people from the old municipality;

17 immediately occupy the hospital which is held by Ustasha and kill all

18 Ustashas; medical staff shall be kept to work under control."

19 And then on number 2, it says: "On the basis of this order,

20 commanders and unit commanders shall develop a detailed action plan and

21 bring it to me for approval on 22 June 1993, no later than 20.00, when

22 details shall be further developed."

23 And if we go to the next page, it says: "In the preparation for

24 this operation, military meetings will be held where the fighters shall be

25 informed about the sacred task of defending the unitary," and I underscore

1 this for the Trial Chamber, "the unitary and sovereign BiH.

2 "This order is strictly confidential and shall be treated as

3 such." And is signed by the commander, Mr. Galib Dervisic. I don't

4 recall him seeing his name here. I don't know if he's deceased, I don't

5 recall him being one of the accused before the ICTY. But anyway, were you

6 aware of this order?

7 A. No. And during my whole time I never saw anything like it, not

8 anything even approximately similar to that.

9 Q. All right. Let's move on to the next document, and of course,

10 this might help us out a little bit. It's 1D 01606. Mr. Usher, if you

11 could kindly assist us. Perhaps the gentleman doesn't have this document

12 either, and -- and --

13 A. Yes, I think I've found it. Thank you.

14 Q. We try to be efficient.

15 A. Yes, I've got it now.

16 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, this is an order. If we go to the second

17 page, it's signed by a commander Drocic Narcis, I think I got it right and

18 we see that there's a stamp. On the B/C/S version we have a stamp,

19 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Green Berets of the army of BiH,

20 Zepce.

21 If we go through this order, and I think this is appropriate, it

22 says first, under 1.1, and this is regarding "the forces of the 7th Muslim

23 Brigade to which belongs the Green Berets, have the following tasks for 24

24 June 1993 ..." So if you recall earlier, the commanders were told to come

25 up with detailed plans and this appears to be one of those.

1 It says: "1.1. The first group led by Muhamed Selimovic, Manga,

2 shall occupy the Ustasha hospital, kill the Ustashas and all wounded

3 Ustashas."

4 Under number 2, I won't read everything to save some time: "The

5 second group led by Salko Bajcic shall occupy the town mosque and deploy

6 snipers and carry out liquidation of guards around the Home. The other

7 part shall surround the Home," the home in capital, "Home according to the

8 exercised plan. Samir Muslic shall, by use of loudspeaker, invite

9 Ustashas to surrender, and if they refuse to surrender, RPG, RG (grenade

10 launchers), rifle launchers shall fire from the town mosque yard and from

11 the park. The snipers shall liquidate the Ustashas who try to escape."

12 "1.3. The third group led by Amin Spahic shall surround the

13 Balkan hotel. It shall deploy men according to the previously exercised

14 plan. Task: To disarm or destroy the so-called 'Ustasha special forces'

15 at the Balkan, and then continue cleansing from Krajnjaca to the building

16 of MUP (Ministry of Interior), where they shall join with the fourth

17 group.

18 "1.4. The fourth group with Haris Drocic shall surround the

19 so-called HVO military police, disarm or destroy. Special tasks shall be

20 given to snipers through Esad Basic."

21 Then we go on to the fifth. "The fifth group, with the Military

22 Police Platoon, they shall secure the weapons producing ..." and so on.

23 Then if we go to number 3, we'll skip number 2. Paragraph number

24 3, at the very end: "All Ustashas shall be arrested and wherever that is

25 possible [sic], they shall be immediately killed. Women and children

1 shall be imprisoned in the secondary school, in the primary school."

2 And here Your Honours, with respect to ethnic cleansing or reverse

3 ethnic cleansing, let me read on: "Children and wives of Ustasha and HDZ

4 leaders shall be taken hostage, maltreated, blackmailed and taken to our

5 radio station to call Ustashas to surrender.

6 "4. Upon full taking of the town before collecting the booty

7 (household appliances, gold and other) and take them to the mosques, and

8 cars to the youth community. The food shall be transported to our silo."

9 My question, sir, is: Here we see talking about killing soldiers

10 who are surrendered, killing wounded soldiers, killing civilians, abusing

11 civilians, using a religious site such as the mosque for snipers to

12 operate, using the mosques in order to collect and secure the booty. Tell

13 me, sir, in light of what was shown to you by the Prosecutor in document

14 P 03361 where you indicated that you were fully aware and where it says in

15 here that Alagic had said that no prisoners were to be taken alive, were

16 you made aware of this?

17 A. So such conversations, things like that happened, rumours, yes,

18 that did exist. But I never heard anything concrete or seen anything or

19 got any reports about that. But I can only say from my part, what kind of

20 observations I made, what I heard about the Mujahedin, but only for -- in

21 a very small area.

22 Q. All right. And you would agree with me, would you not, that here

23 we have documents with stamps and signatures that have in writing

24 concretely --

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, one question.

1 These two documents, how did you get them?

2 MR. KARNAVAS: Through investigation, Your Honour. Through our

3 investigators. And --

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Meaning?

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, Your Honours, we have an investigator out.

6 We searched and we secure archives. Individuals have them. And that's

7 how we got them. And because I anticipated your question, that's why I

8 showed the earlier document, 3361, which was glossed over, which verifies

9 that here he's even told -- he's even told in advance a member of BritBat,

10 where Commander Alagic says to the ICRC that he had given orders that no

11 prisoners were to be taken by his troops, and it would appear that you

12 have a chain reaction, and this is the result. This is concrete results.

13 And of course -- and I point this out because there has been a

14 claim by the Prosecution that it was all bogus information that was being

15 passed on to the individuals on the ground in the Croatian Community that

16 the Mujahedin were there, that atrocities were occurring, that the women

17 would be raped, that the children would be taken, that men would be

18 killed, and here we have concrete example that, one, members of the

19 international community were foretold of these events; two, as the

20 gentleman indicated he was aware of these events; and yet, three, here we

21 have a UN institution, the Office of the Prosecution alleging that it was

22 all fiction and that's the purpose of this and we hope to develop this

23 even more, and I appreciate the extra time provided to me by the Chamber.

24 I thank you very much and I thank you, sir, extremely -- I thank you very

25 much for your cooperation in these questions.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Karnavas. Very

2 well. We're going to continue tomorrow. I don't know who is going to

3 proceed. Is that you, Ms. Alaburic, or the Praljak Defence? Who is going

4 to start tomorrow?

5 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, General Praljak's

6 Defence will be the first to go. I will have 15 to 20 minutes. We were

7 given extra time from Mr. Coric's Defence and some time from

8 Mr. Ibrisimovic as well. But we'll tell you exactly about the breakdown

9 tomorrow, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It is now 7.00. We

11 have to finish. We will convene again tomorrow, as you know at 2.15.

12 Thank you.

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.,

14 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day

15 of June, 2007, at 2.15 p.m.

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