071106ED

Page 24083

1 WITNESS: ANDREW PRINGLE [Resumed]

2 Examination by Mr. Scott: [Continued]

3 Q. Good morning, General Pringle.

4 A. Good morning.

5 Q. I trust you had a reasonably pleasant evening.

6 A. Thank you.

7 Q. If you still have the documents in front of you, and if you could

8 go back to where we left off yesterday, at least in terms of the same

9 document, I want to move to a different topic, and if I can direct you to

10 P 04020.

11 Again, I'm moving past paragraph number 1; although, I suspect

12 there will be further opportunity to discuss that. But if you look at

13 paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, and just in this particular respect, in each of

14 those paragraphs, and I believe the fourth line of the second paragraph,

15 the second line of the third paragraph, and what would be the third line

16 of paragraph 4 or the first - at least in the English version - the first

17 line on the top of the second page, the word "Balija" is used.

18 Do you see that?

19 A. I do.

20 Q. Now, let me -- hoping to avoid perhaps some of the issues that

21 were raised yesterday, assuming, assuming that "Balija" is a very

22 derogatory term towards Muslims, and assuming that as of August of 1993,

23 the HVO is in armed conflict with the ABiH and the Muslims, can you tell

24 us what effect on the command climate it would have for a senior officer

25 to issue an order using the terminology repeatedly, "Balija"?

Page 24084

1 A. Well, in my opinion, it would give the impression that the senior

2 officer issuing the order was certainly being derogatory about, in this

3 case, I assume, Muslim forces. It would be the equivalent if one reflects

4 back to the Vietnam War of perhaps an order being given about dealing with

5 the Gooks or something like that.

6 Q. Can you tell the Judges what is the effect on troops when senior

7 officers use that sort of terminology, in terms of what sort of message

8 does it set or what effect does it have on discipline?

9 A. Well, it's clearly sending a message that the -- that the senior

10 commander regards the foe in a rather derogatory and dismissive way, and

11 that can also send a subliminal message that therefore they can be treated

12 in a way perhaps that is commensurate with their lowly status.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I -- Your Honour, if I could -- Your

14 Honour, unless the gentleman can read minds, I suspect we should have some

15 foundation on this. Clearly, you know, what he's talking about, the

16 "subliminal message," unless he can tie this down factually, I think this

17 should be stricken from the record. I find it offensive that we would

18 have an officer of the British Army, retired be it, to be making these

19 sorts of speculative and unfounded comments.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, Mr. Scott tried to

21 exemplify your theory or your explanations about climate command. He used

22 the example of this document where we see the word "Balija." In your

23 statement, you stated that, by using derogatory terms, there can be an

24 impact on those who have to obey the orders. You referred to the Vietnam

25 War, and you stated that the -- when the American forces or the American

Page 24085

1 forces used the word "Gooks" to identify the north Vietnamese, that could

2 have an impact.

3 In military colleges or academies, as part of the doctrine, as

4 part of NATO or military studies, has any thought been given to the use of

5 words, of certain vocabulary in orders? Is it your personal opinion, or

6 are you talking on the basis of work, research that's been conducted

7 before on the use of certain terms in -- in orders?

8 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I'm drawing on my own experience of the

9 impact that the commander's conduct makes on his subordinates. So if he

10 refers to enemy forces in a derogatory or dismissive way, then he can

11 expect his subordinates to receive a message through that, that he thinks

12 of them in a derogatory and dismissive way, and that is likely to affect

13 the way they in turn treat those enemy forces.

14 So whilst I'm not saying that it, in my experience, that it is

15 taught in military academies how you refer to military -- to enemy

16 forces. What -- what is taught and discussed, as we discussed yesterday,

17 is what we -- what I've described as command climate, which is the impact

18 that every action of the commander makes on his subordinates. The sort of

19 language and the views he takes and the opinions he expresses, as I said

20 yesterday, is all part of that formation of the command climate.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you may proceed.

22 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.

23 Q. And then, on another final topic on this still, the same document,

24 in reference to paragraph number 5, it says in three sentences: "While

25 the task is being completed, the Main Staff, artillery and rocket

Page 24086

1 regiment, shall provide artillery support to the best their ability

2 (ammunition availability.) I am sending Mr. Miro Colic from the Main

3 Staff POVRS officer with whom you can discuss the possibility of using the

4 Maljutka and TF8 FAGOT systems. " Forgive my pronunciation, if I said

5 those wrongly.

6 Then: "Air support will continue to be provided, as agreed by

7 Mr. Miro Lovric, Chief of the Main Staff, Air Force."

8 Now, in each of those references, there is a reference General

9 Petkovic to certain actions being taken or approved or services provided

10 by, if you will, the Main Staff. Can you comment on the significance or

11 whether in some issues -- some instances the Main Staff itself can

12 directly control certain assets or make certain operative decisions?

13 A. Yes. In this case, it's quite normal in the military

14 organisations for either scarce assets or perhaps assets with long range,

15 such as these rocket launchers and air, to be held centrally at a high

16 level rather than penny-packeted out to lower levels. In that way the

17 commander retains flexibility and can reinforce wherever he wants,

18 whenever he wants, according to the circumstances.

19 So, in this case, I would read this to mean that the rocket

20 regiment has been held centrally and is allocated and controlled from the

21 Main Staff, and that is what it's referring to and why, I believe.

22 Q. Continuing on using the terminology of assuming, and the Chamber

23 will draw upon the evidence that it has heard to date, but as you

24 mentioned a moment ago, I'm just looking back at your answer just now on

25 line 13, you said, "for either scarce assets or perhaps assets with long

Page 24087

1 range," et cetera.

2 Assuming that the heavier - I'm using the terminology heavier

3 weapons, such as perhaps tanks, larger artillery; that is, artillery other

4 than typical kinds of infantry support weapons, small calibre mortars - if

5 in the HVO, heavier weaponry was, if you will, a scarce or precious

6 commodity, would that reinforce your view that these would be then more

7 likely to be controlled by the Main Staff?

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I'm going to object at this. It calls

9 for speculation. Where is the factual basis? He's asking him to

10 speculate. These may be important assets, but here we're going about

11 concrete military equipment, and he's trying to get the gentleman to

12 divine from this particular -- these particular passages as to whether

13 other major assets were being controlled by the Main Staff.

14 Now, I don't represent the Main Staff, but I am offended as a

15 lawyer sitting here asking a witness to speculate. Now, if he can show

16 the document, then it can be tied in; but it's purely speculative at this

17 point.

18 Now, the general has given us an answer from which the Trial

19 Chamber can discern whether these assets were scarce and, therefore,

20 perhaps, if there's some sort of factual basis, it can be tied in. But

21 without any factual basis, we're asking for circumstantial evidence based

22 on speculation. I think it's clearly objectionable.

23 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. If I can respond briefly.

24 Yesterday - and I think quite correctly after I further ultimately

25 understood what was being said; and I was slow on the uptake, perhaps, and

Page 24088

1 I apologise for that - on the question of assuming, and that's why I led

2 off this morning, this is an expert witness. I put to him not, not

3 speculating but assuming, and the Chamber will recall and will know the

4 evidence in the case and decide whether the facts -- whether the facts fit

5 or not.

6 But assuming that these were scarce or precious commodities, I

7 simply asked the general in reference to this document, and there will be

8 at least one more similar document, to indicate a view on whether that

9 would reinforce his view that such assets in those circumstances would be

10 more likely to be controlled at a senior level.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: I --

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: I perfectly understand the nature of asking

14 hypothetical questions; and, yesterday, in the context in which it was

15 asked, and in which Judge Trechsel invited the parties to consider as a

16 mode of going forward, was perfectly proper. In my opinion, a

17 hypothetical has to be framed in such a way that either the facts are

18 already in or there is a good faith basis that the facts will be in. But

19 you simply cannot ask hypotheticals where there are not facts in evidence

20 or there's no good faith basis in order to tie it in, because that's the

21 purpose of asking the hypothetical.

22 Now, unless there's a good faith basis on the part of Mr. Scott

23 that's going to tie it in somehow, or it has already been tied in, fine;

24 otherwise, I don't think that the gentleman can answer the question. I

25 have no problem with him being asked hypothetical questions as long as the

Page 24089

1 facts are based on -- or the hypothetical, that is, that based on facts

2 already in evidence or facts that will be in evidence, but not facts that

3 are fanciful.

4 MR. STEWART: Could I make a separate point --

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott --

6 MR. STEWART: It will tie it together, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I would --

8 MR. STEWART: Sorry --

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes. I think we can get perhaps a step further

10 if we lift the issue to a more general level.

11 You are an expert on doctrine, on how battles are conducted, how

12 troops are led. Can you tell the Chamber whether it is a general rule

13 applied in all armies, that the lower you get in firepower, the more in

14 quantity you have; and that always the heavy stuff like air force, heavy

15 weapons, are relatively a scarce commodity. How -- are there general

16 rules on how the command will deal with these, irrespective of whether it

17 be in Africa, in Europe, or wherever?

18 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, every army organises itself as it

19 wishes. But in my experience, scarce assets and, as I've said, assets

20 with long range, it is very common to find those held centrally at a high

21 level where the commander can allocate them with much greater flexibility

22 than had they been allocated to lower levels.

23 He does that so he can provide reinforcement in firepower over and

24 above what a particular formation might be able to produce for itself, and

25 he can apply is the military is called main effort. In other words, if

Page 24090

1 his main concentration is in a particular area, he can reinforce that area

2 with as much long range or scarce asset firepower as he himself controls

3 at his own level. If it had been sub-allocated, he wouldn't have been

4 able to do that.

5 Now, in this case, in this case, what is written in this order is

6 that General Petkovic is sending, in the first instance, an officer called

7 Mr. Miro Colic from the Main Staff anti-armour multiple rocket system

8 branch, with whom you can discuss the possibility of using the Maljutka,

9 TF8 FAGOT systems.

10 Now, I would assume that is because those systems are held

11 centrally and controlled by Main Staff, and that is why a Main Staff

12 officer, with specific responsibility for those systems, has been sent

13 forward to discuss it, in exactly the same way "air support," it reads,

14 "will continue to be provided as agreed by Mr. Miro Lovric, Chief of Main

15 Staff, Air Force."

16 Now, it would indicate to me that the air force is being

17 controlled by a branch in the Main Staff for the reasons I have said.

18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

19 Mr. Stewart, I'm sorry that I have --

20 MR. STEWART: Yes. I was just going to comment that whatever

21 questions Mr. Scott is able to ask, that he does take a little bit more

22 care in the phrasing of the views he attributes to the witness, because we

23 got -- and as it happens, Your Honour Judge Trechsel's questions have

24 really gone specifically and very helpfully to this point. But, quite

25 normally, military organisations for assets to be held centrally at a high

Page 24091

1 level became, that it was more likely, it became the witnesses view, that

2 it was more likely to be controlled by Main Staff.

3 I would invite Mr. Scott to take a little bit more care when he's

4 translating a previous answer in to a view that he puts the witness.

5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: He will be sure to do that.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you may proceed.

7 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The witness has not answered my

9 fellow Judge's question. We clearly understand that resources may be

10 controlled by the Main Staff. But know if we talk about tanks, assuming

11 that the number of tanks is limited - you're not talking about hundreds or

12 thousands of tanks; you're talking about only a few tanks - in your

13 opinion, would the use of tanks in such a case come under the Main Staff,

14 the commander of the operation zone, the commander of the local brigade

15 who normally is in charge of these tanks?

16 In what chain of command is that controlled? Who, talking about

17 these tanks, will make the decisions? Can these decisions be made at the

18 level of the Main Staff, of the Chief of Staff?

19 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I haven't got in front of me an

20 organisation chart of how the HVO formations and units were arranged. If

21 I did have, I could answer your question very specifically, so I will have

22 to answer it on the basis of hypothesis. And to put it in context, the

23 HVO were not very well equipped with heavy weaponry, tanks, rocket

24 systems, et cetera. Under those circumstances, where ad hoc formations

25 are being formed, I would expect it to be sensible for the higher

Page 24092

1 commander to keep those, let's call them, heavy assets centralised and

2 under his immediate command where he can allocate them as necessary.

3 So if, for example, there were but a few tanks where you can put

4 any number on but a few, but let's say 30, as opposed to several

5 battalions or regiments of tanks of 50 or 60 tanks each, that would be

6 normal in a -- a normal Western military organisation.

7 If you, let's say, hypothetically you've only got 30 tanks, then

8 you may sub-allocate them if you see fit, or you may hold them centrally,

9 or you may sub-allocate some and hold some back in reserve. You know,

10 those are all hypothetical answers to a hypothetical question, but the

11 concept of holding scarce assets at a centralised high level is perfectly

12 normal.

13 JUDGE PRANDLER: I achieved only a very modest rank of lieutenant

14 of infantry, in the reserve of course, when I served in the Hungarian

15 army, but really I do not feel that we have a problem here. Anybody knows

16 that there are special units which are attached to, let's say, a regiment

17 level or other major level which the army has at its disposal. So,

18 therefore, I do not see here the problem.

19 No doubt that the -- the Chief of Staff or his deputy has the

20 power to allocate troops here and there and then to send them; and, of

21 course, on the battlefield that is a special responsibility of the

22 commander who is there, let's say, a commander of the regiment or

23 whatever, battalions, et cetera.

24 So I'm sorry to take the floor now, but I really feel that

25 sometimes we blow-up certain problems which are not really problems as

Page 24093

1 such.

2 Thank you.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe that Judge Prandler is

4 perfectly right, but let's complete the discussion on that point.

5 When resources are requested at the Main Staff or from the Main

6 Staff, should that be done through a written document or orally for the

7 higher command to provide officially air support or something else?

8 Should there be official communication between the requesting level of

9 command and the level where such things are decided?

10 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, and those communications can be in

11 a variety of ways. They could be transmitted by radio or fax or courier,

12 or they could be transmitted in the written word, rather depending on

13 whether it is a pre-planned operation or a current operation that is

14 running very quickly.

15 I would -- I would expect a forward commander, who is requesting

16 tank support in an ongoing battle, to simply call for it on the radio to

17 the higher headquarters, and he would be informed by the higher

18 headquarters as to whether it was available or not and the routes and

19 timings, et cetera, by which it would be arriving.

20 So all, all those mechanisms can be used in a more formal

21 pre-planned operation. One might expect a formal written operation order

22 from the higher headquarters, detailing tasks and resources to the

23 subordinate formations, so that they all know who is getting what,

24 particularly additional resources being allocated from a higher level.

25 So any one or all of these methods could be used.

Page 24094

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Mr. Scott.

2 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.

3 If we could then turn next to Exhibit P 03414, which will be in

4 the second of the binders.

5 Q. Going back -- stepping back now to the question that we ended on

6 yesterday in terms of the use of prisoners or detainees in forced -- in

7 labour. Strike the word "forced" now, just in labour. We'll argue about

8 that later.

9 If I can show you this document from the warden of the Heliodrom,

10 Mr. Stanko Bozic, being sent to, among others, Mr. Valentin Coric,

11 Mr. Berislav Pusic. This report says that: "On the 12th of July, 1993,

12 with the approval of the officer for control of the military police,

13 Mr. Berislav Pusic, 40 detainees were given for work."

14 He goes on to say: "On returning from work, the same military

15 policemen informed us that detainee, Mili Isailovic, has been wounded by

16 the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

17 Now, continuing on, again, the discussion we had had yesterday,

18 about using prisoners in dangerous conditions, et cetera, can you tell us

19 how a responsible commander could be expected or should act on receiving

20 such information, that a prisoner or detainee who has been used in labour

21 has been wounded by opposition forces?

22 A. Well, I any there are various issues --

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

24 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] I'd just like to say that,

25 as opposed to the case of the document that we had before us yesterday,

Page 24095

1 this document clearly mentions or refers to the word -- uses the

2 word "detainees," so there's no confusion as to whether we're talking

3 about prisoners, POWs, or detainees.

4 When such a question is put to the witness, I think it should be

5 put to him precisely, because if we're dealing with detainees, they could

6 be detained HVO members and not members of enemy forces. So we should

7 have both these ideas in mind. If it's one's own soldier, can we use such

8 soldier for work purposes. I think that's sufficient.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're right.

10 Mr. Scott, the word "detainee" that we see in this document may

11 refer to various things. It may refer to HVO detainees, to regular

12 prisoners who happened to be here. These might be people who are serving

13 a sentence after being convicted by the relevant military judiciary. We

14 might be talking about prisoners of war or civilians. We don't know.

15 This should be taken into account.

16 Please proceed, keeping that in mind.

17 But I see that Mr. Pusic's lawyer wants to take the floor, since

18 this document was sent to Mr. Pusic.

19 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20 I wanted to add something. Given what Mr. Scott said about

21 Mr. Pusic's position, it seems that, on the 12th of July, he was doing

22 something quite different from what is stated in the indictment. If we

23 have a look at paragraph 13, 14, we can see that Mr. Pusic, on the 5th of

24 July, 1993, was involved in other things, and he wasn't an officer for the

25 controlled military police.

Page 24096

1 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'm forced at this point to respond to a

2 number of aspects of what's happening here. Number one, again, what the

3 evidence is and the arguments and the inferences and conclusions to be

4 drawn from the evidence will, of course, be what all the parties will have

5 to discuss in their closing written and oral submissions.

6 Now we're getting into arguments about what the evidence is or

7 isn't, and what the evidence does or does not mean.

8 Now, the document -- if I use the word "prisoner" loosely, I'll

9 try not to do that. Everyone in the courtroom has the document in front

10 of them. Everyone knows that it says repeatedly detainees, 40 detainees

11 et cetera, et cetera.

12 Now, I have to observe, at this point, that we're almost 40

13 minutes into the first session; and, by now, I've had actually about five

14 minutes of time. So we are really approaching a situation where I don't

15 even know if I will finish my direct examination today. If I only get

16 five minutes in 40, we will not be able to do that.

17 So I just simply make that observation to the Chamber. There will

18 be -- there is time for cross-examination to ask these kinds of question;

19 that is, of course, allowing that there is enough time left for

20 cross-examination when the direct examination is concluded.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please, continue.

22 MR. SCOTT:

23 Q. Now, if I can ask you, sir, going back to it, I don't know if you

24 remember. I'm just going to start all over, again, I'm afraid.

25 I put this document in front you, and I asked you: How would a

Page 24097

1 responsible commander react to receiving this information, that a

2 detainee, while being used in work, had been wounded by opposition forces?

3 A. Well, in accordance with the doctrine that we were referring to

4 yesterday, a responsible commander, receiving this report from the central

5 military remand prison, would raise a number of questions. He would note

6 that 40 detainees were given for work; no question of volunteering or

7 being asked there. He would note that they were under military escort,

8 and he would note that one of them had been wounded and been taken to

9 hospital.

10 Therefore, he would probably assume that the work they were being

11 given to do was at least in a place where they were vulnerable to enemy

12 fire, or at least fire from the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And, in

13 all that, he would ask himself, Is this in transgression of the laws of

14 armed conflict? And if I consider that it is, I better do something about

15 it.

16 Q. Thank you, sir.

17 MR. SCOTT: And can we then go on to -- excuse me one moment. If

18 we could then go on to Exhibit 4792, P 04792. My apology. Let me catch

19 up with you.

20 Q. Sir, in this order by Zarko Tole, on the 4th of September, 1993,

21 given to the North-west Herzegovina operative zone - that would be the

22 zone commanded by Mr. Siljeg - he says: "1. Tomorrow, 5 September 1993,

23 stop all movement of UN, UNHCR, and UNPROFOR at the military police

24 check-points in your area of responsibility."

25 Paragraph number 2 goes on to say: "This is to be carried out so

Page 24098

1 as to look as if it was the result of the arbitrary behaviour of the

2 check-point policemen, while we should appear as doing everything to let

3 them get through."

4 Now, can you tell to the Judges, again in terms of command

5 climate, maintaining discipline and order in units, et cetera, what is the

6 effect on subordinate troops when the commander -- when a commander would

7 give that kind of an order?

8 A. Well, it's -- it would be fairly clear to a recipient of this

9 order that, first of all, the issuer of this order is ordering all

10 movements of UN, UNHCR, and UNPROFOR to be prevented, which he would know

11 would be in contravention of the UN agreement. But he would be

12 particularly interested in para 2, where there is obviously an element of

13 deception and deceit coming into it, and he would probably be asking

14 himself, Well, I wonder why we're doing this and what we're help to be

15 preventing the UN from seeing.

16 It's obviously something is going on between the time we've got to

17 stop all movement tomorrow until 1500 when we can let it go again, and

18 he'd be asking himself the question, Well, I wonder what on earth is going

19 on? Is there something nasty and illegal happening? Perhaps he might ask

20 himself.

21 He would, therefore, draw the conclusion that the issuer of the

22 order was potentially conniving in something that he certainly did not

23 want the United Nations to see, and he might, therefore, ask himself, Why

24 not?

25 Q. If we -- in the interest of time, if we could just touch upon --

Page 24099

1 go quickly forward and touch upon paragraph 55.

2 You're moving on to, again, talking about principles -- the

3 application of principles of command and control, but you mention in

4 paragraph 55, and some of the following paragraphs in particular, the

5 support of staff, the staff function.

6 If I can just point out one particular or two sentences at

7 paragraph 55 in the middle, it says: "The staff has no authority by

8 itself. It derives authority from the commander and only exercises it in

9 his name. Thus, all the activities of the staff are undertaken on behalf

10 of the commander."

11 Perhaps you could just comment briefly on that.

12 A. Yes. This is highlighting the authority vested in the commander.

13 It is the commander who has the authority to issue orders to his

14 subordinates; and in order to help in the execution and the organisation

15 of those orders, he has a staff to assist him. The staff issues orders on

16 behalf of the commander, not in its own right.

17 Put another way, the commander has full authority and carries full

18 responsibility and is assisted by his staff in the execution of his

19 commands.

20 Q. Based upon the research you've done and your overall knowledge and

21 experience of these matters, can you say whether that basic principle or

22 practice applied to the HVO Main Staff?

23 A. From what I've read, the HVO Main Staff applied those principles

24 in the traditional manner, with the staff supporting the commander in

25 executing his command.

Page 24100

1 Q. And the commander in this instance being the top military

2 commander, and, again, perhaps we can assume or perhaps the Judges know by

3 now, during 1993, that being primarily either Mr. Petkovic or Mr. Praljak;

4 is that correct?

5 A. I believe that's correct, yes.

6 MR. SCOTT: If we can go forward, please, to Exhibit P 00502.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry if I briefly interrupt, Mr. Scott.

8 In the documentation that we have and what we hear, the generals

9 that are here accused today are holding the title of Chief of the General

10 Staff. Now, the Chief of the General Staff is part of the staff. He is

11 not normally the commander. The Commander-in-Chief of the HVO, we heard

12 many times, was Mate Boban.

13 Are you aware of this, and how can you associate this, link this,

14 to what you have just told us according to which these generals were the

15 commanders?

16 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I'm aware that there are potential

17 confusions and difficulties in the titles: Chief of the Main Staff,

18 Chief of Staff, Supreme Commander. I believe that those titles were used

19 in different ways at different times to describe different functions.

20 The traditional title "Chief of Staff" would be the chief of the

21 commander's staff. That's the traditional title and the traditional way

22 of understanding it. However, in the UK, for example, the Chief of the

23 General Staff is the head of the army, so -- and sometimes commanders are

24 known as Chiefs of Staff.

25 So who was doing what under what title at what time, I think,

Page 24101

1 bears examination from the facts, rather from -- rather than from perhaps

2 the title.

3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you very much.

4 MR. SCOTT: If we could -- I think we were about to turn to

5 Exhibit 502.

6 Q. Do you have that?

7 A. I have it, yes.

8 Q. This is a document that appears to have gone out over the name of

9 Bruno Stojic as head of the HVO defence department. I note, at the

10 beginning, when one compares the English translation to the original

11 document, the date has been -- there's a mistake in the date. It's not

12 the 18th of September, 1993. It's the 18th of September, 1992.

13 It says over the name of Mr. Stojic: "Pursuant to the provisions

14 of Article 1 of the Decree on the Armed Forces of the Croatian Community

15 of Herceg-Bosna, I issue a short-term formation of the General Staff HVO,

16 effective immediately."

17 Now, can you just briefly look through that document, and of

18 course you've seen it before. What kind of a document is this and what is

19 it doing? What is the function of this document?

20 A. This is what would be described as a staff table of the

21 headquarters, which line by line delineates each appointment in the

22 headquarters, starting with the chief and going through every member of

23 that headquarters down to including clerk. So it's a comprehensive staff

24 table of every position in the headquarters.

25 Q. Now, I note as well, just in passing, before we move on past the

Page 24102

1 document, that in the chart, we move across the column from left to

2 right. If you get to column number 11, you say that a rank is linked to -

3 not in every instance but in most instances, in many instances - a rank is

4 then connected to that particular post. Do you see that?

5 A. I do.

6 MR. SCOTT: If I can, in light of this document, ask you to turn

7 to Exhibit P 01683.

8 Q. And if you have that, sir, can you tell us what has and how that

9 document, if at all, that kind of document would relate at all to the one

10 we were just looking at.

11 Let me rephrase my question. Is this a further, then, breakdown

12 of the actual names of staffs, persons on the positions -- in positions

13 related to the HVO Main Staff?

14 A. This appears to be a list of officers on the Main Staff. Whether

15 it's all officers, I can't be certain. But it's certainly some officers

16 on the Main Staff with their appointment or job and their name, which ties

17 back into the document we were just looking at previously.

18 Q. All right. Just to follow up on Judge Trechsel's comment, we can

19 see even here that in item number 1, in reference to Milivoj Petkovic, the

20 term that is being used in a document over the name of Mr. Petkovic

21 himself is "Chief of the Main Staff of the HVO," at least as of March

22 1993. Do you see that?

23 A. I do.

24 Q. In reference to the discussion we were having earlier today about

25 certain Main Staff assets, do you see, for example, in item number 16 on

Page 24103

1 the -- on the Main Staff, you have the chief of artillery.

2 A. That's on the second document. Yes, I do. Chief of artillery,

3 Marko Stojcic.

4 Q. Then you have later on number 19, the chief of the artillery

5 rocket unit. Correct?

6 A. I see that. Yes, Bozic.

7 Q. Thank you very much.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, could you look at 34

9 and 35, please.

10 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, 34 and 35 of what?

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Turn over the document.

12 MR. SCOTT: 1683.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Have you seen this document

14 before or is this the first time you're seeing it today?

15 THE WITNESS: I don't recall seeing this document before.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good. Well, in this list of the

17 members of staff, there are two officers who apparently belong to a

18 different staff [as interpreted].

19 Is it common in armies for this possibility of an outside officer

20 coming in to a Main Staff? Is that surprising to you in any way?

21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Sorry, a correction. There is a correction in

22 the translation. It said coming from, at line 24, a different state, not

23 a different staff. Different state.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Officers from a different

25 state, not a different staff. A different state. Miro Prce, an officer

Page 24104

1 of the HV, the Croatian army; Josip Speranca, an officer of the Croatian

2 army. Is it common in staffs to see temporary addition of officers coming

3 from a different army?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, that's very common, particularly

5 when the headquarters is dealing very closely with the nation represented

6 by, in this case, officers of HV. I would take those to be Croatian army

7 liaison officers, in exactly the same way as, for example, when I was

8 Director of Operations, Chief of Staff at the permanent joint

9 headquarters, we had officers from the American SANCOM [phoen]

10 Headquarters, the Dutch headquarters, the French headquarters.

11 So it speeds up the link back to those countries. The fact that

12 there are two HV officers in the -- attached temporarily to the General

13 Staff - they obviously don't appear on the General Staff's staff table

14 because they're not HVO officers - would be a clear indication to me that

15 that headquarters has direct communications and dealings with the HV.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

17 MR. SCOTT: If we can then move on, please, to Exhibit P 04131.

18 Q. Continuing on in terms of the command structure of the HVO, and

19 now we're looking at a document the 12th of August, 1993, issued over

20 the -- at least the typed name and stamp of Slobodan Praljak.

21 It indicates that: "Pursuant to the provisions of the HZ HB armed

22 forces, defence forces, Official Gazette," et cetera, "I hereby order:

23 "The GS Main Staff of the armed forces, or defence forces of the

24 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna, shall be directly subordinated to the

25 Supreme Commander of the HZ HB armed forces.

Page 24105

1 "The General Staff exerts direct command over the operative zones,

2 south-east, north-east, central," et cetera.

3 Do you see that?

4 A. I do.

5 Q. And just stopping, pausing there, is that not an uncommon form of

6 military organisation where you have again the very top military commander

7 or commanders and then military districts or military zones directly

8 subordinated to the senior command?

9 A. Yes. I find nothing training in that. That is simply laying out

10 the chain of command from the Supreme Commander through the Main Staff

11 down to the operative zones. That's unity of command as professed in the

12 doctrine.

13 Q. All right.

14 And then continuing on, and touching once again on one of the

15 topics of this morning, it also says that the General Staff has: "Direct

16 command over professional units, the Bruno Busic, the Ludvig Pavlovic

17 regiments."

18 Do you have any knowledge or experience on -- based on your

19 military career that, in addition to such things as artillery or rocket

20 forces or air force, there may be certain specialised units or

21 profession -- the terminology of "professional units" that may be directly

22 commanded by central high command?

23 A. Yes. Whilst I have no knowledge of what the Bruno Busic and the

24 Ludvig Pavlovic Regiments are, I can readily equate this to, for example,

25 special forces being held centrally under command of the highest

Page 24106

1 headquarters, for example.

2 Q. All right.

3 Now, in the interest of time we'll just go through this very

4 quickly. I just mention in passing, because the Chamber will have heard

5 evidence in recent weeks, for example, about the logistics, the main

6 logistics centre in Grude, which is referenced in paragraphs 3 through --

7 well, paragraph 3 in particular.

8 Then if I can direct your attention to item 6, General Praljak's

9 order says: "I strictly prohibit any violation of the command system as

10 regulated by this order in the Herceg-Bosna armed forces. I hereby

11 designate the commanders directly subordinated to me and the individual

12 organs of the HVO Main Staff responsible for the consistent execution of

13 this order."

14 Any comment on that?

15 A. That is simply stressing that there is one chain of command, and

16 that is the chain of command designated in this order. In other words,

17 Supreme Commander, Main Staff, operative zones, and that's the chain of

18 command that should function at all times.

19 Q. Let me -- yes?

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, I listened to you, and

21 it's a bit difficult for me. You talk about the chain of command at line

22 18 of page 25. You talk about the Supreme Command, the Main Staff, and

23 the commander of the operational zones.

24 As far as I understood earlier on, the Main Staff does not have

25 responsibilities when there is a Supreme Command that is in operation.

Page 24107

1 Can you perhaps elucidate that?

2 In this chain of command, what does the Main Staff do? Is it

3 below or alongside the Supreme Commander?

4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the Main Staff supports the top

5 military commander, and the top military commander is subordinate in turn

6 to the Supreme Commander.

7 Now, I understand that there is also some difficulty in the

8 nomenclature here that Supreme Commander, in accordance with other

9 documents, could well be the president himself. So the president -- the

10 chain of command goes from the president through the top military

11 commander supported by his Main Staff down to the operative zones.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So if I've understood you

13 properly, Mate Boban is the Supreme Commander; and below him, there is the

14 person who issued this order, Major General Slobodan Praljak; and below

15 that, there are the commanders of the operational zones. Is that the

16 chain of command?

17 THE WITNESS: That's the chain of command as I understand it from

18 this document, yes.

19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That would mean, to get it exactly precisely,

20 where it says "General Staff," one must understand Mr. Praljak.

21 THE WITNESS: I think one understands -- I'm not sure what his

22 exact title is. But chief of the Main Staff is not the Chief of Staff of

23 the headquarters, but chief of the Main Staff is, let's call him, the top

24 military commander, General Praljak. In his staff, he would have a chief

25 of staff with some slightly different title.

Page 24108

1 It is a bit confusing, but that's how I understand it.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, and excuse me,

3 Mr. Scott.

4 MR. SCOTT: Not at all, Your Honour. If I can just briefly

5 comment. I do understand the Chamber's questions. But I have to say, at

6 this point, some of the confusion is a result of the historical language.

7 It wasn't, of course, the Prosecution that chose the titles that were used

8 and the terminology that was used.

9 Of course, the Chamber will have a large, as it already does, a

10 large amount of documentation in fronts of it to -- to ultimately make

11 those determinations. But to the extent that that language is not

12 documents, we can't change that.

13 There was a terminology change in mid-1993 in which they -- what

14 had been the chief of the Main Staff was then termed to be the commander

15 of the HVO armed forces.

16 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, it has not been --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, counsel, please. Microphone.

18 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, it hasn't been alleged today at all that

19 any of this confusion regarding nomenclature is the fault of the

20 Prosecution. There is no need for a defensive position here. No

21 allegation has been made against my learned friend.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic wanted to say

23 something.

24 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, good morning

25 to you. I have an objection to make with respect to the way in which the

Page 24109

1 Prosecution has prepared the witness; that is to say, they have not

2 prepared him with the documents at his disposal.

3 Now, Supreme Commander, commander. Somebody is just dancing and

4 here, and it's up to the Prosecution. The Prosecution has had access to

5 all the documents, to look at the transformations that the HVO went

6 through. So the witness should have been presented with documents to show

7 all this, not to have to discuss whether it was Tole, Petkovic, Praljak

8 who was Chief of Staff or who was Chief of Staff.

9 So it's not the witness's fault for not having been provided the

10 documents on time and showing the different structural changes and

11 organisational changes along the way.

12 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, to briefly respond, my point -- the point

13 of the comment that I made a moment ago, and I appreciate counsel's

14 comment. I wasn't trying to be personally defensive. I was just trying

15 to further assist the Chamber in the state of affairs on this one. Also,

16 if I was defending anyone, I was defending perhaps the witness because

17 it's not the witness's choice of language that we're dealing with. It's

18 the choice of language in the documents.

19 As Mr. Petkovic well knows, from having been involved in this

20 system, those are the words that are found in the documents, I can assure

21 you that if you go through documents, you will see Supreme Commander used

22 in name of different ways. We have had these conversations since April

23 1996 with a number of witnesses.

24 So, the Chamber, of course, assisted by all the evidence and

25 assisted by this witness as much as possible, will ultimately, of course,

Page 24110

1 have to make those determinations, with hopefully the assistance of the

2 parties.

3 Q. Now, if I could ask you to turn in your binder to 1D 01246, at the

4 end of the second binder, please.

5 A. Sorry, I'm not there. Say the number again.

6 Q. Yes, of course. 1 D -- it's a bit different nomenclature, but 1D

7 01246. It may be the last document in your --

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is indeed the last document.

9 MR. SCOTT:

10 Q. Just continuing on, sir, we've proceeded in this particular

11 respect largely chronologically, by showing you a number of command

12 documents from earlier in 1993 to the middle of August 1993 of different

13 commanders, both during the time when Mr. Petkovic was the top commander,

14 the time when Mr. Praljak was the top commander, and now by the middle of

15 November, 1993, the top commander has become Ante Roso.

16 Tying back some of these things to issue of command climate and

17 control of troops and discipline, I would ask you to look at the third

18 paragraph of the document in particular.

19 And I should say at the top, it says "To all units," "To all units

20 and members of the Croatian Defence Council."

21 "Subject: Warning," third paragraph, "Because of the historical

22 responsibility before our own nation, we are determined to immediately

23 punish any act of murder of civilians, elderly people, women, children,

24 arson and looting, rape, and other acts of violence against people and

25 their property within execution by firing squad."

Page 24111

1 Now, can you comment on not only that document -- that paragraph,

2 but to the extent that you've been able to scan the document in toto, can

3 you comment on that order as an instance of exercising command and

4 establishing command climate?

5 A. Well, any recipient of this document would realise that they now

6 have a commander in command who takes a very strong view on the sort of

7 barbarities described in chapter 3, and goes on to say that - I assume

8 it's shorthand and rhetoric and it's within the military manuals of law

9 and et cetera, et cetera - but if convicted, anybody found guilty of those

10 offences will be executed by firing squad. I assume that that was allowed

11 for.

12 It goes on to say: "The crimes and genocide perpetrated by the

13 Muslim terrorists against Croats do not give us the right to respond in

14 kind. The future Croat generations must not be ashamed of their fathers'

15 inhumane conducts."

16 Here is a commander who is getting a very tight grip of barbaric

17 behaviour and making certain that everybody knows what his view is. He's

18 addressed this order it all units.

19 And, lastly, going back to discussions we had yesterday, giving

20 the order is easy part. Making it happen is more difficult. One would

21 expect - I have no knowledge of it - but one would expect this commander,

22 Ante Roso, to have followed that up vigorously, if there were instances of

23 the sort of thing that he is drawing everybody's attention to, that he

24 will simply not tolerate.

25 Q. The very last sentence, just before we move on, says: "This

Page 24112

1 warning must be read in front of the formations."

2 Can you comment on that?

3 A. Yes. I mean, that's a nice example of the first instance of

4 making it happen. So if every soldier is going to have had this read to

5 him by his immediate commander, in the first instance, General Roso could

6 at least be satisfied that his message has got down to the very lowest

7 level, and that everybody knows what his position is.

8 After that, it's up to General Roso to make sure his position is

9 carried through in the event that any instances of the sort mentioned here

10 actually happen.

11 Q. All right.

12 Let me move on to a series of paragraphs in general, starting with

13 paragraph 58. I'm not going to have time to discuss much of that, but I

14 do want to ask you about one topic on this, because the Chamber has heard

15 other evidence touching on some of these things.

16 From the perspective of a military commander, what information,

17 such as media reports, reports on the television, reports on radio,

18 reports in newspapers, open sources, what sort of role does that

19 information play in the information being received by a commander and how

20 does a commander deal with that?

21 A. A commander will receive information from what is described as all

22 sources. He will receive reports and information coming up the

23 traditional military chain of command. He will receive information from

24 his own staff officers visiting forward to units and reporting back. He

25 will receive knowledge from his own visits.

Page 24113

1 In addition to that, in today's world, all commanders will be very

2 conscious of the media, the pervasive nature of the media. It is not

3 uncommon, for example, if you go into military headquarters, to find CNN

4 and BBC World playing on the wall. That is very much part of life today,

5 and it is part of the -- it forms part of the sources of information that

6 a commander and his staff would be receiving.

7 Q. Taking one further example of that, assuming, assuming for the

8 moment, that this same information had not have been received by the

9 commander up his own chain of command, for whatever reason, but assuming

10 that an atrocity or some issue -- some event in Bosnia was reported in a

11 Zagreb newspaper and that information came to the information of the

12 commander, what would be the responsibility of the commander on hearing

13 that information?

14 A. At the very least, the commander would start asking questions

15 and -- and institute an investigation into the veracity of that report. I

16 say "would." Should.

17 Q. If I can then move on to paragraph 62. In that paragraph, I

18 think, for the first time in your report, General, you introduce a concept

19 that you call "two up and two down." Could you please explain that

20 briefly to us?

21 A. Yes. Starting with the notion of "two down," commanders think two

22 down in order that when they -- when they issue tasks and allocate

23 resources, they're doing so with a fundamental understanding of what is

24 required, and I think I gave an example. Yes.

25 So if a brigade commander, for example, is -- has a number of

Page 24114

1 battalions, one of which has taken serious casualties and it only has two

2 of its four companies operational, then he by thinking two levels down

3 from brigade, battalion, company, then he would realise that that

4 battalion is only half as capable perhaps as the other battalions, and,

5 therefore, he would give them different and lesser tasks than the other

6 battalions.

7 Thinking "two up" is all about commanders understanding where they

8 are in the wider course of events. What is their higher commander's

9 intent, what is it he's trying to achieve, and what role in it he has to

10 play.

11 Q. All right. General, I think we'll have to move on, then, to

12 paragraph 66; and starting in that part of your report, you're discussing

13 more specifically military discipline.

14 You say at the beginning of paragraph 66, you say: "Military

15 discipline is codified to ensure that soldiers operate in active

16 operations in a disciplined and effective manner."

17 And if I could -- and you reference in that paragraph, among

18 others, Exhibit P 00301, so if we could please go to Exhibit 301.

19 MR. SCOTT: And I believe Mr. President, if I'm not mistaken, this

20 is the document that you raised earlier today, and I believe -- I have

21 some indications that there is in fact a better version of the document

22 available, which I would certainly provide to the parties and the Chamber,

23 Your Honour.

24 I believe it's actually marked as Exhibit P 00425. It's a better

25 copy of the same document. It's not in the binders because I'm just

Page 24115

1 responding to the Chamber's -- to the President's inquiry or point, and we

2 can take further steps on that. We will have to work with 301 at least

3 for now.

4 Q. In -- in conducting your work, sir, did you have a chance to --

5 well, you've cited in your report, so I suppose the answer is obvious, but

6 you had an opportunity to review and consider the content of Exhibit 301?

7 A. Yes, I did.

8 Q. And what kind of a comment -- what comment can you make in terms

9 of the quality of this document at least as a document? Is it the sort of

10 a codification of military discipline that you would expect?

11 A. Yes. This is a comprehensive document. I think it has 112

12 articles in it, covering a wide range of subjects, which, taken together,

13 would create the disciplinary parameters within which the HZ HB military

14 forces would be required by law to operate.

15 Q. All right.

16 MR. SCOTT Could I ask then to also then turn to Exhibit P 00282.

17 It should be reasonably close by, a few exhibits earlier.

18 Q. If you have that document, this says: "Excerpt from the rules on

19 military discipline." How does that document compare -- or what role does

20 that document play in setting out further a disciplinary system, if you

21 will?

22 A. Yes. I read this to be a sort of abbreviated aide-memoire,

23 concentrating attention on the essentials, and it rather harks back to

24 what we were talking about yesterday, in terms of the HVO was being set up

25 and conducting a war all at the same time.

Page 24116

1 The previous article was 112 -- the previous document was 112

2 articles long, extremely complicated and detailed. But an officer

3 receiving this rather succinct four-page document could quickly read this

4 and grasp the essentials of -- of discipline and the disciplinary code he

5 was required to basis actions on. So it's a helpful aide-memoire, resume

6 of the previous document.

7 Q. And just as an example, on at least on page 2 of the English

8 version, one of the things set out is which disciplinary measures may can

9 be taken, ranging from warning, to caution, to confinement to barracks, to

10 military detention. Do you see that?

11 A. I do.

12 Q. All right. Perhaps, we can just finish on this before the break.

13 You then, having those documents in mind, in paragraph 67, at

14 about the middle of the paragraph, you give the example. Well, actually

15 earlier in the paragraph as well, you talk about a sentry who falls asleep

16 on watch.

17 You say, in the middle of that paragraph, and you go on to

18 say: "But a soldier who falls asleep on watch on training is likely to be

19 severely punished simply because he must realise the seriousness of his

20 actions if he conducts himself like that on active operations."

21 Can you comment further?

22 A. Yes. When the -- when the military undergo training, they train

23 as for war and they make it as realistic as possible. Sleeping on sentry,

24 as an example, is a very, very serious offence either on exercise or on

25 operations: On operations, for obvious reasons; but on exercise to

Page 24117

1 impress on all the seriousness of the offence.

2 Whether it -- whether it be in peace or war, it is -- one is

3 operating under the same legal code; although, that said, in wartime there

4 may be some extra provisions added on top of -- of the code. But,

5 basically, military discipline is the same in peace as it is in war.

6 Q. Well, let me ask you. Perhaps you can assist us a bit further.

7 When you say in your report "severely punished," let's take both

8 situations, and we'll draw on the British Army.

9 If that happened in the British Army, a soldier who was on sentry

10 duty during a training exercise, a training exercise, fell asleep, was

11 found to have fallen asleep at his post, what would be the disciplinary

12 action that would be taken?

13 A. I have known soldiers who have fallen asleep on sentry be charged,

14 and, when found guilty, committed to gaol for 28 days, which is the

15 maximum a commander officer at that time could give. And, interestingly,

16 in the document we just noted, I see that the HVO had a 30-day detention.

17 That was not uncommon.

18 Q. And if I change that scenario to that same conduct occurred in

19 actual wartime conditions, would that change or what would the punishment

20 likely be in that situation?

21 A. The punishment would be -- well, that would be up to the court to

22 decide, but what is usual is that a commanding officer has a limitation on

23 the level of punishment that he can issue to convicted -- guilty soldiers.

24 If he was not satisfied that that punishment met the crime, then

25 he could refer the -- the accused to a higher court or a court-martial,

Page 24118

1 where heavier sentences were -- were available.

2 So it would be up to the commander to -- to decide how to deal

3 with that.

4 MR. SCOTT: If the Chamber will allow me just to hopefully finish

5 on this point before the break.

6 Q. Is it -- you just said something just now. I want to be accurate.

7 The punishment, well, it's translated here, in line 13, that the

8 punishment met the crime, or it might have been fit the crime, but that's

9 my question. In military justice or military discipline is there

10 generally a concept that the punishment should fit the crime?

11 A. Certainly.

12 Q. And if a soldier falling asleep on duty would warrant being thrown

13 in the brig for 28 days, what kind of punishment could be expected in

14 connection with the severe mistreatment of civilians?

15 A. Well, in the first instance, the severe mistreatment of civilians

16 is -- would be contrary to the laws of armed conflict, and it is probably,

17 therefore, most certainly well beyond anything that the local commander

18 could deal with.

19 So, in the first instance, that soldier would be arraigned before

20 his commanding officer, and the commanding officer would then refer it to

21 a -- a higher court, if I can put it like that, a court-martial, where

22 sentences are Draconianly heavier if found guilty or the availability of

23 much heavier sentences is there.

24 Q. And while that he process is playing out, would that particular

25 soldier accused of such a severe offence, would he continue to be used in

Page 24119

1 ongoing military operations, for example, where further contact with

2 civilians could be expected?

3 A. Again, that would -- that's up to the commander's discretion,

4 really.

5 If this is a soldier who is habitually known to mistreat

6 civilians, then he would probably be remanded in custody, perhaps, or at

7 least removed from the scene where he would have the opportunity to do

8 that.

9 If, on the other hand, you know, everyone is innocent until proven

10 guilty, there is -- there is an element of discretion and decision that a

11 commander must apply there, according to the circumstances.

12 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the question was put

13 in a certain way and a certain answer was given that corresponded to the

14 question. It's clear to me that the expert witness is talking about the

15 situation, I assume, in the British Army.

16 But when you have a look at the entire text, three months later,

17 when someone goes through this, it won't be clear. So, perhaps, my

18 colleague could be more specific and state that it's just an example of

19 how things might work in the British Army, because it's quite obvious that

20 he's not speaking about the HVO.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely.

22 Witness, for the sake of argument, let's assume that, in the

23 British Army, we have a soldier who is guarding a prison and who mistreats

24 prisoners. What would happen in such a case in your army?

25 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, regrettably, we have had some of those

Page 24120

1 instances recently in Iraq, and the accused were brought before their

2 commanding officer and were subsequently committed for trial by

3 court-martial. Not all, I'm happy to say; in fact, very few were found

4 guilty, but the due process of law was seen through.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Time has come to take the

6 break. We are going to have a 20-minute break.

7 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

8 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. I

10 understand that Mr. Karnavas wanted to take the floor for three minutes in

11 private session, so we'll stop him at -- we'll stop just before the end of

12 this session, and then you'll have the floor once the witness has left the

13 courtroom.

14 Mr. Scott, you may proceed.

15 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. I do apologise to the

16 courtroom. I'm afraid I wasn't watching the clock closely enough. My

17 apology.

18 Q. Sir, just to pick up on where we left before the break, I don't

19 want to leave the wrong impression, and, of course, you find yourself

20 sitting in a room full of lawyers and Judges, all of whom are very much,

21 of course, in favour of due process.

22 But, again, I want to make it quite clear, if a commander, faced

23 with a scenario. Let me give you a scenario. The commander has just

24 received a command from one of his subordinate commanders, a junior

25 officer, that information is coming back that civilians in a village are

Page 24121

1 being executed, by any side. I don't care if it's the HVO, the ABiH, the

2 American army, the British Army. And this information comes to the

3 commander's attention.

4 Now, you've talked about invoking the military justice system:

5 Calling the military prosecutor, calling the military police. But what

6 does the commander do on the spot? What does the commander do? Well,

7 I've called the military prosecutor. He'll get here in three months. In

8 the meantime, just go on about your business? I mean, what does the

9 commander do in that situation?

10 A. Well, there are commanders at all levels. The commander at the

11 level where this atrocity is being carried out, assuming he's not part of

12 the atrocity himself, would have the perpetrators arrested and would pass

13 them back up the chain of command, where the senior and appropriate

14 commander would decide what they were going to do with him.

15 If it was a clear case of, let's say for the example, you know,

16 burning houses and raping women or something, then one would expect the

17 perpetrators to be brought before the justice system very quickly,

18 remanded in gaol, so that they couldn't do that again, and would -- and

19 due process would then -- would then click in.

20 They would then be brought before the senior commander who is

21 permitted to deal with them. He -- he would hear the evidence. He would

22 decide whether he could deal with them or whether it should be passed to a

23 higher level, a higher court, and et cetera.

24 Q. All right.

25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour. I

Page 24122

1 apologise to Mr. Scott, too, but could we clarify something? With regard

2 to the hypothetical situation, does it concern the killing of civilians in

3 a village that is being defended or a village that is not being defended?

4 And in such a hypothetical situation, are we dealing with the killings of

5 civilians linked to some sort of military events or not?

6 Thank you very much.

7 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, could I ask that be left, please, for

8 cross-examination so that I can continue?

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, please proceed.

10 MR. SCOTT:

11 Q. Going on to paragraph 68, continuing to talk about discipline, in

12 the second sentence, you say: "If a commander is seen not to impose

13 discipline when disciplinary action is called for, then he will be

14 regarded as weak, or conniving, or both."

15 And can you comment on that further, and in particular, can you

16 comment on when you say "or conniving," what do you mean by that?

17 A. Well, in an army that is signed up to the international laws of

18 armed conflict - as mine has and as the HVO had, it would appear -

19 everybody would know that they were expected to conduct themselves in

20 accordance with the Geneva Conventions and laws of armed conflict; and, in

21 particular, they would know or they should know that certain very obvious

22 crimes are not tolerated and are against the law, such as barbarity to

23 civilians, shooting prisoners, the sort of thing that we've been talking

24 about.

25 Now, if those actions are being perpetrated and the chain of

Page 24123

1 command is taking no action, then that sends a very clear message to both

2 the perpetrators and the observers, that this sort of behaviour is

3 acceptable. I've used the words, "the commander will be regarded either

4 as weak," in other words, he's not confident or strong enough to take

5 action for whatever reason; "or conniving," by which I mean that he does

6 not disapprove of the actions, in fact may even approve of the action.

7 But, in any way, he is complicit in it because knowing that these

8 actions are taking place, he is not taking -- he is not taking action as

9 he is required to do, in accordance with his own doctrine, to bring the

10 perpetrators to - what's the word am I looking for? - to account.

11 Q. All right. Thank you for that.

12 MR. SCOTT: With these -- some of these questions in mind, if we

13 could then turn next to P 00856.

14 Q. This appears to be an order issued again by, or at least over the

15 name of Mr. Petkovic, on the 4th of December, 1992.

16 Can you just -- this appears to be an order to establish, I'll say

17 generally, public order or to control the discipline of troops. Can you

18 just look at that and comment on that as an order, in terms of trying --

19 regaining control over unsoldierly -- in the first paragraph, it

20 says "unsoldierly behaviour, demolishing facilities," et cetera, and

21 comment on this as an attempt to gain control over that situation?

22 A. Yes. This is an order that is presumably based on a concern that

23 off-duty soldiers are remaining armed, many of them becoming under the

24 influence of alcohol and getting quite out of control as a result.

25 And in the light of that, the commander, Petkovic, has issued an

Page 24124

1 order to subordinate units, detailing how he hopes this can be avoided in

2 future, laying down procedures for handing in weapons before off-duty

3 soldiers go off to the cafes, and et cetera.

4 Q. All right.

5 A. Having said that, I'll return once again to: Giving the order is

6 the easy part. Making it happen is more difficult.

7 This would have to be followed through, and, indeed, there is an

8 attempt to put into position a reporting system, which is part of

9 following through. But I would -- I would expect this commander to

10 eyeball his subordinate commanders and poke them in the chest and impress

11 on them, you know, that he thought it was important and they ought to get

12 a grip of it.

13 Q. All right. That last comment, to some extent, perhaps not

14 physically poking them in the chest, maybe he did; but in number 1, at

15 least somewhat figuratively, is it fair to say he is first off starting by

16 saying, all commanders and assistants are obligated to essentially get

17 control of the situation?

18 A. Yes. What he's saying here is as commanders, each and every

19 commander in the chain of command, that is, down to the lowest level,

20 section commander, should be explaining to their men the consequences of

21 this sort of actions.

22 Q. And then, in reference to such things as the code of military

23 discipline that we were referring to before the break is item number

24 4: "Commanders are obligated to finally start taking measures regulated

25 by the disciplinary code."

Page 24125

1 So at the level of disciplinary measures available to the more

2 local commanders, I mean, can you give us some ideas of the kind of

3 disciplinary measures that would be available to the local commander to

4 address this situation?

5 A. Well, when reviewing one of the earlier documents, you pointed to

6 a number of tabulated measures which range from fairly mild, confining to

7 barracks, then there would be issues like additional work, you know,

8 metaphorically peeling the potatoes, rather than going out to play, down

9 to the measures of severity to -- to detention.

10 Q. And just -- you've said a moment ago, you looked ahead - I'll

11 refer you specifically to paragraph number 8 - and you said one of things

12 you would expect an officer to do is then implement a system to monitor,

13 if you will, the implementation of his order, so that the information, the

14 reports are coming back up the chain of command; is that correct?

15 A. Yes. And those will be being received by the staff and the

16 headquarters periodically and as necessary and appropriate brought to the

17 attention of the commander.

18 MR. SCOTT: Could we then next go to Exhibit P 02 --

19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If I --

20 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: There's one point that strikes me here. It's in

22 number 6, where the order is to prevent in a most vigorous manner the use

23 of alcohol over Christmas and New Year.

24 Now, is this a realistic general order? Would other armies have a

25 ban on alcohol during holidays?

Page 24126

1 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I'm not sure that that's what it

2 necessarily means. I mean, the -- I read the substance of this order to

3 be about off-duty soldiers carrying weapons, combined with the use --

4 excessive use of alcohol.

5 I'm not sure whether this means Christmas and the New Year has

6 been cancelled this year.

7 MR. SCOTT: If we could then go on to Exhibit P 02036.

8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

9 MR. SCOTT: My apology.

10 THE WITNESS: Could you say the number again?

11 MR. SCOTT:

12 Q. Yes, of course. P 02036. In other words, 2036.

13 This is, again, an order over the name of Milivoj Petkovic, dated

14 the 22nd of April, 1993.

15 Perhaps, again, you can scan through the six paragraphs of the

16 order and comment on, again, this as an effort to gain control over troops

17 in a particular situation.

18 MR. SCOTT: Perhaps if I can be a bit more specific, it may assist

19 everyone.

20 Q. Let me ask you to look particularly at paragraph number 2, in

21 light of some of the conversation we've had so far this morning.

22 Again, Mr. Petkovic in this situation, at the end of paragraph,

23 says: "Render commanders at all levels responsible for the conduct and

24 actions of their soldiers." What -- what is the commander in the position

25 of Mr. Petkovic doing to say render -- make sure the commanders at all

Page 24127

1 levels know that they are responsible for dealing with this?

2 A. Yes. Brigadier Petkovic is obviously facing here a rather

3 difficult situation in that that appears to be a pretty widespread and

4 general breakdown in discipline, and he cites failing to carry out orders,

5 taking their own decisions on the basis of their own judgement, planning

6 conducted their own operations, terrorising civilians, obstructing

7 UNPROFOR, and so forth.

8 This sounds like a force that is almost out of control. In order

9 to try and get it back into control, he's trying to energise the chain of

10 command by reminding commanders at all levels of their responsibilities.

11 I mean, this is a general breakdown in discipline at every level, where

12 commanders at all levels appear to be pretty ineffective.

13 This is obviously worrying to Brigadier Petkovic, who is now

14 trying to get it back into control, and has issued this written order.

15 But this is perfect example where the presence of the commander is now

16 required in a very energetic fashion, as I've said metaphorically, poking

17 the chest of his subordinate commanders, to make sure they get a grip, if

18 that's possible.

19 Q. And, again, in light of some of the discussion this morning about

20 what actions would be -- what immediate or short-term actions would be

21 available to the commander, other than ultimately some military

22 prosecution?

23 I direct your attention to paragraph number 3, and Mr. Petkovic

24 says: "Immediately set about arresting individuals or groups who have

25 gone totally out of control."

Page 24128

1 So he is there, in fact, sanctioning again, at least by this

2 order, the immediate arrest of such persons; is that correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 In fact, he goes further in the next paragraph: "Use all

5 available means, including the means of force, to stop," and here he's

6 citing really serious incidents, "torching and destroying civilian

7 buildings, and whose actions are sheer terrorism."

8 So, yeah, he wants these people brought to account, and he wants

9 them brought to account rapidly.

10 Q. All right.

11 Let me --

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, I'm reading the

13 introduction to the order, where we have the explanation of why he issued

14 this order. Obviously, there was an inspection of the HVO units, and this

15 order is also based on a number of reports that must have been sent by the

16 brigades. That's the reason why he has issued this order.

17 According to you, in such a situation, should he have then made

18 sure that his order had been obeyed; or, as he says at paragraph 6, was it

19 enough to say that he held all levels of command responsible for

20 implementing these tasks?

21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, paragraph 6 is where it starts. It

22 certainly is not where it ends. Yes. He is right in saying, "I hold

23 levels of command responsible for implementing these tasks," and now he

24 will be taking much interest in seeing how they effectively carry that

25 out. And in the event that they're not carrying it out, then taking the

Page 24129

1 necessary actions in terms of removing commanders and replacing them with

2 more effective commanders or whatever is required.

3 So it's not sufficient just to leave it at paragraph 6, and then

4 sit back and relax. If -- if the state of affairs is as serious as this

5 order would suggest, a high-level commander would be extremely energetic

6 in ensuring that it was carried out.

7 MR. SCOTT: If we could then go to Exhibit P 00679.

8 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott --

9 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

10 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] -- I'm sorry for interrupting.

11 My question relates to Exhibit 2036 in the order issued by

12 Brigadier Petkovic. At paragraph 5, we see that he requests energetic

13 measures against any individual obstructing UNPROFOR's activities, as well

14 as the UNHCR and other international institutions or organisations.

15 This draws my attention because I draw a parallel with another

16 document we examined this morning, P 04792, where another one of the Chief

17 of Staff, Zarko Tole, stated at paragraph -- the first paragraph that all

18 movements of the UNHCR and UNPROFOR should be stopped. And at paragraph

19 2, he says that this should not be seen as a measure coming from the upper

20 echelons.

21 My question to you, based on your experience, is that to me these

22 seem contradictory orders coming, first, from officers working at very

23 high levels in the Main Staff. So we have contradictory messages sent.

24 Does this affect the behaviour of troops on the terrain or the

25 behaviour of lower-level commanders? Could this have an impact on the

Page 24130

1 conduct of operations? What do you think?

2 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, you put your finger on exactly what I

3 was alluding to, when we dealt with the previous document where orders

4 were given to prevent UNPROFOR's freedom of movement, when the recipients

5 of those orders would know that that was contrary to the agreements with

6 the United Nations. I hesitate to use the word"illegal," but it was -- it

7 was an order that they would know was contrary to the agreements.

8 You then compare that with the order we've just seen, which is

9 quite correct, which says that UNPROFOR, et cetera, should be given total

10 freedom of movement.

11 Now, what that means is when you have an officer who is issuing

12 orders that are plainly contrary to either the law or agreements, you are

13 beginning to create a command climate of total confusion, and the soldiers

14 don't know what's right and what's wrong, or what's being enforced and

15 what isn't.

16 That was exactly the point being made on the previous document,

17 where they were had being specifically ordered to prevent UNPROFOR's

18 freedom of movement, and then exacerbated by some sort of deceit and

19 deception cover story as to why they're going to do that until 1500 hours

20 and then let them move on.

21 You put are finger on exactly the point.

22 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

23 MR. SCOTT:

24 Q. General, if I could then ask you to look at P 00679, which, again,

25 is an order over the name of Mr. Petkovic, dated the 31st of October,

Page 24131

1 1992.

2 Item number 1 says: "We have reports that (Muslim) houses in the

3 municipality of Prozor are being torched and destroyed."

4 And in point number 3, he goes on to say: "These incidents will

5 cause great problems for us because they are writing about this in the

6 foreign media."

7 Now, one of the questions I asked you this morning was the impact

8 of public media, if you want to call it, whatever one: The open source,

9 the newspapers, CNN, what have you. Does this document appear to be that

10 Mr. Petkovic is, in fact, aware of and alert to the problems caused by

11 such reporting?

12 A. I'm sorry, I think I missed the question.

13 Q. My apology.

14 Can you just comment in terms of the discussion that we had

15 earlier this morning on the role or effect that reports in public media

16 can have upon the conduct of a commander?

17 A. Well, plainly, the media has focused the attention of Brigadier

18 Petkovic in this event, but the thing I really find striking about this

19 order is notwithstanding the fact that Muslim houses in the municipality

20 of Prozor are being torched and destroyed, notably absent is any form of

21 statement like "in direct contravention to the international laws of armed

22 conflicts and I will not tolerate this," or words to that effect.

23 It is wrapped up in, These incidents are going to cause us great

24 problems because they're appearing in the foreign media. Now, that sends

25 a pretty subtle message, in my view; not that I am particularly -- not

Page 24132

1 that the author, Brigadier Petkovic, is concerned necessarily that Muslim

2 houses are being burnt and torched. What he's concerned about is it's

3 causing him embarrassment and problems, because it's coming to the

4 attention of the media.

5 So this -- this order might have been written in a very much

6 different and much more effective way if it was serious about trying to

7 prevent Muslim houses, in general, being torched. A recipient of this

8 order could easily take the view that, Ah, well, the commander obviously

9 wants us -- if we're going to do this, we've got to make sure the media

10 aren't there and we've got to cover it up. This would be the assumption

11 that could easily be made from such a document.

12 Q. If we can then go, jump to paragraph 55 of your report. Excuse me

13 for a moment. I may have made -- sorry, paragraph 72. My apology. Wrong

14 number.

15 It starts about halfway through paragraph 72. You find this part

16 of your report that says: "Responsibility for the action of subordinates

17 follows: An officer is personally liable for violations of the laws of

18 war, 'if he knew or could have known that units subordinate to him or

19 other units or individuals were planning the commission of such

20 violations, and, at a time when it was still possible to prevent their

21 commission, failed to fake measures to prevent such violations.'"

22 And then going on to say: "Personal accountability is also

23 emphasised if an officer, aware that violations of the laws of war have

24 been committed, fails to institute disciplinary or criminal proceedings

25 again the offender, or fails to report the violations to his superior

Page 24133

1 officer."

2 Now, some of those who practice in this institution might find

3 that language to be closely parallel to one of our statutes, but you're

4 here quoting a JNA document, Federal Secretariat for National Defence

5 Regulations from 1988, Exhibit 7, that we were looking at yesterday; is

6 that correct?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And as a statement of general principle, and if you compare that

9 to what you might find in the British Army, for example, would you

10 consider that to be pretty common language of that sort about the

11 responsibility of a commander?

12 A. That is completely in accord with -- with the instructions,

13 teaching, doctrine of any army that is duty-bound to abide by the

14 international laws of war. The way it's phrased is extremely good, I

15 believe.

16 Q. Excuse me. If I can next direct your attention then --

17 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry for the pause, Your Honour, but I'm trying,

18 because of the time, I'm trying now to read through both the report and my

19 outline to see what we could possibly -- either it's already been covered

20 or, unfortunately, can be skipped at this stage.

21 So I apologise for the pauses.

22 Q. I think, General, I could perhaps next ask you to look at Exhibit

23 P 03019.

24 This, again, appears to be a document issued over the name of

25 Milivoj Petkovic, dated the 30th of June, 1993, which the Judges may

Page 24134

1 remember that particular date and what happens around that time.

2 Just to set the scene, General, if I can direct your attention to

3 paragraph number 8, which in the English version, at least, is at the top

4 of page 2.

5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Objection, Your Honour. This

6 document has already been admitted into evidence, and I myself used it a

7 number of times. I don't mind at all analysing the document in a million

8 different ways.

9 However, I'm raising an objection because this time the witness -

10 and in the introduction, it says he doesn't know what the situation was

11 like on the battlefield and what was happening on the territory in 1993 on

12 the territory of Herceg-Bosna, and that is why he cannot testify about the

13 facts - is now being shown a document which cannot be understood unless

14 one is well acquainted with the facts on the ground and the circumstances

15 on the ground in connection which this order was issued.

16 Therefore, if this witness does not know what was going on on the

17 30th of June, 1993, and if he does not know the conduct of the BH army

18 towards the Muslims in the HVO in the first six months of 1993, then this

19 witness cannot interpret this document in a proper manner, and that is why

20 I object to having the witness comment on these documents without

21 previously establishing whether the witness does, indeed, have the facts

22 at his fingertips, with respect to the situation on the ground in 1993.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Judges will decide whether

24 the witness may answer the question or not.

25 Mr. Scott, please put your question to the witness. The witness

Page 24135

1 will answer your question. The Defence will cross-examine if they see

2 fit, and the Judges will draw their own conclusions.

3 Please proceed.

4 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. In reference to paragraph number 8, it says: "All Muslim

6 soldiers, who are still active in some units, should be disarmed and

7 isolated.

8 "In the places, within the area of responsibility where there is a

9 Muslim population, all military-capable Muslim men should be isolated.

10 Women and children should be left in their houses-apartments."

11 Now, my question to you is not to address whether you know the

12 specific facts that happened at that time; but as a military commander,

13 apart from other things, if this issue was ordered, and assuming that

14 there are thousands of Muslim men in this area, what logistic steps, what

15 logistics issues does this raise when the general of the army, the supreme

16 commander raises --

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott --

18 MR. SCOTT: Yes.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, in order for the

20 witness to be able to answer, he has to be told that the Muslim soldiers

21 are members of HVO units; otherwise, the witness might think that it's the

22 ABiH members that have to be disarmed. He has to be told about the

23 situation.

24 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. I will amended my scenario.

25 I was simply reading the document, but I will amended the document by

Page 24136

1 adding the language.

2 Q. General, you can -- I don't there will be any dispute in the

3 courtroom, I hope, at this stage that, when it says "all Muslim soldiers

4 who are still active in some units," the reference there "in some units"

5 is in HVO units, "should be disarmed."

6 Of course, in the remaining part of the paragraph, it talks about

7 the Muslim population and the military-capable men, regardless of whether

8 they're in any units of any army or not.

9 Now, the questions I put to you, and assuming that there are

10 thousands or tens of thousands of such persons in this area, were General

11 Petkovic to give this order, what were the logistic implications of

12 implementing and carrying out this order?

13 You said to us there has to be "two up and two down" thinking.

14 What does General Petkovic have to do to expect this order to be carried

15 out?

16 A. Well, this order carries with it a number of implied tasks. Those

17 who are being arrested or detained have presumably got to be taken to

18 somewhere where they will be kept in secure conditions, so they will need

19 transport. They'll need guards.

20 And once in the location to which they are being tank, there will

21 have to be due concern shown for a roof over their heads, food, water,

22 sanitation, and everything like that.

23 Now, I don't know what the numbers are involved are here, but you

24 said assume there are thousands. This is a potentially very serious

25 logistic issue, which -- which would need some preparation in advance to

Page 24137

1 get the witness right; or if there was not time or not the intent to

2 prepare in advance, then it would require a lot of activity after the

3 event to get the conditions right.

4 Q. All right.

5 And, again, because we have to move with some haste at this point,

6 let me just add about another part of the order.

7 Just in terms of chain of command, and in terms of passing a

8 command's orders down from the top to the bottom, so to speak, can I ask

9 you to look at the bottom after Mr. Petkovic's name.

10 Do you see there is a further instruction at the end of that

11 order?

12 A. "We submit this order to the chief of the HVO Main Staff for your

13 information and for its implementation..." That one?

14 Q. Sorry, sir. You'll have to be a bit slower for translation.

15 A. Do you mean the is sentence underneath the Petkovic signature

16 block?

17 Q. Yes. Then, there's another block that starts: "Mostar, 30 June

18 1993."

19 "We submit this order of the chief of the HVO Main Staff for your

20 information and for its implementation," over the name Miljenko Lasic,

21 commander of the south-east operative zone, submitted to 2nd HVO Brigade

22 and 3rd HVO Brigade."

23 A. Yes, I see that.

24 Q. Now, is that an effective way of transmitting an order from your

25 commander down through your own command? Essentially, is General Lasic,

Page 24138

1 Mr. Lasic saying, I received this order from General Petkovic. I'm now

2 passing it on to you.

3 A. In that instance, it is a thoroughly ineffective way to pass on

4 this order because it details no tasks, it details no logistics support,

5 it details no hows, whys, and wherefores.

6 This is, obviously, going to be an extremely complicated and

7 sensitive operation, which requires the allocation of resources, none of

8 which is mentioned here. The order is simply passed on and the 2nd

9 Brigade and the 3rd Brigade are presumably just left to get on with it.

10 Q. So, for instance, following up on what you said earlier, in

11 passing the order down his chain of command, does -- does the Commander

12 Lasic provide any orders, direction, guidance, information as to where the

13 prisoners should be -- detained persons should be taken, how they should

14 be provided for, how their needs should be met, what vehicles will be

15 provided for transporting them to wherever they're going to go?

16 Does Mr. Lasic provide any such information?

17 A. Not in this document, no.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, I've listened to your

19 answer very carefully. When reading this order, I find that there's a

20 situation deriving from this order. At paragraph 1, there's the request

21 for fortification or enforcement of units. Paragraph 2, 3, 4, all these

22 paragraphs relate to units that are in theatre, in the field.

23 At paragraph 7, we see the problem arise, appear. It is that the

24 ABiH troops have infiltrated some of their men and losses have resulted

25 from this. It seems, but I might be mistaken, it seems that paragraph 8

Page 24139

1 has to be connected or related to paragraph 7.

2 "This is an emergency situation," we see it mentioned here in

3 this document, "therefore, it is requested that Muslim who are members of

4 the HVO should be isolated," whereas, initially, the order aims at

5 reinforcing the lines.

6 According to you, despite that the main thrust of the order is to

7 reinforce the line and with the information about in the infiltration of

8 the enemy forces in the lines, do you believe in this context that the

9 fact of disarming the Muslim soldiers should have led to an additional

10 order related to logistics and all that?

11 You've mentioned it yourself. Did this not come under the purview

12 of Lasic? Was the operational man in the field?

13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, my understanding, when you combine

14 paragraph 7 with paragraph 8, is that there is plainly concern,

15 understandable concern, since now the HVO are being engaged by ABiH Muslim

16 defence forces, that the Muslim soldiers within the HVO may no longer be

17 reliable. I could understand that. I could, therefore, understand a --

18 an order to disarm them and isolate them.

19 What I would expect to see after that is some form of -- well,

20 certainly all the logistics considerations of how that's going to happen,

21 where it's going to happen, how they're going to be cared for, looked

22 after, et cetera. I would expect to see at some stage some form of

23 investigative procedure to -- to ascertain whether those Muslim soldiers

24 were a risk or a threat or not.

25 But I stand by what I said previously: If large numbers, for

Page 24140

1 whatever reason, of Muslim soldiers and Muslim males are being rounded up,

2 that is a severe logistic problem that must be taken into account.

3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your permission.

4 I do apologise to my learned friend Mr. Scott, but I have to say that I

5 consider this witness put in military logic to interpret what was behind

6 the order and point 8 of that order.

7 I think we should explain to the witness briefly what happened on

8 the 30th of June, 1993. What happened was the following, the situation

9 was as follows, General Pringle: The area of part of Mostar --

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, you're going to be

11 taking time now. Perhaps you could do this during the cross-examination.

12 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in the hour available

13 at my disposal, I won't be able to go through all the areas where my

14 client's name is mentioned. But I think that in just a couple of

15 sentences we can say that on the 30th of June, the HVO lost control over a

16 certain portion, key portions of Mostar and to the north of Mostar, thanks

17 to the treachery of the Muslim soldiers in the HVO and their linking up

18 with the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Armija.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]

20 ... the witness has understood that this relates to paragraph 7. Right.

21 Go on, Mr. Scott.

22 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. That was exactly the point

23 that I was going to make. I thought the witness was quite, quite clear in

24 indicating his interpretation of paragraph 7, and went on to say something

25 to the effect, "I could quite understand in those circumstances."

Page 24141

1 So it seemed to me there was a fair contextual reading of the

2 document.

3 If we could then go on, please, to P 04756.

4 Q. Well, I'll let you find the document. I do have one further

5 questions for you about the previous topic; although, they're actually

6 related to the next document as well.

7 Again, trying to tie together now some of the concepts and

8 principles that we've talked about for the last two days, once General

9 Petkovic issued the order, 3019, that we were just talking about, I mean,

10 is that the end of his responsibility; or as a senior commander, once

11 you've given that order, what is further incumbent upon you to do?

12 A. This order could only be seen as a -- I mean, as far as rounding

13 up the Muslims are concerned, it's -- it's almost what we would describe

14 as a warning order or an initial order, because it carries no detail at

15 all of how it's to be done and how it's to be supported.

16 So if, for whatever reason, the order goes out like this, then I

17 would expect the Main Staff to be working frantically to follow up that

18 with supplementary orders, is what we call them, supplementary orders,

19 amplifying the detail of how this should be conducted, what the logistic

20 arrangements would be, where the camps are going to be, who is going to

21 provide food, water, et cetera et, cetera et, cetera.

22 So this is not the end. This is just the beginning.

23 MR. SCOTT: Now, having gone on then to Exhibit 4 -- P 04756.

24 Q. This -- these are the minutes of a defence department meeting held

25 on the 2nd of September, 1993.

Page 24142

1 And for present purposes, well, let's stay on the topic of the

2 operation of detention facilities.

3 If I can direct your attention to page 4, about halfway down the

4 page in English under -- it's item number 3. And, then, going about

5 halfway down the page it makes reference -- well, just so we can see who

6 is talking, it's talking about Coric and the head, Stojic, and then Coric

7 it says: "Coric then put forward some of the problem encountered by the

8 military police."

9 And in that context, skipping several lines, it then

10 says: "Military prisons are another example of very bad work. The head,

11 then the document is referring to Mr. Stojic, "the head took the floor and

12 then said, 'My opinion is that we have two military prisoners, Heliodrom

13 and the military prison at Ljubuski. As the other places where detainees

14 are held, Gabela and Dretelj, I do not consider them as military

15 facilities and refuse to personally endorse the work of these

16 institutions.'"

17 Now, my question to you on that point, General, is tying this back

18 into, again, Exhibit P 03019. That order, having been given, 3019, can

19 you comment on the statement attributed to Mr. Stojic, which says

20 essentially, "I don't take on any responsibility for at least these other

21 facilities, Gabela and Dretelj"?

22 A. Yes. Well, there appears to me to be a mismatch here, because the

23 initiating order, if I can put it like that, signed by chief of the HVO

24 Main Staff, Major General Petkovic, initiating the rounding up of these

25 people into places unspecified in that order was a military order issued

Page 24143

1 to military units.

2 It would be, therefore, my assumption that those military units

3 carried out those orders and are now in charge of the detainees. I don't

4 know, but that's what the assumption from that very brief order would be.

5 And, therefore, all the -- these people that are being detained are --

6 whether they're in a military prison, are not are the responsibility of

7 the military and, indeed, are the responsibility of the initiating officer

8 Petkovic.

9 Q. All right. If we can then move further, just actually a couple of

10 days later, this document is dated concerning a meeting on the 2nd of

11 September [Realtime transcript read in error "December"], 1993.

12 And if we could move to another set of minutes, Exhibit P 04841,

13 for the 6th of September [Realtime transcript read in error "December"],

14 1993, four days later.

15 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] I apologise to my

16 colleague Mr. Scott, but I think there's an error in the transcript. It

17 says "December" in the transcript instead of "September," so perhaps that

18 should be corrected.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're quite right. It is,

20 indeed, September.

21 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, counsel. I don't know if I misspoke or if

22 it was a matter of translation or transcription. In any event, counsel is

23 correct. The dates were in September.

24 Q. With that in mind, General, if you have -- if you've been able to

25 find that document, P 04841, you will see on the -- excuse me. Bottom of

Page 24144

1 page 1, there's an agenda given, then there's something that's been

2 written here as AD1. I don't know if that's Article 1.

3 But, in any event, it says: "On the basis of verbal reports and

4 insights gained into the manner of executing punishments and conditions of

5 detention of persons capture as active-duty and reserve enemy forces and

6 persons preparing an armed rebellion, the situation was declared

7 unsatisfactory..." --

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, slowly.

9 MR. SCOTT: My apologies.

10 Q. "...the situation was declared unsatisfactory and harmful to the

11 reputation and interest of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.

12 "It was also concluded that the responsibility for the present

13 situation does not lie with the HVO of the HZ HB (government of the HR

14 HB). However, in order to avoid the situation being used in ways that are

15 adverse to the political and other interests of Herceg-Bosna, valid

16 principles of international law of war and international humanitarian law

17 need to be observed in executing punishments and implementing other

18 measures."

19 These were in a meeting as indicated here with Mr. Prlic presiding

20 and signing the minutes as -- on the last day -- on the last page as

21 president of the government.

22 I just want to put the question to you, similar to the question

23 about the minutes of the earlier meeting involving Mr. Coric and

24 Mr. Stojic. I note that in this same meeting, if we look at the first

25 page, those in attendance, if the record is correct, Mr. Stojic was also

Page 24145

1 at this meeting.

2 When it makes a statement that was concluded that "the

3 responsibility does not rest with us," can you comment, again, on the --

4 where -- what responsibility did the HVO, having gone down this road, take

5 on? For holding and caring for these prisoners and detainees, persons

6 that were being held, what responsibilities had been undertaken at that

7 point?

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, General. Just one second.

9 Now, when he's talking about the HVO. What exactly is he talking

10 about? The military or is he talking about civilian government? The

11 gentleman, there is to foundation thus far, that he has explored and

12 understood and is able and is capable to discuss how the civilian

13 government was structured. Now he's being asked to look at a particular

14 document, and from there to drive certain conclusions based on his

15 military expertise. I dare say there has been no foundation laid.

16 Also, in the very last paragraph of this document, it clearly

17 shows: "Since Mr. Boban the Supreme Commander of the HR HB armed forces

18 has not been consulted on the matter, it was decided that he should be."

19 Now, obviously, there are all sorts of events going on. I have no

20 objections to the gentleman giving opinions based on military matters.

21 But when he's asked to give an opinion as to a document such as this,

22 without having, at least in my opinion, having laid a foundation that he

23 is capable of rendering a decision, based on knowledge of how the civilian

24 government functioned vis-a-vis the military, I think that is beyond the

25 scope of the witness's ability to answer and, therefore, I object.

Page 24146

1 MR. SCOTT: If I can address, Your Honour, perhaps with some

2 additional foundational questions. I hope not to take too much time.

3 Q. But in the reports - and, of course, as I said yesterday, we

4 haven't had the time to go through every part of your report in detail -

5 but in terms of your curriculum vitae, which we discussed yesterday, is it

6 correct, sir, that a substantial amount of both the training that you have

7 received and the training you have given to others has involved, I think

8 it was put at one point, dealing with the senior military political

9 interface?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. And what is your -- what is the general experience or information

12 you can provide to us in terms of how in this instance, for example, let's

13 start with 2, the military head, and that is in this instance either

14 Mr. -- because we're now talking about a period that spans from the end of

15 June to September of 1993, first Mr. Petkovic and then Mr. Praljak as the

16 military held, the top military officer, how that person then relates to

17 the top civilian defence official, the head of the defence department,

18 Mr. Stojic? Let's start with that in your experience?

19 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, if I may, and I don't mean to be disruptive

20 of the proceedings, but, again, a foundation needs to be laid because

21 there's a transitional period. You have the Croatian Community, then you

22 have the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.

23 Clearly, the gentleman is capable of discussing how it is, how

24 things are in the UK or perhaps in other Western European countries or

25 NATO government, because he has had some experience, but we're dealing

Page 24147

1 with a unique situation. What I'm saying here is: Before he gets to

2 answer those sorts of questions, at least a foundation needs to be laid as

3 to what documents he's reviewed. What is his basic knowledge with respect

4 to this particular government, the way it's set up, this system. And then

5 from there, if we're satisfied, I have no objections.

6 But I think that we're getting a lit bit ahead of ourselves to

7 simply say: Since he's been trained on how civilian governments interact

8 with the military, therefore, in this instance, this is the way it

9 operated. First, he must demonstrate that he has knowledge of how this

10 particular political system, such as it was, at least de jure existed.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, there is a document

12 that we all have before us. I presume what you want to ask the military

13 expert is something of a military nature, and that is why you're

14 presenting that document. What is the actual question that you wish to

15 raise? Because here we're talking about the government meeting under the

16 Presidency of Mr. Prlic at Mostar on the 6th of September, 10.00 a.m., and

17 the meeting ends at 12.00 noon.

18 So this is a government meeting. What is the military question

19 that you wish to ask the witness?

20 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. I'm just referring in sort, so that

21 I can deal with the foundational questions, perhaps at least very, very

22 briefly.

23 The Chamber may refer to, in the general's report, for example -

24 and I will not have found all of them in the last two minutes as I have

25 you've stood here on my feet - but, for example, at paragraph number 10.

Page 24148

1 About halfway through paragraph number 10, he talks about the

2 course content was set at the strategic -- strategic level. This is at

3 the Royal College of Defence Studies. The course content was set at the

4 strategic level and involved considerable study around the

5 politico-military interface.

6 Then, beyond that, I think there's a number of other places where

7 he talks about that. In paragraph 14, he also -- at the end of paragraph

8 14, he also talks about the military-political interface.

9 Then, when we get further into his report, in effect --

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So what is the question?

11 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour.

12 Statements having been made, just very, very briefly. In

13 paragraph 25, he talks about the decree on armed forces and says, in

14 effect, this enshrines political control over the military as one would

15 expect.

16 And, in paragraph 26, he talks about the consultation. The

17 overall military commander would be expected to interact directly or

18 indirectly with the political commander-in-chief.

19 Then, he talks about: "In the HZ HB, it is my opinion that the

20 overall commander would interact with the head of the defence department

21 on a regular basis and with the president as Supreme Commander."

22 So just so it's clear, in the report, the expert has addressed

23 these points.

24 Q. The point in showing the current exhibit, P 04841, is to ask,

25 first of all: Would it surprise you, sir, at the most senior levels at

Page 24149

1 the military-political level that a serious problem would be discussed not

2 only by -- on the military side, but that would carry over onto the

3 political leadership as well?

4 MR. KARNAVAS: I maintain my objection. I'll just -- I'll let it

5 stand. I have a moving objection, a continuing objection to this line of

6 questioning. A foundation has not been laid. He's being asked -- I have

7 no objections with the gentleman having a background on the interface.

8 I'm sure he's had to deal with, you know, the Defence Minister in

9 the UK, whatever the situation may be, but that's not the point. The

10 point is: We're dealing with a particular political structure on the

11 ground. Has he looked at the way it functions? Has he looked at these

12 documents? Is he capable of giving an opinion? Because he's being asked

13 these very specific questions.

14 I have a continuing objection to the competency of this witness to

15 provide these sorts of answers, and I will sit down for the sake of going

16 forward; otherwise, I would be objecting to every question of this nature.

17 MR. SCOTT: Well --

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, what I don't really

19 perceive is what is it exactly you're getting at.

20 MR. SCOTT: Well --

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just ask the question, because

22 that will make things clear.

23 MR. SCOTT: Thank you. Thank you Mr. President.

24 In reference to the language that I read out of these minutes some

25 time ago, and I'm not presenting as hypothetical, I'm reading a document,

Page 24150

1 I'm reading an HVO record. In attendance, among others, are Mr. Prlic,

2 Mr. Stojic, and others as listed on the minutes, and I've read the part of

3 the record on the second page of the English version, starting really at

4 the bottom of the first page.

5 Q. I guess, really, after all this discussion, my question to the

6 general is: General, does it surprise you that at -- if there is a

7 sufficiently serious level that would come up on the military side, that

8 ultimately would find its way, as it does here on the 6th of September,

9 1993, being discussed at a level of government that involves both the

10 president of the government and the defence minister and others -- or the

11 Head of the defence department?

12 A. It doesn't surprise me that it's being discussed at all. We seem

13 to have the situation in accordance with the previous document, where a

14 military order has been given to military units, to round up large numbers

15 of Muslim people. I don't think anyone has questioned that.

16 What we have questioned is whether there was sufficient logistic

17 support for that operation. It would appear from this document that there

18 is now, as a result of that happening, severe concern that things had are

19 going wrong, and the international laws of war and humanitarian law are

20 not being complied with.

21 What strikes me as surprising is that military order, having been

22 given and carried out, and Mr. Boban being the Supreme Commander of the HR

23 HB armed forces as well, is that this meeting concludes that really this

24 has nothing to do with us, seen in light of the military is subservient to

25 the political.

Page 24151

1 Q. And if we can then continue on --

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I?

3 MR. SCOTT: Yes, of course.

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I just have a clarification on this point.

5 Do you read this passage, the second paragraph on page 2 in the English

6 version, as saying that the political authority, the government, says it's

7 none of our business, implying that it is the exclusive responsibility of

8 the military? Is that your interpretation of this paragraph?

9 THE WITNESS: I think that's how I am reading

10 this: Responsibility of the present situation does not lie with the HVO

11 Croatian Defence council of the HZ HB government. That is what I'm taking

12 that to mean.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 MR. SCOTT:

15 Q. Just to follow on --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Scott, please.

17 MR. SCOTT:

18 Q. Just to follow on and finish this particular set of documents, if

19 you could then go on to --

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Wait a moment. I'm a little bit

21 troubled by the answer that was just given.

22 General, we are talking about the document 4841. That is a

23 conclusion from which -- that is the document from which you derive your

24 conclusion; is that right?

25 THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honour.

Page 24152

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, this document, as we see

2 it before our very eyes, relates to a government meeting that was held

3 under the presidency of Mr. Prlic, who was the president. There is an

4 agenda for that meeting. It is set out here; and, in item 1, they're

5 going to deal with the question of the situation arising from the measures

6 to be taken to isolate persons, prisoners of war, to implement

7 International Law on War. And then item 2, miscellaneous.

8 Then we see that item 1 is based on verbal reports and that there

9 are going to be decisions taken by the government or -- or in point 1, in

10 the conclusions, the place for the detention of prisoners of war must be

11 determined, and the Ministry for Defence is going to be in charge of that,

12 and it has 15 days to do so. But people must be punished.

13 Here, again, the Ministry for Defence and for Justice and the

14 administration are responsible, and they have 15 days, and the Office for

15 Expelled Persons and Refugees, et cetera, is also. Here, we come back to

16 logistics: Take measures concerning quantities of food, sanitation, et

17 cetera.

18 And on -- in point 2, under miscellaneous, there are other

19 secondary topics relating to students and so on and so forth.

20 So where do you see that nothing has been decided? That's what I

21 don't understand.

22 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I was simply referring to the second

23 paragraph on page 2, where it said: "It was also concluded that the

24 responsibility for the present situation does not lie with the HVO

25 Croatian Defence Council." I said I found that quite surprising.

Page 24153

1 MR. KARNAVAS: It should be noted, however, that we find it quite

2 surprising that the gentleman hasn't read any of the documents concerning

3 how the government was structured, then that might cause a surprise that

4 he has right now. That's part of the problem.

5 When he's talking about government, what is he talking about?

6 What is his understanding of the council vis-a-vis Mr. Boban and the

7 Presidency? What is the distinction? There lies the problem. So he's

8 looking at it from the UK mind frame. He's looking at it from the

9 traditional approach that he understands how government functions in the

10 UK, not in the way the government was functioning back then.

11 I go back to my earlier discussion. I have no objections to the

12 gentleman opining on this, but we need to lay a foundation. He's simply

13 not competent. He lacks the knowledge, and he lacks the knowledge because

14 he wasn't provided with the necessary information by the Prosecution, if

15 he was going to go into this area.

16 I also raise an objection, and the objection is this, Your

17 Honours --

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We've understood.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: [Previous translation continues] ... he prepared a

20 report. Now he's being shown documents that were outside of what he was

21 shown in preparation of the report.

22 We're entitled to notice as -- if he's going to be going into

23 documents and opinions as an expert.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] To end, General, and then I'll

25 give the floor to Mr. Scott, when you say reading paragraph 2 of page 2,

Page 24154

1 that it is up to the HVO, is there a political connotation here?

2 Doesn't that mean that it's responsibility for the events that

3 occurred, and that has nothing to do with themselves taking on their own

4 responsibilities? Because later on they do take decisions.

5 If they were not responsible, why would they later on take

6 decisions? Aren't you interpreting things somewhat in paragraph 2?

7 Although, I do, of course, understand given the little time you've had,

8 that you've come to those conclusions.

9 THE WITNESS: I'm simply saying, Your Honour, that the original

10 order for rounding up all these people was a military order. It would be

11 reasonable, I believe, to expect that order to have been given, not as an

12 isolated military action but as a politico-military action.

13 And in the light of that, the fact that the HVO Croatian Defence

14 Council now declares that it doesn't seem to have got any response for

15 what's happened so far, even though, using its own words, "there are

16 transgressions of international law plainly taking place," I find

17 surprising.

18 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, I do -- I do apologise for rising, but a

19 point does come where the level of assumptions must be explained. It

20 can't simply be stated and taken as anything approaching anything that

21 you -- Your Honours can rely upon without a foundation or without

22 something further being explained.

23 I do note, of course, and it is a matter that I won't belabour

24 now, that there does appear to have been movement in relation to the

25 witness, because Judge Trechsel's comments, with respect, was very clear.

Page 24155

1 The witness spoke in relation to that. He answered that, and he says

2 later on, in relation to Mr. President's question, that he found that

3 state surprising. That does appear to be an evolution in his account.

4 But, Your Honour, the assumptions that the detention came from the

5 political side of -- of control needs to be explained. It hasn't been.

6 It's simply an assumption, and it's there that I think Mr. Karnavas does

7 have point.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, Mr. Scott, if I take this a bit

9 further, but perhaps there is a possibility to reconcile the views.

10 On the one hand, we have the sentence that astonishes the

11 witness. And if you look at what it talks about, it is the present

12 situation. It is looking backwards. Then, with the conclusion, the

13 government is looking forward and is devising measures.

14 I find that to -- to be clearly visible in the document itself,

15 and I do not see that it is in any way speculative to read it as it is

16 written.

17 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, all these, of course, are matters for

18 closing speeches and for arguments, but what is objected to is without --

19 Your Honours need to be assisted by having an expert opinion from an

20 extremely able army officer that has proper foundations that Your Honours

21 are clear about.

22 Now, the evidence so far is that Bruno Stojic has said that only

23 two prison camps are part of his responsibility, or that there are two

24 prison camps. Then he also states in this political meeting that they

25 abhor violations taking place. Then we seek to jump into a million miles

Page 24156

1 and say, Well, the order of detention is a political decision. It seems

2 to fly in the face of the facts on the documents before you.

3 Now, if the witness then seeks to speculate, the basis of that

4 speculation must be based upon an understanding of the context that Your

5 Honours are deliberating upon, rather than just an abstract understanding

6 of what happens in a regular organised army.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Perhaps you could help me out. I do not see any,

8 any sentences here attributed to Mr. Stojic, except for the passage

9 regarding students. Maybe I missed something.

10 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, the inference from the Prosecution - and

11 this is why I understand that my learned friend Mr. Scott emphasised that

12 Mr. Stojic was present at this meeting - it's seeking to impute the

13 actions in the field and the detention that took place to the political

14 side of the community of Herceg-Bosna.

15 Now, that needs to be explained, because --

16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, counsel.

17 You have just said that here Mr. Stojic said this or that about

18 the problem we are interested in. We're not interested in a student.

19 I'm asking you where does it say here that Mr. Stojic said this or

20 that? I think you're making an assumption here. Where is it here in

21 this , in this report on the meeting, except for page 3 at the bottom,

22 where is it said that something has been stated by Mr. Stojic?

23 MR. KHAN: Well, Your Honour, lead counsel very helpfully provides

24 P 04756.

25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: We're dealing with 4841. That's the document

Page 24157

1 we're talking about.

2 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, it was very clear, in my respectful

3 submission, from the evidence elicited by the Prosecution at page 59, line

4 17 -- bear with me. I think it's line 17.

5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Of what?

6 MR. KHAN: Of the LiveNote transcript, and this was the reference

7 between Bruno Stojic, that there were only two prisons, Gabela and

8 Dretelj, that were considered as military facilities.

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That was not -- that was of not this meeting,

10 Counsel. I am sorry. I think we should go on now let Mr. Scott continue

11 his cross-examination, because we're --

12 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, you must give me a chance, because what my

13 learned friend, Mr. Scott, quite clearly was seeking to do was to

14 compare -- it was a specific question. He was seeking to compare the

15 political meeting --

16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm not reading his mind.

17 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, let me go to Mr. Scott's question. It's

18 very clear, because he was cross-referencing that suggestion by Bruno

19 Stojic with his presence in the meeting, and seeking to obtain conclusions

20 in relation to that.

21 Your Honour, that's all I've got to say. The question can be put.

22 I've put my remarks forward, but it goes down to the lack of foundation in

23 relation to attributing the detention that took place to the political

24 events that took place in the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.

25 It is as simple as that, and it goes down to my learned friend

Page 24158

1 Mr. Karnavas's question regarding proper foundation.

2 Your honour, I can't take it further. I think it is very

3 straightforward.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I'd just like to make a correction.

6 I tried to tell my colleague Ms. Nozica, but I didn't succeed. I think

7 that Mr. Kahn made a slight mistake, because Bruno Stojic in the document

8 we mentioned acknowledged as authority over prison Heliodrom and Ljubuski,

9 and not Gabela and Dretelj, as was recorded in the transcript on page 73,

10 line 15 of the transcript.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

12 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honours.

13 Just before putting the next question to the witness. Just to be

14 ever-so brief in my time in comparison to the Defence time on these points

15 will be ever-so short.

16 The reason that the -- the connection between -- there were all

17 sorts of objections and issues being raised about the connection between

18 the political and the military. The reason was -- part of the reason

19 showing these documents to the witness and asking these questions, in an

20 abbreviated way, because one of the problems, of course, is we can't

21 present the entire case through this witness, and all the other documents

22 and all the other meetings which took place between the end of June and

23 September. We can't do that. We'd be here for days.

24 Now, ultimately, maybe we'll all have an opportunity to go through

25 day by day all: The international demands that were being made, the

Page 24159

1 testimony by Ambassador Galbraith raising demarches about the conditions

2 in this, before this meeting took place. There's all sorts of evidence we

3 don't have time to consider today.

4 The only point here is to say, in this particular respect, in this

5 particular chain of documents, and it's not I don't think it surprises

6 anyone, you have the link between the top military commander, at this time

7 being either Mr. Petkovic or Mr. Praljak, Mr. Petkovic being the person

8 who gave the order we looked at earlier, and the head of the -- the

9 political head, the civilian head of the defence department, in one

10 meeting; and then going to another top government meeting, the meeting of

11 the HVO government, at which Mr. Stojic then goes from the earlier meeting

12 with his commanders, with the people in the chain of command, Coric and

13 others, then goes to another meeting at the top of the government in which

14 also Mr. Prlic and other ministers are other heads are involved.

15 I don't think that should surprise anyone, and that was the reason

16 for bringing Mr. Stojic in. I don't think that there's any interpretation

17 of the structures of government or anything. That's what the record is --

18 it's what these documents say, and that's the only point that we were just

19 saying it, up to the point of then what the President's already covered

20 and Judge Trechsel, and that is that the witness's reaction to looking at

21 those particular minutes.

22 I think we have answered it now and we can go forward, but I just

23 wanted to make it clear that I just think some of the objections are not

24 well-founded, Your Honour.

25 Now, if we could go on to finish up on this particular set of

Page 24160

1 documents to Exhibit P 05104.

2 In fairness to everyone, at the end of that meeting there was

3 reference to the fact, well, Mr. Boban isn't here, so we should consult

4 with Mr. Boban. Well, this is the Prosecution trying to be fair and

5 trying to continue the story. A few days later on the 15th of September,

6 about nine days later, Mr. Boban apparently issues an order, calling for

7 all the HVO military and armed forces to make sure that they're complying

8 with all the stands of international law, et cetera et cetera.

9 Item 3, General, if you have that - I'm sorry, in my haste I've

10 gone quite quickly - but if you now turn to Exhibit 5104.

11 If I can direct your attention to the second page of the English

12 version, paragraph 3: "In the prisoners of war detention centres, where

13 the conditions required by the International War of Law," presumably, "and

14 the Geneva Conventions are not ensured, they should immediately be

15 introduced, and prisoners of war must be treated in accordance with

16 provisions of the Geneva Convention and other humanitarian standards."

17 Now, is there anything surprising to you, General, about the fact

18 that it would be recognised or further recognised that the Geneva

19 Conventions and the Laws of War would apply to the holding of either

20 prisoners of war or other detained persons?

21 A. My impression on this is full marks to Mr. Boban for taking a grip

22 of the situation and ensuring that the correct conditions are applied in

23 accordance with the laws required.

24 Q. And, in further, on this issue that we've gotten into in the last

25 hour, perhaps, on the political-military interface, can I ask you to look

Page 24161

1 at item 7 of Mr. Boban's order: "The HVO Main Staff will inform all

2 subordinated commands and units of this had order and provide professional

3 help in its implementation."

4 Is that the sort of -- my question to you, having read that, is:

5 Is that the sort of military-political interface that you might expect in

6 this situation?

7 A. Yes. This is the chain of command that we referred to earlier on

8 this morning, starting with the president. Here we have Boban, as the

9 president of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, issuing orders down

10 through the HVO Main Staff for implementation down to the units.

11 Q. Now --

12 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour.

13 [Prosecution counsel confer]

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.

15 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] In point 7, it says that

16 that should be implemented, but what? What is to be implemented in its

17 implementation.

18 MR. SCOTT: Well, I think it says "this order," Your Honour.

19 Your Honour, I see it's 12.30, and what might be the most

20 efficient way is now what I would like to be able to do is to focus

21 exactly on the final documents I'd like to put to the witness, if I could

22 do that during the break.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, do you want to break

24 now or do you want to go on?

25 MR. SCOTT: I think it might be most helpful and efficient, Your

Page 24162

1 Honour, if we took the breakdown, so I could then identify the final

2 several exhibits to put to the witness.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very good. You will have 30

4 minutes left, because you've already used up three hours, 30 minutes, and

5 a few more.

6 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 12.50 p.m.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

10 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President, and I think that we've

11 abbreviated the final Prosecution questions, and I think we can finish in

12 the next few minutes.

13 Before I do that, if I can just deal a couple of outstanding

14 matters that the Chamber has raised. In connection with, Your Honour

15 Mr. President, your point this morning about Exhibit 301, we have indeed

16 confirmed that Exhibit P 00425 is a much better and complete version of

17 that same document.

18 We can certainly -- we can either tender both or we can tender

19 P 00425 in place of P 00301, whichever suits the Chamber. But there is,

20 indeed, a much better and full copy of that, number one. That's just

21 been -- that has been provided to the Chamber, I think, handed out a few

22 moments ago and should be -- and also to the Defence.

23 Secondly, Judge Trechsel yesterday, I believe, if I have this

24 correct - I may be mistaken, but we also try to be responsive to the

25 Judges' questions and inquiries - in connection with Exhibit P 00307, it's

Page 24163

1 the one in which unfortunately we only had limited translation, we did

2 find in that same document, which the Prosecution does indeed tender in

3 its entirety, an explicit reference in chapter 2, Article 26, chapter 2,

4 Article 26, on page 9 of the Croatian or B/C/S version, and it may

5 correspond to something that Judge Trechsel raised yesterday.

6 It's a matter of reading the document. I'm sure I will be correct

7 if I misrepresent the document, but that reference appears to state: "A

8 military is not obliged to carry out orders directed against the

9 constitutional order of the HR HB and is not obliged to carry out other

10 actions that are unlawful and have characteristics of a criminal offence."

11 Q. I believe, if I put that in the form of a question to the

12 witness: General Pringle, I think yesterday you said there was -- at one

13 point I showed you a document, and you said something to the effect that

14 that more or less reflected or enshrined the general principle in modern

15 armies, that a subordinate is required to carry out the orders of a

16 superior except for an illegal order.

17 A. That's correct. In fact, he has a duty not to carry out an

18 illegal order.

19 Q. And the reference to chapter 2, Article 26 of Exhibit P 00307 that

20 I've just read out would be consistent with that; is that correct?

21 You won't have it in translation, I'm afraid, sir. We haven't had

22 a chance to --

23 A. As you read it out, that's consistent with that, yes.

24 Q. Thank you very much.

25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you, Mr. Scott.

Page 24164

1 MR. SCOTT: You're welcome, Your Honour.

2 Q. Finishing on two just -- very quickly on two exhibits. They both

3 relate to topics that have been raised in the last two days, if I can ask

4 you to look, please, at P 05134.

5 My question, General, is really quite limited. But in light of

6 the conversation we've had today about the Main Staff of control of

7 certain assets, this is a report from a duty operations officer, dated the

8 16th of September, 1993. And on the first page, on the first two items,

9 if I can just direct your attention to a decision on operations: "An H203

10 shelled Jugobanka, self-propelled cannon fired on Pucine, and a hand-held

11 rocket launcher fired on the theatre, a T-130 fired on Gornje Selo and

12 Nazdrijica Mahala, as authorised by the chief of artillery of the Main

13 Staff."

14 The next item: "An H122, a Garista, fired on a convoy of lorries

15 entering Blagaj as authorised by the Main Staff."

16 So can I just simply ask you: Would that be consistent with your

17 earlier statements to the Chamber about the Main Staff control of heavier

18 weapons?

19 A. That would be consistent with the Main Staff having control of

20 these sorts of weapons, yes.

21 Q. And if I can ask you to go to Exhibit P 07044.

22 MR. SCOTT: Again, Your Honour, on this one, I'm afraid, with

23 apologies again, that we have -- the date has been mistranslated. It

24 should say, if you want to correct it, it should say 6 December 1992.

25 I'm sorry I've been corrected, too. I apologise, Your Honour.

Page 24165

1 Apparently, It's not the first time. Yes.

2 Q. In any event, the point being -- the only really point of this

3 being, General, if you can look at that exhibit, 7044, again, this is a

4 document issued over the name of Milivoj Petkovic: "Order: Number 1,

5 send regular daily combat reports twice a day as follows: A morning

6 report by 0800 hours," in other words 8.00 a.m., "and an evening report by

7 2200 hours," or 10.00 p.m., following the list of directives in attachment

8 one."

9 We can look at it, if anyone wants it, it's the guidelines for --

10 in fact, if we look at the attachment 1, several pages down in the English

11 version, it says: "Guidelines for daily combat report with list of

12 questions."

13 In just looking at this General, and not just those parts but if

14 you scan through the rest of the document, would that put -- be putting

15 into place a form of command reporting, coming up the chain of command

16 that would -- you would find nothing unusual about that?

17 A. No, nothing unusual. That's exactly what you would expect to see.

18 That's how the higher headquarters gets a good handle on what is going on

19 and what needs to be done, what logistic resupply needs to be done.

20 That's how the higher headquarters controls the support required

21 for subordinate units.

22 Q. All right.

23 Then, in terms of the distribution, we have it going out to

24 essentially all military districts and then some of the more specialised

25 units that we've talked about earlier today; for example, Bruno Busic,

Page 24166

1 Ludvig Pavlovic, the Artillery Rocket Regiment, et cetera.

2 Do you see that?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. General, in conclusion, I'm going to direct you to paragraph 79

5 and 80 of your report and ask you: In recognising as you do the -- some

6 of the challenges and difficulties facing the HVO in the situation that

7 existed at the time, you conclude at the end of paragraph 79: "A working

8 governmental system, with a military answerable to the civilian leadership

9 and with orders and instructions flowing down the chain of command from

10 the Presidency via the department of defence and the Main Staff to the

11 operational commands," essentially in your opinion, that existed at the

12 time; is that correct?

13 A. From the documents that I have referenced and read, that is my

14 opinion, yes.

15 Q. And since you wrote the report in March and you signed it, I

16 believe, in March of 2006, you continue to stand by those conclusions,

17 again, based on the documents and information available to you?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. In paragraph 80, you -- you likewise then conclude: "A working

20 army subject to laid down military code of discipline was plainly in

21 existence." Skipping a couple of lines. "That said, there are doctrinal

22 documents, particularly those pertaining to compliance with the

23 international laws of war, that had they been followed would have resulted

24 in reasonable military behaviour. The onus on commanders to set a proper

25 example and insist on proper standards of discipline was great."

Page 24167

1 Do you continue to stand by that conclusion?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. General Pringle, on behalf of the Prosecution, I want to thank you

4 for coming to The Hague and providing your evidence to the Chamber.

5 Thank you very much.

6 A. Thank you.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before giving the floor to the

8 Defence for cross-examination, I'd like to draw your attention to Document

9 8128, Mr. Scott.

10 It's a document we were shown yesterday; and, overnight, I

11 realised that the annex -- the documents annexed to this exhibit,

12 organisational charts, that they had not been translated into English.

13 In other words, I do not have the translation in English of the

14 documents that are to be found in the B/C/S version of the document, and

15 these documents relate, among other things, to the chain of command.

16 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, excuse me.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We need these documents. You

18 requested the admission of Exhibit 8128, and I'd like to know what is

19 written in these boxes in these charts --

20 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour --

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] -- or in these squares or

22 rectangles.

23 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. I can assure the Chamber -- I

24 assure the Chamber that you will have a full translation as soon as

25 possible.