Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 26231

 1                          Tuesday, 15 January 2008

 2                          [Open session]

 3                          [The accused entered court]

 4                          --- Upon commencing at 2.14 p.m.

 5            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, kindly call the case,

 6    please.

 7            THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  This is case number

 8    IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Jadranko Prlic et al.

 9            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Today is Tuesday,

10    the 15th of January, 2008.  I would like to greet the representatives of

11    the Prosecution, Defence counsel, as well as the accused.  We must resume

12    yesterday's hearing and bring in the witness into the courtroom.  In the

13    meantime, I have an oral decision to hand down.  I would like the

14    registrar to move into private session for a few moments, please.

15                          [Private session]

16  (redacted)

17  (redacted)

18  (redacted)

19  (redacted)

20  (redacted)

21  (redacted)

22  (redacted)

23  (redacted)

24  (redacted)

25  (redacted)

Page 26232











11    Pages 26232-26235 redacted. Private session















Page 26236

 1  (redacted)

 2  (redacted)

 3  (redacted)

 4  (redacted)

 5  (redacted)

 6  (redacted)

 7  (redacted)

 8  (redacted)

 9  (redacted)

10  (redacted)

11  (redacted)

12  (redacted)

13  (redacted)

14  (redacted)

15  (redacted)

16  (redacted)

17                          [Open session]

18            THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're in open session.

19            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  I'd like to inform

20    the parties that the registrar has just raised a technical issue which I

21    am discovering, but this requires additional information.  It seems that

22    if one of you discusses a topic in private session we have to stop for 30

23    minutes to enable the technician to do what's required.  So I'm very

24    surprised by what I've just been told but this is what the registrar has

25    just told me.  So if you'd like to move into private session, please think

Page 26237

 1    twice about it, because we would then have to have a 30-minute break.

 2            Mr. Prlic, I believe you would like to have the floor.

 3            THE ACCUSED PRLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  I need

 4    to say what I have to say in open session, and I would indeed prefer the

 5    whole trial to be held in open session, and this is the essence of my

 6    brief request:  The Trial Chamber decided yesterday to punish or sanction

 7    my Defence counsel, preventing him from actively defending me in the

 8    courtroom for a certain period of time and it was done in open session.

 9    Bearing in mind that both interventions of may lawyer that led to this

10    response on the part of the Trial Chamber were actually done in private

11    session, both in the cross-examination -- in the course of the

12    cross-examination and in his address to the Trial Chamber.  This was all

13    done in closed session.  So I believe that it would be a good idea and I

14    believe that the Trial Chamber will support me on this in order to make

15    this trial transparent.  So I think it would be a good idea to make it

16    possible for those two interventions on the part of my lawyer to be

17    accessible to public.  In light of the fact that this witness testified in

18    closed session, perhaps some elements might be redacted, some words might

19    be redacted, if such words might lead to the identification of the witness

20    who testified in this courtroom over the past two weeks.

21            So it is my request to make public the two interventions of my

22    lawyer that led to this decision of the Trial Chamber.

23            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have been seized of your

24    applications, and we'll deliberate on the matter you've just raised.

25            We shall now bring in the witness into the courtroom.

Page 26238

 1            I'll give the floor to the registrar in the meantime so that we

 2    can have some IC numbers.

 3            THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, Prosecution response to exhibits

 4    tendered by Prlic Defence for Witness BF will become Exhibit IC 773.

 5    Prosecution response to exhibits tendered by Stojic Defence for Witness BF

 6    will become Exhibit IC 774.  Prosecution response to exhibits tendered by

 7    Praljak Defence for Witness BF will become Exhibit IC 775, and Prosecution

 8    response to exhibits tendered by Petkovic Defence for Witness BF will

 9    become Exhibit IC 776.

10            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

11            MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] We're not receiving any

12    interpretation, Your Honour.

13            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as the timing is

14    concerned, let me repeat.

15                          [The witness entered court]

16            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The lead counsel had 40 minutes

17    yesterday.  You therefore have 26 minutes left unless the other Defence

18    counsel have given you some of their time, which I don't know.

19                          WITNESS:  CEDRIC THORNBERRY [Resumed]

20            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.

21            Did you hear?

22            MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

23    Good afternoon, Witness, and good afternoon to everyone in and around the

24    courtroom.  The Prlic Defence has no further questions for this witness

25    and we cede our time to Mr. Stojic's Defence.

Page 26239

 1            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Thank you very much.

 2            Good afternoon, sir.  We are going to resume your

 3    cross-examination.  Prlic's Defence counsel has just told us that they

 4    have no further questions for you.  Their time has been given to the

 5    Defence counsel of Mr. Stojic.

 6            I shall now give the floor to the counsel who would like to take

 7    the floor.

 8            Ms. Nozica.

 9            MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours good

10    afternoon to everyone in the courtroom.

11                          Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:

12       Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.  As far as I can see the

13    Trial Chamber has just been given the exhibits that I intend to use, and I

14    could please ask the usher to give the exhibits that I intend to use to

15    the witness and to the Prosecution.

16            MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as you have just heard,

17    I have been given the time that remained to the Prlic Defence for my

18    cross-examination, but I don't think that I will be using up all of this

19    time.  I think that I will be able to complete the cross-examination in

20    the time that I was allotted originally, but I will try to do that as

21    slowly as possible so that we can avoid any interventions to correct the

22    transcript.

23       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, before you left Mostar on the 1st of September,

24    1993, you arranged the evacuation of the wounded from the hospital in East

25    Mostar and the hospital in Nova Bila.

Page 26240

 1       A.   True.

 2       Q.   The meeting where all the details were supposed to be arranged was

 3    held in Medjugorje on the 1st of September, 1993, and you attended that

 4    meeting.  Am I right?

 5       A.   I don't have it immediately in my memory.  Perhaps I might just

 6    say that when the political decisions had been taken to create a system of

 7    removal with their consent of the various persons who had been injured or

 8    sick, once that had been taken, fundamentally it was left up to other

 9    colleagues, perhaps more junior, and I myself was not very much involved.

10            In immediate answer to your question, however, I hope that you --

11    that you feel that this is an appropriate way to approach it, I think

12    it's -- I cannot remember whether I was present at that meeting or not.

13    There was a host of meetings because there were problems -- problems all

14    the way with that system of removal of people.

15       Q.   But if I understand you correctly, you've just told us, in

16    addition to the answer to my question, that this was part of a process,

17    indicating that it lasted over a period of several days and that in the

18    end the -- there was this evacuation.  Could you agree with me on that?

19       A.   There was a partial evacuation.  The evacuation, as I recall it,

20    and it wasn't fully sent through to me, they didn't -- they didn't tell me

21    all the detail of it, the -- yes, the -- the -- the issue came -- was sent

22    to -- was kicked upstairs, as they say, and we had to deal with the

23    political aspects, and those tended to hang around maybe for at least six

24    weeks.  They were being recorded and sent to -- usually to Stoltenberg

25    in -- in -- sorry.  They were sent to Stoltenberg in Zagreb or wherever he

Page 26241

 1    was at that time.  He wasn't at that meeting either.  We left it, as I

 2    said, mostly to our subordinates.

 3       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, I would like to focus on this evacuation that was

 4    arranged, the one that you managed to agree on, and let me now show you a

 5    document that might refresh your memory about some details.

 6            MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Would the usher please assist the

 7    witness with the first document in my binder.  That's document P 4857.

 8    Just so that the witness familiarise himself with the methods that we use

 9    here.  The first document I want him to look at is P 4857.  That's the

10    first green sticker on my binder.  I think that we have the translation in

11    the original here.

12       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, this is a report from the first meeting held on

13    the 1st of September, 1993.  It is signed by the chief of the inspection

14    service in the HVO, Mr. Ivo Sandrk, a man who apparently attended this

15    meeting, and I would now like us to go very briefly through some of the

16    details.  You can see here that he's talking about the 1st of September

17    1993, listing the names of the people who were present there.

18            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Nozica, in the document I

19    can see the name of a witness who has been granted protective measures, so

20    please avoid mentioning the name of that witness so that we are not faced

21    with the technical problem I mentioned earlier on.  Thank you.

22            MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Very well.  Yes.  Thank you.  Thank

23    you.  Yes, I've seen that too.

24       Q.   Anyway, can you look at the middle of the page or, rather, your

25    name is mentioned here, too, saying that you were present at the meeting.

Page 26242

 1    Could you take a look at that?  Can you see that portion?  I'll give you

 2    some time to find it.

 3            Do you remember that on the 1st of September you did indeed attend

 4    that meeting and that in fact after that meeting you left straight away?

 5    So that's the last day according to your reports.

 6       A.   That's -- that's the day that I remember, yes.

 7       Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  Now, we said it was an ongoing process and

 8    we see on page 2 and the other date, the 2nd of September, which means

 9    that the meetings continued at 1000 hours on the 2nd of September and at

10    this meeting the technical details were agreed upon with respect to the

11    evacuation, the conditions that each party was to meet, and it was agreed

12    that they should ensure the resources necessary to carry out the

13    evacuation, the final destination where the wounded are to be evacuated

14    to.

15            Mr. Thornberry, do you remember that this is how the process

16    continued?  Can you remember this detail, that each party was supposed to

17    secure the necessary means of evacuation?

18       A.   When you mean -- when you say the means of evacuation, I take it

19    you are not referring to whether it is by land or by air or -- how is that

20    intended, please, that question, that issue?

21       Q.   From the document further on we can see that it was necessary to

22    ensure helicopters for this, but I'm just asking you whether you remember

23    that part of the negotiations incorporated the preparations that I read

24    out, that is to say the term I used, "to ensure resources for the

25    evacuation."

Page 26243

 1            If you can't remember that, we can move on.  It's not a

 2    particularly important detail, but I just want to check out and see which

 3    information you had about how the evacuation ensued after you had left

 4    Mostar and Medjugorje.

 5       A.   I -- I don't at all want to convey a contrary feeling, but I would

 6    have to say that it would be very unlikely for this kind of detail to be

 7    brought to me other than for a formal signature, and I cannot remember

 8    going behind that at this stage.

 9       Q.   I do apologise.  Now all my questions linked to this document --

10    well, if you feel that some information from this document wasn't

11    essential as far as you were concerned, essential that you know about

12    them, but I should like to continue along those lines.

13            And now, on the 3rd of September, and you'll find that on page 3,

14    the -- was the third day of the negotiations, and the meeting started in

15    Medjugorje once again at 1000 hours, and from this paragraph and this

16    section related to the third day and the 3rd of September, it says that

17    the Muslim side did not have the helicopters ready for the evacuation, so

18    that the entire operation, well, was not brought into question but was

19    delayed for those reasons.  It had to be postponed.

20            So can you remember anything about that, because it was, after

21    all, a significant operation both for your mission and for the sick people

22    and for the evacuation of persons from Nova Bila and East Mostar and so

23    on.  So did you receive information to that effect, that they did come

24    across these difficulties, the difficulties that I've just described to

25    you briefly?

Page 26244

 1       A.   I think they came across not only those difficulties but a number

 2    of others which were more political than technical.  But as I tried to

 3    suggest a little earlier, in principle this kind of paper doesn't come to

 4    me.  Except, of course, as you have -- as madam has indicated, except as

 5    regards as the -- the kinds of question which crossed boundaries, as it

 6    were, in -- in a supervision of this kind of process.

 7            It was an extremely difficult process, because the parties had

 8    been fighting each other for a long time and they hadn't got used to the

 9    idea that maybe they could do things some other way.

10       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, you have helped me a great deal with that answer

11    of yours when you said that it wasn't just these technical details that

12    were a problem but that there were a series of problems, and you mentioned

13    political goodwill.  So that's why I'm showing you this document, which

14    I'm sure didn't reach you because it's an HVO document.  So I'm not

15    actually asking you about the document but about the information contained

16    therein, and I just wanted to indicate that political and military aspect

17    of this whole operation and the operation of transporting the -- the

18    wounded later on.  And I'd like to indicate just one more detail to see if

19    you were informed about that.

20            If we carry on through this document and look at the 3rd of

21    September once again, it says that the Muslim side did finally secure

22    helicopters.  And I'm going to read a sentence out to you slowly, and it

23    says:  "And the evacuation was to have begun on the 3rd of September at

24    1500 hours from the plateau or open area by the former bus station."  And

25    then the following information is provided:  It says at 1400 hours -- at

Page 26245

 1    1430 hours rather, there was a mortar attack by the MOS forces on part of

 2    the town under HVO control.  On that occasion 18 civilians were wounded of

 3    which five were children -- five civilians were killed, two of them

 4    children.  Among the wounded civilians there were eight Muslims."

 5            Now, you see when the departure of 1500 hours was decided upon,

 6    then the HVO, and this is what it says in the document, "...  cautioned

 7    UNPROFOR representatives," and told them that "... incidents could be

 8    expected on the MOS side, MOS forces side, in order to show that the HVO

 9    was trying to obstruct the agreement."

10            Now, any of these details here which would come under military and

11    political details but important to see whether your agreement was

12    obstructed, have you ever seen this information before?

13       A.   I really have an extremely vague memory of something coming up and

14    having to be dealt with on an emergency basis, but I'm sorry to say my

15    memory does not run -- at this stage does not run further than that.  I

16    wish it did, but I can't do that, I'm sorry.

17       Q.   From this document, just to finish my questions on that, so that

18    part of the evacuation that was agreed was completed on the 6th of

19    September, 1993; is that right?  Now, from this entire document it would

20    follow and emerge that the representatives on the Muslim side changed

21    every time.  Different people attended the negotiations every time.  So

22    what I'm going to ask you is this:  In your statement, Mr. Thornberry, you

23    said that -- you said this in court and also in the written statement you

24    gave to the Prosecutor, that you encountered a very serious and difficult

25    situation and difficult conditions in East Mostar.

Page 26246

 1            Now, Mr. Thornberry, at that time, and linked to these

 2    negotiations and we've just shown one document about them or later on

 3    linked to negotiations which took place later as you said almost six weeks

 4    later, did you gain the impression that the BH army, as concerns the

 5    wounded, was using the wounded in order to further its military and

 6    political goals, to achieve them?  Did you gain that impression?

 7       A.   If I did, I don't remember its specifics.  And if I did, it's very

 8    likely that not only the BH army but others were using the wounded at that

 9    time.

10            When I say using it, I don't mean in some Machiavellian way but,

11    rather, in a manner which will -- which would -- which would enable them

12    to fall back on some expedient if they found that the situation was

13    becoming unacceptable for them because of their political -- the political

14    commitment which they might have made.  In other words, the -- the BH army

15    was really doing what I think most people do after a very major conflict

16    and they have something pressed on them of a humanitarian nature, they --

17    they tend to be cautious in how they accept it.

18            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Nozica, before you continue

19    your questions, as regards the technical issue I mentioned a moment ago,

20    here is the situation:  Everything that is being said is live.  As you

21    know, usually we have a 30-minute delay in the broadcast.  For an unknown

22    reason, everything we're saying today is broadcast live, which means that

23    if somebody mentions the name of a protected witness or a confidential

24    event, there will be no possibility for us to redact the transcript,

25    because as said, everything is broadcast live.  Our technicians are trying

Page 26247

 1    to solve the problem, but for the time being it hasn't been.  So please be

 2    very careful.

 3            MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, for that

 4    warning.  I'll do my best.  And I think in the questions that I have

 5    prepared, there is not a single document which could be of the nature

 6    which you have just described.

 7       Q.   Now, Witness, your answer was that all the sides tried to use the

 8    wounded.  Now, the Trial Chamber here must gain the right impression, must

 9    gain an insight as to what the real conditions were when it came to the

10    HVO and children and civilians.  So a precise picture is what is needed.

11    And which of those conditions either of the parties was able to wield

12    influence on.

13            Now, I'd like us to continue this topic for us to see whether the

14    BH army accepted the solutions offered up by the international agencies

15    and organisations or --

16            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before we continue, we have a

17    document, a document that's been shown to you by the Defence.  As of the

18    3rd of September, obviously there has been discussions between the HVO and

19    the BH army on the issue of the evacuation of the wounded.  All of this,

20    of course, was done with the international community having been informed.

21    And suddenly - that's what the document shows, at least - the Muslim side

22    attacks.  An attack is carried out, and at 2.30 p.m. to be more specific.

23    Attack with mortar.

24            According to that document, 18 civilians were wounded.  Among them

25    five were children.  Five civilians were killed, and among those five

Page 26248

 1    killed there were also two children.  So two children were killed, and

 2    five were wounded.

 3            One could believe that since the BH army is attacking the HVO, all

 4    the victims are Croats.  In fact, that's not what the document says,

 5    because among the victims there are also eight Muslim civilians.  So it is

 6    quite surprising negotiations are going on, and then suddenly in the

 7    middle of those negotiations one of the parties decides to launch an

 8    attack.

 9            You were there at the time.  Do you have yourself have an

10    explanation to give?

11            THE WITNESS:  No, I am afraid not, Mr. President.  I don't have an

12    explanation.  Much that happened in the country at that time was

13    without -- objectively without explanation.  It seemed to be an attack

14    upon the foundations of the agreement.

15            But if I might just add this:  From personal experience in regard

16    to, for example, the situation in Sarajevo, when I negotiated there with

17    the Serbs, the answers had been given by the Serbs to my questions were

18    punctuated, I think is the word, by mortar shells which fell 20 metres

19    away.  And that was a mortar which was in fact Mr. Karadzic and General

20    Mladic who were actually conducting that negotiation.

21            So all I can say is, yes, I concede that -- that the circumstances

22    were rather bizarre, and worse than that, obviously, horrible, but I'm

23    afraid I can't put myself in the place of the parties.

24            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, you say that circumstances

25    were bizarre.  The question that comes to mind and to the Judge's mind in

Page 26249

 1    particular is the following:  Were there individuals that behind the back

 2    of the official negotiators were playing an entirely different score?

 3    Were they not trying to sabotage the agreement being negotiated, or maybe

 4    they were pursuing other more mysterious goals?  Did you have the feeling

 5    at any stage that there could be external individuals other than the

 6    negotiators themselves who would come there to sabotage the work that was

 7    being done?

 8            That's what -- I'm asking you because yesterday I was very

 9    impressed by the video that was shown to us, the video in which you met

10    HVO officials, and I thought I recognised at some stage General Petkovic.

11    And when one sees this video, one feels the climate, this almost fraternal

12    climate, this atmosphere that comes out of such meetings between

13    international representatives and HVO.  The atmosphere is very friendly,

14    as we saw yesterday in the video.  So this question comes to mind:  There

15    are negotiations.  Everybody is taking part in such negotiations, and then

16    those attacks take place and they come and disrupt the proceedings.

17            THE WITNESS:  Sir, I have worked in peacekeeping for nearly 20

18    years, and in maybe half a dozen examples, and I do not know the answer to

19    your question.

20            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

21            Ms. Nozica, please proceed.

22            MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

23       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, we're going to continue discussing the medical

24    evacuations.

25            Now, I started my question a moment ago, so I'll repeat it now.

Page 26250

 1    From the documents that I wish to present to you, what I want to see is

 2    whether the BH army, if it was, and you say it was, and I have no reason

 3    to doubt that, if it was in such a difficult situation with respect to the

 4    wounded, then did it use everything possible to help its people and its

 5    own wounded?

 6            Now, do you remember whether after this evacuation that we're

 7    discussing, that is the evacuation of the 1st of September, the HVO made

 8    suggestions and proposals to the BH army about the evacuation of the

 9    wounded, especially women and children, from the hospital in East Mostar

10    to the war hospital in West Mostar?  Do you remember what the response was

11    from the BH army when that request was made?  And we're talking about the

12    proposals and offers after this evacuation of the 1st -- from the 1st to

13    the 6th of September, 1993.

14       A.   I think that I -- I think that I do not have any memory of this

15    aspect of a very complicated negotiation and delivery of personnel,

16    wounded personnel.

17       Q.   Very well.  Now let's take a look at another document in my

18    binder.  It is, in fact, the last green document.  P 05428.  With the

19    green sticker.  The last document.  You've found it, I see.

20       A.   Well --

21       Q.   Now, if you look at the English version.

22       A.   Okay.

23       Q.   You will see that this is a report sent by the UN military

24    observers to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The date is the 27th of September, 1993.

25    It is a daily report for that particular day.  And would you turn to page

Page 26251

 1    5 of the English version and look at paragraph 4 on page 5.  It's a long

 2    report, but I'm interested in paragraph 4 on page 5, which is page 6 of

 3    the Croatian text.  And there on page 5, if you've found it, you will see

 4    paragraph 4, and there it talks about the continuation of the endeavours

 5    to help the wounded from the hospital, and it says: "Meetings.  East

 6    Mostar had routine meeting with 4th Corps."  It says: "Higher military

 7    observer met with General Pasalic."  It is General Pasalic, in fact,

 8    because in brackets it says "Commander of the 4th Corps of the BH army."

 9    "... discussed his recent refusal to negotiate with the HVO while they

10    continue shelling civilian targets.  Discussions went on to the wish for

11    peace.  Of course the obvious conflict between the two points was

12    highlighted."

13            Now, the next portion is very important.  "The HVO -- medical

14    evacuation for women and children to the west hospital has been offered by

15    the HVO.  However, it would appear that the Bosnian-Herzegovinian side is

16    unlikely to take advantage of this due to the political advantage that

17    such an arrangement or evacuation would give the HVO."

18            Can you remember discussions of this kind and refusal on the part

19    of the BH army with respect to the evacuation of civilians?  Perhaps it

20    would be a good idea to take a look at another document first, sir, which

21    you may have seen yourself.  The document is 2D 455.  And that might be

22    the proposal by the HVO.  It's the second document in my binder.

23            MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Could the usher help us out.  The

24    document number is 2D 455.

25       Q.   This is a document --

Page 26252

 1       A.   Thank you.

 2       Q.   -- which -- it's an HVO signed by the assistant chief of medical

 3    health care department, Mr. Ivan Bagaric.  It is dated the 16th of

 4    September 1993, and I'd just like to mention that a moment ago we read a

 5    report dated the 27th of September.  Now, in this document sent both to

 6    UNPROFOR and the Spanish Battalion, Mr. Bagaric is issuing a request to

 7    help the Muslim side -- to offer the Muslim side the accommodation and

 8    hospitalisation of civilians, especially women and children in the Mostar

 9    war hospital as well as other HVO hospitals.

10            Mr. Bagaric also says that the sick and wounded -- Muslim sick and

11    wounded would be guaranteed the same treatment as our civilians, and he

12    says, "We propose that the control of our work could be done by the

13    International Red Cross, the European or, rather, EC monitors and

14    UNPROFOR."  And he goes on it to say that: "We are doing this for only one

15    reason.  It is the humanitarian reason.  Therefore, we kindly ask you not

16    to make any political connotations to this matter."

17            So this is quite obviously related to the offer conveyed through

18    the UN monitors to the east side and Mr. Pasalic.

19            Can you remember anything linked to this type of situation?

20       A.   There was a -- there were steps towards a cease-fire and agreement

21    about that, to achieve that, from as early as late -- late July.  From

22    that time on, the basic concern of the parties -- I want to qualify this

23    in just a moment.  Basic concern of the parties was to advance their

24    position in respect of a potential settlement, especially in regard to

25    land, territory.

Page 26253

 1            The qualification I want to make is that of course that isn't a

 2    consistent pattern.  It didn't happen all the time.  And beyond that, I'm

 3    sorry, I cannot go.  There were very complicated cross-curtains --

 4    cross-currents there, and I am not really able to decipher them for you.

 5    I wish I could, but I can't.

 6       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, do you have information according to which the HVO

 7    offered the BH army medicines previously, prior to that, and that part of

 8    that the BH army accepted, that it also offered to transport the wounded

 9    to the war hospital in West Mostar and further on to Croatia, and that was

10    partially done?  And do you know that the HVO, even before these events,

11    offered the BH army the joint use of one of the hospitals in West Mostar

12    in which all the wounded would be put up together and who would be treated

13    by the same doctors, both Muslims and Croats, and which would be secured

14    by UNPROFOR?

15            Now, Mr. Thornberry, I don't want to make it difficult for you in

16    anyway.  You say you don't remember many of the details, but try and tell

17    me the things that you do remember.  And I'm asking you this for the

18    simple reason to see who actually cared for the wounded and civilians and

19    to what extent, but I am focusing now -- or, rather, I know that you had

20    far greater problems to deal with with respect to taking in humanitarian

21    aid, to bringing a stop to the hostilities and so on and so forth, but I

22    am always very sensitive when it comes to the wounded, especially women,

23    children, and anyone who was sick.  So what I'm asking you now is do you

24    know that the HVO made every effort even before this to resolve this

25    question in the best possible way, or in a better way than it had been

Page 26254

 1    resolved and then the conditions were at the hospital in East Mostar?

 2       A.   It would certainly not have been possible for them to have been

 3    worse.  But that much said, I -- I'm really in a quandary about this,

 4    because I know, and I'm sure you can tell me, madam, something of what was

 5    going on behind the scenes.  Not merely on the humanitarian but also on

 6    the political side.

 7            I've tried to suggest that, as I'm sure, madam, you are well

 8    aware, not everything seemed to be so actually was.  This is the

 9    difficulty which -- one of the difficulties that I faced at the moment.  I

10    wish I didn't.

11       Q.   Yes.  Yes.  Thank you for your answer.  I -- let me just make this

12    clear to you.  I thought that this document spoke for itself, the UN

13    military observer's document, which indicates that assistance to evacuate

14    the wounded was offered and the BH army rejected the offer saying that the

15    HVO would thus gain political points, so I am rather confused not just

16    you.  But I'm using documents that you should have been or could have been

17    familiar with, and you have great experience, so that's the reason why I

18    am asking you all these questions.

19            Let me just indicate for the transcript because I am afraid, I

20    think that I am right, the that document speaking about the HVO offer to

21    provide accommodation for the Muslim civilians and the BH army personnel

22    and the Croat civilians and the HVO personnel in a Mostar hospital, a

23    joint hospital, it's described in P 02923.  I think this document is under

24    seal.  It is in my binder, but I don't want to show it to the witness

25    because the witness itself -- well, in light of his answers.

Page 26255

 1            Finally, sir, on this topic, from all those documents that were

 2    shown to you, don't they show that the BH army was not ready -- or,

 3    rather, did not want for political or military reasons to accept even

 4    those solutions that were offered to it to alleviate the suffering of the

 5    wounded and the sick in the hospital in East Mostar in the period that is

 6    indicated in those documents?  Could you please just tell me what is your

 7    impression, even if this is the first time that you see or hear of these

 8    official documents.

 9       A.   I am sorry, what is the question therefore?

10       Q.   The question is based on your experience or the documents that

11    you've just seen, does it not follow, irrefutably, that the BH army

12    refused to accept the solutions that were placed at its disposal to help

13    the wounded in the East Mostar hospital?  And according to Mr. Pasalic's

14    statement, it is quite apparent that it did not do so.  It chose not to do

15    so for military or political reasons.

16       A.   There's a further reason, which is everybody was getting paranoid,

17    and it was very difficult for those of us who were trying to act at least

18    as some kind of brokers to persuade both sides that -- to -- to persuade

19    them that we were, in fact, in good faith.  But when the United Nations

20    also is challenged and it's good faith is challenged, the situation

21    becomes a bit more difficult still.  And I'm sorry, madam, I would like to

22    be able to answer your question more succinctly.  I wish it were the case

23    that there are black and white hatted cowboys, but there are not.  We

24    don't have clear indications here.

25            I don't want to confuse the matter further, so I'd better not

Page 26256

 1    continue.

 2       Q.   Yes.  You're giving me true political answers, and I fully

 3    understand -- understand them, but you did answer my question.  There is

 4    another reason, if I understand you correctly.  Therefore, you do agree

 5    that the reasons that I was talking about were also in play:  The

 6    deliberate decision not to accept what was offered for political or

 7    military reasons.

 8       A.   Yes.

 9       Q.   Fine.  Thank you very much.  In the end let me just ask you to

10    look at yet another document.  This one is the document that you yourself

11    drafted, and it will be easy for you to do so, but Judge Antonetti asked

12    you yesterday about some high-ranking persons that you met in the course

13    of your mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Can you recall whether you met

14    at any time with Mr. Ejup Ganic?  Do you remember who he was, and can you

15    very briefly share your impressions of that man with us?

16       A.   I did meet Ejup Ganic.  I met him several times.  I did not meet

17    him in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I met him in -- I met him in -- in -- let me

18    think.  I think it was actually in -- in the city.  I think it was --

19    sorry, the word is gone for one silly moment.

20            He was one of the people whom I consulted when I negotiated the

21    air and -- airfield.

22       Q.   That's correct, yes.

23       A.   And -- and Ganic was the person on the Croat side whom it was my

24    responsibility to interview and, if possible, to get on board for an

25    agreement to share the airfield.

Page 26257

 1            I would -- I would not want to -- to make an evaluation of

 2    Mr. Ganic.  He was a very shrewd political operator who sometimes provoked

 3    positive reactions and sometimes did not.  I found him moderately

 4    difficult to do business with.

 5       Q.   Thank you.  Sir, but let me just check.  I think that on page 26,

 6    line 20, you said that Mr. Ganic was a representative of the Croat side.

 7    Is that what you meant or did you make a mistake?

 8       A.   I'm not sure whom he represented, in fact.  There were times when

 9    it was very difficult to follow his activities.  He -- he tended to focus

10    in -- essentially in the -- in regard to events in the airfield matters,

11    in the headquarters, these kinds of matters, rather than a field

12    operation.

13       Q.   Sir, I think that your own report will serve to remind you whose

14    side -- which side he represented.

15            Let us look at the fourth document in my binder.  The number is

16    P 4395.

17       A.   I'm sorry, may I go back to Ganic?  I'd forgotten that I hadn't

18    given the answer to you on that one.

19            Mr. Ganic was one of my interlocutors in the main city, and I

20    dealt with him in regard to major questions of policy.  He was very close

21    to Mr. Izetbegovic.  In fact, he was really the major figure with

22    Mr. Izetbegovic until late July of 1993.  Around about late July.

23       Q.   Then, Mr. Thornberry, we can agree that he did not represent the

24    Croat side but, as you just indicated, the Muslim or the Bosniak side.

25       A.   Sorry about that.

Page 26258

 1       Q.   [In English] Okay.  [Interpretation] The usher is right next to

 2    you to assist you.  I asked for document P 04395?

 3            MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Could I please ask the usher to

 4    assist the witness in finding the English version and so that he can

 5    identify this document.

 6       Q.   This, sir, is a document that you yourself forwarded.  This is

 7    your report.  The date is the 22nd of August, 1993.  Could we please look

 8    at page 3 in the English version.  That would correspond to page 3 in the

 9    Croatian version too.  The sentence that's right below -- please go ahead.

10    You wanted to say something.

11       A.   Well, I was -- I was just wanting to be quite sure that we were

12    talking about the same document.  This document, is it letter from Viktor

13    Andreev to -- to me.  But I thought that it was -- it's on the 21st of

14    August.  Maybe there's some confusion about the number.

15       Q.   Yes, you may be right, in fact, but could you please look at the

16    document in English.  You could see that on the first page it says "From

17    Thornberry," and then on page 2 it says:  "From -- from -- from Andreev."

18    Yes.  But if you look at the document, I'm sure that you will be able to

19    recall it probably.  This is entitled the summary of political issues or

20    political situation, and if you can perhaps just tell us who did this

21    summary or overview of the political situation.

22            The passage that pertains to my question, that's on page 3 where

23    it says the area under the control of the BH Presidency.  It says here:

24    "While the BH delegation was in Geneva, Sarajevo has been left in the

25    hands of hardline vice-president Ganic.  All the time he has been

Page 26259

 1    increasingly aligning himself with the military commanders who talk of

 2    fighting on even if there is a settlement in Geneva, in order to achieve

 3    the goal of uniting BH."

 4            So the impressions that you shared with us about him, do they

 5    correspond with those presented in the report that you presented about

 6    Mr. Andreev and that you then forwarded to other addressees?  Does that

 7    reflect your impressions, at least in this period of time?

 8            MR. STRINGER:  Excuse me, Mr. President.

 9            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Stringer.

10            MR. STRINGER:  As I follow the questioning, I'm remembering my

11    direct examination yesterday and how it was limited by the scope of the

12    Trial Chamber's ruling on which basis this witness was asked to come

13    testify originally as a 92 bis witness as to matters for which we'd

14    indicated other witnesses had testified. The Trial Chamber again indicated

15    others had testified in corroboration of the relevant issues but that it

16    wanted to hear this witness on these issues.

17            There are clearly a good many reports that came to this witness or

18    which this witness sent on to others which were available to the

19    Prosecution which were not led in direct because we tried to limit

20    ourselves to the scope laid down by the Trial Chamber, and I don't think

21    that counsel now is -- is doing the same.

22            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  Let me remind Defence

23    counsel that initially we had been seized of a 92 bis motion, and the

24    witness statement could have been admitted because a number of testimonies

25    had already been heard on that point.  To entitle Defence to put question

Page 26260

 1    on Mostar and on another very specific points, we decided that Defence

 2    counsel could examine -- cross-examine this witness on very particular

 3    points, but now with the questions you're putting, you are addressing

 4    other issues.

 5            Either you have no questions to put concerning Mostar and in order

 6    to use your -- up your time you are addressing issues we have already

 7    seen.  This is why Mr. Stringer is standing up and objecting.

 8            What do you have to say to that, Ms. Nozica?

 9            MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe, and I may

10    have misinterpreted this, that the last question -- only the last question

11    that pertains to Mr. Ganic, is indeed related to the issue of Mostar to a

12    great extent.  And let me remind Your Honours that this has to do with the

13    witness who testified before this one here in court.  So this is why I

14    believe that this is a significant issue.  And let me just say that I

15    decided to ask this question precisely on the basis of the part of the

16    statement made by this witness where he indicated the names of the persons

17    that he met, and that is why I asked him whether he knew anything about

18    the person that he received reports about.

19            If, Your Honours, you believe that this is not relevant, the

20    witness has already in part answered my question, and I don't have any

21    other questions in this regard.  In fact, I have no further questions for

22    this witness, and this concludes my cross-examination.

23            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Thank you,

24    Ms. Nozica.  So your cross-examination has come to an end.

25            It might be better to have our 20-minute break now, and then we

Page 26261

 1    will resume our hearing and hear the cross-examination of another Defence

 2    counsel.

 3            We are now having a 20-minute break.

 4                          --- Recess taken at 3.34 p.m.

 5                          --- On resuming at 3.58 p.m.

 6            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.  I'd

 7    like to give the floor to the next Defence counsel.  Ms. Alaburic.

 8            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good

 9    afternoon, Witness, and everybody in the courtroom.  Just one note.  We've

10    switched with the General Praljak's Defence just so that we're all clear

11    that General Praljak's Defence will be cross-examining this witness too.

12                          Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:

13       Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Thornberry, my name is Vesna Alaburic.  I'm

14    an attorney from Zagreb, and in this trial I'm representing General

15    Milivoj Petkovic.

16            I would like to ask you to clarify some details from your

17    statement, and we will also be using some documents to see to what

18    extent -- please go ahead.

19       A.   Sir, I wasn't sure whether we had finished the lady's comments on

20    Mr. Ganic.  Did you want me to complete what I was saying about Mr. Ganic?

21            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Would you like to add something

22    to your answer?  Please do so if you wish to do so.

23            THE WITNESS:  Yes.  I do know Mr. Ganic.  I've known him for a

24    number of years, and he is vice-president and has a very wide range of

25    contacts, shall we say, and -- and is a very consummate politician, I

Page 26262

 1    would say.

 2            That's all, sir.  Thank you.

 3            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

 4       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, in your statement, in paragraph 54 -- or, rather,

 5    56, I apologise, you said that you visited East Mostar, and then you went

 6    on to visit West Mostar, and then you said, let me quote -- could you

 7    please listen to what I'm saying.  I don't think that it will be necessary

 8    for you to look at it, but if you want, please do so.  This is a document

 9    in the Prosecutor binder, and the number is P 10041.

10            The sentence that I'm interested in reads as follows:  "We then

11    went to see the HVO in Mostar where they continued the attacks on the UN."

12       A.   I'm sorry, I'm really at a loss.  I cannot figure out which

13    paragraph the witness [sic] --

14            JUDGE TRECHSEL:  It's in this binder, the Prosecution binder

15    [Microphone not activated]

16            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

17       Q.   Paragraph 56.

18            THE WITNESS:  Mr. President, I've got the paragraph now.  Thank

19    you very much.

20            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

21       Q.   So in paragraph 56 -- let me assist you.  It is in the bottom half

22    of the paragraph.

23       A.   Yes.

24       Q.   You found it.  Okay.  So the sentence that I would like you to you

25    to clarify reads as follows.  I understand you to be saying that the HVO

Page 26263

 1    continued with its attacks on the UN.  Did I understand your statement

 2    correctly?

 3       A.   Well, I still can't be sure that the paragraph that I am looking

 4    at is the one from which the witness [sic] is quoting.  I have a paragraph

 5    that begins 56:  "In mid-August I passed through Split and was approached

 6    by my own staff," et cetera.  Would that be the same paragraph from which

 7    the witness [sic] is commenting?

 8       Q.   Yes.  Yes.  That's the paragraph I'm talking about.  Now, could

 9    you please look at the middle of this paragraph.

10       A.   Yes, I've got it.

11       Q.   I think it's line 8, so you say:  "We then went to see the HVO in

12    Mostar where they continued the attacks on the UN."

13            Could you please tell us first whether this is what you actually

14    meant to say, that the HVO continued with its attacks on the UN?  Are we

15    talking about the HVO attacks?

16       A.   I'm sorry, I simply cannot find this sentence here.

17            JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry, there is -- in the translation there

18    is a little difference.  The sentence does not say that they continued to

19    attack but that they proceeded to attack, and it is not necessarily the

20    same meaning.  It may be something quite different, and it may be also a

21    verbal attack.  I do not know, but maybe it is easy now to -- it's really

22    line 8 from the top.

23            THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Mr. President, thank you.  I've got it now.  I

24    understand that there are slight differences between the translation and

25    the original.

Page 26264

 1            I have this sentence, madam.

 2            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

 3       Q.   So my question was:  What HVO attacks on the UN are we talking

 4    about here?  Can you explain that?

 5       A.  " ... they proceeded to attack the UN," are the words that I

 6    understand, and that of course refers to verbal harassment or haranguing,

 7    and it might say Mostar where they proceeded verbally to attack the United

 8    Nations.  That would be a possibility.

 9       Q.   Fine.  Let's us assume that these were really verbal attacks, if

10    we assume that.  Could you please explain to us who it was in the HVO that

11    verbally attacked the United Nations?

12       A.   No.  I'm afraid I could not.  I have no memory of this -- of this

13    particular section of this particular paragraph.  I'm sorry.  I wish it

14    were different.

15       Q.   Fine.  We will now skip two sentences, and let us look at the

16    sentence that is -- that starts in the fourth line from the bottom in the

17    same paragraph.  I will read it in English so that we may avoid

18    differences in translation.  [In English] "Although the HVO officials we

19    met with did not say this directly, the gist of their response was that

20    they would kill us if we attempted to enter East Mostar."

21            [Interpretation] Mr. Thornberry, could you tell us whether this

22    means that the HVO would kill those who entered East Mostar, or is the

23    meaning of it different?

24       A.   I think we -- as I seem to remember, we discussed this sentence

25    yesterday, and I was at pains to emphasise that it was a -- a rather gross

Page 26265

 1    oversimplification of perhaps a rather complicated idea.

 2       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, could you please tell us whether this sentence

 3    actually means that the HVO would kill those who went to East Mostar or

 4    the BH army, regardless of whether this was an exaggeration or not?

 5       A.   Well, it was a gross exaggeration.  Well, I don't -- I may say I

 6    don't have memory of this sentence, but -- of this paragraph, but earlier

 7    in the paragraph it refers to HVO personnel, and it seems to be the case

 8    that that sentence or that paragraph is continuing over the next two or

 9    three lines so that what the sentence appears to say is that -- that the

10    Bosnian Croats threatened us, and if this -- if we attempted to enter East

11    Mostar.

12            I emphasised yesterday just for our memory's sake that I said that

13    this was a serious overstatement and that the sentence was an

14    exaggeration, an exaggeration from the standpoint of -- of attributing

15    actions and threats without there being any justification for such

16    behaviour.  That's what I was trying to say.

17       Q.   Fine.  Let us move on, and I believe that we will be able to

18    clarify the relationship of the HVO towards UNPROFOR and the convoy

19    heading for East Mostar later.

20            Mr. Thornberry, you told us that East Mostar was for a time under

21    siege; is that correct?

22       A.   Yes.

23       Q.   In the document that was shown to you by the Prosecutor yesterday,

24    you don't have to go looking for it, and let me just state for the record

25    that this is document P 03858, this is a press release by Shannon Boyd,

Page 26266

 1    the date is the 21st of August, 1993, and in this document it says -- Mr.

 2    Thornberry, please just listen to me carefully.  It will be sufficient for

 3    you to understand my question.  You don't have to do anything else.

 4            And it says in this document Commander Budakovic said that the

 5    Presidency would agree with the cease-fire but that they have to maintain

 6    the corridor towards Jablanica.  Budakovic who is mentioned here is a

 7    commander of the BH army.  The Presidency that is mentioned here is the

 8    Muslim civilian government in East Mostar.  And my question to you is as

 9    follows:  Were you aware of the existence the corridor linking Mostar and

10    Jablanica?

11       A.   Yes.  But if you proceed to ask me what does it -- what -- what

12    was carried along that corridor I might have some difficulty, because I

13    remember being told, and this was something which had to be incorporated

14    from any agreement.  The agreement, if it was to have an adequate support

15    on all sides, it would have to take that particular corridor into account.

16       Q.   Yes.  We'll come to the corridor and discuss it in greater detail

17    on the basis of some documents in due course, but I'd just like now to ask

18    you to clarify part of this statement that I quoted, and from the

19    statement it would emerge that the command of the BH army in Mostar in

20    fact conditioned the cease-fire and humanitarian aid to Mostar with a

21    military element, that is to say by maintaining the corridor towards

22    Jablanica.  Those were his conditions.

23            Now, my question to is this:  Were you aware of, did you know that

24    the BH army commanders primarily wanted to achieve some military goals

25    even at the expense [Realtime transcript read in error "extent"] of a

Page 26267

 1    humanitarian catastrophe in East Mostar?

 2       A.   I'm sorry to say, madam, that that was the impression which all of

 3    the gentlemen left with us.

 4       Q.   I'd now like to ask you, and may I have the usher's assistance,

 5    please, in helping the witness out, to take a look at document 4D - in my

 6    set of documents - 4D 770.   It's a document --

 7            JUDGE TRECHSEL:  May I draw attention to a line in line 37.2 in

 8    the transcript.  It is said "even at the extent of a humanitarian

 9    catastrophe," I think was the word, "in East Mostar." But I think it's not

10    "at the extent" but "at the expense" that you were asking, wasn't it?

11            THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter notes that she said "expense."

12            JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  The interpreters have put it right.

13    I'm sorry.

14            THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, counsel, please.  Microphone please,

15    counsel.

16            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes.  That was my question, that

17    certain military goals were reached at the expense of the humanitarian

18    situation in Mostar.  So I thank Judge Trechsel for that.

19       Q.   Now, Mr. Thornberry, look at the next document, please, which I

20    would like you to comment, and I'd like us to take a look at the third

21    paragraph from the bottom.  At the end of that document, the third

22    paragraph from the bottom where Sulejman Budakovic, writing to his

23    superior, Rasim Delic, says, and I quote:  "It would also be good if a

24    helicopter could be found to bring us the approved mortar shells (648

25    pieces from Krupa) to Glogova which is halfway between Jablanica and

Page 26268

 1    Mostar (on the road that our convoy carrying materiel and technical

 2    equipment is travelling)."

 3            Now, this sentence, Mr. Thornberry, indicates to us that the BH

 4    army had this route between Jablanica and Mostar for convoys carrying

 5    materiel and technical equipment, MTS.  Now, tell us, were you aware of

 6    the fact that that particular corridor running from Jablanica to Mostar is

 7    one that the BH army used to bring in weapons and other materiel and

 8    technical equipment?

 9       A.   No, I did not.

10       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, how would you comment on the following situation

11    on the assumption that it is correct:  There's a corridor.  It is the

12    Jablanica-Mostar corridor, and the BH army uses that corridor to bring in

13    tonnes, or perhaps that's an exaggeration, hundreds of kilogrammes of

14    materiel and technical equipment, and at the same time that same corridor

15    is not being used to bring in food and other necessities for the life of

16    the population in East Mostar.  Now, what would be your comments to that

17    situation on the assumption that it is a correct rendition of the

18    situation?

19       A.   Hmm, they would be adverse comments, and beyond that I could not

20    go unless I had a lot more information available to me.  This was a very

21    hot route, as counsel will be aware, and it was going to have to be tidied

22    up before it became in any effective way a corridor for bringing in

23    humanitarian elements.

24       Q.   Do you mean to say by that that there was no impediment to

25    bringing in hundreds of thousands of materiel and technical equipment,

Page 26269

 1    military equipment, but that that same corridor would not be suitable for

 2    bringing in food?  Is that what you wanted to say?

 3       A.   No.  I wanted to say what I did say, actually.

 4       Q.   Very well.  I must admit that I didn't understand you fully, but

 5    let's move on.

 6            Now, look at that same document, please --

 7       A.   Yes.

 8       Q.   By Sulejman Budakovic and the date is the 25th, 26th of August,

 9    1993.  Can you tell us where you were at that time on that day?

10       A.   Please, I'm just looking for that date.  25, 26 August.  I would

11    need to research a little bit in order to identify that.  It looks to me

12    as if it was a date -- it was certainly a date within which the

13    discussions and consultations and arguments were taking place about the

14    use of that corridor, amongst others, the use of that corridor for

15    bringing in foodstuffs and -- and medicaments.

16       Q.   Can we agree, Mr. Thornberry, that at that time you were in

17    Mostar?

18       A.   Oh, dear.  No, I'm sorry.  I would like to agree it, subject to

19    our discussion, but I don't know where my information on that is currently

20    at this time.  I would have to -- I would have to take a little bit of

21    time to look within the archives or within the papers available now today

22    before I could actually go ahead and agree -- and agree on that matter.

23            I'm sorry that it's so difficult for me to answer your questions,

24    but a number of these questions go into areas which it's very difficult

25    for me to recall.

Page 26270

 1       Q.   Very well, Witness.  That is the time that you mention in your

 2    statement as the time when the convoy entered East Mostar, and we know

 3    from your statement that that is indeed the time that you were there.

 4    However, it's not essential that you remember that at the present time.

 5    We can establish that on the basis of the documents.

 6            I'd like to draw your attention to one more fact now, something

 7    that you mention -- well, an assertion you made in actual fact, not a

 8    fact.  There was mention about the difficult situation for civilians in

 9    East Mostar.  I'm sure you will remember that?

10       A.   Yes.  Yes.

11       Q.   I'd like to show you now part of the testimony of a witness, it

12    was a protected witness, so I'm not going to mention the name, but for the

13    record and for anybody who wishes to check it out it was Witness BB, and

14    I'm going to quote the testimony.  It was on the record, on page 25335.

15    And I'm going quote --

16            MR. STRINGER:  Mr. President, if we're going to quote from

17    closed-session testimony, I think we should be in private session to do

18    that, because that testimony is currently confidential under a protective

19    order of the Trial Chamber.

20            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Indeed.  Mrs. Alaburic, should

21    wish to quote Witness BB, I'd like to remind you that this testimony is

22    confidential.  So we should go into closed session.

23            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise for not

24    thinking of that myself, and I thank Mr. Stringer for stepping in.  So may

25    we move into closed -- or, rather, private session?

Page 26271

 1            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's move to closed session.

 2                          [Private session]

 3  (redacted)

 4  (redacted)

 5  (redacted)

 6  (redacted)

 7  (redacted)

 8  (redacted)

 9  (redacted)

10  (redacted)

11  (redacted)

12  (redacted)

13  (redacted)

14  (redacted)

15  (redacted)

16  (redacted)

17  (redacted)

18  (redacted)

19  (redacted)

20  (redacted)

21  (redacted)

22  (redacted)

23  (redacted)

24  (redacted)

25  (redacted)

Page 26272

 1    (redacted)

 2                          [Open session]

 3            THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we are back in open session.

 4            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

 5       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, my question to you is this:  Did you know that

 6    there were inhabitants in East Mostar who wished to leave East Mostar but

 7    the Muslim authorities in East Mostar didn't let them?  Were you aware of

 8    that fact?

 9       A.   Well, yes.  Much of the population wanted to leave East Mostar.

10       Q.   Can we then make the following conclusion:  That the BH army used

11    the civilians in East Mostar for achieving its military goals?

12       A.   I think you would have to get better information than I can give

13    on that subject.  It's very difficult for me to have an open discussion in

14    the circumstances.

15            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  This question is an

16    important question.  You have just answered by saying that most of the

17    people in East Mostar wanted to leave East Mostar.  That is what you said,

18    but the question put to you by Ms. Alaburic was a broader question.  She

19    was asking you whether the Muslim authorities were preventing these people

20    from leaving East Mostar. So were you made aware of this?  What do you

21    have to say about it?  What can you tell us about this?

22            THE WITNESS:  First of all, if I may say so, I -- in the -- I

23    think in the third line, I think that I intended to say much of the

24    population in East Mostar rather than the phrase which I think -- I think

25    you said the most.  I don't think I ventured as far as "most," but I'm

Page 26273

 1    quite willing to be -- for the matter to be clarified.

 2            Now, I have to say that I believe that it's quite likely that --

 3    that much of the population would have liked to leave -- to leave East

 4    Mostar because conditions there were becoming so really dreadful.  Yes, I

 5    think that's the answer I want to give.

 6            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  Very well.  But -- that's

 7    your answer, but you haven't answered the question.  They wanted to leave.

 8    Why couldn't they leave?  Why not?

 9            THE WITNESS:  Well, I think it's in the nature of a siege, sir,

10    that it is -- that the population cannot move individually and -- and upon

11    their own personal decisions.  And I think that's the situation -- that

12    was the situation at that time, namely that some people -- some people

13    from East Mostar wanted to leave and were not able to leave in part

14    because of prevention by the -- by the -- I'm sorry, I've lost my place in

15    the -- by the -- by the -- by the authorities of the -- of East Mostar,

16    and there were, to my knowledge in any event, a number of different groups

17    within East Mostar who did not agree with everything or even perhaps in

18    some cases with anything which the notional government of East Mostar

19    wanted to impose.  It would be very surprising to me if -- if there were

20    not, in fact, splinter groups, groups which are based on different ethnic

21    foundation.

22            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

23       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, I'd like to move on to another topic now, the

24    media campaign, and I'd like to remind you that in paragraph 59 of your

25    statement - you needn't look for it - you said that the tactics of taking

Page 26274

 1    TV crews with you in this case proved to be very successful.

 2            Now, I'd like to show you a document, once again compiled by

 3    Sulejman Budakovic, about the media campaign, so let's take a look at it

 4    together.  It is 4D 00722.

 5            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] May we have the usher's help,

 6    please, in assisting the witness.

 7            THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 8            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

 9       Q.   In this document Sulejman Budakovic refers to a meeting with you,

10    you needn't worry about the spelling of your name.  Now, in certain parts

11    of the former Yugoslavia names were phonetically transcribed as they were

12    pronounced, but I'm interested in the last portion where Sulejman

13    Budakovic says that "Except for media presentation of Mr. Cedric

14    Thornberry and a donation of 300 kilogrammes of medicines, nothing

15    specific was done to help the hungry citizens of Mostar and the

16    surrounding areas.

17            Now, the media campaigns is what we're discussing, and I would

18    like to ask you the following, Mr. Thornberry:  Did you have any

19    experience in organising media campaigns, and did you know how in media

20    terms, a problem should be presented for the public to become aware of the

21    problem to the greatest possible extent, to raise public awareness of a

22    problem?

23       A.   Well, I've had several experiences in that field, most notably in

24    Namibia at around the same time as this.  In Namibia to a very large

25    degree the success of the campaign was based upon a high level of coverage

Page 26275

 1    of electronic and ordinary coverage.

 2            We had tried to organise a campaign in --

 3       Q.   Witness, I do apologise for interrupting you.  However, I'd like

 4    us to discuss the campaign in greater detail device for East Mostar, not

 5    focusing on Namibia.  I apologise for that, but tell me whether the

 6    purpose of this media campaign, the one we're discussing now, the East

 7    Mostar campaign, to have the world public see the difficult situation in

 8    East Mostar, to portray the difficult situation in East Mostar, was that

 9    the purpose of the campaign?

10       A.   I would recollect that the purpose of the campaign was to shake

11    some of the media and indeed even some of the public authorities elsewhere

12    in the world.  My desire -- our intent was to -- to make that campaign

13    more effective perhaps by bringing home to the Western world's and other

14    groups, I may say, not only the Western world, but was to try to bring

15    home to other peoples in the world the -- the dreadful conditions in that

16    country.  So, yes, the answer is the main purpose of that campaign was to

17    bring home, to shake from their complacency a large number of people who

18    normally one would have expected would be operating in -- not only in a

19    public relations but in a practical way to help relieve the population of

20    this city.

21       Q.   Very well.  Now tell us, please, the following:  Can you -- would

22    you agree with me that a media campaign can be effective if in a simple

23    and well-devised way indicates the problem?  So it has to be striking.

24       A.   It depends who's going to be struck.  I mean, you could have a

25    target audience.

Page 26276

 1       Q.   In this case specific as you've said, and as we've seen on the

 2    basis of a number of documents, the targeted audience was the population

 3    of the Western countries, which was supposed to exert influence on the

 4    government of its country, to take more energetic measures in resolving

 5    the problem in Mostar.  Can we agree that that was the object of the

 6    campaign?

 7       A.   You put it much more succinctly than I did.  Thank you.

 8       Q.   So can we agree then that if we wish to achieve that goal in our

 9    media campaign that the message we send out to the public must be simple,

10    easily understood, and convincing?

11       A.   That helps too, yes.

12       Q.   Tell us, please, if in a media campaign you wish to indicate the

13    difficult situation of the Muslim population in East Mostar, for instance,

14    would you in that case indicate the fact that the Muslim authorities do

15    not wish to use the possibility of bringing in food to that part of Mostar

16    or that the Muslim authorities do not wish to reduce the number of

17    inhabitants in East Mostar and thereby make the situation easier for the

18    rest of the population, or would you keep quiet in that media campaign

19    about circumstances like that?

20       A.   Madam, I would follow the cogent advice which you had just given

21    us.  I agree with it.  It is a very good idea to have simple and striking

22    images to bring home.

23            We think that the various media groups which came there with us

24    were actually doing that.  They were -- that was their -- that was their

25    task.  Many of them were highly professional and practical-minded media

Page 26277

 1    people, and basically I think the best thing we could do was to stand

 2    aside and -- and let them get on with the job.

 3       Q.   Very well.  Thank you for that answer.  Now, can we just clarify

 4    something else while we're on this subject?  Can we agree, you and I, that

 5    some political conclusions based on -- or an attempt to establish the

 6    facts on the basis of what was contained in a media campaign, that there's

 7    great probability that those conclusions will not be correct, or, rather,

 8    that they will be incomplete, that most probably they would be

 9    over-simplified?

10       A.   I think that's a constant problem in running a media campaign,

11    that not only may it hit to the wrong -- hit the wrong targets and hit

12    them with weapons or -- I mean with darts, with means, it's -- it's

13    important to -- as we've already agreed, it's important to have a

14    thoroughly professional and well-targeted campaign.

15            I'm sorry, I'm perhaps losing you in translation at the moment,

16    but I'm a little puzzled.  I'm trying to find a way of communicating.

17            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, the media campaign, as

18    I can see in paragraph 59, that you did address this issue, and you

19    confirmed, because you told Defence counsel that you felt it was useful to

20    have the media play a part by inviting them to come when you toured the

21    country.  So, for instance, when you went and visited the hospital in East

22    Mostar, we've seen the video footage, and C -- CNN media crew came along

23    with you, and we can see, for instance, a child suffering on a hospital

24    bed.  Of course this will have a huge impact, but you were neutral, and

25    this was a part you were playing because you were a UN civil servant.

Page 26278

 1            Why didn't you ask CNN to come to the hospital in West Mostar so

 2    that they could also show a small child in that hospital also who was

 3    being treated there?  So how did you take your decisions?  Why did you

 4    decide to have the media come along with you in one place and not another

 5    against the backdrop of your objectivity, which should be the golden rule

 6    when you have such a mission to carry out?

 7            THE WITNESS:  When objectivity, however, turns into passivity, we

 8    have a problem, and one of the reasons why we found ourselves in the

 9    invidious position of trying to -- to preclude some of the barbarity which

10    was still being practised, I think that we were based to some extent --

11    our actions were based to some extent by information which was already

12    coming to us when we went into East Mostar.

13            The situation, sir, which I might very briefly mention was one in

14    which the -- the campaign which has been referred to, was a rather blunt

15    instrument.  It -- it -- it hit rather bluntly, but it's very difficult,

16    sir, or we found it very difficult some years ago to -- to impact upon a

17    very broad population.  That was what we attempted to do.  I think we were

18    actually remarkably successful, and not all UN campaigns, information

19    campaigns, have been so successful.  But I am absolutely available, sir,

20    should you be more precise about the aspects of the campaign which --

21    which you feel were lacking.

22            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] When you decided to ask a

23    television crew to come along with you, was this a personal initiative, or

24    were you obeying orders from the top inside the UN?

25            THE WITNESS:  I'm afraid that -- I'm afraid that at that time,

Page 26279

 1    sir, we were the top.  Nobody else was much interested in what was

 2    happening in Mostar.  That's the blunt truth, I'm afraid.  And, sir, I

 3    would like just to defend the impartiality of the United Nations.  It

 4    doesn't mean neutrality.  Not to my understanding, in any event.

 5            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for your answer.

 6            We have a question.

 7            JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Still insisting a little bit on this aspect.  It

 8    does appear that -- that your campaign was a unilateral campaign which in

 9    a way took sides and put the blame on one of -- of two parties.  Was that

10    not so?

11            THE WITNESS:  I -- I wouldn't -- I wouldn't -- first of all, it's

12    a long time ago, and my memory is no better than that of someone of my

13    age, but I don't think that our approach to this was unilateral.  We

14    operated locally through the local authorities, whoever they might have

15    been, and we've had a discussion on that subject.  But also, we sought --

16    while we were there in Mostar on the first of our visits, we tried to

17    gather as much information as we could.  We had public information people

18    with us, and I don't think that our -- our campaign was as sophisticated

19    as it might have been in the sense of targeting an area which was, if I

20    may say, was very well-explored by counsel.

21            So I don't -- I don't really see how we could get a more precisely

22    focused campaign on that first voyage, on that first trip.  Later perhaps

23    it might have been said we should have done this or we should have done

24    that, but in the meantime people were being fed.  Children were being

25    cared for in hospitals.  It is -- it was very easy for outsiders, and some

Page 26280

 1    of them did, not many but some of them did, some people were critical of

 2    us.  They said, "Well, you should have gone through the established

 3    channels."  The established channels had existed since time began and

 4    there was still the edge of famine in that city.

 5            I don't myself see the -- I'm the first person to concede that we

 6    may have got something wrong, but I don't think we got something wrong,

 7    and certainly the media didn't think so.  I hope.

 8            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.

 9            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

10       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, since I believe that I know a thing or two about

11    the media, I would say -- I would agree with you that this was a good

12    media campaign, and I'm not trying to challenge it either from the point

13    of view of the legitimacy of the objective or anything.  What I'm

14    interested in is a legal issue, and because you're lawyer, I believe that

15    we will be able to come to an agreement.

16            If we are trying to determine facts relevant to a criminal -- to

17    the criminal proceedings as lawyers, then we will not be relying on the

18    products of a media campaign.  Can we agree on that in principle?

19       A.   No, not necessarily, madam, because you may have a campaign which

20    would develop its own momentum and in that form, in other words a

21    strengthened form, become more effective.  I think you perhaps, madam,

22    would accept that there can be.  This is a -- a campaign which -- which

23    rolls forward, you hope, not backwards.  But -- yeah, sorry, stop, full

24    stop.

25       Q.   Well, we could discuss this topic, which is one of the most

Page 26281

 1    interesting topics in law as far as I'm concerned, for a long time, but we

 2    have to deal with other topics.

 3            In paragraph 69 of your paragraph you're talking --

 4            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm told that you've had your 40

 5    minutes.  How much time have other Defence counsel given you?

 6            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I -- I have been ceded the time

 7    that was allotted to Mr. Pusic's Defence.

 8            MR. STRINGER:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  Just while we're having

 9    this brief intervention, I have some news about the next witness that I'd

10    like to share with the Trial Chamber and counsel at some time before we

11    break today, which might affect our scheduling for tomorrow.

12            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So you can let us

13    know when we finish.  We shall finish with this witness at half past 5.00

14    because he needs to have a rest.  So you will let us know after that.  All

15    right?  So let's proceed.

16            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

17       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, in paragraph 69 we have this very brief sentence.

18    I'm going to read it.  You don't have to look for it.  You talk about the

19    shelling, and you say:  "[In English] It was my impression that the

20    civilians themselves were just as much a target of attack as the

21    military."

22            [Interpretation] I would like to know what facts is this

23    impression of yours based.

24       A.   Information made to us locally by the local authorities, by what

25    we had learned from our military information people before, during, and

Page 26282

 1    after our visit to Mostar.  I'm sure you know what I mean by that.  And I

 2    think those are the two main sources, but some governments also provided

 3    us with information which has -- which turned out to be extremely

 4    accurate, in my opinion, and which was based on the principle of

 5    self-defence.  Article 51.

 6       Q.   When you say the local government, do you mean the Muslim local

 7    government?

 8       A.   Well, was there another one which was functioning in that area?  I

 9    only ask because I'm not aware of it.

10       Q.   Well, you may have gotten this information from the Croatian

11    government or authorities in West Mostar.  That's why I wanted to clarify

12    this point.

13            Mr. Thornberry, could you please tell me, did you know how many BH

14    army units were deployed in East Mostar area and how many troops did the

15    BH army have in that part of Mostar?

16       A.   I'm afraid I could not answer the question.  I didn't have the

17    data now, and I didn't have it then, I'm afraid.

18       Q.   Could you please tell us, did the local authorities, Muslim or

19    otherwise, give you the information that the BH army often set up

20    artillery weapons close to the hospital that you visited or close to

21    mosques or some other buildings where relatively large quantities of

22    civilians would gather?  Did you ever get this kind of information?

23       A.   We acquired quite a lot of such information, yes.  Maybe you would

24    like to elaborate on your -- on your question, madam.

25       Q.   No, no.  I'm quite happy with your answer, because in UNPROFOR

Page 26283

 1    documents we did find a number of warnings to the effect that the BH army

 2    was setting up its artillery weapons close to such locations.  And in this

 3    regard, I would like to ask you the following:  We heard an analysis in

 4    this courtroom provided to us by a Prosecution expert about the shelling

 5    of Mostar, and among his findings - I'm quoting from memory now - was that

 6    about 75 per cent -- or, rather, three-quarters of the casualties in East

 7    Mostar were men of military age.

 8            Were you aware of this information or information of this sort or

 9    to that effect?

10       A.   I certainly heard from officials and professionals in that area, I

11    mean by that doctors and consultants, specialists, surgeons, what their

12    findings were.  I'm sure I could -- if it was necessary, I'm sure I could

13    find that information, or nearly sure.

14            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, you moved around East

15    Mostar, so this is an important question.  As far as you're concerned, did

16    you see with your own eyes armed soldiers of the ABiH in East Mostar?

17    With your own eyes, I mean, not what X, Y, Z would have told you.  Did you

18    personally with your own eyes see any?

19            THE WITNESS:  I believe so, sir.  I have to say that because I

20    cannot be at this distance so sure as to be able to say with absolute

21    precision, to answer that question with absolute precision.

22            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It means that you think you

23    remember having seen soldiers.

24            THE WITNESS:  Yes.  That is exactly the case.

25            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let me go back to the hospital.

Page 26284

 1    We heard witnesses here, and they talked about that hospital that you

 2    know, and they said that next to the hospital there were ABiH mortar

 3    shells and that they were hitting HVO positions.  You see how the whole

 4    thing was going on?  There were mortars next to the hospital, and those

 5    mortars are used to shoot.  The HVO, which is the target of the shells, is

 6    reacting.  Do you think that's quite an extraordinary situation?  Is this

 7    a realistic description of what happened?

 8            THE WITNESS:  Is -- is it an accurate description of what

 9    happened?  I'm sorry, I didn't -- I missed a part of your question, sir.

10            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I -- I want to know if the

11    situation as described by some witnesses, and given what you were in a

12    position to witness, is the situation possible?  Was it possible for the

13    ABiH, from the hospital in East Mostar, to target the HVO knowing that the

14    HVO will shoot back and that this would cause damage either to the

15    hospital, either among the people who would be killed next to the

16    hospital, and of course knowing that the media will portray the situation?

17            THE WITNESS:  I'm not quite sure I know how to answer this

18    question.  In every peacekeeping operation that I have had participation,

19    including those of the Middle East, allegations have centred on such

20    allegations as these.  Similarly with the use of troops as storm-troopers

21    basically.

22            I don't remember having seen these events.  In part, at least, my

23    answer would be based upon some of the reliable sources that I can

24    identify, I think I can identify, and those sources which included also

25    the Spanish authorities were available to me.  I don't know whether they

Page 26285

 1    were accurate.  I do know that they're likely to be much more accurate

 2    than we are now today sitting here.  But it's very hard, sir, to --

 3            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you didn't see anything.  You

 4    didn't see mortars.

 5            THE WITNESS:  Oh, I did.  Oh, I did.

 6            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You did see mortars next to the

 7    hospital?

 8            THE WITNESS:  No, I didn't say that.  I didn't say that I had seen

 9    them close to the hospital.  I did say that I had seen mortars in the --

10    in that part of the city, in eastern -- on the eastern side of the city.

11            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

12            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

13       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, I would like us to move on to a different topic

14    now.  It has to do with paragraph 55 of your statement where you say that

15    it was considered to be undoubted that the Bosnian Croats were trying to

16    cut off a part -- to carve off a part of Bosnia for themselves.  I would

17    like to ask you a couple of questions about that.

18            Were you aware of the fact that the Vance-Owen Peace Plan from

19    January 1993 envisaged that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be set up as a state

20    comprising ten provinces and that three of the ten provinces were supposed

21    to be so-called Croat provinces?  So were you aware of that plan?

22       A.   Well, of course they were not only based on -- on the idea of ten

23    provinces, but they were also based upon the agreement of the parties.

24    What wasn't particularly agreed was when the parties simply started

25    hitting each other on the head with clubs.  That wasn't part of

Page 26286

 1    Vance-Owen.  That was a trial of strength, and that was what from about

 2    the end of July onwards, really until Dayton, really what we saw.  And I

 3    think in a way it's -- I -- I wouldn't want to emphasise this too -- too

 4    strongly, I don't think so, but you didn't have to dig very far to find

 5    exactly what was going on politically, and those politics were tending to

 6    impact upon the local authorities.

 7       Q.   What I'm interested in at this time is whether you were aware that

 8    the representatives of Bosnian Croats, as early as in January 1993,

 9    accepted the plan that was put on the table.

10       A.   Yeah.  Accepted until next time it became necessary to find some

11    other alternative.

12       Q.   At the end of our conversation today we will find out what led to

13    the search for other alternatives, but you can take my word for it now

14    that the representatives of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina signed all

15    the elements of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan from January 1993.  Let us now

16    assume that this is indeed so.

17            Can we then conclude that in January 1993 it was not doubtful at

18    all that Croats saw their future within the state of Bosnia and

19    Herzegovina as a state in which Croats would have their own entity, a

20    composite state?

21       A.   But, madam, would you agree that at most -- during most parts of

22    1993 the weakest militarily body was in fact that corresponding to the

23    HVO?  I ask this because I think it is almost -- perhaps almost

24    universally held that the Croats and the Croatian authorities were in a --

25    in a worse condition militarily, in terms of strength, and that those

Page 26287

 1    circumstances, and it -- and it could be said that much of the Croatian

 2    concern was to safeguard what they hoped had been agreed, what had been

 3    established during the various bilateral and multi-lateral talks which

 4    were going on at that time, which were going on frequently at that time.

 5    I understand that -- thank you.

 6       Q.   Yes.  I would agree with you, and perhaps we could reformulate

 7    this conclusion.  Please listen to me and tell me whether we can agree

 8    that the representatives of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as early

 9    as in January 1993, wanted to find a peaceful solution to the problems and

10    that they were happy with what the Vance-Owen Peace Plan envisaged for

11    them?

12       A.   Yes.  I would agree with that, especially as I knew -- I knew that

13    talks were taking place between Muslim and HVO authorities on a fairly

14    frequent basis and had been doing so since -- since about January,

15    February of that time.  This inevitably -- must inevitably have an impact

16    upon the strategy and the overall game plan of one of the sides in a -- in

17    a terribly wrought situation as we have been describing.

18       Q.   Mr. Thornberry, I prepared two documents for you, but because we

19    don't have enough time let me just refer Their Honours to them, to those

20    documents, and then I will ask you some questions about it.

21            Witness, you don't have to look for this document.  I will not be

22    asking you about any details.  That's 4D 325.  This is the

23    Izetbegovic-Krajisnik agreement signed on the 16th of September, 1993, in

24    particular paragraph 5 envisaging that the referendum should be called on

25    whether the Muslim or the Serbian state should remain within the union of

Page 26288

 1    the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 2            At the same time -- or, rather, two days earlier, and this is

 3    document P 0 -- P 50 -- P 051.  Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic signed

 4    a document which was almost identical in its contents, but paragraph 5 was

 5    quite different.  There is no mention of the secession of any part of the

 6    territory of the Croatian part of the territory.  This document is P 5051.

 7            Mr. Thornberry, could you please listen to my question.  Sir, you

 8    don't have to look at those documents.  The Judges will check and see for

 9    themselves whether what I'm saying is correct.

10            If Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina in mid --

11            THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  If Muslims and

12    Serbs --

13            MS. ALABURIC:

14       Q.   -- in mid-September 1993 are talking about the possibility that a

15    referendum might be called for the Serbian republic to remain within this

16    state and Croats and Muslims do not mention that in their agreement, which

17    is otherwise almost completely identical, can we agree then that Croats

18    and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina felt that both the Croat and the Muslim

19    entities should remain within Bosnia and Herzegovina, that they had no

20    doubts in their minds as to that?

21       A.   Well, I really feel that this issue is -- takes place way up high

22    beyond my pay grade.  These were the essence of what a lot of the

23    negotiations that were taking place centred upon, and I think you know

24    that as well as I do.

25       Q.   Very well.  I hope that Their Honours and my conclusion will be

Page 26289

 1    found to be the only logical one.

 2            Now, can we move on to a document that I'd like you to look at in

 3    my set of documents.  It is P 7548.

 4       A.   P 75 -- P 7548.

 5       Q.   P 7548.  Yes.  And I'd like us to focus on paragraph 7.  In

 6    paragraph 7 of this document -- or, rather, let's define what the document

 7    is to begin with.  What is the document?  Are you familiar with it?  Have

 8    you ever seen it before?

 9       A.   It says the "Secretary-General only."  That's the next to the

10    highest level of confidentiality which the United Nations uses for its

11    communications.  So it --

12       Q.   Yes, and the document is being sent by Thorvald Stoltenberg.  It

13    says from Thorvald Stoltenberg on the first page of the document.

14       A.   Yes, special representative of the Secretary-General.

15       Q.   That's right.  Now, in point 7 we have a summary of the positions

16    of the three warring parties or conflicting parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You raised a question in my

18    mind.  You say that the Secretary-General is next to the highest level of

19    confidentiality.  What's the highest level then?

20            THE WITNESS:  Most immediate.  Most immediate plus in turn ask

21    Mr. Akashi.  So it has "most immediate" and Secretary-General only, and

22    that is definitely above my pay grade.

23            MR. STRINGER:  Excuse me.  I apologise for the interruption,

24    Mr. President.  I'm just looking at this document on my list and it

25    appears to be one that we've marked as under seal.  I don't -- I can't say

Page 26290

 1    a hundred per cent on that, but could I ask maybe to be cautious, or --

 2    out of -- to have caution just to treat it as such until I can get that

 3    confirmed?

 4            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have nothing against

 5    that.  There weren't any markings on the document, so I didn't check,

 6    didn't feel that was necessary, but, yes, we can move into private

 7    session.

 8            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Let's then move into

 9    private session just to be sure.

10                          [Private session]

11  (redacted)

12  (redacted)

13  (redacted)

14  (redacted)

15  (redacted)

16  (redacted)

17  (redacted)

18  (redacted)

19  (redacted)

20  (redacted)

21  (redacted)

22  (redacted)

23  (redacted)

24  (redacted)

25  (redacted)

Page 26291











11    Pages 26291-26292 redacted. Private session















Page 26293

 1  (redacted)

 2  (redacted)

 3  (redacted)

 4  (redacted)

 5  (redacted)

 6  (redacted)

 7  (redacted)

 8  (redacted)

 9  (redacted)

10  (redacted)

11  (redacted)

12  (redacted)

13  (redacted)

14                          [Open session]

15            THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're in open session.

16            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

17       Q.   Now, the document that I mentioned is the transcript -- or,

18    rather, tape recording from the 235th session the Presidency of

19    Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 14th of January, 1994.  The tape recording

20    and transcript is an interesting example of a political action which boils

21    down to the following:  How not to accept an agreement which is being

22    proposed by the international community but how to leave the impression

23    that you are willing to cooperate on an international level.

24            Unfortunately, Mr. Thornberry, we're not going to have enough time

25    to deal with the very interesting portions of this transcript, but with

Page 26294

 1    regard to this 33 per cent of territory that the Serbs agree should be

 2    given over to the Muslims, what Alija Izetbegovic has to say about that,

 3    and you will be able to find the translation of that portion on pages 19

 4    and 20.

 5       A.   19 and 20.

 6       Q.   19 and 20.  Otherwise, the pages are numbered -- well, may we have

 7    the usher's assistance, please.  The document is 4D 930, and the part that

 8    I'd like to refer to is to be found on pages 19 and 20.  It is the

 9    statement by Alija Izetbegovic.

10       A.   Page --

11       Q.   Yes, pages 19 and 20.  Alija Izetbegovic is speaking.

12            Witness, you might hear a different interpretation to the written

13    text, but that is because different translators and interpreters are

14    working.  I think it is an important portion.  It's not -- I don't usually

15    read the document, but I think that it will be important for me to do so.

16            Alija Izetbegovic says as followings and I quote:  "Let us

17    understand, all these talks we had including the republics and the 33 per

18    cent, et cetera, none of that has been determined, because Klaus warned

19    me," and I think it was Klaus Kinkel that he was referring to, "they" -- I

20    apologise.  I won't think any more.  I've been put right. "Klaus warned me

21    when I talked about some things he said, you know, Mr. Izetbegovic, the

22    rule about politics.  Until we agree on everything, we agree on nothing.

23    So so far we have not agreed on anything.  These are all just

24    pre-conditions for some agreement.

25            "Of course we can, if it suits us, go back to the beginning.  We

Page 26295

 1    only have to ask ourselves if we have a better solution.  But as soon as

 2    we see that we're better off, then turn everything back to the beginning."

 3            MR. STRINGER:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  Before there's a

 4    question, I just want to raise an objection again to taking the witness to

 5    this document which I don't think any of us have ever seen before.

 6    It's -- it purports to be from January 1994, which is after this witness's

 7    time in Mostar certainly, which was again the reason, primary reason for

 8    his being asked to come testify.  I've said it before.  I'm going say it

 9    again.  There are lots of interesting things that I could have led from

10    this witness on my direct which I didn't because of the limitations, and I

11    think that this is unfair at this point to go as far down this road.

12            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There are two issues here,

13    Ms. Alaburic.  Limitations on the cross-examination do not entitle you to

14    address this issue, all the more that as Mr. Stringer has said, this is a

15    document that's dated January 1994, and the witness was no longer

16    operating in that area in Mostar.  So needless to spend any time on that.

17    Just ask your question briefly, because we need to have a break now.  So

18    put the question you wanted to highlight.

19            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I be allowed to

20    respond to Mr. Stringer.  My question follows on from part of the

21    witness's statement contained in paragraph 55 to the effect that it was

22    the Croats that tried to cut off part of Bosnia for themselves.  That's

23    why I ask about the Vance-Owen Plan.  That's where my question about the

24    Krajisnik-Izetbegovic agreement or Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreements comes

25    from, and that is why I'm working up slowing to this transcript.

Page 26296

 1            It is true that the transcript is from 1994 but Alija Izetbegovic

 2    speaks of his own policy from the beginning of the conflict in

 3    Bosnia-Herzegovina and so therefore what he says there has to do with

 4    January 1993 as well as well as the whole of 1993.  So it does refer to

 5    the relevant time, the time relevant in the indictment.  I consider this

 6    to be an extremely important transcript.  I've had it for a long time but

 7    not used it yet.

 8            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Judges will read the minutes

 9    right through.

10            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, might I be allowed to

11    summarise?  In continuation Alija Izetbegovic goes on to say that the army

12    of Republika Srpska was too strong for the BH army --

13            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No, Mrs. Alaburic, no.  Please

14    put your question.  You -- there's a document that states such-and-such

15    and then you put your question.

16            MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours -- yes, that's

17    precisely what I want to say, what it says in the document, because if I

18    go on to ask my question without laying the foundations, then the

19    objection is raised that I have not laid the foundations for my question.

20    So that is why I wish to say what it says --

21            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We need to adjourn now.  You

22    have had approximately 70 minutes, 40 minutes which was your own time, the

23    Pusic Defence gave you the rest.  So theoretically you have ten minutes

24    left for tomorrow.  So please do your calculations again.

25            Sir, we shall meet again tomorrow at 2.15 p.m., because the

Page 26297

 1    hearing will be in the afternoon tomorrow.  So may I ask you to follow the

 2    usher, because Mr. Stringer needs to take the floor on another matter.

 3                          [The witness stands down]

 4            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer, do you wish to be

 5    heard in closed session or in open session?

 6            MR. STRINGER:  Public is fine.  Public is okay, Mr. President.

 7            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer, you have the

 8    floor.

 9            MR. STRINGER:  Just for scheduling tomorrow.  While the

10    proceedings have been taking place this afternoon, I've been informed that

11    everything that needed to happen in respect of the next witness has

12    already happened.  He is ready to testify, and he can testify tomorrow if

13    the schedule allows, and that he has informed our people now that he is

14    not seeking any protective measures so that he can testify in open

15    session.  So that's the news for the next witness.

16            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Thank you for this

17    piece of information.

18            Theoretically tomorrow Ms. Alaburic still has ten minutes left for

19    her cross-examination.  Then we will hear Mr. Praljak's Defence, who I

20    believe will use his 40 minutes, and I think Coric's Defence had given

21    their time to somebody else.  I don't know if Coric's Defence wishes to

22    take the floor tomorrow.

23            Do you wish to take the floor tomorrow or not?

24            MR. PLAVEC: The Defence of Mr. Coric cedes its time to the

25    Petkovic Defence and Mr. Praljak if they need it.

Page 26298

 1            JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So if we do not lose

 2    any time, we will be able to finish with this witness tomorrow and then

 3    hear the next witness after that.  You have already indicated that this is

 4    a 92 ter witness and that you will lead the witness for a short time and

 5    the Defence teams will have one hour and 40 minutes approximately.  This

 6    is what I seem to remember.  So we shall meet again tomorrow at a quarter

 7    past 2.00.

 8                          --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.38 p.m.,

 9                          to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 16th day of

10                          January, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.