1 Wednesday, 7 May 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours; good afternoon
8 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-74-T,
9 the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al. Thank you, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Today is Wednesday, 7th of May. Good afternoon to the Prosecution, to
12 the Defence counsel, to the accused, and to all the people assisting us
13 in our work.
14 For your information, Mr. Karnavas, you used one hour, 19
15 minutes, so you can add up, and you'll see how much time you have left.
16 Let's have the witness in.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 WITNESS: MIOMIR ZUZUL [Resumed]
19 [Witness answered through interpreter]
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. We are
21 going to resume the examination-in-chief. You have the floor. You may
22 proceed, Mr. Karnavas.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon, Your
24 Honours and everyone in and around the courtroom.
25 Examination by Mr. Karnavas: [Continued]
1 Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Zuzul. Welcome back. I trust you had a
2 good evening. Now, yesterday when we left off, I'd asked you a question
3 about the concept of confederation, and it was at that point when you
4 were just about to finish your answer when we had to stop for the day.
5 We will discuss in great detail this concept, but with respect to the
6 concept of confederation, did President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic
7 ever sign any agreements concerning that?
8 A. President Tudjman, President Izetbegovic signed a mutual
9 agreement on the confederation. I believe that was on the 14th of
10 September, 1993. The decision was taken that the agreement would be kept
11 secret in a way. It was never made public. Each of the presidents kept
12 a copy, and there was another one kept at the mission of the Republic of
14 Q. Thank you.
15 A. Needless to say, I am well aware of the existence of that
16 agreement because I was involved in preparing it, and I actually
17 physically drafted it myself.
18 Q. All right. Now, we'll discuss that later on towards the end of
19 your testimony here today, but just to round off this topic, are you
20 aware whether President Izetbegovic ever signed any other agreements with
21 others that would impact or had anything to do with the agreement that
22 you've just indicated to us?
23 A. Yes. A mere two days later, President Izetbegovic signed an
24 agreement with Mr. Karadzic. It was a similar agreement, but it wasn't
25 about a confederation. It was about creating republics within the union.
1 The most noteworthy feature of that agreement was this: First of all,
2 Izetbegovic took this step without ever mentioning it to the Croatian
3 side, or at least not to President Tudjman. Secondly, the substance of
4 the agreement itself. What is noteworthy is the fact that President
5 Izetbegovic subscribed to the possibility that after two years the Serbs
6 would be allowed to leave the union. The possibility, in other words,
7 for Bosnia and Herzegovina to break up.
8 Q. All right. And we're going to get to that, as well, but I just
9 want to make sure I'm crystal clear here and that the Judges understand
10 this. What you're telling us is this: That the second agreement between
11 Izetbegovic, two days later that is, and the Serbs called for the
12 possibility of an eventual carving up of Bosnia-Herzegovina two years
13 after that agreement; is that correct?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Now, finally before we get into the documents, and when we do so
16 we'll be going through them rather quickly, but finally were you ever
17 present when Izetbegovic offered any other part of Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 to anyone else, because it would seem to me that based on this agreement
19 he's offering the Serbs a piece of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Did he ever
20 offer any other part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to anyone else and, if so,
21 to whom?
22 A. I was present in Geneva
23 before this when President Izetbegovic made a direct proposal to
24 President Tudjman for Western Herzegovina to be annexed by Croatia
25 Q. All right.
1 A. This was during a recess in the Geneva negotiations. I was with
2 President Tudjman, and we approached President Izetbegovic. This was
3 something that often happened during recesses in negotiations.
4 At a meeting that had just taken place, there had been very
5 unpleasant conversation where the Bosniak side with President Izetbegovic
6 and the Serbs clashed. I think it was purely human reasons that
7 motivated or pushed Tudjman to approach Izetbegovic during that recess.
8 I can't remember specifically who was with President Izetbegovic. I do
9 believe that Mr. Miles Raguz was also with him at the time. They talked
10 and President Izetbegovic made a proposal in no uncertain terms about
11 what I just said, for Western Herzegovina to secede from Bosnia and
13 extent of the territory on offer. Nonetheless, President Tudjman refused
14 to talk about this.
15 Later on after we'd left, at lunch the president continued to
16 talk about this. My impression at the time was he had been somewhat
17 taken aback by this. He nevertheless believed that regardless of
18 Izetbegovic's motives for that proposal this could never be an
19 appropriate solution for dealing with the crisis in Bosnia and
21 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some time later, perhaps a year or
22 more later, I brought this anecdote up with Minister Granic who at the
23 time was Croatia
24 too, once had attended a meeting at which President Izetbegovic tabled a
25 similar proposal. This other proposal that Minister Granic was now
1 telling me about was even more specific in purely territorial terms.
2 There was talk of specific municipalities that would make up this
3 territory. Nonetheless, at least based on what Granic told me at the
4 time, Tudjman yet again refused to discuss any solutions of that nature.
5 Q. Okay.
6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me. Mr. Zuzul, you have said that there
7 were human reasons. That at least is the translation, and I would be
8 grateful if you could elaborate a bit. Do you mean personal reasons
9 or -- or what does it mean? I do not understand.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, during that session, and of
11 course I'm telling you about this based on how I remember things to have
12 happened, I think there was quite a severe verbal attack launched, I
13 think, by Mr. Krajisnik against Mr. Izetbegovic. Mr. Izetbegovic looked
14 hurt, if anything, by this sort of approach that took place as part of a
15 round of negotiations. Other than that, there had been a number of
16 situations in which the Serb negotiators took a harsh or even vulgar
17 approach in how they accosted the other delegations. This was one such
18 situation. As to President Tudjman's humanly understandable motives for
19 approaching Izetbegovic thereafter, to be perfectly clear this is just my
20 own personal interpretation of those events.
21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
22 MR. KARNAVAS:
23 Q. Okay. Now -- I'm told that maybe you should say in English what
24 "Lucki" means. Lucki. Well, the English translation obviously was --
25 may be incorrect.
1 A. [In English] I would also say it was human approach based on
3 Q. Empathy. Okay. So in other words, Izetbegovic had been
4 attacked. He's sitting there by himself. Tudjman, being the statesman
5 that he was and a human, went there to comfort another human just to --
6 after that very difficult and vulgar attack by Krajisnik. Is that
7 basically what it was?
8 A. That would be my interpretation.
9 Q. Okay. And it was during that -- that exchange, if you will, when
10 Izetbegovic offered Western Herzegovina and Tudjman rejected it.
11 A. [Interpretation] Yes. But the reaction didn't come immediately.
12 We started talking about a number of different things. At one point, the
13 discussion settled on the need for a solution. It was at this time that
14 President Izetbegovic said as follows -- well, I don't think I can quote
15 him with any degree of accuracy, but he made a proposal for Western
17 Q. All right. And just one -- I guess let's stay with this for one
18 second. Did -- was there any counter-proposal by President Tudjman and
19 say, "Well, I don't need Western Herzegovina. How about just giving me
20 Neum, and I'll give you that water port that you're looking for," you
21 know, that deep port?
22 A. At that time, no proposals were being made by President Tudjman
23 apart from a crystal clear reply to the effect that this was in no way an
24 acceptable solution.
25 Q. All right. Now, we're going to go through some documents. I'm
1 going to ask you to keep your answers rather short, and then I'll direct
2 you if I need more amplification. We have quite a few, so we're going to
3 go at a rather rapid clip, but nonetheless I think the information you've
4 provided thus far lays a good foundation for -- for that process. With
5 you, there should be some binders, unless they took them away. Are they
7 A. [In English] Yes, they are here.
8 Q. And if you could to binder number 1, and if you could look at the
9 first document, which is 1D 02039.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: And incidentally, Your Honours, this is the
11 constitution of the Republic of Croatia
12 we saw it with the very first witness. I mention this because this is a
13 document that is well known to everyone around the court in light of our
14 conversation yesterday, that is.
15 Q. Now, let me preface my question by saying we had a witness by the
16 name of Donia that came here. He's an historian who worked for the
17 Prosecution. And in his report -- in his testimony he made references in
18 respect to the Banovina and quoted others or cited others to support his
19 thesis that President Tudjman had aspirations of re-establishing the
20 Banovina Hrvatska boundaries, and both in his report and his testimony he
21 made reference to the constitution. In the preamble, that is.
22 So now I want to go -- I want you to look at this document, 1D
23 02039, page 1, towards the second to last bullet where it says: "In the
24 establishment of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939 by which Croatian state
25 identity was restored in the Kingdom Of Yugoslavia
1 Now, if you could please comment on the preamble recognising
2 that, one, you did not draft the constitution but you have been a member
3 of the government and you are from Croatia. You should be aware of the
4 constitution. Can you comment on that and you knew President Tudjman as
6 A. [Interpretation] Of course I do believe I'm in a position to
7 comment on that. I think I'm sufficiently familiar with Croatia's
8 constitution both as a citizen and as an official. I declare
9 categorically that this interpretation has nothing to do with what is
10 actually contained in the preamble to the Croatian constitution.
11 Q. Why is that?
12 A. Anyone who reads this page without necessarily possessing
13 appropriate legal skills and knowledge must understand that what this is
14 about is the continuity of Croatia
16 sovereignty, this would be entirely absurd. In that case, having read
17 the whole thing, Croatia
18 cent of its present territory and perhaps 200 per cent of its present
19 territory. It would probably be spilling over into Austria, Hungary
21 If I may just be allowed to furnish an additional explanation as
22 to the importance of the Banovina of Croatia in determining the historic
23 continuity of the Croats' right to statehood. As is well known from
24 history, and that is something that we see mentioned here again, there is
25 a reference to 1918 and the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.
1 After the end of World War I and based on the principle of
2 self-determination as defined by Woodrow Wilson, President of the United
3 States, the Croats -- or, rather, Croatia
4 Versailles Conference opted to unite with the Serbs and the Slovenes,
5 thereby constituting the Kingdom of Serbs
6 did, however, keep their sovereignty and their own parliament. This went
7 on until 1928, when Croat delegates were assassinated in the Yugoslav
9 In 1929, the then King of Yugoslavia imposed a constitution on
10 the Croats, defining Yugoslavia
11 abolishing any form of sovereignty of the Croatian people. That is why
12 it is so exceptionally important for the idea of continuity as well as
13 its legal foundations that in 1939 following an agreement between the
14 Croatian and Serbian prime ministers, Cvetkovic and Macek, there was a
15 decision by the King to establish the Banovina of Croatia. In
16 territorial terms, this never came to fruition simply because the Second
17 World War started soon after. This was, however, of the essence to
19 documents followed in 1943, 1945, and this period spanned all the way to
20 the 1974 constitution. It is not my intention to pass myself off as a
21 constitutional legal expert. I am, however, convinced that this is the
22 only correct interpretation of the preamble.
23 Q. All right. Thank you. Well, perhaps you might be able to assist
24 us in -- in more concrete ways given that explanation, of course, but in
25 a different context.
1 We had another witness here, John Kenneth Galbraith's son, the
2 famous economist. His son came in. He happened to be the ambassador to
4 testified that President Tudjman had territorial aspirations and that he
5 believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina would not and should not continue as a
6 sovereign independent state and that a substantial part of Bosnian
7 territory should become the territory of the Republic of Croatia
8 indicated that he formed those opinions having met with him on a frequent
9 basis, sometimes even several times a day. He talked about Tudjman being
10 prejudiced against the Muslim people, and he also indicated at one point,
11 he mentioned the fact as further -- as further basis for list supposition
12 that Croatia
13 Croat who wanted it, and of course as compared to Bosnia-Herzegovina in
14 this period, you know, that would have been one other way of establishing
15 his territorial ambitions.
16 And I'm quoting -- or this is part from the testimony, Your
17 Honours, for the record. The gentleman testified in open court on
18 September 12, 2006
19 from pages 6435, 36, 6427-28, and 6453-54. First let me ask you this,
20 sir: Did you know Peter Galbraith?
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 Q. And yesterday incidentally, just let me touch on this, you talked
23 about a Contact Group, and as I understand it in the context in which you
24 put it, the Contact Group was established as a result of the failure of
25 the Vance-Owen, Owen-Stoltenberg Plans which were UN-EU coordinated
1 efforts; is that correct?
2 A. That was certainly my impression. I think that is correct.
3 Q. You indicated that one of the members of the Contact Groups was
4 the United States, and my first question is Peter Galbraith, being the
5 American ambassador to Croatia
6 States during those negotiations, the Contact Group, to your knowledge?
7 A. No, he was not the representative of the United States in that
8 Contact Group, not the most active representative of the United States.
9 There was one who was specially nominated for that position by
10 President Clinton, and that was Ambassador Charles Redman.
11 Q. All right. And again, how well did you know Peter Galbraith?
12 A. Quite well, I'd say.
13 Q. All right. Now, he indicates that President Tudjman did not want
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina to exist. Is that statement correct in your
16 A. In my opinion, this is an incorrect statement.
17 Q. And what about his statement that he wanted to re-establish the
18 borders more or less based on the Banovina?
19 A. Again, I think this is another incorrect statement.
20 Q. Now, he talked about this policy. Policy, and I mention that
21 word, and I underscore it because in some ways, in some circles, in
22 some -- under some circumstances it could give sort of a nefarious
23 notion. Let me ask you this being familiar with the Croatian
24 constitution: Are Croats all over the world, wherever they may be born,
25 do they have the possibility, based on the Croatian constitution, to have
1 a Croatian passport?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Also, do the Croats around the world, wherever it may be, do they
4 have the possibility, based on the Croatian constitution, to serve on the
5 Croatian parliament? I believe it's called Sabor.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And in fact, if I'm not mistaken, are there some seats that are
8 specifically allocated to those Croats because historically speaking
9 there have been Croatian communities throughout the world that have been
10 organised in order to take care of their particular needs?
11 A. Correct. And if I may add to that, because very often it seems
12 to me that this is misinterpreted. Although there is a number of states
13 across the world that allow their citizens who live abroad and work there
14 to participate in the parliamentary life of their respective states,
16 because when the citizens' will was exercised after the democratic
17 elections and when the free Republic of Croatia
18 was then internationally recognised, one could not and dared not ignore
19 the fact that there was approximately the same number of Croats residing
20 within the territory of Croatia
21 territory of Croatia
22 Why was it that this fact should not have been ignored? A number
23 of them had left for economic reasons, but a large number of those Croats
24 had left for political reasons during the time of Communism, and they
25 could not even spend holidays in Croatia or visit their family members.
1 They were not allowed to do so. In other words, when those Croats were
2 given an opportunity to participate in the political life of Croatia
3 this meant that the injustice was corrected, at least to a certain
4 extent, the injustice that they themselves were not guilty of. They were
5 not to be blamed for that injustice. A provision was introduced that
6 exists in a number of democratic states when this was done.
7 Q. Okay. I think that --
8 A. Likewise -- if I may.
9 Q. Okay.
10 A. I believe that this is very important because your question
11 contained one part that was relative to the possibility of holding a
12 Croatian passport. Maybe you would like me to comment on that.
13 Q. Very briefly.
14 A. It is true that a large number or a majority of Croats who reside
15 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina also have Croatian citizenship
16 and hold Croatian passport because this is provided for by the law --
17 laws of both Republic of Croatia
18 based on my knowledge and my information, I believe that I can say that
19 the other state with a number of citizens holding a Croatian passport is
20 the United States of America
21 logic, would that mean that Croatia
22 territory of the United States of America? What I'm saying is this is
23 just an absurd claim. These are two things that have nothing whatsoever
24 to do with each other. The right to a passport cannot be interpreted by
25 saying that one nation has territorial aspirations towards the territory
1 of another nation.
2 Q. All right. Thank you for that. Now, we're going to move on to
3 the next document, 1D 02910, and this is a -- a presidential transcript.
4 We've seen it before. It has a D number, Your Honours, because there
5 were some pages that were added. We translated 12 pages, so that would
6 have been the extent of -- this was P 00037. So the 12 added pages would
7 have been the addition to burdening everyone around the court with
8 additional reading.
9 Now, if I may, Your Honours, read from the -- the Prosecution's
10 exhibit list and their 65 ter description of this particular document.
11 It will be my vehicle for the next series of questions.
12 If you have that, sir. Based on -- this is what the Prosecution
13 says: "This transcript shows that Franjo Tudjman had clear territorial
14 ambitions toward Bosnia
15 between the Serbs and the Croats in Karadjordjevo to divide Bosnia
16 their reference is to page 2, 5 to 8, and 38 to 39? First -- first of
17 all, let me ask you do. You have the document with you?
18 A. Yes, I do. I have it in front of me.
19 Q. Now, this was a presidential transcript that comes from the 7th
20 session of the Supreme State Council, 8 June 1991. First of all, were
21 you present?
22 A. No, I wasn't present because at that moment I was not politically
23 active at all.
24 Q. Have you had an opportunity to -- to go through this presidential
1 A. Yes, I have.
2 Q. Now --
3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me. Just -- just a --
4 MR. KARNAVAS: Technical.
5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Oh, okay. A correction in the transcript. I
6 think it has just disappeared now. The number of the document is not
7 correctly stated. There is an 8 too much, and it might later make it
8 difficult to find it.
9 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. It's 1D 02910.
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: That's correct. Thank you.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. And this was Prosecution document P
12 00037. The only exception is that we've added or translated, I should
13 say, pages 76 to 83, Your Honours, and pages 96 to 100, and you will be
14 able to notice that quite easily if you look at those pages. They're not
15 numbered, but actually you'll see "Unofficial translation" is at the
16 right top part of the page.
17 Q. In any event, with that, if we could turn to page 2 just very
18 quickly. I want to focus your attention where it says: "About the sixth
19 meeting of the presidents of the republic." Okay? And then you see:
20 "As you can conclude from the release, certain progress has been made in
21 the talks held so far and that Serbia
22 accepted the basic principle of the establishment of an alliance of
23 sovereign republics." And then it goes on. You also see Izetbegovic's
24 name at the bottom of the page.
25 First of all, if you could help us out a little bit in context
1 because I've noted this is June 8, 1991
3 speak a little faster and shorter so we can go through this material. And
4 I apologise to the translators if they're going to have to labour a
5 little bit more.
6 A. At that moment there were almost panic attempts to find a
7 solution to the break-up of Yugoslavia
9 then. The collective Presidency stopped functioning. All the republics
10 had their own governments and their own presidents, and in an attempt to
11 find a solution the presidents met on a regular basis, and this is
12 obviously a meeting that took place after the sixth meeting of the of
13 presidents. The international community at that point in time was not
14 showing very much interest in what was happening in Yugoslavia, in -- it
15 did express, however, its position and stated that Yugoslavia should
16 continue existing in one way or another, in one form or another.
17 Two western-most republics of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia
19 and also had managed to develop the most democratic relationships within
20 their respective societies, proposed a model of confederal organisation
21 of Yugoslavia
22 rather, Yugoslavia
23 to the European Commission or Benelux
24 This proposal was drafted by a commission -- a joint commission
25 of Slovenia
1 representatives of Serbia
2 did not even want to talk about it and tabled a completely different
3 proposal for the survival of Yugoslavia
5 the previous constitution of 1974, and it was absolutely clear that it
6 would be dominated by the Republic of Serbia
7 The key issue was the position of the president of Bosnia
9 The two of them found it very hard to reach any conclusions or make any
10 decisions. However, when they finally presented their positions, then
11 their positions were much closer to the position of Belgrade and Serbia
12 Mr. Izetbegovic at one point stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 would be willing and ready to stay with the Rump Yugoslavia. After that
14 and only after that Croatia
15 their dissolution and secession from Yugoslavia. At that moment the --
16 there was something that was very much ignored by the international
17 community but it became very clear already at that point in time that the
18 situation in Yugoslavia
19 ready for an intervention. At the beginning of 1991, which is now very
20 clear, they had already prepared themselves for a military takeover.
21 On the other hand, everybody was clear that Serbia was getting
22 ready for war. The slogan which became a chapter in one of the
23 internationally recognised books which read "If we don't know how to
24 work, at least we know how to fight," became a -- something that was used
25 by a lot of politicians in Serbia
1 then you can see that the predictions of the CIA and other analytical
2 services were that the break-up of Yugoslavia would happen in a war and
3 that this war would be a bloodbath, but at that point in time and -- the
4 international community ignored all that. This, I believe, would give
5 you a general framework within which this discussion took place.
6 Q. All right. Now, during those discussions, were there discussions
7 being held to carve up any particular republic, because there are some
8 references here to Karadjordjevo, and that's part of the Prosecution's
9 thesis, that there was a meeting between Tudjman and -- and Milosevic,
10 and at this meeting they had divided to -- they had decided to divide
12 A. In this document, I did not find any report about any meetings in
13 Karadjordjevo. I may have omitted this reference, but I don't think it's
15 Q. All right. Well, let me just go through one passage, and this
16 would be on page 38. We don't have time to go through this entire
17 document. It would take hours. But just one -- to focus you on this one
18 page, page 38. It says: "The president: All right. Let's wrap up this
19 item. First of all, regarding this proposal, I said there, and the
20 minutes will reflect this, that this proposal by Izetbegovic and Gligorov
21 is actually an attempt to preserve and somewhat bolster the 1974
22 constitution, basically, that is, Serbia accepted it, but giving it its
23 own interpretation in regards to the creating of an effective democratic
24 federation, and they are sure not to change their position in this
25 regard. Therefore, the solution lies in what was said there, in the --
1 in the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if -- and if we achieve
2 that, then we can possibly look for a basis for an alliance of sovereign
3 republics and states.
4 "I think we shall achieve it because this is -- this is equally
5 in the interests of Serbia
6 no other exit than to accept the solution, although it will -- it will
7 not be easy to find the solution, but essentially that is it."
8 And then he talks about the next couple -- the next paragraph he
9 talks about the European Community, and then the following paragraph ends
11 "Therefore, the question arises whether such a community is at
12 all possible having in mind the economic and other relations in the
13 eastern part of Yugoslavia
14 Now, if we just looked at this segment in the -- you know, this
15 is just one page out of 163 pages, one might get the impression that what
16 Tudjman is actually suggesting, that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be carved
17 up among at least Serbia
18 reading this document?
19 A. My impression was that he was just telling about the conversation
20 that he was reporting about, and the conversation took place among the
21 six presidents, and I don't think that this was about any proposals
22 because it transpires from the entire transcript that no such proposal
23 was ever discussed. There was discussion about completely different
24 things, and the thing that was discussed was whether there should be a
25 confederation of all the republics, meaning the six republics that
1 existed at the moment.
2 Q. All right.
3 A. For example, he is saying, and I have a Croatian version in front
4 of me, on page 9052 of the Croatian text where President Tudjman says
5 explicitly: "We can start from the position that Croatia may find its
6 own interest in preserving a union of sovereign states." And then we
7 come to the guiding thought in my own interpretation of his whole
8 state -- statesman behaviour. He says: "In this way we should achieve a
9 peaceful separation." And he goes on to say: "A peaceful solution of
10 the Croat-Serb issue on the Croatian territory and the whole -- and the
11 territory as a whole," which means that within the context of the
12 situation that prevailed at the time.
13 Q. Okay. Now, in quoting -- and there should be page numbers.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: The first page number, Your Honour, was page 43.
15 I'm just as alarmed as you are because I want to make a clear record, and
16 I know you need to follow.
17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: We don't have -- it.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Honourable Judge, please.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I think that -- you should have, Your
20 Honour, page 43 of 163.
21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I have page 9, and the next one is page 38, 39,
22 40. Okay. So 34 does not figure in this document.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: All right.
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You have it? Oh, this is a discrimination
25 against my person, I note because my colleague seems to have it. So I
1 will think of the steps that have to be taken. Thank you.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, we apologise. We do massive amounts of
3 copying and printing, and I'll blame it on technology, but --
4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Your apology's accepted.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: This was translated by the Prosecution, Your
6 Honour. I'm not suggesting -- I'm not suggesting that the Prosecutor --
7 I'm just merely mentioning this -- that this is part of their --
8 everybody seems --
9 MR. SCOTT: As the Court knows it's always the Prosecution's
11 MR. KARNAVAS: -- everybody seems to be so touchy around here.
12 MR. SCOTT: [Microphone not activated]
13 MR. KARNAVAS: What I meant to say was this portion was
14 translated by the Prosecutor. We translated other pages. Therefore they
15 should not have been missing but obviously it was our fault in copying
16 it. So the Prosecutor should just relax a little bit.
17 MR. SCOTT: [Microphone not activated]
18 MR. KARNAVAS:
19 Q. Now, you quoted -- you quoted from another page --
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One second. Mr. Witness, I
21 take this opportunity to ask a question linked to what we're talking
22 about. We have a presidential transcript that relates to the 7th session
23 of the Supreme Council of the state of the Republic of Croatia
24 the 8th of 1991. Several months ago the Defence challenged those
25 presidential transcripts. You seem to be somebody who may have taken
1 part in one of those meetings, so maybe you will be in a position to
2 solve of some of the problems that we've been faced with. My first
3 question is as follows: Did you personally take part in the Supreme
4 State Council meetings?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No, Your Honour. Participate
6 in this meeting. I only read the transcript.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Maybe not this one, but did you
8 take part in other meetings?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I participated in a number of
10 them, but once I was appointed in 1992.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. In 1992. When you
12 took part in those meetings with President Tudjman, was there somebody
13 who was charged with recording everything that was said by all the
14 participants to these meetings?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, yes. At meetings of this
16 kind there was somebody.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Who was it, a secretary, an
18 employee, somebody specialised?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These meetings were recorded, and
20 then notes or minutes or transcripts were taken, and as far as I know
21 there were a few professional typists, ladies, who did that.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. You have
23 by your answers given authenticity to those transcripts.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Honourable Judge --
25 MR. KARNAVAS: At some point today hopefully we'll get to a
1 transcript where Mr. Zuzul is mentioned. There is an exchange which we
2 will see he did not participate in. So authenticity is one thing,
3 accuracy is another, and we'll get to that at some point.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. But I believe the witness
5 wanted to say something else.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It indeed happened in the way
7 Mr. Karnavas described. As I am reading these transcripts, and this is
8 my first opportunity to read them carefully, I have been able to convince
9 myself that they contain errors, misidentification of person,
10 misinterpretation of their words. And since I know the conditions under
11 which the recordings were made were far, far from ideal, I'm not
12 surprised to see those errors, but it is my personal impression that
13 every transcript has to be checked and re-checked because of those
14 errors, and I'm going to be able to give you my own example to illustrate
15 one of the errors that are contained in one of those transcripts.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Judge Trechsel, did we solve your problem?
18 Okay. Thank you. And we apologise again. And it was no fault of the
19 Prosecution's, so they shouldn't -- I just want to make sure that there's
20 not shifting the blame on anyone.
21 Q. Now, I noticed that earlier that one of your answers, you used
22 the word "unitarian," and -- and I see that on page -- one of the pages
23 that we translated which would have been -- it should be page 46, 47, 48,
24 49 -- I mean, 96, 97, 98, 99, I believe right around there. It says
25 here: "Therefore it is necessary that we cooperate until all
1 possibilities are exhausted and that we create both in principle and
2 personally the best possible relations because that is in our interest,
3 interest of the army and of individuals, but of course we will not be
4 silent about -- we will not be silent about such cases. We will present
5 them as an existence of those elements and dogmatic Communist and
6 unitarian Greater Serbia
7 army but also in all state -- in all strata of the society as well as
8 extremists among us which hinder achieving a political solution."
9 If you could -- I just want to dwell a little bit on this
10 unitarian Greater Serbia. What is meant by that, because we've heard the
11 term "unitary government." Now we have a variation of that word,
12 "unitarian." What was your understanding of that in the context of which
13 we're speaking of, because it might assist us.
14 A. Well, for all of us who group up in Yugoslavia the meaning of the
15 term "unitary" was something that we knew from our everyday lives. It
16 was not something that was learned from constitutional practice, because
17 the more the federal state became unitary or unitaristic the less rights
18 were enjoyed by the republics. Yugoslavia's history is the history of
19 defining unitary versus federal system.
20 In this particular paragraph that you've just quoted, President
21 Tudjman, in my opinion, is referring to something that had already
22 happened in Serbia
23 constitution there was the federal system, but Serbia had two autonomous
24 provinces under this constitution, Vojvodina and Kosovo.
25 At the time when this is being discussed, Serbia had already
1 rescinded the right to the autonomy in both those districts, especially
2 in Kosovo, and from that time until the recent time when Kosovo declared
3 its independence as a state and was recognised as such this was the
4 period when there was the Kosovo crisis, and President Tudjman and all
5 the other participants were quite familiar with this crisis. So he is
6 talking about this unitary Serbia
7 to autonomy and urges the creation of a Yugoslavia that would, it is
8 quite clear, be set up not on the federal principles, not on confederal
9 principles, but on unitary principles. It would be in Serbia's way. I
10 think that's what this paragraphs actually all about.
11 Q. All right. We're going to move on to this next document because
12 we're running a little bit behind. So if we could go to 1D 00894. This
13 is from "Balkan Odyssey." This is a document that we've seen before. In
14 fact we've seen these pages, again no additional reading for anyone
15 around the court. No surprise. But I want to point out one thing and
16 have you comment on it.
17 On chapter 2 Lord Owen in his book says, bottom of the first --
18 of the second paragraph on the first page: "The Netherlands had the EC
19 Presidency from the outbreak of the war in July until December 1991, and
20 in consequence of my visit to The Hague, I discovered that on 13 July
21 1991, when the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence were
22 just eighteen days old, the Dutch government had suggested to the other
23 EC members states that the option of agreed changes to some of the
24 internal borders between the Yugoslavian republic might be explored."
25 Now, I ask you to think about this only because the issue of
1 changing of the borders have come up. From your experiences were you
2 aware of any of the international negotiators exploring possibilities,
3 that is initiating, because I think that's the word, initiating
4 possibilities of changing of borders? And I mention this because of the
5 Prosecution's theory of joint criminal enterprise that Croatia was
6 initiating this process of changing borders?
7 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. I'm sorry to intervene. I'm
8 waiting for my microphone. Thank you very much.
9 Your Honour, I'm mindful that the Chamber, or at least some
10 members of the Chamber, do not like many interventions from counsel, and
11 I've been quiet all day for the most part I think with one exception, but
12 I am going to object and continue to object. There is no reason on this
13 basis; that is, there is no reason for Mr. Karnavas to make speeches in
14 connection with his questions and characterise them as this is what the
15 Prosecution says. This is the Prosecution's theory of the case. It is a
16 form of coaching, Your Honour. It's the key words to the witness to say
17 this is what the Prosecution says, so I'm telling you now this is what
18 you, the witness, are supposed to disagree with. Mr. Karnavas can simply
19 ask non-leading questions to the witness. Were you in such a meeting at
20 this day? Tell us what happened. Did you talk to Izetbegovic about this
21 subject? What did he say? Were you at this meeting or not? No, I
22 wasn't. But there is no reason for constant speeches or
23 characterisations of this is what the Prosecution says, so now I'm
24 telling you, Mr. Witness, I want you, I'm expecting you to say the
25 opposite. It's a form of coaching. We object to it.
1 While I'm on my feet, while I'm on my feet, number two, number
2 two, I want to make the record clear, and I'll say why, in terms of the
3 transcripts, in the last transcript, the presidential transcript that we
4 were looking at, and this is not directed at Mr. Karnavas or the Defence
5 at all, but I just want the record to be clear on something because I
6 know statements have been made in the Croatian press, statements have
7 been made in the Croatian media that the Prosecution, for example, used
8 only -- offered bits and pieces or excerpts of the presidential
9 transcripts that the Prosecution tendered into evidence. As the Chamber
10 knows, that's not the case. The Prosecution's position was we tendered
11 the entire transcript, top to bottom, with the exception of a very few
12 where they were long transcripts and it was very clear to any reader that
13 the last 80 pages had absolutely nothing to do with anything at issue in
14 this case, whether to enter into a free trade agreement with China
15 don't think we needed 80 pages on that. With those kind of exceptions,
16 we tendered every single page of every single transcript, and so when the
17 Croatian media writes its article tomorrow about the hearing today that
18 says, well, Mr. Karnavas had to add other excerpts because the
19 Prosecution had not played fairly, I just want it to be clear, the
20 Prosecution offered the entire transcripts, and it was the Chamber that
21 only decided to accept bits and pieces.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, with regard to the media,
23 that's not the Trial Chamber's problem. We're not going to issue our
24 judgement based on some press cuttings. That's one thing. That's your
25 problem, not ours.
1 However, with regard to the objection you've just raised.
2 Mr. Karnavas, I believe that the objection is in part justified.
3 Initially you should have asked the witness whether he had any knowledge
4 of possible changes within the internal borders, and he could have said
5 yes, no, and then you could have asked him to look at what Lord Owen said
6 in his book. Based on that, he would have said, yes, indeed. Then third
7 step, you can say, "The Prosecution in its indictment claims this and
8 that. Do you agree or not?" Otherwise, you should have preempt or you
9 lead the witness.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Mr. President, but I do want to take
11 exception to the Prosecution's characterisation that I'm coaching the
12 witness. First of all, we had a narrative. We had a narrative where we
13 talked about changing of borders or swapping. We had a narrative where
14 it was Izetbegovic that offered part of Herzegovina. We had a narrative
15 where it was Izetbegovic that signed an agreement to allow half of Bosnia
16 to be carved away, so it's not as if I'm coaching the witness, but I
17 take -- I take your observations and I will modify my -- my technique.
18 Q. Concerning this, sir, do you have any knowledge with respect to
19 international negotiators proposing the possibility at least that they
20 should explore the alteration of the borders within Yugoslavia
21 that separated the republics?
22 A. I know that the option of peaceful changing of the borders was
23 mentioned in several international documents. Lord Owen writes about
24 that at several places in his book. This is one of those places. In the
25 first stage of the work of the conference for the former Yugoslavia, that
1 was always on the table as an option, so voluntary changing of the
2 borders in accordance with the mutual agreement. After all, the case
3 that I described yesterday was initiated by the representatives of the
4 international community, possible territory swaps between Croatia
6 know that it was mentioned in several international documents.
7 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now we move to the next document and that
8 would be 1D 00893. I think we've seen this document as well. So without
9 adding too much commentary, I do want to point out that this was a
10 document that is familiar to everyone here.
11 Now, if we can look at this. This is the European Community
12 conference. We have a draft convention. It mentions Lord Carrington,
13 and there's a treaty proposal. I will ask you to first focus on Article
14 1 where it talks about new relations between the republics, and under
15 1(c) common state of equal republics for those republics which wish to
16 remain in a common state. Under (f), recognition of the independence
17 within the existing borders unless otherwise agreed.
18 I then want you to focus on page 16, the section called special
19 status, which says in addition areas in which persons belonging to a
20 national or ethnic group form a majority shall enjoy a special status of
21 autonomy, and it talks about the right to use national emblems,
22 educational system, et cetera. First of all, are you familiar with this
24 A. Yes, I am familiar with it.
25 Q. All right. And to your knowledge this is what was being
1 discussed at the time?
2 A. That was the framework for the debate and for the thinking in the
3 period between 1991 and the London
4 because this was, in fact, the only official document produced by the
5 international community.
6 Q. Okay. Now, we see from the very -- the preamble, we see that
7 this is November -- 1 -- we see it was November 1991. What is happening
8 in Croatia
9 A. Immediately before this, on the 8th of October, Croatia made its
10 decision to become independent, and in the international sphere Croatia
11 was trying to achieve international recognition based, among other
12 things, on this document as a state within its borders, and soon after
13 this document was produced Croatia
14 unofficially by Germany
15 mid-January 1992. This was when the European states followed the
17 borders. Internally in Croatia
18 Yugoslav army attacked from several sides, and as I said yesterday, large
19 areas of Croatia
20 purposes cut in two.
21 Q. All right. Now, if we go to the next document, P 00089. It's a
22 Prosecution document. We've seen this before. It's been talked about
23 quite a bit by various witnesses, and it's been referenced, in fact, by
24 some in their works. This is 27 December 1991. You more or less told us
25 politically what is happening and physically what is happening in
3 A. Yes, I have.
4 Q. Were you present --
5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, could you --
6 MR. KARNAVAS: P 00089.
7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: The number is clear. In which folder is it? We
8 have five.
9 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, all these documents are in a chronological
10 order, so if you -- the number. So it would be -- you would need to go
11 to the next binder. So number 1, number 2 --
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Number 2.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Yep. We have it that way. If I do go out of
14 order, I'll make sure to give everybody the heads-up. I only have three
15 binders. That's why, so ...
16 Q. Anyway, while we're looking for those, just some preliminary
17 questions. Were you present during this discussion?
18 A. No, I was not.
19 Q. Okay. Now, just to touch on a couple of points. First let me
20 ask you: Given your position and your involvement in the various events,
21 do you feel competent that you might be able to discuss certain contents
22 in this document?
23 A. I think yes. I think I can. I think I can give you some
24 elements regarding the interpretation of this document, and quite by
25 coincidence after I read this document now for the first time, perhaps I
1 can provide some additional information that might shed light on the
2 circumstances, the time when this was going on.
3 Q. All right. Well --
4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, excuse me again --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
6 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, in light of what was just said, I'm
7 going to object to this kind of just simply tell us your interpretation
8 of the document, the document the witness has no personal knowledge of.
9 He was not present at the meeting. He's told us that. And, you know,
10 this is what Mr. Karnavas -- a word Mr. Karnavas himself likes to use.
11 This is just spin. I've got a witness here from the Tudjman government,
12 and I'm going to ask him to give his spin on this material, and that's
13 all it is. I have no objection if -- if he asks about a specific
14 question about something that may have a technical meaning, something --
15 a moment ago he said something, what would "unitary" mean. I didn't
16 object to that. I think probably that's something the witness might be
17 able to assist us with. But to simply take a presidential transcript of
18 a meeting where the witness was not involved, he wasn't even in
19 government at that time to my knowledge - this is December 1991 - and
20 just simply put it before the witness, "Witness, what do you think about
21 this? What's your spin on this?" And that's all this is. That's all it
22 is. Objection, Your Honour.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. I've heard the objection loud and clear,
24 and may I respond. I'll be measured.
25 The Prosecutor brought in Donia, someone who got a degree in the
1 United States on 19th century intellectual Muslims in Sarajevo
2 career in banking -- or in financing. Twenty-some years later, writes a
3 book with very few footnotes and then becomes a "Prosecution expert,"
4 reads this, cites it. Ribicic, Constitutional Judge in Slovenia
5 a book supposedly analysing the laws, the basis of Herceg-Bosna, does a
6 constitutional analysis, and if you look at the portions and you look at
7 the transcript, and by the way I did look at it before coming here today,
8 but if you look at it - I'm afraid I didn't bring it in because of time -
9 you will see that I referenced the part where he gets to say, "Once I
10 read this particular transcript, I changed my opinion." And then if you
11 recall, there was a heated exchange where even you, Judge Trechsel,
12 intervene at one point because I said, well, what about all these other
13 transcripts. You know, and he said, well, he didn't read them, and of
14 course my position at that point was that his report should be stricken
15 from the record because obviously that report was written when he only
16 looked at one particular transcript and not the others, at which point as
17 I recall, Judge Trechsel, you indicated well, you know, he could spend
18 his lifetime reading all this stuff or that could be supplemented, but be
19 that as it may, be that as it may, the point that I'm trying to make is
20 this: When the Prosecution wants to have somebody who wasn't present and
21 take one sliver out of a presidential transcript, and I dare say he
22 wasn't quite correct when he said earlier that he's tendered everything.
23 He's only translated portions, translated portions, so tendering is one
24 thing. Translating is another, so if you only have two or three passages
25 of 160 pages or whatever, he has it.
1 But be that as it may, he brings in outsiders, not participants,
2 to comment, to opine, and then he uses that as the foundation in
3 establishing the joint criminal enterprise, and the first time I bring in
4 someone who is aware of the events, and had Mr. Scott listened because he
5 got a little excited there and was ready for his objection, but he didn't
6 listen to the end of Mr. Zuzul's answer, which was having read that, he's
7 able to comment on certain things. So he got a little excited, didn't
8 listen to the whole answer, and now here we are wasting valuable time.
9 But I want to point that out.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. We are right. We are
11 losing and wasting time. You're both right. You know, Mr. Karnavas, you
12 should, in order to avoid this objection because you are an experienced
13 professional and you know how to do it, initially you should have told
14 the witness: "During the proofing session, we both looked at this
15 document, P 89, 160 pages long, and we mentioned this and that page.
16 Expert Donia in his report said this and that. Could you, Witness,
17 enlighten the Trial Chamber on specific points," because then the
18 Prosecutor would not have anything to object to.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If I may add a point. It strikes me that you
21 are comparing witnesses, your witness here --
22 MR. KARNAVAS: Right.
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: -- to experts brought by the Prosecution, and I
24 don't think that is really quite equitable. An expert is asked to give
25 opinions on matters. A witness is asked to speak about facts that he has
1 witnessed, and the question you put to your witness, in my view, is
2 totally a question for an expert. Now, your witness has not been
3 presented as an expert. We do not have any credentials like we have for
4 an expert, and I think there's a little problem here.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, let me respond to that because I beg to
6 differ with you significantly. Ribicic read law. That's what he did.
7 Now, what makes him an expert to take a presidential transcript and to
8 say based on this he's making a constitutional analysis? And just
9 because we call somebody an expert doesn't make him an expert. Donia
10 worked for the Prosecution, and I dare say in my 25 years of working in
11 this business, I'm entitled to ask a layperson to provide expert
12 testimony if they're capable of doing that. So I've asked -- that was --
13 that was a foundational question. Having read it, is he able to comment
14 on it? He is an expert in a sense even though a fact witness in some
15 ways because he spent time over there. He was with President Tudjman.
16 He knew the events. He represented the government. You're shaking your
17 head, but that's the fact.
18 Now, what I would do -- what I would ask -- what I would ask,
19 Judge Trechsel, is that -- that you begin registering your objections on
20 the record because it seems to me that at this point, at this point, it
21 is curtailing my defence. Not only am I limited in time, now I'm being
22 limited in scope, as well, and I don't think I agree with your analysis,
23 but if that's the case I would like a clear record exactly, and give
24 me -- give me the scope. Tell me how you want me to do it, so maybe I
25 make submissions for an interlocutory appeal, but at this point I must
1 say, with your interpretation I wholly disagree, especially when we say
2 that we're practising before professional Judges, especially because of
3 that, and we can't have it both ways, but I dare say that the gentleman
4 can comment because he was there and he knows the circumstances, and if I
5 was allowed to ask those questions that I wanted to ask, you would see.
6 Now, how much weight you give to that, that's a different story,
7 but I think I have -- I was laying the predicate that would allow me to
8 ask those questions because I wasn't asking him for an expert opinion.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Well, you have challenged me, and I will give
10 you an answer.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm not making an objection. I'm just recalling
13 that we have witnesses, according to the Rules of Procedure, and we have
14 experts, and it is news to me that -- that they are the same and that you
15 can switch and take the expert as a witness and the witness as an expert
16 if it pleases you.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour --
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: But maybe I'm wrong on this.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, let me just -- I don't want to have a
20 philosophical or legal debate, but let's just say hypothetically
21 speaking, hypothetically speaking I brought in as a fact witness a
22 general. Now, by virtue of his position, by virtue of his knowledge, by
23 virtue of his experience, is not that general able, capable, willing, if
24 I asked the question, to answer technical questions regarding military
25 matters that are outside what he has observed? Of course. Do I need to
1 qualify him as an expert? Of course not. If it's relevant I should be
2 able to ask that question. Now, it shouldn't be -- I shouldn't be trying
3 to sabotage the Prosecution, but I could certainly ask him technical
4 questions. It comes within that.
5 Let's just say that I have a regular witness, and I'm asking him
6 if he can identify somebody's voice like you have these recordings. If I
7 can lay the foundation that that individual does recognise the person's
8 voice because he's heard it a hundred times on the telephone, in a sense
9 that person is giving expert testimony because he's capable of
10 identifying the voice. So that's how you can.
11 I'm not bringing this gentleman in as an expert nor was my
12 questioning eliciting expert testimony. I was asking him to opine on
13 what he was able to glean from reading this, and had -- had we been
14 allowed, he would have been able -- he's indicated that after reading
15 this he has some personal experience of which he can discuss certain
16 matters. That's not an expert.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before the break, yes,
18 Mr. Scott.
19 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. I've been patient and
20 hopefully this will give Mr. Karnavas a chance to take a breath. I fully
21 agree with what Judge Trechsel said and that was in my notes, and
22 Judge Trechsel you beat me to it and good for you for that. This is
23 now -- this is now -- the witness is now being tendered as an expert.
24 That's the difference between the witnesses -- the Prosecution witnesses
25 that Mr. Karnavas cites and this witness. And I might add in light of
1 the issues that were raised yesterday, we can add now to the deficiencies
2 the lack of an expert report. We don't have a statement. We don't have
3 an adequate summary. We don't have notice of an expert. We don't have
4 an expert report. So we just got a free-ranging witness here, a member
5 of the Tudjman government, who can just come in and give his views about
6 anything that Mr. Karnavas wants to ask him about.
7 Now, that is not appropriate. You cannot simply, with all due
8 respect to this Chamber, all of whom I have great respect for, you cannot
9 appeal every time to say it's professional Judges as if that means there
10 are no rules. Yes, you are professional Judges. There are still Rules
11 of Procedure and rules of evidence that should be followed and just to
12 say it's professional Judges, no holds barred, everything is fair, you
13 can do whatever you want, is not correct. These are -- further these are
14 not technical matters.
15 I added a moment ago -- I asked a moment -- I made the comment a
16 moment ago: If someone says it was a term of art and a witness could
17 say, "Well, I'm a general and I happen to know that when that term is
18 used this is what it means." These are not technical matters. These are
19 clearly political matters, political matters of the most direct kind.
20 I'm going to give you my political interpretation on these events, and
21 I've never -- I wasn't at the meeting, I've never seen this before, but
22 now that I've read it I'm going to give you my political interpretation
23 of events and that's all we're getting, Your Honour, and I we do object
24 and I'm going to continue to object to this kind of testimony.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Well Your Honour -- Your Honour --
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment. Let me give my own
2 opinion. First of all, I do not agree with what Mr. Scott has just said.
3 We are here with a witness who was a Minister of Foreign Affairs in
5 negotiations, who also participated in the work related to the Vance-Owen
7 The Defence counsel is examining the witness on issues related to
8 borders, to meetings between Tudjman and other individuals with regard to
9 these geopolitical problems. Without the witness being an expert but in
10 his field of foreign affairs, he's no doubt an expert because if you have
11 a minister of foreign affairs who would not be able to address issues of
12 foreign affairs, where are the experts, then? And I do remind you that
13 the Trial Chamber is made up of two former ambassadors among the Judges,
14 and I believe that the Defence are entitled to ask questions of the
16 The only residual issue that may remain is to make sure that the
17 questions as they are asked are not leading because we're dealing here
18 with a common law procedure. So as the chief examiner, he should not put
19 leading questions. So that would be a cause for objections by the
20 Prosecution. But, I mean, if he asked questions that could challenge the
21 case of the Prosecutor, that's another matter. There should not be
22 automatically objections if the Prosecution's case is being challenged.
23 We have just spent about half an hour on procedural matters whereas I and
24 I believe my colleagues, too, are interested in the substance of the
1 We are going to break for 20 minutes, and we shall resume
3 --- Recess taken at 3.50 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 4.12 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.
6 Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.
8 Q. Mr. Zuzul, if you could turn to page 27 of this particular
9 document. We're still on P 00089, 27 December 1991, and I'm going to
10 read a portion here, and I'm going ask you if you're able to comment on
11 it. It says here "the president," so that would be President Tudjman.
12 I'm going to go to the bottom of the page first. It says, "There are
13 numerous indicators that, you see, that America would gladly accept
15 establishment of a Muslim state in Europe."
16 Now, throughout those years that you were involved in the various
17 positions that you held, was that ever a concern, that is, that they
18 might be -- that the US
19 reluctant to see the establishment of a Muslim state in Europe
20 would be, of course, part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
21 A. That was certainly what President Tudjman had in mind. He
22 believed there was concern both in America
23 countries about the possibility to establish a pure Muslim state in
25 Q. Okay. At this point in time, 27 December 1991, had Croatia
1 recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence? This is December 27,
2 1991. Or I should put -- I should rephrase it. Had Bosnia and
4 A. I believe they were preparing for independence, but no
5 international recognition had been granted by this time. I'm certain
6 about that.
7 Q. Now, further down -- in the next page, page 28, I'm just going to
8 hit this rather quickly, certain passages, it says, "Izetbegovic, even
9 Stipe may recall," and I suspect that he's talking about Stipe Mesic,
10 "once openly said that he would favour a solution whereby Slovenia
11 go. Croatia
12 associated with Serbia
13 border crossings between Croatia
15 there? Shall we set up customs office? Shall we set up customs? Shall
16 we make it so that one has to, as the government has already issued and
17 rightly so, an order that petrol may be sold and so on? Shall we --
18 shall we a currency in the end," as written, "all this together? These
19 are the problems that arise in everyday administrative and legislative
20 sense, which establish new relationships which would be unbearable among
21 according to this view, not only for Croatia in view of the shape of its
22 borders but also for the Croatian part of the Herzegovina and Bosnian
24 "In addition, if Bosnia and Herzegovina was to remain whole,
25 what are Croatia
1 If we go down to the -- to the next paragraph. "During the talks
2 under these circumstances, we supported the position of preserving a
3 sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina precisely because the Greater Serbia
4 policy raised the issue of Serbian areas in Croatia.
5 "Therefore, in such circumstances, it would have been
6 politically unwise for us to raise the issue of demarcation of borders in
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina otherwise. However, if you recall as early as
8 1989, we said in our delegation the historic HDZ declaration" I'm sorry,
9 "the historic HDZ declaration that we were for a sovereign Bosnia
11 in view of the interests of the Croatian people, we have to raise the
12 issue of Croatian borders."
13 First of all, let me ask you this: By this point this time were
14 you a member of -- of HDZ? We're talking December.
15 A. I became a member in October that year, but I was just an
16 ordinary member.
17 Q. And how much, if any, of Croatia's territory had been occupied or
18 was under attack at that point in time?
19 A. At that point in time virtually a third of Croatia's territory
20 had been occupied already. Vukovar had fallen. Eastern Slavonia was
21 under occupation, and on the 10th of September the siege of Dubrovnik and
22 attacks on the town began. Dubrovnik was now under siege, and at this
23 time was being subjected to heavy gunfire.
24 Q. In light of your background, experience, and knowledge, are you
25 able to decipher, if you would, where on page 28 President Tudjman says:
1 "Izetbegovic, even Stipe may recall, once openly said that he would
2 favour a solution whereby Slovenia would go, Croatia would have somewhat
3 more and Bosnia would be more closely associated with Serbia"?
4 A. Yes, indeed. That's what I was talking about earlier on. There
5 were clear indicia as far as a solution for the former Yugoslavia was
6 concerned. The Muslim leadership had certain inclinations in favour of
7 Serbia, and I think Izetbegovic didn't hold that back. I think he said
8 as much even when the attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina were first being
9 launched. Even prior to this there were villages in Dubrovnik's
10 hinterland, in Eastern Herzegovina that had already been attacked by the
11 JNA already and had been destroyed in their entirety.
12 Q. What kind of army did Croatia have at the time?
13 A. Croatia had already managed to set up a proper army. We
14 established defence lines and put a stop to any further advances by the
15 JNA. However, at the time it was still unable to defend its territory in
16 its entirety. I think I did spend a great deal of time discussing that
17 yesterday. Now, however, just before the turn of the year in 1992, the
18 greatest danger was the Dubrovnik situation and the possibility that
19 Dubrovnik might fall, as well as the entire area. Not just the area
20 around Dubrovnik but, rather, the city of Dubrovnik itself as well.
21 Q. All right. Let me -- let me just walk you step by step on this
22 now. At this point in time, is the -- are the JNA forces in Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina, and, if so, where are they?
24 A. There is no doubt that they were there. I don't think anybody
25 had asked them by this time to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina officially.
1 I think didn't that happened until sometime later, but it's quite certain
2 that there were JNA units in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is quite certain
3 that they were launching attacks on the republic of Croatia from there.
4 I mentioned several times the area around Dubrovnik and the forces that
5 were arriving from Herzegovina, from Montenegro. These JNA forces were
6 attacking Dubrovnik, but there were attacks like that going on in the
7 Posavina area, as well, and just north of Knin. There were several areas
8 in which the JNA were carrying out attacks from Bosnian territory.
9 Q. All right. And yesterday you told us that you had joined the
10 army. At that point in time, where -- were you in the army or working
11 for the department of defence?
12 A. I was partly in the Croatian army at the time.
13 Q. Okay. And were you stationed in anyplace in particular?
14 A. We were stationed in Zagreb, but it was precisely around this
15 time that I and my colleagues travelled south to Dubrovnik, our intention
16 being to reach Dubrovnik. However, that wasn't possible. Perhaps a
17 month and a half before this, I had been to the Opuzen area. I said that
18 I might have some additional explanations that might shed light on the
19 background of this meeting.
20 Q. Let me -- let me just lead you step by step because before we get
21 there, I just want to make sure that I'm crystal clear. It's December
22 1991. Croatia has declared its independence. Croatia is under attack by
23 the JNA. The JNA is staging attacks using Bosnian -- from the Bosnia and
24 Herzegovinian territory, and as I understand yesterday from your
25 testimony, Bosnia and Herzegovina did nothing to stop it. Perhaps it
1 could not do anything. Let me ask you this question based on this
2 background: What -- let me make sure I phrase it in a way that it can be
3 answered in a non-leading fashion. Were there discussions with respect
4 to Bosnia and Herzegovina's viability as a state and, if so, can you
5 please tell us? And we're talking about historically that period in time
6 because we know that Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet declared its
7 independence, but at that point.
8 A. There probably were, but in the context of defending Croatia
9 there was no one to raise this with in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
10 serious issue.
11 Q. All right.
12 A. I will try to be more specific. I'm talking about the leaders of
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 Q. All right. Okay. And did -- as far as you know, and I'm asking
15 you -- maybe you didn't know back at the time, that is back in December,
16 but thereafter did you ever learn, given your experience and the
17 positions that you held, what Izetbegovic's position was at that point in
18 time? Did you ever come out and expressly say, "We are for independence.
19 We are against Yugoslavia. We want this or that"? Was there ever some
20 sort of a public expression which we could look at and identifiably know
21 exactly where that man, given his position and his responsibility, stood
22 at at the time?
23 A. His position as to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not
24 entirely clear. He said he had a preference for Belgrade's solution. As
25 far as war was concerned, his position unfortunately was clear. He said
1 this wasn't their war and that he had no desire to interfere. If we try
2 to interpret this, and we look at transcript one, the Croatian
3 representatives, he talks about his own meeting with General Kadijevic,
4 Mr. Kljuic's specifically. His conviction is not only that the army
5 would not attack Bosnia and Herzegovina but, rather, that the army would
6 be allowing political parties to take control in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
7 We know now that this was quite gullible as a line of reasoning since the
8 war had already begun, a war true and proper.
9 Q. Okay. Now, to make sure that we fully understand, who is
10 Mr. Kadijevic?
11 A. Mr. Kadijevic was at the time the defence minister of a
12 disintegrating Yugoslavia.
13 Q. All right. And when you say "army," which army are we talking
15 A. [In English] Yugoslav People's Army, JNA.
16 Q. All right. Just to make sure I'm crystal clear, because I'm just
17 a little confused here, at this period of time we see an exchange between
18 Tudjman and Kljuic. Of course we all knew because Kljuic was here that
19 at the time he was president of the HDZ. And what exactly is Kljuic
20 saying to Tudjman so we are -- and be as precise as you can so we can
21 understand that.
22 A. [Interpretation] The transcript is quite long. We see Kljuic as
23 president of Bosnia and Herzegovina's HDZ, and we realise that he had
24 just talked to General Kadijevic. Tudjman asked him an explicit
25 question; namely, whether he had talked to Izetbegovic and Karadzic, who
1 were then the political leaders of the other two ethnicities in Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina
3 much like Izetbegovic, still believed, at least that's how it comes
4 across to me, that the JNA could be part of a solution and not one of the
5 sources of crisis. Apart from Kljuic, there was a large delegation of
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina's Croats attending this meeting.
7 Q. I just want to make sure. I don't want to get into the whole
8 debate, but this issue here is very important. Kljuic is under
9 discussion with Kadijevic, and -- because you said that they were
10 somewhat naive or gullible, gullible, I believe the word was, I think
11 that's the part that we want to be crystal clear, because we know in
12 context that Croatia
13 now we have the highest Croat representative, and he's saying words, at
14 least if I understand you, that they think that they can do business with
15 the JNA, that is, Sarajevo
16 is it that is being said in that, because you understand the events
17 better than we do.
18 A. That is precisely what I was about to point out. On the one
19 hand, we have Mr. Kljuic; and on the other, Mr. Kljuic who is saying just
20 what I've been telling you about. That's my impression, and I think
21 you've just summed it up. That was his conviction. He said he still
22 believed that an agreement could be reached, even an agreement with the
23 Yugoslav Army. On the other hand, there were a group of Croats from
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina on their way to see President Tudjman, the
25 president of Croatia
1 fact, that were strikingly different from what Kljuic was suggesting at
2 the time.
3 Q. All right. Now, in this transcript we see the name of Mate
4 Boban. At that point in time, did you know him?
5 A. Yes, I did. I had known him for quite some time before the war
6 erupted. I can't say I knew him well. He was older than me. I grew up
7 in a small town call Imotski, however, and Mr. Boban worked there. He
8 was the manager of one of the major companies based in the area. It was
9 called Napredak. That was when I made his acquaintance. During the war,
10 however, just before the developments that I have now been discussing, I
11 had been directly in touch with Mr. Boban.
12 Q. All right. Now, I believe you wanted to say something earlier,
13 and I cut you off of a little bit --
14 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes, Mr. Karnavas. I apologise for interrupting
15 you, but since we have been dealing with the document here, with the
16 minutes of this meeting under the chairmanship of the President Franjo
17 Tudjman, I would like to take this opportunity, not tomorrow when the
18 Judges are supposed to ask questions, to ask the witness about a
19 particular point since we are here at the document and you have
20 already -- I mean, Mr. Karnavas, you have already asked several questions
21 about the document, pages 28, I believe, and others. And now I would
22 like to address myself to the -- to page 31, 31, of this very document,
23 that is the document 00089, I believe. And 31, you -- concerning the
24 future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are interesting remarks. Let me
25 quote or -- it's a long quotation.
1 President Tudjman said: "In other words, the sovereignty of
3 that not only do we not have to advocate it, we must not even raise the
4 issue openly. However, why not accept this offer of demarcation -- " the
5 demarcation which would have demarcated into three parts Bosnia and
7 it this morning, and I continue now with the quotation. "However, why
8 not accept this offer of demarcation when it is in the interest of the
9 Croatian people, the Croatian people here in this republic, and the
10 Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because I do not see a single
11 reason, a single serious reason, against it. Moreover, in the talks I --
12 that I personally conducted with Izetbegovic and Milosevic, in addition
13 one of our people in Bosnia
14 the Croatian areas and those that you have included in this community of
15 Herceg-Bosna and in the community of Croatian Posavina, in the event of
16 demarcation, Croatia
17 would not only get those two communities but also for geopolitical
18 reasons Cazinska and Bihacka Krajina, which would satisfy almost ideally
19 the Croatian national interests, not only present but also for the future
20 and then from the remaining areas." End of the quotation.
21 And now my question is to Mr. Zuzul. If -- how would you in a
22 way view this excerpt of the transcript as far as the position, of course
23 it was in late 1991, position of President Tudjman concerning the future
24 of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I thank you, Your
1 Honour. May I say this isn't just because I was part of Tudjman's
2 cabinet, which I was. It is because I wished to tell the truth, the
3 truth that I saw and the way I saw it. I want to tell you how I think
4 about this when I think about it. I think one thing that this transcript
5 shows is one of the principles -- or, rather, all of the principles that
6 Tudjman was applying whenever he thought about the future. The first
7 thing being protecting Croatia
8 protecting the rights of the Croatian people -- the rights of the
9 Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the third thing being
10 putting a stop to the war.
11 When he discusses this, what he actually means is a division
12 within Bosnia and Herzegovina, but this is what I was trying to point out
13 having read the transcript: Tudjman is facing a proposal made by a
14 delegation of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The proposal was
15 formulated as a set of 19 issues or items. If you look at item 27 -- or,
16 rather, page 27, that Tudjman was not familiar with those conclusions.
17 He did, however, show respect to this group of Croats who came to see
18 him, and I can comment why, if you like. And he responds as to why he
19 believed that the only solution acceptable, and this is earlier on before
20 the negotiations, was a demarcation within the borders of Bosnia
22 Regardless of the fact that President Tudjman at the time knew
23 that such a response was not likely to satisfy everyone since there were
24 people around who really believed that some parts of Bosnia and
1 sincerely believed at the time that this was the only direction that this
2 moment in history could possibly take, nevertheless we have those
3 opinions on the one hand and President Tudjman's opinions in his capacity
4 as president on the other, and I think the distinction between the two is
5 perfectly clear.
6 If I may just add something based on my own knowledge of the
7 situation and something specific about Mr. Boban. It is due to a sheer
8 coincidence that I know about the following: Not long before this
9 President Tudjman had first been in touch with Mr. Boban in a way that
10 illustrated the totality of what was going on at the time. I can testify
11 to this based on my own direct experience.
12 I was part of the Croatian army, as I have pointed out already,
13 and we were headed for Dubrovnik
14 colleagues, university lecturers. We were trying to contribute to the
15 defence effort. We reached Opuzen and realised that the situation was
16 bordering on sheer panic. The Croatian army, which was only in the
17 process of being organised, was simply unable to defend the area. They
18 were short on manpower and equipment. We spoke to the command there, and
19 someone raised the following issue: What about the Croats from
21 to the Croatian army in order to defend Croatia.
22 Among our group, representatives of the Croatian army from
24 due to the fact that he is the father of probably the most famous
25 Croatian football player ever, Zvonimir Boban. A little indiscretion, if
1 I may. I was travelling with Marinko Boban in a car that his son had
2 received as a gift from his own football club, FC Milan. That's what the
3 times were like. There is nothing else I can say. We were trying to set
4 up some sort of defence. At one point in time, someone at the table had
5 raised the following issue: Maybe Boban would be able to help. Maybe he
6 could make available some volunteers. He might give us a hand. The
7 person they meant was Mato Boban, who had by this time had been appointed
8 to lead the Croats in Herzegovina
10 conversation, I understood that he knew about Mate Boban but that they
11 had never met.
12 Just to be specific about the time line, I'm talking about late
13 October, possibly early November. So this is just under two months
14 before the Zagreb
15 Mr. Marinko Boban should travel to Herzegovina, of which he, too, was a
16 native, and that he should talk to his relative Mate Boban and ask him if
17 he could help with defending Dubrovnik
18 Marinko Boban returned the same night late - it was well past
20 entire battalion of volunteers who would be prepared to defend and attack
21 the JNA in Herzegovina
22 Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Marinko Boban later told me and
23 President Tudjman that this really occurred, that this materialised.
24 Several days later, a group of Croat volunteers from Herzegovina crossed
25 to Eastern Herzegovina, Dubrovnik's hinterland, and this was possibly one
1 of the key factors in the defence of Dubrovnik and the eventual success
2 in defending the city.
3 I'm talking about telling the truth as I saw it. Why did I deem
4 it important to point out this very fact and to address this particular
5 meeting? President Tudjman knows that he not only enjoys the political
6 support of the Croats from Herzegovina
7 in order to do something that constituted one of the most important
8 strategic goals at the time, which was to defend Dubrovnik. He pays his
9 respect to them at that meeting. He values their presence. It wasn't a
10 matter of agreeing or disagreeing with what they were actually saying.
11 He knew that they were the only ones at the time capable of carrying this
12 extra burden of defence.
13 I don't know whether between the episode that I've just described
14 and the meeting there was any actual communication between President
15 Tudjman and Mr. Boban. I simply don't know. I do, however, believe,
16 Your Honours, that if we place this against that sort of a background
17 then reading the entire transcript is cast in an entirely different
18 light. These proposals are being made but not by President Tudjman.
19 He's discussing these proposals. He's discussing these proposals with
20 people that he respects, with people who are members of the same
21 political party. They respected him in political terms. That was one of
22 the reasons. But if you ask me, I'll say this quite openly, he realised
23 at the time how important these people were and how crucial they were to
24 his ability to obtain his own political goals and in terms of helping
1 I'm sorry if I'm trailing off here into some sort of
2 interpretation rather than telling you what you expected me to say, but I
3 do believe that this is something that casts a truly different light on
4 the transcript itself.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You provide very long answers.
6 They should be shorter.
7 I use the opportunity from my colleague's question, and this
8 will not be taken out of your time, Mr. Karnavas, rest assured. I use
9 this opportunity to raise an issue that seems to me extremely relevant,
10 and your very words raised -- focused my attention on this issue. I see
11 that there was this meeting between Tudjman and the delegation of
12 Herceg-Bosna, and under item 1 it is stated that: "The Community of
13 Herceg-Bosna is going to give its full support to the recognition and the
14 final establishment of the Republic of Croatia
15 But based on this, since you were very close to President
16 Tudjman, you held very high functions indeed, I'd like to know the
17 following: Why did the Republic of Croatia
18 at one point in time the Republic of Herceg-Bosna
19 issue based on the recent model where you had various countries that
20 recognised Kosovo. Why is it that back then Croatia did not want to or
21 was not able to officially recognise the Republic of Herceg-Bosna? Could
22 you answer this question?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you meant the
24 Republic of Herceg-Bosna
25 organisation of Croats, as far as I know Croatia never seriously thought
1 about recognising this as an independent republic. As far as Bosnia
3 sovereign state, Croatia
4 recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina at the moment when Bosnia
6 that moment Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet sought recognition either
7 from Croatia
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you are telling us that at
9 no point in time did Croatia
10 Herceg-Bosna, that it was never a concern of the then leaders of Croatia
11 and that you never heard this possibility being mentioned.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I heard a reference being made to a
13 possibility of the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina and separation of
14 different parts of Bosnia
15 various international negotiations because reference was made to that,
16 but the unilateral recognition by Croatia of the organisation of Croats
17 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina that appeared under different
18 names, one of them being Herceg-Bosna, I never attended any such meeting
19 that a reference was made to that, and I don't know that such a
20 possibility was ever seriously considered by the Croatian leadership.
21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Zuzul, I would like -- following up on the
22 question that my colleague Prandler has asked, I would like to take you
23 back to this Presidential transcript and to page 34 at the top. I think
24 it would simply not be fair if I did not give you the opportunity
25 expressly to comment on this. Here, Mr. Tudjman is quoted in the first
1 paragraph as saying this: "It seems to me, therefore, that just as we
2 have taken advantage of this historic moment to establish an independent
3 internationally recognised Croatia
4 take the opportunity to gather the Croatian people inside the widest
5 possible borders."
6 I wonder how this is to be understood in your view.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Judge Trechsel, before he answers the question,
8 because you skipped a page, I think, and I was going to ask because it
9 should follow -- it should have followed Judge Prandler's quotation to
10 read also page 33 because I think you cannot fully answer
11 Judge Prandler's question without reading the top paragraph of 40 -- of
12 33. And then with that, then we can go on to 34 because it's sequential.
13 So if that's okay, otherwise I'll go back. But I think without page 33,
14 I'm afraid we're cherry-picking at this point.
15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If you want to read it, read it.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, here's the part.
17 It says: "And create," this is picking up where Judge Prandler
18 left off, the continuity of the thought. It is: "And to create a
19 statement, therefore, out of the remaining part around Sarajevo where
20 mostly Muslims and some Catholic Croats would stay which would resemble a
21 small historical land of Bosnia
22 the demarcation of Serbia
23 have to rely on Croatia
24 international actors who are now surely seriously counting, as you
25 mentioned, on Serb policing for that Muslim element, Islamic element, in
3 That's the part that I wanted in, in keeping that we talked
4 earlier about what he had mentioned about the policing of Muslims, the
6 that's -- that puts context into what -- because it seems to me there is
7 some connection to all of this. But I don't want to lead the witness.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The way I experienced this
9 transcript and the overall discussion that transpires from it was that
10 Tudjman primarily responded to the proposals that were presented to him
11 in a very concrete form immediately prior to that. In the 19 items he
12 speaks about various variants. One of them is the cantonisation; the
13 other is republics. All sorts of things are mentioned because at that
14 moment all the options are on the table. As far as the international
15 community was concerned, there was also an option to divide
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina because the documents that we saw before had already
17 been known. In that context, Tudjman presents his discussion and from
18 time to time he presents his own personal views according to which the
19 Western world does not want an independent Muslim state or that, in one
20 way or another, the Western world wanted to have a buffer zone. I would
21 call this considerations rather than proposals.
22 As for the paragraph that the Honourable Judge pointed to, one
23 can see here that he makes a clear distinction between the
24 internationally recognised Croatia
25 certain degree, if you allow me my own interpretation, a degree of pride
1 because he knew that very soon after that Croatia would be recognised.
2 He speaks in one way about the international borders, and he speaks in
3 another way which doesn't lend itself to an easy interpretation about the
4 Croatian territory or the Croatian interest, territory, or the territory
5 where Croats lived, and he primarily implies 30 -- or the 28
7 It seems to me that one can see the difference very clearly,
8 especially within the context of the previous question. He does consider
9 certain possibilities and options, but he leaves room for future
10 decisions and reactions. And there are also areas where he's very firm
11 and categorical, one of them being the borders of Croatia. I think that
12 Tudjman could not be as categorical and as proud at the moment about the
13 recognition, the upcoming recognition of Croatia, if he had thought at
14 the time that the international borders of Croatia would change. Tudjman
15 was not naive. That's at least what we thought of him. And if he had
16 thought in that way he would have appeared naive. On the one hand he
17 speaks about the recognised borders and the recognition of Croatia, and
18 on the other hand he speaks about different ways to solve the situation
19 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the different options for that.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed, Mr. Karnavas.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Any other questions? Otherwise, we'll go on to
22 the next document. And I think from now on where we -- where there's a
23 need I think it's perfectly acceptable, and in fact the best thing is for
24 the Trial Chamber to ask their questions as we go through this.
25 Q. The next one is P 00130. This is another so-called presidential
1 transcript. And just to save a little time we can see this is 3 March
2 1992, and we can see from the very first page that your name is on -- is
3 on as one of the -- somebody that was present at the meeting. P 00130.
4 Do you have it?
5 A. [In English] Yeah.
6 Q. All right. Now, because I don't want to lose too much time on
7 this one, have you had an opportunity to read this -- this particular
9 A. [Interpretation] Yes.
10 Q. And the one part that I want to focus on just very briefly before
11 I ask you for any other things that you may wish to point out, on page
12 65, at the second paragraph, it says: "I think that this is a big
13 problem that should be resolved urgently, namely the problem of
14 communication. The Croatian War Navy, the Sixth Operational Zone, and
15 especially in the context of the problem of Herzegovina."
16 Now, this is several months after the previous transcript that we
17 saw. Can you tell us how the situation had changed if at all in Croatia
18 vis-a-vis the JNA and the aggression that we spoke about yesterday?
19 A. At that moment the overall situation had changed to a certain
20 extent. Croatia
21 been established in certain parts of Croatia or their establishment was
22 under way, so there was no military danger in Croatia. The situation was
23 frozen, in military terms, at that point. However, there was still a
24 direct threat in the area around Dubrovnik
25 of Croatia
2 We're talking about, me and others, which was the main purpose of
3 this meeting, was in relation to the general problems of the army. I and
4 the others who were with me had all just come back from a visit to the
5 territory around Dubrovnik
6 defence there, one of the problems being communication between the
7 different branches the Croatian army, more concretely between the navy
8 and land army, and the impossibility of formal communication with the
9 units. I better say -- I don't know whether I can call them units in
10 formal terms, but with the volunteers in Herceg-Bosna from the territory
11 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, those that I referred to a while ago. And
12 this is what this particular sentence refers to as well as the rest of my
13 presentation. I would like to add to that the group that I was with was
14 dealing with the psychological and information activities; i.e., problems
15 in communication with the different parts of the military were an
16 integral part of our everyday work.
17 Q. You're going to have to slow down a little bit now. Now we might
18 be going a little bit too fast, but is there anything else on this
19 transcript? Otherwise we'll move on to the next document. I only
20 mention that because you were present.
21 A. As for the context in which this happened, I believe that a lot
22 has already been said about that.
23 Q. All right. Now, if we go to the next document, 1 -- it's P
24 00131, and the Prosecution says that this particular document is relevant
25 because this transcript records discussions by the senior Croatian
1 military command and shows Croatian logistical assistance of both arms
2 and military units to the Bosnian Croats. And there's a reference to
3 page 27, and we can see that on that particular page there are references
4 to sector Dubrovnik
5 we just look at the very first page we'll see that you were present at
6 this meeting. This is the following day from the previous transcript, 4
7 March 1992
8 including an individual by the name of Daidza, and perhaps you could
9 begin by telling us did you know this person, who was and what position
10 he held? Just very briefly.
11 A. I met Mr. Daidza during one of my visits to the southern front.
12 I don't know whether this was immediately prior to this event. At the
13 moment when I met him, he was the commander of a unit which mostly
14 consisted of Muslim volunteers. At the moment when we met them, they
15 were in training in Croatia
16 near Makarska. Maybe in Backa Polje, but I'm not a hundred percent sure.
17 But I know for a fact that he was the commander of that unit of Muslim
18 volunteers who fought together with the Croatian volunteers against the
19 J -- the Yugoslav Army.
20 Q. Okay. I'm going to have to ask you to slow down a little bit,
21 but you say Muslim volunteers. Would they be Muslim volunteers from
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or are they Muslim volunteers from Croatia?
23 A. From Bosnia and Herzegovina. From Bosnia and Herzegovina
24 Q. Now, you also mentioned the word "training." I take it that you
25 meant military training.
1 A. Yes. I believe that this was primarily military training.
2 Q. All right. And just prior to that you had pointed to what has
3 been previously marked as 3D 03171. That's the map itself. And you had
4 pointed towards the area of Dubrovnik
5 your attention, and perhaps you might be able to comment. On page 25 of
6 this transcript where you say -- when Daidza says: "I was assigned a
7 task to arrange the valley of the Neretva River
8 commanders because it was our very last defence line. I would like to
9 give a brief statement." And then he gives a statement, and then on page
10 27, at the very last sentence there is a reference from a Luka --
11 A. Djanko.
12 Q. -- Djanko, thank you, where he talks about the zone of
13 responsibility of Dubrovnik
14 territory of the municipalities of Dubrovnik, Metkovic, Ploce -- I always
15 have problems with this one.
16 A. Vrgorac.
17 Q. Vrgorac in Western Herzegovina. And then it goes on: "It is
18 specific about of few elements, Neum and Herzegovina cut it off and it is
19 shallow for the Defence. The Dubrovnik
20 facing subjective problems in commanding, and I will say a few words.
21 "There are actions in Herzegovina
22 staff, and I'm already there with two of my brigades. Croatian people of
24 and I think that they have approximately 22.000 barrels of artillery
25 which is enough. I'm going to say a few words," and then there's a
1 further discussion. Now just so I'm clear, do these reflect what you
2 were saying yesterday with respect to Neum and the difficulties of
3 covering the entire Croatian -- southern Croatian territory?
4 A. Yes. This is a very specific illustration of my own words. I
5 can provide you an example and give you an episode. The first time I met
6 Mr. Djanko down there he was the commander of the Croatian army in the
7 area but not of the navy. According to some information, Yugoslav tanks
8 were moving towards Opuzen -- or, rather, towards the line on the Neretva
9 River. At the moment when we arrived, he was considering the possibility
10 of blowing up a bridge on the river Bistrina in the area. However, when
11 we looked at a map we could see that this would not make any strategic
12 sense, because if he blew up that bridge, he would have prevented their
13 passage through the narrow territory of Croatia
14 and went on moving to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15 What I'm trying say is this: It was absolutely clear that it was
16 absolutely impossible to defend that territory unless the defence of the
17 part of the territory in Herzegovina
18 defence, because it was from that particular area that all the attacks
19 came from.
20 Q. All right. Okay. Thank you. We're going to move on to the next
21 three documents. I will try to cover them in succession, so I'll just
22 point out some relevant passages and then ask you to comment on them if
23 that's okay with the Trial Chamber just to save some time, because they
24 relate more or less to the same matter. So we'll be looking first at P
25 00205. This is from the Security Council. It's 15 May 1992. Before we
1 go to the document, is Croatia
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina to attack the Sarajevo
3 A. Of course not.
4 Q. Have they sent in troops at this point in time to attack the
5 Muslim people?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Okay. And you just told us just previously that in fact there
8 were Muslim volunteers who were being trained in Croatia, assisting
10 the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina onto Croatia
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. Right. Now, if we look at this Security Council Resolution, and
13 if we go to the second page under item number 2, it says: "Welcomes the
14 effort -- the efforts undertaken by the European Community in the
15 framework -- framework of the discussions on constitutional arrangements
16 for Bosnia and Herzegovina under the auspices of the conference of
18 the three communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate actively
19 and constructively in these discussions." And it goes on and on? First
20 question is: Were you aware of -- of these activities? There was --
21 there were undergoing discussions concerning the constitutional
22 arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
23 A. I was aware of that.
24 Q. Okay. And at any point in time -- this is a foundational
25 question for future questions. At any point in time, were you involved
1 in any sorts of activities, negotiations, discussions, drafting of -- of
2 agreements or what have you, that were based in part -- were due to
3 the -- the discussions on the constitutional arrangements of Bosnia
5 A. Most certainly over the entire period of time, on several
6 occasions. At this point in time, I was in a certain way involved in
7 negotiations and talks.
8 Q. All right. Now let's look at point number 3. It demands that
9 all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including
10 the units of the Yugoslav People's Army, JNA, as well as elements of the
11 Croatian army cease immediately and that Bosnia and Herzegovina
12 neighbours take swift action to end such an interference and respect the
13 territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina." First question, to your
14 knowledge were there elements of the Croatian army on the territory of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina and, if so, where would they have been located at that
16 point in time in light of the circumstances and the activities that
17 you've already discussed thus far?
18 A. I don't have any concrete information about that, but I believe
19 that there were elements of the Croatian army on the territories of
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina. I don't have any reason to doubt this report,
21 but it is also absolutely clear from the overall situation that at that
22 moment they were fighting exclusively against the JNA, which was at the
23 time in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is also confirmed
24 by this particular Resolution.
25 Q. All right. Now, we're going to get other Resolutions, but if you
1 could just help us out a little bit because yesterday we talked about the
2 UN and their lack of effort to send combat troops to defend the
3 territorial integrity and the lives of Croatians as a result of the
4 aggressive actions taken by the JNA.
5 Assuming, assuming, and you told us that you were in that area
6 and you know it very well, so we have the foundation for that. You were
7 in the military, so we have the foundation for that, as well, so let's
8 assume that those elements of the Croatian army had withdrawn from that
9 area around Dubrovnik
10 assume for the sake of our hypothetical, but we will see later on that in
11 fact that was the case, that the JNA did not withdraw from that
12 territory, what would have happened to the southern part of Croatia
13 A. Yesterday I said that at that time there already was enough
14 compelling information to the effect that it was the plan of the Serbian
15 army, because the Yugoslav army at that time was completely controlled by
16 the Serbian leadership, to establish the border along the Neretva River
17 It is my impression that had it not been for the volunteers from
19 side by side with them, again I have to say this is my personal
20 impression, and the assistance they received from the Croatian army, and
21 the elements of the Croatian army, that they would not have been able to
22 achieve this goal militarily.
23 Now, as for the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as for the course
24 that the peace talks would take, this is something that we can only guess
25 and speculate, but it is a fact that all the peace talks about Bosnia
2 in control of certain territory, and at times they side-stepped the issue
3 as to how Serbs actually got to hold this territory.
4 Q. All right. Let me just move on for the sake of -- there's a
5 point number 4. We've seen this before where it talks about -- it says:
6 "Demands that those units of the Yugoslavia People's army and elements of
7 the Croatian army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina must either be withdrawn
8 or be subject to the authority of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina or
9 be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective
10 international monitoring, and request the Secretary-General to consider
11 without delay to what international assistance could be provided in this
12 connection. First, let me ask you this starting with the latter part of
13 this segment. What if any assistance, what international assistance, was
14 provided at this point in time in that particular area?
15 A. Primarily monitoring it seems to me.
16 Q. Okay. Were the monitors in a position to fight back the JNA
17 should they continue with their attacks on Croatia?
18 A. I think that they did not have this kind of mandate at that time.
19 I'm sure that they didn't have it at that time. They didn't have the
20 forces to do it either. And we know, I think from the judgements
21 rendered by this Tribunal, that even when they had the forces they were
22 not in a position to intervene and to prevent some major humanitarian
24 Q. Now, the next two documents are dated --
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A follow-up question if I may
1 on the document we've just been reviewing. It is document 205 if I'm not
2 mistaken. Is this the right document, Mr. Karnavas?
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Correct, Mr. President.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In the Resolution, on page 2 in
5 the English version, item 4, it is demanded that the Croatian army units
6 in Bosnia
7 dozens, maybe hundreds of hours. To your knowledge, sir, were there
8 units of the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that at that time there
10 were elements of the Croatian army in some areas of Bosnia and
12 different issue, but they all fought side by side with all those who were
13 trying to defend themselves against the Yugoslav army and the Serbian
14 aggression as I have already said. We in the Republic of Croatia
15 instance, welcomed this resolution. At that time, I was in the Foreign
17 Why did we welcome it? Because this resolution offers two
18 options. One, for the Yugoslav army to withdraw from Bosnia and
20 international institutions, and some hoped that this could actually come
21 to pass. In that case, the question of any elements of Croatian army
22 remaining there would become immaterial. They would have nothing to do.
23 But if that did not happen, the Resolution goes on in paragraph 4 as it
24 continues offering another option for those forces to be placed under the
25 authority of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Your Honour, I
1 can vouch that at that time we were already in contact with Bosnia
3 from this Resolution.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I was only referring to the
5 month of May 1992. For the rest, we'll see later. Thank you very much.
6 Mr. Karnavas, please proceed.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Now, the next two documents are May 1992, and again, they sort of
9 touch upon the same issues that we've discussed, and if we look on
10 page -- page 2 of P 00232, sort of in the middle of the page it says:
11 "Deeply concern also at the developments in Croatia, including persistent
12 cease-fire violations and the continued expulsion of non-Serb civilians
13 and at the obstruction of and lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR in other
14 parts of Croatia
15 talking about when they say the continued expulsion of non-Serb
16 civilians? Are we talking about in Croatia? What part? What are they
17 talking about?
18 A. They're talking about the events in so-called UNPROFOR zones.
19 Those were parts of Croatia
20 so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina had been set up. The international
21 forces arrived in the areas, yet despite that, the expulsion of non-Serbs
22 continued in that zone and in other zones, and when they're talking about
23 the lack of cooperation, it is obvious that at that time what happened
24 was that the self-proclaimed authorities in those occupied forces were
25 refusing to cooperate with UNPROFOR.
1 Q. Well, were those self-proclaimed authorities being assisted by
2 any particular armed force, or were they just capable on their own to
3 conduct those expulsions?
4 A. Right from the beginning, they received direct support and
5 assistance from the Yugoslav People's Army. They received weapons from
6 them. The command structure was for the most part taken over from the
7 Yugoslav army. One of the commanders in the area in -- in the Knin area
8 was Ratko Mladic before he moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina, so it is no
9 secret that it was a mix of self-proclaimed leaders who advocated the
10 idea of Greater Serbia and the Yugoslav army, which in the meantime had
11 dropped every pretense of the effort to save Yugoslavia. They merely
12 occupied Croatia
14 Q. And again before I -- before I ask my next question concerning
15 this particular document, can you tell us at this point in time how much
16 of the -- of Croatian territory is occupied? It might be relevant
17 because sometimes in this courtroom we tend to forget the percentage of
18 the country and the devastation that Croatia underwent.
19 A. Well, I don't want to pretend to be an expert. From what I've
20 read and from the documents that I received in my diplomatic career, the
21 international documents, the percentage of the territory was between 25
22 at the lower end, but the figure that was quoted most often was 30 per
23 cent of the Croatian territory. That would be one-third of the overall
24 territory of Croatia
25 Q. Okay. And we see now in this -- in paragraph 2 -- I mean on page
1 3, item 2, I'm sorry, page 3 item 2 it says: "Demands that any elements
2 of the Croatian army still present in Bosnia-Herzegovina act in
3 accordance with paragraph 4 of Resolution 752 very quickly." Had the
4 situation say, just in the southern part of Croatia, where we talked
5 about earlier, had that changed in the 15 days between the document that
6 we saw earlier, that is P 0025 and this one P 00232, had the situation
7 changed on the ground at all?
8 A. No. The situation did not change, but in the meantime the
9 diplomatic activities between Croatia
10 stepped up, and they would soon result in the signing of the agreement
11 that would fully meet the demands of the UN Security Council.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm told that there's a wrong number in the
13 transcript. It should be P 00205.
14 THE WITNESS: This is P 00232.
15 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes. For the record, for the transcript, I
16 probably misspoke and that's why it was written down. I was referring to
18 Q. Okay. Now when we get to this document P 00233, which is the
19 last document in this series, it's dated the same date, and you told us
20 that the JNA has not left at least the areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina
21 where they're attacking Croatia
22 Now, if we look at -- I just wanted to point a couple of things
23 out again. So we can take a reality check over here, or do a reality
24 check. In paragraph 10: "As regards the withdrawal of elements of
25 Croatian army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina, information currently
1 available in New York
2 UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of Croatian army personnel in
3 uniforms operating within and as part of military formations in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian authorities have consistently taken the
5 position that the Croatian soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina have left the
6 Croatian army and are not subject to its authority. International
7 observers do not, however, doubt that the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina
8 are under the control of the Croatian military --"
9 A. [In English] To the portion.
10 Q. To the portion -- I'm sorry, the portion I can't read. "The
11 portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Croatian
12 military and it's whether -- whether belonging to the local territorial
13 defence, to paramilitary groups, or to the Croatian army. It is unclear
14 in the circumstances how their withdrawal or disbandment as required by
15 the council can be achieved." We spoke of Mr. Daidza. Was Daidza under
16 the -- to your knowledge, that is - if you can answer the question; if
17 not, we won't bother - but was he under the control of the Croatian
18 military or the Croatian authorities or the Croatian army?
19 A. I couldn't give you an answer to that question. I think it was
20 quite clear to me who Daidza and his volunteers were fighting, but as to
21 under whose control he was, I couldn't really venture an opinion.
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. But Mr. Daidza was from Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is a
24 notorious fact. Everybody knew that, myself included. He was from some
25 place in Central Bosnia
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A general question, Witness.
2 At the time you no doubt read the Resolutions of the Security Council, I
3 suppose. Your department within the ministry kept close scrutiny of
4 anything that was written at the time.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Surely. At that time, I was
6 at the Foreign Ministry at the time. We were familiar with those
7 Resolutions, and we were trying to take steps in accordance with those
8 Resolutions. Now I'm talking about the Foreign Ministry.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As you know, those Resolutions
10 result from different information coming from the international forces
11 present on the ground, from other sources, and so on and so forth. In
12 your position, in your capacity, did you observe at any time major
13 mistakes in the Resolutions when certain facts were mentioned? Do you
14 have specific cases in mind where you could say that what was written
15 down was obviously wrong, inaccurate, based on unreliable information?
16 Do you have in mind one or two examples that you could give us from the
17 top of your head?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. President, I can't now
19 think of any Resolutions or reports of the UN Secretary-General such as
20 this one where I spotted some major errors. If there were any such
21 cases, we reacted while the Resolutions were in the process of being
22 drafted. At times, it appeared that the idea behind the Resolutions was
23 to establish some kind of a balanced approach towards -- where all sides
24 would be treated in the same way, and to us who knew what the situation
25 was like on the ground, they did not seem an accurate reflection of that.
1 I can tell you that because I had direct relations, good relations, with
2 a number of international representatives. I would sometimes bring that
3 up. At times, I would officially put -- make an official protest, but
4 most often I would receive the following reply: They were there to
5 establish facts and not to judge what is going on, who is to blame and
6 who is not. It seemed to us that this approach was not always
7 productive, but that may have been just our impression because, after
8 all, I was there to represent the Republic of Croatia
9 possibility that I was subjective in my approach. But I couldn't really
10 say that I noticed any major glaring errors in those documents.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before the break --
12 MR. KARNAVAS: If I could, just one last point on this document,
13 and we'll take our break.
14 Q. Sticking with the same document, because this is 233, because you
15 mentioned Mladic, and I think it might be relevant here. If we look at
16 paragraph number 5 on page 2, it says: "The bulk of JNA personnel who
17 were deployed in Bosnia
18 and were not, therefore, covered by the Belgrade authorities' decision of
19 4 May to withdraw JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of them appeared to
20 have joined the army of the so-called Serbian Republic of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Others have joined the Territorial Defence of Bosnia
22 and Herzegovina
23 which is under the political control of the Presidency of that republic.
24 Others may have joined various irregular forces operating there." Now,
25 you said earlier -- you talked earlier about General Mladic, who was in
2 about what is being said in paragraph 5, why it might be significant
3 about the JNA personnel?
4 A. In an effort to report objectively, I was talking about it a
5 moment ago, it is my interpretation that the Secretary-General in this
6 report as it is worded, that the members of the Yugoslav army from Bosnia
7 and Herzegovina
8 nothing changed. Those were the same troops. They retained their
9 equipment; I think the equipment is actually mentioned somewhere in this
10 report by the UN Secretary-General, and they had the same command
11 structure. And unfortunately time would tell. I think this is the first
12 time that General Mladic is actually referred to in a document
13 originating from the United Nations, but as time went by we went on to
14 see under whose command he operated and what he actually did. So this
15 was just pretense. The same troops remained there under the same
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. That's it, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll take a
19 20-minute break.
20 --- Recess taken at 5.40 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 6.03 p.m.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you may proceed.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Q. Okay.
25 JUDGE PRANDLER: I'm sorry, Mr. Karnavas, to stop you, but before
1 we break I didn't want to take your time. I only would like to have a
2 question from Mr. Zuzul, and it is about a clarification. During the
3 very last minutes of -- of the witness, you spoke and he spoke about some
4 of the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, and I believe
5 it was page 74, lines 1 and 2, that -- that Mr. Zuzul you mentioned that,
6 and I quote: "I was there to represent Croatia," et cetera. And now my
7 question of clarification is the following: According to -- to your -- I
8 mean the summary of what we have received, there is not very much clearly
9 stated, if you will, also posted in New York or only in Geneva
10 morning you -- I mean, previously you mentioned that you were posted in
12 gathered from your last statement that -- that if you were also in New
14 member of delegation, et cetera. So my question is to clarify if you
15 were permanently in Geneva
16 General Assembly sessions in New York or at the meetings of the Security
17 Council. Thank you.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. When the
19 Resolutions were passed, I was with the foreign ministry. I was, in
20 actual fact, assistant minister. I had started dealing with the
21 negotiations already. I had not yet been appointed ambassador. Soon
22 after this, I became deputy foreign minister. You talked about the
23 position of ambassador to the UN in Geneva. I was appointed on the 1st
24 of February, 1993, to that particular position. However, even while
25 working as assistant and deputy foreign minister in Geneva, I was a
1 regular member of our delegations in New York, as well, and I was quite
2 involved in the work of our delegations, and I took part in discussing
3 all the Resolutions on the Croatian side, needless to say.
4 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you very much.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Judge Prandler.
6 Q. And I wanted to point out something on page 74, line 24, because
7 it was translated as -- in an effort for those folks to be objective, and
8 I believe my colleague tells me that you used the word "Pokusaj," if I'm
9 pronouncing that correctly. Could you please tell us whether that means
10 "effort" or "attempt," because it may be a slight variation. It may be
11 slightly nuance, but just to have a more accurate -- what did you exactly
12 mean when you were asked the question about the reports? Were they
13 making an effort, or were they attempting? I don't want to put words in
14 your mouth, but I'm told that you actually used the word. We don't have
15 a Croatian transcript. So if you could think back?
16 A. [In English] I would say that they were making efforts.
17 Q. Okay. All right. Now, if we could go to the next document, and
18 we're probably going to move through the next couple of documents rather
19 quickly so we can get some more substantive areas. The next one is a P
20 document for Prosecution, P 00263. This is a presidential transcript.
21 Now, this is dated 15 June 1992
22 exhibit list indicated that the relevant pages for them are 66 to 67 and
23 that this transcript shows army of Republic of Croatia
24 into Bosnia
25 Now, if I could direct you to that page, page 67, it also shows,
1 by the way, that you were present. I don't know if you recall being
2 present, but in any event, the first page shows that you were present.
3 Page 67, as I understand it, you had an opportunity to read not just the
4 English version but also to make some comparisons with the Croatian
5 version, and it might be of some significance, I don't know, we'll leave
6 it up to the Trial Chamber, but could you look at that, the very last
7 paragraph where it starts: "The numbers of theft and larceny cases has
8 also increased." Did you notice anything missing, any words missing in
10 A. That's true, I was at this meeting. Naturally having read the
11 transcripts it came back to me. It has been 16 years since, after all.
12 However, when I read both English and the Croatian versions, I noticed
13 that the English is missing a word which in this case might change the
14 overall meaning. In the English it's page 67. In the Croatian -- I
15 don't know exactly how the pages were marked, but I think it's 714.
16 Anyway, the word "return" is missing. Therefore, if we try to translate
17 this paragraph over here there is a word missing, the word "return,"
18 which can be translated into English -- well, I am certainly no expert,
19 but to the extent that I can tell, it could be translated in two ways
20 perhaps, "withdrawal," which is I think the word that most people would
21 have used in this case, or "return," which is another possibility. If
22 you add that word to the paragraph, no matter if you actually opt for the
23 word "withdrawal" or the word "return," I think this changes the meaning
24 entirely, and the paragraph shows that those elements of the Croatian
25 army that were in Bosnia and Herzegovina were now returning home and
1 while withdrawing were perpetrating certain crimes.
2 Q. Okay. And with respect to the -- to the issue of check-points --
3 well, perhaps you could read the paragraph itself, which is only a few
5 A. [In English] Excuse me, the same paragraph.
6 Q. Yeah. And you can read it in Croatian. It can be translated or
7 you can read it in English, however you feel more comfortable. Croatian
8 is the original language of the transcript, so ...
9 A. Maybe I'll read it in Croatian so maybe we'll get new translation
11 Q. All right.
12 A. [Interpretation] "Cases of theft and larceny have been on the
13 increase. The movable property, too, has been stolen, and in the last
14 cases at local check-points machines and equipment has been moved over
15 from Herceg-Bosna where units and individuals who were involved over
16 there along various front lines while returning to Croatia have been
17 hauling in as war booty tractors, and all other kinds of agricultural
18 machinery, et cetera. "However," and that's the next paragraph,
19 "However, we have set up very effective check-points here, and I can now
20 say that we have been particularly effective at putting a stop to this
21 kind of practice."
22 Q. Okay. All right. Can you, being there, and now that we have the
23 context and having read it and spotted the error, can you tell us when
24 they say "we have set up check-points here," what are they talking about?
25 What kind of check-points, and what does "here" mean in this context?
1 A. I can't tell you exactly where the check-points were. I simply
2 don't know. However, looking at the overall context, I think these are
3 check-points in Croatia
4 Q. Okay. All right. Let's go on --
5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Just for the record, Mr. Karnavas, wouldn't it
6 be good to mention that it is Mate Lausic who is speaking here? It's not
7 Boban. It's not the witness.
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Right. Right. I should apologise. I should have
9 done that. I'm just getting a little tired but --
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Of course. We all are.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: -- you're absolutely correct.
12 Q. All right. And now just for the record, who is that individual
13 so we know?
14 A. I think at this time he was the commander of the military police
15 of the Croatian army.
16 Q. Okay. All right. Now, if we go on to the next -- next document,
17 P 00336. This is a presidential transcript dated 21 July 19 --
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: We have to change the folders.
19 MR. KARNAVAS: Sorry.
20 Q. 21 July 1992
21 is happening in Croatia
22 stopped, or is it -- and has the territory up to 30 per cent, as you've
23 indicated, does Croatia
24 internationally recognised borders?
25 A. There were no considerable changes in Croatia at this time.
1 Large tracts of Croatian territory were still under occupation. There
2 was nothing much going on in terms of warfare, as far as I know, since
3 all of those were by now UNPROFOR-controlled areas. However, there
4 wasn't anything in particular moving in a good, positive direction
5 either. Nevertheless, relations were changing between Croatia
6 and Herzegovina
7 internationally recognised. It had been recognised by Croatia as well.
8 In the context of this story, one thing that strikes me as worth
9 mentioning is that at a referendum before Bosnia and Herzegovina
10 established, there were only Bosniaks and Croats participating. The
11 Serbs refused to be involved. President Tudjman issued a public call on
12 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina to go to that referendum and to vote in
13 favour of an independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Soon after
14 the proclamation, Croatia
15 with diplomatic consultations immediately. This document is in relation
16 to the first major meeting following the recognition. However, in the
17 context of the Resolutions that I have been talking about, there is one
18 thing that I would like to note. Sometime in mid-June President Tudjman
19 and President Izetbegovic issued a joint statement. I was with President
20 Tudjman when we prepared the statement. Among other things, the
21 statement also dealt with issues mentioned in the Secretary-General's
22 letter as well as in the Resolutions of the Security Council. Croatia
23 wanted to act on those documents immediately. So this gives you the
24 general background. There was a lot of diplomatic activity going on.
25 This meeting was agreed and eventually held between the leaders of the
1 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the leaders of the Republic of
3 Q. Okay. Now -- thank you. Let me walk you step by step, but I'm
4 happy that you put that into context because let me use this to segue
5 into my next question. The Prosecution in the 62 ter description in
6 describing this particular presidential transcript, and I'll use a word
7 that they attribute to me that is "spin", this is what the Prosecution
8 says: That this transcript --
9 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, as I objected earlier this afternoon,
10 I'm also going to object again to this now.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well.
12 MR. SCOTT: There's no point in putting these preparatory
13 comments and criticisms. He can ask the question. If he can point him
14 to the page and say -- if -- assuming it's otherwise a fair question,
15 there's no reason for these other preparatory remarks.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: I am entitled -- I am entitled -- this is the
17 Defence, Mr. President. I am defending allegations. The allegation --
18 the spin by the Prosecutor who wasn't there at the time is suggesting
19 that -- that Tudjman is -- presses the Bosnian president. The gentleman
20 is particularly familiar. That's their spin. He's going to comment.
21 MR. SCOTT: This is further coaching of the witness, Your Honour.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: How is it coaching of the witness?
23 MR. SCOTT: Because I'm now telling you what the Prosecution
24 position is, so you can be sure to disagree with that. That's your queue
25 to disagree.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours.
2 MR. SCOTT: This is objectionable.
3 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours.
4 MR. SCOTT: Just ask the question.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours, let's take a reality check. I met
6 with the witness. I went through the documents. If I wanted to coach
7 him, I would have coached him back then.
8 MR. SCOTT: Maybe you did.
9 MR. KARNAVAS: This is absolutely ridiculous, and this Prosecutor
10 has met with every single witness, gone through the documents, and we've
11 seen them testify. So I'm -- they allege a joint criminal enterprise.
12 They allege that Tudjman is pressing the Bosnian president, entering into
13 a particular agreement, which is the very next document. That's their
14 spin. I'm entitled to -- I'm entitled to point that out because the
15 gentleman can comment. To suggest that I'm suggesting is utterly and
16 patently ridiculous, and I'm being generous at this point.
17 MR. SCOTT: Well, I do suggest it, and also, Your Honour, I ask
18 the Chamber and not just Judge Antonetti. I ask all the Chamber in
19 fairness. Remember back during the Prosecution case and when the
20 Prosecution put on its witnesses. I didn't say, and I'm telling you,
21 Mr. Witness, what the Prosecution case is, and this is the answer I want
22 you to give, and if you look at paragraph so-and-so of our indictment,
23 this is the Prosecution's theory. I didn't preface my questions, and the
24 Prosecution counsel didn't in that way. You ask a witness to come in.
25 You put questions to the witness. You don't argue your case. You don't
1 say, I'm telling -- I'm putting your spin on it. You ask questions.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: It's called burden of proof, Your Honour, burden
3 of proof. They are alleging. They have the power. They draft that
4 indictment the way they want it. They decided to put the spin on this
5 particular presidential transcript in order to get it in. That's their
6 interpretation. I'm not inventing anything. That's their invention.
7 They got to proof that. I'm attacking. I'm defending. That's -- so if
8 he thinks that's the case --
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, the Judges are
10 thinking about how to speed up trials, and the both of you have just
11 illustrated the need for Judges to intervene at times.
12 Mr. Karnavas, you want to highlight one point. Very well. In
13 order to do so, you tell the witness, "Look at this transcript. There is
14 this particular sentence." He can say yes. He can say no. He can say,
15 "I don't know." Thereafter, afterwards you say, "well, it appears in the
16 indictment that this is being alleged," and then we can move forward.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well, Mr. President, but it's not in the
18 indictment. It's in their description of the evidence, but very well.
19 And I understand that the description is not evidence, and you'll see a
20 motion that I filed where I objected to these characterisations. That's
21 parted of this -- my whole attack on the Prosecution case, that in trying
22 to get in evidence they've had to put certain descriptions as to what
23 they believe the evidence shows. So that's part and parcel. And then
24 when I objected to that, they came back and they said, "No. Our -- our
25 characterisations are part of the evidence." But I take your point. Let
1 me move on. Let's go straight to the document. Okay. Let's everyone
2 calm down a little bit.
3 Q. 21st of July, 1992, there's a discussion, and I just want to
4 focus you very briefly because we're going to go on to the next document.
5 On page 59, we have Dr. Franjo Tudjman, who is the president, and there
6 he's -- he says, and I quote: "Mr. President Izetbegovic, our time is
7 limited, so can we finish with this part of the discussion as the base --
8 as the presumption for further interstate conversations, that both
9 delegations agree that the status of the Croatian people in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organised on the basis of three constitutive
11 units of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and second, that the defence forces of
12 the Croatian Defence Council are considered to be an integral part of the
13 defence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they are to be
14 represented in the command, the Joint Command of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
15 Now, can you tell us given the position that you held and your
16 involvement, can you tell us exactly why is President Izetbegovic
17 pursuing this sort of policy, if you will, with President Izetbegovic at
18 the time -- I mean, President Tudjman, why is he pursuing this with
19 President Izetbegovic?
20 A. I attended this meeting. I think it was a very important
21 meeting. I think it clearly illustrates the principles that President
22 Tudjman applied when he was thinking about Bosnia and Herzegovina
23 as when acting in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He accepts
24 President Izetbegovic as the president of a sovereign neighbouring
25 country recognised by Croatia
1 the position of the Croats there, the Croats as a constituent nation in
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina. He's here tabling a proposal that was anyway
3 based on the proposal put forward by the international community, and I'm
4 referring to Cutileiro's plan to the effect that the Croats within Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina
6 groups there. He also goes on to propose that the Croatian armed forces
7 in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be placed under a Joint Command to be
8 exercised by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina so that they might be
9 better able to defend themselves from aggression.
10 I think this very paragraph does a great job illustrating
11 President Tudjman's position at the time. Not just at the time. This
12 moment is when it was actually formulated, but what I've been trying to
13 say yesterday and today is this: My impression from the very beginning
14 of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and onward was that Mr. Tudjman's
15 policies were defined by these three principles, and all three can easily
16 and to great advantage be seen in these sentences contained in the
18 Q. Okay. And just before we get down to the next document, did
19 President Tudjman --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel, please.
21 MR. KARNAVAS:
22 Q. Did President Tudjman intend to subordinate, to subordinate, the
23 Croatians and the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the HVO, under
24 whatever army existed for the Sarajevo
25 "integral part," did he have some other intention?
1 A. No. He wanted both for the Croats to enjoy an appropriate
2 position in Bosnia and Herzegovina's government and its institutions
3 including the BH army command and for the Croatian defence forces to
4 become and integral and indivisible part of the BH army forces [as
5 interpreted]. I think it is impossible to view these two issues
6 separately. He wanted them to effectively become one and the same army,
7 but he also wanted to have a Croat involved in the command structure.
8 Q. Okay. I'm told that it was the defence forces, not the BH army
9 forces. Is that what you meant? Because my disadvantage is I don't
10 understand Croatian, and my colleague here is pointing out at page 85,
11 line 18. So if you could look at that and please tell us again, because
12 we're talking -- there are some nuances here, and I just want to make
13 sure because I can see the Prosecution busily writing away for the
14 cross-examination. I certainly don't want to give him any ammunition as
15 a result of something lost in translation.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note, it was interpreted as
17 defence forces.
18 MR. KARNAVAS:
19 Q. Okay. Let's go to the next document. We're told -- we'll move
20 on. It's okay now. We'll move on. P 0 --
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I ask a question,
22 Mr. President? As I'm unable to monitor both my words and the
23 interpretation at the same time, and I have noticed some errors, and
24 given the fact that between my testimony today, my testimony tomorrow,
25 and my next testimony months will have gone by, I have to apologise for
1 my ignorance, but may I please be granted a chance to inspect a
2 transcript of my evidence and all the other documents, especially in view
3 of the fact that I'm perfectly aware that I'm not allowed to contact the
4 Defence, the OTP, or the Tribunal? Is this something that is doable, and
5 is my request a logical one? I do apologise, but this just brought the
6 issue to mind.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Transcripts are public and they
8 normally can be accessed by everyone. So by the time you return in July,
9 you will have ample time through the internet to access the transcripts
10 of today's hearing. No problem at all. Unless the system breaks down.
11 You never know.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.
13 MR. KARNAVAS:
14 Q. If we could get to the next document, P 00339, because this is
15 connected to our previous document. P 00339. It's dated July 21, 1992
16 and we could see that there's a title to it. "Agreement on friendship
17 and cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
18 Republic of Croatia
19 everybody is crystal clear, by this point Croatia has recognised Bosnia
20 independence; is that correct?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. Within those internationally recognised borders?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Okay. Now, we don't have that much time to dwell on this, nor do
25 we need to, but if we could go to paragraph number 8. Paragraph number
1 8. And I will go through it step by step. "In consideration of the
2 continuing aggression of the Serbian and Montenegrin military forces
3 against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also largely against
4 the republic of Croatia
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the President of the Presidency of the Republic
6 of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the President of the Republic of Croatia
7 call upon the international community, and in particular the United
8 Nations, the European Community, and the United States of America
9 take real and efficient steps to vigorously stop the aggression against
10 their States, to prevent further loss of human life, persecution and
11 expulsion of their citizens and the destruction of property."
12 Let's pause right here. By this point when this was drafted,
13 when they say "in consideration of the continuing aggression," was the
14 aggression continuing in a manner in which it's stated in this paragraph?
15 A. Definitely.
16 Q. All right. And I know that we talked about this a little bit.
17 They're asking the United Nations, European Union, and the United States
18 of America
19 aggression. I mentioned this before. Let me ask it again. By -- by the
20 date of this agreement, July 21, or thereafter did the United States send
21 in combat troops to protect the territorial integrity of Croatia and/or
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina against the JNA or whoever was the aggressor at
23 the time?
24 A. No. At that point in time, nobody ever considered the sending of
25 troops that would fight the Yugoslav People's Army, and if I may comment
1 upon this paragraph, because I directly participated in the drafting of
2 all this, this is a direct annotation on behalf of both presidents to the
3 United States of America because President Clinton had become president,
4 and even before that President Tudjman had sent him a letter expressing
5 his belief that without direct involvement on the part of the United
6 States of America
7 this in the agreement between the two presidents. Both agreed with that.
8 And if I may add a comment to that with regard to this document
9 for which I believe that it is extremely important. Not that there was
10 no pressure from one side to another, but, rather, we negotiated about --
11 about all this, and I don't really know what we're to use. We measured
12 our words carefully the whole day, not just paragraphs but words,
13 especially Mr. Trnka on the Bosniak side and I and the others on the
14 Croatian side, and this is really a good example of our joint work. The
15 presidents signed the document that had been prepared by the respective
16 delegations that comprised representatives of both states. In other
17 words, this document was prepared in a very, very serious manner.
18 Q. All right. With that in mind, let's go on to the next part of
19 paragraph 8. "With this objective in mind, both States will sustain
20 their -- will sustain their past successful cooperation and continuous
21 coordination of the defensive activities in" -- I underscore "in" -- "the
22 contiguous zones of the two States."
23 Question number one is this an accurate statement? That is, was
24 there past successful cooperation between these two folks with respect to
25 activities in the contiguous zones?
1 A. The successful cooperation implied any attempt to prevent the
2 Yugoslav People's Army from achieving their overall strategic goals, and
3 I mean by that preventing them from establishing new borders or taking up
4 the area all the way down to the Neretva River
5 Q. All right. Let's go on. "Aware of the fact that both States are
6 threatened, unless aggression against them is urgently stopped by further
7 destruction and annihilation of their state entity and integrity, the two
8 states will, should the efforts of the international community remain
9 ineffective, take all necessary steps in order to establish broader
10 cooperation in the military sphere and coordinate military operations in
11 order to definitely --" I think this might be "repel the danger
12 threatening them."
13 So was this an accurate --
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Okay. Now, with respect to broader cooperation in military -- in
16 the military sphere and coordinate military operations, since you were
17 part of the negotiating process, can you tell us at least at that stage
18 what was envisaged? I know we have the presidential transcripts, and we
19 can probably glean from that conversation, but you being a participant,
20 can you help us out here?
21 A. What this meant at the moment was every possible form of
22 cooperation between the Croatian army and the army of Bosnia and
25 paragraph leaves the possibility open, although not explicitly, about
1 joint military actions whenever those were needed.
2 Q. All right. And then just finally on paragraph 9 very quickly, it
3 says that there was an agreement to have a protocol on the establishment
4 of diplomatic relations between the two states at embassy level signed
5 immediately. Did that occur?
6 A. [In English] Yes.
7 Q. All right. Now, let's move on to the next document.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is an interesting document
9 for me, a document that was discussed with other witnesses before, and of
10 course I am going to seize the opportunity to ask this question to
11 somebody who took part in the generation of the document. The previous
12 document on the presidential transcript, and let me note that the meeting
13 lasted 10 hours and 15 minutes, we have proof that the document was
14 produced right after the meeting and that the witness participated in the
15 production of the document. Here is my question: This document is signed
16 by both presidents. It is an agreement of friendship and cooperation
17 between the two republics. For your country, was this document
18 distributed? Was it published in the Official Gazette of your republic?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The document was made public on the
20 same day, or maybe the following day. I'm not sure -- sure, and I'm not
21 an expert either to tell you whether this type of agreement should have
22 been published in the Official Gazette, whether it falls under that
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. I had another question.
25 This is an international agreement. According to your law, unfortunately
1 I didn't have the time to check it myself, but was this document due to
2 be ratified by the parliament, or was it up to the president to commit
3 his country to an international agreement without necessity to -- for the
4 document to be ratified?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that for this document no
6 ratification was necessary. In my view, under the then-prevailing
7 constitution the president of the republic could have signed this
8 agreement without this document being ratified by the parliament. I
9 believe that under the current constitution of the Republic of Croatia
10 this type of agreement could have -- could be signed even by the Minister
11 of Foreign Affairs, which for that matter is the case in other states as
12 well. But I believe that given his constitutional competencies, the
13 president could sign such a document today.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Several revolutions of the
15 Security Council are referred to in this document, particularly the one
16 on the 13th of July, 1992. Did you officially send this document to New
18 And in the next document - Mr. Karnavas was maybe about to talk about
19 this document - another Resolution is mentioned. So did you send that
20 document to the international community so that everybody could be made
21 aware that from now on the HVO army was opposed to the army of Bosnia
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We informed the international
24 community about this document on the following day.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] These were all my questions.
1 Mr. Karnavas.
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. Now if we could turn
3 to --
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Hold on a second. Mr. Praljak
5 is on his feet. I don't know why.
6 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Well, then, very well.
7 If --
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, let me just go on.
9 Q. The next document is 1D 02295. Okay. Okay. I will --
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.
11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, your words
12 have been translated into Croatian as the document saying that the HVO
13 would be opposed to the BiH army. That's how it has been translated into
14 Croatian. Can this please be taken into account?
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's not what I said. There
16 has been an error in the interpretation. What I said is that the HVO
17 army, according to the document, was an integral part of the army of
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's what I said. So I'm calling upon the
19 interpreters to be very vigilant because on several occasions we've seen
20 the importance or the significance of -- of nuances such as a comma or
21 full stop. So, please, if you note any problems or misinterpretation,
22 please don't hesitate to let us know for -- in everybody's interests.
23 MR. STEWART: May I point out that exactly the same error appears
24 in the English transcript, so what Your Honour has just said will
25 constitute a correction of that as well.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well indeed, because when
2 I speak I don't necessarily check the transcript in English. I look at
3 you rather than -- than at the screen. I'd rather look at the Defence
4 counsel than at my screen. Mr. Karnavas, you have the floor.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: [Overlapping speakers] Thank you. First, I have
6 to thank General Praljak for that correction, and that's an important
7 one, and we thank him very much. And we thank that he insisted on making
8 that correction. The dangers of circumstantial evidence sometimes, of
9 jumping to conclusions.
10 Q. 1D 02295. That's the next document. It's dated 6 August 1992,
11 obviously some time after the agreement we've seen, and it says here at
12 the very top: "I have come to the territory of the Republic of Croatia
13 at the decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia
15 Abdic. Do you know who this person is?
16 A. Yes, I knew Mr. Abdic.
17 Q. All right. And we'll hear more about him through other
18 witnesses. Now, if you go further down, I don't want to -- he does
19 indicate: "My task is to organise activities which are at this moment of
20 particular importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina."
21 Skipping the next sentence and going down it says: "In view of
22 the recently signed interstate agreement, we consider Croatia
23 right place to set up a number of activities which are of consequence for
24 both republics. With your consent, we intend to establish a Main Staff
25 for providing support to Bosnia and Herzegovina with its headquarters in
3 And then if we go to the very last paragraph, first sentence:
4 "We kindly ask that you adopt a decision legalising the work of our Main
5 Staff and regional staff in the Republic of Croatia
6 which will be determined by mutual agreement." My first question is when
7 he's talking about the recently interstate agreement, were there any
8 other agreements other than the one that we just saw that presumably, if
9 we are to believe some, Alija Izetbegovic was pressed to sign? Were
10 there any other agreements, or is this the agreement that Mr. Abdic is
11 referring to?
12 A. I think that Mr. Abdic was referring to the agreement that we had
13 just looked at and discussed, because this letter is only a logical part
14 of the implementation of this agreement. He may even be referring to one
15 of the earlier agreements, the one that was signed in June that I have
16 mentioned, but I would rather be inclined to say that it -- it is
17 referring to the last agreement we discussed.
18 Q. All right. And when he's talking about setting up a Main Staff,
19 with the intent to establish a Main Staff, what did you -- if you can
20 tell us, what do you think he means by that? What is he asking? Are we
21 talking about the military or civilian sector? What are we talking
23 A. My interpretation would be that this primarily applies to the
24 military and logistical centre. As you can see in the map,
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina has a border only with Serbia from which aggression
1 came from, and the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina for that matter
2 was occupied by the Serbs. So the only the connection of Bosnia and
4 and that's why all the numerous refugees and all the supplies went
5 through the Republic of Croatia
6 aid, medical aid, food, and clothes. All those things went through the
7 Republic of Croatia
8 and Herzegovina
9 international community.
10 And I would like to apologise to the Honourable Judge and correct
11 myself. A decision or an embargo on the import of arms had been imposed
12 on the Republic of Croatia
13 republics were not -- were poorly armed, and they were facing a very
14 well-armed enemy, which was the Yugoslav People's Army. Bearing that in
15 mine, everybody has to be clear and understand that they resorted to
16 various means to arm themselves. I wouldn't be able to testify about the
17 ways and means, the arms reached the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 because I'm not well-informed about that. But whoever who looks at the
19 map will understand how it went. A lot has been written about that. My
20 understanding is that a large part of the international community was
21 actually aware of the fact that they had issued a very unjust decision,
22 and by issuing that decision they had prevented the state from arming
23 itself and defending itself. A large part of the international community
24 turned a blind eye, I would say, when it came to the supply and transport
25 of both weapons as well as all the other different military equipment
1 through the territory of Republic
2 and Herzegovina
3 If you will allow me another comment, I would like to say that
4 the Republic of Croatia
5 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then it would not have made much sense to
6 issue a decision to the effect of helping it to arm itself, and I'm sure
7 that it did help in every possible way.
8 Q. All right. And tomorrow we'll see some documents to that effect.
9 All right. Now, if we could go through the next document, P 0386, P
10 00386. We see that this is 13 July. This is a week after Mr. Abdic made
11 that request. This is Resolution 771, and --
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, how much time,
13 please, has been used by Mr. Karnavas?
14 MR. KARNAVAS:
15 Q. Okay. If you look at this document and you look at the next
16 document, which is P 387, and we look at the other one -- the other
17 document that follows that, the other P document, P 00406, if we can just
18 spend a few seconds looking at them. They're all from the UN. The first
19 one, 386, is 13th of August, the second one is 13th of August, and the
20 third one is 25th of August. If I can just ask you very briefly, had the
21 situation changed on the ground, that is, had the -- had the JNA or
22 the -- or elements of it, had it left the -- the territories of Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina
24 that is?
25 A. Nothing major changed in Croatia, and as for Bosnia
2 Army gradually occupied territories and violated all international rules.
3 In one of the items of this Resolution, makes an explicit reference to
4 ethnic cleansing. Where is that? I think it's item 2, which mentions
5 the operations of the Serbian army in the territory of Bosnia
7 Q. You're referring to which document, but there are three
9 A. Document 386.
10 Q. Okay. All right. But say, for instance, in the other document
11 where they're talking about, for instance, 406, you'll see under page 3,
12 paragraph number 3: "Demands further that those units of the Yugoslav
13 People's Army and elements of the Croatian army now in Bosnia and
15 the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
16 Okay. Now if we pause a little bit at this, it seems to me from
17 your previous answer that the Yugoslav People's Army is still there.
18 Would it be fair to say the elements of the Croatian army remained --
19 seemed to be in -- within Bosnia and Herzegovina?
20 A. If I may explain. This is a -- a Resolution of the
21 General Assembly, which differs from the Resolution of the Security
22 Council. It differs because it doesn't have an executive force and also
23 by the way it was passed. It took a longer time to prepare this
24 Resolution, and it always does then for the Resolutions of the Security
25 Council. If that wasn't the case, then it would be a totally superfluous
1 to mention the Croatian forces because the agreement that deals with this
2 issue evokes the already-signed Resolutions, which means that the
3 conditions of the Resolutions had been met.
4 I can tell you that I'm aware of this Resolution. When the
5 diplomacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina launched an initiative to issue this
6 Resolution Croatia
7 personally took the text of the proposal of the Resolution to President
8 Tudjman, and he authorise I had me to instruct our diplomats to give
9 their full support to the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina
10 this Resolution was being passed. As you know, it takes 100 -- over 180
11 States or over half a majority of the Assembly of the United Nations pass
12 a Resolution. This Resolution was more political than executive in
13 nature, but as far as the diplomacies of the Republic of Croatia
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina were concerned, this meant that this was an
15 implementation of our friendship agreement, and we in Croatia
16 supported the passing of this Resolution.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Well, I see our time is up for the day,
18 Mr. President. I don't want to keep anyone here any longer.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you've used three
20 minutes -- three hours, sorry, and 45 minutes. So you'll have one hour
21 and 15 minutes left tomorrow. Now, what about tomorrow? I'm turning to
22 the other Defence counsel. Will you cross-examine this witness? If you
23 wish to cross-examine this witness, you'll have two hours and 30 minutes.
24 Mrs. Alaburic, is --
25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I believe that
1 it would be very good to use Mr. Zuzul's time, because Mr. Zuzul knows a
2 lot about topics that are very relevant for us. I do intend to put
3 several questions to Mr. Zuzul. I have half an hour at my disposal, and
4 I've asked the Defence teams of Mr. Pusic and Mr. Stojic to give me their
5 time if I find this to be necessary and of benefit to the Trial Chamber,
6 and I'm also going to talk to the other Defence teams if they're not
7 interested in cross-examining to give me their times.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So you will
9 cross-examine this witness during an hour and a half. Mrs. Nozica.
10 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. For the
11 time being I do not intend to -- to examine the witness. In any case, we
12 will decide by tomorrow, and if we do not intend to examine we will give
13 our time to Mrs. Alaburic.
14 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honours, we expect not to have any questions.
15 Perhaps Mr. Praljak will have one or two very short, but it is still
16 under consideration. More probably not than yes, but if, we are talking
17 really about couple of minutes.
18 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as things
19 stand now, we are not going to have any questions. We will make our
20 final decision tomorrow. And as Mrs. Nozica has already told you, in
21 that case we will give our time to Mrs. Alaburic.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Anyway, tomorrow we will
23 conclude at 6.30 at the latest. Judges may need some time to ask
24 questions as well. If there isn't enough time left, you know that the
25 hearing will resume on the 18th of July. Witness, the 18th of July is a
1 Friday. The Prosecutor will have five hours to cross-examine you. Of
2 course there have been administrative issues, objections, and so on, and
3 it appears that we won't have enough time to finish everything on Friday.
4 We may have to continue on Monday morning. Therefore, you will have to
5 stay over during the weekend between the 18th of July and the 20th. I
6 hope this is not going to cause any difficulty for you since, in
7 particular, weekends in The Hague
8 nice. So please make the necessary arrangements to be at the disposal of
9 the Chamber on Friday, the 18th of July, and most probably on the
10 following Monday because after the Prosecutor's cross-examination, there
11 will most probably be redirect. So we need to schedule for two days and
12 not just one, just for your prior information. I know July is still far
13 away, but I just wanted to give you that information so that you can make
15 Now, you may have planned some holidays in July. I don't know.
16 It may not be very convenient for you, but it is impossible to do
17 otherwise. The Prosecutor was not in a position to start his
18 cross-examination this week. This is obvious. This is all I wanted to
19 say at this stage. We will resume the hearing tomorrow at 2.15 in the
20 afternoon. Let me reiterate the recommendations I gave you yesterday.
21 No communication with anyone while you're still under oath. Thank you.
22 See you tomorrow.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.
24 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 8th day
25 of May, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.