080618IT

Page 29509

1 is document 1D 02940, hard copies have been provided to everyone. It

2 hasn't been -- it has not been released into e-court.

3 Yesterday at some point as a result of the ongoing conversations,

4 I asked someone in the United States to locate Dr. Silajdzic's actual

5 presentation before the Senate back then, and I was able to get a fax --

6 it was faxed to me late last night. Recognising that this is a new

7 document, I would nonetheless wish to proceed by asking a couple of

8 questions. It's nothing is -- nothing is new concerning the -- we saw

9 the letters but I do wish to bring out a couple of points to the

10 witness's attention especially but not exclusively a response by

11 Mr. Izetbegovic to one of Mr. Akmadzic's letters to Mr. Biden, so with

12 the Court's permission I would like to put a few questions to this

13 witness. So I'm seeking permission.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor. Do you have

15 any observations or reservations?

16 MR. SCOTT: No, Your Honour, I -- the Prosecution realizes how

17 these things happen and we have no objection to be used in this instance

18 there might be different circumstances at different times, but on this

19 occasion we have no objection.

20 MR. KARNAVAS: I appreciate that.

21 WITNESS: MILE AKMADZIC [Resumed]

22 [Witness answered through interpreter]

23 Examination by Mr. Karnavas: [Continued]

24 Q. Sir, if we can look at 1D 02940. It has been put before you. We

25 spoke yesterday about you being in New York. We see from the very first

Page 29510

1 page of the document it is dated February 18, 1993. This is the

2 testimony or the statement by Haris Silajdzic the then foreign minister

3 before the subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee of the

4 Foreign Relations.

5 Now, if you could go to page 50, will you see towards the middle

6 of the page, I think it's notice third paragraph, I will read, it says:

7 "Tragically negotiations in the name of peace have facilitated

8 the intensification of war. The reason for this is very simple. Instead

9 of responding to naked aggression, the United Nations sponsored peace

10 process has increasingly delivered a series of concessions and awards to

11 the aggressor."

12 Now this was the foreign minister speaking on behalf of the

13 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do you share this observation that

14 Dr. Silajdzic was making before the Senate subcommittee?

15 A. Your Honours, I do not share those views. I received this paper

16 now and the Presidency as a whole did not share those views. All of us

17 in the Presidency were unanimous that under the auspices of the

18 international peace conference on the former Yugoslavia or the London

19 conference as it was called that we should continue with the talks and

20 continue trying to find a solution for peace.

21 Q. Now, if we could turn to another segment. This would be on

22 page -- I believe it's 59. 59 at the bottom.

23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry --

24 JUDGE PRANDLER: May I take the floor. Frankly, I -- when I

25 listen to the witness' statement now, I wonder if the witness is aware of

Page 29511

1 the fact that then, Dr. Silajdzic mainly referred to the Serb aggression

2 and the next paragraph says that, and I quote, "That the hope beyond the

3 process would seem to have been that if enough concessions were given,

4 the aggressor would be satisfied."

5 I mean if enough concessions would be given by the United

6 Nations, it means, then the aggressor would have been satisfied. So I

7 don't know if the witness has -- of course he didn't have the chance to

8 read this whole chapter and parts of it but he may be given the time to

9 have a look at that and then to answer your question. Thank you.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

11 MR. KARNAVAS:

12 Q. That is the disadvantage of not having the document earlier, and

13 I don't wish to telegraph anything because you do have to look this

14 entire statement and then look at what Boutros Boutros-Ghali was saying

15 and what Lord Owen was saying and you will see where it all fits in

16 but ...

17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If I may use this seeming pause to go a bit on

18 in the same direction. Later on in the paragraphs of this page,

19 Mr. Silajdzic speaks of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

20 That -- what do you say to this, Witness, Mr. Akmadzic? Do you find

21 yourself reflected when he says, "The government of Bosnia and

22 Herzegovina unconditionally agreed to these negotiations ..." for

23 instance.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to say that sometimes the

25 government and the Presidency sometimes as it is in the American system

Page 29512

1 where the government is the head of state in a way, that Mr. Silajdzic

2 actually equates the two, and let me go back to what I said before. The

3 international conference here in a way rewards the aggressor. Of course

4 I'm opposed to that, but as far as those negotiations are concerned,

5 they -- everybody had equal status there. Nobody was rewarded for

6 anything, and we were treated in an equitable manner.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. That's a nicely precise and direct

8 answer to my question.

9 Just to be sure, what is referred to, according to you by the

10 words "the aggressor"?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In this specific case, and in

12 general, in the documents that we have at our disposal, the term

13 "aggressor" always refers to the Serb side or as the Presidency of Bosnia

14 and Herzegovina defined the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aggression

15 of Serbian Montenegro, Yugoslavia, and the JNA; and we called it the

16 internal aggression. That is a term as we noted at the time that did not

17 exist in any other war and that's the organised formations of the Serb

18 side within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you, Witness.

20 THE INTERPRETER: The Serbian Democratic Party, the interpreter's

21 correction.

22 MR. KARNAVAS:

23 Q. If you go to page 59, the third paragraph from the bottom, he's

24 asked a question by Mr. Biden:

25 "Please describe your country's make-up, the maybe-up of Bosnia

Page 29513

1 and Herzegovina for me, not necessarily in percentages but in terms of

2 ethnic composition and why do you believe you can put it back together

3 again?"

4 This is what Dr. Silajdzic says, "Well, Bosnia and Herzegovina is

5 an old country. We all used to be Bosnians. We used to be called

6 Bosnians Catholic, Catholics, Muslims, and orthodox."

7 Senator Biden "Catholics, orthodox and Muslims."

8 Dr. Silajdzic says, "Yes, and Jews. Those are the four groups of

9 people that actually built Bosnia, all Bosnia. Bosnia used to be a big

10 Balkan kingdom that comprised big parts of Croatia and Serbia, never vice

11 versa."

12 Now, Mr. Akmadzic, at that point in history, are we talking about

13 a Bosnia where you have -- where there are people identified as Bosnians

14 and there just happen for particular religious denomination, Catholics,

15 orthodox, Jewish or Muslim? And is Dr. Silajdzic correct in his answer

16 to Senator Biden?

17 A. Dr. Silajdzic's answer to Senator Biden is not correct. Let me

18 point out two or three things. First, of all the Bosnian kingdom as such

19 ceased to exist in 1463, I think, after the Turkish occupation.

20 During the existence of the kingdom that he's talking about and

21 the greatest Bosnian king was King Tvrtko, our opinion today is that he

22 was a Catholic, that he was a Croat, although we don't know what his

23 aloud affiliation was. We think that he died in 1391 so in late 14th

24 century, in the period that is of interest for this Honourable Trial

25 Chamber and for us, Bosnia and Herzegovina has three sovereign peoples,

Page 29514

1 Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.

2 In World War II at the very end of the war, there was a big

3 assembly. A decision was made for Bosnia and Herzegovina -- that Bosnia

4 and Herzegovina was not Serbian, Croatian, or indeed Muslim. The

5 decision was that it belonged to all three peoples. It was Bosnian --

6 Croatian, Muslim, and Serbian. The Muslim people was recognised as such

7 in the amendments to the Yugoslav constitution passed in 1974, and it was

8 recognised as the Bosniak people at the Washington negotiations.

9 Q. All right. And if we look at page 96 now, it's the very last

10 page. Yesterday, we saw two of your letters that you sent to

11 Senator Biden and we also saw Senator Biden's declaration or response.

12 Here, we find attached as part of the record a letter submitted by

13 Mr. Izetbegovic and so I want to go with this -- go over this very

14 quickly. It's the very last page, sir, do you have it?

15 A. Yes, I do.

16 Q. And we see that the -- it's dated February 25th, 1993, and it

17 says here:

18 "Dear Senator Biden, this is to inform you that my term as

19 president of the Presidency was extended beyond December 24, 1992 under

20 the constitutional provisions allowing for the extension of the term due

21 to the 'emergency situation.' This was done by the approval of the

22 Presidency as a whole."

23 Is that true or is it false?

24 A. I discussed this with the Judges of the Constitutional Court

25 because I'm not a lawyer myself, and the constitution says that in war

Page 29515

1 and if the state of war has been declared, the president and the members

2 of the Presidency have their term of office extended, but it is also

3 quite obvious that this refers to the members of the Presidency and that

4 they are the ones who have to elect from among their number the president

5 in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Presidency and in the

6 rules of procedure, the term of office is limited strictly to one year,

7 plus another year. And this means that in this letter,

8 President Izetbegovic is not right and it is in particular not correct

9 that the entire Presidency agreed with that because that is simply not

10 the case.

11 Q. All right. So let me be more direct. Is this a true or a false

12 statement?

13 A. Well, this is really a statement made by the president because he

14 signed it but his words are not true.

15 Q. Okay. Now, we go on. It says, "The Presidency represents the

16 Croats, Muslims, Serbs ..."

17 JUDGE PRANDLER: I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Karnavas, but

18 really it is a very important matter. So the -- this issue has come up

19 many times already in this Chamber and we -- I mean the Chamber and the

20 Judges would like to see really how things happened and transpired.

21 Now, frankly, we would like to see some written confirmation of

22 either of the views, who was there, any decision recorded by the

23 transcripts of the Presidency, or there was none. It is my question and

24 I hope that we will find an answer either by the Defence or by the

25 Prosecution, but we have to have a look at the documents themselves.

Page 29516

1 Thank you.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: As far as we know, Judge Prandler, and that's a

3 very good question, and try as we might, we were unable to find those

4 records because as we understand it, those records of those days

5 vanished. They are no longer in the archives. And I leave it to the

6 members of the Trial Chamber to determine where they may be or what

7 happened to them. But we can ask the gentleman whether he presided --

8 whether he was present during any meetings where they decided, based on

9 an emergency situation, to prolong Mr. Izetbegovic's term as president.

10 That may assist us, at least.

11 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, can you help us here?

12 A. Yes. Before leaving for the Geneva talks that started on the 2nd

13 of January, 1993, sometime around the 17th or 18th of December, 1992, a

14 few days before the second term of office of President Izetbegovic

15 expired, I discussed this with him. I warned him that he was given a

16 second year in office thanks to the votes of the Croat members in the

17 Presidency and that it was now the turn for a Croat to become the

18 president of the Presidency because in accordance with the rules of the

19 procedure of the Presidency; so we're not talking about the constitution

20 at all but the rules of procedure of the Presidency, he does not have the

21 right to extend his term of office for another year. And he told me,

22 We'll talk about it in Geneva.

23 And I warned him that once we were in Geneva, that would be ten

24 days or so after the expiry of his term and he said, I will discuss this

25 with Tudjman. And I told him, You have two Croat members of the

Page 29517

1 Presidency here. I as the prime minister at that time, it is our

2 decision to make, not Tudjman's.

3 He told me, The army would not allow me to step down as the

4 president of the Presidency.

5 Q. Thank you. Now, if we could -- unless there is a -- you have a

6 follow-up.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Just perhaps for the record.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I find it surprising that we have here the

10 transcript of a hearing of February 18, and we have attached letters that

11 are of a later date which I find a bit strange but maybe it's -- I just

12 want to have it on the record that we have noted, and it is a bit

13 surprising.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes. And I believe Judge Trechsel, in the

15 document that I showed you with Mr. Biden's response, he said that he

16 would make it part of the record of the hearing. And I should note that

17 the actual record is about 90 to 100 pages long, this is just the excerpt

18 concerning Dr. Silajdzic's testimony for this whole --

19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: According to the paper I have, the last page of

20 the hearing is page 66 where it says, "That the public meeting was

21 concluded."

22 MR. KARNAVAS: I understand. I -- again, I had somebody going to

23 the Philadelphia library yesterday to pick this up.

24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Actually it was on page 94 that the hearing was

25 concluded at 5.55 p.m. but still on the same date.

Page 29518

1 MR. KARNAVAS: I understand. But -- and I haven't worked up on

2 the hill, but as I understand, and we can see this from Senator Biden's

3 response that he indicated that he would make Mr. Akmadzic's letter that

4 he received after the hearings part of the record; and so I can only

5 suspect that since this is all part of this whole hearing, that's why we

6 have the series of letters because you also have Mr. Akmadzic's letter on

7 the 28th.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I have seen that. When did Mr. Biden make such

9 a statement that he would put this in the record?

10 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may have -- if I may have the indulgence of

11 the Court for one moment.

12 Your Honours, 1D 02847. This was dated February 25th, 1993, a

13 question concerning the Bosnian government. It was a week ago "One week

14 ago the European subcommittee held a day-long hearing on the subject of

15 American policy in Bosnia." Then it talks about Silajdzic. Then it

16 says, "Yesterday, I received a letter from the prime minister of Bosnia,

17 Mile Akmadzic."

18 As I understand it --

19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: The next sentence is " ... which I will make

20 part of the record."

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Right. That's where my memory was slipping.

22 Yeah, because I know for a fact that he indicated and I know how the

23 Senate works a little bit because this is a part of the appendix. If you

24 note on page 95, Your Honours, this is part of the appendix, so this

25 would have been part and parcel of those hearings because obviously

Page 29519

1 Mr. Akmadzic challenged what the foreign minister was saying and also

2 brought to the attention that Izetbegovic was not the president of the

3 Presidency because his mandate had run out.

4 Now, if we would go to the next paragraph.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, I have not

6 intervened so far. I looked at the document with great interest and I

7 noted that the meeting took place in the SD 562 room of the American

8 Senate and ended at 1629. At 1643, there is another speaker,

9 General Odon. Normally he was to speak to the military aspects of the

10 situation in the former Yugoslavia, so you had the beginning of his

11 hearing; but the rest is missing and then we go straight to page 94. It

12 might have been good to know what that General said then. Maybe there's

13 no connection at all with this witness but I noted that in passing. I

14 just wanted to convey it to you.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: I did notice that, Mr. President, in my haste when

16 I sent my note my contact to go to the library and search for this

17 document, I specifically asked for the statement by Dr. Haris Silajdzic

18 and he was -- it's not on the internet so he was able to -- he just

19 copied and faxed the portion, but I can certainly make available the

20 entire proceedings which I said I believe is about 90 pages long, that's

21 what I was told somewhere in that vicinity; but that would not be a

22 problem, and I can have that done.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

24 MR. KARNAVAS:

25 Q. If the middle of the paragraph going on, the middle of the

Page 29520

1 letter, says, "The Presidency represents" -- going back to the last page,

2 I'm still reading of Mr. Izetbegovic's letter, it says:

3 "The Presidency represents the Croats, Muslims, Serbs and the

4 others in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, all of the members of the

5 Presidency, including myself, continue to hold office under the original

6 mandates by which they took office."

7 Is that true or false? My timing is very limited, Mr. Akmadzic.

8 A. The time Mr. Izetbegovic is talking about is the time when the

9 two Serb members had already left the Presidency. Another two came along

10 who had not been elected. Their legitimacy was questionable.

11 Q. Okay. So is it true or false?

12 A. False.

13 Q. All right. Now, we go on:

14 "Alija Izetbegovic says Dr. Haris Silajdzic is the official head

15 of the delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the

16 ongoing talks sponsored by the conference on the former Yugoslavia now

17 underway in New York. His testimony before your committee is entirely of

18 the position of the republic and the Presidency of Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina."

20 Is that true or false?

21 A. False.

22 Q. And again, just to -- you were the prime minister,

23 Haris Silajdzic was the foreign minister so he would have been under you

24 as part of the government; correct?

25 A. To the extent that a minister can be led by a prime minister.

Page 29521

1 Q. All right. Was Dr. Haris Silajdzic a member of the Presidency?

2 A. No.

3 Q. All right. And by the way, one final question: Were you ever

4 served with a copy of this letter that President Izetbegovic sent to

5 Senator Biden?

6 A. No?

7 Q. All right. Now, if we go back to our documents, we'll need the

8 binder, and we'll pick up where we left off yesterday that's with 1D

9 02314. Again we left off on the issue of Medjugorje and that agreement.

10 So this would be in binder 1.

11 Again to bring to everyone's attention, yesterday we saw from

12 Lord Owen's book on 1D 02037 we saw that as of May 26th, a foreign

13 officer by the name of Douglas Hogg was trying to get Mr. Owen to

14 acknowledge that the VOPP was dead, I mention that highlight May 26th

15 because this document here, 1D 02314 is 27 May 1993, and here this is

16 addressed to a particular legal advisor. And if you look at the very

17 first paragraph, it says:

18 "Lord Owen wants to convene a working group of lawyers who

19 represent all the sides in the coordinating body as soon as possible in

20 Geneva."

21 Do you see that, sir? It's in paragraph number 1. Do you see

22 it, sir?

23 A. [No interpretation]

24 Q. If you look at document 1D 02314, if we could have the assistance

25 of the usher to help the gentleman find the document. Okay. You will

Page 29522

1 see under paragraph number 1, it says:

2 "Foreseeing the meeting of the coordinating body which had been

3 agreed in Zagreb on 24 April and pencilled in for Friday, 4 June,

4 Lord Owen wants to convene a working group of lawyers who represent all

5 sides in the coordinating body as soon as possible in Geneva."

6 Do you have that text, sir?

7 A. I found it.

8 Q. Now, do you know whether the lawyers did meet based on this in

9 order to draft any legislation?

10 A. I know nothing about that.

11 Q. All right. If we look at the next document, 1D 02322. This is

12 in binder 1, Your Honours. And this is dated 30 May 1993. It's a public

13 announcement. It's from the Croatian Muslim Democratic Party and here it

14 says that they are in the middle of the paragraph, it says, "We see the

15 light in accepting the implementation of said agreements with a strong

16 and permanent union with the Croats." And we see further down where

17 certain people are recommended. Do you see where the five individuals

18 being recommended starting with Dr. Ismet Hadziosmanovic?

19 A. I see that.

20 Q. Do you know whether the -- do you know who the Croatian Muslim

21 Democratic Party is?

22 A. The Croatian Muslim Democratic Party is a Muslim party. Muslims,

23 for the most part, living in Zagreb, but some of their members were in

24 Bosnia and Herzegovina. This party was not in agreement with the SDA,

25 the party in power, the party that won the election.

Page 29523

1 Q. All right. If we go to the next document, 1D 02468. It's in

2 binder number 2, Your Honours. This is dated 31 May 1993. If you could

3 please look at it. Have you found the document, sir?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. Just look at it because I'll be referring to it. This is

6 a letter to Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg by Mate Boban where -- and this

7 is in reference to an invitation for a meeting in Sarajevo and

8 essentially Mate Boban is saying, in paragraph 2 that is:

9 "Any new meeting with Mr. Izetbegovic would be superfluous and

10 would mean the continuation of the practice of avoiding the

11 implementation of what has already been agreed on."

12 Can you please explain what Mr. Boban is saying here, if you

13 know?

14 A. The reference is here to the fact that Mr. Izetbegovic had

15 consistently been failing to implement any agreements. Among other

16 things, the coordination body had never met and had never taken over the

17 function that had been agreed previously at Medjugorje.

18 Q. All right. If we look at the next document, 1D 02904, the very

19 next document. It's in binder 3, Your Honours, and I can assure you this

20 will not happen again. I will make sure we have it. 1D 02904. These

21 are minutes of a meeting of the members of the Presidency of RBiH dated

22 June 15, 1993. The minutes were taken by Mr. Trnka, and we see that your

23 name is there in the very first paragraph along with Mr. Boras's name.

24 Were you present during this meeting?

25 A. Yes.

Page 29524

1 Q. Okay. If we look at the second paragraph it says:

2 "The participants were given draft decree laws (in English) on 1,

3 a coordinative body for implementation, establishing provinces and their

4 bodies, ombudsmen, a court for human rights, international instruments

5 for the protection of human rights, and cooperation with the monitoring

6 mission for human rights ..." and so on and so forth.

7 Now, do you recall ever being given drafts?

8 A. We got those. They were distributed to us they meeting.

9 Q. Okay. And I think due to time we'll move to the next document

10 unless the Court has any questions with respect to this document. I

11 should ask you, on paragraph number 3, it does say:

12 "Before commencing discussions on the offered drafts, Ejup Ganic

13 requested that the situation of Gorazde be considered since it was

14 critical so that the aggression might be stopped."

15 Can you please explain what Mr. Ganic is trying to do here?

16 A. Mr. Ganic is trying and succeeding in a way of postponing the

17 adoption of decisions. He imposes a condition here that normally we,

18 during negotiations, would not have considered a condition for the

19 continuation of negotiations.

20 Q. All right. If we go on to the next document.

21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Just a minute. We also find on the fourth

22 paragraph Lord Owen pointing out that this was a consulting meeting. So

23 it was not a meeting that was supposed to take to lead to decisions, was

24 it?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Lord Owen is right as far as that

Page 29525

1 is concerned, but Lord -- no specific conclusions Lord Owen believed no

2 specific conclusions but negotiations were underway.

3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

4 MR. KARNAVAS:

5 Q. And the meeting had nothing to do with Gorazde which was nowhere

6 near where the Croats and the Muslims are involved in in their

7 discussions; correct?

8 A. There was no HVO in Gorazde. This was no reason for us and

9 Muslims to discuss this except if maybe trilaterally as part of the

10 overall process we decided to bring it up.

11 Q. All right. Now, in keeping with what we just saw, I'm going to

12 show you several documents, and I just need confirmation. 1D 02407. The

13 next few documents, Your Honours, are in binder number 2. This is the BH

14 Presidency proposal on decree laws on provinces. So early in this

15 meeting in Geneva when they were talking about handing over draft decree

16 laws, this is what we are talking about; correct? This is one of them?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. If you look at 1D 02408, we have a draft decree law from the

19 ombudsman 's office; correct?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. Then if we look at 1D 02409, we have --

22 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Karnavas, please slow down.

23 MR. KARNAVAS: Sorry.

24 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you.

25 MR. KARNAVAS:

Page 29526

1 Q. 1D 02409. This is a decree law on the Court of human rights of

2 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; correct?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. Another draft decree is 1D 02410. This is on the adoption of

5 international instruments for the protection of human rights?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. Next document 1D 02411. Draft decree law on cooperation with the

8 international monitoring mission for human rights. That's 1D 02411;

9 correct?

10 A. That's correct. These are all --

11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not understand the witness.

12 MR. KARNAVAS:

13 Q. These were all the texts that were being discussed at that --

14 these were all draft texts being discussed, correct, as part of the

15 negotiating process?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Then we go to 1D 02412. Decree law on military council of the

18 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

19 A. Yes, I see that.

20 Q. And then I think it's the last one, I believe this is the last

21 one, maybe not. 1D 02413. We have a decision to appoint members of the

22 military council of BiH, and we see your name there. Was this part of

23 the negotiating process?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. All right. Now, if we go to the next document, 1D 01940. This

Page 29527

1 is in binder 1, Your Honours. 1940. If you could just look at the

2 document while everybody is getting these, trying to locate it. This is

3 minutes from the session of the RBH Presidency held in Geneva on 16 June

4 1993. We see in the very second page that your name is there along with

5 Boras. So were you at that meeting, sir?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And if we look at item number 2, we see it says:

8 "In order to implement Vance-Owen Plan as much as possible, the

9 co-chairmen of the peace conference on the former Yugoslavia propose the

10 following six draft laws."

11 And that was the -- those were the laws that we saw; correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. If you go to page number 2, we see your name a couple of times.

14 The first paragraph, it says, "Akmadzic said that they thought that the

15 Vance-Owen Plan had not failed." That was your understanding at that

16 time; correct? Is this correct that you still were hopeful?

17 A. Yes. It's not just that I wasn't and there were other hopes that

18 we were entertaining too although we were witnessing increasingly quite a

19 different approach.

20 Q. All right. Now, the second paragraph is interesting, it says,

21 "Akmadzic felt that the coordinating body should appoint a prime

22 minister-elect of the interim government of RBH." And I believe that we

23 already saw a document early on where Dr. Jadranko Prlic had been

24 appointed prime minister. Can you give us an explanation?

25 A. I remained adamant regardless of --, I remained adamant that Dr

Page 29528

1 Jadranko Prlic be appointed prime minister, as had been agreed in

2 Medjugorje on the 18th of May, 1993.

3 Q. Okay. Now, we go further down and we see Silajdzic, he said that:

4 "There was no point in discussing the proposed decrease if the

5 Vance-Owen Plan was being abandoned. These documents cannot be discussed

6 and adopted with reference to the Vance-Owen Plan when we don't even know

7 what exactly it implies."

8 To your understanding, at that point in time, were you, as a

9 member of the negotiating team, aware that the Vance-Owen Plan was being

10 abandoned?

11 A. No, I wasn't. I was assuming that its implementation depended on

12 our will, whether we would accept it or not.

13 Q. All right. Then we see Mr. Izetbegovic where he says:

14 "That it was difficult to explain it to accept that the side

15 which does not acknowledge BH and which is has not signed the plan should

16 be part of the higher state organs. It is unacceptable that the

17 coordination body has the character of a state organ and then it can

18 adopt binding decisions."

19 Could you please explain what Izetbegovic is saying here because

20 I thought there was already an agreement, coordinating body had been

21 formed. Where is Izetbegovic saying here?

22 A. Izetbegovic is adamant in backing the status quo in order not to

23 have a coordination body in order not to have a new prime minister

24 appointed. And he is also adamant that the Serb side should not be part

25 of the coordination body because in his very words, they were the

Page 29529

1 aggressors.

2 Q. All right. If we go to page 3, we see the conclusions and the

3 last conclusion says:

4 "The Presidency stands by the support for the Vance-Owen Plan but

5 its readiness to implement it -- and that it is open for further talks."

6 Now was that a correct statement? Was that a conclusion that was

7 actually reached? Because we have Silajdzic saying that it's being

8 abandoned here, there is support for it. Izetbegovic, we said signed on

9 to this coordinating body, now he doesn't agree with it. So can you

10 please explain this conclusion because it's rather confusing?

11 A. Our conclusion was that the talks were still very much along the

12 lines of the Vance-Owen Plan regardless of the fact that not everyone

13 agreed as to what stage the negotiations were actually at.

14 Q. All right. And if we look at item number 5, it says that:

15 "The Presidency sent the proposal by the Croatian Democratic

16 Union submitted by Mr. Akmadzic to launch procedures for the appointment

17 of Ante Cuvalo for ambassador to -- of the Republic of Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina to the United States."

19 May I ask whether Mr. Cuvalo was appointed to the ambassador to

20 the United States pursuant to your initiative or the initiative of the

21 Croatian Democratic Union, which was obviously accepted by the

22 Presidency?

23 A. It was normal for the parties to provide the initiative. We did,

24 the Presidency took that on board. Despite this, Mr. Cuvalo was never

25 appointed ambassador to Washington.

Page 29530

1 Q. All right. There is -- the next document, 1D 02840. Binder

2 number 3, Your Honours.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Karnavas, please.

4 MR. KARNAVAS:

5 Q. This is an announcement --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: Can I be heard now?

8 Q. This is an announcement pursuant to the request of the

9 co-chairmen of the peace conference he says:

10 "On the former Yugoslavia and the conclusions reached at the

11 meeting in Geneva on 16 June 1993 during the previous weekend

12 representatives of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna met with

13 representatives of the Muslims and Serb side with the aim of coming to an

14 agreement on the new proposals for the resolution of the crisis of BH.

15 In separate talks with the high representatives of the other two peoples

16 in BH, Mr. Mate Boban and his associates expressed the Croatian view of

17 the future arrangement of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina ..." did

18 that happen? Were you part of this process?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And it says here, and it would appear that based on this

21 announcement that you are -- and I'm saying you, the Croat delegation

22 along with the Muslim and the Serb delegation are being prompted by the

23 co-chairmen of the peace conference; correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Now, we're going to go to another topic.

Page 29531

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you still have

2 some ten minutes left.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. It's going to be a

4 Herculean effort, but we'll see what we can do. If we go to 1D 02664.

5 This is in binder number 2, Your Honours.

6 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, I would really be most grateful if we could be as

7 quickly as possible and as efficient. Of course I share the blame for

8 this confusion in the courtroom so ...

9 We see this is a tape recording of the Presidency, of a

10 Presidency meeting on the 29th June, 1993. Have you had a chance to look

11 at this document, sir?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And in fact if we go through it, we see that you are present at

14 the time and you make several observations; correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. As I understand it, yesterday or the day before, you made a

17 reference to a Mr. Fikret Abdic who had complained about Mr. Delic --

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. And we can find it in this particular transcript; correct?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. And because we can read it, and we can see who said what, it

22 would appear also that there was some complaints towards Mr. Izetbegovic

23 in that he was using his position without informing other members of the

24 Presidency and that was an observation made by Mr., I believe, Lasic;

25 correct?

Page 29532

1 A. That's correct.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. For the record, you were, that can be found

3 on pages 9 and 10 of the document. Okay. Now, we can go on to the next

4 document. I apologise to the Court for not being able to spend more time

5 on this. It was rather self-explanatory, the minutes, that is, the tape

6 recording.

7 If we go to the next document, 1D 02309 it's in binder number 2.

8 Q. Do you have the document, sir? 1D 02309. It's -- we see --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. It's dated 1 July 1993 and this is addressed to the General

11 Secretary of the UN, and you are commenting, we can see on the very first

12 paragraph about an attack that commenced on 30th of June, 1993 in the

13 town of Mostar. Do you recall that?

14 A. I do.

15 Q. And you do express and opinion in paragraph number 4, you say:

16 "The objective of this aggression is to impede the implementation

17 of the already existing peace agreements prevent further development of

18 the peace process, and postpone talks on the future political structure

19 of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

20 Could you please tell us very briefly what happened on June 30th,

21 if you recall?

22 A. This was the time when the Muslim forces attacked both in Mostar

23 and in Central Bosnia. This is the time when reached the water shed

24 point with the Vance-Owen Plan which was not being implemented. This is

25 the time when the failure to accept the Vance-Owen Plan and lack of

Page 29533

1 knowledge on the part of the Muslim party means the increasing --

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I just draw your attention to the fact that I

3 have now found the document in binder number one and not in binder number

4 2 as you had indicated. So I'm sorry --

5 MR. KARNAVAS: I don't --

6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I don't feel that I can be blamed. I did not --

7 I was not able to follow at the same time.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. All right. This is part of the problem

9 with these time constraints but as I indicated, Your Honours, we will try

10 to put it all in order. We've hired extra staff. We're doing it both on

11 electronic version and manually. And I think in the future we will have

12 to hire more staff to do that. You can imagine how difficult it is to

13 read this stuff, put it together.

14 It would be helpful to tell the registry to give us more funding

15 for this. Anyway ...

16 Q. Now that we have the letter, can you briefly tell us again very

17 briefly what happened on June 30th? Please speak slowly, so we have your

18 full answer in the record.

19 A. On the 30th of June, the Muslim forces in Mostar launched an

20 attack on the HVO and the Croatian people in Mostar. And they stepped up

21 the attacks in Central Bosnia. These attacks had started in April and

22 continued afterwards, and we warned about the fact that the Muslim party

23 is hesitant to accept international negotiations. In this specific case

24 we're talking about the Vance-Owen Plan and that it is trying to force

25 some other decisions to be taken by those aggressive tactics.

Page 29534

1 Q. All right. If we go to the next document, 1D 01937. This is now

2 11 July 1993. Binder number 1, 1937. This is a letter to the Presidency

3 of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it's a statement actually. It

4 begins by saying:

5 "At a session held in Zagreb, 11 July 1993, chaired by Presidency

6 member Dr. Ejup Ganic, the Presidency of the republic of BH discussed and

7 further elaborated the draft of the constitutional order of Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina."

9 Then we see towards the bottom of the page that we have I guess

10 what would be the draft constitutional order.

11 If we go to page number 2 under paragraph 9, we see that it calls

12 for:

13 "The BH constitution is adopted as part of an international

14 conference. The constitution of federal units to be adopted by each of

15 them may not contravene the BH constitution or decisions of the

16 Constitutional Court."

17 Then lastly, I just want to point out if I ask you the question

18 on page 3, we see under Roman numeral II:

19 "The principles for constituting federal units: 1, the federal

20 units cannot be constituted on an exclusively ethnic basis. 2, nature

21 and geography, the economy, traffic, culture, and tradition will be taken

22 into consideration in constituting federal units."

23 I believe you were asked a question -- I think it was by

24 Judge Trechsel yesterday concerning your vision of how this should be

25 constituted. Was this your understanding keeping in mind that we may be

Page 29535

1 discussing a different peace plan here?

2 A. Yes, regardless of what the peace plan was, it was our constant

3 position that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organised as a

4 decentralized state based on the criteria that are listed here, not only

5 in ethnic terms but ethnic, geographic, cultural, historical, and all the

6 other elements must be included. Bosnia and Herzegovina is recognised as

7 a sovereign state, but it consists of the constituent units and

8 constituent peoples.

9 Q. If we go back to page 1. We see Lord Owen and we see

10 Stoltenberg's name. Is this their initiative or is this the initiative

11 of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. Which of the two?

12 A. This was a new plan that started with Owen and Stoltenberg but

13 the criteria remained the same. The criteria for the setting up of the

14 units and the only difference is how the units were formulated.

15 Q. Okay. Go on to the next topic and I just need a few moments,

16 Your Honours, and I believe I'm going to be through rather quickly.

17 The next binder for the gentleman and we're going to be looking

18 at a document. We will be looking at the -- at a document and it's P

19 05051. That's your first document. This would be in binder number 4,

20 Your Honours. P 05051. Do you have it, sir?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You've seen this document before in this courtroom. It's dated

23 September 14, 1993, it's a joint declaration between President Tudjman

24 and Alija Izetbegovic and if you look at under Roman numeral 2, it talks

25 about the formation of working groups and then if we look at page number

Page 29536

1 3, we see that President Franjo Tudjman appointed as a trustee,

2 Dr. Mate Granic, and President Alija Izetbegovic appointed

3 Dr. Haris Silajdzic. Do you see that, sir?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, based on this joint declaration, were you involved in any

6 working groups?

7 A. Yes, I was involved in the work of one of the groups, and that

8 was the group for the reduction of tensions between the two peoples.

9 Q. What was the reason behind this joint declaration, if you know?

10 A. Well, we saw that the war, and the war in Central Bosnia in

11 particular was continuing and that in spite of our orders, it was not

12 stopping and we tried to find a solution in some other way. The Muslim

13 side in Bosnia and Herzegovina or rather they wanted to deal with the

14 Republic of Croatia more than they wanted to deal with us, the

15 representatives of the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that is

16 why two representatives were appointed, one by Franjo Tudjman and the

17 other by Alija Izetbegovic who would continue being in constant contact

18 and the establishment of the working groups was yet another way, another

19 effort to solve the problems that could not be solved up until that time.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, my fellow Judges

21 are telling me that your time is up.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. I would, with the Court -- with the

23 Court's indulgence, I would ask for the remainder of the period. I

24 understand that we asked for six hours, and if I can't, I would at least

25 like to read into the record the documents that I would have shown in

Page 29537

1 conjunction with this topic and they're not that many but they're all

2 based on this last answer, based on the working groups. So -- I can

3 understand if the Court feels we should move on, we'll move on.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] How many documents are you

5 going to mention?

6 MR. KARNAVAS: The documents that I have I don't really need to

7 discuss too much, you were, because they are part of this working group

8 process. It's 1D 02837, 2898, 2897, 2899, 2900, and I believe it's 1291,

9 1D 01291. They're all basically -- then 2876, these are all based on

10 these working groups to show that this was an ongoing process.

11 Then lastly, I did wish to have the gentleman discuss one part of

12 his transcript which the Prosecution may probably bring up and that's on

13 P 07260, this is the presidential transcript of 19 December 1993 on page

14 24. I'm sure it hasn't been -- hasn't escaped Mr. Scott's eyesight, and

15 I certainly didn't want to think that we were somehow avoiding to ask the

16 tough questions and then lastly, there was one document, 1D 01556 from

17 the -- it's from the Balkan Odyssey but actually this was a communication

18 that was submitted, if the time is up, then I will be moving these

19 documents in by way of a motion. I'm at your disposal.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Because you

21 probably saw the documents with the witness, who saw them together with

22 you, didn't he?

23 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Karnavas. I

25 think it is best to have a break now since it's 3.30, and then I'll turn

Page 29540

1 So, sir, I think that it will not take us longer than 10 or 15

2 minutes. First of all we'll talk about the HVO as component of the armed

3 forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:

5 Q. You told us yesterday and this is recorded in your document 1D

6 2096 that you said to the president of the Security Council that the HVO

7 was a legitimate army recognised by the government and the Presidency of

8 Bosnia and Herzegovina; is that right?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. In the document 1D 2664, there's no need for you to go looking

11 for it because I will read all the relevant portions to you, this is the

12 document that can be found in the second binder. It is the minutes from

13 the meeting of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The date is the

14 29th of June, 1993. This is what you are recorded as saying,

15 Mr. Akmadzic. The date was about the issue whether General Rasim Delic

16 was a member of the Presidency ex officio because he was the chief of the

17 general staff of Bosnia and Herzegovina and you said at page 9 in the

18 B/C/S version and page 8 in the English version, you say -- could you

19 please record -- can you please state that I am going on record as saying

20 that Mr. Delic is not a member of the Presidency unless Mr. Petkovic is

21 sitting next to him:

22 "So let's reach a decision, either both of them or neither one.

23 If we cannot vote on this now since military issues are not on the

24 agenda, can we at least then discuss the issue?" End of quote.

25 Mr. Akmadzic, can you please tell us what were you calling for at

Page 29541

1 this meeting of the Presidency?

2 A. I wanted -- what I wanted was that in accordance with the

3 decision of the War Presidency that the armed forces of Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina consisted of the BH army and the Croatian Defence Council and

5 since a representative of the army or representatives in the War

6 Presidency become members, they should have been representatives of the

7 Territorial Defence, but Territorial Defence was no more that either the

8 chiefs of both component parts of the army should sit on the Presidency

9 or neither, but I also indicated that because it was not on the agenda,

10 rules of procedure of the Presidency must be adhered to. I wanted this

11 to be debated and perhaps a decision could be postponed for some other

12 time but until a decision is taken, Rasim Delic is not a member of the

13 Presidency.

14 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, please tell us whether the president of the

15 Presidency ever tabled this topic, whether this was put on the agenda and

16 did you decide on this issue whether those chiefs of staff would be

17 members of the Presidency or not?

18 A. The president was evasive about this. He asked for Rasim Delic

19 to be a member of the Presidency until we took a different decision. I

20 said no and that was the Presidency decision. He is not a member of the

21 Presidency until we have a decision for him to become one, a joint

22 decision or rather along with Mr. Petkovic or the chief of the HVO staff,

23 whoever this happened to be. In any case, along with Mr. Petkovic.

24 Q. This was all going on in 1993. What about 1992? Were there any

25 initiatives back in 1992 by the Croat members of the Presidency to, for

Page 29542

1 example, set up some sort of a joint command for the two armies, the HVO

2 and the BH army?

3 A. On our part, there was several such initiatives. They were

4 always voiced as part of the work of the Presidency and the government.

5 There were initiatives within the HVO itself. There were even agreements

6 and talks. In a way, and in a formal sense, there was not a joint

7 command perhaps that was set up but there was an agreement on a joint

8 command, however, this never really started operating until the

9 Washington talks were over.

10 Q. Now that you've mentioned the Washington Agreement, can you

11 please go to my small, small, very small binder. This is 4D 1234.

12 This is a document, it's a letter by Ambassador Sacirbey and

13 Ambassador Nobilo to the Security Council. Attached to the letter is the

14 Washington Agreement.

15 Mr. Akmadzic, if you look at the copy that is in our language,

16 you will see only a portion of the Washington Agreement as the framework

17 on the BH federation. What I want to know at this point in time is this:

18 Item 6 of the agreement, military agreement. We can have a look. Both

19 parties have agreed to the establishment of a unified military command of

20 the military of the federation. I skip the following paragraph and take

21 it on: "Current command structures will remain in place. Forces of the

22 sides will disengage from one another immediately ..." and then, "all

23 foreign armed forces except those present with the agreement of the

24 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the authorisation of the UN

25 Security Council will leave the territory of the federation."

Page 29543

1 Sir, Mr. Akmadzic, you were involved in the creation of the

2 Washington Agreement; right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Can you please help us with this to better understand item 6.

5 This provision here, where it says that a joint military command would be

6 set up, does this mean that this unified military command would be shared

7 by the HVO and the BH army?

8 A. Yes, precisely. The HVO and the BH army should have a unified

9 command.

10 Q. It is also stated that the current command structures would

11 remain until further notice. Does that this mean that even after the

12 Washington agreement, the HVO would continue to operate with the same

13 structure as before?

14 A. Not just the HVO. In both the political and the military sense,

15 all the parties would continue to operate in this way until a different

16 kind of agreement is reached, all the structures would be preserved and

17 they would continue to work regardless these agreements until a different

18 system was finally in place.

19 Q. All right. Let's go to another document now, this is also in my

20 binder, this is 4D 8226. This is the law on the proclamation of the law

21 on the defence of the BH federation. What I want to know about is

22 Article 37. We have an English translation on this article.

23 If you look at Article 37 of the BH federation law, we can find

24 the following, 37 paragraph 2:

25 "The federation army shall consist of units of the BH army and

Page 29544

1 the Croatian Defence Council including the core level and the district

2 level."

3 Mr. Akmadzic, does this mean that much, like the BH army, the HVO

4 continued to operate on its own until this law was adopted? And once

5 this law was adopted, it became a component of the federation army same

6 as the BH army?

7 A. That is absolutely correct. Based on what I know, the HVO is

8 still a segment of the armed forces.

9 Q. What about the HVO soldiers in terms of their rights, retirement,

10 pensions, invalid status, shares and stocks. Was their status equal in

11 every way to that of the BH army members? I'm talking about today in

12 Bosnia and Herzegovina?

13 A. Yes, I think so. I think that it is.

14 Q. All right. That concludes the first portion our examination and

15 now I would like you to comment on the Jovo Divjak discussion? Before I

16 embark on this, may I just say that --

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, [as interpreted]

18 the Chamber wonders what is the relevance for this case involving

19 Mr. Divjak. Could you give us some additional information? What are you

20 getting at?

21 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] With pleasure, Your Honours.

22 Mr. Jovan Divjak was Mr. Sefer Halilovic's deputy. In November or

23 December 1992, he was arrested under the suspicion that he had stoked up

24 the clashes between the Croats and Muslims in Prozor on the 23rd and 24th

25 of October 1993 [as interpreted]. This is an incident mentioned in our

Page 29545

1 indictment as incriminating. I think it is essential for us to show you

2 or to try to show you that within the top-most structures of the BH army,

3 there was a top-level commander who was accused of inciting the Croats

4 and the Muslims; and that resulted in a clash since the OTP was saying

5 this was something triggered by Croats and wrapped up by Croats and that

6 they were attacking Muslim civilians, what I'm trying to show you is that

7 that was, in fact, not the case.

8 We have an exceptional opportunity here and maybe this is our

9 last opportunity to discuss this transcript and to discuss the part of

10 the discussion at the Presidency about the arrest of Mr. Jovo Divjak

11 whereas the witness, Mr. Akmadzic, said at this meeting that maybe it was

12 as true as well the reason why Jovan Divjak was arrested because after --

13 my question to the witness, I want to show him --

14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Ms. Alaburic, would you please care to look at

15 page 37, lines 21 and 23. Something must be wrong with the dates. You

16 said he was not arrested in December 1992 for having committed misdeeds

17 in October 1993.

18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Of course. The other year is 1992

19 as well. Everything that goes on in connection with Mr. Divjak has to do

20 with the incident in Prozor in October 1992. The arrest, the discussion

21 of his arrest and the statement that Mr. Jovo Divjak made and I believe

22 we'll have a look at that as long as that is okay with the Chamber that

23 has to do with late 1992.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You may proceed.

25 We understand that this is in connection with Prozor. It was not obvious

Page 29546

1 in the documents.

2 This issue was not mentioned during the examination in chief led

3 by Mr. Karnavas so the time you will spend on that issue will be taken

4 out of the time of your examination in chief.

5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, of course it is for

6 the Chamber to rule on. I just wish to point out that document was shown

7 to the witness yesterday and this document in its entirety I assume will

8 be admitted into evidence. I also believe that my cross-examination

9 about any portion of that transcript must be considered as

10 cross-examination; and as Mr. Karnavas himself said, these transcripts

11 comprise a number of really important statements and observations.

12 However, the Prlic Defence ran out of time, and they couldn't discuss

13 each of these topics. However, the document was used in chief, and I

14 think I should be granted time to examine on this in my

15 cross-examination.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

17 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President, I'm not sure that I've

18 greeted the courtroom this afternoon so I'll do it now. Good afternoon,

19 Your Honours, to all those in and around the courtroom.

20 Your Honour, I just wanted to again to be consistent with the

21 issues the Prosecution have been raising for some weeks now since the

22 beginning of the Defence case, I believe. We just again want to say that

23 we do not consider this -- what we've heard so far to be

24 cross-examination. This is a direct examination of a friendly witness on

25 these point and at all should be considered direct examination and there

Page 29547

1 should not be any leading questions put.

2 Secondly, Your Honours, as a second aspect of the concerns that

3 we continue to raise. When Mr. Karnavas -- I'm not picking on

4 Mr. Karnavas but any party when it was the Prosecution's case, it was the

5 Prosecution, if it's now the Prlic case, eventually it will be the Stojic

6 case, et cetera, we are required -- everyone is required to provide a 65

7 ter notice.

8 This is a perfect example of a topic, the involvement of

9 Mr. Divjak where the Prosecution has had no notice whatsoever, I mean

10 none, zero, not a pair paragraph, not a word, not a jittle or jottle or

11 whatever one might call it; so Your Honour we continue to believe this is

12 a fundamental flaw in the process raising topics that the Prosecution has

13 had absolutely no notice of. I mean Judge Prandler, absolutely no

14 notice, never heard this before. So it's a flaw in the process, Your

15 Honour when there's going to be additional direct examinations by other

16 co-accused of a witness and they must -- and with the greatest respect to

17 my good friend, Ms. Alaburic, she must have known just more than five

18 minutes ago that she was going to do this, and I mean that with the

19 greatest respect. I have I have been working on my cross-examination for

20 days, not just now, although this is a new topic that I now have to deal

21 with overnight perhaps but surely there must be some means for other

22 co-accused examining a witness to provide some notice of what their

23 examinations will be so that everyone can prepare.

24 Part of the problem with the documentation, Your Honours, part of

25 the frustration with the amount of documentation is because you have to

Page 29548

1 prepare great volumes of material potentially that might potentially be

2 used guessing -- trying to guess what might come up.

3 And therefore, it puts everyone and particularly in this case the

4 Prosecution in a position where we, given the lack of prior statement,

5 given the lack of an adequate summary, we have to basically guess some

6 weeks in advance based on the trial calendar when a witness is coming and

7 guess what documents might be relevant; and the Chamber may or may not be

8 concerned about that. It may have no sympathy for the Prosecution

9 position at all, but I submit to the Chamber that it is not -- number one

10 it's not fair to the Prosecution. Number two, it adds to the problem

11 that we all combat with a number of documents and the preparation that's

12 involved. It is all related.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may be heard just for a couple of moments.

14 First and foremost, this topic was indeed on our list because we

15 had discussed it with the gentleman. We didn't get the chance to get to

16 it because we ran out of time.

17 Secondly, the -- if the Prosecutor had looked at the list of

18 documents that we had submitted and these are presidential transcripts or

19 other transcripts that were available to them, they would be able to see

20 where Mr. Akmadzic's name is referenced and look at the documents.

21 Thirdly, I -- I don't recall receiving any sympathy from the

22 members of the Trial Chamber when we were doing our cross-examination.

23 It is what it is. We got a list from the Prosecution when we were doing

24 our cross-examination based on that list we read all the documents. We

25 then did our own searches and from there, further searches, and we would

Page 29549

1 come up with a list of documents and prepare our cross-examination

2 accordingly.

3 Let me remind the Trial Chamber in the United States in the

4 federal system for instance, the defence does not get anything other than

5 the statement of the accused, nothing from the witness, until after the

6 witness testifies on direct examination which is -- this is true and you

7 know that.

8 MR. SCOTT: It's not true where I practice.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: I don't see where the problem lies. It is

10 incumbent on the Prosecutor to look at the documents that we've

11 submitted, that we indicate we're going to put to the witness and from

12 there on, it is for them to figure out where we're going. And if they

13 are prepared and they should and they are, they know where we are going.

14 Lastly, I want to remind the Trial Chamber that this gentleman

15 did indeed testify in the -- and members of the Prosecution were fully

16 aware of it and one of the Prosecutors, in fact, in this courtroom was

17 engaged, in my understanding, in that particular case. So they had a

18 transcript of this gentleman from a previous testimony, there was also a

19 statement that was taken, I don't know whether they have it or not, but

20 when you look at the transcript, it's obvious. I believe Mr. Scott was

21 involved in that particular case, so I don't see where the drama lies and

22 I think Ms. Alaburic and other Defence teams should be entitled to go

23 into areas whether I omitted to do it because it's not part of my case or

24 I'm trying to work within the time limits.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

Page 29550

1 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, you were, if I could respond.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What a waste of time but you

3 may go on, Mr. Scott.

4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, with the greatest respect, I don't think

5 it's a waste of time. I think the -- my position happens to be and maybe

6 I'm the only one in the courtroom who believes it, but my position

7 happens to be that the international community, the victims in this case,

8 and the Prosecution as a party is entitled to fair process.

9 Now maybe I'm the only one who thinks that.

10 I will mention to the Chamber, I will mention to the Chamber that

11 in reference to the summary, the Rule 65 summary we received, there is no

12 reference about anything about Mr. Divjak. We've raised this before.

13 There are two long paragraphs that are extremely generic, so he didn't

14 testify about in the Kordic case, it doesn't touch -- it's not in the

15 summary and it's a fundamental point of notice, Your Honour, what is so

16 difficult, what would be so unfair or so burdensome so oppressive to the

17 Defence to provide the Prosecution some reasonable notice? Thank you.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I shall consult my fellow

19 Judges. I will give you the floor later on. First I'd like to consult

20 my fellow Judges in order to see whether we will give Ms. Alaburic the

21 possibility to put leading questions on not, whether it's within

22 examination in chief or cross-examination, we'll see about that later.

23 We'll first decide whether she should be authorised to put leading

24 questions.

25 What would you like to say, Mr. Khan.

Page 29551

1 MR. KHAN: Well, Your Honours, it is a waste of time because of

2 course motions, Your Honours are seized of a motion on -- very this exact

3 point about the Prosecution's repeated insistence that cross-examination

4 by other accused should be classed as examination in chief. That's a

5 matter of judice at the moment, and it's continuous repetition and the,

6 no doubt, very sincere and very strongly felt views of my learned friend

7 do not get better in my respectful submission by mere repetition. To

8 that extent, I do respectfully submit that Mr. President, and Your

9 Honours are quite right that it is an unnecessary waste of time.

10 In relation to the atmosphere of the courtroom, it's also -- Your

11 Honours of course are very recently come into this case, but one of the

12 reasons why I think sometimes the atmosphere degenerates is by

13 unnecessary immotive language and it behoves no party to wear either the

14 interests of justice or the interests of victims as if an -- and arrogate

15 those interests themselves. The Defence don't wear on that I sleeve

16 their passion or at least they shouldn't, and I do respectfully submit it

17 doesn't do my learned friend, Mr. Scott, who's a very experienced and

18 very fine Prosecutor and lawyer justice to continuously belabour that

19 point. It doesn't advance the actual submissions that Your Honours have.

20 Your Honour, the third point, of course, it's in your inherent

21 powers to mold and craft rules of procedure that are intended to get to a

22 more fair and expeditious conduct of a trial, but this is not a plenary.

23 The rules are there and Rule 65 ter which my learned friend refers to

24 simply doesn't refer to information that's put in cross-examination.

25 When my learned friend was -- when my learned friend

Page 29552

1 cross-examines, the convention is that prior to cross-examination he will

2 give the documents he intends to put to confront a witness to the other

3 party. That's what my learned friends have done. It's what all Defence

4 counsel do, and I don't see that seeking to get a rule changed that

5 the -- that Your Honours could do in plenary by the back door takes

6 matters further.

7 Your Honour, my learned friend Mr. Karnavas is quite right in

8 relation to the United States practice of course Mr. Scott is a master of

9 his own system. I'm not, I'm not from that system at all. But what is

10 clear beyond paradventure is that in the United States of America, he

11 would be in a far more disadvantaged position than he is before this

12 international court; and he does the Judges of this court a great

13 disservice to bleat on or continuously repeat that this is unfair because

14 he does have access, he knows exactly who is going to be called whereas

15 in the United States, he has no idea who is behind the door and who is

16 the next witness. And, Your Honour, in the United States of America, in

17 the United States of America, my learned friend can operate with far less

18 information. American lawyers operate with far more -- far less

19 information, and it cannot be said that a lawyer as skilled with the

20 resources of the Prosecution as experienced as Mr. Scott suffers a huge

21 diminution of his experience and his qualifications and his ability to

22 deal with these witnesses simply by crossing the Atlantic. For those

23 reasons, Your Honour, it's my submission that all of this has been an

24 unnecessary waste of time and could have been prevented.

25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may just two

Page 29553

1 sentences before you start deliberating. I would like to stress that in

2 this transcript, we now have at least five pages dealing with the arrest

3 of Mr. Jovo Divjak, and I would also like to remind my learned friend

4 Mr. Scott that Mr. Stojic's Defence Exhibit 2D 00263 was admitted into

5 evidence a long time ago, and you have it in the binder relating to the

6 examination of this witness and this document discusses the arrest of

7 Mr. Divjak.

8 We cross-examined Prosecution witnesses on this topic. So I will

9 not be asking Mr. Akmadzic any other questions different from what we

10 asked other witnesses. The only difference being that this witness was

11 present at the meeting of the Presidency where this was discussed. He

12 heard explanations proffered by Mr. Halilovic and I consider it to be my

13 professional obligation to seek further explanations from this witness

14 about issues that we discussed with Prosecution witnesses earlier on in

15 this case.

16 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, one minute, one minute to respond. I

17 watch the clock, and I promise it won't be more than one minute.

18 First of all in response to Mr. Khan. My comments were measured

19 the record will show I wasn't raising my voice and when I think the some

20 of the theatrics that have gone on in this trial in the last two years, I

21 think my comments were measured, calm, no one was wearing their emotions

22 on their sleeve. It was a principal point, and a principal point that I

23 continue to believe very much.

24 Secondly, it's -- I'm not trying to take away counsel's

25 opportunity to go into it but just give us notice. And the proposition

Page 29554

1 for anyone to suggest there are thousands literally thousands of

2 documents in this case and because a document is somewhere in the trial

3 record that the Prosecution should guess and have to anticipate what is

4 going to come up in an examination is simply a completely ridiculous

5 proposition with the greatest respect. Thank you.

6 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, can we just say we support the

7 Petkovic -- we support what Mr. Karnavas and Mr. Khan have said, but I

8 would reassure Mr. Scott, there is certain hyperbolic language, maybe he

9 is the only one in the courtroom that thinks that the Prosecution is

10 entitled to a fair process -- I expect he'd have Mr. Bos with him at the

11 very least. But, Your Honours, we all accept, we never submitted

12 anything so ridiculous is that the Prosecution is not entitled to a fair

13 process. What we do is we do disagree from time to time about what is

14 needed for there to be a fair process, and that is what we are talking

15 about; and as Mr. Khan has indicated, all these issues are in the pretty

16 elaborate written submissions which are before Your Honours following a

17 motion by the Prosecution.

18 Now of course we could all invite Your Honours to give us the

19 ruling as soon as you can manageably do it, and we're sure that you wish

20 to do it but it doesn't add anything to have these oral submissions while

21 we're waiting for that ruling.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now, Mr. Praljak, you are on

23 your feet. Why?

24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I would like to ask a

25 question to you, Your Honours, if I may.

Page 29555

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What kind of question? Because

2 my colleagues --

3 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] It relates to the constant

4 reiteration on the part of the Prosecution that we are responsible to the

5 international community. Am I responsible to laws or to a political

6 organisation which is termed the international community and which may

7 involve all kinds of things. I would just this to be made clear. Thank

8 you.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, the Judges are going to

10 confer.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Trial Chamber

13 has discussed the issue. First of all, regarding the intervention by

14 Mr. Praljak. This is a Tribunal that renders justice. It is not the

15 international community.

16 Secondly, with regard to the application by Ms. Alaburic. The

17 questions to be asked based on these two documents must be non-leading

18 questions.

19 Thirdly, the Trial Chamber points out that indeed the

20 Prosecution, during the Prosecution case, had written statements;

21 however, when it comes to the Defence case, we do not have prior

22 statements, only documents are being introduced. In some cases, the

23 Prosecution can legitimately believe that it is prejudiced. That is all

24 we want to say.

25 Ms. Alaburic, you can put your questions, however, I can't tell

Page 29556

1 you whether you're going to have time or not. But put your questions in

2 a general fashion without them being leading and that will be enough just

3 as Judges do when they have their questions.

4 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.

5 Q. Sir, in this transcript, and we should not be wasting any time --

6 don't go looking for it, I'll just make -- give a page reference for the

7 benefit of the Trial Chamber. It's page 01806421 and this is in document

8 1D 2663. I think it is in the second binder provided by the Prlic

9 Defence.

10 So Mr. Akmadzic, we're talking about whether Mr. Divjak was

11 arrested or not, Sefer Halilovic provides some explanations that really

12 don't make it quite clear what happened and you say, let me quote from

13 the page that I just referenced:

14 "Are we sure about what the charges are against Mr. Divjak.

15 Allegedly those charges do not stand."

16 So your question is whether there were grounds for Mr. Divjak's

17 arrest in light of the charges against him. Can you please explain to us

18 what was this all about?

19 A. Well, obviously we were talking about two elements in the

20 Presidency. Some members of the Presidency were aware of the situation

21 and others were not. The fact is that Mr. Divjak was arrested. It is

22 also a fact that Mr. Halilovic claimed that this was not an arrest

23 proper. He was brought into custody, something like that. Nobody says

24 explicitly why Mr. Divjak was arrested and no explanation is given as to

25 the circumstances, what actually happened.

Page 29557

1 So my question was that he was probably charged with something

2 that happened. Why would somebody arrest the deputy chief of -- general

3 staff of the army just like that? And I sought information and the

4 conclusion was that this would be discussed at this session before it

5 ended.

6 Q. Could you please now look at document 2D 263. It's a report from

7 commander Arif Pasalic to his superior Sefer Halilovic and in the first

8 paragraph of this report, this is what it says:

9 "On the 2nd of December, 1992 at 10.30 hours, the Neretvica

10 brigade members in a building owned by Zejnil Delalic an arrest was made

11 and the person was arrested was Jovo Divjak. The reason why he was

12 arrested was the assumption that he was in collusion with the persons who

13 committed a number of crimes in the territory of the municipality of

14 Konjic or rather that Mr. Jovo Divjak participated in issuing orders that

15 were aimed at causing a rift between the Croat and Muslim peoples on the

16 ground, and I now will now skip the rest in my narrative.

17 Mr. Akmadzic, could you please tell me does this tally with the

18 information that you had at the time about the reasons for

19 Mr. Jovo Divjak's arrest?

20 A. No, and this was not the explanation that was given at the

21 Presidency meeting. I have just indicated that it is possible that some

22 of the Presidency members such as Izetbegovic and Halilovic perhaps knew

23 about that, but the rest of us we didn't know that.

24 Q. Could you now please look at 4D 427. Could we perhaps now see

25 whether you received any further information about that? Did you learn

Page 29558

1 that Mr. Jovo Divjak provided a statement regarding his arrest?

2 A. Yes, I heard about that, but I never did receive this statement

3 in the written form.

4 Q. Could you please look at page 3, that's both in the English and

5 the B/C/S version. Mr. Divjak says, as regards the Prozor case and the

6 relations between Croats and Muslims or rather the BH army and the HVO:

7 "I reject any suspicion that I fermented those conflicts. I will

8 go as far as to say that I assisted on trying to calm the situation down,

9 to get people to talk."

10 So does this correspond to what you knew about Mr. Divjak giving

11 such a statement?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Can we then conclude that at that time, you did not receive any

14 information as to why Mr. Divjak was actually arrested?

15 A. I never received any information to that effect at all.

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this completes my

17 cross-examination.

18 Mr. Akmadzic, thank you very much for answering my questions.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Let me come back to

21 Ms. Nozica, I believe.

22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, thank you. While

23 the binders are being distributed in the courtroom, I would like to say

24 good afternoon to everyone in the courtroom including the witness, and I

25 would like to say that I will be -- that I will have more

Page 29562

1 for me to be facing fewer exhibits, far fewer exhibits, I should say than

2 my learned friend, Mr. Karnavas.

3 Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:

4 Q. Good afternoon, again, witness. For the record, after all we've

5 met before, haven't we; but my name is Senka Nozica, and I represent with

6 my colleague Mr. Stojic. I would start with a document just to avoid any

7 misunderstandings, this was in Mr. Karnavas's binder. This is 1D 2067.

8 You've got my binder in front of you, sir. This is the statement of the

9 members of the HV Presidency, your statement of the 21st of April, 1993.

10 During this trial, we have been using this statement. There was

11 a witness here whose name I'm not allowed to mention. In the further

12 course of my cross examination I will only be focussing on the first

13 portion of this statement. The document says at the meeting of the

14 Presidency members, the prime minister and the members of the government

15 of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat ones held yesterday

16 in Mostar in connection with the acts of aggression carried out by the

17 Muslim forces against the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina a statement

18 was adopted that we hereby publish in it's entirety.

19 Mr. Akmadzic, my question would be at the time what sort of

20 information was available to you, prior to the 21st of April, prior to

21 this statement being made public about the military activities of the BH

22 army? Let's try to limit this to Central Bosnia in terms of geography?

23 A. I said this before, but I'd like to repeat this. We're talking

24 about April 1993 and this was one of the most difficult months as far as

25 the situation in Central Bosnia was concerned, one of the worst months if

Page 29563

1 you like. The BH army as one of the component parts of the armed forces

2 of Bosnia and Herzegovina is attacking another component arm of the army

3 of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the population of

4 Central Bosnia. The BH Presidency, a body that we had by this time

5 addressed both directly and indirectly was doing nothing about this. At

6 a meeting that we held, we stated that we were effectively powerless to

7 stop the clashes. We made a public declaration, a statement for the

8 benefit of both the domestic and international public to the effect that

9 we were facing a very difficult situation and that our people were under

10 attack.

11 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, I would like to ask you a very specific question:

12 Did you at any point in time know anything at the time you were making

13 this statement about the army attacks on Zenica and Travnik, that general

14 area in Central Bosnia?

15 A. We were not aware of the attack on Zenica. We were aware of an

16 attack that was launched from Zenica on Travnik specifically, on Bugojno,

17 on Novi Travnik. Actually, for the most part, the areas coming under

18 attack were areas where there were very important military factories in

19 Bosnia and Herzegovina and armament factories.

20 Q. Yes, when I said on Zenica, I meant attacks on the HVO in Zenica

21 but your intervention was perfectly appropriate. But can you explain

22 this when you say attacks on areas that held the most important military

23 factories in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was that the conclusion at the time

24 or had you already caught wind of the possibility that there might be

25 some activity along these lines in precisely these areas?

Page 29564

1 A. We had caught hints that something like this might happen. I

2 would like to tell the Chamber that Central Bosnia is the very heart of

3 Bosnia and Herzegovina. We talked in answer to different question about

4 the kingdom of Bosnia as it used to be. It was precisely in Central

5 Bosnia, in Vares, that the king had his thrown, his seat. It is there

6 that the coat of arms of the kingdom of Bosnia are still kept or at least

7 I hope so.

8 It is precisely in Central Bosnia as it is that in Travnik, we

9 have a clothing factory for the military. In Novi Travnik and Bugojno,

10 we have factories that produce weapons for the military. In Konjic,

11 there is another such factory that produces weapons for the military.

12 When Jajce fell, the Muslims started moving towards Central

13 Bosnia as refugees. There was a disbalance. Now, this is something that

14 I addressed with Mr. Izetbegovic. He said we'll deal with this

15 disbalance or this disharmony in terms of population movement. However,

16 it was quite obvious to me that he was either unable or unwilling to deal

17 with this. We knew about the impending danger looming over Central

18 Bosnia.

19 Q. May I ask you or perhaps remind you because I believe this is

20 something that you actually know. You spoke about all these towns. You

21 spoke about a number of towns with military production facilities. You

22 omitted Vitez, was Vitez not another such town?

23 A. Yes, Vitez was equally important in this context. This was an

24 explosive factory in Vitez and explosives were needed in order to be able

25 to use all these weapons being produced. But we're talking about the

Page 29565

1 aggression being carried out by the BH army at this period of time. In

2 my assessment, and that may be the reason for this omission, Vitez was

3 not at risk to the same extent. It would be very much at risk but that

4 wasn't until a little later, regardless of the fact that there were

5 attacks against Vitez as well.

6 Q. If my understanding is correct, you spoke about this disbalance,

7 how the balance, the population balance was tipped when a large number of

8 Muslims arrived in Central Bosnia and then you spoke about these military

9 factories producing weapons in Central Bosnia. Is my understanding

10 correct, I think you were saying something along the lines that there

11 were expectations that the BH army would be attacking HVO units in these

12 areas. Is my conclusion accurate?

13 A. Yes, we were perfectly aware of the danger, and we warned the

14 Presidency that certain steps should be taken. I talked to

15 Mr. Izetbegovic, and I talked to him about this.

16 Q. Let me now take you through a couple of documents addressing the

17 military situation in Central Bosnia, specifically Zenica and Kakanj

18 areas which is something that you addressed already.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Nozica, if you want to move

20 on to another document, I have a question on this one dealing with a

21 topic you did not tackle.

22 Dealing with item or paragraph number 3, would you mind looking

23 at it? In a very clear manner, you speak about the fact that

24 Mr. Izetbegovic usurped his Presidency since you said that his mandate

25 had expired on the 20th December, 1992 and therefore he usurped his

Page 29566

1 function and this is something you said on the 21st of April, 1993.

2 Upon reading this, I have the following question: The Croat

3 members in the Presidency were of the view that the Presidency operated

4 illegally for a legal ground that you expanded upon but how is it then

5 that you and your fellow Croats, possibly also the Serbs, failed then to

6 tell the international community, because there were a lot of

7 negotiations going on, why did you not say that given that situation, you

8 would withdraw for all negotiations and that the international community

9 had to deal with it only with the usurpers? Why did you not take up this

10 position because then maybe there would have been a problem vis-a-vis the

11 negotiators who would have had only one side facing them and not the

12 three?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we informed the

14 international community about this. We informed the co-chairmen who to

15 us represented the international community. We know the international

16 community is a generic notion, it is not a body in the proper sense, it

17 is not a legal entity. For us during the negotiations, the international

18 community meant the UN and the western European Union. We never went

19 beyond that framework because the co-chairmen were appointed at the

20 London Conference and the scope of that conference was even broader than

21 what I have now been referring to.

22 There is one thing that I would like to share with the Chamber.

23 It wasn't just about us but the difficulties of the Croats in particular

24 were great. The international community, in a manner of speaking, on the

25 one hand had to deal with the Presidency, it had no choice but to deal

Page 29567

1 with the Presidency. On the other hand, there were the three clashing

2 parties which it had no choice but to deal with either.

3 None of us ever questioned the fact that Alija Izetbegovic was a

4 legitimate member of the BH Presidency. None of us ever questioned the

5 fact that he was representing the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All

6 we wished to underline was the fact that the BH Presidency had to operate

7 in keeping with its own rules of procedure, the rules of procedure under

8 which it was established, in keeping with the constitution and the laws

9 of the country. The Presidency had to see us or treat us as a

10 constituent people. We had no insight into any decisions that were being

11 taken, many of them at the same time, actually. It wasn't just the

12 Presidency. We had no access to many of the decisions or their

13 implementation taken by the Presidency itself. This is the background to

14 our reaction. We started with this letter, it's actually not a letter,

15 it's more of a declaration. We started with this and at a later stage we

16 realised that we had not succeeded in achieving what we believed was

17 necessary.

18 As I said yesterday, we froze all of our activities in the

19 Presidency and the government in a bid to use any legal avenues available

20 to us in order to get the Muslims to at least start implementing such

21 decisions as had been adopted, and we wanted to get them to cooperate in

22 terms of the talks.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you for that

24 answer.

25 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 29568

1 Q. Sir, could you please look at document 2D 00472, that's the next

2 document in line. For the transcript, I would like to say that this is

3 an exhibit. It's an order for an attack, it's a BH army document from

4 the 7th Muslim Brigade, the 2nd Zenica Battalion command, the date is the

5 17th of April and in this order for attack, in paragraph 1, it says, on

6 the axis of the attack of the battalion, the defence is amounted by the

7 enemy strength such and such in order to defend the town of Zenica et

8 cetera and the suburbs.

9 Mr. Akmadzic, could you please confirm that this was the

10 information that you had about the attacks on the HVO, let me be quite

11 specific, in Zenica at that time?

12 A. Yes, precisely and if I may, to clarify to the Trial Chamber this

13 issue, the Croatian Defence Council existed in areas where Croats were in

14 the minority. One of the towns where the Croatian Defence Council

15 existed is Zenica, the town that we have here, but there was the Croatian

16 Defence Council in Sarajevo, the town where I lived. So the Croatian

17 Defence Council and all the structures of the Croatian Community of

18 Herceg-Bosna as it was at the time existed throughout the territory of

19 Bosnia and Herzegovina regardless of the ethnic composition of the

20 population.

21 In this specific case that I have in front of me now, this is an

22 attack on the HVO mounted by a much larger force, a superior force, a

23 larger segment of the armed forces, the attacking a weaker segment of the

24 armed forces. We had been receiving complaints from Zenica. We couldn't

25 prevent those attacks. It is my assessment that the reason why we

Page 29569

1 couldn't stop those attacks was because the extremists were out in force

2 in the town of Zenica at this time that we're now discussing other forces

3 from abroad, either organised or on an individual basis were joining the

4 BH army, now I'm talking primarily about the Mujahedin. At this time,

5 within the framework of the BH army or perhaps I should say outside of

6 the framework of the BH army, there were other forces operating such as

7 for instance the MOS, the Muslim armed forces, and we couldn't negotiate

8 with them, we couldn't cooperate with them.

9 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, you mentioned something that goes beyond the topic

10 that I wanted to discuss but it would be pertinent. Could you please

11 explain to the Judges outside the territory of the HZ HB, there were HVO

12 units. You mentioned Sarajevo, you said that throughout the territory of

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were such units?

14 A. Yes in Tuzla, in Bihac, in the Posavina area, in Zenica, in Vares

15 in Kakanj. I'm not talking about locations where the population was

16 mixed and where Muslims were in the majority.

17 Q. Could you tell us the HVO units in Sarajevo and in other places,

18 who did they fight against and who did they fight side-by-side with?

19 A. In Sarajevo, at least at the beginning, there were no conflicts

20 between the BH army and the HVO. There was full cooperation, and they

21 fought side-by-side against the aggressor as this aggressor was defined.

22 Q. Well, it wasn't like that up until the very end, but I don't want

23 to go into this topic, but this was not the case up until the very end.

24 There was a conflict and there was forcible resubordination to the BH

25 army?

Page 29570

1 A. Well, there was no conflicts in the real sense of the word.

2 There was some misunderstandings. The BH Presidency as the supreme

3 commander attached or rather joined the brigade of the HVO that existed

4 in Sarajevo to the BH army.

5 Q. Well, we will call a witness that will explain how the HVO

6 functioned throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it's an

7 important topic. But let us know go back to the issue of Zenica. Could

8 you please look at document 2D 101. It's the next document in the

9 binder. Please go ahead.

10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me, Ms. Nozica, before we leave this one.

11 In the first paragraph Witness, it is stated the reasons for the order,

12 the background, "Based on recent development of the events, situation and

13 behaviour of HVO troops and with aim to prevent surprise ..."

14 Do you have any information, can you inform the Chamber of what

15 was referred to by the behaviour of HVO troops. You may not know what

16 they referred to, and I completely accept that; but I would like to give

17 you the opportunity to comment on it.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think that this preamble

19 when it mentions the developments, what it mentions the negotiations,

20 political negotiations that were conducting at the time, the political

21 situation in the country. I don't know anything about the conduct or

22 behaviour of the HVO units, but I can assume that there were some

23 problems in cooperation although the HVO did propose that joint command

24 be set up. So I couldn't really say what is meant when the words "the

25 behaviour of the HVO units" is mentioned and they are not talking about

Page 29571

1 the HVO as a whole but only about the unit that they are in contact with.

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

3 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. But I think

4 that we will be able to clear this up with the next document, that's 2D

5 101.

6 Q. Sir, have you found it?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. This is a report on the organisation of the HVO in Zenica and the

9 events that preceded its neutralization in the Zenica municipality area.

10 This is a report that was sent by Vinko Baresic, the commander of the

11 Zenica Brigade of the HVO.

12 Mr. Akmadzic, let me put some parts of this report to you. The

13 date is the 23rd of April 1993 so it includes the events of the 17th and

14 the 18th of April. And since you have already seen this -- these

15 documents, I would just like to point some elements to you.

16 In the introduction, the commander of the Zenica Brigade of the

17 HVO indicates that he was for all intents and purposes a member of the BH

18 army in Zenica, that in June 1992, he was transferred to the HVO and that

19 the situation was fine until November 1992 as regards the relations

20 between the HVO and the BH army; and that is when the command of the 3rd

21 Corps of the BH army was set up, headquartered in Zenica. The commander

22 goes on to say that this is when the problems began cropping up. He says

23 that the information service of the 3rd Corps usurped all the public

24 media with a plan that they had and the fierce campaign stating that the

25 BH army was the only force fighting for the sovereign unified indivisible

Page 29572

1 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2 At page 2 of this document, that's in the Croatian version, and

3 for the benefit of the Trial Chamber, this is page 0062 in the English

4 version.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction 61.

6 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] And it says here the pressure in

7 Zenica is increasing. I think the answer in this question one asked by

8 Judge Trechsel, there was sporadic killings and abductions where people

9 were being taken away and nobody knows where we are. When we protest

10 about this to the civilian authorities and the BH army, we get the same

11 reply, that is, they have nothing to do with that; and they will do

12 everything if those acts were committed by members of the BH army to

13 investigate this, but they never wanted to admit that they were

14 responsible or to take the blame and they never identified the

15 perpetrators.

16 The indications that we received in the best scenario cases were

17 that those were individuals who were not under their control and that

18 they distanced themselves from those individuals and their media would

19 inform the public that those -- that this was, in fact, lack of

20 discipline on the part of the HVO fighters who would have to be placed

21 under the control of the official and regular army of the Republic of

22 Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is the BH army.

23 The text goes on to say that the HVO in Zenica did have

24 information that the situation was in fact the exact opposite. It was a

25 serious situation. The public was being prepared for the final showdown

Page 29573

1 with the HVO in Zenica, the command of the 7th Muslim Brigade was set up

2 in Zenica; and the document goes on to say that this command was set up

3 to include for the most part foreign volunteers of the Mujahedin who

4 drove around Zenica or ran around the town bearing their religious

5 banners and singing songs in a language that one could or could not

6 understand in a show of force and members of those units did all the

7 dirty work in Central Bosnia for the most part in the free territory.

8 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, was this the information that you had when you

9 talked about the Mujahedin and when you talked about the preparations for

10 this pressure designed to defeat the HVO in this area militarily?

11 A. Yes, I would say --

12 MR. SCOTT: I'm concerned that we're going to spend some three

13 hours with five minute questions and then asking if the witness can say

14 anything about it. That was a five-minute question. I looked at the

15 transcript. And I think we have to break it down and look at the

16 witness's knowledge for this. How does he know about it? Does he -- has

17 he ever seen this document before? Does he actually know anything about

18 it ought all? I mean we seem to be just reading documents.

19 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It hasn't escaped me.

21 Ms. Nozica.

22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I want with this

23 witness -- well, this document was tendered and was not admitted and now

24 I want to go through all the documents that are relevant for the Defence

25 and find out whether the witness has any knowledge of those events and

Page 29574

1 those documents because that will make our job easier. There is a lot of

2 relevant details in this document I would like to go through it as fast

3 as possible, and what I just quoted from this document confirms what the

4 witness had already said. I would just like the witness to give us a

5 brief answer. I would like to now go through two more details that are

6 contained in this document.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I want to note for the benefit of

8 the Trial Chamber that I was a prime minister in the government of Bosnia

9 and Herzegovina and that I did not -- I do not like to get any

10 suggestions as to what I should say, and I will just present my own views

11 to the Trial Chamber the way I see things. I have already said and I

12 would like to say this again to the Trial Chamber that the Croatian

13 Defence Council and the BH army were partners, and they cooperated well

14 over a certain period of time.

15 As I have already said, and this was the view shared by us in the

16 Presidency, the relations got worse because of the aggression against

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the overall situation. When we're talking

18 about this document, I don't know what individuals were in the HVO or in

19 the BH army ranks were doing. I know that it was a firm agreement that

20 we all reached that we should defend Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21 In answer to another question, I said that it appears to me that

22 there were extremists in the BH army ranks in Zenica and that regardless

23 of all the agreements, one should never overlook the individuals who are

24 involved and the people who are in charge of some units. Throughout the

25 war we had huge problems with Zenica. The Croatian Defence Council in

Page 29575

1 Zenica was just a small element of the joint armed forces. They were

2 under pressure as this report shows, they were under pressure both from

3 paramilitary formations.

4 I don't know if anyone has told the Trial Chamber, if not, I

5 would like to be the one to tell you this that the presence of foreign

6 organised groups or individuals mostly in Central Bosnia led to great

7 difficulties that continued on into the post-war period because without

8 our knowledge and without our approval, many people were granted

9 citizenship and this caused a lot of problems and laws had to be changed

10 because of that. Then we faced the problem how can one -- how can one

11 strip them of the citizenship that was granted to them and the

12 international community had to intervene.

13 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, well, you said this in answer to the Prosecution

15 but you are spending my time. I don't want you to be under pressure but

16 you saw that my time is limited. I think that we started an hour and a

17 half ago, but I would just like Your Honours to tell me when there should

18 be a break but perhaps if we could just complete this document?

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Maybe we could have a break at

20 half past 5.00 if that suits you. It's up to you. I'm entirely in your

21 hands.

22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] That's fine, Your Honour, but the

23 last break was a little earlier on. I thought now was the right time. I

24 might as well press on.

25 Q. Witness, you tell us that you've seen the document. Let me draw

Page 29576

1 your attention to paragraph 3 in the Croatian version. I am -- I won't

2 be reading it. It's 0063 in the English paragraph 2. The next paragraph

3 after that, says the attack on the Zenica HVO started on the 18th of

4 April at 05 hours, the next page claims that at about 1800 hours the

5 Muslim forces took Zmajevac, this is very important, and the second to

6 last page in the English and page 5 in the B/C/S claims that at the time,

7 the reports were written on the 23rd of April, 1993 in Zenica there were

8 no more HVO units remaining, members of the civilian authorities were

9 under house arrest, most of the soldiers were in prisons apart from the

10 HVO seals, everything else was in the hands of the BH army.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note, could Ms. Nozica's

12 microphones please be switched on and all the other microphones be

13 switched off as she speaks. The interpreters cannot hear her properly.

14 Thank you very much.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course it is very difficult for

16 me to address each of these elements simply because I wasn't there.

17 However, based on the news that we got it was exactly like that.

18 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

19 Q. Can we please now look at another document in reference to

20 Zenica, briefly it's the next document 2D 00473. This is yet another

21 order to launch another attack. Please tell me when you've found it.

22 A. 20473.

23 Q. Indeed. This is an order to the commander of the 7th Muslim

24 Brigade as far as I can see, the 7th Muslim Brigade. It's just as we saw

25 in that previous document, isn't it? With Zmajevac was taken. I would

Page 29577

1 like to draw your attention to two salient details in this document if

2 you look at paragraph 1 this is the second to last one not the last there

3 is an attack on Zmajevac facility then if you go to paragraph 3, the last

4 line, "Readiness for attack at 0500 hours on the 18th of April." This is

5 entirely consistent with the report that we looked at. The Vinko Baresic

6 report the commander of the HVO brigade. Is it consistent with your

7 information at the time?

8 A. Yes, it's perfectly consistent with my information at the time.

9 Q. Now for another document a very interesting one this is 2D 01405,

10 this is a BH army document specifically the 3rd Corps. It bears the same

11 date as the previous document, the 17th of April. The latter half of the

12 document reads, the Bosnian Archbishop Monseigneur Vinko Puljic will be

13 visiting the Zenica area over the next few days.

14 Now the commander of the 3rd corps under Hadzihasanovic, if you

15 go to paragraph 2 which is the following order, as part of this visit and

16 generally speaking, any arrests of Croats shall be banned. No buildings

17 or facilities shall be set fire to and no persons shall be mistreated.

18 Mr. Akmadzic, the document speaks for itself doesn't it. It says

19 as part of this visit but also generally speaking. Did you know anything

20 about any further arrests, about the arrests continuing, the burnings

21 continuing or the lootings continuing in Zenica continuing in the Zenica

22 area?

23 A. Yes I knew about that, but one must say that it is perfectly

24 normal to put a stop to something like this during this visit by Cardinal

25 Vinko Puljic given that Cardinal Vinko Puljic was held in very high

Page 29578

1 esteem both as a religious figure and as a citizen, a human being, if you

2 like. It was certainly not their intention to allow him to see anything

3 like that going on or indeed as a result to make anything like that

4 public.

5 Q. I will be showing you some things later on during my

6 cross-examination. We will be looking at army documents and we will see

7 what exactly was going on, but let us try to wrap this topic about the

8 attack on Central Bosnia at the time. I'm talking about the 17th of

9 April. Just for the benefit of the transcript. And this ties in with

10 your statement as you said. Fine. This ties in with your statement on

11 the 21st of April, the last document. This is 2D 01404, this is another

12 order by the 3rd corps command. That reads one carry out reconnaissance

13 along the Travnik-Vijenica-Stojkovici Axis the objective being to take

14 that axis particularly the HVO storage facilities there. Is this

15 consistent with what you were telling us about the plan and the attack in

16 April 1993, the attack against the HVO and against Travnik? As we see

17 it?

18 A. Yes but this was happening, and I think I talked about this

19 before. This is just a detail, a small thing in the general framework of

20 all the attacks going on.

21 Q. Thank you. Thank you very much for this answer. We'll go on

22 about this but we care about all these details because these details we

23 can use as a later stage to put together the overall puzzle?

24 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Your Honours,

25 maybe this would be a good time to take the break.

Page 29579

1 MR. SCOTT: I'm again going to object to this manner of

2 proceeding, and I ask the Chamber to look at counsel's statements just

3 now. All these details will be helpful we'll be using those in the

4 future. The witness hasn't gone through and confirmed all these details,

5 document are being put in front of this witness. We don't know if he's

6 ever seen them before today or not and there's some pretense that he's

7 confirming everything in the documents about any knowledge about any

8 indication of the foundation for that, which facts he's affirming, which

9 ones he don't; and on several occasions, the witness to his credit, I

10 want to be fair about this, to his credit has said "I really don't know

11 about that." But we just showing him more documents. The Chamber cannot

12 go away with this evidence with all due respect in our submission and has

13 any idea what the witness has either confirmed or not confirmed every

14 detail in a multi-paged document cannot be done, Your Honour.

15 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours. Your Honours.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, if I understood

17 properly but I may be wrong, the Defence has just shown you a series of

18 military documents from the 3rd Corps. These documents establish that

19 there was a large-scale operation in April launched by the 3rd Corps and

20 it can be seen that the HVO members were arrested for instance in Zenica,

21 Mr. Totic was also taken prisoner.

22 I was under the impression that you were asked firstly whether

23 you were aware of all this and whether the situation matched what you

24 said during examination in chief as to actions by ABiH troops encouraged

25 by Izetbegovic. Did I understand properly or not because the Prosecutor

Page 29580

1 is telling us that all these documents are not known to you so please

2 answer.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I confirm these

4 documents as such. My observation was about some of the details. There

5 were many more elements which up to now have not been mentioned. There

6 were other orders, there were other attacks in other towns as well. As

7 far as I can tell, this is all about Zenica and Zenica's surroundings,

8 however there were attacks being launched elsewhere as well. There's

9 another thing that I would like to add. I don't know, maybe this wasn't

10 Izetbegovic's order but it was certainly parted of his policy. And maybe

11 there was an order in terms of this being the supreme command. He

12 himself was not there in the area, and he couldn't issue any orders

13 there.

14 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may. Mr. Scott

15 needn't worry we have the transcript, we can see clearly what the witness

16 confirmed and what he denied. I think I built up a foundation for this.

17 I asked him what he knew about what was going on in Central Bosnia. He

18 said he was familiar and then he went on to describe what was going on

19 and then I started using these documents but I think the transcript is

20 there for everybody to see exactly what is going on and then the

21 transcript will show the Trial Chamber exactly what the witness said,

22 what he confirmed and what he denied.

23 Thank you very much.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to have a 20-minute

25 break now.

Page 29581

1 --- Recess taken at 5.30 p.m.

2 --- On resuming at 5.53 p.m.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

4 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. To begin

5 with, I would like to apologise to all of our interpreters and

6 particularly to the French booth because I was cautioned. They say I was

7 speaking too fast towards the end. I will try to slow down now to ensure

8 a quality interpretation.

9 Q. Witness, so far we've been talking about April 1993. I would

10 like to move on to June 1993. Can you please look at 1D [as interpreted]

11 01406. I will show you portions of this document and after that my

12 questions will be about the relations between the BH army and the

13 Presidency, about the negotiations that were in progress at the time.

14 This is a proclamation, a letter by the 3rd Corps Command, the date is

15 the 9th of June.

16 The second paragraph of this document reads, "The last talks

17 between powerful players in Europe and the world were dictating the terms

18 that we were to live with on our doorstep." This is 2D 1406. There

19 appears to be an error in the transcript.

20 The 3rd Corps released this declaration. We must face the truth,

21 it reads, "We are left to our own devices. We have to turn to our own

22 people." It calls on the citizens to unite and use everything that they

23 had to defend the sovereignty, independence, integrity of the freedom of

24 Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a public call on the citizens. It is

25 about gathering any weapons that the citizens had in their possession,

Page 29582

1 the deadline given here is the 30th of June, and it also talks about the

2 sanctions that will be imposed unless this is done.

3 They are talking about the area under the command of the 3rd

4 Corps.

5 Mr. Akmadzic, this is something that we have discussed here and

6 this is something that you raised in chief. At the time, negotiations

7 were in progress. On the 18th of May, the Medjugorje Agreement was

8 reached. Likewise you were shown a letter by Mr. Prlic dated December

9 1992. This is document 1D 01945. In this letter, Mr. Prlic talks about

10 certain actions taken by Mr. Halilovic that were contrary to what had

11 been agreed on the political level.

12 My question is this: Is there anything you can tell us about how

13 the BH army acted throughout these negotiations surrounding the

14 Vance-Owen Plan, the negotiations that were referred to at the time. Is

15 it true that they were adamant that the military operations should go

16 ahead? And can you please explain the one thing that you said?

17 Mr. Izetbegovic apparently told you in relation to his third term of

18 office that he was willing to step down but the army, he said, wouldn't

19 allow him.

20 Can you tell us more about the BH army as a factor in those

21 negotiations. Can you tell us about its power which apparently was a

22 significant factor affecting the failure to accept the Vance-Owen Plan

23 which is what was being discussed at the time.

24 A. Thank you. First of all, you referred to Mr. Sefer Halilovic.

25 At one point in time, he clashed with Mr. Izetbegovic. Another thing

Page 29583

1 that I wish to point out is this: At Presidency meetings, he would

2 sometimes take the floor and say the army wants this, the army wants

3 that. About this proclamation, he would probably have labelled it a

4 pamphlet, and no more than that. But it was the same situation as I had

5 previously faced in Sarajevo. They broke into my garage, they prowled

6 around my house, they were looking for something that they could take

7 from you. They were seizing your vehicles. None of this with any sort

8 of prior approval from the Supreme Command.

9 Along these lines, I could say that the BH army, regardless of

10 the political circumstances in the Presidency itself harboured some views

11 that were more extreme.

12 Q. But if we tried to establish a link between this and

13 Mr. Izetbegovic's statement that he would not have accepted the third

14 term of office, that was not envisaged in the rules of procedure but that

15 the army did not allow him to step down, would that mean that he in fact

16 complied with the positions taken by the BH army?

17 A. Well, I didn't --

18 MR. SCOTT: Objection. It sounds like a leading question to me.

19 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I will rephrase the question.

20 Q. Sir, could you --

21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I just give a technical information.

22 Witness, now in contrast to what happened most of the previous

23 days, you are questioned in your own language and you have the natural

24 tendency immediately to answer when you've understood the question.

25 Please bear in mind that we understand the question considerably later

Page 29584

1 because we wait for the interpretation and have a pause before you start

2 speaking. Otherwise it becomes too difficult for the interpreters.

3 Thank you very much.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much for this

5 caution.

6 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour but when

7 Mr. Scott rose to his feet, I tried to rephrase my question but this is

8 cross-examination, so I don't know why this objection was raised about

9 the leading nature of the question. But let me rephrase it.

10 Q. Mr. Izetbegovic's statement that he would have stepped down had

11 it not been for the army that did not allow him to do so, what was the

12 relationship between the army and Mr. Izetbegovic then? Could you please

13 answer that question? Because the army is in fact a political factor

14 here. Could you tell us something about that?

15 A. Well, I started giving my answer, and my answer will be the same.

16 I did not ask Mr. Izetbegovic what it meant. I did not ask him, and I

17 cannot confirm that he was under any pressure from the army. But I can

18 assume that in a way, the army leadership primarily Mr. Halilovic did

19 tell him, President, do not let this post of the president out your

20 hands.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, the question raised by

22 Ms. Nozica is most interesting because this is one of the first times

23 that we seem to deal with this topic, namely that apparently between

24 Izetbegovic and the army as represented by Halilovic, there would seem to

25 be some kind of dissent. And when I heard the question, I sort of put

Page 29585

1 myself back in January 1993 in Geneva when there were talks and

2 discussions and unless I'm mistaken, I believe that Mr. Halilovic and

3 Petkovic took part in talks with the international community.

4 Could it be that Mr. Halilovic, when he was in Geneva, signed

5 documents, took part in international negotiations, had not been given a

6 clear and precise mandate from Mr. Izetbegovic so that in his back or in

7 a parallel way or contrary would have his own game, could it be that

8 whilst I remind -- recall that you were at some point in time prime

9 minister so I suppose as such you had a word to say in some aspects

10 related to defence.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. When we're dealing with this

12 time after the 20th of December, 1992 when the term of office expired for

13 President Izetbegovic, at that time, the relationship between the

14 president and General Halilovic and indeed the relationship between the

15 Presidency and General Halilovic was not controversial. It became a

16 problem later on in the course of the war and this is something that he

17 spoke about, something that he speaks about now.

18 In January 1993 in Geneva, General Halilovic negotiated and

19 signed agreements with the approval of the president because the

20 president never challenged this in any way and never made any indications

21 to that effect. It is my personal opinion that when we're talking about

22 the president's term of office, this was not any pressure from the army

23 properly speaking, it was a proposal, a request, perhaps, that

24 Mr. Izetbegovic blow up a little bit as he explained to me why he wanted

25 to remain in that post.

Page 29586

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Nozica.

2 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

3 Q. So if we take what you said now as our starting point, this may

4 have been just an attempt of Mr. Izetbegovic to justify himself. But let

5 us move on to the events in Central Bosnia. I said at the beginning of

6 this topic that we are talking about the beginning of June. You were

7 asked questions by Mr. Karnavas, negotiations are ongoing in Geneva, an

8 agreement was signed in Medjugorje on the 18th of May, and some

9 modalities are being sought for the internal structuring the Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina; and regardless of that, is it your knowledge that the army

11 of Bosnia and Herzegovina continued its attacks in this period, it

12 continued attacking Vitez, Travnik and other areas in Central Bosnia and

13 how does this fit in with this whole situation where on the one hand they

14 are negotiating and on the other hand they are pursuing military

15 activities attacking certain towns?

16 A. I would like to stress here that the months of June and July were

17 very tense months in terms of what we were doing at the time. The

18 Vance-Owen Plan was not accepted. It was not being implemented. The BH

19 Presidency met in the country and abroad. There is a great deal of

20 discord among us. We were not in agreement about all of the issues

21 pertaining to the future of our country and the structuring of our

22 country, and I can only assume that this state of affairs was reflected

23 on the armed forces too, it had an impact on them too, and the situation

24 was very serious as it was.

25 Q. My question was: Do you have any information about attacks

Page 29587

1 launched by the BH army in early, let's say, early June in the areas that

2 I indicated, the Lasva Valley, Travnik and so on. Did you have any

3 information about that and so on?

4 A. Yes. Yes.

5 Q. Could we now please turn to document ...

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, Witness. You

7 didn't quite answer the very interesting question by Ms. Nozica. You did

8 answer, however -- I'm not quite satisfied with your answer. I'm going

9 to tell you why. She told you that in June there were military actions

10 in Vitez, in Travnik, and in Central Bosnia, and Ms. Nozica asked you how

11 such military actions could take place whilst there were peace

12 negotiations going on. It is a very well-put question indeed and

13 everybody is waiting for your answer because there seems to be a

14 contradiction, does there not? Everybody negotiating for peace,

15 everybody is gathering for that purpose and applauding the effort and at

16 the same time, there are military conflicts.

17 You were one of the main players. Therefore, it would be

18 interesting to know your view, to try and understand -- I mean -- because

19 we were not there at the time, and we are trying to understand how there

20 could be at the same time negotiations and an offensive in Central Bosnia

21 because that cannot be denied, there was an offensive by the ABiH that

22 is -- that went on into July, nearly until November.

23 Can you answer? If you can't, just say so.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Up until November -- I can give you

25 a broader answer. When we are talking about this time period, Your

Page 29588

1 Honours, I said that in my opinion, this discord and tension in the BH

2 Presidency as the Supreme Commander had an impact on the BH army ranks

3 where there was also tension. The uncertain outcome of the political

4 negotiations because at this time, we didn't have the Vance-Owen Plan and

5 the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan was not yet being drafted and this conflict was

6 put in motion so that whoever takes more territory will have an advantage

7 in the negotiations.

8 I think that this is the key element. How to capture as much

9 territory as possible in order to have stronger arguments. So it's the

10 argument of force instead of the force of argument.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe you have now

12 answered. So you tried to get more, capture more territory to be in a

13 better position at the negotiating table. Is that what you said?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. That's right.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Last question, a very brief

16 one. Given the situation, the Croats who globally were in agreement with

17 the plan that was being created, the Vance-Owen Plan and later on, since

18 you were on that track, at your level, why did you not speak to the

19 international community to say: We agree with you 100 per cent but stop

20 the others because they are the problem. Was anything done in that

21 direction?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I said this myself on

23 a number of occasions, particularly when it came to the Vance-Owen Plan.

24 Lord Owen himself replied saying: Mile, I'll say in this English. [In

25 English] The Vance-Owen Plan is dead. [Interpretation] Yes. In this

Page 29589

1 sense, and in negotiations that followed about other plans, we accepted

2 everything because 17.5 per cent of the population, regardless of the

3 equal status accorded to this population in the negotiations, is too

4 little to try and persuade the 80 per cent of the population to look at

5 things our way.

6 In addition to the Croat-Muslim relations there was always the

7 third partying, the aggressor party as we called it that had a huge

8 territory under its control, the control of its armed forces -- I'm not

9 going to go into figures now but I think at one point it was 70 per cent

10 of the territory and in these international negotiations we referred to

11 this situation as the fait accomplis. This was the strongest argument in

12 the negotiations, unfortunately, or at least that's how it seemed to us.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for this answer.

14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Just really brief and the answer too. Could you

15 date the moment when Lord Owen told you that the Vance-Owen Plan was

16 dead?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I can't give you the

18 date, but I think it was this time period that we're talking about. I

19 think it was in July.

20 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

21 Q. Let us go back to June and I think that we did lay a foundation

22 for this series of questions about military developments so let us look

23 very briefly at some military documents. The next document is 2D 1407.

24 Could you please just tell me when you found it?

25 A. I found it.

Page 29590

1 Q. Well this is a document signed by Tihomir Blaskic. The date is

2 the 9th of June, 1993 so it's the same date, the date when the 3rd Corps

3 issued the proclamation. Very briefly I would like to point your

4 attention to the first part, the Muslim forces and the Mujahedin have

5 carried out an open aggression against the Croat areas in the Lasva

6 region.

7 In this attack, a brigade and some local Mujahedin units were

8 Travnik and Rostovo and elements from the 7th Brigade are taking part.

9 This MOS and Mujahedin attack destroyed and expelled the Croats from the

10 Travnik municipality, but they were not happy with that, they launched a

11 fierce attack on -- in the direction of Zenica, on Guca Gora, and 39

12 Croat villages were emptied out, thousands of Croats, because of the

13 serious situation that the Travnik Brigade faces and in order to protect

14 the lives of civilians, the women and children, we had to evacuate the

15 Croatian civilians.

16 Mr. Akmadzic, in this period, quite a few Croats left this area.

17 Could you please tell me, to your knowledge, was this the result of

18 military operations such as this one launched in June and July as

19 specified yourself?

20 A. I'm not certain how my testimony will evolve from here. Am I to

21 address just this period in time or also what happened later?

22 Regardless, let me say that Central Bosnia, the Bosna River Valley, the

23 Lasva Valley and the Vrbas Valley meant this: Whoever held sway over

24 Central Bosnia which, as I said before is Bosnia's very heart, and nearby

25 there is a stone with the inscription that says the centre of Yugoslavia

Page 29591

1 and militarily, politically and strategically speaking, this was a very

2 important place. For this reason, the focus of the BH army and any units

3 attached to it, and also because of the factories that I mentioned, the

4 Muslim side wanted to take control of this.

5 We've been mentioning some towns, but we have not yet mentioned

6 Fojnica, Kakanj or Vares which saw a lot of the population leave. In

7 Fojnica, there is a monastery which is to all practical intents the

8 keeper of the memory of the Bosnia -- of olden times two friars were

9 killed there, friars at this time and friars in times long gone had a

10 good relationship with both the state and the Muslim side.

11 What I see, what I'm looking at causes me no surprise because

12 these are the holiest things to all Croats in Bosnia, churches and

13 monasteries. What the Croats hold dearest. These were virtually

14 destroyed. I can't vouch for this because I didn't go there myself, I

15 didn't see this for myself, but one thing I do know is that at various

16 points they all came under attack.

17 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, you said the Croat population moved. I remember

18 that. But we need to be more specific about that. When you say the

19 population moved, what does that mean in the context of the times and

20 then can we briefly look at 2D 00902. I suppose you've got that in front

21 of you?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. This is roughly the same time, the 11th June 1993. This is a

24 public statement again signed by Mr. Blaskic and it reads:

25 "Today, there is a disaster in progress among the peoples of

Page 29592

1 Central Bosnia, Croat towns and villages. Over 30.000 refugees and

2 homeless persons are looking for refuge in Novi Travnik, Vitez and

3 Busovaca in a bid to escape the soulless Muslim fighters. The Croats are

4 henned in, waiting to be shot. The White Lilies are shelling and ruining

5 our towns. Only last night their -- Vitez was shelled and eight children

6 died as a result.

7 You spoke about the attack on Vitez. Isn't that what this

8 document shows?

9 A. Yes that's precisely what the document shows but the disaster

10 that was yet to follow was even worse than the one you've just described

11 as the year was nearing its end. We have not yet addressed Vares, Buhine

12 Kuce, Krezancevo Celo, the worst was yet to come.

13 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, I will have to ask you to tell us what you know

14 about this. I believe we have that much time left. It would be quite

15 precious to us. Let us try to round this off because all these topics

16 are very important for us. Can we please now look at two army documents

17 that date back to this period. We have been telling the Chamber a little

18 bit what was going on in Kakanj and Bugojno but now let's move on to two

19 army documents describing the position of the Croats in the area at the

20 time. The next document is 2D 00438, 438.

21 This is a document of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

22 Supreme Command Staff Forward Command Post, information on civilians

23 being exchanged in the Travnik area submitted to the supreme command

24 staff in Sarajevo and also to the attention of the president of the

25 Presidency.

Page 29593

1 Commission members signing this document, I will be showing you

2 some parts of the document that are very important. The commission for

3 releasing prisoners based on an agreement signed on the 6th of October

4 1993 today visited the village of Skradno Busovaca municipality and the

5 village of Mehurici Travnik municipality. The following was ascertained:

6 In the village of Skradno, there were 45 local refugees and 90

7 refugees from Velika Bukovica, these are Muslim refugees. It is not

8 unimportant because we know that there were Muslim refugees as well but

9 let me take you to paragraph 2.

10 In the village of may Mehurici we found 247 Croat civilians who

11 were put up in a school gym. They are under the protection of the

12 military police of the 306th Brigade but they are receiving death threats

13 from the so-called Brigade of Death mostly consisting of Mujahedin

14 foreigners based nearby.

15 Mr. Salko Beba from Operation Group West, who was escorting us

16 told us that the day before we arrived, these Mujahedin shot about 50

17 civilians in a nearby village. A single civilian survived. The

18 execution is now among those 47 -- 247 civilians at Mehurici and then it

19 goes on to say that one of members of the 36th brigade in Mehurici told

20 them that the Mujahedin were also mistreating the local Muslims.

21 The next paragraph reads, we are of the opinion that the

22 Mujahedin problem makes the already complex relations between the Muslims

23 and the Croats even more complex in the area of responsibility of the 3rd

24 corps. The president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and

25 Herzegovina along with the commander of the BH army should go to Zenica

Page 29594

1 or should have the 3rd Corps commander over to Sarajevo for urgent

2 consultations in order to deal with these problems.

3 The last paragraph reads, between Mr. Salko Beba,

4 Mr. Petar Skopljak, the representatives of the HVO, there was an

5 agreement that the next day of the 14th of June there should be an

6 exchange of civilians between the village of Skradno and civilians from

7 the village of Mehurici. We are conscious that this is a textbook case

8 of ethnic cleansing, but we are unable to provide any other sort of

9 protection for these civilians in order to keep them from annihilation.

10 We, the members of this commission, agree that this exchange should take

11 place.

12 This is a document that -- where the BH army is telling us what

13 is going on. The date is the 23rd of June. Please let's not comment on

14 this because the next document I have is a mere continuation of this

15 document. The document that I am talking about is 2D 686 and then I will

16 be asking a couple of questions about this.

17 Can you tell me first and this is something I've been mentioning

18 a lot in courtroom, and it would be good for the benefit of the Chamber

19 but for you to tell us. You know who Stjepan Siber was, don't you?

20 A. Of course I do. The same as Jovan Divjak.

21 Q. The 25th of June 1993, in this document, he claims he is the

22 deputy commander and that's the capacity in which he signed this

23 document, right?

24 A. Yes, Divjak and he were both, and I'm not certain about this,

25 assistants or deputies. I'm not sure what it was that was called at the

Page 29595

1 time but they were the -- some of the top men in the army.

2 Q. This document was obviously put together by him and he delivers

3 this document a mere two days later following this document by the

4 exchange commission, he submits this to the president and to the

5 commander of the Supreme Command staff of the BH army personally at least

6 that's what it says, personally as well. He refers to a 15th of June

7 document, he says, "I remain adamant about your visit to Zenica."

8 The document is -- I'm sorry, my colleague is drawing my

9 attention to this, I know that everybody's got this, but the number is 2D

10 002686.

11 If you look at paragraph 2, this is an integral report and I will

12 be quoting some things that I believe are important. Paragraph 2, the

13 26th of May, the president of the municipal authorities Dzaferovic Ramiz

14 faced Siber Kraic and Vranj, and he says as a citizen, I feel I've been

15 let down by the 3rd corps and the top leadership of the 3rd Corps is

16 heavily involved in a crime and robbery. There are some people there who

17 are executing other people after acts of robbery and then let's move on

18 to paragraph 3.

19 Merdan is the main organizer of the religious units known as

20 Suvalic and Puric's the 7th Muslim Brigade. Then we skip another one,

21 another line I think this is the most important thing, and then I think

22 you spoke about this it reads, holding sway over Zenica and the 3rd corps

23 our commanders who are steeped in crime. They don't want to be the

24 Chetniks because they do not derive any benefit from that situation. At

25 the same time, clashes with the HVO are very much in their best interest.

Page 29596

1 I'm skipping to the next page in Croatian. On the 8th of June

2 1993, 35 Croats were shot in the village of Bikosi. Four witnesses were

3 wounded and remained alive. They were shot by the Mujahedin.

4 On the 10th of June 1993, over 30 Croats were shot in the village

5 of Susanj near Ovnak by some army.

6 On the 22nd June 1992 [as interpreted], members of the commission

7 for the release of prisoners, Alihodzic and Negovetic spoke to Salko Beba

8 from OG West only to find out the following then he goes on to describe

9 something and we've been reading that about in the previous documents.

10 I'm not going to repeat that now. He goes on to say everything that

11 we've read already about the shootings and the capture of Croat

12 civilians. Then he goes on and says we would like to emphasise the

13 commander this crime and robbery are our rife. Fighters coming back from

14 further afield are bringing their bags back full and as soon as they see

15 that there is nothing to rob, loot, or take in an area they refuse to go

16 there. The military police of the 36th brigade goes on to say the police

17 from some of the brigades continue to arrest civilians and they beat them

18 up in cellars all over the place. These security service is not

19 cooperating at all which is something that Mr. Ganic could see for

20 himself when he met with the 3rd Corps on the 15th of May 1993.

21 The 22nd of June, 1992, it should be the 22nd of June 1993,

22 that's correct and the page is 88, line 4.

23 Sir?

24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If I may just add, you gave a number which I

25 think is not the right number. The right number is 2D 00686. You have

Page 29597

1 added a 2 which is not part of this.

2 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honours.

3 I don't think I did. It must have been an error in the transcript. It's

4 2D 00686.

5 Q. Mr. Akmadzic, first let me ask you this generally speaking, these

6 are BH army documents. Were you familiar with this situation that was in

7 progress in the area, the offences committing against the Croats. How

8 informed about this were you?

9 A. This type of information was available to us at the time, it was

10 available to me personally. I can say that the BH army was predominantly

11 made up of Muslims. There were soldiers there from various parts of the

12 former Yugoslavia and from abroad as well. I don't know if I said this

13 but I might as well say this, both Mr. Ganic and Mr. Halilovic are from

14 Sandzak. We call them Sandzaklija, the Sandzak people. There were some

15 from Montenegro. There were some who perhaps weren't aware of how

16 sensitive the relations between the various ethnicities over where I come

17 from were and here I'm referring primarily to the Mujahedin. The

18 criminal offences described here don't as a matter of fact reflect what I

19 heard was going on at the time.

20 Q. I'm sorry, I'm sorry.

21 A. People were subjected to the worst imaginable kind of torture and

22 killed.

23 Q. Just for the sake of the transcript and in order to avoid further

24 interventions you are saying does not quite reflect everything but I want

25 to know if you know --

Page 29598

1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note could the speakers please be

2 asked to speak one at a time. Thank you.

3 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

4 Q. What about these events reflected in these two documents? Were

5 you aware of these events?

6 A. Indeed, I was.

7 Q. Let me now return to a term that you used. You talked about the

8 Croats leaving the area at the time. We have to be very specific about

9 this?

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would like to ask you a

11 follow-up question based on the previous two documents.

12 Witness, we have just seen two documents. I knew about those

13 documents. One of those documents is addressed to the Supreme Command of

14 the army in Sarajevo and to the president of the Presidency. I'm talking

15 about document 2D 438. The second document is 2D 686, it is also

16 addressed to the same people. Those documents clearly show that members

17 of the ABiH army talk about misdeeds committed by the ABiH which shows

18 that the situation is very complicated, indeed. 2D 686 which was drafted

19 by Siber mentions problems. The other document which was also drafted by

20 Ivan Negovetic and Fadil Alihodzic mentions the situation in Mehurici.

21 You stated that you were aware of the situation but from where you stood,

22 did you know that within the command of the ABiH, maybe not everybody

23 agreed. There was no unity. Some people seemed to challenge certain

24 actions so did you know about those discords within the army?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I cannot be a reliable

Page 29599

1 witness on this but on the basis of the documents and the knowledge that

2 we had, we in the Presidency -- we can conclude that there was some

3 discord. That means that from the -- that it would depend on the

4 leadership of that specific brigade or corps how they would act.

5 I told you yesterday, Your Honours, that it seems to me that the

6 3rd Corps was the most extremist one and that it committed the worst

7 crimes against Croats, and I believe that this is the corps that is

8 referred to here. So in the army leadership in Sarajevo, these

9 developments could be observed, and I myself spoke at the Presidency

10 meetings. I said, "If you're on the top of a hill, you can push a stone,

11 make it roll down the hill but you cannot control it anymore once you do

12 that." I think that some of the BH army units were no longer under

13 control, what little control there was.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is your answer, so

15 according to you, some ABiH elements escaped control including control by

16 the Presidency; is that what you're saying?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's my assumption or rather

18 this is my assessment not my assumption.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Nozica. Sorry for

20 interrupting you, but I wanted to talk about those two documents before

21 we move to something else.

22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Questions were of assistance I'm not

23 quite finished with those two documents.

24 Q. As a follow-up to the question by His Honour Judge Antonetti who

25 asked but members of the BH army I would like us to go back to the

Page 29600

1 civilians, Croats, people living in that area. Are they moving out,

2 fleeing, or are they being evicted from that area regardless of who is

3 actually doing that? Either members of the BH army who are under the

4 control of the BH army or some other uncontrolled elements. The reason

5 why I am going back to this is because you say that the Croat people

6 moved out of this area so could you please be more specific?

7 A. The Croat people from Central Bosnia --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to repeat his

9 answer, it was not quite clear to the interpreters.

10 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

11 Q. The question is why did they move out?

12 A. They moved out under the pressure and because of the threat of

13 the BH army and other Muslim forces that are mentioned here.

14 Q. Could you please go on? I just wanted to clear this up and could

15 you please continue now.

16 A. So some people moved out to Herzegovina. Others move out again

17 under the same pressure to other places where the war was not so

18 prevalent at that time so for instance they moved to Kiseljak from Kakanj

19 they moved through Kraljeva Sutjeska to Vares and then again they moved

20 out of Vares to Herzegovina. My brother lived in Vares with his family.

21 My wife, in fact, is from Vares, but she did not live in Vares at that

22 time.

23 My brother moved out of Vares and moved to Herzegovina. Grave

24 crimes were committed there and huge masses of population, I cannot give

25 you the exact figures now, but we're talking about tens of thousands of

Page 29601

1 people moving out. They moved out under the pressure engendered by the

2 war.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Akmadzic for being so specific. This is what I

4 sought.

5 Now I would like to move on to another topic. I will try to deal

6 with it by 7.00 but I will be guided by the Trial Chamber. If I don't

7 finish it by 7.00 I can either go on until I finish it or do it tomorrow.

8 In early 1993, Mr. Akmadzic, you were the prime minister of the

9 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Now we will be dealing with the

10 topic of arming of the BH army and the HVO the way they procured the arms

11 at that time and before that time and even after that time period. Could

12 you please tell me in the BH government, was there an agreement about how

13 weapons that had been procured or produced, manufactured in Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina were to be distributed?

15 A. I have to tell the Trial Chamber at this point that right at the

16 beginning of the war, there was an agreement about humanitarian aid

17 during the war, that humanitarian aid should be divided in three parts.

18 During the war, first the -- in fact, the armed conflict in Central

19 Bosnia broke out because of this shortage of weapons because nobody had

20 enough weapons and the embargo, the arms embargo was in place. In such

21 circumstances, there was an agreement in place. My late deputy confirmed

22 this agreement, Hakija Turajlic because he was in charge of economic

23 relations as I've already indicated. The agreement was to divide the

24 weapons as follows: 50 per cent to the HVO and 50 per cent to the BH

25 army, whenever we could obtain some weapons.

Page 29602

1 Q. Let me show you, well it will be very easy to go through this

2 document that I have already exhibited, that's 2D 147. In fact, your

3 name is mentioned here. Could you please let me know when you found it?

4 A. Yes, I found it.

5 Q. This is a document from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

6 the army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 4th Corps

7 Command the date is the 17th of February 1993 and the topic is the

8 manufacture of ammunition and the delivery of this ammunition from

9 Igman Konjic factory -- Igman factory in Konjic, who it was delivered to

10 and so on. For the most part to the 4th Corps or rather all of it was

11 delivered to the 4th corps and to individual brigades.

12 Item 2 on page 2 this is where you are mentioned. Checking with

13 Dzevad Hadjihuseinovic I ascertained that he has a memo from the BH

14 government dated the 31st of January 1993. It does not have a reference

15 number. It is not signed by Mile Akmadzic, but there is a stamp of the

16 BH government where it is indicated that an order issued to distribute

17 all the ammunition that is delivered and manufactured in the ratio of

18 50/50 between the BH army and the HVO, and it is indicated that this had

19 not been done; and it goes on to say having gone through the information

20 about the ammunition delivered in the period between the 1st of January

21 and the 12th of February 1993 you can see that this order was not

22 complied with and this also pertains to the period that Dzevad mentioned.

23 So do you remember this?

24 A. Well, I remember the agreement. I don't remember the order

25 because other people had to comply with the order, but we did have this

Page 29603

1 agreement in place and this gentleman, he's obviously referring to that,

2 to this agreement that the weapons and ammunition should be divided in

3 two equal parts. Obviously the armed forces that were dealing with that

4 did not comply with this agreement.

5 Q. So this agreement was in place, the date on this document is the

6 17th of February, 1993?

7 A. I have to adhere, I do apologise that we did not have a written

8 agreement to that effect. An agreement that we reached was valid even if

9 we didn't have a written contract or a written agreement. We considered

10 it to be in force.

11 Q. But to avoid any confusion, in this document, Mr. Dzevad says

12 that he received on the 31st of January, 1993 something that he refers to

13 as an order or rather having checked with Dzevad, I ascertained that he

14 has a memo from the government without your signature about this kind of

15 distribution?

16 A. Well, to make this clear, there is a memo and this memo is

17 accurate, but an agreement between the two sides, it's a completely

18 different thing. The memo is also an authentic thing.

19 Q. Well, this is sufficient for my purposes.

20 Could we please look at the next document in the binder 2D 228.

21 These documents are rather brief, and we'll deal with them briefly. This

22 is a document from the command of the 4th Corps, the date is -- the date

23 precedes the one from the previous document and you indicated that at

24 that time an agreement was in place. It is signed by Mr. Arif Pasalic

25 and in the first part he says, I order hereby that at all the checkpoints

Page 29604

1 controlled by the BH army and the military police, the checks of persons

2 and vehicles should be stepped up and also of any cargo being transported

3 and in relation to this, any attempts to transport weapons, mines or

4 explosives and personnel for the purposes of the HVO should be prevented.

5 Mr. Akmadzic, you saw this document?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. To your knowledge, how -- what's the amount of weapons and

8 ammunition that arrived and was delivered to the BH army? I'm not asking

9 you about the exact figures but how many weapons arrived, reached the BH

10 army through HVO-controlled territory?

11 A. The BH army could obtain weapons in one of the two ways: Weapons

12 were manufactured in defence industry plants in Central Bosnia and in

13 Igman Konjic Plant and the other source is weapons that had to be

14 transported through HVO-controlled territory.

15 Now as to the quantities of those weapons it is difficult for me

16 to say that, but all weapons that the BH army obtained was obtained in

17 these two ways.

18 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you very much Your Honours, I

19 have a very brief document that I want to go through, if we can go

20 through this.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, just a follow-up

22 question. For an external observer this situation seems paradoxical,

23 surprising, amazing. These documents were shown to other witnesses and

24 it seems that the BH army received weapons via the HVO. At the same

25 time, the BH army was engaged in military action against the HVO. So

Page 29605

1 what kind of explanation could you proffer about the situation which

2 seems really astonishing?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, there are situations

4 that were even more paradoxical, situations that I did not mention.

5 Well, the third source available to them was buying weapons from

6 Republika Srpska. There are so many paradoxical situations in this war

7 but the BH army and the HVO never ceased being partners. There was

8 always some kind of an agreement in place regardless of the fighting that

9 was going on. I myself attended a meeting or a conversation with

10 Mr. Boban.

11 At that time, I was not the prime minister, but Mr. Boban was

12 asked to deliver a certain quantity of weapons, and he promised that he

13 would do so in my presence. I didn't follow up on this, I can tell you

14 now who asked for it but I don't think this is relevant for the present

15 case. So in particular in the first stage of the fighting of the war

16 when the production plants were not running at full capacity and when the

17 technology was not there, the know-how was not there, most of the weapons

18 the BH army obtained it obtained through or from the HVO.

19 Mr. Izetbegovic himself told me that even the town of Sarajevo

20 which was under siege received certain quantities of weapons and since we

21 were on good terms, I asked him how, when it is impossible for a bird to

22 fly into the town itself, and he told me: Mile, it's possible to

23 transport weapons on horseback.

24 Now, whether there were some other channels such as for instance

25 bringing in weapons with the humanitarian relief supplies, well I cannot

Page 29606

1 testify about that because sanctions were in place, and I don't know

2 about that. But it is quite possible that there were such instances.

3 I'm talking about air transport.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We are forced to

5 stop now. Yesterday, we went extra time. So Witness, we will resume

6 tomorrow at quarter past 2.00. You probably understood that you will

7 probably have to be here on Monday since we're not able to finish with

8 the Defence questions.

9 Ms. Nozica, you have used up 1 hour and 11 minutes.

10 Tomorrow, the Defence will finish cross-examination and then the

11 Prosecution will start its cross-examination. So you will have to be

12 here until Monday afternoon, unfortunately. We could not do anything

13 about it.

14 We will resume tomorrow at quarter past 2.00. I wish you nice

15 evening.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.

17 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day of June,

18 2008 at 2.15 p.m.