1 Monday, 21 July 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon
8 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-74-T,
9 the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al. Thank you, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Today is the 21st of July, 2008. Good afternoon to the accused,
12 to the Defence counsel, to Mr. Scott and his associates, and to all the
13 people helping us.
14 First of all, I shall give the floor to the registrar for a few
15 IC numbers.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honour. Some parties have
17 submitted lists of documents to be tendered through Witness
18 Buntic, Zoran. The list submitted by 1D shall be given Exhibit number
19 IC 00827. The list submitted by 2D shall be given Exhibit number
20 IC 00828. The list submitted by 3D shall be given Exhibit number
21 IC 00829. The list submitted by 4D shall be given Exhibit number
22 IC 00830. The list submitted by 5D shall be given Exhibit number
23 IC 00831. And finally, the list submitted by the OTP shall be given
24 Exhibit number 00832. Thank you. Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar. You
1 wanted the floor, Mr. Scott.
2 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour, ever so briefly. Can we go into
3 private session for just a moment, please.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar.
5 [Private session]
24 [Open session]
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are back in open session.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] 4D is about to cross-examine.
2 You have 2 hours and 60 seconds. As you see, it's very exact indeed.
3 [The witness entered court]
4 WITNESS: MIOMIR ZUZUL [Resumed]
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, sir. You know that
9 the cross-examination is going to resume. Ms. Alaburic is the one among
10 the Defence counsel who is going to cross-examine you first. She is to
11 be followed by the Prosecutor for his own cross-examination.
12 You may proceed.
13 Oh, yes. Ms. Alaburic, my fellow Judge reminds me of this. If
14 you are to tackle new topics, you have to say so, and if you ask
15 questions that arise from the examination-in-chief, then it will be
16 credited as part of your cross-examination. If you tackle a new topic,
17 you have to say that ahead of time.
18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, good afternoon.
19 Good afternoon, Mr. Zuzul. Good afternoon to everyone in the courtroom.
20 Your Honour, I believe that all of my questions will in a certain
21 way be related to documents and topics that have been raised or shown
22 during direct examination, but if you still feel that I'm going beyond
23 the scope of direct examination, I will not be opposed to you treating
24 that time as the time allocated to the Defence of General Petkovic.
25 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic: [Continued]
1 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Zuzul, I believe you remember where we left
2 off, and I will continue according to the plan that I had made already in
3 May. Let me remind you of one question asked by His Honour
4 Judge Antonetti relating to documents of the United Nations. You were
5 asked if you could point out Resolution, a report of the
6 Secretary-General containing major errors. The question and answer are
7 on 27713 page of the transcript, and the next page, 27714.
8 You answered, Mr. Zuzul, that you had not observed any major
9 errors, but what you could hold against perhaps the international
10 community was their attempt to balance out the responsibilities. Do you
11 remember that?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. What kind of balancing out of responsibilities were you thinking
15 A. In more than one meeting that I personally had with
16 representatives of the international community I heard the response that
17 neither in Croatia
18 were they there to establish responsibility or to apportion blame. They
19 were there just to observe what was happening on the ground without
20 taking into account the broader picture, and that created the impression
21 that there was an attempt to artificially balance out the
22 responsibilities, because if you take into account that that part of the
23 territory of Croatia
24 you are trying to report only as of a certain moment without taking into
25 account what had happened before, the resulting picture is objectively
2 Q. Mr. Zuzul, tell me, were you relatively well informed about the
3 developments in Croatia
4 to assess whether a certain UN report does or does not contain errors?
5 A. I believe I was relatively well informed.
6 Q. Were you equally well informed of developments and events in
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
8 A. If we are talking about events on the ground in Bosnia and
11 negotiations on the former Yugoslavia
12 Q. I'd like to move on to another topic that concerns the transcript
13 that you discussed on the 7th of May with the Defence of Prlic, P 00131.
14 It's in the binder of Prlic Defence. I have to admit I don't know which
15 number of the binder because there were several.
16 I believe that you don't even need to see the document. I'll try
17 to remind you of certain portions of that transcript and then we could go
18 through them together.
19 It's a transcript from a meeting between President Tudjman and
20 the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia
21 Croatian army, and the military commanders held on the 4th of March,
22 1992, and in direct examination you spoke about it in the context of the
23 defence of southern Croatia
24 [as interpreted], Mr. Zuzul, as a psychologist in the IPD administration
25 of the Republic of Croatia
1 A. Yes. In the beginning of March 1992 that was my position.
2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, Ms. Alaburic. This reads in the
3 transcript you were represented as a psychologist. Did you mean you were
4 presented as a psychologist? The sentence does not really make sense,
5 I'm afraid.
6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I meant to say that he was
7 introduced as a psychologist. So everybody when starting to speak gave
8 their background first, and that's how Mr. Zuzul had introduced himself,
9 as a psychologist at the Ministry of Defence.
10 Q. This document is already exhibited in the case, and I believe it
11 contains some important positions that I would like you to explain,
12 Mr. Zuzul, as a participant in that discussion. At that meeting, it's on
13 page 46 of the English transcript, you pointed out the existence of two
14 categories of people. One category, former members of the Yugoslav
15 People's Army; and the second category, those who had never been in that
16 army. And then you tried to point out that in certain segments of the
17 Republic of Croatia
18 categories of people.
19 Do you remember giving that caution?
20 A. Yes, I do recall that.
21 Q. What I would like to know at this moment is the view of
22 President Tudjman. Tell us, did President Tudjman believe that anyone
23 who wanted to commit themselves to defence of the country, regardless of
24 whether they had previously been officers of the JNA, should be able to
25 find their place either in the army or in some other part of the war
2 A. Correct. I can testify from direct knowledge and direct
3 communication with President Tudjman that he indeed believed that,
4 because only two days after this contribution to the discussion I made
5 President Tudjman invited me for a talk. We discussed precisely this
6 subject and even -- and he even offered me a position in the Ministry of
8 Q. Could you help us understand another statement made by late
9 President Tudjman. On page 92 of the English transcript he said and I
10 will quote: "As I believe Professor Zuzul mentioned do not make any
11 political statements. And generally speaking, the army has no place in
12 the political arena."
13 Tell us, Mr. Zuzul, did President Tudjman really believe that the
14 army should concern themselves with the defence of the country rather
15 than being a political factor?
16 A. My opinion at the time was that President Tudjman held the view
17 that for the defence of the country and for the purposes of creating an
18 army it would be best if the army stayed out of politics as much as
20 Q. Another very important statement, in fact a three-page speech in
21 the English transcript, that's 103 through 105, I'll try to remind you.
22 On this occasion late President Tudjman said that the US has still not
23 recognised Croatia
24 viewed Croatia
1 factors, certain players like the HOS were still taking pictures with the
2 symbol "U" and the iconography of the independent State of Croatia, and
3 Tudjman said, I quote, "They are fascists. They are a continuation of
4 the independent State of Croatia." And he called upon all the commanders
5 of the Croatian army to firmly oppose that and to prevent any attempt of
6 any soldier to identify himself with any ideology that is similar or
7 identical to Fascist ideologies of World War II.
8 Do you think that Tudjman really supported a Fascist policy of
9 that previous state, the Independent State
10 A. In all my discussions with late President Tudjman, I only heard
11 anti-Fascist views from him. Generally speaking, it is well known that
12 late President Tudjman was an active fighter against Fascism, and to add
13 a personal note, it was indeed a subject that I discussed with him quite
14 often because my father had also been actively involved in the struggle
15 against Fascism. Not in Croatia
16 discussed it quite often. I was a young man then, and I was quite
17 interested in hearing his views and his thinking about it.
18 Q. Tell us, President Tudjman was Tito's general, as the phrase
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. Now, Mr. Zuzul, I'd appreciate it if you could try to comment on
22 certain statements and events related to Vance-Owen's Peace Plan and the
23 events in January 1993. You were familiar with the negotiations, and you
24 knew about the plans of the international community.
25 A. Around the 1st of February, 1993, that's true. I became the
1 ambassador of the Republic of Croatia
2 my job was to monitor the peace talks.
3 Q. In the course of those talks did you come to know
4 Mr. Herbert Okun?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. I will put to you some of his statements, and you will tell me
7 whether they are correct, accurate, or not.
8 So one statement goes like this: "Croats were full of
9 enthusiasm, not only about maps but the whole Vance-Owen Plan." It's on
10 transcript page 16752.
11 Tell us, Dr. Zuzul, this evaluation about the enthusiasm of
12 Croats, is that accurate in your view or not?
13 A. I believe he noted it accurately. I don't know if I, myself,
14 would use the term "enthusiasm," but I would say that the Croats,
15 generally speaking, readily accepted the Vance-Owen Plan.
16 Q. On the next page of the transcript Mr. Herbert Okun said: "The
17 Bosnian Croats signed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in January 1993 knowing
18 that Serbs, and to a lesser extent Muslims, would not accept the
20 To the best your knowledge did Croats really accept the
21 Vance-Owen Plan sincerely and completely, or they were reckoning that the
22 other side would not go through with it and it will be dead in the water
23 anyway, that it was just pure calculation on the Croat side?
24 A. It's much easier for me to talk about the positions, the official
25 positions, of Croatia
1 all seriousness accepted the Vance-Owen Plan, because we believed it was
2 conducive to a solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to a solution
3 to the problems in Croatia
4 still, and to a general diffusion of tensions.
5 As for my colleagues from Bosnia and Herzegovina, I had occasion
6 to talk with many of them at that time, although I did not represent them
7 officially, and it was my impression that they, too, were embracing the
8 plan sincerely.
9 Q. Could you now give us your comments on certain observations made
10 by Mr. Okun regarding maps? Mr. Okun told us the discussions on maps
11 were continuous and marked by dispute, constant dispute. Would that be
13 A. Rather.
14 Q. In my set of documents, I prepared P 9276. Those are maps.
15 Among others, maps of Banovina Croatia and certain provinces in
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the Vance-Owen Plan from January 1993.
17 The document has been exhibited.
18 Could you please open the documents marked "Banovina '39," and
19 another document, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 2nd January 1993. We will
20 not go into detail. Instead, I'd like to look at conclusions that can be
21 made at first blush.
22 If we look at these maps, Mr. Zuzul, can we agree that the
23 territory designated as part of the Banovina of 1939 in the territory of
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina is very similar to what the Croatian provinces
25 used to be in the Vance-Owen Plan of 1993?
1 A. I believe that's right. It's rather similar.
2 Q. Tell me, in addition to these two maps, did you see any other
3 maps during the negotiations which had marked as Croatian territory areas
4 smaller or larger than these?
5 A. During the negotiations numerous maps were shown. The territory
6 varied. It was on occasion larger, on occasion smaller than the one we
7 have here.
8 Q. If we tried to identify a common denominator of all these maps,
9 would we assert that all these maps had marked as Croatian territory
10 Western Herzegovina, that is the area around Tomislavgrad, Posusje,
11 Grude, Ljubuski, and so on. Around Tomislavgrad, Posusje, Ljubuski,
12 Grude, and so on. Let me not go into all the municipalities involved.
13 Then an area of Central Bosnia and a part of the Bosnian Posavina. In
14 other words, these three groups of territories or areas. Can we agree on
15 that, Mr. Zuzul?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. If we were to try to look at the ethnicity criterion and the
18 economic units and so on and so forth and try and identify the areas
19 where the Croats were in an absolute or relative majority, and if we came
20 up with a territory which made a more or less sensible area, would that
21 territory again include Western Herzegovina, parts of Central Bosnia, and
22 Bosnian Posavina?
23 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. Sorry to interrupt counsel,
24 but I am just concerned for the accuracy of the record and so that we all
25 know what we're talking about here. I can appreciate that counsel
1 doesn't want to necessarily go through all of the municipalities claimed
2 to comprise Herceg-Bosna, but there might in fact, and the Prosecution in
3 fact would take the position that there's another category of territory
4 that is neither Western Herzegovina nor Central Bosnia.
5 In looking at the map, if the Chamber has that available, the
6 Prosecution might agree in fact that when one uses the terminology
7 "Western Herzegovina
8 municipalities of Livno, Tomislavgrad, Posusje, Grude, Ljubuski. We
9 would not agree that Western Herzegovina, for example, includes
10 Jablanica, nor do we think Jablanica is part of Central Bosnia. So
11 therefore when certain questions are put to Mr. Zuzul which do not -- do
12 not fully set out the territory described, there is substantial area for
13 confusion or lack of clarity. So counsel might -- if she insists or
14 wants to know this material accurately, she may have to get a bit more
15 detail, I'm afraid.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.
17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I thank my learned
18 friend Mr. Scott on the comment. I must say that I'm not quite clear
19 with the gist of his objection. Let me just draw your attention that my
20 question to Mr. Zuzul did not relate to the area of Central Bosnia. I
21 spoke of the territories marked as Banovina in 1939 and the territories
22 marked as the Croatian provinces under the Vance-Owen Plan of
23 January 1993. In other words, I did not mention Herceg-Bosna in any way,
24 so that his remarks relating to Jablanica and other areas is -- are quite
25 unfounded, and it's not my intention to discuss the area of Herceg-Bosna
1 with Mr. Zuzul. I clearly expressed what I wanted to discuss about in my
2 question. I'm sure the witness answered the question -- or, rather, by
3 looking at the transcript, I can see that the witness did not in fact
4 answer my question, and I would like to ask the Trial Chamber to request
5 the witness to answer the question.
6 Let us forget for a moment that Herceg-Bosna ever existed. If
7 anyone in Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted to set up a third entity, the
8 so-called Croat entity based on economic criteria or the criteria of it
9 being an economic and regional entity and ethnic entity, would that
10 individual come up with a territory that includes Western Herzegovina,
11 parts of Central Bosnia, and parts of Bosnian Posavina?
12 A. What I can testify to is that based on my knowledge of the work
13 of the work group and the negotiating party is that they drew their maps
14 precisely based on the criteria you mentioned, namely, ethnic, economic,
15 and spatial or territorial criteria. At any rate, it was experts from
16 the international community who drew these maps rather than the local
17 players from the area, although I believe that the latter would have come
18 up with more or less the same maps.
19 Q. Thank you. Mr. Zuzul, can you now comment upon the possibility
20 of defining the States which arose from the former Yugoslavia. In your
21 binder you have document 4D 540. This document has been exhibited, and
22 this is the opinion of the Badinter Commission defining the conditions
23 based on which the republics of the former Yugoslavia could be recognised
24 as states. There is no need to read that. You'll remember that.
25 One of the criteria set out the following: That the republics of
1 the former Yugoslavia
2 republican borders.
3 First of all, Mr. Zuzul, were you aware of this view held by the
4 Badinter Commission?
5 A. Although the Badinter Commission advanced their conclusions
6 before I became actively involved in diplomatic work, I was fully aware
7 as a private citizen, and later on as a diplomat, of what they were
8 about. And if I can say, the vast majority of the citizens of the
9 Republic of Croatia
10 After all these years, I can only repeat that this was the only
11 proper decision, that is that the borders of the new states could only be
12 defined as the borders of the then republics.
13 Q. Let us look at the next document, 4D 00542. This is a document
14 of the Council of Ministers of the European Community, guidelines for the
15 recognition of the new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
16 The document dates from December 1991.
17 The last bullet on page 1 says: "Acknowledging the inviolability
18 of all borders that can be changed only through peaceful means and joint
20 Mr. Zuzul are you aware of this document issued by the Council of
21 Ministers of the European Community?
22 A. I am aware of this document. It was on the basis of this
23 document that Slovenia
24 Q. Tell us, was it a fact that the professional expert public at
25 large supported the idea that the new states arising from the former
2 A. By all means. Let me just say something that goes beyond the
3 scope of your question, but I was reminded of that by these documents.
4 On several occasions in the course of that process, in the course
5 of this trial, and I saw this in the indictment as well, that there was a
6 wish for Croatia
7 of the Croatian Banovina.
8 The document we have now on our screens proves the absurdity of
9 such a premise or such an aspiration. The Croatian Banovina did not
10 include important parts of the Republic of Croatia
11 of the most significant and most beautiful parts of Croatia; the town of
13 100.000 inhabitants. In other words, if someone offered the citizens of
15 territory where, roughly speaking, half a million of inhabitants live at
16 present, territory which is at any case an integral part of the
17 Republic of Croatia
18 either historically or territorially, be compared, I don't believe that
19 such an individual offering something like that would be taken in
21 Truth to tell, I am not aware of or I don't know a single serious
22 individual who, if offered the map of the Croatian Banovina and the map
23 of the current Republic of Croatia
24 for the former.
25 Q. Thank you. Thank you for your extensive answer, but you left out
1 Baranja which was also not part of the Croatian Banovina.
2 A. Yes, that's correct.
3 Q. Let's also look at another document which also has to do with the
4 same topic. This is 34428 [as interpreted]. It's also been exhibited.
5 This is an Official Note from the meeting with the -- with the French
6 delegation. This was compiled by General Anton Tus. Please turn to page
7 2. Let me repeat the number of the document. 3D, so it's the document
8 of the Defence for General Praljak, 3D 00482. Now we have the correct
10 At page 2 -- the document dates from January 1993, and the
11 meeting took place on the 13th of January.
12 At page 2 of the document, the words uttered by General Praljak
13 are conveyed. Let me quote that. "The Croats are committed to an
14 integral Bosnia-Herzegovina and to the rights of Croats. The problems
15 between Muslims and Croats in the BH are the result of different
16 objectives of the political struggles. Croats are fighting for state of
17 the BH with an autonomy for Croats whereas the Muslims are struggling for
18 a civic state. So it follows clearly from this that the Croats are also
19 struggling for state of the BH." Let's look at page 3, the end of the
20 penultimate paragraph where General Tus spoke. The Geneva conference
21 offers a solution for the BH on equal footing. The creation of a Serb
22 state in the BH would be an error that would not contribute to the
23 resolution of the Serbian issue in the Republic of Croatia
24 In connection with this document and in particular in relation to
25 the view or the premise expressed by General Tus, let me put the
1 following questions to you, Dr. Zuzul, as an individual who was on quite
2 close terms with President Tudjman, and you can base your testimony on
3 first-hand knowledge.
4 Did the Republic of Croatia
5 certain value which President Tudjman would not jeopardise under any
6 circumstances, to your knowledge?
7 A. Most certainly, yes. That is so.
8 Q. To your knowledge, was President Tudjman aware of the possibility
9 that by separating parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and forming and
10 independent state would call into question the very survival of the AVNOJ
11 republican borders as well as the issue of the survival of the
12 Republic of Croatia
13 development in Bosnia-Herzegovina also legitimise the right of the Serb
14 people in the Republic of Croatia
15 the territory that was under their occupation to be separated, to secede?
16 A. I believe that he was aware of that, and such a danger most
17 definitely existed. I will not go into a discussion about how far such a
18 view, if held by the Croatian Serbs, would have been legitimate.
19 However, the fact of the matter is that back in 1993 or 1994, the Serbs
20 in the so-called Krajina in Croatia
21 Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina had made formal decisions on the
22 issue, that is, to get united. This would most definitely place the
23 borders and even the very existence of the republic of Croatia
25 Q. Dr. Zuzul, in your opinion did late President Tudjman consider
1 the position of the international community serious, its position that it
2 would not allow for the borders of the republics of the former Yugoslavia
3 to be changed by force?
4 A. I do believe that he regarded it as serious and that he was
5 convinced that forcible change of borders would not be allowed. However,
6 oftentimes during international negotiations there was mention of the
7 possibility to change borders through peaceful means.
8 Q. Can you now clarify what you've just said, the fact that the
9 negotiations mentioned the change of borders through peaceful means?
10 Which particular borders of the Republic of Croatia
11 A. The only example I'm aware of where President Tudjman accepted to
12 engage in such talks was the possibility of swapping the territories in
13 the area of Neum in Bosnia-Herzegovina for certain parts of territories
14 in Croatia
15 Proposals for territories to be swapped was something that we
16 were -- we received on several occasions. For instance, I heard
17 repeatedly that Croatia
18 Eastern Slavonia
20 for the territory of the Bosnian Posavina, and I heard indirectly on two
21 occasions the Serb side proposing that that particular territory be
22 swapped for the occupied territory around Knin. In other words, we were
23 supposed to swap a piece of Croatian territory for another piece of
24 Croatian territory.
25 In a nutshell, not once did I observe President Tudjman agreeing
1 to such talks to begin with.
2 Q. Mr. Zuzul, can you now clarify the statement that you made about
3 the -- the part of the territory around Neum? Were these negotiations
4 which were supposed to result in the possibility for Bosnia-Herzegovina
5 to have a proper harbour for its economic purposes on the Croatian coast?
6 A. Correct. Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is Muslim representatives,
7 always emphasised the issue of access to the sea as one of the key issues
8 in all negotiations, and then the issue of Neum and the status of Neum
10 Q. Now, Dr. Zuzul, as opposed to these statements about realpolitik
11 and the standpoints of the international community, I would like to
12 confront you with some statements of President Tudjman about the borders
13 of Republic of Croatia
14 called them unnatural. Sometimes he said that Croatia is the only state
15 in the world that looks like a croissant, that it's simply not natural to
16 begin with.
17 Let me ask you, this statement of late President Tudjman about
18 the unnaturalness and absurdity of Croatian borders, were they reflected
19 in the press? Could people read about it in newspapers, hear it on
21 A. I believe so.
22 Q. Can we, on the contrary, then infer that nobody learned of these
23 views of Mr. Tudjman by wiretapping or any other spy means of gathering
25 A. Correct. As far as I remember, President Tudjman made such a
1 statement in one public debate after the first free and democratic
2 elections in Croatia
3 Q. You mean the one about the croissant.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Tell us, late President Tudjman was an historian?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. As a high official in Croatian politics and a collaborator of
8 President Tudjman, have you ever noticed that those statements were part
9 of the official views of President Tudjman and official positions of the
10 Croatian policy and that they affected the foreign policy of Croatia
11 the state policy in general?
12 A. Well, if you allow me some time, I will tell you about my
14 It always seemed to me that President Tudjman approached certain
15 problems in two ways. First of all as an historian who had spent decades
16 of his life studying the situation in the territory of the former
18 and as a philosopher, I would say that he liked to think in terms of
19 theories of major international solutions.
20 When he spoke from that point of view wearing his historian hat,
21 Dr. Tudjman would expound on all the problems that attended the creation
22 of Bosnia
23 first and the second Yugoslavia
24 viability of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the future.
25 At any rate, he's not the only historian or philosopher or
1 politician who held or expressed those views. We can still hear them
2 nowadays. However, as a statesman who in his own words had an historic
3 opportunity to create a sovereign State of Croatia, I believe that he
4 acted rationally and pragmatically, and he accepted the fact that Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina
6 state. And from the entirety of his conduct as a head of state, I would
7 say that his activities, if you want me to say directly, and I know that
8 from instructions he gave to us diplomats and others, I believe, too, his
9 activities were directed at preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina, but while
10 protecting Croats inside Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 Q. Thank you for this additional explanation, Dr. Zuzul. When you
12 attended these international talks, did you observe certain participants
13 in the talks, not only as one of the participants yourself, as a
14 politician, but also a psychologist?
15 A. Well, I am a psychologist by training. I've spent a good part of
16 my life working as a professor of psychology, and I believe that I could
17 use the same analogy as most of you esteemed lawyers are unable to look
18 at a document without assessing its legal aspects. Similarly, for most
19 of us psychologists, it's hard to abstract our training. But at the same
20 time I'm not saying that my conclusions as a psychologist are more
21 accurate than any conclusions a layman could make.
22 Q. I'm now going to show you some documents, and I'll ask you to
23 comment looking at these documents. The approach of the delegation led
24 by President Alija Izetbegovic, as representatives of one of the three
25 warring sides of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I believe the documents will
1 help us understand better.
2 The first document is 4D 01118. It's a transcript from the
3 session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of
4 the 26th November 1993
5 page 4 in B/C/S. In English it's page marked DD003364.
6 One of the topics here is demilitarisation. To the best of your
7 recollection was demilitarisation one of the topics discussed at
8 international talks?
9 A. Yes, here and there the issue would crop up.
10 Q. Let us look at what Alija Izetbegovic said about the position of
11 his delegation. I quote: "I would say a couple of words about
12 demilitarisation. Another position has to be defended. When we accepted
13 this demilitarisation, we reckoned this way. Light infantry weapons
14 won't be surrendered by anyone certainly, so who will be demilitarised?
15 Those who have heavy weapons will be demilitarised. Therefore, it won't
16 affect us. That was our reasoning. Certain forms of demilitarisation do
17 not affect us, because they will have to surrender tanks and turn over
18 heavy artillery over to be supervised. They would surrender 100 tanks,
19 whereas we would surrender 4 to 10. I don't know what the ratio is
20 currently. In artillery the ratio is 1 to 10, whereas everyone will hide
21 light weaponry, of course, or they will hand it over to the police. So
22 we thought there could be a way of removing those tanks from Bosnia
23 However, after touring Bosnia and Herzegovina, it seems to us that we
24 need the army too. We need an army too. And we need to ensure," I am
25 sorry about the way these sentences sound, but I'm just reading.
1 "This army has to exist as an army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
2 Demilitarisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not really suit us
3 because no one would be protecting us then."
4 Dr. Zuzul, to the best of your knowledge did the Muslim
5 delegation really support demilitarisation for a while and then after a
6 certain point they stopped supporting that principle because they decided
7 it would be contrary to their interests? Do you know anything about it?
8 A. Well, I personally think that demilitarisation had never been
9 taken seriously by anyone. No one ever considered it a serious option,
10 because I believe the Serbian side or the Yugoslav army was not prepared
11 to hand over their weapons. And it was equally clear that the
12 international community had no resolve, did not have the required resolve
13 to take the weaponry away from them.
14 It is quite certain that for Croatia, and especially for the
15 Muslim side in the beginning of the war this demilitarisation would have
16 been useful and good. But as I said, nobody ever believed it possible.
17 However, if you allow me to say this as a psychologist, to
18 venture a comment, I knew and held in high esteem Mr. Alija Izetbegovic
19 as a man who was visibly deeply concerned for the fate of his people, but
20 I believe this passage that you've just read was quite typical of his
21 approach to negotiations. In this very brief passage, he advocates two
22 completely opposite stands. In the first few sentences he supports
23 demilitarisation, and in the next couple of sentences he's against it.
24 And that's when he was addressing his own parliament, if I'm not
1 That frequently happened at the negotiations, even in direct
2 negotiations and talks. And if I may say one more thing, it appeared to
3 me that it sometimes led to problems in communication between him and
4 President Tudjman. As a rule, President Tudjman was the kind of person
5 who, when he made a decision, and he was relatively firm when he made
6 decisions, he was keen on seeing it through. President Izetbegovic, on
7 the other hand, and I have to emphasise I'm speaking from my own personal
8 experience, had difficulty in making decisions. And even when he made a
9 decision, it was not yet certain that he would really carry it out.
10 By this I don't mean to say anything bad about him, but I believe
11 that I'm not alone in thinking like this. There are many other people
12 who had occasion to observe him and who think the same.
13 Q. I thought we would come to that when we see some more passages
14 from this transcript, but I believe what you just said is going to be
15 confirmed by what follows.
16 Let us look at the next passage. In Croatian it's on page 13
17 onwards, and in English it's DD003374 onwards. I'll quote it here.
18 "Alija Izetbegovic says that only US supports integral Bosnia
19 and he says, I'm saying this for the benefit of Judge Antonetti, "all
20 this is for nothing when Mitterrand is leading the policy in France
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please start reading again and
22 tell us where she's reading from, please?
23 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] So let me repeat part of my
25 Q. After a brief comment, "What's the use from France
1 by Mitterrand?" Then Tudjman says: "The objective of the policy is to
2 fight for an integral Bosnia
3 moment any forces that could carry this idea through. I don't see any.
4 Just point your finger. What are those forces that could carry the idea
5 of an integrated Bosnia
6 defend these people here and these areas here, and by exerting its
7 pressure, with some additional pressure from us through politics, we
8 could broaden that area perhaps a little bit, but the army is not strong
9 enough to go all the way to Banja Luka. It's futile even to talk about
10 it. Only idealists with no sense of reality can talk about that."
11 I'll end the quotation here. Tell me, Dr. Zuzul, Banja Luka
12 the capital of Republika Srpska, wasn't it?
13 A. One of the two capitals in the view of the Bosnian Serbs. One
14 was Banja Luka and the other Pale.
15 Q. Tell us, as a person who relatively -- knew the situation there
16 relatively well, did Izetbegovic want to say that the BH army did not
17 have the strength to reach Banja Luka or to liberate the territory of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina from the army of Republika Srpska?
19 A. I believe that your interpretation is correct.
20 Q. Tell us, Mr. Zuzul, based on your participation in international
21 conferences, was it clear that the -- the Muslim delegation led by
22 Alija Izetbegovic --
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me, Ms. Alaburic. I refer to your
24 question before, which I understood to be a question of whether one or
25 the other, and the answer is, "I believe your interpretation is correct."
1 So the answer is it's either or the other, but probably you were asking
2 for an answer as to which it was, one or the other, and that cannot be
3 answered by "yes" very well. This is an exception to the rule that you
4 must answer "yes," "no," "I can't say." It may again be a linguistic
5 problem. I'm referring to page 26, lines 6 to 9.
6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, let me clarify
7 these -- the word "or," which referred to the following: To arrive -- to
8 reach Banja Luka or to liberate the territory depending on how you
9 interpret it. This would be an aggression in view of the Serbs, and now
10 for Croats and Muslims this would mean liberation. So my question was
11 not placed this as opposed to the other but meaning -- liberation meaning
12 the BH army reaching Banja Luka. I believe that Dr. Zuzul understood my
13 question properly.
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. Well, he said -- he did not have a
15 translation either, so it's easier for him, but I thank you for your
17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Very well.
18 Q. Dr. Zuzul, I had a feeling you were about to add something. If
19 not, we can move on to the next question.
20 To your knowledge, based on your participation in international
21 conferences, was it clear that the Bosniak Muslim delegation was in
22 favour of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina as opposed to the state model of a
23 federation, confederation, or anything else of the sort?
24 A. To qualify the conduct of the Bosnian Muslim delegation
25 unequivocally, I believe that they espoused the idea of a united
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitarian state and more so in the political than
2 in the territorial sense.
3 Q. Thank you for the answer. Let us look at the page 19 of the
4 Croatian text and page 3380 of the English version. We have a very short
5 conclusion by Alija Izetbegovic which I will read fully. I quote: "We
6 can make one conclusion so far. The delegation should go up there. More
7 or less we know what the platform is, plus those efforts regarding the
8 extension of functions and territories, plus the failure to sign and so
9 on and so forth. Can we go there with such instructions? Let's see and
10 come back."
11 Dr. Zuzul, based on this it is quite clear that the Bosnia
12 delegation received an instruction here not to sign documents whatsoever,
13 to attend the event but to come back without having signed anything.
14 Based on your experience, were there situations where the Bosnian
15 delegation indeed comported this way?
16 A. I had never had occasion to see an address by Mr. Izetbegovic to
17 his delegation in such clear terms. However, my impression on many
18 occasions had been that they did not have the intention to arrive at a
19 solution but that they negotiated for the sake of negotiating or for the
20 sake of buying time.
21 Q. Thank you. We will see how the positions of the Bosniak
22 delegations evolved. Now let us look at 4D 01052. 01052. This is the
23 transcript from the Presidency session of the Republic of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 29th of December, 1993.
25 I selected the portions I felt were the most important. One of
1 them, maybe not so important but equally interesting, can be found at
2 page -- we're following the enumeration in the lower right-hand corner.
3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Ms. Alaburic, I may again have misunderstood
4 something, but we have a title with the number, and that speaks of a
5 meeting of the 29th of December, but then we have the transcript itself
6 which speaks of 26th of December, and I'd be grateful if you told me what
7 I misunderstood.
8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, can you just tell me
9 where it is that the 26th of December is written since I don't have that
10 date in my document?
11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It's the opening page. It's the very first
12 page. In the English translation, anyway.
13 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely. It's a
14 translation error. So this is an error in the English translation. It
15 is indeed the 233rd session, but as you can see in the original version,
16 the date is the 29th. I apologise for not checking whether the two
17 tally. I did not look at all the details.
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
19 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 Q. Dr. Zuzul, this is what I wanted you to comment upon. Let us
21 look at the enumeration in our language. It's in the lower right-hand
22 corner. Look at the enumeration, 0700. In English that's at pages 26
23 and 27. I will tell you briefly what the BH Presidency discussed here.
24 They said that it was inappropriate for Boban's army to be called
25 Ustasha, because according to an investigation conducted by the Globus,
1 Globus weekly, because they had the -- Boban's troops had 221 years'
2 membership in the party, and they are not Fascists. They should not be
3 called Highwaymen, Vampires and such like. So they should not be called
4 Vampires, Boban's Men, so on and so forth.
5 In your opinion, Dr. Zuzul, how did the Bosnian leadership -- the
6 Bosnian Muslim leadership refer to the leadership of Herceg-Bosnia? How
7 did they style them or call them? Do you have any knowledge to that
9 A. I would not really want to go into what they called them
10 officially, but it is true that the media did use that particular term
11 dating from World War II, the terms harking back to the Ustasha and
12 Chetniks. This particular term could not have been used by Croats and
13 Muslims given the events of World War II since both -- there were both
14 Croats and Muslims who were members of either the Partisans, on the one
15 hand, or the Ustasha on the other.
16 This is street slang, not to say the slang of the underworld
17 which found its way to the public at large through the media. I was not
18 aware of such terminology ever having been used at official meetings such
19 as this one, but I was always aware of the fact that this made
20 communication more difficult. And I mean communication in general
21 between peoples and politicians.
22 Q. Thank you. Let us look at what Alija Izetbegovic said at page
23 703 onwards. That's at page 29 of the English version, 29 onwards.
24 That's the very end of December 1993. The BH army launched an offensive
25 in Central Bosnia. We will be coming to that part of the transcript
1 later on. What we are interested in at the moment is the following, and
2 I quote: "When it comes to the specific conduct of the army in
3 Central Bosnia
4 says: Nothing has been agreed upon until everything has been agreed
5 upon. Therefore, Central Bosnia -- a deal was not reached on
6 Central Bosnia
7 conducting actions since no deal has yet been made."
8 Dr. Zuzul, to your knowledge was it the policy of the Bosnia
9 delegation always such that one issue would be left open, would not be
10 agreed upon, so that pursuant to this particular policy, according to
11 which nothing has been agreed upon until everything has been agreed upon,
12 new -- or, rather, all issues would be raised for discussion again,
13 issues that were considered settled by other parties to the negotiations?
14 A. I cannot claim with any certainty whether the Muslim Bosniak side
15 acted deliberately in that respect. However, on several occasions and at
16 several negotiations I observed not only Mr. Izetbegovic but other
17 representatives of the Muslims expressing the view that nothing had been
18 agreed upon until everything was agreed upon.
19 I specifically remember one occasion where during an interval in
20 the negotiations, as an individual who had by that time been studying the
21 theory of negotiations and where more -- speaking more as -- as an
22 intellectual then than a politician, I -- I tried to reason with them
23 that complex political relations could not be addressed or resolved
24 through -- through such a position. I tried to reason with them on
25 several occasions, but they insisted on taking that course and thus
1 continued in their resolve to leave these negotiations open without any
2 specific solutions.
3 On the other hand, international negotiators were rather inclined
4 to accept such negotiating position because it made it easier for them to
5 hold these negotiations.
6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: With your permission. Mr. Zuzul, in your view
7 is this a wrong attitude? Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,
8 or is it a possible attitude in negotiations?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was a position that was
10 possible and oftentimes expressed. However, in most negotiations that
11 are of a complex nature, and these particular negotiations were of a very
12 complex nature, such a position, and I believe I -- many experts would
13 agree with me on this, such a position leads to an impasse.
14 For instance, in order for them to be able to agree upon
15 political solutions a truce has to be introduced first. If you say that
16 a truce cannot be introduced because political settlements have not been
17 made, you -- you obstruct negotiations.
18 I have now remembered that this was what they specifically did.
19 Whenever we said that he would should find a framework solution for
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would say, "Well, yes, but we did not really
21 agree upon how individual municipality would be -- municipalities would
22 be divided amongst us."
23 So the global solution could not be reached because not
24 everything has been agreed upon. However, if you look at the principles
25 of negotiations, you cannot even go into resolving details unless you
1 have found a framework solution. That was my opinion at the time, and
2 that is still my opinion.
3 I cannot claim that the Muslim side did this to deliberately
4 obstruct negotiations, or as I described it on several occasions, to buy
5 time. It was my impression that the Muslim side, particularly
6 Mr. Izetbegovic, were convinced that their negotiating position would
7 strengthen over time. However, I repeat that was only an impression on
8 my part.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It's time for the
11 break now. We're going to break for 20 minutes. I inform the Petkovic
12 Defence that it still has 45 minutes left.
13 --- Recess taken at 3.52 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 4.12 p.m.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. I
16 believe that Judge Prandler has a question to ask.
17 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you. I'm sorry, Ms. Alaburic, to take
18 your time, but just one minute. It is, of course, not your time, but
19 ours. So I would simply would like to confirm, as far as my position is
20 concerned, that I would have asked the same question from Mr. Zuzul like
21 what has been asked by Judge Trechsel, and also in view of the -- my
22 experience in the given field, that is the international negotiations, I
23 believe that that very principle which was mentioned has been -- in
24 general has been adopted as a positive one. So that is why without
25 losing too much time I would only like to -- to ask Mr. Zuzul, Dr. Zuzul,
1 if you really feel that the given principle has prevented you, I mean the
2 Croatian side, to proceed with the negotiations and to reach some
3 positive results. It is my question. Thank you.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, by no means did it prevent the
5 Croatian side. The Croatian side never even thought or said that it
6 could thwart us. I was speaking of the position of the Muslim side by
7 saying that when you have long-lasting negotiations, you have been
8 negotiating for days and then you reach a point of agreement, if any of
9 the sides holds on to the principle that nothing is agreed until
10 everything is agreed, and if they interpret that principle as meaning
11 that everything that had been agreed previously is null and void, then
12 that could practically thwart, disable the negotiations. That's how I
13 interpreted that principle. It wasn't always the case, but sometimes I
14 had the impression that that's the way the Muslim side interpreted this
15 principle itself.
16 Let me illustrate again. We had been negotiating for two days or
17 five days or ten days, but if one side adheres to the principle that none
18 of these agreements are worth anything unless we agree on the minutest
19 detail on the 14th day, and if they proceed from that principle, then on
20 day 13 we will reach a point when they say none of our agreements hold
21 true. We have to start again.
22 And as I've said already, if you accept this principle in theory
23 and in practice, then it makes it impossible to reach an agreement. And
24 my impression was that sometimes, not always but sometimes, that's the
25 way negotiations were led.
1 I hope, Your Honour, I manage to clarify what I really meant.
2 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you very much, Dr. Zuzul.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, you may proceed.
4 I was a little too generous earlier on. I told you 45 minutes, but it's
5 actually 43 minutes according to our calculations.
6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, thank you very much
7 for this generosity. I hope I will return it with even greater
8 generosity by not using up all of the 43 minutes.
9 I thank the Judges for these questions.
10 Q. Dr. Zuzul, can we try to boil this down to two main standpoints?
11 Can we agree that unless all elements of one agreement are agreed then
12 this agreement has not been reached?
13 A. Of course.
14 Q. And if one delegation in these negotiations deliberately and
15 consciously conducts the negotiations in such a way as to always leave
16 one element not agreed on the principle that nothing is agreed until
17 everything is agreed, that can make the negotiations endless. And can we
18 then say that it is a way of obstructing the negotiations by making
19 agreement impossible?
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Ms. Alaburic, I wonder whether it's quite
21 correct to again speak of deliberate, whereafter the witness has said
22 that he could not affirm that there was a deliberate policy behind that.
23 I think this is not entirely correct. Perhaps you want to reformulate.
24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my question now is
25 phrased very generally, and it doesn't concern the specific policy of the
1 Muslim delegation now. It's a general question. It can apply in other
2 situations to Croats. I am not trying to examine this principle on the
3 factual level. We're going to do that with other witnesses, and we have
4 numerous documents about it even now.
5 Q. So in principle, Mr. Zuzul, regardless of who it concerns, if one
6 delegation behaves in the way I described, if they always leave one issue
7 open, can that be considered as an obstruction of negotiations?
8 A. I am certain that it can, and in my answer to His Honour
9 Judge Prandler, I tried to illustrate why I believe it can indeed be
10 obstruction. If one legitimate principle is taken as absolute, namely,
11 the principle nothing is agreed until everything is, then this principle
12 is used to destroy the entire process. Negotiations are only
13 negotiations if all the sides are talking bona fide in the desire to
14 reach an agreement; otherwise, it's obstruction.
15 Q. Thank you, Mr. Zuzul. Let us look at the transcript again. We
16 were talking about attacks on Vitez. On page in Croatian 704 and English
17 page 29, Stjepan Kljuic is trying to raise the issue wouldn't it be a
18 good idea if the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina moved to liberate Foca
19 rather than moving at Vitez, and he goes on to say that from the
20 standpoint of Bosnia and Herzegovina and from the viewpoint of the Muslim
21 people, "Foca would be more important to us."
22 Dr. Zuzul, tell us, which side held the territory of Foca
23 its control?
24 A. I don't know who held Foca at that moment, but judging by what is
25 said here -- in fact, I'd rather not interpret what Mr. Kljuic meant.
1 Q. Several pages later, Croatian 709, English 33 and 34, Mr. Siber,
2 who was deputy commander of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he says
3 this analysis is interesting -- I'm quoting from 710, the end of his
4 contribution. I quote: "I'm telling you that the BH army has the
5 strength with regard to Busovaca, Vitez, and the part of Novi Travnik
6 currently held by HVO under the absolute control of Boban's men and the
8 when -- where nothing may be done, the BH army has the strength and the
9 resources to move into those places within 48 hours. But what will
10 happen to the left bank of Mostar? The industry in Vitez, especially the
11 segments of the industry in Vitez that are important to this nascent
13 Dr. Zuzul, did you know that towards the end of 1993, at the same
14 time as negotiations were going on the BH army was moving to liberate, as
15 they thought of it, Busovaca, Vitez, parts of Novi Travnik from the HVO?
16 A. Well, I knew about sporadic clashes and skirmishes in those
17 areas, but I'm very surprised to see this transcript and to realise that
18 those were planned operations. I had no inkling of that, and I believe
19 no one on our side, none of those who participated in the negotiations,
20 were aware of it.
21 Q. Let's see how the leadership in Sarajevo planned this offensive
22 without having it become known. Pages 35, 36 in English. I will quote
23 Stjepan Kljuic. "Can we do something for our own sake? Since you --
24 since we were accused at the United Nations. The finger was pointed at
25 us. We have to respond. Why don't you appear on TV and say that the BH
1 army is not mounting an offensive against Vitez, but between us, look,
2 and I mean we're not children here. As Ivo says, someone has more life
3 experience and more wisdom. Some speak more, some speak less and do
4 more, et cetera. It is clear to all of us that strategically speaking,
5 the most important for the BH army are Vitez and Novi Travnik because the
6 industries are there, as my namesake said, that could carry us through
7 another 20 years. And I said once, I said that to the president, for the
8 sake of the international community you should say that we are not
9 mounting any offensives, and second, strictly between us, by the 18th we
10 should stop the offensive."
11 Tell us, Dr. Zuzul, did you have any knowledge that
12 Alija Izetbegovic or any of the representatives of the leadership in
14 very fierce offensive was taking place on the ground and even the date of
15 its termination was defined?
16 A. I had no idea, and I believe no one on our side in the
17 negotiations had any idea. I'm happy that it eventually turned out that
18 a solution can be found through negotiations, but I am sincerely
19 astounded by this double play in politics, although I knew it existed.
20 Q. Can we now look at 4D 009300. It's a president's assertion --
21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I just ask a question which the answer seems
22 implicitly to have been given by you, but still I think it's of some
23 relevance. Do you know whether these discussions, and we're reading the
24 text, the transcript of discussions, whether they led to any decision
25 being taken?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Are you referring to decisions in
2 negotiations or decisions relative to the situation on the ground?
3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm talking about decisions implemented some of
4 the suggestion that are made in the discussion and that surprise you.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot make any assertions
6 because I do not know whether on the basis of this some actions followed,
7 whether the decisions were indeed implemented by Bosnia and Herzegovina
8 I don't know that. However, by you leave, Your Honour, let me tell you
9 why I said that I was astounded. If you remember, I personally --
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me. You have answered my question,
11 actually, and I would not like this to lead to further time being
13 Excuse me, Ms. Alaburic.
14 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we're aware that once
15 a foundation is laid facts have to be proven about such policies, and
16 this is something that the Defence will be doing in the following -- next
18 The next document is 4D 00930. In other words, the document
19 dated the 14th of January, 1993. Let's look at the page ending in
20 numbers 232. In the English version this is page 9, and then 11 and the
21 beginning of page 12.
22 Q. One participant at the meeting, Mr. Ljubjankic read a German
23 report on the negotiations led in that period. Among other things, the
24 BH army offensive against Vitez is mentioned. Let us focus on the
25 statement by Alija Izetbegovic. I quote: "Because they said who would
1 engage in the war effort now. I say we need Vitez for the sake of the
2 future and not because we particularly wish to wage a war right now. We
3 will be accused of wanting to capture Vitez in order to prolong the war.
4 That's not why we're doing it. We need Vitez for the sake of our
6 Tell us, Dr. Zuzul, did you have any knowledge that in early 1994
7 there had been fighting between the BH army and the HVO over Vitez?
8 A. I didn't have any specific knowledge. I did, however, receive
9 sporadic information about fighting in certain areas of Central Bosnia.
10 Q. Let me draw your attention to one part of the German report
11 Mr. Ljubjankic referred to. I quote: "In the last efforts to achieve
12 peace it has become quite apparent that the Muslim army still treats the
13 war option as option number one to say the least. Evidently they want to
14 obtain from the Croats what it was impossible for them to obtain from the
15 Serbs." Although there were other interesting remarks made here.
16 Dr. Zuzul, tell us, in the course of international negotiations,
17 was it your impression or did you have first-hand knowledge of the Muslim
18 leadership in Sarajevo
19 in the clashes against the army of Republika Srpska which was their
20 superior and that they decided to try and gain what they could from the
21 fighting against the HVO?
22 A. I cannot say that I had any specific information to that effect.
23 I can only say that this was the impression I had on occasion.
24 Q. At page 240 onwards of the minutes, in English that's pages 19
25 and 20, Alija Izetbegovic again refers to that principle whereby unless
1 everything is agreed nothing is agreed.
2 Let us look at two of his sentences. I quote: "Of course we
3 have to be in favour of an integral -- an integrated Bosnia-Herzegovina,
4 but do not forget that the presence of that army is -- that that's the
5 reason why we're contemplating a different solution other than that of an
6 integrated state."
7 Dr. Zuzul, did you have any knowledge about the Muslim leadership
8 in Sarajevo
9 Republika Srpska army could not achieve such an integrated state simply
10 because the BH army did not have the strength to win that fight?
11 A. On several occasions so far I have said, and this is something
12 the transcripts confirm now, that the objective of the Muslim leadership
13 was to establish a unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is impression that
14 has been confirmed by actual events. The Muslim side was prepared to
15 give up territory rather than to give up on the idea of a unitarian
17 Another impression of mine which is proved true by this
18 transcript was that the Muslim side sometimes negotiated not in order to
19 reach or find a solution but to play for time, which would allow them to
20 create conditions conducive to a unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Let me describe a situation I experienced. The talks were held,
22 I believe, in Zagreb
23 the following: "Alija, you say you have several hundred thousand dead.
24 How many dead -- or how many more people should die before you should be
25 prepared to negotiate a solution of sorts?" President Izetbegovic's
1 response to that was, "Even if million -- a million of them died, a
2 million would still be left to live their lives the way they should be
3 lived." I'm quoting from memory here.
4 This conversation remained deeply etched in my memory, in a way
5 it does fit into the general picture.
6 Q. Dr. Zuzul, thank you very much. My cross-examination is
8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I generously place
9 the remainder of my time at the disposal of the Prosecution.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
11 Ms. Alaburic. You have been very generous indeed. Mr. Scott, you have
12 the floor.
13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Perhaps -- perhaps it is important for the Bench
14 to clarify what I think you do not misunderstand. Ms. Alaburic, of
15 course, cannot dispose of her time in your favour, and you've got plenty
16 anyway, I'm sure.
17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this was said in
18 jest. We know that we do have the same amount of time as the Prosecution
19 but that that time cannot be given away in this way. Thank you.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: The jest was carried on, Ms. Alaburic.
21 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours. Again, good
22 afternoon and to counsel and to all of those in the courtroom.
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Scott:
24 Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Zuzul. Let me just say that much of your
25 testimony so far has -- has gone a long way toward confirming much of the
1 Prosecution case, so there will be many things that we won't, I think,
2 need to talk about. I would like to ask you a number of questions
3 about -- or some questions at least about your preparations.
4 Before you came and appeared before the Chamber and gave your
5 testimony in May, can you tell us a bit about what preparations you made
6 in giving your testimony? Did you meet with anyone? Did you review
7 documents? What steps did you take in that regard?
8 MR. KHAN: Well, Your Honour, before that is answered, I don't
9 want to be pedantic or difficult, but my learned friends for the
10 Prosecution have on numerous occasions decried a proclivity of some
11 members allegedly to insert comments in their questions, and in my
12 respectful submission that is precisely what my learned friend Mr. Scott
13 has done in his opening remarks about much of the Prosecution case being
14 proved. That is a matter, of course, for Your Honours to decide in due
15 course and I simply rise. I don't want silence in any way, shape, or
16 form to be viewed as some kind of consent or acceptance or acquiescence
17 of the statement put forward by my learned friend.
18 MR. SCOTT:
19 Q. Sir, if you can go ahead and tell us, please, about what
20 preparations you made for giving you testimony starting in May, please.
21 A. Mr. Scott, in order to prepare as best I could to help ascertain
22 the truth and nothing but the truth - this is the way I see my evidence
23 here - I met with the Defence for Mr. Prlic, reviewed the documents they
24 placed at my disposal and went through these documents in my discussion
25 with them. I had one telephone conversation with Madam Alaburic and that
1 was all.
2 Q. And in the course of meeting with the Defence for Mr. Prlic was
3 any sort of a statement prepared or a summary or an outline of your
4 testimony, anything that was prepared and put in front of you by way of
5 review or something that would encapsulate or summarise, if you will, the
6 testimony that you were expected to give?
7 A. I don't recall any such thing.
8 Q. And since you -- you'll recall that when you left the courtroom
9 room in May the President admonished you not to speak to anyone about
10 your testimony between that time and today, and let me just inquire, have
11 you talked with anyone about your testimony, either the testimony you've
12 already gave or the testimony you anticipated starting or commencing
13 again today? And by anyone, sir, I mean anyone. Have you spoken to
14 anyone about your testimony?
15 A. Well, my wife was present at the time and is present here during
16 my testimony. I wouldn't place her in any of the categories. Of course
17 I discussed my evidence with her, and in very general terms I spoke with
18 certain individuals who are part of my private life. But as I understood
19 what the -- Their Honours said, I did not talk to anyone who would have
20 been involved in this case in any way. I did not discuss the case with
22 Q. Well, who were the certain individuals that you consider part of
23 your private life that you spoke to about your testimony?
24 A. It would be very difficult to recall these individuals to begin
1 Q. Excuse me.
2 A. I'm --
3 Q. If it's that difficult to recall, just how many people did you
4 talk to about your testimony?
5 A. About the substance of my testimony. Well, I don't know. I
6 don't think I talked about that to anyone. The fact remains that a good
7 part of Croatia
8 that I testified. This was published in the media. Everyone was able to
9 follow --
10 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
11 A. -- my testimony.
12 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I will have to sometimes,
13 with my apology in advance, cut you off because I'm not interested about
14 what was reported in the media. You said a few moments ago, you said,
15 quote, and I'm looking at the transcript: "... certain individuals who
16 were part of my private life." Now, please name some of those
17 individuals, please.
18 A. My apologies, Mr. Prosecutor. I fail to understand your
19 question. I think you need to be more specific when you asked me what it
20 is I talked about. Well, for instance, I spoke to my family about how I
21 felt in the courtroom. Now, whether this comes into the category of
22 discussing the testimony or not, I don't know.
23 Q. We'll put your family to one side, sir. Who else did you speak
24 to about your testimony?
25 A. I can't particularly recall who it was I spoke to. In my view, I
1 did not speak with anyone about the substance of my testimony or the
3 Q. And since you appeared here in May anticipating at some point
4 that you would be scheduled to come and complete your testimony, since
5 you testified in May have you engaged in any other preparations, made any
6 other reviews, reviewed any additional documents since beginning your
8 A. No specific documents. I apologise. Yes. I went through some
9 documents published on the internet from some other cases. I read some
10 books about that time period and territory, in particular this one book
11 that is known to the Prosecution publish by the CIA analysts entitled
12 "The Balkan Battlegrounds." This book helped refresh my memory of
13 certain events. Other than that, I wouldn't say that I had any such
14 activities, or I undertook any such activities with regard to this case.
15 Q. When you say that you went through some documents published,
16 excuse me, on the internet from some other cases, what other cases were
17 they about?
18 A. I saw part of the testimony of Mr. Mile Akmadzic on the internet.
19 It was just a portion of it, not the entire testimony. And a part of
20 Mr. Rebic's testimony.
21 Q. Now, what made you think that before coming back to give your
22 testimony here under oath that you wanted to review Mr. Akmadzic's
23 testimony and Mr. Rebic's testimony?
24 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, sir, before answering the question I'm
25 going to object to the line of questioning. There was no prohibition on
1 any of that. Secondly, as I understand it and from my sources, the
2 Prosecution has been very, very active in trying to dig up dirt onto this
3 witness's private or past political affairs. So I don't think that there
4 were any prohibitions. I don't think there's anything wrong with it.
5 And in fact when the gentleman did ask for his -- a copy of his
6 transcript, he was told that he could get it from the internet. So if
7 we're going to put any limitations, then we should do that before the
8 person leaves the courtroom, not at this point. And I object to this
9 line of questioning. I would like to know what the relevance is, and I
10 would like an answer and a ruling on my objection.
11 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, the Prosecution hasn't at this point
12 suggested whether anything was improper or not but is simply inquiring so
13 that the Chamber can fully assess the probative value and credibility of
14 this witness, what he has done to prepare to testify, and if Mr. Karnavas
15 doesn't have any objection to the content of it, that anyone can do this,
16 then let's proceed with the questions.
17 My question -- my pending question is: What made the witness
18 think that he would want to review the testimony of Mr. Akmadzic and
19 Mr. Rebic before resuming his testimony?
20 Q. Can you tell us that, sir?
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please answer, Witness.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. First of
23 all, I did not use the term, and I believe I'm quite precise in my use of
24 Croatian, and I speak English. I never said that I reviewed the
25 testimonies of Mr. Akmadzic and Mr. Rebic. I simply said that since I
1 was told that I could find transcripts of my own testimony on the
2 internet and that -- that they could only be found on the internet, which
3 is not the easiest way of looking through something, then I came across
4 the transcripts of other testimonies, and it seemed only logical to go
5 and see what the course of these testimonies was. Since the transcripts
6 were quite long and I was away on holiday with my family, I only looked
7 at them cursorily. As I've just said, nobody ever told me that this
8 would be contrary to the rules binding me as a witness.
9 MR. SCOTT:
10 Q. Let's move forward to a few other basic points as we begin, sir.
11 MR. SCOTT: I'd like for the witness to be shown in the
12 Prosecution's book of maps, which is Exhibit P 09276, and whichever is
13 easier, whether to put it on e-court or whether to give it to the witness
14 in hard copy, but map number 1, the very first map in P 09276, or I'm
15 told that there is a copy in binder 2, I'm told, if that also assists the
16 courtroom. Are P 092 -- I'll make sure I get it right. P 09276. All
17 right. Apparently we're having -- could we please have it on the --
18 thank you.
19 Q. Mr. Zuzul, if you can look on the screen in front of you, please,
20 and I think this will be fully adequate for the present purposes.
21 If you look at the map -- again for the record this is map
22 number 1 in the Prosecution's book of maps, which is P 09276. And would
23 you agree with me, sir, that in December 1990, following the elections,
24 the first open elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were held in about
25 November or December of 1990, every bit of the territory within these --
1 the bright red line surrounding what has been labelled as "Bosnia
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at that time was completely within the
4 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; correct?
5 A. It seems to be a precise map. In other words, that's correct.
6 Q. And in December, if we go forward a year in time, if we go to
7 December 1991
8 territory within that bright red line continued to be the territory of
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina; correct?
10 A. I believe so. Obviously, yes.
11 Q. And moving forward to the end of May 1992, after Bosnia and
13 United Nations, these were -- this red line, this bright red line, these
14 were the internationally recognised borders of that Member State
15 United Nations and all the territory within that bright red line, without
16 exception, was the sovereign territory of the UN Member State of Bosnia
17 and Herzegovina
18 A. Yes, correct.
19 Q. And at least until mid-1994, at least, and every day in between,
20 from May 1992 to the middle of 1994, every bit of that area remained the
21 sovereign territory of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
22 A. In my opinion that remained throughout a sovereign part of Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina
24 Q. Thank you. Now, in a similar fashion, as of the time that
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent state and a Member State
1 United Nations, again in May 1992, from that time until at least
2 mid-1994, the internationally recognised government of that
3 UN Member State was the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina that was
4 based, at least primarily, in Sarajevo
5 A. It's correct in principle. I would not dare venture any
6 assertions on where it was always stationed, where they was based.
7 Q. I'm not sure I understand the last part of your answer. It
8 trailed off a bit, sir, I'm sorry?
9 A. Well, let me try to explain. I believe that there had been
10 moments where the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Presidency
11 were unable to enter Sarajevo
12 is too much, but in principle I believe what you said is correct.
13 Q. Thank you very much. Now, I wasn't asking you any questions
14 about freedom of movement or travel but simply can you confirm for us,
15 this is a basic principle for the Judges, that nonetheless, whether you
16 thought it was a good idea or a bad idea, whichever, the internationally
17 recognised government of the UN Member State throughout this time period
18 was the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina; correct?
19 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you allow me, just
20 one objection. I don't think it is in dispute that states are recognised
21 by international law, not governments. Governments can change, but
22 states always remain a subject to international law.
23 MR. SCOTT: Be that as it may, Your Honour, that has no impact on
24 my question whatsoever. My question to the witness, I believe he's
25 answered it but given the additional qualification that he made, I just
1 want the record to be very clear, the question is whether the
2 internationally recognised government of that state was the government of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina that at least primarily through this period was based
4 in Sarajevo
5 Q. Correct?
6 A. Throughout that time Sarajevo
7 internationally recognised state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is not
8 in dispute and that's correct.
9 Q. Sir. Was there any other government purported to represent the
10 UN Member State of Bosnia and Herzegovina during that period of time that
11 was recognised by the international community? Is there some other
12 government out there somewhere that was representing this state?
13 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, sir. Which period are we talking
15 MR. SCOTT: Between as we said in my initial question, between
16 May 1992, include up to mid-1994.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Then I would object since we have had testimony
18 that at various negotiations Izetbegovic was seen to be a representative
19 of the Muslim nation, and so on and so forth.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let the Prosecutor do his work.
21 We understand perfectly what the question is. We're waiting for the
22 answer. Your objection is pointless.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: I object to the form of the question, because
24 which -- because we have had testimony, we have had testimony where
25 Mr. Akmadzic was there as the prime minister in the United States.
1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas. Mr. Karnavas, I do not quite
2 understand the objections. Do you part from an assumption that every
3 witness will say the same? If some witness has said something, do you
4 think the same question cannot be put to the other witness?
5 MR. KARNAVAS: But I'm looking at the question, Judge Trechsel,
6 and we have had testimony that when there were international negotiations
7 you had three different parties.
8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: And that's it? That's the end of the matter?
9 No other witness can be asked the same question, perhaps?
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour --
11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. We have to assess the witness
12 testimony that is given here, and we do not expect and cannot and should
13 not expect every witness to say the same thing. If one witness had said
14 something, another witness may say the same or may say something
15 different, and I do not understand the justification of your objection, I
16 must say.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, if I could just get a ruling on my
18 objection. My objection is I object to the form of the question as
19 stated. It allows -- it has facts that are not -- that are not
20 accurately portrayed in the evidence. My objection can be sustained or
21 overruled and we'll move on, but I'm entitled to a ruling.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Your objection is overruled.
23 Please proceed, Mr. Scott.
24 MR. SCOTT:
25 Q. Mr. Zuzul, I'm not trying to -- I'm not trying to be difficult
1 about this. I'm just trying to get a very clear answer. I'm not talking
2 about who individual officials were or the fact that some of them may
3 have worn different hats, and indeed the Chamber has heard about that.
4 I'm talking about the government as an entity.
5 The international community had to be dealing with someone. The
6 United Nations sitting in New York
7 UN Member State. And that someone throughout this period time from May
8 1992 to the middle of 1994 was the government of that state, the
9 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I'm simply saying most people would
10 refer to it sometimes as the Sarajevo
11 A. If you want real clarity, what you said is correct, but it's
12 equally correct that the representatives who simultaneously represented
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina appeared in negotiations about Bosnia
15 problem. In my correspondent -- correspondence with Mr. Izetbegovic, I
16 addressed him as president, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although at
17 one point it was quite unclear whether according to the constitution he
18 indeed had that position. But to me it was indeed the government of
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina except when they were acting as representatives of
20 one of the sides in negotiations.
21 Q. You answered my question yes, sir. And in terms of other people
22 that acted or wore different hats, you would agree in fact there were a
23 number of people on the Croat side which also from time to time wore
24 different hats, including one already mentioned, Mr. Akmadzic; correct?
25 Sometimes he was acting on behalf of the HDZ. Sometimes he was acting on
1 behalf of Herceg-Bosna. Sometimes he was the personal representative of
2 Franjo Tudjman, and sometimes he was the prime minister of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
4 A. I could not confirm that because you have enumerated many hats,
5 but, as I said earlier, it's not only true of Mr. Akmadzic.
6 Mr. Izetbegovic himself sometimes acted as the president of SDA, a
7 political party, sometimes as a representative of Muslims in
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at other times as a president of
10 Q. And just in the same way that President Bush of the United States
11 acts as the senior head of the Republican Party, and sometimes he acts as
12 president of the United States. So I think we can establish that.
13 Now, let's go forward to Greater Serbia. You used that concept
14 at least seven or eight times in your direct testimony. You talked about
15 Greater Serbia
16 say Greater Serbia?
17 A. It's true I used that term. I was not alone in that. I believe
18 there was nearly a consensus among everyone whoever dealt with the
19 history of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia
21 Greater Serbia
22 of where they lived. And they even wrote that in so many words in the
23 so-called memorandum of the Serbian Academy
24 document. At one point in the early 1990s that policy began to be
25 implemented with the occupation of certain territories in Croatia
1 later in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is how the plan of creating a
2 Greater Serbia
3 Q. And this follows from that, in fact, what you were just saying,
4 but as part of that practice, and again in your testimony you used
5 several times the phrase "ethnic cleansing," and I'd like for you to
6 please tell the Judges what you mean when you use that term, what you
7 understand that term to mean.
8 A. To me and to most people that term means forcible expulsion of a
9 certain part of a population from territories where they had lived for
10 centuries only because they belonged to one ethnic community. And if I'm
11 not mistaken that term was first used accurately in the case of the
12 occupation of Vukovar when all the Croatian population, but not only, all
13 non-Serb population was driven out from that area. And that repeated
14 itself in other territories that were being occupied by Serbs and later
15 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16 Q. And can you tell us, please, sir, when you use that term, and you
17 talked about Vukovar and you can give me your next answer in reference to
18 Vukovar if you wish or not, but you've mentioned forcible expulsion, and
19 can you tell us what some other types of conduct or behaviour or
20 practices do you understand to be part of ethnic cleansing or that took
21 place as part of ethnic cleansing? And again, if you want to refer to
22 Vukovar, please do.
23 A. I have spoken in very general terms, and although nothing good
24 can be said of such ugly conduct, in addition to expulsions there were
25 mass murders and mass deportations. I meant everything that led to a
1 population to disappear from certain areas, and all of that did happen in
2 Vukovar. Vukovar was the first.
3 Q. Excuse me. Could you tell us what role does the destruction of
4 religious or cultural or educational property, based on what you
5 experienced and observed during these Balkan wars, what role does the
6 destruction of cultural or religious or educational property play in
7 ethnic cleansing?
8 A. From the very beginning of the aggression, religious property was
9 a particular target of destruction and that played a role.
10 Q. And why? What is it about destroying the others, and I use the
11 term "the other," what is it about destroying the religious property
12 associated with the other that is significant or a part of ethnic
14 A. It's difficult to answer that question, because I wonder myself
15 sometimes why, but if I try to think about it, not an acceptable but a
16 rational reason would be to demonstrate to that population that they
17 would never be able to come back to that area, because it's no secret
18 that in those areas religious property is very important to preserving
19 identity. It's also indisputable that some destruction occurred
20 motivated purely by hatred.
21 Q. Thank you, sir. We'll come back to some of those topics again.
22 I would like to turn now to just some of your positions that you've told
23 us about.
24 When you were an Assistant Foreign Minister, and I believe that
25 was the first appointment that you received in the Croatian government,
1 if I recall, when you were Assistant Foreign Minister, can you tell us
2 who was your immediate superior; that is, who did you receive your tasks
3 from, if you will? Who gave you directions? Who directed your work?
4 A. In that brief period of about two months, Mr. Zvonimir Separovic
5 was the minister.
6 Q. And I take it that the answer then flows from that that he was
7 the one who gave you your direction and tasks; is that correct?
8 A. Well, he did, and to some extent President Tudjman.
9 Q. And then when you were appointed Deputy Foreign Minister, the
10 same question, sir, who was your superior at that point in the same sense
11 that I just explained to you?
12 A. Professor Skrabalo was the minister, and with him I worked really
13 as one team. We both reported to President Tudjman.
14 Q. And then when you took on your position as UN representative --
15 excuse me, Croatia
16 consider at that time to be your superior?
17 A. My immediate superior was the Foreign Minister, Dr. Granic.
18 Q. Was that in formal terms only or was it actually Dr. Granic who
19 actually supervised your work, gave you directions, what positions should
20 be taken in Geneva
21 A. It wasn't just in formal terms. Mr. Granic was my superior, and
22 we cooperated very well, but I received many instructions directly from
23 President Tudjman, instructions as to how to act in negotiations. If you
24 want to know more, in my normal daily work of a diplomat I communicated
25 with the Foreign Ministry, with Mr. Granic as the minister and
1 Mr. Sanader as Deputy Minister. In negotiations I communicated directly
2 with President Tudjman even then, and especially when I became a special
3 envoy of President Tudjman for these negotiations, and it was logical to
4 talk directly with him.
5 Q. Just assist the Judges in having a bit more sense of your
6 communications during that time period. Now we're talking about when you
7 were a UN -- excuse me, the representative to the UN in Geneva. How
8 often would you talk to, say, Mr. Granic or to President Tudjman? Is
9 that something that would happen on a daily basis or once a week, or was
10 there a regular morning telephone call? How would you -- how did you
11 deal with these people?
12 A. Well, I think I could say that I talked to Mr. Granic almost
13 every day, a little less often with President Tudjman but still
14 relatively often. During negotiations I would hear from him every day,
15 but it was not a rule to report to him every day. It's just that I
16 needed to keep him abreast of what was going on at the conference.
17 Q. Now, let me change to another individual, Mr. Susak. Had you
18 known Mr. Susak before coming -- taking up your position first as
19 assistant and then Deputy Foreign Minister?
20 A. Correct. I met him when I was in the Croatian army -- or,
21 rather, the Ministry of Defence.
22 Q. And how did you come to meet Mr. Susak at that time?
23 A. Well, I was with a group of my colleagues, university professors,
24 and we had this idea of creating a section for information and psychology
25 work within the ministry, and that's when we met closer up with
1 Minister Susak. I think we first spoke to General Tus and then with
2 Minister Susak.
3 Q. Did you develop a relationship, though, with Mr. Susak after this
4 initial acquaintance that you -- like with President Tudjman, Mr. Susak
5 was someone that you had direct access to and would deal with directly?
6 A. My relations with Minister Susak developed. We became friends
7 almost. We communicated rather often, but it was not as often as I
8 communicated with Minister Granic or President Tudjman. I don't remember
9 a single case when Minister Susak had given me specific instructions on
10 any score whatever.
11 Q. And --
12 THE WITNESS: Just a small intervention in the translation. I
13 said that I don't remember a single case when Minister Susak had given
14 me, me as the ambassador, specific --
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, you were an ambassador
16 of Croatia
17 communications between Tudjman and Mr. Granic and yourself. You
18 mentioned phone calls. You said how often those phone calls would take
19 place, but I would like to know the following: As is the case in
20 diplomatic matters often, do you send diplomatic telegrams, and would you
21 receive specific instructions from Zagreb, or would everything take place
22 over the telephone?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In normal diplomatic work, in the
24 operation of the mission at the United Nations in Geneva, I believe, our
25 communication was similar to those of any other mission, through
1 diplomatic channels: Telegrams, notes, et cetera. We sent them
2 regularly, and we received them regularly, including instructions.
3 Because in a way, ever since I had left for Geneva, I had a dual role.
4 One was to do the regular diplomatic work at the mission with the
5 United Nations, and we performed this in the same way as every other
6 mission did.
7 As far as monitoring the conference on the former Yugoslavia was
8 concerned and participating in negotiations, most of the communication
9 went again through standard diplomatic channels. However, oftentimes
10 communication was direct, by telephone, because quite simply things were
11 happening too fast, and I had both the instructions and the right to make
12 the judgement myself when something was urgent enough to contact directly
13 the minister or the head of state without going through the usual
14 diplomatic channels.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
16 MR. SCOTT:
17 Q. Mr. Zuzul, I'd like to turn next please to Mate Boban, who you
18 mentioned in your testimony before. You said you had known Mr. Boban
19 before, that in fact you grew up in the town, Imotski, where Mr. Boban
20 worked, and as part of your testimony you said that just before the
21 developments that you had just been discussing and that you had just been
22 discussing December of 1991 you said: "I had been directly in touch with
23 Mr. Boban." Do you have any recollection of what business you had with
24 Mr. Boban in approximately December 1991?
25 A. If I remember correctly what I said, I said I was indirectly in
1 contact with Mr. Boban, and that's because my friend and his cousin, I
2 suppose, Mr. Marinko Boban, contacted Mr. Mato Boban regarding possible
3 organising of volunteers to assist with the liberation of Dubrovnik, and
4 I don't recall any direct talk with him, with Mr. Boban, in December
5 1991. No, I don't recall that.
6 Q. All right. Well, I don't intend to spend much time on that given
7 everything we need to talk about. You did -- it was transcribed at page
8 26789 to 90 that you had "I had been directly in touch with Mr. Boban
9 during that time," but I take it now that's been corrected.
10 What kind of relationship following that time did you develop
11 with Mr. Boban in these -- in the years 1992, 1993, 1994, since he was
12 the president of Herceg-Bosna, which I think we can all agree was
13 something that impacted your life at that time a fair amount. What was
14 the nature of your dealings with Mr. Boban?
15 A. I haven't quite understood your statement, Mr. Prosecutor, but as
16 I understand it, I cannot agree at all that my acquaintance with Mr. Mate
17 Boban had significant bearing on my life. It had no significant bearing
18 on my life whatsoever.
19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... what I said was in reference
20 to Herceg-Bosna, which I think that we can agree did have, at least as a
21 topic, as something that was going on at the time, did have a substantial
22 bearing on your life or probably you wouldn't be here. So in that
23 regard, in regard to your dealings with Herceg-Bosna or touching on
24 Herceg-Bosna, can you tell the Judges, please, what relationship did you
25 develop with Mate Boban during that time period?
1 A. Once again, Mr. Prosecutor, I will start by telling you that not
2 even Herceg-Bosnia had a significant bearing on my life. The Republic of
5 Q. All right. Well, be that as it may, sir, and we'll have a lot of
6 time to talk about these specific topics, but tell us about your
7 relationship with Mr. Boban during that time.
8 A. As I said, we knew each other in private life. We would be in
9 touch whenever he came to Geneva
10 well. Sometimes, not always, I accompanied him to various meetings. On
11 occasion we discussed political issues. Sometimes I expressed my
12 disagreement with some of his thoughts or actions. At any rate, I
13 received instructions from Zagreb
14 behave by my superiors.
15 Q. Let me ask you about some of the things you've disagreed with.
16 You said, "Sometimes I expressed my disagreement with some of his
17 thoughts or actions." Can you identify some of those thoughts or actions
18 that you disagreed with?
19 A. My style is markedly different from that of Boban. His tough
20 approach did not always help resolve matters, and my remarks were along
21 those lines. I regularly told President Tudjman and the minister what
22 the situation was like with regard to negotiations, and I left the
23 decision up to them, whether they felt that they need to intervene either
24 toward Mr. Boban or toward anyone else.
25 Q. So you disagreed with his style. Did you disagree with any of
1 his policies or behaviour?
2 A. You see, Mr. Prosecutor, I was an ambassador, and I tried to
3 professionally perform my role. I was not a politician in Geneva
4 not deal with politician.
5 Q. Excuse me, sir. Let me just ask you as a human being at the
6 moment. Let's put aside being an ambassador. Did you ever disagree with
7 any -- the substance or policies espoused by Mr. Boban during this time
8 in any capacity, private, personal, official, whatever? You said you
9 disagreed with him in style. Did you disagree with any of his behaviour,
10 actions, or policies?
11 A. It is very difficult to answer that question in general terms.
12 If you ask me about a specific situation I can give you my opinion, but
13 where can you find a situation where everyone agrees with everyone
14 especially whens such complex issues are at stake. Of course I did not
15 agree with many politicians and many individuals.
16 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... something important. I'm
17 sure you won't use the Judges's time to talk about something trivial. So
18 please talk about something important. Please talk about some important
19 disagreement you had with Mr. Boban.
20 A. I apologise. I believe that you should put that question to me
21 in reference to a specific situation. I'm giving you a general answer to
22 a general question.
23 Q. Can you go please -- can I please direct your attention to
24 exhibit -- excuse me. Can I ask you please to look at Exhibit P 10402.
25 It should be in one of your binders.
1 MR. SCOTT: It should be, Your Honours, in binder number 2. No,
2 excuse me. My apology. Binder number 3. P 10402. And if I can have
3 that on --
4 Q. If I can ask you, sir, to turn particularly to -- and you can
5 look at either one that assist you the most, the English or Croatian
6 language. These are excerpts from the book by Mate Granic, and in
7 particular on page 70 of his book, or in the excerpts you'll just see on
8 page 5 of the English version you'll see a reference to page 70.
9 Mr. Granic says in his book: "Mate Boban had a special role in
10 this conflict. I had heard of him for the first time in 1992 when he
11 became the leader of the HDZ in BH. We were formally introduced soon
12 afterwards but our first serious dealings only after I became -- had,"
13 excuse me, "but had our first serious dealings only after I had become
14 head of Croatian diplomacy. We attended several meetings between the
15 Croatian authorities and Croats in BH. We were never close, and we
16 supported completely different positions. Boban was a very narrow-minded
17 man, full of hatred for the Bosniaks. He supported Bosnian Serbs,
18 believing that he could enter into an agreement with them regardless of
19 the criminal policies of Karadzic, Mladic, and their assistants. It was
20 clear to me that he was the biggest obstacle to peace in BH. At meetings
21 he never spoke about the Bosniaks or Muslims but only used words like
22 Turks or Balija."
23 Now, how does Mr. Granic's description of Mr. Boban fit with your
24 experience? Would you agree with that assessment?
25 A. This is Mr. Granic's opinion which he wrote a number of years
1 later. He did not express his opinion in these terms in the period of
2 time we're discussing. Still, I can agree with some aspects of what he
3 said here.
4 I was under the impression that Mr. Boban felt that he could find
5 a common language with the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina more easily than
6 with the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regardless of that, I would not
7 say that Mr. Boban was the biggest obstacle to peace in
9 Q. And how about --
10 A. I think that's taking it a bit too far.
11 Q. And how about the statements that he was full of hatred for the
12 Bosniaks and he always spoke about them using terms like Turks or Balija.
13 Was that your experience dealing with him?
14 A. I did hear him use these terms, but I would definitely not say
15 that he used these terms all the time. He sometimes referred to them as
16 Muslims and sometimes as Turks or Balija.
17 Q. If I can just hopefully finish with this because I think we may
18 be coming up on the time for the break, but in the middle of that
19 paragraph Dr. Granic says: "We supported completely different
21 Now, you worked closely on these issues for some period of years.
22 You worked closely, as you've told us already, with Dr. Granic. Can you
23 tell us how Dr. Granic's positions differed from Mr. Boban's positions,
24 because Dr. Granic says they were completely different.
25 A. He makes a general statement here which refers to a large period
1 of time. In my view, at some point there was a great difference in
2 principled views between Mr. Granic and me on the one hand and Mr. Boban
3 and others on the other, and this preceded the Washington -- that was
4 about the Washington
5 establishing a federation of Croats and Muslims. Both Dr. Granic and I
6 thought that this was a possible and implementable option. And as can be
7 gleaned from the transcripts, this opinion was shared by
8 President Tudjman too.
9 In my view, Mr. Boban did not believe this viable. That was the
10 biggest difference in opinion at the time, and I think that this is what
11 Dr. Granic referred to here.
12 Q. Well, excuse me for a moment.
13 MR. SCOTT: If the Chamber will bear with me for one moment just
14 so we can finish this.
15 Q. When you say Mr. Boban did not believe this viable, I want you to
16 be very clear. When you refer to "this," what was it that Mr. Boban did
17 not believe viable?
18 A. I believe that I spoke quite extensively of the fact that at some
19 point in time during the negotiations, in particular with American
20 representatives but also with representatives of the Muslims, we started
21 working on the agreement about setting up the federation.
22 Q. What did Mr. Boban not find viable? Not about what the Americans
23 said or what the Muslims said. What did Mr. Boban not find viable?
24 A. Mr. Prosecutor, this was precisely what I was about to tell you.
25 Mr. Boban thought that such a federation could not be made.
1 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I don't want to try the Chamber's
2 patience. We can come back to it after the break.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. A mistake in the
4 transcript. Page 56, line 18, in the English transcript we can read
5 Judge Antonetti, whereas it was the witness speaking at this point.
6 We're going to break for 20 minutes now.
7 --- Recess taken at 5.44 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 6.06 p.m.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing's resumed. Please
10 proceed, Mr. Scott.
11 MR. SCOTT:
12 Q. Mr. Zuzul, in the interest of time I'm going to try and move
13 forward to some other topics.
14 It's fair to say, is it not, that from 1990 and until such time
15 as their status as independent states was internationally recognised,
16 both Croatia
17 the territory of which extended to the external borders, if you will, of
18 the various republics of the former Yugoslavia
19 A. It is correct that they were part of the Socialist Federative
20 Republic of Yugoslavia
21 Q. And up until the time that their independence was declared and
22 recognised, the armed forces of that internationally recognised state,
23 that is, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the armed forces
24 of that state could be garrisoned and moved about within the borders of
25 that state; correct?
1 A. For as long as they constituted the armed forces of that state
2 and for as long as that state existed, yes, I believe that's correct.
3 Q. So would it be fair to say that in general in those respects both
4 President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic, in 1990 and 1991, faced a
5 very similar situation in reference to the state that they were part of
6 and to the military forces of that state; correct?
7 A. I believe they did.
8 Q. At least during 1990 and well into 1991, neither Mr. -- neither
9 country, I shouldn't just refer to them as individuals, Mr. Tudjman or
10 Mr. Izetbegovic, but neither Croatia
12 controlled by, ultimately, the Yugoslavia
13 A. Up until one point both the Republic of Croatia
14 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including all the other republics of the former
16 the republican, not federal institutions.
17 Q. And in approximately 1990, is it correct that both in Croatia
18 in Bosnia-Herzegovina the JNA, by one means or another, seized the
19 weapons belonging to the Territorial Defence in both of those republics?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. And you testified, in fact, that then when the armed conflict
23 with the JNA or the forces of the former Yugoslavia or the Republic of
25 military abilities were actually quite limited. You actually said at one
1 point they were "pitifully weak," and they were not able to defend
4 A. Correct. That was my impression.
5 Q. And is it fair to say, and if you remember from being a citizen
6 and living in that country at the time, that there was a fair amount of
7 criticism directed at President Tudjman that he had not -- he and his
8 government had not done more to prepare for military conflict with
10 A. There was such criticism, yes, that's true.
11 Q. And is it fair to say, and just -- and you did touch upon this in
12 your testimony before that by approximately the second half of 1991, Serb
13 forces of the JNA occupied as much as -- or at least one-third of
15 A. I think that that's, roughly speaking, correct.
16 Q. Now, you've indicated during your direct examination that during
17 this time that the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not do
18 anything to protest the JNA actions or to support Croatia in connection
19 with these various events in 1990 and 1991, and I want to direct your
20 attention particularly there came a time, I believe, sir, on the 9th of
21 January, 1991, where the Yugoslav -- federal Yugoslav Presidency or
22 government ordered illegal paramilitary forces in the republics to
23 disarm. Do you recall that?
24 A. Yes. Yes, I do recall stating in my testimony that the general
25 impression was that the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina was doing
1 nothing to support Croatia
2 Q. Well, do you recall that on the 21st of January, 1991, the
3 leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina backed and supported both Slovenia
5 Yugoslav Presidency to reconsider its actions in threatening to disarm
6 alleged paramilitary forces in Slovenia
7 A. I don't recall that, but I do not exclude that it's true.
8 Q. Do you recall that in August 1991, both Bosnia and Herzegovina
9 and Macedonia
10 perform national service outside their republics?
11 A. Well, I do recall that vaguely. I don't recall exactly when and
12 how it was formulated.
13 Q. Okay. Well, that brings us up to this so-called statement by
14 Mr. Izetbegovic, "It's not our war," and you talked about that in your
15 testimony at page 27618.
16 Now, the Chamber has heard quite a bit of evidence about that.
17 Mr. Izetbegovic made that statement on the 6th of October, 1991, and I
18 wonder, did you hear Mr. Izetbegovic make that statement?
19 A. I was not personally present when the statement was made, but
20 there were so many reports of it that I believed at the time, and I still
21 do believe that he stated that.
22 Q. And in fact, that particular four words, if you will, "It's not
23 our war," was part of a much more extensive statement that he made at the
24 time. I'm wondering if you ever actually read the entire statement.
25 A. I don't remember.
1 Q. Well, do you remember the context in which Mr. Izetbegovic said
2 that, "It's not our war"? In the statement itself.
3 A. I don't remember the statement, but I do remember the context of
4 the events in Croatia
5 received quite a great deal of coverage in the media in Croatia.
6 Q. But you've told us, sir, that you didn't hear him make that
7 statement, and you don't recall ever reading the full statement; is that
9 A. I think that that's correct.
10 Q. Sir, isn't it fair to say that that is something that you've
11 repeated, like so many others, taking Mr. Izetbegovic's words out of
12 context, having no knowledge of the statement in which -- the context of
13 the statement in which they were made?
14 A. No, it isn't. I believe that I'm pretty well familiar with the
15 context of political events and what the impact of such a statement amid
16 such events was at the time when Yugoslavia
17 Q. You can't tell us, sir, what the rest of the statement was. Do
18 you recall around that same time on the 20th of September, 1991,
19 Stipe Mesic, who at that time was serving as the Yugoslav president,
20 called on JNA soldiers to desert and go over to the side of the elected
21 leadership in Croatia
22 A. I remember that vaguely. I do not recall the exact date.
23 Q. And, sir, wasn't President Izetbegovic's statement a few days
24 later an expression of solidarity with Stipe Mesic and Croatia
25 Izetbegovic says, "It's not our war," calling for Bosnia's young men, its
1 conscripts, it's young men, not to go and fight in the JNA war against
3 entire statement, sir.
4 MR. KARNAVAS: I object. This is testimony now from counsel, and
5 I'm rather surprised that the Bench is not reacting a little bit.
6 MR. SCOTT: All of which is based on the evidence in the record,
8 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may -- if I may be heard for my objection and
9 then the gentleman can say whatever he wishes. If we trace the previous
10 questions and answers, the witness has indicated that he hasn't seen it.
11 He vaguely recalls, and so on. Now a question is put, and then
12 afterwards there is a declarative statement made by the Prosecution, no
13 inflection. In fact, it is testimony. I object to that. In believe
14 Mr. Khan quite eloquently informed us about the evils of such statements.
15 I would respect the rules, and I would ask that the Prosecutor be
16 cautioned, just as I'm cautioned on occasion when I get carried away. I
17 would ask the same thing --
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Karnavas. I think
19 you're quite right.
20 Mr. Scott, why don't you put the documents to the witness? You
21 have other ways of bringing him to where you want to bring him, and I
22 think counsel's objection is upheld.
23 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, sir.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.
25 MR. SCOTT: The testimony of the witness is he has not seen or
1 read the statement, so I'll leave it at that rather than showing him a
2 statement that he's never seen before, but the Chamber has.
3 Q. Now, sir, around this same time period in 27 of January, 1991,
4 you recall President Tudjman endorsing the JNA's right to arrest
5 individuals who at the time were mainly activists of Croatia's ruling
6 party concerning the illegal possession of arms. Do you recall
7 Mr. Tudjman endorsing the JNA's right to do that?
8 A. First of all, I didn't say that I never saw Mr. Izetbegovic's
9 statement. I saw the statement on several occasions. I just said that I
10 didn't hear it. Those are two different things.
11 Secondly, what you've just said is something I sincerely don't
13 Q. Well, sir, since you come back to it, I'll just ask you again.
14 Tell us what the rest of the statement -- what the rest of
15 Mr. Izetbegovic's statement says. You say you've seen it several times.
16 Tell us, please, apart from those four words that you remember, what was
17 the context? What was said above those four words? What was said after
18 those four words, and tell us what the context and import of that
19 statement was.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: I think we need to be fair to the witness, after
21 all of these years to ask the witness to recall something that was said
22 years and years ago. I believe Judge Trechsel indicated the method by
23 which this sort of technique should be used.
24 I did -- I did not give any hints to the Prosecution because I'm
25 not here to tell him how to do his job, but I think that's the proper
1 way. He can show him, and then if wants to further cross-examine him on
2 that and confront him then that's fine, but I think it's rather unfair to
3 ask a witness to recall something that he heard 15 years ago. Let's be
4 realistic here.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. I don't know what you
6 want to highlight so I'll let you ask your questions, but as was pointed
7 out by Mr. Karnavas it would be saving time if you had the exact
8 statement in the context of Mr. Izetbegovic. You may as well show it to
9 the witness.
10 MR. SCOTT: I don't have time, Your Honour, to do that. And the
11 point's already been made. The point has already been made. I don't
12 know want to argue with him about what I show him in the document. The
13 point is he doesn't remember anything about it except "It's not our war,"
14 and that's the point.
15 Q. Sir, do you recall that in May 1991 President Tudjman supported a
16 unanimous decision by the collective federal Yugoslav Presidency to grant
17 the JNA more authority to deal with ethnic conflicts?
18 A. Truly I don't remember. I was in the United States of America
19 the time. The information you're asking me about is too specific. I
20 don't remember.
21 Q. Do you recall this situation where in May of 1991
22 President Tudjman urged a group of ethnic Croats in Bosnia and
24 two-day blockade of a JNA convoy, that they should stop their protest and
25 let the JNA proceed on its way? Do you recall that?
1 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, Your Honour, I'm going to object to this
2 technique. Either show the documents and confront the witness, but to
3 ask the witness to remember things or to recall is virtually impossible
4 at this stage.
5 Now, I don't object to this form of questioning. However, if
6 this is going to be the basis upon which later there's going to be a
7 motion to introduce documents, I will high object because now we're not
8 giving the witness an opportunity to look at the documents. What is the
9 basis for Mr. Scott's pronouncements? I don't know. I think we're
10 entitled to that.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Scott. You're asking
12 him whether he recalls, and he said he couldn't remember because at the
13 time he was in the United States of America. Very well. Then to refresh
14 his memory you should show him in the document. You should say here is
15 the document showing this and he can say whether he's seen it or not,
16 whether he was in the USA
17 documents -- or read documents and watch the media.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.
19 MR. SCOTT:
20 Q. Sir, my question to you was do you recall Mr. Tudjman urging
21 ethnic Croats near Mostar to stop blockading the JNA blockade in about
22 May 1991? You either remember or you don't. If you don't remember, just
23 say so.
24 A. No. I've already said that I didn't remember specific events.
25 Q. Do you remember in October 1991 and following the Tudjman
1 government allowing JNA forces to leave their barracks in Croatia
2 take with them their weapons, their tanks, and their ammunitions when
3 they left?
4 A. I do remember that, roughly.
5 Q. Did that happen?
6 A. I think that it did in part. Of course the motivation of
7 President Tudjman was that the Yugoslav People's Army should leave
9 Q. And they were allowed to leave with their weapons, tanks, and
10 ammunition in hand; correct?
11 A. I don't recall the details. I think it's quite difficult to give
12 a general answer, because if I'm -- unless I'm mistaken, the situation
13 was different in different parts of Croatia. In some areas commanders of
14 the Yugoslav army units simply laid down their weapons, in others they
15 tried to resist. So it's very difficult to give a general answer.
16 Q. Sir, the point of this is that isn't it not correct that in 1990
17 and 1991 the ability of either Mr. Izetbegovic or Mr. Tudjman to do much
18 of anything to stop the JNA was very, very limited? Correct?
19 A. It was limited, but time showed that it was not impossible.
20 Q. Time showed. You said at one point that Mr. Izetbegovic believed
21 at the time, and I believe this was when you were referring to this you
22 were talking about June 1991, that the JNA, the federal Yugoslav forces
23 would not attack Bosnia and Herzegovina. You gave that testimony at page
24 27687 of the transcript. And my question to you again, sir, during much
25 of 1990 and 1991, hadn't that exactly also been President Tudjman's
1 position or belief, that he could avoid an armed conflict or war with
3 A. For a certain period of time in 1990 I do believe that this was a
4 position of President Tudjman. In other words, that through negotiations
5 and an intervention from the international community a solution could be
7 Q. And indeed wasn't that, however, the exact point of the meetings
8 between Tudjman and Milosevic in Karadjordjevo, to negotiate a deal by
9 which Croatia
10 attention instead on Bosnia and Herzegovina?
11 A. I don't know exactly what was discussed at Karadjordjevo, because
12 nobody was there except Tudjman and Milosevic. So nobody knows directly
13 what they talked about.
14 Having met Mr. Tudjman later, I know for a fact that his motive
15 for going to meet Milosevic was to try to stop the war and to try to find
16 a peaceful solution.
17 Q. If we -- we won't stop to pull the map out. If anyone questions
18 it I'm sure I'll be corrected, but if you look at a map of the former
21 attacking and resisting the independence declared by Slovenia at that
22 time? Correct?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. And do you know anything that President Tudjman or the Tudjman
25 government did to prevent the JNA from crossing Croatia territory to
1 carry out these actions in Slovenia
2 A. Although I can see what logic you are guided by, I have to say
3 that everybody who knew the situation realised quite clearly that Croatia
4 was not able to stop the Yugoslav People's Army. And in any case, this
5 intervention by the JNA lasted only ten days. Slovenia did not start any
6 serious war, nor was Croatia
7 the JNA, as we can see from numerous documents, any serious intentions.
9 assisted each other in many ways.
10 There is an imprecision in interpretation. I said "fully," not
11 "in many ways."
12 Q. Do you know whether President Tudjman ever told Kadijevic that
14 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
15 Q. Now, you've also talked about, in this -- in fact, in these same
16 set of facts, essentially, that the people in both Croatia and Bosnia
18 A. It is a fact that people armed themselves both in Croatia
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
20 Q. And would you agree, sir, that the Muslim side had every much
21 right to prepare for a conflict and arm themselves as the Croat side?
22 A. Certainly.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, there might be
24 something unclear in your answer. Maybe it was due to the question.
25 The arming of the population, was it spontaneous, or did someone
1 tell them to arm themselves, because that would not be the same
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're right, Mr. President. I
4 would have answered precisely, but I had not understood the question very
5 precisely. I'm not -- I think there were two parallel things going on in
7 myself. A large majority of my colleagues tried to get hold of a weapon
8 without any specific purpose in mind, but on the other hand, the
9 government was also trying in various ways to get hold of armaments and
10 to assure its defence. So there were two processes going on in parallel,
11 and there was a third process as well. A large number of Croats who had
12 emigrated tried to assist by sending weapons, I believe both to Croatia
13 and to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Let me correct myself, not only Croats
14 but others as well.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you for this
16 additional answer.
17 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. I appreciate the
18 clarification. I should have been clearer.
19 Q. Just to stay on that for one moment longer, sir. Is it fair to
20 say that in that situation that we've been discussing, both the Croatian
21 government and the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina as governments
22 were taking steps to organise themselves, to arm themselves, and various
23 individuals and groups were also engaged in such efforts? Is that
25 A. I think that's correct.
1 Q. I'd like to turn to the topic of some of the peace negotiations
2 that you were involved in, and we've talked a fair amount today in
3 connection with the questions by Ms. Alaburic about the process of
4 negotiations, and you had indicated in your direct examination, sir, that
5 negotiations normally result in some sort of compromise; correct?
6 A. In principle, yes.
7 Q. And each side or party to a negotiation, broadly speaking, is
8 entitled to their positions, and they can drive a hard bargain; correct?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. And I'm sure in your experience there's a number of different
11 negotiating tactics and methods, and people use different methods and
12 different approaches to try to get what they want; is that correct?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. And as frustrating as that process may be, it may be very
15 aggravating, in fact, but that's the negotiating process; correct?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. You talked about situations where representatives of the Muslim
18 party might come and receive information but not be in a position to make
19 a decision. Now, I put to you, sir, I suspect that's not uncommon in
20 your experience. A party may come to a meeting and say, "We're here to
21 listen. We'd like to hear what you have to say. We're not in a position
22 to make any decision today, but please lay out your position to us."
23 There's nothing particularly uncommon about that, is there?
24 A. There isn't, but if you use that strategy to obstruct
25 negotiations, then we cannot talk of it as something positive. I've
1 never claimed that that's the way they used this strategy. I just shared
2 my impression that occasionally that is the way they were trying to
3 negotiate without actually agreeing to anything. That was my impression.
4 Q. Would you -- could you agree that the opposite, if you've said
5 that -- if I can paraphrase and I'll try to get it correctly, that, one,
6 this idea that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, but would
7 you agree that the opposite can be equally destructive or misleading or
8 non-productive and that is, the position that as soon as one thing is
9 agreed, acting as if everything has been agreed?
10 A. Quite certainly. Every method, every approach used to obstruct
11 negotiations is equally negative.
12 Q. Let me just be very transparent with you, sir. The position of
13 many, and the Chamber has heard some of the witnesses in this courtroom,
14 is that the problem encountered on the Croat side, as it were, I'm not
15 talking about you personally, sir, generally speaking, was that when
16 something -- when one part of something would be agreed, the Croat side
17 would then immediately act as if everything had been agreed and that they
18 were ready to move forward on everything whether there was, in fact,
19 agreement or not. Have you ever heard that commentary made?
20 A. I can't remember any specific example, but it is true that the
21 Croat side was keen to go forward with the implementation as soon as
22 something was agreed, guided simply by the idea that the sooner something
23 is implemented, if it had been agreed already, the sooner the objectives
24 will be reached, namely, to stop the war.
25 Q. Isn't it fair to say, sir, that on a number of occasions, both
1 the international negotiators and/or the Serbs and/or the Muslim party on
2 a number of occasions would say, "Hold on. We're not there yet. Yes,
3 we've agreed to something, some parts but not everything, and we're not
4 ready to go forward further"? Didn't that happen on a number of
5 occasions? January 1993, March 1993?
6 A. Naturally. Certainly such things happened in all sorts of
7 negotiations, especially the very complex ones like this.
8 Q. In one of your -- in some of your earlier testimony you were
9 talking about one of the meetings -- one of the presidential meetings in
10 June 1991, and there were negotiations involving -- well, the positions
11 of Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Gligorov at one point, and Tudjman was quoted
12 as saying, and again this is in the transcript of the 8 June 1991
13 meeting, P 00037, and Tudjman is quoted as saying, "Basically, that is,
15 Now, what does that mean to you? You say a party has accepted
16 the position, but giving it its own interpretation.
17 A. I could not interpret this sentence because I don't know in which
18 context it belongs, when it was said and what it applies to, but
19 generally speaking we all know of examples when one side says they had
20 accepted something and then interprets it as something entirely
22 I doubt that I have ever quoted Tudjman off-the-cuff like this.
23 Now, this sentence, when I see it like this in English, I can't place it
24 in what I might have said then.
25 Q. I'm sorry, sir, I don't want you to feel misled. This was a
1 statement attributed to President Tudjman in the presidential transcript.
2 I was just putting it to you for your comment as an experienced
3 negotiator. When someone says one party has accepted a position but
4 given it its own interpretation, and I think you addressed that, but I
5 wasn't attributing the statement to you, sir.
6 Now, you've talked about the Washington Agreement, and you told
7 us that you became involved in that process very early on and that you
8 were involved, in fact, in some of the preliminary steps, if you will, to
9 initiate that process; correct?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And can you recall approximately when the Washington process
12 started as opposed to any of the previous efforts? We are not talking
13 about Owen-Stoltenberg. We're not talking about anything -- but when
14 something began to be called Washington
15 A. I can't give you the exact dates. I'm sure they're easy to find.
16 But speaking of the situation at the negotiations, I believe two
17 important factors determined the beginning of the Washington process.
18 First was the direct involvement of the US, that is, sending Mr. Redman
19 as a special envoy of President Clinton, and second was the feeling that
20 prevailed in everyone. I believe that the peace conference, the way it
21 ran in Geneva
22 important elements.
23 Q. I think, sir, that both in your prior testimony and in some of
24 the presidential meetings where you were a participant you confirmed that
25 and which hopefully we need not spend more time on that. It's fair to
1 say that by the latter part of 1993, all of the previous peace processes
2 were basically dead, so to speak; correct?
3 A. Well, that was the prevailing impression.
4 Q. I think at one point in one of your statements you said that the
5 conference, the ICFY, was -- essentially had run its course and was no
6 longer productive. Is that fair to say?
7 A. That was my impression at the time.
8 Q. Now, you talked about some of the things leading up to Washington
9 or the fact that the -- this -- one of the important aspects, the direct
10 and increasing involvement of the United States government, but let me
11 also ask you this: Is it fair to say that by late 1993, early 1994, the
12 Bosnian Croats in particular were under tremendous military pressure in
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina - the war had essentially turned against them at
14 that point - and Croatia
15 because of certain concerns about its involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 Aren't those two things true?
17 A. I could not comment on the situation in the conflict on the
18 ground. There are certainly other people who know that better. But it's
19 true that Croatia
20 community at that time.
21 Q. Now, as things headed in the direction of Washington but even
22 before it was formally known as Washington
23 you not, that a -- some sort of a unification between the Croats and
24 Muslims alone in the same entity, that that was not -- to use Mr. Boban's
25 word, that was not viable. That had been your position; correct?
1 A. That was my impression then, yes.
2 Q. I'd like to turn, please, in your binder to -- I'll tell you
3 which binder in a moment, Exhibit P 10532 should be in the third binder.
4 P 10532.
5 Sir, this is a press account by the BBC on the 9th of August,
6 1993, in connection with ongoing negotiations at the time. You were
7 interviewed, described here as the head of Croatian mission to the UN in
9 that article you say: "Asked why the Muslim idea of unification of
10 Muslim and Croat republics into a Bosnia-Herzegovina union is not
11 acceptable, Zuzul said, 'It could hardly work.'"
12 Why did you think a unification of Muslims and Croats in a
13 unified Bosnia-Herzegovina "could hardly work"?
14 A. I don't really recall that statement, although I have no reason
15 to claim it's not true. But if I had said that, then I must have
16 believed at that moment that it couldn't work. Still, I continued or
17 started to work actively for that solution in which it could work. So if
18 I had said that, it applied only to that moment.
19 Q. And you said earlier today, I believe, that -- you talked -- made
20 reference to the fact that maps had been prepared by the international
21 representatives involved, but just to be clear here, because in the
22 previous paragraph you're commenting on the allocation of territory. The
23 Bosnian Muslims would get 30 per cent, et cetera. I mean, isn't it fair
24 to say, sir, that all the parties were constantly preparing and
25 submitting maps throughout this process?
1 A. That's completely correct, but I was talking about the map that
2 was part of the Vance-Owen Plan, because I think that was the question.
3 The map was shown to me, and I believe I said it had been prepared by
4 international experts.
5 Q. Is it fair to say, sir, moving on Washington, that -- further
6 into it, if you will, that as it ultimately came about and as ultimately
7 signed by the Croat and Muslim parties, that the Washington Agreement was
8 a fairly radical shift from the previous peace plans and represented a
9 substantial turn in Croatia
10 A. Well, it's difficult to say whether it represented a turn,
11 because even before there had been talk about a federation and a
12 confederation between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina
13 However, I believe it represented a concrete and realistic possibility of
14 reaching an agreement which at that moment was being supported by the
15 majority of important international factors -- players.
16 Q. Let me ask you, please, to go to -- we won't be able to finish
17 this tonight, but I suppose we should use the time.
18 If you can go to Exhibit P 07856, which should be in binder
19 number 2. 7856.
20 Sir, this is -- as you're looking there for the record, let me
21 say this is a record of a meeting with President Tudjman and others in
23 be both in English and a Croatian language transcript there, and you can
24 refer to whichever is most convenient for you.
25 Looking at page number 1, and the page numbers should be the same
1 in both versions, President Tudjman, if you will, calls this meeting to
2 order, and he says: "Gentlemen, I told Minister Susak to invite Mate and
3 the rest of you - a summit of the leading people of Herceg-Bosna - for us
4 to come to an agreement as to how and what to take forward after all that
5 has happened recently: Our general meeting in Livno, the Sarajevo
6 meeting, the current talks in Geneva
7 situation arising from the initiative taken by the United States with a
8 group of European countries for an ongoing solution to the
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis."
10 Now, the new situation, sir, that's referred to by
11 President Tudjman here, that's Washington
12 A. That's the beginning, which leads towards the
14 Q. If you can continue over to page number 2, skipping to the last
15 paragraph on that page. President Tudjman continues talking and says:
16 "At the same time, pressure on us publicising," apparently some omission,
17 something that's been left out. "So far they have let it be known that
18 they are not happy with our policy in Herceg-Bosna, that we are to blame
19 for worsening relations with the Muslims, and they have let us know that
20 we must change this and quite openly make Mate Boban a symbol of this
21 supposed responsibility of ours for the clash with the Muslims. It was
22 said then in friendly talks that we must change this symbol, which is why
23 I decided that Mate would take no more part in the talks ..."
24 Do you recall -- do you recall the decision being made by
25 President Tudjman that Boban would no longer participate in the
1 negotiations in early 1994?
2 A. I remember that Mate Boban stopped participating in the
3 negotiations at that time and that President Tudjman wanted him to stop,
4 but whether anyone made a formal decision about that and who made it, I
5 don't know.
6 Q. If I can ask you to go to page 4 of the record.
7 President Tudjman refers to the ongoing discussions, and about a third of
8 the way down that page it says: "We are for a union of three republics
9 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the question could be raised and
10 Ambassador Zuzul, who spoke to the American envoy Redman, who was in
11 charge of it, will tell you we could find ourselves in a delicate
12 position if that American and Western policy were to go as far as
13 allowing the departure of the Serbs ..."
14 Now, on the Croat side, and I don't mean the Bosnian Croats but
15 in terms of the Croats from the Republic of Croatia
16 negotiations around that time?
17 A. I was not leading the negotiations, but I participated in them.
18 Now, in this specific case I believe I reported to the president about
19 talks with Ambassador Redman.
20 Q. At the top of page 5, Tudjman continues and he says and about
21 this process: "At the same time as we find ways and means to come to an
22 agreement with the Muslims, but an agreement which will not bring in
23 question our interest in Herceg-Bosna or our state interest as a whole."
24 Now, this record will show, sir, and we probably won't get to it
25 tonight, but that you were present in this meeting. What did you
1 understand President Tudjman to mean when he says, "We will not allow the
2 agreement to put in question our interest in Herceg-Bosna"?
3 A. Then and now my interpretation was that he meant protection of
4 the constitutive status of the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina
5 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I think that's as far as we can go
6 this evening.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Witness, some
8 recommendations on my part since you are to return tomorrow. The hearing
9 will start at 9.00 in the morning. You're not supposed to have any
10 contact whatsoever, but for the members of your family, of course, you
11 are free to convey your impressions about the hearing to them as long as
12 it doesn't go beyond the family circle. You're also free to read any
13 book that is available to you. We are not here to exert censorship and
14 we are not to prohibit any reading which might seem useful to you.
15 This is what I wanted to tell you. We shall reconvene tomorrow
16 at 9.00 in the morning. Thank you.
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.
18 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 22nd day
19 of July, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.