1 Tuesday, 22 July 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The Accused Pusic not present]
5 [The witness entered court]
6 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
9 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,
10 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-04-74-T,
11 the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al. Thank you, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
13 Today is Tuesday, the 22nd of July, 2008. Good morning to the accused.
14 My best wishes for Mr. Pusic who's been absent for a few of days. Good
15 morning to the Defence counsel, to all the OTP representatives, and of
16 course good morning to you, Witness, and good morning to all the people
17 helping us.
18 We are going to continue with the cross-examination. You have
19 used so far one hour and 39 minutes, Mr. Scott. You may proceed.
20 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning,
21 Your Honours, and to all those in and around the courtroom. Just before
22 I begin, Your Honour, just for the record the Prosecution is filing this
23 morning a written objection to some Defence documents tendered through
24 the witness -- in connection with the witness Buntic, and we ran into a
25 bit of a computer glitch, but as soon as that's corrected it will be
1 filed straight away this morning.
2 WITNESS: MIOMIR ZUZUL [Resumed]
3 [Witness answered through interpreter]
4 Cross-examination by Mr. Scott: [Continued]
5 Q. Good morning, Mr. Zuzul.
6 A. [In English] Good morning.
7 Q. I'd like to just go back ever so briefly to just a couple of
8 points from yesterday. Again, just in terms of negotiations, would it be
9 fair to say in your negotiations experience, would it be fair to say that
10 in a situation where people are -- parties may expect a cease-fire or a
11 peace agreement, if you will, to, if I can put it this way, break out at
12 any moment or to be approaching, each side at that moment wants to put as
13 much territory as possible under its boot, so to speak. Is that correct?
14 A. [Interpretation] Well, I think that one could put it that way,
15 generally speaking.
16 Q. And so it wouldn't surprise you in any particular situation in
17 the Balkan conflict that all sides were engaged in that, would it?
18 A. I wouldn't dare to make such a generalised statement in respect
19 of specific cases. Generally speaking, that is correct but I wouldn't
20 dare confirm that for every specific case.
21 Q. All right. And you were asked some questions at one point about
22 military planning and you were shown some documents which seem to confirm
23 that there was indeed some advanced planning of certain military
24 operations. Isn't it also correct, sir, that that's often the idea
25 behind planning military operation because you don't tell the other side
1 what the plans are?
2 A. It is only logical and understandable that this should be the
4 Q. Now -- and then just touching on -- going back to the
5 presidential transcript that we were in yesterday, I asked you about the
6 decision to remove Mate Boban from the negotiations, from the peace
7 negotiations, as of early -- at least early 1994, and I asked you about
8 that and you said - looking at page 87 of the daily transcript from
9 yesterday - and you said: "But whether anyone made a formal decision
10 about that and who made it, I don't know."
11 But, sir, didn't you see it on the very page of the transcript
12 that I showed you that President Tudjman said in no uncertain terms: I
13 made the decision, it was my decision, I decided. Isn't that correct?
14 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I object. Is he asking to verify
15 what's on the transcript or is he asking to verify what was on Tudjman's
16 mind and intentions? There's a distinction there.
17 MR. SCOTT: Not what was on Tudjman's mind, what Tudjman said.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Then the transcript speaks for itself. That's the
19 best evidence.
20 MR. SCOTT:
21 Q. And do you have some reason to doubt that, sir?
22 A. Is that question addressed to me? I'm sorry.
23 Q. Yes, sir. Didn't Tudjman say - and if we need to go to it again,
24 if you want to turn to Exhibit P 07856, which we'll be going back to in a
25 moment in any event, it was in the second binder, binder number 2. The
1 usher we'll need your assistance, please.
2 A. I remember what I said yesterday too, and you're right.
3 President Tudjman uttered the sentence which found its way into the
4 transcript. However, what I said or added in my answer and what I wish
5 to repeat today is that I don't know whether a formal body was supposed
6 to verify or make that decision.
7 Q. Well --
8 A. However, as is generally known, the international community
9 always asked President Tudjman to use his influence in the negotiations.
10 We can see this in the specific case. The international community asked
11 President Tudjman to help and intercede in order to make sure that the
12 Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina were forthcoming and -- in these
13 negotiations. Now, I don't know whether President Tudjman issued this
14 decision or not; this is something that I stressed.
15 Q. Sir, what you just said now, isn't that another way of just
16 saying -- recognising that everyone involved, the international
17 community, knew of the direct connection between Tudjman and the
18 Herceg-Bosna leadership? It was no secret, was it? And it was for that
19 very reason that the international community approached Tudjman time
20 after time after time?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. In fact -- I know you know and you've testified about some of
23 your dealings with Ambassador Galbraith, Ambassador Galbraith testified
24 that the direct connection and the control by Tudjman of the Herceg-Bosna
25 leadership, I think his exact words were was an open secret bearing on
1 be -- verging on being no secret at all. Would you agree with that?
2 A. That he had a direct connection with the representatives of
3 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina was no secret, open or otherwise. When they
4 came to -- into Zagreb
5 large. When international negotiators came to Zagreb, it was always a
6 public matter, no secret at all.
7 Now, when it comes to control that you mentioned, that's a
8 different matter. It is true that President Tudjman had quite an
9 influence over the Croat representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I don't
10 think that it was -- that he even had that sort of informal control at
11 all times. I do recall when President Tudjman, or rather, the HDZ of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that candidate was not ultimately elected. He
14 definitely had influence, but I wouldn't say that he always had control.
15 Q. Going back to the transcript - and if you can find that, please,
16 now that you have the binder in front of you, binder number 2, 7856 - if
17 you'll go to page 8 of the transcript, please, just again confirming as
18 we began to discuss yesterday, your involvement in this particular
19 meeting. On page 8 this statement is attributed to you.
20 "I might suggest, Mr. President, as Mr. Akmadzic and Mr. Zubak
21 received messages to transmit -- in fact, they're similar to what I said,
22 et cetera ..."
23 And then the conversation turns to Mr. Akmadzic and Mr. Akmadzic
24 says: "I would just like to say a few words, as I assume, Mr. President,
25 that Mr. Granic and Mr. Zuzul have already informed you to some extent
1 about certain matters."
2 Was that the case, that prior to, in fact, this meeting you and
3 Dr. Granic had already briefed President Tudjman on these matters?
4 A. I think that that's correct.
5 Q. There's a reference further down in the part that I just read to
6 you about Mr. Akmadzic where he says: "... we spoke with this delegation
7 of the so-called Croatian council from Sarajevo."
8 Can you briefly, please, tell us the Judges what this Croatian
9 council from Sarajevo
10 A. The Croatian council from Sarajevo
11 a group of Croats living in Sarajevo
12 active before, others weren't, to get organized as a sort of parallel
13 representatives of Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina. It seems to me that
14 they never gained the support of the Croat population in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regardless of the fact that representatives of the
16 international community sometimes received them, they never had any
17 actual influence in the communication with the international community.
18 There may have existed a wish for them to be recognised to a greater
19 extent, but what was also evident was the fact that they in fact
20 represented mostly themselves rather than a population.
21 Q. All right. Well, Mr. Zuzul, I don't have time to argue about
22 that with you today, but was Mr. Komsic, a man named Ivo Komsic, part of
23 that group?
24 A. To my knowledge, he was. Members of that group changed, but I do
25 believe Mr. Komsic was a member.
1 Q. Now, if you'll turn to page 28, sir, I'm going to ask your
2 assistance in the -- it might be difficult, but I would ask for you,
3 please, despite whatever differences that the two of us may have, we need
4 to move fairly quickly today. My time is limited, and I'll try to be as
5 concise as I can and I'll appreciate if you can assist us in doing the
6 same. If you'll go to paragraph -- page 28, please, I just want to
7 indicate here this is another intervention by you. Just to confirm what
8 you said yesterday, if you look at the second paragraph under your name
9 and you report to the group, first the conference -- the conference, and
10 I take it that is the reference to the International Conference on the
11 former Yugoslavia
12 A. Yes, yes, correct.
13 Q. "The conference is at its death bed, it is presently frozen if
14 not dying ..."
15 So that process had really run its course, so to speak; correct?
16 A. In my view, yes.
17 Q. If you go to page 33, please, and this is still you speaking.
18 You say on the first paragraph on that page you say: "Silajdzic told me,
19 very openly, that Komsic's proposal was not entirely Komsic's. I mean,
20 that's completely clear, because besides this map, which you have in
21 front of you, these are completely developed documents, evidently done by
22 experts. And Redman," he was the US Special Envoy, I believe, correct,
23 "has indicated that he is very familiar with their content."
24 Now, this is the same Mr. Komsic that you mentioned just a moment
25 ago; is that correct?
1 A. Yes, that's the same gentleman.
2 Q. And what did you know at the time and what did you mean when you
3 said that Komsic's proposal was not entirely Komsic's?
4 A. As I said here, Silajdzic told me this and he was not only
5 familiar with Komsic's proposal but Silajdzic said, it seems to me, that
6 the proposal was agreed upon between Komsic and the Muslim side. I also
7 believe that they had already acquainted Ambassador Redman with the
9 Q. In fact, sir, isn't it correct that what Komsic put on the table,
10 so to speak, was what came to be the Washington Agreement?
11 A. I don't exactly remember what it was that Mr. Komsic put on the
12 table, but I wouldn't say that this evolved into the Washington Agreement
13 because there still had to -- there was still a long way of negotiations
14 to pass before the agreement would be reached.
15 Q. All right. Well, again, I don't want to spend too much time on
16 it, but it may not -- Mr. Komsic's proposal may not have been the last
17 word, the final version, but isn't it fair to say that it was the concept
18 put on the table at that time that then after further negotiations
19 evolved into Washington
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I'm going to object again. The
21 witness indicated that he doesn't remember exactly what Komsic put on the
22 table. Now he's trying to force an answer out of him. He can put to the
23 witness what Komsic put on the table and then he can ask whether it's in
24 concert with the Washington Agreement.
25 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I disagree, and Mr. Karnavas knows
1 better. It's not required for cross-examination that I do that. I can
2 put propositions to the witness, he wither knows or he doesn't know.
3 Secondly, I can probe the witness. I don't have to accept the first
4 answer given as the last answer.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely.
6 MR. SCOTT:
7 Q. Sir, just to clarify, you heard my question, whether or not it
8 was subject to further negotiations and refinement. I repeat to you
9 again: Wasn't what Komsic put on the table what evolved into and
10 ultimately became Washington
11 A. I cannot confirm that because I don't know what Mr. Komsic put on
12 the table at the time. However, as I said, the process of the Washington
13 Agreement took a long time. In my earlier evidence I spoke extensively
14 of the negotiations I had with Mr. Biscevic, with Ambassador Biscevic on
15 behalf of our side, and on the other side there were Mr. Silajdzic and
16 Mr. Komsic. The proposals we discussed at the time originated from our
17 side, in fact, from my side. If one closely follows the course of
18 events, that can in fact be taken as the start of the negotiations
19 leading to the Washington Agreement or the talks Mr. Granic had with
20 Mr. Silajdzic or the talks between Mr. Granic and myself with Ambassador
21 Redman --
22 Q. All right, sir. I want to go on, please --
23 A. -- all of that preceded --
24 JUDGE PRANDLER: Excuse me. I'm very sorry to interrupt you, but
25 let me ask both of you, please slow down a bit for the sake of the
1 interpreters. I would appreciate it very much. Thank you.
2 MR. SCOTT: My apologies, Your Honour.
3 Q. And I apologise to you again, Mr. Zuzul, I'm not trying to be
4 discourteous, but again time is quite limited and sometimes -- I have to
5 press forward with particular questions. I wish we had more time,
7 Let me ask you to go to page 59 of the transcript. At the middle
8 of that page, sir, President Tudjman comes back into the conversation and
9 says this: "Well, Gentlemen, what we have heard about this reversal, in
10 the sense that America
11 really anything new for us. Because we have always known that the West
12 was interested - as was evident in the case of Germany - in punishing
14 Now, two questions. In the first line where President Tudjman
15 says: "... we have heard about this reversal ..." what reversal is he
16 talking about?
17 A. I find it quite difficult to interpret at this time what
18 President Tudjman referred to, the reversal. Perhaps he meant the
19 departure from the Vance-Owen Plan which was topical at the time and
20 going on to the first step which would mean the rapprochement between the
21 Croats and the Muslims.
22 Q. Can I ask you, please, to go next to Exhibit P 10535, which would
23 be in binder number 3, please. Sir, this appears to be an interview --
24 or, sorry, an account of a speech that was given to -- by
25 President Tudjman around this time. The article is dated the 28th of
1 February, 1994
2 transcript that we were looking at a few moments ago, a few days later.
3 Now, if you can scan down the page until you see the heading:
4 "Muslim-Croat union in Bosnia-Herzegovina ..." and it starts off with
5 Mr. Tudjman saying: "Today, for the first time, all the relevant
6 international factors from Europe
7 that the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it is, is impossible and have
8 recommended to us and in their own way consider it necessary both because
9 of us and because of the world for us to accept a solution according to
10 which the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina would stay in a union with
11 the Muslims ..."
12 Now, we continue on and I'll put a question to you in a moment.
13 Going over to the next page, top of the next page, there's a paragraph
14 that says: "Therefore, they have recommended to us, insisted and
15 persisted, that we must reach an agreement with the Muslims."
16 Now, when one reads this entire article, including the parts that
17 I just quoted to you, in a consistent -- I put to you consistent with
18 President Tudjman's use of the word "reversal" in the presidential
19 transcript, this agreement, the Washington Agreement, represented a
20 fairly abrupt shift from what had happened previously and
21 President Tudjman viewed this largely as something that had been imposed
22 on Croatia
23 A. I should say that all the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
25 several occasions I stressed that President Tudjman always took as his
1 goal the position of Croatia
2 number one; number two, the protection of the Croats in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Keeping in mind and taking care of these two
4 matters, the position of Croatia
5 point there was the variant whereby the status of Croats within
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina could be resolved either by making them one of the
7 three republics in Bosnia-Herzegovina or by being recognised clearly in a
8 different manner as one of the three constituent nations, that is,
9 entities, in that sense the Washington Agreement was indeed a turning
10 point or reversal because the position of the Croat people was now going
11 to be resolved through a rapprochement with the Bosniak people and
12 through setting up a federal relationship with the Bosnian -- with the
13 Muslim side.
14 Q. Sorry, sir, I'm waiting for the translation and that's why there
15 seems to be a lapse of silence. Sir, if you go to the top of the third
16 page of the document, please, just to follow on this point,
17 President Tudjman is quoted as saying: "This is yet another historic
18 turning point in the life of the Croatian people and in the drawing of
19 those everlasting lines, in the process of demarcation between the worlds
20 and civilizations in this area."
21 Do you agree with that statement?
22 A. Well, I do agree that this is a statement that I heard on several
23 occasions from President Tudjman, though it was not only from him that I
24 heard it.
25 Q. I would like to turn briefly to some maps that resulted from
2 MR. SCOTT: If I can have the usher's assistance, I'm looking
3 first at P 10550, and I'm not really sure how those have been -- they
4 should be in the binders, in the third binder, binder number 3 for the
6 Q. Sir, these are -- there's a collection of maps here that we're
7 going to look at for a few minutes.
8 MR. SCOTT: For the courtroom, for the Judges and for counsel,
9 these are maps that have been prepared based on the so-called same base
10 map of the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the municipalities that the
11 Chamber and others have seen since the beginning of the trial.
12 Q. Now, sir, Exhibit P 10550, if you can scan that for a moment, can
13 you confirm that this is a map resulting from the Washington Agreement?
14 Does it look about right to you if you don't recall it in every detail?
15 A. I remember the map and the details very well because in the -- I
16 took part throughout the duration of the Vienna negotiations. I can't
17 really confirm every line of it, but I do believe that that's it.
18 Q. And as a result of this process there were two areas which might
19 be considered Croat majority cantons marked in blue, light blue, on the
20 map, number 2 and number 8. Do you see that?
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 Q. And two rather large mixed -- I'll call mixed cantons, Croat and
23 Muslim, which are marked in hash marks and numbered 6 and 7. Do you see
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. And, sir, if you can recall again - and hopefully we can again do
2 this without needing to pull out a number of other maps - but if you can
3 recall -- sir, can you please confirm to the Judges that contrary -- in
4 quite substantial contrast to the maps resulting from the Vance-Owen
5 Peace Plan that were signed in March 1993, a large part of what had been
6 in the so-called Croat provinces 8 and 10 are now instead in the mixed
7 province of 6 and 7?
8 A. Correct. I can even try to explain to you why I believe that
9 this came to be.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, sir.
11 Before that I would like to object on the grounds of relevance.
12 Are we prosecuting the Vance-Owen Peace Plan? I mean, what is the
13 relevance of all of this? I think it's an abuse of process to give the
14 Prosecution all this time and then go into areas that are totally not
15 relevant. Where is it in part of the indictment?
16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas.
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.
18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: The Defence so far has put great accent on the
19 fact that the Croatian side accepted the VOPP and always put this to the
20 Chamber as something very legitimate, and --
21 MR. KARNAVAS: It accepted the Washington as well, it accepted
22 the Washington
23 accepted the Owen-Stoltenberg Agreement. What is this particular line of
24 questioning? What does it have to do with the indictment?
25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I think Mr. Scott is the one to answer it.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: That's why I'm objecting on the grounds of
2 relevance. Thank you.
3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Let's listen to Mr. Scott.
4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, this topic, both the Washington and
6 this witness. I think I counted the references to Dayton in this
7 witness's testimony at least 15 references to Dayton in 1995 and at least
8 eight references to the Washington Agreement. So my cross-examination is
9 no different than going into the topics that were raised on direct
11 MR. KARNAVAS: I beg to differ. There is a difference
12 referencing to the different negotiations that are going on versus
13 prosecuting Vance-Owen Peace Plan with respect -- with what happened at
14 the Washington
15 and I beg you to look at the transcript -- at the indictment and point to
16 me where is it and how is this line of questioning relevant? Now, I
17 don't mind if he wants to spend all that time, but I do think that it is
18 an abuse of process to give the Prosecution that much amount of time
19 simply to harass witnesses. Your Honours, this is pure harassment. It
20 has nothing to do with the case.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The objection is overruled.
22 Mr. Scott, you may proceed. The Chamber deems that the questions
23 in relation to the Washington Agreement can be relevant in the context.
24 MR. SCOTT:
25 Q. And, sir, if I can next ask you to go in a similar fashion to
1 P 10552, which is a map resulting from the Dayton Agreement. Can you --
2 A. Yes, Mr. Prosecutor, certainly but I do wish to mention that I
3 didn't manage to answer your previous question --
4 Q. Well, I've lost --
5 A. -- because there was an interruption. If you wish me to answer
7 Q. I do appreciate that, sir. I've lost it on the screen, to be
8 perfectly honest. If we can go back --
9 MR. KHAN: If it helps, Your Honour, page 14, line 2.
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Page 13 --
11 MR. SCOTT:
12 Q. Yes, sir, here's my question to you, please, and perhaps you
13 recall it, you seem to recall it and I do appreciate your bringing it to
14 my attention. It says: "Hopefully -- but if you can recall, sir, can
15 you please confirm to the Judges that contrary, in quite substantial
16 contrast to the maps resulting from the Vance-Owen Plan that were signed
17 in March 1993, a large part of what had been in the so-called Croat
18 provinces 8 and 10 are now instead in the mixed province of 6 and 7?"
19 And actually your answer was: "Correct." But if you'd like
20 something more, sir, briefly, then please do so.
21 A. Thank you very much. The Croatian side, as is well-known,
22 accepted the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. However, evidently it could not be
23 negotiated fully. Inter alia, the demarcation within zones 6 and 7 could
24 not be negotiated. I often spoke, for example, about the issue of Neum
25 which was very important to the Muslim side, and according to the
1 Vance-Owen Plan and every previous plan it was part of a unit belonging
2 to the Croatian people.
3 The model of the Vance-Owen Plan was the following. There are
4 three entities, both ethnic and territorial. The model of the Washington
5 plan was that Croats enter a federation with the Muslims, and in such a
6 situation the demarcation in the various units in zones 6 and 7 is no
7 longer so important because it was agreed that the Croats and Muslims
8 would hold power together in these areas and that they would not divide
9 the territories according to the ethnic principle. That is why there is
10 this deviation from the Owen-Stoltenberg or the Vance-Owen Plan, which
11 the Croatian side accepted, out of the same desire that it had when it
12 accepted the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and that was to find a solution in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina that would lead to peace.
14 Q. Thank you. We're going to have to move forward. If I can ask
15 you to look, please, next briefly at P 10552. And can you just confirm
16 to us, please, that based again on your general knowledge and familiarity
17 with these items, that this is a map which shows the cantons resulting
18 from the Dayton
19 A. I think that's correct, yes, I think that's the map.
20 Q. And in terms of anything that might be considered Croat majority
21 provinces or cantons, would those correspond with what on this map has
22 been marked as 8 and 10?
23 A. With respect to 8 and 10, as a rule, yes. As far as Croatia
24 concerned there's a big difference in the part marked 2 here, the
25 Bosnian Posavina area. Now the territory marked as Croatian is
1 considerably smaller.
2 Q. And in contrast -- in contrast to that, the total area covered by
3 8 and 10 in the Dayton
4 the area covered by area 8 or canton 8 in the Washington map; correct?
5 Simply looking at 8 and 10 combined together; correct?
6 A. Well, it's hard to compare like this. It's probably somewhat
7 bigger, but I can tell you why. In Dayton, in the middle of the
8 negotiations, the principle of percentage of territory was introduced.
9 This was accepted, so the solution of Dayton was sought by establishing
10 the percentage of the territory which would be, so to speak, allocated to
11 or controlled by a particular side.
12 Q. Let me ask you while we have the map in front of us - and now
13 we'd like to go back to 10550, the Washington map, if you can just flip
14 back for a moment, please. You said during your direct examination
15 testimony that at one point or on two occasions you said Izetbegovic had
16 offered western Herzegovina
17 define or what did you consider western Herzegovina? What territory was
18 being offered, according to your testimony, to Tudjman?
19 A. I think that I said quite precisely in the course of my testimony
20 that when I was present there was no mention on what territory this was
21 about. That was the situation where I was a witness. In another
22 situation which Minister Granic told me about but where I was not
23 present, Granic told me that then Mr. Izetbegovic mentioned the territory
24 with greater precision. In neither case, to the best of my knowledge, or
25 rather, I'm sure about the first case and according to what Granic said
1 to me in the second also, Tudjman did not take up that conversation, he
2 didn't accept it, so there was no further talk of defining the territory.
3 Q. Do you have any reason to agree or disagree that western
5 marked on the Washington
6 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me -- Your Honour, there's answers --
7 statements being said "no" verbally in the courtroom from the other side
8 of the courtroom. I've heard it now twice. Someone has said "no" twice,
9 I heard it twice. That should not be happening.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Although I am no expert in
11 establishing maps and territories, I'm sufficiently familiar with the
12 area for me to say that this is not a map of western Herzegovina because
13 it does not include areas such as Citluk, such as Capljina, such as Neum.
14 Generally speaking, Herzegovina
15 which has existed for centuries. It's divided not necessarily by a
16 border, but it's divided into western and eastern Herzegovina primarily
17 by the proportion of the population. In western Herzegovina there were
18 predominantly Croats, Catholics; and in eastern Herzegovina, Orthodox,
19 that is, Serbs.
20 Q. Thank you for that. If I can ask you to go next very briefly to
21 Exhibit P 10481, which should be in the binder number 3, 10481. You find
22 that, sir, and if I can ask you and direct the courtroom's attention to
23 page 10, starting on page 10 of that document. -- or actually, page 9,
24 excuse me.
25 Sir, I just wanted to cover this very briefly because you did
1 mention on your direct examination that you had, in fact, been involved
2 with preparing, I believe, this document at page 27721 of your direct
3 examination testimony you said: "I was present" -- excuse me.
4 "Sometime in mid-June President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic
5 issued a joint statement. I was with President Tudjman when we prepared
6 the statement."
7 So can you just confirm to us that pages 9 and 10 of Exhibit
8 P 10481 is the document that you helped prepare at that time?
9 A. I think that's the document.
10 Q. I'd like to turn next, please, to the topic of
11 President Tudjman's views or positions and connections with Croatia and
12 Croatian territory. You've told us several times that President Tudjman
13 often talked about these matters as an historian, but I'd like to show
14 you in a few moments some statements of people that were dealing with him
15 not as an historian, I put to you, but in an operational capacity, if you
16 will, or in connection with negotiations.
17 Before I do that, you said during your direct examination that
18 one of President Tudjman's motivations or the basis on which he acted
19 throughout this period was in the interest of the Croats living in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that even -- in fact, at one point you said that
21 there was even an obligation under the Croatian constitution to protect
22 the Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that correct?
23 A. Yes, that is correct.
24 Q. Now, would you agree with me, sir, however, that doesn't
25 mean - at least in general circumstances - that Croatia would have the
1 right to invade Bosnia-Herzegovina to "protect the Croats" there?
2 A. In my opinion, it absolutely does not mean that, nor am I aware
3 that anyone in Croatia
5 Q. Well, sir, let me put to you -- I appreciate that answer but in
6 terms of President Tudjman's stated position as you've described it, a
7 problem with that position, sir, is: Wasn't that exactly
8 Slobodan Milosevic's position in connection with the Serbs, that all the
9 Serbs should be gathered together in one state? And in fact I think
10 that's exactly how you described Greater Serbia when I asked you that
12 A. Correct, that's how I described Greater Serbia and that was
13 Slobodan Milosevic's standpoint. However, I never heard
14 President Tudjman express such a standpoint, that all Croats should live
15 in one state, nor did I hear it from any Croatian official ever. I think
16 it would have been treated as absurd had it been uttered.
17 Q. Well, sir, I'm just reacting to your testimony when you said
18 repeatedly during direct testimony that Tudjman -- one of Tudjman's
19 principal motivations throughout this period was to act on behalf of --
20 and in fact that he was under a constitutional obligation to protect the
21 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Doesn't that lead -- that logic lead you
22 to the same position as the position taken by Milosevic?
23 A. No, not at all. Those are two drastically different lines of
24 thinking. In many constitutions of democratic countries around the
25 world, there is an obligation to care for the diaspora of that nation or
1 the minority of that nation living in another state. For example, the
2 case of Hungary
3 many states that regulate in this way the fact that it's impossible to
4 organize the world politically in such a way that ethnically pure nations
5 can exist. Europe
6 ago. Due to the development of circumstances, a group of Serbian
7 ideologues and Slobodan Milosevic believed that such a model could be
8 restored. However, looking after members of one's nation living in
9 another state cannot in logical or political terms be equated with a
10 desire to take part of the territories of that other state.
11 Q. Let me ask you, sir, to look at -- go to, please, Exhibit 8630,
12 P 08630, it should be in binder number 2. And while you're looking for
13 that let me say to you for the record -- I said a moment ago that I would
14 show you some statements from persons who were dealing directly with
15 President Tudjman during this time-period, and one of those persons was
16 Warren Zimmermann, a US
17 dealings with President Tudjman, and I think the Chamber has seen
18 references to his book before. I'd like to ask you about several
19 passages, please. If I can ask you to turn in the preface -- if you can
20 see the numbers at the top of the page, the page -- the preface at Roman
21 numeral IX, the preface at the top of the page of Roman numeral IX, let
22 me just read to you, sir, just bear with me, let me read a couple of
23 passages and I'll ask you a couple of questions about him.
24 About halfway down that page it says: "Franjo Tudjman, elected
25 president of Croatia
1 destruction of Yugoslavia
3 Croatians, and he was unwilling to guarantee equal rights to the 12 per
4 cent of Croatia
5 declaring independence without adequate provisions for minority rights
6 gave Milosevic and the Yugoslav Army a pretext for their war of
7 aggression in Croatia
8 Croatian areas of Bosnia
9 in that ill-starred republic."
10 And if you will then turn to page 75 and then I'll stop and ask
11 you about these. Top of page 75 Ambassador Zimmermann says: "Unlike
12 Milosevic, who was driven by a power, Tudjman betrayed an obsession with
13 Croatian nationalism. His devotion to Croatia was of the most
14 narrow-minded sort and he never showed much understanding of or interest
15 in democratic values. "
16 Now, these words have been written by someone who had extensive
17 dealings with President Tudjman at that time. What is your comment about
19 A. I can make several comments about this. Firstly, at that time I
20 was not active in politics or diplomacy, but I don't believe that
21 President Tudjman, as you said, frequently met Ambassador Zimmermann.
22 They did meet, but not that often. Of course that doesn't mean that
23 Ambassador Zimmermann could not know him very well. On the two pages you
24 quoted there are two different points made. What it says on page 75
25 about the assessment of Tudjman's personality, we can discuss that until
1 kingdom come, and I don't want to deny that Ambassador Zimmermann or
2 anyone else has the right to hold a certain opinion about someone.
3 Everyone has that right. However, in the first quotation you read
4 Ambassador Zimmermann puts forward his own view of the break-up of
6 analysis presented by Ambassador Zimmermann at the time has shown that
7 this interpretation is totally incorrect. In my personal opinion,
8 moreover, in this book which was written at a later date
9 Ambassador Zimmermann is attempting to justify what is now well known.
10 Q. All right. Well, let me take you --
11 A. The catastrophic --
12 Q. I'm going to give you a chance to continue. I'm going to give
13 you a chance to continue. When you're talking about this is
14 Mr. Zimmermann's impressions, let me take you to another part of the book
15 which I put to you he's not stating his impressions, but he at least
16 purports, he at least purports to give an account of a particular meeting
17 with President Tudjman, if you'll go to page 181, page 181, please. And,
18 sir, if you will bear with me and if the Chamber will bear with me on
19 this passage, he describes a meeting in March -- excuse me, in
20 January 1992, on the 14th of January, and Zimmermann says: "Tudjman, as
21 usual, was more bluff in his approach to Bosnia. Among his closest
22 advisers was his defence minister Gojko Susak, a Darth Vader-like
23 individual with black eyebrows and a permanent scowl, whose Canadian
24 fortune had gone into supporting Tudjman's party and, it was believed,
25 buying arms for Croatia
1 foremost objective was to wrest the Croatian part of Herzegovina from
3 this agenda on Tudjman, but the Croatian leader didn't need a lot of
5 Slowing down for the interpreters. My apology.
6 "In a long meeting with me on January 14, 1992, just a few weeks
7 after his German protectors had bullied the European Community into
8 supporting Bosnia
9 convince me that Bosnia
10 It was the most astonishing single discussion of my years in Yugoslavia
11 "Tudjman began with a 15-minute monologue. He had just met with
12 a delegation of Croats from Bosnia
13 Izetbegovic's policies."
14 Now, I would cut through some of this but then I would probably
15 be accused of editorialising so I'll just keep reading.
16 "Tudjman's description of those policies were breath-taking. The
17 Muslims, he said, want to establish an Islamic fundamentalist state.
18 They plan to do this by flooding Bosnia with 500.000 Turks. Izetbegovic
19 has also launched a demographic threat. He has a secret policy to reward
20 regard large families so that in a few years the Muslims will be in a
21 majority in Bosnia
22 an Islamic Bosnia will then spread through the Sandzak and Kosovo, et
23 cetera ..."
24 If I might be allowed, skipping down to the next paragraph.
25 "Tudjman admitted that he had discussed these fantasies with
1 Milosevic, the Yugoslav Army leadership and the Bosnian Serbs, and 'they
2 agree that the only solution is to divide up Bosnia between Serbia
4 division ..." et cetera.
5 Skipping to the next paragraph: "Listening to Tudjman I realized
6 I had to abandon diplomatic niceties. With considerable emotion I
7 reminded him, recalling the Iran
8 had a lot more experience with Islamic fundamentalism than he did. In
9 our view Izetbegovic was neither a radical fundamentalist nor a threat to
10 anybody. The United States would strongly oppose the break-up of Bosnia
11 'Nobody who wants to do this can count on any assistance from us. The
12 threat in Bosnia
13 There will be war in Bosnia
14 Muslims will react? What you propose ignores the rights of a large share
15 of Bosnia
16 Now, this is described, sir, as a factual account, put forward as
17 a factual account of a conversation and meeting with Tudjman and not
18 Zimmermann's own musings after the fact. Now, do you have any basis to
19 disagree that that's the conversation that Mr. Zimmermann had with
20 Mr. Tudjman on that day?
21 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I think that both you and I and Their Honours
22 certainly know full well the difference between a factual description and
23 a description in a book. Had we before us the minutes of that meeting,
24 and I'm sure that Mr. Zimmermann as a professional diplomat had minutes,
25 then we could talk about a factual representation. These are the
1 impressions of a person writing a book after a lapse of time. I can
2 point to some obvious mistakes quite easily. I think you said in English
3 that Tudjman's monologue lasted about 15 minutes. In the interpretation
4 I heard an hour. Was it correct that you said 15 minutes?
5 Q. I believe that the book says 15 minutes, sir, in that particular
6 aspect -- the monologue portion.
7 A. Well, you see, even the faster of speakers with the clearest of
8 lines of thought wouldn't be capable of saying as much as Mr. Zimmermann
9 says President Tudjman in 15 minutes. You have to take into account that
10 there was interpretation as well and then you see that in that space of
11 time President Tudjman could not have possibly explained all that.
12 How subjective is Mr. Zimmermann in respect of, for instance,
13 Mr. Susak? He speaks of some fortune that Mr. Susak allegedly had in
15 from Mr. Susak or from anyone from Croatia or Canada for that matter.
16 Therefore, he expressed his very, very subjective impressions. The
17 difference between me and the accounts of the books here is that I'm
18 speaking here under an oath, and the authors wrote books for various
19 motives. As for the author of this book, I had the honour of speaking to
20 Mr. Zimmermann and I believe that a motive in his writing the book was to
21 justify the erroneous assessments which he initially made at the start of
22 the break-up of Yugoslavia
23 Q. [Previous translation continues]... I apologise to the
24 interpreters. I know it makes it difficult but I simply don't have
25 time --
1 MR. KARNAVAS: This is the second time the Prosecutor interrupted
2 this gentleman as he was going into this area.
3 MR. SCOTT: Yes, it is and I will continue to do that because of
4 the time.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Now, Your Honour, then I suggest that he ask more
6 narrower questions. He can't ask a wide-range question and then cut the
7 witness off when he's about to answer the question completely. I think
8 it's unfair to the witness and it's unfair to you, Your Honours.
9 MR. SCOTT: Based on what the witness has said, Your Honour, I
10 would like him to take him to another account by another person that
11 might be differently situated than Mr. Zimmermann, and that is
12 Mate Granic, the foreign -- minister of foreign affairs.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: I believe the gentleman is entitled to express the
14 motives of Mr. Zimmermann. If you look at Zimmerman's book --
15 MR. SCOTT: He did that.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: No, he did not.
17 MR. SCOTT: I did not cut him off.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: I don't wish to debate the point, Your Honours.
19 The point is that the gentleman was not through with his answer and he
20 should be given an opportunity to fully address that matter.
21 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I can remember many, many occasions
22 during the Prosecution case when Mr. Karnavas cut off Prosecution
23 witnesses. I regret that my time is limited. If the Chamber would like
24 to expand my time, then I will certainly, in turn, be more generous with
25 the witness. But I think he has answered the question and I need to move
2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may speak about
3 this discussion. At page 23, line 1, after a very long question my
4 learned friend, Mr. Prosecutor, ends the question with the following
5 question: [In English] Now these words have been written by someone who
6 had extensive dealings with President Tudjman at the time. What is your
7 comment about this? What is your comment about this. Then the witness
8 starts -- then the witness was -- as soon as the witness mentioned that
9 it seemed that Mr. Zimmermann also issued another book after this one, he
10 was cut off. And then there is -- this is the second round which my dear
11 colleague Karnavas was talking about. So the question was: What is your
12 comment? Unless the witness said: This is my comment, he's still
13 responding. Thank you, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, in relation to what
15 Mr. Kovacic has said, a minor detail. It looks as though Mr. Zimmermann
16 published a second book after this one. Have you read this second book
17 by him?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I spoke of the same book. I
19 read the book, admittedly a long time ago, and I discussed this
20 particular book with Mr. Zimmermann and I expressed my great disagreement
21 with his interpretation of the events. We had this conversation over a
22 lunch in Washington
23 stress that these are solely the opinions held by Mr. Zimmermann and not
24 of the state that he represented. What's more, time showed that or
25 proved his opinions wrong. Recently CIA reports were published dating
1 from that period, which showed that the CIA had completely erroneous
2 assessments as to what was going to happen and how the break-up of
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for this information.
6 Please proceed, Mr. Scott.
7 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. I think we can probably all agree that that probably wasn't the
9 first or the last time that the CIA got something wrong, but be that as
10 it may if we could go, please, to Exhibit P 10402. This is a -- this
11 comes from a book written by Mate Granic, the foreign minister of Croatia
12 during this period and a person who you described at least in part as
13 your immediate superior and a person from whom in addition to
14 President Tudjman directly you took instruction from. There's much in
15 the book that we could cover, again, if we had more time, but I'd like to
16 direct your particular attention, please, to page 71 -- excuse me, my
17 apologies, it should be in binder number 3, P 10402. On page 71
18 Mr. Granic says -- and he's referring in the context, I represent to you,
19 to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if you look at the previous
20 passages and pages.
21 "As the minister of foreign affairs, I often spoke about the
22 situation there," a reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina, "with Tudjman.
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina was his favourite topic. He always talked about
24 it at the strategic level while he left to Susak all practical issues
25 including military aid, the financing of Croats or political relations
1 with the BH, HDZ. Despite the enormous confidence he had in Susak, I
2 knew that Tudjman occasionally received information from other sources.
3 He was in direct contact with Darinko Bago and often spoke with Zdravko
4 Sancevic, Croatian ambassador in Sarajevo and Ciro Grubisic, the general
5 consul in Mostar who had been appointed at the insistence of Susak.
6 Tudjman's obsession was to recreate the Croatian Banovina which had been
7 established in 1939 based on the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement according to
8 which Herzegovina
9 joined to Croatia
10 best solution."
11 Now, are you suggesting that this is another account that was
12 only simply Dr. Granic's impressions and he had his own agenda here or do
13 you have any reason to disagree that this is an accurate accounting by
14 Mate Granic of his dealings with President Tudjman?
15 A. Again, I want to stress first of all that I speak here under an
16 oath, whereas Mr. Granic wrote his book while he was participating in
17 political campaigns. My statements aim at the truth and of course the
18 motives he had for writing this book are probably the motives shared by
19 all politicians when writing their books. It's true that Mr. Granic had
20 very frequent contact with President Tudjman. It is most certainly true
21 that oftentimes they discussed Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is not true that
22 Mr. Granic did not have any political tasks or influence vis-a-vis
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina; quite the contrary, he very often did have tasks as
24 the foreign minister. What's more, the ambassadors reported primarily to
25 him, regardless of their contacts with President Tudjman.
1 I had never heard from President Tudjman or I had never heard
2 President Tudjman say that in territorial terms Croatia should have the
3 borders of the former Croatian Banovina. I tried to show the full extent
4 of the absurdity of that idea on the map we looked at yesterday. I
5 cannot claim or state anything about what Mr. Granic might have heard
6 from anyone including the president. However, to my mind, or rather, he
7 did not speak to me either as an ambassador or as a friend. I still
8 remain a friend of Mr. Granic's despite the fact that we do not belong to
9 the same political parties.
10 Q. In terms of the Banovina, you said this several times you said it
11 yesterday, I put to you that what was being discussed here was not to
12 reshape Croatia
13 the existing territory of Croatia
14 add to it those additional parts which were part of the Banovina. Now,
15 that's logically what was being discussed or put forward, isn't it? It
16 was Croatia
17 A. That's how you put it. My answer to that is that this is an
18 absurdity. Who could be so naive as to try and restore a solution
19 from -- dating back from history and think that this would involve only
20 gain and not loss? Tudjman was not so naive as to think that he would be
21 able to take the territories which belonged to Banovina while not being
22 aware of the fact that he might lose those parts of the territory that
23 weren't even included in the Banovina ones. Besides, the memories the
24 Croats had -- have of Banovina mostly tend to go in the direction of
1 territories that are part of Serbia
2 I can tell you that based on my experience which was extensive I
3 never ever believed that anyone in Croatia would consider to expand the
4 borders of Croatia
5 the Croatian Banovina. When Tudjman - and allow me to finish - mentioned
6 the borders of the Croatian Banovina he was referring to the resolution
7 of the national issue between Croats and Serbs. He spoke of specific
8 solutions in terms of organization, and it is true that he went back to
9 that frequently. However, interpreting this in territorial terms is
10 something that I'm fully convinced - and I'm speaking under an oath - is
11 not correct.
12 Q. Well, sir, let me put it to you, you can tell the Judges that
13 Mr. Tudjman never said those things to you. You can say that it would
14 surprise you to hear those things, that wouldn't fit in your experience.
15 But I put it to you, sir, do you have any basis for saying, were you in
16 the room, were you in all the meetings between Tudjman and Granic, do you
17 have any basis to say that Granic is lying in his book when he says that
18 this is his deal -- these are based on his dealings with Tudjman? Maybe
19 you didn't hear it, but are you saying that Mr. Granic just made up these
21 A. I think that the Prosecution could have called Mr. Granic and
22 asked him to repeat or not repeat the assertions he made in his book
23 under an oath here. What I tried to say earlier on --
24 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... are you calling Mr. Granic a
25 liar in making the statements that he makes in his book?
1 A. I think that you are using generalisation that I would never use.
2 I wouldn't say that Mr. Granic is a liar. However, what I'm trying to
3 say for the third time now is that if President Tudjman ever told him
4 something along those lines - and I don't know what it was that they
5 discussed - then the only logical and normal thing would be that he
6 should to me as an ambassador and he as a superior and he to me as a
7 friend and I'm still his friend, that he should tell me so because that
8 was important for our work. I'm convinced that neither I nor Mr. Granic
9 would take part in such business, in the business of taking away
10 territory from another state. I'm asserting here that Mr. Granic had
11 never told me that he had had a serious conversation let alone some sort
12 of instructions from President Tudjman about the territories --
13 Q. Well, sir --
14 A. -- [indiscernible] another state.
15 Q. -- let's then go, please, to another participant in these events
16 whom we've heard about frequently in this courtroom, not least of which
17 from the Defence side, Lord Owen. If you'll please turn to P 08632 --
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before we move on to that
19 document, Witness, let's remain with this document we have in front of
20 us. The Prosecutor put questions on the part of the text, but there's
21 another part in it that seems relevant. Let me sum it up as follows.
22 Tudjman is alleged to have said to Mr. Granic that in his view the
23 Banovina was the better solution. Granic in his book wrote, and as you
24 view it, in a political context to say this. The idea of dividing Bosnia
25 and Herzegovina
1 in Lord Owen's mind, but also this seems important to me. Tudjman
2 believed that the English and the French wanted to divide Bosnia
4 possible if the USA
5 that seems to be the conclusion in this page. He would only have been
6 convinced about this at the beginning of the Washington negotiations.
7 You were in the very heart of all these negotiations. In Tudjman's mind,
8 was his mind somehow maybe influenced by the game played by the British
9 and the French who were not opposed to a division of Bosnia and
11 Americans' agreement. And apparently Tudjman only realized this when the
13 What do you think, because this is what Mr. Granic wrote. You
14 were a friend and you may still be a friend of Mr. Granic's. Maybe you
15 discussed the issue with him.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I discussed the Washington
17 negotiations particularly extensively with Mr. Granic, and I believe that
18 both of us presented to President Tudjman quite adequately both the
19 position of the international position of Croatia and the fact that the
20 Washington Agreement may lead to a solution acceptable to both the Croats
21 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international community. It is true that
22 sometimes President Tudjman was under the impression that some
23 representatives of the international community, and perhaps particularly
24 the British, were in favour of a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Perhaps
25 the fact that contributed to this most, when we're speaking of an
1 atmosphere surrounding the negotiations, was the meeting between
2 Muslim -- or the agreement between Muslims and Serbs that was brokered by
3 Lord Owen and this agreement allowed the Serb entity to, should they
4 decide so, leave Bosnia-Herzegovina two years later or separate from
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I spoke about this at the start of my testimony.
6 I personally believe that President Tudjman would have accepted a
7 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina if such a division had been made by the
8 international community if such a division had -- did not endanger the
9 interests of the Republic of Croatia
10 protection of the rights of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, I
11 believe that President Tudjman was aware of the fact that these
12 conditions could not be met, and that is why I maintain that he looked
13 for a solution of the issue of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina within the
14 borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 I particularly assert this in respect of the period between 1992
16 and the Dayton Accords when I was actively working on this and had
17 frequent discussions about it with President Tudjman.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Mr. Scott, before the break, you had a last document you wanted
20 to submit to the witness.
21 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you very much for that. If
22 we could just finish this one document then we could come back to another
23 topic after the break.
24 Q. Sir, you just in your last answer in the last few minutes made
25 subtle references to Lord Owen, and it's to Lord Owen's book that I would
1 like to go next, please, P 08632, which is in binder number 2, 8632,
2 please. This is an excerpt from Balkan Odyssey by David Owen and I would
3 like you to go, please, to page 36. There are two parts to this, it's in
4 one paragraph, but there's two parts that I will read to you but there's
5 two aspects that I'd like to address. On page 36 it says, starting about
6 a quarter of the way down the page perhaps: "Because the 1939
7 Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement had given the Croatian nation control over
8 substantial parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina many Croats, not least
9 Franjo Tudjman, never in their hearts accepted the 1945 boundary between
11 It mentions -- "similarly, the Serb-inhabited areas ..." and he
12 goes on and talks about that.
13 Skipping down a few lines, everyone has it in front of them. It
14 goes on to say: "This resistance was particularly strongly felt after
15 1945 for the inhabitants," which had been referred to in part by the
16 Krajina, "the inhabitants had been subjected to genocide by the Croat
17 Ustashas during the Second World War. Very few commentators in 1995
18 understood or acknowledged that when the Croatian government attacked the
19 Krajina they were not 'retaking' or 'reoccupying' this land, for the
20 Serbs had inhabited it for more than three centuries. At most, the
21 Croats were reclaiming territory."
22 Now, as for the first part of that passage, is it not clear to
23 you, sir, that here again another international, senior international
24 representative, it was very clear to him that Tudjman very much had in
25 mind this view, this implementation of the 1939 agreement or are you
1 saying that Mr. Owen, apparently like Mr. Zimmermann and like Mr. Granic,
2 had just made this up?
3 A. Mr. Prosecutor, neither in the case of Mr. Zimmermann nor in the
4 case of Mr. Granic did I say that they invented it all. I merely said
5 that those were their very subjective interpretations. One needs not
6 be -- need not be a psychologist or a lawyer to know how different
7 subjective interpretations can be. The passage that you've just read out
8 shows the full complexity of the issue of the Banovina. If you ask me,
9 now that I'm looking at this passage, it can be used for exactly the
10 opposite argument, that's to say that Tudjman would never even attempt to
11 implement the idea of the Banovina because the precise issue that you
12 quoted would be raised, that the Serbs would ask for their territory to
13 be defined within Croatia
14 accept. As the vast majority of Croats, I am also convinced that Tudjman
15 believed that the AVNOJ borders of Croatia were the best solution for the
16 Republic of Croatia
17 unjustifiable to rule out the evident fact, which is that the borders of
18 the Banovina leave out vast parts of the Croatian territory.
19 Q. All right. And just again, as I said, to finish up on this
20 passage before we take the break, the second part of it, can you confirm,
21 sir, that in fact the area called the Krajina, this was an area of
23 than three centuries; is that correct?
24 A. Yes, that's correct. They reached those areas fleeing the
25 Turkish occupation. That was an area that had been inhabited by Croats
1 for -- by that time for some 12 or 13 centuries.
2 Q. And isn't it true, sir, that in fact what you've pointed out
3 several times about this, that it was a contradiction that a number of
4 people, both domestic politicians in Croatia and international
5 representatives, it was a contradiction pointed out to Tudjman on a
6 number of occasions that he could not support Herceg-Bosna on the one
7 hand and deny the claims of the Serbs in Croatia on the other; correct?
8 A. No, Mr. Prosecutor. The international community also accepted
9 the fact that there was a difference in terms of the position of the
10 Serbs in Croatia
11 of the international community and all the results of all the
12 negotiations speak of the Croatian people as one of the three constituent
13 nations in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All the communications
14 between the Republic of Croatia
15 Serb population in the Republic of Croatia
16 that population with the highest possible level of rights. I believe
17 that drawing a parallel there is quite wrong. So with the intention of
18 providing the population with the highest possible level of rights as a
20 May I just say this, I will agree with you on one point. Had
21 Tudjman really intended to include a part of the territory of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina into the territory of the Republic of Croatia
23 there would certainly have been many of those who would have claimed that
24 the same right is enjoyed by Milosevic and his ideologues to include the
25 territory inhabited by Serbs in Croatia
1 do agree that there are many individuals who would have had this line of
2 thinking, and I believe that this is one of the reasons, among others,
3 why President Tudjman never even contemplated the inclusion of parts of
4 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Republic of Croatia
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to have a 20-minute
6 break now.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.
10 Mr. Scott, you still have two hours and three minutes.
11 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. I appreciate that, and
12 I'm -- I need to ask -- I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask the Chamber
13 that despite my continued editing down I'm going to ask the Chamber if I
14 could possibly have another hour of time. I think we were -- safely
15 we'll finish this witness I think tomorrow, but I would ask for the
16 Chamber's indulgence. The Defence has had a total of seven -- a bit
17 over, I believe, seven hours with the witness altogether, and I would ask
18 to have some additional time. I need to know that now rather than later
19 so I know how much I have to alter my plan, please.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: I would object on the grounds that time that was
21 given was not used properly. We've gone into areas that were not
22 necessarily relevant, and I think had the time been managed I would be
23 much more gracious in agreeing to more time. But I'm afraid that given
24 what I've seen, that more time would only be wasted.
25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I also wish to have
1 it put on the record that General Petkovic's Defence objects to the fact
2 that the cross-examination of General Petkovic's Defence is being added
3 to the time that the Defence of Dr. Jadranko Prlic had, and that is --
4 the witness is his witness. So I feel it is unjustified to add together
5 the times of two Defence teams.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber will deliberate on
7 this matter later. Please proceed for the time being.
8 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. Just to respond ever so
9 briefly. I'll of course put myself completely in the Chamber's hands if
10 the Chamber thinks that I've used my time unwisely. I think the matters
11 that we've covered have been all of them been quite relevant and directly
12 pertinent to the case.
13 As to Ms. Alaburic's comments, I mean I have to respond to all
14 the questions put by the Defence to this witness including those put by
15 co-accused. I don't know why it would be the case that that time
16 shouldn't somehow be considered. Other than that, other than that,
17 Your Honour, as I say --
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Wait a moment. We will confer
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. The Bench's microphone,
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, having pondered the
24 matter and listened to your request, having taken into account the
25 objections raised, the Chamber decides to give you an additional 30
1 minutes. This should allow you to finish today.
2 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. I'm gracious for whatever
3 additional time the Chamber can allow me. Thank you for that.
4 Q. Mr. Zuzul, just one point that hopefully we can take fairly
5 quickly. We've talked in the last two days about the parts of Croatia
6 that were occupied, approximately one-third of the country that was
7 occupied by the Serbs in the latter part of 1991, including those parts
8 that then came to be claimed as para-states or autonomous zones, such as
9 the RSK, the Republika Srpska Krajina. Let me just ask you as a senior
10 member of the Croatian government, at any time that those parts of the
11 territory of Croatia
12 consider that they were not -- that they did not continue to be part of
13 the sovereign territory of Croatia
14 A. To the best of my knowledge, never at any time or in any
15 situation was it the position of the overall Croatian leadership and
16 President Tudjman; rather, the position was to attempt through
17 negotiations to gain control of the entire territory of Croatia
18 fortunately happened in Eastern Slavonia. If this was not possible, then
19 the Croatian government and the Croatian people were prepared to restore
20 the territory through military operations.
21 Q. Thank you for that, sir. That wasn't exactly my question. My
22 question was a bit -- I think, a little simpler than that. At any time
23 during 1991 until the time that those territories were ultimately
24 restored some years later to the territory of Croatia
25 government ever consider those territories to cease being territory --
1 the sovereign territory of Croatia
3 A. No, never.
4 Q. And is it correct, sir, that that was the case despite the fact
5 that, for instance, in the RSK the RSK had set up its own government, had
6 its own currency, had its own military force, but, nonetheless, you
7 consider that to be -- continued to be throughout that time-period the
8 sovereign territory of Croatia
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. Now, going to the so-called Friendship Agreement from July 1992.
11 As I understand your testimony, sir, on the involvement of the Croatian
12 army on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that as it was put to
13 you your position was that the presence and involvement of the Croatian
14 army in Bosnia-Herzegovina during at least 1992 was, I'll say, okay, was
15 not a problem, because the Croatian army there was there by agreement to
16 fight together with the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the
17 Serbs? Does that accurately state or summarize your position?
18 A. Well, my position was then, as now, that the fact that parts of
19 the Croatian army in early 1992 were there was indispensable to prevent
20 the Serbs from achieving their goals, that is, to defend southern Croatia
21 and also to defend part of Bosnia-Herzegovina --
22 Q. [Previous translation continues]... sorry, but my time, as you've
23 heard, is very limited. It may have been necessary for them to be there
24 but that didn't give them the right to be there, on the sovereign
25 territory of another nation's state. So put aside whether they needed to
1 be there. You've said that they -- I don't think there's any dispute, if
2 I understand your testimony correctly, that they were there in 1992, and
3 as I understand your justification for that is that it was there by
4 agreement with the Bosnian government in a fight together against the
5 Serbs. That's your justification for the Croatian army being on the
6 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?
7 A. Mr. Prosecutor, in your previous question, which I'm re-reading,
8 you asked me to summarize my position; and in my response that's what I
9 started to do but you interrupted me in the middle of my response. If
10 you're asking me about my position, I had to say what I said as the first
11 part of my sentence. As the second part of my sentence I would add --
12 Q. If you're going to do this I'm going to interrupt you again, sir.
13 My time is limited. My question is not whether you considered it or
14 others considered it indispensable for Croatia to be in that territory;
15 that does not give them the right to be there. Now, on what legal basis
16 or agreement or consent do you purport that it was okay for the Croatian
17 army to be operating on the sovereign territory of the UN Member State of
19 A. Well, you see, Mr. Prosecutor, you are putting questions in such
20 a way that it's impossible to give you answers as simple as you wish. In
21 your question you say that this was the sovereign territory of a
22 UN Member State, and we are talking about a period when Bosnia and
24 it all in the same context --
25 Q. [Previous translation continues]... forward, sir, from May 1992
1 forward when Bosnia-Herzegovina was admitted to the United Nations as a
2 Member State
3 let's talk about that.
4 A. You put your question about early 1992. --
5 Q. I've changed it, sir, I've changed it. From May 1992 forward,
6 please answer my question.
7 A. Even before and certainly from May 1992 onwards, Croatian
8 diplomacy had intensive communications and took steps to reach an
9 agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina in order for us to achieve our common
10 goals and several agreements were signed to that effect.
11 Q. And one of those agreements, is it correct, then came to be the
12 so-called Friendship Agreement of 21 July 1992; is that correct?
13 A. Yes, that's completely correct.
14 Q. Now, in that regard, if I can ask you, please, to turn to a
15 Defence exhibit but it's in Prosecution binder 3, 1D 02295. Sir, you
16 were shown this exhibit during examination by the Defence. This was a
17 letter from Mr. Abdic to Croatia
19 centres in Croatia
20 A. I don't see it in my binder, but I'll try and look at it on the
22 Q. Thank you, sir. If we missed it, my apology. If you can look on
23 the screen, please, and my apologies to the Judges and counsel if it's
24 not in the binder, Defence Exhibit 1D 02295. I'm sure it's my error and
25 I take responsibility for it.
1 But, sir, if you look at that document it was shown to you and
2 discussed during your examination, and in fact at page 27736 you said:
3 "I think that Mr. Abdic was referring to the agreement that we had just
4 looked at and discussed," which I will tell you in the transcript was the
5 21 July agreement. And then you went on to say: "... because this
6 letter is only a logical part of the implementation of this agreement."
7 So would you agree with me that, sir, that this was it was fully
8 appropriate for Mr. Abdic or the Bosnian government to send such a
9 communication in carrying out the Friendship Agreement asking for further
10 specific approvals from the Croatian government in order for the Bosnian
11 government to carry out activities on the sovereign territory of Croatia
12 A. Yes, I think, yes.
13 Q. And just to expand on that a bit, if we can take that as an
14 example. Would you agree with me, sir, that the fact that Izetbegovic
15 and Tudjman had signed the 21 July 1992
16 either state was free to move and roam at will and conduct activities on
17 the territory of the other without further -- without further agreements
18 and consent; correct?
19 A. Well, it's hard to answer such a general question, respond to
20 such a general statement. I think we --
21 Q. Well, let me explain to you, sir. Let me explain it to you, sir,
22 let me put it in a law enforcement context if you've ever come up in this
23 situation. Countries have agreements to cooperate in law enforcement
24 together. And there may be one between, say, the United States and the
25 United Kingdom. The fact that that agreement exists doesn't mean that
1 law enforcement agents of the United States can freely enter the
2 United Kingdom and roam at will and carry out law enforcement activities
3 on that territory. You have to give notice to the local authorities,
4 we're coming here, we appreciate your cooperation, maybe there's a
5 liaison officer who will be working with us, and that's the way these
6 things normally work, correct, and that would have been the same here and
7 that's why Mr. Abdic sought further approval to carry out activities in
9 A. Generally speaking, yes.
10 Q. Now, moving forward, sir, because again our time is quite
11 limited, you don't -- I take it it is not your position or is it that
12 once the war broke out between the Croat and Muslim forces in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, it's not your position, is it, that that
14 Friendship Agreement was then the basis for the presence or involvement
15 of the Croatian army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the
16 purpose of fighting against the Muslims; correct?
17 A. In your question there are several statements, but I thought and
18 still think that the Friendship Agreement between Croatia and
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina was based on the idea of putting a stop to the
20 conflict between the Croats and the Muslims; that's correct.
21 Q. Sir, again, we don't have time to go through all the
22 documentation on this point and we can't, as the Chamber I'm sure
23 appreciates, we can't put our full case to every witness. But taking --
24 assuming for the purposes of these questions that the Croatian army was
25 present in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, 1993, 1994 on the side of the HVO,
1 fighting against the Muslims, the Friendship Agreement would not have
2 been a legal basis excusing their involvement on the territory of
4 A. The parts of the Croatian army which were on the territory of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 - and you said that was the period we were
6 discussing - were fighting primarily the Serb forces, the Serb -- or
7 rather, the Yugoslav Army together with the Muslim forces there --
8 Q. Sir, let me take you to 1993, please. You know and I'm sure you
9 know that after a skirmish, an open armed conflict between Croats and
10 Muslims in Prozor in October 1992, a further round of serious fighting in
11 January 1993 in Gornji Vakuf and Central Bosnia, and then the major
12 conflict breaking out in mid-April 1993 that continued until at least the
13 end of 1993, there was a major war going on between the Muslim side, the
14 ABiH, and the HVO. And I put it to you, and for purposes of this
15 argument, that during that time from January 1993 until February at least
16 of 1994, the Croatian army was present in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the side
17 of the HVO. Now, if that's the case, are you telling the Chamber that
18 the Friendship Agreement signed in July 1992 made that okay? It was okay
19 to fight against that lawful government because of a Friendship Agreement
20 entered into previously under different conditions?
21 A. In your question you include a lot of statements I do not feel
22 confident in commenting on because I'm not aware of most of the events
23 you mention. What I do know and what I repeat is that the agreement
24 signed in July 1992 referred to the situation as it was then, but I also
25 know that throughout 1993 there was communication and diplomatic efforts
1 were made to find a solution for the relations between
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the
3 Republic of Croatia
4 a lot about that because I'm quite familiar with that.
5 As for what happened on the ground, I do know that there were
6 conflicts, of course. I apologise. I knew, of course, there were
7 conflicts, but my knowledge was not nearly so precise for me to be able
8 to testify with the same precision about the events on the ground as I
9 have about the diplomatic efforts.
10 Q. Well, let's talk about another historical example and see -- if
11 we take it out of this particular context it will be easier to come to an
12 understanding. You may recall at the beginning -- at the early part of
13 World War II Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union entered into a
14 non-aggression pact in August 1939. Approximately 22 months later in
15 June 1941 Hitler went back on the non-aggression pact and, in fact,
16 invaded the Soviet Union. Now, I take it is it your position that it was
17 okay for Hitler to invade the Soviet Union based on the fact that 22
18 months earlier they had entered into a non-aggression pact --
19 MR. KOVACIC: I object, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Scott, I think that's a bit far-fetched,
22 MR. SCOTT: Really?
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes. I think so.
24 MR. SCOTT: I don't see it myself but --
25 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, it doesn't really matter. With the
1 greatest of respect this has been going on for quite a while. There has
2 been a ruling by the Trial Chamber. The thoughts of counsel are really
3 not relevant. I think we can just simply move on and accept the finding
4 of the Trial Chamber.
5 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour, but I didn't interject any
6 thoughts. I put the question to the witness, and while I understand that
7 Judge Trechsel may disagree with me, I wasn't expressing any thoughts
8 other than putting questions and positions to the witness.
9 But having said that, I'll be happy to move on.
10 Q. Can you tell us, sir, as a specific example, then, moving forward
11 from World War II, the example that we use concerning Mr. Abdic. Can you
12 think of any examples at the time when in 1993 during the conflict
13 between the Croat forces and the Muslim forces in 19 -- excuse me, in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that there was ever a time when the Croatian
15 government asked for consents or permissions for its armed forces to
16 operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the forces of the Government of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Can you give me an example of anything where there
18 was a letter to Mr. -- dear President Izetbegovic, pursuant to the
19 Friendship Agreement of 21 July 1992
20 armed forces to enter into your country and wage war on your forces. Can
21 you point me to any letter like that?
22 A. Mr. Prosecutor, you are saying things that are totally absurd and
23 yet you are expecting logical responses from me. I think these are
24 absurd statements. I think it's offensive that you want to suggest that
25 I would draw a parallel between World War II and the agreement between
1 the Nazis and so on and the agreements I achieved in a sincere effort to
2 achieve peace. Each of us has the right to his own dignity and I find
3 this offensive.
4 Q. So you're not going to answer my -- you refuse to answer my
5 question then. Do you know of any such agreements or communications to
6 that effect --
7 A. No, no, Mr. Prosecutor --
8 Q. Thank you.
9 A. -- no. I'm not refusing to answer questions, but I do refuse to
10 have you offend me directly or indirectly. I will answer every question
11 I know the answer to; that is why I came here quite consciously and of my
12 own free will.
13 Q. [Previous translation continues]... do you know of any
14 communications between the Croatian government and the Government of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina to the effect that I put to you a few moments ago?
16 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, it's been asked and it's been
18 MR. SCOTT: No, it has not been answered. We've had a speech --
19 MR. KARNAVAS: It says: "No" --
20 MR. SCOTT: -- but we haven't had an answer.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: -- "no, Mr. Prosecutor." "So you refuse to answer
22 my question." He's got his answer to his question.
23 MR. SCOTT: No. He says, I'm refusing [sic].
24 MR. KARNAVAS: The question was absurd and he got an answer to
1 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour, I disagree with
2 Mr. Karnavas's position. If the witness clarifies that his answer was
3 no, he doesn't know of any communications then I accept that. But if his
4 answer is no, I'm refusing to answer -- not answering your questions and
5 then on -- and goes on to make a speech then I don't know the answer to
6 his question.
7 Q. Sir, is it your answer that you do not know, the answer is no,
8 you do not know of any communications between the Croatian government and
9 the Bosnian government authorising the operations of armed forces of the
10 Republic of Croatia
11 war against the forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina? You either do know of
12 such communications, you don't -- as Mr. Karnavas likes to say, you
13 either know, you don't know, or you don't remember.
14 A. Of such communications that are contained in this extreme example
15 that I termed an absurdity, I am not aware and I don't believe that there
16 were any such communications. That there had been communications all the
17 time between the Government of the Republic of Croatia
18 Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is something I am
19 certainly aware of.
20 Q. Can you tell the Judges, please, what you know about citizens of
21 the Republic of Croatia
22 against the ABiH involuntarily?
23 A. I truly do not know enough about this matter in order to be able
24 to comment upon it.
25 Q. Do you recall it being reported in the Croatian press around that
1 time that the families of various Croatian soldiers were protesting their
2 sons being sent to fight in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that criminal charges
3 were brought against some of these young men who would not go and fight
4 in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do you recall that?
5 A. I do seem to recall something about that being written about but
6 at my work-place in Geneva
7 Q. Well, let me just ask you to quickly look at a couple of things
8 to see if it might jog your memory. If you could please look at P 10547,
9 it should be in binder 3, P 10547.
10 While you're looking for that, sir, I'll just say for the record
11 that this is a report from the United Nations Centre for Human Rights
12 based in Zagreb
14 fight in the country of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
15 Point number 4. "The persons who appealed to the objection of
16 consciousness were beaten in the barracks.
17 "All the drafted were told they would be sent to fight in BiH."
18 It makes reference -- also at the top it says: "We received
19 information from the Committee for Human Rights that Croatian citizens
20 born in BH were mobilised on 15 and 16 December 1993."
21 Now, with that in mind if I can ask you, please, it should be
22 close in the same binder, turn to P 10555. I suggest to you that this is
23 the referenced report from the Committee for Human Rights, being the
24 Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, a letter by Mr. Cicak. Did
25 you know of Mr. Cicak and his involvement in these issues at that time or
1 have you heard of his involvement in these matters?
2 A. I do. I know Mr. Cicak personally. I didn't know, I don't
3 remember, his involvement in the matter at the time --
4 Q. Is Mr. Cicak still involved with the Helsinki Committee in
6 A. As a matter of fact, I'm not certain. I don't think so.
7 Mr. Cicak is a public figure who was involved in various public
8 activities either through his membership of various political parties,
9 through his membership of various non-governmental organizations. I
10 believe that he is a journalist and I don't know where else he works. I
11 am not aware of this report. This is the first time I see it.
12 Q. Can I ask you, please, to look at Exhibit P 10548 in the same
13 binder, 3, 10548.
14 A. I see that.
15 Q. Which is an article written in the Christian Science Monitor on
16 the 6th of January 1994 titled: "Croatian conscripts tell of Bosnian
18 Now, do any of that -- excuse me. Do any of those documents
19 refresh your memory further over the fact that in late 1993 at least,
20 perhaps other times, and in early 1994, men in Croatia were being
21 conscripted and sent to fight in Bosnia-Herzegovina against their will?
22 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I do see these articles. They cannot and do not
23 need to refresh my memory because I never had knowledge of such events
24 described here. I cannot assert whether these events happened or not.
25 If they did, then I can only say that this was a grave error. I
1 didn't -- I wasn't aware of it at the time and I cannot tell you whether
2 this is correct or not.
3 Q. All right. Thank you, sir. If I could ask you to next turn to
4 P 10545, which again is in binder 3, 10545. This is an article from the
5 New York Times dated the 24th of November, 2003, and you're referenced in
6 the -- about halfway down the page you'll see some -- a statement
7 attributed to you.
8 "Miomir Zuzul, the former ambassador to the United States who is
9 likely to be named foreign minister, said, 'Croatia will be led by a
10 moderate centre-right government over the next four years.'"
11 Next paragraph: "The victory for the Croatian Democratic Union
12 follows an overhaul of its image, and a purge of the extremists, some of
13 whom were implicated in war crimes committed during the 1991 to 1995
14 Balkan wars."
15 As someone who was, as you've told us, was very involved in these
16 events at the time and held very senior positions in the government back
17 during that time-period, can you tell us who some of the extremists were
18 that were purged from the party?
19 A. Well, the Croatian Democratic Union, as is well-known to those
20 who follow the political events in Croatia, redefined itself in a way in
21 2000 and defined itself clearly as a centre-right political party quite
22 open and prepared to cooperate with the world.
23 Q. My question was more direct, sir. Can you tell the Judges while
24 we have you here and the benefit of your knowledge, can you name some of
25 the extremists who were purged from the party as a result of this
1 overhaul. I'm talking about if you can give us names, please.
2 A. Well, you see, quite a few of them left the party. I would not
3 dare to name any names because I did not take part in the process and to
4 thus categorize these people as extremists. All those who did not wish
5 to accept the new policy of the HDZ as it was defined by the president of
6 the party, Mr. Ivo Sanader, left the party, either lost the intra-party
7 elections or were thrown out of the party. Quite a few of them left the
8 party that way. Now, were all of them extremists, well, I certainly
9 would not say that one --
10 Q. [Previous translation continues]... give us one names at least.
11 A. I do not see that my testimony should serve to define the
12 positions of anyone, of any politician. Those who did not wish or feel
13 that they were a part of that party anymore left the HDZ.
14 Q. You may or may not want to answer, I think you should, but that's
15 my question to you.
16 THE ACCUSED PRLIC: May I say something?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think I can answer such a
18 question because I was not in a -- I am not in a position to know what
19 the political views of a particular person were.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Prlic.
21 THE ACCUSED PRLIC: A question was made but this is not quoting
22 what Mr. Zuzul told in his interview. And this is for the third time he
23 was asked about something he didn't say.
24 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I never said that he said it, but I did
25 put it to him and as a senior government official and a member of this
1 party that if that's true. If he says that that didn't happen, that this
2 is not a true statement, that extremists were not purged from the party
3 after -- between the war and the elections in 2003, then he can say that.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, Witness, we have a
5 text in front of us, and apparently you granted an interview to the
6 New York Times. And you know that as well as I do when somebody says
7 something the press will quote the words uttered by the interviewee, and
8 here apparently some words are put into -- between inverted commas. I
9 see, and it may be what Mr. Prlic was referring to, the purge of
10 extremists and those involved in war crimes, those words are not
11 presented as quotations. So this might lead to think that now it is the
12 journalist drawing this conclusion based possibly on an off-the-record
13 discussion you had with him or her but it's not being quoted between
14 inverted commas.
15 So what is it? Are these conclusions drawn by the journalist or
16 does he report an off-the-record conversation you might have had with
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. As one
19 can glean from the text, this was not a conversation only with me but
20 with several personalities from the Croatian political life and some of
21 them are mentioned here. It is the journalist's statement that is
22 reported here and not mine. Now, why did I not want to make such a
23 statement directly? Because the change occurring in my political party,
24 in the HDZ, occurred at the time while I was not in Croatia but in the
25 United States of America. I welcomed the change and I publicly commended
1 the work of Ivo Sanader. The fact that he won the election for the
2 president of the HDZ against Mr. Pasalic is something that evidently
3 shows that change did occur in that party. I welcomed the change and I
4 still do. The HDZ was being reformed.
5 Now, it is very difficult for me to answer the question as to who
6 the extremists were because in such a way I would be attributing
7 political views to an individual who perhaps did not hold those views,
8 especially so when these extremists are placed in the context of war
9 crimes. I really do not know who committed war crimes in the territory
10 of Croatia
11 Mr. Prosecutor knows full well the government I was a member of was
12 prepared in all the ways to cooperate with the Tribunal and with all the
13 international organizations in order to ascertain the truth, that is, who
14 it was who committed crimes and who did not.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [Previous translation
17 MR. SCOTT:
18 Q. All right. Well, we'll come back to that topic in a few moments.
19 Let me turn back to your -- the positions you held and your previous
20 training. Based on what you've told us, sir, and based on a review of
21 your CV that I've seen various places that's available, prior to 1991 --
22 prior to April of 1992, is it correct to say that -- had you had -- well,
23 let me just ask you. Had you had any military training or experience
24 prior to April or March 1992?
25 A. Prior to March or April 1992?
1 Q. Prior to --
2 A. -- I as a -- in fact, the majority of Croats, as the majority of
3 the citizens of the then-Yugoslavia, I served my military service in the
4 Yugoslav People's Army in 1982 for some ten months. I had the training
5 that was compulsory for all the adult men at the time. I wouldn't say
6 that I had had any special military training.
7 Q. And --
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And just in terms of reviewing your advanced degrees at least,
10 you received a masters in social psychology in 1983 and a Ph.D. in
11 psychology in 1987; is that correct?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. And at the time -- at the time that you were appointed or at
14 least -- excuse me, let me -- at the time that the war broke out and
15 fighting in 1991 and I believe you said you spent some time -- part time
16 working in the Croatian army, at that time you were a professor of
17 psychology at the University of Zagreb
18 A. Correct. Sometime in early September 1991, I, together with a
19 group of colleagues from the university, reported to the Croatian army as
20 a volunteer. Prior to that I was a professor at the Croatian faculty in
22 Q. Just to be clear, when you say reported to the Croatian army to
23 volunteer, were you offering your services in a civilian capacity or did
24 you become a member of the Croatian army at that time?
25 A. I became a member of the Croatian army; however, since we were
1 all university professors we offered our professional knowledge, and that
2 knowledge was not in the art of war but in the various fields that we
3 were involved in in our day-time job.
4 Q. Did you continue working at the same time at the university?
5 A. I don't know when it was that I formally left. In Croatia there
6 is a law which to some extent differs to the law in other countries, that
7 was still in the former Yugoslavia
8 university, for instance, because you have a certain duty to perform,
9 then your job status with the university remains valid. So for all those
10 years over which I was engaged on other duties, based on the labour law
11 in Croatia
12 University of Zagreb
13 time -- the spare time to do that, to even teach at the university. Some
14 of my colleagues did that.
15 Q. You said earlier in your testimony at page 27609 that this group
16 of you that you've just described again in the last few moments set up a
17 "department that dealt with psychological and informational aspects of
18 the war."
19 Is that something that either was or became known as the IPD
21 A. Yes, I believe that that's precisely it.
22 Q. And IPD stands for what, information propaganda?
23 A. No. Initially, IPD meant the information and psychological
25 Q. And did that department or entity ever further evolve into some
1 sort of intelligence service?
2 A. I don't think that the department ever evolved into an
3 intelligence service. The department did evolve, but unless I'm
4 mistaken, an intelligence service was already in existence before the
5 department was set up and developed over time. I'm not sure how -- what
6 the communication between the two was. I know that an intelligence
7 service existed at the time when I was performing this other duty.
8 Q. Well, at the risk of taking a bit of time, can you tell us
9 exactly the nature of the work at the time of this psychological and
10 information department? What were you actually doing? What services
11 were being provided to the armed forces in that capacity?
12 A. When I arrived there and when we set it in motion, it was the
13 early days of the department. As a psychology professor I was engaged in
14 a large research project titled: Children in war. Through the project
15 we tried to assist children, victims of war, by giving them psychological
16 counselling, and a large number of experts were involved in that
17 activity. Through my work there I realized that adults were in fact
18 faced with many difficulties, persons who were refugees or who hailed
19 from war-torn areas. I, together with some other psychologists, tried to
20 develop some preventative measures aimed at countering the development of
21 the post-traumatic disorder, the PTSD. The focus of our work was to
22 counter psychological problems, and we looked at how the US army dealt
23 with that during World War II --
24 Q. [Previous translation continues]... significant amount of time to
25 give your answer to that, but let me move on, please. During your
1 involvement with the Croatian armed forces, during that period in the
2 early 1990s, did you raise -- did you ever rise to any particular rank or
3 were you given any particular rank during that time-period?
4 A. Yes. I received a rank while I was in the Croatian army, the
5 rank of a brigadier
6 Q. Can you give us any particular assistance as to, if you know, how
7 that particular rank might fit into the rank hierarchy of a Western army
8 in terms of -- where I -- in the United States, for example, a brigadier
9 is typically referred to as a brigadier-general. Is that the same in
11 A. In Croatia
12 brigadier-general but a bit higher than a colonel. The logic behind
13 these ranks was the one that the US
14 when they included a number of professors, university professors,
15 particularly psychologists in the army and the ranks coincided with their
16 expertise, with their expert knowledge, rather than their military
17 performance. And we followed the very same logic in developing these
18 ranks in the Croatian army.
19 Q. Now, moving forward to your positions as assistant minister of
20 foreign affairs and then a few months later deputy minister of foreign
21 affairs, based on your CV and what you've told us in your testimony,
22 prior to that time you had no experience, you had no education or
23 training or experience in diplomacy or foreign affairs; is that correct?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. Around this same time-period can you tell us, and that is in,
1 let's say 1992, during the time you became -- took up your post in the
2 foreign affairs, what role or position did President Tudjman's son,
3 Miroslav Tudjman, have in the Croatian government?
4 A. I think that Mr. Miroslav Tudjman who was in that same group of
5 university professors who volunteered to become members of the Croatian
6 army and who participated in the setting up of the IPD department with
7 me, I think that he stayed behind as a member of the army when I left it.
8 If you're referring to the positions he held later on, I think that this
9 happened a bit later after I had left the army that he transferred to the
10 intelligence service of Croatia
11 Q. At what point did he become the head of one of the national
12 intelligence services of Croatia
13 A. Unless I'm mistaken, it was at the very end of 1992. I'm not
14 positive about it, but I believe it was the end of 1992.
15 Q. And which particular intelligence service was this, because there
16 may be several in the Croatian government at that time?
17 A. For a brief time I was appointed advisor for national security to
18 President Tudjman, and there our task was through organizational
19 cooperation to propose cooperation with other friendly states, that is --
20 or rather, in cooperation with other friendly states to make a proposal
21 for the organization of intelligence services in Croatia. I didn't work
22 on this long, but I did start working on this with Mr. Miro Tudjman
23 and --
24 Q. Excuse me, Mr. Zuzul, sorry to interrupt you. Perhaps you
25 misunderstood or my question's mistranslated or I'm sure -- I'll take
1 responsibility for any confusion. My question to you, you referred to
2 Miroslav Tudjman taking up a position as head of an intelligence service
3 at the end of 1992. My question was if you could simply identify that
4 particular intelligence service. There is something -- there was after
5 that time, it may have been at the time, there was an agency called the
6 Croatian Information Service, HIS; there was the Security Information
7 Service which I believe was part of the Ministry of Defence, SIS, perhaps
8 there were others. So which of the intelligence services was
9 Miroslav Tudjman the head of by the end of 1992?
10 A. Yes, that's precisely what I was trying to say. To the best of
11 my recollection, he became the head of the HIS, H-I-S, which was a newly
12 established service based on what I was just trying to say, if my memory
13 serves me well and I think it does.
14 Q. And then you referred to, I was going to ask you that next, you
15 referred to an appointment as national security advisor to
16 President Tudjman sometime during the period 1992/1993; is that correct?
17 A. That was sometime in the autumn of 1992. I don't recall the
18 precise date, but, yes, that's correct.
19 Q. And again, sir, prior to your appointment as assistant minister
20 of defence -- excuse me, minister of foreign affairs in March 1992, had
21 you had any training or involvement or previous experience other than
22 your ten months of service in the JNA in 1992, anything that might be
23 called national security?
24 JUDGE PRANDLER: A translation problem that the very last
25 sentence of yours, Mr. Scott, it says, anything that might be called
1 national service, and you said security.
2 MR. SCOTT: If it was my mistake, Your Honour, I apologise --
3 JUDGE PRANDLER: No, you said security and in the transcript it
4 is service, so it should be replaced. Thank you.
5 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Judge Prandler.
6 Q. Sir, could you answer my question. Did you have any prior
7 training, experience, background in anything called national security?
8 A. No, neither did the vast majority of Croats. I had no
9 experience, to be quite frank. My service in the JNA is not something I
10 would term experience in national security.
11 Q. Well, sir, I have to put to you that based on this review that
12 we've conducted in the last few minutes, and I don't mean to offend you
13 particularly but I do have to put to you this point, and that is based on
14 what you've told us I see no, absolutely no previous experience,
15 training, or qualification for these extremely senior positions in
16 government that you found yourself in in 1992 and 1993. And is it fair
17 to say, sir, that your principal qualification for those positions were
18 being a close friend of Gojko Susak and a close friend of
19 Miroslav Tudjman, the president's son?
20 A. Well, of course you have the right to any opinion you choose to
21 adopt, but this is completely incorrect. At that time I was one of the
22 youngest professors at Zagreb University
23 of a faculty at the university. I was already a professor in the USA
24 In Croatian conditions, all these are major results. I dealt with
25 aggressive behaviour --
1 Q. [Previous translation continues]... anything to do with military
2 service or national security or diplomacy or foreign policy, it had
3 absolutely nothing to do with those fields, sir.
4 A. But when you put such a personal question to me, you should allow
5 me to complete my answer.
6 Q. Go ahead.
7 A. When you look at the structure of the Croatian government, the
8 other persons in the government, when I was deputy minister my immediate
9 superior was Professor Dr. Zdenko Skrabalo, a professor of medicine who
10 had even less experience than I did. He was succeeded by
11 Dr. Mate Granic, a professor of medicine. When you look at who the
12 Croatian ambassadors were, none of them, almost none of them had any
13 previous experience in diplomacy. Why? Well, the reason is the
14 following. Apart from a very small number of those who did have
15 experience, no persons who had such experience chose to join the Croatian
16 option, and this includes both -- both civil servants and the army. I
17 became assistant minister of foreign affairs, and my task was to select
18 staff members, and as a psychologist I had dealt with such issues.
19 Q. Sir --
20 A. At that time there were 35 people in the Croatian diplomatic
21 service, only half of them --
22 Q. [Previous translation continues]... some minutes to go further
23 with your question -- your answer, excuse me. Sir, isn't -- again,
24 wasn't your primary qualification that you were President Tudjman's man,
25 you were deeply loyal to President Tudjman, both at the time in 1992,
1 1993, 1994, and thereafter. You were the president's man, weren't you?
2 A. I do not take that as an insult because had I not been loyal to
3 those I worked with, I would not have done that job. I had many critical
4 comments to make about President Tudjman, but I did accept him as the
5 president of my country and as the man I worked with. Had I thought this
6 was something opposed to my principles, I would have left the job.
7 However, I find it completely unacceptable because I have held many
8 positions in the international community. And certainly it was not my
9 friendship with Miro Tudjman or anyone else or my loyalty to
10 President Tudjman that got me there. That loyalty was understood as my
11 doing my job honestly under difficult conditions and you can check that
12 with your colleagues.
13 Q. Let me ask you -- I apologise to the interpreters.
14 Let me ask you, please, to turn to Exhibit P 10401 in binder 3,
15 P 10401, binder 3. Do you have it? Sir, this appears to be an interview
16 that you gave or at least purports to be an interview that you gave on
17 the 10th of December, 1992, titled at least in part or referenced here
18 as: "Interview with Miomir Zuzul, deputy foreign minister of the
19 Republic of Croatia
20 Now, if I can direct your attention to the middle of the second
21 page, under -- there's a heading on the middle of that page that says:
22 "I would refuse the position of prime minister ..."
23 In the paragraph that follows, let me refer to that place and
24 then put a question or two to you.
25 "There are at least three reasons why people believe that
1 Miomir Zuzul until recently 'only' professor and head of the department
2 of developmental and child psychology in the school of philosophy at
3 Zagreb University
5 powerful and promising people in Croatian politics. He is from Imok, and
6 they say that that lobby is fairly strong. It is said that Miomir Zuzul
7 is 'Susak's man' and the power of the defence minister is well-known.
8 Aside from that, he is a personal friend of the president's son. A third
9 reason has to do with his job. People believe that the very fact that
10 someone is involved in the organization of the intelligence service, in
11 this case within the foreign affairs sector, is already sufficient reason
12 for personal political power."
13 Now, do you recall that, I assume, you gave an interview back in
14 1992, I think probably if most people give an interview and it comes out
15 in the press, I guess we're all proud enough or what have you that we
16 want to read the interview. Do you remember those words being written
17 about you in December of 1992?
18 A. Well, now it is coming back to me when I see this interview, but
19 as we can see these are words written by a journalist. Had you wanted to
20 read the next sentence, which we can all read now, in the next sentence
21 it says that even then I denied what the journalist was saying, the fact
22 that this journalist wrote that. Had it been correct, I would really
23 have become prime minister within a few months or the minister of foreign
24 affairs because both those posts were filled with new people a few months
25 later. I became an ambassador of the Republic of Croatia
1 complaining about that. It was an honour and I was proud of it, but it
2 shows that what the journalist thought at that point in time was not --
3 did not reflect reality in fact.
4 Q. Sir, I refer you further down the page where the -- statements
5 are attributed to you directly, questions are -- excuse me, questions are
6 put to you by the interviewer and then you'll see in brackets (Zuzul) and
7 then it starts out: "Taken individually ..."
8 I'm just giving you that as a landmark. If you go to the next
9 paragraph which is still attributed to you speaking, it says this:
10 "Susak? I'm a friend of his, I hope, but I have not known him long
11 either. Watching him through the war and through politics I recognise
12 that this is a man worthy of esteem. I belong to no one, not even to
13 Susak, but I acknowledge that we are working along the same political
14 line, that is, we have a similar political option which in the final
15 analysis is not Susak's but the president's. In that sense, both Susak
16 and I are the president's men but he is the closer and stronger one."
17 Is that the statement that you gave to the interviewer in
18 December 1992?
19 A. Correct, that's the statement I gave then and I would not change
20 it now.
21 Q. Staying on the topic of intelligence services or coming back to
22 that again, which has been mentioned several times in the last few
23 minutes. Did you ever have any dealings or have dealings with a man
24 involved in intelligence named Markica Rebic?
25 A. Yes, I knew Mr. Rebic well. He comes from the same town I come
1 from. For a while we both worked together in the secondary school in
2 Imotski. However, when he became involved in intelligence we had very
3 little contact and our personal contact, private contact, ceased as early
4 as the early [as interpreted] 1990s.
5 Q. And --
6 A. [In English] As the mid-1990s, I said. There is mistake in
8 Q. Thank you. When you say "mid-1990s," sir, can you help us a bit
9 more with that. Mid-1990s could be, I suppose, anything from 1993 to
10 1998. Can you help us?
11 A. [Interpretation] When I became the ambassador to Geneva
12 Mr. Rebic, to the best of my recollection, was not yet involved in
13 intelligence work. When he did join the intelligence service, I was
14 already a diplomat. And in the nature of our work we didn't have a lot
15 of contact. Privately, our contacts grew less because I gained the
16 impression that there was a certain circle of people within the then-HDZ
17 and within the institutions which did not gladly accept me. When you
18 have such an impression about someone you have known for years, whether
19 your impression is correct or not, your relations cool and that's what
20 happened between me and Mr. Rebic.
21 Q. Back a few months ago in October of 2007 when a verdict was
22 issued by this institution in the so-called Vukovar case, you're reported
23 by the Croatian news service HINA as saying that -- you were very
24 critical of the verdict. You say you hoped it was a mistake and you said
25 that the ICTY verdict "has scandalised the whole civilised world."
1 Is that correct?
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Can we get the -- where this comes from. I
3 mean --
4 MR. SCOTT: A HINA report on the 1st of October, 2007.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Which document is it on?
6 MR. SCOTT: It's not an exhibit, Mr. Karnavas.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, if it is not an exhibit I would object.
8 MR. SCOTT: I don't have to put an exhibit to the witness,
9 Mr. Karnavas, and you know that. That is my basis for asking the
10 question, you do not have to put every document to the witness.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: I beg to differ. I think it's professional
12 courtesy to at least give counsel the opportunity to see if whether
13 you're quoting the document correctly. I will take it that you're
14 bona fides, but I don't think that you should presume that I should have
15 to. Thank you.
16 MR. SCOTT:
17 Q. Sir, do you recall making that statement?
18 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I think it would be -- show
19 courtesy to show the witness that article.
20 MR. SCOTT:
21 Q. Sir, are you denying that you made such a statement --
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just one moment.
23 Mr. Praljak.
24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, now that this
25 is being discussed there was several documents previously which were in
1 English only. Mr. Prlic responded but we were unable to participate to
2 understand. So could we, the accused, be provided with the documents in
3 a language we understand? There were several documents in English only.
4 Thank you.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, this report by HINA,
6 you don't have it, do you?
7 MR. SCOTT: Not in the courtroom, sir, and I strongly in the most
8 uncertain terms -- most certain terms, excuse me, I disagree with
9 counsel. We do our investigation, we read a lot of documentation. I
10 prepare questions. I do not have to show every document on which I base
11 a question to the witness. The witness can tell us very easily, if he
12 says he never gave such an interview or made such a statement, he can
13 tell us that.
14 Q. Sir, is it -- are you telling us that you don't recall --
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The witness may answer.
16 THE WITNESS: Are you -- [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor, I don't
17 know why you are putting in my mouth what I want to say or don't want to
18 say. I want to answer every question, and if I don't know the answer I
19 will say I don't know. There's no need for you to answer in my stead. I
20 did make a statement, and like most people in Croatia I do think it was a
21 bad decision. I don't know whether the statement was made in the precise
22 words you quoted because I don't see it before me, but in investigating
23 me and my life you must have seen that I'm a person who held certain
24 principles throughout, who from 1993 to this day have supported the work
25 of this Tribunal, not only as a Croat but also as a member of the
1 international community. And I think I have done quite a lot and that's
2 how I came to be here. So when I thought that a decision had been made
3 which was not just, in view of what had happened, I said so.
4 MR. SCOTT:
5 Q. [Microphone not activated]
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.
7 MR. SCOTT:
8 Q. I didn't put any words in your mouth. I was asking a question, I
9 may have had some arguments with counsel, but I never put words in your
10 mouth except to ask you if you were critical of that judgement. Now, you
11 said you were and I didn't say there was anything wrong with that. Of
12 course you're entitled to your opinion, but I simply wanted to just
13 establish that by way of background. Further on that, sir, and based on
14 what you just told us about your attitude toward the Tribunal, can we
15 agree, sir, that this Tribunal can only do its work and judgements can
16 only be issued, good or bad, based upon the evidence and information that
17 is gathered and put before this Tribunal, much of which must come from
18 the states of the former Yugoslavia
19 A. Yes, completely correct.
20 Q. Now, you were instrumental, were you not, in the hiring of a
21 Washington DC
23 A. Not the way you formulated it. When I was appointed to the post
24 of ambassador in Washington
25 Croatian Embassy and the Republic of Croatia
1 introduced to him as somebody who had already been recruited by
2 Minister Granic, if I'm not wrong, and this had happened at least half a
3 year before I arrived. I was introduced to Mr. Rivkin, I had good
4 cooperation with him. I thought then, as I do now, that he did a good
5 job for the Republic of Croatia
6 exclusively concerning his work as a lobbyist for the Republic of Croatia
7 in Washington
8 Tribunal. This was never organized through the Embassy of the Republic
9 of Croatia
10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may very
11 briefly, it's evident that my learned friend is going somewhere with
12 this. In any case, the last two questions, especially the last one
13 concerning Mr. Rivkin, is difficult to evaluate as to relevance. What
14 can the witness's possible contact with an American attorney-at-law while
15 he was an ambassador in Washington
16 events in the indictment, all of this has to be shown to be relevant,
17 otherwise it's a pure waste of time. So the relevance has to be
18 established. We sense where this might be going and then it's
19 irrelevant. So please let this be established first.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, if you asked that
21 question you probably had a goal. I must admit that I'm a little lost.
22 I can't see precisely what you're aiming at, but please proceed.
23 MR. KARNAVAS: Is the objection overruled, Your Honour, because
24 there's a question on relevance. Is Mr. Rivkin here now being tried for
25 errors and omissions --
1 MR. SCOTT: That's not the standard of relevance.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I said that the Prosecutor must
3 have a goal, an aim, so I asked him to proceed in order to see what his
4 aim is.
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. I misunderstood you, Mr. President. I
6 agree with you.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed, Mr. Scott.
8 MR. SCOTT:
9 Q. Can I ask you, sir, to turn to Exhibit P 10544, which will be
10 found in the binder 3. You have that, sir. This is an article in the
11 Washington Post dated the 1st of July, 2000. I would like to refer you
12 to the -- well, let's start at the top. It says: "Top Croatian
13 ministers looked to a Washington
14 they weighed demands from the International War Crimes Tribunal for
15 information about alleged atrocities committed by Croatian troops in the
16 1991 to 1995 Bosnian war" --
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, Mr. Kovacic wants to
19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I think that it has been
20 established before this Tribunal that the accused have the right to see
21 exhibits in a language they understand. This is not the first document
22 in this binder which we do not have in Croatian. I propose that for this
23 reason the use of this document be prevented, and of any document in
24 future which is not translated into Croatian, as was every document that
25 the Defence could not use if it had not been translated.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, the accused must
2 have the document in their own language; however, sometimes documents are
3 shown in B/C/S, we don't have any translation available. The document is
4 then placed on the ELMO, we read out the relevant paragraph, and then it
5 is up to the interpreters to translate the document for everybody's
7 MR. SCOTT: [Microphone not activated]
8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I don't mean to -- just one last
9 intervention on this, on the grounds of relevancy. As far as I'm aware,
10 there have been no accusations or charges against Mr. Rivkin with the bar
11 association concerning any illegal activity or unprofessional activity
12 that he conducted, that's number one, on behalf of Croatia or in his
13 private practice.
14 Number two, as you may know, an attorney of the United States who
15 represents a foreign government has to -- has to get clearance in that,
16 in those affairs. So it's very well-known by the United States
17 Government that Mr. Rivkin was representing another country because they
18 have to be registered as such if they're going to be doing any lobbying
19 work. I really fail to see on what grounds we're going into Mr. Rivkin's
20 activities. If he gave bad advice to a client, shame on him, they should
21 take him before the DC bar association. But what does this have to do
22 with Mr. Zuzul, what does it have to do with the case, what does it have
23 to do with the indictment? I would beg -- demand from Mr. Scott his
24 basis as opposed to showing the document.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, in order to save
1 time you asked for the additional time, you were granted additional time.
2 What did you want to establish by mentioning Mr. Rivkin? As far as I'm
3 concerned, it's the first time that I hear about this gentleman.
4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, in order to do that we would have to
5 excuse the witness and go into private session. I do not have to lay out
6 the rationale and goals of my cross-examination in front of the very
7 witness who's being examined. So if you would like to do that, if you
8 would like to excuse the witness and go private session, I would be happy
9 to address it.
10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, by your leave, I would
11 like to draw your attention to the following. The Prosecution advanced
12 the suggestion that they just advanced; however, the Prosecution in
13 another case before this Tribunal had a position that was quite the
14 opposite to this one and in that case when the Judges asked the Defence
15 to lay the foundation for their question the Prosecution opposed the
16 request that the witness leave the courtroom. So I'm quite surprised
17 that the Prosecution should now be asking that the witness be requested
18 to leave the courtroom, so there must be a hidden agenda there; I'm sure
19 of that.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic, which case did you
21 have in mind?
22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] That was in the Kordic/Cerkez case,
23 and by happenstance we were the counsel in that case, and I must say that
24 the Presiding Judge in that case was in the habit of asking us whenever
25 such a line of questioning was embarked upon, and of course the
1 Presiding Judge, or rather, the Prosecutor could not know where this was
2 heading, and of course the Presiding Judge would then ask us where we
3 were going with our questions and we had to respond and we -- it was
4 oftentime asked that the witnesses leave the courtroom.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, what are you getting
6 at? What is your purpose in the interest of time?
7 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I disagree with counsel. I don't
8 pretend, I'm not going to stand up and pretend to know the particular
9 circumstances on that prior occasion, if that happened or not. It may
10 have been for perfectly good reasons, I don't know. But I stand by the
11 position that I'm cross-examining this witness, I want to put questions
12 to this witness, and I do not have to lay out my plan of questioning in
13 front of the witness before I put my questions to him. So I would be
14 happy to talk to the Chamber, I would be very happy to talk to the
15 Chamber, but not in the presence of the witness.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I shall confer with my fellow
17 Judges to see whether the witness is to leave the courtroom or not.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 MR. KHAN: Your Honours, could I just say before you deliver your
20 ruling, as a matter of principle, I think it must be said that my learned
21 friend Mr. Scott's proposition is quite correct. I don't see any problem
22 at all with excusing the witness. It can't be right that a witness be
23 forewarned as to a line of cross-examination. Of course that's another
24 matter for the Court to know relevance. So I would commend my learned
25 friend's proposition as being quite sensible.
1 MR. KARNAVAS: [Microphone not activated]
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, this is what we're going
3 to do.
4 Witness, anyway, we were about to have a break. You're going to
5 be excused out of the courtroom. Then we'll have a break, and as soon as
6 you've left the courtroom Mr. Scott is going to tell us about his
8 So please follow the usher witness and you can start your
9 20-minute break -- well, it will be a little longer for you.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, very quickly before
12 the break.
13 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, just in -- again, I would ask to please
14 go into private session because I think members of Mr. Zuzul's family
15 are --
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, yes, you're right.
17 Let's move into private session.
18 [Private session]
11 Page 31213 redacted. Private session.
22 [Open session]
23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in public session.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Scott.
1 MR. SCOTT:
2 Q. Mr. Zuzul, I think at one point we left off and I had directed
3 your attention to -- yes, I'm sure I did, P 10544, and I do acknowledge
4 to counsel, apparently we're not able to get translation of this
5 particular in time. If we can have the English version brought up in
6 e-court, I will ask for the interpreters' assistance. In fairness,
7 Mr. Zuzul, I understand that you're quite fluent -- if I may say so,
8 excellent speaker and I'm sure read excellent English.
9 This article starts off -- we read the part before and then it
10 goes on second paragraph to say: "Croatia's foreign minister privately
11 urged the government to comply in full. But attorney David B. Rivkin
12 Jr., at the time a partner in the law form Hunton & Williams, said at one
13 point that cooperating would be the 'worst option' and urged the
14 ministers instead to pursue diversionary legal tactics, according to
15 records of government deliberations made available here."
16 I'm pausing for the benefit of the interpreters.
17 "Rivkin, whose view won the day, said his view [sic] was to
18 present an aggressive defence of wartime actions by the Croatian
19 government, then headed by President Franjo Tudjman, and help the
20 government fend off the demands."
21 Then it goes on in the next paragraph just to further finish on
22 this particular aspect.
23 "The new government has declared it wants to cooperate with the
24 Tribunal, denounced Rivkin's legal strategies ..."
25 Now, just to pause there for a minute, sir, this is indeed,
1 however, the same David Rivkin that, then, you further involved with the
2 Croatian government in terms of, I think you said, lobbying work in
3 Washington DC
4 A. No, Mr. Prosecutor, I did not involve him. He had already been
5 recruited to lobby in 1995, whereas I was appointed ambassador in 1996.
6 As I said, I cooperated with him and I have to be sincere and say that I
7 cooperated with him well but on work in Washington.
8 Q. Yes, I understand that. My understanding is that at least as
9 part of the work being performed by Mr. Rivkin he was hired in 1996 at
10 your suggestion and with the approval of Franjo Tudjman; is that right?
11 A. I don't know what part of his work you are referring to. He was
12 recruited to work for the Croatian state in 1995.
13 Q. Sir, if I can direct your attention to Exhibit P 10542, which is
14 again in the last binder, binder 3, P 10542. This is an article in a
15 publication called Newsday, Washington
16 1997, in which you are one of the persons featured, being quoted and
17 referred to in the text of the article. Toward the bottom half of the
18 page there is this paragraph just to set the context here. It says:
19 "The Pentagon official" being referenced, "said Croatia
20 to bring ethnic Croat indictees before the Hague Tribunal.' The official
21 said that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman can 'make things happen' if
22 he seriously wants them to."
23 Then it goes back and makes a statement apparently attributed to
24 you: "The Croatian envoy also said his government will resist subpoenas
25 handed down by the Tribunal for internal documents connecting Tudjman and
1 his aides with the war waged in Bosnia
2 Now, do you recall taking the position, and in fact announcing to
3 this reporter that the Croatian government would resist turning over
4 documents to the Tribunal in connection with Tudjman's involvement in the
5 war in Bosnia
6 A. I don't recall and I cannot confirm whether or not I said this or
7 how I said it. It is correct, however, that the official policy of the
8 Croatian government at the time was not to hand over documents as I
9 understand it concerning events in Croatia, not events in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was merely implementing the official policy.
11 Q. I see. In fact, on that official policy if I can direct your
12 attention to Exhibit P 10556, also in the third binder -- oh, I'm sorry.
13 Are the interpreters -- excuse me, sorry.
14 There is an interpretation of this document. Sorry, Ms. Winner
15 is trying to help me out and doing a good job of it.
16 Sir, if you will look now at this exhibit, P 10556, this is a
17 report from Markica Rebic dated the 4th of June, 1998, to the president
18 of the Republic of Croatia
19 I would like to direct your attention, please, first of all, to page 28
20 of this report in the English version so that the courtroom can have the
21 fuller understanding of what this document is about.
22 On page 28, sir, in paragraph number 4 provides us with this
23 information: "In 1996, the HIS," and this was the intelligence agency
24 that you identified earlier today as the one that became headed by
25 Miroslav Tudjman at the end of 1992, "the HIS was assigned as the main
1 protagonist responsible for carrying out Operation The Hague on the level
2 of the Croatian government. This service corresponded to the HIS, that
3 is, the SIS in the department -- department of defence, I believe, OZRH,
4 Republic of Croatia
5 Going on to paragraph -- excuse me, on page 20 -- going back to
6 page 20, please, with that connection involved -- in mind. At the top of
7 page 20 this is reported to Franjo Tudjman by the intelligence service.
8 "On the basis of ICTY documents, which this Service has acquired
9 through intelligence methods and from reliable sources which have so far
10 proved to be correct, we propose that the ultimate objective of the
11 ICTY Prosecution is to link all indictments against Croats (Republic of
13 leadership, and the most prominent members of the RH leadership,
14 including the President of the Republic of Croatia
15 Below that the Chamber may see that the reports about certain
16 testimony given at the Tribunal. On page 34, top of page 34 numbered 4:
17 "The defence strategy shall rest on the crucial position of
18 non-involvement of the Republic of Croatia
19 Central Bosnia
20 conflict') ..."
21 And then as to Operation Storm, Oluja, the separate issue of the
22 ICTY's alleged lack of jurisdiction, and that's what is become known as
23 the Gotovina case.
24 Now, in that particular regard in connection with documents, sir,
25 and in connection with what you said implementing official policy to
1 resist turning over documents, in that context if I can next direct your
2 attention, please, to page 23 of the same report, top of page 23: "When
3 HVO archives became a serious problem in the course of preparation of
4 General Blaskic's defence, with respect to the substance of the subpoena
5 and ICTY's requests involving HVO officials, this Service, in cooperation
6 with the HIS, took action and measures to protect the HVO archives."
7 Now, sir, you said a few moments ago that you understood that you
8 were implementing official policy in resisting the production of
9 documents. Did you understand that policy to be consistent with what is
10 stated in this document -- this report that I just put in front of you,
11 is that the policy that you were implementing?
12 A. I have never seen this document before and I was not aware of its
13 contents or the policy it refers to. It's quite difficult to me to draw
14 conclusions from this particular viewpoint. There's a lot here I would
15 not agree with, but I never received instructions couched in the terms
16 presented here. It's correct that the policy which I knew of as an
17 ambassador and which I tried to justify as best I could was that at that
18 time the government considered that the Tribunal was -- did not have
19 jurisdiction concerning the events of -- following Operation Storm and
20 during Operation Storm. Whether there was a justified position or not,
21 I -- that was the position. I tried to expound to my collocutors and
22 some agreed with it and some did not. I am not sure, as regards other
23 matters, that the position was what is represented in this document. I
24 know that my instructions were always that we would, in fact, cooperate
25 fully with the Tribunal as regards Bosnia-Herzegovina. And from the
1 outset Croatia
2 pay lip service to that some of us but we actually supported the
4 Q. If we can go back, please, to P 10544, the Washington Post
5 article, and there again if we put it on the e-court on this document
6 we'll need the assistance of the interpreters, please.
7 In the second page of that article toward the bottom of the page
8 there is a paragraph that starts -- yes, it's on the screen now.
9 "Based on what Rivkin says were false assurances by officials in
10 the Tudjman government, he said that Hunton & Williams erroneously
11 claimed in legal filings that it had fully complied with Tribunal demands
12 for all documents related to the Ahmici atrocity."
13 And I'll note that that has nothing to do with Operation Storm.
14 "Shortly after taking office, however, the new government
15 revealed that it had uncovered several intelligence agency files that not
16 only named some of the Croatian militia members responsible for the
17 slayings, but also revealed that Tudjman's government provided false
18 identities and paid for homes where the men could hide from Tribunal
19 arrest warrants in a scenic village on the Adriatic coast."
20 Now, sir, did it ever come to your attention that at around the
21 time that you were saying it was the official policy not to produce
22 documents, that in fact subsequent to that these additional documents
23 became known and ultimately were turned over to the Tribunal?
24 A. Excuse me, I didn't quite understand your question. The official
25 policy that all the documents were handed over -- may I read this in
1 English? Sorry.
2 Q. Of course.
3 A. At that time with respect to quite a lot of the things you are
4 mentioning now, I was not aware of them and I don't know what is and what
5 is not correct. If you as the Prosecutor of this institution or if this
6 institution says that not all the documents which was subsequently handed
7 over were handed over, then I believe you because I believe this
8 institution far more than I believe Jeffrey Smith the journalist who
9 wrote this article and whom I know personally.
10 As regards your previous question, who were the extremists among
11 the Croats, one name I can give you is Jeffrey Smith. I know of some
12 other articles he wrote where he wrote all sorts of things starting from
13 certain political positions. Having said that, I am not saying that what
14 you say is not true. I do not know about it.
15 Q. Sir, I note that when it comes to talking about Mr. Jeffrey
16 Smith, a person -- non-Croat person not in Zagreb, you're suddenly quite
17 capable and willing to identify him as one of the extremists that you
18 wouldn't tell us about before. What is it about Mr. Smith that makes you
19 willing to identify him but not any of the others?
20 A. Mr. Smith is an American, if he's the person I'm thinking of, and
21 I assume he is, an American of Croatian origin, close to a circle of
22 Croats who hold relatively extreme political positions with whom, neither
23 as an ambassador nor later on as a minister or politician, I never had
24 close relations with them because they thought Croatian policy should be
25 different from what it was. Of course they had the right to their
1 opinion, and he expressed this opinion, if it's the same Jeffrey Smith,
2 in several articles in which inter alia, if I remember correctly, he
3 fiercely attacked the government I was part of for cooperating with the
4 Tribunal in another case, using different arguments but starting from the
5 starting point of a group which exists among Croats in America and I
6 believe elsewhere. That's why I wanted to mention him. I'm not even
7 saying it's the same Jeffrey Smith, but I assume it is.
8 Q. If we can go forward to another aspect of the report from
9 Mr. Rebic that was actually then touched on in part of the
10 Washington Post article that I just referred to and that is the
11 protection -- the giving of false identities and protection of men or
12 hiding on the Adriatic coast. If I can refer you back again to page 23
13 of Exhibit P 10556. Under the paragraph about the HVO archives is this
14 paragraph, and we do have a translation of this.
15 "This service established through counter-intelligence methods
16 the existence of seven other secret indictments against Croats in
17 Central Bosnia
18 information" --
19 JUDGE PRANDLER: Excuse me, Mr. Scott, I wonder which page?
20 MR. SCOTT: Page 23. I apologise, Judge Prandler. Page 23.
21 Q. "On several occasions it forwarded timely information on the
22 intention of SFOR members to arrest the individuals charged in secret
23 indictments, and to that end measures were taken to hide and protect
24 them. We are providing direct protection to four individuals from
25 Central Bosnia
1 protecting one individual, while the remaining two persons were informed
2 on time of their possible arrest."
3 Now, do you recall having any information at the time, sir, that
4 one of the persons being protected at this time, in 1996, was
5 Ivica Rajic?
6 A. No, I didn't have any information about that.
7 Q. Could I direct your attention, please, to Exhibit P 10539 in the
8 third binder, P 10539. Sir, this is a letter, again from you, in fact,
9 to the Washington Post, published a letter to the editor, on 11 November
10 1996 which you were apparently responding to certain -- an article
11 written concerning Mr. Ivica Rajic. We'll put that on the ELMO, please,
12 we made need the assistance of the interpreters, please.
13 You refer to in the second paragraph: "In his article, Mr. Dobbs
14 wrote that Ivica Rajic, who is wanted by the United Nations War Crimes
15 Tribunal was 'reportedly seen in a state-owned hotel' in Split
16 report apparently drawn from a report appearing in the Croatian weekly
17 Globus, is incorrect."
18 At the end of the paragraph: "Contrary to the media assertions,
19 the current movement or residence of Rajic remain unknown to Croatian
21 And I note the date of this -- your letter to the Washington Post
22 being 11 November 1996
23 Washington Post, sir?
24 A. Well, now that I see the letter, yes, I sent the letter.
25 Q. What kind of inquiries did you make of the Croatian government
1 prior to sending your letter to determine whether, in fact, your
2 government knew where Mr. Rajic was or not?
3 A. Mr. Prosecutor, as you are well aware I was a Croatian ambassador
4 at the time. Any ambassador may seek instructions and this is what they
5 often do, but no ambassador may conduct an inquiry into finding out
6 whether the information he received from the government or not.
7 Evidently, the Croatian government did -- was not able to know what was
8 correct here or not. I received information from the Croatian
9 government, on the basis of which I drafted the letter.
10 Was I supposed to mistrust the information I received from the
11 Croatian government? Was it true? I don't know. As I may have said, I
12 hold the author of this article, Mr. Michael Dobbs in high esteem, he's a
13 very good journalist and I can even say he's a very good friend. I wrote
14 a response on the basis of the information I received from my very own
15 government. I don't think any other ambassador would have done something
17 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may be allowed
18 one intervention that might help clear up the matter, I personally know a
19 great deal about this issue. I would like to clarify one point. This
20 particular paragraph says: "The current movement or residence of Rajic
21 remain unknown." And at the time the letter was drafted --
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Will you take an oath? It seems to me that you
23 are testifying now, Ms. Alaburic?
24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] No, no, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You're testifying without an oath?
1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I appeal to you to
2 hear me out. You will see that I'm not making a statement of any sort;
3 I'm merely drawing your attention to what is different in this paragraph
4 and what the Prosecutor has to tie up with. This article was published
5 in the Globus weekly at some point in time, it also says that a
6 photograph was published of a man who was supposed to be Rajic but was
7 not. It was a hotel staff. And then there follows this sentence: "...
8 the current movement ... of Mr. Rajic ..." is such and such. The time at
9 which this statement was given to the editorial office does not coincide
10 with the publishing of the Globus article, so that both the Globus
11 article and this particular letter could have been true. I'm merely
12 trying to point out that these refer to two different time-periods.
13 Thank you very much.
14 MR. SCOTT:
15 Q. Sir, if you will next direct your attention, please, to Exhibit
16 P 10546, P 10546, in binder 3. In a nutshell, sir, this is a letter from
17 the Republic of Croatia
18 1996, in which Ivica Rajic's employment with the minister of defence is
19 extended. If you look under "Decision" at the first paragraph above
20 "Statement of reasons."
21 "The service is being extended for a duration of six months to
22 carry out the same job duties starting on 30 December 1994 ..."
23 continuing on. This is dated the 17th of June, 1996, if my calculations
24 are correct, six months would have extended to at least the 17th of
25 December, 1996. So, sir, were you aware that when you reported that the
1 Croatian government did not know of Mr. Rajic's whereabouts or movements,
2 that at that very time he was employed and paid by the Croatian Ministry
3 of Defence?
4 A. Of course I wasn't aware of that and I don't know how I could
5 have been aware of that as an ambassador. I only knew what my government
6 informed me of. Whether somebody inside the system was aware of that I
7 don't know and I cannot testify to that. But most certainly, had I known
8 that this was not correct, I would not have written a letter such as this
9 one because the crucial sentence in the entire letter is at the end.
10 Q. Sir, I next want to turn to the topic of Mr. Ivo Komsic again,
11 whose name has come up several times in your testimony. You had a number
12 of contacts with Mr. Komsic in the negotiations, the peace negotiations,
13 in the latter part of 1993, early part of 1994; is that correct?
14 A. I had a number of contacts with -- with others I even had more
15 contacts so I can't define the significance of that, but most definitely
16 I contacted Mr. Komsic and he contacted me.
17 Q. I believe in your testimony on direct examination in reference to
18 the joint -- the document that was put before you at the time was a joint
19 declaration by Tudjman and Izetbegovic on the 14th of September, 1993
20 and that was Exhibit 1D, if I'm not mistaken, 1D 01535, we're not -- just
21 for the purposes of the record. I'm not going to open it. But the
22 persons who signed that document on the -- the persons who signed that
23 document, among others, included Mr. Komsic and I believe -- and yourself
24 on 14th of September, 1993. And I believe you testified at page 27788
25 that the persons who signed that document were among those persons having
1 the greatest political influence or impact in Bosnia-Herzegovina around
2 that time.
3 Do you remember giving that testimony?
4 A. Well, I don't know what it was that I exactly said. I did say
5 that the document was signed the way you described it. Perhaps I may
6 have referred to the greatest political influence, but I certainly did
7 not have Mr. Komsic in mind. I did say, and I can repeat it, that
8 Mr. Komsic helped bring the agreement about. I said before, and I
9 believe I repeated it today, that at the meeting preceding this one there
10 was Ambassador Biscevic and I on the one side, Mr. Silajdzic and
11 Mr. Komsic on the other side. I also said in my earlier evidence that
12 President Tudjman had certain reservations vis-a-vis the possibility of
13 Mr. Komsic representing the other side. After a lengthy conversation
14 with him, and if I can put it that way, my comments that this was the
15 express wish of the Muslim side and if this was the way in which we would
16 reach an agreement, it would be a good idea to agree to Mr. Komsic.
17 President Tudjman responded to that by saying, Very well, but then
18 Mr. Biscevic will be accompanying you.
19 Q. Sir, I think if you will remember back to a transcript that we
20 were looking at earlier, presidential transcript on record that we were
21 looking at earlier today and I believe at the end of the day yesterday,
22 it was a record for the 13th of February, 1994, and in that transcript
23 you made -- you and others made reference to the involvement of
24 Mr. Komsic in the negotiations in Geneva at that time. Do you remember
1 A. Do you mean the transcript from the meeting of the Presidency of
3 Q. Yes -- no, no, the Presidency of Croatia. The one that you
4 reported about and you gave -- made certain statements that the ICFY was
5 on its deathbed and you're reporting about the Washington developments
6 and it was a transcript of that meeting. I don't think in the interests
7 of time we need to pull out the transcript. Do you recall that?
8 A. Mm-hmm.
9 Q. Yes? All right. And --
10 A. I do remember that.
11 Q. And you mentioned in that record I believe, if I'm not mistaken,
12 around that same time you had involvements with Mr. Komsic that in fact
13 you reported, I think that's when there were discussions about whether it
14 was completely Mr. Komsic's proposal or not and then conversations with
15 Mr. Redman. Do you remember that?
16 A. Yes, I remember. I think that I said that Mr. Silajdzic had told
17 me that it was not only Komsic's proposal. I think that that's the way I
18 put it.
19 Q. Absolutely right. Absolutely correct.
20 Now, if I can ask you to go to Exhibit P 10403. I'm afraid, sir,
21 that I have to put one last book in front of you today, and to the best
22 of my knowledge, Your Honours, I'll tell you this is my last exhibit.
23 Mr. Komsic -- this Mr. Komsic wrote a book and actually it's been
24 listed and used in this case by both the Defence and Prosecution, various
25 excerpts, called: "Surviving a country" by Komsic. And there's a
1 chapter or portion of his book, if you haven't had a chance to read, I
2 guess I have to break the news to you which is titled: "Zuzul's
4 And you have Exhibit P 10403, Mr. Komsic is giving an account and
5 in this chapter it starts, in fact on 11th of February, 1994, so two or
6 three days prior to the presidential transcript meeting that we looked at
7 earlier today. He talks about being in Geneva and he talks about
8 Mr. Silajdzic, which seems to be consistent.
9 "Silajdzic insisted that there were no borders between the
10 Muslims and the Croats, the borders were an invention leading to war and
11 that everything was the consequence of Tudjman's obsession with getting
12 the former Banovina. Zuzul reacted and there was a heavy exchange of
13 words. (Granic left yesterday and took our plan to Zagreb). It was not
14 possible to have a proper dialogue after that."
15 Now, if I can direct your attention, please, to the last page of
16 this excerpt, on page 3, the top of the page, please.
17 "The conference increased the tension between the two
18 delegations, the HNV and Herceg-Bosna, both in Geneva."
19 Now, can we agree, sir, that the HNV is a reference to the
20 Croatian National Council, a body that had been formed in Sarajevo and
21 was another organization of Bosnian Croats that you spoke about earlier
22 today; is that right?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Mr. Komsic says that: "Zuzul invited me for a talk about this.
25 It was a very unpleasant and difficult conversation. He first tried to
1 tell me his personal views trying to give me some advice. When this did
2 not help and I stated the arguments that completely justified everything
3 that we had done and proposed, he told me the 'government' position. He
4 was clear and unambiguous, and in addition to mentioning high treason, he
5 threatened me. He warned me that 'they' had my family, who were in
6 Sisak, under control. I told him that I was not impressed by these
7 threats because they had tried to kill me before, my property was
8 confiscated and divided, an arrest warrant was issued for my son and they
9 were threatening me publicly and arrogantly on Croatian Television. I
10 reminded him of the appearance of Ignjac Kostroman on Croatian Radio
12 Do you recall, sir, having this conversation with Mr. Komsic
13 around the 11th of February, 1994?
14 A. The conversation, as is described here, is the sort of
15 conversation I've never had with anyone, including Mr. Komsic. I can't
16 remember and I can't make any claims about meeting up with him or not on
17 that day. I must say that I am scandalised by this. For instance, he
18 said that he left our premises in the United Nations building excited and
19 encouraged. I never had an office in the United Nations building, so to
20 say the least, he is lying about the venue of the meeting.
21 Allow me, Mr. Prosecutor, to put a logical question. Two days
22 after what happened an official record was made. Was there anything in
23 what was recorded as me having said that even remotely resembles what is
24 written by Mr. Komsic here? You have gone over the better part of my
25 career as a diplomat and not only as a diplomat. Did you ever come
1 across a situation where I threatened anyone, mentioned anyone's family,
2 or anything of the sort? Yesterday we had occasion to see the way
3 Mr. Komsic addressed at the --
4 Q. [Previous translation continues]... I'm not sure that you would
5 have necessarily reported that in the meeting in Zagreb, but perhaps you
6 would have. But be that as it may, sir, let me direct your attention to
7 the next paragraph.
8 "In the end, I told him that they did not have the right to
9 decide about our lives, our property, and our history, and we would not
10 become a national minority in order for a handful of Herzegovinians to
11 have their own state. I left their offices in the UN building, both
12 excited and encouraged. I finally realized that they were powerless.
13 Out of control, Zuzul said at one point, 'You got rid of Boban, but you
14 won't get rid of Tudjman.'"
15 Do you remember making that statement?
16 A. Of course I did not make it. A moment ago in my answer I told
17 you that Mr. Komsic was even lying about the venue of the meeting. What
18 were these offices of ours in the UN building that he was coming out of?
19 We never had anything of the sort. He was lying about the venue and
20 about everything else. Whoever knows me would find it inconceivable --
21 well, after all, I'm 185 centimetres tall and I have as many kilogrammes
22 as I have, and Mr. Komsic is a rather short, tiny person. Would I
23 threaten him? Nowhere in any of the texts will you find me advocating
24 any sort of an option that he suddenly seems to be claiming that I
25 espoused. These are just fabrications in the service of I do not know
1 whom, but they are not the truth. I have never said anything bad about
2 Mr. Komsic and I was always a minority in behaving thus, and that's why
3 all the more so am I surprised in seeing that he is putting these words
4 into my mouth that do not tally with my personality, with my political
5 views, and this event as described herein never occurred.
6 The same Mr. Komsic, as we had occasion to see in the transcript
7 from the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which I was unaware of until
8 yesterday, makes it his business to invent derogatory terms for his
9 compatriots, Croats, at the Assembly. So that's the sort of man he was,
10 and I was not aware of that until yesterday. Not even now that I know
11 this would I threaten him politically and even less so physically.
12 Your Honours, would I ever include in a threat somebody's family? The
13 family, to my mind, is something sacred, it comes before everything else,
14 and I am really shocked that anybody should wish to impute something of
15 the sort to me.
16 Q. Mr. Zuzul, I want to thank you for coming to The Hague and giving
17 your testimony and that concludes my examination.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
19 Mr. Karnavas, will we have re-direct tomorrow? Maybe you don't
20 have re-direct.
21 MR. KARNAVAS: This cross calls for no re-direct, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's good news. Nobody had
23 expected that.
24 Witness, on behalf of my fellow Judges I would like to thank you
25 for having come and testified here. It was lengthy but necessary because
1 both the Defence and the Prosecution needed to put questions to you. I
2 wish you and the family members accompanying you a safe trip back home.
3 Could Mr. Usher escort the witness back out of the courtroom.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]...
5 and Your Honours.
6 [The witness withdrew]
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you sent us the
8 schedule for after court recess. I think a witness is scheduled. I
9 don't believe he's been granted protective measures.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: The next witness, no, Your Honour, and I should
11 note, I should note, that after that witness we're still trying to make
12 arrangements to bring the -- Mr. Perkovic back to follow-up. We're
13 waiting to hear back. As soon as we hear back, we hope within the next
14 day or so, certainly before Friday, we will communicate that news. We
15 do -- Mr. Scott did approach me yesterday and I did give my assurances
16 that as soon as we know we will let everybody know so they could prepare
17 accordingly. So in any event, we might have an updated calendar for all
18 of you. That's it.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
20 As you well know, we shall re-convene after court recess. We
21 have a few minutes left, but I take this opportunity to wish everyone a
22 good rest. We have spent some three intense months, so I encourage you
23 all to take a good rest. We shall re-convene on Monday, August the 25th,
24 at quarter past 2.00. That's all. I need to leave, because in less than
25 25 minutes I'll be back in this courtroom.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.
2 to be reconvened on Monday, the 25th day of
3 August, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.